NAJEEB A. JAN

THE METACOLONIAL STATE



Pakistan, Critical Ontology, and the Biopolitical Horizons of Political Islam

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The Metacolonial State

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To Aneela, for whom no words can capture my unsayable love and gratitude.

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Series Editors' Preface

The *Antipode Book Series* explores radical geography 'antipodally,' in opposition, from various margins, limits or borderlands.

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Vinay Gidwani
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Introduction

Islamapolis*: The Crisis of Islam and the Political in Pakistan*

Without doubt, Pakistan is today a deeply troubled space, a nation perpetually caught up in tragic headlines: sectarian killings, suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, endemic corruption. A dense cite of multiple intersecting catastrophes, Pakistan is often written off as a zombie state, neither quite dead nor alive, and permanently "beyond crisis." *The Metacolonial State* neither contests nor apologizes for this list of veritable indignities; rather it seeks an understanding of the nature of this "beyond." At its most elemental, this book seeks to understand the virtually permanent state of exception in Pakistan in relation to the question of ontology – the emergency and abandonment of being.

This crisis in Pakistan I argue is not the outcome of Islam's allegedly resurgent medievalism, or some essential disjuncture with the modern. Nor is this solely the crisis of Pakistan's imbrication within a "colonial present." Rather Pakistan's situation is ineluctably and synchronically bound up with the unfolding of history and the play of modern forms of power. I argue that Pakistan is spectacularly paradigmatic of a broader metaphysics of power and mythical violence afflicting the globe. In part the aim here is to open up a new path of analysis under the sign of a "critical political ontology." I seek to demonstrate the ethical and political relevance of "critical ontology" for rethinking the historical and spatial complexity of violence and power, and, more broadly, for demonstrating its vital significance for geographic, political, and historical thought. Though interdisciplinary in nature, this approach is primarily rooted in a radical rethinking of concepts otherwise central to human geography: world, space/place, biopower, governmentality, and sovereignty.

The Metacolonial State: Pakistan, Critical Ontology, and the Biopolitical Horizons of Political Islam, First Edition. Najeeb A. Jan.

In more concrete terms, *The Metacolonial State* serves as a genealogy of the alliance between the Pakistan Army and orthodox sectarian schools within Sunni Islam. This mullah–military complex, and its subsequent entanglement with regional and global geopolitical forces, has intensified the politicization of Islam worldwide (a phenomenon most commonly associated with groups like the Taliban and al-Qaeda) and radically altered the religio-political equation in Pakistan. As perhaps the first phenomenology of political Islam, the book aims in part to provide visibility to the violent spatial architecture of the multiple, competing, and intersecting forms of local, national, and international sovereignties that destructively play out across the landscape of Pakistan. *The Metacolonial State* serves then as a *genealogy* of the specters that haunt this now almost permanent "space of exception," a place where the violent logics of security and terrorism embrace to form a single deadly system of mutual legitimation.

Following Agamben, one of my central claims is that ontological inquiry is essential for exposing structures of violence and power which otherwise secretly govern modern ideologies seemingly most distant from one another. Islamism, like secular liberalism, is a system of thought and practice which remains caught up and "embedded in a wider history of metaphysics" of which it remains unaware. Political Islam's ontic dissonance with the West thus belies a deep underbelly of ontological equivalences and resonances. By exposing, for instance, the metaphysical homology between beheadings and drone strikes, one of the troubling but key conclusions of the book suggests a radical indistinction between Islam and the West.

In its broadest sense *The Metacolonial State* seeks a critical understanding of power and violence at the level of language, ontology, and practice. The work is concerned not just with "Muslim violence" but also with the violence of the globe; exposing the signatures of power undergirding postcolonial life, while refusing to see Pakistan as merely the passive recipient of Western formations of power. Hence in addition to disclosing the ontological commitments undergirding the militarization and securitization of political space in Pakistan, the analysis will also seek to contribute to an understanding of the broader logics of the governmentalization and economization of all spheres of life under neoliberal biopolitical techno-capitalism. In many ways *The Metacolonial State* responds to the challenge that Foucault offered in his essay on Kant and Enlightenment: "to write a critical ontology of ourselves." With inducements from Stuart Elden's "Mapping the Present," *The Metacolonial State* deploys not only a rigorous Agambenian and Foucauldian framework for the historical and political analysis of contemporary Islam and Pakistan, it also locates the problem of violence and power within the cite of a political ontology.

Critical Ontology and the Metacolonial

The task, then, of writing Pakistan's "history of the present" in terms of a critical ontology, constitutes a significant departure from most works on Pakistan and political Islam. The opening chapter, subtitled "The Biopolitical Apparatus," develops and spearheads a path of political and spatial analysis that is rooted in the voluminous work of three major social theorists and leading thinkers of the twentieth century: Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, and Giorgio Agamben. The chapter develops and clarifies the significance and meaning of "critical ontology," a term first used by Foucault and which, in its most succinct formulation, I understand as a concern for thinking the relation, the *polemos*, between being and power. Because reality is always already *politicized*, ontology cannot be divorced from the political as such. My contention is that the key to understanding the *obscenity* of political violence is through a disclosure of the ontological apparatus that silently undergird political and cultural practice.

As is well known, the term "critical" resonates with both crisis and critique. In this way the introduction sets up a preliminary comportment towards the *sense* and *space* of the *metacolonial* problem undertaken in this project. While I attempt a tentative development of critical ontology as a cartography or *topology of being-power*, it must be borne in mind that critical ontology is more sensibility than method – an incitement towards a way of thinking. As more of an intuitive and creative endeavor, its measure is *poiēsis* rather than *technē*. Critical ontology does not rest on discovery – of permanent structures, origins, or facts – but on disclosure. Furthermore, critical ontology resists weaponization. In this sense it bears an affinity with the more archaic understanding of "criticism," which signaled forms of inquiry at the limits of knowledge – "about precisely that which can be neither posed nor grasped."[1]

The task of this book then is to introduce on the one hand the nature of critique, presupposed by a critical ontology and on the other to provide a brief history of the contemporary crisis of Pakistan in such a way that not only avoids any hint of orientalist exceptionalism but also reminds us, in a concrete and preliminary manner, that the problem space of Pakistan is coincident, politically, historically, and philosophically, with "Western" spatiality and temporality. While this is already the task assigned to postcolonial critique, the opening chapter sets the stage for thinking this problem not at the disjuncture between universality and particularity but paradigmatically, from singularity to singularity. This is the opening "methodological" gambit of the term *metacolonial*.

More significantly, from the perspective of geographical thought, the heart of critical ontology is derived from the rich *topology* of the Event

(*Ereignis*) that is the hallmark of Heidegger's latter oeuvre; hence the question of space and place are front and center in this analysis. Understood through Heidegger's crossing of the ontological difference, I define political ontology as a concern for the event of the political: a path of thinking that seeks to register the political traces of the abandonment of being. As a variant of postfoundational political theory, political ontology engages with the possibility of a proper recognition and encounter with the *ungrounding* and desubjectifying force of the ontological question. Responding to Agamben's somewhat lyrical onto-political maxim – that the foundations of violence lie in the violence of foundations – critical ontology, as a thought of and at the abyssal limits of language and thinking, is also a hauntology: an attempt to unmask and disclose the metaphysical ghosts that continue to haunt our current constellation of political nihilism.

Chapter 1 lays out an interpretation of Agamben's thought, which substantially challenges the existing ways in which most social scientists and theorists have appropriated his work. I aim to show how the work of Agamben (and implicitly Foucault) cannot be properly understood without placing his innovative rethinking of power within the horizon of ontology, thereby addressing the serious misunderstandings that have marked the reception of Agamben's philosophy. I do this by drawing out the vital link between ontological thought and the various grammars of power that social scientists have otherwise marshaled from Agamben and Foucault (biopolitics, sovereignty, governmentality, the apparatus, the exception, etc.). In Agamben's corpus these otherwise widely deployed concepts are in fact indebted to a confrontation with the latter Heidegger's thinking of the appropriating event (*Ereignis*). It is this aspect that is routinely ignored or passed over within the social sciences and that in many ways is symptomatic of the very forgetfulness of being that the logic of the ban inaugurates. In short, the task of Chapter 1 is to make the ontological terrain of Agamben's (and more challengingly Foucault's) discourse on power more visible and explicit. I argue that such a realization has both political and ethical consequences for the very subjectivity of academic life and our understanding of responsibility.

The exposition of a critical ontology in the work of Heidegger, Agamben, and Foucault sets the stage for a political and ethical cartography that is then subsequently mapped on to the political space of Pakistan. The remainder of the book does not, however, merely "apply" the theoretical framework of critical ontology to the study and interpretation of the problem of violence and militarism in Pakistan, but also seeks to show something of the reverse; namely that the various forms of religio-political and state violence – expressed in the brutal deployment of blasphemy laws, the routine declarations of martial law, and the use

of drones against "militants" in the FATA region – disclose an underlying ontological signature. This is the structure that is in play in what Agamben identifies through the archaeological paradigm of the camp: a permanent and intensified space of sovereign exception. The disclosure of the political emergency in Pakistan hence alerts us to a fundamental ontological crisis that penetrates not only the political but also the very process of subject formation under neoliberal techno-capitalist regimes. It is, however, to the very pain of the political, a pain that alerts us to an ontological trauma, that our ethical sensibilities and political action must turn. In short, it is only through our *sense* of the political that ontology gains significance.

The term "metacolonial" is, in brief, a neologism intended to capture succinctly the way in which political discourses and practices are "colonized" by an underlying metaphysics of power and its accompanying political theologies. Through the term *metacolonial*, intended not as a critique but as an ontological supplement to postcolonial theory, Islamic modernities are brought face to face with the metaphysical ghosts haunting our global, biopolitical, capitalist present. With the philosophical groundwork laid out in Chapter 1, the biopolitical – which continues to resonate as a critical concept in the ongoing work of geographers and social theorists – is now redefined as "power over the singularity of life." The threshold is thus concerned with laying out the preliminary stakes for thinking biopolitics in an explicitly ontological register.

To reiterate, the metacolonial, in its simplest formulation, refers to the colonization of life by metaphysics (ontotheology): the colonization of life by power. It is a cartography of the shadows cast by power over being, a shadow that is paradoxically the destining of being itself. It is an exposure and critique of power as it plays out in what Foucault called, in opposition to demonstrative truth, the truth-event. For Heidegger the truth-event, the play of being, was eventually to be understood (experienced) primarily in terms of the event of withdrawal, "an originary erasure that leaves traces (beings) in its wake."[2] One of Heidegger's major contentions was that the question of being is one before which both humanity, in its existential capacity, and philosophy, in its tendency towards rational systematicity and explanation, tend to flee. This is because the question of being is ultimately a destabilizing question that dissolves every ground and certitude. However, for Heidegger, raising the question of being was vital, despite the pervasive and dominant attitude of the oblivion, even among his best students (Levinas, and even perhaps Derrida): "The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again."[3] The metacolonial

places the questioning of being at the heart of its critical enterprise and takes seriously the effects of the sway of being on both history and politics and the constitution of one's own subjectivity. The *questioning* is above all not a matter of specific propositions and answers, but a matter of opening up a path of transformative experience; one has to be seized if not shaken by the question.

Along this path, truth and untruth, like the difference between being and beings, are not simply opposed but in a state of play, struggle, and strife (*polemos*), a state of fundamental imbrication. This we have already identified as the crossing of the ontological difference. Foucault's history of the present can be seen as a history of this original strife between truth and untruth as it plays out in history, where history is itself an echo of the struggle of truth and untruth, the originary *polemos* and event of being (*Ereignis*). *Ereignis* can be thought as "the event of an erasure and a withdrawing, constitutive of presence and history as such, the unfolding of truth as that which turns away from presence within presence."[4] It is not Europe or the West then that is technological, but history itself.[5] *Gestell*, Heidegger's term for the essence of modern technology, is itself "a configuration of truth … a sending of being, [which] signals the most extreme concealing of the essence of truth as un-concealment."[6] *Gestell* is essentially an onto-historical rather than Western phenomenon. This point lies at the heart of the metacolonial's departure from the postcolonial. The metacolonial signifies the colonization of man, not by Europe, but by history itself. The history of Islam is today, like the history of the West, simply coincident with the structure of exception and the ban of being. This metaphysics, *this state of exception, now invests all structures of power, and is thus the originary source of the imperial, metacolonial, condition*. The topology of exception, and its technologization, is the presence that haunts Islamic as much as Western modernity. Through the term metacolonial then, Islamic modernity is brought face to face with the ghosts of metaphysics, haunting its technological, biopolitical present. In this way metaphysics is *not* simply what Derrida called a "white mythology."[7] It is the abandonment of being that is the structural phenomenon and event that gives rise to the forgetfulness of being, an event that coincides with the history of our present – an event that coincides and has its roots in the essence of truth itself.

The task of the metacolonial is thus to expose and fully understand, as preparatory to the development of ethical practices of resistance[8] (*askēsis*), the ways in which our lives are governed – managed, ordered, and disposed – within the various disciplinary, normative, neoliberal, and biopolitical regimes of power. The task of the metacolonial is to bring to light the ontological frames that are implicit in the course of our everyday, global, political life. As a critical ontology, the metacolonial

is interested not in truth, but instead a politics of truth (regimes and powers of truth) and knowledge-power, so long as power is understood in its ontological, enunciative function.

The book proceeds to chart the imbricated spaces of exception engendered by the military and the 'ulama: the spaces of war (*jihad*) and law (*shari'a*) as they intersect with the core logics of biopolitical security inaugurated by the Pakistan movement. Effectively this book serves as a strident interrogation of all three sacred cows in Pakistani society: the religious establishment and blasphemy laws, the powerfully embedded military and secret intelligence apparatus, and the very ideology of Muslim nationalism expressed through the writings of its *spiritus animus* Dr. *Allama* Muhammad Iqbal and the "secular" constitutional lawyer Mohammed Ali Jinnah. The primary charge of the book is to demonstrate that the political cartography of Pakistan, and by extension the political practices of the Deoband 'ulama, have been increasingly permeated by a sovereign biopolitical impetus. The resulting indistinctions between dictatorship and democracy, between "secular" and "religious" forces in Pakistan, disclose the nature of a historical ontology that is exemplified by the *biopoliticization of Islam*. I argue that Pakistan is itself revelatory of a broader ontological crisis enveloping the globe.

The work proceeds under the assumption that ontology is not simply a series of philosophical propositions about reality that one can choose to maintain. In Agamben's work ontology is no longer thought in terms of some *a priori* Kantian transcendental. Rather ontology always presupposes an already politicized and historicized conception of reality, a representational world picture, a *savoir*, of what *is*. A metaphysics is as such always already at play in our everyday ways of thought, our political practices, cultural discourse, and of course our violent productivist comportment to the world. Though ontology can easily devolve into the mere abstractions of "first philosophy" divorced from the materiality of the world, in critical ontological thought, something more immanent, visceral, political, and essentially historical is at stake. However, political ontology is neither the structuralist pursuit of some essentialized and universal social/psychological substrate, nor can it be linearly weaponized in the service of political resistance.

Rethinking the Political

One could argue that the opening philosophical excursus on critical ontology would be best left to another work. However, my deepest conviction is that by separating the philosophical/ontological from the historical/political I would be inscribing within the very material form of

writing/publishing, the same ontological difference that this work seeks to erase. This is on the one hand in keeping with the sensibilities of Heidegger after his turn (*Kehre*) from fundamental ontology towards being-historical thinking, but also because in addition to social theorists, my primary hope is that this book will appeal to academics and social scientists concerned with the immediate problem of political violence. My goal, in addition to an exposition of political ontology, is, to borrow Josh Barkan's phrase, to "wrench Heidegger from his Alpine seclusion" and force him to confront the complex spatiality of our postcolonial present, and in doing so open up the relevance for thinking the metacolonial. On my reading, this strategy is already evidenced in Agamben's work. Ontology resides, however, not in analytic propositions but in the very bloody sinews of tortured bodies, in the charred wreckage of suicide bombings, in fear and trembling in the face of our ineluctable temporality, and in the very fragility of life. To reiterate the Nietzschean thesis: "Being – we have no other way of imagining it apart from 'living'." It is the wound of the political and the passions of hate that form the substance of an experience of abandonment. We have traditionally responded to this pain with foundational formulations (peace-Islam, freedom-liberalism, human rights) that have not only proven ineffective but have also quickly become indistinct from the very forms of action they seek to banish. In this way a phenomenology of Pakistan discloses, ontologically, and with exemplarity, the very *failure of peoples* that is otherwise obscured in the hope of progress and Western humanism. The crisis of the land of the pure ("*Pak*–istan") is thus at the same time the very crisis of the globally hegemonic Western conceptions of value and purity. Critical ontology moves us to ponder the nature of the separation of being and acting, the disjuncture between ethics and politics which, to paraphrase Jean-Luc Nancy, so viscerally marks our "time of abandonment." The problem of politics, the problem of Pakistan, then is not merely political, it is ontological, and yet we cannot glimpse this other than through the specificity and urgency of a particular place, in this and that event. The problem in some ways with conventional social science critique is not that it is often disinterested and ontic but that it is *merely* ontic. The metacolonial is ontological in as much as it is not *merely* ontic.

The Metacolonial State therefore addresses one of the crucial challenges before scholarship of the postcolonial world; writing and thinking its very contemporaneity – the fact that it belongs to modernity and speaks to it. An analysis of the trauma of Pakistan, and the postcolonial more broadly, reveals *the* most significant things about the world of today. Pakistan is therefore an indispensable site for reflection on the nature of the precarious present and the terrifying futures of our global modernity.

The Islamapolis

> If politics today seems to be going through a protracted eclipse and appears in a subaltern position with respect to religion, economics, and even the law, that is so because, to the extent to which *it has been losing sight of its own ontological status*, it has failed to confront the transformations that gradually have emptied out its categories and concepts.
>
> —Agamben[9]

Each chapter that follows describes a facet of the Islamapolis, the political space of each configuration or *dispositif*, that bears on the life world of Pakistan. Throughout the work I deploy the syntagm "*Islamapolis*," a configuration with multiple but interrelated significations, which unfold along several interconnected registers. *Islamapolis* can be seen as a short hand that encapsulates the metacolonial ethos, and in this way the entire book's thesis. On the one hand it loosely translates "Islam-*abad*", where *abad* and *abadi* refer to settlement and population. In this sense *Islam-a-polis* is simply the "city of Islam," the nation of an Islamic *bios* (population). Along another register, that of process, *Islamapolis* names Islam's discursive articulation and material imbrication within systems of modern power: its encounter and folding within 'the political' – the space of the *polis*. What is critical, however, is the way in which, through this encounter, it becomes *apolis* – homeless, uncanny. *Islamapolis* also signifies the ways in which contemporary articulations of Islam are subsequently infected by the onto-logic of sovereign power. *Islamapolis* thus marks the biopoliticization of Islam: the mechanisms, technologies, and strategies by which power over life manifests itself in Muslim discourses, practices, and polities. The *Islamapolis* is thus an exemplary metacolonial apparatus, a space that signals the simultaneous hollowing and hallowing of Islam. The attempt in this work is to offer a cartography of the *Islamapolis*.

In his reflections on terrorism, philosopher Jean Baudrillard offered these prescient remarks: "[If] Islam dominated the world, terrorism would rise against Islam, for it is the very world, the globe itself, which resists globalization."[10] Numerous events could be called to witness, but the events of October 21, 2009 are particularly revealing. At around 3:00 p.m., the usually calm and contemplative atmosphere of Islamabad's International *Islamic* University (IIUI) was shattered by a double suicide bombing that killed six people, including three young *hijab* clad girls. Dozens of other victims were severely injured in the blasts, one of which was detonated at the women's cafeteria and the other outside the office of the Chairman of the Department of Islamic Law (Shari'a). Baudrillard's formulation echoes resoundingly in these bombings, an

event that is indeed paradigmatic of the war between Islamist forces and an Islamic state.

This "homeland" for the Muslims of British India is increasingly producing both real and imagined states of homelessness for its beleaguered citizens.[11] This work will argue that a more rigorous conceptual and historical understanding of the structure of violence is needed if we are to begin to make sense of what has confounded local analysts and the public alike. The aim of this book, in its most prosaic terms, is in part to provide visibility to the space of the political where the violent contests between local, national, international, and trans-national sovereign forces are playing themselves out. It is in many ways a preliminary history, or *gene*-alogy of specters that haunt this now almost permanent "space of exception." Even as I write, this space of exception threatens to take on a permanent localization in Pakistan, in a way that has already consumed Afghanistan. In Pakistan today security and terrorism have become a single deadly system in which they legitimate and justify each other's mode of being. In the desperate cycle of state terror and insurrectionary terrorism that has gripped Pakistan, and indeed the world, we need more than ever to understand the complexities of "power" and "violence,"[12] in both their repressive, revolutionary, resistant, and fetishistic forms. This self-consciously interdisciplinary project – part history, ethnography, geography, philosophy, always critical – is both solicited by and responds to this crisis.

Implicit in this narrative is the problem of globalization, perhaps the ineluctable and simultaneously enigmatic condition of our time. It goes without saying then that the political space under examination here is immediately global, and its contours cannot simply be folded into the borders of something called "Pakistani" history. Globalization is not merely about the reconfiguration of national powers – the circulation of goods, commodities, images, and capital across territorial boundaries – but also about flows and configurations of power that produce new bodies, affects, desires, associations, and understandings; in short, globalization produces a new "sense of the world."[13] The crisis in Pakistan is understood immediately as both a local and trans-local phenomenon, where political space is both material and affective; it touches on the structure of feelings of everyday life.[14] Especially in the wake of 9/11, within the broader global circulation of affect, Islam, with all of its multiple registers, is consumed at a more acute affective and bodily level. Juan Cole's book *Engaging the Muslim World*[15] recognizes "anxiety" as a central motif that defines the biopolitical interplay between America and the Muslim World. While Cole's book seeks to deconstruct the singular affective registers of each term, it would be fair to say that the problems of violence and war that confront us in the age of terror must be situated on a level that exceeds politics and history.

The term for this excess, which I will elaborate on shortly, is biopolitical sovereignty. Not only then as Cole argues do we have to confront generalized anxieties mutually reflected in the Islam–West relationship, we must also take into consideration more immanent planes of affect that pervade the landscape of and between Muslim communities and states (Iranian anxieties about Arabs, Jewish anxieties about the Arab, Indian anxieties about Pakistan, vice versa, and so on). My concern here is thus with a series of overlapping and immanent biopolitical and sovereign anxieties. The intensification and multiplication of this series of overlapping anxieties – especially in regions that are more concretely impacted by the decision of imperial policies and the destructive regimes of neoliberal globalization – tend to aggravate and intensify the "state of exception"[16] and the attendant production of what Italian social and political "theorist" Giorgio Agamben calls "bare life." Bare life is naked life, a life (*zoē*) without value, at once included and excluded from the law. The neologism "*metacolonial*" that I deploy in this work is not meant to displace the postcolonial, but instead seeks to capture a sense of the nihilistic condition that pervades our time.[17]

The metacolonial, then, articulates two fundamental theoretico-political trajectories from the work of Michel Foucault (1926–1984) and Giorgio Agamben (1942) into a single conceptual space: Foucault's concern with biopolitics and governmentality and Agamben's illuminating thesis on sovereign power, bare life, and the state of exception. These two critical vectors are then gathered under the sign of the *metacolonial*, the term that is at the heart of this book's thesis. The metacolonial is a single term meant to capture the critical thrust of these paradigms, which are now already widely deployed in the social and human sciences.[18] The metacolonial is a sovereign biopolitical space where the state of exception takes on a near-permanent localization. Part of the innovation of this project, its conceit, is to bring these powerful disclosive paradigms to bear on an understanding of political Islam in Pakistan. Political Islam is not by any means monolithic, even in Pakistan, let alone globally, and in this study I have chosen to concentrate on the Pakistani vectors of the Deoband school in large part because of their intimate, though contested, link with the Taliban phenomenon. My primary task then will be to show that the political space of Pakistan, and by extension the political practices of the Deoband 'ulama, have taken on an increasingly biopolitical character. At its broadest then, this work is conceived as a genealogical history – "a history of the present" – of the crisis of Pakistan. My primary task will be to show how this history is itself a manifestation of the *biopoliticization of Islam*. From within this biopoliticization of Islam we can talk about and make sense of 'ulama governmentality and the state of violence.

Stated differently, this work is animated principally by a concern to understand the forms of violence that have gathered around the horizons of political Islam. While the Deoband 'ulama of Pakistan remain the primary thematic subject and focus, they are largely signposts towards a broader attempt to disclose a cartography of the political. That is to say, I am not principally concerned with a specific narrative history of political Islam in Pakistan, but rather am attempting to think this phenomenon in relation to what Foucault called the historico-political *a priori*.[19] One of the more rudimentary contentions that I will make is that the phenomenon of "Islamic/Islamist" violence and terrorism is not a problem of politics or religion as such, but rather a problem of *the political*.[20] The aim here is to *problematize* political Islam, to show it up as an apparatus (what Foucault called a *dispositif*).[21] These problematizations do not constitute a new postgenealogical methodology or analytic, but instead are designed to induce a critical spirit that can at least witness, if not perhaps respond, to the state of exception in which we live. This study therefore revolves around one essential question: how to think the problematic of political Islam (and specifically the Deoband) genealogically and biopolitically. Through this term – the "metacolonial" – Islamic modernities[22] are brought face to face with the ghosts of metaphysics haunting our global, technological, biopolitical present. To disclose political Islam as a metacolonial phenomenon is therefore the specific task of this work. It must also be stated upfront that I arrived at the question of 'ulama biopolitics only after observing, documenting, and thinking about the ways in which Deoband political somatics – its body politics – has increasingly been caught up with the sovereign powers of the state. The Deoband commitment to the *enforcement* of shari'a, the deployment of blasphemy as a technology of sovereign power, the production of the Ahmadi as heretic and "bare life," and its valorization of violent *jihad*, are some of the examples that I use to open up a space for a new problematization of political Islam and 'ulama praxis.

The provisional aim of this metacolonial analysis of political Islam will be to show how the space of the political – which unfolds today as a pure topology of exception – proliferates and intensifies through the alignment (and disaggregation) of sovereign orbits and imperial spaces. This political space, or field of power, can be characterized as a series of nested and overlapping sovereignties within a wider biopolitical matrix. This space can be understood as a grid of intelligibility that provides the conditions of possibility of political practice. Since the metacolonial is characterized above all as a state/space of exception,[23] it will be necessary to highlight the political and *topological* structure of the exception and enunciate its relationship to Foucault's genealogy of

power and the subject.[24] The metacolonial state is therefore a state of biopolitical exception, a state in which the capture of life finds a more or less permanent and stable spatial arrangement.

It should be noted upfront that my attempt here is not to outline a new paradigm for critical thought, but rather to attempt to think the problem of political Islam genealogically and, by extension, biopolitically.[25] As specific cartographic exercise whose topology relies extensively on Agamben's innovative account of the structure of the sovereign ban, the metacolonial is both an affect and a zone – a state/space – marked by the intensification of sovereign and biopolitical forms of power. The metacolonial designates this colonization of life by the will to power.[26] It is within this complex mapping of power that the practices and possibilities of the both the 'ulama and the army (the mullah–military complex) are to be situated. The metacolonial theory offered here, then, suggests that it is the modernist transformation and politicization of the *ummah* into a quasi-nationalist structure that has enabled the 'ulama to harness the destructive logic of sovereign power. This is the simplest dimension of what I mean by the phrase the *biopoliticization of the Islamic life-world*.

In the dominant forms of the Western and Islamist imaginary, some singular and unique theology, a civilizational ethos even, is supposed to ground the incommensurable difference between contemporary Islamic formations and the West. Neocons, Orientalists, and Islamists alike assume that the "traditional"[27] textual sources of the Muslim life-world, the Qur'an and Hadith, form the deep antechamber for both militant and democratic Islamist politics. Variations of this proposition, which pervade as virtual truisms in public discourses on political Islam, need to be rethought significantly.[28] However, *even though Islamic political language trades in the discursive coinage of tradition, the market in which these terms have purchase is today an altogether transformed space*. That is to say, the Muslim world, its "traditional" market, has undergone a series of architectonic shifts, a disruption and transformation of its classical *episteme* to a modern one.[29] The terms "biopolitical" and "exception" signal this transformation of Islamic space. Another key element of this book then will be an attempt to interrogate the consequences of this epistemic shift, and I have used the term metacolonial to signal this concern with political Islam *at the level of what Foucault called the épistème*. Unlike the shifts from the classical to the renaissance to the modern *épistème* that Foucault has so admirably elaborated with respect to the West, the modernist shift in large parts of the Muslim world, and certainly South Asia, were accompanied by the colonial violence of a "distant sovereign."[30] It is this colonial difference that can account, in part, for the troubling experience of modernity in large parts

of the Muslim world;[31] that is to say, on pain of a considerable generalization, that there is no clash between something called modernity and the West on the one hand and something called Islam on the other. Rather the violences and incoherence of political praxis in large parts of the Islamic world result from a disavowal, or misrecognition, of its already modernist, biopolitical ground. As Agamben suggests, the "enigmas" of modern violence can only be solved "on the terrain – biopolitics – on which they were formed."[32] On Agamben's diagnosis, the inevitable failure of biopolitics leads to the proliferation of an increasingly sovereign rationality. The impossible task, then, is to give an account of the *ruin* of the modernist Muslim subject – *homo Islamicus* – and by extension the ruination of contemporary political Islam.

As is already evident, a plethora of terms – genealogy, governmentality, biopolitics, sovereignty, exception, episteme – are critical to this endeavour. Given that these concepts are often deployed and articulated with a wide degree of differing latitude and even at times at cross purposes, a somewhat lengthy clarification of the way I understand and use these terms is essential for the intelligibility of the project as a whole. To be sure, this is a history *as* genealogy, and it will be important to begin by clarifying the stakes of this articulation. The opening chapter is therefore devoted to a clarification of these terms and highlights the conceptual and political work of disclosure they will perform. The primary labor has been to forge a new *reading* of the crisis, rather than to simply chronicle its historical unfolding.

The Deoband 'Ulama

One primary concern of this book is with understanding the religio-political[33] nature of the Pakistani Deoband movement and its relationship to the military and nationalism. Within the multiplicity of Islamist practices in Pakistan, the Deoband has emerged as one of the most highly organized and yet remarkably polycentric institutions that claim orthodox religious authority. I am arguing in this work that the Deoband 'ulama practices have undergone a series of dramatic transformations since 1947. I characterize these transformations primarily in terms of Foucault's grammars of power – governmentality, sovereignty, discipline, and biopolitics.[34] The 1979 Afghan–Soviet war marks a particularly significant threshold in this transformation: an event that led to the intensification of the conscription of 'ulama power within a broader set of military and geopolitical spaces. Though this new military–mullah complex was a significant turning point, I am arguing that crucial elements of this transformation had been underway since the inception of

the Islamic State in 1947. This transformation, as I shall discuss, has also played itself out in the dramatic shifts within the institutional space of 'ulama authority: the madrasa. Historically the madrasa within South Asia has been an informal space for the dissemination of a variety of forms of Islamic learning (*'ilm*).[35] By the nineteenth century, however, especially with the emergence of the Deoband, it had become a more formal disciplinary space for the production of "pious" bodies and 'ulama authority. As the expanding network of Deobandi *madaris* (religious schools) entered or were co-opted by other political arenas, these docile bodies have been increasingly deployed either for various state sponsored projects of "*jihad*"[36] or as militant cadres for the Deoband's own increasingly autonomous yet fractured and internally feuding political movements: the Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama-i Islam (Society of Islamic 'Ulama or JUI) and its various radical sectarian and jihadist offshoots like the *Sipah-i Sahaba* (SSP) and the Taliban. Thus, as a "history of the present" the book pays particular attention to the ruptures, displacements, and transformations of discourses on religion, identity, and politics; transformations that I am suggesting should be understood principally in terms of biopoliticization.

In addition to thinking about the history and politics of this important, and yet remarkably understudied, Islamic organization, what I am aiming for here is the development of a more nuanced and critically receptive framework for the analysis of political space[37] in Pakistan, a space that cannot neatly be divided between the secular and the religious. I am also convinced that a mere historical account, a *histoire*[38] of the 'ulama, will fail to take account of the complex simultaneously global and subterranean nature of the political field in which the subjectivities and praxis of the Deoband 'ulama are forged. For instance, there is without doubt a strong class dimension to the problem of the Taliban today, but it would be too simple to reduce the phenomenon of Islamist violence to the developmentalist failures of the postcolonial elite. As any casual observation of the sociological makeup of the vast majority of *talibs* within the Deoband *dini madaris* network will reveal, they belong very clearly to a subaltern class. The majority of the 'ulama are themselves indeed subaltern.[39] The effective historical marginalization and subalternity of the 'ulama are undoubtedly key factors in understanding the violent turn of the 'ulama. There is also little doubt that ways in which General Zia ul-Haq's "Islamization" decade, coupled with the imbrication of the Pakistan Army and society in the Afghan war, have fundamentally altered the landscape of the political in Pakistan. However, what I am suggesting here is that the phenomenon of political Islam must be seen as intimately bound up with the project of Pakistan itself – with its very metaphysics in fact. It is not a question of attempting

to isolate some pure Islam and show how it has been corrupted by a series of political events. Nor is it a question of showing how modern political forms and vocabularies (the state, the part, the nation, etc.) have been Islamized. What I am aiming for is something different. I seek to show how the very discursive regime of Islam is now fundamentally political, and how it is now always a discourse of power and subjectivization, even in cases where it declares itself as concerned solely with private, inward, or moral self-improvement. The distinction between Islam as such and the political as such is untenable. Islam is today always already a *bios*. This indistinction between the political (public) and the spiritual (private) does not begin with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, nor even with the founding of Pakistan. While these events are thresholds of transformation, the historical shadow of biopolitics are longer, while simultaneously being both synchronic and diachronic. I will argue that it is in fact in the thought of 'Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), the spiritual founder of the South Asian Islamic State, that the *poiēsis* of Islam makes its paradigmatic and lethal confrontation with the *polis*, with the political. Iqbal's work is an expression of this confrontation in which the political triumphs over the ethical (*polis* over *ēthos*). Iqbal does not initiate this confrontation but he gives it its most popularly received and powerful expression. If Pakistan is birthed in Iqbal's imagination, Islam was laid to rest in his *khayaal*.[40] It is in his poetry that Islam is most poignantly, romantically, and metaphysically linked to the absolute necessity of a modern state, albeit a state that rejects the conventional ethno-racial and linguistic basis for national identity.[41] Pakistan's history might hence be written as nothing but the disastrous effect of the (impossible) territorialization of Islam[42] – the transference of divine sovereignty to the state and the subsequent sacralization of the collective Muslim body (*ummah*).

Without a sense of this transformation, the nature of the crisis that envelops Pakistan, if not the globe, will remain hidden as we search in vain for a more descriptive and causal – or what Foucault called "genetic" – explanation.[43] The transformation consists in part of a double and simultaneous process: the "statification" (*étatisation*) of Islam and Muslim society, and the "governmentalization" of the Islamic state.[44] Hence 'ulama religio-political practices must be situated across a series of complex historical and political horizons. We must in short recognize how 'ulama practice has been essentially imbricated within the historically variable relations of power and the contingencies of Pakistan's fractured politics, rather than as an outgrowth or mutation of some static tradition. This approach can in part account for the ways in which Deoband "Islamic" discourses (on nationalism, the state, authority, gender, minorities, citizenship) have shifted over time and space.[45]

It should also be mentioned at the outset that not all political formations under 'ulama tutelage can be framed within the rubric of "extremism," "violence," or "radical Islamism." Certainly a very large component of the Deoband phenomenon is manifested in the phenomenon of the Tabligh-i Jama'at, which is a self-consciously "non-political" expression of Islam.[46] However, this understanding is in keeping with a very narrow and limited definition of politics and the political.[47] It is of course understandable that it is this militant and "uncivil" dimension of the traditionalist 'ulama that has garnered most interest, in particular given the centrality of radical Islam in framing neoliberal and neoconservative concerns. Here also an understanding of the radicalization of segments of the 'ulama, their turn towards violent forms of political activism, and their increasingly militant policing of the boundaries of Islam must also be set within further contextual parameters. The first is the imbrication of Islamist groups within the simultaneously repressive and enabling role of the State. Secondly, given that the Pakistani State, in conjunction with the United States and Saudi Arabia, has consistently attempted to infiltrate, control, and harness orthodox Islamic institutions, due importance must be placed upon the larger structure of empire in making possible domestic economies of violence and power in which certain forms of "indigenous" jihadist violence are valorized and sustained.[48] These larger geo-political attempts to deploy and manipulate "Islam" and Islamist forces for the legitimization of martial rule and for the waging of proxy wars (Afghanistan and Kashmir) resulted in the artificial political empowerment of groups like the Deoband. Under the catalyst of these state interventions, the otherwise politically marginal communities of Islamic orthodoxy, who were traditionally focused on scholarship, piety, and quiet social reform (*daw'a* and *tabligh*), have nonetheless transformed themselves into agents of *jihad* and brokers of increased socio-political power.[49] While the comportment towards state power and, more broadly, governmentality among the 'ulama cannot solely be read as an effect of empire or the postcolonial state, Cold War cartography certainly fostered the conditions of possibility for the effective transformation of an 'ulama republic fantasy into a political possibility. A feature supposedly characteristic of fundamentalist or Islamist groups,[50] namely the desire for state power, can now equally be said to be true of "traditionalist" 'ulama led Islamist groups. As such the standard typological distinctions of Muslim politics[51] – Islamist/fundamentalist, modernist, traditionalist – have entered a zone of indistinction.[52] Our analytic gaze must hence take into consideration the material and discursive effects of power of a new kind of colonial/imperial present,[53] exercised in the name of a variety of global and universalist legitimating discourses

(democracy, freedom, "Western civilization," etc). Arguably this overlapping of imperial desire and Islamist fantasy continues to provide a mutually reinforcing dialectic that is central to the technologies of American imperial ambitions both in Iraq and more globally.

Broadly speaking, I regard the terms "Deoband" and by extension the "Taliban" as suggesting a fictional unity. The singular signifier of course gestures to multiple signifieds. As such these phenomena should be viewed as a complex series of intersecting and overlapping *dispositifs*, as assemblages or formations of power. The Taliban can thus be seen as a dense intersection point of a competing set of multiform powers, exercising an unlimited sovereign right of death, an all-powerful monstrosity, reflective equally of the violent political space in which it took birth.

Notes

1 Agamben 1993, p. xv.
2 Beistegui 2005, p. 53.
3 Heidegger 1962, p. 4.
4 Beistegui 2005.
5 Importantly for Heidegger, as the German word for history, *Geschichte*, suggests, history is essentially destiny. Destiny, not to be confused with fate, is for Heidegger a sending (*Schickung*) of being. It is therefore being and not man that has historical agency: "The history of man is played out in the manner and nature of his response to this exposure to the truth of being, which distinguishes him as human" (ibid). Hence the time of the event, *kairòs*, should be distinguished from the domain of ordinary history (chronology), which is the successive, demonstrative time of facts, for which Heidegger reserves the word *Historie*.
6 Ibid.
7 Derrida: "Metaphysics – the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West: the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form of that he must still wish to call Reason."
8 According to Negri's thesis in the *Porcelain Workshop*, the ontological problem is rooted in the relation "between difference and creativity. … resistance is what allows for the existence of a relation between both terms. But if difference and creativity are ontological, then resistance will be so as well." Negri 2008.
9 Agamben 2000, p. ix.
10 Baudrillard 2003, p. 12.
11 Already Pakistan has some of the highest figures for IDSPs.

12 This work is thus also simultaneously a meditation on power, violence, and the body. I draw almost exclusively for my understanding of power on Foucault and Agamben. Violence has also become a thematic of intense recent scholarly attention. I draw also on Zizek's distinction between the "fascinating lure of … directly visible 'subjective' violence" and the more invisible forms of a systemic and symbolic "objective" violence; a violence that lurks like "dark matter" in the social "background"; Zizek 2008. On violence see also the essays collected in Lawrence and Karim 2007, and also Arendt 1970; Sarat and Culbert 2009; and Abel 2008. Also influential for this study are Feldman 1991 and Pandey 2005. For a specifically Foucaultian critique see Hanssen 2000.

13 Globalization is what Jean-Luc Nancy describes as an "enclosure in the undifferentiated sphere of a unitotality", a process that leads to an uninhabitable un-world or state of injustice, "an unprecedented geopolitical, economic, and ecological catastrophe", in contrast to the creative potential of *mondialization* (world-forming). See Nancy 2007; Nancy 1998; and Hardt and Negri 2000.

14 Stoler 2004. Scholars of the political are now increasingly paying attention to the role of affect and passion in political life. See Clough 2007; Flatley 2008; Protevi 2009; and also Hall 2005, who all represent a significant advance in theorizing political affect.

15 Cole 2009.

16 The term is Agamben's. I elaborate on the significance of this term for my project in this and subsequent chapters. See Agamben 2005a.

17 Agamben 1998. The concept of bare life signifies a "new academic interest in nonrepresentational approaches to the question of being which conceive of time–space as having no determined actuality." Quoted in Thomas and Ahmed 2004. The metacolonial is thus also an attempt to think in non-representational terms. See also Thrift 2008.

18 See Chapter 1. We might also begin to think about the metacolonial as a kind of ontological imperialism, a form of power that is thus both after, above (*meta-ta-physica*), and before formal colonialism.

19 See Han 2002. I will expand on the significance of Foucault's historical *a priori* in Chapter 1.

20 Given the postfoundational distinction between politics and the political that I draw on, we can say therefore that the crisis is simultaneously an *onto-political* crisis. For an excellent account of Left-Heideggerian appropriations of political ontology see Marchart 2007. On another register this book can be seen as an exploration the problematic of political Islam in terms of an historical and political ontology. Chapter 1 will attempt to formulate the outlines of a critical ontology and further illuminate the significance of the metacolonial: as a colonizing *dispositif* or enframing of the life-world by metaphysics (*technē*).

21 This is perhaps what Foucault had in mind with the terms *problematization* and *eventalization*, which were meant to designate a way of thinking beyond genealogy. See Visker 1995.

22 See al-Azmeh 1996. The metacolonial is thus linked to "ghost-modernity" rather than postmodernity.
23 Agamben 2005a.
24 It would be possible to state in a nutshell that what I find limiting in most of the studies of Muslims and political Islam in Pakistan is a series of "untheorized" and largely liberal models of power and the subject. In contrast, Foucault's rethinking of power and the subject, and poststructuralism more broadly, proceeds on the basis of a problematization of these two key elements. In large measure the conceptual work of Chapter 1 responds to the rather impoverished uptake of a vast range of useful ways to think about time, space, and the political. Agamben is exemplary in this regard.
25 While biopolitics has become an important paradigm, like governmentality, in the social and human sciences, it has not yet been applied to the study of political Islam.
26 Or metaphysics as *technē*.
27 My use of the term of course unfolds in the wake of the significant rethinking of this category along with its usual binary opposite modern. For the classic account see Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983 and Anderson 1991.
28 See Haj's excellent new study, which significantly problematizes the very applicability of categories like "modern," "secular," and "tradition"; Haj 2008. Haj's work reflects the influence of Talal Asad's anthropology of the secular. My aim here is to complete Asad's project on a more radical footing.
29 Talal Asad's term "discursive tradition" draws only partially from the genealogical resonances of the Foucauldian term "discursive regime." See Asad 1993.
30 I borrow this term from Sen 2002.
31 Of course a similar disenchantment also pervades "the West."
32 Agamben 1998, p. 4. Obviously modern violence (Islamic exceptionalism) is not an exclusive feature of political Islam. On the contrary, liberal polities have a much longer and violent record of political praxis. See, for instance, Dillon 2009; Reid 2007; Mehta 1999; and Anderson and Cayton 2004. There is also an already vast literature on violences of "freedom" and American exceptionalism (Stephanson 1995; Madsen 1998; Dawson and Schueller 2007; Hietala 2003; Neal 2008; Spanos 2008; Horsman 1986; Stannard 1993).
33 The term religo-political is used to suggest that religion, like politics, is always saturated by relationships and effects of power. See Simons 1995 and Mouffe 2005.
34 While there have now emerged a number of excellent works on the Deoband 'ulama and their institutions, none of them take a biopolitical approach; see, for instance, Malik 2008; Zaman 2007; Hefner and Zaman 2007; Haroon 2007; and Zaman 2002.
35 See Jafri 2006a; Jafri ibid.; and other essays in Hartung and Reifeld 2006. For an account of the *maktab* and madrasa tradition in India see also Sikand 2006.

36 Here I am of course referring to the mobilization of *Jihad international* by the US against the Soviets, and the use of these mujahideen forces by the Pakistan army after the Soviet withdrawal in both Afghanistan and India. For a good overview see Hussain 2007.

37 It is in fact a politico-theological space. For a sense of the critical importance of this syntagm see de Vries and Sullivan 2006.

38 A genealogy, or history of the present, proceeds with an implicit critique of historicism. In Chapter 1 I make this critique explicit, thereby setting the stage for the kind of theoretico-historical analysis of this work.

39 On postcolonialism and subaltern historiography, see Guha and Spivak 1988 and Chaturvedi 2000. The fact that the originally Gramscian term subaltern derives from the name of a military rank is significant in our account of military space in Chapter 2. Both the postcolonial and subaltern are of course highly contested terms. However, as Young notes, it is concerned with colonial history only to the extent that that history has determined the configurations and power structures of the present; Young 2001, p. 4. The subaltern classes are generally marked as marginalized groups. The excess and surplus children who populate the madaris landscape are undoubtedly both marginalized and excluded. It is in part this marginalization that accounts for the turn of the 'ulama towards violence. Though he does not quite use the term, Jamal Malik has already shown how the 'ulama are drawn largely from the ranks of the rural and urban poor (Malik 1996.) However, because Malik does not make a distinction between authority and power, I depart significantly from his conclusion about the dissolution of tradition and authority. Instead, it is a question of understanding the ways in which the Deoband reconstitute and shape the contours of an all ready ongoing and mutating "tradition" and how they forge new identities and create new spaces for authority and power.

40 Iqbal's problematization of the West, and his desire for a certain liberation of Muslim minds and bodies from the long night of colonialism, left him vulnerable to the metaphysics that articulated both the state and the biopolitical form. The united *ummah* is then deployed as a weapon in potentia, a mass of bodies, against the power of the West, and in fashioning and imagining this power Iqbal allowed the biopolitical underbelly of his new weapon to colonize the very structure he was fashioning against the West (i.e. *ummah*)

41 I will discuss Iqbal in the final chapter. See, however, his famous *Reconstruction* for an elaboration of his political thought; Iqbal 1989. For the classic formulation of nationalism's *raison d'être* see Ernest Renan's "What is a Nation?" in Eley and Suny 1996. Pakistan's founder, Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, often deployed Renan's racist/biopolitical logic in justifying his two nation theory. See the final chapter.

42 In this way it is also a history of its exception. Without getting ahead of ourselves, Agamben writes that the state of exception is the "principle of every juridical localization, since only the state of exception *opens the*

space in which the determination of a certain juridical order and a particular territory first becomes possible." Agamben p. 19, italics mine.

43 For a critique of the genetic mode of historical analysis see Foucault 2003a and Dean 1994.

44 The term *étatisation* is from Foucault's widely read governmentality lecture in Foucault 2007b, pp. 87–114. For Foucault, "government" refers to relations between self and self, between communities and social institutions, as well as to the exercise of political sovereignty. Unlike Marxists he avoided "State Theory," which attempts to deduce the modern activities of government from essential properties of the state. Precisely because Foucault was interested in governmentality as an activity or "practice" that goes beyond the formal state object, we can similarly frame the exercise of political power by the 'ulama as a form of governmentality. Foucault used the term "rationality of government" interchangeably with the "art of government." We are concerned here therefore with the arts (*technē*) of 'ulama governmentality. Like Wahabism, which has influenced the more recent theological comportments of the Deoband, the Taliban is an expression of Islam as *police*. See the introduction in Gordon, Burchell, and Miller 1991. Given the limited ways in which the governmentality paradigm is often deployed, in particular its divorce from his concept of biopolitics, I will discuss the relationship between the two in Chapter 1.

45 For instance, with respect to gender, a number of religious parties backed Fatima Jinnah's candidacy when she ran against General Ayub Khan, whilst some of the same groups were opposed in principle to female leadership in the case of Benazir Bhutto. See Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987 and Kandiyoti 1991.

46 This kind of problematic claim of being non-political or a-political is of course characteristic of the Tabligh-i Jama'at. For the definitive account that echoes this characterization see Masud 2000.

47 Certainly the Tabligh can be subject to an analysis in terms of power, for they most clearly exhibit a form of governmentality – "conduct of conduct" – their key role is the fashioning of a particular kind of Muslim subject. Recently in the wake of terrorist violence, the Annual gathering of the Tabligh-i Jama'at in Raiwand included a number of demonstrations and protests against all forms of violence and terrorism (see the report "Taliban under fire from Pakistan's faithful" (*Dawn* 15 November 2009).

48 Mitchell 2002.

49 Neither the colonial nor the postcolonial state can be said to originary causes of 'ulama governmentality.

50 This is the kind of typology that Roy deploys; Roy 1994.

51 Eickelman and Piscatori 1996.
52 As such, these distinctions, while of rough and ready usefulness, are no longer, if indeed they ever were, analytically tenable. Most scholarship on political Islam, including Zaman and Metcalf, continue to make these distinctions (Metcalf 2004d and Metcalf 1987).
53 The term is used in Gregory's excellent study (Gregory 2004).

1

Critical Ontology

The Biopolitical Apparatus

Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word "being"? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression "being"? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question.

– Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*

Whoever seizes the greatest unreality will shape the greatest reality.

– Robert Musil[1]

This metacolonial exposition of history and politics is principally informed by a path of thinking cleared open by Heidegger, Foucault, and Agamben – the original figures that together constitute the axis of critical ontology. Their works can be seen as converging across at least three thematics: "technology/*Machenschaft*," "biopolitical sovereignty," and "the space of exception." Heidegger's critique of technology and his diagnosis of modernity as nihilism (*Gestell*), Foucault's genealogical grammars of power (biopolitics and governmentality/security), and Agamben's "sovereigntology" (the state/space of exception), all share a broad characteristic, which can be subsumed under the general trajectory of what might be called "power over the singularity of life." If in Foucault's work the ontological resonances of his grammars of power (biopolitics, discipline, governmentality, security) appear subdued, in Agamben they are explicit. Agamben radicalizes Foucault's conception of biopolitical sovereignty by articulating the question of power – the subject's (*Dasein's*) relation to truth (being) – in the very mediality of the history of being. The broader aim of the metacolonial then is to disclose

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the linkage between biopolitical sovereignty and *Gestell* – Heidegger's shorthand term for the technological understanding of being or technological dispositioning (*technē*). In its simplest formulation then, the metacolonial, as a phenomenon, refers to the relentless proliferation of a constellation of apparatuses that seek to capture and extinguish the singular potential of human existence. The metacolonial speaks to the colonization of life by metaphysics (onto-theology): the colonization of life by power.

In more brief and substantive terms, critical ontology should be understood not only as a cartography or *topology of being-power* – a question of the *relay* and *relation* of being-power – but also as a syntagm that marks the crisis, or emergency, of being. At first blush it may seem evident that the critical axis relates to power and the ontological axis to being – critical (power/knowledge), ontology (being). Such a neat separation, however, is not intended by this formulation, because, as will be clarified below, *being is itself power* (potentiality). If Foucault stands to the left of this formulation and Heidegger to the right, then Agamben exemplifies the confrontation and suturing between the two. Critical ontology is thus a disclosure of the crossing/tension between being and power; the *polemos* of being/power. This relay of being/power is not a philosophical abstraction but is rather constitutive of human subjectivity and praxis in its historical and political unfolding. As a guise of critical ontology, the metacolonial discloses the catastrophe of "human being" (*Da-sein*), unravelling in the wake of a life colonized by metaphysics.

Before attempting to articulate a few of the parameters that form the outlines of a critical ontology, it is important to point out that I am not aiming for the development of a definitive theory or method. Critical ontology is deployed merely as an incitement towards thinking, an intuitive and creative endeavor that does not rest on discovery – of permanent structures, origins, or facts – but disclosure. Its measure is *poiēsis* rather than *technē*, and like Heidegger's thought of being, it is always "underway."[2] As a form of disclosure or revealing, it is more akin to art than social or political theory and in this way has affinities with the ficto-historical aspects of Foucault's genealogies.[3] Rooted in what we might call Heidegger's "phenom-ontology," critical ontology seeks to witness and disclose the problems of the human condition (subject formation, war, the violence of law, etc.) and not the human *cogito*. Heidegger's rejection of philosophy itself and his embrace of poetic thinking are thus mirrored in the play of critical ontology. The metacolonial, the discursive destination of this work, is, in a sense, merely a terminological space intended to facilitate the amplification and resonance of critical ontology. Ensuing from our way of (not) thinking-being,

the metacolonial names our current condition as one of concealment and abandonment. It seeks to expose the practices of law and violence that unfold in the wake of the topologies of exception that permeate our life-world. In short, it is an interpretation and exposure of the metaphysics – the contemporary attunement and understanding of being – under girding political modernity.[4] For Heidegger *understanding* is not merely a cognitive disposition, it does not stand primarily in relation to idea (*eidos*) or a way of seeing (*theoria*), but rather it is an *ethos*, a way of being-dwelling. In this sense the metacolonial seeks to disclose our way of being in the *polis*.

It is of course in one of Foucault's final and widely read essays "What is Enlightenment?"[5] – an essay devoted to Kant, in which he attempts to distance and distinguish the practice of critique from humanism – that we first hear the conjunction "critical ontology" and "historical ontology."[6] In order to salvage the ethos of modernity as a "permanent critique of ourselves" Foucault risks thinking being and power as essentially together. If, Foucault writes, the Kantian question "was that of knowing [*savoir*] what limits knowledge [*connaissance*] must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what *place* is occupied by whatever is *singular*, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?"[7] The essay as a whole suggests that critical ontology is an *attitude* of experimentation[8] at the limits of established knowledges and social practices.

The six references to "ontology" in the "Enlightenment" essay can perhaps be read as a late terminological gesture offered in acknowledgement of the decisive influence that Heidegger had on his entire corpus: "For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher. [...] My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger."[9] If nothing else this phrase offers us a potentially invaluable bridge between the thought of ontology and the work of political and cultural critique. Despite the early appearance of these remarks in the introduction of Hubert Dreyfus's commentary on *Being and Time* (Foucault's statement appeared in French in 1984 and has been available in English at least since 1991), in the otherwise voluminous corpus of "*Foucaultia*" there has been remarkably sparse uptake exploring the productive links and confrontations between these two seminal figures.[10] In the *Homo Sacer* project, however, Agamben offers a consistent refrain: that Foucault worked with a "lucid awareness" of the ontological implications of his arche-genealogy of power.[11] Central of course to Agamben's own "political spirituality"[12] is the exposition of the onto-political legacy inherent in the *arcane imperii* – the originary structure of biopolitical-sovereignty.

As he writes in the *Use of Bodies*, the non-dénouement to the four volume *Homo Sacer* series:

> Ontology or first philosophy has constituted for centuries the fundamental historical *a priori* of Western thought. … It is from this perspective that we are seeking to trace out – even if purely in the form of a summary sketch – an *archeology of ontology*, or more precisely, a *genealogy of the ontological apparatus* that has functioned for two millennia as a historical *a priori* of the West.[13]

Though Foucault does not himself develop or outline critical ontology as a specific, systematic method, it is clear that, in certain respects, this was simply a more formal term for the kind of critical practice he had been engaged in all along. For Foucault critique is a departure from the traditional philosophical search for origins and formal structures with universal value. It is instead to be thought of as *problematization*: a "philosophical *ethos* consisting in a critique of what we are saying, thinking, and doing, *through a historical ontology of ourselves*." This critical-historical ontology of ourselves is concerned with three elements: those historical discourses, or truths, "through which we constitute ourselves as objects of knowledge;" with the practices of power "through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others;" and with ethics "through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents."

> The *critical ontology of ourselves* must be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it must be conceived as an attitude, an *ethos*, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the *limits imposed on us* and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.[14]

Foucault's concise exposition of critical ontology is noteworthy. In *Stanzas*, Agamben's early meditation on the originary split between poetry and philosophy, he notes that when the term "criticism" first appeared in the vocabulary of Western philosophy, it signified "inquiry at the *limits* of knowledge about precisely that which can be neither posed nor grasped. … criticism, insofar as it traces the limits of truth, offers a glance of "truth's homeland"… the quest of criticism consists not in discovering its object but in assuring the conditions of its inaccessibility."[15] In his later years, weary of the inescapably ontic frame of philosophy, Heidegger turned increasingly to poetry – which he came to regard as the highest form of thought – as a way to memorialize the immemorial, to remember "the forgetfulness of a scission"[16] that lay at

the origin of Western culture. In this way through the *stanza*, the essential nucleus and stance of poetry, "the human spirit responds to the impossible task of appropriating what must in every case remain unappropriable."[17] The later Heidegger, as is well known, eventually deploys *Ereignis* as the core term for his path of thinking. Widely regarded as impossible to translate, and often incorrectly rendered as "Event", *Ereignis* might be heard as bespeaking the appropriation of the unappropriable. For *Dasein* then – Heidegger's ontological designation for human being – it is in this movement, the appropriation of its *existence*, its being-in-the-world, that the parameters of ethical responsibility are illuminated. Since Heidegger always thinks ethics in terms of the Greek *ethos*, as dwelling in the nearness to being, a critical ontology can only be *a critical ontology of ourselves*, of the limits and constraints always already imposed on *Dasein* by metaphysics, by the technological dispositioning of being-in-the-world. As such, key strands and formulae of Foucault's thought – *problematizations*, the concern with the subjects' relation to truth, the grammars of power (biopolitics, neoliberalism, etc.) – are inextricably linked to what he calls "critical/historical ontology."

As is evident from the reference above, Agamben explicitly fashions his critique as "*a genealogy of the ontological apparatus*," thereby signaling his intent to develop Foucault's critical ontology, something he may himself have undertaken were it not for his early demise. For Agamben, politics – the place (*polis*) where the humanity of the living animal is decided – manifests "as the truly fundamental structure of Western metaphysics." The task par excellence of this metaphysical structure – this biopolitical apparatus – is the "politicization" of bare life. In assuming this function "modernity does nothing other than declare its own faithfulness to the essential structure of the metaphysical tradition."[18] Critical ontology's preliminary assignment then is the disclosure of this metaphysical structure/tradition, and an exposition of its "*significability*", of its bearing on and colonization of our life worlds. The "critical" work involved in thinking ontology is *kenosis*, the movement in thought of the place, or mediality, the crossing over and mirror-play, of the question of being and the question of power.

Before exploring then the primary articulation between Foucault's conception of biopolitics, Agamben's state of exception, and the latter Heidegger's critique of technology, we must turn, with as much clarity as possible, to a more detailed consideration of Heidegger's rethinking and critique of traditional ontology and his *topology* of being. Since the Heideggerian critique of metaphysics (refracted through the prisms of Foucault and Agamben) *is* the core of the metacolonial, it will be important to articulate, as lucidly as possible, the way in which ontology and the question of being articulate.

Heidegger: Being, World, Singularity

> But where is nihilism really at work? Where men cling to familiar beings and suppose that it suffices to go on taking beings as beings, since after all that is what they are. But with this they reject the question of being and treat being like a nothing (*nihil*) which in a certain sense it "is", insofar as it unfolds essentially. *To cultivate only beings in the forgetfulness of being – that is nihilism.* … By contrast, to press inquiry into being explicitly to the limits of the nothing and *to draw the nothing into the question of being* – this is the first and only fruitful step toward a true overcoming of nihilism.[19]

While a complete elaboration of Heidegger's path of thinking is obviously beyond the scope of this chapter, my primary charge is to clarify the stakes of the *Seinsfrage*, the question of being, as a prelude to thinking about critical ontology and "power." Additionally, I will aim to clarify the significance of key path-marks from Heidegger's latter oeuvre – truth as unconcealment (*alētheia* the clearing, worlding, *Ereignis*, *Seinsgeschichte* ("history of *beyng*"), *Gestell* (dispositioning), the fourfold, and the thing – all of which resonate in the critical postmetaphysical enterprise of both Foucault and Agamben. Without a firm understanding of what is intended by the critique of Western metaphysics as onto-theology – a critique that undergirds Heidegger's elaboration of *technē* (*Gestell*) and power (*Machenschaft*) – the nature of Foucault's various grammars of power and Agamben's meditations on sovereignty, abandonment, the exception, and bare life remain opaque at best. More crucially, the modes of resistance to power, in Foucault's *askēsis* and Agamben's form-of-life, only begin to make sense when placed in proximity with the comportment of *Gelassenheit*, Heidegger's ethical way of being as the counter-stance to *Gestell*.

It is customary to begin any introduction to Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) by noting that he was one of the twentieth century's most remarkable and influential thinkers, whose 1927 magnum opus *Being and Time* forever transformed the landscape of Western philosophy. Despite his controversial politico-philosophical legacy and a wealth of detractors within the circles of analytical philosophy,[20] there is barely any major critical/poststructural/postmodern theorist who is not in some way profoundly indebted to Heidegger's stunning critique of Western metaphysics.[21] Yet outside of specialist enclaves, even among humanities and social science scholars otherwise partial to poststructuralism, the terms "being," "metaphysics," and "ontology" often evoke puzzlement and suspicion, if not hostility, as if one were sneaking transcendence – a cosmic super-something – through the backdoor of postmodernist relativism.[22]

However, in a preliminary, somewhat clumsy yet succinct manner, we might characterize the metaphysical attitude, the dominant "natural attitude" that Heidegger sought all his life to vanquish, with the phrase "the avoidance of the void." Whether forgotten, rendered irrelevant, or simply overlooked and presupposed, public relations for "ontology" are in disarray, yet predictably so in the age of technology. It is therefore important to state off the bat that, properly understood, Heidegger's "being-way"[23] is not some quasi-mystical quest for a pure transcendental or cosmic-super event. Being has no willful agency; it is not some super-natural thing or theological phenomena that resides autonomously and discretely on a separate plane of reality. Nor is "being" some universal timeless structural entity or cosmic puppeteer that holds secret codes to human existence. Heidegger's path of thinking is resolutely post-foundational.

Ontology Contra Metaphysics: Ontotheology

Heidegger's thinking can be characterized as a lifelong attempt to understand, think, say, and experience the truth of being, or being *as such*. His major contention, and critical point of departure, is that within the entire history of philosophy (aka metaphysics) the question of being had been progressively forgotten and as such his first major work, *Being and Time* (1927), was singularly tasked "to raise anew the question of the meaning of being."[24] Perplexed by the question and lacking any understanding of its significance, modern philosophy increasingly came to regard the question of being as arcane, empty, and irrelevant. For metaphysics the meaningful presence of things in the world is simply presupposed and the very *worlding of the world* is progressively overlooked. Heidegger saw as his task to revive the significance of this question and to have us recognize the poverty of traditional (metaphysical) ways of understanding being. While philosophy since the Pre-Socratics has certainly been concerned with the being question in one form or another – as *physis*, *Logos* (Parmenides and Heraclitus), *eidos* (Plato), *energeia*, *parousia* (Aristotle), *cogito* (Descartes), Absolute Spirit (Hegel), will to power (Nietzsche), transcendental ego (Husserl) – Heidegger's primary claim is that the Western tradition of metaphysics has offered only partial and impoverished accounts of being, reducing it to presence, essence, or "beingness." The overlooking and presupposing of the being question enacts a realist foreclosure of the truth of being, which is a more primordial, dynamic (*dunamis*) "space-time" singularity. Heidegger's career involved variations on the articulation of precisely this "more originary" element in its complex imbrication with the human being (*Dasein*), and

his central strategy was to deepen and distinguish his dynamic way of the thinking being from the traditions' ossified inheritance of Aristotle's metaphysics of presence. This strategy can be provisionally summed up with the iconic Heideggerian koan: "being is not *a being*."[25]

Metaphysics of course refers to that most basic domain of philosophical thought that is concerned with asking questions about the nature of reality.[26] Within the corpus of Western philosophy, ontology, defined simply as the study of being, is itself usually considered a branch of metaphysics. Hence to ask or attempt to answer the *question of the meaning of being* is to engage in ontology. From the perspective of metaphysics, the being question was effectively a question about the realness of things; *what* is it that all entities/beings share in common, what is it that makes them real. This line of enquiry ultimately devolved into substance metaphysics (*ousia*) whose crowning glory today is particle physics. For Heidegger, however, the realness of the world does not consist simply in the spatio-temporal out-thereness of stuff, but rather in the fact that things out there are intelligible; they are suffused with meaning and significance. Thus while Heidegger is famed for his attempt to "overcome metaphysics," what is often ignored is that Heidegger was not opposed to metaphysics *qua* metaphysics, but rather a particular tradition and style of (Western) ontology.[27] As such the term postmetaphysical should be used with a high degree of qualification in describing Heidegger's work, and while it is safe to say that for the most part the word "metaphysics" is deployed by Heidegger to mark a certain blindness, negativity, or error, metaphysics nonetheless determines the ways in which "truth" and meaningful worlds are disclosed. Heidegger's ontology then was not against metaphysics as such, but rather was a critique of the very limited and impoverished way in which being had been presented, understood, and, eventually, forgotten. In this way he regarded all of Western philosophy since Plato, to be marred by a weak and increasingly hollow metaphysics and referred to this tradition as a "metaphysics of presence" or *onto-theology*.[28]

More importantly the "oblivion of being" that he sought to expose was not merely an arcane problem for "first philosophy," but was rather a matter of the utmost significance for all arenas of human life, from politics, religion, and ethics to art, science, and technology. The consequence of this forgetting, in which actuality and vision (representation) take primacy, is exemplified in an attitude he calls technology (*technē*). On Heidegger's account of the history of being, the modern West culminates in the dominance of a technological and nihilistic way of thinking being, a structuring rationality that effectively colonizes the life-world. In his famous essay on technology, Heidegger writes

"Metaphysics grounds an age." [29] Ian Thompson clarifies the significance of this phrase eloquently:

> Heidegger's claim is that by giving shape to our historical understanding of "what *is*," metaphysics determines the most basic presuppositions of what *anything* is, including ourselves. "Western humanity, in all its comportment toward entities, and even toward itself, is in every respect sustained and guided by metaphysics."[30]

When in the *Contributions* Heidegger writes that "Abandonment of being must be *experienced* as the basic event of our history,"[31] a line that is central to Agamben's own understanding of our political predicament, he is effectively suggesting that metaphysics names the very catastrophic trajectory of human history, otherwise known as "progress." In this way being *is* historicity, world, and power. Additionally, metaphysics is not simply the result of philosophical shortcomings or historical missteps from out of the first Pre-Socratic inception of thinking being, nor is it something like an explicit ideology or theory that one can simply choose to own or disavow. Every worldview always already presupposes a metaphysics – a world – just as much as every practice presupposes or performs a theory. Hence analogous to conventional critical enterprises (critical theory or poststructuralism) critical ontology simply attempts to bring our implicit ontological/metaphysical vectors into visibility. As Thompson puts it, "Heidegger's deconstruction is premised on his attribution to metaphysics of an unparalleled pride of place in the historical construction and maintenance of intelligibility."[32]

In outlining the path for the radical collapse of the subject–object duality within which "Western" metaphysics thrives, Heidegger's language has allowed for the rethinking of being as a *happening*, as emergence, unfolding, and un/concealment.[33] It is this unfolding/unconcealment and concealment that tradition, or what Zimmerman calls "productionist metaphysics,"[34] covers over. The task of overcoming such metaphysics is indeed staggering given that this form of thinking is basic not only to the very occularity of modernity but to the most immanent, though unthought, assumption about what *is*.

Though in his later work Heidegger becomes interested in *being as such*, or the truth of being, in the early phase Heidegger's question about being begins as a general inquiry into the being of entities (the intelligibility of beings) by way of a focus on the being/existence of a special entity, the human being (*Dasein*). Simply put, an entity or *a being* is anything that manifests, appears, or shows up, *as* this or that, in the everyday world (desks, tea cups, cats, my imagination, etc.). By appearing and manifesting Heidegger means is intelligible presence: *beings* are

things or entities that are encountered *meaningfully*, *as* this or that, *as something*. For the most part, however, we simply encounter beings as beings, as entities that *are* and as *what* they are. In the metaphysical worldview, the totality of this multiplicity of discrete independent objects that are out there, seemingly independent of the human subject, constitutes our surrounding everyday "world." In Heidegger's estimation what we miss is the *worlding*[35] of this world. Broadly speaking our everyday comportment is properly attuned to our engagement with objects, things, and entities, in a way that regards them as situated autonomously and discretely in the world; this comportment can be marked by the word "ontical" or "ontic."[36] The ontic is best understood not as merely referring to beings, but as a mode of comportment towards entities and the world, in which the Cartesian subject/object distinction is taken for granted and being *as such* is presupposed. This ontic modality is the dominant comportment within both the natural and human sciences, and it is our comfortable and familiar mode of everyday engagement with the surrounding world.[37] The ontic mode privileges our everyday capacities for representation and knowledge, and when self-reflexive and critical it tends to ask epistemological questions.

To further solidify our understanding of the deficiency of metaphysics, of the predominance of the actual over the possible, we turn to a consideration of ontotheology. As Iain Thompson's superb manuscript clarifies, ontotheology has a specific structure that is rarely attended to even by avid readers of Heidegger. Putting the matter eloquently, Thompson writes, "Heidegger's claim is that by giving shape to our historical understanding of "what *is*" metaphysics determines the most basic presuppositions of what *anything*, including ourselves is."[38] Each epoch implicitly codifies its understanding of the being of entities, and this understanding is disseminated and embedded in its discursive practices. Foucault's *episteme* effectively aims to get a handle on this *a priori* structure of intelligibility. Metaphysics, Thompson argues, "provides each historical epoch of intelligibility with its ontological bedrock." Ontotheology has a double structure and regards being either in terms of a most basic substance (like an atom, quark, or a wave) or as the most highest thing (God, the unmoved mover). Thus the error that pervades foundationalism is itself a variation of the metaphysics of presence or ontotheology, because foundationalism postulates a most basic foundation (rationality, nature, etc.) from which all other principles can be logically and necessarily derived. When the term ontology is invoked by non-Heideggerians, it is usually equated with something like a basic foundation, a super universal, or an elementary category that bears no further meaningful reduction. This quasi-Aristotelian uptake of ontology as onto-theology manifests precisely what Heidegger aimed to overcome

in his *destrucktion* of the metaphysical tradition. Heidegger sees onto-theology as the unacknowledged, unthematized way of doing metaphysics from Plato through Kant. It is the engine secretly operating behind all forms of modern thinking, including, as I will show, modern Islamist thinking (from Iqbal to Mullah Omar). This error is not, however, caused by human agency, nor strangely enough could this error have been avoided. Here, Heidegger's broaching of the destinal is undoubtedly an anathema to any simple conception of liberal agency. In rejecting foundationalism, the primary thrust of poststructuralist critique invariably embraces antifoundationalism. Heidegger, however, regards antifoundationalism, most coherently expressed in the work of Nietzsche, as itself the highest and possibly most dangerous form of onto-theology. It is in this sense that both Agamben and Foucault must be considered postfoundational and not merely antifoundational thinkers.

The Essence of Being: Being, Beings, and the Ontological (In)Difference

What then is the question of being? What are we looking for and enquiring after? What are conventional academic discourses and everyday ways of thinking deprived of by remaining oblivious or indifferent to the *Seinsfrage*? One quick but preliminary way into the domain of the question is to consider the ontological difference/distinction; the difference between being (*Sein*) and beings (*Seiendes*). Consider again the laconic phrase "being is not a being," which succinctly captures the ontological difference.[39] This difference also correlates with the "ontological/ontic" distinction, where ontological, initially and for the most part, refers to being and ontic refers to beings (things, substances, entities). I say preliminary because as Heidegger's path of thinking gets underway and he moves past the limitations of fundamental ontology, he realizes that the ontological difference fails to properly think the essential intimacy between being and beings, that is between being and the world, and merely resubstitutes a transcendental chiasmus in place of indifference.[40] As we shall see, Agamben's own invocation of "indifference," and the Mobius strip-like structure of the inclusive/exclusion, relate to this complicated unity in difference of being and beings.[41] Though Heidegger does not formulate the "ontological difference" by name in *Being and Time* he clearly states its intended thesis: "The Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity."[42] This says that while being *is*, it is not *some*thing (an entity), rather it *is* a certain *no*thing (being).[43] Yet it is on the basis of this not-entity, being, that beings *are* and *are so* meaningfully. How we think the mediality of this "*are*" – as

happening, occurring, existing, showing up, or presencing – is of critical importance.

From a purely phenomenological standpoint, the being question is about understanding our singular and embodied experience of existence: the way in which we already find ourselves thrown into a shared world of meaning, a world whose very possibilities and intelligibility are always already structured by relationships of power, history, and culture. We find ourselves thrown into the midst of our "facticity," concerned, anxious, and curious about the meaning of our mortal, temporary, existence. It is, however, important to keep in mind, as Heidegger's move away from the fundamental ontology of *Dasein* was to attest, that the truth of being does not simply unfold as a historicist projection of human subjectivity. Additionally, a crucial distinction is to be made between being and the truth or essence of being. As Heidegger notes: "With regard to beings, Being is that which shows and makes visible without showing or becoming visible itself."[44] Here Heidegger is thinking truth in proximity to the Greek term *alētheia* (ἀλήθεια), often translated as disclosedness, unveiling, or unconcealment. As Sheehan notes, *alētheia* was "the condition of a thing insofar as it is now present-and-visible, and not just spatio-temporally present to one's eyes but meaningfully present to one's mind." *Alētheia* is a complex and dynamic unfolding of two essentially related moments of unconcealment and concealment. As such, Heidegger's ontology, his concern for the truth of being, can be read as a "phenomenology of the unapparent and the invisible."[45] Heidegger's goal was to bring to remembrance, to think, this intrinsically hidden "place," "clearing," or "openness" of being that metaphysics had overlooked and forgotten. Metaphysics is structurally blind to concealment, its mode of questioning directed solely at beings in their unconcealment. Because metaphysical thought remains constrained to presence, it is incapable of addressing what remains absent or hidden from presence. In this way metaphysics adheres to the Latin *veritas*, which thinks truth solely as a matter of correspondence, correctness, and certainty. Beistegui phrases this eloquently: "Metaphysics can only see what is true – what shines in the midst of truth – and so remains blind to truth itself, to the essence of truth as the clearing that shelters the concealing."[46]

Towards the end of his life, between 1966 and 1969, Heidegger led a series of seminars in Le Thor, France, with a small group of French colleagues, including the young Agamben.[47] During these conversations Heidegger states clearly for the record: "We must constantly emphasize that the only question which has ever moved Heidegger is the question of being: what does "being" mean?"[48] In the very same seminar Heidegger also remarks: "If the emphasis is: *to let* presencing, there is no longer room for the very name of being."[49] Therefore, after the publication of

over ninety volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*, most of which have only emerged in the last two decades, a debate rages over the presumed centrality of the being question in Heidegger's thought. For Thomas Sheehan, "the thing itself" (*die Sache selbst*), the fundamental matter for thinking for Heidegger, was not being, but *Ereignis*; the appropriated clearing or event of being, the very *source* for the meaningfulness of presence.[50] While it may seem as if another front on the *gigantomachia* has broken out,[51] it has long been recognized that Heidegger's approach to the question of being underwent a turn (*Kehre*)[52]. If Heidegger sought single-handedly to escape the massive gravitational force of over 2500 years of ossified metaphysics, it was only after reaching a certain velocity and distance that he could attempt to jettison the preliminary phase of *Being and Time*. As such his comportment gradually shifted from the fundamental ontology of the *Dasein* analytic in *Being and Time,* where the meaning of being was at stake, to "be-ing historical thinking" (*Seynsgeschichtliche Denken*)[53] inaugurated in the *Contributions to Philosophy*, where the emphasis was now on the "truth," topology, and emergency of being.[54]

As Sheehan copiously documents, "Heidegger was scandalously inconsistent in how he employed the word *Sein.*"[55] For instance, in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, he uses the expression "the being of beings" to name both his own ontological question as well as the traditional metaphysical question, which asks about the realness or "beingness of beings." Heidegger's often ambiguous use of the term "being" forces us to schematize the different ways and levels at which being is understood, and to approach the question of being in resolutely onto-phenomenological terms. Up until now, as we can see from the preliminary sketch of the ontological difference, the difference between being and beings can easily suggest that being is some kind of special postmetaphysical non-ingredient that serves as a condition of possibility for beings to appear (as if being dust magically added to some pure blank object causes it to come out of a hidden non-existence and appear like a rabbit in a magician's hat). However, from a strictly phenomenological standpoint being is not to be understood as what allows for the spatio-temporal and material out-there-ness of things, rather being is the meaningfulness or intelligibility of an entity/object for humans. Heidegger's initial being question was then effectively a phenomenological question about intelligibility or meaningfulness and the source of this meaningfulness. Being is thus significance as such. The source of significance itself was articulated in at least two distinct ways: as world (being-in-the-world) and then as the thrown-open clearing that opens up a world (*Ereignis*). *Being and Time* is of course devoted to the elaboration of world, the meaning-giving context opened up by *Dasein's* temporality or ex-sistence, whereas

his later work seeks to account for "world" as such in relation to "earth." Heidegger's thinking traverses a particular arc, beginning with the *singular* presence of an appearing thing and proceeding to an elaboration of the complex unfolding of *this* presence, which folds *together* multiple dimensions of meaningfulness.

It is clear then that as Heidegger's path of thinking gets underway, he increasingly grapples with new ways to think and say the fundamental matter for thinking. Being (*Sein*), the word all too familiar to classical metaphysics, is eventually traced as be-ing or beyng (*Seyn*), the later not only recalling an older Germanic spelling but also perhaps suggesting a certain intrinsic resistance to signification. Eventually the vocabulary of being and all of its variations are eclipsed by *Ereignis*, which comes to dominate the ontological enterprise. Similarly, the ontological difference, a heuristic figure that was so central to the early exposition of the being question, is seen as fatally compromised by metaphysics and is eventually replaced by the dynamic interplay of the fourfold of earth, sky, mortals, and gods.

To be clear then, Heidegger used the term being (*Sein*) in two distinct senses. In the first phenomenological sense, Heidegger understood being as the "being" of things: as the "significance," "intelligibility," or meaningful presence (*Anwesen*) of things within the politico-cultural worlds of human interests and concerns. In the second, ontological sense, being (being as such or being itself) was meant to indicate the *source* or "giving" of such meaningfulness. Heidegger eventually referred to the *source of being* as the thrown-open clearing, which should be understood less as some transcendental condition of possibility and more as an immanent co-happening for meaningfulness to occur. It is therefore important to recognize from the outset that in Heidegger's "phenomontology," in addition to these two (in)distinct senses, "being" is both indispensable yet insufficient: all attempts to "say" and "re-name" it are always already betrayals. Nonetheless, it is necessary to remain mindful of the way in which Heidegger's locution of being oscillates between the being or intelligibility of things/entities to the intelligibility of being as such. That is to say, being sometimes refers to significance (*significability*), intelligibility, or meaningful presence, as well as to that which makes meaningful presence possible, the source or event of being-as-meaningfulness. He would eventually refer to this source of intelligibility as "the clearing" (*die Lichtung*) or, more accurately, "the thrown-open or appropriated clearing."[56] Because the place of this clearing, the *Da*, is human *Dasein*, or ex-istence, the question of being is immanent with the question of the subject.

Sheehan's stark and controversial claim that the Heidegger philosophy was not about *Sein* at all seeks to mark a decisive intervention in

Heidegger's terminological ambiguity: Heidegger's "endeavors were to bring to light this intrinsically hidden 'whence' that classical ontology had overlooked and forgotten. Being (*Sein*) in all its incarnations is the topic of metaphysics. Heidegger, on the other hand, is after the essence or source of being and thus the ground of metaphysics."[57] While for many commentators being is always both being and the clearing for being, both senses folded into a unity, situating our understanding of Heidegger in the midst of these terminological transitions will become crucial for staging the requisite confrontations with both Agamben and Foucault's appropriation of the *Seinsfrage*. In particular, keeping these two senses of being distinct will become vital for situating Agamben's engagement and development of Heidegger through the thematic of (im) potentiality and caesurae. Eventually then we will need to think in terms of series of three ultimately "inseparable distinctions:"[58] between beings (entities, things), being (world, the open, unconcealment), and the truth of being (beyng, concealment, earth).

It would be helpful then to schematize and refer distinctly to three primary senses of being. This will allow us to reconfigure and suture the preliminary sense of the ontological difference. Critically, as indicated, these three senses of being dovetail with Agamben's elaboration of potentiality (actuality/potentiality/impotentiality):

1. Being-Presence (actuality/actual)
2. Being-World (potentiality/possible)
3. Being-*Ereignis* (impotentiality/impossible)

We can also insert here a preliminary definition of the metacolonial as the utter predominance and colonization of the actual over the possible, beings over being, the totality over singularity.

This initial tripartite distinction between (1) beings, (2) the being/meaningfulness of beings, and (3) the essence/truth of being, allows us to distinguish between three senses of the ontological difference, which eventually are to be read as ontological (in)distinctions:

1. The first sense is the metaphysical or ontotheological sense in which the difference between beings (particular things, "thatness") and the beingness of beings (universal essence or ground of beings, "whatness") is articulated. This is effectively the difference between entities and the form (*eidos*), ground, or underlying essence of entities as a whole (*ousia*). This is the Platonic, foundational, or ontic understanding of the difference, which Heidegger seeks to overcome at all costs.
2. The second sense is Heidegger's preliminary rejoinder to Platonic metaphysics (1), namely the ontological difference as the difference

between being and beings, which preserves the difference as *difference*. Being as "presencing" (*Anwesen*) is the *no*thing that gives the *some*thing, beings, their meaningful "presence" (*Anwesenheit*). This is a postfoundational[59] or ontological understanding of the difference. In its initial preliminary sense, the ontological difference refers to the differentiation of things from their being or meaningfulness.

3. The third sense, however, is the difference between being (meaningful presence, intelligibility, significance), and *Ereignis*, the appropriating event of meaningful presence.

It should be evident that, from a phenomenological standpoint, there can be no such thing as a purely ontic entity. Everything we encounter is always already encountered *as* something meaningful and intelligible (even if it is an undefined object, it will show up meaningfully, in this case *as* strange or out-of-place). The foregrounded presence of anything is only possible on the basis of an already existing background network of meaningful relations that Heidegger called *world*. The "world" is the prior "open space" or "clearing" that allows things to appear meaningfully. Critical ontology effectively seeks to grasp the basic background conditions that *govern* the various configurations of the clearing, the horizon of intelligibility that direct our engagement with the world and by extension with use and value. The question of power, or the apparatus, is intimately bound up with the configuration of world.

Technology and Metaphysics

> The limitless domination of modern technology in every corner of this planet is only the late consequence of a very old technical interpretation of the world, the interpretation that is usually called metaphysics.
>
> –Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*

> … the hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and the rootless organization of the average man … spiritual decline … the darkening of the world, the flight of the gods … the destruction of the earth, the reduction of human beings to a mass, the preeminence of the mediocre … the disempowering of spirit, its dissolution, diminution, suppression, and misinterpretation … all things sinking to the same depths, to a flat surface resembling a dark mirror that no longer reflects anything and gives nothing back … the onslaught of what aggressively destroys all rank, every world-creating impulse of the spirit … the regulation and mastery of the material relations of production … the instrumentalization and misinterpretation of spirit.
>
> –Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*

Technology *is* being. "In the era of technology, positionality (*das Gestell*) is precisely how being gives itself to us today." Put differently, technology is itself the meaning of being. Since technology shares the same essential space as that of metaphysics from which it grew, it can be regarded as the completion of metaphysics. Technology thus marks the ultimate level of *Seinsverlassenheit*; the forgottenness of being, or the total occlusion of the essence of "truth as untruth," or concealment. As such, it amounts to the devastation or crisis of being (emergency of being). For Heidegger, the devastation of Europe in war was itself an instance of a deeper and decisive devastation, that of being, which he also equates with the completion of European nihilism. Critical ontology is an expression of this crisis and begins with the recognition that we are always already thinking from out of this crisis; the thinking subject is already marked and caught up in the technological sway of being. Hence in Agamben's onto-political thinking, the problem, persistence, dispersion, and intensification of sovereign violence, is rooted in and abetted by the refusal (incapacity) to decipher the metaphysical engine that sustains the key political categories of modernity. As such his conception of the camp, the permanent space of exception in which we live, is a corollary and development of Heidegger's emergency of being.

Thinking of course emerges from being; it takes place from out of and in relation to a constituted field of intelligibility. For Heidegger, when that field becomes dominated by and given over wholly to metaphysics, when our comportment to being becomes onto-theologically saturated, then a pale leveling cast of technology begins to pervade the entirety of our life worlds, with catastrophic consequences for politics and life. Modern techno-power is itself the outcome, or unfolding, of the history of being. The forgetting of being and the reduction of being to beings, which is what metaphysical thinking does, culminates in a technological way of seeing and being. The complete domination of technology with its exclusive manipulation, not only of beings but of beings in their character of being utilizable for some technological demand, radically preclude any possibility of an openness to being. It is in opposition to this foundational metaphysics that Heidegger devotes his entire energies. As such, from an ontological vantage point – one that registers the transformative power of positionality (*Gestell*) and the sway of metaphysics – the oppositions between science and religion, between democracy and authoritarianism, between "the West" and "Islam," can be seen not so much as false but merely ontic. Under the now global regimes of the various technological apparatus (biopower, neoliberalism, etc.) ontological convergence is rendering these oppositions increasingly indistinct.

On Heidegger's account, "modern techno-power is founded in an unconditional drive toward the enhancement of power. This drive

toward enhancement calls for the *objectification* and ordering of beings; conversely, the objectification and ordering of beings facilitates the drive towards enhancement."[60] In this way, if we regard Foucault's "history of power" as in part a narrative of the intensification of power, we can see how it is indebted to the process that Heidegger calls technological enframing. Governmentality then can be thought of as the way technological subjects seek to accomplish security, certainty, and stability "through a complete ordering of all beings, in the sense of a systematic securing of stockpiles, by means of which [their] establishment in the stability of certainty is to be completed."[61] The individualizing and totalizing poles of biopower in Foucault coincide in the "total mobilization" of beings as resource, the systematic securing of stockpiles for the sake of power. The result is that nature, now distinct from human "culture," comes to appear as a vast field of usability and disposability or "standing reserve" (*Bestand*).[62] It is in this sense that "culture" is itself a form of colonization[63] of the originary life-world possibilities of a human being. Human life itself becomes a resource, or domain for maximization and securitization. This transformation of man, and subsequently the domain of culture itself, into production and stockpile, is the unfolding of what Heidegger calls the will-to-power. Thus humanism, which is at the heart of the "anthropological machine," with its attendant political doctrines of liberalism and democracy and its juridical armature of a rights bearing subject, are complicit in technology's occlusion of its own impoverished metaphysical *episteme*.

For Heidegger, then, technology (*technē*) is not something technological but is rather a mode of revealing (*aletheuein*), a kind of ethos that sediments our attitude towards beings. Playing on Aristotle's notion of *technē* as a mode of knowing, technology, Heidegger says, is a certain revelation of beings, a concentration on the thing as a separate being, an essence, a substance, something with properties that can be broken down into its parts. Technology reveals beings as reducible to structure, as analyzable, quantifiable, predictable, and controllable. Most importantly beings can be harnessed and secured. Foucault's critique of security and biopolitics is intimately bound up with this Heideggerian critique of modernity's technological way of being.

Technology thus designates the way in which we comport ourselves towards both beings and being, folding the later into the former. Yet technology itself is a certain destining of being and not some historical error of translation of the Greek notion of *alētheia* to the Roman *veritas*. Heidegger uses the term "*Gestell*" (framing or enframing) to designate this "essence of technology." The dominance, and perhaps we might say arrogance then, of the social science preference for quantity over quality can be seen as an extension of the very structure of Western metaphysics

that Heidegger sought to uncover, an attitude rooted in enframing's ontologically reductive mode of revealing, for which only that which is calculable in advance "counts" as being, and being true. According to Heidegger then, Western metaphysics and history are essentially technological, that is, governed from the start by an unquestioned conception of reality that is intrinsically productivist and instrumental.

Technological modernity's unconditional drive toward the enhancement of power, and its subsequent transformation of the horizons of intelligibility, subsumes subjectivity and institutions alike. This drive towards enhancement and constant improvement calls for the objectification and ordering of beings. The will to power is above all a will to efficiency. This understanding leads us to think of all beings, including human beings, but especially the natural environment, as composed of entities lacking intrinsic meaning other than as resources for relentless optimization, efficiency, and calculation. The logic of sovereignty, in Agamben, also follows this command of decision and ordering.

Technology defines the way in which the "world," perceived solely as extended space, is mobilized, ordered, homogenized, and used up so as to enhance man's will to hegemony. The ordering takes the form of a total planning or an equipping that consists in the division of the whole dynamic of being into sectors and areas, followed by the systematic organization and exploitation of such *regions*; Foucault's military spaces of discipline. Thus, each domain has its own "institute of research," each area is controlled and evaluated with a view to assessing its potential and eventually calibrated for mass consumption.[64] Beings as a whole have become this "stuff" awaiting consumption. Nothing falls outside of this technological organization: neither politics, which has become the way to organize and optimize the technological seizure of beings at the level of the nation, nor culture. Foucault's governmentality is an extension of this metaphysical ordering. In the world of the Taliban, Islam is consumed, and deployed as a pure instrument of a sovereign will, which is to say that the Taliban's comportment towards Islam is technological.

However, technology is not only a structuration, systematization, and ordering of socio-political life but also of experience itself. Heidegger's call for thinking as *poiēsis*, which as we shall see parallels Agamben's notion of a form-of-life, comes in response to an age in which being is determined as "technological" – as disclosable, calculable, available. "Heidegger looks for the possibility of opening up a reserve of a different modality of happening, which he explores under the rubric of *poiēsis*. … the understanding of the historicity of experience as event."[65]

For Heidegger "the essence of technology" constrains our current epoch or constellation of historical intelligibility; it frames us. The essence of modern technology is this "enframing" (*Gestell*). It is effectively

a stance, a comportment towards being. This framing, or "enframing" (*Gestell*), is an historical "mode of revealing" in which things increasingly show up only as resources to be optimized. *Gestell* then refers both to a technological way of revealing – the way in which entities are revealed as standing-reserve – and with the idea that this way of revealing claims and takes possession of us within the domain of subjectivity. *Gestell* is thus the primal specter of our hauntology.

Politics: Apparatus, Machine, Power

The emergency of being is thus nihilism, manifest in the form of progress and technology, ruling "as will to power, as the most disastrous unleashing of power amidst beings as a whole."[66] Thus echnology, biopolitics, and sovereignty have their roots in metaphysics itself, a fact that characterizes the "progressive" and "liberal" nature of Western history. That which makes our history Western, according to Heidegger, is metaphysics, and metaphysics culminates in the age of technology. As the embodiment of a will-to-power, precision, calculation, ordering, systematization, and control all become key elements of a way of knowing the world. Modernity as such, in either its liberal, communist, or even Islamist mode, foregrounds this purely instrumental and technological understanding and way of being. With the domination of neoliberalism as the primary driving force of political and economic rationality, everything becomes commodified, and an "impersonal," "self-regulating," "autonomous" market becomes the measure of all things. On this reading, we become not only *homo economicus* but more like machines, alienated not only from our proper *humanitas* but also from the world.

For Nietzsche the will to power is the ultimate fact or destination to which modern civilization has come. It is Nietzsche's doctrine of the will-to-power that serves as the cipher for Heidegger's critique of technology and modern power, and both Foucault and Agamben implicitly draw on this critique. Foucault's biopolitics and Agamben's concern with sovereign power and the exception could be understood as original developments, extensions or variations of this critique. On Heidegger's account of the history of the forgetting of being, he shows how the eternally recurring will-to-power, which is at the core of Nietzschean metaphysics, has left us with a purely instrumental and technological understanding of being. The very essence of our way of modern thinking has culminated in the nihilism of the will-to-power and the logic of technology. Nietzsche's conceptualization of the totality of entities as "eternally recurring will-to-power" is exposed by Heidegger as the purest expression of a nihilistic ontotheology, which presages nothing other

than the "unending disaggregation and reaggregation of forces without purpose or goal."[67] However, even while Heidegger acknowledges the will-to-power as the essence of *modern* man, and indeed as the unavoidable manner in which the being of beings is revealed, he also proposes a way out. The way out involves thinking his concept of *Ereignis*, which is the negative, the counter-essence, of *Gestell*. Thus the thought or thinking of *Ereignis* is the cite where Heidegger's ethics unfolds. The concepts of *Ereignis* and *Gestell* will in the section on Foucault be thought in terms of space and power, where ethics (dwelling) corresponds to the thought of *Ereignis* and politics to the mode of power in *Gestell*.

Ethics: Gelassenheit and the Saving Power

The later Heidegger's ontology, as we have seen, revolves around the German word *Ereignis* – "the event," "enowning," or "appropriating." *Ereignis* is the rupture or opening that holds within itself, that conceals, the secret of its happening and makes possible both *Dasein* and the appearance of beings dependent upon its disclosedness or openness. *Ereignis* therefore names that which is never unveiled to calculation, that which is repeatedly suppressed by the metaphysics of presence, namely, the unthinkable, the *ungovernable*, the inappropriable, the upsurge in the nothing that renders *Dasein* free and available for the showing of being. Heidegger would say that the history of metaphysics, which coincides with the history of technology and the history of Western civilization, is the repeated effort to repress *Ereignis*. Both Heidegger and Foucault argue that "modernity is dominated by a technological power that works to objectify the real and reduce human life to the level of resource. Both argue that this power works to order the forces of life, placing them into productive systems. Heidegger calls this power machination (*Machenschaft*) or enframing (*Gestell*) whereas Foucault calls it biopower."[68] The task of thinking today, according to both thinkers, is to overcome biopolitical (representational, metaphysical) ways of thinking.

For Heidegger, the *ēthos* that must replace *Gestell*, the kind of thinking that redirects us to the question of being, is *Gelassenheit* (letting-be). If technology is sustained and perpetuated by the will-to-power as the basic attitude of man, it is "serenity" or "letting-be" that characterizes the ethos of a non-technological mode of knowing and relating. This is effectively an embrace of the power of powerlessness, the power not to, and, as we shall see, bears a strong resemblance to that aspect of possibility that, in Agamben's discussion of potentiality, he claims has been displaced in favor of actuality. This is a kind of thought that does not submit thinking to the exclusive rule of exchange-value, commodification, and

practicality. It is its own end, rather than a means to an end. This does not mean an abstract thinking for its own sake, but rather the valuing of forms of thinking and questioning that cannot immediately be harnessed within a calculus of direct practical advantage. This form of thinking exhorts us to uncover, contest, and transcend the reified sediments of our deepest metaphysical assumptions, and hence possibly our most deeply cherished assumptions about the nature of the good life and the nature of the self, community, and world.

If being is the singular appearance of a unique event, the oblivion of being is by contrast the reduction of life to quantity, fact, production. The double structure of the oblivion of being is the crisis haunting our age, and an understanding of its concrete manifestations have been transposed from the realm of philosophy to social and political life by the work of Agamben and Foucault. Agamben's conception of the state of emergency and abandonment is the bridge between the thought of crisis in Heidegger and the sense of crisis that pervades our political present. It is to this crisis, or catastrophe of the political in Agamben, that we will now turn.

Agamben's Apparatus: Being, Power, and Abandonment

> The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact or realize. … This does not mean, however, that humans are not, and do not have to be, something, that they are simply consigned to nothingness and therefore can freely decide whether to be or not to be, to adopt or not to adopt this or that destiny …. There is in effect something that humans are and have to be, but this something is not an essence nor properly a thing: *It is the simple fact of one's own existence as possibility or potentiality*.[69]

Giorgio Agamben is a thinker of immense beauty and spirit, complexity, and simplicity. He offers us a series of philosophically dense reflections on contemporary problems of power (sovereignty, biopolitics) and the possibility of ethics. Agamben's work is a meditation on life, existence, political power, law, violence, the sacred, happiness, suffering, potentiality, and above all human possibilities. In short he is a thinker who directs our attention towards what is most essential – the being of thought itself. In the past decade Agamben's development of Foucaultian biopolitics, especially the concept of sovereign power and the state of emergency, has become an important explanatory framework for

scholars attempting to understand the spatial imaginaries and political rationalities of US imperial projects. As such, Agamben's initial academic notoriety was intimately bound up with the US Global War on Terror and its proliferating declarations of emergency, suspensions of law, its license to kill, and other brutal uses of exceptional powers. Agamben's rich deployment of spatial terminologies – the camp, the exception, the inclusive exclusive ban, threshold, *nomos*, etc. – are without doubt the features that have endeared him to many geographers, and have opened up new domains of geographical analysis.

What is rarely noted, or elaborated on, is that these paradigmatic concepts are in fact deeply indebted to Heidegger's thinking on being and space. I argue in this section that the state of exception is not only an empirical question of describing this or that particular political space but rather an *ontological* aspect of contemporary geo-political modernity. This new ontological direction promises on the one hand to reorient Agamben studies, which have by and large downplayed, or remained oblivious to the central problematic of political ontology, and on the other to highlight the onto-spatial registers of Agamben's thought. My claim is that by ignoring Heidegger's challenge to our everyday representational and implicitly metaphysical way of thinking, our conceptions of space, power, and our understanding of Agamben's use of spatiality will remain somewhat impoverished. Only on an ontological register then can we properly confront a series of charges commonly leveled against Agamben: his political pessimism on the one hand and the insufficient attention paid to historical specificity and nuance on the other. However, Agamben's work is neither conventional political theory nor history but is rather a critical, political, and spatial ontology. More importantly, this reorientation paves the way for the reception of Foucault's grammars of power in resolutely ontological terms.

The *State of Exception* is one of the few books in Agamben's oeuvre that does not contain direct references to Heidegger's corpus.[70] The fourth chapter titled "Gigantomachy Concerning a Void" attempts to reconstruct the outlines of an "esoteric dossier:" a behind the scenes battle between Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin over the question of the relationship between anomie, law, the state of exception, and the place of sovereign violence (*Gewalt*). As Agamben clarifies "this struggle for anomie seems to be as decisive for Western politics as the *gigantomachia peri tēs ousias*, the "battle of giants concerning being," that defines Western metaphysics."[71] The Greek phrase[72] is from Plato's *Sophist*, and appears famously in the opening sentence of the Introduction in *Being and Time*, decisively marking Heidegger's own declaration of war against the philosophical tradition for its forgetting of the question of being. For Heidegger the "giants" were of course Plato and Aristotle, and the

contemporary victors of this destinal engagement who now dominate our technological epoch have clearly inherited the banner of Aristotelian *energeia* and *ousia*: being as permanent presence.[73] What can decisively be glimpsed here, and is a strategy that recurs across the entire corpus of Agamben's work, culminating in a chapter entitled the "Ontological Apparatus,"[74] is this consistent linkage between politics (power), metaphysics, and ontology. Agamben's invocation and "concern" for the void/being is a call for resistance against the totalizing apparatus of the *oikonomia* (economy), and is perhaps one of the many signposts that Agamben erects for "future cartographers of the new ethical territory to orient themselves."[75] The *ēthos* of orienting oneself in relation to this "empty space" or void, proximate to the Heideggerian ethical gesture of *Gelassenheit* (letting be), also reflects the degree to which Agamben cannot be weaponized. While Agamben is clearly no docile Heideggerian lieutenant, we simply cannot get a sense of the strategies that Agamben deploys in his own struggle against the nihilism of Western politics/metaphysics without a clearer mapping of the "terrain" of critical ontology that Heidegger's monumental path of thinking opened up.

Similarly, in one of his earliest works, *Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture*, which appeared in English in 1977 and was dedicated to the memory of Martin Heidegger who had died the year before, Agamben emphatically describes his early investigation as "a topology of the unreal" and as "an inquiry into the void." The *stanza,* the metrical device that European poets of the thirteenth century cultivated as the essential nucleus of their poetry, is a "capacious dwelling, receptacle" that safeguards the unique object of poetic enjoyment. However, access to a proper enquiry into the nature of this *topos* is barred, Agamben writes, "by the forgetfulness of a scission" that has become fundamental to Western thinking. Clearly an echo of the *gigantomachia* – the war between being and beings, the *de/cision* [*Unterschied*] of *Ereignis* – this theme of scission or separation, also recurs throughout Agamben's work. In *Stanzas* it is read as the split between poetry and philosophy, between the poetic word and the word of thought. In his more recent works this immemorial oblivion is marked as the separation of being and acting, which plays out as the separation between the human and the animal, between culture and nature, *zoē* and *bios*.

As will become clear, all of Agamben's key originary concepts – potentiality, indifference, inoperativity, abandonment, the exception, sovereignty, bare life – must be understood in relation to – though not simply a derivative of – the uncanny yet intimate cite disclosed by Heidegger's ontological investigations. As if addressing from the very beginning the "future cartographers" of the *Remnant*, Agamben notes: "We must still accustom ourselves to think of the 'place' not as something spatial, but as something more original than space."[76] Here from his very

earliest writing Agamben urges us to pay attention to a topology (of being/living) that precedes all topography, the very *taking place* or *worlding* of the world: in short a geography *before* geography. However, an exploration of this *place* or, better yet, *placing*, which both precedes and permeates – colonizes – our world, must invariably begin with a sense of what the inquiry into the question of being entails. In more prosaic terms, the kind of analytic purchase afforded by the use of ontology refers precisely to this topography and its bearing on our topology. The domain of critical ontology, overlapping with what Foucault called the historical *a priori*, is hence a form of analysis that attempts to grasp the basic background conditions for the horizon of intelligibility that governs our engagement with the world and, by extension, horizons that condition the normative production of meaning, use, and value. In contrast to ontic and epistemological investigation, ontological inquiry sees our understanding of the world (our "worldview") as emerging from a more basic pre-reflective series of practical involvements – a discursive regime. All claims to knowledge (*connasiance*), and expressions of judgment, then always already contain a backgrounded understanding (*savoir*) about what kinds of entities there are to know, and an ethical stance toward these entities. Ontology therefore highlights the mutual interrelatedness of conditions of possibility and actuality. The aim of historical ontology is thus to make explicit and foreground the work done by specific prereflective activities to animate and legitimate a particular horizon of intelligibility. Ontology becomes *critical* when placed in relation to *Seinsgeschicte* (the history of *Ereignis*/being). That is to say, what happens to our way of engaging with the world (other entities), when the horizon of intelligibility is colonized by technological, neoliberal modes of knowing and being in the world. "Ontology" Agamben notes "is laden with the historical destiny of the West not because an inexplicable and metahistorical magical power belongs to being but just the contrary, because ontology is the originary place of the historical articulation between language and world."[77] It is in this sense that we should read Heidegger's claim that "metaphysics is the essential ground of Western history."

Agamben's Critique: A Grammar of Crisis

For Agamben the primary experience of the modern is carceral: modern human being is suspended in a *topos* of power, the political, a space marked by the violent oscillation between sovereign power and bare life (*homo sacer*). Agamben's work should be seen as an exercise in political ontology, not only because he thinks with the question of being but also because at a minimum he is involved in the reconstitution and examination of the most basic categories of political thought. Agamben

takes up Heidegger's challenge to think ontologically, to think beyond metaphysics, and without doubt we will miss the critical thrust of Agamben's thought if we refuse to meet him on this ontological register.[78] Heidegger's main contention was that Western history, in the forgetting of being,[79] has culminated in a technological nihilism, and that a new kind of thinking was necessary to reorient modernity from its precipitous fall. Agamben is determined to carry out and extend this project. He suggests that even though Heidegger makes a valiant effort to think beyond onto-theology, he remains caught up in metaphysics by positing the ultimate ground, not in terms of the will to power, but in terms of a relationship of negativity (Heidegger's *Abgrund*, Abyss, or nothing). For Agamben, Heidegger's grounding of language in negativity and death, even if it is characterized as dynamic negativity, still relegates human nature to emptiness or nothingness. In other words, Heidegger's path cannot fully overcome the problem of nihilism. In this way Agamben repeats for Heidegger an analogous critique that Heidegger made of Nietzsche. Since the problem of nihilism is also of central concern for Agamben, he wants to make sure that we recognize the metaphysical structure of nihilism (anarchy), which secretly governs the logic of modern sovereignty and which defines the topology, or space, of the exception.

Agamben's resolutely onto-logical reading of biopolitics and power, however, appears most forcefully in his essay "What is an Apparatus," where he explicitly marks the link between Heidegger's *Gestell* and the apparatus (*dispositif*). For Agamben the apparatus is the "decisive technical term in the strategy of Foucault's thought." Agamben connects the Latin term *dispositio* with the French term *dispositif*, allowing apparatus "to take on the complex semantic sphere of the theological *oikonomia*. ….in which, and through which, one realizes a pure activity of governance *devoid of any foundation in being*." Once again Agamben highlights the motif of separation, between being and act, as central to the metaphysical destiny of the West, and the emergence of the anthropological, neoliberal biopolitical machine.

> In light of this theological genealogy the Foucauldian apparatuses acquire an even more pregnant and decisive significance, since they intersect not only with the context of what the young Hegel called "positivity", but also with what the later Heidegger called *Gestell* …. When Heidegger, in *Die Technik und die Kehre* (The Question Concerning Technology), writes that *Ge-stell* means in ordinary usage an apparatus, but that he intends by this term "the gathering together of the (in)stallation [*Stellen*] that (in) stalls man, this is to say, challenges him to expose the real in the mode of ordering [*Bestellen*]", the proximity of this term to the theological *dispositio*, as well as to Foucault's apparatuses, is evident.[80]

Thus it is clear that, for Agamben, the decisive Foucaultian term for power, the apparatus, must be drawn into the conceptual space of Heidegger's *Gestell*. It is in this sense that we must also reconfigure the biopolitical.

The ancient Greeks, Agamben explains, had *more* than one term to express what we usually mean by the word life. They used two distinct terms: *zoē*, which expressed "the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, humans, or gods)," and *bios*, which signified the form or manner of living of a single individual or group. *Zoē* is thus mere life, naked life, whereas *bios* is the way of life of a community or political life. Another way of thinking the difference between the two is in terms of mere life (uncultured/natural/barbaric) and the good life (cultured/civilized). During the classical period, *zoē* was excluded from the *bios*, the city (state) or political sphere (the *polis*). *Zoē* was relegated to a particular space, that of the home (*oikos*), the private, or domestic sphere, and excluded from the *polis*, the public or political space. From Foucault's work on biopolitics, which Agamben draws upon and seeks to "complete," we learn that today *zoē* has been restored, or included, into the central concerns of political life (the *polis*); "at the threshold of the modern era, natural life begins to be included in the mechanisms and calculations of State power, and politics turns into biopolitics."[81] Thus whereas *zoē* was historically distinct or separate from *bios*, in modern states it is now central to *the population/nation (bios)*. The modern state today is concerned with the very bare life of its subjects/citizens, and understands this life as central to the constitution of collective life, the population. The concepts of population, people, and nation thus represent the indistinction between *zoē* and *bios*.

While the primary uptake of the concept of bare life has been to see it as a new figure of the victim, the subaltern, or the abject, bare life must be recognized as a properly onto-political figure that shares a proximity to sovereign power. Bare life is a life subjected to a biopolitical space, captured by the *polis* and transfixed by the paradox of sovereignty.[82] It is a life that is stripped, made naked, marooned, made barren, "wasted." Bare life is a life wholly exposed to power (*Gestell*) separated from its impotentiality and being (*Ereignis*), and in this way it is a haunted life of homelessness. Sovereign power and *homo sacer* are not, as is often thought, strictly oppositional, for as we shall see, ontologically they participate in the same structure of abandonment.

It will also be helpful if we keep in mind that even though bare life is a key protagonist in Agamben's ontology, it is not a timeless universal figure or phenomenon. It changes in relation to the changing modalities of political power.[83] That is to say, bare life has a history, and in order to reveal where instances of this paradigm occurs today, what it means and

signifies in our time, he undertakes a brief genealogy of the term beginning with the classical periods of Greece and Rome. More importantly, bare life is not just *biological* life, but is rather akin to something like existence or facticity (*Dasein*). In fact, towards the end of *Homo Sacer*, Agamben is explicit in linking *zoē* with existence, pure Being:

> In the syntagm "bare life", "bare" corresponds to the Greek *haplôs*, the term by which first philosophy defines pure Being. The isolation of the sphere of pure Being, which constitutes the fundamental activity of Western metaphysics, is not without *analogies with the isolation of bare life in the realm of Western politics*.

Life, similar to *Dasein's* factical life in Heidegger, is thus a key term that takes on a new ontological resonance in Agamben's work, and this metaphysical capture of life, its "empowerment" and interiorization under modernity, will be taken as a key component of the metacolonial. The metacolonial, like the political destiny of the West, which is marked by the "interlacement of *zoē* and *bios*," is thus a biopolitical space marked by the indistinction between law and life.[84]

The novelty of Agamben's account of sovereign power lies, in part, in the introduction of the figure of *homo sacer* (sacred man). In characterizing bare life as the "*life of homo sacer*" (sacred man, or the one who may be killed and yet not sacrificed), bare life becomes sacred life. *Homo sacer* thus designates life caught up in a particular (inauthentic) relationship, a particular closed circumstance, which involves a loss of ontological openness.[85] Under Roman Law, there was a ban on the sacrifice of the one who was designated *homo sacer*, in addition to the unpunishability of his killing. "The double exclusion into which he is taken and the violence to which he finds himself exposed" suggests that sacred life is a "life that cannot be sacrificed and yet may be killed." For Agamben this interlacement of *zoē* and *bios* seems to define the political destiny of the West.

While Agamben concretizes what otherwise seems like an obscure reference to Roman Law, through references to figures like the bandit and the wargus (werewolf), his main onto-spatial task, once again, is to disclose the topological structure of *homo sacer* is such a way that it reveals its homology with the structure of the exception. Having done so he advances his main hypothesis linking power and life:

> … *homo sacer* presents the originary figure of life taken into the sovereign ban and preserves the memory of the originary exclusion through which the political dimension was first constituted. The *political sphere of sovereignty* was thus constituted through a double exclusion…. *The sovereign*

sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life – that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed – is the life that has been captured in this sphere. … in this sense, the production of bare life is the originary activity of sovereignty.

This hypothesis becomes central to Agamben's critique of liberal democracy, which in its almost ritual invocation of the sacredness of life, of (human) rights in opposition to sovereign power, remains oblivious to its onto-historical foundations as an expression of a relation of abandonment and (as in Foucault) life's subjection to a power over death. Agamben's classical detour reveals the way in which life originally appears in Roman Law (*vitae necisque Potestas*) as the counterpart of a power to kill (*nex*). In this way it can be seen that the standard left critique of liberal regimes – that they do not remain true to the ideal of liberty and peace, that they are hypocritical – nonetheless leaves intact the veracity of the liberal ideal. If Foucault castigates liberal politics for its blindness to its own ceaseless demand for war and its delimited conception of power and agency, Agamben exposes the fundamental complicity of the political with both an originary (historical) and an ontological violence (abandonment). The topological symmetry between the figure of the sovereign and the figure of *homo sacer* means that "the sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially *homines sacri*, and *homo sacer* is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns." The modern "secular" *polis* then is founded on the capture of bare life within the sovereign juridical order. As such *homo sacer* "names" something like the originary "political" relation. Within this space "life is sacred only insofar as it is taken into the sovereign exception" and only insofar as it remains subject to the sovereign decision.

The continued presence of disposable bodies and peoples today testifies to the contemporary relevance of this most ancient figure. Who are these disposables today? Who can we kill with impunity? Who decides? The one who can make this decision, regarding who is included and excluded, is the one who is said to exercise sovereign power. *Homo sacer* then becomes, for Agamben, "the *key* by which not only the sacred texts of sovereignty but also the very codes of political power will unveil their mysteries." Unlike the postcolonial, which privileges the historical structures of formal colonialism, the metacolonial seeks to recognize the various mirrors of sovereignty that amplify and reflect the biopolitical and now globalized forms of violence. In this way jihadist and neoconservative ideology can be seen as inverted reflections of each other's sovereign image.

The Topology[86] of Sovereignty and the Exception

> The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the "state of exception" in which we live is the rule. We must arrive at a concept of history that corresponds to this fact. Then we will have the production of the real state of exception before us as a task.[87]

In "The Logic of Sovereignty," part one of *Homo Sacer,* Agamben's task is to link the paradox of sovereignty with the topology of the exception and subsequently to shed light on the force of law in relation to an ontology of potentiality. In expounding on the problem, or rather paradox of sovereignty, Agamben is effectively outlining a kind of spatial ontology that is itself rooted in what I take to be the crucial meditation of any critical ontology: namely the question of the relation, or non-relation, of being and beings. Hence, even though he does not quite use this terminology, Agamben's work can be read as a *topology of the crossing of the ontological difference*. In this section I will highlight those aspects of Agamben's "sovereigntology" that suggest that the political question of sovereign power is inextricably linked with the question of being and the aporias of metaphysics (of space and time). I am aiming here at a clarification of the way in which power and being are thought in Agamben's work.

Several readings of Agamben contra Foucault suggest that Agamben is merely interested in a conventional model of sovereignty that focuses exclusively on the juridico-political aspect of state power.[88] Such interpretations are at best simplistic and selective readings of Agamben's discussion of sovereign power. Agamben clearly states upfront that his inquiry is concerned specifically with the "hidden point of intersection between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power." In fact, Agamben points out that if the problem of sovereignty is reduced to the question of who within the political order is invested with certain powers (as was the concern of Schmitt), then the very *threshold* of the political order, the *topology* that Agamben seeks to chart, will remain hidden from purview and can thus never be called into question (elsewhere he also talks of the "sovereignty of language"). Like Derrida's treatment of sovereignty in *Rogues*, Agamben's conception of sovereignty and power is to be thought in terms of the broader metaphysical crisis of the modern. It is, however, his spatial rendering of the exception that gives his work a distinctive edge.

A common conceit of modern liberal democracy, which sees itself as supplanting the arbitrary rule of monarchy, is that a domestic "rule of law" replaces the reliance on the potentially erratic figure of the sovereign, or even the depredation of a populist mob majority (as under

Nazism). The rule of law, the favorite phrase of the Pakistani Military and global governmentality more broadly, is thus cast in opposition to the rule of men. Momentarily this formulation occludes the fact that laws are made by men. What is being valorized then is not the primacy of rational, "natural," law and justice, but the displacement of limited power (the rule of a king or a select coterie, i.e. a sovereign mentality) with consensus (biopolitical mentality). However, for Agamben this very distinction, which derives law from something called "natural rights," is still problematic because it does not eliminate the problem of sovereignty or decision. Under Islamic legal reasoning, the inevitable question of the jurists' decision is evaded in the same way by assuming a minimum set of transparent divine commands that simply *are* (natural). It is here that Schmitt's characterization of the sovereign as one who decides the exception comes into play. As is well known, Schmitt's deployment of sovereignty was introduced principally as a mechanism to ground and legalize Hitler's use of executive power. Schmitt's challenge to liberal theory lies not so much in a kind of direct opposition to liberal thought but, as William Rasch notes, in his exposing the liberal order, showing that it is not natural or transparently rational but is itself ideological. Its power derives from its blindness to its own ideological ground, its own assumptions about power and what it means to be. That is to say liberalism is a political order and not merely the outcome of rational logical thought on the nature of justice, equality, or ethics. Like any other political order it rests on a *decision* and not a pre-given universal norm. In this way Schmitt shows that modern liberalism is itself a variation of political theology. For Agamben to expose this theology is to expose its metaphysical ground, a ground that is paradoxical and thus meaningless. Law is thus effectively an expression of power rather than what it often masquerades as – a pure expression of natural, or in the case of Islamic Law, divine, justice.

While the state of exception usually refers to the temporary suspension of the rule of law – as in a declaration of martial law or a state of emergency during which time the State takes on "emergency powers" – in Agamben's work it takes on a broader series of onto-political resonances. In concert then with Benjamin's insight, Agamben goes on to show that the state of exception, originally understood as something extraordinary and which should have validity only for a limited period of time, is now everywhere the rule, and has come to constitute the fundamental structure of the modern legal system itself. It has become the paradigm of government today. This transformation as Agamben highlights has consequences not only for overtly authoritarian polities but also democracies, in particular for the way in which law is related to anomie (lawlessness). The topology of exception revels it to be a void, an empty

space that is constitutive of the modern legal system. I will argue in the chapter on Islamic Law that a consequence of the biopoliticization of Islam is a simultaneous juridification of shari'a, whose hidden but fundamental relationship between law and lawlessness is yet another regional manifestation of the state of exception.

For Agamben then, the state of exception is rooted in the metaphysical structure of Western politics, or in his phrase, it is "consubstantial with Western politics." By tying his topology of the exception with Jean-Luc Nancy's use of the word "ban" (in abandonment), we are left without doubt that the problem of sovereignty, its violence and its force, is first and foremost an onto-logical problem. The potentiality of the law "to maintain itself in its own privation, to apply in no longer applying" is itself the power of the ban, the power of abandonment, which resonates with Heidegger's name for the movement of being in our technological era. In this way the state of emergency and the emergency of being reveal themselves to be different names for the same situation of abandonment.[89]

> The relation of exception is a relation of ban. He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather *abandoned* by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable … It is in this sense that the paradox of sovereignty can take the form "There is nothing outside the law." *The originary relation of law to life is not application but Abandonment*. The matchless potentiality of the *nomos*, its originary "force of law", is that it holds life in its ban by abandoning it. This is the structure of the ban that we shall try to understand here, so that we can eventually call it into question.[90]

The discussion of sovereignty is thus immediately transformed into and linked with the investigation of the structure of the exception. Thus unlike a conventional account of sovereignty, which would be concerned with delineating its concrete historical, i.e. ontic instances, Agamben sets the stage for a disclosure of its ontological – and only in this sense originary – foundations. Thus sovereignty can be seen as an "ordering of space" that is not limited to a concern with territorial limits, but consists primarily in its relationship to and capture (closure) of an outside.[91] The "exception is not a mere exclusion, but an inclusive exclusion, an exceptio in the literal sense of the term: a seizing of the outside" (TR, 105). The state of exception is understood as "a complex topological figure in which not only the exception and the rule but also the state of nature and law, outside and inside, pass through one another. It is precisely this topological zone of indistinction, which had to remain hidden from the eyes of justice, that we must try to fix under our gaze."

Agamben claims that it is this relationship of exception that undergirds the structure of the modern juridical relation – the relation of the sovereign structure of law to its subjects. "In this sense, the sovereign decision on the exception is the originary juridico-political structure on the basis of which what is included in the juridical order and what is excluded from it acquire their meaning." As we shall see, this *unlocalizable* topology of the exception will be vital in understanding the transformation of the 'ulama, who must first enter into a relationship (or produce) a state of exception in order to open up a space in which the determination of a certain *Islami-nizam* becomes possible. In this way the sovereign exception can be seen as vital to the often violent 'ulama technologies of rule, for whom "the sovereign exception is not so much the control or neutralization of an excess as the creation and definition of the very space in which the juridico-political order can have validity."

The provisional aim of the metacolonial analysis of Islam will be to show how the space of the political – which unfolds today as a pure topology of exception – proliferates and intensifies through the alignment (and disaggregation) of sovereign orbits and imperial spaces. Since above all the metacolonial is a state/space of exception, it will be critical to further highlight the topological structure of the exception and its relationship to the question of power more concretely.

The Biopoliticization of Life

> Sovereignty is, after all, precisely this "law beyond the law to which we are abandoned", that is, the self-presuppositional power of *nomos*.
>
> What we can now call the ontological-biopolitical machine of the West is founded on a division of life that, by means of a series of caesurae and thresholds (zoè/bios, insufficient life/autarchic life, family/city), takes on a political character …
>
> –Agamben, *Use of Bodies*

Having outlined the topological structure of sovereignty, Agamben moves to the question of "the bearer of the sovereign ban," which is none other than bare life.[92] It is life itself, existence, which in the state of exception, "finds itself in the most intimate relation with sovereignty." Intimate and deadly. The problem that Agamben discloses is not that sovereign power is simply violent (the right to kill), for certainly as Foucault has shown, in its biopolitical modality the task of state sovereignty is to preserve and secure the life of the *bios*, a task to which it dedicates and directs its reserve of violence against the racially excluded other. Rather it is the way in which the sovereign *nomos* facilitates "a

scandalous unification of the two essentially antithetical principles that the Greeks called *Bia* and *Dikē*, violence and justice." Drawing on Pindar's fragment on the *nomos basileus*, one of the earliest documents on law and sovereignty, Agamben characterizes sovereign power as a force, *a place*, a threshold, where violence and law become indistinct, a "threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence." In Heidegger's terms, this "coincidence of violence and law constitutive of sovereignty" would correspond to the movement of *Gestell* (politics) and the movement of *Ereignis* (ethics) resolving into a unified vector rather than remaining in conflict and tension.

As a key biopolitical phrase in Agamben, *politicization of life*[93] suggests that the natural life of human beings that was once excluded from properly political spheres (the Greek *polis*) has now been placed at the center of concern in modern political life. We can no longer distinguish between *zoē* and *bios*, between our biological life as living beings and our political existence. We have entered what he calls a *zone of indistinction*[94] (in-difference) between public and private, of biological body (private) and body politic (public, nation). Agamben begins by outlining his primary biopolitical thesis in full concert with Foucault[95]:

> … the entry of *zoē* into the sphere of the *polis* – the politicization of bare life as such – constitutes the decisive event of modernity and signals a radical transformation of the political-philosophical categories of classical thought. …. if politics today seems to be passing through a lasting eclipse, this is because politics has failed to reckon with this foundational event of modernity.

The politicization of life, for both Agamben and Foucault, signals the capture of life (its singularity, its mystery, its finitude, its ungovernability, its aleatory nature) by a certain kind of power, a power that pervades and subsumes the modern *polis*. This power should neither be understood as either a material or discursive structure, nor even an ideological configuration, but rather as an ontological vector. It is around this phrase, the politicization of life, that the points of convergence between Agamben and Foucault and Heidegger's political ontology need to be highlighted, especially since the provisional aim of the metacolonial is to disclose the biopoliticization of Islam. Certainly political Islam, as we shall see exemplified in Deoband political practice, has failed to recognize the nature of this "foundational event," this "radical" (i.e. ontological) transformation, having already equated modernity with the surface of Western culture as such. *Political Islam's ontic dissonance with the West thus belies a deep underbelly of ontological equivalences*

and resonances. The common signature of the West (as an imperial force) and political Islam as a counter-imperial force (and imperial in its own sphere… multiple and overlapping spheres and scales of sovereign power[96]) Agamben reads the political as:

> … the truly fundamental structure of Western metaphysics insofar as it occupies the threshold on which the relation between the living being and the *logos* is realized. In the "politicization" of bare life – the metaphysical task par excellence – the humanity of living man is decided. In assuming this task, modernity does nothing other than declare its own faithfulness to the essential structure of the metaphysical tradition. The fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, *zoē/bios*, exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion.

Agamben is thus suggesting that the structure of the modern *polis* bears a corresponding homology to the structure of onto-theology (Western metaphysics *tout court*). Deepening the points of overlap between his account of sovereignty and Heidegger's *technē*, Agamben writes:

> In carrying out the *metaphysical* task that has led it more and more to assume the form of a biopolitics, Western politics has not succeeded in constructing the link between *zoē* and *bios*, between voice and language, that would have healed the fracture. Bare life remains included in politics in the form of the exception, that is, as something that is included solely through an exclusion.

It is with this structure of the exception and the idea of an indistinction between *zoē* and *bios* that Agamben's thesis adds a distinctively ontological twist to the concept of biopower, a move that is otherwise latent in Foucault's account. Thus it is the *structure* of capture – the structure of the ban or exception and the capture of bare life through an exclusive inclusion – and not just the capture of life itself that marks the distinction between the accounts of these two giants. Foucault's thesis is thus "completed" in an ontological sense:

> … the sense that what characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of *zoē* in the *polis* – which is, in itself, absolutely ancient – nor simply the fact that life as such becomes a principal object of the projections and calculations of State power. Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the

> realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, *bios* and *zoē*, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction.[97]

For Agamben this state of exception, which at once excludes bare life and in doing so simultaneously captures it within its political order, is the "hidden foundation" on which the structure of the modern relation between politics and life rests, a structure in which life presents itself as what is included by means of an exclusion. In a similar fashion the idea of the metacolonial seeks to unveil the way in which Islamist politics also constitutes itself in relation to the production of bare life. The structure of the exception, the inclusive exclusion of *zoē* in the *polis,* will be shown to also be coincident with Islamist politics. Crucially then it is across this link between bare life and politics, "a link that secretly governs the modern ideologies seemingly most distant from one another," that the indistinction between Islam and the West can be found.

The Camp: Abandonment and the Space of Emergency

> Yet in the course of the study, the structure of the exception that had been defined with respect to bare life has been revealed more generally to constitute in every sphere the structure of the archè, in the juridico-political tradition as much as in ontology. In fact, one cannot understand the dialectic of the foundation that defines Western ontology, from Aristotle on, if one does not understand that it functions as an exception.
>
> –Agamben, *Use of Bodies*

Agamben's invocation of the left Heideggerian scholar Jean-Luc Nancy would seem to invite an explicit linkage between the ban and the abandonment of being in Heidegger. As Agamben notes, for Nancy the entire history of the West is a "time of abandonment" and this empty time figures within the space of the law (in force without significance). However, it is at this juncture that Agamben wishes to push us towards "the real state of exception." Though perhaps an important first moment, it is not sufficient to merely witness, recognize, and expose the ontological structures characteristic of the paradox of sovereignty, the ban. Nor can we erect a more just law, a more universal system of human rights, or a pure law.

> Only if it is possible to think the *Being of abandonment* beyond every idea of law (even that of the empty form of law's being in force without significance) will we have moved out of the paradox of sovereignty toward a politics freed from every ban.[98]

The way in which we grasp then the question of abandonment is of utmost significance in Agamben, and perhaps the primary key in unraveling Agamben's work. Agamben then suggests that the problem of thinking beyond sovereignty (and representation) is the same as the problem of *Seinsverlassenheit*:

> … the abandonment of the entity by Being, which, in fact, constitutes nothing less than the problem of the unity and difference between Being and being in the age of the culmination of metaphysics. What is at issue in this abandonment is not something (Being) that dismisses and discharges something else (the being). On the contrary: *here Being is nothing other than the being's being abandoned and remitted to itself; here Being is nothing other than the ban of the being*. … the ontological structure of sovereignty here fully reveals its paradox.[99]

For Agamben, however, even this characterization remains within the orbit of nihilism; it remains a relationship, albeit of negativity, for it does not "push the experience of abandonment to the extreme." This extreme is to think abandonment outside any conception of relationality. That is to say, it means to think politics neither in terms of power nor ethics, for even the latter is a relation (to the other). Agamben recognizes that with the conception of *Ereignis*, Heidegger comes closest to formulating the real state of exception. For what is appropriated in *Ereignis* is being itself, and with it the history of being coincides with the end of history and the end of the state. It is perhaps to this time that Foucault alludes when he hopes that the figure of man "be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea" (sea of being perhaps). For Agamben then Heidegger's mature thought of Being and *Ereignis*, Being beyond Being, "amounts to nothing less than attempting to think the ontological difference no longer as a relation, and Being and being beyond every form of a connection."

In the third part of *Homo Sacer*, Agamben turns his ontological gaze towards a series of more concrete and localized spaces that exemplify the violent operation of the exception. The paradigmatic biopolitical space, the *nomos* of the modern, is the camp: "the birth of the camp in our time appears as an event that decisively signals the political space of modernity itself." The camp is the signature of the modern. This is a major indictment of the modern and a disabling characterization of the political.

Agamben maps the topology of the camp, distinguishing it from Foucault's disciplinary spaces of confinement, by once again emphasizing a series of paradoxical onto-spatial articulations. For the camp, which is an absolute space of exception, this paradoxical structure is the localization of the unlocalizable. "*The camp is the space that is opened*

when the state of exception begins to become the rule. In the camp, the state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the rule of law on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial arrangement." Hence the camp, as a materialization of the state of exception, augurs a new juridico-political paradigm in which the norm not only becomes indistinguishable from the exception, where bare life and juridical rule not only enter into a threshold of indistinction, but where fact and law also enter into a zone of indifference:

> Insofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation. This is why the camp is the very paradigm of political space at the point at which politics becomes biopolitics and *homo sacer* is virtually confused with the citizen.[100]

However, it is not only State constituted zones like the concentration camp, or more recently Guantanamo Bay and the numerous black sites for holding "permanent detainees" and "illegal combatants," where anything is legally possible. We could profitably read the state of violence during the partition of British India as yet another zone where "not only is law completely suspended but *fact and law* are completely confused."

The space of the modern *polis* is in this way understood by Agamben as coincident with the topology of the camp, whose "dislocating localization is the hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living." The camp can therefore be understood as a radicalization of Foucaultian biopolitics, in that it signals a disjuncture between the relationship of birth (bare life) and the order of the nation-state. This means that the camp is almost postbiopolitical, in that it marks the emergence of an instability in the structure of the old *nomos*; in the mechanism of the regulation of the relationship between territory, birth, order. Foucault of course hinted at the possibility of this daemonic and lethal mix between biopower and sovereignty, whereby the state becomes an "absolutely murderous state." Something of this lethal machinery has now embedded itself within political Islam and its principal expression of sovereign power, the political technology of jihadism.

Foucault's Political Ontology and the Grammars of Power

Foucault has generally been read as the paradigmatic antimetaphysical thinker. In this section, I show why we should not disqualify regarding Foucault as a thinker of political ontology. I take seriously Foucault's oft repeated but barely heard statement: "For me Heidegger has always

been the essential philosopher. … My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger." This acknowledgment I argue must be linked to his challenge to scholarship to write "a historical ontology of ourselves."

Though Foucault's work is complex, detailed, documentary, patient, and "meticulously grey", we can already hear the resonances of Heidegger's *Gestell* in his deployment of key terms like "systems," "technology," "order," and of course the apparatus (*dispositif*). Foucault's thought as I aim to document, however, has a more substantial series of resonances and correspondences with the more overtly ontological vocabulary of Heidegger: episteme (*Geschick*, destining, epoch, history of being), archive and statement (being-in-the-world), discourse (*Rede*), *dispositif* (*Machenschaft*), technologies and arts (*technē*), *connaissance/savoir* (ontic knowledge/ontological knowledge), milieu (*Umwelt*), care (*Sorge*), *askēsis* (*Gelassenheit*), order and system (*Gestell*), normalization (*das man,* inauthenticity), and problematizations/eventalization (*Ereignis*). I contend that Foucault's empirical "histories of the present" are in fact the shadows of a historical ontology.

While I draw on the small yet significant and growing body of works that link Foucault to the question of ontology (Dreyfus, Rayner, Oksala, Elden) this section is mainly concerned with extending Agamben's "completion" of Foucault. I suggest that the consequences of rethinking Foucault's various grammars of power – sovereignty, biopolitics, governmentality, neoliberalism – in the light of Agamben's explicitly ontological rendering of the Foucaultian project, will be instructive for initiating an onto-logical turn in the social sciences. In particular, by identifying the apparatus (*dispositif*) as a decisive technical term in the strategy of Foucault's thought, and then subsequently linking the apparatus not only to the originary fracture between being and action, but also to the genealogy of governmentality, Agamben has already laid the definitive groundwork for understanding power in terms of a political ontology. Highlighting a few of the myriad ontological resonances in Foucault's thought is imperative for uniting the disjuncture between sovereignty and biopolitics that pervade the literature on Foucault. In doing so we will have completed the ontological axis necessary to ground a genealogy of the crisis of Pakistan, in terms of a critical ontology – in terms of the biopoliticization of Islam.

The Shadow of Being

> Foucault is a man always on the move, alone, secretive, and who, because of that, distrusts the marvels of interiority, refuses the traps of subjectivity, asking where and how there emerges a discourse entirely surface and

> shimmering, but bereft of mirages – a discourse not alien to the search for truth, as was believed, but one that finally reveals the perils of that search and its ambiguous relations with the myriad configurations of power.
>
> – Maurice Blanchot[101]

> Last but not least, the major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism. …. And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini – which was able to mobilize and use the desire of the masses so effectively – but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us.
>
> – Michel Foucault[102]

It becomes increasingly clear that as Foucault moves towards outlining his ethical response to the various systems of power that he had patiently diagnosed in his early work, his language and conceptual vocabulary took on a more overt ontological stamp. In his 1981–1982 lectures *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, where he begins to develop the notion of a "political spirituality" or philosophical *askēsis* as a form of ethical resistance to modern relations of power and knowledge, he writes:

> … there have not been that many people who in the last years – I will say in the twentieth century – have posed the question of truth. Not that many people have posed the question: What is involved in the case of the subject and of the truth? And: What is the relationship of the subject to the truth? … As far as I'm concerned, I see only two. I see only Heidegger and Lacan. Personally, myself, you must have heard this, I have tried to reflect on all this from the side of Heidegger and starting from Heidegger. There you are.[103]

At first blush it may seem scandalous to suggest that Foucault's work is effectively a meditation on the history of the truth of being. In Heidegger's work, as we have seen, this truth manifests itself as technology (*technē*), and consequently in his enigmatic and aporetic formulation, the truth is that we live in untruth.[104] In one of his last published works, *The Use of Pleasure*, Foucault analyzes the "slow formation, in antiquity, of a hermeneutics of the self."[105] This hermeneutic self relationship is an operation of knowledge, a *technology of the self*, which, emerging from the gradual transformation of originary (ancient) practices of care of the self (*epimeleia heautou*), anticipate the subjectifications of modern power. The self described goal of Foucault's project is "a history of truth. It was a matter of analyzing, not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their "ideologies", but the *problematizations* through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought – and the *practices* on the basis of which these problematizations are formed."[106] Foucault's

elaborate reading of these *practices* and *problematizations* is part of a larger effort "to isolate some of the elements that might be useful for a *history of truth*. Not a history that would be concerned with what might be true in the fields of learning, but an analysis of the "games of truth", the games of truth and error through which *being is historically constituted as experience*; that is, as something that can and must be thought".[107] Foucault italicizes the words *problematization* but not being. However, this phrase "the problematizations through which *being* offers itself to be, necessarily, thought" is a clear indication that his "history of truth", his history of truth *games*, is nothing other than the practical and historical documentation of the *play of being*. Rayner's analysis of this important section confirms our ontological reading of Foucault's problematizations.

> Not only here does Foucault clearly identify the stakes of his philosophical project (a history of truth); not only does he specify the theoretical framework that he uses to study the history of truth (problematization); but in doing so he surreptitiously slips the notion of 'being' into his discourse, locating 'being' at the heart of the problematization. … then the history of truth is also, in a sense, a history of being. Conversely, Foucault's critical problematization of the present can be construed as an attempt to question being without posing the question of being as such.[108]

It is not Foucault who shies from being, however, it is being that shies from the work. A critical ontology is therefore in part a task of problematizations.

Turning (Kehre)

In the *Contributions* Heidegger calls for originary historical thinking. Since be-ing is not an entity, and not some "thing" at all, then originary historical thinking is that form of thinking which "enjoins the deep sway of be-ing."[109] Foucault's new use of the term *problematization* can be seen as a response to this call, ontologically amplifying and enhancing *genealogy*, which was all along a practice of ontological disclosure. Thus in light of these opening formulations in *The Use of Pleasure*, his explicit remarks regarding his indebtedness to Heidegger, and his subsequent deployment of the terms "critical ontology" and "historical ontology" as a late description of his own work, it becomes imperative to rethink Foucault's project in the light of the question of being. In addition, if genealogy is recast as a practice of disclosure (rather than simply a historical method), then the "history of the *present*" can be

seen as a shorthand for the "history of the metaphysics of *presence*" – the history of the modality of beings presencing, a history of *relationing* (and subject formation), which is, in the age of representation, nothing other than *Gestell*. Foucault's archaeological and genealogical phases can then be read, following Nietzsche, as the concrete but preliminary diagnosis of nihilism (the oblivion of being and the intensification of power) and the will to power as a force of historical transformation. But preliminary for what? For his late work on ethics, his *turning* or conversion of power is through a form of poetic-dwelling. If we link Foucault's trajectory of thought to the general structure of Heidegger's ethico-political topology (Heidegger's homecoming path), then we can regard Foucault's work as an archae-genealogy of *Gestell* (the political, the danger), leading to the project of problematizations as a form of *askēsis*, "an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought,"[110] or *Gelassenheit* (the ethical, saving power).

In his essay *Subjectivity and Truth*, Foucault describes his work as "a genealogy of the modern subject"[111] or the historical process of subjectification. He writes, "I have tried to get out from the philosophy of the subject through a genealogy of this subject, by studying the constitution of the subject across history which has led us up to the modern concept of the self … the question of the historicity of the subject."[112] He specifies that his method for constructing a genealogy of the subject is an "archaeology of knowledge," whereas the domain of the analysis are the various "technologies" or "hermeneutics of the self;" the various intersections between certain types of practices and techniques of the subject (confession, asceticism, etc.), with scientific discourses about the subject (criminology, psychiatry, etc.). It is important to note that in Foucault's late work, "care of the self" is generally opposed to and privileged over technologies and hermeneutics of the self. Thus his moves from the earlier emphasis on discipline and techniques of domination to techniques of the self, is consistent with his diagnosis of forms of increasingly widespread and surreptitious powers. More interestingly in the same essay he situates his genealogy, again, with respect to Heidegger. He writes:

> … for Heidegger, it was through an increasing obsession with *techne* as the only way to arrive at an understanding of objects, that the West lost touch with Being. Let's turn the question around and ask which techniques and practices constitute the Western concept of the subject, giving it its characteristic split of truth and error, freedom and constraint. I think that it is here that we will find the real possibility of constructing a history of what we have done and, at the same time, a diagnosis of what we are [a historical ontology of ourselves]. At the same time, this theoretical analysis would have a political dimension.[113]

Furthermore, in the same essay he casts his genealogy of the modern subject as "a critical philosophy that seeks the conditions and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, of transforming ourselves."

The Care of Freedom

Foucault's early death prevented him from fully articulating and developing this final ethical trajectory, a trajectory that Agamben continues with his articulation of forms-of-life.[114] Certainly, if our reading is correct, this convergence of Foucault between the two G spots of Heidegger, *Gestell* and *Gelassenheit*, belies those numerous interpretations of Foucault, which suggest, on the one hand, that he abandons the project of archaeology and the statements (*énoncés*) in favor of genealogy (discourse and power) and, on the other, that his late ethical turn represents a belated return to the subject and an absolution of an ultimately pessimistic and totalizing conception of power that prohibits the possibility of ethical agency and effective political resistance. Needless to say, I regard both these interpretations as premised on the very "forgetting of being" that Foucault is trying to overcome. Jeffrey Nealon's thesis,[115] while it does not take the ontological turn I am outlining here, nevertheless confirms essential continuities between Foucault's entire œuvre and formulates it as the history of the intensifications of power. By placing Foucault's work within an ontological paradigm we can see that his triangulation of knowledge, power, and the subject does not disappear in his ethical phase, in favor of rescuing some notion of a free and ultimately heroic agent. Rather, if we understand the subject as intrinsically entangled with power and knowledge, the task of genealogy is first and foremost a disclosure of the power/knowledge networks and governmentalities that constitute and structure the subject's grid of intelligibility and possibility. Foucault's historical ontology resituates the diagnosis of the present – cast in the familiar terms of power, knowledge, and subjectivity – in relation to the possibility of an "experience of the outside." Thus the shift in Foucault is simply a *turning*, a movement in thought, towards a more radical[116] conception of freedom. This radical conception of freedom is itself indebted to Heidegger, who, for Foucault, takes modern philosophy to its limits, a limit that finds its ultimate potential in "a radical experience of the being of language."

Despite being associated with the notion of an inescapable network of power relations, Foucault always maintained that his primary thematic was a concern for the subject and its possibilities of freedom. The diagnosis of power relations – sovereignty, discipline, normalization,

biopolitics, governmentality – were all designed to betray a historical process of constriction and constraint on human potentiality. The disclosure of power was thus a necessary prelude towards a "passage to the outside." In Foucault's genealogy, as is well known, it was the figure of man itself, modern subjectivity in both its individualizing and totalizing form, that has emerged as the primary carceral hinge. In the "What is Enlightenment?" essay Foucault clarifies the task of critique as "seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom." Foucault characterizes "the philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves as a historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings."[117] Freedom therefore lies in the transformative work we do upon ourselves, our capacity to think and be otherwise. The concern with freedom then is not a prelude to the affirmation of a series of complex juridico-ethical propositions, pace Rawls, but a mode of self-transformation. In Heidegger's work freedom is clearly linked to being. Freedom for Heidegger, Beistegui writes, "does not derive from any imperative to act according to a moral law, but from an existential-ontological structure of our being. Freedom is an ontological category, not a moral one."[118] Additionally we can point out that the primary existential-ontological structure for Heidegger was designated as care (*Sorge*). Foucault's significant deployment of the term "care of the self" (*askēsis*), to mark the practice or work of freedom, is intimately bound up with Heidegger's account of care. In its simplest formulation care designates for both thinkers a concern for one's existence or being. For Heidegger it was in the structure of care that the three primary existentials of *Dasein* –understanding (projection), mood (affect or engagement), and fallenness (thrownness) – are unified. Ultimately Heidegger's aim in Division I, part VI of *Being and Time* was to reveal the structure of care, that is to say, the entire range of *Dasein's* existential possibilities, and to reveal these possibilities of *Dasein* as temporality (as *kairological* rather than chronological time).

Having situated Foucault's conception of ethics and care within the parameters of Heidegger's existential analytic, we can now further develop the parallels between Foucault's ontology of freedom and its link to *askēsis* in terms of Agamben's thought of potentiality. This thought, however, as Rayner insightfully illustrates, was there from the very beginning in Foucault's oft-neglected work on avant-garde figures such as Baudelaire, Blanchot, and Artaud. Thus rethinking Foucault's corpus in light of his ontology of literature will also be invaluable in our formulation of the metacolonial. The attempt of this work, with the thought of the metacolonial, is a meager attempt to think traditional postcolonial histories in terms of a historical ontology. To write a

genealogy is to think not in terms of the narrative representation of historical phenomenon but in terms of the phenomenology of history itself. From this perspective then the challenge remains to think not merely outside eurocentrism, but logocentrism. Part II then is a first attempt in response to the question, "What might a historical ontology of Political Islam in Pakistan look like, and what does it do?" Without however laying the foundation – our axis of ontology – such an endeavor would remain partial, in part because the target of a critical ontology is a problematization of the subject–object relation and the sway of being-power itself. That is to say, a historical ontology is not principally about producing concrete historical knowledge (ontic knowledge) nor is it a question of discovering original or interesting facts through translation of the sparsely considered narratives of the other. It is about the formulation of a historical clearing for the possibilities of a new experience of alterity. That is to say, with Foucault, it is a kind of exercise, a form of care of the self.

Being, Subjectivity, and Power

Within the knowledge reign of *Gestell*, all possibility is actuality. It is perhaps precisely here that we can insert the fundamental relationship between Heidegger's history of being[119] and Foucault's history of the present. Foucault's genealogical face, so to speak, is oriented towards the historical movement of machination, of power, and it is only in his ethical *turning* that he directs his attention to the question of a response to machination (power), a response that would not simply replicate the potentiality occluding function of power. For Heidegger, as Michael Lewis neatly demonstrates, politics is the realm, or space, of *beings* as a whole, while ethics, the counter-essence to politics, is that "dwelling within the political whole which resists the totalizing determination of politics and responds to being as that space in which singularity can occur and thus *subvert* the totality."[120] Foucault's history of the present can thus clearly be read as a history of the metaphysics of the present, the historical unfolding of a metaphysics of the present, or simply a history of the presence. We could also say that the history of the present is effectively a history of power. His genealogical investigations are thus mappings of the forgetfulness of being with which our history coincides: a history of the emergence of various forms of normalization and biopolitics as the historical trace and effect of *Seinsvergessenheit*. The history of the present culminates in biopower, a process that describes power capture of life. In Foucault the term life retains an element of what Agamben would call bare life. A biopolitical society, which is also

a normalizing society, "is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life."[121]

Though Foucault, as we noted above, declares Heidegger to be his essential philosopher, he maintains in the remaining passages of the interview that although Heidegger was critical to bringing Nietzsche into clarity, it was "Nietzsche that won out." What can we infer from this? Not simply that Foucault affirms the will to power. Rather that he was more inclined to bear witness to the shadow of being, power, to truth manifested in its technological modality. In short, Foucault primarily sought to document the danger of the will to power rather than give an account of the "saving power." If being is in a phase of radical occlusion, then it is this history of presence (of actuality) that Foucault sought to document. Perhaps until his studies of ancient techniques of the self, the idea and possibility of a saving power, of an ethical resistance to power, was dormant more than it might have been distant. Foucault's ethical turn is thus his attempt to think not just differently, but perhaps to think the difference more radically as a chiasmus of the ontological difference itself.

Foucault states:

> As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared … then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.[122]

While these signature lines of Foucault are widely read as heralding the end or death of the subject, this must be understood in less romantic and absolutist terms. What he sought was, like Heidegger, to loosen the metaphysical thickets that have come to constrain our possibilities, and to free thought from the experience (*Erlebnis*) of a sovereign and self-assertive subjectivity that is itself the "object-effect" of an analytical investment of "domination-observation"[123] and knowledge-power regimes. *Discipline and Punish* sought to expose not merely the genealogy of penal practice but also the carceral mechanisms of the modern age that act upon free subjects and desire as the extension of a more general movement of power over life. This governmentality, this power over life, was captured in Foucault's descriptions of normalization and biopolitics. By exposing these metaphysical structures of capture operating at the level of intimacies, by loosening the "grip of technology,"[124] the modern subject is opened up to the possibilities of an experience of the thought of the other – the experience of being.

From a broad critical ontology perspective that is emerging thus far, we can think of Foucault's entire oeuvre as a meditation on the games of

truth by which humans are constituted as subjects of power. Put otherwise, his work is a genealogy of subjectivity in relation to increasing and multiplying thresholds of power. At the same time Foucault attempted to make clear in several interviews that his work should be seen not simply as a genealogy of power, where power is understood as a thing in itself, but rather a genealogy of the *modes* of subjectification. Power is thus cast as a modality and a relation. As we saw with Agamben, the question of relationality itself lies at the heart of the structure of the ban. Hence the ethical turn is a more engaged way of understanding and thinking the problematic that has always been central to Foucault's work; namely the triangular relationship between subjectivity, truth, and power, and power, as we know in Foucault, is on the side of truth. Genealogy is thus an art of history, a practice of thinking, in which the relationalities and rationalities of power, its governmentalities, are disclosed.

Life and Power

Foucault consistently sought to explicate power precisely in terms that do not immediately call to mind an entity or externality, but rather an immanent field of force relations. Biopowers are methods of power and knowledge that not only assume responsibility for the life processes of populations but also set out to control and modify (limit) the potentiality of life itself. Thus in contrast to the more inefficient form of sovereign power, biopower:

> … would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body. If one can apply the term *biohistory* to the pressures through which the movements of life and the processes of history interfere with one another, one would have to speak of *bio-power* to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life.[125]

I would argue that the Foucaultian phrase "*power over life*" does not only designate the fundamental component of the bipolar technologies of biopower,[126] but rather describes for Foucault the general movement of power in history. Once we read Foucault's work on power as part of a broader political/historical ontology, the apparent fissures between Agamben and Foucault on the question of sovereign power begin to dissolve. Agamben's term *politicization of life* and Foucault's term *power over life* are

nearly equivalent. However, given that Agamben revives sovereign power as central to the problematic of modernity and contemporary violence, and given that Foucault's introduction of the term biopower was intended as a theoretical critique of the "juridico-discursive" model of power, with the emergence of biopolitics effectively heralding the demise of sovereign power,[127] it is easy to see how their accounts of power can be regarded as divergent if not incompatible.[128] Agamben, however, is one of the most perceptive readers of Foucault's dark side (i.e. his ontology), and his correction or completion of Foucault's conception of biopower is not of a historical nature[129] but, as I have argued above, registers a difference with the modality of life's inscription into power, with the topological *structure* of capture – the structure of the ban or exception and the capture of bare life through an exclusive inclusion – and not just the capture of life itself. Foucault's thesis is thus "developed" along its ontological axis, along its ontological potentiality.

Foucault's phrasing is key here, and he goes on to make a subtle distinction between biopower and biopolitics, which is often obscured. While he terms the new configuration of power biopower (*modern biopower* for Agamben), he regards it as the mutation and evolution of a more general movement of power over life. "In concrete terms," Foucault writes, "starting in the seventeenth century, this *power over life* evolved in two basic forms."[130] These two forms (or poles) of power, interlinked by sexuality,[131] are the disciplines or the *anatomo-politics of the human body* and *regulatory controls* or *biopolitics of the population*. Thus as Foucault clarifies, power over life, whose new configuration Foucault names biopower, consists of two elements, "disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population," that is to say, biopower is the apparatus of discipline in conjunction with the new apparatus of biopolitics. In biopower a concern for the management and control of the individual body converges and intersects with a concern for the management and preservation of species life (population): "the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, [marks] the beginning of an era of 'biopower.'"[132]

Thus to be clear, power over life does not simply mean the conscription of an originally free subject within an external structure of domination and subordination. It is not simply that the subject is enmeshed within institutional arrangements of disciplinary power, nor that its subjection to forms of overt sovereign power or repression wholly define it. Though one element of power (which Foucault designates as power with a capital "P") certainly does involve domination and overt violence, the form that Foucault is primarily interested in is the productive subject-forming power. Power is thus not external to the subject but immanent with it. We may say that the modern subject is itself the expression of a

constellation of historical and ongoing forces; the modern subject is itself a form of power through and through. It is also the normalized and disciplined subject of a biopolitical identity that is the most powerful expression of subjectivity today, a form that I would argue pervades the dominant conceptions of Muslim identity. In fact, Foucault would claim that the discursive regime of historico-political discourses are the most powerful and effective forms of subject formation/bondage. For it is precisely when the subject sees itself in a war of liberation against repressive forces, that this very struggle binds it more concretely to the identity/subject/people it wishes to liberate. We might call this *the biopolitical trap of the wretched*. Thus historico-political discourses and movements of resistance against overt power can end up producing a more effective double capture of subjectivity. For instance, in *The Order of Things*, Foucault shows how what seem to be opposing and discontinuous positions really belonged to the same archaeological or epistemic ground. Something of a similar strategy is deployed by Agamben when he talks about the limitations of democracy, human rights, Marxism, and liberalism, which all remain oblivious of their metaphysical soil. Our metacolonial interpretation pertaining to the violences of Islamism, and Pakistani political space more generally, relies similarly on the notion that Islamic actors are embedded in a wider space and history of metaphysics, of which they remain entirely unaware. In this sense metacolonization proceeds through its invisibility. The "enigmas" of modern violence, be it the Nazi or the American war machine, al-Qaeda or the IRA, can only be solved:

> … on the terrain – biopolitics – on which they were formed. Only within a biopolitical horizon will it be possible to decide whether the categories whose opposition founded modern politics (right/left, private/public, absolutism/democracy, etc.) – and which have been steadily dissolving, to the point of entering today into a real zone of indistinction – will have to be abandoned …. And only a reflection that, taking up Foucault's and Benjamin's suggestion, thematically interrogates the link between bare life and politics, *a link that secretly governs the modern ideologies seemingly most distant from one another*, will be able to bring the political out of its concealment and, at the same time, return thought to its practical calling.[133]

Perhaps, then, in a nutshell, we may say that this interrogation of the link between power and life is what characterizes the principal ethico-political task of critical ontology. Foucault's problematizations, what in his final interviews he referred to as elements of a "political spirituality," were at the end of the day simply an attempt to loosen the grip of a series of entrenched and unthought metaphysics – discursive regimes, epistemes, regimes of truth – so as to enable certain new possibilities of

experience, counter-movements and counter-thinkings, to discover and invent new ways of governing oneself and others. To work, Foucault states in an interview, "is to undertake to think something other than what one has thought before."[134]

In short, Foucault's genealogies are histories of power over life, of the dispersal and intensification of power (*Machenschaft*) at its point of articulation with the individual and collective subject and its institutions and practices. If Foucault was notoriously reticent about articulating clear paths of political resistance it was because of his suspicion of the very metaphysics upon which the valorization of agency and intentionality rest – namely the fiction of the autonomous, sovereign, humanist subject. Hence his famous reprise to ideology: that the very subject we are invited to free is already the effect of power. The purpose then of genealogical histories "is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshold of emergence, the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return; it seeks to make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us."[135] If Foucault moves in his later work towards ethics and the arts of existence, this is in fact a greater alignment with Heidegger's understanding of ethics as the necessary counter-essence to politics.

Thus we can map two spaces or places: the *polis*, the space of power and politics, and *ēthos*, the place of ethics. Foucault would also contrast his genealogy with deconstruction, which borders on a fetishization of the aporia. For Foucault the movement of thought was not endlessly deconstructive and circular, but rather held out genuine possibilities for new forms of being, and new possibilities and directions. Thus while Foucault is usually broken into three periods, archaeology, genealogy, ethics,[136] with his third turn often interpreted rather grossly as a concession to the humanist subject, I would like to suggest that we conceive the third period of ethics as an onto-critical period. Between each stages of Foucault's work the ontological resonances intensify, in particular with his later call for a critical ontology of ourselves and his use of terms like eventalization and problematization. This also corresponds with interpretations of Foucault's evolution, which see his progressive "phases" as extending his concern with the fate of the subject bound up in ever intensifying and deepening power relations. Using elements of, and extending, the arguments of Dreyfus, Elden, and Rayner, I have intimated here that Foucault understood power in terms of *machination*, and that his mature conception of biopower is a term used to "give ground" to Heidegger's critical history of being. By this I do not simply mean that Foucault's work was ontic, but rather that it had a primary ontic directionality while standing in the crossing of the ontological difference.

Foucault's notions of the *episteme* and discourse aim to disclose the *a priori* structures of intelligibility, structures that close off possibility and only open to potentiality with a subsequent development of *askēsis*. The *episteme*, *like the statement*, is thus a proto-event, serving as a metaphysical ground plan, a "dispersion of an exteriority"[137] that orders and lays out in advance (spaces) the manner in which something can appear as an object of scientific investigation (or everyday consumption). With the deployment of *askēsis,* Foucault develops the insights gleaned from the event of the *episteme*, and conforms to a way of approaching truth *phenomenologically and* non-representationally. As Heidegger clarifies, ontological claims cannot be established by argument and propositional logic, since it pertains to a domain prior to assertive discourses. Hence truth (*alētheia*) is a matter of revealing, disclosure, and *seeing*. If anything, Foucault turns the phenomenology of seeing into a phenomenology of experience and the limit (*Erfahrung*). As the etymology of experience suggests, experience is itself an experiment in the traversing of a certain limit (an *experimentum linguae*). As specific types of apparatus, discourses set limits on experience in such a way that world is revealed as the actuality of things, in such a way that the comportment of subjectivity is oriented towards the totality of beings rather than the singularity of being. Since modernity is itself a world-disclosing operation, it is in this way no less true as an actuality. However, as the truth of being – its evental nature – gradually withdrew into oblivion, the thought of the outside (the experience of ecstatic time) and the possibility of thinking the ecstatic leap into the between of being and beings (the crossing of the ontological difference), "increasingly acquired the cast of a mystical, or even mad, experience [and] by the time the history of being unfolded into modernity, the meaning of 'being' had been reduced to what could be represented by the subject in a clear and calculable manner."[138] This accounts for Foucault's reservations regarding humanism, where the rational subject asserts itself as the foundation of being and truth. Thus it is critical to view and situate Foucault's account of modern subjectivity within a broader Heideggerian history of being and its subsequent metaphysics of an increasingly technological subjection. "Power" in Foucault is then effectively a name for the processes and apparatuses that facilitate, economize, rationalize, and normalize this subjection.

Thus if we see Foucault's concern for discourses as occurring at the intersection of language and power, his late turn towards ethics (care of the self) can be seen as a continuous development of Heidegger's thematic of care: "the challenge of finding a home in the 'unhomeliness' (*Unheimlichkeit*) of being, of reconciling speech with the exteriority of language, and of folding experience into the withdrawn horizon of time."[139]

To reiterate, the central thrust of *Being and Time* is that the being of *Dasein* is care and the sense (or space) of care is ecstatic temporality. The elaboration of the meaning of care in Heidegger is a preparatory towards understanding the truth of being as such, as *askēsis* is preparatory for Foucault. Furthermore, what Heidegger labors to reveal is the temporal significance of care, the sense in which time (temporality) is the horizon for all understanding and experience of being.

If then, as we have asserted here, Foucault's genius lay in his ability to write in a manner that crosses and sutures the ontological difference, then we must read Foucault's history of the present as a historical ontology. As an early rendering of critical ontology, genealogy functions not as a method but an art of disclosure, a disclosure of the history of being and of human-being, which is the history of the present as a history of being, as a history of power.

Notes

1 Quoted in Agamben 1993, p. xix.
2 Precisely in this sense, still far behind. I am also here indebted to Krystof Ziareck's rendering of *poiēsis*, not as an aesthetic, but as a marker of "a space of critique in its proper sense, that is, a space of a de-cision, of a differentiation and separation of the technological and the poetic" (Ziarek 2001, p. 179).
3 See O'Leary 2009.
4 And by extension the praxis of contemporary political Islam.
5 Foucault 2003c, pp. 43–63.
6 Foucault seems to use both terms interchangeably. Ontology as such, however, also appears in several key interviews.
7 Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in Rabinow and Rose 2003, p. 33 (emphasis mine).
8 Experiment here is to be linked with Agamben's term for experience.
9 Dreyfus 1991, p. 9.
10 There are of course a few notable exceptions, primarily within the domain of philosophy, to which this work is indebted; Rayner 2007; Elden 2002; Milchman and Rosenberg 2003; Scott 1996; Visker 2000. More recently, see Ayer 2015 and Nichols 2014.
11 Agamben 1999, p. 139.
12 The term is Foucault's, as a way to characterize the ethos of "eventalization" from his essay "Question of Method" (Burchell and Miller 1991, p. 233). I discuss eventalization in the segment on Foucault.
13 Agamben 2016 (my italics).
14 Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in Rabinow and Rose.
15 Agamben 1993.
16 Agamben's phrase that refers, in the context of the division between poetry and philosophy, to the abandonment of being.

17 Agamben 1993.
18 Agamben 1998, p. 13.
19 Heidegger 2001, pp. 154–155.
20 It is to our own project's advantage that as illustrious a compendium as Bertrand Russell's "History of Western Philosophy" fails to even mention Heidegger's name once. There is, however, a sense of ironic truth to the charge of positivist philosophy that Heidegger was merely chasing ghosts – a certain nothing! Without doubt Heidegger's ghost continues to haunt us in the most profound, troubling, and moving of ways.
21 Of course, in addition to Foucault and Agamben, we may include in this list figures like Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Lévinas, Antonio Negri, Paul Ricoeur, Ernesto Laclau, Judith Butler, Julia Kristeva, Claude Lefort, Jean Luc-Nancy, and Alain Badiou. The list is very, very long. Even as they oppose what they take to be a certain epistemic racism (Lévinas) or the proto-fascist jargon of the "originary" (Adorno), they nonetheless draw deeply from the wells of his thought. Even Žižek who, in the *Ticklish Subject* and *The Parallax View*, has offered a sustained critique of Heidegger's understanding of technology, nonetheless regards Heidegger as an essential and indispensable philosopher.
22 Up until very recently and despite Agamben's copious and continuous engagement with, and development of, Heidegger's critique of metaphysics, the mainstay of social science deployments and critiques of Agamben, both friendly and adversarial, seem to studiously avoid any serious engagement with ontology, as if Agamben's invocation of metaphysics were simply one of the many examples of his erudite proclivity for referencing eclectic and obscure materials. Here it is useful to remind ourselves that the term critical ontology was, most famously, first deployed by Foucault himself.
23 The syntagm is from Capobianco 2010, p. 6.
24 Heidegger 1962, p. 1.
25 Half of the preliminary sense of the being question is answered here. Half of the remaining half is answered on page 1 of *Being and Time*: that time is the possible horizon for any understanding of being.
26 The word "metaphysics" derives from the Greek words μετά (metá, "beyond" or "after") and φυσικά (physiká, "physics") and was first used as an editorial decision for anthologizing those works of Aristotle that came "after" his works on physics. Ironically, the word has come to mark a form of arcane thinking, divorced from "practical" reality.
27 "Western" is in brackets because the Platonic Aristotelian legacy that Heidegger engages "returns to Europe" through the filtering and shepherding of Hellenistic philosophy by Arab philosophers, in particular the work of the "Central Asian" Muslim thinker, Abū 'Alī al-Husayn ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Sīnā, better known as Ibn Sina (Latinized Avicenna). In turn both Aristotle and Plato had a significant impact on both Islamic philosophy, mysticism, and theology.
28 Thus it is critical to remember that it is onto-theological metaphysics that is the target of his deconstructive energies, and not *metaphysics qua metaphysics*. It is perhaps here that Heidegger departs from much of

postmodernism, which seeks to reject metaphysics *tout court*. Throughout this work I will generally use the term "ontology" to refer to Heidegger's path of thinking and "metaphysics" to refer to the (Western/Islamic) tradition of ontology (as ontotheology) that Heidegger seeks to deconstruct and expose for its essential nihilism.

29 Heidegger 1977b, p. 115.

30 Thompson 2005, p. 8. The quote is from Heidegger.

31 Heidegger 1999, p. 78 (emphasis mine).

32 Thomson 2005.

33 In order then to move away from the static resonances of being, Heidegger introduces the term *Ereignis*, awkwardly rendered by Emad and Maly as "be-ing as enowning." See their introduction to Heidegger.

34 "The metaphysical schemes of Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger argued, were based on the view that the structure of all things is akin to the structure of products or artifacts. … Plato and Aristotle seemingly projected onto all entities the structure of artifacts" (Zimmerman 1990, p. 157).

35 Importantly *worlding* is not *merely* the long historical interplay of culture/power relations.

36 Though Heidegger does not define ontical or ontological, Macquarie and Robinson add a footnote to clarify that "Ontological inquiry is concerned primarily with Being; ontical inquiry is concerned primarily with entities and the facts about them" (Heidegger 1962, p. 31). Heidegger: "Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical" (ibid). I will generally use ontic in place of ontical. However, ultimately both these clarificatory statements are misleading.

37 It is this ontic sense of world that conventional geo-graphy is engaged in logging and knowing.

38 Thomson 2005, p. 8.

39 According to John Haugland, the ontological difference is "the central thought of Heideggerian philosophy", in Dreyfus 2000, p 47.

40 It is hence critical to keep in mind that the primary sense of the ontological difference is only a way-station, and must be sutured, or crossed-out, because its preliminary sense can misleadingly cause our understanding to revert back to very metaphysical binary that Heidegger seeks to challenge. See Lewis 2005.

41 Hence the insufficiency of the preliminary sense of the ontological difference alone.

42 Heidegger 1962, p. 26.

43 "'For there is Being.' The primal mystery for all thinking is concealed in this phrase" (Heidegger 1977a, p. 238).

44 Heidegger 1972, p. 30.

45 Beistegui 1998, p. 33.

46 Beistegui 1998, p. 43.

47 In addition to Jean Beaufret, to whom Heidegger's famous 1947 "Letter on Humanism" was addressed, the poet Rene Char would also occasionally join the conversations. A twenty-four year old Giorgio Agamben was also

invited to participate in the 1967 session, an event that was to define the turning point in the young philosopher's vocation (see Durantaye 2009).

48 Heidegger 2003, p. 67.

49 The sentence continues; "Letting is then the pure giving, which itself refers to the it [*das Es*] that gives, which is understood as *Ereignis*" (Heidegger 2003).

50 Sheehan's research was first published as "A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research," in *Continental Philosophy Review* (2001). See also his now indispensable *Making Sense of Heidegger*.

51 This debate is paradigmatically represented by Richard Capobianco on "Team Being/Ontology" vs. Sheehan on "Team *Ereignis*/phenomenology." For the former the two terms name the "Same," whereas Sheehan is convinced of an irreducible difference between the two. See Sheehan 2015 and Capobianco 2010. As significant and illuminating as this debate is, my sense is that the two sides are far closer in substance to one another than either is letting on. Jussi Backman's *Complicated Presence*, for instance, eloquently synthesizes, without intending to, the saying of being and *Ereignis* under the sign of singularity.

52 The nature of this *turn*, its extent, significance, and location, are the subject of intense debates – location because the *turn* seems also to be a saying/indicating of the turning within being-*Eriegnis* and not with Heidegger!

53 The usual familiar phrasing is *Seinsgeschichte* or "being historical" thinking, as a response to *Geschichte des Seyns*, "the history of being." As we shall see, this concept will be crucial for understanding critical ontology: the irreducible link between being and power (Heidegger and Foucault).

54 During the 1969 Le Thor session Heidegger remarks that "the thinking after *Being and Time* replaced the expression 'meaning of being' with 'truth of being.' In order to avoid any falsification of the sense of truth, in order to exclude its being understood as correctness, 'truth of being' was explained by 'location of being' [*Ortschaft*] – truth as locality [*Örtlichkeit*] of being. This already presupposes, however, an understanding of the *place-being of place*. *Hence the expression topology of be-ing*" (Heidegger, 2003, my italics).

55 Sheehan 2015, p. 10.

56 I am indebted to Sheehan's remarkably lucid account in "Making Sense of Heidegger" for clarifying the distinction between the two senses of being.

57 Sheehan 2010, p. 33.

58 Modifying Agamben's paradoxical phrase, "inseparable division," which he invokes in relation to the anthropological machine: "With its every word, testimony refutes precisely this isolation of survival from life. The witness attests to the fact that there can be testimony because there is an *inseparable division* and noncoincidence between the inhuman and the human, the living being and the speaking being …" (1999, p. 157).

59 Post-foundationalism contra the Nietzschean antifoundationalism of postmodernity is a rejection of nihilism and absolute relativism of humanist subjectivism. Agamben's declaration of his own postfoundationalism can be found in *The Coming Community* in the section titled *Ethics*.

60 Rayner 2007, p. 92.
61 Heidegger 1991, p. 234, quoted in Rayner.
62 Heidegger, 1977b, p. 17.
63 Note the links between the etymological roots of culture with colonization. See Heidegger's *Parmenides*.
64 Thomson 2005.
65 Ziarek 2001, p. 27.
66 Beistegui 1998.
67 Thomson 2005.
68 Rayner.
69 Agamben 1993, from section XI titled *Ethics*, p. 43.
70 Compare for instance with *Homo Sacer*, where Heidegger's name alone appears 21 times 2007.
71 Agamben 2005a, p.59.
72 *Gigantomachia,* from Greek mythology, refers to the war of the Giants against Zeus.
73 Heidegger writes: "The passage from Plato's *Sophist* which opens the study serves not as a decoration, but rather as an indication of the fact that in ancient metaphysics the *gigantomachy* over the Being of beings had broken out. In this battle, the way in which *Being as such* comes to be understood …. must already be visible. … The Being of beings obviously is understood here as permanence and constancy … Does not all war over Being, then, move in advance within the horizon of time?" (1997, p. 168).
74 See the final volume of Agamben's seven-part *Homo Sacer* series, *The Use of Bodies* (2015).
75 Agamben 1999, p. 13.
76 Agamben 1993, p. xviii.
77 Agamben 2015, p. 111.
78 The number of commentators, in addition to Negri, who explicitly engage with Agamben's ontology, and his relationship to Heidegger in particular, is limited, but growing. For instance, Bruno Gulli writes: "…what makes Agamben's thought particularly interesting is his ability, much needed in our time, to constantly and indissolubly think ontology with politics – a link which is not the result of the mere juxtaposition of two different spheres of thought, but rather a powerful and compelling showing of their intimate and essential connection" (in Calarco and DeCoroli 2007, p. 220). Thus far only Abbott's superb "The Figure of this World" (2014) has really shown this essential connection. See also Prozorv 2014.
79 The *polemos* of being.
80 Agamben 2009, p. 12.
81 Agamben 1998, p. 10.
82 Science can also be read as an epistemological machine that proceeds by way of the capture of life, and in this way *homo sacer* is the fate of bare life under the regime of biological sovereignty and *technē*, a logic expressed in the "bloody mystifications" of racial, national, and class identity.
83 By changing modalities of power, I mean, for instance, the discussion in Foucault regarding the dispersion of power: the transition/mutation of

monarchical sovereign power to the emergence of disciplinary and biopowers.

84 Like the Führer, in the figure of the Taliban (bare life), "bare life passes into law" (Agamben 1998, p. 105) ; that is to say, the life of the Taliban is seen as indistinct from the Shari'a and Islam.

85 We might also link bare life, with the impoverished experiential life of *Erlebnis* (lived-experience), which is counter to the form of experience that Heidegger calls *Erfahrung*, which is an experience that transforms the "traveler" and can in this way be linked with *askēsis*.

86 Like Foucault's *connaissance/savoir* distinction, Agamben uses the term *topographical* to refer to ontic or Cartesian space, while the term *topological* signifies onto-logical space. The topological refers to the boundary, the b/order of exclusion/inclusion, the sovereign de/scission, the camp and the space of exception. In contrast to the topographical, which has a simple either/or, inside/outside, structure, the topological is a more complex paradoxical space, like the Mobius strip. Our concern is thus with the topology of the metacolonial, a cartography of its onto-political space.

87 Walter Benjamin, "Über den Begriff," quoted in Agamben 2000, p. 6.

88 Patton 2007.

89 Perhaps only here can we gain an understanding of the meaning of the valorized figure of the "*real* state of exception" in Benjamin.

90 Agamben 1998, pp. 28–29 (italics original).

91 If classical monarchical forms acknowledged this outside in terms of the Divine, then perhaps modern secular sovereignty operates by way of an obscuration of this fundamental relationship.

92 One who has to bear the brunt of sovereign violence. "Bare life remains included in politics in the form of the exception, that is, as something that is included solely through an exclusion."

93 A term that Karl Lowith first used to characterize the fundamental character of totalitarian states.

94 The spatial terms, *zone of indistinction*, along with *threshold*, are both key terms in Agamben's complex political ontology, and are hence onto-spatial terms.

95 "Foucault's thesis – according to which "what is at stake today is life" and hence politics has become biopolitics – is, in this sense, substantially correct. What is decisive, however, is the way in which one understands the sense of this transformation. What is left unquestioned in the contemporary debates on bioethics and biopolitics, in fact, is precisely what would deserve to be questioned before anything else, that is, the very biological concept of life" (Agamben 2000, p. 6).

96 The sovereign power exercised, for instance, by a mafia don, may be of limited scale and sphere of influence, but its signature is the same as that of the forms of sovereign power exercised by imperial states. That is why it is important to pay attention to the circus of sovereign without collapsing one on to the other. Though of course the role of legitimacy plays an important role in the adjudication between sovereignties, the parameters of legitimacy do not diminish the catastrophic and scandalous nature of sovereign power.

97 All three previous quotes from Agamben 1998, pp.8–9.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid, p. 59.
100 Ibid, p. 171.
101 Foucault and Blanchot 1989, p. 68.
102 Preface to Deleuze and Guattari 1983, p. xiii.
103 Foucault 2005, p. 189. "You must have heard this", as in the cat is now out of the bag?
104 As Beistegui puts it, "*Dasein* is in untruth: its relation to truth, that is, to itself as this process of uncovering, is itself covered over in everyday existence" (2005).
105 Foucault 1990b.
106 Ibid, p. 11.
107 Ibid, p. 6 (italics mine).
108 Rayner 2007.
109 Heidegger 2000.
110 In line with our hauntological subthematic, we might even say that, for Foucault, *askēsis* is not merely an "exercise of oneself" but an "exorcism."
111 Foucault 2007a, p. 149.
112 Ibid, p. 150.
113 Ibid, p. 152.
114 See Agamben 2015.
115 Nealon 2007.
116 Radicalization in Heidegger refers not principally to political revolution, but ontological resolution. In Ernesto Laclau's work also, radical refers to the domain of ontology, and only secondarily to the political.
117 Foucault, pp. 43–63.
118 Beistegui 2005.
119 Heidegger's notion of a history of being marks the historicity of ontology, in opposition to the early thrust of fundamental ontology, which came close to offering a trans-historical conception of being.
120 Lewis 2005.
121 Foucault 1990a, p. 144.
122 Foucault 1973, p. 387. Earlier in the preface he calls man "a kind of rift in the order of things… a configuration whose outlines are determined by the new position he has so recently taken up in the the field of knowledge," (p. xxiii).
123 Ibid, p. 305.
124 Beistegui's phrase.
125 Foucault 1978, p. 143.
126 "A power whose highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through" (ibid, p. 139).
127 "The old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life" (ibid, p. 140).

128 As typical of this form of reading see Paul Patton and Ojakangas 2005. This perspective however emerges only at the cost of the complete elision of ontology in either one or both thinkers.
129 "*It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power*. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception." Agamben.
130 Foucault p. 139 (emphasis mine).
131 This, sexuality, is perhaps the point of articulation that Agamben surprisingly misses when he refers to Foucault's lack of clarity regarding the "point at which these two faces of power converge," referring of course to the two techniques of individualizing and totalizing power.
132 Foucault, p. 140.
133 Agamben.
134 "The Concern for Truth" in Lotringer 1996, p. 455.
135 Foucault.
136 Han.
137 Foucault 1982a, p. 125.
138 Rayner.
139 Ibid.

2

The Space of Emergency

The Military, Discipline, and Political Theology

Historical Thresholds of Sovereignty

Three catastrophes serve as the contextual historical matrix for my concern with the biopolitical space of Islam: 1947 (the emergence of postcolonial Pakistan), 1979 (the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan), and 2001 (the point at which these two dates converge on the United States). If politics were astrology and sovereignties were heavenly bodies, then these years were surely the moments of inaugural shifts and destinal realignments within the fabric of the global *cosmopolis* – disturbances whose fateful (eventful) reverberations still cast their pale and threatening shadow over our time. The metacolonial attempts a disclosure of the *topology* of this time, seeking to capture a few of the shadows cast by the haunting movement of this present/presence as it plays itself out, recklessly, on the landscape of religion and politics in Pakistan and Afghanistan. I will briefly outline the ways in which these years mark significant biopolitical thresholds.

Of course 1947 is the year of a violent cesarean birth and the subsequent bloody separation of oddly conjoined triplets who had been gestating in colonialism's womb since at least 1857. The postpartition surgery was inept, and incomplete, and the sad saga of this trauma continues to haunt the national destinies of India and Pakistan. The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 was merely the completion of this originary biopolitical fracture – the ceaseless separation of *bios* and *zoē*. More critically, as a topological site for this study, 1947 marks the birth of the first Nation State that came into being under the sign of a mobilized Islam – a Muslim Republic, an *Islamapolis*, but not yet an Islamic State. Ironically, as I shall seek to demonstrate, Pakistan – whose name derives

The Metacolonial State: Pakistan, Critical Ontology, and the Biopolitical Horizons of Political Islam, First Edition. Najeeb A. Jan.

from a bemused acronym of colonial provinces, and whose *raison d'être* was perhaps acrimony (*ressentiment*) itself – exemplifies what Nietzsche called the spirit of revenge; the revenge of History not just against colonialism or the West, but against Islam itself.

As such, Pakistan will be thought here as both a geographic, imaginative, and metaphysical apparatus.[1]

Just under 33 years later, 1979 marks the birth and gestation of another pair of awkward Islamo-political entities, conceived yet again through the romantic misadventures of Imperial desire: the Iranian revolution and the birth of the Afghan Mujahideen and the Jihad International. If 1857 can be regarded as the first major counter-strike of new forms of local sovereignty against British colonialism, 1979 Iran marks the first exemplary counter-strike of Muslim sovereignty directed against the American empire. The long *duree* of American involvement in Afghanistan should thus be seen as directed not only towards its arch imperial rival, the Soviet Union, but also against Iran, combining in one space a key and long-standing component of American foreign policy; hostility towards revolutionary nationalism.[2]

However, more significantly, as a key contextual moment of the metacolonial, we can reconfigure the primary thrust of the Iranian revolution as directed against the deep historical trajectory and traditions of Shi'i Islam itself; the *Ayatollah*, literally the "sign of God," is now made to appear as the actual sovereign of a new political space, a space where what was once hidden, the *ghaybah* of the imam, becomes actualized. As Agamben notes, "sovereign power can … maintain itself indefinitely, without ever passing over into actuality. (*The troublemaker [Schmitt] is precisely the one who tries to force sovereign power to translate itself into actuality*.)"[3] Thus the sovereign authority of God that was once in occultation, is now captured and subsumed within the new *Islamapolis*. In this way the Iranian Revolution inaugurates not only the first "Islamic" State but also marks the proper *homecoming* of political Islam. The radical doctrine of *wilayat al-faqih* – the direct rule, or sovereignty, of the jurist – that undergirded the rise to state power of the ayatollahs is a decisive turning point in the historical relationship between Islam, the 'ulama, and the political, in short between knowledge (*'ilm*) and power. If it can be accurately said that in early Islamic societies, *nomos* and rule did not coincide, then the Iranian Revolution is indeed a truly modern revolution. The Islamic revolution as a specifically political revolution marks the involution of Islam itself: Islam comes to replace Allah. This entry of Islam – and its concomitant form of Muslim subjectivity (*Homo Islamicus*) – into modern political power, marks the hollowing and decline of Islam that is now everywhere apparent. The 1947 birth of Pakistan and the 1979 Iranian revolution are thus key markers in this transition.

There were other nefarious convergences that suborn this year as the crucial biopolitical threshold for political Islam. In particular, 1979 saw not only the brutal conflagration of imperial powers in Afghanistan, it also witnessed a decisive *event* of power in Pakistan. On the 4th of April, behind the fortified walls of Rawalpindi's infamous Adiyala Jail (and just a few months before Soviet tanks rolled into Kabul) by order of Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia ul-Haq (1924–1988), the Pakistan military hangs Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto, effectively decapitating the symbol (however flawed) of democracy in Pakistan. The sordid alliance that subsequently ensues between the ISI, the CIA, and the House of Saudi inaugurated what we may call the *Great American Jihad*: a paradoxical proxy crusade that may go down in history as the most costly, misguided, foul, and shortsightedly successful *ménage à trois* of the twentieth century. The immediate offspring of this multilateral imperial *dispositif*, the Mujahideen, were hailed not only with massive injections of cash, heroin, and arms, but also with ethico-political accolades; a select few representatives of these warriors of Islam were greeted in Washington and knighted by Reagan as the "moral equivalents of our Founding Fathers."[4] There is undoubtedly a degree of truthful irony in this convergence – one exemplary practitioner of a puritanical project recognizing his own exceptionalist face in the nascent forces of *jihadism*.[5]

The events set in motion in 1979 thus mark the beginning of the end of one Imperial foe and the birth of another.[6] In what can only be a strange imprint of the call of enframing around which these assemblages have gathered and proliferated, we can hear the echo of technology and the structure of exception in the very names of these entities; al-Qaeda which derives its organizational name not only from the Arabic word *qā'idah* (foundation or base) but also is a reference to the very computer database of names that was kept in Peshawar to keep track of the Arab-Afghan Greater Jihad conscripts. In the name al-Qaeda is thus embedded a simultaneous reference to the foundations of Islam and a military or computer database and in the Taliban and the Deoband, we again hear the very structure of exception, the *ban*, which this work, following Agamben, seeks to disclose.[7]

If 1979 was significant for the fortunes of political Islam (from Palestine to Pakistan), it was also the crucial decade for the new visibility of other forms of religio-biopolitics. Here we may mention, in addition to the emergence of the BJP in India, the rise of the Christian Coalition and its alliance with neoliberalism[8] and neoconservatism in the US. The second Iraq war could in this sense be viewed as a direct product of this liaison. Political Christianity, or "Christianism,"[9] arose in part out of the Christian Reconstructionist movement and the various forms of Dominionism in the US. This movement was influenced by the Calvinist theology of

R.J. Rushdoony whose work was popularized by Francis Schaefer, and laid the groundwork for the rise to power of figures like Pat Robertson, whose failed bid for direct political (sovereign) power in 1989 eventually morphed into a more grass roots (governmentality) operation – birthing the Christian Coalition, an organization that remains a decisive constituent of the Republican Base, and which critics had suggested had virtually overtaken the functioning of the Republican party during the Reagan and Bush I years. As will be apparent, there is a distinct parallel between these forms of Christian fundamentalism and that of the Deoband 'ulama in that they both seek to create a space of sovereign operations (focused on the body and sexuality – gay rights, abortion) as a way to counteract the hegemony of liberal secularism. The latent sentiment, "Christianity/America in Danger," so remarkably captured with the wild popularity of Mel Gibson's *The Passions of Christ*, parallels the concern of Islamists for whom Islam (Muslim Society) "must be defended."[10] Thus 1979 clearly inaugurated a decade of a new assertion of a range of political theologies, no longer disguised in the familiar garments of secular sovereignty. It is thus not the case of an old medieval religious specter returning to haunt the liberal pretensions of modernities, otherwise progressive historical *telos*, but something quite the reverse; the becoming historical, or the Hegelianation, of religion itself.

In this way 1979 Afghanistan can be seen not only as the place where the grand dénouement of the Cold War unfolds but also as the vital threshold for the biopolitical capture of Islam and the transition point into the age of Terror and Security,[11] which announced its conclusive arrival with the event of September 11, 2001. The subsequent convergence then between neoliberalism and neoconservatism, which advocates a far more moralistic and sovereigntist modality of power, constitutes the critical biopolitical matrix in which the analysis of political Islam's present must proceed. In short, Afghanistan marks the crucial threshold of the biopolitical age of terror[12] we now inhabit.

The abysmal, spectral figure to emerge from the convergence of these three historical vectors is the Taliban – the *Muselmann*, not as witness of Auschwitz, but rather the *shaheed* of Afghanistan. As Agamben notes, Primo Levi described the most abject figures of the Nazi concentration camps as *der Muselmann* (the Muslim) – "a being from whom humiliation, horror, and fear had so taken away all consciousness and all personality as to make him absolutely apathetic."[13] Today the Taliban stand as the exemplary figure of Muslim life that does not deserve to live. The Taliban, however, are *homo sacer* with Kalashnikovs, and in this way exemplify the proximity between sacred life and sovereign power. A heretical reading, one that troubles liberal sensibilities, discloses the Tali*ban* phenomenon as an exemplary and double instance of the sovereign paradox.[14]

Emerging from the postapocalyptic wreckage of US–Soviet imperial rivalry in Afghanistan, the Taliban were effectively spawned by yet another alliance between the secretive security apparatus of Pakistan's "military intelligence" and the Deoband 'ulama. This Mullah–Military complex, as I hope to demonstrate, is key to understanding the discourse and practice of the Deoband 'ulama as biopolitical. Perhaps more troublingly, the Taliban combine two of Agamben's key biopolitical paradigms, the camp and the refugee. During the first period of the Afghan catastrophe, between 1979 and 1988, thousands of camps were set up across the Afghan–Pakistan border to house the influx of some 4–5 million refugees.[15] These camps were thus born out of a situation of crisis, martial law, and war. The *madaris* that proliferated in conjunction with these camps functioned as a disciplinary holding and training space for surplus children. The camp, as Agamben notes, is "the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space (insofar as it is founded solely on the state of exception)." The camp thus appears as an event, the hidden paradigm that decisively signals the political space of modernity itself. Eminently *torturable* and *bombable*, the Taliban mirror the long history of global and local forms of sovereign violence through their own will to decapitation, and through a range of other less intense enactments of radical control over the body. The strict and obsessive reinforcement of gender boundaries between males (beards) and females (veils) is itself an instance of an emaciated sovereign logic, which substitutes control over territorial space with control over the body and social space.

Despite the fact that the presence and continuity of Taliban ideology is viewed with embarrassment by Muslims worldwide, it simultaneously grounds the governmental logics for the "War on Terror." Hence 1979 Afghanistan/Pakistan can be seen not only as the time-place where the grand dénouement of the Cold War unfolds, but also as the vital threshold for the biopolitical capture of Islam and the transition point into the age of "Terror and Security," which announced its conclusive arrival with the event of September 11, 2001. A misrecognition of this space as a merely geopolitical (or Islamic) crisis – one of incompetent nation building, imperial mischief, or incompetent textual interpretation – rather than as an exemplary space of emergency, may obscure the way in which the crisis in Afghanistan/Pakistan presages a severe ontological crisis yet to come; the darkest apotheosis of the emergency of being in whose nihilistic time and *polis* we already dwell. Perhaps this is the kind of dark space that ought to become the inducement for a way of thinking past the conventional limits of the disciplines. Failure to do so, Agamben warns with his haunting last three words of *Homo Sacer*, runs the risk of an *unprecedented biopolitical catastrophe*. What follows here is a labor of thinking under the weight of this immanent failure.

Disciplinary Space

> [The] tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the "state of exception" in which we live is the rule. We must attain to a concept of history that accords with this fact. Then we will clearly see that it is our task to bring about the real state of exception, and this will improve our position in the struggle against fascism.
>
> –Walter Benjamin

> Indeed, the state of exception has today reached its maximum worldwide deployment. The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that – while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception internally – nevertheless still claims to be applying the law.
>
> –Agamben

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault suggests that a fundamental transformation in the epistemic regime of penal justice was in part caused by the infiltration of an apparatus of power that had emerged in military camps. The origins of modern "disciplinary" power thus lie not in the prison but the *space of military camps* and the battlefield. The disciplinary dressage of early modern military camps, the culture of perpetual observation and examination, the emergence of spaces of confinement, and the recourse to repetitive training exercises were all corporeal forces that were designed to construct a more efficient fighting human machine. Such techniques eventually spread, mutated, and penetrated other institutions like the hospital, school (madrasa), and factory. The disciplinary manipulation of bodies does not produce subjects per se, but is only one part of a complex network of power/knowledge, or "apparatus," which forms the constitutive conditions of subjectivity. Modernity, Foucault suggests, inaugurates the disciplining of the soul through the corrections of the body.

Building on this analysis, this chapter effectively undertakes a brief history of the Pakistan Army in terms of the crucial role it has played as a cipher for the militarization of all spheres of political, cultural, religious, and economic life. Through a concrete examination of military proclamations of martial law and the history of its entanglements and alliances with both "militant Islam" and "militant America," this chapter traces the ways in which the Pakistan military has contributed to the (normalization of the) state of exception through its repeated interventions in and domination of political space. The chapter also reads the role of Pakistan's notorious Inter-Services Intelligence Agency as an extension of "global police sovereignty." Pakistan has come to exemplify the ways in which the secret services have become the model of actual political organization and action.

That the military has played a dominant role in shaping the political destiny of Pakistan is commonly acknowledged. In this chapter, however, I interrogate the very nature and form of military power, which has been amply described but remains remarkably undertheorized. This means that it is the structure of the sovereign exception, the ban, and not simply the material logics and history of the military that need to be exposed. At the same time I do not suggest that some deep a-historical structures are solely to account for the crisis in Pakistan. On the contrary, it is first and foremost the militarization of the *polis* by that institution of colonial governmentality par excellence, the Army, which lies at the heart of the political crisis facing Pakistan. Hence the chapter makes clear that the productive link between Islamist violence and the army is not merely a question of uncovering a dark history of alliance and shortsighted deployments, but is rather a question of understanding the intensification and permanent localization of the state of emergency.

I conclude by showing how Pakistan's singular tragedy lies in the increasing indistinction between dictatorship and democracy; the proper name of this space of indistinction is the exception. A misrecognition of this space as a merely geopolitical (or Islamic) crisis – one of incompetent nation building, imperial mischief, or incompetent textual interpretation – rather than as an exemplary space of emergency, may obscure the way in which the crisis in Pakistan is reflective of a more global, onto-logical crisis of government and life.

The new madrasa at Deoband, which according to Metcalf is the "leading theological academy of modern India," is described as at once traditional and modern. Metcalf is uncomfortable, and rightly so, with the common understanding of the madrasa as "traditional." This was a school that "clearly broke with earlier patterns of education"[16] and which "from its inception was unlike earlier madrasas. The founders emulated the British bureaucratic style for educational institutions instead of the informal familial pattern of schools then prevalent in India. … Financially, the school was wholly dependent on public contributions, mostly in the form of annual pledges, not on fixed holdings of *auqaf*, pious endowments contributed by noble patrons."[17] In her concern to critique modernization theories,[18] Metcalf misses here an opportunity to see this transformation of the madrasa as inaugurating the emergence of a modern disciplinary space of power within the very heart of orthodoxy.

The modern madrasa replete with new forms of the enclosure, regulation, and surveillance of bodies represents the penetration of modern forms of power, both disciplinary and biopolitical, into the heart of a movement that ostensibly trumpets its anti-Western, anticolonial, and antimodernist credentials. Metcalf's assertion that "the school's

concerns were totally apolitical"[19] is untenable not only because it ignores the overt political nature of the Deoband since 1918 but also because it relies on a flawed and weak conception of politics/power that is rooted precisely in the kind of juridico-political and state model that Foucault has so severely critiqued. The material reliance of the madrasa on "popular" rather than "sovereign" finance most clearly signals this shift into the modern. We must view the institutions and its practices of the Deoband within the framework of a more robust and conceptually rich conception of power, a model of power that at minimum has inaugurated "the cutting of the King's head."[20]

It is thus fitting that we begin our account of the metacolonial space of Pakistan by a consideration of the fundamental role that "discipline" has played in facilitating the now innumerable and proliferating spaces of violence in Pakistan. That the military has played a dominant role in shaping the political destiny of Pakistan is commonly acknowledged, but little or no attention has been placed on interrogating the nature and form of military power or the state form itself. The military has been endlessly described,[21] but it remains remarkably undertheorized. Overall I will be highlighting the indistinction between military space and 'ulama space (mullah–military complex). Both inaugurate and proliferate disciplinary and sovereign–biopolitical spaces. It is their recent overlap and merger that has resulted in the crossing of a certain threshold, leading to the emergence of new and unexpected *dispositifs* and assemblages of power. Today's civil war is not just a contest between jihadism and the military and nor is it only a contest between various sectarian traditions. It is also an increasingly violent civil war within the Deoband establishment itself. Pakistan's guiding principles – enunciated by the Father of the Nation M.A. Jinnah in an early radio address to the new nation – "Faith, Unity, *Discipline*,"[22] must thus be seen in a whole new and disturbing light. It seems as if the disciplinary sword has triumphed over the other two: unity and faith. Both Islam (faith) and Pakistan (unity) lie in obvious ruin.

Pakistan's history has long remained under the shadow of dictatorship, but as Agamben clarifies, dictatorship and the state of exception are not the same thing. The former is only a species of the latter. Thus while plenty of attention has been paid to explaining the causes for Pakistan's seemingly endless cycle of dictatorships,[23] no one has yet paid attention to the relationship between the sovereign exception and dictatorship. The proclamations of emergency that are considered in this chapter can then be applied to our understanding of the *fatwa* as a force of law. The military as a force of war can be said to merge with the 'ulama's space of law (*Allah awr Army*). A threshold is reached when the distinction between law and war collapses. The Pakistan military has

contributed to the (normalization of the) state of exception through its repeated interventions in and domination of political space, a space so suffused with military logics that it suffocates and transforms the possibilities of democratic space too. Pakistan's singular tragedy today is the increasing indistinction between dictatorship and democracy; the name of this space of indistinction is the exception.

I have characterized metacolonial space as a biopolitical sovereign space of exception. In order to understand political Islam in Pakistan we need to take into account the nature of political space, to understand and expose its contours. The political and politics are of course terms of classical provenance, linked to the Greek term *polis*, which, though conventionally translated as city-state,[24] designates a space of power. The political is also associated more concretely with the emergence of *popular* movements and *populations*.[25] There is thus something already biopolitical in our everyday usage of the term "political." This space of the political is signaled by the broader transformations that Foucault identifies as the transition from sovereign (monarchical) power to forms of modern biopolitics and governmentality. In Foucault's use of the term, power is not a thing or substance; it is not owned or possessed but rather circulates. It is a term that designates relationships that take place at the level of populations and the individual and not just at the level of the state.[26] Islam can be said to be political in so far as it embodies a mentality of power – a governmentality – that seeks to shape, conduct, control, discipline, protect, and/or liberate (Islamicize) society. It does not have to refer to activities that aim at the control of the formal state apparatus or that take place at the level of formal political parties that contest national elections. Similarly, Agamben's conception of sovereign power does not refer exclusively to the orbit of state power.[27]

In the introduction I outlined the inadequacies of approaches to political Islam that privilege "religion" as either a universal category or as an independent agent of historical formation. Consequently, my research seeks to highlights the "secular"[28] processes and forces (state actors, global political economy, etc.) that bear on the formation of Islamist politics and subjectivities.[29] If Pakistani political space is being increasingly defined by the state of exception, then 'ulama biopolitics must itself be situated within a broader understanding of the state/space of sovereignty. In Pakistan this space has been dominated by and produced as a military space. Here we must understand military in the broadest sense as not simply that encapsulating the jurisdiction of the Pakistan army but as a space of security critical to the colonial present. In short we must first turn to the way in which the Pakistan Army has infected the broader political space by its own martial disciplinary logics, logics that have served to intensify and multiply the space of exception.

It is not simply the case, however, that the army or the military are somehow the originators or cause of the state of exception. Like colonialism, the army has simply sustained and intensified the logic of exception. It is the structure of the sovereign exception, the ban, and not simply the material logics and history of the military that need to be exposed.[30] At the same time, I am not suggesting that some hidden metaphysics or deep a-historical structures are solely to account for the crisis in Pakistan. On the contrary, it is first and foremost the militarization of the *polis* by that institution of colonial governmentality par excellence of the Army that lies at the heart of the political crisis facing Pakistan. Thus the state of exception is not unique or particular to either the military or the 'ulama. Moreover, we must keep in mind that this military space is the site of convergence of a range of sovereign powers, including the United States. Additionally both military and 'ulama governmentality thrive in a broader space of power, which is itself further sustained by the routine (normal) exercise of sovereign power by imperial and colonial forces. The ruling trinity of Pakistan, *Allah, Army awr Amrika* (the AAA),[31] is thus first and foremost an expression of a sovereign anxiety. Any attempt to solve the predicament of violence and instability in Pakistan must look to the horizon of the incoherences of sovereignty. What hampers most studies that seek to account for the crisis of Pakistan is the repeated failure to problematize the political, sovereignty, religion, identity, and the very biopolitical logic of the nation-state.[32] In short it is power and not Pakistan as such that requires thinking. Pakistan is merely the effect of power, of a series of assemblages of power.[33] Hence we must make clear that the productive link between Islamist violence and the army is not merely a question of uncovering a dark history of alliance and shortsighted deployments but is rather a question of understanding the intensification and permanent localization of the state of emergency.

The question of the *place* of political Islam in Pakistan, and the Deoband and the Taliban in particular, cannot be fully understood without taking into account the link between martial spaces, the political, and of course the postcolonial context of the Pakistan Army, its colonial present. The army emerges historically as the key institution of colonial policing, securing colonial sovereignty over British India, and as such its originary conscription, its *raison d'être*, lies firmly within the ambit of colonial governmentality. Subsequently since 1956, it has been "martialed" as the effective local proxy for American foreign policy and would simply collapse without the periodic infusions of money, aid, and technology from the United States.[34] An understanding of the military, and in particular its spatial metaphysics, is thus indispensable to this account of political Islam, since Pakistan is first and foremost a series of overlapping (and conflicting) military and security spaces, and now, even more so, a

vast permanent space of exception. It is the complex of this (metacolonial) space that is the constitutive matrix of political Islam. It is also in this *place* that the dynamic of Pakistan's *centrifugal*[35] problem emerges. This enigmatic condition is a case of profuse sovereign anxiety and confusion, the resulting anomie of which affirms the state of exception in a vicious circularity. An element of this sovereign anxiety is commonly expressed in the popular configuration *Allah, Amrika awr Army* (the AAA), the trinity that is allegedly responsible for the fate of the country. Indeed, the very emergence of Pakistan was the means to redress an anxiety of citizenship and power as it was first articulated by the nascent All India Muslim League (AIML), a movement that effectively conflated the economic insecurities of the Muslim feudal elite, with the idea of a majority Hindu India as constituting a threat to Islam and its "*way of life*." Transformed under two centuries of colonial ordering and now already constituted as a *bios*, Islam, so the AIML argued, "must be defended." The official slogan of the AIML in the years leading up to the partition was "Islam is in Danger." The military have thus come to regard themselves not merely as protectors of the state but, by extension, defenders of Islam, albeit a provincialized, territorialized Islam. It is therefore by way of an indistinction between Islam and the nation-state that the military justify their extra juridical *juris-diction*, which extends above and over any law including the shari'a itself. In Pakistan, as any causal observer would attest, the law and the military are indistinct. The 'ulama simply wish to attain to this level of sovereignty.

What gives the Pakistan Army its rights of proclamation – its capacity to pro-claim law? It is not because it houses the foremost intellectuals of the nation or the foremost juridical experts (Islamic or secular). It is because the Army is the institution that has the greatest capacity to wield organized violence and which, by the repeated takeover of the state's political and economic machinery, has effectively maintained a monopoly on death dealing.

Pakistan and Her Army

There is by now a long and faithful tradition of critique within Pakistani scholarship that highlights the particularly nefarious role played by the Army and the persistence of feudal institutions in the creation of Pakistan's seemingly endless series of social, economic, and political crises. Veteran activist and journalist Tariq Ali has been predicting the imminent collapse of Pakistan since 1969. His highly influential *Can Pakistan Survive*? was so good it was banned by General Zia ul-Haq.[36] His latest book, *The Duel*, characterizes the dialectic of Pakistan's

tragedy as the "ongoing duel between a US-backed politico-military elite and the citizens of the country."[37] The last three decades, Ali writes, "have witnessed a shallow and fading state gradually being reduced to the level of a stagnant and treacherous swamp."[38] Ali was, however, in self-exile in 1963 and was thus spared the wrath of the military establishment. More sustained and less polemical analysis of the praetorian state began to emerge in the 1980s,[39] including a volume edited by a former commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Air Force (1957–1965) Air Marshal Asghar Khan.[40] In a series of more recent works, greater flesh has been put on the ways in which the army has not only co-opted the political process but also simultaneously extended its power within the fabric of culture and economy.[41] These works explore the deadly network of alliances between the 'ulama, the military, and the United States and outlines the ways in which alliances between these three forces contributed to the retardation of democratic potential. The 'ulama are written off as antimodern and illiterate forces that have been opposed to the integrity of Pakistan from the very beginning. Since then a certain dominant, and by no means incorrect, theme has come to characterize almost all explanations of Pakistan's problems: the nefarious role played by the United States in consistently supporting both military rule and jihadist forces in the 1980s.[42] This structural alliance is then set on top of an already existing network of postcolonial woes that have beset the nation from its violent and bloody inception: a feudal hierarchy, poverty, and political corruption. All in all, so the argument goes, these forces, the AAA, have compromised if not destroyed the "secular" potential and originary vision of "true" Pakistan and "true" Islam. Shaikh, Ali, and Rashid, in particular, offer us a compelling narrative and endless description of a series of cynical alliances and ideological hypocrisies.

In many ways I share the analysis of these leftist and liberal authors. However, what emerges is a detailed historical and political *description* of the movement of actor-puppets with little attempt to understand the nature of "movement" and the principle of motion itself. The explanatory framework invariably draws from a Marxist paradigm, including the contradictions of capital, imperial greed, corruption and mismanagement by the ruling elite, and "false consciousness." Here, unfortunately, the 'ulama are viewed simply as antimodern forces whose resurrection has been facilitated by the cynical "weaponization" of Islam by the Army and America alike. Again while I share the underlying tenor of these arguments, something is missing. It is this essential ground – the unthought – that I seek to explain.

I am arguing that Islamist violence is made possible and sustained by a more autonomous will to power among the 'ulama class and is not merely a corollary of the inscription of the 'ulama within military spaces.

At the same time, however, the violence of the 'ulama cannot be understood in isolation from its conscription within and proximity to geopolitical violence of the army and America. Additionally we might add that the martial spaces extended by the military, which determine the ethos of the political space in which all other political actors participate, cannot be decoupled from the ongoing "martial face" of a variety of neoliberal and neoconservative global governmentalities.[43] This is the secondary, neocolonial sense of the metacolonial, where *meta* implies being in the midst of rather than after. This ongoing metacolonial space is markedly different for India than it is for Pakistan. This is not to say that the former is devoid of such metacolonial forces, only that they differ in intensity. In India, in contrast to Pakistan, a sovereign anxiety and dislocation is not for the most part in a state of perpetual crisis. Pakistan's destiny therefore lies in its complex entanglement within a series of interconnected but also conflicting historical and political *dispositifs*: its postcolonial legacy, the dominance of the military, the place of Pakistan within the imperial orbit of the United States, and the violent biopolitical caesura that carved out this "moth-eaten" nation. What I am referring to here is, of course, the very *eidos* of Pakistan and the capture of Islam within its political schema. Pakistan emerges under the biopolitical imperative of "society must be defended."[44] In a similar way, American foreign policy, rightly regarded as deterring democracy, is the outcome of its own will to security. We do not then have merely cynical players who are promoting a political vision for direct material gain but rather a series of actors that are each concerned with defending and securing their populations, their *ummah*, their metaphysics.

As the premier colonial institution, the Army has always conflated its own *raison d'être*, the defense of the territorial nation-state (Pakistan), with the defense of Islam. Similarly, the Deoband 'ulama have always regarded their political activity, from the founding of the originary school in 1857 to their support for the Taliban today, as the safeguarding and preservation of Islam. During the tenure of Zia ul-Haq, this indistinction reached its maximum intensity as Pakistanis were increasingly disciplined by a new form of Martial Islam (the martialization and politicization of Islam crosses a certain threshold). Certainly in the minds of such figures as Hamid Gul, the former head of Inter-Services Intelligence (1987–1989), who Ahmed Rashid rightly called "the most fervent Islamic ideologue in the army after Zia,"[45] the defense of Islam took priority over Pakistan. It would not be unfair to suggest that today Pakistan is being haunted by Hamid's *ghouls*.

Today there is no shortage of studies that make the decisive connection between the rise of violent religious extremism in South Asia and the troubling role of the Army in the proliferation of *jihadism*.

The transformational threshold in the rise of 'ulama governmentality was inaugurated by a series of overlapping geopolitical and nationalist, not Islamist, forces. This alliance is, on the one hand, a confirmation of Mitchell's *McJihad* thesis, which highlights the indistinction between McWorld and Jihad.[46] Mitchell seeks in part to erase the lines of absolute difference characterizing "our history" and "theirs," not only by expanding the scope of "the they" but also by showing how "us and them" are historically interpolated and how a common space of power is forged by the political economy of oil. Mitchell is effectively suggesting that the question of political Islam be analytically framed within a field of power relationships, not only of local power struggles but also of trans-national power grids of neoliberal Empire.[47] Mitchell goes on to remark:

> As a rule, the most secular regimes in the Middle East have been those most independent of the United States. The more closely a government is allied with Washington, the more Islamic its politics. … When other governments moved closer to the United States – Egypt under Anwar Sadat in the 1970s, Pakistan under Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s – their political rhetoric and modes of legitimation became avowedly more Islamic. … This pattern, once it has been noticed, lends itself to a straightforward, but unsatisfactory, explanation. The United States depends on the support of conservative political regimes, it is often pointed out, and these have tended to rely on religion to justify their power. … This explanation is unsatisfactory because the conservative political morality offered by certain forms of Islam is not some enduring feature of the religion that rulers adopt at their own convenience. Its usefulness reflects the fact that religious conservatism expresses the views of powerful social and political movements. Political regimes enter into uneasy alliances with these movements, depending on *a force they do not directly control*.[48]

While certainly correct, Mitchell does not elaborate on the nature of this force. Is he suggesting that conservative Islam is a force distinct from global capital? If so he would be undermining his own *McJihad* thesis, which highlights a series of interlinked dependencies between the maintenance of power and the authority of states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, between Islamist forces and US strategic and economic interests. Mitchell states that because religious movements have played such a pivotal part in the global political economy "it would seem to follow that political Islam plays an unacknowledged role in the making of global capitalism." Hence his formulation of our age as McJihad:

> … an age in which the mechanisms of capitalism appear to operate, in certain critical instances, only by adopting the social force and moral

> authority of conservative Islamic movements. … the crisis in Afghanistan reflects the weaknesses of a form of empire, and of powers of capital, that can exist only by drawing on social forces that *embody other energie*s, methods, and goals.[49]

McJihad then describes a deficiency of capitalism, a deficiency that produces a history of incoherences. Towards the end of the essay he makes clear that *McJihad* "does not refer to a contradiction between the logic of capitalism and the *other forces* and ideas it encounters" but rather "to the absence of such a logic." However, by suggesting that the political violence in the region is the "persistent symptom of this lack" it would seem as if Mitchell unwittingly confirms the deep distinction between the forces of global capitalism (modernity) and "other forces and energies" (jihad). I would like to suggest a more fundamental indistinction between capitalist violence (Empire) and Islamist violence (Jihad). The plane of this indistinction is biopolitical and it reaches a more fundamental union in the CIA–ISI–jihad alliance, represented by figures like Gul, Osama, and Reagan. Therefore the distinction between state-military violence and Islamist violence is already severely blurred in Pakistan.[50]

By now the thesis that the United States helped forge the conditions of possibility for the rise of jihadist extremism is well known, even to an American audience.[51] Coll leaves no room for doubt about this long and sordid history of liaisons, and while the 1979 war does constitute a threshold in the transformation of political Islam, the essential link between the military and political violence has a longer provenance. If we do not take into account the long history of the Pakistan Army's will to sovereignty, the nature of this violence will be reduced to a series of "tactical" mistakes and shortsighted policies. At a minimum, a focus on radical Islam or even ethnicity as the root cause of the crisis simply masks the more fundamentally repressive role of the praetorian state – its legitimization of the use of violence as the means for political participation and negotiation. In particular, it disguises the role of the military, which from the very outset of Pakistan's history has attempted to control the political process and gear the state towards maintaining what Ayesha Jalal aptly calls a "political economy of defense."[52] However, even this formulation does not go far enough. The turn towards radicalism by the 'ulama is not causally linked to state practices but rather emerges from the incoherence and nihilism of a biopolitical process of which both the state and Islam are mutual interlocutors. It is when these forces meet that particularly violent thresholds are crossed. The event of Pakistan itself constitutes the first merger.

While the violence of this decade, in particular the emergence of suicide bombing as a weapon of insurgency, has taken on a new affective

intensity, previous decades have borne witness to similar levels of military–civilian violence. There is already a long history of the brutalization of Baluchistan that has yet to be fully documented. The 1990s conflict between the MQM (Muhajir Qaumi Movement) and the State was also written in terms of mutilated bodies in gunny bags. Interestingly enough, today's operations against the Pakistani Taliban reflect a pattern of civil/military relationships that has led to the repeated deployment of paramilitary groups for domestic and foreign agendas of the Pakistan Army. As is well known, the MQM was also nurtured by Zia as a force to counter whatever little remained of the democratic impulse of the PPP,[53] during a decade that also claimed hundreds of lives in sectarian and ethnic violence.

The conflict between the MQM and the Pakistani state dates back to "Operation Clean-up", a government-initiated military operation in 1992, ostensibly aimed at cracking down on all "terrorist" and "criminal" elements in Sind but which effectively became a witch hunt against the MQM. The MQM's charismatic albeit autocratic leader, Altaf Hussain, was forced into exile, and the party that had dominated Karachi politics from its founding in 1984 was forced underground. May and June of 1994 were marked not only by the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan but also by a period of violent resistance by a militant wing of the MQM. As one monster was veering out of control, another was being manufactured. In May 1995 the conflict took its most bloody turn with MQM militants systematically ambushing police patrols. Using rocket launchers, they attacked a number of government offices and police stations, and during the months that followed Karachi came to a virtual halt as the MQM and paramilitary forces battled it out on the city's streets, a glimpse of what was to come in Swat and Waziristan a decade later. While sporadic ethnic and sectarian violence had been a permanent feature of the Karachi landscape since 1992, the intensity and organized nature of the 1995 round of conflict was entirely different. Analysts began to compare the situation in Karachi to the insurrection in Kashmir as the death toll during the months of June and July peaked at over 600 people, the beginning of months of carnage that were to follow. A new set of sensationalistic evening dailies cropped up in Karachi – front pages adorned with pictures of bloodied, bullet-ridden, or severely tortured bodies. The state's swift and brutal retaliation ensured these tabloids ample material for their daily commodification of violence. The term gunny sack became a household icon of the state's capacity to deal death.

Thus while it is important to document the links between various Islamist groups and the military, a more fundamental account of political space is lacking. Most analyses thus far take the state or the military as their point of departure, conforming to a model of juridico-political

power that Foucault rejected. Even those scholars who draw on Agamben's theory of sovereign power insist on sovereignty as an exclusive feature of the state. I do not wish to deny the role of the state (or colonialism for that matter), but the question of power and sovereignty as posed by Foucault and Agamben transcends the originary logic of state power. *Thus it will be necessary to consider the state of exception.*

The Violence of Law and the Law of Violence

> Indeed, the state of exception has today reached its maximum worldwide deployment. The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that – while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception internally nevertheless still claims to be applying the law.[54]

For Agamben, "in the state of exception it is impossible to distinguish between observance and transgression of the law."[55] As a paradigmatic example of this, Agamben considers *the Decree for the Protection of the People and of the State,* established in Germany on February 29, 1933. Similarly, we may consider November 3, 2007. In Pakistan's sixth decade of paralytic existence, the answer to the otherwise vexed question of national sovereignty and identity would disclose itself in yet another Martial Law Proclamation. The text of the "emergency proclamation" reads:

> Whereas there is visible ascendancy in the activities of extremists and incidents of terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, IED explosions, rocket firing … some militant groups have taken such activities to an unprecedented level of violent intensity posing a grave threat to the life and property of the citizens of Pakistan. … Whereas some members of the judiciary are working at cross purposes with the executive and legislature in the fight against terrorism and extremism, thereby weakening the government and the nation's resolve …Whereas some judges by *overstepping the limits of judicial authority have taken over the executive and legislative functions … Whereas the Government is committed to the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law and holds the superior judiciary in high esteem*, … [In] *Accordance with the constitution and as the constitution provides no solution for this situation*, *there is no way out except through emergency and extraordinary measures*… I, General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff, *proclaim emergency* throughout Pakistan. I hereby order and *proclaim* that the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall remain in abeyance. This Proclamation *shall come into force* at once.[56]

This was Pakistan's quintessential postmodern moment, the execution of a coup *within a coup* – a state of emergency *within* a state of emergency. Could it be that the state of emergency, which has already for so long become the rule in Pakistan, now has to be declared within itself, repeated, to sustain its sovereign efficacy? However, from its political orientation and timing right down to its language, it was a provincial state of emergency within the orbit of a more global one. Thus Musharraf's proclamation, despite the US State Department's rhetorical and mild public disapproval, was tailor-made to coincide with the broader requirements of the biopolitical logic of the "war on terror." However, this is not just a case of the order of US power extending itself more viscerally into an already militarized neocolonial space of a client regime. If the traditional twentieth century mode and space of operation of US imperial power was Janus-faced – democracy by day, imperialism by night – this Pakistani coup could be seen as an intensified reflection of the way in which US governmentality was asserting itself on its own home front! If Hardt and Negri's *Empire* signals at minimum the erasure of nationalist economic borders and its subordination to global capital, then the sovereigntist logic of the war on terror would seem to inaugurate the erasure of the protective biopolitical lines between members of American *polis* and the global (Muslim) targets of its security operations.

This emergency proclamation is remarkable not only for its paradigmatic exemplification of the paradox of sovereignty but that it also reveals the discursive contradictions that emerge when a law of force seeks to legitimize itself as a force of law. The proclamation, as we read, is magically "*in accordance with the constitution*" even though the constitution does not authorize such declarations; that is to say, the silence of the law, its spaces of darkness, overshadows the law itself. This silence is martialed as the necessary violence by/of the sovereign, who wields this power in the name of a silent partner who speaks directly to the *dictator*: the one who speaks. As Agamben insightfully notes, the "space devoid of law seems, for some reason, to be so essential to the juridical order that it must seek in every way to assure itself a relation with it, as if in order to ground itself the juridical order necessarily had to maintain itself in relation with an anomie."

We see here then what the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt had in mind when he talked of a theologico-political form of sovereignty. Schmitt sees the modern political form of sovereignty as a secularized version of a theological concept. As British legal scholar Douzinas notes, this is the sovereign feared or celebrated in modern political theory: the sovereign who decides the exception, goes to war, annihilates his enemies, who metes out spectacular punishments to those that violate his body or

writ.[57] However, as Agamben shows, the secularization of sovereignty in modern democracies does nothing to render this figure any less violent or insatiable. Schmitt was merely concerned with finding the proper locus for the exercise of sovereign decisionism and not like Benjamin, on whom Agamben extensively draws, with undermining it. This is why it is essential to see "modern secular politics" in terms of political theology.[58] The topological proximity between an ostensibly secular army and the Islamists becomes more apparent when both are considered as variations of a common political theology.

Additionally on Schmitt's understanding, the *lacunae* within the law – those situations that are not covered by or that fall outside the scope of the law – represent that empty space that demands and authorizes the invocation of necessity. The exercise of the sovereign exception is thus predicated on necessity and the gaps/silences within the structure of the law. Necessity is hence the hole/whole that the law has not covered, that must in some sense remain uncovered, such that the sovereign may *take its place* (the sovereign as necessary). I would argue that a similar structure of lacunae within the shari'a is precisely the non-space from which the 'ulama seek to secure a sovereign place. This *will to place* (*'amr*) is exacerbated precisely when the 'ulama are dislocated and suffer a decline in their regard.

Pervasive (but no Longer Persuasive) Musharraf

In *Rogues*, Derrida writes that "the right of the stronger has always been the best right." This is itself a "cynical confession of sovereign power to speak in the name of the law, and to simultaneously violate it." Musharraf's proclamation asserts that it is *respectful* of the judiciary precisely through its suspension of the constitution and the sacking of the Supreme Court Justice. However, is this not the suspension of respect itself? It is also perhaps the first such declaration that blurs the lines between violent religious "extremist" terrorists and the Supreme Court and its "*Lashkar*" of secularized Bar Association members. As the Pakistani State/Military was busy signing MOUs with FATA militants like Baitullah Masood, its internal security forces and police were bludgeoning lawyers and student protestors armed with dangerous placards. For the "protection of the people," human rights activists had to be jailed or placed under house arrest. In this way the war against terrorism manifests effectively as a war against civil society and law itself. The task of the state is thus to co-opt law and terrorism where possible and smash them when they contravene the will of the sovereign. Therefore, before the question, who and what is sovereign in Pakistan, and by what right/power is

it exercised, here I shall ask: how *is* sovereignty in Pakistan? How is it played?

Appearing on State-controlled PTV, while "illegally" holding both titles of civilian President and Chief of Army Staff (ostensibly declaring emergency to forestall any legal challenge to the continuation of his Presidency), Musharraf addressed a stunned nation. Beginning in Urdu he declared:

> … our country is at a dangerous juncture, facing a national crisis. Throughout history, nations have often had to make difficult decisions. That time has come now for Pakistan – *we* have to make important and painful decisions. If these decisions are not made then Pakistan's future is at stake. … the decision *I* have made is, first of all, for *the sake of Pakistan*. Pakistan is above all personal interests. …[59]

Failing to note the deep historical and ongoing complicity between the military and the forces of violent jihadism, nurtured to perverse perfection on the Kashmiri and Afghan fronts, he continues:

> "… Terrorism and Extremism are rampant. Suicide bombings are widespread. … fanaticism is now common. Fundamentalist extremists are everywhere. … Extremism has spread [into] the heart of Pakistan. … They want to impose their outdated religious views upon the people. In my eyes, this is a direct challenge to Pakistan's future as a moderate nation. … Pakistan is on the verge of destabilization… inaction at this moment is *suicide for Pakistan* and *I* cannot allow this country to commit suicide. Therefore, I had to take this action in order *to preserve the democratic transition which I initiated* eight years back…. To the [Western] critics and idealists against this action, I would like to say, *please do not expect or demand your level of democracy, which you learned over a number of centuries*. We're also trying to learn and we're doing well. Please *give us time*. Please also *do not demand your level of civil rights, human rights, civil liberties* which you've learned over centuries…. *Please give us time*."

This speech affords us a series of critical remarks that will set the stage for this investigation. We can begin by noting the mundane within the already bizarre. When asked how long the emergency will last, spokesmen for Musharraf suggested a matter of months! What took the West ostensibly centuries to learn – civil rights, democracy, etc. – could now be crammed with determination in the space of a few months. Since the emergency was actually lifted on December 15, 2007, one day earlier than he had finally proposed, we can assume that this crisis was averted and historical destiny was attained! Doubtless the relentless pressure and popular resistance by segments of an empowered civil society who opposed the military maneuver along with media coverage against State

brutality meted out to well (Western) dressed and suited secular lawyers had also something to do with it.[60] Thus a degree of international pressure and public embarrassment for the Bush administration may have resulted in pressure on Musharraf to "lift" the ban, but only after it had accomplished a series of its ostensibly original goals: retain the Presidency and thus the power to dissolve assemblies at will; tame those segments of civil society that had learned the corrupting lessons of Western democracy too fast, i.e. the media, lawyers, and human rights advocates; scramble any possibility of reinstating the Chief Justice; instill a general level of dis-localized fear that will warrant the affective need for continued military preeminence; and shift all of these operations under the façade of democracy as quickly as possible!

The somatic, colonial, and biopolitical registers of this language are astounding. The nation is a (terrorist) *suicidal* body and he, the Führer/doctor/priest, will not allow the nation to end its miserable life! Thus Musharraf evokes the Spirit of Hegel by declaring that Pakistan, unlike the West (or India), has not yet matured in the dialectical fire of history – "we need time" not democracy! By effectively declaring Pakistan a backwards society not yet deserving of popular (self)-rule, he was not only echoing two centuries of colonial discourse and undermining the very ethos of *swaraj*, which animated both the Congress and the (All India) Muslim League, he was also effectively legitimating the exercise of old-style monarchical forms of power and violence in order to control, discipline, and pacify his unruly subjects – all in the name of the preservation of the life of the nation. Could we have asked for a more decisive formulation of biopolitical sovereignty? If at this juncture he had donned his Jodhpurs and a pith helmet, would the performance have been any less comic or simply more tragic? In assuming the language of a subordinate vassal, the President/General reveals the extent to which his own hold on power is dependent on placating the sensibilities of a more distant Emperor (the West, America) – the repeated use of "please," indicative perhaps of the ultimately whimsical line between *homo sacer* and the sovereign. Yet such an indictment of the army as a subordinate local sovereign power speaks only to the secondary dimension of the metacolonial, the various apparatus of ongoing forms of colonialism. To probe the primary, metaphysical modality of colonization we must turn to the persistence of certain ghosts.

Sovereign Hauntology

In another nationally broadcast speech, but his time to the Reichstag on July 13, 1934, then Chancellor of Weimar Germany, Adolf Hitler, in the wake of Ernst Röhm's putsch (better known as the "Night of the Long Knives") proclaimed:

> In this hour *I* was responsible for the fate of the German people, and thereby *I* became the supreme judge of the German people. … I further gave the order to cauterize down to the raw flesh the ulcers of this poisoning of the wells in our domestic life. Let the nation know that its existence – which depends on its internal order and security – cannot be threatened with impunity by anyone! And let it be known for all time to come that if anyone raises his hand to strike the State, then certain death is his lot.[61]

If we substitute Pakistan for Germany here and we have virtually the same biopolitical spirit of sovereignty expressed by Musharraf (or General Zia ul-Haq preceding him in 1977). As with Hitler, this was not merely the old form of monarchical sovereignty, not simply the exercise of a ruthless dictatorial will, but the merger of the figure of the leader with the national body itself. Hitler charismatically embodied the German nation and was constituted as the Führer not merely a Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader). With Musharraf, who was merely the temporal instance of an otherwise pervasive military sovereignty, there was a similar collapsing and merger of the national body with the institution of the army itself. Additionally Musharraf was upheld as a model citizen/general, who, in displaying genuine affection and care for the nation, stood up against the endemic corruption of elected politicians, judges, and lawyers. What is further relevant again for our diachronic and synchronic comparison is the concern that Hitler showed for "legally" sanctioning the extra-judicial massacre of his former *Sturmabteilung* (SA) paramilitary loyalists, which was accomplished through the introduction of the "Law Regarding Measures of State Self-Defense." Carl Schmitt, then Germany's leading legal theorist, subsequently wrote an article "The Führer Upholds the Law" defending Hitler's actions. In the words of Schmitt – now made even more infamous and relevant by the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben – "sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception." That is to say, sovereignty is exercised and simultaneously accrues to the person (or institution) that, when declaring a state of emergency or martial law, may "legitimately" suspend the validity of law. "The exception" wrote Schmidt "is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything. It confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception."[62] Schmitt understood the tautological nature of sovereignty and considered liberal theory weak precisely for its failure to grasp the nature of decision (and hence its inability to deal with crisis). The assumption of the universality and rational self-evidence of law in the legal positivism of liberal jurisprudence was, according to Schmidt, groundless; liberalism had to but could not accept the inevitability of authority and

the priority of executive power. The law for Schmidt could not, *a priori*, be grounded in the will of the people or a constitution without a vicious circularity. Law requires *juris-diction*, an authority or constituting force necessary to carve out a normative homogenous space of operation, a sovereign space that is the condition of possibility for the *nomos* – the "normative" operation of judicial and legislative power. In *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault elaborates on the theory of sovereignty as itself the *diction* (saying, proclamation) of the law. The theory of sovereignty, first elaborated by Jean Bodin, "attempts to show how a power can be constituted, not exactly in accordance with the law, but in accordance with a certain basic legitimacy that is more basic than any law and that allows laws to function as such."[63]

For Schmitt, who does not solve but merely exacerbates the problem, sovereignty functions as a kind of linguistic "quilting point," the stable signifier that (temporarily) holds back (*epoch*) signification from being engulfed in an endless regress of abyssal circularity. The sovereign is the guarantor against insecurity, anarchy, chaos, and madness. Therefore it is not some *a priori* reason, "self-evident truth" or "natural" law that grounds popular assent to sovereign power, but rather an affect or sentiment whose primary modality is the uncanny, a primal anxiety – fear of the unknown (the aleatory). This anxiety is best exploited by concretizing it within the dynamic of the friend/enemy distinction. Thus the thrust of Schmit's 1934 essay was to appeal to the necessity of sovereign right, which is the only force capable enough and quick enough to respond to and forestall "grave danger" facing the state/people. Doubtless we hear the resounding echoes of this tactic of law in the Bush administration, as we heard it in the formative cries of Pakistan.

In his 1976 lectures *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault describes Nazi political society as one where the general logic of biopower was absolutized together with the sovereign right to kill. In this "absolutely racist State, an absolutely murderous State, and an absolutely suicidal State,"[64] we see the "demonic" convergence and intensification of both sovereignty and governmentality. Foucault used the term "thanatopolitical" to name the dark underside of the biopolitical politics of preserving and enhancing the life of the populous.[65] What I demonstrate here is how the convergences of this logic within the military space, which is constitutive of the Pakistani *polis*, has extended itself to political Islam.

In the wake of *securitas*,[66] liberalism is effete if not complicitous with the logic of biopolitical sovereignty. The rise of neoconservatism and the era of fabricated preemption, torture, and extra-judicial killing (drone warfare) is certainly evidence of the failure of liberalism and its human rights. How then might this paradox be resolved? How might the ghost that inhabits the paradox of sovereignty and haunts the political be

exorcised? It is precisely to figure this quandary that we turn to the work of Agamben, whose "sovereigntology" may offer us a way to problematize power over life with greater clarity. As Agamben reminds us, "the paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact that the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order."[67] Agamben's approach to sovereignty must be understood across the ontological difference for it seems to me as if his task is to disclose the onto-theological structure of sovereign power, which brings us close to the orbit of Heidegger's conception of enframing (*Gestell*). Thus for Agamben any resort to constitutive power will invariably be haunted by the structure of the ban, regardless of whether power is exercised by the multitude, altruistic capitalists, benign dictators, or even an elected *demos*.[68] The notion that the paradox of sovereignty is the common structure of all modern political life is the point where Agamben, Benjamin, and Schmitt all converge.[69] The primary struggle is not along the democratic/totalitarian (and in our case democratic/Islamist) axis but rather is rooted in a question of the metaphysics that undergirds sovereignty, power, and the political. The task is how to think beyond the metaphysics of sovereignty towards "a post-metaphysical ontology of the political yet to be realized,"[70] a political space divested of the onto-theological paradox of sovereignty and the structure of the ban.

The Polemos of the Political

> [In] conformity with a continuing tendency in all of the Western democracies, the declaration of the state of exception has gradually been replaced by an *unprecedented generalization of the paradigm of security as the normal technique of government*.[71]

As William Rasch notes, "the figure of the sovereign makes those democratically inclined nervous, because democracy seeks to avoid asymmetry at all cost … replacing sovereignty with the rule of law, as if the rule of law had no need for the personified sovereign." When personified as an individual, an institution, or a general will, sovereignty appears as if it precedes the law, giving the law its force (a force that is normally understood as emerging out of and in consonance with reason and *ratio*, measure). The sovereign is thus a kind of shadow of the law. However, the law itself is not subject to the law. The law lays down the law and demands obedience in exchange for protection under the law.

A common conceit of modern liberalism, which sees itself as supplanting the arbitrary rule of monarchy, is that a domestic "rule of law" replaces the reliance on the potentially erratic figure of the sovereign or

even the depredation of a populist mob majority (as under Nazism). The rule of law is thus cast in opposition to the rule of men. However, for Agamben this distinction, which derives law from something called "natural rights," is still problematic because it does not eliminate the problem of decision. Under Islamic legal reasoning, the inevitable question of the jurists' decision is evaded in the same way by assuming a minimum set of transparent divine commands that simply are. It is here that Schmitt's characterization "Sovereign is he who decides the exception" comes into play. Schmitt's deployment of sovereignty was introduced principally as a mechanism to ground and legalize Hitler's use of executive power. Schmitt's challenge to liberal theory lies not so much in a kind of direct opposition to liberal thought but in his exposing of the liberal order, showing that it is not natural or transparently rational but is itself ideological. Liberalism's power derives from its blindness to its own ideological ground, its own universalist assumptions about power and what it means to be. That is to say, liberalism is political order and not merely the outcome of rational logical thought on the nature of justice, equality, or ethics. Like any other political order it rests on a decision and not a pre-given universal norm. In this way Schmitt shows that modern liberalism is itself a variation of political theology. For Agamben to expose this theology is to expose its metaphysical ground, a ground that is paradoxical and thus meaningless. Law in this way is effectively seen as an expression of power rather than an expression of justice.

On September 16, 2001, in an interview with the late Tim Russert for NBC's *Meet The Press*, (Vice) President "Dick" Cheney, declared:

> We also have to work, though, sort of *the dark side*, if you will. We've got to *spend time in the shadows* in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here *will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies*, if we're going to be successful. *That's the world these folks operate in, and so it's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal*, basically, to achieve our objective.

The "Dark Side" as we have come to know has effectively meant the suspension of *habeas corpus*, ignoring the Geneva Convention, a general disregard for other international laws regulating needless preemptive war, and the degrading disciplining and punishment of "prisoners of war," including their immunity from dehumanizing treatment like torture and indefinite detention. In essence what was at stake in the conflict between Musharraf and the March 2007 suspension of the Supreme Court Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, was not only the

constitutionality of Musharraf's Presidency but also the disappearance of dozens of "terror" suspects and their right to *habeas corpus*. In invoking the "Dark Side," Cheney gives us an opaque glimpse of the biopolitical sovereign underbelly of neoliberal governmentality. Thus fearful "liberal" citizens have by and large willfully tolerated not only the torture and humiliation of the other but have also permitted a scale of surveillance and constraining of basic rights in order to secure the homeland and victory in the war against deterritorialized, dangerous, and evil Muslims everywhere. What is distinctive here is not the deployment of a sovereign modality of power abroad or the use of torture per se, for surely this has been a routine fixture of overt and secret US foreign policing. What is perhaps most disturbing is the attempt to normalize this dark side, to reproduce it in actuality, and fold it within the procedure of the law, thereby collapsing the distinction between sovereign violence and the law once and for all. The Bush administration's relentless will to torture and its drive to exert the power of death (legitimate killing) over its targets, is the decisive signal of this folding of sovereign power within normalizing modalities of neoliberal governmentality. The ideological name and manifestation of this tendency, driven by a metaphysics of Islam hating, is neoconservatism.

It is in light of the "Dark Side" then that we can situate Musharraf's closing remarks within what I am striving to call the metacolonial – the matrixial space that will be vital for understanding the 'ulama and political Islam itself. Therefore, as his language tellingly shifts from Urdu to English – in a section that must have been drafted by anyone of the now numerous modern American incarnations of Tomás de Torquemada, such as John Woo, David Addington, Alan Dershowitz – Musharraf directly invokes the tropes of "law-fare" discourse in the United States. He quotes directly from Abraham Lincoln's speech that justified the sovereign suspension of the ancient biopolitical right of *habeas corpus*[72] during the US civil war. Only now the echoes of the genuine lament and apology that we may have heard in Lincoln are gone, replaced instead by a series of false "twice-shy" tears. Therefore, in this obscene yet illuminating substitution, the voice of a modern day Pakistani military "usurper" and the voice of an elected nineteenth century Civil War American President, come to equivalence in the state of exception that has now indeed become the rule everywhere. Buttressed then with the juridico-historical justifications for an exemplary practice of exceptionalism, Musharraf effectively blurred the distinction between himself (the military) and Pakistan, between his voice and the voice of law, between the violence of law and the law of violence. It is thus not only at radio frequencies that the Voice of America and the Voice of Pakistan converged but also on a series of other broad-band metaphysical

wavelengths. It is my contention that we need to destructure more carefully such biopolitical wavelengths. The prime frequency at which both "Terror" and the "War on Terror" broadcast globally is the frequency of violence. It is in the resonance of these indistinctions that we can hear more clearly the sound of the metacolonial.

To be fair, of course it was not always the military that contributed to the normalization of the rule of exception. Readers of Pakistan's leading English Language Daily, *Dawn*, are by now familiar with frequent accounts of the savaging of the constitution, in its relation to the saga of the 8th Amendment. What characterizes the real tragedy and danger, however, is the now vastly apparent indistinction between this state of emergency – rule by military *dictat* – and the subsequent democratic transitions. Agamben writes of the "inner solidarity between democracy and totalitarianism." Many liberals and the mainstay of the bourgeoisie elite, a tiny percentage of the populace to be sure, seemed to welcome the postmodern coup. The old colonial refrain that Indians do not deserve or are not capable of assuming democracy, echoed from virtually every corner of established privilege in Pakistan (and was echoed in conversations with many members of the Pakistani diaspora in the US as well). The corrupt and ineffective interludes of democracy that routinely punctuate the otherwise formal constant of military rule, now seem to be indistinct not only with the *polis* but also the economy, as the military apparatus penetrates ever more deeply into the economic fabric of the nation.[73] Breaking the cycle of indistinction between democracy and martial law requires somber reflection on the place and function of sovereignty itself.

The Space of War

The term "Islam" is as general (or perhaps vacuous) as the term "humanity" or the "West" and functions more like a political metanarrative or polemical quilting point, but it is important to keep in mind that the invocation of the idea of Islam the *ummah* is almost always a way to designate a mass, a population, and hence an object of knowledge regulation to be policed. In this sense *ummah* discourses are doubly biopolitical in that they are not merely a feature of a range of Muslim political imaginaries but rather constitute a modality that is useful to the logic of security that drives the proliferating indistinctions of the wars of/on terror. Trans-national discourse on the *ummah* are perhaps, in this sense, more vital to the political economy of liberal regimes, whose pervasive logic of security and martial capacities for war thrive on the affective deployment of Islam as an imminent threat. The American

project for the imposition of liberal peace across the "Muslim World" is defunct without expert discourses on (political/radical) Islam as the engine of a countermodernity, a unified homogenous plot, whose profuse resentments threaten "Western civilization" and its "way of life." The idea of a unified *ummah* is thus central to the metaphysics of both Islam hating (e.g. neoconservatives) and Islam loving (e.g. *jihadists*). In our rapidly globalizing era, the biopolitical third between "Security" and "Population" is "Terror" rather than "Territory." The *ummah*, as *Islamapolis*, may then be seen as an extension of the carceral *polis*, replete with an imaginary geopolitics that seeks to exercise yet again the power of Islamization. What presides over these sovereign mechanisms "is not the unitary functioning of an apparatus or an institution, but the necessity of combat and the rules of strategy. … In this central and centralized humanity [*ummah*], the effect and instrument of complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple mechanisms of 'incarceration,' objects for discourses that are in themselves elements for this strategy, we must hear the distant roar of battle."[74]

For Foucault war was the central problem of modernity: "What I would like to study would be the problem of war and the institution of war in what one could call the military dimension of [modern] society. … How, when and why was it noticed or imagined that what is going on beneath and in power relations is a war? … Until now, or for roughly the last five years, it has been disciplines; for the next five years, it will be *war, struggle, the army*.'[75] In parallel, our concern here is with War (War on Terror, jihad), Struggle (*jihad*, *ethos*), and the Army (Pakistani Military). Foucault's idea of war lies in Heidegger's conception of *polemos*.[76] As Julian Reid notes with regard to the emergence of the disciplines, "Foucault insisted that the tactical models of military organization were of utmost importance to understand how war invests the order of power."[77] In *Discipline and Punish*, war and the military sciences, and not the prison, are designated as the originary impetus behind the disciplining of individual bodies and the eventual transitions to carceral societies. As he extended his analysis of power from disciplinary to biopolitical regimes and modern governmentality, the problematic of war and power only intensified. *The History of Sexuality* elaborates further on the fundamental imbrication of liberal regimes, predicated on the production of "peace" with war and biopower. In conjunction with Agamben, we can say that, under modernity, the camp and the *polis* merge. The Taliban are, in an essential way, a merger – a daemonic combination to use Foucault's terms – of the camp and the *polis*.

In *State of Exception*, his sequel to *Homo Sacer*, Agamben extends the analysis of the conscription of life in the *a-polis* to include the domain of law, so as to disclose the indistinction between the political and the

juridical, between law and the living being.[78] With devastating insight into the juridical excess of the neoconservative "war on terror," for whom the actual and always threatened suspension of law had become a measure of global dominance (a consequence itself perhaps of decaying economic sovereignty under conditions of Empire), Agamben argues that the state of exception, which was meant to be a provisional measure adopted by states under conditions of emergency, has, in the course of the twentieth century, become "the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics."[79] Certainly Pakistan's perpetual state of martial law and the ongoing violence of military/jihadism, can be usefully comprehended through his meta-analysis.

The space of the modern *polis* is in this way understood by Agamben as coincident with the topology of the camp, whose "dislocating localization is the hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living." The camp can therefore be understood as a radicalization of Foucaultian biopolitics, in that it signals a disjuncture between the relationship of birth (bare life) and the order of the nation-state. This means that the camp is almost postbiopolitical, in that it marks the emergence of an instability in the structure of the old *nomos* – in the mechanism of the regulation of the relationship between territory, birth, order. Foucault of course hinted at the possibility of this daemonic and lethal mix between biopower and sovereignty, whereby the state becomes an "absolutely murderous state." Something of this lethal machinery has now embedded itself within political Islam, and its principal expression of sovereign power, the political technology of jihadism.

Notes

1 In the extensive four volume *Nietzsche* lectures – lectures that were decisive for Foucault – Heidegger suggests that Nietzsche's primary thought of the will to power could not be interpreted in isolation from his other key doctrines of eternal recurrence, nihilism, and the Übermench (super-man or over-man). On Heidegger's reading, "eternal recurrence" effectively signifies the desire of the human subject to stamp (and thus preclude) Being in its singularity and flux, with the mark of *logos* as presence and permanence (Heidegger 1991, p. 201). Zarathustra's most succinct formulation of the eternal recurrence – "the will's revulsion against time and its 'It was'" (Heidegger 1968, p. 93) – signals the spirit of revenge (*ressentiment*). In this way, metaphysically, Pakistan is that which fixes and invariably subordinates Islam to its provincial geography and its limited political sovereignty. Pakistan's requirement was to ensure the predictability, codification, and security of that which cannot be secured and predicted. It can be said then that Pakistan, which seeks to formally conflate purity (*pak*) with the *polis*, ensures the

creation of a conflictual negative space, whose essential spirit is nihilism. Islam's ethical possibilities are thus extinguished in an Islamic State, in the *Islamapolis*.

2 Hunt 1988.

3 Agamben 1998, p. 47. The passage goes on to say: "Instead one must think the existence of potentiality without any relation to Being in the form of actuality."

4 Ahmad, Barsamian, and Ruggiero 2001.

5 As we have now learned from numerous accounts, Z. Brzezinsky, Zia ul-Haq, and Prince Faisal Turki had been breeding these jihadist forces prior to the actual Soviet Invasion. That many of these children have multiplied and have returned to devour their fathers, is indeed a fitting tribute to Freud's *Totem and Taboo*.

6 A transition which in the minds of its imperial architects could be thought of as one from "Mad-Russia" to "Mad-Rasah."

7 If this book were permitted a Haiku form it could be rendered simply as *Tali-ban*. If this rendering has merit, then it could be said that the Taliban are an exemplary joke, a cosmic pun!

8 More significantly, from the perspective of an emerging global governmentality, 1979 is also the year around which the explicit opening shots of neoliberalism were fired across the globe (see Harvey 2005). Thus it was the year not only for the creation and opening of new political spaces but also the final collapse of the economic into the political, a process that has itself hastened the vast proliferation of multiple zones of indistinction.

9 In lieu of the term "Christian fundamentalism" I prefer the term "Christianism" because it highlights its multifold equivalence with Islamism. The various strands of political Christianity have distinct parallels and similarities with political Islam in terms of the spectrum of positions viz-a-viz religious law and its relationship to the state. Rushdoony's *Institutes of Biblical Law* is even more to the right of Mawdudi's religio-political views, and would align itself close to Taliban doctrine in terms of its logic of exceptionalism.

10 Foucault 2003b.

11 Neocleous 2008.

12 Reid 2007; Dillon 2009; and Dauphinee and Masters 2006.

13 Agamben 1998, p. 185.

14 As Agamben reminds us, "the paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact that the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order" (ibid, p. 25).

15 "The refugee must be considered for what he is: nothing less than a limit concept that radically calls into question the fundamental categories of the nation-state" (ibid, p. 134).

16 *Introduction* in Metcalf 2004b.

17 Metcalf 1978.

18 Modernization theories have, in part, due to the early efforts of scholars like Metcalf, fallen into disrepute. Such theories were examples of egregious eurocentrism that aimed to continue the civilizing mission by other

means. Modernization theorists argue that the proper script for modernity and progress has already been written in the West and so all that traditional societies have to do is emulate this script. However, modernization theory continues today in the guise of development. For an excellent critique, see Wainwright 2007.

19 Metcalf 1982.

20 Only in this sense do we dispense with the theoretical privilege of sovereignty, not its modality of power, which has undergone an intensification and dissimulation.

21 See below for a consideration of the relevant literature.

22 These words are famously inscribed on the *Teen Talwar* (Three Swords) monument located at a prominent intersection/roundabout in Clifton, Karachi.

23 See, for instance, Jalal 1995.

24 "*Polis* is usually translated as city or city-state. This does not capture the full meaning. *Polis* means, rather, the place, the there, wherein and as which historical being-there is. The *polis* is the historical place, the there *in* which, out of which, and for which history happens" (Heidegger 1987, p. 152). The *polis* does not designate geometrical or Cartesian space but primarily names the place, site, or abode in which *Dasein* (human being) comes to dwell. I will generally use *polis* (and bio-*polis*) to signal the biopolitical space of the modern: the *polis* of police and policy, the *polis* of Islamapolis.

25 It is perhaps for this reason that we do not generally identify, say, the Abbasid revolution as a manifestation of political Islam, and the term seems to be almost wholly absent from studies of Islamic Empires and "premodern" Muslim societies. Political Islam, and Islamism, acquire their full place in the hierarchy of Western political epistemology only after the Iranian revolution, with modest gestures to the Muslim brotherhood, and perhaps Jamal al-din al-Afghani, as the progenitors of Islamism as such.

26 See previous chapter on power and biopollitics for further clarifications of this otherwise broad and enigmatic term.

27 It is precisely for this reason that Nasser Hussain's use of the term "emergency" to characterize colonial juridical apparatus is flawed (Hussain 2003). Not only does he fail to take into account the politico-theological (onto-logical) nature of sovereign power, he is concerned largely with the way in which colonial legal structures hampered the development of national sovereignty. Thus while his study sheds excellent new light on the structure of colonial formations, his uptake of Agamben is of limited use in our study. Like Agamben, I view sovereignty as the source of the political problem and not a goal to be achieved.

28 For Carl Schmitt these "secular" processes are already politico-theological processes.

29 In this way my project merely attempts to instantiate lines of inquiry that have been sustained elsewhere more eloquently and forcefully (see Asad 2003).

30 The military is thus a symptom of a deeper historico-political disease of modernity. We can get a sense of the importance of this structure by noting how, despite the passage from military dictatorship and martial law to democracy, Pakistan remains in an exceptional state. As if often disturbingly apparent to the citizenry of Pakistan, the distinction between regimes of martial law and regimes of democracy are increasingly entering a zone of indistinction.

31 To the commonly asked question, who rules Pakistan, a popular adage often invokes the AAA: the trinity of Allah Army, and America that are allegedly responsible for the fate of the country. The terms suggest that the power of the Army and America are not unlike the power of God: mysterious and wholly unaccountable to the people.

32 That is to say, an Asadian or broadly Foucaultian understanding of the political has not been applied to the study of Pakistan.

33 In her attempt to "make sense" of Pakistan, noted scholar of history and international affairs, Farzana Shaikh, similarly fails to take into account the very structural incoherence of the very terms she deploys in her explanation. There is a mention of, but no serious problematization of, power. However, the book does break ground by pointing to the incoherence of Pakistani identity itself as lying at the heart of the crisis: "the vexed relationship between Islam and nationalism." For instance, she insists that "Pakistan" rejected theocracy at its foundations, but one is left with the distinct feeling from her narrative that some agent called "Pakistan" has simply failed to juggle its pluralist balls adeptly. By contrast, I view both identity and nationhood as problematic to begin with. For an otherwise useful and comprehensive account of Pakistan's "ideological" morass, see Shaikh 2009.

34 The current contortions of its own policy viz-a-viz the Taliban cannot be understood without understanding this reliance on US support. For useful historical and political accounts of the army, see Cohen 2004; Shah 2014; Siddiqa 2007.

35 An allusion to both its nuclear ambition, symptomatic of a destructive will to power, and the inability of the center to hold.

36 As a young teenager, while in High School in Pakistan, I was able to obtain a bootleg copy. It was perhaps one of the first political texts that influenced my desire to study history and politics. It should be republished, however, under the new title "Canned, Pakistan Survives!".

37 Ali 2008.

38 Ibid, p. 1.

39 Gardezi and Rashid 1983.

40 Khan 1985. One of the contributors, journalist Zafaryab Ahmed, was arrested and tortured by the Zia regime.

41 For the classic account of the military capture of the economy see Jalal 1990. In an excellent study Ayesha Siddiqa shows how the army has penetrated both economy and society in a more sustained and intense manner, such that their extraction from power will be difficult even when the façade of democracy returns (see Siddiqa 2007). Siddiqa's analysis runs parallel

with but more deeply than Mazhar Aziz, who also seeks to outline a greater explanatory role for the military in understanding the political failure of the state (Aziz 2009). Both studies extend the metaphor of failure or a frustrated process of nation-building. Once again I seek to examine the assumption that "development" and "nation-building" are desirable to begin with.

42 This is effectively the primary tenor of the argument in several relatively recent works (see Rashid 2008; Ali 2008; Hussain).

43 Dillon 2009.

44 Foucault 2003b.

45 Rashid 2000, p. 129. As Rashid notes, Gul played a lead role in both the establishment of the Taliban after the Soviet–Afghan War, and for redirecting the Afghan jihad towards the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir against India. During his tenure, General Gul was also instrumental in forging the right-wing conservative coalition, the *Islami Jamhoori Ittehad* (Islamic Democratic! Alliance) against the left-leaning liberal Pakistan People's Party (Abbass 2004, p. 123).

46 Mitchel's essay is in part a response to these ostensible opposites in Benjamin Barber's quasi-Orientalist tirade (Barber 1995), which effectively regurgitates the essentialist Islam/West binary under the cover of pop sociology.

47 Whereas colonialism refers to "foreign presence in, possession of, and domination over bounded, local places" (Said 1994), imperialism refers to foreign domination without the necessity of presence or possession over expansive, transnational spaces. Colonialism formally refers to the occupation of territory by foreign settlers, soldiers, or administrators. Imperialism, by contrast, is the projection of political power across large spaces, over other target states. No assumption of property need ground the imperial relationship. What makes for an imperial relationship, one that characterizes the US/Pakistan relationship, is the influence and the potentiality to project power rather than to be actually present. Imperialism is a kind of global hegemony without formal annexations and colonies. Thus the frame for understanding the relationships of power between the US and many Muslim nations is imperial: what geographer Derek Gregory call a "colonial present." In Hardt and Negri, however, Empire constitutes a new formation that exceeds the imperial sovereignty of the United States. For Pakistan, however, the two forms of power, Empire and Imperialism, cannot be neatly disaggregated (see the essays in Calhoun and Cooper 2006).

48 Mitchell 2002.

49 Ibid (emphasis mine).

50 For a useful account of the role of the Pakistani state in the emergence of militancy in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, see Hussain 2005; and Zahab and Roy 2006.

51 See Cooley 2000. For a popular account, see Dreyfuss 2005; Baer 2003; and Coll 2004.

52 Jalal 1990.

53 Verkaaik 2004.

54 Agamben 2005a, p. 87.
55 Agamben 2005b, p. 99.
56 *Dawn News*, Karachi, 11/3/07 (emphasis mine).
57 Costas Douzinas, "Speaking Law: On Bare Theological and Cosmopolitan Sovereignty," in Orford 2006.
58 As Derrida notes, "we did not have to wait for Schmitt to know that this politico-juridical concept [of sovereignty] secularizes a theological heritage." He thus cautions against a facile abandonment of sovereignty recognizing, like Agamben, that its paradoxical and ontological status has to be attended to. Neither cosmopolitanism (for Derrida) nor the Multitude or universal citizenship will resolve the sovereign aporia (Derrida 2005).
59 That is to say Musharraf's mantra might just as well be "Pakistan First" the penultimate, biopolitical slogan.
60 Clips of the bloody police baton charge and tear-gassing of the lawyers guild made its way even on to John Stewart's *The Daily Show*.
61 Fest 1974, p. 469.
62 Schmitt 1985, p. 15.
63 Foucault 2003b, p. 44.
64 Foucault 2007b.
65 Mbembe uses this aspect to describe necropolitics (Mbembe 2003).
66 In Roman mythology, *Securitas* was the goddess of security, especially the security of the Roman Empire.
67 Agamben 1998, p. 25.
68 The political for Agamben is thus devoid of an ethos. It would seem that he seeks to articulate a way to conceive of action and work in ways that resemble Heidegger's conception of *Gelassenheit*. See the opening chapter on critical ontology.
69 See the superb essay by Rasch 2007.
70 Ibid.
71 Agamben 2005a, p. 14.
72 "The first recording of bare life as the new political subject is already implicit in the document that is generally placed at the foundation of modern democracy: the 1679 writ of habeas corpus" (Agamben 1998, p. 123).
73 See Siddiqa 2007.
74 Foucault 1977, p. 308.
75 Foucault 2003b, p. 23.
76 Reid 2006. *Auseinandersetzung*, meaning war, confrontation, *logos* or *Kampf*, struggle.
77 Reid 2006, p. 31.
78 Agamben 2005a.
79 Ibid, p. 2.

3

The Space of Law

'Ulama, Shari'a, and the Technology of Blasphemy

Central to Agamben's analysis of modern forms of biopolitical sovereignty is the description of the capture of bare life by the state and the legal order in order to produce the figure of *homo sacer*. Charting the increasingly violent nature of what I call 'ulama governmentality, I argue that the characteristic modality of the 'ulama in Pakistan today lies precisely in the deployment of sovereign power, in the production of the heretic/blasphemer as an essentially "killable" human. In Pakistan the juridical tools that have been complicit with the 'ulama and the state's production of *homo sacer* are the notorious Blasphemy Laws that were formally established by the state during General Zia ul-Haq's dictatorial tenure. I outline the ways in which the Blasphemy Laws have been wielded by the 'ulama against Christians, Shia, and other minorities in Pakistan. This chapter seeks to recast the problem of blasphemy as a problem of the political rather than of an intrusion of antediluvian religious sensibilities into modern space. The politico-juridical rationality of the 'ulama then can be seen to be, through and through, a variant of modern biopolitics: the concern with sovereign power and the government of the other.

The Deoband commitment to the *enforcement* of shari'a, their deployment of blasphemy as a technology of sovereign power, the production of the Ahmadi as heretic and *homo sacer*, *fatwa* fragging, and the valorization of violent *jihad* are some of the examples that I use in this chapter to problematize political Islam and 'ulama governmentality. I conclude by suggesting that the historical transition of the shari'a from enjoining to enforcement, from *fana* to fanaticism, is perhaps a marker of Islam's irretrievable crossing over a modern biopolitical threshold.

The Metacolonial State: Pakistan, Critical Ontology, and the Biopolitical Horizons of Political Islam, First Edition. Najeeb A. Jan.

Enframing Islam in Pakistan

> All societies and all cultures today (it does not matter whether they are democratic or totalitarian, conservative or progressive) have entered into a legitimation crisis in which law (we mean by this term the entire text of tradition in its regulative form, whether the Jewish Torah or the Islamic *Shari'a*, Christian dogma or the profane *nomos*) is in force as the pure "Nothing of Revelation." But this is precisely the structure of the sovereign relation, and the nihilism in which we are living is, from this perspective, nothing other than the coming to light of this relation as such.[1]

In the town of Deoband in Utter Pradesh, India, a seminary was established in 1867 to preserve and protect Islam. Legend has it that the town got its name from the intrepid accomplishments of a local wizard (*maulana*) who had been called into action as a pre-modern ghost buster. A family of devilish demons (*djinns* or *deo*) had been plaguing the town. The story has it that our ghost buster, after a protracted exorcism, was able to bung up (*bund*) these devilish genies into bottles. Hence the name *Deo-band*. It is unlikely that this *genie*-ology would stand the test of historical verification, but the legend does contain a haunto-logical irony. For it was a *jinn* of a very different sort, a *wizard* of English Constitutional Law, Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, known to posterity as the *Father*[2] of the Pakistani nation (Quaid-e-Azam), who paved the way for the unleashing of those *ghouls* that had remained bunged up for well over a century. Today these ghouls are eminently recognizable in the form of the Taliban. Over the last century, the teachers ('*ulama*) of the Deoband school have come to occupy the space of biopolitics, and the power of the postcolonial Deoband has reached its apogee with the Taliban and its fateful alliance with al-Qaeda. Thus, from its very inception, political Islam has been bound up with the politics of secularism in an inseparable and macabre tango with the biopolitical.

This genealogical study has sought to locate our understanding of political Islam in terms of the metacolonial, a device that at minimum seeks to evade the false binary between culture/religion and the political.[3] If Pakistan today suffers from a personality disorder – a biopolitical sovereign anxiety that threatens to tear it further apart – then we must seek to understand the spirit of the malaise rather than describe the symptoms in all of their depressing detail. One aspect of this trajectory involves understanding how the complex processes of modernity and globalization have transformed the very episteme, the discursive framework, of knowledge ('*ilm*) that the 'ulama draw upon. For Foucault, the episteme is linked to an art or *technē*, which in turn signals a field of knowledge/power. By paying attention to the way in which the field of

power, the discursive regime, has transformed, we can gain a better insight into the meaning of 'ulama praxis. This praxis does not simply reflect or for that matter distort something called tradition or Islam, but rather it reflects the dominant apparatus in which discourse and practice are situated. Therefore, at a minimum a genealogical account begins by undermining the autonomous and privileged category of an unproblematized and monolithic "Islam," enabling us to think about Islam and Muslim society in view of its complex entanglements with the space of the modern in which they are always already situated.

The term '*ulama* refers in its most general sense to a man of learning or to one who possesses knowledge ('*ilm*[4]), and we may in turn ask which regime of knowledge/power now possesses the 'ulama. What contemporary Muslims understand by knowledge '*ilm* may have already undergone a transformation. Secondly, while the singular of 'ulama, 'alim, can refer to any kind of learned man or scholar, the word 'ulama today refers to a class of religious scholars. Thus a great Pakistani historian or physicist could be introduced as an 'alim, but he/she would not be counted among the 'ulama. Nor would a group of professors at a modern Muslim university be referred to as 'ulama. The emergence of the 'ulama as designating a class of religious scholars is distinct in the modern period.[5] This movement traces its formal historical origins to the Deoband *madrasa* (seminary), founded by Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanotawi (1832–1880) and Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1828–1905), in British India's United Provinces (UP now Uttar Pradesh).[6] A leading theological academy of modern India,[7] the Dar al-'Ulum of Deoband has since its inception in 1866 spawned one of the most influential global "traditionalist"[8] (orthodox) institutions within the wider Muslim world. According to Barbara Metcalf, one of the Western worlds foremost scholars of the Indian Deoband, the Deobandis were one of the several groups that sought to "reproduce Islamic culture in a colonial period characterized by considerable challenges to the preservation of traditional learning. … they became known not only as a school but as a school of thought."[9] This school of thought and movement was soon to take on a "sectarian"[10] dimension, as it transformed from a *maslak*, a style of Islam, to a distinct form of Muslim identity. Today the Deoband's Afghan and Pakistani based variants have attained global notoriety, principally because of the nexus between the Deoband and the Taliban.[11]

The Deoband 'ulama see themselves as holding a self-consciously reformist ideology, defining themselves in opposition to more "popular" syncretic styles of Muslim belief and practice, on the one hand, and to "modernists," on the other. The key point, however, is that neither "popular" nor "modern" scholastic authority is recognized as legitimate by the Deoband because it does not emerge from within their particular

disciplinary/institutional setting. Within contemporary South Asian Islamic formations, the "Deobandis" distinguish themselves not only from the Shi'a but also from other Sunni rivals such as the "Barelwis"[12] and the *Ahl-i Hadith*,[13] both of which also emerged in India in the second half of the nineteenth century.[14] Each of these groups contests the other groups' sources and *performances* of religious authority and power. With the exception of a general reverence for the Qur'an and the Prophet, these groups rarely see eye-to-eye on matters of religion, culture, and politics except when it comes to their loathing and contempt for the Ahmadi, another nineteenth century Indian phenomenon. Ahmadi's are Muslims who regard Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908) as a "prophet" after Muhammad. I will consider this case of the exception at great length in this and subsequent chapters, since it reveals the nature of Deobandi sovereign power in the most paradigmatic of ways. The Ahmadi, as I will show, have become the bare excluded life through which 'ulama power and authority manifests itself. In this way the Ahmadi are the cipher for understanding 'ulama sovereignty.

Multiplicities of the Deoband

The Deoband forms a sub-set within a sub-set of Islamic multiplicities, in part because the origin story of the Deoband is itself contested with the various institutions of the 'ulama having fractured numerous times around fundamental political principles. During the course of my interviews with contemporary 'ulama, I also detected a heightened awareness of the multiple structural forms that the Deoband must create in order to survive in the modern age. The current editor of *Al-Farooq*, a Deoband madrasa affiliated journal, exemplified this with an aptly consumerist ice-cream metaphor: "We offer Islam in a variety of flavors, some people like the *chiko*, others vanilla, while some just hate mango." These Deoband "flavors" are to be found in its three primary modalities: Educational (*dini madaris*: games of truth in the production of knowledge); Political (JUI, sectarian and jihadist outfits: technologies of government in the use and exercise of power); and Missionary/Spiritual (*daw'a, tabligh*: techniques of the government of self and others). Each of these modalities are intertwined and cannot be neatly distinguished from the other. Needless to say, a range of political and social sensibilities pervade the 'ulama. Though here I am concerned with the more violent effects of the Deoband, effects that are invariably linked to the violence of the political itself, there are many Deobandi orientations that explicitly reject forms of violent coercion (this of course does not imply that they are apolitical). In short, not every Deobandi is a militant jihadi.

The Deoband's political activity is not limited to the activities of its formal political party the Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama-i Islam (Society of Islamic 'Ulama' or JUI). The official political wings of the Deoband have themselves fractured numerous times around disagreements on fundamental political philosophy. Just prior to the 1947 partition, the primary split occurred between Husayn Ahmad Madani and Shabbir Ahmed 'Usmani over the question of Muslim nationalism. Since 1947 the JUI has continued to divide into factional and militant sectarian offshoots. With regard to Education (*dini madaris*), there are an estimated 4000 Deoband schools, but only half are actually registered and under the curriculum control of the central office (*Wafaq al-Madaris*) in Multan. Thus even as an educational project the Deoband is subject to potentially multiple mutations. Also the Deoband's Spiritual (*daw'a*) wing is fused with the activities of the larger global and ostensibly non-political Tabligh-i Jama'at movement. To complicate matters further, many 'ulama have deep links with the main Sufi *silsilas* within Pakistan.[15] Furthermore, people connected with the Deoband do not often refer to themselves as Deobandi, having only resigned to this label as a means of differentiating their style of Islam from other Sunni groups like the Barelwi, Ahl-i Hadith, Parvezis, Jama'atis (Islamists), etc.

The Deoband began under a single pomegranate tree in the town of Deoband in 1857 and forged a single political organization, the Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama-i Hind (Organization of Indian Islamic Scholars), in 1919. In 1945 the party split along nationalist differences with Maulana Shabbir Ahmad 'Usmani taking leadership of the JUI-Pakistan faction. Since 1947 the endless logic of the caesura that is Pakistan has played itself out within the JUI. It first split between its pro-Pakistan ('Usmani) and pro-India (Madani) factions, and then it fractured into a dozen smaller and often competing groups. Up until 1979, however, these divisions between the sub-groups were largely confined to a non-violent political, though often vitriolic, arena. Internal skirmishes were largely political, but rarely violent. The second sovereign event, however, 1979, has resulted in the intensification and far more dangerous mutation of these groups, which now have over 40 different sub-political organizations, some allied, others at violent loggerheads.

During my research period in 2001, I regularly posed a series of question regarding the differences between the Deoband and the Barelwi, to virtually everyone I met, from taxi drivers and pan shop vendors, to businessmen, lawyers, and members of the military. Outside of the madaris, I never once, in well over a hundred encounters, was able to get anyone to explain to me the principle theological differences between the major South Asian splits within the Sunni Hanafi traditions: Deoband, Barelwi, and Ahl-i Hadith. The majority questioned were not

even aware of these splits within mainstream Sunni Islam and had only a vague sense of what branch their own Sunni identity corresponded to (either in terms of *madhhab* or *maslak*). Even when the Taliban hit headlines in 1994, few people could connect the name Deoband to the Taliban. It comes as no surprise then that the principle theological differences within the Deoband, between the *Hayati* and the *Mamati*,[16] are even more bafflingly obscure, and are themselves rarely the cause for divisions.[17] Divisions are almost always political or communal, beginning with the original differences over nationalism between Husayn Ahmad Madani and Shabbir Ahmad 'Usmani; that is to say, the more enduring splits within the Deoband are not theological but are rather *biopolitical*.[18]

While the JUI is the largest religio-political organization in Pakistan, it has never been able to obtain even the meager Parliamentary seats it has without forming political alliances. On average, and even including the recent 2002 elections, the JUI has rarely been able to garner more than 2–3% of the popular vote. All Islamist parties combined, with the exception of 2002, rarely garner more than 10% of the national vote.

While the JUI, throughout its political career, has always battled to introduce a system (*Shari'a Nizam*) within Pakistan, efforts have largely been confined to the sphere of constitutional amendments, assembly, and committee work. The *Nizam-i Mustapha* movement (Movement to Establish the System of the Prophet) took this essential thrust of the JUI to a larger and more proactive political level. The JUI (S) gave tacit support to General Zia ul-Haq and were closely allied with the Mujahideen effort against the Soviets. It was through the prestige, money, and power that accrued to the new jihadist outfits that a revival in the political fortunes of the JUI was accomplished. The exponential growth of madaris during this period is simply one indicator of this transformation.

The various Deoband arms, wings, and offshoots can be seen to roughly correspond with sectarian (national) and jihadist (trans-national) thrusts.[19] The sectarian divisions form three tactical fronts: against the Ahmadi, against the Shi'a, and against the Barelwi. Organizations that campaign against the Ahmadi (Qadianis) were among the first to form, all in 1949. The various anti-Ahmadiyya (*Khatm-i Nubuwwat*) groups received strong support from all of the main Sunni groups, from Mawdudi's Jama'at-i Islami to the Barelwi. Hating Ahmadi is the one cause around which even progressives like Allama Iqbal have gravitated. The Ahmadi are thus the cipher of bare life for all Sunni Islamist parties.

In addition to these sectarian sub-groups, which began to further multiply and proliferate in the 1980s, the Deoband has also spawned over a dozen jihadist outfits that work in Kashmir and Afghanistan,[20]

and functioned as the more or less explicit tools of the ISI's "foreign policy" until 2001. Today the Pakistan Army operates essentially as one faction within the larger jihadist apparatus. Yet the logic of the jihad is not confined to Islam as Baudrillard suggests. Instead what we are dealing with is a proliferation of the jihadist apparatus that came into being under the sovereign alignment of 1979. As the Pakistan Army today battles the very jihadist elements it has carefully nurtured since 1980, what we see in Pakistan is the generalization of an apparatus (*dispositive*)[21] in which security and terrorism form a "single deadly system, in which they justify and legitimate each other's actions."[22] As Agamben's brief essay on security insightfully suggests, "terrorism" is simply the reverse side of the security apparatus, an inverse and more concentrated reflection of the sovereign power deployed by the state.[23] Terrorism is therefore merely the excrement of civilization and modern governmentality.

Crisis of Authority: 'Ulama as Subalterns

The 'ulama have remained remarkably adaptive and responsive to historically shifting forms of power and the broader social transformations that have accompanied modernity. By viewing Deoband political practice as rooted within historically variable relations of power and the contingencies of Pakistan's fractured politics rather than in any theologically grounded transcendent principles, we may account for such divergences in actual praxis. Political practice does not resort first to a rethinking of texts but rather is animated by the field of biopolitics and sovereign power relationships that pervade the political space in which the 'ulama operate.

Any serious account of 'ulama violence today must situate the 'ulama within the context not only of an emerging biopolitics but also within the crisis of 'ulama authority and influence. Through their educational projects (*madaris*) and several vast publishing arms affiliated with the major Deoband schools and through a mass army of affiliated Spiritual warriors (Tabligh-i Jama'at), the Deoband had remained, by and large, committed to democratic modes of intervention and influence in the public sphere. However, by 1980 what was still lacking was a form of "authority" that could translate into real "political power," without which the goal of disciplining mass society would remain elusive. For large segments of Pakistani society and the elite class in particular, the 'ulama were still considered to be backwards and irrelevant. Written out of the nationalist narrative due to the opposition to Pakistan's independence by the dominant Madani faction, public derision and ridicule of the 'ulama was not uncommon, a fact that is not lost upon the

'ulama themselves.[24] In conversations with Maulana Ibn Naqshibandi,[25] he recounted dozens of popular derisive adages, the most endearing of which was "for some people we are still worse than stray village dogs."[26] Tales and rumors regarding the predatory homosexual exploits of the mullah and the young boys under his care are commonplace. Liberal intellectuals in Pakistan are predisposed to loath the 'ulama, routinely dismissing them as ignorant (*jahil*).

The 'ulama then are burdened with this double sense of irony: that within the very boundaries of a nation state that was created ostensibly in the name of Islam, those entrusted with its "preservation," those trained to speak in its name, and those conversant in the language of the sacred revelation remain a mere subaltern class, disempowered and at times despised. The rise of a new form of sovereign and biopolitical governmentality among the 'ulama is a development that must be understood within the context of the historical decline of the role and uses of the 'ulama under colonial and postcolonial modernity. Understanding the 'ulama's paradoxical relationship to the modern postcolonial nation-state is key to exposing a variety of political tactics, like the deployment of blasphemy as a political weapon, as something other than an antediluvian eruption of medieval Islamic religiosity into the well-ordered, teleological space of the modern.

Rather than seeing Deoband political practice as a form of politics outside of time, as counter-modern, I argue that religio-political groups like the Deoband cannot be understood outside the concrete manifestations of modern governmentality. By a mixture of both design and contingency, the 'ulama have effectively negotiated the various spaces and networks of power to invigorate and empower their movements and institutions. The 'ulama have established a sphere of influence seeping into all sectors of life in Pakistan even though they started from a subaltern constituency whose cultural and political valency were otherwise dissolving under the weight of a modernizing, postcolonial state. However, it is not merely on the register of an economy of power that I seek to advance my claims. The Deoband, in their becoming political, do not in fact contest the rudimentary cartography of political modernity (i.e. the idea of sovereignty, nation, state, government, population, society, citizen, technology, etc). It is perhaps only at the second order level of political culture and the politics of identity (which again are not divorced from the question of power) that discursive posturings play out as markers of difference and distinction.[27] The survival of the Deoband as an institution and a political force signals its ineluctable entanglement with the modern.

An understanding of the Deoband's gravitation towards forms of violent and coercive political activism is represented most clearly by

their support for and creation of sectarian and jihadist groups. This turn, however, must be situated through an understanding of the ways in which the State, especially since the 1980s, has attempted to infiltrate, control, and harness orthodox Islamic institutions. These State attempts to deploy and manipulate "Islam" and Islamist forces for the legitimization of martial rule and for the waging of proxy wars (Afghanistan and Kashmir) resulted in the artificial political empowerment of groups like the Deoband. Under the catalyst of this state intervention, the otherwise politically marginal communities of Islamic orthodoxy have transformed themselves into agents of jihad and brokers of increased socio-political power. Given the ways in which the Pakistani martial state has, historically, legitimized the use of violence, intimidation, and coercion as the means for political participation and negotiation, we can begin to see how newly empowered Islamist political groups have themselves deployed the symbolic weight of Islam to advance their claims of political leadership. More importantly, we can trace the ways in which the 'ulama themselves exercise forms of policing power over and above both civil society and the sovereign authority of the State.

One of the crucial elements of the state of exception is described by Agamben as the merger and indistinction between authority and power. The real crisis arises, argues Agamben, when these two elements combine in one person or institution and the state of exception becomes the rule.[28] The crisis of the 'ulama in Pakistan can thus also be seen as the merger between the desire of authority and the conscription of the 'ulama within geopolitical spaces of power. Traditional 'ulama authority, already in decline in Pakistan,[29] merges with a desire for power. What happens when the background series of assumptions that convey traditional authority with power are transformed by colonialism, on the one hand, and the emergence of populations, on the other? We could then characterize the postcolonial transformation of the Deoband as the shift from the rule of law (*taqlid*) to the rule of war (*jihad*). The conjunction between *authority* and *power* seems to be well illustrated in the phenomenon of Talibanization. I would argue that the precursors for this transformation are not simply the events of 1979, which led to the deployment of the mujahideen. Rather it is the *statification* and *biopoliticization* of Islam, signaled first by the very creation of Pakistan.

According to G.H. Khan, the Ahrar was set up in Lahore in 1929[30] at the suggestion of Maulana 'Abul Kalam Azad, as a mechanism to weaken the unity of the Pakistan movement. The group,[31] who used the famous slogan "Long live the rule of God, Death to Democracy" (*hukumat-i illahiyya*) and opposed the Pakistan movement, was suspended for over a decade in the early years of Pakistan. In many ways it was their underground philosophy that had a decisive influence on the sovereign aims

and objectives of the Pakistani Deoband more broadly. If the legal political parties worked within the ambit of Parliamentary democracy, their dark side, the Ahrar, nurtured contempt for it. One might even say that the Taliban and the various radical jihadist outfits today are the re-emergent face of the Ahrar.

At the forefront of the assault on "apostates" and heretics in Pakistan, driven in the main by anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment, were the various Finality of the Prophet movements (*Khatm-i Nubuwwat*), which have their political origins in the Majlis-e-Ahrar. Since their inception in Pakistan they have been organized and run by a series of well-respected Deoband professors (*'alims*). Following partition, the underground Ahrar influenced the activities of *Tahrik-i Tahafuz-e-Khatm-i Nubuwwat* (KN). One of the key demands of the KN was that "Qadianis" be declared a non-Muslim minority and that all Ahmadis be removed from governmental posts including Jinnah's Foreign Minister Chaudhuri Muhammad Zafarullah Khan (1893–1985). Liaquat 'Ali Khan's refusal to remove Khan from his post was in part the pretext for the Ahrar remobilization in 1953.[32] After the disturbances had subsided, martial law was withdrawn, and the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan passed a special Act to constitute a Court of Inquiry to investigate the "causes" of disturbances that led to the imposition of martial law. The landmark report, which has come to be known as the Munir Report,[33] was produced in April 1954 and is a historian's treasure trove. The report is a formidable investigation and offers a visionary forecast of the fate of the country if "ambiguous laws" were allowed to enter the constitutional framework.[34]

The Committee examined the viewpoints of all leading 'ulama in the country at that time. It seemed as if the 'ulama could agree on nothing other than the belief that Ahmadis were disbelievers (*kafirs*) and that anyone becoming an Ahmadi was an apostate (*murtid*) and liable to the death penalty. What was also apparent is that beyond this exception, no positive definition of what constitutes a Muslim could be agreed upon.[35] It seems that production of bare life is the only concrete strategic similarity between various Islamist groups in Pakistan. Additionally the leaders of the various sects stated that they could not stand one another and routinely called each other *kafirs*. The Barelwi 'ulama held that the Deobandis and Wahhabis were beyond the pale of Islam, also potentially apostate (*murtid*). According to a fatwa of the Deobandis, the Shi'a are all disbelievers (*kafirs)* and apostates (*murtad)* for not respecting and recognizing the caliphate of Abu Bakr and the *Sahaba* (Companions):

> The net result of all this is that neither Shi'a nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i Hadith nor Barelwis are Muslims and any change from one view to

> the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be kafirs. And it does not require much imagination to judge of the consequences of this doctrine when it is remembered that no two ulama have agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim.[36]

Attempts by this contradictory class of religio-political scholars to politicize the process of defining the boundaries of "Muslimness" must be understood through a consideration of the metacolonial. With these contextualizations in place, one can talk about ways in which modernist Islamic politics draw upon and deploy the symbolic weight of what is popularly marked as traditional, authentic discourse to create new forms of political space and to exercise new forms of disciplinary and sovereign power. The exclusion of minorities began with the targeted focus on the Ahmadiyya and Shia, a process that ultimately led to the juridical embodiment of a series of discriminatory and exclusionary constitutional amendments and ordinances in 1974 and 1984. In fact one of the Deoband's self-proclaimed major socio-political achievements was the legislative and religious exorcism of the Ahmadiyya from the broader Muslim community in Pakistan.

The Munir Report also states: "One of the main activities of the Ahrar was their opposition, in one form or another, of the Ahmadis. It may indeed be said that the Ahrar took their birth in the hatred of the Ahmadis."[37] It was the Ahrar's post-Khilafat movement (1919–1924) campaign of the 1930s that seriously transformed relations between the broader Ahmadiyya community and orthodox Sunnis. As opposition to the Ahmadi (both the Lahori and Qadiani groups) migrated from the realm of (*kalam*) to the political, the strategy of the 'ulama has been one of sovereign power. Janbaz Mirza, the prolific historian of the Ahrar sect, gives special place to the Ahrar campaign against the Ahmadi's.[38]

Initial Ahrar policies broadly reflected the early Deoband 'ulama's opposition, under the leadership of Madani, to Pakistan's independence, Jinnah, and the Muslim League. The Ahrar leadership called Pakistan "*Palidistan*." However, as the possibilities of power under an exclusively Islamic/Muslim State began to take shape, factions within the Ahrar, along with figures like Shabbir 'Usmani and Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi, promised to declare support for Pakistan if Jinnah would guarantee that "Qur'anic laws would be enforced."[39] Given the Ahrar's influence, Jinnah is alleged to have made numerous statements that Pakistan's laws would be in conformity with the spirit of Islam. As late as 1945 the Punjab Muslim League declared that when Pakistan would be achieved,

"the administration would be carried out according to the Qur'an."[40] The Ahrar manifesto reads as follows:

> God is the only source of strength. The oneness of God, the acceptance of Muhammad (PBUH) as the last and final prophet and following the example of the *Sunnah* and the Companions of the Prophet is our creed. The establishment of *Khilafat*,[41] *Shura*[42] and *Ijma'a-e-Ummat*,[43] is our politics. Our system of finance is *Zakat*, *Ushr* and *Jazia-o-ikhraj*. The word of God above all, the spread of Islam through Jihad is our destiny. Our goal is to please God and the Last Prophet.[44]

While the "manifesto" is ambiguous, this forms the ideological template for all Deoband groups, a Government of God (*hukumat-i illahiyya*), and since God does not himself govern directly the task of governing the world falls to the representatives of Islam, the 'ulama. Though it leaves room for a series of differential tactics as to how this "political system" will be established, the driving force of the various movements cannot so simply be placed in the hands of such a vague and ideological mandate. The gathering (*Jama'at*), I would suggest, is itself a response to the gathering call of *Gestell*.

> Biopolitical caesuras are essentially mobile, and in each case they isolate a further zone in the biological continuum, a zone which corresponds to a process of increasing *Entwürdigung* and degradation. Thus the non-Aryan passes into the Jew, the Jew into the deportee, the deportee into the prisoner (*Haftling*), until biopolitical caesuras reach their final limit in the camp. This limit is the *Muselmann*.[45]

Pakistan it could be said is that exemplary unfolding of this degradation: the homeland of the Muselmann.

Towards a Conception of 'Ulama Governmentality

What is the nature then of the biopolitical regime of the 'ulama? For Agamben, the task of critical thought is to offer a testimony[46] of the way in which life, in its state of exception, has now become the norm under modern biopolitical regimes.[47] As I have discussed in Chapter 1, biopolitics, in its broadest sense, is a politics of life, where life is understood in an exclusively biological[48] and technological fashion[49] (bio-tech). The inclusion of this bare, biological life in the political order "constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power. *It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power*."[50] The remaining task of this chapter will be to situate

'ulama political practices in terms of sovereign power. If we can show that the structure of the exception is consubstantial with Islamist politics, then our claim regarding the indistinction between Islam and the West will take on added plausibility, thus running counter to the dominant barrage of imperial and governmental discourses on Islam, which assert a fundamental if not incommensurate difference.[51] By placing life and the body at the center of their own political strategies, the practices of the modern 'ulama, like the modern State, disclose this secret of power otherwise concealed under the banner of fidelity to Islam and the shari'a. Thus the form of power exercised by the 'ulama today is linked to that "most immemorial of the *arcane imperii*" that Agamben discusses in *Homo Sacer*. The *arcane imperii* is literally the secret of power. But what is this secret? Agamben does not quite say. We surmise that this secret of power is the sovereign secret, which is to say an ontological secret, namely the covering over of the withdrawal of being, leaving only bare life. It is an immemorial secret, not because it is timeless or very old but because it is no longer in memory, forgotten. It is precisely this link, the link between bare life and politics, which "secretly governs the modern ideologies seemingly most distant from one another."[52] Islam, like Marxism and Liberalism, is "embedded in a wider history of metaphysics, of which it remains unaware."[53]

A genealogy, understood as a historical ontology, thus seeks to disclose the way in which the being of life is understood and to expose the way in which this understanding manifests in practice, operating unnoticed in the background of the modern framework (episteme) of biopolitics (*technē*). For Foucault the history of being,[54] its shifts from one episteme to another, is generally marked by the transformations of power in the modern age: governmentality as pastoral power merging with police power, biopower as the transformation of sovereign power and disciplinary power in the context of the emergence of sexuality, and so on. Foucault's grammars of power should be seen in this light, as ways of illuminating the various modes of subject production as a prelude to accounting for what we have become today and as inducement for thinking otherwise. His terms were therefore not designed to stand as permanent theories of the political or as methods for the analysis of political structures, but rather they are anticoncepts, conceptual motifs that help shed light on the multiple ways in which modern life and subjectivity are constituted and constrained (even through the powers of freedom). Biopower is hence the assumption of the political and the subsumption of life within its space (space of the *polis*).

If the potentiality of Islam was once constituted as a "way," a way towards being/Allah, if the shari'a[55] itself designated the wisdom of this "path" and "way," if the 'ulama were regarded as men of understanding

and illumination, then today we can speak of Islam as having transformed into a way of life, the shari'a into a force of law, and the 'ulama as hollow men possessed by power. A proper archaeology and genealogy of this transition remains to be thought and written.[56] However, this is to say that today Islam, like the West, is firmly in the "grip of technology,"[57] a grip that we can best see in terms of biopoliticization.[58]

What does 'ulama politics reveal about the nature of the *polis*, the political space in which the 'ulama dwell? This space, as we shall see is revealed to be hollow, ethically and ontologically hollow, and is thus only a space of power. The 'ulama dwell in this space; their city/camp is the *Islamapolis*. Thus a genealogy will not principally be concerned with the biographical narration of the lives of the 'ulama or plot out the chronological details of political machinations. Our concern is instead with the political being of the 'ulama,[59] their biopoliticization and supplication towards sovereign power.

To speak of the biopoliticization of the Deoband 'ulama means attempting to understand the transformation of 'ulama practices (*'ilm awr amal*) as a corollary of their conscription within the space of the modern *polis*. While it is tempting to view the corruption and violence of the Pakistani Deoband primarily in terms of its alliance with the state and the military, the story is somewhat more complex from the perspective of a history of power. Characteristically, and against the mainstream left, both Foucault and Agamben viewed power in terms that did not privilege the state apparatus as the source of violence. Rather the state was itself the threshold effect of a political *a priori*, an *a priori* that we have identified as the *apparatus* in Foucault and *sovereignty* in Agamben. With his grammars of power, Foucault is effectively expanding the geography of violence, making visible new spaces where power operates, spaces that are often hidden or do not usually manifest as political.

The problem for a critical reading of political Islam then is to arrive at some understanding of this shift in the Islamic episteme and its historical/political *a priori*. As Foucault wrote famously in his governmentality essay:

> We all know the fascination which the love, or horror of the state exercises today, attention is paid to its history its advance, its power, its abuses. The excessive value placed on the state is expressed in two ways: one form is the immediate, affective and tragic, is the lyricism of the *monstre froid* we see confronting us. But there is a second way of overvaluing the problem of the state, one which is paradoxical because it is reductionist … But the state, no more today than at any other time in history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor to speak frankly this importance. The state is no more than a composite and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think.

> *Maybe what is really important for our modernity – our present – is not so much the étatisation of society, as the 'governmentalization' of the state.*[60]

Similarly for Agamben, while the state deploys a brutal form of mythic violence, the sovereign effect is prior to the constitution of the state. Agamben analyzed the way in which figures like Schmitt and Hobbes deployed the concept of sovereignty as a mechanism to legitimize the state and its deployment of what Benjamin called "mythic violence." Opposed to mythic violence in Benjamin's critique of the political was divine violence.[61] Mythical violence, either in the form of state or revolutionary violence ("law-preserving" or "law-positing" or constituted and constituting power) comprised the space of the modern political against which Benjamin, and following him Agamben, sought to think. Consequently, the depredations of the 'ulama in the modern period should be understood not in terms of the adoption of medieval formulations of Islamic jurisprudence and their blind, literal, and disconcerting application within modern polities but rather in terms of the biopoliticization of Islam in two movements: governmentalization and juridification. For Agamben, juridification represents the coincidence of life and law, its biopolitical becoming, which is reflected in the popular characterization of Islam, among liberals and conservative alike, as a "way of life."

> If anything characterizes modern democracy as opposed to classical democracy, then, it is that modern democracy presents itself from the beginning as a vindication and liberation of *zoē*, and that it is constantly trying to transform its own bare life into a way of life and to find, so to speak, the *bios* of *zoē*.[62]

Agamben's characterization here of the link between bare life and way of life finds its continual echo in the near universal characterization of Islam as "a way of life" and the faithful (*ummah*) as a political "society which must be defended."

Yet another popular fundamentalist mantra – Islam is a "complete code of life[63] – also betrays its underlying technological understanding. The juridification or codification of Islam, its reduction to an ideology, thus further signifies its collapse into and indistinction with the shari'a. So we are speaking not of the Islamization of modernity but the modernization of Islam and its final coincidence with the history of the West. At the technological apogee of this history, the shari'a is deployed as a strategic and tactical instrument, as war by other means.

Masud, Messick, and Powers note that, in the historical formation of Islamic law, an important division within juristic labor marks the relation of the shari'a to the concrete world of human affairs.

While marking off the juridical from the worldly may itself be problematic to begin with, they nonetheless draw our attention to an important point:

> Across time and space, two distinct categories of legal interpreters have stood at the meeting points of law and fact. The domain of legal procedure, including adversarial cases, rules of evidence, binding judgments, and state enforcement, belongs to the judge (*qadi*); the issuance of nonbinding advisory opinions (*fatawa*, or *fatwas*) to an individual questioner (*mustafti*), whether in connection with litigation or not, is the separate domain of the jurisconsult (*mufti*). In their different venues, both qadi and muftis have specialized in handling the everyday traffic in conflicts and questions falling within the purview of the shari'a.[64]

My argument here suggests that one way of characterizing the transformations undergone by the modern Pakistani Deoband is the gradual indistinction between the role of the jurisconsultant and the role of the judge. In the modern period the Deoband 'ulama have largely been seen as legal scholars, and the madrasa was largely a site for the production of other scholars who could offer non-binding legal opinions. All the major madaris have libraries of jurisprudence (*ifta)*, which collect legal assessments (*hukm*). However, under the regime of the Taliban, the distinctions between mufti and qadi, hukm and state law have collapsed, and Islam is fully subsumed by the imperatives of state authority.

The Honor of Apostasy

Effectively today we see the *metastatic* unfolding of the apostasy apparatus, a tool designed initially to target Ahmadis and Shi'a. The cancer is now endemic with Pakistan effectively having declared itself an apostate nation. In the past, scholars were careful to distinguish between apostasy (*murtaddun*) and heresy (*bid'at*, change or innovation),[65] which can be of varying degrees. Not all heresy constitutes apostasy. The nuances of medieval jurisprudence, however, are largely lost on the Deoband 'ulama, who selectively apply their own rulings on apostasy so as fashion the laws into a practico-political weapon. According to the classical tradition, when a born or converted Muslim becomes a new disbeliever (*kufr tari*'), he becomes an apostate and is exposed to the death penalty. The verdict in the annals of medieval jurisprudence that the punishment for apostasy and blasphemy is death would be near impossible to refute.[66] As the Deoband-trained scholar, Dr. Muhammad Asrar Madani writes in his booklet on blasphemy and apostasy, "the

defense of Islam and the honor and dignity of the Prophet are the religious obligations of Muslims, from which there is no excuse."[67] Apostasy for Madani includes, "abandoning or forsaking Islam; repudiating any of Islam's basic and principal tenets; reverting to the former state of falsehood from the absolute Truth of Islam or converting to any other religion … proclaiming prophethood for oneself or believing in an impostor as a prophet after the last Prophet of Allah, Muhammad (SWAT) and indulging in any deeds or uttering something that leads to disbelief (*kufr*)."[68] From this catch-all definition he concludes: "It is clear from the above meanings of apostasy that all blasphemers, mockers, Jews, Christians, their friends, associates and sympathizers, polytheists, atheists, and half-hearted Muslims, non-believers in the Oneness of Allah and His Absolute Lordship and in all His prophets whose chain ends with the last Prophet Muhammad, are *kafirs* and apostates … The punishment for apostasy is death but if the person repents sincerely, then the death sentence can be lifted and the person forgiven." Madani's book/pamphlet is an extended series of selective quotations from the Qur'an, Hadith, and Sunnah, which support this argument. At the close of his work, he approvingly cites a Hadith:

> If any Muslim turns away from Islam and disbelieves in that which was sent down to the Prophet Muhammad or undermines his personality, denies his prophethood, or accuses him of lying, other Muslims who hear such blasphemy and apostasy are duty-bound to kill the guilty person as soon as they are able to do so. … It is incumbent on the present imam of the Muslims to execute him and accept no apology from him.[69]

Since Christians, Hindus, and Ahmadis could be said to equally deny the finality of the Prophet, the issue in question is not punishment for a denial of this belief, which would then require the state to murder, as Madani suggests, all Christians and non-believers, "unless they repent." This would be impractical, which is why the specific laws for punishment are against blasphemy, which does not target a born kafir, who *prima facia* disputes the validity of Islam and the status of the Prophet. Rather what is punished is the offense of blasphemy which is based on the perception of an "insult" or "harm" to Islam and the Prophet (*Ghustakh-e-Rasool*). Blasphemy, thus, in contrast to general disbelief (*kufr*), can be committed by either a Muslim or *kafir*.

However, it is precisely this ambiguous zone between apostasy and blasphemy that the Deoband have adroitly exploited. The definitions of what constitute acts of heresy, blasphemy, and apostasy are ambiguous and bleed into one another. Since blasphemy constitutes an act of insult against the Prophet, or a public denial of his virtue or Prophetic status as

the Last of the Messengers of God, blasphemy is an act that can technically encapsulate Muslims and non-Muslims alike.[70] Since the Ahmadiyya community believe that Ghulam Ahmad Mirza (1835–1908) of Qadian was a prophet (albeit one who did not bring a new law or a new book) for most orthodox Sunni's and Shi'a, this would constitutes a denial of the "finality" or Prophet Muhammad. Thus technically the very definition of Ahmadi belief falls under the category of "insult" and denial. The strategy of the Deoband has thus been twofold: to excommunicate the Ahmadis by officially declaring them non-Muslims (*kafir*) while simultaneously constituting their everyday beliefs and practices as blasphemous acts, rendering them a permanent class of *homo sacer*. It would be sufficient to draw an Ahmadi into an open debate or to utter the *kalima* or read the Qur'an to place charges of blasphemy against him.

It was in 1974, during the tenure of Zulfikar 'Ali Bhutto, in an effort to appease the religious right, that the Ahmadis were declared by a constitutional amendment to be a non-Muslim minority. Bhutto was also facing civil unrest of the kind that was fomented in 1952,[71] unrest that was fomented by the thuggish wings of the JUI, the *Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nubuwwat*. Bhutto had wanted to defer the matter of the Ahmadis to the Council of Islamic Ideology, but Mufti Mahmood led the demand for an immediate constitutional amendment to declare the Ahmadis apostates. Other Islamist parties, smelling blood and a point of weakness, joined the fray against Bhutto. The matter was taken to the National Assembly and subsequently a Second Amendment to the 1973 Constitution was passed in September of 1974.[72] The state was now like a Pope, in the business of excommunication, directly contradicting the principle of religious freedom and the avowedly secular ethic of Jinnah.

A decade following the 1974 act of excommunication, the war against the Ahmadi escalated from a theological rebuke to a matter of criminality. Under Zia ul-Haq, the anti-Ahmadi Ordinance as introduced into the Pakistani criminal code in 1984. Under article 298c[73] introduced by the ordinance, Ahmadis could be criminally charged if caught "impersonating" a Muslim, with a possible sentence of up to three years. However, the decisive shift occurred under the democratically elected regime of Nawaz Sharif,[74] who introduced the notorious Blasphemy Laws in 1993. The penalty for insulting the Prophet, and if the SSP had their way the Companions of the Prophet,[75] now carried the death penalty, and a case could be filed without the need for an FIR. The law made it a capital offense for Ahmadis to publicly recite the *Shahada* or read the Qur'an.[76] Khomeini's 1989 fatwa against Rushdie was also playing itself out in the background and was perhaps a major impetus behind the shift. The task was now easy, since the Ahmadi denial of the finality-of-the-prophet could be folded under the charge of blasphemy.

Many deaths pertaining to the blasphemy laws have been carried out not by the state but by "mob" violence, which demonstrates that the sovereign element of this law, the right to take life, is most directly exercised by the 'ulama. Despite the fact that no one has yet been officially executed by the state, hundreds of people have been harassed and killed, including non-Ahmadis, and dozens still languish in prison awaiting the juridical process.[77] Acts of mob violence, on the other hand, have led to dozens of lynchings. It is these lynchings that sustain a quasi-sovereign status for the 'ulama: the right to declare the exception and kill the *exceptio*. Thus within Pakistan the Ahmadis have had to suffer persecution not only through courts of law but also at the hands of prejudice by some of their fellow Muslims.[78]

While the exemplary focus of such violence in Pakistan has been on the Ahmadi community, the real target of these laws are not simply members of the Ahmadi, Christian, or Shi'a minority (even if such excluded populations bear the brunt of the violence) but the entire body politic itself. While the Blasphemy Laws have certainly been directed with more viciousness at messianic tendencies within Islam (Ahmadi, Shi'a), that is to say those that might challenge the validity of the Deoband as guardians of the law, the 'ulama deployment of the laws of apostasy must principally be seen as a sovereign rather than a juridical strategy.

Veteran journalist I.A. Rahman has long documented the sad chronology of persecution facilitated under the new climate of the Blasphemy Laws. On May 11, 1993 the case of the young Christian brothers Salamat, Rehmat, and Manzoor Masih made international headlines and was the cause for significant embarrassment worldwide. The case against the Masih boys was based on an allegation that they had written sacrilegious slogans on a wall, and they were booked under Sections 295a and 295c of the Penal Code. During trial it turned out that two of the brothers were illiterate and could not write. Despite this they were sentenced to death by a Sessions Judge on February 9, 1995.[79] Due to severe international pressure, the Lahore High Court acquitted Salamat Masih and Rehmat Masih of blasphemy charges on February 22, 1995, and the boys were subsequently exiled to Canada for fear that the 'ulama would arrange for their extra-judicial murder. The case and the manner of its unfolding, however, sent shivers down the spines of Christians in Pakistan who realized that they were now *homo sacer*.[80]

Prior to the arrest of the Masihs, two persons had already been sentenced to death, one Christian and the other Muslim. Both men suffered harsh conditions in jail and during their trials remained under the threat of lynching by the zealous crowds that would gather at the court proceedings. The court events were turned into regular spectacles reminiscent of

the crowds gathering around the scaffolds of Paris during the *Ancien régime*. The 'ulama used each event as an opportunity to display the potential of their power over life. In all of these cases the force that comes to bear on the subject (on the Ahmadi or the Shi'a) is directed against his or her very life and lifestyle rather than particular acts. This represents a transition of 'ulama power from a more pastoral and disciplinary mode to a biopolitical and sovereign one (Foucault 1977).

On May 5, 1998, John Joseph, a Roman Catholic Bishop from Faisalabad who had long crusaded against the country's growing religious fundamentalism, intolerance, and the discriminatory laws against minorities, committed an act of public suicide reminiscent of the June 11, 1963 political suicide of the Mahayana Buddhist monk, Thich Quang Duc, in Saigon, a self-immolation now immortalized in Malcom Brown's Pulitzer Prize- winning photograph. Bishop Joseph shot himself in front the Sessions Court in Sahiwal in protest against the court's decision to award the death sentence to another Christian, Ayub Masih, on the charge of blasphemy. The Bishop and the Monk sacrificed their bodies in protest against new violent and imperial structures: the homology between Islamism and America could not be more complete.

The Sovereign Space of Blasphemy

The 'ulama's sovereign strategy revolves around the production of boundaries and a space of obedience. As DeCaroli notes, "the work of sovereignty precedes the law … the sovereign field precedes and enables the judicial decision. This decision – a legal decision that is readily obeyed – must have a territory to which it is applied. Not a neutral space, but a space that is capable of being obedient."[81] Additionally, the ability to exercise the authority to define the boundaries of Muslimness and therefore of inclusion and exclusion, which is itself a necessary condition for the declaration of banishment (declaring who is in (*momin)* and who is out (*kufaar*)) relies on the capacity for the violent enforcement of these boundaries rather than on a capacity for juridical reasoning. In this way the production of a space of exception and violent spatial effect go hand in hand. Hence 'ulama authority is tied to the presence of and establishment of boundaries that are themselves maintained by acts of violence. When these acts take on an iconoclastic form they do so for the symbolic performance of power, which simultaneously recasts the act of destruction into one of preservation and safeguarding. That this power is exercised by rival factions of Deoband jihadists against each other, let alone their Shi'a and Barelwi adversaries, comes as no surprise.

From a structural point of view, the effective deracination of the Ahmadi, their excommunication from the fold of the faithful (*ummah*), can be seen as a way of stripping them of their "Muslim" citizenship. This state-sanctioned act of exclusion from the domain of Islam should be seen as a parallel move to the denationalization of Jews under the Nuremberg Laws. Both were preludes to the production of *homo sacer* and hence can be regarded as a malleable juridical apparatus for sovereign power. The declaration of the Muslim as infidel (*murtid*), and the invocation of "the state of ignorance" (*jahiliyyah*) is also a time-honored strategy of all jihadist groups who seek to deploy their mythic violence against fellow Muslims. This is the general meaning of the biopolitical sovereign strategy of the 'ulama: the assumption of the authority to decide when it is permissible to harm those who are outsiders (*haram*). The political power to declare the borders between inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion, thus defines the basic logic of 'ulama sovereignty. This is not a territorial logic but a juridico-political one. This sovereign logic is concerned not with the law itself, with ethics or with the illegal, but with the boundary between the legal and the non-legal. This between, or *zone of indistinction*, "appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal form",[82] a "no-man's-land between public law and political fact … between the juridical order and life."[83] Effectively, then, the juridification of the shari'a is marked by this collapse of the political and the juridical.

The biopolitical significance of the state of exception "as the original structure in which law encompasses living beings by means of its own suspension" therefore emerges not only paradigmatically in military orders, whether by Bush, Musharraf, or Hitler, but also through the fatwa, which is itself transformed from an opinion on the path of ethical life to a sovereign command. The exemplary case of the fatwa as a sovereign command was of course Khomeini's 1989 declaration of Rushdie as apostate. The act was designed to shore up power for Khomeini. Agamben's description of *homo sacer* could very well be a perfect description of Rushdie's life following the fatwa:

> … his entire existence is reduced to a bare life stripped of every right by virtue of the fact that anyone can kill him without committing homicide; he can save himself only in perpetual flight or a foreign land. And yet he is in a continuous relationship with the power that banished him precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditioned threat of death. He is pure *zoē*, but his *zoē* is as such caught in the sovereign ban and must reckon with it at every moment finding the best way to elude or deceive it.[84]

Thus, what is at stake in the power of the ban, in the maintenance of a "torturable" subject or the apostate as *homo sacer*, is not the application

of the law to a crime or the determination of the illicit from the licit but the creation of the very grounds of sovereign power and rule. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this "space devoid of law" is "so essential to the juridical order that it must seek in every way to assure itself a relation with it."[85] The Deoband and Taliban's recourse to the notion that they are simply executing the shari'a is therefore a strategy of (self) misdirection, one that both sanctifies their drive for absolute sovereign authority over territory and bodies and obscures the connection between sovereignty and the capture of bare life within their juridico-political orbit.

Legislative Exorcism and the Deoband Anti-Ahmadiyya Movement

Indeed, the capture of bare life by the state, political agents, and the legal order in order to produce the figure of *homo sacer* is central to Agamben's analysis of modern forms of biopolitical sovereignty. The characteristic modality of the 'ulama in Pakistan today lies in precisely this deployment of sovereign power and the production of the heretic as *homo sacer*. The order of the shari'a continues to haunt the body of state law and the constitution, lying at once inside and outside the law. The juridical tools that have been complicit with the 'ulama and the state's production of *homo sacer* are the Blasphemy Laws. Agamben's reference to the jurist in the following remark is aptly characteristic of the way in which the 'ulama have crossed a biopolitical threshold:

> If there is a line in every modern state marking the point at which the decision on life becomes a decision on death, and biopolitics can turn into thanatopolitics, this line no longer appears today as a stable border dividing two clearly distinct zones. This line is now in motion and gradually moving into areas other than that of political life, areas in which the sovereign is entering into an ever more intimate symbiosis not only with the *jurist* but also with the doctor, the scientist, the expert, and the *priest*.[86]

The problem of blasphemy that has now migrated from the domain of the fatwa to the domain of the state is an exemplary phenomenon which betrays 'ulama complicity with the will to sovereign power.[87] According to Maulana Waheed Khan at Jami'a Faruqiyya, the legislative exorcism of the Ahmadiyya was one of the major achievements of the Deoband in the "defense of Islam."[88] Deoband sovereignty is thus expressed through the inclusive exclusion of the Ahmadi[89] within the scope of shari'a law, a law whose juridification is marked by its taking on the aporetic dialectical structure, or topology, of the ban. The ban on the Ahmadi brings the body of the Ahmadi, now rendered *homo sacer*, within the legal orbit

and scope of their mythic violence, and it is this assumption of sovereign power, I would argue, that constitutes a real heresy (*shirk*). This is a strategic form of what Agamben calls "the ordering of space," a practice that is constitutive of the sovereign *nomos*. As we saw with the military, what is at issue in the sovereign exception, the ban, "is not so much the control or neutralization of an excess as the creation and definition of the very space in which the juridico-political order can have validity."[90]

The state of exception – which is effectively a "complex topological" relation between outside and inside, between "the normal situation and chaos" – is the device that makes the validity of the juridical/shari'a order and by extension 'ulama sovereignty possible. The law of punishment for the apostate fundamentally reconfigures the relationship of the 'ulama with law and death. Properly speaking, the thanato-political, that is to say sovereign, expression of modern biopower is enshrined in the decision of life and death and the right to kill. The relocation of this declaration within the sphere of the shari'a effectively redirects sovereign power towards the 'ulama, with their capacity and authority to declare apostasy (*takfir*).[91] The declaration of the heretic is therefore a move, a juridical weapon, which exposes "the secret tie uniting power and bare life."[92] Sovereign power needs a subject that can be abandoned to its "law beyond the law."[93] The 'ulama's move is therefore in line with Schmitt, who sought to harness the space of the outside and bring it within the order of the political. This right of declaration of the exception (exercised by both the military and the 'ulama alike) and the sanctioning of death constitute a form of authority that bears the signature of sovereignty. As Agamben argues, this state of exception is more fundamental to sovereignty than the law itself. It constitutes the very condition of possibility for juridical order. The shari'a is therefore deployed as sovereign currency in the wider biopolitical networks of the metacolonial state. In simpler terms, the shari'a is a means to the end of political power. It is no longer a path or a way. Its relation to understanding (*fiqh*) has been overshadowed by its juridification, and it is proffered as a law that must be obeyed. In the *Islamapolis* the shari'a is war by other means, a form of historico-political discourse, a decisive weapon in the clash of local and regional sovereignties.

Heretics of the Modern

> Territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it is first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power.[94]

Blasphemy is about many things, but central to its articulations is the concept of boundaries and limits (*hudud*). The 'ulama's juridification of

the shari'a facilitates their role in the marking of social boundaries and the corresponding exercise of the exception through banning and exclusion. By articulating the boundaries of Muslimness, the 'ulama are able to constitute the faithful (*ummah*); Muslim *People* are produced through the deployments of specific biopolitical relationships and a distinctive logic of exclusion.

What I am interested in here is the grammar of blasphemy and how its corresponding notion of the heretic, the apostate, the *murtid* function across a range borders and different spaces: appearing here as the *jihadist*, the fanatic, the Islamist, the suicide bomber, and there as the kafir, apostate, and *murtid*. We should ask, then, what does blasphemy look like when it is mirrored in spaces marked either as secular or religious (tradition/modern, secular/profane)? I would suggest that the more general process of exclusion and legitimized violence against the excluded shows up on a number of horizons in addition to the more recognizable framework of "heresy." This would include, for instance, the question of "national security," which itself took the form of heresy in the United States during the McCarthy era. For some years after 9/11, and in many sub-cultures of the United States, being Muslim was tantamount to prophesying a heresy against the religion of the United States.[95]

As Edward Said has taught so well, imperial formations are sustained and imbricated within culture. In a fit of rage, and quite reminiscent of the liberal excoriations directed against British Muslims during the Rushdie affair, David Brooks, conservative '*alim* of the *New York Times*, draws banal yet emotively sharp demarcations between the West/Us/US and its constituent other, Muslim protestors/Islam/Them. Brooks writes:

> *We* in the West[96] were born into a world that reflects the legacy of Socrates and the agora. In *our* world … *Our* mind-set is progressive and rational. *Your* mind-set is pre-Enlightenment and mythological. In *your* worldview, history doesn't move forward through gradual understanding. In your worldview, history is resolved during the apocalyptic conflict ….[97]

One could comment endlessly on the magnitude of rank stupidities embedded in this piece, but I bring up his op-ed up not because it is one more variant of Islamophobia but rather because the notion that pious, secular, and political Muslims (Islamists) alike belong not just to another incommensurable civilization but belong outside of time. They are thus at best medieval specters, but certainly they are modernity's heretics. Brooks, in a variation of a fatwa that is endlessly reproduced in the media, was effectively laying out both spatial and temporal boundaries of the West in order to facilitate the production of "bomable abominable" spaces. Similarly, the editors of the Zionist magazine *Forward*, in response

to Cartoongate, write: "Suddenly, that old sense of shared European–American culture and values, so quaintly archaic just a year ago, seems more alive than ever." In best-selling author Robert Kaplan's heroic portrait of American Empire he writes about the Muslim World as the new Wild West: "'Welcome to Injun Country' was the refrain I heard from troops from Colombia to the Philippines, including Afghanistan and Iraq…. The War on Terrorism was really about taming the frontier."[98] The violence of such renewed Orientalist discourses thus collapses the distinctions between temporality and space, between Iraqis and Iroquois, folding the two points into a newly constituted moral geography whose newly fashioned juridico-political boundary is subject to policing and the exercise of exceptional Imperial power.

The twentieth century elaboration of American Empire, especially in its relationship to Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Iran, and more recently Iraq and Afghanistan, map out what Derek Gregory has called a colonial present, an ongoing and profound imperial perimeter of power.[99] This element of the colonial present corresponds with the ontic elaboration of the metacolonial. The Pakistani State has clearly fallen under the ambit of a specifically American grand geopolitical strategy in ways structurally analogous perhaps to the relationship between autonomous Indian Princely States and Colonial Britain after 1857.[100] It is thus not surprising that academic discourses on Pakistan have historically been dominated by "security" and political science studies. Additionally, the vast corpus of otherwise insightful theorizing and sometime brilliant works that have emerged from within the field of postcolonial studies are of limited provenance for understanding and evaluating Pakistan's specific political career (as compared to India), especially when such paradigms privilege the colonial effects of the past while occluding a neoimperial or colonial present.[101] In whatever way we might wish to label this current imperial relationship, whose primary modality of engagement has been though the cultivation of military networks, it is necessary to register the concrete and transformative effects of institutions of global power that intersect, interdict, and are otherwise ineluctably imbricated with local "Pakistani" sovereignties. This is not to suggest that a fully determined and wholly constituted set of singular constraints and possibilities are determined by this neocolonial relationship. However, it does allude to the substantial transformative effects on the political, cultural, and effective cartography of the region, effects that have Empire as one of its more significant conditions of possibility.

By going beyond the paradigm of Pakistan's postcolonial condition, the metacolonial aims to highlight a haunting by an intertwined metaphysical and colonial present. This formulation is designed not only to disturb the agency of Pakistan and question the scope and effect of its

supposed territorial sovereignty, but also to problematize the ascription of certain narratives of history (whether in the trope of "crisis" or "success") as "belong to" or "being of" something called "Pakistan" in the first place. That is to say, Pakistan should not be understood in isolation from the wider network of imbricated politics, communications, ideas, and economy. Conventional histories of Pakistan and its subject-citizens have become part of what Said has termed an "imaginative geography," where distance from the imperial center is narrated as difference through a series of spatializations. Conventional narratives that seek to uncover or reveal aspects of the "history of Pakistan" occlude concrete and material imperial effects on such "autonomous" spaces, spaces that are in effect subjected to disciplining and control within the wider politico-juridical landscape of Empire. If both empire and capital themselves, from the vantage of the metacolonial, are also symptomatic of yet another emergency, then the crisis of Pakistan should be viewed not as an anomalous divergence from the path of a proper political development but merely one more, albeit rather bloody and precarious, shade of the political itself.

A Tale of Two Shaikh's

The Deoband 'ulama have deployed these juridical technologies, specifically injunctions against blasphemy and apostasy, to carve out the boundaries and the form of an Islamic body (*ummah*) over which they can exercise greater forms of sovereign authority and control. The case specifically highlights not only the tensions, contradictions, and imbrications between competing forms of sovereign power over the space of the political in Pakistan, but also the ways in which such sovereign powers overlap and resonate, particularly through the mullah–military complex.

Writing from within the dark solitary confines of his dungeon, a hapless prisoner makes an impassioned plea to his fellow nationals: "I am a victim of the abuse of Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code," wrote Dr. Younas M. Shaikh, from his Adyala Jail cell in Rawalpindi. "There was no definite evidence against me, still there was much religious pressure and so the mullaism [sic] and the abuse of religion got me here. I hope American war against religious terrorism [sic] will also affect the religious terrorism of codified law in Pakistan as well as its abuse in the administration of justice."[102]

Like all good tales about the Muslim world these days, this one too is suffused with reference to 9/11. Younas M. Shaikh's plea was penned, on October 12, 2001. However, even through the thickness of his jail's dank walls, reverberating from beyond the Khyber Pass to his West, Younas

could not but have failed to hear the booming chatter of daisy cutters, furiously uprooting the weeds of religious terror, to make way for more fertile, possibly liberal democratic pastures. In the coming months, another Shaikh Muhammad, Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, mastermind of the infamous event, and hundreds of heretics, blasphemers, and assorted evil-doers like him were soon to find themselves in similar dark cells, in lands far, far away, arrested without warrant, held indefinitely, in places unknown, with secret evidence if any at all arrayed against them. As we know now the Orwellian code name for these penal black holes is "Bright Light," suggesting of course the liminal passageway on the edge of death.

Returning to our first Shaikh, Dr. Younas, then a 45 year old Pakistani medical professor, had been arrested without warrant a year earlier by the Islamabad police in October of 2000 and was booked under Pakistan's Blasphemy Laws. The son of a local merchant, with impeccable religious credentials, a Hafiz-i Qur'an no less, Shaikh had studied medicine in Pakistan and in Ireland, and at the time of his arrest he was working part time at a small clinic and teaching at a Homeopathic Medical College in Islamabad. Earlier, in 1992, Dr. Shaikh, single-handedly, inaugurated "The Enlightenment" in Pakistan, an organization committed to "rationalist and democratic principles," which advocated the "principles of liberalism, secularism and humanism." Above all Shaikh's enlightenment group argued for separation of state and religion. The blasphemy accusation against him was based on a few statements, which he allegedly made in one of his lectures while answering questions about the state of hygienic practices during the time of the Prophet Muhammad. He allegedly had insisted that the practice of shaving hair under the armpit was a modern invention and not observed by the Prophet and his contemporaries. Additionally he had stated the obvious that Muhammad's parents were not Muslims because they died before Islam existed. These responses became the basis for an FIR, a criminal complaint under Section 295-C of the penal code. The complaint was filed by Maulana Abdur Rafoof, an Islamabad-based mullah affiliated with the *Majlis-i Tahafuz-e-Khatm-i Nubuwwat* that effectively functions as the antiheretical, harassment wing of the Deoband 'ulama's political party (JUI). The alleged informer, a student of Dr. Shaikh's, who was also linked with the anti-Ahmadi, anti-Shi'a movement, had himself not personally attended Dr. Shaikh's lecture when the alleged blasphemy had occurred. The case of heresy was hence drafted almost entirely on hearsay.[103]

According to Pakistan's Blasphemy Laws, police can arrest an accused without obtaining a warrant of a judicial magistrate or filling an FIR (First Information Report). After his arrest, Dr. Shaikh was kept for

fifteen days in police custody and denied bail. There were reports that his reading glasses were broken, leaving him in a state of helplessness. Throughout his ordeal, he had no lawyer since most of the lawyers in Pakistan do not dare to appear in blasphemy cases for fear of becoming a target of fundamentalist rage themselves. In the court room, at his first hearing, an aggressive group of some twenty clerics of the Deoband's *Majlis-i Tahafuz-e-Khatm-i Nubuwwat* exerted pressure on the legal proceedings by appealing to religious sentiment.

Although no crime was established nor was any substantive material evidence offered by the prosecution, Younas was pronounced guilty on 18 August 2001, fined Rs.100,000, and sentenced to death. In many ways the victims of these proceedings can be seen as judicial sacrifices offered to the clergy. In Pakistan, blasphemy-accused are not only facing a potential death penalty, but even while in jail, they are in danger of being beaten or killed by prison guards or fellow inmates. If acquitted, they face the further possibility of vigilante justice. Since the mid-1980s when the Blasphemy Laws went on the books, hundreds of cases have been filed, and though no one has yet been awarded capital punishment, a few hundred individuals still languish in prison, and several incidents have resulted in the murder of alleged blasphemers, in some cases even before any legal proceedings went into play.

> For the next two years, I was held in solitary confinement in a very small death cell in the Central Jail, Rawalpindi, a dark and dirty death cell with unbearable, stinking and distasteful food. There was no facility for walking or exercise, and I was without books, newspapers, medication or treatment for my worsening diabetes. I remained constantly under threat of murder by Islamic fundamentalist inmates themselves in jail for murder and gang rape, or by some religiously-minded prison warden.[104]

Subsequent to an appeal, Younas Shaikh, forced to defend himself by secretly smuggling law books into his death cell, was eventually acquitted on November 2003. His lamentable three-year-long nightmare ended up in forced exile in Switzerland.

Until now my account of this witch hunt, which like the cases of suicide bombers and the exploits of jihadism in general, should produce the familiar forms of liberal discomfort if not revulsion. They all seemingly represent implacable eruptions of religious fanaticism that simply do not belong in "our liberal-secular humanist space-time." However, there is one critical element of Dr. Younas Shaikh's plight that I have omitted. Younas was a strong public advocate of "people-to-people" relationships between South Asian nations and specifically was critical of the Pakistani military's abuse of the Kashmir problem, and the ways

in which it fostered a wedge between Pakistanis and Indians and facilitated the construction of an enemy, which in turn fueled the logic of military rule. On 1 October 2001, Younas attended a meeting of the South Asian Union in Islamabad to discuss Pakistani–India Relations and Nuclear War. At the meeting he expressed the view that Pakistan and India should agree that, in the interest of the people of Kashmir, the present line of demarcation should become an official line of peace: the international border between the two countries. He also criticized the army's use of "freedom fighters" – known elsewhere as terrorists – as political instruments in Kashmir. Following Younas' talk, Shaukat Qadir, a Brigadier from the ISI, threatened Younas and said that he would "crush the heads of those who think and talk like that."[105] A few days after this, Younas was summoned to the principal's office, was fired without cause, and as he left the office was arrested by police. His first act of heresy was thus against the dominant power structure of the Pakistani nation-state: the military and its shadowy intelligence agency the ISI.

My deliberate comparison of the case of Younas M. Khalid, the Pakistani blasphemer, with Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the Pakistani-born Kuwaiti terrorist, is to suggest a kind of homology between both types of heresy. The body of the blasphemer has traditionally been the site for spectacular forms of disciplinary punishment and juridical excess. The use of torture (or the threat of mutilation and death) is designed to extract confessions. There are disturbing parallels between the CIA's use of water boarding and indefinite solitary confinement to produce a confession and the forms of punishment and confessional extraction deployed during the Salem witch trials. Both forms of apostasy involve the denial and defilement of the symbols of sovereignty. What I seek to highlight, however, is the manner in which the two blasphemers are constructed as fully biopolitical subjects, subjects who possess dangerous and socially destructive forms of knowledge, and on whose bodies a host of disciplinary and governmental rationalities are allowed to unfold.

Piety (Taqwa) Politics and the Public's Fear

During the US-supported dictatorship of General Zia ul-Haq (1977–1987), the Deoband were able to achieve two of their self-proclaimed major socio-political goals: the legislative and religious exorcism of the Ahmadiyya from the broader Muslim community in Pakistan and the codification of Blasphemy Laws, under the ambit of a wider *shariatization* of the judicial framework. Placed within the context of the 'ulama's

paradoxical relationship to the modern, postcolonial nation-state, the anti-Ahmadiyya movement was one of the first steps towards what is improperly but widely understood as the "radical fundamentalism" or "Talibanization" of the Deoband. Talibanization is simply the logical fruition of the violent unfolding of a sovereign logic. I would argue that an understanding of the radicalization of the 'ulama and its militant policing of the boundaries of Islam must be set within a series of metacolonial and postcolonial contexts. The easiest to identify is the metacolonial, in particular the repressive and regressive role of the State: namely the state's legitimization of the use of violence, intimidation, and coercion as the means for political participation and negotiation. The postcolonial context refers to the more complex process by which the textual tradition of an urbanized 'ulama were politically privileged over and above the more widespread and dominant forms of 'folk' Islam and Sufi orders. In this way the 'ulama were elevated as the authentic representatives of the "Muslim community."

Modern 'ulama politics can thus be seen as deploying the symbolic weight of what is popularly marked as traditional, authentic discourse to create new forms of political space and to exercise new forms of disciplinary power and authority within the ambit of larger more powerful sovereign orbits (the state, the empire). Additionally, they engage in what I call "piety" (*taqwa*) politics. *Taqwa* is literally piety with resonances of a fear of the awesomeness of God. What is celebrated in piety politics, however, is the awesomeness of the 'ulama, a sovereign strategy that translates piety to mean a fear of the 'ulama. Thus *taqwa* politics creates a "public fear" within the public sphere. Since representation and display are central to strategies of power, the 'ulama often choose public sites – court proceedings, women's bodies, and billboards – as spectacles and markers of their display of power. The production of *homo sacer* is the ultimate form of this power.

My primary suggestion, however, is that Islamic "theologians," particularly those who advocate dwelling in political space, do not deploy something like piety politics as a conscious strategy of power. Rather their political practice represents a deeper alienation from the ontological ground of their own language. This is not a problem of misunderstanding on the part of the 'ulama nor a transition in the formal structure of knowledge, one induced, say, by a change in the referential body of Islamic knowledge taught at a madrasa. Rather it is a transition in the very "epistemological unconscious" or historical *a priori*, which arises as a result of the proliferation of the space of the political. The transition of 'ulama practice and ethics can be seen as a transition from the exercise of discipline to that of control, with the rationale for the exercise of sovereign power firmly anchored in a biopolitical understanding of the faithful (*ummah*).

From the *Order of Things* to *Discipline and Punish*, one of Foucault's aims has been to show that the basis of what we think today, the entire order of existing things, is radically different from that of the classical thinkers. Epistemic transformations, or discourses as he later called them, were ruptures that fundamentally reconfigure not only what kinds of things can become the objects of knowledge but also the way in which these objects are configured within the new worldview. The task of a genealogy of Islam would be to trace these shifts. The epistemic reconfiguration thus concerns the realm of power (*savoir*) and is eventually articulated in relation to the wider set of institutional and political developments within which Islam is put to work, mobilized, and deployed, ways that are increasingly aimed at the salvation of the biopolitical body rather than the soul.

The movement of the Deoband into sovereign biopolitical space, their crossing of a spatial threshold, is a shift that was consummated in the Taliban's capture and deployment of State power. It constitutes a sovereign shift in that it *re-places* Deoband authority by investing the 'ulama with a form of power that is grounded in the ultimate right of the sovereign to take life, to execute, to take the decision on life and death. Today the only victory the Deoband celebrates is the victory over bodies not souls. It is marked by the burst of the Kalashnikov rather than a meditation on the voice. The demand for the shari'a as the preeminent law of the land is thus not an ethical demand; it is a demand of sovereign power since fatwa prescriptions in the Shari'a state will accrue the force of law.

It is the technologized relationship to being embedded in the modern political that results in the 'ulama grasping Islam ontically rather than onto-logically. It is not Islam *per se* that is technologized but rather the framework of understanding, the enframing grasp of modernity, which is a covering of the concealment of being and of being's withdrawal. We are dealing hence not with a direct case of 'ulama obsession for power but rather their possession by power (*Gestell*).

Coup de 'Ulama': The Objectives Revolution

At its birth Pakistan was still effectively framed under a colonial constitution. Under the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the 1935 Government of India Act became, with minor adaptations, the de facto working Constitution of Pakistan and was known as the Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order. The colonial apparatus was effectively still in place from the military to the legal establishment. It seemed only as if the State had been ethnicized. The unresolved problem of sovereignty, however, would prove calamitous. Today as

Dr. Shashi Tharoor, ex-Minister of State for External Affairs of India, rightly observed: "Most States have an Army. Pakistan is effectively an Army with a State."[106]

The first major step towards "decolonizing" the inherited Constitution was taken by the Constituent Assembly in March 1949 when it passed a resolution on the "Aims and Objects of the Constitution," subsequently known as the Objectives Resolution (see Appendix B). The Objectives Resolution was effectively a blueprint for the new Constitution, which was eventually adopted on March 23, 1956.[107] The Constituent Assembly formed several committees and sub-committees to carry out its task of framing a Constitution. The most important one was the Basic Principles Committee, which was appointed on 12 March 1949, after the Objectives Resolution was passed by the Constituent Assembly. The JUI President Shabbir Ahmad 'Usmani was appointed as one of its members. Its task was to report – in accordance with the Objectives Resolution – on the main principles of the future Constitution. The Basic Principles Committee submitted its interim report on 7 September 1950 and its final report in December 1952.

The Basic Principles Committee also set up a special committee for Islamic Teachings ("Talimaat-i Islamia"), which consisted of a range of Islamic scholars to advise on matters arising out of the Objectives Resolution. The Deoband had several key players on the Board,[108] and their goal was from the beginning to make the Objectives Resolution a fundamental part of the constitution. The Resolution was effectively a mechanism for usurping the "sovereignty of God," and it was the subject of substantial controversy. Most of the non-Muslim members of the Committee wanted the references to the sovereign of God and Islam removed. The Objectives Resolution was in fact the key cipher, or Trojan horse, for the "shariafication" of the law and thereby constitutes an underappreciated silent coup. It begins 'In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful:'

> Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the *authority which He has delegated to the state of Pakistan through its people* for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan; … Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice *as enunciated by Islam* shall be fully observed; Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective sphere in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and the *Sunnah*; Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures; …[109]

Much to the chagrin of the Deoband, the Principals Committee only recommended adding the Objectives Resolution as a preamble to the constitution.[110] There it hovered over the constitutional framework like a sovereign ghost until 1985 when Zia formally incorporated it into the constitutional machine. The subsequent political haunting of Pakistan is evident to even the most casual observer of Pakistan's benighted history.

The incorporation of the Objectives Resolution as a substantive part of the Constitution triggered a wave of petitions to Pakistan's superior courts attempting to invalidate laws on the basis of their "repugnance to Islam." The power to examine which law or provision was or was not in accordance with Islamic injunctions had, since the 1956 Constitution, been decided either by the superior courts or parliament. Up until 1979, the Objectives Resolution's provisions for "Islamization" only provided for the setting up of advisory boards (like the Council of Islamic Ideology) that would advise on the matter of conformity of laws. None of the recommendations of the advisory board carried the force of law. However, in 1980 Zia ul-Haq, acting under the Provisional Constitutional Order, established by *fiat* the Federal Shari'at Court as a parallel legal body to the superior courts, which he did not fully trust. Initially the court appointees were hand-picked political allies but not 'ulama. Later, however, three 'ulama were required to be on a Bench of five judges. The parallel Federal Shari'at Court was now set up with powers to declare invalid any law or provision of a law deemed repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and the *sunna* of the Holy Prophet. Additionally, as Foucault notes in *Discipline and Punish*, power gains its greatest hold on the body and the socius, when it intensifies, multiplies, and extends its realms of application. The Shari'at Court thus effectively paved the way for the 'ulama to capture an important space within the ambit of state power. The entire state machinery was now constitutionally bound to uphold decisions of these "Islamic" Courts. The establishment of this parallel mechanism independent from parliament to Islamize the legal system stands undeniably as the main contribution of Zia ul-Haq to the "Talibanization" of Pakistan.

Legal historian Martin Lau, in his excellent account of the relationship between the judiciary and Islamization, makes the argument that the initial phase of Islamization was effectively a process led by secular judges rather than the 'ulama. As long as the clauses relating to keeping the laws of Pakistan in accordance with the Shari'a lay in the hands of the judges rather than the 'ulama, a controlled form of Islamization could be used to enhance the power of the judiciary and expand the scope of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. In 1985, however, the vague ideological stipulations of the Objectives regarding the

sovereignty of God were drawn into the Constitution. The nebulous outside was now the nebulous inside. This is a rarely commented upon yet landmark event. Lau suggests that this marks a transition within the "Islamization" process, allowing the class of 'ulama to challenge the up-until-then judiciary-led process of Islamization. Effectively this meant that Islam and its shari'a stipulations would no longer be controlled at the level of the state by largely secular, liberal, and Western-trained jurists. Islam could now be deployed as a "revolutionary force, which was threatening the state from within the very judicial institution set up to protect it."[111]

Lau sees this as a more radical phase of Islamization; however, I argue to the contrary. The Objectives Resolution should be seen as delayed revolution and marks the attempts by the 'ulama to give "their" shari'a modern powers; it marks the complete juridification and modernization of the shari'a. In Agamben's terms, the shari'a is now a *constituted* and not merely *constituting* power. Shari'a transforms fully into its mode of enforcement. The Objectives Resolution can also be seen as mirroring the struggle between the Islamists and the All India Muslim League within constitutional and juridical spheres. It is not so much that the anti-Pakistan 'ulama like the Ahrar opposed the idea of an Islamic State. What they opposed was the idea that the power of Islam was being deployed by lay, secular, and elite classes. The struggle therefore at the level of the constitution can be seen to mirror these early political maneuverings, which were aimed, albeit unsuccessfully, at wresting the leadership of the Pakistan movement from the secular, landowning elite. Through the Objectives Resolution and its eventual incorporation into the ambit of the state, the subaltern class of 'ulama successfully challenged the powers of the liberal intelligentsia for leadership of the very definition of Pakistan. This represent a very substantial coup for the 'ulama.

Six years after the incorporation of the Objectives Resolution, the Supreme Court observed that:

> … in our milieu it has given rise to a controversy and a debate which has had no parallel, shaken the very Constitutional foundations of the country, made the express mandatory words of the Constitutional instrument yield to nebulous, undefined, controversial juristic concepts of Islamic *fiqh*. It has enthused individuals, groups and institutions to ignore, subordinate and even strike down at their will the various Articles of the Constitution by a test of what they consider the supreme Divine Law, whose supremacy has been recognized by the Constitution itself.[112]

During the 1949 debates, Board member Maulana Shabbir Ahmad 'Usmani expressed his views in support of the Objectives Resolution by stating that "Islam has never accepted the view that religion is a private

affair between man and his creator…." Islam "possesses a comprehensive and all-embracing code of life." He then quotes Jinnah, the Father of Pakistan, from a letter he wrote to Gandhi on August 1944:

> The Qur'an is a complete *code of life*. It provides for all matters, religious or social, civil or criminal, military or penal, economic or commercial. It regulates every act, speech and movement from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life, from the salvation of the soul to the health of the body; from the rights of all to those of such individual, from the punishment here to that in the life to come. Therefore, when I say that the Muslims are a nation, I have in my mind all physical and metaphysical standards and values.

The cipher proper then, the real Trojan horse for the rise of Islamist power, is not the 'ulama but Jinnah himself.

Force-of-Law and the Law of Force

The comportment of modern Muslims to "Islam" is similarly structured by the episteme, framework, of *technē*, a modality exemplified in the Deoband demand for the "enforcement of shari'a." A genealogy of Islam concerns itself with the history of this episteme and would trace the way in which Islam's original ethical potential, the *ēthos* of submission of the will exemplified in certain Sufi practices, for instance, is in conflict with the *ēthos* of the modern *polis*, the political, whose essence is the will to power. The deployment of shari'a as an instrument of power represents this transition from a will to god to a will to power. I am not suggesting here that Muslims ought not to have or engage in politics. In fact, such a proposition would be impossible for the spaces we inhabit are inescapably political. The proper task of politics would be to disclose the coincidence of this political space with the exception as a first step towards a de-linking of law and violence. A genealogy of political Islam concerns itself with disclosing the transition of Islamic knowledge (*'ilm*) in its relation to power (*savoir*). The emergence of Islamic subjectivity and the current obsession with Muslim identity (*ethnos*) is inextricably linked to the metastasis of the modern *polis*, whose topological structure Agamben has shown to coincide, like sovereignty, with the state of exception. The crossing of a threshold of indistinction within Muslim society between *authority* and *power* marks this transition to modernity, which, under the figure of the Taliban and the Islamic suicide bomber, has reached its catastrophic apogee.

Couched behind fidelity to the will of God (the claim of merely being followers of an Islamic *logos*), the political violence that drives the campaign for the primacy of the shari'a (whether at the hands of the

Saudi monarchy, Zia ul-Haq, or Mullah Omar) must be seen as the deployment of shari'a as an instrument of use-value that potentially confers sovereignty – authority *and* power (*auctoritas and potestas*) – to those in possession of the cipher, or "ark" of shari'a. This power is itself enabled by the power to issue edicts and proclamations (*fatwa*). In this sense the technologization of Islam is manifest precisely in the transformation of the desire of the fatwa to extend from opinion to something like a force-of-law. Like the liberal assumption of rational objectivity, Islamism is effectively blind to the will-to-power that undergirds its pious homage to Islamic law.

The 'ulama interest in the shari'a as a force-of-law is most clearly betrayed through their intense efforts to produce the exception. The state of exception Agamben writes "is an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without law (which should therefore be written: force-of-~~law~~). Such a "force-of- ~~law~~" in which potentiality and act are radically separated, is certainly something like a mystical element or rather a *fictio* by means of which law seeks to annex anomie itself."[113] This force-of-~~law~~ is also revealed in the reverence for the jihadist who is a man of pure action. More significantly, "the syntagma *force of law* refers in the technical sense not to the law but to those decrees (which, as we indeed say, have the force of law) that the executive power can be authorized to issue in some situations, particularly in the state of exception." Thus *piety* politics also enable the fatwa to be mobilized as a force-of-law, as decree rather than opinion. The 'ulama then can be seen as interested in deploying the force-of-law, and in this way their articulation of the shari'a is an extension or opening of a state of emergency.

Severing this nexus of law and violence – whether it manifests itself in the dynamic of the war on terror (which masquerades as a war for freedom and democracy), the repeated use of martial law, or the justifications of violence against society and the bodies of the vulnerable (women, minorities, Ahmadis, Christians, and Shi'a in Pakistan) through appeal to heresy (safeguarding the sanctity and honor of Islam/Islam must be defended) – is, as Agamben encourages, the central task of a reconstituted political ontology. Recognizing the structure of the ban in our political relations and public spaces is key to this objective.

> We must learn to recognize this structure of the ban in the political relations and public spaces in which we still live. … The banishment of sacred life is the sovereign *nomos* that conditions every rule, the originary spatialization that governs and makes possible every localization and every territorialization. And if in modernity life is more and more clearly placed at the center of State politics (which now becomes, in Foucault's terms, biopolitics), if in our age all citizens can be said, in a specific but extremely

real sense, to appear virtually as *homines sacri*, this is possible only because the relation of ban has constituted the essential structure of sovereign power from the beginning.[114]

The force of law has indeed become the law of force.

Notes

1 Agamben 1998, p. 51.
2 See the note on the "Father of the nation" and the *Duce* in Chapter VI.
3 Talal Asad's work on the anthropology of secularism has been influential here (see Asad 2003).
4 In Arabic '*ilm* has connotations of light and illumination and suggests an experience rather than "information." While the Sufi/Mullah, *zahir/batin* dichotomy is a historical oversimplification, in a general way we could argue that a Sufi sensibility leaves open the possibility for an understanding of '*ilm* as an experience of language (absence), whereas the 'ulama tend to be concerned with the literal and visible aspects (presence) of knowledge (see Chittick 1998; and Baldick 1989).The English word *knowledge* is flat and homogenous, and is embedded with the dominant assumptions about what constitutes truth in the Western tradition. Thus any genuinely serious inquiry into the 'ulama and '*ilm* would require itself to take up the question of the will-to-truth in its relationship to the will-to-power. After Heidegger, no better guide for this critical investigation is to be found than Michel Foucault. I believe it is the single most dominant cause for the impoverishment of social science investigations that, in the wake of postmodernism, they have given up being concerned with the question of truth, leaving it to the domain of philosophers.
5 Metcalf 1982. This fact itself may reveal something about the very modernity of the 'ulama, their constitution as religious within a modern *episteme*, which makes a distinction between religion and the secular. The 'alim/'ulama disjunction reflects the coding of the modern at a very fundamental level.
6 For a serious full length historical account of the early Deoband, see Metcalf 1982. Faruqi 1963 is also useful. A valuable primary source is the two volume history by the Indian Deoband scholar Rizvi 1980. One the best and most comprehensive book-length treatment of the contemporary Deoband 'ulama is Zaman 2002. Metcalf's first book *Islamic Revival*, while seminal in many respects, nonetheless ends her narrative at the precise moment of the rapid politicization of the 'ulama; namely the 1918 Khilafat movement. In her valuable attempts to play down a series of Orientalist essentialisms that link Islam with fanaticism, she underplays the political dimensions of the Deoband movement. Metcalf's otherwise pioneering work has suffered from a largely untheorized model of politics and the political. Zaman's work, by contrast, constitutes a necessary methodological advance in the study of the

South Asian 'ulama. Since my understanding of history, the subject and society is rooted in Foucault's work on power, I draw, but significantly depart, from Metcalf's overall interpretation of Deoband piety.

7 Metcalf 1982.

8 In the following chapters, I will problematize this characterization of the Deoband as "traditionalist."

9 Metcalf 1982, p. xx.

10 In her most recent work, Metcalf uses this term but does not flesh out its implications (Metcalf 2008). See the chapter "Refashioning Identities" for an account of this violent sectarian dimension of the Deoband (Zaman 2002). In later chapters I intend to show that the Deoband movement is essentially a biopolitical project rather than as Metcalf claims an apolitical inward pietistic movement of personal reform. For her attempts to grapple with the violent political nature of the Taliban Deobandis post 9/11, see Metcalf 2004e.

11 While it may not have been inaccurate to describe the Taliban as Afghan Deobandi's – or rather Afghan Students of Pakistani Deoband madrasas – in 1994 and 2001, today the Taliban is a more complex and multilayered phenomenon that has also taken on distinct Pakhtun nationalist overtones. See Ali for the nationalist element and also Giustozzi 2007. The link between the Deoband and the Taliban is therefore complex, and it would be to oversimplify the former to make an unequivocal connection with the latter. While one must be wary of essentialisms and simplifications of the Deoband, it would also be inaccurate to say that the link is arbitrary or a mischaracterization.

12 The Barelwis revere the authority not just of the Prophet but also of Sufi saints, whom they regard as sources of spiritual guidance. For a comprehensive account of the Barelwi movement, see Sanyal 1996. Deobandi groups generally oppose Barelwi forms of intercessionsist and shrine based religious devotion. Though Deobandi's do not oppose all forms of Sufism, their commitment to Sufi traditions has given way over time to more puritan and Wahabbi influences.

13 The Ahl-i Hadith ("people of the hadith") are broadly speaking more literalist and simultaneously antinomian. They insist on the exclusive legitimacy of the Qur'an and hadith, and assume that they can have pure unmediated access to these texts. Effectively this means a rejection of the authority of the classical schools of law and hadith commentary.

14 For a brief survey of the rival Sunni groups, including the Nadwat al-'ulama, which has significant overlaps and similarities with the Deoband, see Ahmad 1967; and Sanyal 2005, pp. 28–49.

15 For instance, Maulana Musharraf 'Ali Thanawi, a *mohtamim* (rector) of Lahore's Jami'a-Islamiyyah, has taken *bait* (oath) with a Naqshbandi, Chisti, and Qadri shaikh, three of the most prominent Sufi orders in South Asia.

16 The split between the *Hayati* and the *Mamati*, like the split between the Deoband and the Barelwi, revolves around the question of the 'living' (from *Hayat*, life) status of the Prophet. The *Hayáti* position is closer to that of

the Barelwi, in claiming that the Prophet has an invisible yet living presence among the *ummah*. The *Mamati*, like the Ahl-i Hadith, believe that the Prophet is only living in a special abode within Heaven.

17 Pirzada's book on the JUH does not even mention this difference, testifying to the secondary role of the theological versus the political within these Islamist organizations (see Pirzada 2000).

18 That is to say, over the designation of which society is to be defended!

19 It might also be mentioned that in addition to these sectarian and jihadist groups, which are often at loggerheads with one another, the Deoband has also associated itself with sectarian unity groups, the Milli Yakjehti Council. However, given the prominence and support provided to the sectarian groups by the scholarly leadership of the Deoband, it seems as if the unification projects are merely a front to deflate criticism that the Deoband fans sectarian hatred. The Deoband always considers itself to be a movement for the protection of the honor of the Prophet and the Sahaba. It follows that sectarianism is a logical corollary of the protection of Islam in a biopolitical age. Communalism and sectarianism are both species of the biopolitical caesura.

20 Each of the Sunni Islamists groups and not only the Deoband, have jihadist offshoots. One of the most effective jihadist outfits was the Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HM, the Mujahideen Party), the militant wing of the Jama'at-i Islami (JI). HM was formed at the behest of the ISI in September 1989. Given Mawdudi's long history of opposition to the claim of jihad in Kashmir by the Pakistan Army, the formation of this wing can be seen as contrary to its organization's founders spirit. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Mawdudi's successor, however, was drawn into the sovereign game like everyone else, and the JI also benefited from the slush funds and street prestige that the Afghan and Kashmir jihads procured. As the parent of all major jihadist groups, the ISI also uses the militant wings of the mainstream political groups to control the political parties themselves.

21 It is important for us to keep in mind that Foucault's use of the term *dispositif*, apparatus, continues the spatial thematic already embedded in Heidegger's conception of *Gestell* (enframing, enframe, meaning a certain structural encapsulation).

22 See Marchart 2003.

23 See Agamben's essay *On Security and Terror*: "…discipline wants to produce order, security wants to regulate disorder. … Nothing is more important than a revision of the concept of security as basic principle of state politics. European and American politicians finally have to consider the catastrophic consequences of uncritical general use of this figure of thought. It is not that democracies should cease to defend themselves: but maybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, not merely towards their control. On the contrary, we can say that politics secretly works towards the production of emergencies."

24 The biographies of Ludhianawi and Mufti Mahmood, for instance, are replete with incidents of social disregard and lamentations of the declining public authority of the 'ulama.

25 At Jami'a Faruqiyya, November 2000.
26 *Koch logun ke liya to hum abhi tak gaun ke kuthey se bhe bhuttur hain.*
27 However, this second order of the political, should not occlude the fact that these categories remain indebted to modernity.
28 Agamben 1998.
29 Malik (1996) also makes the claim that under the postcolonial state, the traditional space of 'ulama authority has been in decline.
30 The *Munir Report* states that the Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam, a party of nationalist Muslims, was formed in a meeting held in Lahore on 4 May 1931.
31 Usmani 1996.
32 The Munir Report emphatically blames activists of the Ahrar, acting as fronts for the mainstream 'ulama, for the violent nature of the events. From the Munir Report: "The disturbances were the direct result of the rejection by Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, of an ultimatum delivered to him in Karachi on 21st January 1953 by a deputation of the 'ulama who had been authorized to do so by the Majlis-i Amal constituted by the All-Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention held in Karachi from l6th to 18th January 1953. The ultimatum was to the effect that if within a month the Qadiani Ahmadis were not declared a non-Muslim minority and Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister who is an Ahmadi and other Ahmadis occupying key posts in the State, not removed from their offices, the Majlis-i Amal would resort to direct action (*rast iqdam*)" (p. 1).
33 The Report is titled: "Report of the court of inquiry constituted under the Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1953."
34 The report includes 2600 pages of evidence, 339 documents, hundreds of letters, and a host of books, pamphlets, journals, and newspapers.
35 "Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulama, need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental. If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done and that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one of the ulama, we remain Muslims according to the view of that alim but kafirs according to the definition of everyone else" (*Munir Report*, p. 218).
36 *Munir Report*, p. 220.
37 *Munir Report*, p. 12.
38 Jalal 2000, p. 295.
39 *Secret Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence*, quoted in ibid, p. 448. See also the section below *Fatwa-e Pakistan*.
40 *Secret Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence*, quoted in ibid, p. 449.
41 Institutionalized form of temporal and spiritual authority over the entire umma.
42 A Islamic consultation assembly, or Council of Islamic Elders, that advise the khalifa.
43 Assembly of Community of the Prophet.
44 Usmani 1996.

45 Agamben 1998.
46 For Agamben, testimony refutes the "isolation of survival from life," the separation of a sphere of naked life (bare life, *zoē*) from the context of the forms of life (*bios*). "The witness attests to the fact that there can be testimony because there is an inseparable division and noncoincidence between the inhuman and the human, the living being and the speaking being, the *Muselmann* and the survivor. … Testimony thus guarantees not the factual truth of the statement safeguarded in the archive, but rather its unarchivability, its exteriority with respect to the archive." Ibid.
47 Agamben 1998 and 2005a.
48 In the essay *Form-of-Life*, Agamben understands biological life as "the secularized form of naked life" (Agamben, 2000).
49 That is to say with Heidegger, that life is understood as fact rather than facticity.
50 Agamben, and later more famously, "the entry of *zoē* into the sphere of the *polis* – the politicization of bare life as such – constitutes the decisive event of modernity."
51 Jihadist discourses also share this structure of essential difference.
52 Agamben 1998, p. 4.
53 Lewis 2008.
54 This history of being, as we have seen in Chapter 1, is not confined to some wholly other transcendental sphere but instead participates, through its crossing, in the economy of power and the *polis*. Being is always therefore also a question of power.
55 It is not arbitrary then, in a formulation that continues with the Deoband, that handbooks of shari'a begin with and are predominantly concerned with the forms of ritual and worship *('ibadat*) and only secondarily with what would fall under the domain of modern law (*mu'amalat*).
56 That is to say, a proper history of the shari'a as apparatus (apparatus of capture and closure, of being, the shari'a as the induction of a certain positivity and history) has yet to be written. This historical investigation is beyond the scope of our talents, but it should be evident that this transformation and ossification far predates the colonial modern and can be traced to the emergence of canon law and shari'a in the ninth and tenth centuries of Islam, when the works of Aristotle, Plato, and Plotinus were permeating discussion of Arabic philosophy, scholastic theology (*kalam*), and jurisprudence. In such a history we would note that colonialism plays the role of a certain amplification and conduction, and not originator of these apparatus. Colonialism thus serves as the amplification of a threshold that is itself metacolonial. As noted in Chapter 1, "meta" is itself a polysemic spatial signifier, meaning both beyond and after, and also above and alongside.
57 Beistegui's phrase.
58 Islamic history thus folds within the epoch of technology, an epoch that itself unfolds as *Gestell*. Within this epoch, being is unveiled as beings, as energy, and as standing reserve. The challenge of a genealogy (a critical historical ontology) of Islam lies in adequately problematizing the historical situation (epoch) of Islam with respect to being.

59 In Heideggerian terms, this means illuminating the worlding or facticity of the 'ulama, their being-in-the-world. This world is not a universal world but a spatio-temporal world.
60 Gordon, Burchell, and Miller 1991.
61 See the essay *Critique of Violence* (Benjamin, 1996). On my reading, this distinction between mythic and divine roughly corresponds to the distinction between *potere* (political power) and *potenza* (ethical power).
62 Agamben 1998.
63 This phrase was popularized in Pakistan by Ghulam Ahmad Parvez (see Parvez 1968). Only in the antinomian strands of Sufism is this link between law and life openly problematized (see, for instance, Winkel 1997).
64 Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996.
65 Fakhry 1983, p. 223.
66 See Friedman 1989 and Madani.
67 Madani 1994, p. 129.
68 Ibid, p. 130.
69 Ironically Asrar Madani, who has a *Fazil* degree from Dar al-'Ulum Deoband, also has a Ph.D. in Early Arabic Poetry from the University of Glasgow in Scotland, and has chosen to reside in the land of the *kufar*, Canada!
70 For instance, a Church service declaring Christ the Son of God would technically constitute an act of blasphemy against Islam.
71 On May 22, a group of 160 students from Peshawar boarded a train to Multan. As they stopped in Rabwah, the predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual headquarters of the Ahmadiyya community, they began hurling insults at the locals. As the train returned from Multan, it stopped again in Rabwah, and this time a group of Ahmadis had formed to counter the students. An altercation with knives and sticks ensued, which led to thirty serious injuries. Disturbances followed in the wake of the government's failure to meet demands by agitators to crack down on Ahmadis in the government. Sporadic violence against Ahmadi homes and properties ensued and a countrywide general strike took place in June (*Dawn News*, May–July, 1973). Though media reports of the time do not confirm this, it is likely that the students from Peshawar were affiliates of the Ahrar (Khatm-e-Nabuwat).
72 Clause (3), added to Article 260, which defines a non-Muslim, expands a general definition to include… (see Khan 2001b, p. 297).
73 The offences prescribed for religious offences have been provided in Sections 295, 295a, 295b, 295c, 296, 297, 298, 298a, 298b, and 298c of the Pakistan Penal Code. Section 295 was originally a holdover from the introduction of a blasphemy clause introduced by the British in the colonial era. In 1990, the Federal Shariat Court declared the death sentence as mandatory for any blasphemy against the Holy Prophet. Originally article 298c only stipulated a prison penalty for those caught "posing" as Muslims, aka the Ahmadiyya. Later in 1993, Section 295c was added, covering the crime of blasphemy against the Prophet, with its stipulation of the death penalty. Section 295c of the Pakistan Penal Code (Blasphemy Act) imposes the death penalty on anyone found to have "by words or visible representation

or by an imputation or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiled the name of the Prophet Muhammad of Islam." Additionally any one accused of blaspheming against the Quran would also be awarded life imprisonment under the same section of the Blasphemy Act (see Appendix A).

74 It has been alleged that Nawaz Sharif's 1990 election campaign was in part sponsored by both the ISI and Osama bin Laden (*Daily Times*, Thursday, June 23, 2005) and represented a return of the military after a "democratic" Benazir Bhutto hiatus. The more radical elements of his IJI (Islamic Democratic Alliance) coalition were demanding the implementation of Islamic finance, which included a ban on interest. Since this would have resulted in the collapse of Pakistan's finance and banking sector, Sharif allowed the introduction of those aspects of the 'ulama demands that would not upset his economic standing with the ruling class of Pakistan. The Blasphemy Laws seemed like a fair concession to Sharif, but it was perhaps the final crack in the constitutional walls that allowed 'ulama sovereignty to spiral out of control.

75 Such a law would target Shi'as who generally show a disregard for the three caliphs (*Sahaba*, Companions), Abu Bakr, Usman, and Omar, for usurping 'Ali's leadership.

76 In 1997, the landlord of the house my family was then residing at suddenly passed away. Nasrullah sahib was a good friend of my father. The Defense Housing Society's Sultan Masjid was a stone throw away from our house and my father went to the mosque to procure individually printed chapters of the Qur'an (*siparas*), which are recited during the wake ceremony. (It is customary at a funeral wake for relatives and friends to complete a reading of the Qur'an.) When the imam asked my father who had died, he told him that it was our landlord. The imam knew that Nasrullah was an Ahmadi and refused to loan the qur'an pages (*siparas*). Later the imam told my father that if he had done so a blasphemy case could have been filed against him and my father.

77 According the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan between 1994 and 1996 alone, 94 Ahmadis were killed by sectarian mobs. Over 70 have been murderously assaulted; 38 places of worship were either burnt, damaged, or forcibly occupied; 15 graves were desecrated; and 26 burials of members of the community were either prevented or the rites disrupted. Cited in *Newsline* (December 2000).

78 For a sad, but excellent account of the travesties perpetrated against the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan, see Friedmann 1989.

79 *Newsline* (May 1993).

80 The members of one Masih community fled their homes and were turned into refuges in their own homeland.

81 DeCaroli 2007.

82 Agamben 2005a, p. 1.

83 Ibid.

84 Agamben 1998, p. 183.

85 Agamben 2005a, p. 51.

86 Agamben 1998, p. 122. My emphasis on *jurist* and *priest* (i.e. 'ulama).

87 I am by no means asserting that only today has blasphemy become an issue. Clearly the matter has a long historical provenance; from the Kharijite' assassination of Muhammad's cousin 'Ali, to the revolt of the famed student of Hasan al- Basra, Wasil ibn Ata (d. 749), who founded the Mu'tazilites School (from the Arabic verb *i'tizal* "to part or separate from"). What I am asserting, however, is the ubiquity and intensity of the phenomenon today, the way in which the core tool of exceptionalism is yielded by an increasingly large and diverse array of individuals and institutions, including but also beyond the state apparatus.

88 Ironically he cited Deoband's "military" opposition to the British during the colonial period as their greatest legacy!

89 The Ahmadi are a Muslim community that emerged as a distinct doctrinal movement in late nineteenth century India. The Ahmadiyya derive their name from their spiritual leader Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908) who claimed to be the *Mujaddid* (divinely inspired reformer). It is, however, precisely what he claimed and did not that is the subject of severe contestation. His severest critics charge that he claimed for himself the status of a *nabi* (prophet), thus contravening the idea that Muhammad was the last prophet of God. This is the basis upon which many Sunni's derive their animus, going as far as accusing the movement of being a colonial and Zionist conspiracy. Most of his followers, however, regard him as the promised Messiah or Mahdi. Ghulam Ahmad who initiated the first members of the Ahmadiyya community in 1889 was born on Friday, February 13, 1835 in the town of Qadian, in Punjab, India. His followers are thus also called Qadianis. There are two principal splits within the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, between the Lahori Ahmadi and the Qadiani. The split, which rarely manifests in violence, is based on a dispute over succession and the precise meaning of Ghulam Ahmad's status as a Mahdi. The Ahmadis today are a worldwide community, though the largest population remains in the Pakistani town of Rabwah. For further details, see Gualtieri 2004. See also Valentine 2008.

90 Agamben 1998, p. 19.

91 The right to declare a Muslim a *kafir*, thus taking the individual out of the bonds of the Muslim community and hence protection.

92 Agamben 1998, p. 6.

93 Ibid, p. 59. This subject is of course the *homo sacer*.

94 Foucault in Crampton and Elden 2007.

95 One could recall numerous media instances; when North Carolina University required its incoming freshman class to read Michael Sell's *Approaching the Qur'an*, Fox News' mullah O'Reilly was outraged and demanded to know why students were forced to read "the book of our enemy?"

96 I am afraid that even those Muslims living in the "US" and speaking very good English are for neocons like Brooks at best liminal moderns, that is, in the West but yet not of it.

97 David Brooks, "Drafting Hitler", *New York Times*, February 6, 2006 (emphasis mine).

98 Kaplan 2006.

99 Gregory 2004.

100 Citizen-subjects of the Pakistani nation-state in relationship to Washington, their "coloniality," so to speak, can be said to have structural analogies with a metropole/colony relationship prior to 1947.

101 The terms Empire and Imperialism (with or without the qualifiers "new" or "neo") are not being invoked as rigid or monovocal designators. I am mindful of the ways in which the applicability of these terms is fraught with its own challenges, in particular for accurately distinguishing aspects of difference and continuity from the colonial and imperial orders of the past. In this sense, a host of international institutions (IMF, World Bank, NATO, US Military Bases, etc.) have effectively continued to extend and exacerbate spheres of inequality and uneven distributions of wealth and power by means both overt and subtle. Thus it makes little sense to talk of a uniform spaces of "postcoloniality" in either Asia, Latin America, or Africa, let alone the Middle East. Broadly speaking, however, we understand the term Imperial to designate the contemporary use and exercise of American military and economic power, ideologically infused with strains of neoconservative and American nationalist purpose in the broader service of neoliberalism, which is a global system of political economy that extends the sovereignty of the market into all arenas of life.

102 "Blasphemy – My Journey through Hell," statement by Dr. M. Younus Shaikh (originally posted on www.iheu.org).

103 The parallels with the witch hunts at Columbia University spearheaded under the ominous David Project should be obvious. The David Project is an organization dedicated, much like the *Tehreek-e-Difa Sahaba*, which is itself a "propaganda" countering organization, to silencing of any critique of the State of Israel in its exercise of sovereign power over its own *homo sacer* constituent: the Palestinians.

104 "Blasphemy – My Journey through Hell", statement by Dr. M. Younus Shaikh.

105 Quoted in Ardeshir Cowasjee, "In the name of the law", *Dawn*, March 14, 2004.

106 Stated on *GPS* with Fareed Zakaria.

107 According to the new framework Pakistan was now an "Islamic Republic."

108 'Usmani, Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi (l884–1953) and Mufti Muhammad Shafi were members of the Board.

109 For the full document see Appendix A (emphasis mine).

110 The agitation's of 1953 were also in response to this.

111 Lau 2005, p. 49.

112 Quoted in ibid.

113 Agamben 2005a, p. 39.

114 Agamben 1998, p. 111.

4

The Space of War

Homo Islamicus, Body Politics, and Jihad

Primo Levi described the most abject figures of the Nazi concentration camps as "*der Muselmann*" (the Muslim) – "a being from whom humiliation, horror, and fear had so taken away all consciousness and all personality as to make him absolutely apathetic." Today the Taliban stand as exemplary figures of a Muslim life that does not deserve to live. Born in the postapocalyptic wreckage of US–Soviet imperial rivalry in Afghanistan, and spawned by secretive intelligence agencies (principally Pakistan's ISI), the Taliban today evoke a simultaneous sense of the reviled and the revolting. Eminently *torturable* and *bombable*, the very presence and continuity of Taliban ideology is viewed with embarrassment by Muslims worldwide, while simultaneously grounding the biopolitical logics for the "War on Terror."

The primary charge of this chapter, however, is to undertake a doubly heretical reading of the Taliban as spectral figures who disclose the paradox of sovereignty. I render the Taliban as "*homo sacer* with Kalashnikovs," exemplifying at once the proximity between sacred (bare) life and sovereign power. Perhaps more troublingly, the Taliban combine two of Agamben's key biopolitical paradigms, the camp and the refugee, hence decisively marking the contemporaneity of the political space of Afghanistan/Pakistan.

This chapter seeks to show how the emergence of the Taliban phenomenon – and by extension, much of the global radical jihadist movement – cannot be understood through reference to Islamist ideology as such, but instead might be more usefully situated on a metacolonial horizon. Contrary to the Taliban's own self-regard as agents for the enactment and *enforcement* of divine commandment and the left/liberal consensus of the Taliban as figures outside of time and reason – as

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strange reincarnations of a "medieval" Islamic sentiment – this chapter will seek to disclose the Taliban as an exemplary site of modernity.

On February 26, 2001, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar pronounced his infamous Bamiyan fatwa. The proclamation of a jihad against the fifteen-hundred-year-old twin statues of the Buddha carved into sandstone cliffs in Afghanistan's Bamiyan province was widely regarded as a perverse act of cultural barbarism. While Taliban apologists pointed to political rather than theological underpinnings, the Taliban leadership insisted on viewing their action as a pure expression of iconoclasm; as a resolute act of piety and fidelity to shari'a law. Through such violence the Taliban continue to evoke a sense of the reviled and the revolting, while simultaneously securing the biopolitical logics for the "war on terror." Contrary, however, to both the Taliban's self-regard as ministers for the enforcement of divine commandment and the left/liberal consensus of the Taliban as figures outside of time and reason, this chapter will seek to disclose the ways in which 'ulama politics is symptomatic of what I am calling the "metacolonial state." Drawing on the critical ontology of Heidegger, Foucault, and Agamben, I will attempt to read Taliban idol smashing, and other examples of 'ulama body politics, as gestures marking the effective indistinction between "Islam" and the "West." Within the framework of this cartography, which is marked expressly by the extreme convergence of law and life, we may be able to reveal a greater series of intimacies between the political spaces of Islam and liberal secular modernity – spaces which converge most concretely along the horizon of abandonment and biopolitical sovereignty. By extension I will argue that the crisis in Pakistan/Afghanistan today is itself a manifestation of the biopoliticization of the Islamic life-world.

The Kafirs' Condemned Body

> All Muslims are like one body. … Wherever the Muslim body is being oppressed it is our duty to support Jihad.
>
> – Sami' al-Haqq[1]

> We want to be known as the smashers of idols.
>
> – Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, Taliban Minister of Justice

In the early months of 1994, just before the Taliban were to claim their first major victory in Kandahar, an "angry mob" gathered outside a local police station in the town of Gujranwala in Punjab. Hours earlier the police had taken a local doctor, Hafiz Farooq Sajjad, into custody. The crowd demanded that the police turn over custody of Sajjad. The lynch

mob slowly grew into a crowd of hundreds and began attacking the police post, eventually storming the police lock-up and dragging the already dazed, confused, and handcuffed Sajjad into the streets. As he lay bleeding on the ground outside the police station, the crowd pelted him with bricks and stones. Elements of the crowd then poured kerosene oil over his body, making several attempts to set his body on fire. Eventually the body was tied to a motorbike and dragged through the streets for hours.[2] This was the body of a blasphemer.

What had so enraged the crowds? Investigations of the incident, which drew national alarm and forced President Benazir to attempt to introduce amendments to 295c to prevent its widespread abuse, remain conflicted over the cause. What is known is that Farooq Sajjad was a devout Sunni Muslim (a Hafiz-i Qur'an[3] no less) and a regular at the local mosque. Additionally, he had a diploma in *tibb* (Eastern medicine) and an MA in Arabic and Islamic Studies. Sajjad's father was also a well-respected leader of the local chapter of the Jama'at-i Islami. Apparently a call had gone out from a local Deoband mosque that an *atai* (quack) doctor had burned the Qur'an. Since *atai* sounds like *Essai* (the Urdu word for a "Christian") many people thought that some "Christian" had burned the Qur'an. A large crowd had already gathered for a funeral at the mosque and somehow descended on the nearby house of Sajjad where he and members of his family were beaten up and assaulted. As news of the incident spread, the police arrived and took Sajjad away for his own "protection". Eventually the "jurisdiction" of the crowd superseded that of the police, exposing the logic of force central to any law. To date nobody has been arrested for the murder.

The body of the blasphemer had traditionally been the sovereign's site for the display of spectacular forms of disciplinary punishment and juridical excess. Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* shows us how modernity discovered the body as an instrument of power, and today it is apparent that the body is the primary hinge for the deployment of 'ulama power. For Foucault, as we have noted, the term "biopower" indicates the way power, at a certain historical juncture, transforms itself to govern not only individual bodies through disciplinary processes but also the body-politick constituted in terms of populations. "The discovery of population is, simultaneous to the discovery of the individual and the trainable (dressable) body, the other great technological node around which the political processes of the West have evolved."[4] Whereas discipline was an "anatomo-politics" of individual bodies, designed in part to insert docile bodies into the new capitalist machinery, biopolitics attempts the control of populations in order to govern, secure, and control the life of the collective. With the introduction of biopower, the "social body" is constituted as an object of government. The older form

of sovereign power was based on the principle "*To make die and to let live*" and exercised as the right to punish and kill. By contrast the new biopower seeks *to make live and to let die* with its primary objective being the care of life and the biological with regards to its utility for production and efficiency. Biopolitics is thus a network of powers, an apparatus that is not necessarily stable or coherent, a collation of practices and knowledge that can give rise to a variable range of techniques of control. As Foucault made clear, the various forms of power he described can form daemonic permutations and combinations.[5]

The task of a genealogy as historical ontology is to map such powers. Strictly speaking, what is being made sovereign here is Islam itself and not the 'ulama per se. It is the defense of Islam in the name of the sovereignty of Islam that is at stake in the exercise of these powers. There is therefore an element of truth to the jihadist claim that he gives his life for Islam. This is how "a power whose aim is essentially to make live instead exerts an unconditional power of death."[6]

As Foucault elaborates in his 1976 College de France lectures, the vehicle that allows thanato-politics to coincide with biopolitics is racism; that which "allows biopower to mark caesuras in the biological continuum of the human species, thus reintroducing a principle of war into the system of 'making live.'"[7] Racism is the production of inferiors (infidels, *kafirs*), "ways to distinguish different groups inside a population. In short, to stabilize a caesura of a biological type inside a domain that defines itself precisely as biological."[8] As Foucault describes in *Discipline and Punish*, sovereign power is characterized through its control over the life and death of the bodies of others. Sovereign power subjugates the body; it is a power over the body of the other, and it uses the body as a place, site, and marker for the display of sovereign power. Like the ceremonies of *supplice* that Foucault documents, these acts are spectacular and visual displays of power, that inscribe the marks of the sovereign in prominent places. In the *ancien régime*, gallows and the corpses of the executed were displayed for several days. The scaffold and torture were exemplary places and technologies for the demonstration and displays of such power. What Agamben adds to this topology of power is the notion of the exception:

> Living in the state of exception that has now become the rule has meant also this: our private biological body has become indistinguishable from our body politic, experiences that once used to be called political suddenly were confined to our biological body, and private experiences present themselves all of a sudden outside us as body politic.[9]

This serves as an excellent description of the sovereign biopolitical turn of the 'ulama, bound up as they have been from the start, with the

proliferation of the state of exception. Contrary then to the understanding of liberals[10] who see Islam in dire need of a reformation, it is not the rights-bearing free citizen that marks the beginning of the modern age, but the entry of the body into political calculations. Blasphemy law forms the primary mechanism of this capture of life and the body by the 'ulama. Indeed, the Deoband deployment of blasphemy as a technology of sovereign power, the production of the Ahmadi as heretic and *homo sacer*, their commitment to the enforcement of shari'a, and the valorization of violent *jihad* open up a space for a new problematization of political Islam and 'ulama body politics.

In clarifying the mutations of modern power from the sovereign to biopolitical mode, Foucault writes that "the right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defense of society."[11] In this way the right to punish and kill is always expressed as a "defense of Islam," as the defense of the body of the faithful (*ummah*). The constitution of British Indian Muslims as a uniform body begins under the imperative to govern India on behalf of the colonial *oikos*. However, the biopolitical logic that the *ummah* must constitute by itself a national body was not originally a demand of the 'ulama but rather was the founding logic of the secular Pakistan movement. Thus the very idea of Pakistan was driven by biopolitics, the idea that Islam, now indistinct from Indian Muslims, must be defended. Since then this biopolitical logic has disseminated and metastasized.

The killing of the former governor of Punjab was not a murder but simply defense of Islam, a defense of the spirit (*nomos*) of the law and the Muslim Social body, all of which coincide in complete indistinction.

> The emergence of this figure of global police sovereignty is also accompanied by a transformation of politics within states, which corresponds to this model of lawlessness and indistinction: "the secret services – which had always been used to act ignoring the boundaries of national sovereignties – become the model itself of real political organisation and of real political action" (Agamben 2000, p. 85).[12]

At its most elemental this book's primary argument asserts that the transformations of political Islam are best understood in terms of biopoliticization. How does this biopoliticization play out and what does it mean to say that the space of Pakistan coincides with the metacolonial as opposed to the postcolonial? Further, we may ask in what way has Islam today, in its coincidence with life, been emptied of its ethical possibilities? *How much of the hollow rattling that goes on in Islam's name is merely the raucous anxiety of a nihilism that refuses its own recognition?*

The entry of Islam – and its concomitant form of Muslim subjectivity (*Homo islamicus*) – into modern political space, marks the hollowing and decline of Islam which is now everywhere apparent. The birth of Pakistan in 1947 and the 1979 Iranian revolution are key historical markers in this transition, but there were other nefarious convergences that suborn 1979 as the crucial biopolitical threshold for political Islam. In particular, 1979 saw not only the brutal conflagration of imperial powers in Afghanistan but also witnessed a decisive *event* of power in Pakistan. On the 4th of April, behind the fortified walls of Rawalpindi's infamous Adiyala Jail (and just a few months before Soviet tanks rolled into Kabul) by order of Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia ul-Haq (1924–1988), the Pakistan military hung Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto, effectively decapitating the symbol (however flawed) of democracy in Pakistan. The sordid alliance that subsequently ensued between the ISI, the CIA, and the House of Saudi inaugurated what we may call the *Great American Jihad*; a paradoxical proxy crusade that may go down in history as the most costly, misguided, foul, and shortsightedly successful *ménage à troi* of the twentieth century. The immediate offspring of this multilateral imperial apparatus (*dispositive)*, the Mujahideen, was hailed not only with massive injections of cash, heroin, and arms but also with ethico-political accolades when a select few representatives of these warriors of Islam were greeted in Washington and knighted by Reagan as the "moral equivalents of our Founding Fathers."[13] There is undoubtedly a degree of truthful irony in this convergence; one exemplary practitioner of a puritanical project recognizing his own exceptionalist face in the nascent forces of *jihadism*.[14]

The events set in motion in 1979 thus mark the beginning of the end of one Imperial foe and the birth of another.[15] We can hear the echo of technology and the structure of exception in the very names of these entities; al-Qaeda, which derives its organizational name not only from the Arabic word *qā'idah* (foundation or base) but also is a reference to the very computer database of names that was kept in Peshawar to keep track of the Arab–Afghan Greater Jihad conscripts. In the name al-Qaeda is thus embedded a simultaneous reference to the foundations of Islam and a military or computer database. In the Taliban and the Deoband, we again hear the very structure of exception, the *ban*, which this work, following Agamben, seeks to disclose.[16]

In this way 1979 Afghanistan can be seen not only as the place where the grand dénouement of the Cold War unfolds but also as the vital threshold for the biopolitical capture of Islam and the transition point into the age of Terror and Security,[17] which announced its conclusive arrival with the event of September 11, 2001. The subsequent convergence between neoliberalism and neoconservatism, which advocates a

far more moralistic and sovereigntist modality of power, constitutes the critical biopolitical matrix in which the analysis of political Islam's present must proceed. In short, then, Afghanistan marks the crucial threshold of the biopolitical age of terror[18] we now inhabit.

The abysmal, spectral figure to emerge from the convergence of these historical vectors is the Taliban. As Agamben notes, Primo Levi described the most abject figures of the Nazi concentration camps as *der Muselmann* (the Muslim) – "a being from whom humiliation, horror, and fear had so taken away all consciousness and all personality as to make him absolutely apathetic."[19] Today the Taliban stand as the exemplary figure of Muslim life that does not deserve to live. However. their violent and symmetrical oscillations between the figure of *homo sacer* and the sovereign means that the Taliban are neither *Muselmann* (the witness of the biopolitical nightmare of Auschwitz) in life nor *shaheed* in death. The Taliban are *homo sacer* with Kalashnikovs, and in this way exemplify the proximity between sacred life and sovereign power. A heretical reading, one that troubles liberal sensibilities, discloses the Taliban phenomenon as an exemplary and double instance of the sovereign paradox.[20] Emerging from the postapocalyptic wreckage of US–Soviet imperial rivalry in Afghanistan, the Taliban were effectively spawned by yet another alliance between the secretive security apparatus of Pakistan's "military intelligence" and the Deoband 'ulama. This Mullah–Military complex is key to understanding the discourse and practice of the Deoband 'ulama as biopolitical.

Perhaps more troublingly, however, the Taliban combine two of Agamben's key biopolitical paradigms, the camp and the refugee. During the first period of the Afghan catastrophe, between 1979 and 1988, thousands of camps were set up across the Afghan–Pakistan border to house the influx of some 4–5 million refugees.[21] These camps were thus born out of a situation of crisis, martial law, and war. The *madaris* that proliferated in conjunction with these camps functioned as a disciplinary holding and training space for surplus children. The camp, as Agamben notes, is "the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space (insofar as it is founded solely on the state of exception)." The camp thus appears as an event, the hidden paradigm that decisively signals the political space of modernity itself. Eminently *torturable* and *bombable*, the Taliban mirror the long history of global and local forms of sovereign violence through their own will to decapitation and through a range of other less intense enactments of radical control over the body. The strict and obsessive reinforcement of gender boundaries between males (beards) and females (veils) is itself an instance of an emaciated sovereign logic, which substitutes control over territorial space for control over the body and social space.

Of Beards, Bodies, and Buddhas: Sexual Somatics and the Radical Fatwas of the Deoband

When the juridical technologies of blasphemy are viewed together with the Deoband 'ulama's violent and coercive attempts at the regulation of bodily norms and practices, we can see that they do not simply constitute the logical corollary of implementing "timeless" shari'a prescriptions but rather together formulate a somatics that targets both the individual and the collective body. Sexuality is the point at which the body and the population intersect, a "dense transfer point of power," a matter of discipline and requiring normalization. Thus the obsession of the 'ulama with sexuality can be seen as an attempt to curb the aleatory and creative excess of the body. Additionally, it allows them to shift technologies of power into a higher gear, maintaining, on the one hand, a concern for discipline over the body while simultaneously expanding the scope of operations across the broader mass of Muslim subjects, constituted as either Muslim citizens of the Islamic State or as more loosely defined members of a trans-national body, the *ummah*.

Because the 'ulama view their limits on sex and pleasure and their strict gendered division of bodies as practices of resistance against the West, the sexuality that Foucault had already exposed undergoes a doubling effect. By regarding their sexual politics as forms of resistance to Western culture, the 'ulama merge morality and identity formation, but these somatic and sexual controls, which are regarded as mechanisms to evade the hegemony of Western culture, are nothing more than ways of carving out spaces for the alternative regulation of individual and collective bodies. In this way we may suggest a homology between Foucault's analysis of the "veritable discursive explosion"[22] of discourses on sex in the Victorian age, discourses that presaged the emergence of the biopolitical subject, and the current explosion of discourses on/of Islam, as mechanisms of intensification of the production Muslim humanism – *Homo islamicus*. Properly speaking, we are not talking about the re-emergence of Islam, but the appearance of *Homo islamicus* with its attendant assertion of a subjectivist metaphysics grounded in the will to power. As Foucault writes in the *Will to Knowledge*:

> Sexuality must not be described as a stubborn drive, by nature alien and of necessity disobedient to a power which exhausts itself trying to subdue it and often fails to control it entirely. It appears rather as an especially dense transfer point for relations of power: between men and women, young people and old people, parents and offspring, teachers and students,

> priests and laity, an administration and a population. Sexuality is not the most intractable element in power relations, but rather one of those endowed with the greatest instrumentality: useful for the greatest number of maneuvers and capable of serving as a point of support, as a linchpin, for the most varied strategies.[23]

The vast emphasis of Islamic cultures on preventing sexual transgression must thus be situated today within the added context of the truth-event of populations (biopower). Hence the severe social and self-management of the woman's body and her dressage speaks to the biopolitical form of power that Islam and its experts have assumed. As Foucault emphasized in *Discipline and Punish*, the body is a principal factor in the political economy of power. The tactics of the body are clearly a disciplinary mechanism of 'ulama power that is perhaps itself quite old, but when expressed as the capacity to defile or punish the body through the law, they take on a distinctively dark tone of biopolitical sovereignty. The dual deployment of Islam, like the deployment of sexuality, "has its reason for being, not in reproducing itself, but in proliferating, innovating, annexing, creating, and penetrating bodies in an increasingly detailed way, and in controlling populations in an increasingly comprehensive way."[24] Resistance by the 'ulama to any reforms of these laws speaks to their role as an instrument of power. The increasingly violent and direct targeting of the body (enforcement of the beard, lashing and stoning for adultery, throwing acid on the unveiled faces of women) testifies to the diabolical mélange between older sovereign and disciplinary modes of power and the biopolitical space of the present.

Normalized Bodies

> The beard and [trimmed] moustache on a Musalman's face gives him the strength of manhood, an upright character, individual integrity and exclusive identity. His *survival* and *safety* may rest on this brave appearance. The beard is the only kind of hair that *differentiates males from females*. The hair on all the other parts of the body are common between male and female.[25]

Scholars working on the questions of gender and Islam have become familiar with the ways in which the woman's body has become a site for contestations of religion and identity across a global array of Muslim communities. The absence/presence of the hijab has come to be seen as a marker of a particular form of religiosity (the right kind if one is an Islamist, the wrong kind if one is liberal[26]). The recent controversies in France testify to the polysemic range and significance of the hijab

question. Until the arrival of the Taliban, however, the male gender had been relatively unburdened from having his body become the site of religious battle. While the absence/presence of a beard had always been seen as a marker of male religiosity, within Pakistan, the "clean shaven" Muslim, like Iqbal or Jinnah, embodied its own nationalist prestige. As recently as 2002, Pervez Musharraf was heard excoriating a gathering of 'ulama regarding the lack of any essential link between being a good Muslim and having a beard. The governing and military classes have, by and large, been clean shaven. Every head of state, governor general, president and prime minister, even the Islamizing "zialot" Zia ul-Haq,[27] has valued his disposable Gillette. The beard remained a marker of religiosity, but it could also signify other negative qualities.[28] The monumental decision to shave every morning remains for most males in Pakistan a largely professional or aesthetic question.

Given the social status of revered non-bearded individuals, the 'ulama have always stressed the holiness (*sunnat*) of the beard, but preferred not to openly criticize those Muslims who did not choose to grow one. There was a somewhat greater measure of approbation for those that grew a beard and shaved it off, which verged on a kind of facial apostasy. Under the Taliban, however, the "complete enforcement" of the shari'a, with no compromises to worldly convenience or modern values, meant that the beard was to be mandatory. This insertion of 'ulama authority within the space of the everyday and seemingly insignificant matter as the length of one's beard eventually became a powerful way to inscribe the shari'a, and hence the juridical power of the Taliban, literally into the bodies of men. Punitive legislation measures the body and penetrates its everyday mode of conduct.

Contrary to Musharraf, the Deoband tradition has regarded the beard as an essential marker of Muslim identity. In addition to the epigram from no less an authority than the *Shaikh-ul Hadith*, Sheikh Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhalvi (1898 –1982),[29] we could take a more recent example: a letter to the editor that appeared in Karachi Dar-al 'Ulum's monthly organ, *Al-Balagh*, is typical of the emphasis being placed on the beard as a marker of Muslim identity:

> Muslims are overcome with western influence in their lives and it's easy to forget, nay, *neglect* the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Little do these Muslims realize the magnitude of their actions in imitating *Kufaar*. This is truly shocking! … And then there are others who claim that the matters concerning beards is a "little" issue not worthy of mention nor practice. To them I say get off the denial bandwagon, you're a Muslim! Follow the Prophet (PBUH) in all aspects of life, for he was the best of examples. I couldn't tell you how many times I've mistaken a Muslim brother (outside of the Masjid) for a *kafir* on account of his clean-shaven,

> well oiled, face. How can I say "*Asalamu Alaikum* Brother!" when I do not know if he is a Muslim. Yet that very brother then wonders why he was ignored! … From one brother to another, I say: "Grow a beard, then, since it also promotes Brotherhood in the real world. Stand with your Brothers, be one. We know you think you are handsome without it (a beard), but who cares? What matters is how Allah (S.W.T.) sees you. And when you do grow a beard, don't mock the *Sunnah*, please grow it correctly, i.e. FIST LENGTH. That is the prescribed length and no shorter."[30]

Under the Taliban regime, Muslim males were required to grow beards according to the "fist length" prescription. Failure to comply would often lead to fines and even imprisonment for a period that was correlative to the rate of follicle growth! The consensus on the importance of the beard is historical, but calls for its public "enforcement" by the State is a peculiarly modern and recent development and is merely a corollary of the transition to the enforcement of shari'a.

Writing in the mid-1970s, Muhammad Zakariyya notes in the introduction to his widely referenced work, *Daarhi ka Wajub* (The Mandatory Beard):

> On my journey to India this year 1395 Hijri [1975], I noticed something very new. … During my stay in Saharanpur, I was quite unusually infuriated with the question of the beard. I myself had noticed, and indeed many close friends also pointed this out, that I had never previously taken such a harsh stand before. But whenever I saw a person who had shaved his beard, I was enraged, and I denounced this act at every meeting. I strongly admonished people regarding the prohibition of shaving the beard. I could not determine the cause of this strong feeling towards this *sunna* except perhaps that I had begun noticing that more and more people were neglecting it and also that admonishments in this matter were also dwindling. During his last three or four years, the late Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani (may Allah's mercy be upon him) during the last years of his life also strongly denounced the shaving of the beard.[31]

Muhammad Zakariyya then goes on to suggest that unlike other sins, such as adultery or theft, where the act is temporary, a shaved beard constitutes an ongoing violation of the shari'a. "The shaving of the beard is a continuous act, and is exhibited all the time. Thus when performing *salad*, the sin remains. Similarly during the fast, Hajj and all other *Ibadaat* this sinful act accompanies him." Muhammad Zakariyya's definitive account on the mandatory status of the beard, like almost any other work by a Deoband '*alim*, consists largely of multiple citations from the accepted corpus of hadith, *sirah*, and commentaries and also includes similar judgments from other senior and well-respected Deoband giants. Muhammad Zakariyya draws routinely on the authority of Husain Ahmad Madani and Ashraf 'Ali

Thanawi (1863–1943). For instance, he cites Abu Hurairah: "Abu Hurairah reports that the Rasul Allah [Prophet] said: 'Lengthen your beards and cut your moustaches, and in this matter do not imitate the Jews and Christians.'" He goes on to remark that it is "unfortunate that today, by aping the Christians, we are neglecting and destroying this blessed and very important *Sunnat* of the Prophet." By quoting numerous sources he goes on to verify that the "shari'a commands that the length of the beard should be one fist full when held from below the chin. According to the *ijma* of the 'ulama it is not permissible to have a beard shorter than this."

While Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi and Husain Ahmad Madani could not agree on the question of nationalism, their agreement on the mandatory status of the beard was near unanimous. Maulana Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi in his work "*Islahur Rusoom*" also categorically states the centrality and importance of the beard. It is worth quoting sections from his work:

> The Hadith categorically states that the beard should be lengthened and the moustaches cut. This is narrated both in "Bukhari" and "Muslim". The Prophet has sternly commanded this to his followers. Wherever Rasul Allah gives a *command* then that act becomes *wajib* (compulsory), and to neglect this *wajib* command is completely *Haram* (forbidden, prohibited, banned). Thus it is *haram* to shave the beard and keep long moustaches. … Now, since it has been *factually* established that it is a *sinful* act to shave or shorten the beard, those who are adamant in this practice, and furthermore regard the growing of the beard as an embarrassment, and jeer and mock at those who do keep full beards; for such people to maintain their *Imam* (faith) is most difficult. For them it is imperative that they repent forthwith and also renew their *Imam* and marital vows; and fashion their appearances according to the teachings of Allah and His Prophet.[32]

Thanawi then deploys a series of *psychological*, *rational*, and *aesthetic* arguments in favour of keeping the beard according to shari'a prescriptions:

> Some people shave to appear young and to hide their age … this is totally meaningless … Age is a gift from Allah, the more years you have lived, the more blessed you are. … if according to some fools the keeping of the beard is the cause for embarrassment, then they should remember that according to many *kafirs*, to be a Muslim is itself a cause of embarrassment and a sign of backwardness. So Allah forbid, should you forsake Islam also? Just as we do not abandon Islam because the *kufaar* regard it as backward, so why should the very symbol and appearance of Islam be neglected because some irreligious misfits think it [the beard] is an embarrassment and an uncomely appearance. … Also, *rationally*, the beard for men is like the beauty of the hair on a woman's head, both being creations

> of beauty. If the shaving of the hair on a woman's head is considered unnatural and depraved, then how could the shaving of a males face ever contribute to his good looks. Surely there is no explanation, except that foreign customs have pulled a curtain over our insight and reasoning, and have clouded our common sense.

In his intervention on the subject of the beard, "*Daarhi ka Phulsafa*" (The Philosophy of the Beard), Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani further articulates the connection between the beard and Muslim identity. For Madani the beard is the *uniform* of the Muslim. The biopolitical significance of the beard as the equivalent of a nationalist flag could not be more explicit.

> If we observe the English, French or Germans etc., we see that they have their own flags and their exclusive *uniforms*, such that those who are familiar with them could immediately identify any of them. They can be identified on the battlefields and in political arenas. *Every nation does its utmost to promote and protect its flag and also its national symbols and emblems*. In fact if transgressions are made [against those symbols] it could lead to dangerous situations. Pull down a flag or insult it in any way, and then see the consequences, *they could even lead to war. … Uniforms are necessary for the effective functioning of any kingdom or government*, that is why they important among all tribes and nations … in *Allah's Kingdom*. … Those nations and countries who do not preserve and protect their uniform and identity are very easily and quickly absorbed into other nations. They disappear in such a manner that no trace of their name or culture remains. … The Sikhs uphold their symbol of identity by keeping the hair of their head and beard. … The British came to India at the end of the sixteenth century. They stayed for about two hundred and fifty years. They came from a country that is cold, but they did not give up their coats, trousers, hats and neckties in this country, which is very hot. That is why a nation of three hundred and fifty million could not absorb the comparatively small numbers that came. They held forth their identity as a separate nation and as an exclusive government. … It is evident from this that *any nation or religion can only continue to survive when it adopts an exclusive form of appearance*, civilization and culture, custom and language. Therefore it is necessary for the religion of Islam – which is higher than all other religions in its beliefs, character and practice – to adopt an exclusive uniform and outlook. *To protect and preserve this mode and uniform is tantamount to protecting the religion itself, and lives will readily be sacrificed for this purpose*.[33]

Madani, having defined the West as an essentially "shaven community," redirects the essentializing gaze of Orientalism back upon Europe with the same biopolitical occularity; viewing white man as determined by his

hair style, the filth of swine and pork eating, and sexual and moral decadence. He continues with his *islah* (admonishment):

> He who chooses for himself the [fashion] of another people will be regarded as from them. This is the Hadith which at times annoy many un-Islamically inclined youth. [But] historical facts should be studied and in view of what the enemies of Islam have done, *their exclusive uniforms and their attire and fashions should be shunned and disliked*. It does not matter whether the fashions are those of Curzon, Gladstone, France or America, or whether they are related to dress, body, language, culture or customs. In every locality and every country of the world it is regarded as natural and human to like and adopt everything that a friend likes, and to regard everything of an enemy with contempt and as foreign. Especially those things that exclusively belong to the enemies. Therefore our earnest effort must be to become loyal and honest followers of Muhammad, and not slaves of Curzon, Harding, France or America.[34]

What is to be noted here in these tedious yet revealing extracts is that, despite the passionate arguments and chastisements, at no point do any of these figures suggest that the state or any other authority enforce compliance with this prescription. Thus, as we can see, even as late as 1975, Muhammad Zakariyya was merely annoyed that fellow Muslims were neglecting the word of Allah (*sunnat*). For Thanawi the question of the beard is expressed largely as an issue of love for the prophet, one's community, identity, and ultimately personal salvation. In Madani's work there is a clearer sense of the us-versus-them binary. However, formal opposition to the customs and practices of the non-Muslim, especially in light of their political superiority, left the 'ulama helpless against the very *savoir* of the colonial period: the idea that Muslims constitute a people with a flag and a uniform.

In *Hayat-ul Muslimin*,[35] Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi heightens his fetishization of the subject when he states that "appearance" is fundamental to "identity" and that it was prohibited for a Muslim to shave his beard and take on the appearance of a Westerner: "Thus shaving or cutting the beard … wearing shorts, are completely forbidden. … If a Muslim despises or mocks at such shari'a prohibitions, his act of transgression progresses from sin to *kufr*." One could of course argue that this is precisely the foundation for classic Taliban politics, who had taken the bearded sentiments of the traditionalist masters and carried them to their practico-political conclusion. Under a traditional (*'amr bil marouf*) regime such as the Taliban's, the enforcement of the beard was thus bound to occur. If shaving is an act of heresy (*kufr*), then does not the Muslim become a blasphemer (*murtid*)?

While this formulation of the argument, Thanawi plus political power equals Taliban (reformulated elsewhere as Islam plus Power equals

Radical Fundamentalism), is perhaps too linear and problematic, it certainly makes it tendentious to simply dismiss the Taliban as aberrant extremists. Thanawi makes his admonishments and passionate judgments as he does precisely because he was operating in a juridically neutered space. In such a context, the invocation of heresy (*kufr*) would have had a different affective resonance.[36] So we might ask, what has intervened between Thanawi of the 1930s (or even Muhammad Zakariyya in the 1970s) and the Taliban today? One obvious answer is the state. Given, however, the way in which Thanawi and the Ahrar gravitated to the possibility of an Islamic State, one might detect another logic at work, one that has today crossed a (biopolitical) threshold. Given the extraordinary emphasis placed on "Islamizing" the state through the judiciary, it is clear that Thanawi must have imagined what state power could do for the restoration of Islamic sovereignty. While it is unclear if Thanawi would have suggested the deployment of coercive state forces to enforce all forms of shari'a norms,[37] it is clear that the idea of Pakistan was attractive because it was simultaneously an idea of Muslim power. Thanawi's piety had given way to the lure of the political and the constitution of the Muslim as a biopolitical body was essential to that thrust.

However, we can also read these earlier admonishments as efforts to preserve a historically normalized consensus regarding the status of the beard. The normalizing force of 'ulama disciplinary power was coming under increasing erasure. The punitive potential of 'ulama discourse therefore rested on the counterconstruction of a delinquent subject. For Thanawi and Zakariyya the shari'a violator was just such a delinquent in need of rehabilitation and repentance. Under a Taliban-style dispensation, however, the mere delinquent becomes the offender: "The delinquent is to be distinguished from the offender by the fact that it is not so much his act as his life that is relevant in characterizing him. … The legal punishment bears upon an act; the punitive technique on a life."[38]

One of the tasks of a critical history is to trace and identify the kinds of sociopolitical and discursive transformations, the shifts in mood and history, that can be marshaled to understand the ways in which the Deoband community has facilitated and spawned particularly violent, intolerant, and sectarian forms of political practice; practices that are simultaneously distanced and sanctioned by many of the mainstream Deoband 'ulama. How is it possible that the heirs of the deeply meditative, erudite, pietistic, and scholarly tradition has morphed into a violent and abject movement known as the Taliban? What happened to the heirs of Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi – revered as one of the "greatest 'ulama of the century" – and the heirs of Husayn Ahmad Madani – *mohtamim* of the seminal seminary at Deoband, leader of the JUH? How could such

traditions produce the now revered (and feared) Mullah Omar, the one-eyed captain of the Taliban, the surrogate "Amir al-Momineen" (commander of the faithful) of the new Deoband?[39] What are the conditions of possibility that allow for the emergence of diametrically opposed politics and sensibilities from within an ostensibly uniform set of religious discourses and practice (Deoband)? The opposition I am exploring here is the apparent gulf between the sensibilities of the early founders of the Deoband and the most recent permutation of that institution the Taliban. The Taliban have been widely coded as radical fundamentalists, as an incarnation of a medieval specter, stubbornly refusing its Hegelian destiny to dissolve under modernity or at best as a pathological phenomenon that suggests containment or control. On a metacolonial level the politicized traditionalism of the Taliban has undoubtedly been forged through the distortionary violence of cold war geo-politics. However, as I have tried to show, this phase transition begins well before the influence of the American empire. Like colonialism, American Empire should be viewed not as a primary cause of Taliban violence (the US supported the Mujahideen argument) but rather as a conductor and intensifier of the conditions of possibility of sovereign power.

From the metacolonial perspective, however, we can view this phase transition of the 'ulama as one from disciplinary power to biopower. Under a disciplinary regime the 'criminal' is known through his transgressive deeds. Under biopower the delinquent is known through his or her abnormal personality (the terrorist, the heretic). The fetishization of subjectivity that characterized the 'ulama angst regarding the beard has today intensified in the Islamist production of a biopolitical society, where delinquency is specified in terms not so much of the law but of the "norm."[40] The shari'a order thus coincides perfectly with the "'criminological' labyrinth from which we have certainly not yet emerged."[41]

The question that the enforcement of the beard raises is complex. The views of the 'ulama on the beard have been clear for centuries. Madani and Thanawi had published fatwa on the beard in the mid-1920s and 1930s, and the *Fatwa-e-Deoband* also contains dozens of related fatwa. Every Darul Ifta routinely produces fatwa concerning the mandatory status of the beard. However, at what point did the beard become politicized? Not all heresies (*kufr*) are equal it seems. The issue of the beard was not a rallying point until the Taliban, Muhammad Zakariyya's irritation notwithstanding, but it is clear that the increased clout resulting from the blasphemy laws, coupled with the Taliban's defiant assertiveness, have provided the conditions of possibility for the reassertion of the beard. The strategy of sovereign power includes the criminalization of increasing spheres of everyday life. By appealing to a history of colonial domination and the need to preserve and protect Muslim identity, the power

and prestige of the 'ulama as protectors of the faith and therefore as sovereign surrogates was suddenly enhanced.

By weighing in over the spaces for pluralistic thinking and limiting the scope of free speech, the 'ulama have been able to accrue forms of power that have historically been unattainable. The space of juridical authority that had been domesticated under colonialism, and further marginalized under the postcolonial regime, became suddenly enlarged. The Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan were embraced in part because they represented the new power of the 'ulama over those segments of society that had rejected and spurned them. Fear of Talibanization meant indirectly fear of the 'ulama (piety (*taqwa*) politics). The Deoband's overall enthusiastic support for the Taliban, even in matters that seemed in contention with the generally accepted *ēthos* of Islam, was a marker of their embrace of new forms of power (or *puvva*). The case of the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas bears this contention out.

The Buddhas of Bamiyan

> The Taliban are not extracting any hidden treasures from underneath these statues nor are they going to benefit materially from this act in any way. What is it that these people are doing? Is there a message that is being transmitted to the world? … The very fact that they are undertaking an act that has no economic or materialistic motive despite world opposition is in itself a very potent defiance of the ideology of "follow the rising sun." It is not the demolition of stone statues then that is causing the hue and cry, it is the defiance of the current world order! Taliban are openly demolishing the belief system of the forces of darkness! They are defying the ideology, not of the Buddhists, but of the western powers! … Believers of Islam will choose to defy the powers of darkness at the time and manner of their own choice![42]

In this section I will develop my understanding of the unapologetic subject by analyzing Mullah Omar's resoluteness in the face of world opinion following his order to destroy the Bamiyan Buddhas in March of 2001. I suggest we read this act in terms of public spectacle, performativity, and power rather than as the logical implementation of shari'a prescriptions regarding the smashing of idols (*but shikani*). It is clear that for centuries the Bamiyan Buddha statues survived Islam, but they did not survive the Taliban. This fatwa can be compared with similarly controversial edicts (the enforcement of the beard and forced prayers) and the support for these measures among Deoband 'ulama in Pakistan must also be placed within the context of the unapologetic subject and its dimensions of sentiment and performativity.

On 26 February 2001, the Taliban leader and caricature of a caliph, Mullah Omar, pronounced his infamous Bamiyan fatwa, which was quickly broadcast over Afghanistan's *Radio Shari'at*. In this edict, he proclaimed all-out war against two 1500-year-old statues of the Buddha carved into sandstone cliffs in Afghanistan's Bamiyan province. These towering idols, 175 and 120 feet high, were regarded as one the most impressive relics of Afghanistan's pre-Islamic era. Additionally, the *Amir-ul Momineen*[43] ordered the demolition of all other statues in the country including those in museums, since they are also "repugnant" to the laws of Islam. "All statues and non-Islamic shrines located in different parts of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan should be destroyed."[44]

The Taliban had seized Bamiyan, a stronghold of the opposition and home to a majority of ethnic Shi'i Hazaras, on 10 September 1998. Just a few months earlier the Taliban had conducted a massacre of some 8000 Hazaras during the campaign to capture Mazar-i Sharif (on 8 August). However, there had been sporadic fighting in the area since then between troops of the hardline Islamic militia and members of the opposition coalition led by Ahmad Shah Masood. The anti-Taliban Hezb-e-Wahdat party took Bamiyan back briefly in early February 2001 but were routed comprehensively a few days later. It was a few days after this recapture of Bamiyan that Mullah Omar issued his famous fatwa. Like the fatwa issued by Khomeini against Rushdie, the power of Omar's fatwa reverberated beyond the geographical borders of Afghanistan. Within hours international and local media condemned the fatwa as an act of savage destruction against a World Heritage Site.

In an editorial in the international Deoband journal, *Al-Balagh*, Mufti Rafi 'Usmani, the Grand Mufti of Pakistan, denied the assertion that the destruction of statues was an un-Islamic act. He noted that Qur'an narrated the story of the Prophet Abraham, who was a "destroyer of idols." Rafi 'Usmani reminded his audience that the Prophet Muhammad did in fact destroy all 360 idols in the Ka'ba after the conquest of Mecca. He concluded, however, by suggesting that there could indeed be a disagreement among the 'ulama regarding the priorities and the methods used by the Taliban. "There are many evils in the society," he said. "And scholars may disagree over which ones need the most attention at a given time."[45] Similarly, he noted that scholars could disagree over the particular approach taken to eradicate an evil. Some might question whether the action would alienate the Buddhist nations in Southeast Asia at a critical time for Afghanistan. However, according to 'Usmani, the Taliban had taken the decisions in light of guidance from their respected scholars. The Grand Mufti of Pakistan also questioned the right of the world leaders to criticize Taliban. "The people who nuked Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who killed hundreds of thousands of people in Iraq, and are

killing people in Afghanistan through the recently imposed sanctions, how strange that they should be raising their voice in support of stone statues?"[46] 'Usmani also cautioned Muslims not to mistake the Taliban for a "bunch of ignorant people. I know them personally. They themselves are not ignorant in shari'a. They also have scholars among them and their decisions are based on the guidance from their respected scholars." In other words, this was at once a tactical way of preserving support for the Taliban's actions and thereby drawing on their reserve of actual and symbolic political power, while simultaneously maintaining the scope of legitimate scholastic differences within an institution (Darul 'Ulum) not otherwise known for its links with "extremists."

The diverse set of condemnatory and justificatory discourses that ensued around this event is fascinating. Pakistan's premier English daily *Dawn* ran seventeen opinion pieces on Bamiyan, which were by and large harshly critical of this latest of Taliban antics, deriding Mullah Omar and the Taliban as an insult and embarrassment for Islam and for Muslims worldwide. However, this criticism was also couched behind a series of attempts to present this event as a political rather than religious maneuver. This was typified in the commentary of the author of the book *The Taliban*, Ahmad Rashid.[47] Rashid claimed that "the controversial decision was apparently influenced by the hardliners who appear to have emerged much stronger after the imposition of UN sanctions." Juan Cole has suggested that Mullah Omar was influenced in this decision by Osama bin Laden. Others touted the act as an outburst of revenge, a signal of defiance against UN sanctions and the world community. Other editorials touched on more local political factors, namely that the Shi'i Hazaras of Bamiyan had allied themselves with the Northern Alliance and had put up stiff resistance against the Taliban.

In the Urdu press, *Jung* editorials and letters were less overtly hostile and condemnatory towards the Taliban but often registered a polite disagreement about whether the fatwa was necessary or even Islamic. The Western concern for pieces of "rock" in the face of their "indifference" to the suffering of the Afghan people through the imposition of crippling UN sanctions was, however, highlighted as a classic case of hypocrisy (*munafiqat*).[48]

What is ultimately more illuminating are the various public and private reactions to these events from within the broader Deoband establishment. Maulana Fazlur Rahman, leader of the Deoband's main political faction, the JUI (F), who has very close links with the Taliban, supported Omar's viewpoint. "As a leader of an Islamic party, I say that statues are not acceptable in Islam."[49] However, when pushed by reporters about the *shari'a* validity of the fatwa, he went on to say: "Let us not forget that the UN has imposed sanctions on Afghanistan at a

time when hundreds of children are dying of cold and hunger. … Maybe that is *also* why they have taken this drastic action, to show their anger." Rahman was certainly not eager to present the Islamic basis for the ruling by the Afghan Ministry of Vice and Virtue, because he would not have been willing to pronounce or support a fatwa issued on this subject for idols and statues housed in Pakistani museums and archeological sites. More interestingly, Sami' al-Haqq of the Haqaniyya madrasa suggested that the statues should be locked in a museum or sold "because there are infidels who are interested in buying them. Then the money should be used for Afghanistan."

In India, however, where this act provided fodder for the RSS, the destruction of the idols was proof of "Muslim marauders version of history." However, the Deoband '*alim* Abdul Khaliq, vice-chancellor of the Dar al-'Ulum at Deoband, the Mecca and birthplace of the Deoband movement, stated emphatically that: "We don't support the Taliban action in any way. It is anti-Islamic." By distancing himself from any suggestion that the act was sanctioned, this Deoband '*alim* did not want this form of power accruing to his institution. It did not, however, prevent Asad Madani, the *mohtamim* of India's Deoband, from attending the April 2001 Deoband conference.[50]

By contrast to all these apologetic or condemnatory statements, the leadership and officialdom of the Taliban were loath to attribute any political motive, revenge, defiance, or otherwise to this act and made it out to be an action that was resolutely an act of piety and fidelity to Islam. Taliban's culture minister, Mawlawi Qudratullah Jamal, told *The Times of India*: "The status of all religious deities (*ma'abut*) had been under consideration for some time. The ministry for the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice recently submitted its findings."[51] For him, the act was a routine, bureaucratic enforcement of shari'a law. He dismissed the pleas against the demolition as "drama" and in another broadcast over Radio Shari'at stated: "The infidels want to rob Islam of its spirit. I would like to ask the world Muslims not to harmonize their voices with those of non-believers. These statues were the gods of infidels and these infidels continue to worship and respect these icons. Allah Almighty is the only real god and all false gods should be smashed."[52]

On a similar note, Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Muhammad Hassan said in his Eid-ul Azha sermon at a local mosque that it was "foolish" to claim that Omar's decree was un-Islamic. "It is a shame for Afghans even to think their forefathers were idol worshippers. Islam is our only true pride."[53] In what was perhaps a retort to Sami' al-Haqq, Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, the powerful Taliban justice minister, who is said to have persuaded Omar to issue the edict to destroy the statues, stated: "We want to be known as the smashers of idols, not sellers of idols."

The Unapologetic Subject

Like many of the other students and ʻulama I had occasion to talk with, Maulana Wali Khan, a junior scholar at Jamiʻa Faruqiyya, displayed a sense of enormous pride that Taliban had defied the world community. He was less concerned with explaining the shariʻa basis for the ruling. "For the first time," Maulana Wali Khan informed me, "we have an Islamic regime that can stand behind the *Sunnah* without apologetics or concessions to the west." This theme of an unapologetic Islam, flying in the face of Western modernity, was reiterated in numerous conversations. It is hence not surprising to find that most popular and many academic discussions of political Islam regard such statements as implicitly suggesting the radical alterity of Islamist politics, an alterity that arises from a primal commitment to certain essentialized texts. If, however, we see these acts and discourses in terms of the assertion of sovereign power and as countermeasures to other forms of competing sovereignty, then a slightly different picture begins to emerge. The problematic of "Pakistani" history and histories of political Islam in general can thus be situated within, rather than against, the condition of political modernity. Viewing this phenomenon across a horizon of shared historical experience and political affect also brings the narrative of Kabul into greater proximity with K-Street than Karachi.

The use of violence and the Kalashnikov as a means of settling public debates had clearly benefited the Deoband as much as it had the MQM in the 1980s. As a model for enhancement of one's poll profile and overall clout, the MQM model was an enviable one. The Deoband's hope for political power hence rested on some measure of direct and indirect collaboration with the ISI. Even though many ʻulama would deny direct linkages between the activities of their "former" students, the masculinity of the SSP and other jihad groups like Harkat ul-Ansar and the Lashkar indirectly played into the hands of the Deoband. In the language of the streets, it was a clear sign: "do not mess with us now." The numerous cases of hunting down "alleged" blasphemers or reckless editors who dared to post "offensive" materials or Medical School professors who discussed prophetic hygiene, all served as examples of the ways in which new forms and spaces of power were being reconfigured. For the Pakistani Deoband the Taliban served as just such a foil. By linking themselves more closely with the Afghan Deobandi's the Deoband in Pakistan could capitalize on the symbolic victories of the Taliban over the "liberal West." Unapologetic Islam was less a debate about theology and the principles of holy life (*usul al-fiqh*) and more about "cultural" capital and the rhizomic flows of power. It was a performance of power.

This form of defiance remains problematic as uncontaminated resistance because it still stands under the shadow of the West (as apologizing to or refusing apology *to* the West). Moreover, this form of contemporary self-fashioning of Islam – being merely one manifestation of a global conservative turn since 1979 – uncritically inverts the dominating and polarized discourse of European culture. In other words, the West remains central either as rapprochement or rejection. This constricts their own interpretive flexibility by setting themselves off and against the already fixed and essentialized spaces of "modernity" and a "Western Other." *Political Islam's ontic dissonance with the West thus belies a deep underbelly of ontological equivalences and resonances* in the guise of the sovereign exception. That is to say that political Islam's much touted resistance to Western culture occurs largely at the ontic level, while secretly preserving a shared political theology.

Unless we can exorcise this daemon of exception, Pakistan's political space will continue to be possessed by power. It is not a matter of showing how the Taliban as fundamentalists transmit a medieval logic into the space of the modern for, as we have seen, the central preoccupation of the 'ulama, its singular political strategy of violence is based in the same sovereign logic, a logic exercised, on the one hand, by the military and, on the other, by the secular liberal regimes of the West. If all these forces of violence inhabit the same space of modernity in the same way, then our analysis will have shown that political Islam will have to be considered not as some kind of alternative modernity but a phenomenon that has taken up within itself and exercises a political theology that is fundamentally Christian (in the sense of *oikonomia*). The awkward paradox here then is that the various functionaries of the Islamic State, the army and the mullahs, labor to produce and guard over a Christian metaphysics on which their capacities for violence are sustained. Nothing short of an Exorcism is required to render inoperative the nihilist metaphysics that undergirds the project of the Pakistani nation-state and its various Islamist and secular ideologies.

From the perspective of the larger metacolonial thesis we have been developing, the destruction of the Buddhas, the enforcement of the beard, etc., are all valorized as an expression of the formation of subjectivity. As acts of power they participate in the shared metaphysical space of the West in its understanding of the place of life. The unapologetic subject derives the animus of his stance from opposition to the West. By doing so he operates within a field of the political whose broad contours are already marked off as given, with the recourse to Islamic symbols and theology being largely symbolic deference to difference in order to be the same.

In pressing for laws that regulate blasphemy, prayer, beard, public bodily practices, etc., the 'ulama are tapping into a powerful means of

re-inscribing the fear of God, and hence the fear of the 'ulama, back into society. In a secular space the language of 'ulama holds little power. As we have seen, the deployment of piety (*taqwa*) politics serves as the mechanism for the enhancement of a juridico-discursive space where 'ulama sovereignty can be activated. In contrast to the colonial era, where the 'ulama's juridical space was confined to the domestic sphere (the classical *oikos*), the postcolonial state has afforded the possibility of the reunification of the *polis* and the *oikos*. However, this merger of spheres is now fully global as Agamben's *Apparatus* essay demonstrates. The politicization of the 'ulama, which is often regarded as contrary to the modernist secular template of the separation of powers, is thus from the perspective of a biopolitics, an intrinsically modernist move. From the perspective of liberal, secular, and even some traditional Muslims, 'ulama appropriations of mechanisms of coercive control and their recourse to violence represent "the final argument of the 'ulama"[54] in a fast globalizing postmodern universe. Instead, I would suggest that we read these transformations as the effect of globalization itself.

Notes

1 The Deoband principle of the famous Madrasa Haqqaniyya in Akora Khattak and the leader of the JUI-S, Sami' al-Haqq. Quoted in *Dawn News*. Madrasa Haqqaniyya has become the notorious symbol of the militant madrasa, ruining the reputation of hundreds of other deeni madaris that do not have overt or direct links with jihadist groups. However, it remains well documented that Haqqaniyya is one of the leading madrasa, which has supplied jihadist fighters and members of the core leadership for both the Taliban in Afghanistan and jihadist outfits in Kashmir. (See Zahab and Roy 2006. Also Jeffrey Goldberg, "Jihad U.: The Education of a Holy Warrior", *The New York Times Magazine*, 25 June 2000.)
2 I.A. Rahman, "In the name of Allah", *Newsline* May 1994.
3 One who has memorized the entire Qur'an, "who knows it by heart."
4 Foucault 1978.
5 Agamben's problematizion of Foucault's apparent separation of sovereign power and biopower, his argument that the juridico-sovereign and the biopolitical cannot be separated, is premature and rests itself on a weak reading of Foucault's political ontology.
6 Agamben 1999, p. 84.
7 Ibid.
8 Foucault, quoted in Agamben (ibid).
9 Agamben 2000, p. 137.
10 Muslim or secular alike.
11 Foucault 1977, p. 90.
12 Agamben 2000, p. 85.

13 Ahmad, Barsamian, and Ruggiero 2001.
14 As we have now learned from numerous accounts, Z. Brezinsky, Zia ul-Haq, and Prince Faisal Turki had been breeding these jihadist forces prior to the actual Soviet Invasion. That many of these children have multiplied and have returned to devour their fathers is indeed a fitting tribute to Freud's *Totem and Taboo*.
15 A transition that in the minds of its imperial architects could be thought of as one from "Mad-Russia" to "Mad-Rasah."
16 If this work were permitted a Haiku form it could be rendered simply as *Tali-ban*. If this thesis has merit, then it could be said that the Taliban are an exemplary joke, a cosmic pun!
17 Neocleous 2008.
18 Reid 2007, and Dauphinee and Masters 2006.
19 Agamben 1998, p. 185.
20 As Agamben reminds us that "the paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact that the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order" (ibid, p. 25).
21 "The refugee must be considered for what he is: nothing less than a limit concept that radically calls into question the fundamental categories of the nation-state" (ibid, p. 134).
22 Foucault 1978 (and previous quote).
23 Ibid, p. 17.
24 Ibid, p. 107.
25 Zakariya, *Daarhi ka Wujub*, 1976.
26 I proffer this as a heuristic marker and not an analytical formula.
27 Rafiq Tarar comes to mind as a recent exception but he was appointed President by Nawaz Sharif.
28 There is the popular adage that trust for a trader should be inversely proportionate to the length of his beard.
29 Muhammad Zakariyya was the Principal and Shaikh-ul Hadith of the Mazahir ul-'Ulum in Saharanpur. His major work, *Faza'il-e-A'maal* (Virtuous Deeds), is essential reading for the Deobandi madaris. He was the nephew of Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandhlawi, the founder of the revivalist Tablighi Jamaat.
30 Mufti Ebrahim Desai, Darul Ifta, Madrasah In'aamiyyah, Camperdown South Africa, Fatwa Department (printed in *Albalagh*, August 2001). According to one famous author: "To trim the beard when it is less than one palm in length, like some Maghrabis do, is the way of the Hermaphrodites" (Maulana Qari Muhammad Tayyab in *Daarhi ka Shari-i Ahammiyat*).
31 Zakariya, *Daarhi ka Wujub*.
32 Thanawi, *Islahur Rusoom*.
33 Madani, *Daarhi ka Phulsafa*.
34 Ibid.
35 Thanawi, *Hayat-ul-Muslimeen*.
36 In the way, for instance, that the term evil is invoked in everyday discourse.

37 Imam Abu Hanifa was always weary of entrusting morality to the state (see Powers 2002 and also Wheeler 1996).
38 Foucault 1977, p. 251.
39 Currently in *ghaiba*.
40 Foucault 1977, p. 253.
41 Ibid, p. 254.
42 M. Motiwalah, Letter to the Editor, *Albalagh*, March 2001.
43 In a bid to extend his authority across the *ummah*, Mullah Omar was set up as a quasi-Caliph, or *Ameer-ul Momineen* (Commander of the Faithful).
44 *Dawn*, March 10, 2001.
45 'Usmani, Rafi, editorial, *Albalagh*, April 2001.
46 'Usmani, Rafi, editorial, *Albalagh*, April 2001.
47 Rashid 2000.
48 Within the Quranic lexicon, the *munafiq* (hypocrite) stands a rung lower than the kafir (unbeliver) in his proximity to hell
49 Interview, *News*, March 13, 2001.
50 *Jang*, April 23, 2001.
51 *The Times of India*, March 16, 2001.
52 Ibid.
53 *Albalagh*, April 2001.
54 As one member of the Shari'a Faculty at the International Islamic University put it.

5

The Space of Exception

Nationalism and Biopolitical Sovereignty

In a widely accepted narrative of imaginary redemption, it is often suggested that Pakistan's decline towards sectarian intolerance and militarism would have been averted if the Father (*Duce*) of the Pakistani nation, Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, known to posterity as the *Quaid-e-Azam*, had lived to steer the ship of state. In this final chapter I seek to unsettle a number of pious sensibilities surrounding Pakistan's nationalist ideology and the Islamic concepts of the *ummah* and *millat* (nation/community) developed in the writings of Pakistan's spiritual founder Dr. Muhammad Iqbal. I suggest that the biopoliticization of Islam was most forcefully inaugurated in the political thought and practice of these two charismatic figures. In Iqbal's thought the subsumption of the *ummah* and Islam within the violent spatial imaginary of the modern trinity of nation-state-capital is most forcefully accomplished. Once configured around the concept of the *ummah*, an entirely new field of security practices emerged, constituting a veritable biopolitics of Islam and Muslim populations.

For both Jinnah and Iqbal, the unity, or homogeneity, of a people was determined not so much by religious ideology but by religious identity: Islam. Muslims therefore constitute a nation, an *Islamic people*. It is clear then that Jinnah had deeply imbibed a racist colonial anthropology that had split the Indian population into two "communal" categories of Hindu and Muslim. Like the French nationalist Ernst Renan, Iqbal and Jinnah inadvertently espouse a form of modern biopolitical racism that makes distinctions within the biological continuum, not at the level of physiognomy, but "deeper," at the level of culture and ways of life. Being Muslim is no longer a matter of a private inner disposition towards the divine, but a racial and socio-political marker of nationalist identity.

The Metacolonial State: Pakistan, Critical Ontology, and the Biopolitical Horizons of Political Islam, First Edition. Najeeb A. Jan.

As such I argue that Pakistan's two-nation "theory," at once rooted in the consequences of a racialized colonial hierarchy, should be read as biopolitical from its very inception.

Pakistan: The Banner of Islam

> "Don't you know that Islam was born on 14 August 1947?"
>
> – Egyptian King Farouk I[1]

> "Pakistan," I said aloud, "What a complete dump!" And we hadn't even arrived.
>
> – Salman Rushdie[2]

In Pakistan, official states of emergency and martial laws are declared with routine familiarity; they have become cyclical, almost predictable. Popular movements and public agitations have been equally instrumental in forcing the military to retire to the barracks. They too have been cyclical but are now increasingly cynical. The eloquent and indefatigable Marxists critic Tariq Ali has never been in doubt about the causes of the ongoing crisis. In his 1983 classic of political history, *Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State*, Ali placed the onus of responsibility squarely with the praetorian ambitions of the Armed forces and its repeated liaisons with an imperial America.[3] Almost three decades later one is tempted to answer Ali's question: Yes, Canned Pakistan survives! However, there seems to be something too neat, too subjective, too linear, too historicist and rational, and self-contained about the *Amrika-Army* explanation.

By contrast in her recent attempt to make sense of the senseless, Farzana Shaikh,[4] begins by downplaying the standard neo-Marxist accounts of writers like Tariq Ali[5] and Hamza Alavi, who had privilege class explanations.[6] She seeks to supplement the standard explanations of Pakistan's political crisis (corrupt politicians, army interventions, feudal hierarchies, imperial liaisons, etc.) with a more forceful probing of the underlying ideological contradictions and ambiguities – the "vexed relationship between Islam and nationalism"[7] – that lie at the heart of the Pakistan project. While her initial move towards ideological incoherence places the question of Islam at the center of analysis rather than regarding it as an epiphenomenon of false consciousness, her overall approach is severely hampered by an uncritical uptake of the key terms of the analysis: religion, culture, the political, nationalism, and Islam. The key political question of sovereignty does not arise. While today one cannot but agree that "Pakistan's national identity came to be a divisive

rather than a unitary force,"[8] she falls just short of essentializing Islam. Drawing on the insights of Metcalf and Nasr,[9] she effectively traces the problem of Pakistan's instability to a contradiction *between* "two rival discourses of Islam – the communal and the Islamist." Both of these camps, she argues, "have struggled for ascendancy in defining Pakistan's national identity."[10] Shaikh argues that it is the "contested versions of Islam, rather than any disjunction between a 'secular' leadership and a 'religious' establishment that account for the difficulties in forging a coherent national identity." She concludes her thoughtful and reflexive account by suggesting that it is the nature of consensus itself that is problematic.[11] However, this insightful redirection is not explored, and she falls back on the more quotidian, albeit correct, assertion that it is Pakistan's "problematic and contested relationship with Islam that has most decisively frustrated its quest for a coherent national identity and for stability as a nation-state. … It is this contestation over the multiple meanings of Islam that accounts today for the doubts about the meaning of Pakistan and the significance of being Pakistani."[12] In her analysis, Pakistan and Islam appear as reified, albeit somewhat schizophrenic, personalities.

By contrast, in this book I have suggested that the very concepts of Pakistan, Islam, and being Muslim cannot be neatly separated and exist together on a biopolitical horizon. This is why a Deoband orientation can coexist within a range of politico-ideological arrangements: an authoritarian/totalitarian system (Mullah Omar-Taliban), a secular system (Husayn Madani-JUH), Islamic "democracy" (Ashraf Thanawi-JUI) and all ranges and combinations thereof. This does not mean, pace Metcalf, that the Deoband is politically hollow; it simply means that ideology is itself compelled by other arrangements. I have suggested therefore that we view political Islam as a technology of power and the Deoband movements as a series of specific apparati, *dispositifs* that exist within a complex topological space of power. The task then is to view Pakistan as a certain kind of *dispositif*, a thought which, in responding to an existing set of problematizations, brings into being a whole new series of affects, institutions, and configurations. It is therefore towards understanding the shifting dynamics of the space of power that we must turn our analytical gaze. In this way there can be no mistake of viewing Pakistan as a good idea gone bad but rather as an assemblage of power, a *dispositif*, that emerges within an already existing field of complex biopolitical and sovereign elements.

In his foreword to Professor Sharif al-Mujahid's *Ideological Foundations of Pakistan*, Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi,[13] Director General of the Shari'a Academy and former President of the International Islamic University, writes that Pakistan essentially represents an idea. "It reflects

the idea of a distinct and unique socio-political and religio-spiritual collective personality of the Muslims of South Asia." In Ghazi's view, one common within Pakistani nationalist historiography, Pakistan is the outcome of a trans-historical *telos* of Islam. Jinnah's Pakistan movement, Ghazi tells us, was "preceded by a long and conspicuous history of Muslim self-assertion as a singular civilizational entity, the traces of which are prominently manifest in all the significant landmarks of Indian history."[14]

Today a generalized yet immanent uncertainty of violence pervades the entire socio-political landscape of Pakistan, affecting the elite and masses alike. One would be curious to know what histrionics and conspiracy theories Ghazi would appeal to in order to make sense of this "singular civilizational entity" in the wake of the bombs that were exploded outside his former office. I have attempted to understand Pakistan's crisis as a sovereign anxiety, a chronic state of emergency that parallels a "nervous system" on the verge of breakdown.[15] One is tempted to invoke Michael Taussig's observations with regard to Colombia, to talk instead about Pakistan's "ordered disorder." But whose *order* is this chaos?[16] As we have seen in Agamben, the state of exception is not merely an attribute of the state apparatus, and therefore we cannot simply rest content with tracing the exception back to its more exemplary institutions, the Army or Imperialism. A general clue then towards thinking the indistinction between Islamists and communalists[17] lies in thinking about the "state fetish" that animates the desire of both groups. Neither, I would argue, challenge, nor quite understand, the more fundamental nature of the Leviathan that they seek to harness to protect Islam/Muslims. Paraphrasing Taussig and bringing him more in line with Agamben, the state is not the reality behind the mask of the political but rather the mask that prevents us seeing a certain reality of the political[18] – analogously Islam. Both Islamists and modernists alike have deployed a fidelity towards "true Islam" as a mask for their state fetish or what Agamben more rigorously identifies as sovereign power. The *ummah* in short is the new God, the biopolitical sovereign that must be defended. The profound ambiguity therefore of the concept of Pakistan, with its incessant discourse of the pure and the impure, mirrors the profound ambiguity of the concept of the sacred itself.[19] Pakistan the pure (*pak*) state, the sacred state, is also the state that produces *homo sacer*. It is therefore a state that is subject to a continuous ritual of violent purification and absolution, a process that Agamben calls the biopolitical caesura. The logic of this caesura, this deadly merger between the sacred and the state, between Islam and Pakistan, has its foundations not in the Deoband but in the very "secular" movement for an Islamic/Muslim state. It is thus the very conjunction between Islamic reason (governmentality)

and violence that sutures the "legitimacy" of modern jihad and that – like the Western conjunction between peace/liberalism and war,[20] reason and violence[21] – must be exposed.

Against Weber's emphasis on "legitimate" violence, the monopoly of which is said to define the modern state, Taussig like Agamben redirects our gaze towards "the intrinsically mysterious, mystifying, convoluting, plain scary, mythical, and arcane cultural properties and power of violence to the point where violence is very much an end in itself – a sign, as Benjamin put it, of the existence of the gods." Thus by extending Taussig's notion of state fetishism and Agamben's disclosure of the political onto-theology of sovereignty, we can expose the logic common to both Islamists and modernists alike. If it is "precisely the coming together of reason-and-violence in the State that creates, in a secular and modern world, the bigness of the big S,"[22] then similarly it is the coming together of Islam and violence in the practices of both the state and the 'ulama that animates the command, the bigness, of political Islam. Pakistan serves as the primary vehicle for this fusion of reason and violence, the fusion of Islam and the State.

Borders of the "Ummagination:" The Two-Nation Notion

One of Pakistan's most celebrated nationalist historians, the late Prof. Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi (1903–1981), the first education minister of Pakistan, barely mentions the pro-Pakistan 'ulama in his oddly titled *Short History of Pakistan*. This weighty tome of over a thousand pages was the standard text for the Pakistan Studies Intermediate (FSc) level syllabus up until the mid-1980s. The book begins its short account of Pakistan in the Vedic period and is largely a history of the Islamic world. The sections dealing with British colonialism and the post-1857 nationalist movements comprise the last fifth of the book. The pro-Pakistani Deoband are barely mentioned.[23] 'Ulama hostility to the Muslim League (ML) is given sharp notice. The text serves as a general marker of the lowly regard mainstream nationalist elite had for the 'ulama, a pattern that changed suddenly by the revisionist assessments of the 'ulama's role under Zia's tenure.[24]

The 'ulama began their political careers in Pakistan as relatively marginalized political agents largely written out of both modern nationalist and fundamentalist narratives, as lingering specters of a bygone era and representatives of a community that have held back both Islamic and nationalist progress. The madrasa as the chief institute for the production of other 'ulama increasingly found itself drawing only the subaltern

and largely impoverished urban and rural classes and were increasingly confined to a private sphere of religious education[25] that did not connect in any significant way with the production of more useful citizen bodies. This problem of a lack of authority amidst a series of contradictory and competing voices is what contributed to their adoption of what I have earlier called piety (*taqwa*) politics, an affective politics of sentiment, regard, fear, glory, and ultimately the sovereign fetish.

Along with these considerations, it must also be stated that the "secular nationalist" narrative is both disingenuous and historically myopic. Both the involvement of the 'ulama in the Pakistan movement and the passionately Islamic dimensions of Iqbal and Jinnah are seriously downplayed. Secularist narratives tend to define the commitments of Iqbal and Jinnah to Islam as existing at the level of generalities and broad universalist principles: brotherhood, unity, egalitarianism, justice, democracy, and all that. However, the devil, and not merely the 'ulama, so it would seem, are very much in the details.

We have already seen how this problem of details with respect to the Objectives Resolution led to a virtual coup by the 'ulama. Liberal Pakistanis are quick to suggest that the theocratic mayhem that has beset Pakistan was in large measure because the original father of the secular nation, Jinnah, along with his trusted successor Prime Minister Liaquat 'Ali Khan,[26] did not live to see the destiny of Pakistan reach fruition. We must recall that Liaquat 'Ali Khan, the *Quaid-e-Millat* during the debate on the Objectives Resolution, had described Pakistan not merely as a homeland for Muslims but as "a polity, which may prove to be a laboratory for the purpose of demonstration to the world that Islam is not only a progressive force in the world, but it also provides remedies for many of the ills from which humanity was suffering." In 1951, during his address to a gathering of members of the Islamic World Federation in Karachi, Liaquat asserted that the underlying idea of the Pakistan movement was not just to add one more country to the conglomeration of nations on the world map. Rather, Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge by the Muslims of this subcontinent to secure a territory, however limited, where the Islamic ideology and way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world.[27]

Liaquat was merely being faithful to the spirit of the architects who envisioned that the State of Pakistan, however "moth eaten," was to be an Islamic democracy and also a beacon and "bulwark of Islam." The merely pragmatic argument that Pakistan functioned as a means to prevent the tyranny and discriminations of a Hindu majority are buried as a minor clause in the national configuration of Pakistan's Islamic ideology. Pakistan is an experiment with history – a tryst with a twist. If much discussion, though largely paranoid and conspiratorial, has been

focused on why this experiment has gone sour, it would be naïve to simply blame the lab techs for their faulty execution of an otherwise sound science. Rather it is the very ideologization (nationalization) of Islam that is problematic.

Djinns of the Nation

In his January 1938 address to the Gaya Muslim League Conference in Bihar, the *Quaid-e-Azam*, Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, described the flag of the Muslim League as "the flag of Islam"[28] and Islam as "a complete code" of life. We should not fail to note that two key paradigms of modernity that Agamben exposes, the flag (banner) and *technē* (code), are here internalized and normalized in Jinnah's Islamo-nationalist discourse:

> Today in this huge gathering you have honored me by entrusting the duty to unfurl the flag of the Muslim League, the flag of Islam, for you cannot separate the Muslim League from Islam. … When we say "This flag is the flag of Islam" they think we are introducing religion into politics – a fact of which we are proud. *Islam gives us a complete code*. It is not only religion but it contains laws, philosophy and politics. In fact, it contains everything that matters to a man from morning to night. When we talk of Islam we take it as an all-embracing word. … *The foundation of our Islamic code is that we stand for liberty, equality and fraternity*.[29]

If the persistent confusion about the nature of Pakistan's relationship to Islam persists,[30] this owes in large measure to the fact that Jinnah was confused about this relationship or engaged in deliberate double talk. In the Gaya address, for instance, he emphatically equates the Pakistan movement with Islam and Islam with a complete code of life. In another address at Edwards College, he went as far as describing Pakistan as "the premier Islamic State," as the state that would safeguard and preserve Muslim ideology, "which has come to us as a precious gift and treasure." It was precisely this kind of talk, in which "Muslim" and "Pakistan" were used interchangeably, that animated the small yet important sector within the Indian Deoband leadership, which subsequently countered the leadership of the Indian Deoband 'ulama (JUH) under Madani. Even if Jinnah used the term "Islamic state" on the rare occasion for most of his Urdu speaking audience, "Muslim state" was invariable heard as *Islami riyasat* or *Islami hukumat*.

One of the few articles ever penned by Jinnah was published in the March 1940 issue of the London-based rag *Time and Tide*. In this essay Jinnah is at pains to rearticulate (dare I say mimic) the immensely

profound, dense, and intellectually sober conclusion of the 1933 report of the Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Reforms. This report anticipates Samuel Huntington's equally profound (please do not fail to mark my irony) clash-of-civilizations thesis.[31] Jinnah, lamentably, says of this colonial report: "Perhaps no truer description of India has been compressed into a paragraph, without which no understanding of the Indian problem is possible. … that Islam and Hinduism "represent two distinct and separate civilizations and moreover are as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are nations of Europe."[32] On Jinnah's understanding, democratic systems are based on the concept of a "homogeneous" nation, and as such what is applicable to England is "very definitely not applicable to heterogeneous countries such as India, and this simple fact is the root cause of India's constitutional ills."[33] What then does the homogeneity of the multiple ethnicities, languages, histories, and traditions of the provinces that were to constitute Pakistan consists in? For both Jinnah and Iqbal, this unity, or homogeneity, of people was determined not so much by religious ideology but by religious identity – Islam. Muslims therefore constitute a nation, a *people*. Jinnah had deeply imbibed a racist, colonial anthropology that split the Indian population into two "communal" categories of Hindu and Muslim.[34] Being Muslim was not a matter of a private inner disposition towards the divine but a racial and socio-political identity marker. Islam therefore is no longer a private matter but a public one. As such the two-nation "theory" is rooted in the consequences of a racialized colonial hierarchy.[35] It becomes clear to see how Pakistan can be seen as a biopolitical project, especially when we take into consideration Foucault's articulation of race and biopolitics.

For Foucault, a threshold of biological modernity occurs when the pole of biopower is directed towards the collective body and operates through regulating the processes at the level of a population. The birth and death rates, health, economic production, all have an immediate political dimension.[36] Biopolitics is hence about governing life, "securing" ways of life, and regulating the exposure of a people to danger and accidents at the level of both the individual and the species. The key to a biopolitical regime or mentality then is to preserve normality and order at the *aggregate* level of the population. This is the statification (*étatisation*) of the population as species, and it marks a decisive threshold in the history of modern politics. Now, although Foucault distinguishes between classical sovereign power and modern biopower, he does not claim that sovereign power disappears. Rather sovereign power is recoded and folded into modern biopower, often manifesting itself as "state racism." This is biopower's thanatopolitical underside. The sovereign element then continues to both disturb (caesura) and preserve a

biopolitical logic. Iqbal and Jinnah inadvertently espouse a form of modern biopolitical racism that makes distinctions within the biological continuum, not at the level of physiognomy but at the level of culture and ways of life. The distinction between Hindu and Muslim lifeforms effectively divides the population into communal sub-groups and races. Now the decisions to "take life" or "make die" can be seen as part of a bio-logic: Hindu life is inferior, dangerous, or life-threatening to the security of the aggregate Muslim body (clearly Muslims in Hindu-majority states were not to be included in Pakistan). In contrast to disciplinary forms of power, which seek to control the concrete and specific habits of each individual, the logic of security and biopower only plans for an uncertain and probabilistic future, "a future that is not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable."[37] That is to say, Jinnah's concern was for the population as a whole, and his concern was to assure the probable security for *most* Muslims in India. Now while Jinnah may not have approved the elimination of dangerous Hindu life by providing the logic of separatism (exclusion of Hindu *zoē*) as necessary for the survival of the Islamic *bios*, partition violence simply expressed the hidden logic of exclusion's ban. During partition a pervasive state-biopolitical-racism thus allowed everyone the right to eliminate others in the name of ways of life (Hindu and Muslim). Jinnah and Iqbal's Islamic exceptionalism, and by extension the exceptionalism of the Taliban and America, must therefore be situated on a common biopolitical horizon. This common horizon in no way disturbs the historical specificity of different formations. This horizon must be problematized before an adequate framing of the solution to the violence that plagues the region can be found. Thus after crossing a biopolitical threshold, the Islamic expression of sovereign power takes the form of a decision on life and death, inclusion or exclusion. Thus racism, understood not in a genetic or superficial sense but rather as essential distinctions made between peoples at the level of ways of life, allows sovereignty to assure the function of death within the economy of biopower.

For Agamben the subject caught in the ban, the *homo sacer*, is one who is captured under the force of sovereign violence precisely by virtue of his exclusion. Hindus were thus not simply excluded and exiled from Muslim space;[38] their exclusion sanctioned and legitimized their murder. Hence for Agamben, sovereign power has evinced a biopolitical dimension. With modernity the spaces of exception simply proliferate and become increasingly the rule. It is this relation between sovereignty and bare life, Agamben claims, that remains un-thought in Western political thought and, by extension, in Islamism broadly conceived. Hence totalitarianism, Islamism, and democratic liberalism remain trapped within a horizon circumscribed by the convergence of

biological and political life. Afghanistan is the exemplary place of this convergence.

To be fair to Jinnah, what was envisaged here was not the more debauched notion of a clash of civilizations but instead civilizational identity and *difference*. As we know from the excellent study by Jalal, during this period Jinnah was not hell-bent on a separate state for Muslims,[39] but rather was keeping the multiple possibilities of the Pakistan idea as a bargaining chip for greater Muslim representation in any National Assembly. As late as the 1946 Cabinet Mission plan, "two-nations one-state" was still on the table. What Jinnah wanted, among many other things, was an appropriation for Indian Muslims of the high mark of European modernity – nationhood. Muslims constitute a nation, and as such their rights must be protected by a constitutional arrangement that gave maximal provincial autonomy to Muslim majority provinces. When Jinnah felt that a space for Muslim sovereignty could not be preserved from the encroachments of the kind of strong centrist state that Nehru, Patel, and Gandhi had in mind, Jinnah reaffirmed the alternative: a separate Muslim State.

Jinnah was also a politician with a keen sense for demographics. The Lahore Resolution made it clear that his demands for Muslim autonomy would not come to fruition through some constitutional *fait accompli*. Now the matter was to be turned over to the *passions* of the people, and the ML exploited the sense of a threat to Muslims under a Hindu-dominated parliament. I do not dispute the widely shared notion that Jinnah's formal ideological commitments were on balance "secular," and certainly his many formal declarations consistently railed against the notion of theocracy: "Pakistan shall not be run by priests with a divine mission," etc., and yet he never failed to suggest that the mission of Pakistan was itself divine. Take, for instance, his *Id ul-Fitr* address delivered in September on the eve of the 1945 elections, in which he draws upon Edward Gibbon to make his case:

> Every Musalman knows that *the injunctions of the Qur'an are not confined to religious and moral duties*. "From the Atlantic to the Ganges", says Gibbon, "the Qur'an is acknowledged as the fundamental code, not only of theology, but of civil and criminal jurisprudence, and the laws which regulate the actions and the property of mankind are governed by the immutable sanctions of the will of God." *Everyone, except those who are ignorant, knows that the Qur'an is the general code of the Muslims*. A religious, social, civil, commercial, military, judicial, criminal, penal code; *it regulates everything* from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life; from the salvation of the soul to the health of the body; from the rights of all to those of each individual; from morality to crime, from punishment here to that in the life to come, and our Prophet has enjoined on

> us that every Musalman should possess a copy of the Qur'an and be his own priest. *Therefore Islam is not merely confined to the spiritual tenets and doctrines or rituals and ceremonies. It is a complete code regulating the whole Muslim society, every department of life, collectively and individually*.[40]

It is not then the theocratic, religious basis that Jinnah objects to. He only disputes the singular moral authority of the 'ulama to determine the code and "regulate" society in all of its minute details. What better example do we have of the governmentalization of Islam than this? He also made numerous verbal concessions to the Pakistan-Deoband faction led by Shabbir 'Usmani, to bolster support for the ML. Jinnah spoke two languages, one to Muslim nationalists and one to Islamic nationalists, not because he was a hypocrite but because he did not see a distinction between the two. What remains incomparable in Mr. Jinnah is the temerity with which he was able to contain the bristling poles of contradiction that lay at the heart of both his political praxis and his political ideas. Islam was at the imaginary heart of his platform but its symbolic masters, the 'ulama, remained unconvinced that the flag of Pakistan and the flag of Islam were one and the same. Jinnah for his part was always weary of the *djinns* that the Deoband could unleash, whilst conversely, the Deoband 'ulama were concerned with Jinnah's relationship to bottled spirits of another variety. Ultimately, however, a significant faction of the 'ulama were won over by explicit promises by Jinnah, made both in public and private, that the Qur'an and *Sunnah* would guide the framing of the constitution.

'Allama's Law: Islam, the State, and Muslim Peoples

> We must learn to recognize this structure of the ban in the political relations and public spaces in which we still live. *In the city, the banishment of sacred life is more internal than every interiority and more external than every extraneousness*. The banishment of sacred life is the sovereign *nomos* that conditions every rule, the originary spatialization that governs and makes possible every localization and every territorialization.
>
> – Agamben[41]

It was 'Allama Muhammad Iqbal who sanctified the proper marriage between Islam and the State, not at the level of prose but poetry, at the level therefore of affect and aesthetics. In this way I regard him as the exemplary Islamist. It is no accident that during a 1986 conference on Iqbal in Tehran, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic were "the embodiment

of Iqbal's dream."[42] Iqbal is widely regarded as the spiritual founder of Pakistan. In her study of Iqbal, Annemarie Schimmel calls him a "talisman" of Pakistan.[43] Iqbal was a complex, ambivalent figure,[44] and, despite his title as the architect of Muslim nationalism, he is simultaneously known for his rejection of nationalism.[45] However, in his attempt to critique Western conceptions of nationhood as rooted in ethnolinguistic properties, he substitutes an Islam-state duality in place of the classical nation-state formula, thereby retaining the state fetish and reconstituting national belonging on grounds of religious identity.

In retrospect, Iqbal's presidential address to the 25th Session of the All-India Muslim League (AIML) at Allahabad on December 29, 1930 was a landmark. Even though the word Pakistan had not yet been coined, the speech is widely regarded as the precursor to the "Pakistan" Lahore Resolution of 1940. Iqbal, unwittingly presaging Foucault's definition of biopolitical governmentality, defines Islam as "a system of life and conduct." The speech gives us a key insight into a series of confused and unresolved dialectical tensions in Iqbal's thought, tensions that sustain his poetry but ultimately led to a destructive, divisive politics. Iqbal offers an almost Hegelian characterization of Islam as the unfolding of a universal European spirit: "In Islam, God and the universe, spirit and matter, Church and State, are organic to each other. […] To Islam matter is spirit realizing itself in space and time." Islam for Iqbal is not only an ethical ideal; it is also a polity, "a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal." Because of Islam, writes Iqbal, Indian Muslims were transformed "into a well-defined people, possessing *a moral consciousness* of their own," a society with "remarkable homogeneity and inner unity."[46] The idea that a nation or people consists not of objective factors like race, language, or geography derives from Ernst Renan, who Iqbal cites in the address. A nation thus transcends geography and race but is united by "a moral consciousness." "The formation of the kind of moral consciousness which constitutes the essence of a nation in Renan's sense demands a price which the peoples of India are not prepared to pay." The implications are clear; Hindus and Muslims did not share a moral consciousness and hence could not constitute a united nation. In this way Iqbal places ethics under the sign of biopolitics. In rejecting formal racism, which divides Muslim people along tribal/national/ethnic/territorial lines, Iqbal embraces what he calls "higher communalism," which unites the pan-Islamic community, the global *ummah*, solely by virtue of a homogenous religion. The Muslims of India, Iqbal states decisively, "are the only Indian people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the word," for unlike the Hindu, they possess "homogeneity which is necessary for a nation." Thus we must be clear: Iqbal did not reject nationalism qua

nationalism but instead situated national-communal belonging at the level of religion and culture. Yet remarkably, in the same breath, Iqbal seeks to territorialize this homogenous, non-localizable pan-Islamic community, offering words that undeniably shaped the trajectory of Muslim politics from that moment on: "*I would like to see the Punjab, North- West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State*. […] the formation of a consolidated *North-West Indian Muslim State* appears, to me to be *the final destiny of the Muslims*, at least of North-West India."

With his shift from the idea of a moral consciousness to its embodiment in a state, a biopolitical threshold is decisively crossed. What Iqbal articulates is a conception of Muslim species-life as object; this object should be the target of the modern state because only the state can secure it.

> The truth is that Islam is not a Church. *It is a State* conceived as a contractual organism long before Rousseau ever thought of such a thing, and animated by an ethical ideal which regards man not as an earth-rooted creature, defined by this or that portion of the earth, but *as a spiritual being understood in terms of a social mechanism*, and possessing rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism. […] *I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam*.
>
> – From Muhammad Iqbal's 1930 Presidential Address

Here we see the merger of the spirit with the socius and the socius with the state as an organic whole – as contractual organism. The collective body and the body of Islam become indistinct. The Islamic body must be defended.

Iqbal talks of a homogenous Islamic moral consciousness and exhorts his audience to fashion "organic wholeness of a unified will" and achieve "a real collective ego," deriving his aspirations from the principle of *tawhid*. *Tawhid* is widely regarded as the central concept and principle of Islam and is usually translated as the unity or oneness of God. However, in Iqbal, this principle of divine singularity is mapped on to life and transformed as the unity of the *ummah* and even the unity of humanity. On the surface this seems like a fine idea, much like the peace of liberalism, but it reflects an attempt to harness divine powers, singularity and sovereignty, and transfer them to the Muslim body politic and to the Muslim State. Through politicization of *tawhid*, Iqbal seeks to reverse the bifurcation of "worldly" and "religious" domains that are the hallmark of the secular state.[47] "Reason" and "spirit" do not therefore require a laborious Hegelian dialectic because in Islam, according to Iqbal, the state is already sacred and spiritual: "The state according to Islam is only an effort to realize the spiritual in a human organization."[48]

Elsewhere Iqbal stated that "according to the law of Islam there is no distinction between the Church [religion] and the state. The state with us is not a combination of religious and secular authority, but it is a unit in which no such distinction exists."[49] In this absolutely Islamic state, the principle of *tawhid* requires us to offer our final and definitive allegiance to God and to the laws of God as revealed to His Prophet. "Prophethood is the basis of our organization, our religion and our law. It creates unity in our diversity and makes us into a well-knit community."[50] According to Iqbal's reading of the Qur'an, "Islam does not aim at the moral reformation of the individual alone; it also aims at a gradual but fundamental revolution in the social life of mankind."[51] There is little here that the Pakistan Deoband would disagree with. The law of the 'Allama and the law of the 'ulama are not then separated by the chasm that nationalist historiography is so keen to assert. The distance between the thought of Iqbal and a figure like Maulana Abul Ala Mawdudi is indeed significant, and I do not mean to suggest that these differences are irrelevant. However, the standard analysis overstates these differences; in Foucault's words, it operates at the level of *connaissance* and not *savoir*. If we rethink the emergence of political Islam at the archaeological level, then the chasm between "modernist," "traditionalist," and "fundamentalist" appears much smaller.

Iqbal and the Separation of the Ahmadi

Iqbal was an early advocate of a state-sanctioned excommunication of the Ahmadis from the Muslim *ummah*. Taqi 'Usmani, who compiled a substantial brief against "the imperial and satanic plot of Qadiyanism," showcases a series of statements from Iqbal to buttress the 'ulama crusade: "The best course of action for the [British] Government is to declare the Ahmadi's a separate religious group" and "the Muslim *ummah* has every right to demand the separation of Ahmadis from the Muslims."[52] Iqbal in fashioning the Muslim People is also fashioning excluded and bare life. "Where there is a People," Agamben writes, "there will be bare life." Pakistan's history, as a history of the land of the pure (Pakistan), thus bears out Agamben's contention that every identity must "continually be redefined and purified through exclusion, language, blood, and land." The Muslim as a "people" thus always already carries the fundamental biopolitical fracture within itself.[53] The apparition of partition is destined to continually reappear – as in Gujrat, Ayodhia.

Iqbal was no conventional secularist, and neither was Jinnah. Iqbal did not reject either the state or the nation but rather fused the two in

the body of Islam. His *nomos* subsequently dictated the need to localize the unlocalizable. As Agamben writes, "When our age tried to grant the unlocalizable a permanent and visible localization, the result was the concentration camp."[54] Iqbal initiates the production of the Pakistani camp and the penetration of "the spirit of Islam" by the specter of the exception by linking the survival of "Islam as a world force" with the need for an independent sovereign state.[55] Thus the political theology embedded in the erstwhile secular concepts of the state and modern sovereignty (clearly exposed by Schmitt) came to traverse Muslim discourse precisely at that moment when those discourses viewed themselves as opposing the hegemonic order of the West. In order to understand the homelessness of today's Pakistani Muslims, we must examine the metaphysical and affective aspirations of the Pakistan idea, a functional concept that sought to respond to the problem of Muslim population security. It was not, however, merely a homeland for Muslims but a homeland for the indistinction Islam-Muslims. It is this merger and identification of Islam with the biopolitical body of the *ummah* that is of utmost significance. With Iqbal the task of safeguarding Islam falls to *Homo islamicus* rather than divinity. This *Homo islamicus* does not merely reside in the *madaris* or the pious *momin* body but in all Muslims by virtue of birth. As Jinnah was fond of saying, "Pakistan is our birthright."

In his superlative study, Gyan Pandey has noted that the primary metaphor of partitioning was the "two-nation theory,"[56] which both Iqbal and Jinnah confabulated. However, the moment is now ripe to make a necessary corrective. To begin with, on pain of factuality, it must, with Bangladesh, be the "three-nation theory;" so perhaps it was always really the x-nation theory, but the word "theory" is also misapplied. Calling the "two-nation theory" a theory would dignify its profoundly essentialist violence. What then should we call it? Metaphysics? Thus x-nation metaphysics is the political theory of modernity.

Dar al-Harb: Discipline to Security[57]

Fatwa-e-Pakistan

The *Khilafat* movement (1919–1924) marks a new threshold of 'ulama involvement in the political sphere, beginning with the formation of the JUH. However, if this period stands as the high mark of Hindu–Muslim cooperation, it also sowed the seeds for a double and lateral divisiveness, between Muslims and Hindus, on the one hand, and between Muslims and Muslims, on the other. The bulk then of the new Islamist groups,

from the Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam, Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama-i Hind, and the Jama'at-i Islami, opposed the Muslim separatist platform of the Muslim League for various reasons. After the 23 March 1940 Lahore Resolution, however, a few 'ulama under the silent stewardship of 'Ali Thanawi began to see the potential of the "Pakistan idea" for a Divine Government (*Hukumat-e-Illahiyya*).[58] They began to delight in the possibility of attaining full state power such that the domain of the fatwa, their exclusive preserve, could be enlarged from the sphere of domesticity, where it had been confined under colonial rule, to the full bandwidth of the political and the economic – in short a full blown form of 'ulama governmentality.

However, the mainstay of the Deoband and the Ahrar still resolutely opposed Jinnah, labeling him *Kafir-i Azam* (The Great Kafir). Through a fatwa in 1945, Maulana Husayn Ahmad Madani, leader of the JUH, denounced the 1940 Lahore Resolution and asked Indian Muslims not to join the Muslim League on the grounds that its demands and actions were contrary to the dictates of Islam.[59] Counter-fatwas were promptly issued. The *fatwa* wars of 1945 are today being repeated in the halls of the Deoband establishment, as we shall see below. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad 'Usmani (1885–1948) played a major role in countering Madani's fatwa, and he issued a series of counter-fatwas. 'Usmani declared Madani's concept of *Muttahidah Qaumiyyat* (United or Composite Nationalism) as antithetical to Islam and Muslim interests, a surrender to the domination of Hindus. These fatwas were publicly announced in his message to the All-India Jami'at-ul Islam Conference in Calcutta on 26–29 October 1945.[60] 'Usmani also directly debated Madani at the Deoband madrasa on 7 December 1945.[61,62]

In these fatwas the demand for Pakistan was sanctioned as Islamic. The fatwa by Mufti Muhammad Shafi, the Grand Mufti of Deoband, was more emphatic. According to him the demands of the AIML were the only legitimate course open to the Muslims of India. Supporting Congress, and hence the Madani position, amounted to heresy (*kufr*).[63] Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi resigned his Rectorship of Dar ul-'Ulum precisely on these grounds and formally joined the AIML. However, this move was taken only when Thanawi was given assurances by Jinnah that Pakistan would be "a pure Islamic order where Islamic laws are fully enforced and all Islamic teachings are followed in every walk of life."[64] Only Thanawi's fatwas had the power to counter Madani's, and so Jinnah said what he had to. Thanawi would never have issued his "*Tanzim-ul Muslimeen*" fatwa if Jinnah had not made such promises.

However, it was not until after 1940 that these issues came to a head. One decisive refutation of Madani's "united nationalism" theory appears embedded in the twelfth volume of the massive twenty-one-volume

commentary, the *I'la al-sunan*,[65] compiled by the nephew of Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi Zafar Ahmad 'Usmani (d. 1974) and published in Arabic in 1939. The significance of this critique appearing in Arabic within the discursive form of the Hadith commentary is analyzed at length by Zaman. Zafar 'Usmani's main contention, Zaman tells us, is that in a mixed nation society, the distinction and identity of Muslim life is diluted. A unified nation where non-Muslims form the numerical majority would result in "the destruction of Islam, its laws, and its rituals, and it is therefore forbidden from the viewpoint of the shari'a."[66] Zafar Ahmad repeatedly emphasizes that the idea of a united nationalism will lead to the destruction of the foundations of Islam. "Distinguishing Muslims from unbelievers" (including "the People of the Book") is, indeed, one of the "fundamentals" of the shari'a and anyone who denies the importance in Islamic law of maintaining sharp boundaries between Muslim and non-Muslim – he says in a thinly veiled allusion to Madani – "is neither a competent scholar of Islamic law nor even a proper Muslim."[67]

In the commentary, and importantly for our metacolonial thesis, 'Usmani cites a number of prophetic traditions that underline the almost Iqbalian idea that the only legitimate mark of distinction between people is "piety." *Taqwa*, or piety, thus takes on a key biopolitical function, since it is invoked not only as a critique of nationalism but also as a marker of peoples and the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion.[68]

The split between Madani and 'Usmani was a source of much consternation within the lower rank and file of the Deoband establishment. Maulana Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhlawi (1897–1982)[69] was so vexed with this problem that he traveled from India to Pakistan several times to sit at the feet of his personal mentors to resolve this fundamental split over the question of nationalism. The product was a polemical tract titled "*Islam awr Siyyasat*,"[70] largely filled with hadith quotes, which concluded that the contradiction in positions between the two Deoband luminaries was not real but only apparent. Muhammad Zakariyya was concerned with preserving the fundamental unity of Islamic political theory, at least as it was subject within the career of the Pakistani Deobandiyyat. The split over the nationalist question, he declared, does not constitute a contradiction within the Deoband School, only a difference of opinion as to how to realize the same goals, an *Islami Muashra* (Society). The distinction between the two groups can thus be seen as based not in theology but in the attitude towards the question of sovereign power. The fact that Muhammad Zakariyya resolves the glaring political split at the level of the social body shows once again how the social and the political are in fact indistinct. For both factions the social body is the target for governmental interventions, regulations, and disciplining.

Notwithstanding, however, the Pakistani ‘ulama were able to carve out their own inviolable domain and within its confines both survive and then thrive. Jinnah had deftly played his hands, but his recourse to Islam and his promises to the leaders of the JUI animated the ‘ulama into a series of new projects, the primary political goal of which was to bring the laws of the state into conformity with the shari‘a. The Objectives Resolution as we have discussed was then the primary vehicle for the restoration of ‘ulama authority and power. In this regard their early victories were largely symbolic. While the Deoband could point to some success in achieving their goals, they remained a largely subaltern social group until the 1980s. Victories in successive elections were marginal, enrollment in madrasas had seen growth only proportionate to population growth, and only the economically depressed sectors of society were sending their children to become trained in their *maslak*. The only dramatic victory that the ‘ulama could boast of was achieved through the violent political activity of the anti-Qadiani movement, the Khatm-i Nubuwwat Tahrik, spearheaded by Maulana Ludhianawi (d. 2000) in the 1970s. However, with the arrival of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the shifting of a new security apparatus, the fortunes of the Pakistani Deoband experienced a dramatic transformation.

The Jihad On

Between 1988 and 1991, *Al-Balagh*, the Urdu monthly of the Dar al-‘Ulum,[71] printed the jihad memoirs of the Dar al-‘Ulum vice principal Maulana Rafi Ahmad ‘Usmani. Selections of his memoirs would also show up in the pages of Pakistan’s largest Urdu daily, the *Jang*, and in *al-Irshad*, the monthly rag of the jihadist outfit Movement of Islamic Jihad, or Islamic Struggle Movement (Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami) (HUJI).[72] The memoirs were eventually published in a single volume, *These Incredible Servants of Yours* (*Ye Teray Pur Asrar Banday*),[73] an edition replete with maps and color photos of jihadist paraphernalia and weaponry. The essays provide a fascinating glimpse of the jihadist movement from the perspective of one of the Deoband’s allegedly moderate and proestablishment institutions in Pakistan. We can see the indistinction between Islam and Pakistan at play. Rafi’s brother, Taqi ‘Usmani, is the principle of Dar al-‘Ulum and one of the most senior clerics in Pakistan. Mufti Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmani (b. 1943) is also the editor of *Al-Balagh* and is perhaps *the* most prolific and highly accomplished contemporary scholar of the Deoband in Pakistan.[74]

Rafi ‘Usmani’s jihad memoirs can be read as valorization of the Mujahideen effort in Afghanistan and a series of lame excuses (he had a

bad back) as to why he was unable to participate in the jihad himself, except for a minor skirmish at Urghun in Paktika Province. His personalized and often humorous account of the jihad is peppered with citations from hadith and the Qur'an. For instance he narrates the tale of a *paan*-chewing, Memon *mujahid*, who had been deprived of *paan* for months while on the battlefield. A serious *paan paragh* himself, Rafi 'Usmani describes the delight on the *Mujahid*'s face when the master unveiled his own little silver *paan* case. The memoirs also furnish accounts of *mujahideen* heroism, courage, sacrifice, death, and miracles on the battlefield. It is an account of the Jihad in Afghanistan where "a million and five hundred thousand martyrs gave their blood to liberate Afghanistan from the infidels and save Pakistan and the Muslims countries of the Middle East from the communists." 'Usmani is emphatic that "this is not an account of the misrule that was seen in Afghanistan after victory in the fight for leadership." He blames the "shameless civil war" that followed the Soviet withdrawal on "the politicians"[75] and "the greed of leadership [which] has given the enemies of Islam an opportunity to ridicule jihad and the *mujahideen*." However, the *power* that has emerged in the form of the Taliban gives us hope that the sacrifices offered in the jihad against disbelief would bring their result. "May Allah preserve the Taliban from every mischief of self and the devil and from the conspiracies of the enemies of Islam, and may he make them worthy of renaissance of Islam." The very Mujahideen that he praises have now turned their Kalashnikovs against the 'Usmani brothers.

In *Purr Asrar* Rafi recounts memories of his youth, and the delight he felt when people raised the slogan of Pakistan: "*Pakistan ka mutlab kya? Laillaha Ilallah*" (What is the meaning of Pakistan? There is no God but God). In preparation for the partition violence, he and his brothers trained in the martial art of *binnawt*,[76] which apparently had been added to the syllabus at the Dar al-'Ulum Deoband. "The local Muslims were expert in this art and the Hindus stood in awe of them." As children he writes, "we prayed eagerly after every *salah* that they [Hindus] should attack and we should have an opportunity to fight. … Anyway, the enemy did not dare to attack Deoband."

His memoirs constitute a masculinist history of *Pakistan as jihad*, and he folds into this account a strong jihadi affect. His recollections describe a morbid eagerness to partake in every conflagration between Pakistan and the state of India (which are all jihads Maulana Mawdudi's counter-fatwa not withstanding). Throughout the work, his recollections of Pakistan's history of war/jihad with the "Hindu's" includes glowing narratives of Army heroism (even the secular Ayub is praised), and he paints the soldiers of the Pakistan Army as *shaheeds* (martyrs) fighting for Islam. Thus, this can be seen as a narrative of the martial body and its

desire for war against the infidel. As Pakistan's history from the Ahrar movement through the Munir Report till today's Taliban schizophrenic insurrection shows, the space of the infidel and *kufaar* is almost coextensive with the entire body politic. Jihad is, in this sense, very much like a cancer, an autoimmune deficiency that consumes its own body in the name of overproduction and protection. In Rafi 'Usmani's memoirs, the duty to the state and the duty to Islam become at points utterly indistinguishable. The work is not the raving of a minor '*alim*, but a chief mufti in the Deoband establishment. Nor did these memoirs appear simply in the obscure pages of a Deoband monthly. The work aims to be a paradigm for jihad, which we read as a modality of the *polemos*: the political as war. The place then of jihad, and its biopolitical inflection, appears most vividly in this continuous and consistent overlap between jihad for the nation and jihad for Allah. In Rafi 'Usmani's account, Pakistan and Islam clearly enter into a zone of indistinction. For 'Usmani, politics is jihad by other means.

Even Husayn Ahmad Madani, in his *Naqsh-i Hayat*, writes admiringly about the military exploits of the progenitors of the original Dar al-'Ulum.[77] The incredible ferocity with which the British quelled the uprisings[78] had no doubt some role to play in turning these former *mujahids* into *mujtahids*. This "pacifist" turn was a concession to the need for a radical new style and to the overwhelming disciplinary power of the colonial apparatus.

The Deoband Conference

> Afghanistan is the only country in the world with a real Islamic system. All Muslims should show loyalty to the Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar.
>
> – Osama Bin Laden, April 9, 2001

Between 9 and 11 April 2001, between 300 000–400 000 Deoband supporters converged on a small town of Taru Jabba, situated near the Jalozai Afghan Refugee camp, some 10 km east of Peshawar.[79] The "International Deoband Conference" was sponsored by Maulana Fazlur Rahman's Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama-i Islam (JUI), and was ostensibly held to celebrate the founding of Deoband Dar al-'Ulum in India in 1866 and its 150 years of service.[80] The 150 years date from 1273 to 1422 A.H. of the Islamic calendar, affirming that the Deoband consider their formal origin to lie in the events of the 1857 Rebellion and not the 1866 founding of the school. The event, however, was a clear display of strength in numbers and a celebration not of piety but of pan-Islamic

fervor and jihad. In addition to being an overt celebration of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the conference was a series of pep rallies designed to inculcate fervor among Pakistani Deobandi's to bring about a similar Islamic revolution in Pakistan. According to Ahmed Rashid the event was funded by the ISI.[81] Given that, at the time, Musharraf had placed a formal ban against "political" rallies, the fact that the authorities allowed an event of this scale to take place was a tacit signal of the acceptance of its general goals.[82]

The conference itself is an example of what Foucault called a *dispositif*, a strategic alignment of forces each with its own series of tactical aims. The highlights of the event included the playing of a taped audio message from Osama bin Laden in support of Mullah Omar and the Taliban as well as a live address to the conference participants by Mullah Muhammad Omar, who was hailed as the *Amir-ul Momineen*, Commander of the Faithful, not just of Afghanistan but also, implicitly, the Commander of the global *ummah*. The *Jang* special edition report on the conference reproduced his speech under the heading "A message from *Amir-ul Momineen* Mullah Muhammad Omar." Bin Laden told his audience that Afghanistan was the only country in the world with a real Islamic system and that all Muslims should show loyalty to the Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar. "Allah Almighty and you should be witnesses that I, Osama bin Laden, am giving allegiance to Mullah Omar." The Saudi dissident's offering of *bait* to Mullah Omar drew the wild applause of the tens of thousands who had gathered at the rally. Western embassies in Islamabad protested against the government for sanctioning the rally, since it was clearly a rally in support of the Taliban, their aims, and their leadership in violation of the UN sanctions against the Taliban. However, this was April 2001, and the rise to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan was precisely what drew the widespread support of the Pakistani Deoband 'ulama.

The event also featured the participation of religious and political dignitaries from almost every Muslim country in the world, including a keynote address by Libyan leader Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi, who was once famed for his contempt of the 'ulama during his own Green revolution. Since the key motif, however, was political defiance against the West (aka the USA and Israel) and its economic globalization,[83] Qadhafi added a certain pan-Islamic clout to the gathering. Since the event was also a celebration of the founding of the Deoband and a follow-up to the 1980 centenary held in India, prominent members of the Indian Deoband establishment also attended, including the head of the Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama-i Hind, the *Amir ul-Hind*, Maulana Syed Muhammad Asad Madani, the vice-chancellor of the Indian Dar al-'Ulum, Maulana Marghoobur Rahman, and the Indian Deoband madrasa's top-ranking

scholar *Shaikh-ul Hadith*,[84] Maulana Nizamatullah Aazimi. There were several other prominent Indian Deoband 'ulama, including the son of *Hakim ul-Islam*, Qari Muhammad Tayyib, Muhammad Salim, and the secretary of the JUH, Amjad Madani.[85]

Despite the enthusiastic attendance by the Indian clerics, a major split was apparent between the Pakistani and Indian Deoband over the question of support for the Taliban, an issue that came to a head on 11 September 2001. The destruction of the Buddhas in Bamiyan, which preceded the conference, already showed distinct differences among the Deoband 'ulama. In contrast to the stridently militant and jihadist tenor of most speeches, the Indian 'ulama attempted to focus on questions of Muslim unity and on questions of education. Maulana Marghoobul Rahman's speech confined itself to the educational, literary, and political achievements of Dar al-'Ulum in Deoband, and he urged Muslims to refrain from aggression so that they would not be labeled as terrorists or fundamentalists. In one of the concluding panels chaired by Asad Madani, a series of resolutions were affirmed that included general denunciations of the role that the United States had played in the Islamic world. Yet despite their unease, none of the leadership returned to India and criticized the event nor did they try to distance themselves from the conference and its explicit backing and support for the Taliban. One of the conference organizers and a trusted lieutenant of bin Laden, Muhammad Rahim Haqqani,[86] was more emphatic about the nature of the conference: "We want to send the message that only Islam has the capability of bringing peace and stability in the world. The West has failed. … The Taliban are the practitioners of the pure Deoband Islamic thought. They have implemented laws in the real spirit of Islam. This is what we want here in Pakistan. We do not have true Islamic laws here." It might have been useful for the Indian 'ulama to counter such claims about the true spirit of the Deoband, but they were largely silent.[87]

While bin Laden's message was not reproduced in the *Jang*, Mullah Omar's rhetorical speech was. Introduced as the *Commander of the Faithful*, Mullah Omar's speech hailed the 'World' Deoband Conference as "a milestone for establishing the superiority of Islam. … If we were not at war," Mullah Omar declared, "all the Afghan Muslims would come to Pakistan to help hasten the establishment of the Islamic Shari'a system."

However, I would like to focus mainly on the fiery speech of Fazlur Rahman because today he is still widely regarded as one of the more moderate JUI 'ulama. It will also be instructive to see how the thematic focus on the body of the *ummah* and the danger to Islam posed by the enemies of Islam has similarities with the rhetoric of the AIML with its slogan of "Islam in Danger." Islam, Fazlur Rahman tells us, is still in

danger, but now the threat is a new combination of internal and external powers – the US, the UN, Christianity, and secular NGOs are all charged with conspiring against Islam. Fazlur Rahman's speech was reproduced in the *Jang* newspaper under the title: "All of Pakistan will become the fortress of Islam." This could have easily been the title of any one of Iqbal's or Jinnah's speeches. The text of the speech is worth quoting at length. "We are calling for a jihad against the secular system," announced the JUI leader:

> At this hour the Muslim *ummah* is in grave danger. America and Western powers through the agency of the UN, are trying to trample on the Muslims, and they have a determined footing on this policy of destruction. All of Afghanistan is being punished for its establishment of an Islamic system (*nizam*). In Pakistan, Bangladesh and other Muslim countries, NGO's, Qadianis and other non-religious (*la-dini*) powers want to destroy Islamic values and enforce on us their European culture and traditions (*tehzib*). Not only are they trying to get rid of Islamic value/identity they are weighing the possibility of setting up a Christian and Qadiani state in Pakistan. On the one hand the Muslim *ummah* is being divided into sects, and on the other hand NGOs are attacking religion. And so at this juncture we are left with only one path, that we take our knowledge (*'ilm*) and spiritual (*ruhani*) traditions and just like the Deoband Dar al-'ulum, we must wage a struggle (*jidd-o-jahad*) to maintain our Muslim identity and to protect our faith and freedoms. Through the energies and ideas developed at this conference, we will try to avert the designs of US. The aim of this conference is to thwart all the influence and designs that the enemies of Islam [NGOs, America, UN] have in Pakistan. … This conference will prove to be a critical path towards establishing a complete Islamic system in Pakistan and thwarting the secularism of NGOs.[88]

How do we begin to make sense of this ensemble of ideologically diverse groupings? The Deoband assemblages at this conference in 2001 are very different today in 2008 as we shall see below. What kind of configuration are we are dealing with then? It is certainly not best understood as an ideological configuration. Instead we should view this in terms of what Foucault called an "apparatus of security," which is itself a key element of modern governmentality.

In *Sécurité, Territoire, Population* Foucault lays out his genealogy of modern "governmentality," which he regards as a correlation among different technologies of power. As we have discussed, he distinguishes between three different modalities in the history of the relations of power: the legal system, which corresponds to the institutional model of the territorial state of sovereignty;[89] disciplinary mechanisms, which correspond to the modern society of discipline and put in place, alongside the

law, a series of police, medical, and penitentiary techniques designed to order, correct, and modulate the bodies of subjects; and finally dispositifs of security, which correspond to the contemporary state of population and to the practices that define it. Political Islam must hence be situated as a general element of the government of Muslims. Foucault takes care to specify that these three modalities do not chronologically succeed nor successively exclude one another but coexist and articulate with one another in such a way that one of these constitutes in turn the dominant political technology: "in reality we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, governmental management, which has population as its primary target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism."[90] One technology of power may provide guiding norms and an orienting *telos*, but it does not saturate all power relations. There is instead a principle of assemblage at work, which determines how heterogeneous elements – techniques, institutional arrangements, material forms, and other technologies of power – are taken up and recombined. The Deoband conference then can be seen as a configuration of elements, what Foucault calls a *dispositif* that constitutes a particular space of topology of power:[91]

> … by the term "apparatus" I mean a kind of a formation, so to speak, that at a given historical moment has as its major function the *response to an urgency*. The apparatus therefore has a dominant strategic function. …
>
> … the nature of an apparatus is essentially strategic, which means that we are speaking about a certain manipulation of relations of forces, of a rational and concrete intervention in the relations of forces, either so as to develop them in a particular direction, or to block them, to stabilize them, and to utilize them. The apparatus is thus always inscribed into a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain limits of knowledge that arise from it and, to an equal degree, condition it. The apparatus is precisely this: a set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge.[92]

For Foucault the most crucial articulation of the technology of power was "security," a mechanism through which the figure of population is constituted as a target of government intervention. Between the Deoband today and the Muslim League before it, political Islam discovers the paradigm of *ummah* security, the security of the global Muslim population at large. It is this persistent sense of the oppression against the Muslim body worldwide (Bosnia, Kashmir, Palestine, etc.) that subtends the primary affect of the speeches at the conference. It is also a persistent feature of Deoband journals like *Al-Farooq* to feature regular reports on the various crisis afflicting the Muslim *ummah*. Once political Islam is

understood in relation to population and security, the underlying affect of "secularists," Muslims, and "Islamists" begins to dissolve. In this light it becomes clearer to see why Fazlur Rahman reserves, as he does here and elsewhere, so much invective for NGOs. The Deoband are actively engaged in recombining elements of sovereign power and security and adapting them to the problems of population, war, and threats from internal and external formations. The speech above shows how Fazlur Rahman, albeit clumsily and with all the paranoia that is part of the milieu of violent uncertainties in which he is thrown, is driven by the same security logic that compelled Jinnah and Iqbal, a logic of security that now operates in a new set of complex cartographies of power. It is this space that I have been trying to articulate as the critical matrix in which our analysis of political Islam must proceed.

In *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault returns to the theme of biopolitics that he had begun to articulate in the *History of Sexuality*: "one of the basic phenomena of the nineteenth century was what might be called power's hold over life."[93] This power is to be understood not solely at the level of the state or political theory but rather "at the level of the mechanisms, techniques, and technologies of power."[94] Foucault introduces the distinction between the two poles of biopolitics as the "micro" and "macro" levels of "power's hold over life." On the one hand, Foucault argues, "we saw the emergence of techniques of power that were essentially centered on the body, on the individual body." Here he refers to the disciplines and to what in *History of Sexuality* he calls a "micro-politics of the body." On the other hand, a second pole of biopolitics relates "to man-as-species," to human beings insofar as they form a "*global mass* that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on." He names this new technology of power a "'biopolitics' of the human race." In the light of this schema we can now reconfigure the transitions of the Deoband 'ulama, which shift from a form of power centered primarily on the individual body to a form of power centered largely on *ummah* security, as the transition from Dar ul-discipline to Dar ul-Security. It is Pakistan that is the device or logic that facilitates this transition.

The Deoband movement begins in the wake of the failure of the 1857 rebellion to restore Muslim sovereignty. In the wake of that failure, the Deoband madrasa is established, and it increasingly turns towards the project of normalization. The madaris is the site where initially discipline and normalization come together. Now, however, we have a new series: sovereignty–discipline–security. The variations then between the Indian, Pakistani, and Afghan Deoband can be seen in the light of the security apparatus and not therefore in the light of textual interpretations, political ideologies, and subjective interiorities. The security

apparatus bearing on each country, the specific topology of power, is what varies, and it is to this variation that Muslim politics acquires the diversity and indistinction of its responses.

Fat-war: Reading the Fatwa as Strategy

Through a reading of the strategic deployment of a series of *fatwa* proclamations by the 'ulama, this section will further advance the following suggestion: that, while the '*ummah*' today has no formal significance or substance, discourses of and on the *ummah* might still be usefully understood along a series of biopolitical and affective registers, well before the range of material and embodied practices (invocations) of the 'ulama can be considered in all their rich material and polemical particularity. Thinking the *ummah* biopolitically means in part to recognize with Foucault that undergirding the discourses on Muslim community/society and its associated polemics of peace, brotherhood, and unity is the logic of sovereignty and *polemos*: antagonism and war. The invocation of the *ummah* and discourses on Islamic community (transnational or local) effectively provide the rational for a series of violent inclusions/exclusions (*kufaar*, *murtid*, *jahiliyya*) and subsequently open the space for the exercise of sovereign power with its attendant rights of war and death. In this way we can see that the existence of "Islamic" violence/terrorism is not a political or religious problem as such but rather a problem of the political or, better yet, an onto-political problem.

Karachi has received many global accolades, including on several occasions that of "The Most Dangerous City in the World." Such titles have usually been shrugged off as mere Western hyperbole, but since 2007, an apocalyptic mood has perceptibly permeated the otherwise thick dermis of this immense and unruly megalopolis. A severe case of sovereign anxiety and radical uncertainty pervades the country, and I arrived there in August 2008 in what seemed to be the eye of a storm. It was certainly not a good time to be enquiring into the resonances of the *ummah*. If the fiction of community is sustained by feeling, then neither nationalism nor Islam were serving well the function of a discursively mobilized sentiment of belonging. A nation that ostensibly had as its *raison d'être* the security of the Indian Muslim population, whose founding chant was "Islam must be defended," was now being torn apart by the very logic of its unity. In the Age of Terror, *Dar-ul Harb* and *Dar-ul Islam* have entered into a zone of indistinction. It would not be inaccurate to suggest that the very logic of territorial consolidation that underwrote the sovereignty of Pakistan, the existence of an Islamic difference, was once again busy with the task of its endless biopolitical

separation. If Islam and the invocation of the Indian *ummah* were the solution to the original crisis of colonialism, then the solution has now itself become the crisis. A pervasive fear of Talibanization and general Terror – understood not in localized terms but as a general dislocation – now haunts the nation. By all accounts Islam, now emptied of its original ontological content, is also at war with itself. Before proceeding to the analysis of the biopolitical discourses of the 'ulama, it may be useful to foreground them with a series of excerpts from everyday responses to a series of general questions regarding the *ummah*.[95]

Whose Ummah?

I had interviewed over 20 people, and it quickly became apparent that the *ummah* as a concept had limited and variegated popular circulation. Most people were in fact thrown off by my question, and were surprised that one could even do research on something that was either an abstraction or a simple definition. Most people did not think of it beyond its formulaic generality. For the most part their involvement with community was highly local, bound up more with either class, ethnic, or sectarian affiliation rather than Muslim generality. In short, the alleged metanarrative of the *ummah* had no day-to-day relevance other than as an invocation of a counter-hegemonic discourse (unity directed against the historical and ongoing colonial intrusions of the "West"). Invariably where the term evoked passion it was across a series of biopolitical registers, the idea of Muslims as a people, as a power that could guarantee the defense of Muslim life.[96]

Ibn Naqshibandi, an '*alim* teaching at Jami'a Faruqiyya, a major Deoband madrasa, said (interview in Urdu): "Najeeb *Sahib*, I'm not sure my answer will satisfy the 'scholarly' nature of your inquiry. I'm sure there are '*ulama-e-karam* [noble religious scholars] who have done some *taftish* [research] on this, but I am not aware of their work … but I don't think the *ummah* is an idea behind which a series of complicated words and formulae can stand. The *ummah* is rooted in a practice, and the '*ilm* of this practice does not come from learning by books but from sitting and learning at the feet of one who has learned *hadith* from his teacher who has learned it from the greater teachers, like Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Hajji Imdadullah or Maulana Idries Kandhlawi, who learnt it from the *shah girds* [students] of Shah Walliullah and so on all the way back to Prophet Muhammad …."

Naqshibandi then went on to describe the holy (*tabligh)* activities of a variety of Deoband 'ulama who traveled to India, South Africa, England and who without thought of worldly reward established *madaris* for

inculcating scripture (*sunnat)*. For Naqshibandi, the *ummah* is constituted as a space that is opened up by the sacrifices of the great '*alim*. Which is to say that he was not quite interested in my quasi-political line of questioning regarding inclusion/exclusion and power but instead wanted to reaffirm the centrality of authority that flows from the Deoband genealogy (*silsila*) and the quiet anti-intellectual practice of following shari'a (*taqlid*). That is to say, he was merely reinscribing the structure of authentic authority and letting me know that no genuine knowledge of Islam could emerge from an American academy. Before leaving, however, he handed me a gift! Then it became clear that his narrative was not an avoidance of the political at all.

The Taliban and the Teli-ban

I did not get a chance to read the paper I was handed until I was flying home. As I read the fatwa that he had handed me – a fatwa that was distributed by mail to thousands of followers and was to be published the following day, 30 August 2008, in a full page add in the leading Urdu Newspaper, the *Daily Jang*[97] – I nearly jumped out of my seat. It was a virtual declaration of (civil) war. Its opening salvo at least. Here before me was a classic case of shari'a being deployed as an instrument of war by other means. Already a year earlier, as a premonitory indication of the seriousness of the fatwa, a major leader of JUI (F), Maulana Hassan Jan, was gunned down by unknown assailants.[98] Only weeks before the seventy-year-old cleric had gone on national TV publicly denouncing the Taliban and their terrorist attacks against Pakistani civilians. In this case the Taliban did not take credit for the assassination, though it was clear why Hassan Jan was singled out. The fatwa under consideration here, however, brought this covert internal conflict more formally out into the open.

The draft of the fatwa was preceded a few days earlier by a major conference held at the number two Deoband institution in Karachi, the Jami'a Faruqiyya in Shah Faisal Colony, presided over by Faruqiyya's now close to retiring principal (*mohtamim*), *Shaikh-ul Hadith* Maulana Salimullah Khan;[99] he is also Mullah Omar's father-in-law. In addition to the faculty of Faruqiyya, the meeting was attended by prominent representatives of the Deoband from all over Pakistan, including Muftis from Dar al-'Ulum Haqqaniyya and Jami'a Banuriyya (Banuri Town).[100] Such large gatherings are not unusual; Deoband conferences are held year round; however, what is distinctive in the list itself is the absence of representatives from the formerly No. 1 and No. 2 Deoband Schools, the Dar al-'Ulum Karachi and Jami'a Ashrafiyya in Lahore. The joint fatwa that was

issued after this gathering was nothing short of a declaration of civil war: a struggle for hegemony between moderate and pro-government factions of the Deoband and its more militant underlings.

During my pre-9/11 visits to Pakistan, one of my major contacts into the world of the Deoband, the editor of the journal *al-Farooq*, Ibn Naqshibandi, would ferry me from Faruqiyya to Dar al-'Ulum Korangi. Both schools were closely affiliated and would cooperate on a number of levels. In 2007, when I asked Ibn Naqshibandi to take me to Dar al-'Ulum Korangi, he refused: "we are having some issues and I can no longer go there," he told me. It was not until I read the fatwa that I quite understood what he meant. The fatwa reads:

> For the past few years, the question of Islamic banking was being examined in light of the principles of the Qur'an and *Sunnah*. The documents, forms, and papers of the banking principles under consideration have also been examined in light of the history of the *fuqahas* researches on this matter. Eventually in this regard in order to facilitate a verdict, senior 'ulama gathered from all four provinces at a major conference on 28th August 2008, held under the auspices of Hazrat *Shaikh-ul Hadith* Salimullah Khan and at the Jami'a Faruqiyya. At this meeting, all the senior Muftis of shari'a law unanimously agreed on a fatwa that declares all forms of "Islamic" banking are in fact most definitively in violation of the shari'a and are un-Islamic banking. Therefore those banks which provide interest-based banking under the cover of Islamic banking are no different from regular interest based banks.
>
> At this conference the participants also came to a consensus that the law of the ban on photography/pictures cannot be suspended under the cover of keeping in step with the spirit of modernization/progress. Similarly the legitimacy of all other mediums of representation (TV, Newspapers, etc.) in terms of the verdict of the shari'a is similar to that of pictures and changing times do not nullify the law. Therefore because of the law that bans pictures, all media should come under this law. Therefore any 'ulama who appear on TV, even under the guise of Islamic *tabligh*, is in violation of the shari'a. Therefore in the same way that it is mandatory and necessary (*wajib awr lazim*) that one should avoid *haram* (banned) things, similarly 'ulama should not appear on TV channels even in the name of spreading Islam, for this is also *haram* and should be avoided because it is against Islam.

The proclamation effectively declares the following: all forms of banking, including and in particular those that describe themselves as Islamic banks, are heretofore declared *haram*, against the shari'a, and forbidden. Banks working in the name of Islamic banking are not different from other banks and dealing with them is illegitimate. A great deal

of deliberation has gone into this decision, the *fatwa* declares, but this is the final consensus of the *Fiqh Majalis* (gathering of legal scholars). In addition all forms of human and animal representation on television or in print are also repugnant to Islamic shari'a, including TV channels that claim to be set up solely for purposes of Islamic preaching.[101]

What is significant is that both Islamic banking and the acceptance of human representation in the media were specifically sanctioned or at least allowed (*jaiz*) by the top two schools. The fatwa is almost explicitly aimed at governing the behavior of other 'ulama. So not only do we have here a major scholarly (*fiqh*) revolt but also a *Teli* (*TV*) ban by the Taliban, a declaration of what is *Deo*-banned. By going after both the institutions of finance and the entire framework of the media, the fatwa is also a direct ban on secular economic life. On 14 and 19 September, the Grand Mufti of Pakistan, Taqi 'Usmani, the head of the premier Deoband school, the Dar al-'Ulum in Korangi, issued a counter-fatwa, which clarifies the legality of Islamic TV and more importantly Islamic banking. It needs reminding here that a series of counter-fatwa's that were offered against Maulana Husayn Ahmad Madani in the 1940s, fatwas sanctioned by Maulana Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi, preceded the violent split between India and Pakistan. What Agamben designates as biopolitical caesura, the law of people formation, the ceaseless separation of *bios* and *zoē*, seems busy at work yet again.

As the various Taliban offshoots and groups have gradually divided and turned their guns on each other, Baudrillard's statement, "terrorism would rise against Islam,"[102] once again takes on the tone of an ominous prophecy. The Deoband has from its inception never formed a politically unified entity and since the 1980s has split into numerous factions, as we pointed out in an earlier chapter. However, a split of this magnitude among senior clerics rather than militant offshoots is unprecedented, and today as we speak, senior figures of the Deoband like Maulana Fazlur Rahman (JUI-F) and Rafi 'Usmani face the potential wrath if not bullets of the very Taliban movement that they assiduously supported throughout the 1990s and early years of 2000.

The Teli-ban (the ban on representation as such) and the banking ban (a ban on the engine driving the political economy of globalization) suggest then a discursive, legal complement to the now pervasive threat of physical violence posed by the Taliban. That is to say, that the fatwa is no longer targeting the individual body and its conduct directly but that of the body politic. The transition from tactics to strategy is, as Foucault describes in "Docile Bodies," a key moment in the transition towards biopolitical strategies of power: "relations of power, they are played; it is these games of power (*jeux de pouvoir*) that one must study in terms of tactics and strategy."[103] While the chapter on docile bodies is concerned

with elaborating the tactics of disciplinary power and its abilities to arrange, control, and dispose of the life of the individual body, in *Society Must Be Defended* and *The History of Sexuality* Foucault shifts focus from the relations between power and the individual to those of power and the population: from "tactics" to "strategy" this represents a shift in the scale and target, body to *bios*.

In light of this transition from tactics to strategy, it may be argued that the principal target of the traditional eighteenth and nineteenth century *fatwa* was the natural body. The Deoband 'ulama's power was perhaps itself constituted through techniques of discipline deriving from the changing forms of law, warfare, and the spatial regulation of the private domain under colonialism. There is then a certain discontinuity in the scope and target of the fatwa that exemplifies the overall biopoliticization of Islamic practice and discourse that I am seeking to highlight. The Teli-ban fatwa seeks to create a counter-space of sovereign power targeting the pious *ummah* (not just *kufaar*), and hence this non-state, juridical fatwa undermines the intimacy of official state sovereignty (premised on respect for Islam) and law. It thereby creates a space for the exercise of a counter-decision and in this way the sovereignty of its own law. It is a form of potential law-positing, or mythic, violence. The irregular and unpredictable mechanisms of its potential enforcement bring 'ulama sovereignty and violence into the field of play. The aim of this fatwa is thus not *primarily* tactical (anatomo-political) but strategic (biopolitical). It is no longer focused on the relation between the individual soul and his salvation that is the concern of the fatwa but rather the soul of the population. Its ambition is not local but global as the media ban most directly challenges all forms of the endless proliferation of self-styled Islamic authority.[104] The Teli-fatwa here does not target the individual Muslim body nor does it seek to shape its conduct (its comportment, style of dress, diet, ablution, prayer, fasting, etc.) but targets society understood as a mass, a Muslim population. It is a strategic move in a larger ensemble of power maneuvers. As Foucault highlights in *Discipline and Punish*, disciplinary power is aimed at individual bodies, employing surveillance, normalizing techniques, and a "panoptic" grid of institutions, whereas biopolitical power has as its target a "species-body;" it suffuses the general processes of life and death for a whole population.

Unlike the older forms of sovereign and disciplinary power that police and govern the life of individual subjects, biopolitics is a new configuration of power, one which supersedes individual life and death and transforms itself into a depersonalized, almost bureaucratic matter concerning the security and well-being of the population. It is not personal, just business. The tone of the Teli-fatwa is similarly dry, business-like, matter

of fact, not to be taken personally; it simply proclaims the law of operations for the *ummah* at large. It is an exercise of 'ulama jurisdiction that is no longer confined by coloniality (colonial sovereignty) to the sphere of the private. In this way the fatwa can be read as a perverse response to the surreptitious war cry of secularity itself. Foucault's insight that "the role of political power is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to reinscribe … relationship of force, and to reinscribe it in institutions, economic inequalities, language, and even the bodies of individuals"[105] can thus be seen to hold true of fundamentalists and secularists alike.

The disciplinary tactical aspect of the fatwa has by no means disappeared; it is simply subsumed and/or complimented within a more biopolitical modality. In this way the historical transition of the shari'a from enjoining to enforcement, from *fana* to fanaticism, is perhaps a marker of Islam's irretrievable crossing into a modern biopolitical threshold. This fatwa is an exemplary instance of this crossing. We may thus paraphrase a section of Foucault's 1978 article on governmentality as follows:[106] maybe what is really important for our modernity – our present – is not so much the drive towards an Islamic state as such but rather the governmentalization (biopoliticization) of Islam. Given that the king's head has not yet been removed, given that the juridico-sovereign model of power persists, the emphasis and fear of those forms of political Islam that target the state has occluded our understanding of a vaster more subtle mechanism of power operating immanently within the domain of the *ummah* more broadly. "Accordingly, we need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatus of security."[107]

The important task then is to configure the ways in which the 'ulama combines these powers towards tactical/strategic and sovereign ends. What we have here is a specifically *Deo*-monic[108] (daemonic) combination of sovereignty, discipline, and biopolitics. The fatwa is strategic-biopolitical in that it proffers specific counter-techniques of social management (i.e. banking, media) aimed at both prevailing state (Pakistani) and global (US) power as well as other local forms of entrenched 'ulama authority. There is no concession to an *ummah* here, only a battle cry – the logic of sovereign, biopolitical jihad.

A parallel Foucaultian concern, one that leads us to the question of *homo sacer* and bare life, must also be addressed: "How can one both make a biopower function and exercise the rights of war, the rights of murder, and the function of death without becoming racist?"[109] Like their "secular" neoconservative counterparts in the War of Terror, the

death-dealing that unfolds in the process of enforcing sovereign will (whenever such juridico-military mechanisms of violence are in place) is prevented from being regarded as either an arbitrary or malicious exercise of power or as racist because it is enacted as the defense of a "way of life" under threat.[110] In the case of the fatwa, the implicit directive is clear; violations of the ban on banks and the ban on media are violations of shari'a, and, in the language of Taliban justice, this simply means that an unrepentant violator of the ban has become *murtid*, apostate, and hence can be killed without being sacrificed. The fatwa, as an instance of the technology of 'ulama sovereignty, thus opens up a space for the production of an exclusive inclusion of the *murtid* as *homo sacer* (the ban of the Taliban): "The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life – that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed – is the life that has been captured in this sphere."[111] In a parallel way, the War on Terror creates another sovereign sphere, a Taliban space (whether in Afghanistan or Waziristan) that can be bombed at will because it harbors a form of life that is not worth living, a non-political, alien form of human being (the abode of the transcendent evil of radical Islamism, the cancer of Islamic fundamentalism, the dangerous other). The Islamo-fascist and the heretic (*kafir*) alike mirror the logic of sovereignty at play in these overlapping spaces of exception. The everyday Afghan Muslim, perhaps even more so than the Jew under Nazism, living under regimes whose dominant political paradigm is the War on Terror, is doubly "the privileged negative referent of the new biopolitical sovereignty and is, as such, a flagrant case of a *homo sacer* in the sense of a life that may be killed but not sacrificed. His killing therefore constitutes … neither capital punishment nor a sacrifice, but simply the actualization of a mere 'capacity to be killed' inherent in the condition"[112] of the terrorist/jihadist/Muslim/apostate. As *jewñ* (lice) is the figure of abject Muslim life, the Taliban/*kafir* is rendered as bare life. The framework in which the killing of the Taliban/*kafir*/apostate takes place is "neither religion nor law, but biopolitics."[113] In this way the execution of Daniel Pearl, "shock and awe," and the torture of "terrorist/detainees" at Abu Ghraib would seem to be the handiwork of the same biopolitical-technological specter haunting our time.

Citizens of the Islamapolis

In a most general sense the term "*ummah*" is of course as vacuous as the term "humanity" or the "West" and functions more like a political meta-narrative or polemical quilting point. However, it is important to keep in

mind that the invocation of the idea of the *ummah* is almost always a way to designate a mass, a population, and hence an object of knowledge regulation and policing. In this sense *ummah* discourses are doubly biopolitical in that they are not merely a feature of a range of Muslim political imaginaries but rather constitute a modality that is useful to the logic of security that drives the proliferating indistinctions of the wars of/on terror. Trans-national discourses on the *ummah* are perhaps, in this sense, more vital to the political economy of liberal regimes, whose pervasive logic of security and martial capacities for war thrive on the deployment of Islam as a vital threat. The American project for the imposition of liberal peace across the "Muslim World" is defunct without expert discourses on (political/radical) Islam as the engine of a countermodernity, a unified homogenous plot, whose profuse resentments threaten "Western civilization" and its "way of life." The idea of a unified *ummah* is thus central to the metaphysics of both Islam-hating (e.g. neoconservatives) and Islam-loving (jihadists). In our rapidly globalizing era, the third biopolitical term between "Security" and "Population" is "Terror" rather than "Territory." The *ummah*, as Islamapolis, may then be seen as an extension of the carceral polis, replete with an imaginary geopolitics that seeks to exercise yet again the power of normalization (Islamization). What presides over these sovereign mechanisms "is not the unitary functioning of an apparatus or an institution, but the necessity of combat and the rules of strategy. … In this central and centralized humanity [read *ummah*], the effect and instrument of complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple mechanisms of 'incarceration', objects for discourses that are in themselves elements for this strategy, we must hear the distant roar of battle."[114]

For Foucault war was the central problem of modernity.[115] Foucault's idea of war can certainly be related to Schmidt's friend/enemy distinction and agonistic theories of the political (*a la* Chantal Mouffe). I believe, however, that its more significant origins lie in Heidegger's conception of *polemos*.[116] As Julian Ried notes with regard to the emergence of the disciplines, "Foucault insisted that the tactical models of military organization were of utmost importance to understand how war invests the order of power".[117] In *Discipline and Punish*, war and the military sciences not the prisons are designated as the originary impetus behind the disciplining of individual bodies and the eventual transitions to carceral societies. As he extended his analysis of power from disciplinary to biopolitical regimes and modern governmentality, the problematic of war and power only intensified. *The History of Sexuality* elaborates further on the fundamental imbrication of liberal regimes, predicated on the production of "peace" with war and biopower. In conjunction with Agamben, we can say that under modernity

the camp and the *polis* merge. The Taliban are in an essential way a merger – a daemonic combination to use Foucault's terms – of the camp and the *polis*.

If the political space of Pakistan has indeed crossed the threshold of multifold indistinctions – between martial law and democracy, between *fact* and life, between law and violence, between Islam as peace and Islam as war – it would mean that a new set of vocabularies will need to be developed to discern the complex folds of this state of emergency, which on Heidegger's reading is symptomatic of the "emergency of being." It is my contention then that Pakistan's fate and by extension that of the Deoband cannot be understood or *interrupted* unless we take into account the *topos* of the metacolonial space that envelops its onto-historical destiny. The predominant shade of this matrix in Pakistan is military-colonial, a space where politics, in Foucault's famous reversal of Carl von Clausewitz, is always war by other means.

The martial undercurrent of biopower and in particular its thanato-political tendencies have thus continued to suffuse all aspects of social relations including revolutionary anarchic and "constituting" discourses. The ruse of power, its "race war" discourses, hidden and disguised as historico-political counter-discourses, is perhaps most effectively alive in the thought and practice of resistance. Even his own genealogy comes under the scrutiny of the underlying *polemos*, dynamic of life. Perhaps this is why Foucault remained wary of attaching himself within the intellectual tide of postmodernity and perhaps why he may have remained suspicious even of postcolonial critiques written partially under his name. Imperium is not therefore a devious error of an originally pacific project of modernity but rather its necessary correlate. If Empire and liberty – *Pax Americana* – are two sides of the same coin, cannot the same be said of any instantiation of *Pax Islamica*?

Power of Death

Under the colonial regime, the domain of juridico-Islamic power was confined to the sphere of the domestic. Additionally, because of the decapitation of formal Muslim political sovereignty, the entire zone of remaining autonomous and legal power that was open to Muslims was redirected towards the zone of the private and the domestic. Domesticity, which historically has been the space where patriarchal power was rarely trumped by the state,[118] was thus the primary site for the expression and exercise of 'ulama power. The space of 'ulama power underwent a mutation and indirect enlargement under the colonial apparatus. With the onset of independence, political sovereignty would be transferred to the

former subjects of colonial rule, but these subjects had already undergone profound trans-mutations under colonialism, which had indeed transformed political space and the very form of the subject who would inhabit it. If before the Lahore resolution the bulk of the 'ulama opposed the idea of a separate Muslim state, with the emergence of the name "Pakistan" the possibilities for 'ulama power in an Islamic State began to garner a small but growing section of the 'ulama, who began flirting with the Muslim League.

The modern state has increasingly penetrated zones of the private while maintaining its formal regard for individual rights through the coup of the biopolitical subject. Traditional powers of the private subject, the male prerogative over his wife and children, for instance, have also been increasingly usurped by the state, which alone takes charge of the rights of each individual in its flock. In his chapter "*Vitae Necisque Potestas*" – a chapter that provides historical depth to Foucault's characterization of sovereign power as "the right to decide life and death" – Agamben shows how the expression "right over life and death" in the history of law first appears in the Roman formula *vitae necisque potestas*, "which designates not sovereign power but rather the unconditional authority (*potesta*) of the *pater* over his sons." Agamben then links the appearance of *vita* (life) in Roman law with the collapse of the classical Greek distinction between both *zoē* and *bios*:

> … *vita* is nothing but a corollary of *nex*, the power to kill. … Life thus originally appears in Roman law merely as the counterpart of a power threatening death. … the *vitae necisque potestas* attaches itself to every free male citizen from birth and thus seems to define the very model of political power in general. Not simple natural life, but life exposed to death (bare life or sacred life) is the originary political element."[119]

We can then apply this genealogy not only to the "father" of the nation, the Duce, but also to other expressions of community leadership. Thus we can see this formulation of an absolute right to kill in the modern Islamist understanding of the Caliph, an individual who holds both temporal and spiritual authority over the *ummah*. If in the broad strokes of Muslim history these powers were judiciously separated, today in the post-Iran-revolution world, they have become united. However, this connection was already presaged in the very idea of Pakistan. Thus in the configuration of modern sovereignty, we must keep in mind the "genealogical myth of sovereign power," which "is nothing but the father's *vitae necisque potestas* extended to all citizens. *There is no clearer way to say that the first foundation of political life is a life that may be killed, which is politicized through its very capacity to be killed*."[120]

If the battle within Pakistan is seen in terms of the metacolonial as waged on the topological terrain of sovereignty, then the institution or individual who most effectively exercises the power of death captures the space of sovereign power. Today it is this space over which the Army, America, and the Mullah are in a bloody contest. These are not three distinct formations, as the long history of Pakistan demonstrates the filial and mendacious relations between all three components whose maximum alliance occurred in the years following 1979. The intensity of politics today can be seen as the aftershocks of this sovereign alignment.

Notes

1 Quoted in Burke 1973.
2 Rushdie 1995.
3 Ali 1983; Alavi and Halliday 1988. Also see Hamza Alavi "Class and State" in Gardezi and Rashid. As she rightly observes, "This focus on 'class' interests obscures the complex relationship between Pakistan's religious identity and its most powerful state institution."
4 Shaikh 2009.
5 Ali 1983.
6 Alavi's notion of the *salariat*.
7 Shaikh 2009, p. 2.
8 Ibid, pp. 10–11.
9 Shaikh draws on Syed Vali Nasr, "National Identities and the India Pakistan Conflict" in Paul 2005; and Metcalf. I have already discussed the limitations of the latter, and these in turn hamper Shaikh's analysis.
10 Shaikh 2009, pp. 12–13. The distinction here between Islamists and communalists is problematic, and only superficial. In many ways it simply replays the modernists/Islamist binary itself.
11 "Pakistan's stability as a nation-state is not so much greater certainty or a stronger sense of consensus. Rather, it will depend on the nature of the consensus itself" (Shaikh 2009).
12 Shaikh 2009, p. 209.
13 Ghazi was also former Minister for Religious Affairs under Benazir, and was a key player in the *Khatm-i Nubuwwat*.
14 Foreword to Mujahid 2001, p. xiv.
15 Taussig 1996; Taussig 1992.
16 As we have seen, in Agamben, the state of exception is not merely an attribute of the state apparatus, and therefore we cannot simply rest content with tracing the exception back to its more exemplary intuitions, the Army and imperialism. Also the order is *Gestell*.
17 Which can be read, in Shaikh's terms, as the ostensible difference between those calling for an Islamic State and those calling for a Muslim State.

18 See the essay "The State as Fetish" in Taussig 1996.
19 Drawing on Agamben, this is a point that Talal Asad makes with regard to the secular, and there is no reason why we should not extend this to Islam and Pakistan.
20 Dillon 2009; Reid 2006.
21 Adorno and Horkheimer 1991.
22 Taussig 1996, p. 116, also quoted in Asad 2003.
23 Qureshi 1988. This lacunae was subsequently addressed in his specific work on the 'ulama (Qureshi 1972). Here a more nuanced appreciation for the role of Thanawi and Shabbir 'Usmani is on display. "There were some 'ulama who played a more positive role in the Pakistan Movement. Some of them came from the Deoband movement itself, thus redeeming some of its wasted reputation," p. 385.
24 Aziz 1998.
25 Zaman very nicely illuminates the contradictory ways in which the 'ulama have contributed to their own marginalization and confinement within the private sphere, by marking off distinctions between the space of Islam and the worldly, while simultaneously claiming Islam is a complete code of life. That is to say, the sacred and the profane are both enacted and disavowed (2002).
26 Liaquat 'Ali Khan was assassinated in Rawalpindi on 16 October 1951. Khan was shot twice in the chest by an Afghan, Said Akbar. In what is perhaps a strange twist of irony Benazir Bhutto was also assassinated in Liaquat Bagh, the park named after Liaquat 'Ali Khan in the wake of his assassination.
27 His address to the *Motamar-i Alam-i Islami* at Karachi on February 9, 1951 (*Dawn*, February 10, 1951).
28 See Agamben on the relationship between the flag, the banner of the nation, and the structure of the sovereign ban itself (Agamben 2000).
29 Jinnah 2000 (emphasis mine). If Western liberalism has been able to mask its underlying political theologies, here in Jinnah's Islamic secularism, the religio-political element is on open display and in solidarity with libertarian exhortations of the French Revolution.
30 For a characteristic example of the ongoing ideological ritual/impasse, see Jan 1998.
31 Huntington 1998.
32 In his article Jinnah quotes the first paragraph from the Report of the Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Sessions 1933–34, Vol. 1). It begins: "India is inhabited by many races … often as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are the nations of Europe." It then goes on to describe the essentialized characteristics of these two "races."
33 M.A. Jinnah, *Time and Tide* (London), March 9, 1940, reproduced in Mujahid.
34 For an insightful critique of communalism, see Pandey 1990.
35 Chatterjee 1993.

36 Which perhaps explains why Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the JUI is so obsessed with NGOs. See Khan 2001a.
37 Foucault 2007b, p. 20.
38 And Muslims from Hindu space.
39 Jalal 1985.
40 Ahmad 1943, p. 299 (emphasis mine).
41 Agamben 1998, p. 111.
42 Quoted in Majeed 2007b, p. xxiii.
43 Schimmel 1963. See also Singh 1997 and Mir 2005.
44 For an excellent study that highlights the complex relationships between the Iqbal's politics of Muslim and European imperialist discourses, see Majeed 2007a.
45 Thus Iqbal could write, on one hand, the *Tarana-i Hindi* (Song of an Indian), which came a close second – to Tagore's *Jana Gana Mana* – to being adopted as the national anthem of India, and, on the other, he also wrote the *Tarana-i Milli* (Song of a Muslim Millat): "China and Arabia are ours; Hindustan is ours; We are the Muslims, the whole world is ours …."
46 It is not merely the irony of the present that makes us gasp at this remarkably essentialist claim, but it is also the irony of Iqbal's moment in 1930, when it was precisely the political division and confusion of direction that Iqbal was called upon to address. Not to mention, of course, that such essentialized visions of a unified Muslim population were projections of Iqbal's biopolitical desire rather than reflections of Indian Muslim history to begin with.
47 Iqbal 1996.
48 Ibid, p. 155.
49 Iqbal 1964, pp. 60–61.
50 Iqbal, *Rumuz-i Bekhudi* in Iqbal 2000.
51 Iqbal and Tariq 1973, p. 226.
52 Muhammad Iqbal, *Harf-i Iqbal*, cited in Taqi 'Usmani *Qadiani Fitna awr Millate Islamiya ke auqaf* (1996).
53 The constitution of Muslim species life as a political body, the life of the *ummah*, thus passes through a fundamental division that defines the original political structure of modernity; namely the categorical pairs of bare life (people) and political existence (People), exclusion and inclusion, *zoē and bios*.
54 "The camp as dislocating localization is the hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living" (Agamben 1998).
55 Islamism is just such a new *nomos*, and not a return to older forms. 'Ulama law, its anticipated coincidence with the state and its current romance with violence, is not a return, but rather an extension of the modern *nomos*, of the state of exception now becoming the rule.
56 Pandey 2001.
57 The space of war, the classical opposite of *dar-al Islam*, the space of peace.
58 Effectively a theocracy led by 'ulama divines.
59 Metcalf 2008.

60 Shabbir 'Usmani also voiced his opposition to Madani in his address at the Muslim League Conference, Meerut, and the Punjab Provincial Jami'at-ul-Ulama-i Islam Conference, in Lahore, on January 26, 1946. These fatwas are compiled in Maulana Shabbir 'Usmani, *Hamara Pakistan* (1946).
61 Shabbir 'Usmani, *Khutbat-i 'Usmani* (1946).
62 Mufti Muhammad Shafi (1897–1976) also gave a series of fatwas in favour of the League. Fatwas were also issued against the JUH by Maulana Muhammad Idris Kandhlawi (1898-1974), Maulana Zafar Ahmad Thanawi, Mufti Jamil Ahmad Thanawi (1905-1994), and Maulana Khair Muhammad Jalandhari (d. 1970).
63 Bukhari, ed., *Chalis Baray Musalman* (2001).
64 Imran 'Usmani.
65 *The exaltation of the normative practices [of the Prophet].*
66 Zaman 2007.
67 Zafar Ahmed 'Usmani, cited in ibid.
68 This point further advances the necessity to view the personal, piety, and other such inner qualities like honor, chivalry, etc., as properly political precisely because they aim at the defining boundaries of inclusion/exclusion.
69 For a brief apolitical account of Muhammad Zakariyya's life, see Metcalf.
70 Zakariya, *Islami Siyyasat*.
71 The Harvard of the Deoband madaris in Pakistan.
72 See the chapter on the Space of Law.
73 "These Incredible Servants of Yours". Could be translated as "These Completely Trustworthy Men," or "These Protectors." Maulana Muhammad Rafi 'Usmani, *Ye Teray Pur Asrar Banday*, 2005.
74 He has dozens of publications in Urdu, Arabic, and English to his name. His collection of fatwa span several volumes. Son of the late Maulana Mufti Muhammad Shafi (the former Grand Mufti of Pakistan, or Mufti-e-Azam-e Pakistan), Taqi 'Usmani was born in Deoband, India, and received his *Takhassus* degree from the Dar al-'Ulum in Karachi in 1961, where he now serves as its President. He also obtained an MA in Arabic literature from Punjab University and an LLB (Law) degree from Karachi University. Under Zia, whose own father was a Deoband cleric, Taqi 'Usmani was appointed to serve as an 'ulama appointee of the Federal Shari'at Court of Pakistan from 1980 to 1982 and the Shari'a Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan from 1982 to 2002. Taqi received his ijaza to teach hadith from a number of Deoband 'alim under whom he studied, including his father, Maulana Idris Kandhlawi, Maulana Rashid Ahmad Ludhianawi, and Shaikh-ul Hadith Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhlawi. 'Usmani still considers tasawwuf (Sufism) an integral part of the Deoband heritage, even as many of his more Wahhabi leaning contemporaries offer a more resolute denunciation of Sufism. His unofficial murshids were Sheikh Abdul Hayy Arifi and Mawlana Maseehullah Khan, themselves disciples of Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi. Almost every week Taqi 'Usmani delivers his sermons on islah and hadith (his hadith specialty and expertise are on Sahih al-Bukhari). Like most Deoband 'ulama, 'Usmani played a key role in the formation and organization of the *Khatm-i Nubuwwat*, anti-Ahmadi

movement. He was also instrumental in drafting many of the controversial Hudud laws for the Shari'at Bills, which passed under Zia's tenure.

75 Failing to note that the politicians were the ex-Mujahideen.

76 South Asian fighting and wrestling style.

77 Namely Hajji Imdadullah (1817–1899), Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanotawi (1832–1880) and Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1828–1905).

78 On the ferocity of the British "shock and awe" campaign see Metcalf 1995; ibid.

79 Deoband organizers put the figure of attendees at over a million. Regardless of this it was still one of the largest religio-political gatherings after the annual Tabligh event in Raiwand.

80 The *Daily Jang* issued a special four-page spread to cover the event. The heading was "*Dar al-'Ulum Deoband ke 150 sal khidmaat*" (Dar al-'Ulum Deoband's 150 years of service),

81 Rashid 2008, p. 53.

82 A similar rally was held in Lahore later in April under the auspices of Lashkar-i Tayeba, again an ISI sponsored event, which the government permitted despite the ban on other political parties.

83 Western products, including Coca Cola, were banned from the event kiosks, and to make sure that this message was clear, Coca Cola signs were placed on certain stalls only to be blackened with prominent x's painted across them. According to news reports, some of the most popular souvenirs were posters depicting burning US and Israeli flags.

84 As Zaman correctly notes, the *Shaikh-ul Hadith* is a title given to the highest ranking professor of hadith studies, and is the most important 'ulama rank in the Deoband madaris (2002).

85 For a complete list of attendees, see the *Jang* special issue April 9, 2001.

86 Muhammad Rahim al Afghani, a senior aide to bin Laden, was captured in August 2007.

87 The situation has changed in India since 2008, especially in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. The Indian Deoband held several press conferences formally denouncing all acts of violence against innocent civilians.

88 *Jang*, 9 April 2001.

89 Not to be confused with Agamben's conception of sovereign power, which is biopolitical.

90 Foucault 2007b, p. 107.

91 As Agamben notes, the word *dispositif* or "apparatus" was the decisive technical term in the strategy of Foucault's thought, especially at the point when he begins to concern himself with what he calls "governmentality" or the "government of men" (Agamben 2009).

92 Foucault 1980, pp. 194–196.

93 Foucault 2003b, p. 239.

94 Ibid, p. 241

95 As part of an ISGP sponsored research trip to Pakistan, investigating Transnational Islamic Discourses, I informally interviewed twenty Pakistanis regarding the significance and meaning of their conceptions of the *ummah*,

the community ideal, or ideal community of believers. As would be predictably self-evident, the singular term and its general level of abstractness were grossly inept at capturing the complex and perplexing mood of the moment. Real names have been changed to protect the identity of my interlocutors who spoke openly and frankly about Islam and politics without regard for anonymity.

96 It may also be useful to point out that other forms of non-religious transnational discourses and practices were more immediately important: networks of business, connections with former college friends in the US, discussion of Indian and American films, tales of international travel, hopes for migration and better pay, supporting international sports clubs, etc.

97 *Jang* has a circulation of over 1 million.

98 Hassan Jan (1938–2007) was Vice President of Deoband Wafaqul Madaris and was elected as a member of the national assembly in 1988. *The News*, September 15, 2007.

99 As President of the Deoband *Wafaq al-Madaris* (the Central Curriculum Committee of all Deoband Madaris), Salimullah had also completed his vast sixteen volume commentary on Bukhari, and was even before this feat known as *Shaikh-ul Hadith*.

100 The participants of the meeting included Maulana Wali Khan and Dr. Manzoor Ahmad Mengal (Jami'a Faruqiyya), Mufti Abdul Hameed Deenpuri (Jami'a al-'Ulum Islamia, Banuri Town), Mufti Rafiq Ahmad and Mufti Saif Alam (Banuri Town), and a dozen other prominent muftis.

101 Interestingly they left out the question of photography and ID cards.

102 Baudrillard 2003, p. 12.

103 Foucault 2000.

104 The Baraelivis, Mawdudi's, Hamza Yusufs, Nyaz Naiks, and Amr Khalids of the world, who increasingly deploy media technologies to counteract the traditional site and genealogy of 'ulama authority.

105 Foucault 2003b, p. 16.

106 Originally: "Maybe what is really important for our modernity – our present – is not so much the *étatisation* of society, as the 'governmentalization' of the state" (Gordon, Burchell, and Miller 1991).

107 Contrary to many teleological interpretations of the way in which power is said to "evolve" rather than mutate, Foucault made clear in his Governmentality essay that sovereign power was not simply "replaced" by disciplinary power, nor that disciplinary power was in turn replaced by governmentality. "In reality," he argues, "one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government."

108 *Deo*: Djinn, or Genie (possibly related also to *Devi*). The Deoband is often pronounced *Devbund*.

109 Foucault 2003b, p. 263.

110 We are reminded of the phrase, "massacres have become vital" (Foucault, 1978).

111 Agamben 1998, p. 83.

112 Ibid, p. 114.

113 See section 6, "The Ban and the Wolf" in Agamben 1998. He goes on to state "If today there is no longer anyone clear figure of the sacred man, it is perhaps because we are all virtually *homines sacri*."
114 Foucault 1977, p. 308.
115 "What I would like to study would be the problem of war and the institution of war in what one could call the military dimension of [modern] society. … How, when and why was it noticed or imagined that what is going on beneath and in power relations is a war? … Until now, or for roughly the last five years, it has been disciplines; for the next five years, it will be war, struggle, the army' (Foucault). In parallel, our concern here is with War (War on Terror, jihad), Struggle (*jihad*, *ethos*), and the army (Pakistani Military).
116 In later Heidegger *polemos* emerges as an ontological concept that describes the chiasmatic relationality of Being and *Dasein*, the crossing of the ontological difference.
117 Reid 2006, p. 31.
118 Lal 2005.
119 Agamben 1998, p. 87.
120 Ibid.

Conclusion

The Metacolonial and the Space of Thinking

> "The history of being" is the name for the attempt to bring the truth of being as appropriation into word for thinking, and familiarize the word and its sayability as an essential ground for historical humans.
>
> – Heidegger, *Die Geschichte des Seyns*

In his preface to *Remnants of Auschwitz*, Agamben describes his commentary on the place of testimony as laying "signposts" that might allow "future cartographers of the new ethical territory to orient themselves." In order to speak to and reveal something about the contemporary nature of our global crisis, which today presents itself as something of a perfect storm, these inquiries have been sustained with a modicum of hope that the largely unexplored vectors of a critical ontology may hold out the promise of such a re-orientation, and of a more significant interrogation of the present. The intensification of neoliberal logics that increasingly dominate all spheres of everyday life, the global proliferation of states of exception, the violent reassertions of biopolitical exceptionalism (witness Trumpism, Brexit, the global rise of far-right populism) and the increasingly intense crisis of the "Anthropocene", all seem to suggest interconnected signatures of a distress in our very ways of being-in-the-world. This condition is in part what I have tried to signal with the term "metacolonial state." Its ambition lies precisely in the possibility of re-suturing our political space to its originary impotentiality, to its ethical possibilities.[1]

To reiterate then, the metacolonial, as a phenomenon, refers to the colonization of life by metaphysics (ontotheology); the colonization/politicization of life by power. As a cartography of the shadows cast by power over the singularity of life, it maps the darkening of our life-worlds.[2] In addition to being a shorthand for metaphysics, *meta* here also acts as

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a complex, multiple, and yet exemplary spatio-temporal prefix. This is in contrast to the *post* of postcolonial, which is principally a temporal marker. In its other protean guises, *meta* can designate the sense of "with," "across," "after," "above," "beyond," and "behind." The metacolonial thus marks a spatio-temporal condition that is both prior to the colonial and ongoing (meta as being "in the midst"). In its sense of *after*, the metacolonial is thus effective in the present, but not merely as a temporal residue or vanishing mediator.

To be sure the metacolonial is not opposed to the postcolonial, but seeks only to infuse it with the *ēthos* of a critical ontology.[3] It seeks to enable a critical threshold, a potential passage towards a mutation in the social sciences that has yet to occur. If ontology is the future – as the interdisciplinary wide turn towards post-foundationalism would seem to indicate[4] – then the metacolonial aims at being a preliminary exploration/exposition of this coming ethico-political topology.

The postcolonial is doubtless no longer a unitary practice, its "theoretical well" drawing inspiration from a diverse, and at times contradictory, array of social theorists from Marx and Gramsci to Foucault and Derrida. Yet increasingly, even within domains sympathetic, calls for theoretical regime change within the broadly constituted field of postcolonial studies and beyond have already began to emanate.[5] In particular, as the *locus classicus* of postcoloniality, India, itself assumes the role of a global hegemon, the Marxists-Gramscian paradigm of subaltern studies will have approached its limit. Can a simple critique of orientalism or a Saidian ethico-political "counter-mapping" sustain the ontological burden that the *aporia*s of development and globalization opens up for us? Put more generally, we might ask whether the deployment of a Derridian/Spivakian inflected postcolonial critique is not still itself a species of war – a variant of what Foucault identifies in *Society Must Be Defended* as "historico-political discourse"? Key to the *ēthos* of historico-political discourses was its challenge to the deployment of notions such as truth, knowledge, and justice, by the state, in its justifications and legitimations of sovereign power and territorial control.[6] Thus historico-political discourses perceptively understood knowledge as a weapon in the politics of truth, in a struggle over the constitution of truth as power. Deployed on a political stage, politics is thus conceived as the continuation of war.

The metacolonial seeks a passage out of the current impasse and aporias of the postcolonial. It is thus in part a correction of the largely political, epistemological and representational trajectory of the postcolonial, which has declared its limits with deconstruction and the *aporia*.[7] In short, the metacolonial does not seek to locate the originating point or place of crisis within capital, colonialism, or globalization but rather

views these as themselves realys of a deeper ontological catastrophe. The metacolonial also remains reflexive of the deployment of its own regime of truth-power; the way in which critical theories – which target the normative juridico-philosophical discourses of the state and other powerful organized institutions – function themselves as historico-political discourses. That is to say, ontological critique must take discourse – the fundamental entanglement of language and power – seriously and remain permanently arrayed against the subject of enunciation[8] with its powers of agency and resistance.

Let me suggest then that Marxism and the postcolonial are necessary but not sufficient to the possibilities inherent in the thought of the aporia and *espacement* as "worlding of the world." Most post-colonial interrogations of development and the colonial present remain hamstrung by the anthropological machine inherent to Saidian humanism, and the largely historico-political ethos of subaltern studies. What the postcolonial critique of Foucault, *a la* Spivak, misses is that the remarkable grammars of power that Foucault has bequeathed us, principally the apparatus and biopolitics, have onto-logical and not merely historico-political resonances. The spatial ontology inherent in Foucault's conception of biopolitics is in turn further radicalized in Agamben "sovereigntology" (the camp is after all a topological and not a topographical figure). The thought of the metacolonial must thus deploy these ontological resonances in ways that evade the historico-political limits of postcolonial Marxist discourse.

The question then is this: can the metacolonial – which involves taking on significant ontological risk – transform traditional modes of postcolonial critique from its predominant concern with representation, human rights, and political economy, and reorient it towards something like an ethical cartography? Can it transform the postcolonial/subaltern "other," which is not yet a fully ontological category? In this way the metacolonial seeks an inflection (an ethico-ontological inflection) of the dominant understandings of postcolonial critique and not its overcoming or overthrow; a "veering away" from the vestiges of metaphysics inherent in the conceptions of "the political," "the subject," "agency," "community," "history," and "space," that are dominant elaborations of postcolonial critique.

The theorists of critical ontology examined in the opening chapter, bring us close to this threshold by exposing the limits of the political, and subsequently opening up ethical horizons that have too long been subsumed and obscured by the will to calculation, efficiency, maximization, and production. The danger that figures like Agamben and Foucault expose is precisely the growing indistinction between the call of the disciplines – the domains of expert knowledge production and

praxis – and the call of development. What we may ask, is the call of the neoliberal development apparatus, if not *Gestell*.[9]

In order for the metacolonial to continue to radicalize the critique of violence and domination inherent in the humanist paradigms of subjectivity (identity), it must initiate a turn from the humanist residues of postcolonial critique. In its critique of colonial/hegemonic representations, the postcolonial remains captive to the humanist (biopolitical) paradigm with its valorization of "subjectivity with agency." The largely epistemological skepticism of the postcolonial is transformed under the metacolonial into a radical perspective on the history of truth that transforms the very experience of being. The metacolonial thus aims to expose the limits of those traditional forms of the critique of power which remain oblivious to the metaphysical topology of the very categories of thought their practices of liberation draw on. For Foucault this critique was expressed succinctly in the notion of biopolitics.

An understanding of the metacolonial state also prompts an attitude of attentiveness to the hauntological destiny and truth of being; a phenomenology of the event haunted by the specter of its own absent ground. The metacolonial signifies a staging and performance of haunting, a radical dis-placement; it marks the non-site of the unhomely (*Unheimlich*). If the fundamental attitude of modernity with respect to the truth of being is one of "forgottenness" – exercised as will to power, security and governmentality – the metacolonial is simply remembrance. The metacolonial responds to the poverty of a metaphysics of actuality that "devalues beings precisely insofar as it cuts them off from their own ground."[10] It is "when there are no longer any genuine goals that total planning and control, consumption and production, can be presented and experienced as intrinsically valuable and eminently desirable."[11] The metacolonial thus seeks to disclose this nihilistic apparatus of governmentality that dominates in the *age of world picture*, and offer in its place an attitude of response-ability, resoluteness, and reservedness[12]. Both Heidegger and Foucault's turn to *poiēsis* and art reflect this fundamental attitude of *Gelassenheit* in the face of the destinal sway of *Ereignis*. As the proliferating crisis of war, climate and economy reveal, the modes of modern technological society, its operative commands, do not seem to be in our control, and the more vigorously we assert human causality at the heart of the current crisis, the more *Gestell* conceals its aggressive objectification and government of world. However, as this dominant mode of being continues to reduce the world to a resource for human consumption and aggrandizement, the more the danger itself, *Gestell*, will emerge as an object of thought. This *exposing* of *Gestell* is the singular task of thinking for the metacolonial.

Becoming Bio-Political: From Fana to Fanaticism and the Rise of the Lashkar

> The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought.
>
> – Heidegger[13]

> The "political" is the way in which history is accomplished.
>
> – Heidegger

The preceding chapters have sought to show how the history of Islam is today, like the history of the West, increasingly coincident with the structure of exception and the sovereign ban. This state of exception *now invests virtually all structures of power, and is thus the originary source of the imperial, metacolonial, condition*. The topology of exception, and its technologization and economization of all speheres of life, is the presence that inhabits Islamic as much as Western modernity. Through the term metacolonial, Islamic modernity is brought face to face with the metaphysical ghosts haunting its technological, biopolitical present.[14]

In the *Islamapolis*, understood as a metacolonial state/space, there is an intensification of what Agamben calls the "politicization of life:" the growing inclusion of man's natural life in the mechanisms and calculations of power. In becoming historical and political, Islam today is in perhaps the final stages of a process of hollowing out, of undergoing an irredeemable loss of its originary inheritance. Manifest most clearly in the passions of jihad, Islam has become primarily a biopolitical affect. From this perspective then, it is not Islam as such but the (bio)political that is decisive. Part of the claim that has unfolded in the book is that political Islam has crossed a threshold of biopolitical modernity; Islam is now fully incorporated in the space of the political. The violent use of shari'a law, epitomized, for instance, by the destruction of the Buddha statues or the deployment of blasphemy as a "license to kill," are the visible specters of the play and unfolding of this historical/political space, the performance of its self-referential sovereign power.

To think ontologically – in the shadow of genealogy and the state of exception – is to make manifest the increasing opacity of life held captive under the sway of the biopolitical apparatus and its *intensification of power over the singularity of life*. In showing how Pakistan is itself the voice of a biopolitical command, an exemplary metacolonial regime, I am suggesting the fundamental homelessness of Muslim life today. Hence we may say that in gaining a homeland for Muslims, Islam has become truly homeless (*apolis*); in creating a state space

for the sovereignty of God/Islam, and in linking this doubly resonant political theology to the well-being of an *ummah* (community) now conceived as a *Muslim population*, an *Islamapolis*, Pakistanis have become refuges, homeless. As a territorializing *Islamapolis*, an Islamic city/camp, Pakistan has become an exemplary metacolonial space that marks the simultaneous hallowing and hollowing of Islam. This homelessness found its first major expression in the Pakistan movement, *Harkat-ul Pakistan*, the desire for a Muslim homeland, for Muslim territoriality. This desire paved the way for the domination of the *Lashkar-i Pakistan*, the Army (*lashkar*) of Pakistan. The *Lashkar-i Pakistan*, in turn, gave birth to other *lashkars*, including the Taliban. Today, in the ungovernable will of the Taliban is expressed the desire for a homeland for Islam itself. This ultimate biopolitical fantasy represents the final threshold of the biopoliticization of Islam. It is perhaps not coincidental that the word *Lashkar* – battalion, army, or corps – also shares etymological roots with the word *Laash*, which means dead-body or corpse. The Taliban are thus the pure expression of action, the *Lashkar-i Islam*. In this way can it not be said the Pakistan is the graveyard of Islam? Sovereignty in Agamben, is also dead-body making in the name of life. Along the metacolonial horizon the *Lashkar-i Freedom* and the *Lashkar-i Islam* can be seen to converge in a deathly embrace.

As is well known, the driving *ethos* of the phenomenological and poststructuralist traditions was to counter the predominance of a series of Cartesian logics embedded within modern epistemology and social thought, particularly the liberal "Western" model of the sovereign autonomous subject. What the Cartesian representational traditions seemed to miss was an understanding, or *sense*, of the silent pre-given and taken-for-granted contextual backgrounds that shape the very conditions of possibility of knowledge and meaning. Like the phenomenologists more generally, Foucault was also concerned with articulating this "background" of human understanding. Adopting the Heideggerian concept of *umwelt* (environment), Foucault reformulates it in terms of *milieu*, or the historical *a priori*. This *savoir* (knowledge), or space of power relationships, already shows up as a particular "order of things." Thus the imperative of political Islam, like its liberal and neoliberal counterparts, lies in its will-to-order. For the entire spectrum of players on the horizon of political Islam, Islam is said to offer a "code," more than a "way," of *placing* and ordering life and things. In the meantime the very ways in which life is now understood, the ways in which it has come to be placed at the center of politics, is a transformation that has gone unnoticed and unremarked by Islamist theorists.

The (bio)politicization of "life," and hence the meaning of Islam as "a way of life" or *din*, has remained unthought, as if it were a transhistorical constant. This is why in this work I have been interested in articulating the *episteme* of political Islam. Through an archae-genealogy I hope to have shown the ways in which past and present imperial forms of knowledge (*savoir*) now constitute very "forms of subjectivity and worldliness"[15] of the Muslim *life-world*. This project has been aimed at articulating this *savoir*. Yet, because we stand within this *savoir* we can only hint at it.

I have suggested that the emergence of the Taliban phenomenon (the destinal mutation of the Deoband) – and by extension, much of the global radical jihadist movement – cannot be adequately understood through reference to Islamist ideology alone, but instead might be more usefully situated on a metacolonial horizon – a horizon that is itself a complex of intersecting spaces of power. Part of the labor of thinking that this work sought to undertake was to explicate the metacolonial as a way of supplementing the predominantly representational and temporal modality of postcolonial critique, with a spatial and affective biopolitical analysis. Contrary then to the Deoband and Taliban's own self-regard as agents for the enactment and *enforcement* of divine commandment (the juridification of the *shari'a*) and the left/liberal consensus of the Taliban as figures outside of time and reason – as strange reincarnations of medieval Islamic sentiment – the Taliban/Deoband should be seen as an exemplary site of modernity, exemplary not merely in the sense of the modern as the material and temporal conditions of its possibility but in the sense of modernity's primary politico-theological characterization. In both Foucault and Agamben the threshold of the modern era occurs when politics turns into biopolitics. For Agamben "the entry of *zoē* into the sphere of the *polis* – the politicization of bare life as such – constitutes the decisive event of modernity and signals a radical transformation of the political-philosophical categories of classical thought."[16] If Deoband praxis is, as I have argued, caught up in the biopolitical apparatus, and driven by the will to sovereign power then it is already Western in the most essential of senses.

Hence another key strand of my argument has been to suggest that 'ulama practices should be understood in relationship to a history of power and the series of political technologies of the body through which they produce bare life. I have attempted to show how we can situate the 'ulama in relationship to the three broad forms of power that are exercised spatially – sovereignty, discipline, and biopolitics: "sovereignty is exercised within the borders of a territory, discipline is exercised

on the bodies of the individual, and security [biopolitics] is exercised over a whole population."[17] The territorial practices of the 'ulama, as we have seen with reference to the technology of blasphemy, are exercised in the production of the boundaries of *ummah* inclusion/exclusion (the *ummagination*); discipline is exercised in the space of the madrasa, in the regulations, dressage, and habit formations of the corporal body; and the security practices of the Deoband/Army/*Lashkar*/Taliban are exercised through jihad, which is in part concerned with the security and defense of the *ummah*/nation at large. Together a combination and mixing of these powers produces a daemonic apparatus. Together they constitute the statification and biopoliticization of the *ummah* and Islam.

We may be tempted to read the transition of the 'ulama through Walter Banjamin's formulation: from the uncertainties of *divine violence* to the certainties of *mythic violence*. The 'ulama behave like a "state" precisely when they engage in sovereign practices. Sovereignty, in turn, is rendered through the right to *declare* the enemy and to subsequently command power over the body of the enemy to the point of death. Spectacular displays of violence against the body of the condemned, as Foucault reminds us in *Discipline and Punish*, are the classical hallmarks of sovereign political power, which the Taliban and the 'ulama in Pakistan have amply demonstrated. Jihad therefore should be seen as a technology of war that encompasses an economy of violence and power in structurally parallel ways to liberal geopolitics.[18] Appeals to political theology (providence, Allah), the ritualized performances of power and their spectacular display (shock and awe, drones, beheadings), and the glorified media representations of violence, are all key aspects of the jihadist/liberal logic, which binds together the body, power, and violence. Jihad is thus the cipher for the appropriation of the "magical technologies of war."[19] Therefore the right to declare jihad, and the right to declare the heretic/apostate/enemy, can both be seen as biopolitical technologies: "It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power."[20] The 'ulama's love for and valorization of jihad, so amply demonstrated in Rafi 'Usmani's memoirs,[21] and the broad vitalist allure of jihadist masculinity and heroism (the culture of *shahadat* for the party or the state) is ultimately drawn, like the sexuality of the military uniform, from the reservoir of this capacity for sovereign *mythical* violence: "sovereign violence is in truth founded not on a pact but on the exclusive inclusion of bare life."[22] It is this capacity for ultra-violence over bare life (the *homo sacer*) that marks sovereign power. Additionally, the ability to control the mechanisms of violence over bare life outside of the formal juridical boundaries of the state is precisely that which renders 'ulama power as a species of the sovereign exception.

As I have shown in the preceding chapters, practices of violence against the included/excluded and vulnerable seem to be the hallmark of the Deoband in Pakistan today. The right to define and kill the enemy establishes the sovereign and is, according to Agamben, the essential right of modern politics. Agamben claims that it is this relationship of exception that undergirds the structure of the modern juridical relation – the relation of the sovereign structure of law to its subjects: "In this sense, the sovereign decision on the exception is the originary juridico-political structure on the basis of which what is included in the juridical order and what is excluded from it acquire their meaning." This *unlocalizable* topology of the exception is vital in understanding the transformation of the 'ulama, who must first enter into a relationship (or produce) a state of exception in order to open up a space in which the determination of a certain *Islami-nizam* becomes possible. In this way, the sovereign exception can be seen as vital to the often violent 'ulama technologies of rule, for whom "the sovereign exception is not so much the control or neutralization of an excess as the creation and definition of the very space in which the juridico-political order can have validity."[23] The topology of exception is itself a void, an empty space that is nonetheless constitutive of the modern legal system. The consequence of the biopoliticization of Islam include this juridification of shari'a, whose hidden but fundamental relationship between law and lawlessness is yet another regional manifestation of the state of exception.

The task of this genealogy has been to expose the structure of the ban that constitutes this link between bare life and politics, "a link that secretly governs the modern ideologies seemingly most distant from one another" – namely Islamism and liberalism. This is how one might understand Agamben's exhortation "to bring the political out of its concealment."[24] In Agamben's formulation the "entry of *zoē* into the sphere of the *polis* – the politicization of bare life as such – constitutes the decisive event of modernity."[25] Contrary then to the way in which Islamic rage and violence is often depicted as a "reaction" to modernization, to rationalization, or even to colonization, I have argued that the specific violences of the Taliban and the Deoband are manifestations of the modern itself, and not the outcome of a struggle between tradition and modernity. This is precisely what the (late) birth pangs of modernity look like, a future-present that can be glimpsed in Europe's paroxysmal decent into violence a mere few decades ago, and what America continues to witness in its Imperial ventures from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan today. There is little doubt then that we indeed live after the "failure of peoples."[26] The Deo's, the djinns, genies, and demons that haunt the political space of globalization

today are of ancient provenance, and predate both capitalism and colonialism and anything else we might be tempted to meaningfully designate as "the West."

In becoming historical and political, Islam today is in perhaps the final stages of a process of hollowing out, accomplishing its loss of inheritance.[27] If it is possible to read *fana* – the classical gesture of desubjectification that marks the ethos of Sufism — in proximity to *Gelassenheit*, by contrast todays space of piety is increasingly disciplined by the dispositioning of *Gestell* which ruthlessly subjects life and the body to its biopolitical measure. As Islam replaces Allah, Islam itself becomes *sacer* (sacred, hallowed) and the Muslim becomes *Musalmann* (*homo sacer*). Manifest most clearly in the passions of jihad, Islam has become primarily a biopolitical affect. The violence, fanaticism, and terrorism that seem to be the hallmark of the more notorious forms of Islamic political expression (to be distinguished certainly from the mass of everyday "Muslim" politics) are not then signs of a revolt against modernity. It is merely modernity – the political – playing itself out and coming to a presence in the constitution of Islam as a properly biopolitical phenomenon. Once again, it is not Islam as such but the (bio)political that is decisive. The violence of Islamic law, epitomized by the destruction of the Buddha statues or the deployment of blasphemy as rational for murder, are instances of the play of this space. Given their intimate symbiosis with bare life, such phenomenon exemplify the biopoliticization of Islam. In such spaces the violation and execution of shari'a (law) become indistinguishable. Under the Taliban, or at least wherever they held sway, we saw how a maximum of anomie and disorder can perfectly coexist with a maximum of legislation. In this sense I have aimed to disclose the Deoband/Taliban phenomenon as in fact a marker of the effective indistinction between Islam and the West rather than its antithesis.[28]

More specifically, "Islam" and the "West" – their dominant discourses, practices, and desires – now share, produce, mutually reinforce, and coinhabit the state of exception. Afghanistan is already the exemplary site of this production, and its anomie threatens to fully engulf both neighboring Pakistan (a process well underway if we take into account the war in the Waziristan region) and Iran. The tragedy of a relentless Imperial will is that it proliferates vacuous, ob-scene spaces, which in turn demand and require intervention; for the Imperial will also sees itself as an exemplary practitioner of law and order, it is an exemplary rationality of governance and sovereignty. The more it orders the greater the empty gap in which it must dwell, and so the global cycle of exception draws both parties within the vortex of its inescapable violence and non-sense.

The phenomenon of imperial violence, manifested in particular through the use of drones – exemplary technological devices for the efficient production of spaces of exception and extra-judicial murder – must therefore be placed in conjunction with the Islamapolis. "Islam" and the "West" – their dominant discourses, practices, and desires – now share, produce, mutually reinforce and co-inhabit the state of exception. Even though political Islam, especially in its more intense variety, may appear as the shadowy obverse of imperial sovereignty,[29] it is in fact its technological partner. Once the phenomenon of violence is viewed from across the *polemos* of critical ontology, the critical question is not the emergence of political Islam, or any other process of Islamization, but the emergence (and emergency) of the political. In short then, today Islam and the West have entered a zone of indistinction. It has been the task of this work to problematize and articulate this zone of indistinction as a metacolonial horizon.[30] My goal here was not to write a social history of the 'ulama, but rather to write/think a genealogy of political Islam within which the Deoband narrative is embedded.

We can also read this genealogy as an attempt to trace and expose sovereign power, which always appears in the form of a necessity or an absolute (as peace, as freedom, as *Islam*). The state of exception, "which is what the sovereign each and every time decides," takes place precisely "when naked life – which normally appears rejoined to the multifarious forms of social life – is explicitly put into question and revoked as the ultimate foundation of political power."[31] In the metacolonial space of the *Islamapolis*[32] the 'ulama seek to deploy an apparatus of power, a military space, in order to police bodies, constantly producing naked life in the guise of the heretic (*kafir*). In the *Islamapolis*, which is perhaps an exemplary space of *shirk*, a Muslim humanism has assumed biopolitics as its primary task undertaking the sacralization of Muslim life and identity.[33] This is why the celebrated political gesture of Islam today is jihad: action in the defense of Islam. That is to say, Islam is in force – enforced – without Allah. This is a metacolonial rather than merely a postcolonial phenomenon, where colonialism's original sin was simply to accelerate and intensify the birth of a *bio-polis*. Colonialism is simply an apparatus of conduction. The power that political Islam seeks is therefore a biopolitical sovereign power (*potere*) that no longer has any form of legitimation other than emergency, and because of this, this sovereign power must everywhere and continuously refer and appeal to emergency "as well as labor secretly to produce it."[34]

With the emergence of Pakistan – its founding ideology effectively a rights claim – and the deployment of shari'a as a jurisprudential biopolitical technology, we have witnessed the acceleration, and spread, of the production of bare life as *homo sacer*. Today citizens in Afghanistan and the Frontier borders of Pakistan are all *homo sacer*. The Taliban phenomenon marks a new boundary of indistinction between *homo sacer* and the sovereign: a beheading followed by a drone bombing. The tortured, torture. The new formulation of the Taliban's power over life and death is reproduced through the circulation of new visual images of sovereignty. The execution or death video's (beheadings, drone/suicide bombings, hangings) demonstrate the limits of control over the body of the "other" and of life itself, and in this way "brings to light the secret tie uniting sovereign power and bare life." This coupled with the constant anxiety of being the *homines sacri* for the other – the West or now even the Pakistani Army – demonstrate the reversibility and ultimate inseparability of these two characteristics. However, it is not merely at these extremes that the stamp of biopolitics parades itself; it is in the very general rendering of Islam as "a way of life" that marks, most ironically, the threshold of a subjection of life (of potential).

The costs of misdiagnosing this violence-power are high. For jihadists, power in located in the West; for Marxists in the means of production; for liberals in the aberrant individual; and for most postcolonial theorists in the colonial effects playing out in political discourse. If, however, our metacolonial reading is correct, what cost has been paid for the misrecognition of biopowers hold over the South Asian socius, which all along saw its pyrrhic victory in the form of a nationalist displacement of a formal, ontic, colonial sovereign power. It is not then merely the idea of the state that needs to be overcome, but the very idea of a people, for biopower is wholly immanent to the socius; it does not merely organize it from above or from some hidden central location behind everyday social structures. Nationalism is irredeemable.[35]

If the "originary political element" is a "life exposed to death" (bare life or sacred life), then "the originary juridico-political relation is the ban," for it is in the threshold of the ban that bare life and sovereign power are held together. The ban is a force that "ties together the two poles of the sovereign exception: bare life and power, *homo sacer* and the sovereign." The Taliban exemplify the ban in tying, crossing, the two poles, where one passes into the other. It is this relation of the ban that Agamben regards as the "essential structure of sovereign power from the beginning" and he charges our ethical sensibility to expose this form in the political structures and public spaces we currently inhabit.

The banishment of sacred life is the sovereign *nomos* that conditions every rule, the originary spatialization that governs and makes possible every localization and every territorialization. If in modernity life is more and more clearly placed at the center of State politics (which now becomes, in Foucault's terms, biopolitics), if in our age all citizens can be said, in a specific but extremely real sense, to appear virtually as *homines sacri*, this is possible only because the relation of ban, which is an ontological relation, has constituted the essential structure of power from the beginning.[36]

Coda on The American Sovereign Exception and the "Enframing" of the Muslim Enemy

Mainstream public-political discourses increasingly tend to show up "Islam," the constitutive other of the West, as the major obstacle/challenge to a final dénouement of a global and enlightened secular/neoliberal order. However, with the casting of the locus of this "opposition" as emerging from within the ranks of radical and jihadist organizations, a simultaneous act of dual concealment and a form of "enframing" Islam occurs. What is concealed is the degree to which (arguably) mainstream forms of political Islam are variants of modern political ideologies that do not fundamentally challenge the key frameworks of contemporary political theory (popular sovereignty, the nation-state form itself, capitalism, profit accumulation, the capacity for autonomous governance over bounded constituents, etc.). Secondly, the deep historical entanglement of the United States in the forging, co-production and promoting of radical Islamist militancy (principally as a bulwark against socialism and independent Third World nationalism) is also concealed.

The American exercise of power over life, its unfurling of a form of global sovereignty, is encapsulated not only by its ability to invade and interdict both individuals and entire governments at will, but also by the ability to name juridical categories (illegal enemy combatants, terrorists) that place "Muslims" individually and collectively outside the bounds of international law and hence at the arbitrary disposition of the American Executive. Recall Schmidt's odiously insightful formulation: the capacity to mark the exception confirms not only the rule, but also the Ruler. It is of course power, and the force of power alone, and not the force of communicative reason or justice, that enables America's self-configuration as the exception to the new global order/rules it seeks to safeguard. The Muslim, who need not be given any theological definition and need only to confirm to the *fact* of his Muslimness, can thus be seen as standing in a

relation of exception to the West, enhancing the logic and rationality of an Imperial American State, whose current interventions and extension of power are further buoyed by a special historical sense of mission, a calling that has typically been subsumed under the term "Manifest Destiny." As Agamben astutely notes: "What is at issue in the sovereign exception is not so much the control or neutralization of excess" – that is to say terror, radical Islam – "as the creation and definition of the very space in which the juridico-political order can have validity." Does Radical Islam effectively act as a guarantee for the rationality and condition of possibility for the enhancement, both domestic and international, of the power of the American State (and other states to a lesser degree)? Ironically, has not Islam, and the associated excess of terror that it allegedly produces by virtue of its own "essence," come to be even more critical for outlining and propelling a sense of American identity and mission in a postcolonial, post-cold war era?

Hence, we should also ask what work the "blasphemous subject" – the suicide bomber, the militant jihadist, and all such figures of the enemy as heretic – is doing on behalf of imperial discipline and pedagogy. Public discussions about politics and violence, wherever Muslim bodies are present, however, tend to be wrought under the unifying signs of militant jihadism, al-Qaeda, suicide bombers, resident evil, or as Bush has called it, "Islamo-fascism." By restaging at the level of state power the journalistic formulations[37] of liberals like Christopher Hitchens and his neocon brethren (all of whom remain under the thrall of the Orientalist grand inquisitor, Bernard Lewis), forms of essentialist/racist discourses are elevated into official state-superpower concerns on national security; they become part of the discourse of war. The imperial and governmental utility of the construction of Islamo-fascism as a discursive signifier of global evil, at once everywhere and yet nowhere specific, as a kind of totalizing power arrayed against civilization itself, allows for the mobilization of imperialisms impressive, vast and expansive machinery. Such *con*-structions play on the slippage of signs overdetermined by sentiment, and only serve to mask the techniques of global governance and the materialized specificities of modern neoliberal rule, by claiming to speak for humanity itself.

The moment is sufficiently dire to note the ways in which the "Muslim" is now effectively positioned as a uniquely globalized subject, a subject of theoretical as well as political and military labor. This widespread trope of the Muslims as the quintessentially violent and troubled Other of modernity and civilization, as a spectral figure outside of time, opens it up to the specific modes of discursive and institutional subjection and correction. Whether as policed subject-citizens in Western democracies or tortured bodies in Abu Ghraib, the Muslim is both the prime and

primal cite for violent interventionist strategies and inquisitions, by *jihadists* and imperialists alike.

Thus while it is easy to condemn acts of 'ulama *taqwa* politics, there is a certain recognition that the modern, and in particular the American liberal imagination, must perform. This is the recognition of a specter haunting the very conceptions of identity (the interlacement of *zoē* and *bios*) and sovereignty. The way in which the 'ulama draw sharp borders between "true believers" and "heretics" as a prelude for legitimizing violence against their bodies is simply a theologically inflected form of the secular biopolitical "US versus Them" characterization that has routinely accompanied the history of American exceptionalism and violence against the other. By violently dominating the articulation of boundaries the 'ulama lay claim to speak for Islam itself, thereby attempting to localize within their own particularity an element that is unlocalizable.[38] By centering Islam within themselves, the 'ulama disavow internal differences through the concretization of an external threat (to Islam/Pakistan). The neoliberal guardians of the West perform a similar function in their characterization of Muslims as in need of yet another civilizing mission. In the Western imagination, does not Islam, as a heresy against Christianity in the first medieval instance and as a heresy against time itself in the second modernist instance, function in imperial discourses to similarly produce anomic zones and spaces of emergency? The attacks of 9/11 were mobilized within the discourse of American biopolitical sovereignty, to take on a series of affective and political significances, not in terms of a crime, but as an act of blasphemy against the body of a global sovereign. It was coded as the first broadside in a wider uprising of antimodern barbarians. This direct attack against the global sovereign in turn unleashed its own vast cultural-military and disciplinary mechanisms: torture, "shock and awe," vast piles of human collateral damage, and other exemplary forms of punishment, effectively paralleling the ways in which the sovereign of the *ancien régime* once responded to crimes against its body. Regicide today is simply subject to a different economy of discipline and punishment.

Notes

1 This project is as such indebted to, and seeks alliances with, the ongoing work of such future cartographers; see for instance J. Wainwright and Mann 2018, Wainwright 2013 and M. Joronen 2008 and 2013. Pairing the brilliant analysis of corporate and neoliberal sovereignty, in W. Brown 2015 and J. Barkan 2013, with Agamben's *Kingdom and Glory*, further underscores the ontological threat to the planet posed by *homo economicus*.

2 I discuss this aspect at the close of this chapter.
3 At one methodological level we could say that the metacolonial attempts to rearticulate postcolonial theory under the banner of our axis of critical ontology. Effectively this would be a Heideggerian postcolonialism.
4 "What is emerging," writes Negri, "is the ontology of power. When we confront the centrality of the political in postmodernity, we are directly confronting an ontological problem" (Negri 2008). See also Marchart 2007; Tønder and Thomassen 2005; White 2000; Odysseos 2007; Strathausen 2009.
5 See, for instance, the collection of essays in Loomba 1998. See also Cooper 2005 and Eley 2005.
6 Foucault 2003b, pp. 171–174.
7 Spivak 1999.
8 In its critique of power, the postcolonial and its companion multicultural ethic inadvertently tend to valorize the identities of the marginalized and subjugated other.
9 As Wainwright skillfully argues in "Colonizing Development" (2007).
10 Beistegui 1998.
11 Ibid.
12 Reservedness, writes Beistegui in a footnote, "signals our belonging to the earth, and not just the world, and so our belongingness to something that resists our grip, and to which we must learn to *surrender*" (ibid).
13 Heidegger 1977b.
14 In this way metaphysics is *not* simply what Derrida called a "white mythology." Derrida: "Metaphysics – the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West: the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form of that he must still wish to call Reason." It is the abandonment of being that is the structural phenomenon and event that gives rise to the forgetfulness of being, an event that coincides with the history of our present and has its roots in the essence of truth itself.
15 Borrowing the conceptual space from Wainwright 2007.
16 Agamben 1998, p. 3.
17 Foucault 2007b, p. 11.
18 For an excellent account of how geopolitics is now also biopolitics see Vaughan-Williams 2009. For the now classic Foucaultian reading of geopolitics see O'Tuathail 1996.
19 This phrase is taken from Bahrani 2008. See also Taussig 1992.
20 Agamben 1998.
21 Rafi Usmani, *Yeh Tere Purasrar Bunday* (1995).
22 Agamben 1998.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid, p. 5.
26 Agamben 2000.
27 Naqvi 2012.

28 To turn the neoconservative definition of itself against itself, political Islam – if not Islam in the totality of its current configuration – is an Islam that has been mugged by the (biopolitical) reality of modernity.
29 As the otherwise erudite post-9/11 intervention of Enseng Ho suggests. See his deservedly acclaimed article, *Empire Through Diasporic Eyes*. The problem as I see it, however, is not one of reconstituting an Islamic empire, but of the will to sovereignty.
30 We may further and in a preliminary way characterize the metacolonial as itself a space that emerges in the wake of what Heidegger called the oblivion or emergency of being (Polt 2006).
31 Agamben 2000.
32 The meaning of the Islamapolis, as a space that is characterized by its lack of questioning and care for being, its erasure of being, should be more clear now. In the Islamapolis, which is today an exemplary space of *shirk*, the sacralization of Muslim life and identity, a Muslim humanism if you will, has replaced that which is most essential, and assumes biopolitics as its primary task. This is why the celebrated political gesture of Islam today is jihad, action in the defense of Islam. Islam is in force (enforced) without Allah.
33 The meaning of the Islamapolis, as a space that is characterized by its lack of questioning of and care for being, its erasure of being, should be more clear now.
34 Agamben (slight modification). The production of the heretic as *homo sacer*.
35 See Nealon 2007.
36 Agamben 1998.
37 We can think of numerous works to this effect from the everyday speeches of Bush to David Frum and Dick Pearl's master work of demonology, *An End of Evil: How to Win the War on Terror*. Tony Blankley's last gasp attempt to resuscitate the merits of a bin Laden inflected Huntingtonian sentiment, *The West's Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations*?, is also reminiscent of the Muslim League cry, "Islam in Danger."
38 "When our age tried to grant the unlocalizable a permanent and visible localization, the result was the concentration camp. … the juridical constellation that guides the camp is … martial law and the state of siege" (Agamben 1998).

Appendix A

1.1 Blasphemy Law

295-B Defiling, etc., a copy of Holy Qur'an. Whoever willfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur'an or of an extract there from or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable for imprisonment for life.

295-C Use of derogatory remarks, etc.; in respect of the Holy Prophet. Whoever by words, either spoken or written or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

298-A Use of derogatory remarks, etc…, in respect of holy personages. Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly defiles a sacred name of any wife (Ummul Momineen), or members of the family (Ahl-i-bait), of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), or any of the righteous caliphs (Khulafa-e-Rashideen) or companions (*Sahaba*) of the Holy Prophet description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

298-B Misuse of epithet, descriptions and titles, etc. Reserved for certain holy personages or places.

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1. Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written or by visible representation:
   refers to or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or companion of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as "Amir-ul Momineen", "Khilafat-ul Momineen", "Khilafat-ul Muslimin", "Sahaba" or "Razi Allah Anho";
   refers to or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as Ummul-Momineen;
   refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family (Ahl-i-Bait) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as Ahl-i-Bait; or
   refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family (Ahl-i-Bait) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as Ahl-i-Bait; or
   refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as Masjid; shall be punished with imprisonment or either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
2. Any person of the Qadiani group or Lahore group (who call themselves Ahmadis or by any other names), who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, refers to the mode or from of call to prayers followed by his faith as "Azan" or recites Azan as used by the Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

298-C Persons of Qadiani group, etc., calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith. Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis or any other name), who directly or indirectly, possess himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Appendix B

1.2 Objectives Resolution

The text of the "Objectives Resolution" as passed by the Constituent Assembly March 1949:

'In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful'

Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust;

This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan;

Wherein the state shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people;

Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed;

Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective sphere in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and the *Sunnah*;

Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures;

Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a federation wherein the units will be autonomous

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with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed;

Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, and association, subject to law and public morality;

Wherein adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes;

Wherein the independence of the Judiciary shall be fully secured;

Wherein the integrity of the territories of the federation, its independence and all its rights including its sovereign rights on land, sea, and air shall be safeguarded;

So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honored place amongst the nations of the world and make their full contribution towards international peace and progress and happiness of humanity.

Glossary

adab – Belles letters, literature; culture and culturally prescribed forms of comportment.
adhan/azan – The Muslim call to prayer; from the root words "ear" and "permit."
Ahl-i Hadith – "The people of hadith." A Sunni doctrinal orientation that emerged in late nineteenth century colonial India. They denied the authority of all Sunni schools of law and insisted instead on the exclusive and unmediated authority of the Qur'an and hadith as the sources of all guidance. Effectively opposed *taqlid*.
Ahmadi – A doctrinal offshoot that emerged in late nineteenth century India and is defined most notably by the belief of its adherents (the Ahmadis) in the prophethood of the movement's founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908).
amir – Leader of a group or community
Amir al-Momineen – Commander of the Faithfull.
anjuman – Association or organization.
Barelwi – The doctrinal orientation associated with Ahmad Rida Khan (d. 1921) of Bareilly, a small town in Uttar Pradesh in northern India. The Barelwis emphasize ritualized forms of devotion to the Prophet. Their ritual practices, which are often associated with Sufi shrines.
bid'at – Innovation or novelty in religious matters.
dar al-'ulum – Institution of Islamic learning; see *madrasa*.

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Dars-i Nizami – Classical madrasa syllabus introduced in India in the seventeenth century, and adapted with slight modification by the Deoband schools.

Deobandi – The doctrinal orientation associated with the *madrasa* of Deoband, in northern India; an adherent of this movement. The Deobandi movement, which emerged in late nineteenth century colonial India, lays stress on a renewed commitment to *hadith* and sacred law as the basis of a "reformed" and reinvigorated Islamic identity.

din – Faith; religion; way of life.

fatwa – A legal opinion issued by a jurisconsult (*mufti*).

fiqh – Islamic law and jurisprudence.

fitna – Disorder; chaos; the term is also used for the first civil wars in the history of Islam, which permanently divided the Muslim community into hostile factions and later into distinct sects.

fuqaha' (sing. *faqih*) – Scholars of law (*fiqh*).

hadith – Traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad; regarded by Muslims as second to the Qur'an as a source of religious guidance and law.

Hanafi – A school of Sunni law named after Abu Hanifa (d. 767). Most Sunni Muslims in South Asia, including the Deobandis and the Barelwis, subscribe to this school of law.

Hanbali – A school of Sunni law named after Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855); an adherent of this school. Hanbalism is the dominant school of law in Saudi Arabia.

haram – Forbidden.

hudud (sing. *hadd*) – Punishments expressly sanctioned in the Qur'an and the sunna and (unlike many other punishments) not subject to being mitigated by the ruler or the aggrieved party.

huquq (sing. *haqq*) – Rights.

huquq Allah – The rights of God, regarded as non-negotiable.

hukm (pl. *ahkam*) – A legal ruling.

Hukumat – Government.

itihad – Systematic reflection on the foundational sources of the law to arrive at legal rulings on matters not already or explicitly determined by sacred law.

ikhtilaf – Disagreement among jurists.

'*ilm* (pl. '*ulum*) – Knowledge; religious learning; science(s).

imam – Leader or head of the community; in Shi'i Islam the *imams* are the descendants of 'Ali who are regarded as infallible guides; the term is also used for the person leading the ritual prayers.

isnad – Chain of transmission that forms an essential part of any report relating the words or deeds of the Prophet Muhammad (*hadith*).

Ithna 'ashari – ("Twelver") Shi'a – a sub-division of the *Shi'a*, whose members regard twelve successive descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and her husband, 'Ali, to be their infallible religious guides (*imams*).

Ja'fari – The school of law of the *Ithna 'ashari* ("Twelver") sect of the Shi'a; named after the sixth Shi'i imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765).

jahiliyya – "The age of ignorance"; refers to the era before the advent of Islam; also used in the twentieth century by certain Islamist thinkers to assert that their co-religionists were living in a new age of unbelief or apostasy.

jama'at/jama'a – Group; association; community.

jihad – "Struggle." Two types of jihad are usually distinguished; an "internal" struggle to forge character, self-formation, etc., and an external armed struggle or war against unbelievers or oppressors. Jihad as war can be invoked in self-defense or in the defense of Islam.

khilafa – "Deputyship;" the caliphate.

Khilafat al-Rashida – "The rightly guided caliphate;" designates the four caliphs (Abu Bakr, 'Umar b. al-Khattab, 'Usman b. 'Affan, and 'Ali b. Abi Talib) who immediately succeeded Muhammad as the leaders of the Muslim community (632–61 C.E.). To the Sunnis, they are the most revered of all the Companions (*sahaba*) of Muhammad; the Shi'a recognize only 'Ali as a legitimate caliph and as their first imam.

kafir – One who disbelieves or denies the faith of Islam. See also *shirk*.

madhhab – School of law; in Urdu, sometimes used interchangeably with religion (*din*).

madrasa (pl. *madaris*) – Islamic/religious school, seminary, or institution of higher Islamic learning.

Maliki – A school of Sunni law named after Malik b. Anas (d. 795).

masjid – Mosque. Place of worship.

maqtab – Usually a small school attached to a mosque for elementary Islamic learning

mawlawi / mawlana – Also spelt maulana. A term used to designate a religious scholar; see '*ulama*.

millat / milla – A community defined by ties of faith (see *ummah*).

mufti – A jurisconsult; one who issues legal opinions (*fatwas*).

mujahidin – Those waging *jihad*.

mujtahid – A practitioner of *ijtihad*.

muqallid – A practitioner of *taqlid*.

mullah – A religious scholar or master; see *maulana*, '*ulama*.

pak – Pure, as in *Pakistan*, the pure state, the nation of the pure

pir – A Sufi master. Also often rulers or leaders in rural communities.

qawm – Nation as defined by ties of ethnicity, shared territory, and language.

qadi – Muslim judge who rules according to the shari'a.

qanun – Law as enunciated by the ruler, as distinguished from the discourses of the Muslim jurists (*fiqh*).

sahaba – The Companions of the Prophet Muhammad. For the Sunnis, they are not only the source of all information about the teachings of Muhammad but also the paragons of religious authority that is second only to the Prophet. The Shi'a recognize only some of the Companions as righteous.

Shafi'i – A school of Sunni law, named after Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafi'i (d. 820); an adherent of that school.

shari'a – The totality of Islamic legal and ethical norms; the sacred law of Islam.

shaykh/shaikh (pl. *mashayakh*) – A religious scholar; a Sufi master.

shirk – The greatest sin in Islam; associating another being, entity, or person with God.

Shi'a (sing. Shi'i) – Community of Muslims who, unlike the Sunnis, believe that after the death of the Prophet infallible religious guidance must continue in the person of the *imams*, who are divinely designated to lead the community in religious and political matters. There are several subdivisions within the Shi'a, of which the historically most important are the *Ithna 'ashariyya* and the *Isma'iliyya*.

Sufi – Muslim mystic. Sufi practice is also referred to as *tasawwuf*.

sunna – The normative example of the Prophet, usually expressed in the form of reports relating his teachings and conduct (*hadith*).

Sunnis – Those professing adherence to the *sunna* of the Prophet and to the agreed upon norms and practices of the universal Muslim community. The Sunnis constitute the overwhelming majority of the Muslim people worldwide.

tabligh – The preaching of Islam.

Tabligh-i Jama'at – A proselytizing movement that emerged in early twentieth century India and now has operations worldwide. Those associated with the Tabligh-i Jama'at often belong to or have some affinity with the Deobandi orientation.

taqlid – "Investing with authority"; following the legal rulings of earlier scholars or of the school of law to which one professes adherence.

taqwa – piety; fear of God.

'ulama (sing. *'alim*) – Men of learning, those who possess knowledge (*'ilm*). Usually applied to a class or group of religious scholars who have formal training in the Islamic religious sciences, especially but not exclusively in Islamic law and hadith.

ummah – The global, pan-Islamic community of Muslims.
usul al-fiqh – The sources of the law; the principles of the science of jurisprudence and the methodology of legal reasoning.
Wahhabi – An adherent of the puritanical teachings of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1791); Wahhabism is the official ideology of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
waqf (pl. *awqaf*) – Pious endowments.
wali – "Friend [of God];" saint.
zakat – Islamic alms tax paid annually on one's accumulated wealth; one of the five "pillars" of the faith.

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