Truth About Muslim Population Explosion In India

Evidence From Census 2011

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For the Devas

Contents

Preface

Democracy is all about numbers, so if you have lost numbers, you have lost the game. Anyone with basic understanding of the democratic process and demography will understand the very important role demography plays in the election of democratic governments. Demography is important on its own but it is due to "one person, one vote" which makes demography even more important in a modern democratic society. And it should specially be remembered by those who have already seen a partition into two countries on religious lines.

Hindu population as a percentage of total Indian population and Hindu fertility vis-a-vis Muslims has been falling gradually ever since independence but specially after the announcement of family planning programs by the central and various state governments in the 1990s. This information is not new. But the extent to which it has fallen is an entirely different debate. The Census of 2011 showed that population of Dharmic religions has fallen from 87.2% in 1951 to 83.5% in 2011 (with Hindu population at 79.8% i.e. below 80%) while the Muslim population has risen from 10.4% in 1951 to 14.2% in 2011. On paper 14.2% looks like a small number but digging deeper into population data will reveal why this should send alarm bells ringing for the future of India.

The Congress led UPA government (perhaps deliber-

ately) did not release the religious data of 2011 census. Many people believed that the central government did not release the census data so as to not alarm the Hindus as their percentage had fallen for the first time below 80% in India which could have helped BJP in consolidating the Hindu vote. But even when BJP came to power in 2014 with an overwhelming majority, thanks to the Hindu vote consolidation, they did not release the census data on religious demographics until much later.

And as expected, the census data confirmed the fears of many pragmatists as the Hindu population fell below 80% in the Census 2011. In fact, as we will show during the course of this book, the situation on the ground is much worse than what most people in India are spoonfed to believe. While it is true that the total population of Hindus in India has fallen to 79.8% in 2011, but this only tells part of the story.

The real story is about the population of children in India where Hindus are much worse off, something that is cleverly masked by the aggregate population number. The aggregate statistics does not tell that Muslims were already 23% in the 0-4 age group in the urban areas in 2011, neither does it tell that they were just 14% in 50-54 age group, thus implying a huge change in demography. So Muslims population had an effective gain of 9% in a span of two generations separated by 50 years in the urban areas. In any country where partition happened on religious lines such information would be a point of everyday discussion, but it is almost censored in India.

Why is Demography important?

The very fact that this question of demography is being asked in this day and age in India points to the absolute

low to which Indian strategic thought and real-political awareness has fallen to. India is not a mono-religious, mono-cultural nation state to find this question stupid. India has already witnessed one partition along the religious lines in 1947, thanks to the religious sentiments of the then Muslims and their religious demography provided an overwhelming support for the demand of partition. At the time of partition, the population of undivided India was 74% Hindu and 26% Muslim in the 1941 census. It is important to highlight here that the Muslim League, the spearheading Muslim party behind partition, won majority of the seats reserved for Muslims in the elections of 1946, i.e. right before the partition.

Now, seven decades after partition, the demography of divided India is fast approaching the pre-partition demographic levels. So the possibility of a second partition, or a violent movement and long civil war prior to another partition is very much on the cards if the present trends continue where the so called secular parties keep playing the British role of divide and rule and appeasement (under the name of secularism) and BJP, the Hindu party of today, keep playing the role of the then Congress under Gandhi (in the name of true equality and true secularism).

One might ask the question why is this past and history so important? Haven't we already left behind the partition memories when India chose to become a multicultural secular nation, thus settling this debate in 1947 itself? The answer to this question is the fact that this kind of demographic change (as seen in India) and the resultant history is neither new nor one-off historical incident. It has occurred all over the world and many examples abound. A few examples are sufficient to clear the cob-webs in the minds of naive Hindus who have not put much thought into the demographic question- Que-

bec in Canada, Christian country of Lebanon vs Islamist Lebanon of today and finally not to forget the Bengal and Punjab of non-partitioned India.

Let's start with Quebec, which has nothing to do with Islam but everything to do with demographics. It is a province in Canada, which was originally a French colonial area, colonized by the French which they lost to the British in the Seven Years War. Even though it came under the British after the Seven years war, Quebec still had a large minority of French citizens who held on to their language and religion (largely Roman Catholic) as against the majority British (Anglican Church or Protestants).

Up until the 1960s the Quebecois Catholics had a large fertility gap with the rest of Canada.[1] This in turn slowly increased the influence of Francophone Catholics in the British polity and more and more support for Quebecois nationalism grew with the increase in their population. This issue was settled only when the Canadian government recognized Quebec as a separate nation within a united Canada (by granting various concessions). Of course, it is a simplistic analysis of Quebecois nationalism but one cannot disregard the demographic angle behind it.

So the French Catholics managed to carve out a state within a state essentially within Canada from a minority which was only 1/10th the size of the rest of Canada (Anglo-Saxon Protestant) when they were first incorporated in Canada as per the Seven Years War. Of course, this kind of semi-peaceful resolution in India is highly unlikely, as unlike Indian Muslims, French Catholics in Canada are largely civilized now and did not engage in violent conversion of the Anglo Saxon protestants within

[1] Catherine Krull, Fertility Change in Quebec:1931-1961

their domain, like how the Muslims converted the remaining Hindus in the post independence Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Lebanon, another example, is a country in the middle-east which was formerly under the Ottoman empire. It was once touted as the most peaceful middle eastern country and highlighted in the liberal media as the multi-cultural paradise. Lebanon was often paraded as a proof of the secular Islamic society, up until the internet came and blew that propaganda to pieces and showed Lebanon for the Islamist state that it is today. Lebanon conducted its last census under the French rule in 1932 and has since then shied away from the idea. The current power sharing mechanism between the three religious groups will be unable to survive the information in new census and can throw the nation once again into civil war.

What many do not know is that, even in the 18th century, Lebanon had a Christian majority. The Christians had a lower TFR on average vis-a-vis the Muslims and over time, the Muslim minority started changing the demography of the country, to the point that today, Lebanon is a Muslim majority country and Christians are now under the mercy of the Muslim ballots. Since the Shias and the Sunnis each form roughly half of the total Muslim population in Lebanon and generally hate each other more than they hate the Christians, the latter can still bide their time in Lebanon until their demography is completely eroded. But for how long, no one knows.

Another example is the United Punjab province in India which had Hindu/Sikh (Dharmic) majority up until the 1920s while united Bengal had Hindu majority up until the 1850s. This is something many Hindus do not know. The fact that demography in these provinces changed to Muslim majority by the time Jinnah arrived

was one of the most important reasons for the call for a separate country for Muslims in pre-independence India.

For examples from present, one can look within the Hindu majority India today. The places where Hindus are a minority deserve a special mention as they have become hostile to the native Dharmic population, whether it is Kashmir, Nagaland or Mizoram. Kashmir in particular saw Kashmiri Pandits being driven out of their homes by their own neighbours, the very same Muslim neighbours they had played with while growing up. While Jammu and Ladakh are Hindu and Buddhist majority respectively and are an integral part of India today and hardly pose a threat to India, Kashmir being Muslim majority is a place where no Hindu, not even the native Kashmiri Pandits could think of going back.

On the other side of the border, Pakistan although founded on the principle of religion also practised secularism (at least legally for some time post independence), which many in the left liberal circles conveniently forget. When Jinnah created Pakistan, he promised safety for the Hindus who stayed back, partially backed by the presence of British legal code which was adopted by the new nation. Of course, today it is a completely different story as the Hindus of Pakistan have been wiped out of existence in the former east Pakistan/Bangladesh, where Hindu population has fallen from 20% even in 1971 to 8% today. [2]

Also we should not forget to reiterate here that Muslims in the current Indian Union overwhelmingly voted for Pakistan during the 1946 general elections. So, any claim about their adherence to 'secularism' is a lie which

[2]States like Nagaland and Mizoram which have a Christian majority today are no different as they openly pursue Christian agenda with no pretense of secularism whatsoever, now that the demography has been completely won by the Christians.

will be shattered the moment any party on the lines of Muslim League appears on the horizon (of course riding on the back of Muslim demography).

History of course has a very unfortunate problem of repeating itself, specially given how little Islam has changed from its foundations in the 7th century, which is why learning from history is very important for the survival of any country or civilization under its attack. Can the liberals or the left even pretend that secularism is possible or that Hindus will have any rights under a Muslim majority India? Is there any strong reason to believe that the Hindus in India will not suffer the same fate as the former Hindus in Pakistan or Bangladesh?

These very few examples are sufficient to drill home the message of importance of demography, but the leftist intelligentsia is quick to dismiss any concern whatsoever about the changing demographics of India. These excuses are designed depending on the information set possessed by the debater.

The first excuse is the complete denial of the extent of demographic change. In this case, the liberal intellectuals try to show how it will take more than two centuries for the Muslims to take over the country demographically. Any person who claims otherwise is claimed a Sanghi and hence his opinions mocked, reputation soiled and arguments thrown into the dustbin. If the first excuse fails they resort to outright naive solutions and argue that high Muslim population will cause no problem. The number of riots, both before and after the partition, are completely ignored without even an acknowledgement of the importance of demography. In the third and extreme case, where they might accept the problem, they pretend to solve it by educating the Muslims to end their extra-territorial loyalty to Ummah. But states like Kerala with high Muslim TFR prove this strategy to

be outright flawed as the highly educated Muslims there have systematically out-bred all other communities, thus puncturing the education is the best anti-dote and Muslim population surge is a temporary phenomenon narrative. If the rest of the country follows this Kerala model, it will become Muslims majority sooner rather than later.

Structure of book

Given the immense propaganda and misinformation surrounding the demography, this book aims at dispelling all the myths created by the liberal intelligentsia on Muslim population growth in India. The results presented here are based on the Population Census of 2011, done by the Government of India and based on real world statistics.

This book will serves as an informative eye opener and documents the extent of demographic changes in contemporary India against the myths peddled by the liberal intellectuals, who do not want the average Hindu to wake up from his deep slumber.

The book is divided into several parts as described below.

- Introduction: It gives a broad overview of the changes in demography in the world and the Indian subcontinent during the past 100 years. It also partially dispels the myth of no Muslim population explosion.

- The Explosion: This chapter shows the extent of demographic change in current India using data from Census 2011 and provides innovative way to gauge information about the future by looking at different generations. The results here show the extent of explosion of Muslim population in various

regions of the country. We have extensively utilized maps to present the demographic picture of different states and regions of India.

- Future Projections: This chapter presents the latest trends in fertility for Hindus and Muslims. Based on fertility trends and current population levels we make future population projections under various scenarios. Most importantly, we also destroy the myth that one should not worry about Muslim population growth since the Muslim fertility has been declining in the last few decades.

- TFR Politics: In this chapter, we analyze the reasons behind decrease in Hindu share in total population. The reasons vary from government policy on sterilization and population control to evils within the Hindu society like female foeticide, not to mention the general Hindu apathy towards maintaining demographic superiority.

- Conclusion: This section provides future course of action and concludes the discussion.

Although it will be interesting to present data on other religions as well but this book will stick to presenting the information primarily on Hindus and Muslims. While there is a booming Christian population, thanks to the conversion mafia, it is not as big a security challenge as the increase in Muslim population in the near future. Also it is difficult to gauge the true extent of Christianity as a lot of Christian converts belong to the lower castes and tribes and will lose various social benefits post conversion if their new identity is revealed. Since it makes sense for the neo-converts to mask their identity and not get identified in the census data, it is

more difficult to get the complete picture of the growth of Christian community in India.

Thus, this book focuses only on disseminating the information on Muslim population in India. Including details on other religions like Christianity would dilute the main message in this book, which is about the surge in Muslim population. So, although Christian numbers are presented in some sections of this book but not much time is spent on explaining them.

There are two main data sources used for the analysis in this book. The first primary source of data has been taken from the population census done by the Government of India in 2011. For most of the analysis we have used the total population numbers of each religion reported at the district level. These district level religion statistics can then be further disaggregated by age, sex and rural-urban status.

For the aggregate statistics on the past population, we have used information from various other sources and primarily from Centre for Policy Studies (henceforth CPS). We have tried to provide historical data, wherever it adds to the overall understanding of the situation. The source for external material is quoted in the footnotes. But most of the population analysis in this book is driven by the information present in the latest Census 2011. Although the overall population numbers from previous census are interesting but they still do not reveal the true picture about the future of Muslim population.

This forms the core of the book as it reflects the innovative methods used for future prediction, something not often used by the demographic experts (due to being unaware or explicit bias against Hindus) reporting on India. The bulk of chapter 2 and some parts of chapter 3 are based on 2011 Census data.

Apart from the population data, we have also used in-

formation from National Family Health Survey 3 (NFHS-3) to calculate fertility levels and other important characteristics among the different population groups. Some information is used from the past NFHS waves or from the latest round of NFHS-4, but most of the results are prepared using raw data from NFHS-3 wave done in 2005-06. The latest round of raw data was not publicly available when we compiled the results of this book and hence we stick to the past survey (although the results will not change much even with new survey). This data is used to get results presented in chapter 3 and 4. Unlike the 2011 Census, NFHS does not cover whole population but is a representative survey for India.

If a table or figure does not mention data, it is from Census 2011 or NFHS-3 depending on whether it is population data or survey. We mention Census 2011 or NFHS-3 wherever possible, though it might be removed in some cases to avoid redundancy. In all other cases when external information is used, its source is mentioned in the footnote or at the end in references.

Note: We have taken utmost care to map the districts correctly between 2011 census and the mapping software. But it is possible that some districts are not matched correctly due to difference in the total number of districts due to addition of new districts in the Census 2011. We try to mention the cases where the maps do not reflect the population figures for these new districts. In case you come across any such errors please email us.

Target Audience

The book is fairly heavy on maps and tables. It is primarily written for mass consumption and not just for academic discussion. Hence, we have tried to walk on

a tight rope as it is fairly difficult to balance these two objectives.

In order to accomplish the first objective we have used visual aid wherever possible. This also means a lot of information is packed in the maps, which does not necessarily gets repeated in the text unless very important. The accompanying website for the book provides visual aids like videos and more maps to understand the demographic changes. The readers are advised to peruse the website for more information as well as to introduce the work to others.

At the same time, in the genuine interest of scholarship we have also provided legitimate references wherever possible. But to ensure readability, in case if explanations do not add to the understanding of the topic at hand, weskipped and technical details as well as the references. In case of any doubts or clarifications, please feel free to contact the authors.

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Introduction

> *"Pakistan and Bangladesh are their fixed deposits. Those are Islamic states, no one can lay claim on them. India is a joint account, plunder it as much as you please.*[1] *"*
>
> – Siva Prasad Roy

The liberal discourse in India hates to talk about the increasing Muslim numbers in India and if any evil RSS/BJP leader mentions it by mistake, it takes the whole liberal world by storm. What follows next are apologies and some number crunching exercises to prove the insignificant size of Muslim population in India and how Indian demographics cannot be altered in the near future. The entire number crunching exercise is to highlight that India is safe from the Muslim fertility bomb and that even if the current fertility trends continue it would take forever i.e. at least 2250 AD (not too far if you think from a civilizational context!) for Muslims to make Hindus minority(<50%) in India. The next step after this number crunching exercise is to then give out the disclaimer that given rising prosperity in India the

[1] Sita Ram Goel, Muslim Separatism

fertility will decline for both Muslims as well as Hindus. What such disclaimers forget to mention is that- Muslim women will continue to pop out one more kid than their Hindu sisters, whether the latter's TFR (total fertility rate) is 2 or 4.

This whole number crunching exercise actually goes completely against the liberal agenda if you look at it closely. Instead of proving that Muslims are insignificant in India, the standard liberal argument should follow the current European template- "Diversity is good for the nation and since India is a plural country, Hindus should stop claiming it exclusively for themselves. Indians love Biryani as much as they love Halwa, so there should be no problem even if Muslims becomes majority i.e. more than 50%." But like every other nascent western fad and ideology this argument might take a few decades to get mainstreamed in India, at least among the folks brainwashed by secular education.

However, under current situation and having suffered one partition based on religious fault lines, this argument would be unpalatable even for the dumbest and most secular Hindu. Even the most secular Hindu knows what happens to minorities in a Muslim majority country (only that they do not how far they are down this road). A quick look at their neighbours like Pakistan and Bangladesh is sufficient to give them a glimpse about their future under a Muslim majority. Since it is difficult to sell usefulness of excess Biryani, this explains why the liberal commentators prefer to fool gullible Hindus by number crunching instead. Hence, statistics is used to prove how the fascist Hindu Organizations are wrong about the Muslim fertility bomb and that there is no way in which the Muslims can take over India in the next 200 years. 200 years is not too long in the civilizational context but sufficient enough to put the gullible

Hindu to sleep and go with earning his daily bread.

But those who are not gullible very well understand how bogus these number crunching exercises are. Firstly, Muslims do not have to attain 50% population to enforce their agenda. Given their deep belief in Islam and commitment to resort to violence to enforce it, their nuisance value increases exponentially with their actual numbers. After all, the Muslims were below 30% at the time of partition in 1947. Secondly, the population explosion is much higher and hidden well under the statistics presented to the local populace. If it were so insignificant, why did the Government of India take so long to come out with the religious demographics in 2011 census. Even the Hindu fascist government under NDA took a long time before releasing these statistics.

1.1 Religion in the Indian Subcontinent

The share of Dharmics (Hindus and other local non-Abrahamic faiths) have been falling in the Indian subcontinent ever since the British first started enumerating the population census in 1881. The share of Dharmics in India in each census since 1881 are presented in the table 1.1[2].

The population of Dharmics has fallen from about 79% in 1881 to 67% in 2011. During the course of these 130 years, the Dharmic population grew almost five times from 20 crores in 1981 census to 100 crores in 2011. In

[2]Unlike India which conducts census every ten years, the census from Pakistan and Bangladesh are not regular and hence adjusted figures are reported here as calculated by Centre for Policy Studies. For details see CPS.

Year	Population (millions)				Percentage		
	Total	Dharmic	Muslim	Christian	Dharmic	Muslim	Christian
1881	250	198	49	1.7	79.32	19.97	0.71
1891	279	220	57	2.1	78.81	20.41	0.77
1901	283	218	62	2.7	77.14	21.88	0.98
1911	303	231	67	3.7	76.40	22.39	1.21
1921	305	230	71	4.5	75.30	23.23	1.47
1931	337	252	79	5.9	74.75	23.49	1.77
1941	388	287	94	7.4	73.81	24.28	1.91
1951	443	325	108	9.0	73.47	24.49	2.04
1961	540	392	136	11.5	72.70	25.17	2.13
1971	678	483	179	15.3	71.27	26.48	2.26
1981	853	599	236	18.2	70.19	27.67	2.14
1991	1,068	734	312	21.7	68.74	29.22	2.03
2001	1,293	881	385	26.7	68.13	29.80	2.07
2011	1,528	1,027	470	31.0	67.22	30.75	2.03

Table 1.1: Population in the Indian Subcontinent (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh)

contrast, the Muslim population jumped from 5 crores to 47 crores, i.e. more than nine times.

While in terms of percentage points the fall in Hindu share has only been 12 points, but in terms of growth rate of total population, the Muslims (nine times) have shown almost double the growth as compared to Hindus (five times). Since population growth is exponential these numbers are really spectacular since Muslims started out with one-fourth the population of Hindus in 1881, but still managed to decrease the share of Hindu population, pointing towards the big fertility gap that has existed between these two religious groups.

The Hindus lost roughly six percentage points from 1881-1951 i.e. the first 70 years and another six between 1951-2011 i.e. the last 60 years. The drop has been much faster in the last six decades mainly on account of lower growth rate of Hindu population as compared to the Muslims.

To understand the evolution of demographics in the subcontinent since independence, we need to look at table 1.2 which gives breakup of population by religion in the subcontinent for the three countries of Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. It also gives the important picture on how minorities have been treated by Hindus and Muslims since 1947 under India and Pakistan-Bangladesh respectively.

On the one hand are the two Islamic nations, which were majority Muslim in 1951 and have since then wiped out the remaining traces of minority Hindus in their fiefdoms. The Hindu population in Pakistan has been below 2% since 1951, while it has fallen from 23% to 9% in the last 70 years in Bangladesh. On the other hand, Muslims have grown stronger in India from 10.5% in 1951 to 14.2% in 2011. It should come as a surprise for the liberals that Hindus in Pakistan-Bangladesh have reduced and almost disappeared under the peaceful Muslims, while under the fascist Hindus in India the Muslims added 3.5 percentage points!

If we look at the absolute numbers, the picture becomes much more clear. While the Hindus in India grew by roughly 3.3 times during this time to increase their number from 31 crore to 100 crore, the Muslims have grown more than 4 times in all these countries. The most spectacular growth story is of the Muslims of India who grew by 4.6 times during this time, even higher than Pakistan and Bangladesh, the two countries that were formed for them in 1947. So, not only Muslims got a separate country in 1947, they also multiply faster in secular India.

Compare the situation of Muslims in India to the Hindus in Bangladesh, who grew by less than 1.5 times during this time. This silent disappearance of Hindus in Bangladesh is the least highlighted and ugliest chapter

Year	Population (,000)				Percentage (%)		
	Total	Dharmic	Muslim	Christian	Dharmic	Muslim	Christian
Pakistan							
1951	33,703	538	32,732	433	1.60	97.12	1.28
1961	42,880	630	41,666	584	1.47	97.17	1.36
1972	62,462	1,119	60,435	908	1.79	96.75	1.45
1981	84,254	1,389	81,554	1,310	1.65	96.80	1.56
1998	132,352	2,540	127,720	2,093	1.92	96.50	1.58
Bangladesh							
1951	41,933	9,599	32,227	107	22.89	76.85	0.26
1961	50,840	9,801	40,890	149	19.28	80.43	0.29
1974	71,478	10,223	61,039	216	14.30	85.40	0.30
1981	87,120	11,358	75,487	275	13.04	86.65	0.32
1991	106,315	12,088	93,881	346	11.37	88.30	0.33
2001	123,851	12,415	111,079	357	10.02	89.69	0.29
2011	144,044	13,392	130,205	447	9.30	90.39	0.31
India							
1951	361,088	314,934	37,728	8,425	87.22	10.45	2.33
1961	439,235	381,565	46,940	10,729	86.87	10.69	2.44
1971	548,160	472,516	61,418	14,225	86.2	11.2	2.60
1981	683,329	586,336	80,293	16,700	85.81	11.75	2.44
1991	846,421	720,031	106,737	19,654	85.07	12.61	2.32
2001	1,028,737	866,349	138,188	24,200	84.21	13.43	2.35
2011	1,210,855	1,010,790	172,245	27,820	83.48	14.23	2.30

Table 1.2: Religious demographics in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India

of demographics in the history of Indian subcontinent. To any independent observer, it should hit as a shock why such a big demographic loss of Hindus in Bangladesh did not (or does not) make any headlines in the international or domestic media while random incidents against minorities in India get front page coverage everywhere. The growth in Muslim population in India alone should be sufficient to put to rest any questions about the space offered to Muslims in India. While hue and cry is raised over stray incidents against Muslims in India, the genocide of Hindus in Bangladesh (before, during and after the 1971 war) completely passes under the radar.

And although Bangladesh is touted as a democracy

and less anti-Hindu than Pakistan, this disappearance of Hindus from Bangladesh should shock you even more about the realities of living under a Muslim majority. The disappearance of Hindus in Bangladesh is yet another tale of disappearance of other religions from a country once it attains Muslim majority, something that has been observed repeatedly from Egypt to Lebanon.

1.2 Partition-1947

A nation which does not learn from history keeps repeating the same mistakes. The history about the horrors of partition has been whitewashed and the new generation is kept in dark about it. While every country tries to remind its future population about the past horrors by keeping it alive through culture- art, media and museums, the Indian state has used a reverse policy to downplay the atrocities of the partition.

There can be a thousand explanations which can be given for the partition of India ranging from British conspiracy or communalism practiced by the then Muslim League, the dominant Muslim party in pre-partition era. But at the back of all explanations and logical gymnastics lie the cold fact that British India had a large Muslim population and the sentiment of a pure Islamic land got overwhelming support among the Muslims of that time.

The below table 1.3 [3] shows the Muslim population figures from 1941 census, the last census before the partition, according to which the Muslim population was 26.9% of the then total Indian population. Out of the then provinces Baluchistan, NWFP, Sind, Bengal and Punjab, had Muslim majority. Out of these five, the first

[3]Table reproduced from Ambedkar, "Pakistan or Partition of India", 1945

State	Population (,000)		Muslim
	Total	Muslim	Percentage
1. Ajmere-Merwara	583	89	15.4
2. Andaman Nicobar	33	8	23.7
3. Assam	10,204	3,442	33.7
4. British Baluchistan	501	438	87.5
5. Bengal	60,306	33,005	54.7
6. Bihar *	36,340	4,716	12.9
7. Bombay	20,849	1,920	9.2
8. Central Provinces & Berar +	16,813	783	4.7
9. Coorg	168	14	8.8
10. Delhi	917	304	33.2
11. Madras	49,341	3,896	7.9
12. N.W.F.P.	3,038	2,788	91.8
13. Orissa	8,728	146	1.7
14. Punjab	28,418	16,217	57.0
15. Panth Piploda	5	0.2	4.8
16. Sind	4,229	3,054	72.2
17. United Provinces @	55,020	8,416	15.3
Total	295,502	79,344	26.9
* Bihar	28,823	4,168	14.4
Chota Nagpur	7,516	547	7.3
+ C.P.	13,208	448	3.4
@ Agra	40,903	6,231	15.2
Oudh	14,114	2,185	15.5

Table 1.3: Population figures from Census 1941

three provinces completely went to Pakistan, while the latter two were divided between India and Pakistan.

Entire books have been written on the subject of partition of India but we think that the above table gives a good snapshot into the politics of that time. Any political idea or platform requires the backup of a suitable demography, which in the case of partition was provided by Muslim population to the Muslim League. While the British could have fanned the communal hatred but without the support of a large section of population, the project for creation of new homeland based on religion

would have been a non-starter.

While the Muslim population percentage in undivided Punjab and Bengal was 57.0% and 54.7% respectively, the parts that went to West Pakistan and East Pakistan (Bangladesh) had 78.8% and 70.2% share of Muslims in 1941. The statistics for the regions which became west and east Pakistan are given in table 1.4. Both the regions saw an increase in the total Muslim population numbers between 1901-1941. While Pakistan saw decrease in Muslim Population from 83.88% to 79.82% between 1901 and 1941, Bangladesh saw an increase from 66% to 70%.

The surprising result (decrease in Muslim Population) in case of Pakistan is accounted for by the increase in number of Sikhs, who grew by 5.63 times during this time (not shown in the table). Some authors have argued that the Sikh population during this time grew riding on the improved irrigation facilities, which allowed for better harvest thus in turn allowing for supporting bigger families. Though the Hindu population decreased during this time, but the increase in Sikh population decreased the overall Muslim share in the pre-partition west Pakistan.

The conclusion from the above two tables is that the secessionist demand for a new nation based on religion started rising even when Muslims were less than 25% of the then total population. Of course, the important point to note here is that when population of Muslims reached 25%, there was enough geographic variation to guarantee that some regions had Muslim population above 50% and these were the regions which spearheaded the demand for a new Islamic nation devoid of any kaffirs.

So the important question which these statistics raise is for those who chant that *"demography does not matter"*. A country which has already seen a partition on religious lines cannot afford to overlook such an important historical incident. Equally worrying is the intellectual

Year	Population (,000)			Percentage (%)	
	Total	Dharmic	Muslim	Dharmic	Muslim
Pakistan (1901-1941)					
1901	16,577	2,641	13,904	15.93	83.88
1911	19,381	2,898	16,364	14.95	84.43
1921	21,108	3,274	17,620	15.51	83.48
1931	23,541	4,427	18,757	18.81	79.68
1941	28,282	5,568	22,293	19.69	78.82
Bangladesh (1901-1941)					
1901	28,927	9,814	19,113	33.93	66.07
1911	31,555	10,353	21,202	32.81	67.19
1921	33,254	10,608	22,646	31.90	68.10
1931	35,604	10,812	24,731	30.37	69.46
1941	41,999	12,437	29,509	29.61	70.26

Table 1.4: Religious demographics in pre-partition Pakistan and Bangladesh

environment which suppresses any talk on demography where any concerns regarding big jump in Muslim population percentage are completely brushed aside as figment of imagination.

While Muslims might not reach 50% of the Indian population in the next few decades but there would be enough regions with greater than 50% Muslim population. Given the history of partition these regions which will have similar demographics to Bengal and Punjab of pre-partition India are the regions one should worry about.

Also, India as a nation state has not proved any better than the British in handling communal flareups as it is amply demonstrated by the large number of riots in post-partition India as well as how the Kashmiri Pandits were expelled by the Muslim majority region of Kashmir in the 90s. And government after government, both

in the centre and J&K, have failed to rehabilitate the Kashmiri Pandits and give them natural justice. If the pusillanimous response of the Indian republic in the past is a benchmark, then Hindus will have a very hard time in the regions where they become a minority as the Indian state would not come to their rescue.

1.3 India since independence

Before we deep dive into the census 2011 figures, it is important to take a stock of the population numbers as reported in the past censuses conducted by Government of India. These are the figures quoted everywhere and are normally used to dissuade the general public from paying attention to the Muslim fertility bomb.

Year	Dharmics		Muslims	
	Total(%)	Change	Total(%)	Change
1951	87.22	–	10.45	–
1961	86.87	-0.35	10.69	0.24
1971	86.20	-0.67	11.20	0.51
1981	85.81	-0.39	11.75	0.55
1981	85.07	-0.74	12.61	0.86
2001	84.21	-0.86	13.43	0.82
2011	83.48	-0.73	14.23	0.80

Table 1.5: Religious population in different census

The Muslim and Dharmic population change over the decades is shown in table 1.5 [4]. While the percentage point change for Muslims was around 0.5 in the initial decades, it has increased to around 0.8 in the last

[4] Source: Centre for Policy Studies (CPS)

three decades and totalling up to roughly four percentage points gain in the seven decades post independence.

This increase in Muslims has been at the cost of decrease in population of Dharmics which has come down from 87.2% to 83.5% during the same time. Although to a normal observer this might look like only a 3.7 percentage point loss, but given the exponential nature of population growth and high base population of Hindus to begin with, this is a big erosion. It is something that we will clearly explain in the latter chapters of the book.

But does this 3.7 percentage point decrease reflect the full picture of Muslim population explosion? No. And to answer why that is the case, we will look at the census figures from 2011 and explain in the next section.

1.4 Numbers can hide reality

While the total population is a good metric but it hides more than it reveals. The future of any region is determined by the next generation and not the current overall population numbers. Since population projection might require one to make too many assumptions, a better way to gauge the future is to look at the percentage share of each religion in the number of young adherents.

The importance of demography in a democracy cannot be overstated. Mulayam and Mayawati with less than 20% core voters are able to come to power in UP and dominate the agenda in a first past the post democratic system. Keeping this cutoff in mind, we will look at 0-4 year population cohort of Muslims in 2011 census and identify districts where this share has changed rapidly. These same kids will reach voting age in less than two decades and alter how we view politics.

The 2011 census reports the population in each age

group, so we can gauge the extent of future Muslim population by looking at these different age cohorts. The share of Hindus and Muslims in different age cohorts is given in table 1.6. This table 1.6 also presents the crux of the book as it shows the extent to which Muslim share has already risen in the lower age cohorts. The overall population numbers hide this huge increase in Muslim population share in the lower age cohorts.

Age Group	Muslims			Hindus
	Urban	Rural	Total	Total
0-4	22.88	15.20	17.23	77.41
5-9	22.65	14.90	16.92	77.87
10-14	21.75	14.09	16.16	78.45
15-19	21.31	13.47	15.85	78.38
20-24	19.47	12.62	14.93	79.07
25-29	17.38	11.78	13.73	80.26
30-34	16.40	11.24	13.03	80.97
35-39	16.07	11.06	12.77	81.21
40-44	15.27	10.70	12.27	81.33
45-49	14.42	10.25	11.70	81.64
50-54	13.81	10.08	11.37	81.79
55-59	13.48	9.76	11.02	82.1
60-64	14.43	9.70	11.13	82.13
65-69	14.13	9.18	10.59	82.56
70-74	13.68	9.00	10.32	82.89
75-79	11.87	8.47	9.52	82.75
80+	13.52	9.41	10.65	81.6
All ages	18.23	12.41	14.23	79.8

Table 1.6: Population by age group (Census 2011)

Before we look at table 1.6 for analysis, some clarifications are in order. During the course of this book, we

will use the same two age cohorts repeatedly, 50-54 years and 0-4 years. Firstly, looking at younger cohorts allows us to directly gauge the population changes that will take place in the future. It does not require too many assumptions like one needs in population forecasting models. So, 50-54 age cohort act as a base to compare the young 0-4 age group. Secondly, the newly born today will form the youth of tomorrow and will influence the policies as well as show muscle on the street. The 50+ year old generation will not do political rallies or put shops on fire. It is the youth who will control future and the share of 0-4 year age cohort captures the youth who will be active 25 years down the line. Thirdly, using 50-54 year cohort as a reference against 0-4 year cohort also allows us to be free of any biases which might arise due to big difference in two religious groups in terms of life cycle decisions or average age. The older generation can live longer depending on care or medicine usage etc[5]. There are slight differences in pre-natal care and early childhood survival rate of Hindus and Muslims, but we cannot gauge if such differences were present when the 50-54 year group was growing up. So, we choose 50-54 age cohort as it allows us to compare population across 50 years (today's 50-54 year old were 0-4 year old 50 years ago), without suffering any biases which might come due to longevity difference between the two groups.[6]

Now, lets go back to analyzing the table 1.6. As one

[5] A larger share of Muslims live in urban areas and thus can live longer due to better medical facilities

[6] Actually Muslims have lower infant mortality as compared to Hindus. According to NFHS-3, 6.53% Hindu children die between 0-4, as compared to 5.82% Muslim children. Reference: Guillot and Allendorf (2009). So, actually share of Muslims will only grow when they grow older as a larger percentage of Hindu kids will die during childhood compared to their Muslim counterparts.

can see, the percentage of Hindus has fallen from roughly 82% in the 50-54 age cohort to around 77.5% in the 0-4 age cohort. This is an erosion of 5.5 percentage points in 50 years i.e. in roughly two generations if you consider one generation to be 25 years. The share of Muslims jumped from 11% to 17% i.e. a 6 percentage point increase. This is more than 50% increase in Muslim share in just two generations.

Compare this now to the earlier table about overall Muslim population numbers. **If you look at table 1.5, the increase in Muslim share from 1971-2011 (two Censuses separated by 50 years) is from 11.2% to 14.2% i.e. only 3 percentage points, while if you look at cohort numbers in table 1.6, the increase is 6 percentage point across two generations separated by 50 years**. Thus one should not be surprised why Islam apologists prefer to quote overall population numbers and thus a small increase of 3 percentage points instead of looking at the cohort size from Census 2011 and quote a tremendous 6 percentage point increase in the Muslim share.

The numbers appear even more striking if instead of looking at cohort of 50-54 years, we look at 25-29 year cohort as a reference base. The jump is from 13.7% to 17.2% i.e. 3.5 percentage points in just 25 years. So, the Muslim share has increased more rapidly in the last 25 years (3.5%) than the one before that (2.5%).

It is also interesting to see this change in demography by rural and urban areas. The Muslim population growth looks even more phenomenal in the urban areas, which have higher concentration of Muslims in general. The urban Muslim population share went from 13.8% to 22.9% i.e. 9 percentage point gains between the two cohorts separated by 50 years (out of which 5.5 percentage points were added in last 25 years). This means that the



Figure 1.1: Muslim Population share across age groups (Census 2011)

Muslims almost form one quarter of the 0-4 year olds in the urban areas.

To give a complete idea of this trend we have plotted Muslim population share in India by different age cohorts in figure 1.1. The figure shows the big jump around 20-24 age group, when the urban Muslim share jumped sharply. Although the rural population share also shows a similar jump but it is not as significant as the urban one.

Since this jump happened for the age cohort of 20-24, it corresponds to those born between 1986-1991. While the Muslims population share had been growing even before but what caused this sudden change? One of the probable explanations for this break could be sharp increase in fertility gap between Hindus and Muslims during this time specially in the urban areas. Only an increase in fertility gap between the two religious groups could explain such a big change in the trend from one cohort to the other. This is a topic we would later explore in detail.

To summarize, looking at the age wise breakup of different religions presents the true picture of the current demography in India. The changes are almost double the size in cohort analysis, something that is masked by the overall population numbers. What makes it worse is that this is not population projection but was the state of demography seven years ago i.e. in 2011 and since then a lot of water has flown under the bridge.

2

The Explosion

"The future belongs to those who show up."
– Mark Steyn

The last chapter gave a snapshot about the overall growth in Muslim population share in India. Now it is time to look deeper and identify the regions which have seen the maximum explosion in Muslim population. These geographical regions are going to be the hotspots of Islamic fundamentalism in the near future and challenge the hegemony of Kashmir being the only Islamic underbelly of India.

This chapter will put to rest the theory of insignificant Muslim population growth in India by laying threadbare the population numbers by each region and cohort. Given the large difference in Muslim population geographically, it is easy to hide Muslim growth trends using statistics. But before we get there we should know how does this statistical chicanery actually work?

The first step is to quote the aggregate population numbers for whole India. Since India is huge and Muslims still form roughly 14% of the total population, it is assumed that once lulled into complacency by the 14%

number, a lay Hindu would not argue further. Secondly, if the person involved knows a bit more about demography and points towards the unequal population growth of Muslims in specific states, his arguments are brushed aside as the overall Muslim population percentage in these Muslim heavy states is still below 30%. In this way, the doomsday scenario is pushed back by 100-200 years depending on the mood of the statistician. But in this chapter we will show why this second attempt is also a failure as the 2011 census provides much more information through its cohort wise data.

2.1 India level trends

The last chapter presented the details on how Muslim population share has climbed up to 22% in the case of 0-4 year cohort living in urban areas. This is 7% percentage points higher that their share in 50-54 year cohort i.e. just two generations ago. But these are aggregate statistics and hide local pockets of Muslim dominance. So, how does Muslim numbers look like at a disaggregated level?

The spatial population distribution for Muslims for the two age cohorts is shown in figure 2.1 and 2.2. These two maps show Muslim population shares at the district level. For the course of this chapter, we will stick to six colour codes to show the Muslim population percentage:

- <10% - white
- 10-20% - light green
- 20-30% - green
- 30-40% - dark green

State	Total			Urban		
	0-4	50-54	All Ages	0-4	50-54	All Ages
ANDAMAN & NICOBAR	8.71	8.65	8.52	12.30	12.32	12.05
ANDHRA PRADESH	11.41	7.96	9.56	22.77	15.14	18.58
ARUNACHAL PRADESH	1.95	1.76	1.95	5.31	4.46	4.59
ASSAM	45.00	27.32	34.22	24.95	13.90	18.24
BIHAR	18.70	15.20	16.87	23.29	16.75	20.08
CHANDIGARH	6.35	2.52	4.87	6.38	2.52	4.88
CHHATTISGARH	1.94	1.89	2.02	6.45	5.37	6.04
D & N HAVELI	3.70	3.53	3.76	6.52	5.93	5.91
DAMAN & DIU	8.86	8.14	7.92	10.50	10.04	9.10
GOA	11.78	5.67	8.33	15.54	7.68	11.15
GUJARAT	10.78	8.40	9.67	18.03	12.26	14.75
HARYANA	11.51	4.23	7.03	5.84	2.21	4.03
HIMACHAL PRADESH	2.92	1.61	2.18	4.04	2.19	3.19
JAMMU & KASHMIR	76.78	63.78	68.31	75.24	59.69	64.40
JHARKHAND	16.95	11.73	14.53	20.04	13.39	16.99
KARNATAKA	15.74	10.22	12.92	26.76	16.71	21.20
KERALA	37.32	19.30	26.56	40.65	21.14	29.00
LAKSHADWEEP	99.11	94.85	96.58	99.03	94.12	96.36
MADHYA PRADESH	6.86	5.79	6.57	18.28	12.36	15.40
MAHARASHTRA	13.96	8.97	11.54	23.92	14.01	18.64
MANIPUR	10.96	6.14	8.40	13.44	6.79	10.00
MEGHALAYA	4.60	4.45	4.40	2.31	2.32	2.58
MIZORAM	1.38	0.87	1.35	1.28	0.95	1.45
NAGALAND	3.45	1.77	2.47	6.56	3.06	4.55
DELHI	16.18	8.46	12.86	16.39	8.55	13.01
ODISHA	2.39	1.70	2.17	7.46	4.33	5.86
PUDUCHERRY	7.31	5.73	6.05	9.18	6.67	7.32
PUNJAB	2.54	1.34	1.93	3.34	1.54	2.47
RAJASTHAN	10.77	7.37	9.07	22.00	13.63	17.91
SIKKIM	1.79	1.13	1.62	5.37	2.74	4.04
TAMIL NADU	7.01	5.00	5.86	11.28	7.75	9.27
TRIPURA	10.77	6.55	8.60	7.09	3.11	4.83
UTTAR PRADESH	21.34	16.08	19.26	36.96	25.38	32.20
UTTARAKHAND	17.61	8.84	13.95	25.99	12.99	20.20
WEST BENGAL	34.94	20.54	27.01	27.82	12.33	18.93
INDIA	17.23	11.37	14.23	22.88	13.81	18.23

Table 2.1: State wise Muslim Population

- 40-50% - orange
- >50% - red

Now lets go back and look at figures 2.1 and 2.2. At a first glance, one can see that the number of coloured districts has increased tremendously in the 0-4 age cohort as compared to 50-54 age cohort. According to the district definition we are using, the total number of coloured districts (i.e. those with more than 10% Muslim population) has gone up from 268 to 351 in the youngest cohort. Out of 594 districts, this represent an increase of 14% which went from minuscule Muslim presence i.e. white to >10% share (green or red) in the district population.

The important point to note here is that the greenery has increased everywhere and no part of India is untouched by this growth. This change between these cohorts corresponds to change of color from white to light green. At the same time one can also notice that already green districts turned dark green or red as we move from 50-54 year age cohort to 0-4 age cohort. This means Muslim population in the young cohorts has consolidated upon the population gains made by their forefathers.

So, how many districts jumped from one colour (or one percentage bracket) to another as we move from the old cohort to the young cohort?

The statistics for change of district status between the two age cohorts is shown in the transition data table 2.2 and 2.3. While table 2.2 corresponds to total Muslim population share, table 2.3 corresponds to the share of Muslims in the urban areas.

Each entry in the table 2.2 reports the number of districts that lie within a given percentage bracket for the two different age cohorts. The diagonal is coloured grey and corresponds to districts whose status is unchanged



Figure 2.1: Muslim (%) in Age group (50-54 yrs)



Figure 2.2: Muslim (%) in Age Group (0-4 yrs)

Age	Age(50-54 yrs)					
(0-4 yrs)	<10	10-20	20-30	30-40	40-50	>50
<10	326	0	0	0	0	0
10-20	83	74	0	0	0	0
20-30	0	40	8	0	0	0
30-40	0	7	7	2	0	0
40-50	0	0	9	9	0	0
>50	0	0	0	4	8	17

Table 2.2: No of districts with share of total Muslims in a given percentage bracket and under different age cohorts.

for the two age cohorts i.e. these districts lie in same percentage bracket both for 0-4 age group as well as 50-54 age group. The green cells on the other hand correspond to those which have higher percentage of Muslims in the younger cohort compared to the older cohort. Had the share of Muslims decreased in the younger cohort in any bracket for any district, it would have gone above the diagonal (i.e. grey cells), but that did not happen for any district.

Also, the sum for each column gives the number of districts corresponding to a given percentage bracket for 50-54 year age cohort, while the row sum gives the number of districts in a given percentage bracket for the 0-4 age cohort.

To understand transition lets look at the first column. There are 326 districts which have <10% Muslims in both 0-4 as well as 50-54 age cohorts, but there are 83 districts which have 10-20% Muslims in 0-4 age cohort, but had <10% Muslims in 50-54 age cohort. These 83 districts registered a switch from being less than 10% Muslim to 10-20% Muslim between the two cohorts.

Lets further understand the transition matrix by looking at the bottom right cell. There were 17 districts with >50% Muslim population in the 50-54 year cohort and they all continue to have >50% Muslim population even in the 0-4 age cohort. The adjacent green cell on the left shows that there were 8 districts in 40-50% bracket for the 50-54 age cohort but they became >50% Muslim in 0-4 age cohort. In total there are 29 districts (17+8+4, sum of the last row) with >50% Muslim share in 0-4 age cohort, while there were only 17 districts (sum of the last column) with >50% Muslim share in the 50-54 age cohort. So in 50 years 12 more districts became Muslim majority, bringing the total number of Muslim majority districts to 29.

In the table, we have coloured the non-zero entries to show the transition of population share between the two age cohorts. One should note that all the coloured entries lie below the diagonal of this matrix. There is **NO district** which saw a decrease in the share of Muslim population from old cohort to the young. The presence of zero in all the cells above the diagonal highlight the reality of Muslim population growth in every district wherever they have managed to get a toe hold.

This transition matrix also highlights the stark feature that the already coloured districts have turned darker in shade i.e. moved to higher share brackets everywhere. The transition is one way- from green districts to dark green and dark green to red and so on.

Other than the important points mentioned above, this table actually packs more information. We should look at the lower percentage brackets to understand the whole picture. There were a total of 83 districts which moved from <10% bracket in 50-54 age cohort to 10-20% bracket in the younger age cohort. This means that roughly 20% districts which had <10% Muslim popu-

lation jumped to the next level. However, out of 121 (74+40+7) districts with 10-20% Muslim share, 47 districts i.e. 39% of this group jumped to the next level. Then among the 24 (8+7+9, 20-30% column) districts with 20-30% Muslim share, 16 districts i.e. 67% jumped to the next level in the younger cohort. Then 13 out of 15 (2+9+4, 30-40% column) districts jumped to the next level in 30-40% Muslim share, while all 8 districts in 40-50% level become >50%.

This means that once a district gets higher Muslim population share, it jumps to an even higher population share at a much faster rate. This is reflected from the stats that all the districts with 40-50% Muslim share in the old cohort became Muslim majority in the younger cohort. What causes this pattern?

On the one hand is the simple explanation of the exponential growth rate which alone can explain this trend. Given higher Muslim TFR (total fertility rate) than Hindus, the districts with higher Muslim population share decreases the Hindu population share much faster than the districts where Muslims have lower population share and hence lower base to multiply upon. On the other hand, one can think about how Kashmiri Pandits were chased out of the valley. This forms a more complicated explanation, but will resonate among many, where fertile age Hindus flee from Muslim majority areas for a better life. In the end the reality should lie somewhere in the middle of these two explanations. While an earlier phase would build on TFR difference, the latter phase can involve physical intimidation and violence like in the case of Kashmir.

A similar transition matrix for urban areas is given in table 2.3. The results are even more stark for urban areas. The urban areas had fewer non-green districts to begin with and those which were green have turned darker in

Age	Age(50-54 yrs)					
(0-4 yrs)	<10	10-20	20-30	30-40	40-50	>50
<10	196	0	0	0	0	0
10-20	76	76	0	0	0	0
20-30	0	94	17	0	0	0
30-40	0	22	43	5	0	0
40-50	0	1	17	13	1	0
>50	0	0	1	8	10	14

Table 2.3: No of districts with share of Muslims in a given percentage bracket and under different age cohorts in urban areas.

colour increasingly. As of now there are 33 (14+10+8+1) districts with more than 50% Muslims in 0-4 age group. This number was only 14 in the 50-54 age cohort.

The urban areas have seen even larger population growth for Muslims in the 0-4 age cohort as compared to the rural areas as seen by the presence of large number of green cells in urban transition matrix. For example- in 10-20% bracket in the total population shown in table 2.2, only (47 out of 121) i.e. 38% districts jump to >20% brackets, while in urban areas (117 out of 193) i.e. 60% jump to the next brackets. And they jump not only to the next 20-30% bracket, but even higher up to 40-50%. One of the primary reasons for this result as we will show later is the high TFR gap between urban Hindus and Muslims as compared to their rural counterparts. The TFR difference in rural areas is lower and hence the demographic loss is slower for Hindus there.

To summarize this section, we can say-

- A district once green turns darker in shade
- No district ever becomes less green on the color scale (Once Muslims have an advantage in any district, they only improve upon it). Is there any way to explain this consistent trend other than religion?
- Urban areas turn darker at a much higher rate than rural. Demographic loss is much faster in the urban areas.

In the next section, we will look at the trajectories of individual states in the past 50 years. We begin with the states which have seen the highest demographic change. We classify states into three codes depending on the severity of the demographic crisis. We borrow the colour code from warning systems in order to classify the demographic emergency. The red zone states are in severe danger, orange zone states are in medium danger while the rest are classified as others.

2.2 The red zone states

The red zone states are sitting on the cusp of demographic transition and these are the states where Hindus can actually become a minority very soon. These will also be the states which will need intervention in the near future. The states under red-zone are-

- Assam
- West Bengal
- Kerala
- Uttar Pradesh

- Bihar

The red zone states are selected on the basis of their high Muslim numbers as a percentage of their total population. These states (either whole state or specific regions) have seen massive change in their population demographics over the last two generations. If one looks only at the overall growth numbers, one can easily brush aside this growth as insignificant. Thus the need is to dig a bit further into different age profiles.

We will first look at the table which is normally produced in the academic debates and uses the second point of argument as we had mentioned in the introduction (pushing doomsday scenario into the future by 200 years). To show that there is no Muslim population explosion even in the red zone states, these analysts will show the statistics as presented in table 2.4.

Year	Assam	Kerala	WB	UP	Bihar
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1971	24.56	19.50	20.46	15.87	14.53
1981	-	21.25	21.52	16.27	15.09
1991	28.43	23.33	23.61	17.72	15.70
2001	30.92	24.70	25.25	18.50	16.53
2011	34.22	26.56	27.01	19.26	16.87

Table 2.4: Muslim population (%) in red zone states in various census

So let's first look at table 2.4.[1]. The table 2.4 shows the extent of Muslim population growth in these five red zone states over the last five decades. While Assam has seen roughly 10 percentage point increase in Muslim

[1]Assam did not have census in 1981.

share in the last four decades, Kerala and West Bengal roughly saw a jump of 7 percentage points. The increase for UP and Bihar has been 3.5 and 2.5 percentage points. As any leftist will argue these numbers are small and although there has been an increase, Muslims are nowhere close to 50% and hence these states will not be Muslim majority any time in the near future.

But the proof of the pudding is in eating, so how long do these states actually have before turning into Muslim majority? What is the right way to look at these demographic changes? To look at the quantum of changes instead of pondering over table 2.4, the right way is to focus only on census 2011 and look at table 2.5, which gives the percentage of Muslim population in these states by age cohorts. While UP and Bihar have roughly 20% Muslims in the 0-4 age cohort, Assam, Kerala and West Bengal have 35% or more share of Muslims in the youngest age group.

While the overall change in Muslim population was only 10 percentage points in the case of Assam as shown in table 2.4, but it is more than 17 percentage points if one compares 50-54 age cohort with 0-4 age cohort in the 2011 census. A similar picture emerges if one looks at the other red zone states. Let us analyze each of these states separately.

Assam

Assam is sitting on a tinderbox and is the worst affected among the red-zone states. The demographic evolution of Assam is shown in figure 2.3. The number of red districts in Assam has jumped from 4 in the old cohort to 11 in the young age cohort i.e. districts with more than 50% Muslim population in that cohort.

Overall, Assam saw an increase of Muslim population from 27% in the old cohort to 45% in the 0-4 cohort.

Age Group	Assam	Kerala	WB	UP	Bihar
0-4	45.00	37.32	34.94	21.34	18.70
5-9	43.44	34.74	34.29	21.33	18.17
10-14	38.71	32.00	33.34	20.83	17.89
15-19	33.94	32.05	31.89	21.11	18.54
20-24	33.37	32.15	29.09	20.13	17.18
25-29	31.82	29.48	25.70	18.46	15.93
30-34	30.24	26.97	23.36	17.71	15.22
35-39	28.86	24.13	22.85	17.56	15.41
40-44	28.25	21.46	22.21	17.37	15.52
45-49	26.82	19.90	20.94	16.83	15.42
50-54	27.32	19.30	20.54	16.08	15.20
55-59	26.22	18.96	19.58	15.79	14.48
60-64	27.17	18.42	20.57	16.05	14.57
65-69	26.35	19.01	19.81	15.03	14.10
70-74	28.45	16.67	18.85	14.55	13.90
75-79	26.90	15.07	16.24	13.68	12.93
80+	32.08	14.06	18.21	15.23	13.52
All ages	34.22	26.56	27.01	19.26	16.87

Table 2.5: Total Muslim Population (%)- Census 2011

Age Group	Assam	Kerala	WB	UP	Bihar
0-4	47.16	34.30	37.43	17.74	18.24
5-9	45.55	31.89	37.03	17.64	17.68
10-14	40.83	29.36	36.15	16.96	17.39
15-19	36.03	29.49	34.52	16.64	18.00
20-24	35.82	29.72	32.11	15.49	16.66
25-29	34.29	27.07	29.07	14.44	15.51
30-34	32.89	24.54	27.08	14.14	14.85
35-39	31.47	21.91	26.64	14.09	15.07
40-44	31.05	19.55	26.31	13.88	15.22
45-49	29.54	18.15	25.21	13.45	15.18
50-54	30.31	17.59	25.30	12.91	14.97
55-59	29.05	17.24	24.52	12.89	14.27
60-64	29.76	16.84	25.48	13.18	14.23
65-69	28.87	17.24	24.60	12.49	13.79
70-74	31.13	15.14	23.78	12.05	13.56
75-79	30.08	13.79	21.22	11.44	12.71
80+	35.31	12.46	23.40	12.44	13.19
All ages	36.85	24.34	30.79	15.55	16.46

Table 2.6: Rural Muslim Population (%)- Census 2011

Age Group	Assam	Kerala	WB	UP	Bihar
0-4	24.95	40.65	27.82	36.96	23.29
5-9	24.37	37.92	26.76	37.33	22.91
10-14	21.97	35.00	25.78	36.60	22.17
15-19	20.17	34.86	25.40	36.23	22.15
20-24	19.31	34.80	22.38	33.27	20.61
25-29	18.07	32.14	18.87	30.19	18.93
30-34	16.65	29.61	16.43	28.84	17.93
35-39	15.97	26.55	15.63	28.49	17.86
40-44	15.24	23.50	14.47	27.91	17.54
45-49	14.27	21.81	13.31	26.61	17.04
50-54	13.90	21.14	12.33	25.38	16.75
55-59	13.27	20.82	11.29	25.11	16.01
60-64	13.93	20.09	11.97	27.39	17.35
65-69	13.28	20.95	11.08	26.01	16.76
70-74	13.25	18.33	10.44	25.80	16.71
75-79	11.34	16.52	8.24	23.03	14.64
80+	13.61	16.03	10.18	26.32	16.07
All ages	18.24	29.00	18.93	32.20	20.08

Table 2.7: Urban Muslim Population (%)- Census 2011

This is roughly 18 percentage point increase across generations separated by 50 years as shown in table 2.5. It is also important to notice here the jump in the Muslim population from 33.94% in 15-19 year cohort to directly 38.71% in the next young cohort of 10-14 years. This then again sees a 5 percentage point increase in the next cohort, followed by a 2 percentage point increase in the youngest cohort. Looking at this huge jump for ages 0-14 implies that the older generation of Muslims who gave birth to these kids i.e. 24-39 years had a large number of kids compared to Hindus or there was large infiltration of Bangladeshi Muslims.

The next two tables 2.6 and 2.7 show the rural-urban breakup for Muslim population in the different age groups. There are few things to notice here. First, Assam (also West Bengal) had a higher Muslim population in the rural areas in the old cohort. This is different from rest of the country as in the rest of country, urban areas usually have higher Muslim population. The British had started settling Muslim peasantry in the lower Assam, mainly in the composite Goalpara and to a lesser extent Kamrup districts, from several districts of what later became Bangladesh. Since then and especially after 1971, these numbers have only increased in the rural areas. Second, the percentage of Muslims in the young cohort are 47% in the rural areas, **so rural Assam will be the first to turn Muslim majority among all red zone states in the future**. Third, the urban areas had much smaller Muslim population to start with in the older cohort, but it has also almost doubled to 25% in the 0-4 year generation. So, even urban Assam is witnessing a fast demographic transition.

Out of total 24 districts, 12 districts in Assam are already over 40% Muslims in the 0-4 age group, which are given in table 2.8. Out of these twelve districts, nine



Figure 2.3: Percentage of Muslims in Assam

have above 60% Muslim share in the youngest cohort. Most of these districts have made tremendous gains over the past 50 years.

Barpeta, Darrand, Goalpara, Nagaonm, Karimganj, Bagaigaon, Marigaon, Karmup and Nalbari have added 20 percentage points to the population from older age cohort to the young. Out of these districts Cachar, Nalbari and Kamrup were all around 30% in the older cohort and are now almost close to achieving Muslim majority in the younger cohort.

District	0-4 yrs	50-54 yrs	Total
Dhuburi	87.70	71.34	79.67
Barpeta	82.61	60.16	70.74
Darrang	77.84	51.13	64.34
Goalpara	68.79	49.81	57.52
Nagaon	67.97	43.80	55.36
Karimganj	67.40	46.02	56.36
Hailakandi	66.77	53.47	60.31
Bongaigaon	65.71	38.86	50.22
Marigaon	64.41	42.75	52.56
Kamrup	52.46	31.93	39.66
Nalbari	49.81	27.41	35.96
Cachar	44.43	31.37	37.71

Table 2.8: Assam districts- Muslim population (%)

Just to put it in historical context, the number of Muslims in Assam in 2011 are 1.07 crore; up from 5 lakh in 1901 and around 20 lakh in 1951 census. The number of Dharmics in this period has gone up from 28 lakhs in 1901 to 1.94 crore now. Thus Muslims have multiplied nearly 22 times, while Hindus less than 7 times. In terms of population gains, Assam has seen one of the most lop-sided demographic transitions in the history of

independent India, right under the nose of the Indian government. So, while immense time and energy has been spent on resolving the ethnic conflict in Assam, but the real issue of demographics has always been pushed under the carpet by the Delhi elites.

West Bengal

The neighbouring state of West Bengal has not fared any better than Assam in terms of mitigating demographic disaster. The border districts of West Bengal have seen equal amounts of change in their demography like Assam. Under the successive state governments in West Bengal, it seems there was a clear policy of giving shelter to immigrants from Bangladesh for building a captive voter base. This policy is only coming to haunt now.

In terms of overall picture, West Bengal currently stands at 34.9% Muslim share in the 0-4 age group. It has increased by more than 14 percentage point from the 50-54 generation, where the Muslim share stood at 20.5%. It is also important to mention that out of these 14 percentage point gain, 9 points have been gained in the last 25 years i.e. from 25-29 age cohort to 0-4 age cohort, indicating how population growth explodes once you have a higher Muslim share. The driving force behind high Muslim population in Bengal is through the rural areas, which stand at 37.4% share of Muslims in the youngest age group, compared to urban areas where this number is 27.8%.

Compared to Assam, there is a big difference in the case of West Bengal. The Muslim population is primarily concentrated in lower Assam, while the upper districts (roughly half of Assam) have less than 10% Muslim population. On the other hand, the entire West Bengal has become coloured and has significant Muslim presence.



Figure 2.4: Percentage of Muslims in West Bengal

District	0-4 yrs	50-54 yrs	Total
Murshidabad	73.74	59.02	66.27
Uttar Dinajpur	58.58	43.24	49.92
Maldah	56.93	44.95	51.27
South 24 Parganas	46.65	26.14	35.57
Birbhum	42.90	31.32	37.06

Table 2.9: West Bengal districts- Muslim population (%)

The Muslim population in West Bengal is more spread out, moving from the high concentration border regions to lower concentration interior regions, but still above 10% share. While the border districts are either dark green or red, the inner districts have started to turn light green.

Out of nineteen districts shown in the map of West Bengal, five districts have more than 40% Muslim share in the youngest age group. Most of these districts are along the border with Bangladesh. Apart from them, many other districts along the border too have 30% share of Muslims in 0-4 age cohort.

The districts of Maldah, Uttar Dijnapur and Murshidabad are already Muslim majority with Murshidabad having the largest 73.7% Muslim population in the 0-4 age cohort. Birbhum and South 24 Parganas are in the 40% plus category. If one only looks at the total population, the Muslim share would not seem very high in these districts except Murshidabd. But the younger age cohorts show much rapid increase, something which is hidden by the aggregate numbers. The crucial districts of West Bengal are shown in table 2.9.

Kerala

Kerala is the southern most state in India and is



Figure 2.5: Percentage of Muslims in Kerala

District	0-4 yrs	50-54 yrs	Total
Malappuram	78.02	62.59	70.24
Kozhikode	52.20	30.24	39.24
Kasaragod	49.76	26.30	37.24
Kannur	41.98	20.33	29.43

Table 2.10: Kerala districts- Muslim population (%)

severely under the red-zone. Given that this state is under the influence of another big Abrahamic faith i.e. Christianity, Hindus face a double assault here. Thanks to the presence of these two population groups, Hindus in Kerala are already below 50% in the lowest age cohort.

Apart from rural Assam, urban Kerala is the only region which has gone past 40% Muslim share in the 0-4 age cohort. The overall share of Muslims in Kerala stands at 37.3% in the 0-4 age cohort, up from 19.3% in 50-54 age cohort. So, the Muslim share has just doubled between the two generations separated by 50 years. In terms of percentage points gain, Kerala's gain is even larger than Assam.

Kerala has uniformaly lost Hindu demography both in the urban and rural areas. The loss has been more prominent in the urban areas where Muslim population jumped from 21.1% to 40.6% from the old to the young cohort. The rural areas saw slighly smaller gains as the Muslim population now stands at 34.3% in 0-4 age group, up from 17.6% in 50-54 age group.

But looking at Muslim demography alone gives an incomplete picture as Kerala also has a large presence of Christians. While north Kerala has more Muslims, south has a large Christian population.

The details of all religious groups in Kerala are presented in table 2.11. Kerala has 59% Hindus, 21.4%

Christians and 19.3% Muslims in the 50-54 age cohort. While the Hindus and Christians have both seen a sharp fall in their shares, Muslims have expanded at their expense. Now in the 0-4 age cohort, Hindus have lost the majority and contribute only 46.7% to the total population, while Muslims and Christians contribute 37.3% and 15.5% respectively. Thus the Muslims have replaced Christians from the second spot and are now ahead of them by a large margin. While in the 50-54 age cohort Christians were 21.4%, they are only 15.5% now and much behind 37.3% Muslims in the state.

The change in Muslim population of Kerala is shown in figure 2.5. As you can see from this figure, the Muslims are dominant in the north of Kerala where their population has reached above 40% in four districts in the 0-4 age cohort.

The most Muslim dominant district is Malappuram where their population has gone from 62.6% in 50-54 age cohort to 78% in the youngest age cohort as shown in table 2.10. The other very notable addition to this list is Kozhikode, Kasargod which have 52.2% and 49.8% Muslims in the 0-4 age group. Both these districts had around 30% Muslims in 50-54 age group and have thus gained more than 20 percentage points in between generations separated by 50 years. The last district in above 40% category is Kannur, which again added 20 percentage points between these two age groups. The other two dark green districts (>30% Muslim share) in the 0-4 age groups are Wayanad and Palakkad and are on their way to join other north Kerala districts.

Another important point to notice from figure 2.5 is that now Muslims have a considerable presence in all the coastal districts of Kerala, including even the South. While Thrissur, Ernakulam and Kollam have turned green i.e. 20% plus in 0-4 age group, Alappuzha and Thiru-

Age Group	Hindu	Muslim	Christian
0-4	46.67	37.32	15.48
5-9	48.11	34.74	16.75
10-14	50.02	32.00	17.62
15-19	50.44	32.05	17.17
20-24	52.04	32.15	15.46
25-29	54.86	29.48	15.33
30-34	56.06	26.97	16.67
35-39	57.70	24.13	17.90
40-44	58.44	21.46	19.84
45-49	59.54	19.90	20.31
50-54	59.02	19.30	21.44
55-59	59.16	18.96	21.64
60-64	59.78	18.42	21.56
65-69	59.47	19.01	21.28
70-74	59.88	16.67	23.20
75-79	60.20	15.07	24.47
80+	59.18	14.06	26.43
All ages	54.73	26.56	18.38

Table 2.11: Kerala: % of Religions (Census 2011)

vananthapuram have Muslim population between 10-20%. If these districts also show same growth rate as other northern Kerala districts, we can expect that south Kerala will also have around 50% Muslims in another 50 years.

The Christians in Kerala are concentrated mostly in Kottayam, Idukki and Ernakulam, where they still hold majority but are shrinking fast just like their Hindu counterparts in the other parts of Kerala.

What can we learn from the growth of Muslims in Kerala? The case of Kerala should be an eye opener for Hindus on a very broad level as it bursts many myths that are being perpetuated in the media and academia. Firstly, Kerala has low TFR for Muslims as compared to their counterparts in rest of India, but it is still significantly higher than both Hindus and Christians there.[2] Secondly, it has high literacy for all religious groups which bursts another popular myth that literate Muslims are not interested in increasing their demographic share. Although, partially the blame can be laid on Hindus and Christians of Kerala as well because their fertility has been below replacement for a very long time now while Muslims maintained it well above the replacement level of 2.1. In any case, Kerala shows how TFR differential does not really decrease with increase in Muslim literacy. Thirdly, there are no big differences in Muslim population growth in the urban and rural areas. This again puts to rest the theory that it is only the rural Muslims who contribute more to the Muslim population growth.

Uttar Pradesh

The state of Uttar Pradesh has around 21.3% Muslim population and so one might be surprised that we classi-

[2]Discussed extensively in the next chapter

fied it under the red zone. The biggest reason that UP is listed in the red zone is due to alarming rise in the number of Muslims in west UP and all along the border with Nepal. Since UP is the most populated state, it is easy to miss the real picture by looking at the whole state. The story of UP unfolds only after looking at different regions within UP separately.

Unlike Assam and West Bengal, the Muslim population explosion in UP is happening in the urban areas. The urban population in UP went up from 25.3% in 50-54 age cohort to 37% in the 0-4 age group i.e. up by 11.7 percentage points. The rural areas on the other hand have seen a smaller growth from 12.9% to 17.7% for the same age groups. Since, UP still has a significant amount of rural population, it brings down the population share of Muslims in all age groups, but the urban numbers are nevertheless very alarming[3]. If the current trends continue, many urban centres in UP will see dominance of Muslims in the urban politics.

The two most important regions to look out for in UP are- western UP, where the Muslim population shares have already reached alarming position and second the districts which lie along the Nepal border. Most of these districts have gained more than 10 percentage points between the 0-4 and 50-54 age groups. Both of these regions are extremely important as west UP is right next to Delhi, the seat of power of the Indian nation state, while the districts along Nepal border are sensitive due to possibility of infiltration by Pakistan and China.

West UP: The west UP region has been raising the demand for becoming a separate state called Harit Pradesh (Green State) for quite some time now since it is one of the prime agricultural regions in India. While the de-

[3]A good survey of UP towns is given here by CPS.



Figure 2.6: Percentage of Muslims in UP



Figure 2.7: Percentage of Muslims in Bihar

mand for Harit Pradesh has not materialized, it has instead turned green in another way by becoming a Muslim dominated region.

Out of all the districts in west UP, seven already have 40%+ share of Muslims in the youngest age cohort. These districts are Muzzafarnagar, Moradabad, Rampur, Saharanpur, Meerut, Bijnor and Amroha. Most of these districts have seen tremendous jump in the Muslim demography with 10 plus percentage point increase between the two age groups. It is important to note here that the other districts like Baghpat and Ghaziabad are also dark green (30% plus Muslims) in this region.

District	0-4 yrs	50-54 yrs	Total
Rampur	51.29	48.00	50.57
Moradabad	50.70	41.20	47.12
Muzaffarnagar	50.48	31.31	41.30
Saharanpur	48.98	33.23	41.95
Bijnor	48.47	36.68	43.04
Amroha	43.78	36.44	40.78
Meerut	42.87	25.43	34.43

Table 2.12: UP districts- Muslim population (%)

It can thus be said that after Assam, West Bengal and Kerala, if any region is a true red and alarming zone, it has to be west UP. After Assam, west UP has the maximum number of red or near red districts which are equal to seven. The other districts in the region are also catching up quickly with their counterparts in the region. Since, the region is very close to New Delhi, it has important security considerations for the future.

The districts along the border with Nepal are no better than west UP. We can see that Bahraich, Shravasti and Balarampur have turned dark green in the lowest age

cohort and will probably turn red very soon in the future. The other border districts have also not fared any better and we see a general increase in Muslim share from Lakhimpur Khiri to Siddharth Nagar. Since these districts lie on the porous border with Nepal, it can create significant security problems in the future by providing easy infiltration routes into Indian territory.

Bihar

Bihar too has seen rapid explosion in Muslim population in the border areas with Nepal and West Bengal. Among the red zone states, it is still below 20% but it has many sensitive districts and it's urban Muslim population is already 23.3% in the 0-4 age cohort. Bihar is one of the least urbanized states in India but its Muslim population share mimics the rest of India statistics, with slightly higher Muslim population in the urban areas as compared to the rural.

In overall terms, the share of Muslims in Bihar has risen from 15.2% in the 50-54 age group to 18.7% in the youngest age group, thus adding 3.5 percentage points between the two generations separated by 50 years. While the rural population share jumped from 15% to 18.2%, the urban share increased from 16.8% to 23.3%, i.e. a 6.5 percentage point change.

The geographical population distribution of Muslims for the two age groups in Bihar is shown in figure 2.7. There is a clear geographical pattern in the growth of Muslims in the state. Most of the Muslim growth has happened in the border districts, while many of the central districts still have less than 10% Muslim population in the younger cohorts. The increase in the border districts along Nepal has been much more pronounced and the same is true to those near West Bengal.

There are four Bihar districts which have more than

District	0-4 yrs	50-54 yrs	Total
Kishanganj	69.83	65.31	67.97
Katihar	48.57	39.45	44.46
Araria	47.86	39.08	42.94
Purnia	42.03	34.79	38.46

Table 2.13: Bihar districts- Muslim population (%)

40% share of Muslims in the 0-4 age cohort. These districts are Araria, Purnia, Katihar and Kishanganj. Kishanganj has the highest share among these all where the population of Muslims in 0-4 age group is 69.8%. The important feature of all these districts is that they all are close to the chicken neck region of West Bengal. All these districts have added roughly around 10 percentage points in the Muslim population in 0-4 age group as compared to the 50-54 age cohort except Kishanganj. Compared to West Bengal, Kerala or Assam, this is smaller, as the previous states added more than 10 percentage points during the same time. This can again be explained by the fact that Hindu fertility in Bihar has not crashed like in these other states. The average Bihari Hindu still has more kids compared to his counterpart in West Bengal.

Apart from these four districts, the Muslim population has also reached more than 20% in Pashchim Champaran, Puraba Champaran, Sitamarhi, Madhubani, Darbangha and Supaul in the younger age cohort. All of these districts again lie along the border with Nepal. Once put together with the districts of UP, it forms one big arc of high Muslim population concentration along the entire border with Nepal.

2.3 The Orange zone states

The orange zone states do not have as alarming demographics as the red zone states but are close to getting there. The Muslim demographics in these states mimic those of red zone states just a few decades ago. Thus the orange zone states of today will form red zone states of tomorrow. The states under orange-zone are-

- Uttarakhand
- Jharkhand
- Haryana
- Maharashtra
- Karnataka
- Jammu & Kashmir

There are other reasons for importance of these orange zone states. One, these states have seen a phenomenal demographic change. Two, they lie next to the other red-zone states and hence would see (or have already seen) a huge spill-over in their border districts.

Uttarakhand

Uttarakhand was carved out as a separate state by the then NDA government in 2002. It has actually seen the highest increase in the total Muslim population between the two censuses conducted in 2001 and 2011 and the numbers jumped from 11.9% to 13.95%, i.e. roughly two percentage points. It is more surprising because this two percentage point increase happened on a low base of 11.9%.



Figure 2.8: Percentage of Muslims in Uttarakhand

Although in our classification, Uttarakhand is not in the red zone but it has been one of the biggest gainers in the last years and the growth of Muslim population has just been phenomenal. The share of Muslim population is 17.6% in the 0-4 age cohort compared to 8.8% in the 50-54 age cohort and looks much worse than what comes out by comparing 2001 and 2011 census. This means that within a span of 50 years, Muslim share has almost doubled. This is a spectacular growth given the fact that Muslims were less than 10% in the old cohort, thus making their gains much more difficult. Even UP and Bihar with much higher Muslim population share in the old cohort did not add 9 percentage points to the youngest cohort. Only Assam, Jammu & Kashmir and Kerala added more percentage points than Uttarakhand in such a short period of time.

The figure 2.8 shows this tremendous increase in the Muslim population. Only two districts are green in 50-54 age cohort, but there are four districts which are green in the youngest age cohort. The four districts of Haridwar, Dehradun, Nainital, and Udham Singh Nagar went from completely white to extremely dark colored. Haridwar and Udham Singh Nagar district are specially interesting since they became orange and dark green respectively.

This is a very alarming case as demography moves slowly at low percentage levels and Uttarakhand should not have seen such sudden transition in demography. One of the potential reasons could be spillover of extra migrants from neighbouring West UP districts. Two, out migration of local Hindu population. Although the second seems less likely since the Tarai districts of the new hill state should see population inflow from rest of the hill regions in Uttarakhand, due to the new economic opportunities which should be available in the new hill state.

Given that southern Uttarakhand sits next to Western UP with Haridwar, Udham Singh Nagar and Nainital on the border, it will create a multi-state demographic problem in the future. What caused this phenomenal upsurge in Muslim population in these border districts should be a matter of concern for everyone. Uttarakhand hosts the most popular religious shrines of Hindus in the Himalayas and having a big Muslim population in the Tarai region can easily block access to these shrines high up in the mountains. It is not just a delusion to think that in the future, government will have to provide Amarnath style security to the Hindu pilgrims who wish to travel to Uttarakhand.

Haryana

Although Haryana currently does not have as big a Muslim population as the other orange zone states but it has seen significant increase in the percentage of Muslims in some of its districts, which is very alarming. The most alarming reason to include Haryana here is due to the sheer increase in numbers that it has seen. Haryana went from 4.23% Muslims in 50-54 age cohort to 11.51% in the youngest cohort. While the number of Muslim percentage share just doubled in case of Uttarakhand, in case of Harayana it increased almost 2.5 times. This makes the share growth of Muslims in Haryana even steeper.

Apart from such rapid growth, there are other reasons for importance of Haryana. One, it lies west of Yamuna i.e. right across the red-zone regions of west UP. So any communal tensions erupting in UP can quickly grip Haryana. Two, it lies next to Delhi where the southern border has the green regions of Mewat, Faridabad and Palwal. Rise of Muslim population in this regions completes the encirclement of Delhi with west UP on the east and Mewati districts to the south of Delhi.



Figure 2.9: Percentage of Muslims in Haryana

District	0-4 yrs	50-54 yrs	Total
Mewat	85.42	71.63	83.85
Palwal	28.29	14.28	20.00
Faridabad	12.45	5.57	8.93
Alwar	22.38	10.07	14.90
Bharatpur	21.68	10.66	14.57

Table 2.14: Mewat Region- Muslim population (%)

The growth of Muslim population in these districts of Haryana has been very phenomenal, not seen anywhere else in India. Mewat is the most stark among these districts where Muslims now have almost complete demographic hold in the lowest age group. As we will show in the latter chapter on TFR trends, Haryana is an outlier with an average Muslim woman having a Total Fertility Rate above 5 even in the recent period, thus giving Haryana the biggest TFR gap between Hindus and Muslims.

The historical region of Mewat also extends to the eastern districts of Rajasthan and thus it is important to look at these regions together to get a holistic picture. The rise in Muslim share in the two districts of Alwar and Bharatpur again is more than 10 percentage points between the two age groups. The Muslims in these two Rajasthan districts have become from 10% to 22% between the two cohorts separated by 50 years. Outside the red zone states, this kind of change is difficult but very easily achieved by Muslims of Mewat.

Given such rapid population increase, it is important to look into the beliefs of Muslims in this area and highlight some important historical facts. The region is home to Meo Muslims of the fundamentalist Tablighi Jamat. This was not always the case though as early Meos like

the other forced converts in the middle ages were hardly interested in the core Islamic practices for a very long period. But this changed in the early 1900s when under Maulana Muhammad Ilyas and Tablighi Jamat, the Islam practised in the region became fundamentalist.

The results were soon for everyone to see as the Meos in this region first revolted against the Hindu rulers of Bharatpur. This was then followed by large scale partition riots in Gurgaon, Alwar and Bharatpur. Unlike the Muslims of western UP who were offered protection by the local Khaps, the Meos given their fundamentalism garnered no Hindu sympathy. A large number of Meos died in these riots and got displaced, but soon after independence they returned back to Mewat once the hostilities subsided (although a few migrated to Pakistan).

Jharkhand

Jharkhand was carved out of erstwhile Bihar by the last NDA government in 2002. It had a decent Muslim population before as reflected in the 50-54 year cohort, which was 11.73% of the total. For the 0-4 age cohort, those numbers have now jumped to 16.95%. The two districts of Sahibganj and Pakaur, which lie next to West Bengal and near the sensitive area of chicken neck, joining India with the other north-east states, have seen the highest Muslim growth.

Other than the southern districts of Jharkhand, all the districts in the north have seen a big change, though not as big as Sahibganj and Pakur. The two north-eastern districts of Jharkhand have seen more than 11 percentage point addition to the Muslim share in the 0-4 age cohort. In terms of gains the other districts which have seen similar 10 percentage point jump are Jamatara and Deoghar.

But these stats do not show that southern Jharkhand

is any better demographically for the Hindus. Jharkhand Hindus are caught in the middle of a pincer movement with the increase in Muslims in the northern districts, while the rise of Christians in the south. After Kerala, Jharkhand is another state with a significant number of Christians. Although unlike Kerala, where Christians are reducing, the Christians are increasing in Jharkhand due to the possible prevalence of conversion mafia in the tribal south.

The entire region south of Ranchi has been under the grip of Christian conversions. Given the stealthy nature of these conversions, the hard data would not reflect the current numbers totally. But there are enough who have declared themselves as Christians. The total Abrahamic population in Ranchi is above 20% in the 0-4 age cohort as shown in table 2.15. The numbers for these two religions are definitely inching up. The aggregate district numbers do not show the rise in Christian figures which is much higher if looked at the Tehsil level, pointing towards concentration of Christian pockets just like the Muslims.

District	0-4 yrs	50-54 yrs	Total
Ranchi	21.15	18.48	20.75
Purbi Singhbhum	10.27	9.01	10.20
Saraikela-Kharsawan	7.93	5.18	6.73

Table 2.15: South Jharkhand- Muslim and Christian population (%)

Maharashtra

Not only Maharashtra is an important economic hub of India but even historically it has been an important seat for Hinduism, because it was here that Shivaji unfurled the Saffron flag, which ultimately led to the decline of Mughal kingdom and return of the brief but important



Figure 2.10: Percentage of Muslims in Jharkhand



Figure 2.11: Percentage of Muslims in Maharashtra

period of Hindu Raj. But currently, the Muslim population share in Maharashtra has gone up from 8.97% in the old cohort to 13.96% in the young cohort.

Maharashtra is in orange zone because its 10 districts turned from white to green in the 0-4 age cohort. It is a tremendous growth over a wide swathe of territory. Not only a large number of districts have crossed the psychological threshold of 10% but those already green have turned darker.

The most phenomenal rise of Muslims has been in Mumbai region and then followed by Aurangabad and Akola. The rise in Muslim population in some of the major districts of Maharashtra is shown in table 2.16. Both Mumbai and its suburban districts have seen 13% increase in the share of Muslims in the youngest age cohort, which almost matches the fertility zeal of the Meo Muslims in Mewat.

District	0-4 yrs	50-54 yrs	Total
Mumbai	32.34	18.90	25.06
Mumbai Suburban	26.00	13.27	19.19
Akola	24.37	14.58	19.70
Aurangabad	25.15	17.69	21.25

Table 2.16: Maharashtra- Muslim population (%)

Mumbai is the financial capital of the country and attracts migrants from all over the country, so it is a bit alarming to see this increase only in the population of Muslims. It is not possible that it is attracting only the Muslim immigrants with young children such that it has caused this big imbalance in demography.

Mumbai is dominated by a class of Muslims, who if we believe the media stalwarts, are primarily interested

in business. So what will explain this change in demography? Is it migration or high fertility of Muslims? Only migration cannot explain it as it is impossible to believe that the financial capital only attracts the Muslims. There is something deeper at play which is not reflected by the aggregate statistics.

Mumbai has been host to one of the worst riots in the history of post-independence India. Did it permanently alter the psyche of local Muslims to opt for their safety in numbers? It is not that otherwise Muslims do not care about high fertility, but probably the riots gave further impetus to carry out the womb jihad.

The side effects of the rise in Muslim population is already felt in the residential areas of Mumbai. One of the incidents was related to sacrificing goats on Bakrid. It is a known unwritten (sometimes written) rule throughout the world to not slaughter animals in the residential premises due to hygiene issues. But it is an insufficient reason for many practising Muslims, even though it might be a point of objection by other residents. This led to minor problems and scuffles in many housing societies across Mumbai recently.

Ghettoization is the response to save oneself from such indecency, where the two communities decide to keep their contacts to the bare minimum and definitely not live in the same premises. But this hurts the upscale Muslims who try to move to posh societies but are denied due to past precedents of their community members. As an end result, the Maharashtra government is now planning to intervene through legislation to stop such discrimination, but will it work? Or rather- does it look at the problem holistically? How many people would be happy with allowing unhygienic slaughter in their residential premises?

All in all, these problems will look like a minor side

show once the demography of Mumbai is altered completely. After the encirclement of Delhi, the political capital, by West UP and Mewat regions, the financial capital i.e. Mumbai has been internally engulfed by home grown Muslims. In summary, we can say that the two cities are sitting on a cusp of big demographic churning.

Karnataka

Other than Maharashtra, Karnataka is the other state where large swathes of geography has turned green. As many as nine district moved above the threshold 10% population level among the 0-4 age cohort as seen in figure 2.12. On the aggregate level, Karnataka moved from having 10.22% Muslims in 50-54 age cohort to 15.74% in the youngest cohort.

Except four disticts, rest of the districts in Karnataka are already above 10% Muslim in the 0-4 age cohort. Even out of these four, two are already above 9% and must have crossed 10% threshold as we write this book. The changes in Karnataka have been most notable in the southernmost and northernmost districts. Both in Dakshin Kannad and Kodagu in the south, the Muslim share has more than doubled between the two generations. These districts are next to northern Kerala and seem to be heavily influenced by that. Whether this change is brought naturally by high Muslim TFR or through infiltration of Keralite Muslims is a question which cannot be answered by looking at aggregate numbers. In terms of gainers in the north, Bidar and Gulbarga, both now have more than 20% Muslims in the 0-4 age cohort.

What has happened in southern Karnataka is not any less phenomenal than what happened in northern Kerala districts. Both in Dakshin Kannada and Kodagu, Muslims have more than doubled their share as shown in table



Figure 2.12: Percentage of Muslims in Karnataka

District	0-4 yrs	50-54 yrs	Total
Total			
Dakshin Kannada	34.82	16.53	24.02
Kodagu	21.73	10.83	15.74
Dharwad	24.18	16.77	20.94
Bidar	22.19	15.98	19.68
Urban			
Karnataka	26.76	16.71	21.20
Bidar	40.53	28.78	35.20
Gulbarga	39.98	30.01	35.16
Dakshin Kannada	39.90	18.59	27.23
Dharwad	33.11	20.72	27.24
Kodagu	31.81	18.59	24.25

Table 2.17: Karnataka districts-Muslim population (%)

2.17. The other district which comes close to such gains is Dharwad and is located in the centre.

Another important fact which comes out of table 2.17 is that the gains in Karnataka are primarily made in the urban centres. The overall urban population in 0-4 age group in whole Karnataka is 26.76% and higher than the all India level. The districts which are below 30% in total Muslim share are inching or are already above 40% in 0-4 age cohort. This implies that the future urban politics in Karnataka, some 2-3 decades down the line when 0-4 age cohort becomes young, will be predominantly driven by Muslims.

To summarize, the gains made by Muslim population are well dispersed over the whole Karnataka region (specially urban centres), with the prominent gains being made in the south. This should be a cause of concern as combined together with the neighbouring high Muslim

concentration districts of northern Kerala, it would form a big region of Muslim dominance and create multi-state problem in case of communal flare-ups in any of these southern states.

Jammu & Kashmir

The state of Jammu & Kashmir is actually more red than even the red zone states. The only reason it is not included in the red zone states is that it is the well known Muslim dominated state in India, being the only one as of now. The stranglehold of Muslims in the valley region has been complete since the forced expulsion of Kashmiri Pandits. What is left now is just the finishing touches to the almost complete historical genocide business.

It is still noteworthy to document the changes in the majority Islamic districts of Kashmir Valley. At the top lies those districts which were almost 100% Islamic, i.e. those in the valley region. Although the change from 50-54 to 0-4 age cohort is hardly 1-2% gains for the Muslims, but it shows the unrelenting nature of the Islamic jihad. Never stop till it is absolutely complete. The template followed in these districts is no different than Pakistan or Bangladesh, except that these districts very well lie inside the borders of India.

At the second level are the districts like Doda and Rajouri, which are going from marginally Muslim dominated to fully Muslim dominated. Rajouri is more special because there the Muslim population has grown from 58.0% in the 50-54 age cohort to 71.8% in the 0-4 group. Doda too has become 58.2% Muslim as compared to 50.1% in the older cohort.

The third set of districts are those which are not Muslim majority but have still seen rapid growth in the Muslim numbers. In this set on one side are the Jammu division districts of Jammu, Udhampur and Kathua and



Figure 2.13: Percentage of Muslims in J & K

on the other is the Ladakh region. While the first set of districts has seen 3-4% increase in the Muslim population in 0-4 age group, Ladakh had seen an almost 5% increase.

The story of J&K again solidifies the maxim of Muslim aggression- whatever is mine is mine, but what is yours is also mine. The erasure of remnants of any Hindu demography in Kashmir valley plus the continued dilution of the Hindu demography in Jammu and Ladakh regions seems to be the policy of this state.

But the pro-Muslim governments of J&K do not seem to be satisfied with the speed of overall Muslim takeover of the state through high Muslim fertility and have hence decided to import Muslim Rohingyas and strategically place them in the Hindu dominated Jammu. According to many sources, the current Rohingya strength in Jammu is supposedly above 10,000 [4]. Why didn't the bleeding heart Muslims of Kashmir valley settle the Rohingyas in their own region rather than offload them on the Hindu region of Jammu? Is this how the government wants to protect the minority Hindus in Jammu & Kashmir by creating similar situation which led to the ouster of Kashmiri Pandits in the 90s?

2.4 Other States

Apart from the eleven states mentioned in the previous two sections, the other states too have seen burgeoning Muslim demographics. These states may not see demographic inversion today but will form the orange or red zone states tomorrow. We will quickly mention some details and notable factors from these states.

[4] Hindustan Times report

Rajasthan

Rajasthan bore the brunt of very first Islamic invasions in northern India but still somehow managed to keep its Hindu character. This character is increasingly changing with the pop-up of new districts with 10% plus Muslim share in the 0-4 age cohort. There are three districts currently above 20% share of Muslims- Jaisalmer, Alwar and Bharatpur. The last two were already covered in the discussion on Mewat region of Haryana.

The most noticeable development in Rajasthan has been in the border districts with Pakistan. Both Jaisalmer and Barmer have seen rapid increase in the Muslim demographics. Although it is not as steep as in Alwar and Bharatpur, but it has important geo-strategic considerations given permanent rivalry with Pakistan, a self-proclaimed Islamic hegemon neighbour. Having a large Muslim population in these border districts will only increase the burden on the security apparatus in India.

Gujarat

Like the neighbouring Rajasthan. Gujarat too has seen rapid increase in Muslim population in all districts but specially in the border districts. Gujarat has a special significance because it is supposedly assumed to be the laboratory of Hindutava. Looking at the number of districts which turned green or dark green in colour, it seems the laboratory is inconsequential in front of the Islamic demographic machine.

The largest gains have been made in Kachchh, Jamnagar and Junagadh- more than 6%. There are many other districts which have added 3-4 percentage points. In summary, Gujarat has been no different than any other state in India. The whole noise that Gujarat is the pinnacle of anti-minority politics has not made even a small dent in the Muslim population growth. It has increased

by leaps and bounds just like in the other states.

Madhya Pradesh

Although the situation of Madhya Pradesh does not look that precarious right now, but fact of the matter is that it has added six new districts to the green zone. Apart from these new additions, two districts now have above 20% share of Muslims in the 0-4 age group. The districts of Indore, Burhanpur, Bhopal and Shajapur have all added around 5% to the share of Muslims in the youngest cohort.

Andhra Pradesh

Andhra Pradesh is another important state and historically has been the hub of Razakars of the erstwhile era. Here, we show the figure for the entire Andhra Pradesh when it was not divided between Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.

The number of green districts in AP have increased from 4 to 10 in the youngest age group. The most notable jump has been in Hyderabad where the Muslim share has jumped from 36.7% to 49.5%. So Hyderabad must have become majority Muslim in the youngest age cohort, as we write this book. Other districts which have seen notable changes are Nizamabad, Cuddapah, Medak and Adilabad all of which registered more than 4% change.

Apart from the high Muslim shares in the old Razakar dominated Hyderabad region, Andhra Pradesh is also known to be on high priority of the Christian conversion machine. It is difficult to ascertain the number of true Christians in AP since they increased till 1971 but have shown a decline since then, at least in the official census. Since the converts from lower castes lose their reservation benefits on conversion, it is a prevalent theory that many of the nouveau converts hide their true identity from the



Figure 2.14: Percentage of Muslims in Rajasthan



Figure 2.15: Percentage of Muslims in Gujarat



Figure 2.16: Percentage of Muslims in MadhyaPradesh



Figure 2.17: Percentage of Muslims in Andhra Pradesh



Figure 2.18: Percentage of Muslims in Tamil Nadu

secular establishment in order to continue receiving the benefits. Since the major focus of this work is not on enumerating the number of Christians, we leave this equally important task for another time up until we can prove these theories credibly.

Tamil Nadu

It is another big state and next to the red zone state of Kerala. Any problems in the neighbouring Kerala would sooner or later spill over into the state of Tamil Nadu.

Although Tamil Nadu does not look very green as of now, but that is due to historically low presence of Muslims in all districts which is changing now. While it had only one green district in 50-54 age cohort, the number of green districts in the 0-4 age group has gone up to 6. Only Ramanathapuram had 10% plus Muslim population in the older cohort, which has now increased to 18.2%. Apart from Ramanathapuram, Vellore, Nilgiris and Chennai have shown high gains in the range of 4%.

2.5 The two security nightmares

In terms of threat potential from the growing population of Muslims, not all regions will be affected at the same level or simultaneously. The riots in Assam in early 2011 and in Muzzafarnagar in 2013 were only a prelude to the times that lie ahead. Similar to pre-partition situation one can blame this on opportunistic politicians and state irresponsibility, but that will once again amount to forgetting the elephant in the room i.e. demography. One can always come up with such scapegoat.

2.5.1 Chicken Neck

Chicken neck is the narrow stretch of land connecting India to its north-eastern states and lie in the state of West Bengal. The importance of this area can be gauged by the fact that in some areas, chicken neck is hardly 27 km wide. If the enemy states capture the chicken neck, they can easily cut the only land connection to the north-east.

We are well aware of the increasing Muslim stronghold in the border districts of West Bengal but it is increasingly so in and around the chicken neck. The demographic changes in the chicken neck area can be seen from figure 2.19. If you look carefully, the developments in the chicken neck corridor should give sleepless nights to the security apparatus in India. On the western side, the two districts right next to this corridor, Kishanganj in Bihar and Uttar Dijnapur in West Bengal are completely red in 0-4 age group i.e. greater than 50% Muslim. The adjoining districts further to the west (Araria, Purnia and Kathiar) are also orange i.e. 40%+ Muslim. On the eastern side of this corridor in West Bengal, the districts are again increasingly becoming greener. Cooch Behar is already 30%+ Muslim. And once you go further the whole lower Assam is already red in colour.

To summarize, things are slightly less worse in the immediate eastern part of the chicken neck due to Sikkim and eastern West Bengal districts, but the western areas of chicken neck are definitely precarious. And once you take into account that this western part provides the narrowest crossing between Bangladesh and Nepal, the strategic nightmare only becomes much more evident.

If there is one geo-strategic blunder that will cost India heavily in the future, it is not widening the chicken neck corridor at the opportune moment, when after the



Figure 2.19: Chicken Neck: Top(50-54 yrs), Bottom (0-4yrs)

1971 war it had the perfect opportunity to extract its pound of flesh in return of favour to the newly created Bangladesh. But what is worse is that this level of demographic change has not raised any alarm bells in Delhi and it is continuing with ever increasing pace. Nothing explains the shortsightedness of Indian state more than the current situation in chicken neck.

2.5.2 The Mughal corridor

The Mughal Corridor usually forms a topic of heated conspiracy theory among many circles. Originally, the idea of 800 mile corridor connecting east and west Pakistan seems to have been proposed by Jinnah as a way to build pressure on Congress during the partition negotiations.[5]. Even if we believe the quoted sources, it must have been just a political gimmick played by Jinnah at that time. But this idea has survived among both sides of the conspiracy theorists.

While Jinnah back then was in no position to carve a corridor right through the heart of Indian state due to unfavourable Muslim demography in these regions, question is have the things changed significantly in the past 70 years? Does the northern banks of Ganga provide a fertile ground to realistically pursue the idea of Mughal Corridor this time?

To explore this idea, we have to look at the population of Muslims in this whole belt which is shown in figure 2.20. There have been significant strides made by Muslims in the lowest age cohort in the whole region, but two significant features pop out of this figure. First, the good feature, the western side of this corridor near

[5] As reported in Outlook here Also, reported in Chapter 8 of "Study of the politics of the partition, 1937-1947" by Naqvi, Syeda Sabiha Nazli.



Figure 2.20: Mughal Corridor: Top(50-54 yrs), Bottom (0-4yrs)

Pakistan is still mostly white. Second, the bad feature, things are not that rosy on the eastern side once you look at the border regions near Nepal.

The regions to the east of west UP and west UP are increasingly becoming more Muslim with each passing day. Same is the case for the eastern most part of the corridor in West Bengal, Bihar and Jharkhand. The region in the middle is also increasingly turning green along the Nepal border. Without resorting to any paranoia, from the security point of view it is not a healthy development to have a high Muslim population all along the border with Nepal. While these districts in the central part of the corridor might not directly cause exodus of the rest of Hindus in the region, but they can easily provide a transit corridor for men and material through the porous border, thus making the task easy for the intelligence units in Pakistan and China.

As things stand in Census 2011, carving out a full Mughal corridor right now seems infeasible but can still be a security nightmare. If in the future, Nepal turns more hostile (under pressure by China and local developments) the only peaceful border of India will also need careful watch and permanent vigil. Having a hostile population on the border will only make this task more difficult for the security forces.

2.6 The Christians in the North East

We had stated at the outset of this book that this work is primarily devoted to documenting the increase in Muslim population of India, but we still think it is important to mention the Christian growth in the North Eastern states

of India.

Out of the seven states, the Christian population in the North East is around 70% in the 2011 census excluding Assam and Tripura (the population figure stands at around 60 lakhs). We already know that Assam is highly Islamized, so effectively the whole north east is dominated by the two Abrahamic religions.

The demographic evolution of Christian population in the North East is shown in figure 2.21. There are two important points to notice from this figure. First, the Christian population is dominant in all these states barring Assam, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur valley (Imphal region). Imphal is a special case and is the white region among the sea of red districts in the right side of the figure. Most of the red districts do not just have Christian majority, but are approaching 100% Chritian domination. Second, the concentration of red districts is almost similar for the two age cohorts barring one important exception of western Arunachal Pradesh (although if you look closely at the Christian numbers, they are slowly inching up in most districts). This only highlights the difference in approach of the two Abrahamic religions. While one gets a foothold and then slowly increase upon it, the other expands by missionary zeal and converts the whole family and tribe.

The history of Christianization of north east states goes as far back as and around independence. Around that time Christians formed 30% of the total population (minus Assam and Tripura), while now the numbers have gone up to 70%. The spread of Christianity among the tribes in North East forms a text book case of Christian mass mobilization, which started under the British but ran unchecked under independent India.

The most important case is that of Arunachal Pradesh as it is currently undergoing huge transformation. As you



Figure 2.21: Christians in the North East

can notice from the top of the figure 2.21, the districts are fast changing from green to red. Actually, in the 2011 census it was the first time that Christian population percentage was higher than Hindus (30.26% vs 29.04%). To gauge the size of transformation, it is important to highlight here that just a decade ago in 2001, the Christians were a mere 18.72% while Hindus were 34.60%.

The age cohort analysis in the case of Christianization is not perfect because the Church focus is on converting full families and tribes, which cannot be highlighted in such analysis. Nevertheless, we are able to capture the sharp rise in Christian numbers in Arunachal Pradesh. Given that north eastern states are far from the corridors of power in Delhi, such transformation is easy to miss but only at a high strategic cost. Sadly, this rapid transformation of Arunachal Pradesh finally completes the evangelist project in the north east as the last fortress of Hindu, Buddhist and Animist culture has also succumbed due to government lethargy.

3

Future projections

"Demography changes slowly and then suddenly hits you in your face."

– Yuga Parivartan

The favorite retort of the leftists and secularists living in the safety of their gated colonies is that we all know that Muslim population has grown in India and there is nothing new that you have shown in the previous chapters. These are general trends that we should not really worry about as the Muslim population will stabilize in the future due to decreasing TFR as an educated Muslim woman will have fewer kids in the future.

In the last chapter we exposed how using the latest young cohort is the right way to look at the current demography, similarly in this chapter we will present results on TFR (total fertility rate) to bust similar claims on future projections. It is difficult to do future population projections as a lot of things might be moving, so we will make consistent assumptions and look at different scenarios. Building on the analysis from the previous chapter, we will project future cohorts instead of full population. Since we have information on the youngest cohort, this

is the information we will use to make our predictions. Hence, our projections will be most robust as we will use the latest information.

Focusing on just the youngest cohort for population prediction is better in at least two ways. Firstly, it allows us to use the most recent information available. A 75 year old women will no longer have kids and will have insignificant impact on the future demography. Secondly, it also allows to cut down on the number of assumptions we have to make for the population growth as we will see later in this chapter.

In this chapter, we will firstly document the history of Muslim fertility advantage or high fertility among Muslims. Having done that, we will explain the methodology used for future projection and then apply it to various Indian states. **We will also discuss how/why the explosion of Muslim population was not noticed until now but will be increasingly noticed in the future. The most important take away from this chapter is, it is only the percentage TFR that matters, but everyone quotes raw TFR difference between the two religions.** The chapter will then close with other important discussions on this topic.

3.1 Muslim fertility advantage

The Islam apologists all around the world have tried to invent all sort of reasons to explain away high Muslim fertility compared to other groups, but in the end there is nothing better than theological explanation. When talked about the Muslim womb jihad, the favorite taqiya of the left is to claim that that Muslim TFR is coming down, but what they do not mention is that although Muslim TFR is coming down, it is still signifi-

Region	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Diff.
World	2.2	2.9	0.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.2	5.2	1.0
M.East-N.Africa	2.5	2.8	0.3
North America	2.0	2.7	0.7
Asia Pacific	1.9	2.4	0.5
Europe	1.6	2.1	0.5

Table 3.1: Worldwide Fertility by region 2015-2020. Source: Pew Research Center Demographic Projections. "The Changing Global Religious Landscape".

cantly higher than the other groups in the population. The below table reproduced from Pew Survey shows this trend from around the world.

There are few things to notice from the above table. First, Muslims have higher TFR across the world and there is hardly any exception.[1] Second, on average they have an advantage of 0.7 kids per woman when averaged for the whole world, which given the average number of 2.2 kids per woman translates into 30% excess fertility. So, what we see in India is nothing different as Muslims over-breed others in the rest of the world as well.

Given the information on rest of the world, now we can focus on the Muslim fertility advantage in the context of India. The overall trends over the years for TFR are shown in table 3.2. It gives the TFR for each state as well as the statistics by religion corresponding to three different NFHS surveys[2]. The last row in gray colour

[1]Orthodox Jews in Israel are the only exceptions.

[2]NFHS: National Family Health Survey. The figures reported here are from the surveys done in 1998-99, 2005-06 and the latest 2015-16. There are two ways to calculate TFR, from NFHS or Census data and we report both.

shows the overall India trends. The overall TFR in India has fallen from 2.85 in 1998-99 to 2.68 in 2004-05 to 2.20 in the most recent survey done in 2015-16. The recent data from NFHS4 is disturbing in itself because many states have gone below the replacement fertility level of 2.1 as shown in column 7 of table 3.2.

What can be clearly seen from this data is that Muslim TFR has been higher than Hindus in the two surveys (NFHS2 and NFHS3).[3] At the all India level, although the TFR has been falling for both Hindus and Muslims the fertility gap between the two groups has stayed at 0.8. It would have been very useful to use the most recent NFHS4 data for future projections, but only the aggregate statistics were available and we could not compute the religion-wise fertility difference from NFHS4 (although we have used Census 2011 data to generate latest TFR estimates).

The other important take-away point from table 3.2 is that the Muslims have fertility advantage in all states and it is not just an aggregate pattern driven by a few states. In the states with high Hindu fertility like Bihar, which had a TFR of 3.86, Muslims had an even higher TFR equal to 4.80 in NFHS3.

To understand the extent of difference for different states, we computed the TFR difference betwen Hindus and Muslims which is shown in table 3.4. While the Muslim fertility was 22.56% higher than Hindus in NFHS2, it increased by one percentage point to 23.60% in NFHS3. When it comes to population growth, the percentage TFR differential is the only statistic one should care about and not the raw TFR difference (as we will

[3]The figures for NFHS2 quoted here are from Alagarajan and Kulkarni, Population Growth, Fertility and Religion in India, EPW (2005). The figures for NFHS3 are generated from the raw NFHS3 data by us. NFHS4 figures are from the NFHS website

State	NFHS2 (1998-99)			NFHS3 (2005-06)			NFHS4
	Hindu (1)	Muslim (2)	Total (3)	Hindu (4)	Muslim (5)	Total (6)	Total (7)
Andhra Pradesh	2.20	2.53	2.25	1.79	1.89	1.79	2.00
Assam	2.00	3.05	2.31	1.95	3.63	2.42	2.20
Bihar	3.36	4.44	3.70	3.86	4.80	4.00	3.40
Gujarat	2.70	3.12	2.72	2.38	2.72	2.42	2.00
Haryana	2.77	-	2.88	2.43	-	2.69	2.10
Karnataka	2.04	2.84	2.13	2.08	2.16	2.07	1.80
Kerala	1.64	2.46	1.96	1.53	2.45	1.93	1.60
Madhya Pradesh	3.35	3.39	3.43	3.16	3.06	3.12	2.30
Maharashtra	2.45	3.30	2.52	2.00	2.85	2.11	1.90
Punjab	2.29	-	2.21	2.04	3.22	1.99	1.60
Rajasthan	3.69	4.93	3.78	3.14	3.95	3.21	2.40
Tamil Nadu	2.16	2.57	2.19	1.77	2.19	1.80	1.70
Uttar Pradesh	3.87	4.76	4.06	3.72	4.33	3.82	2.70
West Bengal	2.02	3.29	2.29	1.92	3.14	2.27	1.80
India	2.78	3.59	2.85	2.59	3.39	2.68	2.20

Table 3.2: Total Fertility Rate (TFR) by States

State	Hindu	Muslim	Difference (%)
Urban	1.95	2.71	28.04
Rural	2.87	3.85	25.45

Table 3.3: TFR Rural vs Urban (Source: NFHS3)

show later). As you would remember from the previous table, the TFR difference between Muslims and Hindus stayed at 0.8 for both the surveys, the percentage differential actually went up due to lower TFR of Hindus.

The other important take away from this table 3.4 is that while Muslims have 22-23% higher TFR for the whole country, it is above 30% in case of Assam, Kerala and West Bengal. This huge difference is caused by a TFR of less than 2 in case of Hindus in these states, plus high TFR by Muslims. For example, take the extreme case of Kerala, where TFR for Hindus is 1.53 and for Muslims 2.45 (NFHS3). If we just look at the TFR of Muslims in Kerala i.e. 2.45, it is less than national Hindu TFR of 2.59. But Kerala Hindus are under-breeding to such an extent that the percentage difference between Hindus and Muslims have become 37.5%. While Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have seen a drop in percentage difference, it has increased for Kerala and Assam. The case of Assam is very special as the percentage difference there jumped from 34.43% to 46.28%, an almost 12 percentage point increase between 1998-99 to 2004-05.

A similar trend for difference can be seen by looking at the fertility difference between urban and rural areas. The religion-wise TFR by region is shown in table 3.3. The urban areas have a low fertility compared to rural areas both in the case of Hindus as well as Muslims. While in case of urban areas the fertility difference is 0.76, it is slightly higher at 0.98 for rural areas. But in terms of percentage difference, the rural areas have a 25.45% difference compared to 28% in case of urban areas. The low Hindu fertility in urban areas generate a much higher percentage difference for a lower absolute difference between the fertility of two religions (similar to what we

State	TFR Difference (%)	
	NFHS2	NFHS3
Andhra Pradesh	15.00	5.59
Assam	52.50	86.15
Bihar	32.14	24.35
Gujarat	15.56	14.29
Haryana	-	-
Karnataka	39.22	3.85
Kerala	50.00	60.13
Madhya Pradesh	1.19	-3.16
Maharashtra	34.69	42.50
Punjab	-	57.84
Rajasthan	33.60	25.80
Tamil Nadu	18.98	23.73
Uttar Pradesh	23.00	16.40
West Bengal	62.87	63.54
India	29.14	30.89

Table 3.4: TFR difference between Hindus and Muslims

saw in case of Kerala). [4]

The key takeaways from this subsection are the following:

- Muslims have higher TFR than Hindus in almost all regions
- The absolute TFR is falling for the whole country; for both Hindus and Muslims
- The absolute TFR difference between Hindus and Muslims has stayed constant at 0.8, between 1998-2005
- The percentage TFR difference between the two communities has gone up due to lower base TFR of Hindus (since the absolute difference has not reduced)

3.2 Projection: Methodology

The overall population projection although a worthwhile exercise can hide a lot of information for a very long duration. We already explained in chapter one and two how we should stick to the youngest generation to understand the future direction of overall population. We will do something similar for the future projections now.

[4]It is important to mention here that there is another way to calculate TFR from Census data. Since NFHS3 is from 2005-2006, we also report the latest TFR values as calculated from 2011 Census data in table 3.5. Both methods have their own advantage and assumptions, but mostly the figures from the two are close to each other as well as show the trend fall in TFR. Table 3.5 gives a comprehensive list of TFR for all states and if you compare the aggregate TFR numbers are close to NFHS4.

State	Total			Rural		Urban	
	All (1)	Hindu (2)	Muslim (3)	Hindu (4)	Muslim (5)	Hindu (6)	Muslim (7)
ANDHRA	1.63	1.61	1.85	1.70	1.89	1.43	1.84
ARUNACHAL	2.24	2.05	2.15	2.30	2.34	1.66	2.00
ASSAM	2.16	1.72	3.10	1.82	3.22	1.27	1.89
BIHAR	2.93	2.87	3.31	2.98	3.44	2.07	2.53
CHHATTISGARH	2.43	2.45	2.18	2.61	2.49	1.95	2.05
GOA	1.56	1.52	2.12	1.51	2.36	1.53	2.06
GUJARAT	2.03	2.01	2.24	2.28	2.45	1.64	2.13
HARYANA	2.32	2.19	4.81	2.35	5.37	1.92	2.95
HIMACHAL	1.74	1.74	2.45	1.79	2.51	1.24	2.10
J & K	3.02	1.98	3.57	2.16	3.97	1.54	2.61
JHARKHAND	2.61	2.51	3.17	2.81	3.62	1.76	2.19
KARNATAKA	1.81	1.76	2.24	1.92	2.40	1.49	2.16
KERALA	1.79	1.53	2.31	1.56	2.30	1.49	2.33
MP	2.63	2.65	2.61	2.90	3.16	1.96	2.34
MAHARASHTRA	1.91	1.88	2.35	2.10	2.53	1.57	2.30
MANIPUR	1.86	1.97	2.39	2.09	2.43	1.84	2.31
MEGHALAYA	3.63	1.93	3.64	2.35	3.90	1.47	1.87
MIZORAM	2.56	2.09	3.35	3.42	3.64	1.80	3.04
NAGALAND	2.08	1.79	3.39	1.98	3.74	1.69	3.07
NEW DELHI	1.80	1.76	2.31	2.08	2.90	1.75	2.30
ODISHA	1.98	1.96	2.09	2.05	2.16	1.55	2.02
PUNJAB	1.86	1.88	2.44	2.03	2.57	1.78	2.29
RAJASTHAN	2.80	2.77	3.42	3.00	4.17	2.05	2.74
SIKKIM	1.44	1.48	1.78	1.58	1.18	1.26	2.06
TAMIL NADU	1.58	1.57	1.87	1.63	1.93	1.49	1.85
TRIPURA	1.73	1.65	2.15	1.79	2.21	1.34	1.82
UP	2.61	2.55	2.90	2.77	3.35	1.74	2.22
UTTARAKHAND	2.13	2.02	2.99	2.19	3.46	1.59	2.45
WEST BENGAL	1.68	1.51	2.18	1.67	2.25	1.19	1.98
India	2.17	2.11	2.66	2.34	3.00	1.61	2.20

Table 3.5: TFR based on Census 2011

We will use the latest information on the youngest cohort and extrapolate from there using the current fertility rates for the two religions as found in NFHS3. The aggregate Muslim and Hindu numbers for 0-4 age cohort for different states will come from chapter two.

For simplicity of presentation, we will make the following assumptions:

- Each generation is roughly 25 years and completely populates the next generation (ignoring life cycle fertility concerns)
- A fertility of 2 children per woman is needed to keep population constant (assuming infant mortality and other factors influencing population in next cohort are similar for the two religions). Although, replacement level TFR is 2.1, we make this simplifying assumption for projections. It does not matter as we are more interested in share projection rather than raw population numbers.
- No inter-faith children

The first assumption means that the current 0-4 age cohort in 2011 will completely populate the next generation in 2036 i.e. 25 years later. This is keeping in mind that it is only the fertile age women in any generation which determine the population of the next generation. The older men can father children with younger women but even in that case the constraint is the number of women in any generation. Though, women can bear kids till later than 25 years old, but we are using the cutoff as 25 years for fertility to define one generation of 25 years. This is not very stark assumption as still a lot of women marry early and have kids before 25. We will revisit this assumption again in the next section.

Again, to keep the analysis simple, we have assumed that the population stays constant at 2 children per woman. Of course, this is lower than the replacement fertility level of 2.1 children per woman. This also assumes away many other factors like less number of girls born in each cohort or death of young kids as captured by Infant Mortality Rate etc. But unless there is huge difference between the two religions on these factors, our analysis will be robust. Actually, Hindus have higher infant mortality as compared to Muslims as well as more female foeticide, which will only underestimate the extent of Muslim population growth in the next cohort.

The third assumption is again needed to keep calculation simple as there is no way to know how many women give birth to children of another faith. There is a big debate around "Love Jihad" and it is possible that there is presence of systematic poaching of Hindu girls by Muslim men.[5] Any presence of Love Jihad angle will only bolster the number of Muslims in the next generation, hence our estimates in this section will again underestimate the Muslim population growth in the future.

Thus given these assumptions, one should expect that the share of Muslims in the future generations will be over and above what we forecast in this section. Now, we will explain the underlying projection model. This part is slightly technical and mathematical and can be ignored if you want. Nevertheless, it adds to the understanding of the nature of population dynamics and exponential growth, which explains why Muslim population explosion till now did not attract too much attention. We will present a very basic model of projection to show key findings.

[5]The case of Hadiya from Kerala has brought Love Jihad into national limelight now.

3.3 Exponential growth

Population growth follows an exponential growth rate as the future growth depends on the current population level as well as its growth rate. The population of a generation at time 't', M_t is given by:

$$M_t = (1 + r_M)^t M_0$$

where M_t is the Muslim population in generation 't', M_0 is the Muslim population in generation 0 (or baseline/initial generation) and r_M is the rate of growth of Muslim population, as will be captured in TFR. The growth of Hindu population can be given by a similar function with H_t being Hindu population at time t and r_H being Hindu TFR:

$$H_t = (1 + r_H)^t H_0$$

The only difference between the two equations is the difference in the rate of growth of populations. While in the case of Muslims, the rate of growth is r_M, in case of Hindus it is r_H. In terms of data and our assumptions, a TFR of 2 will correspond to $r_H = 0$, where population does not grow. A TFR of 3 children will correspond to a growth rate r_H of 50% as each female will replace herself and her husband with 3 children i.e. a gain of one more member in the next generation. Similarly, a TFR of 2.5 will give a growth rate of 25% coming from $0.5/2 * 100$.

Finally, given the initial population levels H_0 and M_0, the overall Muslim population share, $Share_M$, in any generation after 't' periods will be given by:

$$Share_M = \frac{M_t}{H_t + M_t}$$

$$Share_M = \frac{(1+r_M)^t M_0}{(1+r_H)^t H_0 + (1+r_M)^t M_0}$$

So, the overall Muslim population share is:

$$Share_M = \frac{1}{1 + (\frac{1+r_H}{1+r_M})^t \frac{H_0}{M_0}}$$

The Muslim population share in the next generation thus depends on only two variables:

- Initial ratio of Hindu-Muslim population share in the base line generation i.e. H_0/M_0. We will use this ratio from 0-4 age cohort as observed in 2011 census. This is our baseline cohort.

- Ratio of population growth rates of two religions as given by the ratio $(1+r_H)/(1+r_M)$. This we can calculate by TFR difference between two religions from NFHS3 survey data or Census 2011.

This second variable i.e. ratio of Hindu to Muslim population growth rates needs more attention as this point is often ignored in the usual demographic debate. **The argument used by the left is that TFR is coming down for all religions, but as can be seen from above what matters is not the absolute TFR of two religions, but the ratio as shown above. So one should not focus on r_M and r_H separately, but $(1+r_H)/(1+r_M)$. Actually the absolute TFR difference between the two religions does not matter at all.** Even if absolute TFR for Muslims might be falling, the percentage difference between TFR of two religious groups can still go up. And this is what has happened in India in most states.

To illustrate this point, look at the example given in table 3.6. The absolute TFR difference between Hindus and Muslims is fixed at 1 in all cases while TFR is allowed to vary. For a given Hindu and Muslim TFR, we have calculated r_M and r_H. TFR is increasing for both Hindus and Muslims as we go down in the table. The same absolute difference of 1 TFR gives the highest TFR ratio, $(1 + r_M)/(1 + r_M)$, in case where Hindus have TFR 2 compared to 3 of Muslims. And as shown before it is in this first case (2 vs 3) that the share of Muslims will grow the fastest.

Hindu TFR	Muslim TFR	r_H	r_M	Difference TFR	$(1+r_M)/(1+r_H)$
2	3	0	0.5	1	1.50
3	4	0.5	1	1	1.33
4	5	1	1.5	1	1.25

Table 3.6: Impact of TFR on growth ratios

This is exactly what has happened in the case of Kerala, where the Hindu TFR decreased but the Muslim TFR did not go down fast enough to decrease the TFR ratio. Actually to keep the population shares constant, the absolute Muslim fertility has to decrease by even more as compared to the Hindus. For example- consider the case where Hindus have TFR of 4 vs 5 vis-a-vis Muslims, giving a ratio $(1 + r_H)/(1 + r_M)$ of 1.25. Now, if Hindus have only 2 kids, then Muslims should have 2.5 kids in order to keep the ratio equal to 1.25.

Thus for a two kids decrease of Hindus from 4 to 2, Muslims need an even bigger decrease from 5 to 2.5 to keep the TFR ratio same. In case, Muslims also decrease their TFR just by 2, then they go down from 5 to only 3,

in turn increasing the ratio $(1 + r_H)/(1 + r_M)$ from 1.25 to 1.50 as shown in the table 3.6.

Thus reporting only absolute decrease in TFR is hiding crucial information on demographic change. The TFR difference between Hindus and Muslims was 0.8 few decades ago as well as now. Since, Hindus had higher TFR in the past, this 0.8 difference gap was on a higher base thus decreasing the ratio of TFR. This instead led to slow growth in Muslim share. But now this same absolute difference leads to a bigger TFR ratio between the two religions and will hence increase the Muslim share in the next generation at a much faster rate. So, if the percentage difference does not decrease, one should expect the Muslim population to rise even faster. If one adds to it the growth chasing Muslim migrants from Bangladesh, it will only exacerbate the demographic explosion.

3.4 Overall trends

This section gives the broad trends for future population using the methodology as described in the previous section. Before we showcase the population trends, there are few points to remember:

- All projection graphs are for 0-4 age cohort only. The idea is that if a group has majority in 0-4 population group, it will attain overall majority sooner or later. 0-4 age group will constitute the total youth in roughly 25 years and contribute to the next cohort.

- The graphs are based on the current share of Hindu-Muslim population in the reference group (state or India in age cohort 0-4) and their corresponding TFR as per NFHS3. The projections are similar

Region	Share % (0-4 yrs)		TFR (NFHS3)		Difference
	Hindu	Muslim	Hindu	Muslim	TFR (%)
India	77	17	2.6	3.4	30.7
India Urban	71	23	1.95	2.71	38.9
India Rural	80	15	2.87	3.85	34.1
Red Zone States					
Assam	51	45	1.9	3.6	89.4
Kerala	47	37	1.5	2.5	66.6
West Bengal	63	35	1.9	3.1	63.5
Uttar Pradesh	78	21	3.7	4.3	16.4
Bihar	81	19	3.9	4.8	24.3

Table 3.7: Data used for projection

even if we use TFR from Census 2011, the reason being that TFR ratios have hardly changed.

- The other religions are given the same TFR as Hindus. For example- the Christians in Kerala have a large share and have similar TFR as Hindus. So the sum of Hindu-Muslim population will not be 100% in all cases.

- The absolute TFR difference does not matter, what matters is the percentage differential between Hindus and Muslims. For example- as long as the percentage gap is 20% it does not matter if Hindu TFR is 2 and Muslim 2.4 or Hindu TFR 3 and Muslim 3.6. The future projections will remain the same.

Let's first start with the overall case for India. The share of Muslim population in the 0-4 age group is shown in table 3.7. The total Muslim share is 17% while it is 23% in urban area and 15% in rural area. The corresponding TFR for these regions are taken from table 3.2 and 3.3. For ease of reference, all the numbers used for projection are collected together and presented in table

3.7. Now we will give projections for India and the red zone states.

India

The future population projection for India is shown in figure 3.1. It is calculated using the current Hindu and Muslim share in population as given in 2011 census and using TFR estimates from NFHS3. In all graphs in this section, the baseline statistics used for projection as mentioned at the top of the graph. For example- in case of total Indian population projection in figure 3.1, Hindu population is 77% in the 0-4 age cohort, while Muslim population is 17%. The TFR is 2.6 and 3.4 respectively for Hindus and Muslims.

For the time period shown in figure 3.1, Muslim population will reach 40% in 0-4 age cohort before 2136. This will happen if they maintain same fertility differential of 30% during this period. But if Hindu fertility falls faster and below 2 as seen in many areas, this can happen much faster if Muslim fertility does not fall at a faster rate than Hindu fertility. It should also be noted that Muslims will be 30% plus by 2086 i.e. in roughly 70 years. At the time of partition, the Muslim share in total population was only 26%.

It can be seen by looking at figure 3.2, which gives projection for rural and urban India. The urban fertility for both Hindus and Muslims is lower as compared to their rural counterparts, but in terms of percentage differential, urban areas have a higher difference. Thus you can see that the growth of Muslim population share is much steeper in urban areas when compared to rural India. The difference is so huge that urban areas can become Muslim dominated by 2120 i.e. in roughly 100 years, while rural areas will stay Hindu dominant for a bit longer. Although the Muslims will cross the psychological threshold of 40% in urban areas in roughly 70 years



Figure 3.1: Projection: 0-4 age group in India



Figure 3.2: Top Panel:Urban, Bottom Panel:Rural India

(i.e. 2086) from now. If you think in terms of civilization, 70 years is not such a long time. And what matters the most for the civilization is economic resources. Since cities drive the economics of a nation, one should be extremely worried that productive resources of India will be under Muslim majority in roughly 70-100 years.

What is important to mention here is that we have not discussed migration from rural areas to urban as India develops further. It is natural that given economic development, many villagers will migrate to cities. Since rural areas have higher Hindu population it is expected that more migrants to cities will be Hindus, thus bringing down the Muslim share in urban areas for some time. But the extent of migration is not known and even if it happens on a large scale (based on the premise that more rural Hindus migrate compared to rural Muslims), it will be at the cost of diluting Hindu majority in the rural areas.

After looking at the overall state of India, we should now focus attention on the red-zone states. The three states which will be Muslim dominated in this century itself and very near in the future are- Assam, Kerala and West Bengal.

The population projections for 0-4 age cohorts for Assam are shown in figure 3.3. It is based on the current Hindu and Muslim population percentage of 51% and 41% respectively in 2011. The current TFR rates are 1.9 and 3.6 for Hindus and Muslims. Based on these current TFR trends, Muslims must have already achieved majority in the 0-4 age group as we write this book. The Muslims do not even need to wait for the next generation in 2036 to complete this transition. Not to mention that these projections do not at all include the illegals from Bangladesh flooding into Assam. If the Bangladeshi Muslims keep flooding into Assam, we will see a much quicker



Figure 3.3: Top Panel:Assam, Bottom Panel:Kerala



Figure 3.4: Top Panel:West Bengal, Bottom Panel:UP



Figure 3.5: Bihar

Hindu demise in the state.

Similar demographic inversion is true in the state of Kerala as well as shown in figure 3.3. New born Muslim kids will be the majority some time in the middle of 2011-2036. We have mentioned the statistics used for these projections at the top of the graph for Kerala. Unless there is a change in Hindu-Muslim TFR percentage difference, these trends will continue and results will be there for everyone to see in 20 years.

The next state that will see demographic demise is West Bengal. According to the current projections, West Bengal will be Muslim dominated among the new born cohort some time around 2036 (a few years later). In 2011, it had some 63% Hindus in 0-4 age cohort. If current generation maintains same TFR differential as past generation, it will have almost the same number of new born as the Muslims around 2036.

The overall projections for UP and Bihar do not see very different from the projections of India. The one big difference in favour of Hindus in UP and Bihar is that their TFR is not as low as the other three states mentioned above. Both the Hindu and Muslim TFR is high and effectively the TFR differential is low, so the convergence in populations of Hindus and Muslims is also slow. But if UP and Bihar Hindus also copy their counterparts from Kerala or West Bengal, they will also show similar projections. An important point to mention here though is that both UP and Bihar are very big states and the figures here do not do justice to the regional variations within these states. For example- West UP is already having 50% share of Muslims among the new borns, which would not be reflected in the statistics for the whole state. Such regional variations though can also be easily projected using this method, but have not been reported here.

Key Takeaway from this section:

- Due to exponential growth rate, demography changes slowly in the beginning and then quickly in the intermediate period.
- What matters for growth difference is the percentage differential between Hindu and Muslim TFR and not absolute difference.
- Urban India is changing at a very fast pace compared to rural area. One, due to larger share of Muslims in urban areas. Two, due to large TFR difference.
- Assam, West Bengal and Kerala are on a road of no recovery due to high TFR gap between Hindus and Muslims in these regions. At current trend, these states will become Muslim majority in 0-4 age cohort before 2050.

3.5 How does explosion work?

We have already discussed in the previous section on the key determinants of population share over a period of time. In this section, we will bust another big statistical lie used by the left, which is to lull the regular Hindu by quoting slow change in overall Muslim Percentage. But obviously the change is slow in the beginning when Muslims have a smaller population base i.e. small M_0/H_0. The overall Muslim share changed slowly due to old Hindus hanging around when their share in total population was much larger. But the story is completely different if we look at different age cohorts.

From real data, this can be seen by looking at table 1.6, where the share of Hindus change slowly in the old

Year	Share (%)		Change (PP)	
	Hindu	Muslim	Hindu	Muslim
1961	82.85	10.70	-	-
1986	80.21	13.54	-2.64	2.85
2011	77.00	17.00	-3.21	3.46
2036	73.17	21.13	-3.83	4.13
2061	68.71	25.94	-4.47	4.81
2086	63.63	31.41	-5.08	5.47
2111	58.02	37.46	-5.61	6.05
2136	52.02	43.92	-6.00	6.46

Table 3.8: Simulation of 0-4 age cohort according to our model taking 2011 population for 0-4 age group and NFHS3 TFR difference

age cohorts but then change much quickly in the younger cohorts. It is also true for age wise data presented at the state level.

Now, lets analyze the same change by looking at the projections presented in figure 3.1. The same figure is now represented in terms of numbers in table 3.8. There are two things to be noted from this table. First, our model matches the data very well. Although the share of Hindus and Muslims in the 0-4 age cohort is based on simple TFR difference between the two communities and the population ratio in 2011, it is able to replicate their shares in the real data very closely. If you compare with table 1.6, Hindu share is 77% in 0-4 age cohort in 2011. If we go back 50 years i.e. look at 50-54 age group, according to our projection model, Hindu share should be 82.85%. This is roughly equal to 81.79% share of Hindus in 50-54 age cohort (born in 1961) in the real data

presented in table 1.6[6]. So, our model is doing fairly well in matching the old cohorts born in 1961 and 1986 (who are 50-54 and 25-29 year old today).

The other important point one can take away from table 3.8 is the fact that the percentage point change is growing over time. In the first 25 years, the change in Muslim share is 2.85 percentage points, which will grow steadily to 6.46 over time if TFR gap persists. So, we can summarize:

- Aggregate population numbers hides the change and it is reflected only by looking at the age cohorts. Hindus had a big advantage in the old age cohorts which suppresses the gains made by Muslims in the younger age cohorts if one only presents the aggregate Hindu-Muslim shares. This goes back to the point made in chapter one.

- When one starts looking at the change in cohort size, Muslim share grows steadily over time due to exponential growth of population. The percentage change in cohort size grows over time.

These two factors slow the population change that any person can observe during his lifetime, except towards the very end when the two religions have similar population. Once a critical mass is achieved, the changes happen much quickly. According to the above table in the first 50 years, Muslim population went up from 10.70% to 17.00% i.e. around 6.3 percentage points (between 1961-2011), while in the next 50 years (2011-2061) it will jump to 25.94% adding roughly 9 percentage points.

[6]Hindu share is low in 50-54 age cohort because Hindus have higher infant mortality rate and lower life expectancy than Muslims, thus decreasing their share in 50-54 age cohort. Accounting for these factors will allow our model to match the data even better.

This is exactly how information has been hidden in the last 50 years, as Hindus have been fooled by showing them aggregate Muslim population share which is still <15% while in the lowest age cohort (0-4 years) they are already 17%.

Where does India stand currently?

As explained in the methodology section, the growth in population depends on two crucial factors, first, the ratio of Hindu to Muslim population and second, the percentage TFR differential.

Ratio: India has already lost the massive Hindu to Muslim population ratio that it had after independence. In the first 75 years, Muslims have slowly but steadily managed to increase their share, which currently stands at 17% in the 0-4 age cohort, while it was around 10% in 1947. Compared to 75 years ago, Muslims have a bigger population share now, so their position has grown much stronger on the baseline ratio front.

TFR percentage differential: Muslims have almost always had TFR advantage in independent India. While the TFR has gone down for both groups, the percentage difference has not gone down. Table 3.4 shows that the aggregate differential still stands at 30% between the two communities and has only grown over time due to rapid fall in Hindu TFR. With Hindus having fewer kids, it has just become much easier for Muslims to keep a higher ratio with fewer number of kids.

For example- in Kerala Hindu TFR is 1.5, while Muslim TFR is 2.4, which gives a massive 60% fertility advantage to Muslims. Unsurprisingly, the TFR difference for Kerala went up from 50% to 60% between 1998-99 and 2004-05 with a decrease in TFR for both communities because Hindus adopted population control methods

whole-heartedly. If this is an indicator of things to come, just before/around the build up of demographic tensions, Muslim TFR will zoom up while Hindu TFR will continue to plummet. Even currently, the Muslim TFR is 3.6 in J&K (one of the highest in the country) while that of Hindus is just 2.0.

So, we can conclude that Hindus today have a bigger disadvantage as compared to 1947. Not only they have eroded the base advantage, but their TFR prospects are also bleak and worse than that in the past.

3.6 The Double Whammy

The discussion till now had been restricted by the assumption that both Hindus and Muslims take same time for producing the next generation. But there is an increasing trend of late marriages and late children among middle class Hindus. Although, it has not been a big difference till now since a large section of Hindus too were getting married early and having kids at an early age. But with economic development, it is becoming more and more difficult for Hindus to get married early and have children.

As the middle class among Hindus expand, given that there is no religious directive to marry early, the average age for having marriage and children will only go up in the future. This is something which is already documented among the upwardly mobile Hindus.

In this section, we will understand the implications of late marriage on population growth if the Muslims do not start marrying late like the Hindus. To do this, we will now incorporate the time taken to produce next generation in our population prediction model.

The population shares are affected not only by TFR



Figure 3.6: Two Scenarios: if Muslims have kids at younger age compared to Hindus

but also the average age for bearing kids. If on average Muslims have kids at a younger age compared to Hindus, their next generation will arrive sooner. And if this next generation comes earlier, then the generation after that too will come early. So on and so forth for all the future generations. For example- if Muslims take 3/4th the years that Hindus take to produce next generation, by the time Hindus produce 3 generations (75 years for 3 generations) Muslims would have produced 4 generations (75 years for 4 generations).

Why does this matter? Since population follows an exponential growth, a faster compounding means faster growth in a given period of time. It is similar to compound interest function, where faster compounding and high interest rate both generate high future amount.

This double whammy of Muslims having kids at a younger age is shown in the figure 3.6. By assumption, in these figures Muslims take 3/4th of the time compared to Hindus to produce next generation. This is not a preposterous assumption as urban Hindus are delaying marriage and kids to beyond 30 years of age. By this assumption, if an average Hindu decides to have kids at 30 years, an average Muslim will only need to have kids by 22.5 years, which is completely possible and realistic[7].

The figure 3.6 shows this double whammy graphically by including population growth scenario of another set of Muslims who generate next generation at a fast rate. Let's call these Muslims as "Fast Muslims" (represented by dark green) and they take only 3 quarters of the time (22.5 years) needed by Hindus (30 years) to produce their

[7]The figures are speculative, but age of marriage and subsequently age for having kids is going up for Hindus. Similar graphs can be drawn for other scenarios where Muslims take 0.8 or 0.9 amount of time as compared to Hindus for producing next generation

next generation.

As a comparison group, regular Muslims (light green) are also included and they take same time as the Hindus. As compared to the previous section, the figures here show raw population numbers and not percentages. Also notice that "Fast Muslims" have more points (seven) on the graph, as they build their new generation faster than both Hindus and Muslims (who have six points each for the 150 year period). So, the Muslims will exceed Hindus when any of the green lines crosses the saffron line.

The two panels in figure 3.6 correspond to two different initial population and TFR scenario. The top panel roughly represents whole Indian population in the 0-4 age group. It has 77 Hindus and 17 Muslims to begin with in the year 0 (you can think of it as the year 2011 and total population as 100. Since Hindu percentage is 77%, it translates to Hindu population of 77. Similarly calculate the population for Muslims.). Also, the Hindu TFR in this case is 2, while Muslim TFR is 2.6. We are again making simplistic assumption that replacement fertility level is 2, so Hindu population remains constant at 77 for the whole period. On the other hand Muslims have population growth due to fertility of 2.6. The Fast Muslims (dark green line) add new generation in 22.5 years, and have a higher upward slope than Muslims (light green line), who add next generation in 30 years, in the same amount of time as Hindus.

Due to short breeding time, Fast Muslims will pass Hindu population in roughly 127 years after year 0, while regular Muslims will take a bit longer. Although it is not shown on the graph, but if TFR gap continues even regular Muslims (light green line) will cross the Hindu population at some point. But the important take away is that if you have next generation in less amount of time, you will grow faster.

We can do a similar analysis for the urban areas which have a higher Muslim population share as well as below replacement fertility level for Hindus. This scenario is shown in bottom panel of figure 3.6 where initially in year 0, Hindu population is 71 compared to 23 of Muslims. The fertility for Hindus is 1.9 i.e. below replacement, while 2.5 for Muslims. Since Hindu fertility is below replacement their population will keep falling during the whole time, while Muslim population will be growing. In this case, the Fast Muslims will overtake Hindu population in less than 100 years while regular Muslims will take slightly more than 120 years at current TFR levels. In the second case, the double whammy reduces the time taken by Muslims to overtake Hindus by roughly 20 years, which is approximately the time taken by Fast Muslims to churn out a new generation. Thus double whammy will reduce the time needed by Muslims to catch up with Hindu population by 16%. Although both 100 and 120 years seem far away right now, but they are significantly different from each other and can cause political repercussions at a much early stage.

Key Takeaway:

- Double Whammy due to difference in child bearing age between Hindus and Muslims will allow for a much faster population convergence.

- Urban areas will see much faster convergence due to the presence of both low Hindu TFR plus delayed child bearing by Hindus

But how does the two religions actually differ in giving birth to their first children. As of NFHS3, there is no big difference between age of mother at first birth, although more Muslim women seem to bear children at a younger



Figure 3.7: Distribution of mother's age at first birth (NFHS3)

Age	Hindu	Muslim
15	6.01	7.59
16	8.62	10.56
17	11.06	13.22
18	12.18	14.05
19	12.68	14.22
20	11.23	11.47
21	9.35	8.96
22	7.40	6.18
23	5.58	3.89
24	4.30	2.87
25	3.29	2.02
26	2.43	1.67
27	1.75	0.90
28	1.26	0.66
29	0.86	0.58
30	0.69	0.28
31	0.44	0.34
32	0.27	0.20
Above	0.63	0.35

Table 3.9: Mother's age at first birth (NFHS3)

age compared to the Hindus. This information is shown in table 3.9 and figure 3.7.

If you closely look at figure 3.7, you can see that green line corresponding to Muslim women is higher than Hindus in the lower ages. For ages below 22, higher percentage of Muslim women have already had their first child compared to the Hindus. Since more Muslim women have their first child early in their life, there are fewer Muslim women who have their first child at a later age. Thus the green line for Muslims crosses the saffron line for Hindus between 21-22 years of age.

Although this difference is not high but it is still important to mention that back in 2005-06 (NFHS3 survey period) Hindus were already having their kids late as compared to the Muslims.

With the rapid spread of education and modernity among Hindus, this trend for late children among Hindus will only intensify. Although, we do not have NFHS4 data to give concrete information about this trend, but rapid growth of Hindu middle class as compared to the Muslims will support this hypothesis. **So, if Muslims do not delay their child bearing age as much as the Hindus, then the population share of Hindus will face a double whammy- low TFR as well as slower rate of building new generation. This double whammy will close the gap between the two religions at a much faster rate.**

3.7 Discussion

The effective message of this whole chapter lies in understanding the mechanism that will determine future demographics. As evidently argued, the only two metrics that matter for demographic projection are baseline

level of populations and percentage TFR difference.

This chapter puts to rest the whole statistical gimmick that is peddled around- "the absolute level of Muslim TFR is coming down". Yes, it is coming down but Hindu TFR is coming down even faster and has led to a situation where percentage difference between the TFR of two religions has hardly changed.

Since the multiplication of future generation of Muslims will happen on a bigger base population which is 17% now, compared to 10% at the time of independence, the multiplication will be much faster. Given these two important facts, whether you buy the number and projections given in this chapter or not, you will at least concede that Muslims have a much better chance to pull off the demographic inversion now than at any other time in the history of independent India. Once you add the delayed marriage and child bearing among the future Hindus to this mix, the situation looks more grim. The last thing Hindus want is the double whammy of demography to hit them.

In terms of states, the future of Assam, West Bengal and Kerala seems to be almost sealed in favour of Muslim demography. Most people alive today will see J&K style situations reoccur in these states in their life time most probably. The number of Muslim births will be majority in the next two decades in the best case scenario for these states. Why is that so? Since we did not include the amount of migration from Bangladesh in this mix, the projections are in some way under-reporting the extent of future demographic change in Assam and West Bengal. UP and Bihar on the aggregate do not appear sitting on the tinder-box but will see regional flareups in Muslim dominated pockets like the one seen in 2013 Muzzafarnagar riots in West UP.

We did not include the projections for other states,

but the Assam and West Bengal of yesterday were like the other states with 15-20% of Muslims today. So their future can be easily seen through the lens of historical developments. All it takes is 50 years or 2 generations to hand over the demographic superiority to the Muslims.

Since the three states mentioned above will be certainly dominated by the Muslims in the near future, the only question is how will Hindus be treated in these states? How the secular state of India handles the future of Assam, West Bengal and Kerala will be the model template for the rest of the country. The Hindus in the rest of India will get another chance to draw valuable lessons as and when this demographic transition is complete. The past lessons from J&K hardly made any dent in the psyche of Hindu intellectuals. Will it be any different this time?

4

TFR Politics

> *"Democracy is like a train, you get off once you have reached your destination."*
>
> – Erdogan

The lower rung BJP leaders every now and then are known to raise the bogey of TFR and exhort Hindus to increase their fertility. No sooner that such ideas are floated, the entire media gets up into arms leading to disowning of such members and comments by the top BJP brass.

While the left chastises the TFR brigade by citing their ill-founded fears about Muslim population explosion, the neo-liberal supporters on the right although acknowledging the problem fail to react because they don't/can't match the resolve of Muslim women as they think that Hindu women are not captive breeders and even after making them aware of the ground situation would not support the Hindu cause. Even though it might be logically in the interest of Hindu women to have more children, but such thoughts are not even partially entertained (or vocalized) by the neo-liberals. Hence for ideological purity this group of right wing does not want

to act even after understanding the facts about demography.

Apart from the economic Right Wing, the regular Hindus hide their personal choice of having fewer kids under the intellectual veneer of excess population, environment deterioration and other ideas that have been spoon fed to them since independence. And like any other 'nouveau convert' they have taken these modern memes with great zeal. The national and state governments have spent enough money on brainwashing and hence we find open support for this government propaganda which has put the responsibility of saving the world from environmental catastrophe squarely on the Hindu shoulders. And the Hindus are more than happy to comply and watch their own demographic demise with loud cheers.

The previous chapter showed the big gap between Hindu and Muslim fertility, but that did not completely reveal the complicity of governments in curtailing the Hindu fertility. The various "low population" programs run by the government have had a much adverse impact on the Hindus compared to the Muslims. The story of Hindu fertility is actually much worse than what is revealed through the TFR statistics. And these questions affect not just the present but also the future of Hindu demography.

We cover three more themes that are usually overlooked in census studies, but important for understanding the mechanics of fertility game. They are- sterilization, female foeticide and infant mortality rate. While sterilization and infant mortality rate are closely tied to government action, female foeticide is a reflection on the lack of strategic thinking by the Hindu society as a whole.

4.1 Sterilization

Population explosion has been a big discussion since the time of Malthus and although farm productivity has increased at a much faster pace in the last two centuries but the debate around high population refuse to die. It also forms the bedrock of international policy making guided by plethora of international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank.

India is a special target for such population policies because it has the second largest population in the world. This generates international interests both by scholars as well as policy makers. Thus there has been a big push to understand as well as to push down the Indian fertility (you can read Hindu fertility). [1]

As we saw in the previous chapter, the Indian fertility is now 2.20 in the latest NFHS4 conducted in 2015-16, which means the target for fertility reduction has been achieved much quickly than expected even by the international organizations. The Hindu TFR is very close to the replacement fertility level while for the Muslims it stands above 2.6 even in NFHS4.

The most common method to control population in India has been government mandated female sterilization. The level of female sterilization has been 36% or above since the past 3-4 decades. In the latest NFHS4 survey, the sterilization level stands at 36% as reported in table 4.1.[2] We don't yet have complete access to NFHS4 data, but according to NFHS3, the median age for female sterilization stood at 25.7 years. This goes in line with Indians getting married early, having a few kids and then getting sterilized. The rate of sterilization for different

[1] Dyson, On the future of human fertility in India.

[2] Figures based on women who ever had sex. Figures for NFHS4 taken from this link.

	NFHS3 (2005-06)	NFHS4 (2015-16)
Female Sterilization (%)	37.3	36.0

Table 4.1: Female Sterilization in India

Age at Sterilization	Hindu	Muslim
<25	45.69	45.73
25-29	34.96	33.71
30-34	14.82	14.99
35-39	3.85	5.08
40-44	0.63	0.40
45-49	0.03	0.01

Table 4.2: Age at Sterilization (out of those Sterilized)-NFHS3

age groups is shown in table 4.2.

But do all communities get sterilized at the same rate? To answer this question we looked at the data from NFHS3 which shows the sterilization of women by religion as well as education levels. The details are shown in table 4.3 [3]. It gives sterilization both by communities as well as education levels.

What you can clearly see from the table 4.3 is that compared to Hindus only half the Muslim women ever get sterilized. While the percentage of Hindus getting sterilized stands at 32.78%, the rate for Muslims is only 16.60%. If one thinks about low fertility levels among Hindus, sterilization at low age could be one of the di-

[3]These numbers are slightly below the national averages reported in previous table. While in previous table, GoI figures included only women who ever had sex, in our calculations we include all women and not just those who have ever had sex.

rect reasons. Except Muslims, the rest of the religious communities too have a similar sterilization rate and so it would not be too far fetched to say that Muslims are either consistently avoiding government mandated sterilization or government is not targeting them as much as the Hindus. While the gullible Hindus seem to have embraced the "Hum do, Hamare do" (we two, our two) agenda of the government with enthusiasm, it has few takers among the Muslims.

The table 4.3 actually gives more information than just the rate of sterilization among different communities, it also reports the rate of sterilization among women by different education levels. The rate of sterilization is the highest among the low educated women as the more educated ones seem to have access to other contraceptive methods. Since Hindus are more educated than Muslims, it implies that the thrust of sterilization is even higher among the poor and uneducated Hindus.

And this intuition holds true if we look at the breakup by education and religion as shown in table 4.4, which shows the sterilization rates by the level of education among Hindus and Muslims. There are two things to notice from this table. First, Muslim rate of sterilization is lower at all education levels. Second, the difference in sterilization rates is the highest at the "No education" level. While the uneducated Muslims only get sterilized at 18.78% i.e. slightly higher than their average level of 16.60%, the uneducated Hindu female is sterilized at the rate of 43.27% i.e. more than 10 percentage points higher than aggregate Hindu sterilization rate of 32.78%.

While the rate of sterilization is high for low education levels among Muslims, but Hindus see a drastic increase in sterilization rate. Even at the higher education level, there is a gap of more than 3 percentage points between the Hindus and Muslims. The consistency of these results

Religion	% sterilized
By Religion	
Hindu	32.78
Muslim	16.60
Christian	29.91
Sikh	23.81
Buddhist	44.46
Jain	29.57
By education level	
No education	37.78
Incomplete primary	40.45
Complete primary	33.72
Incomplete secondary	24.20
Complete secondary	14.89
Higher	12.23

Table 4.3: Percentage of females sterilized- NFHS3

at all education levels should raise an alarm among those who lobby for sterilization campaign as the way forward for population control. Any sterilization campaign will only end up hurting the Hindu fertility.

What is the success of sterilization campaign regionally? Is there a consistent difference between sterilization rates of Hindus and Muslims at the state level? To understand this, the sterilization figures by states are reported in table 4.5. The southern states are far ahead of their northern counterparts when it comes to providing sterilization to their female population. Andhra Pradesh comes out at the top with the sterilization rate of 54.41% among its females. The other southern states of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala too show high numbers compared to the northern states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, where sterilization rate is around or below 20%.

Education level	Hindu	Muslim
No education	43.27	18.78
Incomplete primary	41.51	25.77
Complete primary	38.17	21.07
Incomplete secondary	24.13	14.94
Complete secondary	14.18	8.98
Higher	11.21	7.57

Table 4.4: Sterilization rate (%) by education and religion

From the table 4.5, one can conclude that Muslims have much lower sterilization rate as compared to the Hindus everywhere in the country. Except Goa, the sterilization rate of Muslims is consistently lower in all states. Whether it is the state with highest sterilization rate i.e. Andhra Pradesh, or the state with lowest sterilization rate i.e. Assam, the sterilization campaign has failed to produce results among the Muslims. Even the low sterilization states like UP and Bihar show a glaring gap between the two communities.

Assam shows the lowest sterilization rate of roughly 10% among all states. It is a special case and once again it is important to remember that Muslim population in Assam is predominantly rural. So, it seems Assam has such low sterilization rate because it failed to push sterilization among its rural Muslims.

The most important point to note here though is the campaign for sterilization in the saffron states i.e. states which have had BJP rule for quite some time. The low rung BJP leaders have been often seen campaigning for high fertility among Hindus, so one would expect the saffron states to follow a state policy which favours high fertility among Hindus. But is that true in the data?

One can take Gujarat as an example of saffron state with long enough BJP rule to gauge the impact of saffron rule on sterilization policy. Gujarat has an above average rate of sterilization among its population and there is a high enough difference of sterilization between Hindus and Muslims standing at 11%. So at cursory glance it seems that BJP has not been able to translate the preaching of its low level leaders into action on the ground through state policy. Although, Gujarat is the only example here and so it is insufficient to draw conclusion on BJP's policy stance. It would be interesting to calculate the same results from NFHS4 data, since then we can include figures from Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh etc with a long enough BJP tenure to impact sterilization decisions.

But is sterilization always just and does the government follow ethical policy of sterilization? To answer this question, NFHS3 included a question on whether the interviewee was informed about the irreversibility of sterilization before the operation? Out of some 32,523 respondents who answered this question, roughly one-third were not informed about the irreversibility of the procedure. It is a gross failure on the part of Indian state to not inform people about such an important issue affecting their lives. The results for this question and the breakup by religion is shown in table 4.6.

The southern states seem to do slightly better on informing their population about this procedure, but the results are alarming for most other states. Thankfully, at least in this case of not informing the females, there is no glaring difference between the two communities as seen by the national average of around 33% for both Hindus and Muslims.

Key Takeaway:

State	% sterlized		Total	Difference
	Hindu	Muslim	Sterlized	H-M
Andhra Pradesh	52.45	34.17	54.41	18.28
Assam	11.73	3.62	9.88	8.12
Bihar	24.48	5.75	20.12	18.73
Chhatisgarh	33.68	23.61	33.44	10.07
Delhi	20.19	6.85	17.54	13.34
J & K	20.84	17.51	18.50	3.34
Goa	19.85	23.27	17.39	-3.42
Gujarat	35.19	24.18	34.22	11.00
Haryana	33.83	3.85	31.31	29.99
Himachal pradesh	38.54	21.43	41.22	17.11
Jharkhand	25.02	8.81	19.35	16.21
Karnataka	47.07	34.13	44.83	12.94
Kerala	42.94	31.29	38.43	11.66
Madhya Pradesh	37.88	24.49	37.13	13.39
Maharashtra	40.28	26.20	41.40	14.08
Orissa	25.91	6.25	26.04	19.66
Punjab	25.05	11.96	24.02	13.09
Rajasthan	29.93	17.19	28.27	12.74
Tamil Nadu	44.62	39.59	42.38	5.02
Uttaranchal	26.62	7.69	24.94	18.93
Uttar Pradesh	16.77	5.42	13.46	11.36
West Bengal	27.46	16.49	27.35	10.97

Table 4.5: Female Sterilization Rate by State- NFHS3

State	Not Told			Difference
	Hindu	Muslim	Total	H-M
Andhra Pradesh	36.96	34.77	33.82	2.18
Assam	12.85	13.79	12.77	-0.94
Bihar	34.58	29.72	36.45	4.85
Chhatisgarh	33.39	29.41	33.66	3.98
Delhi	10.76	16.00	10.58	-5.23
Gujarat	43.72	34.09	42.76	9.63
Goa	41.18	33.78	38.77	7.4
Himachal Pradesh	33.01	54.54	33.67	-21.52
Haryana	30.45	16.66	30.64	13.78
Jharkhand	39.54	30.00	37.04	9.54
Jammu and Kashmir	47.27	40.12	42.73	7.14
Karnataka	34.49	37.20	34.77	-2.71
Kerala	31.75	32.59	31.33	-0.83
Madhya pradesh	29.88	21.53	31.01	8.34
Orissa	20.86	0.00	20.67	20.86
Punjab	33.05	36.36	28.32	-3.31
Rajasthan	40.34	48.52	41.79	-8.18
Tamil Nadu	17.46	22.91	17.15	-5.45
Uttarakhand	27.04	29.41	26.76	-2.36
Uttar Pradesh	44.01	40.87	42.3	3.14
West Bengal	27.55	26.14	26.03	1.4
India	33.25	32.98	32.82	0.27

Table 4.6: Not told that Sterilization is irreversible-NFHS3

- Hindus have much higher sterilization rate than Muslims, 32% relative to 17%.

- The sterilization rate is consistently higher for Hindus no matter how you slice up the data whether geographically or by education levels

- Since sterilization is voluntary, this consistent under-sterilization of Muslims implies that they avoid it due to theological reasons or low targeting, while Hindus react to government propaganda

- The thurst of sterilization campaign is built on sterilization of low educated i.e. poor Hindu females

- Roughly one-third of the survey respondents did not know about the non-reversible nature of female sterilization, which points towards a big human rights crisis as these women lose control over their biological body due to misinformation/no information.

To summarize, one can say that the big dent in Hindu fertility rode on the success of sterilization campaigns by the successive governments. Most states have shown a missionary zeal to sterilize poor uneducated Hindu females. Since, Muslims have higher fertility than Hindus everywhere, this raises another question why such polices did not specifically target the Muslims? The gains by targeting Muslims (the high TFR group) would have been much higher than targeting the Hindus.

If Muslims were targeted more under this policy, it would have been much easier to achieve fertility reduction targets. So why did the governments not pursue this direction? Or they actually targeted Muslims but

they did not react to the incentives as much as the Hindus. And if the governments knew that it is the Hindus who are self-selecting into this policy, why did they not stop or tune down the roll-out of the sterilization campaign? Why did successive governments allowed the erosion of Hindu demography through state sponsored schemes, which specifically targeted Hindus more than the Muslims? These are some very pertinent questions which cannot be answered without having access to more detailed data. And lastly, why have the saffron states with long enough BJP rule not removed this policy, while their low rung leaders go around asking Hindus to have 5 children?

4.2 Female Foeticide

If the Indian state has played its role in curtailing Hindu population, the Hindu society is not far behind in limiting its own growth. The presence of female foeticide has been a problem for the last few decades and has gripped many policy enthusiasts.

So what is the root cause of female foeticide among Hindu society? The first impulsive answer will be to blame it on the misogyny of Indian people (same can be said about Chinese, where this problem is even worse) who hate women and kill their female offspring. However, this is not true. The fact of the matter is, female foeticide has its origin partly in poverty and partly in female privilege. India is a traditional country and as such, parents live with their children in old age, when they can no longer work. For the majority of Indian parents, it usually means living with their sons, as only the sons are expected to take care of their old parents. This is specially true in the semi-urban and rural areas where

parents still live with their sons. Given the near absence of any kind of social safety net in India, this is the only option available to a regular person.

In this climate, when the erstwhile Congress governments ran massive propaganda against population explosion and dangers of large families, which it blamed for the lack of economic growth and hide it's incompetence, parents were forced to choose between a male and female child. Sadly, it generated overwhelming support for male children. This seems to have followed from the fact that in most regions the male child is expected to take care of old parents while the female child is supposed to leave them and live with her husband.

In the past, having large number of children usually meant that female foeticide or infanticide was never a problem as children were seen as wealth and not as a burden like how today's society has been made to believe. So the parents used to have many children without any preference which kept the sex ratio balanced. But then the government launched the propaganda against population and the result was that people decided to have fewer children as should be clear from the statistics on sterilization in the previous section.

When they were convinced to have fewer children, they decided to select for male child which resulted in female foeticide and infanticide overdrive. This propaganda against over population need much more investigation as highlighted in a piece published by Indiafacts [4], according to which GoI took support of Ford Foundation, the same organization which now trumpets feminist causes, to help abort female foetuses in order to control

[4]The article appeared in Indiafacts, an online portal, giving details on push by Ford Foundation in aborting females in north India to help control population growth. Read here.

population.

Since our topic of discussion is demography, we leave the discussion on reasons behind female foeticidethe for some other time. Under the current climate, it is important to see the damage caused (or will be caused) to Hindu demography due to this selective abortion of females by Hindus. Just like excessive sterilization, female foeticide is a result of government war on excessive population. The Muslims have not reacted as enthusiastically as Hindus to the government directives on population control as seen through their reluctance to use contraception. This also led to lower female foeticide among Muslims and thus they have a better sex ratio compared to the Hindus.

It is only the females in each community who give birth to the next generation and hence it is important to look at the sex-wise breakup of each community in different age cohorts. These population statistics for India are presented in table 4.7. It reports raw share of both male and females in each age cohort. We will stick to analyzing the results for age cohorts 0-4 years and 50-54 years, as done before in Chapter 2. The columns (1) and (2) give the percentage share of Hindus and Muslim females in their age cohort. So, if there are 100 female kids in 0-4 age cohort, 77.2 of them are Hindu (1) and 17.45 are Muslim (2) females. Same applies to other age cohorts as well as columns (3) and (4). The gap between female and male share is shown in columns (5) and (6) for two communities, where column (5) = (1)-(3) and (6)= (2)-(4). Under normal circumstances, i.e. no female foeticide, column (5) and (6) will be roughly close to zero. The percentage of Hindu males among all males in lower age cohorts will be equal to percentage of Hindu females in all females among that age cohort.

The important points to notice from table 4.7 are the

following. Firstly, the share of Hindu females out of the total female population is always lower compared to the share of Hindu males in the total male population in each age cohort. Secondly, the gap between percentage share of Hindu males and females is still high in the lower age cohort at 0-4 years, which probably hints towards presence of female foeticide among Hindus even now as shown in column (5) of table 4.7. Under ideal scenario of no female foeticide and similar death rates during pregnancy, both the columns (5) and (6) will be close to zero.

The important point to note here is that both Hindus and Muslims have lower share of females in 0-4 age cohort, implying that the other religions have a larger share of females in these cohorts. If the rate of death of female children were same across all religious groups, we would expect both male and female population share in that age group to match. But what we see here is that population share of males is higher among Hindus in all age cohorts and much higher in the lower age cohorts. If the two had similar birth-death for both genders, there is no reason to expect difference between female and male population shares out of total female and male population respectively.

What does table 4.7 tell and what it does not tell? One, it does not give the extent of female foeticide among Hindus and Muslims. Two, it does not say that there was no foeticide among Muslims. What it gives is the relative difference in female deaths between Hindus and Muslims. The share of Hindu females out of total females in a given age group should be similar to total Hindu males out of total males, so the difference here captures the relative excess female foeticide among Hindus.

The worst gap between Hindu male and female shares in their respective age group is seen in the age cohort of 15-19 years i.e. those born between 1991-95. There are

Age	Female		Male		Difference(F-M)	
	Hindu (1)	Muslim (2)	Hindu (3)	Muslim (4)	Hindu (5)	Muslim (6)
0-4	77.2	17.45	77.6	17.02	-0.40	0.43
5-9	77.67	17.15	78.06	16.72	-0.39	0.43
10-14	78.27	16.38	78.61	15.97	-0.34	0.41
15-19	77.88	16.27	78.81	15.47	-0.93	0.80
20-24	78.8	15.03	79.32	14.84	-0.52	0.19
25-29	80.07	13.82	80.45	13.65	-0.38	0.17
30-34	80.81	13.09	81.12	12.96	-0.31	0.13
35-39	81.03	12.81	81.39	12.74	-0.36	0.07
40-44	81.14	12.19	81.51	12.35	-0.37	-0.16
45-49	81.5	11.65	81.76	11.75	-0.26	-0.10
50-54	81.71	11.21	81.87	11.52	-0.16	-0.31
55-59	82.04	11.06	82.16	10.98	-0.12	0.08
60-64	82.24	10.83	82.03	11.43	0.21	-0.60
65-69	82.71	10.41	82.41	10.78	0.3	-0.37
70-74	82.96	10.12	82.82	10.51	0.14	-0.39
75-79	82.67	9.48	82.84	9.56	-0.17	-0.08
80+	81.6	10.58	81.61	10.73	-0.01	-0.15
All ages	79.64	14.29	79.95	14.16	-0.31	0.13

Table 4.7: Population share by sex and age group (Census 2011). Column (5)= (1) - (3) and Column (6) = (2) - (4).

0.93 percentage point excess males as compared to females in this age group. A large share of this gap is captured by Muslims, who have 0.80 percentage point higher number of females in this age group. These were the years post liberalization when sex determination techniques became available for the first time on a mass scale before government curbed upon it.

Although the difference in these male-female shares have come down over the new age cohorts but there are still excess males in the Hindu population. It is only in the higher age groups that the difference goes close to zero or turn negative even for Muslims i.e. more males compared to females, potentially implying early deaths of Muslim females compared to Hindu females and/or lower female foeticide in older generations.

Thus the key takeaways from the discussion on female foeticide are:

- Hindus have practised female foeticide on large levels in the past 2-3 decades with the worst period being 1991-95.

- Share of Hindu females in the total female population is lower than their male counterparts, pointing to further worsening of demography in the future as more share of Muslim females mean more share in the reproductive pool.

- The boomerang effect of this foeticide will be only seen now (post the 2011 census) as the worst impacted generation from 1991-95 enter the reproductive age. The -0.93 percentage point gap in Hindu male and female will show up in the next cohort.

Female foeticide is the most ugly side of the Hindu society and will impose a huge demographic cost on the

Hindus in the future. A society that kills it unborn daughters will definitely earn the negative karma for its actions. Now it is upon the future generations to pay for the mistakes of their ancestors.

4.3 Infant Mortality Rate

It seems the dice of demography has been rolled against the Hindus by the nature itself. How else can one explain that on top of self-inflicted wounds like the excess female sterilization and foeticide compared to Muslims, Hindu children also die more naturally?

The infant mortality has come down for the whole Indian population over the years as reflected in the statistics collected in the different waves of NFHS survey. But what is puzzling is the consistent difference in the Hindu-Muslim mortality rate among the infants. This difference in mortality rates between Hindus and Muslims is shown in table 4.8 [5].

Both Hindus and Muslims have seen a decreasing mortality rate for their infants and the total number of infant deaths has gone down from 9.16% to 6.53% for the Hindus, while from 8.23% to 5.82% for the Muslims. But the difference in Hindu-Muslim death rate has stayed at 0.71 even in the last NFHS3. Although, more Muslims live in urban areas but that does not completely explain the difference between the two communities as found in some of the papers quoted above. The common explanation of higher female discrimination (or foeticide) is also rejected because Hindu male kids also die at an alarmingly high rate when compared to Muslims. If discrimination was the major reason, male Hindu kids would not

[5] Table reproduced from Allendorf and Guillot: Hindu-Muslim Differentials in Child Mortality in India

Survey	Under 5 Mortality Rate		Percent Died		
	Muslim	Hindu	Muslim	Hindu	Difference
NFHS-1	93.6	105.6	8.23	9.16	0.93
NFHS-2	76.3	93.3	6.82	8.20	1.38
NFHS-3	62.9	71.6	5.82	6.53	0.71
All waves	77.4	90.6	6.95	8.01	1.06

Table 4.8: Infant Mortality rates (Source: Footnote 5)

have the infant mortality rate different than male Muslim kids.

There have been many papers written on this issue where the authors have tried to explain the puzzle using different metrics. The puzzle only deepens since Hindu women provide better antenatal care as well as immunization to their kids according to these surveys.

The literature does not have clear answer for explaining the Muslim advantage but one can still list some of the important factors[6]. The most important ones are, firstly, Muslim mothers usually stay more at home thus conferring survival advantage to their kids compared to the Hindu women who work outside more. Secondly, Muslims probably have better access to public health care in case of diarrhoea or other water borne diseases (urban effect as more Muslims are urbanized). Thirdly, it can also be due to higher fertility among Muslims. Since fewer Muslim children are first-borns or, relatedly, fewer are born to very young mothers, which confers higher survival advantage. Fourthly, Muslim women are taller, indicating long term health benefits, and hence giving birth to better nourished kids. Whether this is related to excessive vegetarianism among Hindu mothers is a point to think about.

[6] Bhalotra et. al, Religion and Childhood Death in India

But even after accounting for all these above mentioned factors, being a Muslim gives survival advantage to the young children. This implies that we are probably missing some other important variable which is highly correlated with being Muslim and conferring survival advantage to their new borns.

Nevertheless, irrespective of whether we know or not, this difference in mortality rates between Hindus and Muslims has conferred further advantage to the Muslim demography. This difference (from NFHS3) in infant mortality rates will shave off another 0.1% from Hindu demography and add to the Muslims. Although, it is not as big a drag on the Hindu demography as the female foeticide, but it is nevertheless an important differential, which one should look into. When one is losing demography, every 0.1% matters. Also, the aggregate deaths of >6% are still huge and should be brought down to near zero as has been achieved in the rest of the world.

4.4 Other Myths

One of the popular myths surrounding the Muslim population explosion is that it is growing because they have more children from multiple wives. The growth is supposed to come from the practise of polygamy among Muslims. But is this inference supported in the data? Or even more fundamentally, can polygamy generate higher population growth?

Firstly, the number of children depends on the number of females in a community, so one man having multiple wives does not directly impact the number of kids a female can bear. Secondly, multiple wives can matter when Muslim men increasingly marry Hindu women thus increasing the total pool of females raising Muslim

kids and decreasing it for Hindus. Although there is no data on it and probably there are many instances of love jihad, but census numbers cannot throw light on cases of love jihad. Thus blaming polygamy for high Muslim fertility is wrong if we cannot prove that polygamy leads to poaching of Hindu women. Thirdly, this is not true in the data as Muslim men do not practise polygamy any more than Hindus.

NFHS3 collected information on the number of wives as it asked the respondents whether they know if their husbands have other wives. The results of this question are shown in table 4.9. More than 97% of both Hindus and Muslims are in monogamous relationship. Although, slightly higher percentage of Muslims have more than one wife but it is not so huge as to generate the population explosion that some Hindus would like to believe. Thus given this information it is not correct to attribute high Muslim fertility and population growth to polygamy.

Although, it is still possible that permission for polygamy in Muslim Personal Law gives more leverage to Muslim men to demand more children from their wives. Easy divorce and permission for polygamy definitely brings down the bargaining power of Muslim women in fertility decisions. But as it stands in the data, this threat seems to be covert and not overtly executed by Muslim men. So, it would not be polygamy but permission of polygamy per se in Islam that can lead to higher Muslim fertility.

Before we close this discussion on TFR politics, we can look at the last but equally important information which can be obtained from the NFHS data. It is a subjective question and quantifies the ideal number of kids as reported by the families. If Hindus do not want to get sterilized, there is no way government can force their females to get sterilized. Similarly, if they do not want to get restricted to one child, there is no reason to consider

Number of Wives	Hindu	Muslim	Christian	Sikh
1	97.98	97.08	96.51	99.64
2	1.48	2.21	2.48	0.26
3	0.12	0.30	0.49	0.00
4	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.00
5	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
6	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
7	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Don't know	0.21	0.15	0.34	0.05

Table 4.9: Number of wives by religion (NFHS3)

Ideal Number	Percentage			
of children	Hindu	Muslim	Christian	Sikh
0	1.20	1.19	1.85	3.10
1	9.43	3.48	8.16	15.14
2	61.24	46.61	59.72	65.20
3	18.53	24.36	14.41	8.59
4	6.40	14.94	8.16	2.12
5	0.81	2.65	2.15	0.07
6+	0.39	1.49	1.65	0.00

Table 4.10: Ideal Number of Children (NFHS3)

Ideal Number of children	Secondary (%)		Higher (%)	
	Hindu	Muslim	Hindu	Muslim
0	0.92	1.52	0.94	0.95
1	23.21	8.84	27.93	11.24
2	70.07	65.61	65.92	68.05
3	4.11	16.71	3.24	11.95
4	0.48	4.56	0.62	4.38
5	0.05	0.28	0.08	0.47

Table 4.11: Ideal number of Children by education (NFHS3)

female child as a burden and practise female foeticide. In both these cases, Hindus have themselves to blame and no one else.

The dedication to preserve/alter the demography clearly gets reflected in the number of kids each community wants to have in an ideal scenario. NFHS3 collected the response on the ideal number of kids for each respondent and it can be used to answer this question. The results for this question are shown in table 4.10. It shows that majority of Hindus i.e. 61.2% prefer 2 children, compared to only 46.6% Muslims. A significantly large number of Hindus want to restrict themselves to 1 or 2 children, while the number stays fairly high for Muslims even at 3 or 4 children. A lower child preference among Hindus is potentially driven by their higher education levels, but it does not completely disappear even after controlling for education.

The results for ideal number of kids by highest levels of education (secondary completed and higher) are shown in table 4.11. Compared to the previous table, here one can see that 93% of Hindus have listed their ideal num-

ber of children below or equal to 2. The most dramatic is the sharp increase in the number of Hindus whose ideal number of kids is 1, which goes up from 23.2% to 27.9% as one gets more educated. In comparison, the percentage of Muslims who want only 1 kid is very small. Also noticeable are a significant number of Muslims who list 3 or more as the ideal number of kids. This table makes it clear that Muslim preference for kids stays higher than Hindus even after achieving higher education which is being reflected in the dedicated number of community members who stick to having large families.

While education drastically reduces the Hindu preference for children, it stays more or less high for a significant portion of Muslim population. It is these dedicated members among the Muslim community who are creating most of the TFR difference between Hindus and Muslims. And it is this group of people, who would not change their mind even after becoming richer or more educated. Although, ideal number of kids is a subjective measure but this information in NFHS3 reflects the important reason behind high Muslim fertility and the TFR gap between the two religions.

4.5 Exodus Experts

There is a set of Hindu intellectuals, who prefer to put the blame on various governments for their lackadaisical policies leading to the ethnic cleansing of Hindus in many regions. While it is true that in the case of Kashmiri Pandits and some other regions, targeting Hindus happened under the watch of successive governments with a tacit approval, but it would not explain rapid demographic decline in other regions with heavy to moderate majority of Hindus.

Once a region gets high Muslim population, it is possible to expect out migration of Hindus due to demographic pressure by the Muslims through outright targeting of kids and women.[7] Of course, one cannot find a bigger and better example than the exodus of Kashmir Pandits, the only case in independent India where the victims have not yet been able to return back to their home state.

In the last chapter we amply demonstrated how the Hindu fertility has crashed in Kerala and seems to be the prominent reason behind falling Hindu demographics in that state. Similar trends have been observed else where but there is a particular class of exodus experts who do not want to pin the blame where it lies i.e. on Hindus themselves for their low fertility (or government for rampant sterilization campaigns). Such experts look for exodus as an explanation for fall in Hindu population, specially in the case of red zone areas. But is exodus really the main reason behind the falling demography? We think that it is one of the reasons but cannot explain the falling demography of Hindus everywhere in the whole country. If exodus was the main culprit, then all regions will not see similar erosion of Hindu demography from Kashmir to Kanyakumari.

To make this point clear, we can again look at the fertility data available in the Census 2011. It reports number of births in a year in each district. This district level data can then be used to generate district level TFR. As a case study, we can look at TFR data from west UP districts. To understand whether exodus is really the biggest reason for the fall in Hindu demography in west

[7]For example- In the case of Muzzafarnagar riots in 2013, the primary reason for the spark was eve-teasing of Hindu girls by some Muslim men.

UP, let us look at the TFR of four districts in west UP given in table 4.12. Baghpat is significantly Hindu, Muzzafarnagar and Saharanpur are moderately Hindu while Rampur is majority Muslim.

The reason for this case study is two fold. One, these districts lie in the high Muslim concentration areas of western UP and hence exodus should be high in these districts. For exodus hypothesis to hold, we will expect young Hindus to migrate and thus bring down the overall Hindu TFR and fertility.[8] Two, the districts are close to each other and would have Hindus similar to each other in the whole region. Same will be true for Muslims as well. This is to avoid bias in comparing Hindus from one region with Hindus of another region as they might be very different from each other. Since the four districts are neighbouring, this bias would be minimum as the cultural norms are not expected to change completely in the neighbouring districts. So, we have a good way to compare fertility decisions of Hindus and Muslims and if exodus hypothesis holds.

If exodus were true in case of west UP demographic demise, then we would expect lower Hindu fertility in the districts with low Hindu population because these are the districts where Hindus are under greatest demographic pressure from the Muslims. On the other hand, districts with high Hindu population should not show any such constraint and have high fertility because the young population from there has not migrated under demographic pressure. But is it the case?

[8]Kairana in Shamli district from the same region had many news on Hindu migration out of the city. Exodus is possible in pockets within the districts itself, but the question we are asking is whether it led to the complete demise of Hindu population share in west UP. Did Hindu demography crumble due to exodus alone or there are other possible factors as well?

District	Hindu Share(%)	Hindu TFR	Muslim TFR
Baghpat	70.41	2.39	3.99
Muzzafarnagar	57.51	2.34	3.62
Saharanpur	56.74	2.33	3.26
Rampur	45.97	3.01	2.96

Table 4.12: Comparison of district TFR for UP

Looking at table 4.12, it does not seem so.[9] The districts are arranged in decreasing order of Hindu population with Baghpat at the top with 70% Hindus and Rampur at the bottom with 46% Hindus and Muzzafarnagar and Saharanpur in the middle and borderline Hindu majority.

What you can see is that the Hindu TFR is no different in case of Baghpat, Muzzafarnagar and Saharanpur. While the first district is 70% Hindu and the latter two only borderline Hindu majority. Surprisingly, Hindu TFR is the highest (=3.01) in Rampur, the district which is Hindu minority among these four. This shows that Hindus are having fewer kids in this region out of choice, otherwise how will comparatively high majority district like Baghpat has similar TFR as other low Hindu majority districts? Rampur on the other hand shows high TFR though it is a Hindu minority district. With the current dataset, it is difficult to say whether Rampur is an outlier or the Hindus there are consciously trying to out-breed Muslims.

[9]It must be mentioned that district level TFR measures can be a bit more noisy than the measures at state/national level due to population variations at the district level which can bias estimates. Such issues average out at bigger levels. But nevertheless it is the best measure for district level TFR.

On the other hand, the Muslim TFR in this region shows a consistently decreasing pattern with the share of Hindu population in the district. It is highest in Baghpat, with 70% Hindu population, and lowest in Rampur, with 46% Hindus. Also, the decrease is huge and goes down from 3.99 to 2.96 i.e. by almost 1 unit. Given that these are neighbouring districts, it is a very shocking statistic to say the least. Either there are some very deep underlying differences in the Muslim populations in these districts or Muslims really change their fertility pattern once close to achieving majority.

Since this fertility calculation is done based on those who were present in the household, it raises serious questions on the exodus hypothesis for the borderline Hindu majority districts. For all practical purposes, a fertility difference of 1.4 as in case of Baghpat translates to 58% fertility differential between Hindus and Muslims. If we do the population projection for Baghpat as done in the last chapter, given the current 62% Hindus in 0-4 age cohort (it is less than total 70%) and 58% fertility differential, Hindu population of Baghpat will be only 49.4% in 25 years in the 0-4 age group. Thus Baghpat will mimic the other neighbouring districts in roughly 25 years even without any out-migration of Hindus. Thus table 4.12 is a big evidence against exodus hypothesis in the case of current west UP. The demographic demise of western UP at least can be explained by low TFR of Hindus alone.

The purpose of this section is not to undermine the whole idea of exodus, as it might happen after the Muslim share in the whole population reaches a certain threshold. And may be there is some exodus even in the western UP region but given the data on TFR differential, one does not need exodus to reduce the Hindu share in the 0-4 age cohorts. When the fall in TFR can easily explain demographic shift even in districts with high enough Hindu

population share, exodus seems only a way to shy away from the personal responsibility. Hindus are losing 5-10% share in so many districts that it seems to be driven by a bigger underlying cause. And according to the data, it is the low Hindu TFR. No matter which way you slice the data, this underlying factor never goes away.

5

Conclusion

> *"It is the most intolerant person who imposes virtue on others precisely because of that intolerance"*
>
> – Taleb [1]

To say that the information provided in Census 2011 on religious demographics is alarming, would be an understatement. During the course of this book, we have extensively covered the demographics information from various angles and each angle only showed a dismal position of Hindu demography.

When one looks at data there are usually outliars and anomalies in the overall trends, but the growth in Muslim concentration in districts has just one trend (and it is upward). We showed in chapter two that districts only change one way i.e. jump to a higher bracket of Muslim share in 0-4 age when compared to 50-54 cohort. There is not even a single district, which for example had 20-30% Muslims in 50-54 age cohort and their numbers decreased below 20% in 0-4 cohort. And it is true for all districts

[1] Nassib Nicholos Taleb: The most intolerant wins: The dictatorship of the small minority. Chapter from "Skin in the Game".

in each share bracket. Generally, there can be a few exceptions to such regularity in data but not with respect to Muslim population share increase.

Now the question is- how can you justify such regularity? The rich Hindu-poor Muslim, advantaged Hindu-disadvantaged Muslim, majority Hindu-minority Muslim and other similar dichotomies cannot and should not hold true for all districts in India. The TFR difference has two components- Hindu and Muslim fertility. So, even if Hindus might be reducing their fertility at faster rate, why is it that in no district Muslims decreased it more than Hindus so as to lead to a decrease in Muslim population share in some district?

Thus it is no longer justified to assign high comparative Muslim fertility to all social factors other than being a Muslim. These various factors have a role to play but one cannot explain away the identity of being a Muslim driving these trends. One can no longer discount the fact that Muslims have Islamic mandate to grow numerically and dilute others' population share. And no where else would it matter more than under democracy with "one person, one vote".

Given the sensitive nature of information uncovered in this book there would be many attempts to dilute this analysis by the usual suspects i.e. Islamophilic social scientists. A section of social scientists will engage in monkey balancing (statistical) exercises to discount the findings that we have reported in this book. So, it is essential to bust the statistical charade of these social scientists before they even decide to refute the findings here. The next section will pre-emptively put to rest any such exercises in the future.

5.1 Statistical Gymnastics

Statistical gymnastics is nothing but the usage of fancy statistical modelling techniques to hide the information which is unpalatable to the secular intelligentsia who in their attempt for ideological purity don't want to believe that religion can be the most important driving force for decision making in an individual's life. But the lived experience of these ivory tower intellectuals, who have at most shared a biryani with a Muslim friend, is very different from the experience of those on the ground who everyday realize the increasing number of skull caps on the roads, in the markets and in their neighbourhoods. And hence statistical chicanery can hide demographic facts for a brief period of time but not forever.

So, when true demographic facts are presented, it does not go down well with a large section of social scientists in this country. Then begins the efforts to somehow hide this explosive demographic information. This situation has been faced by other authors, who have worked on this topic before and tried to present the true demographic picture.

One such example is the counter article by Jayaraj and Subramaniam in 2004 to counter the claims made by J K Bajaj and co-authors in their book Religious Demography of India [2].

As is typical of liberal attack in such cases, rather than scientifically disprove the thesis of Bajaj and co-authors, Jayaraj and Subramaniam first tried to destroy their credentials. This personal attack is evident right at the beginning of their paper in EPW and is quoted below:

"The book under review, written by A P Joshi, M D Srini-

[2] Jayaraj and Subramaniam, Abusing Demography, EPW, 2004.

vas and J K Bajaj (two of whom, we understand, are physicists, and one is a metallurgist), is a product of research from the Centre for Policy Studies, Chennai."

There are two reasons to be wary about this type of attack. First, if the thesis put forth by Bajaj et al is so superficial and improbable, there is no reason for a counter article in EPW. Second, if you consider it important enough to denounce, you do not have to mention the educational qualifications of the authors concerned to further your point. The technical details of the paper should have been strong enough to counter Bajaj et al, thus leaving no room for personal background and abuse.

But lets put aside the history of above controversy and look at the current scenario and how our book settles most of these debates. There are different ways to contribute excess fertility among Muslims to various factors like income, education level, caste etc., but we saw in previous chapter that religion remains the most important one. As a final step, we will now pre-emptively answer most of the roundabout questions that will be raised by the demography data deniers in the future. Here is a laundry list of such questions and relevant answers:

1. The first two chapters of our book completely sidestep the discussion on projection by using the age information present in the Census 2011. While total population does matter, but if we already know how the future generations would look like, it is not smart to look at those aggregate numbers.

   If Muslims account for 22% of 0-4 age cohort in urban population, we know they will be 22% youth in coming 2-3 decades. No amount of statistical polishing will change this fact. Using age information on district level, we have thus shown which regions

will have high Muslim concentration in the very near future thus decreasing the need to depend on projections for the next few decades.

2. For the future projections, we have used current fertility and base population levels for the two religions. Once again, we sidestep any discussion on how regression curves fit the past data. We use the latest information on TFR and population shares to make the cohort predictions. Those who control the youth, control the future and hence we stick to predicting just the next cohort shares. Hence, we do not have to make strong assumptions needed for predicting whole population shares and how they have changed in the past.

   There are two important differences (or benefits) of using this method. Firstly, we are not predicting total population shares but population shares in the 0-4 age cohorts so we need fewer assumptions. Secondly, for future prediction as reported in chapter 3, the main assumption is on percentage differential of TFR between the two religious groups and current cohort ratios. If the current differential remains valid in the near three-four decades our predictions will come out to be true. Also, the chances of this second assumption to hold true is much higher because for the percentage differential to go down, Muslim fertility has to decrease more than Hindus in absolute terms (which has not happened in cases like Kerala, the HDI paradise!). Given the trend of rapid decrease in Hindu fertility, it becomes even more difficult for the Muslims to decrease their fertility at even greater levels to match the TFR shredder Hindus.

3. The level of absolute TFR difference does not matter, what matters is the percentage differential. So, if the percentage differential continues to be large, the Muslim population share will continue to rise at the same speed. A difference of 1 at Hindu TFR of 4 is less damaging to demography than at TFR of 2.

   Why is the above point very important? We have seen fertility decrease for both religious groups over the years, but that is only in levels. But as shown in table 3.4, although the fertility levels have gone down for both Hindus and Muslims, the percentage differential between the two still stands at 30% (it actually increased in NFHS3 from NFHS2, where it was 29%). For population shares to stay constant the percentage TFR gap between the two communities should go down. So if absolute Hindu fertility decreases by 0.5, the Muslim fertility has to go down even more to decrease the percentage gap.

   Once again, Kerala is a perfect example for this where Hindu fertility has gone down to 1.5. For population shares to stay constant, Muslim fertility in Kerala should also go down to 1.5, but instead it is stuck at 2.4 (still lower than Indian TFR but enough to turn Kerala into Islamic majority). This has created a big percentage differential and Hindu population share keeps falling at a much increased pace in Kerala, as compared to the past. If in the future Hindu fertility continues to hover below the replacement level, Muslims can overtake them easily by maintaining a small difference in levels.

4. It is true that there are many associated factors for high fertility and hence each of them can contribute

significantly to high Muslim fertility. But nevertheless, being Muslim is a significant factor even after controlling for these numerous factors. Even if one controls for various socio-economic factors, religion is predominant and explains more than three quarter of difference in Hindu-Muslim TFR.[3]

The statistics, no matter which way you split, geographically or by social status, as presented in the last chapter always result in higher fertility for Muslims. There must be some underlying Muslim factor which must be driving these consistent results everywhere. Even globally, Muslims have a higher fertility than other religions in all the regions. It is impossible for some other nuanced factors to explain such statistical consistency everywhere in all places and all the time for all social groups.

On top to corroborate, we have two other measures, which point towards why Muslims might have high fertility. First is a subjective measure-ideal number of kids. The average of ideal number of kids reported by Muslims is higher everywhere. Once again, even after looking at the results by education levels, we consistently find Muslim preference for more kids in the data. A significantly large percentage of highly educated Muslims continue to report 3 or 4 kids as an ideal number of children.

Second is the objective measure of sterilization, that we have presented in the book or contraception adoption in general as reported in other studies. Muslims are consistently less sterilized all across

[3] A good discussion on Hindu-Muslim TFR differences is given in Bhat and Zavier (2005). They use both NFHS-1 and NFHS-2 to show that religion is the primary reason for high Muslim fertility.

the country. If they were so deprived and poor as claimed by the left, they should respond more to government sops that come with sterilization. But Muslims consistently avoid sterilization in the whole country. These two trends are well established in the literature such as Dhamalinga et al (2005). They establish both these trends hold for data from NFHS2. Similar results were found by Iyer and Joshi (2013) for the later waves of NFHS3. [4]

Given these finding we can argue that only extremely biased individuals will ignore such consistency in the data and look for sophisticated non-explanations to mask the high comparative Muslim fertility and population growth.

5. Even after acknowledging the various factors responsible for high Muslim fertility, one cannot completely ignore that one of the reasons for Muslim disadvantage on different social indicators is rooted in their bigger families.

   If we are to believe this disadvantage hypothesis for having more kids, then it generates a vicious cycle of more kids leading to worse social outcomes and then worse outcomes leading to more kids in the next generation of Muslims. If this feedback loop continues for the next few generations, which is very possible, the demography of India would be left completely in disarray.

   Whether one believes that high Muslim fertility is

[4] Dharmalinga et al., Muslim-Hindu fertility differences, EPW, 2005.

Iyer and Joshi, Missing Women and India's Religious Demography, Journal of South Asian Development, 2013.

rooted in Islamic theology or social deprivation, the end result is the same. By the time this issue is resolved in a few decades (i.e. if one waits for Muslims to achieve same social level as Hindus), Muslims would have already altered the Indian demography completely as shown in the second and third chapters.

6. There is another important piece of non-quantitative evidence which is completely ignored by the Nehruvian brand of intellectuals and western specialists, which is the decree given in Islamic jurisprudence and as upheld by the regular fatwas. The regular Muslims are very well aware of the their goal to convert the Dar-al-Harb into Dar-al-Islam and womb jihad is one of the easy and silent ways to achieve this objective.

   While as a social scientist, one should avoid the pitfall of giving full weight to such decrees issued by the Mullahs and the Maulavis, in order to conclude about the decision making process of common Muslims. But not giving any weight at all to the Muslim religious duties, as is common among many scholars, is also equally problematic for true scientific inquiry.

   One survey after another has proved it beyond doubt that Muslims form one of the most zealot religious groups on this planet. Their zeal for religious adherence is the strongest as reflected in their support for implementation of Sharia or other barbaric practices in repeated surveys across the globe. Does it befit any social scientist to ignore this mounting amounts of evidence which goads ordinary Muslims into having more children and convert every place

into Dar-al-Islam in any way possible?

Also, some scholars might try to brush aside this argument by citing numerous Hindu leaders who too have talked about increasing Hindu TFR in the past. While stray Hindu leaders might be found speaking in favor of more children by Hindus, but it is no where as close to the Muslims. Firstly, Hinduism is not monolithic like Islam (even though Islamic practices might be diverse within India) when it comes to the concept of defining the other non-believers (kaffir). Secondly, Hinduism is not a proselytizing sect as the other Abrahamic religions, one of them being Islam. Thirdly and most importantly, most of these Hindu leaders, who might have spoken in favour of high fertility, probably do not have grand standing within the Hindu community itself. Had it been the case, Hindu TFR would have been high as well! Just because Hindus do not follow the decree from their religious or political leaders, it does not mean that Muslims neither. And hence this line of debate is vacuous. Fourthly, if such leaders from Hindus or BJP were to be believed to carry out their agenda, one would expect lower sterilization rates for females at least in the BJP ruled states like Gujarat. But that's not true in the data.

7. Lastly, even if mental gymnastics can lead some people to believe in the sophisticated statistics rather than consistency of high Muslim fertility everywhere in India (even more valid in more educated states like Kerala), they cannot run away from the fact that some of the regions are already beyond point of no return. 29 districts out of 594 already have 50%+ Muslim population in 0-4 age cohort, plus

another 18 have 40-50% and another 16 with 30-40%. This makes 63 very sensitive districts in India, with a significant Muslim population (here it is worth pondering that at the time of partition in 1947 Muslim population was mere 26%). Assam, Kerala, West Bengal and West UP are already sitting on a tinderbox, just waiting for the right moment to explode. One should not be too surprised if big ethnic tensions grip these states in the near future, the way it happened in Jammu & Kashmir in the 90s when Kashmiri Pandits were driven out of their homeland.

The above list of counterarguments will need to be updated at regular intervals as given the nature of mental gymnastics potential of the intellectuals with Islamophilic bent, it is expected that they will definitely come up with some half baked ideas to refute the findings presented here. Sadly, the 2011 census data, through its information on age cohorts, reveals more information than they expected. The persistence of current trends for the next few decades are sufficient to completely alter the demography forever.

The damage to the demography has already been done in many states, specially in Kerala, West Bengal, Assam and West UP. No amount of TFR debate aimed at proving how it is not rooted in Islamic theology but social economic conditions of Muslims, is going to change the demographic future of these areas. Given the splendid record of how the Indian state has handled the Kashmir problem in the last seven decades, one can only feel sorry for the mess that the future generations will inherit in these other states which are staring at their future of becoming another Kashmir.

5.2 Under or Over-breeding

The vices of modernity and consumerism has hardly left any corner of the world untouched. Moving to non-primary sectors of economy (primary sectors being agriculture, mining etc.) has reduced the dependence on children for accomplishing tasks and made them economically unproductive for modern families. Under these circumstances having a kid is more of a lifestyle choice than a survival necessity. Also, given that the children these days need not only more investment but also need it for a longer duration before they can find any meaningful employment, has made parenting a costly job. Thus it would not be an over-statement to say that for many modern couples kids are glorified pets and the decision to have/not have one depends completely on the individual's lifestyle choice.

Taking cognizance of this scenario, one can now raise the question whether the increasing fertility gap (in percentage terms) between Hindus and Muslims is due to Hindus under-breeding or Muslims over-breeding. The TFR has gone down for both religions, but more so for the Hindus.

By looking at the quantum of reduction in fertility for Muslims and ignoring Hindu fertility, one can say that modernity has affected them as well at some level. If the value of kids has reduced for Hindus, it also seems to have reduced for Muslims as reflected by small reduction in their fertility.

It is difficult to think of a situation where the entire Muslim community coordinates to have one child more than the Hindus everywhere, irrespective of the level of Hindu TFR. For it to work, Muslim leadership will have to keep a tab on Hindu fertility levels everywhere and then direct their community members on the exact and

optimal number of children. If it were completely under the control of Mullahs, Muslims will bridge the population gap much more quickly by having even larger families and sustaining the fertility levels as in the 1980s. But it has not happened and although the percentage gap between Hindu-Muslim TFR has remained the same, the absolute fertility of Muslims has come down nevertheless. As a directive it is easier for the Mullahs to exhort the Muslims to have bigger families, but planning and coordinating on the precise number of children seems a bit too far fetched.

By this argument, one cannot attribute the complete TFR gap to over-breeding by the Muslims. The Muslim TFR has gone down, but the Hindu TFR have plunged even further. The fertility level for maintaining a stable population is 2.1, but the Hindu TFR has gone below that in many regions.

Given the current fertility trends, Hindus can't even maintain their current population levels in most states. The Hindu fertility has reduced below 2.1 in most regions which is even worse than many European nations. The age pyramids are becoming top heavy and Hindu population will start to reduce in few years. Except UP and Bihar, it seems that Hindu population might have already peaked in many states.

So, is it justified to blame only the Muslims for the Hindu population debacle? If one group cannot even maintain replacement level fertility, is it fault of the other more aggressive group which puts more weight on having a decent sized family?

For example- Hindus in Kerala have known for a while how they are losing demography to the Muslims in the state. And although TFR of Kerala Muslims is only 2.5 (not the highest in the country), their Hindu counterparts have consistently had below replacement level fertility for

a very long time. So, who is to be blamed here- Muslim over-breeding or Hindu under-breeding?

The fertility gap between rural Hindus and Muslims is not as dismal as their urban counterparts. Both the absolute and percentage gap is lower in the rural areas. Not surprisingly it is in the urban areas that the Muslims are closing the population gap at a much alarming rate.

5.3 Optimal Response

Given the information presented here, the immediate follow up question for anyone reading this book will bewhat should be the ideal response of Hindu society under this persistent Islamic womb jihad?

The response to this question can vary, but there are two stages to any kind of problem resolution. The first stage is problem recognition, while the second stage is actually finding a solution. Sadly, the Hindu society still seems to be stuck on the first stage.

The liberal and Islamophilic intellectuals in this country have no sympathy for any Hindu cause, so it would be too much to expect them to have even a passing discussion on this issue. They will remain silent or rather suppress any demographic information from reaching common Hindus. The troubling part is that Hindu intellectuals too have not formed any credible opinion on this subject. The regular Hindu intellectuals although aware of the demographic loss do not realize the extent of loss which has already happened.

This book fills up the gap on providing the information on the extent of demographic loss, but it will take some time to come to grips with this data. And once the Hindu society absorbs this information, the question will still linger whether they can stand up face to face with

this problem and do something about it.

Quantity has a quality of its own. No one demonstrated it better than the Allied forces during the second world war when they won it by pitting sub-standard tanks and war planes against more modern but heavily outnumbered German war machines. So, if one can win a world war by pitting quantity against quality, there is no reason to expect different outcome in a democracy where the game is rigged in favour of the numbers. And this game is being played out in front of everyone's eyes for the past seven decades in India, but Hindus fail to recognize what holds for their future if they do not put sands in the wheels of Muslim demographic jihad machine.

Just to reiterate the importance of demographics, let's look at the map of Bangladesh below to see how demographics were altered for forever in our neighbourhood. The colour has consistently changed to dark green for younger population i.e. Hindus have gone below 5% of the population in almost all districts now as shown in the figure 5.1[5]. The dark green represents highest Muslim share (lowest Hindu share) in the regional population, while red the lowest (highest Hindu share). The graph is shown for different age cohorts.

Bangladesh has a Hindu minority but still the Muslims there ensured that they decrease their percentage share further. It also shows that just being a minority under threat (like the Hindus in Bangladesh) was not a good enough reason for Hindus there to over-breed the majority. Unlike the minority in India i.e. Muslims, the minority in Bangladesh i.e. Hindus consistently underbred or possibly migrated. The results are more than clear in 5.1, where gradually the whole of Bangladesh has removed the Hindu population share in lower age cohorts.

[5]Information taken from 2011 Bangladesh Census



Figure 5.1: Hindu Demography of Bangladesh

Whether this is fertility difference or out-migration of Hindus under threat is an interesting question to pursue, but it will need a full book on its own.

Hindus in India will face similar future in large number of areas if they do not understand it even now. And those in the Hindu fold who cry about secular politics today can only imagine what holds for them in the Muslim majority neighbourhoods of tomorrow. So, what is the way forward to handle this issue.

There seem to be only two solutions:

- Restricted one child policy for Muslims
- Hindus counter-breeding Muslims

While policy 1 would be an ideal and less costly choice, but given general lack of spine among Hindus in India and pandering to secular agenda, it is almost impossible

to implement. The law enforcement agencies are already scared to police minority dominated areas, so policy 1 is a cropper even before starting. One can give long arguments in favour of policy 1 but given the current circumstances one can almost rule it out. What can happen is that under the garb of restricting overall population, one child norm is enforced on whole population, which Hindus will comply while Muslims will flout. So, rational Hindus are left with nothing but policy 2 as the only remedy till some other better solution can be found or Muslims somehow are reduced back to one-digit figure.

The only other nation which has understood this problem seriously and taken the bull by its horn is Israel. The Muslim TFR went down from 8-9 in 1960s to about 4.6 in 1980s but has stayed there almost since then. Israel being a democracy faced similar problem as India and the presence of a large number of liberals ensured that policy 1 was rejected there as well. So, the orthodox Jews took it upon themselves to stem the tide of demographic reversal and started counter breeding Muslims to remain relevant in the Israeli politics. The current demographics [6] show that they have been more than successful in their initiative as can be seen in the table 5.1. It is worthwhile to mention here that the orthodox Jews had no support from the liberal crowd in Israel, but they still manged to stem the demographic tide on their own.

What does this mean for the future of Israel? The orthodox Jews have not only successfully countered the problem of high TFR of Muslims but have also completely altered the political landscape of Israel. Given the small weight that liberals put on their fertility, they are increasingly replaced by the more orthodox sections

[6] Friedlander: Fertility in Israel-Is the transition to replacement level possible?

Group	TFR
The Jewish non-religious group of both ethnicities (67-70%)	2.0-2.2
The Arab Christian population (2%)	2.6
Arab Moslems and Druze (16%)	4.0
The Jewish ultra-orthodox and the National Orthodox (12-15%)	6.0-7.0
Israel's overall TFR	2.9

Table 5.1: Fertility in Israel

of Jews. This means that in the future Israeli politics will move more to the extreme right and given the fact that orthodox Jews will control the politics, they would be in a position to implement policy 1 if needed. So, Hindus who go in an over drive to support every misadventure of Israel will do much better if they learn something from the orthodox Jews rather than extend blanket support to all policies of Israel.

Once Hindus realize the gravity of the situation, they will have to put in huge efforts to implement this solution. They will face a lot of flak from the women activists who would fight it tooth and nail and give argument of quality over quantity. But sadly in a democracy there is just one vote both for the enlightened Hindu feminist as well as the fanatic Muslim. No amount of fact digging from the scriptures and history that Hindu seers and other iconic figures had just one or two but quality offspring can change the fact that numbers matter in a democracy more than anything else. And India will continue to be

a democracy in the foreseeable future.

Also, one should not forget that unlike other civilizations Hindus had never been overly nihilistic or individualistic in their history, which helped them keep a demographic surplus in the face of Abrahamic onslaught for thousands of years. Unlike other Pagan civilizations, one reason for the survival of Hindus was their focus on family values and having enough offsprings. This is equally or even more important today in this democratic age where you lose your policy making powers the day you lose your numbers.

Having decided to go forward with policy 2, one still needs to overcome the implementation hurdles. Sacrifices will be needed by both men and women who have to give up many of their individualistic freedoms to help nurture bigger families. Also, it cannot be implemented at the cost of quality and it will need a big collaboration to subsidize education of these children. Again, one can learn from orthodox Jews who have successfully achieved it by developing their own institutions where they provide cheap education and jobs to their community members. This gives another reason to repeal discriminating laws like RTE (Right to Education Act), so that in the future when Hindu consolidation takes place, the state does not impose increasing costs on the Hindu institutions.

The ball is now in the court of rational Hindus who understand that increased Muslim numbers is a problem for their survival in the long run. Burying their heads in the sand or waiting for successive BJP governments to do something will not solve this problem. Since policy 2 does not require the support of all Hindus, it can be easily implemented if a critical mass of Hindus can come together.

The only need will be to develop supporting institutions which can take care of this burgeoning Hindu popu-

lation. In the end, 20-30% of Hindu population is enough not only to counter-breed Muslims, but to also make future Indian politics more pro-Hindu as this young population will replace the current generation of anti-Hindu liberals. The only question that remains to be answered is whether Hindus are ready to realize their Dharma and rise up to this challenge and beat the Muslims at their own game.

5.4 The Future

The history of the past seven decades has shown a linear movement in one direction. Will the future be any different? The immense damage that the government mandated population policy has wreaked on Hindu demography cannot be overstated. Thus it would be foolhardy to expect that the current dispensation in Delhi will heed any advice on the demographic situation. Worse, they will not even like to be woken up from the deep slumber and will wilfully ignore the writing on the wall.

Demography is destiny and those who ignore it, their future generations pay the cost for this ignorance. In the last five chapters, we have documented the historic explosion of Muslim population growth in India and how it remained hidden till now. It is left to the reader to make his own conclusions based on the material presented here. It is less likely that things will change in any way in the near future and they will be difficult to change as long as there in no acknowledgement that the problem exists. Sadly, the political and ideological hysteresis built into post independence India will only make such acknowledgement difficult.

The Hindu of current generation needs to realize that digging his head into the sand or running away from the

battlefield like Arjuna, is not going to teleport away his problems. The demographic debate may look ugly and uncivilized to his modern ethos but it is here to stay and will only grow important with each passing day.

6

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