



PARTITION AND LOCALITY

Violence, Migration, and Development in
Gujranwala and Sialkot, 1947–1961

Ilyas Chattha

OXFORD

About the Author

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For my parents

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Preface and Acknowledgements

Partition and Locality offers a unique, locality-based perspective on the processes of collective violence, mass displacement, refugee resettlement, and urban regeneration arising from Partition of the Indian subcontinent. It is part of a broader historiographical shift in which attention has turned to examining what happened in 1947, and investigates the immediate, as well as the longer-term impact of Partition on two key cities in Pakistani Punjab. Its findings strongly reinforce the need to view Partition as a process rather than as an event, which began well before August 1947, and stretched on for years, if not decades, after the new borders had been delineated. The focus of the work is on the cities of Gujranwala and Sialkot, both located in the province of Punjab, but it has, I believe, relevance across the border as well.

In writing this book I have incurred such debts to others which justify a brief but sincere acknowledgement of at least some of the people, without whom this work would have proved an insurmountable obstacle. These debts have been building up for many years now. For unfailing guidance in my studies at both the universities of Warwick and Southampton, my greatest thanks go to David Hardiman and Ian Talbot. In particular, Ian Talbot generously read and commented on the entire manuscript and helped me to avoid errors in argument, style, and grammar. I am grateful to Imran Ali for being kind enough to provide a base for me at the LUMS during my fieldwork research.

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Any errors, over-generalizations, omissions, peculiarities, foibles or mistakes in style are unintended, but mine alone. I am entirely responsible for the contents of this book.

ILYAS CHATTHA

List of Abbreviations

AIML	All-India Muslim League
CID	Central Investigation Department
DC	Deputy Commissioner
DLO	District Liaison Officer
DP	Displaced Persons
DPRO	District Police Records Office
DSP	Deputy Superintendent of Police
DRO	District Records Office
FIR	First Information Report
HEC	Higher Education Commission (Pakistan)
HSVC	Hindu Scouts Volunteer Corps
INA	Indian National Army
LUMS	Lahore University of Management Sciences
MES	Military Engineering Services
MLNG	Muslim League National Guards
MEO	Military Evacuation Organizations
NAP	National Archives of Pakistan
NDC	National Document Centre
NIHCR	National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
OIOC	Oriental and India Office Collections
PBF	Punjab Boundary Force




PBRR	Punjab Board of Revenue Records
PLAD	Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates
PPWD	Punjab Public Works Department
PSA	Punjab Secretariat Archives
Rs	Rupees (Currency of Pakistan)
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SSP	Senior Superintendent of Police
SHO	Station House Officer (Police)
SGPG	Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee
TOP	Transfer of Power Documents, 1942-47
UP	United Provinces
WPR	West Pakistan Refugees

Translations/Transliterations

The oral interviews were chiefly conducted in Urdu, and I have retained the original language in the quoted excerpts to retain some of the emotional tenor of the spoken language. In the case of quotations from Urdu newspapers and the police FIRs, I have retained the original language at some places where the wording in it captured a particular nuance. All translations from Urdu are my own. I have followed the English rules of capitalisation for sentences, proper names, and titles. With respect to place names such as Jullundur, Montgomery, Lyallpur, and the North-West Frontier Province, I have given the name and spelling variants for the colonial era, as used by the British.



Map 1: Map of Punjab in 1947



Courtesy Dr Pippa Virdee

Introduction

Partition of the Indian subcontinent in August 1947 was marked by the greatest migration of the twentieth century and the death of an estimated one million persons. The violence was at its most severe in the Punjab province, where more than ten million Punjabis were uprooted at the time of the division. All major cities and towns in that province were profoundly affected by the demographic upheavals, which had direct consequences on the contours of their subsequent evolution. The Pakistani Punjab cities of Gujranwala and Sialkot bore the brunt of the 1947 upheavals. They suffered widespread riot-destruction, demographic shift, and economic transformation at the time of the division of the Punjab. Their industrial concerns were abandoned or closed because of the almost total migration of the Hindu and Sikh trading and business classes to India. At the same time, both cities received a large number of Muslim refugees. Sialkot received more than double the number of refugees that had left, chiefly from the neighbouring Hindu-ruled princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Half of post-independence Gujranwala's population comprised of Muslim refugees from different parts of East Punjab, and elsewhere in India. The cities thus provide good case-studies for an examination of the dislocation brought about by Partition and for an understanding of how rehabilitation and industrial recovery took place. The problems of finding both accommodation and employment, as well as addressing the skills gaps in the cities, were immense. The post-Partition refugee settlement and economic development in the cities can be examined within the wider theoretical context of mass violence, forced migration, and resettlement.¹

The post-1947 development of both Gujranwala and Sialkot is particularly significant, as both cities play a dominating role in the regional, national, and, to a lesser extent, international economy. They remain, however, greatly under-researched. The focus is, however, not only on migration and resettlement, but also on the

violence that caused the profound socio-economic dislocation in these localities as elsewhere in the Punjab. By drawing on previously unexploited, and hence extremely exciting primary source material—First Information Reports (FIRs), lodged at local *thanas* (police stations) at the time—this book analyses Partition-related apparent communal violence in relation to: (a) its spontaneity; and (b) its organizational character. Despite the recent advances in historical understanding concerning the 1947 violence, especially in terms of its organisation, its exact perpetrators are usually hazy. This work will represent an important contribution to that knowledge by uncovering for the first time, some of the actual perpetrators of the violence in the region.

In addition to its findings on violence, the book will contribute to the existing literature on the aftermath of Partition in two ways. Firstly, it will switch the academic focus from the generalized first-hand accounts of refugees and furnish it with a local grounding in the histories of Partition. Secondly, it will help redress the imbalance in studies of Partition. Until recently, most of the historical works concentrated on developments in the Indian Punjab to the detriment of its Pakistani neighbour. This work will not only add to an empirical understanding of the Pakistani Punjab post-1947 experience, but will also, however, through addressing major themes arising from the study of urban resettlement, represent a useful contribution to the understanding of the Indian refugee experience. Before an examination of some of the theoretical and definitional problems inherent in the study, we shall turn first to its place in the existing literature on Partition of the subcontinent.

UNDERSTATING THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PARTITION

'HIGH POLITICS' APPROACH

The current historiographical trend about events which form part of Partition is concerned with the human dimension of its aftermath.² This work continues this approach by examining the aftermath of the violent events of 1947 at the local level. For a long time the historiography of Partition was dominated by accounts of the high-



level decision-making in the 1940s. Historians took August 1947 as a 'natural' end of an era without ever looking beyond that period. Trying to understand the British decision to divide and quit India, includes a broad range of explanations from the 'great man' approach of history, to arguments concerning the British policy of 'divide and rule'. For many British participants it was seen as a regrettable necessity.³ For many Indians, per the classic nationalist interpretation, Partition was the logical outcome of the British policy of divide and rule.⁴ For the traditional Pakistanis it was seen as the fulfilment of the 'two-nations', which understood the Indian Muslim and Hindu communities as being totally separated from each other by religious and cultural practices.⁵ Official histories in Pakistan see a linear progression from the foundation of the Muslim League in 1906 to the creation of Pakistan, or in many cases, begin with the separatist politics of Syed Ahmad Khan in the late nineteenth century. Success in achieving the Indian Muslims' 'inevitable separatist destiny', is attributed to the role played by the Muslim League leader, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah.⁶ The revisionist school, with its main exponent Ayesha Jalal, repudiates these conventional assumptions. She has argued that the Congress' leadership's closed-minded attitude towards Jinnah and the Muslim League resulted in the division of India. She perceives the March 1940 Lahore Resolution as a bargaining card to gain the right to equal treatment at India's political centre rather than as a separatist demand. It was also a stick to bludgeon the Muslims of the Muslim-majority provinces into supporting the Muslim League.⁷

With the availability of new archival sources in the 1970s, the Cambridge School of Indian historiography identified the elite's contests for political power and patronage, rather than the British divide-and-rule policies, as driving Muslim separatism.⁸ The earliest works on the study of Muslim separatism focused on the United Provinces (UP) where the Muslim League traditionally had its strongest support. Later, attention was turned to those Muslim-majority provinces which formed the future heartland of Pakistan. In particular, scholars, such as Ian Talbot and David Gilmartin, focused on the Punjab. According to them, if the Punjabi Muslims had not supported the Muslim League's separatist demand, Pakistan could

never have come into existence. According to Talbot, the 'decisive shift' happened during the vital 1946 provincial elections, when landlords switched support from the ruling Unionist party to the Muslim League.⁹ Gilmartin, is also aware of the factional realignment, but in addition emphasizes the role of the Sufi *pirs* in popularizing the League's appeal. He also brings out the tensions between the vision of the Islamic community and local tribal allegiances around which colonial Muslim politics had revolved.¹⁰ Such regional studies brought forth important insights to understanding the mechanics of Pakistan's creation, but still, largely overlooked the human dimension of the division of India and its post-Partition consequences.

These themes have been addressed by a growing number of studies in the past twenty years or so. The ideological debate on India's independence and Partition has generated bitter controversies. Lamentably, most texts reflect prejudices more than analysis. In the words of Ayesha Jalal, the historians' argument on Partition's historiography rarely escape being labelled 'made in India' or 'made in Pakistan'.¹¹ Conflicting arguments rather than interpretations and analysis, have also characterized the historiography of Partition. As Gurharpal Singh rightly says, 'historians are ideological animals as far as Partition is concerned'.¹²

'NEW HISTORY' OF PARTITION

With the fiftieth anniversary of independence in 1997, literature dealing with Partition became noticeably more sensitive to its human aftermath for ordinary people. Oral sources and literary representations rather than conventional histories provided an important key to understanding the emotional and physical personal experiences of 1947, thus providing evidence of the impact of Partition on everyday lives. The greatest initial achievements resulted from the work of feminist writers such as Butalia, Bhasin, and Menon.¹³ Their concern with 'history from beneath' coincided with the outlook of the subaltern group of historians, led by Ranajit Guha.¹⁴ Recent years have witnessed the publication of a number of anthologies of Partition narrations, mostly based on firsthand accounts, in an attempt to unlock the 'human emotion' of the 1947 upheavals. Ian Talbot sees

the novels and short stories of Partition as providing such insights into the 'human impact' of Partition-related migration, as the sense of hopelessness and 'sense of uprootedness'.¹⁵

This new emphasis reflects the reality articulated by Gyanendra Pandey that for ordinary people, Partition was experienced as suffering and violence, although this has largely remained unacknowledged in official histories. Where it does feature in these and in community histories, it is included not out of a sense of social justice, but to enable the construction of stereotypical identities.¹⁶ Pandey identifies several different 'techniques' that writers have employed to silence the history of Partition-related violence. One is to declare such violence 'non-narratable: the 'limit case' of history', and, therefore, 'unhistorical and inexplicable'. Another distancing technique historians have used is to focus entirely on issues of causation. A third historiographical device is to localize it in time 'as a freak occurrence, like a natural calamity, which requires no historical explanation'.¹⁷ David Gilmartin also reminds us that 'the place of the violence in the larger historical narrative has continued to prove elusive' and calls for histories that see 1947 as 'a key moment in a much longer and ongoing history linking the state and arenas of everyday conflict'.¹⁸ Ayesha Jalal has also suggested Partition historiography needs to be linked with the new history of human dimension with its 'high politics' and statecraft.¹⁹

Recent Partition scholarship has gone some way towards reversing the popular impression that Partition as an event was confined to 1947, and has instead highlighted its complex and far-reaching legacies.²⁰ One of the striking features of the Partition studies is the consideration of the variety of ways in which refugees were assimilated into local communities, and the contrasting ways in which migrants collectively emerged as a distinct 'political group or community'. Such new studies have brought important insights to bear upon understanding the impact of Partition in the 'other face of freedom'. Some are concerned with the relationship between the refugees and the state, both in terms of state policies toward the migrants, and the material roots of socio-economic tension between the refugees and the host community. A second strand in this scholarship evaluates the effects that refugees had on the economy in the places where they

settled, and brings out the voices/identities of the refugees, with their often traumatic and nostalgic memories of a lost homeland on the other side of the border. This new historiography enhances our understanding of the ways refugee populations resettled and either assimilated or emerged as a distinct group within a wide array of physical, social, and regional environments. As new vistas of enquiry open up, they take us beyond the stereotypical portrayal and make it increasingly clear that there is no undifferentiated narrative of Partition. Yet, most of the existing literature on the impact of Partition tends to focus in general terms, or at best has a provincial angle, with respect to patterns of violence, resettlement, and rehabilitation.

More recently, in the 'new history' of Partition, there is an increasing awareness towards exploring differential issues of Partition-related violence, migration, and refugee resettlement, by means of a comparative localised case-studies approach. A locality-based approach to understand the impact of Partition is important, with studies such as *Divided Cities* on Lahore and Amritsar, which fell narrowly on either side of the international border, is pioneering this trend.²¹ The emphasis on locality has also led to study away from the Punjab towards the Bengal, in particular.²² Research, however, has largely focused on the Indian, rather than Pakistani Punjab.²³ The 'new history' approach with its emphasis on 'lived experience' and the 'locality' as a site to explore the gender and subaltern dimensions of Partition, has ignored Gujranwala and Sialkot. Moreover, existing scholarship has solely focused on the consequences of Partition within the context of the 'refugee experience'. However, this work considers the refugee experience alongside that of the local established populations and will argue that the impact of Partition could be as profound on them as on the refugees. It reflects some of the themes of the new history of Partition, both in its subject matter and locality-based focus. It is aimed at not only establishing a greater understanding of the effects that Partition had on different people and cities, but also it has a role in adding to and not simply supporting the current literature. Moreover, while the focus of work is upon the Pakistani Punjab, it has relevance in understanding developments across the border as well.

UNDERSTANDING THE PARTITION-RELATED VIOLENCE IN PUNJAB

Partition violence has only recently been considered in terms of general theories.²⁴ Why was this violence not featured in broader accounts of genocide or ethnic cleansing? This academic neglect was not only because of the Eurocentric character of the post-Second World War debate on mass violence overshadowing India's Partition violence, but also because the state's nation-making accounts downplayed the darker side in order to bolster the achievement of freedom. For a long time, standard accounts of the 1947 communal violence observed this violence as summer madness, 'slaughter', 'mass killings', 'massacres', and the like.²⁵ Some observers such as Evan Jenkins, the Governor of the Punjab, remarked on 14 August that the 'urban slaughter was without precedent' even in the first phase of violence in the Punjab, and that 'the rural massacres were new'.²⁶ General Rees, commander of the Punjab Boundary Force, described the 1947 horrors as a 'fratricidal war of extermination'.²⁷

Contemporary explanations of the violence, both in India and Pakistan, always portrayed the killings as erratic and spontaneous, many with the aim of 'blame displacement'. Each country explained violence as retaliatory and in many cases termed it as 'self-defence'. Both sides, immediately after independence, made available accounts of the horrors of 1947. A good example is the account of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) made available in the form of Gurbachan Singh Talib's book, *Muslim League Attack on Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab 1947*.²⁸ Polemically, Talib argues that the Muslim League leadership had planned the expulsion of non-Muslims from the Punjab because they wanted the entire province to join the future Pakistan. As early as March, in the Rawalpindi Division, they started eliminating and clearing both the Hindus and Sikhs. The SGPC report explains the Sikh reprisals against Muslims in East Punjab merely as 'reaction' which assumed alarming proportions only after the creation of Pakistan on 14 August 1947. Another Indian version of the violence is the work of Justice G.D. Khosla, *Stern Reckoning*.²⁹ Khosla affirms that the Muslim League leaders and cadres initiated the massacres that continued as a one-

sided affair until mid-August. Again, the attacks in East Punjab against the Muslim population were seen merely as a retributive response to the preceding actions in West Punjab.

The Pakistani side saw the violence and sufferings of migration as part of both the triumph and sacrifice for freedom. Official accounts, such as *The Sikhs in Action*, claimed that there was a 'Sikh Plan' to eliminate Muslims from East Punjab in order to create a Sikh state in the Punjab after Partition. In this specific aim, the Sikh princely states, such as Patiala and Faridkot, were involved in assisting and harbouring the perpetrators in the hope of their 'dream of a sovereign state'.³⁰

The scale of the casualties in 1947 has always been a source of dispute. Recently a number of works have challenged the casualty figures for Partition-related massacres as set out by some British and Indian participants, ranging from 200,000 to 500,000, and have pointed to a death toll of over one million.³¹

A number of different explanations and interpretations have been put forward to account for the onset of communal violence. 'Communalism' is used in the subcontinent to refer to political identity focused solely on religious lines. There is a lively debate as to whether it emerged with colonial rule³², or possessed a pre-colonial history.³³ Some authors see the emergence of communal identities and the construction of Indian society under the colonial state conditions.³⁴ The Indian nationalist historians explain communalism as an aspect of pathological politics distinct from 'normal' politics. They believe that communalism was essentially the product of colonial rule. Owing to the scarcity of employment within administrative services such as the Indian Civil Service, and competition for seats in government councils and assemblies, Bipan Chandra posits that Indians, both Hindus and Muslims, turned on one another by focusing on the artificial division of religion. He contends, along with several other writers, that the growth of the religious conflict was more a matter of economic jealousy rather than a consequence of any socio-religious gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims, emerging from narrow tendencies within society itself.³⁵ Some authors, on the other hand, hold the view that there was a fundamental fault-line in Hindu-Muslim relations in Indian society and understand communal

identity in what may be seen as primordial terms. Francis Robinson points to the importance of religion, kinship, and language, in the construction of the Muslim identity and argues that the Hindu and Muslim divide has always been well-entrenched in India. He then takes issue with Paul Brass's contention that the communalization of Muslim identity was an outcome of elite politics, which manipulated a following through the selection of divisive symbols.³⁶ Such arguments, despite well taken, remain contested.

Donald Horowitz sees Partition violence as evidence of the 'spontaneous quality of riot behaviour', though with respect to attacks on refugee trains, he acknowledges that they possess features of organised genocide. He also points out that social justification and approval motivates violence.³⁷ Ashutosh Varshney highlights the point that cities and areas with strong civic engagement and organisations limit the communal violence. He suggests that, 'Without the involvement of organised gangs, large-scale rioting and tens of hundreds of killings are most unlikely, and without the protection afforded by politicians, such...[gangs]...cannot escape the clutches of the law.'³⁸ The work of Paul Brass has, however, shifted attention away from such interpretations and it looks at violence mainly as politically motivated. A common theme is the involvement of unscrupulous politicians, and policemen in the generation of violence, usually in order to further political interests.³⁹ Similarly, Steven Wilkinson on elections explains the relationship between Hindu-Muslim riots in India and shows that communal tensions are manipulated for the electoral incentives.⁴⁰ Such understandings of contemporary violence have utility with respect to the events of 1947. Brass's concept of an 'institutionalized riot system' in post-independence Indian cities such as Aligarh and Meerut, parallels characteristics of the 1947 violence, in which, for example, the involvement of politicians, police, and criminal gangs was widely reported.

The extent to which the violence was in fact spontaneous has been recently questioned. A great deal of research has revealed that attacks were not only carefully planned but, in addition, possessed a class dimension, and were gender specific as well. Swarna Aiyar makes it clear that in many cases, the aggressors operated in organized

groups under 'military style' leadership. Her work considers the role played by the demobilized soldiers in determining the nature and brutality of the violence. 'Their participation meant that the violence took on for a time the characteristics of civil war. Ordinary crowd violence usually involves actual physical confrontation, generally rude weapons, if any, but professional techniques such as ambush and modern sophisticated weapons that the ex-soldiers used made for quite a different kind of impact, carrying the violence to an altogether new and different plan', she has argued.⁴¹ Ian Talbot argues that the first phase of organised violence started during the March 1947 massacres of Sikhs in the Rawalpindi district, which was far from being 'a spontaneous and a temporary aberration.' He marks this episode of the violence as exhibiting 'cold blooded planning and execution.'⁴² The works of Ian Copland and Shail Mayaram make clear the involvement of the various princely states in the Punjab. Copland maintains that, 'Muslims were not only butchered in East Punjab, but systematically expelled. We would now term this process 'ethnic cleansing'. He clearly reveals that leaders of some of the states were the perpetrators of this 'ethnic cleansing project.'⁴³ Mayaram's account of violence in Mewat on the contrary challenges the notions of political parties and their association with violence. Some Muslim Meos in the princely states of Bharatpur and Alwar had not even heard of Jinnah and the Muslim League, but they had been caught up in 'the state-sponsored campaign of *safaya*, epitomizing the ideology of cleansing.'⁴⁴ More recently, the work of Zamindar shows that 'partition violence' must 'include the bureaucratic violence of drawing political boundaries and nationalizing identities that became, in some lives, interminable.'⁴⁵

While Brass discusses organisation in the killings, he terms Partition violence as 'retributive genocide'. He considers 'the genocidal massacres' in the Punjab to have been organised and planned, but their 'special character is that they were not ordered by a state'.⁴⁶ Henry Huttenbach suggests that not just states but well-armed ethnic groups 'with or without the collusion or cooperation of the instruments of the state' could 'embark on a genocide campaign.'⁴⁷ Jason Francisco has, however, supported the more conventional view that Partition violence in the Punjab was not state

sponsored so it might be referred to as 'fratricide'. 'The partition stands as the archetype of what I call nationalist fratricide'. He declares, 'the conflict between people of a common cultural heritage.'⁴⁸ In contrast to this, Anders Bjorn Hansen has argued Partition violence shows that the state need not be the only actor in a 'genocidal situation'. He suggests that the genocidal violence can also occur when the state is either unwilling or incapable of countering the violence, while the actual power is usurped by various communal groups. Instead of focusing on state involvement per se, the attention should be on processes leading to the genocidal situation.⁴⁹

DEFINITIONS

Can the 1947 violence be identified in the broader applicability of the concepts of ethnic cleansing and genocide? There are a number of inherited problems associated with the study of Partition violence. These concern the extent to which it was spontaneous or calculated, the degree to which a focus on localised violence can form part of a broader historical narrative, and the extent to which it differs from the 'traditional' communal violence. The role of the state is quite complex when trying to understand mass violence.⁵⁰ Leo Kuper argues that colonization constructed 'plural societies', and many genocides occurred 'in the process of decolonization or as an early aftermath of decolonization.'⁵¹ Some critics argue that the leading twentieth-century ethnic population transfers, and the partitions that often accompany them, generally increased suffering and death.⁵² Some theorists such as Horowitz have suggested the 'partition' as a conflict resolution, while others such as Woodward see genocide and Partition as 'two faces of the same coin'.⁵³

The UN Convention of 1948 defines genocide as 'acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group'. Some authors are critical of the Convention's definition, in particular, because of its exclusion of political and social groups and the connection between state and terror.⁵⁴ Genocide gains its moral force, and conceptual horror, precisely because of the nature of the Holocaust. The term 'ethnic cleansing' seems to have originated



with the wars in the former Yugoslavia. This involves removals rather than extermination and is not exceptional but rather common in particular circumstances. The UN Commission of Experts itself defined 'ethnic cleansing' quite specifically as 'rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons of another ethnic or religious group'. Robert Hayden argues that ethnic cleansing may be sponsored by the very powers that profess horror at genocide.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, for many writers, ethnic cleansing has become conterminous with genocide and the two terms are almost interchangeable.

Regardless of whether the conceptual terms 'genocide' or 'ethnic cleansing' are deployed, a debate still rages over the issue ranging the 'spontaneity' or 'planning' of the mass violence. The role of both the state and the local authority is imperative here. The findings of several scholars have pointed out that there were a host of culpable individuals and group actors involved, ranging from religious extremists on both sides, to politicians, officials, policemen, and soldiers. This debate continues and has been fuelled by such developments as the 1984 anti-Sikh riots in Delhi, and the 2002 Gujarat riots.⁵⁶ For some writers such as Talbot, similarities are being revealed between Partition and the post-independence communal violence in India.⁵⁷ This study sees Partition violence as having characteristics which clearly mark it off from what has been described as 'traditional' consensual communal violence.⁵⁸ It views this violence as variegated and complex, and illustrates the existence of an organisational and 'genocidal' element in it, alongside spontaneity.

A number of terms were used in both the administrative and popular discourses for Partition-related migrants. These included evacuees, displaced persons, migrants, and refugees. The Urdu, Punjabi, and Hindi words for refugees are *muhajir*, *panahgeer*, and *sharnarathi*, respectively. In general, these covered the categories of both the anticipatory and the actual migrants, as well as the people who migrated after the March 1947 riot in the Rawalpindi Division, when the Punjab was still undivided. In narrow legal and administrative terms, Pakistan's official discourse of evacuation and rehabilitation categorised the migrants from India as 'agreed-areas' refugees (refugees hailing from 'disturbed areas' of Punjab—who



were involuntarily evacuated through the coordinated efforts of the Indian and Pakistani governments). By contrast, 'non-agreed areas' refugees from elsewhere in India, such as from northern and central India, the Jammu and Kashmir region, as well as the divided province of Bengal were not designated as subjects hailing from 'disturbed areas'. They were considered less vulnerable to violent communal attack than their counterparts in the agreed-areas. This crucial distinction qualified the agreed-areas refugees for official rehabilitation entitlements such as the right to till the abandoned non-Muslim resources. Although the 'non-agreed' inhabitants were actually discouraged from migrating by their potential 'host' states, they were not turned away from the specific right to rehabilitation or denied citizenship if they successfully managed in making the passage. Zamindar shows that the Pakistani state from its inception was reluctant to accommodate all the Muslim refugees that might want to come to the country from India and introduced 'the technologies of permits and passports' to limit the influx on 'economic rationalization'.⁵⁹ On 7 February 1955, finally, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan abolished the distinction between agreed and non-agreed areas refugees in respect of allotment of evacuee property on a permanent basis. It thus redefined the refugee 'who left India or any part occupied by it between 1 March 1947 and 30 June 1953 can claim rehabilitation under new scheme.'⁶⁰

Both imperial and district gazetteers and the census reports played a crucial role in the 'essentialisation' of religious and caste identity.⁶¹ The terms 'Muslims', 'Hindus', and 'Sikhs' refer in this book to the constructed categorisations of religious communities and political mobilizations that emerged within the colonial British settings.⁶² There are a great many problems with use of the terms 'Chamar', 'Meghi', and 'Chuhra' in relation to the low-caste groups. They are not only open to contestation, but also distort the self-ascription of the people themselves.⁶³ Their etymology is uncertain and the colonial role in perpetuating their use in diverse forms of social identity, community, and organisation is contentious.⁶⁴ Undoubtedly, in many quarters of post-colonial India and Pakistan these categorisations have become the terms of abuse.⁶⁵ In order to avoid simply reproducing colonial classifications here and in an effort to

recover the complexity of multiple and shifting identities, this book employs an additional range of designations and socio-religious self-ascriptions, including 'low-caste group', 'labourer' and '*sepidar*' (customary employee). The terms 'non-Muslim(s)' and 'minorities' refer only to Hindus and Sikhs. The terms 'West Punjab' and 'East Punjab' refer to geographical regions of the province.

THE STUDY SITES, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY

The case-studies of Gujranwala and Sialkot have been carefully chosen: firstly, because of the intensity of Partition-related violence and the resulting mass migration of Hindus and Sikhs; secondly, because they, in turn, received large numbers of Muslim refugees; thirdly, because they managed to overcome the disruption of 1947 to achieve rapid post-independence economic development; and fourthly, they were primarily chosen for their contrasting regional contexts and differing industrial profiles. While Gujranwala is a city in central Punjab, Sialkot is situated on the border: they thus invite a unique comparative case-study for examining the changes and challenges arising from Partition in the Pakistani context. The time-frame of the book covers the vital period between 1947 and 1961. This period was crucial not only for the rehabilitation of refugees and urban regeneration, but also for these cities to overcome Partition depression after the destruction and dislocation of 1947. The justification for taking 1961 as the cut-off point is because in that year the Pakistan authorities not only completed the census survey but also declared it to be 'the most important year in the history of the settlement of refugees in Pakistan,' because all temporarily transferred properties—houses, shops, buildings sites, factories and industrial concerns—were given in 'complete ownership' to the refugees.⁶⁶ Moreover, this crucial period which straddled Pakistan's independence lends itself particularly well to a better historical understanding now that the important classes of sources material have become available.

This work relies heavily on unexplored documentary primary sources, drawn from census data, budget reports, revenue record reports, and refugee rehabilitation reports. These are drawn from



both the provincial and the district level records. The materials are stored at the district record offices in Gujranwala and Sialkot, the National Documentation Centre, National Archives (Islamabad), as well as at the Punjab Secretariat Archives and Settlement Record Office in Lahore. The Governor's *Fortnightly Reports*, along with key documents from *The Transfer of Power* series, are also employed with respect to political developments in 1946–47. These archival sources are supported by newspaper accounts, both English and Urdu, and private papers drawn from the Mountbatten, Jenkins, Rees, and Mudie collections. Primary written sources will be supported by a wide range of secondary works on Partition produced both by historians and contemporaries. In addition, a number of interviews provide oral sources for this study.

There are difficulties exploring the local level sources on the impact of Partition. At the time of my fieldwork in 2007, the dilapidated 'settlement record room' in the Faridkot House on Lahore's Mozang Road, preserved thousands of uncatalogued personal files of refugees concerning their compensation 'claims' in the Punjab. At the time I visited, the premises had a staff of eight under the subordination of a settlement secretary. A number of files were burned and dilapidated. I was told that the records were still in daily use because many cases of compensation were still being processed in the different courts due to litigation, or still needed to be addressed. However, with the permission of the settlement officer, I attended some 'daily hearings' of those persons whose 1947 settlement claims and disputes were still in the process of being settled. Technically, this was one of the justifications why the records had not been declassified.

There are much more intricate problems related to the retrieval of the records at the district and *tehsil* levels. Archival resources in Sialkot and Gujranwala are scattered and have been moved continuously. In Sialkot, I was told that the district record had been shifted to Rathian, Jhelum, in 1956 due to the need to combine all records of refugees from Jammu and Kashmir at one place. Similarly, Gujranwala's urban settlement record, after many dislocations over the years, was housed in 2007 in a rented office of the housing department in the Model Town area. The police record was also spread

all over several individual *thanas* and there was, in many cases, only one *muharrar* (reader) at the police station who was aware of the way in which FIRs were kept and retrieved. Such scattered records had never made it to the national archive and thus had not been utilised by researchers.

There are also problems concerning the biases in the source material for the study of the 1947 communal violence. Official sources may be written with a view to 'blame displacement'. Vernacular press reporting was partisan. Equally, both the British colonial accounts of communal violence and local FIRs, which frequently attributed it to spontaneous and furious 'mobs', are open to question. Similarly, there are also problems with the government reports of refugee resettlement. Despite providing valuable data, they exaggerated the 'official' version of speedy 'rehabilitation' of the refugee populations. A comprehensive analysis then could only be achieved by supplementing such source material with oral history.

The contribution of oral history to historical reconstruction is widely acknowledged.⁶⁷ Oral history has not only enabled historians to unlock the experiences of people who were marginalised within the 'master narrative', but it has also played a key role in changing the pattern of the way that history is written and studied. In spite of this, the use of personal testimonies as historical evidence has been severely criticized. Traditional documentary historians have questioned the veracity of oral testimonies both because of faulty remembrances and the influence of contemporary events that inevitably have an impact on how and what is remembered. The interviews for this study conducted about sixty years after the events. Memory after a long period of time becomes influenced by other events and interpretations could be clouded by age. By acknowledging the primacy of traditional sources over oral history, Grele argues that 'an oral history must be used with a critical eye' and it 'must be evaluated with care'. He aptly remarks that when oral histories are used modestly and with care, they increase our understanding of our past and reveal hidden levels of discourse.⁶⁸

Oral history has made an immense contribution to the construction of Partition's 'history from beneath'. Shail Mayaram has adequately brought out the experiences of the Meos of Mewat to the fore, by

utilizing oral testimonies, which she feels have been so strongly 'grounded in the construction, transmission and perseveration of historical memory'. Their silence is matched by the 'forgetting' of the state, by the complicitous silence of the media, and by the mob and victimizer's memory'.⁶⁹ The overwhelming memory of 1947 for people across the whole of North India remains that of Partition, rather than simply of independence. Mayaram concludes that, 'Memory bridges myth and history, helps us explore different forms of the historical imagination in the past, and may be useful in furthering the vision of an alternative history'.⁷⁰ Urvashi Butalia has brought the experiences of women to the fore and has exposed the harsh realities of abduction, rape, and violence against women in a patriarchal society. 'No historical document can approximate [their] pain and anguish, none can reflect [their] trauma or even begin to understand his confusion and ambivalence', she writes. Oral history can help individuals and societies remember and make better sense of their traumatic pasts. It shows how this memory shapes the consciousness of the present. 'The facts of any event are important', recognises Butalia, 'but equally important is how people remember those facts, and how they represent them'.⁷¹

Partition and Locality uses oral history as a complementary source, heavily relying on documentary source materials. Interviews were conducted not only with the perpetrators and victims of the violence of 1947 but also with the migrant entrepreneurs of the hosiery and jewellery trades of Gujranwala, to assess their role in the economic development of the post-Partition city. A similar research procedure was followed to collect the histories of the families of local artisan, *Lohars*. For the Sialkot case-study, interviews were conducted not only with some eye-witnesses of the violence but also with the proprietors of sporting goods industry in the city. The fieldwork in this study primarily took place in the first half of 2007 and in the second half of 2008. The interviews were conducted in a variety of settings. The collected accounts provide a general profile of the migrants, their experiences of migration, resettlement, and setting up of businesses. The interviews primarily focused on those who had lived through Partition and its aftermath. But in some cases there was no option to selecting testimonies from the post-Partition

generation. The interviewees have been given pseudonyms, as some amongst them wished to have anonymity. This book draws on the interview techniques pioneered in the 'new history' era of Partition. It adopts a semi-structured approach, rather than the use of formal questionnaires. Moreover, it cross-checks memories which may suffer from faulty recall with documentary sources. While writing this book, I was aware of the fact that first-hand testimonies are important for both uncovering 'perceptions' of the past, and the 'new facts' about it. The accounts challenge some of the received views on histories of Partition.

STRUCTURE

Excluding the introduction and the conclusion, this book is divided into three parts: (i) the colonial period and its impact on the urban development of Gujranwala and Sialkot, and the wider issues of Partition-related violence, migration, and refugee settlement in the context of the Punjab province; (ii) the local episodes of mass violence and migration in the two cities from March 1947 onwards; (iii) the post-independence demographic changes and economic challenges in the two cities.

In Part I, the opening chapter begins by introducing the reader to the socio-economic and political development of Gujranwala and Sialkot in the late-colonial period. It examines the ways in which the two cities' strategic location, helped by the development of the railway, assisted in their rise, along with the ways in which new industries supplanted the existing ones, but relied similarly on a skilled population. It highlights the key role of the Hindu and Sikh minorities in the development of the two cities. It also examines the growth of reformist organisations and revivalists and the impact on religious harmony. It asks the question whether the sharpened religious identities of the colonial era paved the way for the violence and mass migration of 1947. Chapter 2 provides a Punjab-wide assessment of the patterns of violence and the resulting mass migration. It also considers West Punjab's response to the refugee influx, issues of their accommodations, and economic recovery in the province. Part I thus provides a background to the book by explaining



life before Partition in both the cities, and the general impact of divide for the Punjab.

Part II focuses on the communal violence in the cities of Gujranwala and Sialkot, and reflects on the circumstances which led to the widespread riot-destruction in both from March 1947 onwards. Using previously unexploited local police records, the findings help to understand the scope of the violence in a comparatively localised framework. Chapter 3 seeks to understand these issues in a Gujranwala case-study and for the first time reveals the identities of the prime perpetrators of violence in the district. It explores not only the district authorities' partisan attitude towards the minority population, but also brings to light the direct participation of local policemen in the attacks and looting. It also exposes the connivance of the local railway staff with the *Lohar* perpetrators, who were at the forefront in attacking refugee trains in Gujranwala.

Chapter 4 provides a similar detailed local study of the violence in Sialkot. It reveals the role of individual police constables and workers of the city's Muslim League in the wanton destruction and looting in the wake of the administrative collapse. The chapter also considers the relationship between violence and the state, by examining the Hindu-ruled Dogra state of Jammu and Kashmir's complicity in the organised violence against the Muslims of Jammu, who flooded into Sialkot as refugees. It also examines the impact of post-Partition Sialkot's precarious existence near the border, not only on the local population, but also on the non-Muslim, untouchable 'Chamar' community.

Although Partition brought sufferings for many and disrupted old social, commercial, and kin networks, at the same time, it created new opportunities for the migrants, as well as the local population, to exploit the economic vacuum arising from the migration of Hindu and Sikh business classes. This aspect of Partition has been neglected in the literature. In the third and final part, Chapters 5 and 6 consider the ways in which the departure of Hindu and Sikh trading and capital classes had handicapped the economic activities in Gujranwala and Sialkot, and how these cities responded to the changed circumstances. It assesses the post-1947 refugee rehabilitation and economic recovery, alongside the government assistance in industrial

development. It provides the key to understanding how these cities, despite their initial disruption, due to Partition, recovered to emerge at the forefront of industrial development in the region. Chapter 5 on Gujranwala considers the extent to which the input of local and refugee capital and labour was locally significant in the city's post-independence urban economic development. Chapter 6 enquires how Sialkot's new border situation affected its development not only with respect to security concerns but also concerning the loss of traditional markets and raw materials. The focus is upon post-independence Sialkot's industrial recovery and the new economic opportunities for Muslims created therein. It reveals how local skilled Muslim artisans seized new opportunities to start new economic activities following the departure of the Hindu traders, and assesses the extent to which the artisans' success depended on the assistance provided by the government.

This book aims to shed fresh light on the impact of Partition and its aftermath on the Pakistani Punjab. It will provide new insights into the patterns of violence, refugee resettlement, and economic development by means of a detailed study of the cities of Gujranwala and Sialkot. Tracing developments in the cities prior to, during, and following Partition itself, produces interesting conclusions.

NOTES

1. There are other cases similar to the events in the Punjab, in which large proportions of the population became displaced due to War and Partition. The expulsion, resettlement and integration of ethnic Germans (altogether between ten and twelve million German speakers were displaced after the Second World War) have been addressed by a majority of contributors in A.J. Rieber (ed.), *Forced Migration in Central and Eastern Europe, 1939-1959* (London: Frank Cass, 2000). Likewise, there were around 200,000 Greek Cypriots, who fled from the north to the south of the island after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, in the wake of a long inter-communal conflict. Resettlement in Cyprus bore a resemblance to the settlement development scheme in the Punjab. See for example N. Kliot and Y. Mansfeld, 'Resettling Displaced People in North and South Cyprus: A Comparison', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 7, 4 (1994), pp. 328-59.
2. On the theme of 'Partition of India and The Human Dimension' see a recent volume of *Cultural and Social History*, 6, 4 (December 2009). For an introduction to this 'new history' of Partition historiography see, I. Talbot and G. Singh, *The Partition of India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

3. Alan Campbell-Johnson, 'Mounthatten and the Transfer of Power', *History Today*, 47, 9 (September 1997), pp. 38-9; H.V. Hodson, *Great Divide* (London: Hutchinson, 1969).
4. V.P. Menon, *Transfer of Power in India* (Calcutta: Longmans, 1957); L. Bahadur, *Struggle for Pakistan: Tragedy of the Triumph of Muslim Communalism in India, 1906-1947* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1988).
5. K.B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1968); I.H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1965).
6. For an official representation of Jinnah see Sharif-Al-Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1981); S. Hayat, *The Charismatic Leader: Quaid-i-Azam M. A. Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008).
7. A. Jalal, *Jinnah: The Sole Spokesman: The Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
8. Various works of the Cambridge School include J. Gallagher, G. Johnson and A. Seal (eds.), *Locality, Province, and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics, 1870-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); F. Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
9. I. Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj: Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement, 1849-1947* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1988).
10. D. Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1988).
11. A. Jalal, 'Secularists, Subalterns, and the Stigma of Communalism: Partition Historiography Revisited', *Modern Asian Studies*, 30, 3 (July 1996), p. 681.
12. G. Singh, 'The Partition of India in a Comparative Perspective. A Long Term View', in I. Talbot and G. Singh (eds.), *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 96.
13. U. Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1998); R. Menon and K. Bhasin, *Borders and Boundaries: Women in India's Partition* (New Delhi: Kali Press for Women, 1998); and also see A. Major, "'The Chief Sufferers": Abduction of Women during the Partition of India', in D.A. Low and H. Brasted (eds.), *Freedom, Trauma, Continuities. Northern India and Independence* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998), pp. 57-71.
14. See for example D. Arnold and D. Hardiman (eds.), *Subaltern Studies*, VIII (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994); S. Amin and D. Chakrabarty (eds.), *Subaltern Studies IX* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996); and also see R. Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
15. I. Talbot, *Freedom's Cry: The Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in North-West India* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997).
16. G. Pandey, 'The Prose of Otherness', *Subaltern Studies*, VIII, p. 194.

17. G. Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 45–6; and also see *Routine Violence: Nations, Fragments, Histories* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 33 and 43–8.
18. D. Gilmartin, 'Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In the Search of a Narrative', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 57, 4 (November 1998), pp. 1071 and 1092.
19. Jalal, 'Secularists, Subalterns, and the Stigma of Communalism', pp. 681–736.
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21. Talbot, *Divided Cities*.
22. J. Chatterji, *The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947–1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
23. M.S. Randhawa, *Out of the Ashes: An Account of the Rehabilitation of Refugees from West Pakistan in Rural Areas of East Punjab* (Chandigarh: Public Relations Department, 1954); V.V.S. Tyagi, *Economic Impact of Partition on Indian Agriculture and Related Industries* (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, American University: Washington, D.C., 1958). Tyagi's thesis has heavily drawn on the work of C.N. Vakil, *The Economic Consequences of the Division of India* (Bombay: Vora and Co; Press, 1950); S.M. Rai, *Punjab since Partition* (Delhi: Durga Publications, 1986). Rai draws mainly on the work of A.K. Luthra, *Impact of Partition on Industries in Border Town Districts of East Punjab* (Ludhiana: the Board of Economic Inquiry, East Punjab, Publication No. 1, 1949); S.L. Keller, *Uprooting and Social Change* (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1975); Kaur, *Since 1947*.
24. P. Brass, 'The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946–1947: Means, Methods, and Purposes', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 5, 1 (2003), pp. 71–101; A.B. Hansen, *Partition and Genocide: Manifestation of Violence in Punjab 1937–1947* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2002); I. Talbot, 'The 1947 Partition of India', in D. Stone (ed.), *The Historiography of Genocide* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 420–33; I. Ahmed, 'Forced Migration and Ethnic Cleansing in Lahore in 1947: Some First Person Accounts', I. Talbot and S. Thandi (eds.), *People on the Move: Punjabi Colonial and Post-Colonial Migration* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 96–142.
25. Jenkins to Mountbatten, 10 July 1947, *TOP*, Vol. XII, Doc, 56, p. 74.
26. *TOP*, Vol. XII, Doc, 337, p. 516.
27. Rees Collections, Punjab Boundary Force, Mss Eur D 807/2, O.I.O.C.
28. G.S. Talib, *Muslim League Attack on Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab 1947* (New Delhi: Voice of India, first published in 1950, reprinted New Delhi, 1991).

29. G.D. Khosla, *Stern Reckoning: A Survey of the Events of Leading up to and Following the Partition of India* (First Published in 1949, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989).
30. Mudie Papers, The Sikhs in Action, Mss Eur F164/23, pp. 50-1, O.I.O.C; and also see Government of West Punjab, *Note on the Sikh Plan* (Lahore: Punjab Government Printing, 1948); Government of West Punjab, *RSS* (Lahore: Punjab Government Printing, 1948).
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32. For an analysis and etymology of this word see G. Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990).
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40. S.I. Wilkinson, *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
41. S. Aiyar, 'August Anarchy: The Partition Massacres in Punjab 1947', *South Asia*, 18, Special Issue, (1995), pp. 13-36 and p. 28.

42. I. Talbot, 'The 1947 Violence in the Punjab', paper presented at Workshop on *Religion, Violence and the State in South Asia*, Balliol College, Oxford, (26 March 2004).
43. I. Copland, 'The Master and the Maharajas: The Sikh Princes and the East Punjab Massacres of 1947', *Modern Asian Studies*, 36, 3 (2002), pp. 660 and 698.
44. S. Mayaram, 'Speech, Silence and the Making of Partition Violence in Mewat', in Amin and Chakrabarty, *Subaltern Studies IX*, pp. 132–162.
45. Zamindar, *The Long Partition*, p. 8.
46. Brass, 'The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab'.
47. H.R. Huttenbach, 'Locating the Holocaust on the Genocide Spectrum: Towards a Methodology of Definition and Categorization', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 3, 3 (1988), pp. 289–303.
48. J. Francisco, 'In the Heat of Fratricide: The Literature of India's Partition Burning Freshly' in M. Hasan (ed.), *Inventing Boundaries: Gender, Politics and the Partition of India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 372.
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Part I

CONTEXTS: HISTORICAL AND PROVINCIAL

Specimens of a trade in cutlery which seems to have been established for a long time in Gujranwala, Wazirabad and Nizamabad, where also guns, pistols, swords, razors, spears, horse-bits, bullet-moulds and other steel articles are made... Their exhibits of cutlery were awarded a silver medal at the Franco-British exhibition in London, which were sold on the spot.

– John Lockwood Kipling 1881

The industries for which Sialkot has a reputation in Punjab bazars are the brass work of Daska and Pasrur, the *koft* or damascened work of Kotli Luharan, and the paper of Sialkot. Among Europeans, Sialkot racquets and badminton bats with silver-mounted riding canes, represent the manufactures of the district.

– John Lockwood Kipling 1881

1

Colonial Inheritance: Life before Partition in Gujranwala and Sialkot

Gujranwala city is situated in West Punjab and lies in what might be termed its north central region. Sialkot in contrast is a northern border city adjacent to the state of Jammu and Kashmir (see Map 1). On the eve of Partition, Sialkot district was divided into four subdivisions of Daska, Pasrur, Narowal, and Sambrial. Gujranwala district was divided into three sub-divisions of Hafizabad, Wazirabad, and Mandi Bahauddin. The population of Gujranwala city in 1941 was about 196,000 compared to Sialkot's figure of 139,000. Although Muslims constituted the majority of the population, it was the Hindus and the Sikhs who chiefly controlled the pre-Partition economic activities in the two cities.

Both Gujranwala and Sialkot were immensely affected by the colonial impact in the Punjab. Sialkot had become one of the most important industrial centres in the province by the end of British rule. It was surpassed only by Amritsar in the province, which was dominated by agriculture rather than industry. Gujranwala, on the other hand, had neither a strong urban civic cultural nor an obvious industrial background. While Gujranwala's growth lagged behind that of Sialkot, its strategic road and railway connections ensured for it a prominent commercial position in the Punjab.

This chapter examines the two cities' colonial growth. It examines the ways in which their urbanisation was stimulated by the development of civil lines, cantonment areas and migration, along with the ways in which the cities' strategic location, boosted by the development of railways, assisted in their rise. It will also assess the communal composition of the population and the communities'

relations in the localities. Finally, it will outline the role the Hindus and Sikhs played in the cities' social and economic life. Without this background, it would be difficult to fully understand the changes and challenges which arose in the cities as a result of the division of the Punjab in 1947. Firstly, we address such themes through the case study of Gujranwala. Before examining the city's considerable urban and economic growth during the colonial rule, we shall briefly turn to its much earlier socio-economic and political history.

GUJRANWALA'S PRE-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT

Gujranwala, the 'abode to Gujars', was originally known as Khanpur Shansi, after an individual of the Jat caste, called Khan Shansi, founded several villages in the region. In the mid-seventeenth century, the cattle-breeding tribe of Gujars occupied the region and gave it its present name. Gujars still constitute a considerable proportion of the population of the city. Knowledge of Gujranwala's early history is sketchy. The first recorded reference is found in the journals of the Chinese traveller Hiuen Tsang in AD 630. At that time, the principal places in the district were Eminabad, Hafizabad, and Khangarh Dogran, rather than Gujranwala. During the reign of the Mughal Emperor Akbar (1556-1605), both Sialkot and Gujranwala formed part of the Rechnabad *sirkar* (district) of the Lahore *subah* (province). A large area from Eminabad to Sialkot was held by one (or sometimes two separate) *faujdar*, who ensured the collection of revenue and maintained law and order. The revenue of Eminabad was given as Rs 621,325 in the *Ain-i-Akbari*.¹ The period between the decline of the Mughal Empire on the death of Aurangzeb (1707), and the rise of the Sikh confederacies till the dominance of Sikh rule, was one of 'anarchy and misrule'. This period saw internecine quarrels and successive waves of invasions. There was no strong authority to maintain peace and order in this or other parts of Punjab which were devastated by the invading armies of Nadir Shah (1739), and the frequent incursions of Ahmad Shah (1761). The places were occupied by the Pathans, the Sikh Rajput chiefs, and the Bhangi tribes.²

What makes Gujranwala different from other places of the Punjab is that it was the first place in the region where Sikh domination was

established in the late eighteenth century. Therefore, the place had many associations with the Sikh community and witnessed some intimate connections with the fortunes of the Sikh royal family. It was the birth-place of Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1779–1839). Charat Singh, grandfather of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, seized Gujranwala in 1765, which henceforth remained his headquarters till his death in 1773. In 1810, Ranjit Singh established the Sikh monarchy, although, the work was begun by Charat Singh and continued by Mahan Singh, Ranjit Singh's father. Ranjit Singh faced many opponents in Gujranwala before he was able to secure his power. The decaying power of the Mughals, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, had given the opportunity to Gujranwala's Muslim tribes to maintain their independence. The most prominent were the Bhattis, Tarars, and Chathas who carried on 'an unceasing and bitter struggle' against the Sikh ascendancy till their final overthrow by Ranjit Singh in 1799. To mark the overthrow of Muslim chiefs and the triumph of the Sikhs, the names of prominent Muslim stronghold localities were changed. For example, the names of Rasul Nagar and Alipur Chatha were altered to Ram Nagar and Akalgarh respectively, though the old names were still being used by the Muslims of the region. Strikingly, the names of these localities were to revert to their older Muslim names after the departure of Hindus and Sikhs at the time of the 1947 Partition.

During the Sikh ascendancy in Gujranwala several leading figures of the Muslim tribes were killed and their possessions were looted and confiscated. Many Muslim families took refuge in the nearby jungles and *bellas* (forests). For years they offered a 'guerrilla resistance' to the Sikh regime. When the power of the Sikh Kingdom was broken following the Second Sikh War, and the Punjab was annexed in 1849 by the British, they returned and most of their old possessions were restored to them.

An immediate impact of Sikh rule was the substitution of law and order for insecurity and anarchy. The regime ushered in an era of comparative order and security by setting up a barrier against invasions from outside and stamping out tribal feuds and the private wars of rival chieftains. Indeed the regime accommodated all communities and appointed Hindus in public affairs and Muslims as

judicial officers in the city of Lahore.³ Ranjit Singh's dominance of the region had provided opportunities to the Sikh community to control the whole district of Gujranwala, like elsewhere in the Punjab. The Jat Sikh *Jagirdars*' (landlords) discretion was practically unbounded, as long as they furnished their contingent of troops to the Sikh royal army, or their quota of revenue to the royal treasury. The most noticeable *Jagirdars* of Gujranwala were enumerated by a British Settlement Officer, James Morris, in his settlement report of 1856.⁴ Overall, about one-half of the district was administered directly by the Sikh regime, with the remaining being granted in *jagir* tenure, either to members of families planted by Ranjit Singh, or to court officials and favourites from Lahore. Upon the fall of the Sikh Kingdom to the British in the Second Sikh War of 1848–49 at Chillianwala (known as house of slaughter), the *jagirs* of these chiefs were confiscated, albeit temporarily. Thus the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 involved the complete downfall or temporary eclipse of many of the leading Sikh families. The leading Muslim tribes played a crucial part in the victory of the British in the battles of Ram Nagar, Chillianwala, and Gujrat against the Sikhs who had defeated them earlier in the century. They rallied to the British, furnished their supplies, and brought them information about the enemy's movements. For example, some Muslim Pathans of Jandiala Sher Khan provided timely information to the British authorities to avert 'a plot to stir up the Sikh population' by the agency of a religious leader, who was 'fomenting rebellion in the guise of a religious mendicant'. Similarly, a Sikh General, who had been able to escape safely to Jhang, was captured with the aid of Muslim Bhatti chiefs.⁵ As a reward for such services, Muslims were restored to many of their estates from which they had been ejected by the Sikhs, and the nominees of the latter were expelled by force of arms where necessary.

Indeed the British occupation of the Punjab was a shattering blow for the Sikh community. The disbanding of the Sikh armies after the battles of Chillianwala and Gujrat had thrown out of employment thousands of 'sturdy Sikh soldiers' who lost their honours and emoluments. Nevertheless, the cataclysmic events of the 1857 'War of Independence' brought the Sikh population, whose attitude since



the annexation of the Punjab had been one of 'sullen acquiescence', into closer cooperation with the British. As a whole, the direct effects of the rebellion were felt less in Gujranwala because of the absence of a cantonment in the area. Sialkot, unlike Gujranwala, was heavily affected during the war, mainly because of a large native army presence in the cantonment, where the mutineers took over the town, and remained 'masters of the district for some time'.⁶ The Sikh community's loyalty during the war not only opened up service in the British Indian Army for it, but also provided the opportunity to restore its fortunes and emoluments. Moreover, the Punjab after the 1857 events was regarded as a model province and emerged as the 'Sword Arm of India' as well as the 'Home Front'.⁷ The Sikh community, having been classified as a 'martial race', along with the Muslims, formed a major component of the British Indian up until 1947. Some of the army's deserters, at the end of the British Raj, were to take part in Partition-related violence to clear out the opposite community.


GUJRANWALA'S COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT

It is important to understand Gujranwala's development in the wider context of the impact of the British rule on the Punjab. This will reveal both its unique features and also the ways in which it was typical of other localities. We will thus briefly refer to the overall impact of British rule on Punjabi urban life. Under British rule, some cities were to lose their importance, and often their city status along with it.⁸ Others either came into being, such as Lyallpur (present-day Faisalabad), Montgomery (present-day Sahiwal), and Sargodha, in the canal-colony development scheme, or underwent considerable change. At the same time, many modern cities and markets arose as a result of the opening up of land, which was tied in with the commercialisation of agricultural production. The cities in the western part of Punjab, the so-called 'colony cities' or 'colony market towns', were of this type.⁹ At the same time, new garrisons and civil lines were built at a certain distance from the 'old city' or the 'walled city'. Thus within the limits of a single area, two cities would seemingly spring up, the old and the new.

Pre-colonial Gujranwala was a walled city. Its fortifications dated from Ranjit Singh's reign, when eleven gates were built around the city. The densely-populated inner city was entered by these ancient gates that often took their name from the surrounding areas. Eminabad, Sialkoti, and Sheikhpura gates guarded the city's main entrance from that direction. Lohari gate took its name from the iron workers who worked in its vicinity. Soon after the Punjab's annexation, the British deputy commissioner of Gujranwala refurbished the city's gates. Map 2 shows the main administrative units and bazaars of Gujranwala during British rule. Gujranwala rapidly expanded during the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1861, a modern Gujranwala 'civil station' for the small European population, was built about a half mile to the north-west of the old city. This was followed by a mixture of residential and commercial housing of the 'Civil Lines'. With the arrival of the Christian missionaries, educational institutions, medical missions, and churches were built along with a number of new public buildings of the district courts, treasury, jail, and police lines. These civil lines were built at a certain distance from the 'old city' separated by the Gujranwala railway line. They were constructed with all modern facilities and sophistication. 'There was very effecting [sic] road-watering with motor sprinklers, and the road lighting with electric lights was excellent'.¹⁰ Other civic services such as medical, education, and drainage system were well maintained.

The Gujranwala Public Works Department was responsible for the maintenance of government buildings in the district. The Private Electric Supply Company supplied electricity to the civil lines. The Gujranwala Municipal Committee had a large number of shares in the electric company and was receiving 'a good dividend'.¹¹ The Gujranwala District Board was established in 1892. It worked as an advisory body to the district administration. Apart from the imposition of different taxes and issuing various licenses to the citizens, the activities of the board were extended to education, medical, and public works. During the period 1934-35, its income, by means of various taxes, was about Rs 536,190, while its expenditure was Rs 528,216.¹²

Map 2: Map of Gujranwala City In 1947



With the settlement of a small European population, the urban population experienced enormous social and urban change. The upper classes, specifically, upper caste Hindus and Sikhs of the inner city, became the beneficiaries of the new amenities. Aided by their wealth and a pattern of life, similar to the Europeans, moved them into the civil lines. By the 1881 Census, the population of the civil lines was only 700, compared with the over 22,000 inhabitants of the

old city.¹³ Banarsi Shah and Charan Singh were among the first who exchanged their inner-city dwellings for spacious residences in the civil lines. The former's splendid mansion in Gujranwala the area still illustrates the glory of that period. It is now occupied by a wealthy Muslim migrant family from India. The bigger mansion of Charan Singh was taken over by the district authorities and until recently was used as the local passport office.

Gujranwala's commercial importance increased greatly with the colonial state's communication revolution from 1871 onwards. The opening of the railway connected the city with the main junction at Wazirabad in 1874, linking it with routes from Peshawar to Karachi. Construction of the railway revolutionised long-distance transportation and added immensely to Gujranwala's commercial importance. The railway network linked the principal market-towns of Wazirabad, Nizamabad, Hafizabad, Akalgarh, Kaleke, Sukheki, Kamoke, and Eminabad with Gujranwala city. These towns and cities had their own railway stations, from where surplus crops were transported to the city's grain-market. Local traders and manufacturers occasionally visited Lahore and Amritsar for raw material and economic needs. Some of them were even importing hardware directly from Karachi, Bombay, and Jamshedpore. By the early 1930s, motor vehicles were being used and were also being assembled in the city. Lorry traffic had become 'almost universal' within the district by replacing bullock-carts.¹⁴ Gujranwala's Nishat and Sialkot's Nanda Bus services provided a regular and 'efficient' service from Sialkot—via Gujranwala—to Lahore. Such private services affected the regular railway business in the region because of cheaper fares. By the mid-thirties, Gujranwala with a considerable motor-lorry traffic and regular railway service had 'almost become a suburb of Lahore'.¹⁵

PRE-PARTITION COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IN GUJRANWALA

Prior to Partition, however, there was not enough industry in Gujranwala to really distinguish it from other small provincial towns. Most manufacturing involved the processing of agricultural products. There were cotton-ginning, rice-husking, and oil-milling factories and these were owned mainly by the Hindus and Sikhs. The most

important were the Guru Nanak Cotton Ginning, Punjab Rice Husking Factory, and the Chawla Oil Extracting Factory. Woodworking also flourished in the district as wood was easily available from the depot of Wazirabad, where it was floated down from Kashmir. There were both furniture- and match-making factories in the city.

The communication network decisively altered the patterns of trade in Gujranwala, as it not only connected the city more closely with other urban centres, but also enabled the rapid transportation of raw materials from the surrounding areas. Local iron-works developed, utilising unwrought iron which was transported from the railway junctions of Wazirabad and Gujranwala. Small scale iron manufacturing predated the colonial era. The *Lohar* community of the region had a long-established reputation for making agricultural implements and household items. Historically, Gujranwala was on the invasion route from Central Asia. As a result, the region developed a specialised expertise in manufacturing metal-based weapons. The skilled *Lohars* modified their skills by making swords and daggers for the Mughal emperors. A large chunk of the industry was situated within Gujranwala and its satellite towns of Wazirabad and Nizamabad. The region, because of the strong concentration of iron-works, was sometimes called the 'Sheffield of India'.

Artisan *Lohars* made all kinds of articles for use and ornament, such as shields and arms, betel-nut cutters, knives, boxes, plates, and inkstands. Besides these, some of the artisans made walking-sticks and tube-wells. The most important manufacturing was cutlery and knives. This became a speciality of Nizamabad where around two hundred families of *Lohars* plied their craft in about twenty-five workshops, and products made here were sent all over India. John Lockwood Kipling, then the Principal of Lahore's Mayo School of Art, described the blacksmiths (*Lohars*) of the town as 'the better class of artisans'. He wrote that a large proportion of the brass vessels of 'sound workmanship' manufactured in Gujranwala and Nizamabad were shown at the 1881 Punjab Exhibition and some of these were sent to the Calcutta Exhibition of 1883-84 as well. There was also a large export of cutlery and walking-sticks to Bombay, Calcutta, and other places in India. The town was also a regular supplier of the familiar office knife to the Stationary Office, Calcutta.¹⁶

Gujranwala's growth resulted from its increasing administrative importance and emergence as a communications hub. In particular, the city's iron manufacturing benefited greatly from the arrival of railway. The main depots of unwrought iron of the Punjab North-Western Railways were situated at Wazirabad and Gujranwala railway junctions because of their central location in the Punjab. From there unwrought iron was supplied all over the northern Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. In 1908-09, for example, overall, about 64,000 *maunds* of unwrought iron arrived by railway in the Punjab. The railway stations of Gujranwala and Wazirabad received more iron materials than any other cities of the province. Gujranwala railway station dealt with 24,308 (outwards), and 34,961 (inwards) *maunds* of unwrought iron. Wazirabad railway station managed about 1,363 (outward), and 2,747 (inward) *maunds* of unwrought iron in the years 1908-9.¹⁷ This easy access of unwrought iron boosted manufacturing in Gujranwala. It was just a small-scale iron industry at the outset of colonial rule, but bigger items such as iron-safes, door-chains, axe-heads, hinges, nails, frying-pans, *almirahs*, and charcoal-stoves were manufactured usually in zinc sheets by the early twentieth century. In 1908, there were some twenty-six iron-workshops, employing about a hundred people. Dagahwala bazaar of Gujranwala became the centre of such iron-work manufacturers. The products were mainly manufactured by the artisan communities.

The colonial period was especially important in increasing the mobility, technical skills, and capital of the local artisan communities of the region. They were largely drawn to the city during the colonial period because of employment opportunities in the extended construction of the civil lines, railway networks, and the canal headwork at Marala. Those who benefited most from these developments were the Muslim artisan castes of *Lohars* and *Tarkhans*, along with the Sikh *Ramgarhias*, who possessed similar metalworking and carpentry skills. Demands from the British Indian Army during the First World War further boosted manufacturing and increased their income. They produced a large variety of spear-heads, daggers, pen-knives, and swagger canes with regimental crest. Many obtained jobs in the army as 'shoe-smiths', 'regiment-smiths' and 'armour-makers'. Many others were employed in the railway as 'railway-

smiths', 'railway-masons' and 'railway-drivers'. At the beginning of the war, *Lohars* and *Tarkhans* employed in Gujranwala combined numbered over 5,000.¹⁸

The post-war economic uncertainties compelled members of these skilled communities to specialise in products in particular locales. While many of them switched to making brass, copper, and bronze utensils, others shifted their skills to the making of sanitary fitting wares. By the time of the Second World War, a substantial proportion of these skilled workers had set up their own workshops and started out by working on large defence orders from the colonial state during the war. Many received military training to forge and reproduce modern weaponry during the war-time. The *Lohars* traditionally worked on a type of cottage-industry basis. The owners of these industrial enterprises and units tended to be drawn from the Hindu commercial castes, while the craftsmen were Muslims.

The bulk of the iron and steel manufactured in Gujranwala was for local consumption as opposed to the Sialkot's surgical instruments, which, as we will see later, were produced for export. The district authorities encouraged Gujranwala's iron-manufacturing industry by setting up a training industrial school, to compete with the standard imported products. In 1926, the Punjab government, under the control of the Director of Industries, established the Tool Makers' Trade School in Gujranwala. The school was run and maintained under the supervision of the Inspector of Industrial School Punjab and was fully equipped with a modern plant and the requisite tools and appliances, for both iron-works and carpentry. Apart from this state school, the American Christian Mission also set up the Gujranwala Industrial School which possessed an 'up-to-date Motor Garage', that claimed the ability to meet competition from imported brands.¹⁹ The development of these industrial institutions gave a stimulus to industrialization and subsequently played an important role in the making of Gujranwala's modern small and medium engineering and mechanical industries.

Industrial growth was one factor behind Gujranwala's increasing population. Jobs were also to be had in construction work, and in the provision of goods and equipment for the civil lines. Finally, there were employment opportunities as unskilled labourers and hauliers.

The population of the city rose by more than 20,000 in the decade between 1921 and 1931, reaching a total of about 58,000. The increase in 1932–33 alone was about 12,000, when there were plenty of job opportunities due to the construction of the headwork project for the Marala Canal.²⁰

The growing industrial activity of Gujranwala led to such an expansion in the commercial and banking sectors, that leading banking companies and societies opened their offices in the city. On the eve of Partition, it had four branches or agencies of the leading banks of India. Initially, the Central Bank of India and the Imperial Bank of India opened their city branches in the civil lines. The Punjab National Bank opened its branch in a building close to the city's railway station, while the Lloyds Bank Limited set up a Pay Office in the city's Kutcheri Bazaar. The Gujranwala Central Co-operative Bank Limited was at the forefront of providing loans to the industrial class of the city. The Gujranwala Mortgage Bank Limited considerably impacted the business of traditional Hindu Banias in the district. The bank offered discounted interest rates.²¹ Though the modern banking system affected the business of the money-lenders, it was, however, the Hindu commercial castes that largely owned and controlled most of the city's banking system; so the banking sector was badly hit when they migrated in 1947.

THE HINDUS OF GUJRANWALA

Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show some demographic features of Gujranwala district prior to Partition. The Hindu community had established itself in the region during Ranjit Singh's reign and controlled most of the trade and business activity. By the end of the colonial era, important Hindu and Sikh communities had grown up in Gujranwala's Shaheenabad, Baghban Pura, Checherwali, Guru Gobind Garh, and the Guru Nanak Pura *mohallas* (see Map 2). These were exclusively Hindu and Sikh localities, and were fairly densely packed and contained both residential and commercial areas. After independence, they were occupied by the poorer Muslim refugees from East Punjab. The well-known Sarafa bazaar in the Sialkoti gate also contained many Hindu residences and jewellery and hosiery shops. These are,

today, occupied largely by Muslim refugees from Jullundur, Ludhiana and Amritsar.

While the Banias and Jains monopolised the banking services in Gujranwala, the Aroras were the city's most educated caste, and dominated the city's educational and professional activities. They formed an important component of the district administration and their district-wide population was enumerated as 35,000 at the time of the 1931 Census. Dr Gokul Chand, who belonged to this caste, represented Gujranwala in the Punjab Legislative Assembly as Minister for Local-Self Government, Punjab. Khatri were another very important and influential Hindu caste of the region, whose population was enumerated at just over 28,000 at the time of the 1931 Census.²² They were not only traders, controlling the retail and wholesale trades in iron safes, brass and aluminium vessels, but were also big landowners. Overall they owned about forty estates in Gujranwala, six in Wazirabad and sixteen in Hafizabad.

Table 1.1: Size of Urban Population in Gujranwala's District Towns²³

Name of Town	1931	1921	1911	1901	1891	1881
Gujranwala	58,716	37,887	29,224	20,224	26,785	22,881
Wazirabad	20,707	18,645	17,146	18,069	15,786	16,462
Hafizabad	14,431	8,854	n/a	4,597	n/a	2,453
Eminabad	7,329	5,816	5,526	6,494	5,841	5,886
Akalgarh	5,483	n/a	3,943	4,961	4,262	4,312
Ram Nagar	4,768	4,632	5,256	7,121	6,592	6,830
Pindi-Bhattian	4,478	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	3,528

Table 1.2: Religious Composition of Population in Gujranwala District in 1941²⁴

Communities	Gujranwala (dist.)	Gujranwala (tehsil)	Wazirabad	Hafizabad	%
Muslims	642,706	285,845	157,961	198,900	70.5
Hindus	100,887	58,242	22,355	27,290	11.5
Sikhs	99,139	76,035	13,543	9,561	10.9
Christians	62,274	44,614	11,979	4,236	6.7
Scheduled Caste	7,485	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.4
Total	912,491	464,736	205,838	239,987	

The most influential Khatri families of Gujranwala were the Madhoks, the Malhotras, and the Vigs. Their extensive agricultural lands, in and around the city, enabled them to control its largest grain market. The wealthy Kapur and Chopra families dominated the trades and commercial activities of Akalgarh and Hafizabad, respectively. They owned not only most of the shops and properties, but also a considerable amount of agricultural land which was granted to them during Ranjit Singh's rule, which was cultivated by their Muslim tenants. The affluent Bostani family controlled over half of the properties in Ram Nagar. Powerful Marwahas of Wazirabad and Khatri Dewans of Kamoke held similar possessions. The most influential was Dewan Lal Nath of Eminabad, who had established the biggest flour and rice mills of the region on his landed estates. They also had brick kilns, cotton-ginning and rice-husking mills. He established his own educational institutions like Amar Nath High School, which was maintained by the Nath estate.²⁵ Muslim tenants and labourers worked on his estate.

Banarsi Shah and Charan Singh emerged at the forefront in the manufacturing of iron-works and pipe fittings. With the rapid refurbishing of the civil lines and other construction work, demand for their products received a stimulus. In a short span of time, they earned their fortunes and emerged as the leading traders of the town. The workforce in their factory was primarily Muslims. Another leading light of the city was Ram Gopal Arora, who in the early 1940s had established a well-known firm called Prabhat Engineering Limited. It provided employment for both Muslims and Hindus right up to 1947. The workers were to take over the firm when the Arora family left for India in 1947. Lala Kasturi Lal Jain was the leading jeweller of the city. He was not only the leading mortgage lender of the region but had shares in the city's well-known Bullion Bank as well. At the time of Partition, he migrated to Jullundur and set up the well-known jewellery business in that city by the name of 'Gujranwala Jewellers'.

The Hindu community of Gujranwala not only controlled trading and commercial activities, but swiftly took up educational and professional opportunities as well. They set up their own educational institutions. The distinguished King George Hindu College was an

important educational establishment of Gujranwala. This premier institution for the Hindu community was established with the assistance of the government, which granted free land for the college. Despite the fact that the institution largely served students from the Hindu community, its doors were open to all communities.

THE SIKHS OF GUJRANWALA

As has been noted earlier, Gujranwala was the first place in the region where Sikh domination was established, and Ranjit Singh hugely privileged the members of Sikh community. By the end of the colonial era, while Sikhs only formed about 11 per cent of the total population of the district, they held more than a quarter of its agricultural land and paid about one-third of the land revenue. Although they were thinly spread all over the rural and urban localities, their main concentration was in the Gujranwala *tehsil* where they constituted more than 16 per cent of the population. In some localities such as Karial, Naushehra Virkan, and Maju Chak their concentration made them an overall majority.²⁶ They were largely landlords and many of them employed Muslim tenants on their land. Their colonial stereotype as 'sturdy' cultivators meant that they acquired large amounts of the land in the canal colonies. Labanas Sikhs formed the most dominant element of the Sikh population and their financial position gradually improved under the Sikh rule. They owned a considerable number of agricultural properties in Gujranwala. Cattle-trading was also prevalent among them. They were also freely recruited into the army.

In the city itself, Sikhs were concentrated largely in Guru Nanak Pura, Guru Gobind Garh, and Dhullay *mohallas*. A small number of the *Ramgarhias* Sikhs were involved with the iron-manufacturing industry of the city and specialised in the manufacturing of musical instruments such as harmoniums. The Gujranwala Khalsa Council was the community's main social organisation. The imposing Khalsa High School, established in 1889, provided community education and was maintained by the Khalsa Educational Council. The school was upgraded to a college in 1917, thanks to the efforts of its founder



principal M.U. Moore. Other luminaries who served on its staff included Teja Singh, Kirpal Singh Narang, and Fauja Singh.

THE MUSLIMS OF GUJRANWALA

The Muslims of Gujranwala formed more than 70 per cent of the city's population. The majority were artisans who had been drawn to the city in search of work during the colonial period. As pointed out earlier, many were employed for the maintenance of the railway lines as 'railway masons' while others served as 'regimental smiths'. Important Muslim concentrations were in the old city's Rasul Pura, Islam Pura, and Rahman Pura suburbs. There were few large-scale Muslim businessmen. There were just a handful of Muslim mill-owners. The most important Muslim-run factory was the Allah Ditta Utensils. Muslim businessmen were drawn from the Arain, Sheikh, and Gujar communities. Sheikhs dominated the wool and hides trades, and Arains and Gujars held a similar position with respect to marketing garden and dairy products respectively. The wealthy landowning Jat and Rajput families, such as Chatha, Cheema, Tarar, and Bhatti, also owned houses in the city because of its growing educational and health facilities.

Kashmiris were an important community within the city. A British observer described them as 'the finest race on the whole of the continent of India' because of their well made and robust features.²⁷ They formed a significant proportion of the city's population. According to the 1931 Census they numbered 23,311 in the district. Over the years, they had been drawn to Gujranwala from Kashmir because of its employment opportunities. They dominated in *pashmina* shawl-manufacturing and their markets extended from Rawalpindi to Amritsar. Although the *pashmina* shawl industry declined with the contraction of the European market, the Kashmiris, alongside the Ansaris turned to making sheets, *lungis*, and cotton *durries*. The locality of Gakkhar on the Grand Trunk Road became a centre for making *durries*. Kashmiris were by and large prosperous, and therefore, were able to play a role in the city's public life. They competed with Hindu Aroras for holding key positions in different government offices. The retired district judge Haji Rahim Bakhsh,

carved out an imposing role in the city's public life. Ata Mohammad was a leading Kashmiri figure in the city's pre-1947 politics. He became the president of the Gujranwala Municipal Committee in 1932. His elder brother, Khan Bahadur Sheikh Din Mohammad, a prominent lawyer of Gujranwala, was elected a member of the Punjab Legislative Council, while the younger brother, Mian Mohammad Afzal, was appointed as an Extra-Assistant Conservator in the Punjab Forest Department.²⁸ Some members of this community were employed in the local railways. Like Lahore and Sialkot, both of which had a significant pre-independence Kashmiri population, Gujranwala attracted a substantial number of Kashmiri refugees from Jammu and Kashmir and Amritsar, following the division of India in 1947.

Overall the Muslims of Gujranwala lagged behind the Hindus in the professional and educational fields. Despite the establishment of the Islamia High School, which was later upgraded to a college, by the Anjuman-i-Himayat-ul-Islamia, the new educational opportunities were monopolised by high-caste Hindus. Significantly, in 1935, over fifty non-Muslim lawyers were practising in the Gujranwala District Bar compared to only five Muslims.²⁹

The Muslims of Gujranwala, as we have seen, lagged behind the non-Muslims not only in terms of education but also in trade and finance. Both the Hindus and the Sikhs owned more than two-thirds of the city's properties and business activity. This is further evidenced starkly from the following figures: the urban immovable property tax paid by them amounted to Rs 65,000, as against only Rs 13,000 paid by the Muslims. The sales tax paid by them amounted to Rs 201,765, as against about Rs 12,500 paid by the Muslims. The income tax paid by the non-Muslims amounted to about Rs 700,000, as against about Rs 50,000 paid by the Muslims.³⁰ This meant that although the Hindus and Sikhs formed about one-third of the city's population, they paid more than 90 per cent of its taxes and revenues.

Indeed it was this economic stake that led the Sikh representatives on the 1947 Radcliffe Boundary Commission to argue for the city and its surrounding districts to be awarded to India. Radcliffe drew his eventual line of demarcation based on population rather than 'other



factors' and this left Gujranwala in Pakistan. During the months of August-December 1947, almost all of its Hindu and Sikh population, as throughout West Punjab, migrated to India. Amidst scenes of chaotic violence, Muslims made a reverse journey from East Punjab, some of whom were to settle as refugees in the city. Such experiences will be examined in later chapters. We shall turn now to an examination of Sialkot's historical colonial inheritances.

LIFE BEFORE PARTITION IN SIALKOT

Sialkot contrasts sharply with Gujranwala in terms of its culture of enterprise and export activity. It was one of the wealthiest cities in the British Punjab, and its three well-defined industrial clusters producing surgical instruments, leather garments, and sporting goods had thrived during the colonial rule. They not only fulfilled the bulk of India's requirements but were also exported world-wide. On the eve of Partition, the average annual export value of the city's sporting goods and surgical instruments stood at over Rs 35,000,000. The Hindu and Sikh commercial and trading classes of Sialkot mainly controlled the pre-Partition industry of the city, while the Muslims chiefly formed its workforce. Any territorial division of the Punjab was likely to be grim not only for community relations but for the city's continued prosperity. This section of the chapter raises questions such as how can we account for Sialkot's more rapid urban and industrial growth than Gujranwala? What role did Sialkot play in the economic life of the surrounding district? How did the Hindu and Sikh populations contribute to Sialkot's industrial and commercial development? Finally, how did the community of rapid Christian converts impact on inter-communal relations in Sialkot? Before examining such questions we shall turn to the city's urban and economic growth before and during colonial rule.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Sialkot's origins were placed 'in the time frame of Harappan Civilization'.³¹ Legend attributes the city's founding to the times of

Raja Salivahan, who built the fort and gave the place its present name. It is thought that the word Sialkot means 'the fort of Salivahan', which is a corruption of Sia. Sialkot's early history is interwoven with traditions of Raja Salivahan, his two sons Raja Rasalu and Puran, and his foe, Raja Hondi, so famous in the Punjab's folklore. Puran was killed by a wicked stepmother, and thrown into a well, the resort of pilgrims near Sialkot, called 'Puran ka Kunwa' (the well of Puran).³² A *mohalla* in Sialkot is still called Puran Nagar, which up until Partition housed the main concentration of the Hindu population in the old city.

Pre-colonial Sialkot city possessed a fascinating architectural layout and structure. It possessed a labyrinth of narrow alleyways and crowded bazaars that were demarcated by the occupations and communities of their inhabitants. The architectural layout of the houses and bazaars had many similarities with the building-style of neighbouring Kashmir. Inhabitants' traditional houses were usually built with Kashmir wood. The inner city was highly congested because of the extended size of the families. The most prominent suburbs of the city were Rang Pura, Miana Pura, Kashmir Mohalla, Puran Nagar, Hiran Pura, and Baba-de-Beri. The first three localities were the colonies of Muslim artisans, the last one, as its name implies, was inhabited by Sikh families. Rang Pura on the east and Miana Pura on the west were the most important. The 1881 Census enumerated their population at 6,223. The inner city's Hindu population was concentrated in the *mohallas* of Puran Nagar, Neka Pura and Hiran Pura. Markets and bazaars opened up near to these residential areas and were known for their specialities. For example, Bara bazaar was well-known for its specialty in jewellery, cloth, and Kashmiri fruits. The localities of Rang Pura and Kashmir Mohalla specialised in Sialkot's well-known paper manufacture. The city's pottery-making, which included the manufacture of tiles, jars, flower pots, and tea sets, was also located in the suburban areas. Over the years, due to migration and concentration, the city's suburbs became very congested and had no further room to absorb the population. They remained stagnant, while the city was 'daily increasing in size'. In the decade ending 1891, the city added more than 9,445 persons

to its population, reaching a total figure of 55,087, while the population of the congested suburbs increased by no more than 471 heads.

Map 3: Map of Sialkot City in 1947




Table 1.3: Size of Population in Sialkot's Suburbs, 1881-1891³³

Name of Suburbs	1881	1891
Rang Pura	3,676	3,865
Neka Pura	1,653	1,785
Hiran Pura	820	970
Baba-de-Beri	74	n/a

The densely-populated city was entered by ancient Do Darwaza (two doors). The old city possessed important religious shrines. Shrine of the Muslim saint, Iman-Ali-ul-Haq, known as Imam Shahib, is of ancient construction. Imam Shahib lived here during the thirteenth century, during the reign of Feroz Shah Tughlaq (1351-1388). He is reputed to have converted a majority of the local population to Islam. During *Muharram*, Muslims from all over the district flocked to pay homage to the *pir*. During the period of Ranjit Singh, the shrine of Baba Guru Nanak, known as Gurdwara Baba-de-Beri, which was built on Zafarwal Road, was held in great veneration by the Sikh community. Annually, on 13 April, a large Basakhi *mela* (fair) was held here, and Sikhs from all over the Punjab flocked to pay homage to the Guru. There was also a big Hindu temple, Gaho Shaiwala, in the inner city, which was built by the notable *Jagirdar* Raja Tej Singh. Another famous monument of the city is the historical fort of Raja Salivahan. It afforded shelter to the European inhabitants of the cantonments during the 1857 war.

Unlike Gujranwala and many other old urban centres in the province, Sialkot was not a walled city, nor was it unsanitary. In 1894, the Sialkot Gazetteer noted:

Sialkot is a fairly handsome, well built, and clean town. Its main streets are wide and open, and either paved or metalled, with good drainage on both sides...The sanitary arrangements are excellent, being facilitated by the elevated position of the town and the natural drainage afforded by the Aik stream on its south and east sides. The water-supply is obtained from wells in the city.³⁴

With its flat terrain and fertile soil, Sialkot was ideal for extensive and productive cultivation, with over 80 per cent of the land being

cultivable. The district was watered by an extensive system of small inundation canals that had originally been constructed by the Mughals in the eighteenth century. Sialkot was regarded as a 'fiscal district' and contributed a considerable amount of revenue to all those regimes who had ruled the region.³⁵ As the most fertile region of the province, with a regular annual rainfall of thirty to forty inches, 'Sialkot rice' had already attained a substantial level of development and trade on the eve of the British annexation of Punjab in 1849.³⁶ The city had a *Kanak Mandi*, where the surplus crops of the district were sold and exported to other parts of India. In 1894-95, the total export trade of the city was estimated at a value of Rs 400,000 per annum, while the total import was estimated at about Rs 1,500,000.³⁷

Sialkot's prosperity and abundant employment opportunities attracted regular waves of migrations from surrounding areas over the years. Many from the north-west region came for work seasonally, while others settled down permanently. For example, Dr Lal's ancestors migrated from Batala to Sialkot in search of work in the early nineteenth century 'due to poverty'.³⁸ However, the majority of migrants in the district came from neighbouring Jammu and Kashmir as the state had a long history of inter-migration and political association with Sialkot. Many would come over seasonally in search of work during the winter season, while others settled permanently, forming the largest concentration in the Kashmir Mohalla of the city. In the years of 1878-79, a severe famine in Kashmir forced large numbers of people to migrate to Sialkot permanently. By the end of the nineteenth century, Sialkot, because of the regular flow of migrants, was regarded as one of the 'most densely crowded' districts in the Punjab.³⁹ Consequently, the congestion of the population formed an increasingly anxious problem and land became an important commodity in the district. As the 1894-95 Sialkot Gazetteer reported: 'It is clear that the district had reached a point at which the main factor of the condition of the people is the intensity of their pressure on the soil, and if they are to lift themselves out of the "hungry residue" of the population many will have to turn from agricultural to industrial pursuits.'⁴⁰

It became necessary for people of Sialkot to earn their livelihood from something other than the land. Industrial development came quite late but was rapid by the end of colonial rule. At the close of the Second World War, Sialkot was more developed industrially than anywhere else in the Punjab except Amritsar. Before examining this late surge, it is necessary to briefly dilate about its much earlier beginnings.

Sialkot's most important pre-colonial manufacture was paper-making. This was due to its excellent geographic position and access to natural resources, especially wood and waterpower. The paramount consideration for paper mills was the presence of an abundant supply of clear running water from the four well-known local streams. During the Mughal period, paper made by Sialkot mills was noted for its 'excellence' throughout northern India, being largely used in Delhi itself. In those days the yearly proceeds amounted to £80,000 in value.⁴¹ The paper-making trade was a 'hereditary profession' and the workmen were mainly Kashmiris and Malik Awans of the Kashmir Mohalla and Rang Pura, respectively.

Iron manufacturing was another industry which predated the colonial era. The nearby village of Kotli Loharan, about three miles north-west of the Sialkot cantonments, was famous beyond India for the work of its ironsmiths. By the time of British rule, according to John Lockwood Kipling: 'The smiths or koftgars of Kotli-Loharan, near Sialkot, produce[d] a large quantity of caskets, shields, salvers, and other articles of ornament.' The articles manufactured in the village were found all over India and even in some parts of Europe. Kipling noted that the hawkers of Kotli Loharan were 'frequently seen in the streets of Calcutta and Bombay; and the writer is acquainted with one who has included Italy, France, and England in his travels'. The articles of 'Kotli' found their way in 'considerable quantities to Europe and America'.⁴²

During the colonial period, the industries of Sialkot underwent a great change. Many older occupations died out; as for example, those of *pashmina* shawl, leather-working, and paper-making. The principal reason for this was new competition, modern means of production, and the opening of new markets. The manufacturing of *pashmina* industry and traditional 'garbi Lois' suffered severely with the

concentration of the European market. Sialkot had only about 6 looms working instead of 100 at the start of the First World War.⁴³ Similarly, the number of Sialkot's Chamar community involved in leather-working and skin-trading fell from over 8,000 in 1904 to 1,766 in 1911. The decline in the paper trade was chiefly due to the new supply of 'Jail Paper' (made by prisoners as part of their rigorous punishment in different jails). The government ordered that jail paper should be employed for vernacular writing and for envelopes in all public offices. But as many old and traditional occupations died out, many new ones sprang up, relying on the pre-existing skills and the presence of an artisan stock. The most important amongst them were those of sporting goods and surgical instruments. These products of the city, by the end of colonial rule, found their way not only all over India, but were also being exported to the various British colonies. Before examining the considerable colonial development of Sialkot's sporting goods industry, we shall turn here first to the colonial development of the city and its impact on local trade and population.

SIALKOT'S COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT

Sialkot achieved considerable urban growth during colonial times. A large military cantonment was built with modern sophistication a mile and a half from the old city. The site of the Sialkot garrison was selected carefully by the British Commander-in-Chief, Charles Napier, lying strategically between the seasonal streams, Bher Nalah and Palkhu Nalah. The foundation of the cantonment was laid in 1849 and was completed in 1852. The cantonment measured over two and a half miles in length and one and a-half in breadth. It spread over an area of about 6,670 acres. In addition, it possessed two grass farms with a total area of 2,800 acres and a dairy farm of 917 acres. The cantonment was well laid out with broad, straight avenues and gardens. It was built in three long lines running east and west of the city. People belonging to different castes and religions were kept in separate units. The European regiments occupied the northern line and the Native regiments the southern, with the public buildings and officers' houses in the centre.⁴⁴ Two station hospitals were built for



British and Indian troops, respectively. In addition to the cantonment, a number of new buildings and streets were constructed. About half-a-mile to its north-west, new 'civil public buildings'—the court-house, treasury, jail, and police lines—were built. With the expansion of the municipalities and cantonment, the area was rapidly transformed.

The impact of all this new construction on local trade, production, and employment was considerable. The trade in lime and wood received a stimulus from the rapid refurbishing of the civil lines and the cantonments. The wood works flourished in the district as wood was easily available from the neighbouring Jammu and Kashmir.⁴⁵ The construction work created a high demand for labourers and a large number of 'immigrants' poured into the area in search of work. Sialkot received about 20,653 migrants from Kashmir alone.⁴⁶ The regular influx of Kashmiri migrants increased the existing population of that community in the city. Existing family networks stimulated a large Partition-related refugee inflow in 1947.

Sialkot town greatly increased in commercial importance with the arrival of the railway. The Alexandra Bridge, where the railway crossed the Chenab River at Wazirabad on its way to Sialkot, was opened by the Prince of Wales in 1876. In 1885, a twenty-seven mile-long branch-line from Wazirabad to Sialkot was opened. This was extended to Jammu in 1890, and twenty-five years later the Sialkot-Narowal railway line was opened, which connected Sialkot with Amritsar. This enabled the rapid transportation of raw materials from the surrounding areas, and in particular, played an important role in the timber trade from Kashmir. The wood was distributed from the Wazirabad and Jhelum depots, which lay on both the rivers of Chenab and Jhelum. Sialkot also developed its means of communication with the neighbouring districts and the hills. In 1892 a railway line was opened between Gujranwala and Sialkot.⁴⁷

The extensive construction of the buildings, headworks, and railways, and the opening of the canals not only provided employment but also raised the importance and wages of the '*mistri*' [skilled artisans] community of Sialkot. At Marala, the head-works of the Upper Chenab Canal, there was a rise in pay of two *annas* per day in the case of *Lohars* and *Tarkhans*, earning from Rs 36 to Rs 38 and 8

annas per mensem. With the consistent availability of work, coupled with a better salary package, many, by the turn of the twentieth century, had 'blossomed out' into owning red brick houses, nice clothes, and even carriages.⁴⁸

Sialkot's rapid urbanization was intrinsically linked with the strong European presence in the cantonments. In the immediate aftermath of the 1857 events the number of the European troops had increased, along with the arrival of a large number of Western Christian missionaries. This led to a rapid growth in commodities trading and the creation of new markets. In less than five years, with the construction of cantonments, the population of the Europeans exceeded 1,800, nearly half of them being civilians. The demands of those Westerners and their styles of consumption led to the opening of new retail shops and grocery stores in the 'cantonment bazaar'. It was, however, the Hindu commercial castes who took the most advantage of the newly-created urban environment. According to the 1891 Census, the population of the cantonment exceeded 15,475, while the city's was about 32,918, making a total of over 48,000 inhabitants. The Hindu population increased to 17,978, compared with 12,751 a decade earlier. This population increase of over 5,000 was larger than the combined migration of all the other major communities in the city—including the Muslims, Sikhs and Christians—which totalled 4,236. Indeed the Hindu commercial castes were the first to open new shops in the cantonment bazaar and the towns. By the time of Partition in 1947, they owned more than a thousand wholesale shops and grocery stores in the city of Sialkot.⁴⁹

With the spread of Christian conversion, a substantial number of the lower caste population came to the city in search of work. A large portion of the newly-converted Christians obtained menial employment in the cantonments, missionary hospitals, and educational institutions. They were employed at higher salary rates than they had ever been before. Many worked in the military dairy farms and others as 'canteen-keepers', or 'sweepers' in the cantonments, hospitals, and educational institutions. They also made furniture for the cantonments and other purposes. Their increased numbers in the cantonment area led to the establishment of a new



Christian settlement 'Hunterpore' in the town, in memory of missionary, Dr Hunter, who was killed along with his family in 1857. In a short span of time, the concentrated Christian population became a strong presence in the city because of employment facilities available to them. By the time of the 1891 Census, Christian converts had outnumbered Sikhs in the city (see below Table 1.7).

Urbanization not only benefited the newly-Christian convert community and the Hindu trading class, but provided new opportunities for castes engaged in such activities as dairy-farming and market gardening. The latter were the Arains, whose district-wide population was enumerated at just over 72,000 at the time of the 1891 Census.⁵⁰ As good vegetable growers, they supplied vegetables and fruits to the urban community. The presence of the large European population in the cantonment had enhanced their business; for example, the consumption of potatoes grew considerably in the cantonment areas. In a similar way, with the growth of the town, the income of dairy-farming community of Gujars also increased considerably. The demand for milk enabled them to move closer to the city. The Sheikhs also benefited from the European presence in Sialkot. They, along with the Hindus and Jains, opened grocery shops in 'the cantonment bazaar'; for example, the well-known Sheikh Qadir and Sons General Store was one of the modern, self-shopping style grocery outlets in the cantonment, which chiefly fulfilled the consumption requirements of the European and upper-class population of the area. This wealthy Sheikh family also owned two hotels in Sialkot, Mount View, in the cantonment and the Green Café in the inner city.

The end of the First World War further speeded up the urbanization process. At the end of the war, returning Indian soldiers moved into the town because of its modern amenities and opportunities for education. Their living standards had increased because of their good service pay. The war not only hastened urbanization but also speeded up the pace of Sialkot's industry. The export of surgical instruments and sporting goods to England and other countries developed immensely during the war, when English industries were at a standstill. The rapid 'boom in trade' doubled the salary of workers; as for example, before the war, a mechanic in the Sialkot sporting

industry commanded Rs 1 per diem but after the war, it rose to 2 rupees.⁵¹ The boom in trade stimulated the process of urbanization, as a large number of labouring classes had been drawn into the city in search of work. Moreover, the richer *Zamindars*, who were becoming better educated, and the absentee landowners also moved into Sialkot. The population of the city, thus, according to the 1911 Census, was 48,595, but had increased to 70,619 by 1921.

Evidence of rapid urbanization was revealed not only in the census figures, but also in home sales and legal disputes over properties. The expansion of Sialkot saw its rise to the status of a First Class Municipality as early as 1867. The Municipal Water Works were erected at a cost of Rs 475,000. A drainage scheme at an estimated cost of Rs 600,000 was sanctioned by the district government. The welfare of the cantonment was maintained by the Sialkot Cantonment Committee that drew its revenue largely from various kinds of taxes. In 1920, the committee controlled an income of about Rs 90,000; more than half of it came from the 'octroi', while the rest was derived from a fixed house-tax on owners, a dog tax, a tax on traders and professions, and land-rents.⁵²

Sialkot city possessed all the amenities associated with a district headquarters. There were schools, colleges, hospitals, and *zenana* centres. Sialkot's Murray College, which the Church of Scotland founded in 1889, was famous for the high standards of its graduate degree all over India. Similarly, the Lady Anderson Girls High School was granting the standard matriculation degree. There were also primary and high schools maintained by the different communities and communal societies. In the 1920s, the 'educated classes' of the city were 'proving very useful in public service and in trades'.⁵³ However, it was again the Hindu trading and professional castes who utilised the opportunities of modern educational facilities and emerged as the most-educated class of the town.

Table 1.4: Size of Population in Sialkot Town, 1881-1941⁵⁴

1881	1891	1911	1921	1931	1941
45,762	55,087	64,869	70,619	100,973	139,000



Table 1.5: Religious Composition of Population in Sialkot City and Cantonment⁵⁵

Census	Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs	Christian	Jains	Parsis	Others
1881	28,865	12,751	1,942	1,500	876	n/a	1,328
1891	31,920	17,978	1,797	2,283	1,105	4	n/a
1901	39,356	13,433	2,236	1,650	1,272	9	n/a
1911	40,613	15,417	4,290	3,222	1,310	17	n/a
1921	44,846	15,808	3,433	5,033	1,472	27	n/a
1931	69,700	18,644	4,931	6,095	1,570	7	26

THE HINDUS AND SIKHS OF SIALKOT

Sialkot's Sikh and Hindu population comprised largely of the Khatri, Bania, and Arora. They were not only the most-educated groups in town, but also dominated the retail and wholesale trades, and controlled the industrial sector. The principal concentration of their commercial and business activities was in the Trunk, Budhi, and Bara bazaars, and around Sabha and Drummanwala Chowks. In Bara bazaar alone, they owned over three hundred shops. Dr Gurbaksh Singh, father of the celebrated Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar, possessed a medical clinic in Trunk bazaar, while Hakeem Lala Beli Ram operated a clinic of *desi* medicine in the Budhi bazaar.

The poor and artisan Hindus lived in the Sialkot suburbs of Neka Pura and Hiran Pura, while the middle class resided mainly in Puran Nagar. More affluent and rich residents had moved to houses along Sialkot's posh Paris Road in the civil lines. The road, unlike those in the inner city, was wide and well-developed. On both sides of it, concrete double-storey houses were constructed. The area was exclusively a rich Hindu and Sikh locality. The most wonderful residence on the road belonged to the wealthy Hindu barrister C. Roy. Other important residences included the White Piñar Palace of Krishan Gopal Dutt (later a Finance Minister of East Punjab), and the Red Uberoi Mansion of the sporting-goods businessman Sardar Ganda Singh Uberoi. Other important and attractive residences in the city were the Agarwal Bungalow of contractor Lala Gobind Ram, and the Ahluwalia House of Kirpal Singh, owner of the Pioneer Sports.⁵⁶



The leading families of the Hindu and Sikh communities were Dutt, Roy, Uberoi, Agarwal, Nanda, Rai, Ahluwalia, and Dew Sikh. Rai Diwan Chand dominated the banking and insurances sector and had taken a large amount of land on mortgage and owned two leading vernacular papers in the city. As a rich man of the town, he frequently contributed to various official and community schemes. During the First World War, for example, he donated Rs 25,000 to the War Fund.⁵⁷ Munshi Ram Chand was the biggest mill-owner of Sialkot. His growing empire included the National Rubber Mill and the Munshi Cloth Mills. Pandit Toder Mal owned Sialkot's leading Machine Press, while Krishan Gopal Dutt owned the majority of the leather trade of the city. Lala Gobind Ram and Karam Chand owned the company under the name Dittu Mal Gobind Ram and were the leading contractors and steel-rolling suppliers of the region. Sardar Bahadur Shiv Dew Singh, then a member of the Imperial Council of State, controlled the surgical instruments concerns of Sialkot, which largely employed Muslim *Lohars* along with Sikh *Ramgarhias*. The well-known and rich Nanda family not only controlled the entire business of transport in the district under the name of Sialkot Nanda Transport Service but also regularly operated on different inter-city routes. The most regular and frequent of these included the Sialkot-Jammu-Srinagar, Sialkot- Gujranwala- Lahore and Sialkot- Narowal-Amritsar routes. Later, a Sialkot-born son of this family, by the name of Gulzari Lal Nanda, became Prime Minister of India. The sporting-goods tycoon, H.S. Uberoi, owned the majority of sporting goods trade of the town. His growing empire not only operated outlets in the major cities of India, such as Bombay and Calcutta, but also worldwide. The wealthy Sikh Balwald Singh dominated the city's grain marketing trades, while his brothers Kirpal Singh and Rajindar Singh owned the city's successful Pioneer Sports which had branches not only in Jullundur, Bombay, and Calcutta, but also at 6 Rangoon Street, London, by the name of J.S. Ahluwalia.⁵⁸ Kirpal Singh migrated to Jullundur in 1947 and emerged not only as one of the most successful sporting businessmen of the city, but also played an important role in establishing a major rival to the sporting goods industry of Sialkot in India. In all, Hindus and Sikhs owned two-thirds of Sialkot's shops and trades, and paid more over 80 per cent of its urban taxes, as for

example, is evidenced starkly from the fact that they paid Rs 132,870 as sales tax as against only Rs 25,311 paid by the Muslims.

As the statistics reveal, Muslims of Sialkot, like Gujranwala, were much poorer than the Hindus and Sikhs who controlled the city's business life. In comparison, most Muslims were artisans and labourers. The Kashmiris and Gujars dominated the Muslim population. Other important Muslim communities were the *Lohars* and *Tarkhans*, who were employed in the railway and the canal headworks. According to an official estimate, they had a combined population of over 8,650 in Sialkot.⁵⁹ With the passage of time, they moulded their traditional skills and entered the newly-emerging, modern sporting goods and surgical instruments industries. These industries were Hindu-owned, but they were destined to be taken over by Muslim artisans after the migration of Hindus and Sikhs in 1947.

DEVELOPMENT OF SIALKOT'S INDUSTRY

In 1870, for the first time, some *mistris* of Sialkot repaired surgical instruments for the American Mission Hospital. Encouraged by the hospital staff, they gradually started manufacturing replicas of the originals, and subsequently a new industry steadily grew in Sialkot. In a similar manner, a missionary in the Sialkot cantonment went to a carpenter's shop and got a badminton racquet repaired for 2 rupees. Afterwards, the city hawkers visited all cantonments, near and far, and the British quarters, where they supplied and repaired sporting goods. While the actual stimulus for this manufacturing came from the British Indian Army and the Christian Missionary hospitals, Sialkot's surgical instruments and sporting goods industries owed their emergence to the previous existence presence of the artisan classes.

In 1908, Sialkot's first surgical instruments sector was founded by Sarder Bahadir Shiv Dew Singh. It initially was a scissors and small surgical equipment concern which chiefly supplied 'private practitioners'. In 1911, another firm Uberoi Surgical Industry emerged, which employed foreign machinery and Sheffield steel for the manufacture of its equipment.⁶⁰ With the big demand of orders



during the First World War for the Allied Forces, the city's production increased and in time around twenty-six medium factories arose, which were producing instruments annually worth Rs 3,000,000. After the war, Sialkot made surgical instruments for export to all parts of the subcontinent, as well as to Burma, Afghanistan, and Egypt. The Second World War brought further 'blessing for industry' and many new firms sprang up as there was an industrial slump in the UK and the USA. On the eve of Partition, the annual export of the surgical instruments was worth Rs 5,000,000.⁶¹ As we have already noted, while Hindus owned the factories, Muslims supplied the skilled workforce.

The birth of the modern sporting goods industry was linked to the Uberoi Brothers—Jhanda Singh and Sardar Ganda Singh. In 1894, Ganda Singh along with his brother started manufacturing badminton and tennis racquets with only half a dozen workmen. Production was expanded to include polo sticks, cricket bats, hockey balls, hockey sticks, footballs, golf clubs, and apparatus for gymnastics. In many ways, Sialkot benefited from its location at the intersection of the rivers of Chenab and Jhelum and the proximity to the states of Jammu and Kashmir and Chamba. The easy access to natural resources of timber from was vital for the production of, for example, cricket bats. Timber was also vital in the furniture-making trades, not only in Sialkot but in neighbouring towns.⁶² Sialkot's sporting goods industry was the main consumer of the Kashmir willow. The combined benefits of raw materials, technical labour resources, and the naturally favourable climatic conditions, ensured the emergence and continued growth of the city's sporting goods industry.

In 1903 Ganda Singh Uberoi visited England, and for the first time, imported the English willow, power machines, and English experts. In 1911 the Uberoi Sports Goods started a system of apprenticeship, and under a European foreman, workmen were contracted and trained to follow English methods, and they supplied on a weekly basis as many cricket balls for which they could get orders.⁶³ The outbreak of First World War stimulated the demand for Sialkot products because of the stoppage of the corresponding European industries. The buoyant market led to the emergence of some new firms. Soon there were some twenty new firms and numerous cottage



industry dealers. They were chiefly set up by workmen who had learnt their trade while working with the Uberoi. The latter was the only firm at that time that employed power machines and the 'latest appliances'.⁶⁴

By the end of the war, Sialkot had become the centre for sporting goods. The city's products were exported to Japan, America, Australia, Africa, and other countries, chiefly within the British Empire, and the output of goods amounted to Rs 1,000,000 in value annually. The Uberoi Sports employed over 200 artisans and paid over Rs 10,000 as income tax in the year 1920. Its owner Sardar Ganda Singh Uberoi had emerged as the leading businessman of the town. He was among the top contributors to the Government War Funds during the First World War, donating Rs 15,000.

Sialkot was electrified in 1928. The Sialkot Electric Supply Company Power House generated 1,200 kilowatts per day, an amount sufficient to meet the needs of the whole city without any disruption. Within two years, it had supply electric power to the city's leading industrial concerns. Many new and small sporting goods trades and factories emerged. Among others, the most famous firms were Ali Shabier's Ali Trading Sports and Kishan Chand's joint venture, the Phillips and Co. By the mid-1930s, Sialkot was viewed by some observers as 'an industry city' with 'an organic community'.⁶⁵ The city was not only at the forefront of the manufacturing sector in sports, but also represented the Punjab province in various sporting activities at an all-India level. In 1930, for example, the city's team competed in the Mysore State Rackets Championship.⁶⁶ In 1940, when the Governor of Punjab visited Sialkot and Gujranwala for the Second World War's War Fund raising purposes, he recorded that 'Sialkot is an industrial City of considerable importance...with [there] being several large factories for manufacture of sports goods and, in addition, there are at least two small metal factories, one of which manufactures surgical instruments of excellent quality'. He hoped that the government's 'Supply Department' would place orders from the town.⁶⁷ The sporting goods industry of Sialkot had become one of the most important export centres in India by the end of British rule. Its products found their way throughout the empire. The

following table shows the average annual exports of the city's sporting goods throughout the closing years of British rule.

Years	1941-42	1942-43	1943-44	1945-46	1946-47
Rupees	20,000,000	30,000,000	30,000,000	25,000,000	30,000,000

The city's continued prosperity was badly hit by Partition-related violence and migration of the non-Muslim owners of the industry. It took decades to overcome the 1947 depression. That theme will form the focus of Chapter 6; here we will address the important question of the extent to which the sharpened religious identities of the colonial era paved the way for the violence and mass migration of 1947.

RELIGIOUS COMPETITIVENESS AND COMMUNAL CONFLICT

The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw a gradual worsening of relations among the different religious communities in the region. Christian missionaries introduced an element of competitiveness in proselytisation which was soon picked up by indigenous religious reformers.⁶⁹ Through modern communication and organisational techniques, the missionaries developed and maintained a widespread network of schools, orphanages, medical missions, and introduced the *zenana* mission, designed to reach women and girls in the seclusion of their homes.⁷⁰ Sialkot was an attractive locality for the missionaries because of the considerable population of the lower classes and castes. As has been pointed out earlier, Sialkot was largely a town of artisans and labourers, many of the migrants attracted by jobs arising from the initially abundant agricultural labour, and then the various colonial development projects. They included castes that were traditionally associated with menial occupations, usually as the *sepidars* (customary employees) of higher-caste families. For instance, 'Meghis' (the weavers), 'Chamars' (the leather workers), and 'Chuhras' (the sweepers), among others, were treated as 'untouchables', because they collected and handled unclean substances such as dead carcasses.



Ranjit Singh's birthplace in Gujranwala



The tomb of Mahan Singh in Gujranwala
(Courtesy of the British Library)




Sialkoti gate in Gujranwala which was founded in 1869
(Courtesy of the British Library)




Sialkoti gate, Gujranwala in 2008



Gujranwala church, founded in 1865
(Courtesy of the British Library)



Shaiwala Teja Singh temple in Sialkot




Gurdwara Baba-de-Beri in Sialkot




Traditional Kashmiri woodwork architecture in Sialkot's *Kashmiri Mohalla*




Sialkot's Murray church, founded by the
Church of Scotland in 1889



Sialkot cathedral, established in 1850



Sialkot's Murray College



Surgical instruments being manufactured in a Sialkot factory



Surgical instruments being manufactured in a Sialkot home-based workshop



Tennis rackets being manufactured in a Sialkot factory



Hockey sticks being manufactured in a Sialkot factory

Historically, these lower communities had converted to Islam and Sikhism, but their social status and traditional occupation had rarely changed as a result. 'Chuhra' converts to Islam were known as 'Musallis' and those to Sikhism were known as 'Mazbis'. They were the prime human commodity available for reconversion, initially for the missionaries, and subsequently, for the various religious and sectarian reform movements like the Arya Samaj from the late nineteenth century onwards.

Sialkot remained the epicentre of such conversion and sectarian exercises because of the strong concentration of lower-caste groups. In all, the low-caste groups comprised nearly 18 per cent population of the district. This percentage was larger than any other place in the Punjab. The 'Chuhras' alone, formed nearly 8 per cent of the population, making the second most-numerous castes after the Jats, and the 'Meghis', district wide, numbered at over 115,429.⁷¹ The arrival of Western Christian missionaries introduced a new element of communal conflict and competition. In 1839, the missionaries established their first headquarters in the Punjab at Ludhiana. They moved forward rapidly with each new British annexation. In 1855 the mission of the United Presbyterian Church of America, and the following year, the mission of the Established Church of Scotland, were opened in Sialkot. The Church of Scotland came to Sialkot in January 1857 when the first Scottish missionary, Thomas Hunter, came to live with his wife, Jane Scott, and infant son near the Brigade Parade Ground. In 1852, the first stone of the Trinity Church was laid and five years later was consecrated by the Bishop of Madras on 30 January 1857. In the 1880s, the Belgian Capuchins and the Roman Catholic missions were founded. Within a short span of time, they built several modern educational institutions, hospitals, churches, orphanage centres, training schools for converts, and boarding houses.

The rapid growth in the number of native Christian converts alarmed indigenous reformers. Throughout the Punjab the number of Christian converts rose from 3,912 in 1881 to over 19,000 a decade later, and by 1901 had reached nearly 38,000. In the case of Sialkot, within a decade, the number of Christian converts rose rapidly from 1,535 in 1881 to over 11,668 a decade later. This total represented an



increase of no less than 660 per cent, larger than any other district of the province, and exceeded that of Rawalpindi, with the second largest number of convert Christians, by 64 per cent.⁷² At the Census of 1911 the Christians reached 48,620. This meant the 'mass movement' of conversion was more successful in Sialkot than any other place in the Punjab, as for example is evidenced starkly from a fact that the converts there comprised 95 per cent of the total in the province. These shifts are further illustrated in Table 1.7.

Table 1.7: Population of Christian Converts in Sialkot District⁷³

Year	1881	1891	1901	1911	1921	1931
Number	1,535	11,668	11,939	48,620	62,266	66,365

Official enumerations not only played a crucial role in the 'essentialisation' of religious and caste identity, but also opened up a space for communities and social groups to redefine themselves.⁷⁴ Apart from the impact on the local religious reformers, the rapid rise in the Christian population greatly affected the socio-economic structure and the constitution of the village communities. With their conversion, the status of lower-caste groups increased. Now, they freely enlisted in the British Indian Army, particularly in the 7 (1st) and 7 (3rd) Punjabi Regiments. Moreover, in 1899, special grants of over 11,500 acres land were awarded in the canal colonies for 'Christian Settlements'. Many Christian converts migrated there as farmers and formed the settlements of Maryamabad, Clarkabad, Martin Pura, and Youngsonabad. The Mazbi Sikhs received allotment 'on special terms' because of serving in the Pioneer Regiment.⁷⁵ Many converts migrated to towns, while others asked for 'a more definite remuneration' for their menial work. The rapid redistribution and urbanization of converts, who were traditionally employed as farm hands, significantly threatened the balance of the local rural labour market. The peasants complained about the shortage of menial labour. On the other hand, in the towns, conversions caused great concern amongst the rising Hindu elite. The converts were allowed to assimilate with the urban elite and the children of the outcastes were attending school with upper-caste students.

The rapid growth in Christian converts, and the missionaries' close ties with government, created a deep fear of the 'Christian threat' among many Indian religious leaders. This became one of the major motivating forces for religious and sectarian revivalism in Sialkot and other areas throughout the Punjab. Such writers as Harjot Oberoi have argued that the activities of nineteenth century religious reformers crystallised and sharpened existing blurred religious identities in the colonial Punjab.⁷⁶ Undoubtedly, this was a period of growing communalism in the region. In Sialkot, by the turn of the twentieth century, more than ten different social and religious societies were at work. The most influential reformist movement was the Hindu Arya Samaj. It boasted of over three hundred members in the locality.⁷⁷ Initially, the founder of the Arya Samaj hardly criticised Islam and Sikhism, as his main targets were the Christian missionaries. Following the line of the missionaries, the Arya Samaj began a *Shuddhi* (purification) campaign, to reconvert untouchable Christian converts to the Hindu fold. It performed the 'purification' of over 40,000 Meghis and brought them into the fold of the organisation in various districts of the province. For years the Sialkot Arya Samaj was the 'centre of attraction for the Meghs of the Punjab'.⁷⁸ On 28–29 March 1903, dates were fixed for the purification of about 3,000 Meghis in different villages. Later on, the purification extended to surrounding districts where in all about 36,000 'lost' people came into the fold of the Arya Samaj. Hindu 'traditionalists' opposed the mass purification of the lower classes which threatened to upset the ritual and social order. In a Sialkot village, for example, Rajputs attacked the purification ceremony and, later on, expelled the new converts from the village. On a number of other occasions, the forces of law and order authority were required to calm down the situation.⁷⁹

The reform organisations also took over many public welfare projects. The most important public collective action of the Arya Samaj was the creation of Aryan schools in the region. In 1903, an Arya Industrial School of Sialkot was opened to educate the children of Meghis. To make Meghi untouchables 'practical workmen', classes of tailoring, carpentry, smithy weaving, and drawing were started there. In 1912, the Arya Samaj established an Arya High School in

Sialkot. The children of the untouchable class were also admitted, although the school chiefly instructed urban children, mainly from the sponsoring lower-middle class, in both Vedic and Western knowledge. Philanthropists Lala Ganga Ram and Lala Khushal Chand provided the main funds for the building and other welfare projects.⁸⁰ The district government also came forward to help the society in its beneficial work. It granted about fifty square meters of land to the society. By 1920, the Arya Samaj maintained six primary schools and a girls' school in Sialkot town alone.

Singh Sabha was an important society in Sialkot. It was established in 1884. The strength of the society was seen in the symbolic construction of the city's Singh Sabha Chowk. The main aim of the Sabha was to preach Guru Nanak's doctrines and principles, and to raise the social status of the Khalsas by the light of education. This society maintained one Anglo-Vernacular high school for boys. Its imposing opening ceremony was inaugurated by the then Governor of the Punjab, O'Dwyer. Despite the Sabha's initial alliance with the Arya Samaj, many in the Sikh community saw its policy of reconversion as a direct threat to the Sikh identity. The Arya Samaj, and another Hindu reform movement, the Brahmo Samaj, during their street preaching, denounced the Sikh Gurus which embittered relations between the Hindus and the Sikhs.

Among the Muslim societies of Sialkot, the Anjuman-i-Islamia, an amalgamation of three 'native' societies, was the most active Muslim organisation. It came into existence in 1908 to spread religious and secular education among the Muslims of Sialkot. The influence of the society was reflected in the creation of its own high school along with two lower primary schools. Another Muslim entity which was very important in the district was the Anjuman-i-Ahmadia. Its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was considered as the promised Messiah and Mahdi by his followers. The Ahmadia had many close parallels with the Arya Samaj. It became involved in serious competition with orthodox Islam, with the missionaries, and with a variety of reformist societies in all three major religious communities. The Ahmadia sought to appropriate Guru Nanak as a Muslim, while the Arya Samaj and Khalsa, in turn, concentrated their attention on proving Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to be a Hindu. Indeed Sialkot was one of 'the great



strongholds' of the sectarian activity of the Ahmadia. In 1920, it had memberships over 28,000 in the region.⁸¹ Until the emergence of the Majlis-i-Ahrar in the early thirties, the Ahmadia continued to dominate in Sialkot and contributed greatly to its religious competitiveness and communal conflict.

From the late nineteenth century onward, the growing organisational strength of, and rivalry between the Ahmadia, Singh Sabha, and Arya Samaj, reinforced existing communal divisions. This process of reinterpreting the past and presenting a new vision of the future permanently changed relations among the three communities whose members had been living side-by-side with some degree of harmony for generations. Moreover, the strains of development and rapid urbanization also provided the circumstances for the development of communalism in the region. Sialkot, because of the strong presence of Christian missions and sectarian educational institutions, was an important centre for such burgeoning organisations. Local printing presses magnified the mushrooming religious antagonism; for example, Sialkot alone published more than ten papers by the turn of the twentieth century. They were evenly owned by the rival communities. Although religious revivalism was mainly confined to the city, communalism, to a lesser extent, had penetrated the countryside where 'The old joint-stock wells' had steadily been replaced by 'individually-owned wells...owing to the decay of the communal spirit'.⁸²

Despite all the activities of reformers, in many ways competing religious affiliations and identities remained variegated and undifferentiated. Though religious separatism was to form the basis of Partition in 1947, it did not overwhelm the common caste, *biraderi*, or regional sources of identity until the later stages of colonial rule. The Punjabi identity remained more important than that derived from religion. As Malcolm Darling observed, travelling through the region: 'In crossing the Chenab we entered the central Punjab (both Gujranwala and Sialkot formed this part of the province), where Muslims and Sikhs are as intermingled as barley and wheat when sown together...There are many villages where Muslim and Sikh are of the same tribe and both of Hindu ancestry, with still some customs in common.'⁸³ The diversity reflected past



invasions, migrations, and conversions which gave the region a history of continual change. Thus many kept up the customs and practices of the religion that they had left. They were all governed by customary law and their religious ties were generally loose.⁸⁴ The author of the 1894 Sialkot Gazetteer noted that the majority of Muslims who were converts still continued 'to pay respect to local deities and employ a Brahmin priest in their social ceremonies'.⁸⁵ Some evidence from the chief court records reveals limited intermarriage across religious communities. In Zafarwal, Sialkot, for example, a Hindu Rajput married a Muslim Arain woman and had two children. Similarly, in 1905, the Pasrur Chief Court upheld the decision of a Hindu proprietor's will, in which he willed that his two sons from a Muslim woman would inherit half his property and his one son from a Hindu wife would inherit the other half.⁸⁶

Given this complex scenario, Partition-related violence in the region in 1947 was by no means an inevitable outcome at the end of the colonial rule. Granted the region had a history of 'traditional' religious conflict, but, at the same time, there was a well-established tradition of community interaction and this co-existence, with some degree of harmony, continued to exist until the late colonial era. In the cultural binding, the Punjabi language played a key role. Within various religious communities, there were a variety of beliefs and practices, as well as, castes and *biraderis*. The laying of the foundation-stone of Sialkot's well-known Clock House, by the two leading lights of the city, Sheikh Ghulam Qadir and Seth Rai Bahadur, was an example of a diverse set of community relationships. The *dargah* of Imam Shahib drew devotees from all religious communities. A big *mela* was held annually on 13 April at the Gurdwara Baba-de-Beri and attracted big gathering from all quarters of the society. Inter-community support also, undoubtedly, existed. The privileged Hindus, time and again, contributed to Muslim welfare. The business empire of Sardar Ganda Singh Uberoi was at the forefront of such assistance. A rich Hindu contractor Lala Gobind Ram paid all the cost for the construction of a mosque at Sialkot's Wazirabad road. He also contributed funds to the Sialkot Muslim League. Similarly, an influential Muslim from Sialkot, Safdar Khan, was at the forefront of the Congress' political activities in the city.

Moreover, the communities relied on each other for everyday prosperity and livelihood. The Muslim artisan Abdul Ghani, who worked for a sporting goods Hindu firm before Partition, presently living in Karim Pura *mohalla* of Sialkot, recalls the economic interdependence shattered in 1947. 'Hindus were the owners of the factories and we worked there. They would provide us the different articles at our home and we stitched them and gave them back in the due time...', Ghani added, 'after their migration and closure of the industry our livelihood ended and we remained jobless for a long time'.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, beneath the surface there were tensions that could erupt into violence. Sialkot's proximity to the Hindu-ruled Dogra state of Jammu and Kashmir was a potential source of tension. This is revealed in the following interview below given by Abdul Islam Butt who was eighteen at the time of Partition, and an active member of the Sialkot Muslim Students Federation:

The Hindus of Sialkot dominated the social and economic activity of the city. All the shops in the Kalaw Mandi (market) belonged to them; even not a single one belonged to Muslims...[Similarly all] the residences at Paris Road belonged to the Hindus. This was a 'no go area' for the Muslims at night time....The Muslim workforce largely relied on the Hindu businesses for their livelihood...The political events in the state [Jammu and Kashmir] always strained the Hindu-Muslim relations [in Sialkot]. As the news of bad treatment of Muslims [from Kashmir] reached Sialkot, the Muslims here took over the streets of the city and raised slogans against the Hindu Dogra Maharaja. In such protests, the Kashmiri community of Kashmir Mohalla and Dharowali was always at the forefront and the processions were generally spearheaded by leaders of [the Majlis-i-] Ahrar.⁸⁸

The Majlis-i-Ahrar came to prominence in 1931. Their radical stance against the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir in the 1931 July 'fatal communal riot' in Srinagar, in which the state troopers killed nine Muslims and wounded a score of others, prompted their influence in the region.⁸⁹ They shaped the course of political outbreak in Kashmir, and were, in turn, influenced by it. Sialkot formed the epicentre of their agitational activities because of a large number of Kashmiri population in the city, many of whom had relatives in the state. In



August 1931, in response to a call for demonstration, by the Ahrars of Sialkot, over 15,000 took out processions in the streets of city to express anger and sorrow at the state-sponsored killing of Muslims in Srinagar.⁹⁰ The Ahrar leadership believed in agitational politics and in keeping the masses occupied with one issue after the other to keep the momentum high. They also concentrated their energy on declaring the Ahmadia as non-Muslims, as well as took a radical stand on the issue of the Shaheed Ganj Mosque. Their radical stance on various communal issues not only helped to swell their membership, but their growing popularity also resulted in a victory in a by-election for the Punjab Legislative Assembly in 1937. The victory enabled the Ahrars to debate their stance on the 'Kashmir issue' and 'Ahmadia as non-Muslims' in the provincial assembly.

There was a sharp discord between the Majlis-i-Ahrar, the Tahrik-i-Khaksar, and the Ahmadia. The groups, throughout the thirties, competed with each other, and their tensions became acute in both Sialkot and Gujranwala. Both Ahrars and Khaksars chiefly drew their strength from the 'urban *kami* castes'. The former prevailed in Sialkot and the latter dominated in Gujranwala, while the Ahmadia, in part, had influenced both cities. Gujranwala's well-circulated Urdu daily, *Al-Adal* (the Justice), was the mouthpiece of the Khaksars. It played an important role in swelling the numbers of the group in the city by not only highlighting the communal issues but also by denouncing the controversial Islamic teaching of the Ahmadia. From early 1940 onwards, the group's substantial growing strength in the city alarmed the district authorities, who maintained close watch on its founder Allama Mashriqi, and kept New Delhi informed about the 'Khaksar troubles'. These were incorporated in the Viceroy's *Fortnightly Reports* to London.⁹¹ This also included, on 15 July 1940, the assassination of a Sikh member of Punjab Provincial Congress. The following day a Sikh retaliated by murdering a Muslim.⁹² Such isolated 'revenge' incidents furthered the communal divide in the city, which was to reach a breaking point by the summer of 1947.

Throughout the 1930s, the Muslim League was marginalised in Sialkot, as elsewhere in the Punjab. Its absence is evidenced from a letter of the Governor of Punjab, Herbert Emerson, to the Viceroy in 1936, in which four major parties of the province were listed,



absenting the Muslim League and Congress.⁹³ The correspondence indeed included the Majlis-i-Ahrar despite the fact that this group, opposed to the ruling Unionist Party, had little provincial political representation. It was only in the early 1940s that the Muslim League became prominent in the region. On 28–30 April 1944, the Muslim League leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, visited Sialkot and exhorted the Muslims there to come forward to join the Muslim League so as to achieve Pakistan, by addressing the 'Historic Sialkot Convention'. 'After seeing you so enthusiastic, I am greatly heartened and have no doubts about the success. The day is not far off when you will have the reward of your sacrifices'.⁹⁴ The Sialkot Muslim Students Federation was the chief organiser of the Muslim League convention in the city. This convention marked the beginning of the loosening of the Unionist party stranglehold and swaying Muslim sentiment from the Ahrars towards the Leaguers in the region. Abdul Islam Butt was a prominent activist of the Sialkot Muslim Students Federation when Jinnah visited Sialkot, and later remained active in Sialkot city's local politics as a veteran Muslim Leaguer. His opinions and policy statements would often appear in the local newspapers. He also played a key role in the publication of the book *Tehrek-i-Azadi main Sialkot ka Kardar* (Role of Sialkot in the Pakistan Movement). He has provided the following information in the course of an interview.

Quaid-i-Azam along with Liaquat Ali and many other prominent Muslim Leaguers visited Sialkot for three days [on 28–30 April], 1944. He stayed in Sialkot cantonment's hotel Mount View.... At time the Ahrars were very popular in the city. Their processions in Ramtali Chowk would gather thousands of people. Their firebrand speakers such as Mazhar Ali Azhar and [Ata-ula-] Shah Bukhari would scathingly criticize the Maharaja [of Jammu and Kashmir], as well as the teaching of the Ahmadia sect. They also targeted the Muslim League. The problem with Ahrars was that their workers were largely poor segment of population. At time, the poor and labourers were not entitled to cast vote. Therefore they failed to win elections.... In fact, with the joining of former Unionist Chaudhry Sarfarz into the Muslim League, the environment of [Sialkot] politics changed. Initially the educated classes supported the League because they only were entitled to cast a vote at the time. Afterwards opportunists such as Chaudhry [Sarfarz] benefited.⁹⁵

By the beginning of the forties, religion had become a major focus of political identities and mobilizations. The historic 1945–46 provincial elections, which were contested purely on communal lines, changed the outlook of the Punjab.⁹⁶ Many of the Unionist party's landed leaders had shifted their allegiance toward the Muslim League by considering it as a better vehicle for their interests. The Muslim League won a landslide victory in the elections in the Punjab. The Sialkot Muslim League swept aside the Unionists and the Ahrars and won all four seats for the Punjab Legislative Assembly, as is evidenced from the below Table.

Muslim League	Versus	Unionists/Ahrars	Winner Party
Sheikh Karamat		Mazhar Ali Azhar	Muslim League
Chaudhary Sarfarz		Faiz-ul-Hasan	Muslim League
Mumtaz Daultana		Mohammad Din Mirza	Muslim League
Chaudhary Nasir-ul-Din		Ghulam Gallani	Muslim League

Despite the victory, the Muslim League was still kept out of power by the coalition government established by the surviving Unionists, the Congress, and the Akali Dal. Jinnah's anger, in the wake of the Cabinet Mission, at the British invitation to Nehru to form an interim government, and the latter's statement of 10 July 1946 in which he declared that Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly 'completely unfettered by agreement and free to meet all situation as they arise', led him to abandon his strictly constitutional approach to politics. Jinnah retaliated that by declaring 16 August 1946 a Direct Action Day, to demonstrate the Muslim League's potency and enthusiasm for the Pakistan movement. 'If you seek peace, we do not want war, but if you want war, we will accept it unhesitatingly', he declared.⁹⁷ Mass mobilization in Calcutta led to terrible violence.⁹⁸ The ghastly outcome of this manifestation set a dire precedent for the use of street violence as a tool of power politics. From then until independence such politics dominated the political scene. Violence was increasingly locked into an all-India pattern, as killings in one part of the country were justified as retribution for violence in



another part. Evidently, many people were losing faith in the efficacy of the state, and its ability to protect its inhabitants. The violence from the summer of 1946 onwards, convinced an overwhelming majority of Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims, that the division of India was inevitable. Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab demanded division of the province, along with Partition of the subcontinent, on religious lines following the Rawalpindi Division massacres of March 1947. This strengthened the Congress desire to ensure that any future Pakistan was cut down to size. At Partition, as we shall focus in the next chapters, Sialkot and Gujranwala, as well as many other places throughout the Punjab, saw widespread violence and experienced demographic transformation. This impacted heavily on the cities' continued prosperity.

CONCLUSION

Both the rural and urban areas of Gujranwala and Sialkot were immensely affected by colonial rule. This brought challenges to existing industries and increased pressure on the land. It also provided opportunities by way of migration and improved communications, which linked local agricultural and industrial production with the regional, national, and even international markets. The advent of the railway greatly increased the cities' commercial importance. With the development of the means of communication, they served as a hub of flourishing commercial activity. In both cities, Muslims formed the artisan class, while trade and industry were the preserve of the Hindu commercial castes. The latter migrated to India in 1947, thereby, transforming the composition of the two cities.

In the case of Gujranwala, the combined benefits of an excellent railway network and main roads ensured a prominent position for the city in the Punjab province. Although its industrial growth lagged behind that of Sialkot, the city developed as a trade and industrial centre for iron-manufacturing goods. The production was linked to the artisan communities of the locality, specifically the *Lohars*. In the case of Sialkot, once a large military and European population was settled, retail activities were boosted as were commercial activities



associated with local dairying and market gardening. Labour demands arising from colonial building projects encouraged migration from the surrounding areas. The Hindu trading and professional castes mainly benefited from the opportunities offered by the civil lines establishments and modern education facilities. Sialkot benefited from its proximity to Jammu and Kashmir as there was a supply of timber necessary for the city's sporting goods industry in the region. Although Sialkot's prowess in manufacturing activities had clear pre-colonial roots, the demands of the British Indian Army and Mission hospitals provided the stimulus for the earlier stages of industrialization in the town. The artisan communities improved their position through the development of the region and the increased demand for their products.

Colonial rule not only brought increased material progress, but heightened awareness of communal identity. Such organisations as the Arya Samaj, Singh Sabha, and Ahmadia sharpened religious identities. They competed not only with Christian missionaries, but with each other in the race to popularise their views. Religious revival resulted in deterioration of the existing communal relations. These processes went farthest in the urban areas of the districts of Sialkot and Gujranwala, but even the countryside was affected. Nevertheless, large-scale violence was by no means inevitable at the end of British rule, but was contingent on political circumstances.

Political, rather than religious, conflict created the tensions that ultimately resulted in the division of the Punjab in 1947. Gujranwala and Sialkot, like other areas of the region, were hit by communal violence and resulting mass migration. The departure of the capitalist Hindu and Sikh classes created immense dislocations before a recovery was achieved. Before examining the local-level violence that generated the demographic transformation of Sialkot and Gujranwala, it is necessary to consider the province-wide context of this Partition-related dislocation.

NOTES

1. *Sialkot District, 1894-95*, File No. K 21 (a) XVI, Part (A), p. 15, PSA. For the socio-economic conditions in the Mughal Punjab see C. Singh, 'Centre and



- Periphery in the Mughal State: The Case of Seventeenth-Century Punjab', *Modern Asian Studies*, 22, 2 (1988), pp. 299–318.
2. The events in the nineteenth century Punjab are adequately covered by A.J. Major, *Return to Empire: Punjab under the Sikhs and British in the Mid-nineteenth Century* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1996).
 3. C.A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 16.
 4. These included from Parganah Gujranwala Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa, Sardar Fateh Singh, Sardar Dal Singh, Diwan Sawan Mal; Raja Gulab Singh from Parganah Hafizabad; Sardar Desh Singh, Sardar Jawahir Singh, Sardar Sawan Mal from Parganah Ram Nagar; and Gurbaksh Singh, and Rani Nakayan Raj Kauran (second wife of Maharaja Ranjit Singh) from Parganah Sheikhpura.
 5. Gujranwala, File No. K 21 (a) XIII, p. 29, PSA.
 6. D. Ross, *The Land of the Five Rivers, and Sindh* (London: Crystal Palace Press, 1883), p. 142.
 7. T.Y. Tan, *The Garrison State: The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849–1947* (New Delhi: Saga, 2005).
 8. C.A. Bayly, 'Town Building in North India, 1790–1830', *Modern Asian Studies*, 9, 4 (1975), pp. 485–8.
 9. In 1907, the population of the colonies had surged to more than two million. For year-wise increase of population in the colonies see B.H. Dobson, *Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement 1915*, p. 34, I.S.PU.20/53, O.I.O.C. For the development of canal colonies see, David Gilmartin, 'Migration and Modernity: The State, the Punjab Village, and the Settling of the Canal Colonies', in Talbot and Shinder, *People on the Move*, pp. 1–30; I. Ali, *The Punjab under Imperialism*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988).
 10. Gujranwala, File No. K 21 (a) XIII, p. 296, PSA.
 11. Ibid.
 12. Ibid., p. 308.
 13. K. Mohammad, Final Report of the Fourth Revised Settlement, 1923–27 of the Gujranwala District, IOR/V/27/314/500, O.I.O.C.
 14. Gujranwala, File No. K 21 (a) XIII, pp. 195–6, PSA.
 15. Ibid., p. 341.
 16. Gujranwala, File No. K 21 (a) XIII, pp. 188, 190, PSA.
 17. A. Latifi, *The Industrial Punjab: A Survey of Facts, Conditions and Possibilities* (London: Longmans, Green, 1911), p. 230.
 18. Ibid., p. 210.
 19. Gujranwala, File No. K 21 (a) XIII, p. 328, PSA.
 20. Ibid., p. 45.
 21. Gujranwala, File No. K 21 (a) XIII, p. 209, PSA.
 22. Ibid., p. 88.
 23. Ibid., p. 45.
 24. *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents* (Lahore: NDC, 1983), Vol. III, Table 9, p. 13 and p. 85.
 25. Gujranwala, File No. K 21 (a) XIII, p. 87, PSA.
 26. *The Partition of the Punjab 1947*, p. 43.



27. Gujranwala, File No. K 21 (a) XIII, p. 89, PSA.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., pp. 210-1.
30. K. Singh (ed.), *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab, India and Pakistan, 1947* (Delhi: National Book Shop, 1991), pp. 223-4.
31. K.A.R. Kennedy, 'Prehistoric Skeletal Record of Man in South Asia', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 9 (October 1980), p. 400.
32. After the death of Raja Rasalu AD 400, the region is said to have fallen under the curse of Puran, for 300 years lying totally devastated from famine and incessant plunder. For the details see 'Four Legends of King Rasalu', *Folk-Lore Journal*, 1, 5 (May 1883), pp. 129-51.
33. *Sialkot District*, 1894-95, File No. K 21 (a) XVI, Part (A), p. 170, PSA.
34. Ibid., p. 165.
35. According to the author of *Ain-i-Akabri*, the *mahals* of Sialkot, divided into four *parganas*, paid revenue of Rs 900,000. During the period of Ranjit Singh, about 125 villages in Sialkot territory, yielding estimated revenue of Rs 95,390, were alienated to Sikh *jagirdars*. During the British rule the district was ranked second-largest in revenue. In 1883-84, Sialkot paid a revenue of about Rs 1,127,769. See *Sialkot District*, 1883-84, Vol. XVI, Part A, p. 70, PSA.
36. J.M. Douif, *The Punjab Assessment Digest* (Lahore: 1896), p. 24.
37. Dunlop-Smith, *Final Report of the Revision of the Settlement of the Sialkot District in the Punjab, 1888-1895*, p. 10, V/27/314/626, O.I.O.C.
38. An Unpublished Autobiography of Dr Kishan Chand of Sialkot (1962), pp. 29-30; I am grateful to Dr Lal for providing me a copy of his father's memoir.
39. Dunlop-Smith, *Sialkot District in the Punjab, 1888-1895*, p. 6, V/27/314/626, O.I.O.C. Sialkot stood first in order of population among the districts of undivided Punjab, although it was one of the smallest in its total area. It comprised 1.7 per cent of the total area of the province and 5.36 per cent of its total population.
40. *Sialkot District*, 1894-95, File No. K 21 (a) XVI, Part (A), p. 42, PSA.
41. In 1894, a British Settlement Officer placed the numbers of mills at work, at the time of his settlement, at 82, employing nearly 1,000 men and yielding an annual income of £7,500. On an average, two thousand reams were exported annually, and three hundred more were sold within the district itself. Ibid., pp. 167-8.
42. Ibid., pp. 127-31.
43. A.C. Badenoch, *Punjab Industries, 1911-1917* (Lahore: Punjab Government Printing, 1917), p. 14.
44. Captain Gregory Rich, *The mutiny in Sialkot with a brief description of the cantonment from 1852 to 1857* (Sialkot: Handa Printing Press, 1924). The measurement and map of Sialkot Garrison can be seen in S.A. Abbott, *Cantonment and Environs of Seealkote, 1868-69* (Calcutta, 1870), Maps. I.S, O.I.O.C.
45. The Maharaja of Kashmir also gifted a large amount of lime for the building of the Trinity Church in the cantonment. Similarly, a private contractor of Lahore supplied about 1000 *maunds* of kankar-lime for the Church. The confiscated arsenal of the Sikh Army from the battles at Chillianwala and Gujrat was also utilised for the roofing of the Church. The British authorities gifted about 120,000



- old confiscated Sikh weapons for this purpose. See Rich, *Description of the Cantonment*, p. 3.
46. *Sialkot District*, 1894-95, File No. K 21 (a) XVI, Part (A), pp. 34 and 40, PSA.
 47. Gujranwala, File No. K 21 (a) XIII, p. 87, PSA.
 48. Latifi, *The Industrial Punjab*, p. 232; and also see *The Punjab District Gazetteer: Sialkot District 1920*, Vol. XXIII-A, (Lahore: Punjab Government Printing, 1921), pp. 113-4.
 49. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) 30 December 1947.
 50. The majority of them were tenants with occupation rights. Many migrated to the canal colonies, receiving about 17,675 acres of land in the Chenab Colony. See Dobson, *Final Report on the Chenab Colony Settlement 1915*, p. 39, I.S.PU.20/53, O.I.O.C.
 51. *Sialkot DG 1920*, p. 113.
 52. Octroi was levied in the towns of some provinces of British India, on all goods (other than a few specified staple items like wheat) intended for consumption in the towns.
 53. *Sialkot DG 1920*, p. 203.
 54. For the 1881 figures consulted the *Sialkot District, 1883-84*, XVI, Part A, p. xviii, while for all other figures, except the 1941, consulted the *Sialkot District Statistical Tables, 1936*, Vol. XV, Part B, File No. J, 64/65, p. xvi, PBRR. For the 1941 figure consulted, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947*, p. 85.
 55. *Sialkot District Statistical Tables*, pp. xvi-xvii, PBRR.
 56. An Unpublished Autobiography of Dr Kishan Chand of Sialkot, pp. 29-30.
 57. *Sialkot DG 1920*, p. 196.
 58. I am grateful to Dr Lal for this information.
 59. Latifi, *The Industrial Punjab*, p. 210.
 60. *Ibid.*, p. 234.
 61. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 25 November 1957, p. 3.
 62. According to an estimate, during 1934-5, approximately 2,031,717 cubic feet of timber in logs and sawn form was annually floated down from the two states through the Chenab River into the Wazirabad Depot. The Punjab Government's Forest Department was earning Rs 18,000 in annual rafting fee from the trades.
 63. At first the workers were taken on for a couple of months to judge their suitability, and were paid 4 annas a day. Their parents were then approached to agree that the boys could enter into a five year 'indentured contract'. They initially specialised in light work such as stitching balls, and as they improved, they were pushed into higher grade work in the same line.
 64. Latifi, *The Industrial Punjab*, p. 224.
 65. C. Kanaganayakam and Z. Ghose, 'Zulfikar Ghose: An Interview', *Twentieth Century Literature*, 32, 2 (1986), p. 170.
 66. *The Times* (London) 29 July 1930, p. 6.
 67. Craik to Linlithgow, 19 February 1940, L. Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics, 1940-1943: Strains of War* (Fortnightly Reports) (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), p. 76.
 68. A.A. Anwar, *Effects of Partition on Industries in the Border Districts of Lahore and Sialkot* (Lahore: Board of Economic Inquiry, Ripon Printing Press, 1953), p. 56.



69. K.W. Jones, 'Communalism in the Punjab: The Arya Samaj Contribution', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 28, 1 (1968), pp. 46-7; 'Ham Hindu Nahun: Arya-Sikh Relations, 1877-1905', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 32, 3 (1973), pp. 457-75; and also see G. Barrier, 'The Arya Samaj and Congress Politics in the Punjab, 1894-1908', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 26, 3 (1967), pp. 363-79.
70. C. Harding, *Religious Transformation in South Asia: The Meanings of Conversion in Colonial Punjab* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); J. Cox, *Imperial Fault Lines: Christianity and Colonial Power in India, 1818-1940* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
71. L.G. Ram, *The Uplift Movement at Sialkot, Punjab* (Calcutta: Sarkar Press, 1915), p. 2.
72. *Sialkot District*, 1894-95, File No. K 21 (a) XVI, Part (A), p. 65, PSA.
73. *Sialkot District Statistical Tables*, p. xiii, PBRR.
74. I. Hacking, 'Making Up People', in T. Heller, M. Sosna, and D.E. Wellbery (eds.), *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), pp. 222-36; and also see Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census'.
75. Dobson, *Chenab Colony Settlement 1915*, pp. 6, 37, 42.
76. H. Oberoi, *The Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity, and Diversity in the Sikh Tradition* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994).
77. *Sialkot District*, 1894-95, File No. K 21 (a) XVI, Part (A), pp. 68, PSA. The aim of the society was to preach and revive the Vedic doctrines enunciated by Maharishi Swami Dyananad Saraswati, the founder of Arya Samaj, in his well-known work, *Satyarth Parkash*, (The Light of Truth) which encouraged the view that the Vedas were infallible. He thought that all of India's 'trouble and suffering' was due to 'the meat-eating and wine-drinking foreigners, slaughters of...animals'.
78. Ram, *The Uplift Movement at Sialkot*, p. 6.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-8.
81. *Sialkot DG, 1920*, pp. 56-7.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
83. M. Darling, *At Freedom's Door* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 76. Denzil Ibbetson, who carried out the Punjab Census of 1881, described the tribe as 'far more permanent and indestructible than the caste'. He held the immense influence exercised by Muslims in Punjab to be responsible for the suppression of Brahmanism and its caste restrictions. He declared that as a result, the restriction on marriage with other castes was neglected and what became important was the tribe. D. Ibbetson, *Punjab Castes* (Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1993), p. 16.
84. C.L. Tupper, an administrator who drew up a compendium of 'customary law', found the institution of the 'tribe' to be central to understanding the principles of social organization from which the customs had evolved. He argued that the basis of the Punjabi custom was the cohesion of the tribe, the family and the village, and not the sanction of religious law. Tupper, *Punjab Customary Law* (Calcutta: Government Printing Press, 1881), Vol. II, p. 78.
85. *Sialkot District*, 1894-95, File No. K 21 (a) XVI, Part (A), p. 65, PSA.



86. D.J. Boyd, *Customary Law of the Sialkot District*, Vol. XIV, pp. 8–9, PBRR.
87. Interview Abdul Ghazi, Karim Pura *mohalla* of Sialkot, 5 January 2007.
88. Abdul Islam Butt, Karim Pura *mohalla* of Sialkot, 7 January 2007.
89. 'The Trouble in Kashmir', *The Times* (London), 5 November 1931, p. 13.
90. Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty*, p. 356.
91. Craik to Linlithgow, 14 April 1940, Carter, *Punjab Politics, 1940–1943*, p. 123.
92. *Ibid.*, 16 July 1940, p. 160.
93. L. Carter, (ed.), *Punjab Politics, 1936–1939: The Start of Provincial Autonomy—Governors' Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2004), p. 47.
94. *Inquilab* (Lahore) 30 April 1944.
95. Interview with Abdul Islam Butt, Karim Pura *mohalla* of Sialkot, 7 January 2007.
96. Talbot, *Provincial Politics*; Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam*; Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*.
97. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed (ed.), *Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah* (Lahore: Ashraf, 1964), Vol. II, p. 17.
98. The 1946 Great Calcutta Killings, in which communal massacres caused the death of at least 4,000 people, triggered riots in Bombay in September, in the Noakhali and Tippera districts of Bengal, and in Bihar in September–October 1946. For details see F. Toker, *While Memory Serves: Last Two Years of British Rule in India* (London: Cassell, 1950), Chapter 12, p. 176; and also see, S. Das, *Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905–1947* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991).

2

Partition Violence, Migration, and Resettlement: Broader Punjab-Level Scenario

Partition of the Punjab triggered a major displacement of population. An estimated four-and-a-half million Hindus and Sikhs migrated to East Punjab, while almost five-and-a-half million Muslims moved to West Punjab. Hundreds of thousands of people died in the months around Partition. This chapter contextualises the case studies of Gujranwala and Sialkot by providing a general consideration of the division of the Punjab in August 1947 and its aftermath. It links both the decision to divide the province and its accompanying violence with the earlier March 1947 disturbances in the Rawalpindi Division. It provides some useful introductory insights concerning the themes of women's abduction, conversions, and the organisation of violence. The extent to which the violence was organised rather than a spontaneous mass frenzy will be laid bare in a discussion, in particular, highlighting on a leading role of the army troops, who were attached to the Punjab Boundary Force (PBF), and the police force in orchestrating Partition violence in West Punjab. Using a variety of fresh sources, from the Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation to the records of the Governor General, the chapter also considers the respective roles and responses of the Muslim League and the provincial authorities to the processes of migration and refugee rehabilitation. It also focuses, not only on the official policy regarding the refugee resettlement, but also highlights the tensions between central and provincial authorities in implementing it. This theme has been developed by Sarah Ansari with respect to Sindh province.¹



PREPARING FOR VIOLENCE AND PARTITION

Standard accounts of the 1947 communal violence in the Punjab commonly concentrate on the disorders of mid-August, when the machinery of state was either in the process of transition or was being dismantled and even the boundary demarcations were uncertain. Violence in the Punjab's major towns and cities, in fact, started as early as March 1947, when the first actual movement of people began as a result of the Rawalpindi killings of Hindus and Sikhs. Violence later peaked at the time of the British departure and the announcement of the Boundary Award in August. The earlier March violence in the Punjab followed on the heels of the growing tensions that had accompanied the 1946 provincial elections and was closely connected to the Muslim League's civil disobedience movement to topple the Unionist-led coalition government of Khizr Tiwana towards the third week of January 1947.² The agitation had been marked by processions and public meetings, which were organised in defiance of the provisions of the Punjab Public Safety Ordinance. The real aim of the agitation was to topple the Unionist government in the province. The daily agitations to demonstrate the Muslim League's potency and enthusiasm for the Pakistan movement not only heightened communal tensions in the major cities and towns of the province, but also completed the politicisation of religion. The violence only took full hold when Khizr announced his resignation on 2 March. This enraged the Sikh Akali Dal as it not only brought the prospect of Pakistan nearer, but seemed to open the way for a Muslim League government in the Punjab.

The disturbances which began in both Lahore and Amritsar rippled out to other parts of the province. The worst violence occurred in Rawalpindi Division where serious rioting began during the first week of March. The 'raiders', some of whom were from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) but also included local Punjabis, not only burned and looted many Hindu and Sikh villages in the region but also looted and gutted 'Murree hill stations' which were used by British troops during the hot weather.³ According to an official estimate, by mid-March more than 5,000 Hindus and Sikhs had been killed in these raids and more than 50,000 had taken shelter in the

hurriedly established camps at Wah and Kala. There were also reports of the forcible conversion and the abduction of over one hundred Sikh women in the areas.⁴ The gravity of the growing tension can be seen in the fact that special armoured trucks and tanks were sent to Rawalpindi and Attock to defuse the communal situation.

A particular feature of the March violence was its 'genocidal aspect'. There was a general agreement that these attacks on Hindus and Sikhs were 'carefully planned and carried out', and reportedly led by some 'retired Muslim Army officers- some of them pensioners with honorary Commissioned rank'.⁵ The poor law and order situation in the areas made the minorities more vulnerable. Crime was being committed with relative impunity, or passive social complicity because of the protection which was afforded to the attackers by the members of local populations and politicians. This can be seen from the fact that, as early as mid-March 1947, for the first time a passenger train was derailed about a quarter of a mile outside the Rawalpindi Chaklala Railway Station and some armed Muslims indiscriminately looted hapless Hindu and Sikh commuters.⁶ A worrying feature of the March violence in Rawalpindi was the lack of effective intervention by the law and enforcement forces. Indeed for the first time 'the worst cases of police partiality' and 'negligence' were openly observed. Although an immediate inquiry on the 'Rawalpindi Division disturbances' recommended the suspension of the Central Investigation Department (CID) Hindu deputy superintendent of police, Rawalpindi, Bashan Sen, and twelve policemen on the charge of 'official negligence', political exigencies obstructed accountability.⁷

Powerful and unscrupulous politicians played their role in heightening communal tensions and fostering violence. They promised protection to its perpetrators. A prominent Muslim League leader Mumtaz Daultana, future premier of West Punjab, during his tour of the riot-torn Attock district, promised future protection for those who had been arrested.⁸ Unfortunately, the failure to punish the rioters encouraged further violence. There were some reports in the post-1947 period that the Mamdot Villa of the Punjab Muslim League leader, the Nawab of Mamdot, later the first premier of West Punjab, was a centre for aiding and abetting street violence to topple



the Unionist government in 1947. Mamdot, allegedly not only offered Rs 100,000 to four '*achhut*' (untouchable) members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly to change their loyalty for his slot of the premier, but also used his wealth and influence, with the assistance of Begum Shah Nawaz, to purchase arms and grenades from the NWFP.⁹ Similarly, a Sikh leader Master Tara Singh, in the aftermath of the Rawalpindi killings, warned: 'We shall live or die, but not submit to Pakistan domination.'¹⁰

By late March 1947, Hindu and Sikh refugees from the violence-stricken areas in the Rawalpindi Division were arriving in Amritsar and other parts of the Punjab. As was to happen on a larger scale in August, the refugees' tales of atrocities raised animosities wherever they settled. They planned revenge and the Sikh community produced and circulated wildly inflammatory pamphlets and brochures. As early as late April, within six weeks of the Rawalpindi killings, there were reports of about 25,000 Muslims being displaced from the princely states of Patiala and Nabha, and over 5,000 had arrived in Lahore.¹¹ This trickle was just the beginning of what, after August 1947, was to become the largest migration of the twentieth century.

The tide of violence and forced migration that started in August 1947 was thus not a sudden eruption but a culmination of five months of tension and conflict. Ian Talbot has pointed out that British authority in the Punjab was declining from March onward and violence in the major cities of Lahore and Amritsar began as early as March 1947. He sees this episode of violence as being completely different in character from that of the 'traditional' communal riot in the province and links it with that of Partition period: 'August violence was not a sudden eruption but the final throes of a sustained period of conflict'.¹² The Rawalpindi massacres in March not only speeded up the British decision to divide and quit India, but also led the Hindus and the Sikhs of the Punjab to demand the division of the province, along with Partition of India on religious lines. This ultimately paved the way for a reduced Pakistan and a compromised nation in August 1947.

While the March attacks were entirely different in scale despite their 'genocidal element', the horrific repercussions in August 1947 were intensified by the urgency to wind up Partition process in

seventy-two days and to draw up the borderlines in just thirty-six days. Clearly, the magnitude of the violence and migration was unexpected in August, but many different warnings about the likelihood of violence had been made from March onwards. Evan Jenkins, the Governor of the Punjab, was before long reporting that the actual transfer of power would likely to provoke 'large-scale disturbances...[in] the principal districts of central Punjab', and he wrote to Mountbatten that 'it would be difficult enough to partition within six weeks a country of 300 million people which has been governed as a unit for 98 years.'¹³ On the basis of the Chief Secretary's *Fortnightly Reports*, Jenkins continually reported about the worsening communal situation. He wrote about militant organisations and their disruptive plans, claiming that the Akal Saina and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) would probably work in close cooperation.

The strongly communalised local press exacerbated tensions. The newspapers *Ajit* and *Rajut* instigated the Sikh community to 'be ready for sacrifices to maintain unity and the existence of the *Panth*'. The Muslim newspapers, *Azad* and *Inquilab*, wrote against the division of Punjab with the heading, 'Fragmentation of the Punjab'. They reported with an expression of 'grim determination' the need to resist Partition of Punjab, warning the Sikh leaders of the consequences of playing into the hands of the Hindus.¹⁴ The paramilitary organisations had mushroomed and penetrated every corner of the Punjab. By June 1947, it was estimated that the RSS had opened seventeen new branches and its membership had risen to 59,200. The Muslim League National Guards (MLNG) had accumulated 43,200 members, not to mention the members of a variety of miscellaneous bodies such as the Ahrar *razakars*, Khaksar militia, Shahidi *jathas*, Volunteer *jaishes*, Hindu Scouts Volunteer Corps (HSVC), and Akal Saina.¹⁵ A great number of former soldiers, who had war-time military experiences, provided 'advice' and 'training' on military tactics and organisations to the volunteer 'groups' in their pursuit of the ethnic cleansing rival communities during the 1947 conflict. Some veterans of the Gurkha sought employment 'to train the volunteers' of the HSVC and the RSS in Lyallpur.¹⁶ Similarly, former members of the INA were not only employed as 'advisors', by the various paramilitary

units, and were recruited in the police force on the eve of Partition, but also they were 'involved in leadership of the gang in East Punjab.'¹⁷

Preparations for violence were made to pre-empt the boundary award. With the appointment of Radcliffe to map the boundary lines a 'sudden flare-up' was noted.¹⁸ Energies were directed to making representations to the Radcliffe Punjab Boundary Commission. Teja Singh, the Sikh representative on the commission, stressed 'the necessity of preserving the solidarity and integrity of the Sikh community'.¹⁹ Obviously the Sikh representatives stressed that 'other factors', such as their substantial role in the agricultural life of the canal colonies and the relatively high ratio of land revenue paid by them, had to be considered, along with population criteria on religious lines. The growing uncertainty about the drawing of the boundary lines 'over-shadowed everything else', Evan Jenkins reported to Mountbatten on 13 August.²⁰ As 15 August approached, when the award was meant to be published, 'wildest rumours' of its outcome circulated.²¹ The uncertainties and dissatisfaction with the Boundary Award found expression in the mass killings that took place not only during these days, but also for some weeks to come. With the announcement of the Award on 17 August, many people found themselves on the 'wrong side' of the border. Soon thereafter, flight and violence went hand-in-hand. An 'almost universal conflict' and a 'fratricidal war of extermination' set in through the twelve central districts of the Punjab.²² The biggest migration of the twentieth century began. The caravans of refugees arrived from East Punjab's cities and towns and carried with them harrowing stories of atrocities against Muslims, which were retold in the press. Indian papers detailed violence against Hindus and Sikhs in West Punjab. Some newspapers went totally out of control, calling for sacrifices and revenge. The publication of a cartoon in the daily *Shahbaz* depicted Gandhi and Master Tara Singh as the 'Indian cow', which illustrated the communal level to which the media and parties had sunk.

The air was thick with rumours. For example, a rumour was gaining currency that Sikhs from Patiala were infiltrating into Lahore in small batches.²³ The authorities seemed quite reluctant to impose order. Enforcement of law and order depended upon information, but

no information was reaching the civil power because the police had ceased to function effectively in a general state breakdown of the colonial state. The Punjab police force was riddled with communal sentiments, as Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh policemen witnessed their families and co-religionists being threatened and murdered. Fear played a role. Safety of families was a preoccupation. The partiality of the law and enforcement forces was a prominent feature of Partition violence. There were a number of instances in which the police actively participated in killing, arson, and looting. The Joint Defence Council reported in mid-August that the police in Lahore 'joined mobs and carried out arson and murder.'²⁴ On some occasions, the charges against individual constables of looting the properties of the Hindus and Sikhs were also reported; included in such cases, for example, were the arrests of two Muslim constables in Jhang and six in Mianwali.²⁵

Another feature of the heightened anxiety was the demobilising and disarming of police from the 'other' community. Major General Rees of the Punjab Boundary Force reported that a Hindu superintendent of police in Amritsar (named Kaul) had disarmed the Muslim members of the police force, which had 'created considerable alarm and despondency.'²⁶ There were reports that a number of Hindu and Sikh police officers and subordinates were 'deserted' in West Punjab as well.²⁷ Many others sneaked away from the local police stations and took away the official weapons with them. In the later weeks of 1947, they joined militias in turning the tide of battle, by using these weapons. '...Constable Mohinder Singh, batch number 1805, was on duty today. With my permission, he went to the Mozang Bazaar to eat food this evening, but so far he did not return to the [police] station...', a police Hawaldar Khar-ud-Din, telephoned to the DSP from the Mozang Thana, Lahore'. 'He was armed with a rifle and 50 cartridges...it is highly likely that he has run away [to India]...and has taken station's weapons with him'. In the same message, the Hawaldar further reminded his '*Sahib*' [sir] that this was not an exceptional case, '...in fact, earlier on 16-8-1947, a Head-Constable and a Sub-Inspector had disappeared from the thana...and went to Amritsar. They had taken [the police] station's rifles with them...'²⁸



Rumours of division and disarming of the police, army, and bureaucracy had reached General Rees' PBF of 25,000. The force proved toothless in the outburst of communal frenzy and in a context of administrative collapse. The works of Robin Jeffrey and, more recently, Daniel Marston have highlighted the limitations of the force in containing the violence in 1947.²⁹ The units of the PBF spread throughout the main twelve disturbing districts of the Punjab. In addition to lack of troops, there are a number of instances of the partisan attitude of all of its contingents. Instead of safeguarding minority communities under attack, the PBF detachments either failed to intervene, or in some instances joined in the assaults. The participation of army troops led the violence to the genocidal situation. The worst cases involved the units of the Baluch, Punjab and Dogra troops, who were attached to the PBF. Sadiq Ali, for example, a Muslim resident of Lahore's *mohalla* of Saadi Park, reported the involvement of a group of eight to ten Hindu troops of the Dogra Regiment firing at Muslim civilians in Mozang's Ponch Road, killing one and wounding eleven.³⁰ Sikh members of the 2nd Sikh Regiment were reported shooting indiscriminately on Muslim civilians and a police picket in the Mughal Pura locality of Lahore, in which two civilians and one constable died.³¹

In a similar way, there were a number of compelling evidences of the direct involvement of the Muslim troopers of the battalions of 3rd and 10th Baluch Regiments, the detachments of the PBF, in orchestrating violence in 1947. This took on a 'genocidal character' in the unjustifiable killings of the defenceless Sikh refugee populations in the Ramgarh locality of the city of Sheikhupura.³² Louis MacNeice, a BBC correspondent who covered Partition and killings in the Punjab, for example, reported from Sheikhupura on 29 August 1947:

Within 24 hours at least 800 people, nearly all Sikhs and Hindus, had been shot, stabbed, speared, slashed, clubbed, or burned to death. Several hundred had been wounded...and the Muslim police, far from trying to stop the trouble, actively helped the rioters. Reinforcements were rushed from Lahore yesterday. There was grim incident at a factory [in the city's Ramgarh locality] where several hundred Sikhs had taken refuge. Troops [3th Baluch Regiment], who were Muslim para-troopers, killed 150 Sikhs

and allege they were repeatedly fired upon. This incident is now the subject of an official inquiry, but in any case it shows how imbued the troops themselves have become with this communal bitterness, and what a great psychological strain is being placed upon these sepoy of the Punjab Boundary Force.³³

The *Hindustan Times* on 2 September 1947 carried a similar detailed report on the massacre of Sikh population of Sheikhpura by both the Muslim members of Baluch Regiment and the district police.³⁴ The violence against minorities in the Punjab was undoubtedly involved heavy participation of army troops, veterans, paramilitary organisations, and the local police. The participation of a great number of 'combat veterans', led the apparent communal conflict to the 'ethnic cleansing' situation.³⁵ There is also evidence of the involvement, or complicity of the leaders of various princely states in orchestrating the violence. The vehicles belonging to the princely states of Patiala and Faridkot were reported to be carrying arms for the perpetrators. A police report pointed out that over 250,000 Muslims alone were missing in the largest Sikh-ruled state of Patiala.³⁶ Like large-scale episodes of the collective violence in twentieth century, Partition violence in the Punjab bears the characteristics of what would now be termed the 'ethnic cleansing' of a region of its minority populations in terms of making claims for 'territory'. We will further reveal a leading role of both the Muslim army deserters and the Hindu Dogra troopers in orchestrating Partition violence, as well as the making and expulsion of refugee populations in the case study of Sialkot in Chapter 4.

Following Partition, violence and migration went beyond the control of the new governments of India and Pakistan. The number of refugees crossing the West Punjab border daily was between 100,000 and 150,000.³⁷ A Sikh army officer stated that the whole of East Punjab was engaged in 'hunting down and butchering Moslem [sic] minorities'.³⁸ The fearful tales and narratives by the refugees of slaughter, rape, and looting at the hands of the Sikhs in East Punjab, further rationalised the eviction of Hindus and Sikhs in West Punjab through a corresponding increase in violence. Alongside the fight for territory and the cry for revenge, the desire for looting was a main

factor in the attacks on the wealthy Sikh and Hindu minorities. In addition to banded individuals, the charges of exploiting the situation for personal gain by some 'Muslim ring leaders', and 'Town Salar', who were attached to the MLNG, were observed throughout the cities and towns of West Punjab.³⁹

The way the properties or whole areas associated with Hindus or Sikhs were looted and burned down reveals a high degree of premeditation. The various groups were divided and assigned different performances: some were throwing oil on the establishments, while others were torching them and loading the looted booty. Included in such episodes was an example of the systematic looting of the properties of the privileged Hindus and Sikhs of Lahore's Bahawalpur Road. '...Muslims were purposely burning the houses and shops of Hindus and Sikhs', an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Lahore's *thana* Mozang, who witnessed the incident, described, '...they committed this crime for the looting purpose...When a party of police reached there some people were loading the looted items in their *tongas* (horse-carts)...'⁴⁰

Hindus and Sikhs houses and shops were selectively burned down, while the adjacent Muslim properties were left untouched. A Muslim Constable on duty in the locality of Baghban Pura of the city of Lahore reported to the Mughal Pura Police Station: 'A Hindu shop in Baghban Pura Street which displays an English-written signboard "H.Q. Chawla" has set ablaze...while neighbouring [Muslim-owned] shops have left unscathed...'⁴¹ The expulsion of the unwanted minorities, by means of willful destruction of their properties, was a clear example of the ethnic cleansing of a locality. This was made possible not only in a general breakdown of local administration, but also in a total feeling of impunity from the law, alongside social connivance.

Refugees travelled on foot, in bullock-carts and trains. Some of the refugee columns stretched over fifty miles in length. The private armies who cut off stragglers and abducted women constantly attacked them. In the face of strong criticism, a decision was taken at a Joint Defence Council meeting on 29 August to abolish the PBF from 1 September 1947 and to be replaced by the Military Evacuation Organisations (MEO) of India and Pakistan. After the failure of the



force, the task of maintaining law and order in Punjab was taken over by India and Pakistan. To show their determination, newly installed Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, issued a joint statement on 3 September calling on all communities to end the atrocities and warned the perpetrators that 'bands caught in the act of committing crime will be shot at sight'.⁴² On the same day, the two Punjab governments set up the Liaison Agency to oversee the evacuation of refugees in all the disturbing districts. This was headed jointly by two chief liaison officers based in Lahore and Amritsar. This agency along with the MEO was responsible for the movement of people across the borders of both Punjab.

While large foot *kaflahs* were the common means of evacuation for the rural refugees, trains and motor trucks were used for evacuating the urban population. A Joint Evacuation Movement was formulated by the MEO of both Indian and Pakistan governments which organised 226 'Special Refugee Trains' from Pakistan to India, and 211 in the opposite direction. They evacuated the refugees en masse and generally carried members of a single community only, with between 2,000 and 5,000 passengers placed in a single train. An official estimate put the numbers of the Muslims evacuated by railway at over 1.3 million, from late August till the end of November 1947 and over a million non-Muslims in the opposite direction.⁴³ Military trucks were used for short distance travel but were not available easily. While the compelling images of refugees remain the *kaflahs*, which stretched over many miles, and the trains with their compartments and rooftops packed with destitute refugees,⁴⁴ air travel was another mode of transport, which was swift and safe, but available only to those who could pay the exorbitant price. Around 30,000 Hindus and Sikhs were evacuated by air from West Punjab.

The railway tracks and roads which led to the newly-created border lines became battlegrounds. Armed mobs and gangs systematically detained the trains and engaged in wholesale slaughter and general plundering. The trains were attacked 'with military precision, with one half of the gang providing the covering fire while the others entered the trains to kill'. There were several methods used for the derailment of trains to massacre and loot the refugees. 'Often the

gang conducting this operation had their couriers on trains who pulled the communication cord between stations, and then the killer gangs operated throughout trains.⁴⁵ Another method was to throw crude bombs at the train or lay a boulder on the tracks. Sometimes the tracks were damaged with the full complicity of the local railway staff.⁴⁶

Undoubtedly, Partition violence cannot be easily dismissed as a 'vengeful retaliation' and 'summer madness', the view held by some writers.⁴⁷ This is something that Gyanendra Pandey is very concerned with the nationalist history of popular violence in contemporary India, which sees violence as an aberration, as 'mere glitches, the result of an unusual conjuncture of circumstances'.⁴⁸ He has rightly questioned some of the conventional assumptions on Hindu-Muslim violence. This research on Partition sits with this bleak position. Violence against Hindus and Sikhs in West Punjab, as against the Muslims in East Punjab, was organised with military precision, sophisticated weapons, and transport. 'When I reached there the *mohalla* of [Guru] Gobind Garh [a Sikh neighbourhood in Lahore's Mughal Pura area] was burring from all four sides. Already between 100 and 150 houses were completely burned down...', a Muslim Sub-Inspector of the Thana Mughal Pura reported. 'Three men were still throwing kerosene on the buildings. Other two were engaged in torching...some were involved in looting...'⁴⁹ This important statement not only highlights the careful planning behind the burning of a Sikh locality in Lahore and, furthermore, dispels the easy interpretation that the violence was an inexplicable aberration, which cannot sit easily in wider studies of ethnic cleansing, but it also clearly displays the commonalities with sectarian and communal violence in today's South Asia.

Partition violence had clear class and gender dimensions. Politically astute members of the upper-middle class Hindus and Sikhs had started to migrate months and weeks before the actual Partition took place. They had begun to sell their properties and shift assets to 'safer zones'. Poor people who lacked not only the resources, but also were unaware of the rapidly evolving political scenario, were driven out from mid-August onwards. The possession and control of three commodities *zan, zar, and zamin* (woman, money, and

property) belonging to 'other' communities was the main driving force in the aftermath of Partition. Although the 'quest for *zar* and *zamin* had led to unpardonable offences against members of all three communities', as Ayesha Jalal emphasizes: 'the debasement of *zan* assumed nightmarish proportions.'⁵⁰ Men from all communities cut off stragglers and abducted women, manifesting their masculinity over powerless women. According to the Punjab police chief, over 100,000 abducted women and children were found to be 'missing' in the province.⁵¹ Urvashi Butalia and others have brought the experiences of women to the fore and exposed the horrible realities of abduction, rape, and violence perpetrated against women in a patriarchal society. More recently, children's experiences of Partition have also been examined.⁵²

Little, if anything, has been written about forcible conversions of the conflicting communities at the time of Partition. Many delighted in violating the integrity of the 'other' religion and community, ripping apart the normal and the spatial landscape of the Punjab. Men as well as women were victims. Those whose religious identities were in doubt were forced to lower their trousers to confirm circumcision. 'I have told them several times that I am not a Sikh, but they keep asking me to lower trousers down to show circumcision', a terrified man told the reporter of a Lahore-based newspaper *Inquilab* on 2 September 1947. An official report by the Pakistan High Commissioner in India, Major General Abdul Rehman, stated that about 46,000 persons were involuntarily converted to the opposite religion in the province.⁵³ These forcible conversions displayed the degree of religious fanaticism to which the communities had sunk. Despite recent advances in historical understanding, such a sombre aftermath of Partition rarely finds its way into the existing literature. We will touch on this truly untold aspect of the aftermath of 1947 in the case studies of Gujranwala and Sialkot in the next chapters.

At the beginning of January 1948, the MEO set up a special 'pocket clearance' organisation to accelerate the evacuation work of converted persons, abducted women, prisoners, patients, and prostitutes. In this regard, three government-run-homes were set up in Lahore: Milli Darul Atfal in the Bahawalpur House, Women's Home in a section of Women Jail at the Jail Road, and Darul Muhajirat in a section of the

Mental Hospital. By the first quarter of 1948, the authorities in West Punjab had found over 18,100 persons forcibly converted to Islam, and had recovered over 6,355 abducted Hindu and Sikh women. Many of them had been transferred to India.⁵⁴ In 1949, the return of prisoners had also started and, by the end of the year, over 4,080 Hindu and Sikh prisoners from the West Punjab jails were shifted to Indian jails.⁵⁵

The greatest task facing the new governments, however, was the reception and rehabilitation of hundreds of thousands of refugees. The scale of the problem was both unexpected and staggering. 'The tides of people...', as Yasmin Khan has observed, 'were so fantastical, so vast and so thorough, that they unbalanced the entire substructure on which Pakistan had been built.'⁵⁶ There was no structure in place to deal with the massive scale of the crisis. We next turn to the West Punjab government's response to the arrival and resettlement of the Muslim refugees, as well as the provincial Muslim League leadership's handling of the abandoned properties.

REFUGEE RECEPTION

In April 1948, the West Punjab authorities completed a refugee census and admitted 'the difficulty of resettlement' of the *muhajirs*. The survey revealed that 5.5 million Muslim refugees had arrived in the Punjab, representing nearly 28 per cent of the population in the province.⁵⁷ This presented an unprecedented and unanticipated problem for the government. The most fortunate occupied properties abandoned by the Hindus and the Sikhs. Many others thronged in camps, schools, military barracks, and squatted on railway platforms, footpaths, and every conceivable space for many years. The immediate concern for the incoming refugees, whether they were urban or rural, was the provision of basic necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, and medical attention. By the end of January 1948, the Punjab government had established seventy-five refugee camps where hundreds of thousands of people were provided with free food, clothing, and medical attention until they had been resettled. The high costs of dealing with the refugee 'problem' can be gauged by the fact that, during the period August 1947- March 1948, the Punjab



government spent a sum of Rs 36,000,000 on maintenance of 'refugee reception camps'.⁵⁸ In addition, the government was also feeding the 'pocket clearance' of the Muslim refugee population of the Jullundur Camp and Kashmiri Amritsar Camp by despatching several trucks loaded with food, daily. Despite the regular protests of the West Punjab authorities to their Indian counterparts that the Muslim refugees in the camps were 'Indian nationals' and should be rehabilitated by the Indian government, it, however, continued to feed them on 'humanitarian grounds' till late 1949.⁵⁹ Overall, expenditure had reached over Rs 65,000,000 by that time. Earlier, for the support of refugees, the Refugee Rehabilitation Finance Corporation with an authorised capital of Rs 30,000,000 was set up in 1948.⁶⁰ In addition to this, voluntary community assistance and charitable support for the refugees was institutionalised in the Quaid-i-Azam Fund and the Governors' Fund.⁶¹

Water and sewerage arrangements were usually non-existent in the camps. Unhygienic conditions caused health problems. There were reports that over 100,000 died in different camps because of disease and severe cold.⁶² The refugees frequently protested against the inadequate housing conditions and shortage of rations. Different organisations representing refugee interests emerged. There were occasionally clashes between the refugees and the government authorities.⁶³ These increased rather than decreased as the months passed. To prevent permanent financial burdens the refugees were quickly 'processed' and temporary 'rehabilitated'. The state speedily directed the despatch of rural refugees *en masse* to specific districts, *tehsils*, and villages. Urban migrants, unlike agriculturalists, were not 'directed' by the state and settled where they wished. Most urban refugees chose to go to places where they had pre-Partition family ties or business connections and where they thought they could find work. For many others, the process was arduous and involved relocations and forced resettlement. Many thousands were convinced and shifted to their 'new provinces' of the Sindh and NWFP, while many others preferred to make a reverse trek to their 'homelands' in India. According to an estimate, by April 1948, more than 80,000 'displeased refugees', mainly from the Lahore camps, had already returned back to India.⁶⁴ Many poor, as well as those who were

indecisive about their destinations languished in the camps over the years. By the end of October 1950, the authorities in West Punjab decided to clear the camps. Eventually, in late November, out of 25,000 in the Lahore camps, a 'last batch of refugees' of more than 5,000 was transferred to Mardan. The remaining 5,000, mainly Urdu-speakers, refused to relocate to the NWFP and asked the government to make arrangements for their repatriation back to UP, India. Over 250,000 Muslim refugees were returned to India before the introduction of the permit system.⁶⁵ In fact, the demands of refugees for repatriation to India increased considerably with the 1950 Nehru-Liaquat Pact on minorities' rights. Despite the Indian authorities' 'reluctance to accept' the returned Muslim refugees, more than 50,000 people had registered in Lahore alone for their return to India.⁶⁶ Their number increased rather than decreased as the months and years passed.

At the same time, problems were exacerbated by the difficulties of the return of some Hindu trading families to the cities of West Punjab who attempted to 'reoccupy' their houses and properties. As early as March 1948, over 2,000 returned Hindu traders were reported in the city of Lahore alone.⁶⁷ While there has recently been a proliferation of research devoted to the 'refugee experience' and the refugees' role in the urban development of the Punjab's cities, little has been written on the issues concerning the return of refugees to their 'homelands'.⁶⁸ We will touch on this aspect of the aftermath of Partition in the case study of Sialkot in Chapter 6.

GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF RESETTLEMENT

The whole process of rehabilitation was divided into two categories of temporary and permanent measures. Various administrative measures were adopted to provide emergency relief and accelerate the pace of the resettlement progress. Initially, on 27 August 1947, a Refugee Commissioner for Pakistan was appointed. Once the scale of the refugee problem became apparent, on 5 September the Ministry of Rehabilitation was established at the centre, echoed by the creation of a new department of rehabilitation in the Punjab, with many specialised agencies staffed by hundreds of both permanent and

temporary employees. The entire administrative exercise of rehabilitation was divided into three categories of decision-makers: Rehabilitation Commissioner; Financial Commissioner Revenue; and Rehabilitation Commissioner for Industries, and Director of Industries.⁶⁹ In order to co-ordinate the work of the centre and the provinces, on 15 October the Pakistan-Punjab Refugees Council was set up. At the district level, there were deputy rehabilitation commissioners dealing with the problems concerned with urban and rural properties, allotments, and repairs. Refugee advisory committees were set up in each district as well as vigilance committees for each *tehsil* and *patwar* circle.⁷⁰ The refugee's resettlement involved a huge task of registering claims, exchanging records of rights between the two dominions, verification of claims on the basis of this record and the determination of comparative values of areas abandoned and claimed. An elaborate Central Record Office was set up in Lahore under the Punjab resettlement authorities for the verification of registered claims.

The primary concern for the state authorities was to resettle as many refugees as possible on the abandoned land and houses. Despite the sheer number of people involved, rural resettlement was less challenging than urban rehabilitation because of the large amounts of land left behind by Hindu and Sikh evacuees.⁷¹ Within two months of the creation of the Punjab Rehabilitation Scheme, a large number of agricultural refugees were 'directed' to the various districts of the Punjab. As early as the end of November 1947, many districts became 'full up' with refugees and the district officers were reported as 'reluctant to take more' numbers.⁷² As a whole, by the end of March 1948, about 4,000,000 (90 per cent) of the Muslim refugees were temporarily allocated evacuee and state land on the basis of twelve acres per family.⁷³ Under this 'quasi-permanent scheme', to re-unite, as far possible, scattered social or family units, many attempts were made and opportunities were provided to concentrate 'homogeneous bodies of settlers' by offering them a choice of areas for their claims and 'chak or village' where they wished to settle.⁷⁴

The refugee survey of 1948 showed that most of the 'agreed areas' refugees who came from East Punjab province, East Punjab states, and Delhi areas were largely resettled in the major West Punjab

districts of Lahore, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Sargodha, Jhang, Gujranwala, and Multan. While many refugees from the 'non-agreed areas' relocated to other provinces of the country, the Kashmiri refugees from Jammu and Kashmir were mainly accommodated in the 'border districts' of Rawalpindi, Attock, Jhelum, Gujranwala, Gujrat, and Sialkot.⁷⁵ The settlement of the refugees from the 'agreed areas' was considered relatively simple as almost all the holdings were allotted through the exchange of the non-moveable property record between the two Punjabs. In contrast the process of allotment in the 'non-agreed' areas was complex and involved many problems of 'bogus' and 'multiple' allotments.⁷⁶ In the case of the 'non-agreed' areas, records were lacking. Information was collected about the area abandoned by the displaced persons. In such a situation the only source of information on land ownership and claims to land were the refugees themselves who were invited to submit claims upon which a permanent scheme of resettlement could be drawn. Inevitably such claims were frequently exaggerated. The difference in pace of resettlement in the two areas can be measured by the fact that up to 1959-1960, 90 per cent of claims of the displaced persons from 'agreed areas' had been settled on agricultural land, while the percentage of settled claims for the displaced persons from 'non-agreed areas' was less than 60 per cent.⁷⁷

The delay in resettling the so-called 'non-agreed areas' refugees in the Punjab resulted not only from the difficulties of exchange of record and over-stated claims, but was also rooted in government policy and response. At the outset, the Punjab government was ambivalent about providing massive relief for the 'non-agreed' refugees. It took the view that there simply were not enough resources in the province to house all the refugees who flooded in. So they had to be 'distributed' in a further forced exodus that would scatter them throughout Pakistan. Indeed, the central government, based in Karachi, then decided to press or cajole other provinces to take in surplus refugees. The provincial government was of the view that the properties abandoned by the Hindus and Sikhs of West Punjab should be allocated to the Muslim refugees from East Punjab. The government representatives feared that any further allotment of the resources to 'non-agreed refugees' would 'not only mean the

waste of all the goodwill towards Pakistan created by distribution of free rations, but might also lead to active hostility towards Government'.⁷⁸

The Central Minister for Rehabilitation of Refugees, Mian Iftikharuddin, came out with a radical solution for rehabilitating the refugees, when he proposed breaking up the large estates in the Punjab, with a view to distributing land among the refugees. He recommended that 'a graded tax' should be levied on the income of all landlords, drawing more than Rs 15,000 per annum from their agricultural land. This revolutionary proposal was turned down by the provincial cabinet which was dominated by the landed gentry, with the Nawab of Mamdot its Chief Minister, one of the biggest landlords of united Punjab. In turn, Mamdot criticised the central government's 'arbitrary decisions and interferences in the internal administration of the Province'. He targeted the Refugees Minister who had failed to obtain for East Punjab Muslims the same treatment with regards to property as the West Punjab's Hindu and Sikh refugees.⁷⁹ Mian Iftikharuddin severely criticised the Punjab government's handling of the refugee issue and categorically rejected Mamdot's claims of the settlement of 5,000,000 refugees in the province. The Refugees Minister's resignation on the grounds that the Punjab government was unwilling to take speedy measures to rehabilitate the refugees further strained relations between the centre and the province.

Relations did not ease between the provincial and central authorities, despite Iftikharuddin's replacement. The Pakistan-Punjab Refugee Council took issues of the refugee settlement with the Punjab and shortly found the attitude of the provincial government to be 'totally non-cooperative'. There was also a clash over the 'delimitation of functioning' between the Pakistan-Punjab Refugee Council and the Mamdot cabinet. This, in particular, reached its nadir over the issue of abandoned motor cars and vehicles, as the provincial government consistently interfered and opposed the allocation of abandoned cars by the Refugees Council.⁸⁰ Mamdot threatened a refusal to cooperate within the Council because, in his view, it had no regard for the Punjabi opinion. He instructed the provincial officers 'not to carry out' the decisions of the Council and threatened

the withdrawal of the Punjab officers, then employed in the Joint Refugees and Rehabilitation Secretariat, which was an integral part of the scheme.⁸¹ The Governor of Punjab was long before reporting on the provincial government's handling of the refugee crisis, and he informed Jinnah that the Nawab of Mamdot 'always double-cross the Council by verbally instructing his officers not to carry out the decision...and the political situation is steadily deteriorating under Mamdot's leadership and Shaukat's inspirations'.⁸²

Mamdot was the focus of severe press criticism at the time within the Punjab for his handling of the refugee question. Twenty refugee members of the provincial assembly, threatened to move a non-confidence resolution against him in the assembly. One of them expressed 'the callousness and indifference of the Punjab rehabilitation authorities have demoralised the refugees to a considerable extent.'⁸³ Even within the Mamdot cabinet, there was a persistent tug-of-war over the allotting-power regarding the 'abandoned industrial undertakings' between the revenue minister and the industries minister.⁸⁴ Mamdot was also embroiled in factional rivalries with other landlord politicians such as, Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Sardar Shaukat Hayat. Their bickering was to culminate in January 1949 when the Governor General of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, ordered the Governor of Punjab to dissolve the Punjab Legislature Assembly so the central government could take over its functions.

It was not until 1955 that the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan abolished the distinctions between 'agreed' and 'non-agreed' areas, with respect to allotment of evacuee property on a permanent basis. The role of unscrupulous politicians and the bureaucracy over issues relating to refugee rehabilitation, greatly affected the relations between the centre and provinces. Such tensions between the province and the centre over 'refugee question' were by no means unique to the Punjab. Sarah Ansari has pointed out the tensions in the Sindh between the provincial authorities and the centre over the refugee resettlement, and shows how the refugees 'found themselves caught in the middle' of such political bickering.⁸⁵

Though, at the state level, the refugees were quickly processed or resettled, in reality, the transitory period for the processing and settlement of urban refugees, unlike rural refugees, was a lot longer.

Apart from the exchange of records between the two Punjabs, it essentially entailed the huge task of addressing the shortage of housing, allocating, and matching jobs, and most importantly, stimulating the commercial activity once again. The acquisition of evacuee houses provided accommodation that was far from adequate. As the 1948 refugee census reveals, 1,315,000 urban Muslim refugees replaced an outgoing 1,102,000 Hindu and Sikh refugees in West Punjab. This meant that the urban areas of the province were burdened with an excess of over 213,000 of refugees.⁸⁶ Housing in urban areas, thus, was limited. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that many of the abandoned houses had been damaged during Partition-related violence and therefore had to be repaired before they could be allocated to the refugees. According to an official estimate, by the end of 1949, the government had spent a total amount of Rs 3,213,773 on repairing 23,000 evacuee properties in the various towns and cities of the Punjab.⁸⁷ The main difficulty associated with the repair of properties was the shortage of finance, technical staff, and above all, a suitable construction agency to carry out this work.

The post-independence resettlement of refugees and the allotment of abandoned properties opened up unprecedented avenues of profiteering and corruption in the early years of Pakistan's history. Long-established residents competed with refugees for the abandoned Hindu and Sikh properties. More than 50 per cent of the abandoned houses and 36 per cent of the shops were illegally occupied by the local residents.⁸⁸ The officials of the Punjab rehabilitation department, ranging from local *patwar* circle to the Lahore Central Record Room, benefited themselves at the expense of the refugees. The daily earnings of the Lahore Secretariat's pavement-sitting petition-writers increased ten-fold, as is evidenced from the fact that over one thousand petitions were being filed every day by the refugees in Lahore alone. For many poor and 'aggrieved refugees', it was almost impossible to file their claims without offering bribes to the officials, or their 'touts'. A chain of functionaries, ranging from the local *patwari* to the secretariat petition-writers and the Central Record Room clerks and concerned officers, cobbled together in this benefiting. Many regularly ran 'like shuttle-coaches' between the

district headquarters and the Central Record Office, Lahore, to obtain 'favourable orders from the concerned officers' for those who paid the toll.⁸⁹

Officials succumbed to the temptations of handling evacuee property to the detriment of genuine refugee claims. Stories of 'making money' from the refugees were occasionally reported by the local press. The Urdu daily *Inquilab* reported on 13 March 1948, for example, a Sub-Tehsildar of Sialkot district forcefully occupied the land of a refugee from Gurdaspur. The *Civil and Military Gazette* on 13 December 1949, for example, published a detailed report on the inquiry against Ibraim Ahmad Usmani, the deputy director for Sialkot rehabilitation office, in which he was suspended for the position for issuing 'large-scale bogus ration cards'. The 11 September 1951 issue of the *Civil and Military Gazette* carried a report of the Dera Ghazi Khan's rehabilitation office, in which he was reportedly arrested over accepting an 'illegal gratification' from a refugee from Amritsar for allocating tactically an evacuee shop. Apart from wide-spread corruption, nepotism was another important factor of dealing the evacuee property. For example, the district Okara's special magistrate, Mian Abdul Haq, was named and shamed, by the Special Branch Secret Intelligence Police, who was reported 'dishonestly squeezing valuable property...at nominal prices to his friends and relatives'.⁹⁰

Refugees were commonly viewed as helpless, homeless, and in need of resettlement. Generous assistance was provided to them, by the local established populations, in the historical concept of *Muhajir-Ansar*. Refugees too not only looted the evacuee property and illegally occupied the houses of the non-Muslims, but also filed 'false' and 'inflated' applications for their claims and submitted false affidavits to prove them. There were many who obtained 'multiple allotments' on a single claim. There were also numerous who 'were not genuine evacuees at all'. Source material, drawn from the Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation reports, reveals that refugees exploited the resettlement system to enrich themselves. An official report of the Punjab Land Settlement revealed the situation of 'bogus claims' itself:

A number of cases were brought to the notice of the authorities, where displaced persons put forwarded bogus claims as they either did not possess any land in East Punjab or very little as compared to their claims.⁹¹

The cases of refugees' misusing the resettlement scheme were far outweighed by the reports of politicians' and officials' abusing of the abandoned resources. Politicians attempted to enrich themselves and their relatives by occupying evacuee property, or by illegally allotting it. There were many reports against the first two premiers of West Punjab, Nawab of Mamdot and Mumtaz Daultana, for their misuse of power. One of them, for example, was that Daultana favourably allotted the 'biggest flour mill of the subcontinent' to his brother-in-law in Sargodha, and in addition, a vacated shop on the Mall Road, Lahore, and the Odeon cinema in Lahore.⁹² The charges against the Nawab of Mamdot were the misuse of public office to secure prime land at low concessional rates in Montgomery district, as well as the siphoning off abandoned properties and cars for his followers and former tenants. The temptation for the refugees' resources at the district and *tehsil* level was even worse that resulted in to the detriment of genuine refugee claims. An official report of the Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation revealed the political corruption at district level itself:

The abandoned evacuee property offered a temptation to which many of the leading figures in the districts succumbed, and political considerations prevented suitable action being taken in such cases. In allocating houses and especially factories it was found to be very difficult.⁹³

Most serious of all, a number of the leading Muslim League leaders were the chief beneficiaries of the material benefits of the flight of Hindus and Sikhs to India. One example of the extent of political corruption in the urban evacuee property was revealed by a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, Mohammad Afzal Cheema, who blaming the Punjab Muslim League leaders revealed on the floor of the House:

...Mr Speaker...Without disclosing the name of any honourable member of this assembly, I can inform to this House, with full reliability and trust, that many seasoned members of this assembly...have illegally occupied the big houses and bungalows [of the migrating Hindus and Sikhs]... considering them as rewards of their services for the creation of Pakistan...⁹⁴

Little attention has been paid about the recovery of Partition's illegally held properties. Undoubtedly, time to time the Punjab authorities warned that legal action would be taken against the 'looters' and the deadlines were issued to surrender the evacuee properties. There were occasionally police drives to recover looted property. For example, the district police drive in mid-September 1947 in both Sialkot and Gujranwala recovered property worth about Rs 170,000 and 100,000 respectively.⁹⁵ Occasionally, 'strict warnings' were issued to the refugees to surrender voluntarily 'illegal transactions' that they had obtained on the basis of 'interpolated or bogus claims'. Such warnings and deadlines were rarely observed or implemented. The beneficiaries maintained their occupations by paying off local and provincial administrators and the police.

Some serious efforts were made by the military regime of Ayub Khan (1958-69) to recover 'unauthorisedly held' properties. This is evidenced from a 1959 recovery operation of the Enforcement Staff and Evacuee Property Intelligence Bureau, in which it 'unearthed hidden evacuee property' worth over Rs 20,000,000.⁹⁶ The following year, the Directorate of Enforcement discovered urban evacuee property alone worth about Rs 70,000,000, besides the illegal occupied agricultural land.⁹⁷ It is clear that the officials and politicians succumbed to the temptations of handling evacuee property to the detriment of genuine refugee claims, but the way in which competition for resources generated conflict between the refugee and local groups, as well as exposed the fissures between the centre and provinces during the period that straddled independence, require much more careful study.

URBAN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Early in 1950, the authorities in Punjab carried out a survey of people who were still living on the pavements of cities and towns. The great majority of estimated 581,000 required 'housing'. Sheikh Fazal Ilahi, the Punjab Refugee Minister, declared that at least 200,000 houses were required to solve the housing problems of the displaced persons in the province.⁹⁸ To address immediate refugee requirement, new housing schemes were designed to meet the different needs of the displaced persons coming to the cities. This resulted in an unprecedented urban expansion of the cities and towns of the province through the development of new residential and commercial areas. Refugees were allocated one or two room accommodations, depending on the extent of their compensation claim. The creation of additional housing facilities in the cities meant that refugees not only came to acquire permanent homes, but also a semblance of permanence in their daily lives.

The Urban Rehabilitation Department constituted the West Punjab Housing and Settlement Agency under the chairmanship of Khan Mohammad Leghari in 1948. The schemes were designed to meet the requirements of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, who could not be accommodated in abandoned houses. The Improvement Trusts were set up for planning and procuring land for the construction of 'satellite town schemes' in various towns. In less than a decade, thirty-three satellite towns and refugee colonies in thirteen different urban areas were constructed. The total estimated cost, in 1960, of the satellite towns' schemes came to Rs 112,000,000.⁹⁹ However, the newly-constructed posh 'satellite towns' did not solve the acute housing shortage. These new housing schemes were primarily designed to meet the standards of the rich and upper classes, and were unaffordable for the poor class of refugees. In 1958, under the military regime of Ayub Khan, a rapid survey of the displaced persons was carried out through the local authorities; it was found that there were still around 146,700 families of displaced persons in thirty-five towns, requiring housing facilities of one type or another.¹⁰⁰ In 1959, the central government set aside Rs 118,700,000 as a grant, in addition to a loan of Rs 20,000,000, for the

construction of cheap housing. Over 6,300 two-room quarters or extensions were planned in different satellite town schemes. Additionally 3,800 new sites were also developed and over 3,000 houses constructed, involving an expenditure of Rs 13,984,806. In addition to this, in 1960, the central government developed cheap housing schemes of 'one and two-roomed nucleus houses' to meet the needs of 13,397 families. There was further construction of 35,534 'developed plots' for low-income families. To meet the needs of 28,988 'low-income groups of displaced families', the Lahore Township Scheme was designed, which was to be completed by the end of 1968.¹⁰¹

Housing on its own could not ease the problems of refugees. They urgently required some means of living. It was not just the refugees but locals who had suffered from the dislocation of trade and industry, which had left behind a large labour population without jobs. This included not only around 300,000 urban refugees but around 100,000 urban locals as well, who had lost their jobs because of the economic consequences of Partition.¹⁰² Monthly wages of industrial labourers declined to below Rs 75. The industries of the Punjab faced acute shortages of managerial, technical, and the entrepreneur classes. Production also suffered due to shortage of capital and non-availability of raw materials, absence of normal trade channels and transport due to marketing difficulties. There was also an acute shortage of trained staff in the banking sector.

The government fully recognised the serious scale of the problem. The twentieth meeting of the Pakistan-Punjab Refugees Council on 24 October 1948 took some important decisions to overcome the difficulties facing the industries of the province. Under the aegis of the Council, five committees were set up. These included the General Economic Committee to supervise the general rehabilitation of the economic life of the province, the Industries Committee to formulate plans for starting new industries, and the Public Work Committee to explore the possibility of utilising refugee labour on public welfare. To assist refugees in finding suitable employment, the government planned various schemes and used Employment Exchanges. The Ministry of Labour provided technical and vocational training. Some training-cum-work centres for refugees were opened in the refugee



camp. Refugees could engage in paid work while acquiring new skills such as spinning, weaving, and knitting. All these steps were taken to address the shortage of skills. The well-known Hailey College of Commerce, the University of Punjab, started additional evening classes for training bank employees and other staff in 'accounting and elementary education of banking'. At the same time, different financial institutions sent their 'newly-recruited staff' for training to the college. The Lahore Central Co-operative Department also started its own banking classes and courses for training clerks for the co-operative banks.¹⁰³ In mid-1948, the Muslim Commercial Bank opened in Lahore. There were also six Employment Training Centres and five Vocational Centres. They not only provided training, but also helped in 'exploring employment opportunities'. By mid-1949, these institutions had trained about 6,500 people.¹⁰⁴

Most of the factories were looted or damaged during Partition-related disturbances. Out of 2,900 unregistered factories, 135 undertakings were found to be in 'unauthorised possession', and 115 were badly damaged. By 1950, 1,654 factories had been allotted. On the basis of a comprehensive survey, a high-powered Development Board was set up to coordinate as well as to prioritise development schemes under the chairmanship of the Chief Minister of Punjab. The Punjab government developed many schemes for which finances were obtained from the Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation, the Refugees Rehabilitation Finance, and the Central Government Development Loan Fund. Another important step was the setting up of the Industrial Facilities Promotion Committee to assist and advise industrialists in matters relating to the acquisition of land, procurement of raw materials, machinery, power resources, railway sidings, trained personnel, and marketing facilities. The committee was thus designed to motivate private enterprise. In addition to this, there was the Punjab Provincial Co-operative Bank and the network of Central Co-operative Banks and societies in the province and various districts. The total working capital of all the co-operative banks in the province was Rs 160,705,679. There were about 400 industrial co-operatives societies operating in the Punjab.¹⁰⁵

The Punjab government thus made considerable efforts to support the restoration of normal commercial activity in the province. At the

national level, in 1948, the first central bank of the country, the State Bank of Pakistan, was set up and capitalised at Rs 30,000,000. In 1949, to cope with finance, the Small Scale and Cottage Industries Development Corporation, with an authorised capital of Rs 5,000,000, was established.¹⁰⁶ The following year, the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was created with an amount of Rs 30,000,000. This had the responsibility to provide medium and long-term capital to the industry, where private capital and enterprise was inadequate. The Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Finance Corporation mainly funded refugee craftsmen. Alongside were the Refugee Artisans and Craftsmen Rehabilitation Committee and the Pakistan Spinners and Weavers Association. In 1950, the Government of Pakistan launched the Small Business Corporation, aimed at small entrepreneurs in the industrial field. The main strategy was to provide capital to existing enterprises and to create new industrial establishments. By April 1951, the centre government had granted Rs 340,000,000 for economic development. This was described as the 'largest grant for rehabilitation in Punjab.'¹⁰⁷

To conclude, Partition-related migration brought immense socio-economic challenges for the new Pakistan state. Many major cities of the Punjab now had half their population comprising of Muslim refugees from India. Both the national and provincial governments directed huge resources to deal with the problem of refugee rehabilitation, including the provision of housing and employment. But while Partition initially brought huge problems, it also created new opportunities for both the refugees and the locals. They were also to fill the economic niches left by the departing Hindus and Sikhs. This unstudied aspect of the aftermath of Partition will form the focus of Chapters 5 and 6 in the case studies of Gujranwala and Sialkot. We will turn first, however, to a localised study of the patterns of violence and migration. Gujranwala and Sialkot shared in the violence and dislocation which took place across the Punjab. Despite this, not much has been written about the circumstances in which their Hindu and Sikh populations fled to India, or about the reverse inward migration of Muslims.



NOTES

1. S. Ansari, 'A Tricky Transition: Sindh- Centre Relations 1947-1949', paper presented at the Birmingham University workshop on the theme *Rethinking the Partition of the Indian Subcontinent*, (23 October 2006); and also see *Life After Partition*.
2. In the wake of British Prime Minister Attlee's announcement that by June 1948 British political power in India would be completely withdrawn, the attention of both the Muslim League and Congress particularly turned at once to the two provinces—the Punjab and the NWFP—which had Muslim majorities, but pro-Congress governments. Whichever parties retained control of those provinces up until June 1948 would seem certain to hold power when the British quit. For the background to both the agitation and to Punjab politics after the formation of the Unionist party see I. Talbot, *Khizr Tiwana, The Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India* (London: Curzon, 1996), pp. 145-56.
3. 'Wreckage of Punjab', *The Times* (London) 18 March 1947, p. 5.
4. Minutes of Mountbatten's interview with Sardar Patel, 25 April 1947, *TOP*, Vol. X, Doc, 216, p. 425.
5. Jenkins to Wavell, 17 March 1947, *Disturbances in the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents* (Islamabad: NDC, 1994), p. 100.
6. *Inquilab* (Lahore) 15 March 1947, p. 3.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 April 1947, *TOP*, Vol. X, Doc, 263, p. 506.
9. 'Pre-Partition Riot Spotlight', *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 21 October 1949, p. 6.
10. Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 April 1947, *TOP*, Vol. X, Doc, 263, p. 506. In the later weeks of 1947, according to different intelligence sources, Master Tara Singh was being kept informed of the trains scheduled for Pakistan and was giving directions to perpetrators by the means of a wireless. He was also reported purchasing rifles and grenades, and was planning to blow up 'the Pakistan Special [train carrying staff and their families between Delhi and Karachi] with remote control firing apparatus and after wrecking the Special, to set it on fire, and shoot the occupants'. See for example Jenkins to Mountbatten, 9 August 1947, Mountbatten Papers, Mss Eur F200/193, O.I.O.C.
11. *Inquilab* (Lahore) 25 April 1947, p. 3.
12. Talbot, *Divided Cities*, p. 58.
13. Fortnightly Report, Governor's letter to Mountbatten, 30 July 1947, L/P&J/5/250, O.I.O.C.
14. Fortnightly Report of First Half of June 1947, L/P&J/5/250, O.I.O.C.
15. Fortnightly Report of Second Half of June 1947, L/P&J/5/250, O.I.O.C.
16. Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty*, p. 531.
17. Minutes of the Joint Defence Council Meeting, 16 August 1947, Mountbatten Papers, Mss Eur F200/130, O.I.O.C.
18. 'Punjab Security Arrangement for Partition', Jenkins to Abell, 13 August 1947, Mountbatten Papers, Mss Eur F200/130, O.I.O.C.
19. *The Partition of the Punjab 1947*, p. 230.

20. Jenkins to Mountbatten, 13 August 1947, L/P&J/5/250, O.I.O.C.
21. Note by Field Marshal Auchinleck, 15 August 1947, *TOP*, Vol. XII, Doc, 486, p. 736.
22. Rees Collections, Punjab Boundary Force, Mss Eur D 807/2, O.I.O.C.
23. Mudie Papers, The Sikhs in Action, Mss Eur F164/23, O.I.O.C.
24. For details see Minutes of the Joint Defence Council Meeting, 16 August 1947, Mountbatten Papers, Mss Eur F200/130, O.I.O.C. Also see Jenkins Papers, Mss Eur D 803/3, O.I.O.C.
25. For the case of Jhang see the Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week Ending 13 September 1947, p. 456, NIHCR; and for the case of Mianwali see *Nawa-i-Wakt* (Lahore) 6 October 1947, p. 1.
26. Note by Major General D. C. Hawthorn, 11 August 1947, *TOP*, Vol. XII, Doc, 432, p. 667.
27. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week Ending 23 August 1947, p. 420, NIHCR.
28. FIR no. 412, Note Book no. 6, 29 August 1947, Thana Mozang, DPRO, Lahore.
29. R. Jeffrey, 'The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problem of Order, August 1947', *Modern Asian Studies*, 8, 4 (1974), pp. 491-520; D.P. Marston, 'The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, 1945-1947', *War in History*, 16, 4 (2009), pp. 469-505.
30. FIR no. 207, Note Book no. 18/1, 14 August 1947, Thana Mozang, DPRO, Lahore.
31. FIR no. 403, Note Book no. 13/56, 14 August 1947, Thana Mughal Pura, DPRO, Lahore.
32. I. Talbot, Epicentre of Violence in West Punjab: The Sheikhpura District, unpublished paper presented to a conference on *Rethinking 1947 Partition Violence in Punjab*, Southampton University, (15-16 April 2010).
33. 'Sikhs Slaughtered at Shaikpura [sic]', *The Times* (London) 29 August 1947, p. 4.
34. For details see 'Nehru's Tour of Riot Areas', *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi) 2 September 1947, p.1.
35. For the involvement of the army veterans in orchestrating Partition violence see S. Wilkinson, Veterans and Ethnic Cleansing: Evidence from the Partition of India, unpublished paper presented to a conference on *Rethinking 1947 Partition Violence in Punjab*, Southampton University, (15-16 April 2010); and also see I. Kamtekar, 'The Military Ingredient of Communal Violence in Punjab 1947', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 56 (1995), pp. 568-72.
36. Mudie Papers, The Sikhs in Action, Mss Eur F164/23, pp. 50-51 and 60, O.I.O.C. A correspondence from Nehru to Patel evidenced genocide in Patiala: 'Story of designs and resistance of Muslims [is] false and fantastic. They died like goats and sheep. About a *lakh* murdered in whole State; about 12,000 in Patiala alone. Whole families wiped out'. For details see Nehru to Patel, 5 October 1947, Durga Das (ed.), *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-1950* (Ahmadabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1971-4), Vol. I, p. 50. Also see Copland, 'The Master and the Maharajas'.
37. 'Indian Army's Hard Task', *The Times* (London) 26 September 1947, p. 4.



38. Col. Peter Green, 'Eyewitness to the end of Empire', *Canberra Times*, 15 August 1987, (Peter Green Papers, Mss Eur C416, O.I.O.C).
39. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Weeks Ending 13 & 27 September, 1947, pp. 456 and 471, NIHCR.
40. FIR no. 340, Note Book no. 512, 23 August 1947, Thana Mozang, DPRO, Lahore.
41. FIR no. 377, Note Book no. 2/147, 12 August 1947, Thana Mughal Pura, DPRO, Lahore.
42. Singh, *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab*, pp. 508-9.
43. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, the Government of Pakistan, 128/CF/48, File No. 36, p. 4, NDC.
44. The powerful images of refugees can be seen in the correspondence of *Life Magazine*, Margaret Bourke-White, *Halfway to Freedom: A Report on the New India in the Words and Photos of Margret Bourke-White* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949); Khushwant Singh's fictional presentation has captured the emotion and fear of these train journeys experienced by some two million people. K. Singh, *Train to Pakistan* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1956).
45. Aiyar, 'August Anarchy', p. 23. In *Train to Pakistan*, the saboteurs use a thick steel wire tied atop two poles across the railway track. The plan is to derail the train when it hits the steel wire and then kill all the passengers. In a poignant climax, the hero cuts the steel wire and falls on the tracks only to be crushed by the passing train that carries his beloved and their unborn child safely across the border.
46. A Muslim refugee special train, for example, left Ambala and was derailed near the Sikh princely state of Patiala, resulting in 129 casualties and 200 serious injuries. A subsequent enquiry report pointed out the accident occurred 'due to the train having been directed on to a deadline instead of the mainline, which is attributable either to gross negligence of the railway staff or a deep-seated conspiracy. The Station A.S.M. pointsman and the driver have been arrested'. For the report of the Shambhu Train Accident see Singh, *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab*, Doc, 193, p. 565.
47. 'Remembering Partition: A Dialogue between Javeed Alam and Suresh Sharma.' *Seminar*, 461 (January 1998), pp. 98-104.
48. Pandey, *Routine Violence*, p. 33; and also see 'The Prose of Otherness', pp. 188-121; *Remembering Partition*.
49. FIR no. 313, Note Book no. 13/50, 12 August 1947, Thana Mughal Pura, DPRO, Lahore.
50. A. Jalal, 'Nation, Reason and Religion: The Punjab's Role in the Partition of India', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 33, 32, (8-14 August 1998), p. 2189.
51. *Inquilab* (Lahore), 22 February 1948, p. 4. Earlier, a minister of Pakistan Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan stated that over 53,000 Muslim women alone were abducted in East Punjab. For the details of the statement see *Inquilab* (Lahore), 10 January 1948, p. 2.
52. S. Ansari, 'Children, Citizenship and the State in 1950s Pakistan', paper presented at the Royal Holloway College, University of London, workshop on the

- theme *From Subjects to Citizens: Society and the Everyday State in Indian and Pakistan 1947-1964* (12 August 2009).
53. *Inquilab* (Lahore), 3 February 1948, p. 2.
 54. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, 128/CF/48, File No. 36, p. 3 and Appendix Dix (B), NDC. For the Muslim women's experiences of Partition-related violence see Virdee, 'Negotiating the Past'; F.A. Khan, 'Speaking Violence: Pakistani Women's Narratives of Partition', in N.C. Behera, (ed.), *Gender, Conflict and Migration* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006), pp. 97-115.
 55. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 23 December 1949, p. 10.
 56. Khan, *The Great Partition*, p. 156.
 57. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, File no. B50, Appendix A, p. 9, NDC.
 58. *Inquilab* (Lahore), 11 March 1948, p. 3.
 59. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 11 December 1949, p. 7.
 60. Budgets of the Central Government of Pakistan for the years 1947-48 to 1951-52, Book No, F6, B, p. 14, PSA.
 61. According to an estimate the people of Lahore alone supplied, on average, about 500 *maunds* of *chapattis* and cooked food every day for a period of about six months for the refugees of the three camps at Wagha, Bowli, and Walton. By April 1948, the Quaid-i-Azam Fund had collected over Rs 20,000,000. *Inquilab* (Lahore), 13 April 1948, p. 2.
 62. *Inquilab* (Lahore), 12 January 1948, p. 4.
 63. For example, refugees in the Race Course camps in Montgomery attacked the local police and chanted slogans like 'do or die'. The police fired on the refugees and killed twenty-four refugees. *Inquilab* (Lahore), 26 August 1948, p. 1. On 1 July 1948, over 5,000 refugees took over possessions at the front of the Secretariat, Lahore, and the police was called to disperse them. *Inquilab* (Lahore), 2 May 1948, p. 2. In Mandi-Bahauddin, the local people occupied the properties of the refugees and this led to a 'war' between the locals and the refugees. *Inquilab* (Lahore) 10 March 1948, p. 5. In Lahore's Bowli Camp, when refugees protested over the issue of rations, the police fired on them and killed two refugees. 'Terrible Incident of Bowli Camp', *Inquilab* (Lahore), 21 April 1948, p. 1. In Gujranwala, local landlords tried to eject refugees from their land and the incident was halted with the intervention of the district administration. *Inquilab* (Lahore), 2 May 1948, p. 2.
 64. 'Return of Refugees to India', *Inquilab* (Lahore), 13 April 1948, p. 2.
 65. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 23 December 1949, p. 10.
 66. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 26 November 1950, p. 5.
 67. 'Return of Refugees to India', *Inquilab* (Lahore), 9 March 1948, p. 6.
 68. Zamindar, in her recent work, *The Long Partition*, ethnographically tracks the situation of North Indian Muslim families which Partition produced and examines the role of India and Pakistan in introducing permits and passports system to control the influx of moving people.
 69. A note on the work done by the Punjab Government, Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, 128 CF/48/, File 36, p. 14, NDC.
 70. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, 128 CF/48/, File, 36, p. 21, NDC.

71. The records show that the Muslim refugees in West Punjab could receive 4,836,000 of standard acres against the total rural population of refugees of 4,325,000. A scale of 'graded cuts' was introduced, although this was much less than in the Indian Punjab. A maximum limit of allotment was fixed. In order to ensure that every rightful claimant got a share, a cut of 50 per cent was imposed on claims beyond 20,000 units (roughly equal to 250 acres of irrigated land in Lyallpur) and no allotment exceeded 36,000 units, which were roughly equal to 450 acres of irrigated land in Lyallpur. *The Punjab: A Review of First Five Years, 1947-1952*, File E1 (9), A 82 (2), p. 48, PSA.
72. The Governor General's File No. 803, p. 26, NAP.
73. The Governor General's File No. B50, p. 2, NAP. In time, a permanent settlement scheme of land allocation was developed after both the Punjabs had agreed for the exchange of revenue records of rural settlement. From November 1948 up to the end of January 1949, revenue records of 15,184 West Punjab villages had been handed over to the Indian Punjab government, and in return, revenue records had been obtained from India of 14,449 villages of East Punjab and the East Punjab States, and of thirteen villages of Delhi areas. For the details see *Resettlement of Refugees on Land, 1 July to 31 December 1954*, E33, Part XIII, p. 5, PSA.
74. *Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, Part II*, p. 25, PBRR.
75. The authorities divided the places of origin of migrants in India into two main categories. The refugees from East Punjab and East Punjab States fell in the category of 'agreed areas'; all the migrants from other areas were placed in the category of 'non-agreed areas'.
76. Records of Lahore High Court show that hundreds of bogus and multiple allotments were subsequently annulled. See for example *Sahibzadi Naseem Begum versus Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner* (judgement order: NLR-1982-SCJ-1965); *Salamatullah and others versus Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner* (judgement order: 1982 SMR 1120-R of 1966); *Gulab Khan versus Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner* (1982 SCM 630-R/70).
77. *West Pakistan Year Book, 1960*, E1 (12) 1960, PA, pp. 58-9, PSA.
78. The Governor General's File No 804, pp. 13-4, NAP.
79. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, 128/CF/48, File No. 262,-PMS/48, pp. 36-7, NDC.
80. A Note on the work done by the Punjab Government, Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, File No. 36, 128 CF/48/, p. 14, NDC.
81. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, 2 (2)-PMS/48, 26 March, 1948, p. 2, NDC.
82. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, File no. 262,-PMS/48, pp. 36-7, NDC.
83. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 28 February 1948, p. 3.
84. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, File 1350, 20 CF/49/50, p. 2, NDC.
85. Ansari, *Life After Partition*, p. 94.

86. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, 20/CF/49, File no. B.50, p. 18a, NDC.
87. The Policy and Progress of Rehabilitation of Muslim Refugees in the Urban Areas of Punjab up to 31 March 1950, the Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, File no. B.50-20/CF/50, p. 18a, NDC.
88. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, 20/CF/49, File No. B.50, p. 18b, NDC.
89. 'Lahore Scribes Thrive at Expense of Refugees: Resettlement Claims a Vicious Circle', *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 17 July 1954, p. 2.
90. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week Ending 20 September 1947, pp. 468-9, NIHCR.
91. Refugees and Land Settlement, January to June 1955, E33, Part XIV, p. 2, PSA.
92. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 7 July 1950, p. 3.
93. A Note on the work done by the Punjab Government, Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, File No. 36, 128 CF/48/, p. 14, NDC.
94. PLAD, 10 March 1954, File No. D- 50 (4), pp. 922-4, PSA.
95. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week Ending 27 September, 1947, p. 471, NIHCR.
96. West Pakistan Year Book, 1959, E1 (12) 1959, PA, p. 61, PSA.
97. West Pakistan Year Book, 1960, E1 (12) 1960, PA, p. 59, PSA.
98. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 7 May 1950, p. 9.
99. West Pakistan Year Book, 1961, E1 (12) 1961, PA, p. 99, PSA.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, 20/CF/49, File no. B.50, p.18d, NDC.
103. Board of Economic Inquiry West Punjab, Monthly Summary, October 1947-June 1948, p. 4, ISPA.11/4, O.I.O.C.
104. West Punjab Economic Survey, July-September 1949, (Board of Economic Inquiry Publication, West Punjab, Lahore, 1949), p. 13.
105. The Punjab: A Review of First Five Years, 1947-1952, File E1 (9), A 82 (2), pp. 35-6, PSA.
106. Ibid., pp. 34-5.
107. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 11 April 1951, p. 7.

Part II

LOCALITY, VIOLENCE, AND MIGRATION

I can identify the men who murdered my father and took away my mother, provided I see them. One of them appeared to be Bashir Kashmiri. I am a victim of cruel crime; please investigate my case.

– Priya Kaur reported to the Gujranwala Sardar Police Station,
17 June 1947

On 14 August 1947, two police constables, by the names and badges Mohammad Ali Shah Police No 427 and Rahamat Ali Police No 312, perpetrated an attack upon the Hindu *tarkhans* of a village called Shahla (Sialkot)...They forced them to quit the village and looted and even sold their belongings to the local people...

– Sialkot District Police Record, 10 November 1947

3

Partition Violence and Migration in Gujranwala

This chapter reflects on the circumstances which led to the widespread violence and the expulsion of minorities in both Gujranwala city and district in 1947. This locality-driven approach seeks to understand the complex and differential aspects of the localised acts of violence and migration. It draws on hitherto unexplored original sources, including the Punjab Police Intelligence Reports and Gujranwala District Police FIRs to explain the nature, motivation, and purpose of violence at the local level. Use is also made of oral source material to shed light on the experiences of violence and abduction, and further to identify the perpetrators of violence in the region. In the recent years, one important historical contribution has been the increased emphasis on the organisation of violence and the role of paramilitary militias, army troops, and combat veterans in the perpetrating of Partition violence.¹ Yet, the exact identity of the grass-root perpetrators and complicity of the district law enforcement forces is usually fuzzy.

The analysis will, for the first time, shed light on the leading role of the local *Lohars*, who were in the forefront of attacks on the refugee trains that passed through the region, carrying Hindus and Sikhs to India. Much of the violence in Gujranwala was planned, which fits in with the emerging insights produced by locality-based studies elsewhere in the Punjab. Interestingly, however, the police records, despite the evidence they provide to the contrary, persist in regarding the violence as communal mob attacks which were unorganised. Evidence of planning is clear in local episodes, as well as in the largest incidence of killing in the district, the Kamoke train



attack, which forms an important case study for the chapter. The chapter not only considers the partisan official and police response to the Muslim perpetrators of violence, but also reveals the local policemen's direct involvement in looting and large-scale murders of Gujranwala's Hindus and Sikhs. It begins with a description of the growing tension and violence in the city and its surrounding areas from March 1947 onwards. This, in particular, established a pattern of partisan official and police responses, which were later to account for the large numbers of deaths due to the intense violence that accompanied the transfer of power in August 1947.

PARTITION VIOLENCE IN GUJRANWALA

Until recently, nothing has been written about the extent of Partition violence and the emptying of minorities in Gujranwala town and district. The locality was badly hit in 1947, and by the end of the year the entire population of Hindus and Sikhs was forced to quit the city. Violence in Gujranwala rose with the Muslim League's street mobilization against the Khizr Tiwana government, as it sought political gains, as elsewhere in the Punjab. On 1 March 1947, one day before the resignation of Tiwana as premier of Punjab, over one thousand people took out processions in the streets of the city with a variety of slogans such as *Khizro Toddy Bacha Haay Haay* (Khizr, a stooge of the British), *Ban Ka Ray Ga Pakistan*; *Lar Kay Lengey Pakistan* (Pakistan would be achieved at any cost). That day's gatherings ended with the hoisting of the green Muslim League flag on the building of Gujranwala's Magistrates Court by some passionate members of the MLNG. The hoisting of a Muslim League flag upon the public buildings was regarded as a show of triumph against 'other' communities. For the minorities of the city, security became the paramount need of the hour in the heightened communal situation.

Against the backdrop of the growing communal tension, preparations for violence were underway in the city, as they were in many of the Punjab's towns. Communal armed bands mushroomed. By the beginning of March 1947, a Special Branch Intelligence Police reported that the strength of the non-Muslim volunteers stood at

about one thousand in Gujranwala.² Equally, the MLNG and the RSS had been drawing immense strength from the students and youths for months. With the burgeoning enrolment of bands and gangs, 'a widespread collection' of funds and arms began. Locally-manufactured arms of Nizamabad and Wazirabad were accessibly available in the district. Their demand had already increased with the March massacres of Hindus and Sikhs at Rawalpindi. By the end of the first week of March, there was 'an unprecedented rush' and stockpiling of various kinds of weapons such as carbines, pistols, spears, *barchees*, swords, daggers, *kirpans*, *kulharis*, and *lathis*. The accumulation of arms and ammunition was not limited to the scared minorities of Gujranwala. 'The members of all communities hurried to arm themselves', a Special Branch Intelligence Police reported on 8 March 1947.³

By the end of the first week of March, within a few days of the fall of the Khizr government and soon after the incident of Rawalpindi killings, life within the inner city was disrupted by isolated cases of arson and stabbings. These initial violent episodes sowed deep apprehension among the minorities of the city. In early March, for the first time a 48-hour curfew was imposed in the city as a preventive measure, and afterwards, whenever there appeared to be tension and trouble. However, the introduction of curfew alone could not provide the necessary assurance to Gujranwala's non-Muslim residents, and sporadic disturbances continued throughout March. On 22 March, on Pakistan Day, a large number of Hindus and Sikhs paraded on the streets of the city, observing 'Anti-Pakistan Day' and chanting slogans against the Muslim League. The disturbances and communal incidents in the surrounding areas also affected the city. For example, the burning of a Hindu sweet-shop in neighbouring Wazirabad city caused 'a great panic' in Gujranwala city. News and rumours spread rapidly. There was a rumour circulating in the city that many non-Muslims were fleeing.

Communal sentiment continued to simmer throughout April. People began collecting illegally manufactured bombs and other forms of explosives. Bombs were now being manufactured in the inner city. A number of episodes were reported of accidents involving the manufacture of homemade bombs. On 4 April, for example, a



Hindu in the locality of Baghban Pura severely injured himself making a bomb which exploded. Five days later, a Sikh in Guru Nanak Pura *mohalla* injured himself in the same way. In early May, the callous murder of a well-known Muslim Pir Sahib near the Civil Line Police Station aggravated the communal temperature further, in the already tense city of Gujranwala. At the end of the month, riots broke out following an explosion in the Kakeen Rai area. The trouble spread to the Hindu and Sikh localities of Guru Gobind Garh and Guru Nanak Pura, where shops and properties were looted and gutted. The continuously tense situation led the district magistrate to impose a 48-hour curfew in the non-Muslim localities.⁴ Rigid curfew brought the disorders under control. Nevertheless, retaliation became the order of the day. The city divided entirely along communal lines and minorities felt safe only in their own localities. By the time of the announcement of the June 3 Partition Plan, preparations for a communal battle had accelerated. There were fourteen cases of incendiarism and stabbings reported in the city. Muslims and non-Muslims vied with each other in this war of attacks on other communities. Different groups of young hooligans were roaming in the city. Sporadic ambushes and assaults on the minorities became one of the prime crimes of the day. These included an attack by a gang of nine Muslims on two young Sikhs who were cycling by the city railway station. One Sikh was brutally axed to death while the other narrowly escaped and reported to the city's Sadar Police Station, providing a sketch identification of the killers.⁵

At this point, the district law and enforcement agencies appeared relatively dysfunctional, and crime was being committed with relative impunity. Although cases were registered, they were not followed up and the reality was that no one was ready to stand as a witness. In one instance, a young Hindu woman revealed the identity of a culprit to the local police: 'I can identify the men who murdered my father and took away my mother, if I see them. One of them appeared Bashir Kashmiri. I am a victim of cruel crime; please investigate my case'.⁶ Such isolated episodes could be seen as attempts to cow the minorities of the city, if not drive them out. Moreover, the minorities viewed the predominantly Muslim police of the city as unreliable and partisan. This resulted not just from the generally deteriorating communal

situation, but from isolated attacks, especially on night patrols, by non-Muslims. On 21 June, for example, an on duty Muslim Police Foot Constable was assaulted.⁷ Again the increasingly 'acute' situation was met by the imposition of a 72-hour curfew in the city. This time, despite the deployment of the troops, the situation could not be brought totally under control and some people were arrested 'disobeying curfew orders' and carrying arms with them.⁸ The situation grew more serious by the beginning of the first week of July. A government publicity van which toured the city to proclaim curfew was attacked and the Muslim announcer was killed. The incident made the situation very tense and several cases of the stabbing of Hindus and Sikhs were reported in the city. Sikh and Hindu properties in Guru Nanak Pura, Lohianwala, Dhullay, and Sayad Nagar areas were looted and destroyed. This episode was not only an important signal to the minorities that they could not win the struggle for power in the city, but also a message that this could be done with impunity and the law enforcement agencies were not going to protect them. Growing tension led the district authority to describe it as being at 'boiling' point. This state of affairs led the Governor of Punjab, Evan Jenkins, to report to the Viceroy Mountbatten that Gujranwala which had been 'simmering for some time, boiled over on 4th July, when there were several stabbing incidents.'⁹

Amidst such a 'deeply engrained hatred', wealthy Hindus started to sell their properties and shift their capital out of Gujranwala. In early July, the district authorities received intelligence reports which warned: 'Gujranwala Hindu businessmen are contemplating moving their assets elsewhere and hatred between the communities appears to be deeply engrained.'¹⁰ There were some frantic attempts to try and prevent retaliatory violence in the city. For example, on 11 July, a peace committee meeting of some leading members of all communities was called in the city town hall. In this, a well-known Hindu lawyer, Niranjan Das, acted as an important go-between. The peace efforts received a major setback when he was callously murdered as he tried to pacify an angry mob which he encountered on his way back from the meeting. His efforts to rescue an injured Muslim led to his own death.¹¹ This horrific incident acted as a catalyst for further violence in the city and prompted anticipatory

migration by wealthy Hindus and Sikhs. One instance was that of a leading entrepreneur, Ram Gopal Arora, who sold off his iron-workshop and other businesses to a local Muslim foreman of the workshop and shifted his assets to 'India'.¹² This trend of anticipatory migration of the business class was by no means unique to Gujranwala. Such writers as Ian Talbot and Ravinder Kaur, have pointed to the anticipatory flight of wealthy Hindus out of Lahore in the months leading up to independence.¹³

On 3 August, Sunder Dass Midhah, the Hindu deputy commissioner, was replaced by a Muslim, Pir Mubarak Ali Shah. The former was well-respected for the way in which he had dealt with the law and order situation in the district, with firmness and efficiency, and with the predominantly Muslim police force. His replacement at another time might not have been as alarming to the city's Sikhs and Hindus, but at this juncture it served to emphasize the helplessness of the minorities. As Shah took over charge of the district's law and enforcement agencies, many houses, shops, and warehouses in inner-city areas were raided. The searches of the area on 9 August recovered thirty-six bombs of different types and two grenades from the possession of a Sikh Granthi. From now onwards police raids on non-Muslims were considered as attacks by them. In some places, police faced counter-attacks in such raids. In one example, a police picket in Guru Nanak Pura was fired at from the rooftop of a Sikh house, wounding two policemen. An immediate raid on the locality arrested five Sikhs.¹⁴ These searches were primarily of Sikh rather than Muslim areas. They suggest a partisan attitude, as does the failure of the authorities to deal with the control and suppression of violence, when properties in the Hindu and Sikh localities of Guru Nanak Pura, Guru Gobind Garh, Hakim Rai, Mandi Khajurwali, Brahm Akhara, Chauk Chashma, and the Sheikhpura Gate area, were being looted and destroyed. The Hari Singh Nalwa bazaar represented the look of total destruction when Hindu businesses and properties were looted on the eve of independence. Those who resisted the destruction of 13 August were killed. One of the most brutal and shocking murders was that of the well-known Dr Tej Bhan of Gujranwala by an 'unknown' man. As the date of independence arrived, a situation of preparation for civil war almost prevailed in the district. Hindus and Sikhs moved

from their cut-off *mohallas* and deserted bazaars to the city's Khalsa College and Gurdwara. Refugees from outlying villages and towns also arrived in the city. Their full-scale evacuation was started by the MEO in mid-September and within two months the majority had migrated to India. By early-November, there were still over 16,000 refugees, mainly from the rural areas, awaiting their departure from the Gujranwala city camps.¹⁵

While Muslims held the upperhand, Sikhs were also preparing for attack, as is evidenced by the following report of a local *Lambardar* Ghulam Haider about his Sikh counterpart Sardar Lal Singh of a village Basiwala.

Sardar Lal Singh, son of Bago Singh, caste Khatri, is very much a Congress like-minded person in village Basiwala. He has always been involving in malicious propoganda against the Muslims. Often, the different *Jathas* of Sikhs used to arrive in his place and he always entertains them very well. Today after-noon, a Sikh *Jatha* of between 25 and 30 Sikhs armed with *kirpans* came from Eminabad to Basiwala and Sardar Lal Singh entertained them with cold water. Lives of the Muslims of Basiwala are in consistent danger. It is submitted please make some adequate arrangements for the protection of local Muslims'.¹⁶

Indeed in some places, Sikhs and Hindus were the aggressors rather than victims. The reports of Sikhs' attacks on Muslims appear repeatedly in the files of Gujranwala Sadar Police Station. For example, a police report lists the following string of 'communal riot' crimes: a Kashmiri Muslim flower-seller narrowly saved in *mohalla* Baghban Pura; a young Muslim was found dead in Sharawala Chowk; a Gujar Muslim was murdered in Dhullay; a tailor was assaulted in the locality of Sayad Nagar; three persons were found dead, including a woman, at Eminabad Road, and so on.¹⁷ A report of the SGPC boasted that 'the Hindus and Sikhs of Gujranwala were a well-organised and fearless people, and gave back to the Muslims better than they got. Especially [when] the Gurdawara was attacked, from which Sikhs kept their assailants well at bay'.¹⁸

When violence spread from the major towns to the villages or *qasbahs* it took on a new intensity not only in the Gujranwala district, but throughout the Punjab. Unlike wealthy and educated Hindus and



Sikhs living in the city, poor and rural communities who lacked resources, political awareness, and hesitated to abandon their traditional cultivable land were the ones who bore the brunt of the violence. Violence was directed by various gangs against them aimed at driving them out through fear, looting, and murderous means. The worst violence in Gujranwala occurred in the outlying towns and villages of Kamoke, Eminabad, Hafizabad, Ram Nagar (present-day Rasul Nagar), and Akalgarh (present-day Alipur). According to an estimate, two thousand Hindus and Sikhs were killed in Akalgarh alone and over two hundred women were abducted.¹⁹ There were about 150 non-Muslims killed in Kamoke. Their grain depots, flour mills, and husking factories were looted and burned. Many took refuge in the Gurdwara of Dam Dama Sahib. Similarly the Sikhs of Eminabad took refuge in the Gurdwara Rori Sahib.

Violence in Gujranwala district was frequently marked by its cold-blooded organisation. The attacks were not the work of a few manic belligerents, but organised violence was a feature of the attacks in the district as throughout the Punjab, although some scholars still try to maintain that it was a spontaneous occurrence. Some attacks were carried out by 'outsiders', while others were by the 'locals'. In a few instances there were mass war-bands, drawn more from the local population who were motivated by the desire to loot. Some attacks on refugee trains were systematically carried out by the *Lohars* of the region with the connivance of the local railway staff. In many instances, they had purpose and meaning, though they rationalised their activities in terms of the attacks on Muslims in East Punjab, by killing Hindus and Sikhs, and expelling them from their properties. They carried out the attacks with impunity because of the breakdown of government authority.

Criminal incidents continued to be reported, as we can see from the local police records. Although, sometimes, the incidents were reported by the privileged members of Hindus and Sikhs, the registered cases, in many instances, were reported either by the local *Lambardars*, both by Muslims and non-Muslims, or by the law enforcement forces, rather than the victims themselves. Such statements, thus, did not reflect the victims' descriptions of the incidents. The umbrella term '*hamlahawar*' [attackers] was used in

the police FIRs to denote a broad spectrum of alleged groups, ranging from the various members of 'local' populations to habitual criminals, emerged as perpetrators, organisers, or accomplices of the violence and looting. There were few prosecutions, or attempts to investigate these episodes, which were merely noted and now provide sources for the historian. Included in such records, for example, was the case of a young Hindu man, who was murdered by some 'unidentified men' at Naushehra Virkan main road.²⁰ The reported cases ranged from petty trouble-making to large-scale murders. The desire for looting was a prominent feature of Partition violence. In one instance, a 'nameless' Muslim murdered an eighty-year-old Sikh couple while sleeping on their rooftop, merely in order to loot their belongings in the house.²¹ In another instance, mass raiders drawn from the local population outnumbered the victims. In a village, Tata Chanwa, the lure of loot attracted a mob of over 2,500 Muslim villagers to attack a relatively small population of Hindus and Sikhs, as is evidenced by the following report of a Muslim *Lambardar* of the village to the Gujranwala police:

Today, a big crowd of over 2,500 Muslim villagers attacked Tata Chanwa. After seeing such a big gathering of people attacking the village, local Hindus and Sikhs left their houses unlocked and ran away...Some Hindus and Sikhs had already gone and locked their houses. *Hamlahawars* looted their houses and took away everything...They set alight some houses after looting.²²

In a similar way, in a village Kanginwala, about two miles south of Gujranwala city, some 'outsider' Muslim '*hamlahawars*' attacked its Hindus and Sikhs in the early hours of the morning, hiding their identity in darkness. Prior to the attack, some of them consistently fired in the air to make a big noise so that the 'influential landowners' could vacate their houses for fear of harm. A local Sikh *Lambardar*, Kharak Singh, reported the incident to the district police the following day:

I am a *Lambardar* [of Kanginwala] where half Muslims and half Hindu and Sikh residents live. All Muslims are either *kamies* or tenants while Hindus and Sikhs are landowners. Therefore they were not in a position



to attack the Hindus and Sikhs. Yesterday, early morning when there was time of *Azan-i- Fajr* [call for prayer] and most of people were still at their homes, all of sudden a big noise [of gun-fire] was heard, this was continued for a while. I abruptly rushed to my rooftop and saw a crowd of between 40 and 50 people was coming to the village. Without any pause, their gun-fires continued. The people of the village were running here and there to save their lives. My family took refuge in nearby sugarcane fields in the north side of the village. Some fires of a gun hurt one of my arms. Armed *hamlahawars* were Muslims. Because it was dark at time and was also raining, I was not able to identify the men. As the danger was over, I have rushed to the *thana* to report about this incident.²³

The attacks on both Tata Chanwa and Kanginwala point to the nature of violence in Gujranwala. They suggest that far from being a spontaneous occurrence, such attacks were marked by their cold-blooded planning and execution. Moreover, such massive gatherings could not occur spontaneously, nor did they acquire their weaponry without advance planning. In fact, various organised groups of criminal gangs arranged the attacks and drove out non-Muslims and looted their properties. While the attackers operated in groups of limited numbers, their social support base was extended to the majority. Taking advantage of the disturbed conditions, the local population mopped up after the raids, in expectation of loot and amassing properties. They carried off what they thought was their share, and there was nothing to prevent them from taking advantage of the spoils of raids. In many raids and operations, the looted booty ranged from valuable ornaments to merely a couple of duvets. Looting carried out with 'social approval', in the same way that Paul Brass has pointed out that 'the communal situation made such looting inevitable and acceptable to nearly everyone except the victims.'²⁴

Such attacks could occur because of the quiescence of local police and officials. They were either genuinely helpless because of the scale of the disorder, or sympathised and connived with the attacks, and in some instances, even individual constables participated in them. It is to this little-studied and vexed issue that we will now turn.

PARTITION VIOLENCE AND ROLE OF THE GUJRANWALA POLICE

The Gujranwala police largely condoned and contributed to the violence, not because of a spontaneous 'temporary madness', as is sometimes associated with Partition-related violence, but because they could act with impunity in an environment of insubordination and administrative breakdown. In some places such as Vanikay Tarar and Naushera Virkan, for instance, local *thanedar* (station house officer in charge of a police station) declared Hindus and Sikhs 'disloyal' to Pakistan. There were also reports that a rural *kafilah*, on its way to the Gujranwala camp, was attacked by a massed band of armed men with the complicity of the local police.²⁵ Some individual constables 'headed' the attacks on the non-Muslim localities and directly participated in 'large-scale' murders and looting.

A fine example of the criminalization of the Gujranwala police is provided by a letter from Lieutenant Colonel P.C. Gupta, in-charge of the 4th Battalion (Sikhs) the Frontier Force Regiment in Gujranwala, to Inspector Sadar Police Station, Gujranwala on 18 August 1947. Gupta wrote the letter after witnessing the scene of violence in the village of Mamnanwali (six miles north of the city of Gujranwala). Here he saw an attack and widespread looting in progress in which 'ten leading men were heading the mob to attack the non-Muslim village'. They were 'apprehended' on the spot by the 'Military Patrol'. In the letter, Gupta listed separately the 'Reasons for their arrest' in the front of the captured criminals' names. 'These men were apprehended while dispersing the mob attacking the village of Mamnanwali where they had already committed large scale Murder and Loot', he continued, both highlighting and underlining the last two words. Of the ten men when Gupta arrested, two of them hailed from Mamnanwali, and they assisted the main perpetrators to figure out the houses and properties of Hindus and Sikhs, while others came from the nearby villages of Arup and Samra. Most troubling of all was the discovery of a 'serving Police Constable in plain clothes' who was 'heading the mob' in attacking and looting the Hindus and Sikhs of Mamnanwali. 'No 739 Police Constable Bashir Ahmed, Gujranwala Police Line...', Gupta concluded, 'committed large-scale killings and

loot in village Mamnanwali. He had a 303 serving rifle and 50 cartridges in his possession.²⁶

Clearly, this kind of behaviour was neither isolated, nor unique to Gujranwala. Such episodes contradict writers like Javeed Alam, who have declared that Partition violence was a spontaneous result of mass frenzy and argue that there was 'no involvement of large organizations.'²⁷ Material drawn from Gujranwala reveals, on the contrary, that violence frequently appeared to be carried out in a systematic and organised way. Serving employees of the local police not only connived with '*hamlahawars*' and 'headed' the attacks, but also participated in looting. Ian Talbot provides similar examples of the 1947 events in Lahore and Amritsar. He emphasises that the 'connivance or participation of the police makes sustained violence possible. Rioters act with impunity because they have no fear of prosecution. Powerful political patrons afford them protection.'²⁸ It is possible to identify that the killings of non-Muslims and looting of their localities in Gujranwala were calculated and well-planned. The violence had elements of a genocidal intent, and was designed to remove non-Muslims from the district, and policemen coordinated and participated in the violence as well. The parallels are shockingly close to episodes of large-scale communal violence in post-independence India, such as the 2002 Gujarat pogrom.

There were some instances of solidarity of ethnic ties even amidst the deep-seated communal animosities and lust for loot. G.D. Khosla, in his account *Stern Reckoning* writes, that in a village Chak Ghazi in Gujranwala district two Jat Muslims, Fateh Mohammad *Lambardar* and Mian Rehmat Khan, 'escorted' the Hindu and Sikh Jats safely to the Akalgarh refugee camp. During my fieldwork, I went to visit the village and interviewed Fateh Mohammad *Lambardar*, who was twenty-five at the time of Partition. He provided the following information that suggests that ethnic ties even in these circumstances could cut across religious identity:

...There were only a few families of Hindus and Sikhs living in [Chak Ghazi] village. Hindus operated grocery shops and Sikhs were peasants like us...Hindus and Sikhs of our village did not suffer at all and migrated to Ali Pur (Akalgarh) camp. Many Sikhs of Ramkay [a neighbouring

village] came to our village and sought help...We not only protected them but also escorted them safely to the camp.²⁹

Such evidence of ethnic ties leading to the protection of religious minorities emerged in many other accounts given by Jats in the district. However this was not reported in the press and has been neglected in historical narratives.

Partition and its accompanying forced migration meant different things to different people. For some people of Mandi-Bahauddin, it was an opportunity to capture the lucrative businesses of Hindu *arheties* (banias), and in lieu, set up their own.³⁰ For large numbers of Muslim Jats and tenants, the departure of the Sikhs held the promise of swift possession of crops, cattle, and land (though land was subsequently allotted to the incoming Muslim refugees). Local Muslims differed in their attitudes to their Hindu and Sikh neighbours. In a village, Chak Bhatti, for example, some of them wanted to exterminate the '*kafirs*' (infidels) while others were of the opinion that they should be converted and then allowed to stay 'unmolested'.³¹ Such hidden stories about making the non-Muslim local population '*dindar*' (new converts) are paralleled in the oral accounts that I collected from the Muslim Jat residents of the Gujranwala district. A long-established resident, *Lambardar* Mohammad (previous name Jagira Singh) of Tata Chanwa, for example, remembers that his family's protection and restoration of property was contingent on conversion. While male adults were spared circumcision, children were circumcised in a special ceremony in a local Mosque. 'My many relatives migrated to India but I decided to remain in Pakistan. Still everybody knows in the region that we were the Sikh before 1947. Some people call us *dindar* and this term has become a sort of identity. Some hesitate to arrange marriages with us', Mohammad narrated.³²

Conversion occurring at the time of Partition is seldom acknowledged. Still little is known about the converts' struggle to acquire acceptance. It is nonetheless evident from reports of the district liaison officers on 'recovered and returned converts' that a large numbers of people involuntarily converted to Islam. According to a report by the Gujranwala District Liaison Officer there were over

2,000 recovered converts in the district to be evacuated to India by the end of April 1948.³³

Police reports reveal instances of old scores being settled in the then prevalent atmosphere of communal animosity. The horrifying murder of *Lambardar* Bahader Singh Ghumman in the village of Kalra Singh, for example, was orchestrated by a Jat Muslim in the disguise of communal strife, in order to solve a fifteen-year old enmity over the issue of disputed agricultural land. In this killing, some local Muslim '*kamies*' and a Christian played the role of mercenaries.³⁴

Like this, many other registered cases in the police FIRs were simply written: '*Ya wakaya farkawarana fasaad maloom huta hay*' (this incident appears like a communal riot), *hamlahawars* were described *na maloom afraad* (unknown/nameless people), and big gatherings were called *mushtihal hajum* (furious and an uncontrollable crowd). Such reports echo British colonial accounts of communal violence which were frequently attributed to spontaneous and furious 'mobs.' Such reporting may have almost unconsciously slipped into the colonial representation of violence. More sinisterly, it may have been adopted to conveniently displace blame for violence, and to remove the need to prosecute locally powerful groups and individuals. As we have already revealed, such reporting ignores the well attested elements of organisation and purpose in communal killings. Moreover, the case material in the section below on the local *Lohar* perpetrators clearly identifies the high level of organisation behind the refugee-train attacks and the connivance of local railway-drivers in them; surprisingly the subsequent police report merely, but conveniently, termed them as a 'communal riot.'

THE LOHARS OF NIZAMABAD: THE PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE

The most chilling killings of Hindus and Sikhs in Gujranwala were perpetrated by the members of *Lohar* community of Nizamabad. Gural Singh's *qasbah*, Mansoorwali, was raided on 24 August and the *hamlahawars* took away '*har cheej*' (everything) belonging to its non-Muslim residents. Singh reported that the following items had

been stolen from his house, and he suspected that the *hamlahawars* were the Nizamabad men.

Four big silver pans, 4 silver glasses, 11 round silver *pateelay* (pans), 4 deep silver *parataw* (pans), 4 knitted *manjaya* (cotes), 5 knitted *pirhee* (sitting cotes), 6 *razaeea* (quilts), 7 bed-spreads/sheets, 14 *kash*, 3 steel trucks, 1 *sandook* (wooden big box), 1 steel *balthe* (bucket), 1 *dapra* (around bucket), 6 *tola* gold necklace, a 4 *masa* gold ring, and a 10 *tola* bracelet.³⁵

Gurpal Singh's suspicion apart, the stories of killings of Hindus and Sikhs, and attacks on their trains by the Nizamabad *Lohars* in August- September 1947, are common even now in the region. Their actions received little official and press attention. They could thus be revealed in full only by ethnographic fieldwork research. Many of the accounts and narratives that I have collected from Nizamabad and its surrounding areas which are reproduced here were not represented in the press and have thus not entered the historical narrative. The popular image of Nizamabad people is brave, brutal, and enterprising. A former resident of Nizamabad, now living in Gujranwala's Gill Road, provided me with the following information during the course of an interview:

Have you heard about 'Nizamabad Lohars'? They are famous for their iron-works expertise. They manufactured cutlery and arms...They were the people who mainly killed the Hindus and Sikhs and looted their properties...The tales of the killings of Hindus and Sikhs in the area are well-known from Gujranwala to Wazirabad...³⁶

As a native of Gujranwala, I had heard similar stories of non-Muslim massacres since my childhood. It was only during the course of fieldwork for this study that I followed up on these popular stories. I utilised local knowledge to track down respondents, and in doing so, discovered hidden stories of Partition that have not found their way into any written accounts. Khosla, in his work *Stern Reckoning*, has briefly mentioned the brutality of Nizamabad *Lohars* on the Hindu and Sikh population, and has pointed out their involvement in the derailment of a refugee train near Wazirabad.³⁷ This apart, the

material on the *hamlahawars* in Gujranwala represents an important advance in historical knowledge by uncovering the actual perpetrators of the violence. The firsthand accounts deliver a graphic account of the violence unleashed upon the Hindus and the Sikhs. They provide evidence of the existence of the organisation and the well-planned raids on trains, and the systematic slaughter of the non-Muslim passengers and the general loot of their processions afterwards. One of the most striking elements uncovered in the eye-witness accounts was that there was, in fact, connivance between the individual railway-drivers and the local *Lohar* perpetrators to stop the trains for ambush at a 'marked point'. Before pursuing this untold story, it is important to point out that Nizamabad was an important centre of the cutlery cottage industry, where hundreds of blacksmith families plied their craft in about thirty iron-workshops and large quantities of knives, *barchees*, daggers, and swords were made and sent to different places in India. Many blacksmiths, with military training during the war-time, had manufactured and reproduced modern weaponry such as carbines. Apart from large defence orders from the colonial state during the war, Nizamabad-forged well-known 'carbines' were accessibly available in the region. There was thus a stockpile of weapons for those who were prepared to use them in the troubled conditions of 1947. Moreover, many *Lohars*, because of their iron-work expertise, were employed in the local railways as drivers, railway-masons, and railway-smiths. Nizamabad's strategic location on both the Wazirabad-Gujranwala and Wazirabad-Sialkot-Jammu main railway lines was also an important factor in attacks on the refugee trains. All the trains on their way to East Punjab as well as to Jammu, arriving from the north, passed through Nizamabad. The *qasbah* and its inhabitants earned notoriety for such attacks on the minorities.

One of the worst train massacres occurred in the outskirts of Nizamabad on the Wazirabad-Jammu railway track on 15 August 1947. Field Marshal Sir Auchinleck reported in his memorandum to a meeting of the Joint Defence Council that, 'On morning 15th August train held up three miles from Wazirabad, casualties estimated 100 killed and 200 wounded by stabbing'. In the same memorandum, he further reported that, 'Fifteen passengers killed in another train

near Wazirabad'.³⁸ The story of this systematic massacre on Hindu and Sikh passengers is well-known in the region, especially in Nizamabad. This was, however, never reported in the press and is not part of the historical narratives. There are eyewitness accounts of the train carnage in Nizamabad itself. An eyewitness, Mohammad Ramzan, who was eighteen at the time and a resident of Nizamabad, provided this detailed and graphic account of the episode:

First, Hindus and Sikhs in India attacked the Muslim trains and killed the Muslims. To take revenge...and desire for loot, they [people of Nizamabad] planned to attack a Hindu and Sikh train...They planned everything with Rahamat Kashmiri who was a train driver of the train [which operated via Wazirabad-Jammu railway track]. He was asked to stop the train [at Sialkot-Jammu railway track] about a mile away from the Nizamabad Railway Station. Rahmat Kashmiri suggested to them to put a couple of big trees in the front of the track because this not only helped him to identify the 'stopping-spot' but could provide a justification to stop the train...More than 200 people with axes, rifles, swords, daggers, and *barchees* concealed themselves in the sugar-cane fields. The train stopped where he [Rahmat Kashmiri] was told to stop, where they had thrown some cut-trees [on the track]. They attacked the train and killed all the people in the train, including children and women. They did not spare a single one...They looted all their belongings and took away their big trunks, carrying on their shoulders and heads...I did not loot anything.³⁹

The involvement of the driver Rahmat Kashmiri was repeated in many other accounts that I collected in Nizamabad. Some eyewitnesses, such as Mohammad Ali, blamed him entirely for the carnage and believed that because of this 'sin' he was punished by God, subsequently throughout his life. Mohammad Ali, who was about twenty at the time and a resident of Nizamabad, provided the following information:

...Yes, I know they [*Lohars* and Kashmiris of Nizamabad] chopped the train and cut into pieces its Hindu and Sikh passengers. That train was on its way to Jammu railway track...They attacked the train only because of loot. All were involved in the attack and loot. Policemen were also there in the train for Hindus' safety. They also helped in killings and loot. The



driver Rahmu (Rahmat Kashmiri) connived with them [*Lohars* and Kashmiris] and he was the real culprit who stopped the train there. They blocked the track by placing trees on it...He [Rahmu] made a mistake. He had even taken [a bribe of] Rs 10,000 from Hindus [and Sikh passengers of the train] and had promised them that he would not stop the train...but he still stopped it there...⁴⁰

The sequence of the events that set in motion the attack on the train questions the explanations of the violence as a spontaneous outburst of revenge. Eye-witnesses of the train carnage are almost unanimous that it was pre-planned and the train-driver, Rahmat Kashmiri, was convinced to stop the train at a 'marked point'. The well-prepared and armed *Lohars*, systematically slaughtered passengers and looted their possessions with remarkable precision. Such episodes not only have parallels with accounts of the 2002 Gujarat attacks on Muslims but contradict such writers as Donald Horowitz, who argue that planned riots may be less deadly than relatively spontaneous violence in which leadership 'rises to the occasion, rather than creates the occasion.'⁴¹

The accounts, in many instances, reveal that the perpetrators were merely engaged in looting occasioned by the administrative breakdown. They rationalised their cold-blooded killings of Hindus and Sikhs in terms of revenge, because of attacks on Muslims elsewhere. They had the social approval of the local population, though limited, for their criminal activities, because of a general belief that they were engaged in jihad. Many, however, bluntly stated that the raids on non-Muslims were prompted by the temptation of loot. Some boasted of their killings and about driving out the Hindus and Sikhs. An elderly *Lohar* of Nizamabad, by the name of Ghulam Nabi, provided an interesting account of his brother's role in the killings of defenceless Hindus and Sikhs. He glorified his actions by saying that this was in 'revenge' for the killings of Muslims in India. 'My brother died three years ago. He was renowned all over the place because of killing the Sikhs. He was not among those who looted the properties of Sikhs. He was a six-foot-tall man. The people of the area still know our house because of his deed.'⁴²

The account shows the extent to which the perpetrators of violence lacked remorse for their criminal acts. Instead, the respondent

proudly states the fact that his brother murdered many non-Muslims. The account also indicates, alongside the cold-blooded killings, a desire for loot, though his brother was not involved in this himself. The stories of Nizamabad *Lohars'* attacks on the non-Muslim population and refugee trains were constantly repeated as I travelled around Nizamabad and its surrounding areas, such as Wazirabad, Mansoorwali, Salarwali, Jamkay, Tata Chanwa, and Pandorian. The respondents did not need to be persuaded to speak and they readily agreed to talk to me. This response was quite different from what I had experienced with urban residents of Gujranwala, where most of the time prospective respondents had to be convinced of the credentials of the interviewers and the usefulness of the project before they would say anything. One of the most compelling interviews conducted in Gujranwala district was with Sardara Dindar, a Sikh convert to Islam from the time of Partition. He was eighteen at the time and is now a resident of the village Tata Chanwa. He still remembers the events of that period vividly, when his relatives, along with the rest of the Sikh population of the village migrated to India, but he and his one brother chose to remain in Tata Chanwa. While representing the victims of Partition violence, Sardara narrated his story:

Lohars of Nizamabad killed thousands of Hindus and Sikhs and looted their property. They used to attack with swords and guns which they made for themselves. They would attack one village, then other. At that time there were all round rumours that the Nizamabad *Lohars* are coming! They are coming! There were fears, and talks all over the region about their cruelty...They raided in Jamkay, Manchar, Mansoorwali, and Wazirabad and so on. Sometimes local villagers of the areas invited them to attack their villages to clear out the Hindus and Sikhs...The local people also looted lots of properties of Hindus and Sikhs and eventually placed the blame on *Lohars*...I saw many dead bodies that were floating at the canal bank [the Tata Chanwa canal]...

Sardara also expressed the solidarity of ethnic ties amidst killings and lust for loot. 'In some places, the local Muslims convinced the Hindus and Sikhs of their places to leave villages. Many helped them across the dangerous zones. All my relatives migrated to India but I chose



to remain here and embraced Islam.⁴³ Sardara's brother Sultan added: 'Although the *Lohars* of Nizamabad largely made attacks and loot in the region, many *kamies* and others in the camouflage of the *Lohars* looted the properties of Hindus and Sikhs'. Sultan stressed that 'they had modern weapons, resources, and were all relatives and lived in one place. Hindus and Sikhs were too scared of them'.⁴⁴

It is possible to point out that the Nizamabad *hamlahawars*, in many instances, used the trains as a means of transportation for their criminal activities. They chiefly targeted those places for their attacks, which were either situated on the railway stations or adjacent to the railway lines, because they used the trains as a mode of transport. For example, all the above-mentioned attacked localities of Wazirabad, Mansoorwali, Salarwali, and Jamkay had railway stations. Moreover, they did not confine attacks to their neighbourhood, but covered an area of more than fifty miles, for instance, 'as far as Kamoke and the Naushe[h]ra Vir[k]an Railway Station[s]'.⁴⁵ It would be extremely difficult, without careful planning and the help of the local railway staff to carry out such precision attacks. A remarkable instance of this fact is the extent of an attack on a Hindu locality of Lohianwala, located a mile north of Gujranwala city, on the main railway track and the Grand Trunk Road. On 24 August 1947, a train coming from Wazirabad to Gujranwala stopped at Lohianwala and a big crowd of people got off the train and attacked and looted the locality. After completely ransacking the place, in due course of time, *hamlahawars* got back on the train, which was, surprisingly, still waiting for their return at the railway station. A local resident and an eyewitness of the event, named Mohammad Sanaulla Bhatti, reported the incident to Gujranwala Sadar Police Station on the same day:

Today afternoon, a train which was heading for Gujranwala stopped at the Lohianwala railway station. Around between 400-500 men got down from the train, waited for orders and attacked Lohianwala. After seeing such a big crowd of *hamlahawars* in the locality, all Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims of Lohianwala hurriedly exited their houses and ran away, and all gathered on the north side of the locality. After sometime, a haze of smoke and light of flames appeared over the locality. Sometime later, we saw the *hamlahawars* returned to the railway line. In this whole happening, the train remained stopped at the railway station until the *hamlahawars*

boarded it. As they all got on the train; it went away. This big crowd of *hamlahawars* appeared to be Muslims. I was watching the incident at a distance so could not identify any of the *hamlahawars* who were involved in this incident. What I noticed I have informed you.⁴⁶

The police record is unable to explain where these *hamlahawars* came from, where they boarded the train, and why the train was kept waiting until the attackers returned. Yet despite the clear organisation behind it, the subsequent police report merely termed it 'a communal riot' by the 'unknown', nameless, people. This is evidenced by the forwarding remarks of the Sub-Inspector of Gujranwala Sadar Police Station: '*Ya wakaya farkawarana fasaad maloom huta hay, Jasay hie mazeed maloo mat maltihee hay aap ko baag de jay gee*' (The incident appears to be a communal riot so as soon as further detail comes out it will be forwarded to you).⁴⁷

The quiescence or dysfunctional behaviour of local police aside, the episode could obviously not have been carried out without the connivance of the local railway staff. Some studies on Partition violence have pointed out the ambushes on 'refugee trains' and the involvement of the railway staff in them. Until recently, nothing has been uncovered about the use of trains as a mode of transportation for the attacks. Remarkably, how could it be possible to execute such a performance without the involvement of the local railway staff and the resources of the perpetrators? A close analysis of the event further suggests that the attack on Lohianwala was a calculated move rather than the haphazard 'eruption' of 'spontaneous' violence. There are three points to be noted here. First, the site for the planned attack was carefully selected, not only because of its location at the Grand Trunk Road and the main railway line, but due to the concentration of wealthy Hindu and Sikh population in the locality. Second, the occurrence indicates that the state authority had become weak, to the point of being non-existent, and the criminal gangs were making use of the situation to act with impunity for their own personal and local ends. Such a situation was by no means unique to Gujranwala. Indeed it prevailed throughout the Punjab. Evan Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab, drew a similar conclusion, when he reported to Mountbatten on 13 August that the gangs were both 'well-armed and



well-led', and the village raiding was quite impossible to control without a very great display of force.⁴⁸ Third, the prime purpose of the *hamlahawars* was apparently widespread looting, rather than 'revenge and retaliation' which is sometimes associated with Partition violence. Significantly, they did not even spare the Muslim's houses. For them, the conflict was not a religious one but a moment of significant opportunity. Pecuniary gain was their main purpose rather than communal revenge.

In understanding this, a study by Ayesha Jalal of communal violence in 1947 Punjab is instructive.⁴⁹ In her article, she emphasises that the struggle over territory in the Punjab as a whole was mirrored at the local level in 'strategies to appropriate the property of neighbours'. The material benefits of the 'localised and personalised nature of the battle for social space' accrued to individuals, not local communities. Jalal argues that much of the violence was committed by 'gangs representing majorities against minorities', and this actually demonstrated 'battles for control in urban and rural localities that were as vital to them personally as they were to the purported interests of their respective communities.'⁵⁰ The motivation for the Gujranwala *hamlahawars*' cold-blooded attacks on the minorities was a desire for loot on the pretext of a 'revenge' ideology of jihad because of attacks on Muslims in East Punjab. They committed mass crimes for their own personal ends in an environment of anarchy and state transition. Evan Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab, stressed the importance of a sense of impunity in the outbreaks of communal violence in the rural Punjab in August. He believed that in many ways the gangs carried out operations with relative impunity and social approval, in 'the general feeling that all cases will be dropped on 15th August...'⁵¹

Gujranwala also provides important case material on incidences of abduction of women. This was seen most clearly in the incident of the Kamoke train carnage. One of its most troubling elements was the direct involvement of local police in carrying away Hindu and Sikh women alongside the criminals. We will reveal this in the case study below.

KAMOKE TRAIN CARNAGE AND THE ABDUCTION OF WOMEN

The region between Gujranwala and Lahore because of its geographical location on the Grand Trunk Road and main railway lines earned great notoriety for the systematic attacks on some of the 'refugee special' trains and convoys. One of the worst train massacres occurred at the Kamoke railway station, a satellite town of Gujranwala, on 24 September at noon, on a train coming from Pind Dadan Khan, Jhelum, carrying over three thousand non-Muslim refugees towards East Punjab. The attack was planned. The daily newspaper, *The Times*, reported on 26 September 1947: 'In spite of heavy firing by the escort, the Muslims, attacking from the rear, forced their way into the last four carriages. The attack lasted 40 minutes, after which the train returned to Gujranwala, where the wounded were taken to hospital.' It listed 375 casualties.⁵² The Punjab police estimated the fatalities at over 400, with about the same number injured.⁵³ Despite the fact that the Pakistan government 'severely condemned' the incident and assured the Indian government that it would punish the 'culprits', the extent and severity of the carnage led the Indian Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation to set up a 'Fact Finding Committee'. With the consultation of both district liaison offices of Lahore and Delhi, and the statements of survivors and eye-witnesses of the tragedy, the fact-finding officer, Chaman Lal Pandhi, submitted his report to Delhi within a short span of time. The report gave the death toll as 'at least 3,000' and revealed the involvement of local police in the abduction of large numbers of non-Muslim women. According to the findings of Pandhi, 'The most ignoble feature of the tragedy was the distribution of young [non-Muslims] girls amongst the members of the Police force, the [Muslim] National Guards and the local *goondas*. The SHO Dildar Hussain collected the victims in an open space near Kamoke Railway station and gave a free hand to the mob. After the massacre was over, the girls were distributed like sweets.'⁵⁴ The following long account of a victim, Shrimati Laj Wanti, provides some indications of the horrors of the women in the Kamoke train carnage:

Even clothes were torn in the effort to remove valuables. My son was also snatched away in spite of my protests. I cannot say who took him away. I



was taken by one Abdul Ghani to his house. He was a tonga driver. I was kept in the house for over a month and badly used...After about a month it was announced by beat of drum that the Hindu Military had arrived and those of the inhabitants who had Hindu women and children in their possession should produce them at the police station...The 150 women who were produced at the station, Kamoke, were taken in tongas to Gujranwala. Out of the women collected only 20 got up and said that they wanted to return to India. I was one of them. There were 10 children with these women. The remaining lot was put into the trucks and sent back to Kamoke by the Sub-Inspector of Police. We were then taken to the Hindu refugee camp and put into trucks which brought us to Amritsar.⁵⁵

This account is taken from the SGPC publication, *Muslim League attacks on Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab*, and it is difficult to know to what extent it is credible. Yet this description rings true in the light of oral accounts that I collected from the site during my fieldwork. The respondents vividly reflected the '*kat-lo-garat*' (mass killings) of Hindus and Sikhs and '*aghwa*' (abduction) of their women at the Kamoke railway lines in 1947. A migrant, Ali Akbar, whose family came from Amritsar to Kamoke, told me during the course of an interview. 'Upon my arrival in Kamoke, there were many talks that people killed Hindus and Sikhs, looted their possessions and abducted their women. I did not see anyone [abducted woman]...Nobody will tell you about them.'⁵⁶ One local resident, Rashid Ahmad, over 80 years old in 2007, vividly remembers the attack on the train which he recalled as follows:

The train arrived in Kamoke that night and stayed there till following *dopahr* (afternoon). Something was wrong with either train engine or train track. There was news all around that a Sikh train stopped in the railway lines. People were planning to attack the train from *fajr* (early morning). Many hundreds of people took part in the attack and looting... Many people died when soldiers fired on them. I know personally some people of Kamoke took away [Hindu or Sikh] women...They subsequently voluntarily embraced Islam. They did not live in Kamoke.⁵⁷

My first respondent, Ali Akbar, believing that one of his acquaintances had taken away a woman in 1947, introduced me to another person by the name Ghulam Khadar. The latter was an elderly resident of

Kamoke. Before providing any information about the 1947 Kamoke tragedy, I had to firstly convince the respondent about my credentials and the usefulness of the project. The interview was not easy despite this explanation because of Ghulam Khadar's scepticism. A few of the main excerpts from a long interview are reproduced below which reveal the fate of such women:

The people attacked the train at the station and killed many Hindus and Sikhs. The attackers were not the locals; they came from out of Kamoke. Yes, many non-Muslim women were also abducted in Kamoke. The people took them away in other outlying areas so that military could not find them. One of my relatives took a woman to Sheikhupura and lived and worked there in a brick-kiln for many years. This woman converted to Islam and became pious...She was a Patwari woman...Islam allows this.⁵⁸

A few aspects emerge from the above accounts. First, the abducted women were immediately shifted to other places for fear of military searches as well as to avoid social disgrace. Second, the majority of these women preferred to live where they were taken rather than be sent to India. The account of Shrimati Laj Wanti, for example, indicates that out of 150 women only 20 were ready to go back to India. Third, there is also an indication that the army was periodically searching for the 'missing' women. The following account of a recovered woman of the Kamoke incident not only points to the repeated efforts of the army for the recovery, but also further provides evidence regarding the awful experiences of the 'main victims' of Partition. The tale of this recovered 'girl' is that after abduction she was taken away to Pandorian village by a Kashmiri Muslim who kept her in his house for five days and afterwards tried to kill her:

I had 16 tolas of gold sewn into my under-garments. I requested him not to kill me and offered him the gold which he took and made over to his brother. In the house, the Kashmiri raped me and then suggested that I should marry his nephew Din Mohammad. Owing to the shock and the atrocities my brain became unbalanced. A month later Gurkha military came to the village. I was concealed in a Muslim refugee's house. For some hours the Gurkha military searched for me in vain and went away. Three months later the military again came to the village. Neither the



Kashmiri nor Din Mohammad was in the house. I had been concealed in a corn bin. The soldiers were going to leave when a Muslim woman told them of my whereabouts. The soldiers returned to the house in which I was concealed and hearing their foot-steps I came out and fell down senseless.⁵⁹

Overall, it is difficult to determine the number of women abducted in Gujranwala in 1947. Khosla puts the number of 'young girls' who were 'taken away' during the Kamoke train carnage at about 600. Despite providing the statistics of casualties of the Kamoke train incident, the Punjab police report does not mention the abduction of any women. However, one official government document, 'Details of Converts and Abducted Women in the districts of West Punjab' of the Central Ministry of Refugee Rehabilitation provided 'Evacuation Progress' of the 'recovered' with 21,219 non-Muslim women being returned to India by the week ending on 24 April 1948. In Gujranwala district alone, by that date, 676 non-Muslim 'abducted and converted girls' were recovered and 'evacuated' to India. At the same time, another 138 recovered girls of Gujranwala were 'still in camps'.⁶⁰ According to a report of the Gujranwala District Liaison Officer to the Chief Liaison Officer, Lahore, of the 185 women who were discovered 3 were stated to be 'with police officials and 9 with known *badmashes* or influential persons in the district'.⁶¹ From anecdotal evidence it seems probable that there were many incidences of abduction and conversion of individuals by marauding gangs that received little official and media attention.

Similarly, it is hard to figure out the overall numbers of communal killings in Gujranwala district during the 1947 disturbances. A considered estimate would be somewhere in the region of 9,000–10,000 people. A report by the SGPC placed the total number of Sikh casualties in Gujranwala district at about 15,000, while Francis Mudie, the Governor of West Punjab, reported to Mountbatten that the 'Estimated Casualties After 14th August, 1947' totalled about 4,000, on the basis of the Punjab Chief Secretary's *Fortnightly Reports* on the law and order situation in Gujranwala district. Indeed, there were numerous isolated massacres in the innumerable villages and *qasbahs* along with murders of individuals that received no

official or media attention. One of the most important factors responsible for this state of affairs was that there was no effective communication between the district headquarters and the outlying local police stations. The reality was that, by the end of August, the authorities had little idea of what was happening in the remote villages. Of course, in comparison with casualty statistics from some East Punjab localities, Punjab's princely states, and the Jammu and Kashmir region, these figures are low. This in no way, however, diminishes the horror of the brutal killings and abductions and the evil purposes of the *hamlahawars*.

NOTES

1. Wilkinson, 'Veterans and Ethnic Cleansing'; Talbot, 'Epicentre of Violence'.
2. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week Ending 1 March 1947, p. 57, NIHCR.
3. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week Ending 8 March 1947, pp. 82-3, NIHCR.
4. FIR no. 14, Note Book no. 4/14, 29 May 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
5. FIR no. 12/14, Note Book no. 122, 10 June 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
6. FIR no. 158, Note Book no. 130, 17 June 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
7. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week Ending 21 June 1947, p. 251, NIHCR.
8. FIR no. 4/14, Note Book no. 33, 7 July 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
9. Jenkins to Mountbatten, Report no. 697, 14 July 1947, R/3/1/91, NDC.
10. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week Ending 7 July 1947, p. 449, NIHCR.
11. Singh, *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab*, Doc, 225, pp. 628-9.
12. This theme will be discussed in Chapter 5.
13. Talbot, *Divided Cities*; Kaur, *Since 1947*.
14. Mountbatten Papers, File no. 128, Acc no. 2794, Appendix iii, p. 450, NDC.
15. *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore) 4 November 1947, p. 6.
16. FIR no. 7/12, Note Book no. 159, 17 August 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
17. These isolated cases were taken from the Gujranwala Sadar Police Station FIRs record from June 1947 onwards.
18. SGPC, *Muslim League Attack*, p. 182.
19. Khosla, *Stern Reckoning*, p. 151.
20. FIR no. 142, Note Book no. 122, 2 August 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
21. FIR no. 12/14, Note Book no. 64, (nd) August 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
22. FIR no. 71/69, Note Book no. 63, 26 August 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
23. FIR no. 8/14, Book no. 100, 23 August 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
24. Brass, 'The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab', p. 83.
25. Singh, *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab*, p. 630.

26. A report (No.op.4/1) from P.C. Gupta, the 4th Battalion (Sikhs) the Frontier Force Regiment, Gujranwala to Inspector Sadar Police Station, Gujranwala, Note Book no. 109, 18 August 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
27. 'Remembering Partition: A Dialogue between Javeed Alam and Suresh Sharma'.
28. Talbot, *Divided Cities*, p. 59.
29. Interview with Fateh Mohammad *Lambardar*, Chak Ghazi, Gujranwala, 28 December 2006.
30. *Inquilab* (Lahore), 2 September 1947.
31. Khosla, *Stern Reckoning*, p. 153.
32. Interview with *Lambardar* Mohammad, Tata Chanwa, Gujranwala, 8 March 2007.
33. Chief Liaison Officer (India) Lahore to Chief Secretary East Punjab, Singh, *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab*, Doc, 219, pp. 613-4.
34. FIR no. 150, Note Book no. 66, 10 August 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
35. FIR no. 70, Note Book no. 57, 25 August 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
36. Interview with Iqbal Bilal, Gujranwala, 28 January 2007.
37. Khosla, *Stern Reckoning*, p. 149.
38. Note by Field Marshall Sir C. Auchinleck on Situation in Punjab Boundary Force Area for Joint Defence Council, 15 August 1947, *TOP*, Vol. XII, Doc, 486, p. 736.
39. Interview with Mohammad Ramzan, Nizamabad, 17 December 2008.
40. Interview with Mohammad Ali, Nizamabad, 17 December 2008.
41. Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, pp. 257-66.
42. Interview with Ghulam Nabi, Nizamabad, 27 February 2007.
43. Interview with Sardara Dindar, Tata Chanwa, Gujranwala, 21 February 2007.
44. Interview with Sultan, Tata Chanwa, Gujranwala, 21 February 2007.
45. 'Report of work in Gujranwala District', Singh, *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab*, Doc, 225, p. 632.
46. FIR no. 9/14, Book no. 110, 24 August 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
47. FIR no. 83, Book no. 110, 24 August 1947, DPRO, Gujranwala.
48. Jenkins to Mountbatten, 13 August 1947, L/P&J/5/250, O.I.O.C.
49. Jalal, 'Nation, Reason and Religion', pp. 2183-90.
50. Ibid. Khosla also believes that it was 'not religious emotion or aggressive chauvinism...but the prospect of personal gain' which prompted Muslim outrage against Hindus and Sikhs in Jhelum. *Stern Reckoning*, p. 198. Similar evidence emerged from the work of Hussain on Lahore, 'Forced Migration and Ethnic Cleansing in Lahore', pp. 116-67.
51. Cited in Talbot, *Divided Cities*, p. 56.
52. 'Sikh Refugee Train Attack', *The Times* (London), 26 September 1947, p. 4.
53. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week Ending 27 September 1947, pp. 382-5, NIHCR.
54. The report of Fact-Finding Officer, Chaman Lal Pandhi, Fact-Finding Branch, the Indian Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation Delhi, Singh, *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab*, Doc, 225, p. 631.
55. A statement of Shrimati Laj Wanti, twenty-three at the time, a resident of Nurpur Sethi, Jhelum, to the Chief Liaison Officer, Lahore. SGPC, *Muslim League Attack*, p. 261.

56. Interview with Ali Akbar, Kamoke, 15 February 2007.
57. Interview with Rashid Ahmed, Kamoke, 15 February 2007.
58. Interview with Ghulam Qadir, Kamoke, 16 February 2007.
59. Khosla, *Stern Reckoning*, p. 152.
60. 'Details of Converts and Abducted Women Evacuated during the Week Ending 24 April 1948, File No 36, 128/CF/48, Appendix B, NDC.
61. Chief Liaison Officer (India) Lahore to Chief Secretary East Punjab, Singh, *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab*, Doc, 219, p. 613.

4

Partition Violence and Migration in Sialkot

Sialkot witnessed a far higher level of violence and destruction than Gujranwala. More than a third of Sialkot was burnt down. About eighty per cent of its industrial concerns were abandoned or closed and its working capital growth declined by over 90 per cent because of the almost total migration of the Hindu and Sikh trading classes. The city's electricity grids, in part, remained closed for more than six months after Partition, and the continuing 'black-outs' caused the stoppage of all five tube-wells of the town, which were supplying water to the city.¹ Sialkot was transformed overnight from a central Punjab city to an international border town. This chapter highlights the level of organisation, chief characteristics of violence, and draws attention to, and analyses, the prime perpetrators of violence that took place in Sialkot. It draws on hitherto unexplored, original documentary sources to uncover the partisan and participatory role of police in the violence. The chapter also draws some insights on the relationship between violence and the state, examining the neighbouring Hindu-ruled state of Jammu and Kashmir's complicity in the perpetration of organised acts of violence against Muslims in the Jammu region. Finally, it examines the impact of Sialkot's border existence on the non-Muslim untouchable Chamar community. This unexplored topic draws on fresh sources that reveal the role of incoming Muslim refugees and army deserters in expelling the low-status Chamars of the region. The actions were chiefly rationalised in terms of labelling them as a 'spying caste', because of Sialkot's security concerns regarding its sensitive border with Jammu and Kashmir. In reality, such claims, as we will assess, were motivated by

the desire to appropriate the Chamars' limited resources. Before addressing these issues, the chapter begins by explaining the preparations for violence in the city, which began months before the actual Partition, and sheds light on some processes of anticipatory migration of Sialkot's wealthy Hindu and Sikh communities.

SIALKOT AND PARTITION VIOLENCE

Partition violence in Sialkot was largely politically motivated, as in Gujranwala. In fact, it was the Muslim League's direct action campaign against the Unionist-led coalition government that led to the first riot in Sialkot in February 1947. The Sialkot city Muslim League had appointed its own 'paid workers' at a salary of Rs 50 per month to carry out 'propaganda' amongst the Muslims and untouchable '*Achhut*' of the district. The Leaguers' actions for political gains frayed the communal situation in the city, by utilising religious events, such as Eid-i-Milad, to increase their street power. The agitation intensified daily, for example on 21 February 1947, there was almost a complete *hartal* (shutting down and stoppage of business) in Sialkot, and a crowd, estimated at over 6,000 paraded on the city streets to demonstrate its enthusiasm for the Muslim League and the Pakistan movement. Although public pronouncements were made against the use of violence for political ends, the mob, as part of the civil disobedience agenda, stormed the city's central jail, which resulted in injuries to eleven policemen. All of this disrupted the situation in the town quite a bit. In the first week of March 1947, three Sikhs were attacked by a mob of Muslims in the town. A Sikh was killed in a neighbouring village. The murder had a sequel with the death of a Sikh Sub-Inspector of police, Trilok Singh, during his investigation into the affair. After this incident, many meetings for the unity of the Muslims, the Hindus, and Sikhs were held, but the situation remained uneasy. Violence erupted over the celebration of 'Pakistan Day' on 22 March, despite the fact that Sialkot fell under the jurisdiction of the newly-introduced Disturbed Areas Act.²

The growing violence in Amritsar against the backdrop of the Rawalpindi massacres of Hindus and Sikhs in March had resulted, by the third week of April, in a small trickle of Muslims quitting the city



for Sialkot. This disquieted the Hindus and Sikhs living in the increasingly tense city and some packed their bags for the neighbouring city of Jammu. This initial exchange of population had an 'ever worsening effect' on the region, as pointed out in late April 1947 in a Special Branch Secret Intelligence Police report.³ Subsequently, some of the Hindus and Sikhs were to return to Sialkot as the communal tensions 'eased' in May.

Preparations for violence were underway in Sialkot, as they were in many of the Punjab's cities. The Special Branch Secret Intelligence Police regularly reported the mushrooming of private paramilitary organisations, the enlistment of volunteer bands, and their daily movements. The Sikh *Shahidi Jatha* was observed as one of the largest volunteer organisations in Sialkot, with district-wide branches and formations. Giani Labh Singh was 'commander-in-charge' of the district. Harcharan Singh was the 'supervisor' of the district branches, and Jathedar Puran Singh was 'in-charge' of the Sialkot city unit. By the end of April, over 500 volunteers had already 'enlisted' to provide their services.⁴ Funds were earmarked for the procurement of arms and transports: about Rs 900 was collected at Gurdwara Baba-de-Beri, alone. Five motor-cycles had been acquired for the purpose of relaying messages quickly and for maintaining connection with the rural *jathas*. There was also large-scale manufacturing and selling of traditional arms, such as *barchees*, *kirpans* and swords. Nizamabad and Wazirabad manufactured arms found their way to Sialkot. The sale of arms in the neighbouring Qadian's Sword and Kirpan Factory was at 'a roaring trade', according to a secret intelligence report.⁵

Muslim organisations were also preparing for future conflict. Many students were enrolled in both the MLNG and the Muslim Students Federation. The latter took over the onus of relief and aid of the riot victims, while the former was directed to 'arrange *thikri pehra*' (night-patrolling) in the rural areas. Because of the success of the regular propaganda campaign, *Majlis-i-Ahrar's* volunteers began joining the MLNG in large numbers. A newly-established 'Volunteer Jaishes' was also recruiting volunteers in the district under the supervision of Hissam-ud-Din and Maulana Abdul Rehman Mianvi.⁶

Preparations for violence were occasioned not only by the backdrop of the Rawalpindi massacres, but also by the growing uncertainty

surrounding the Punjab's future. This was especially true in border areas such as Sialkot, as no one knew where the future boundary line of demarcation between the future Indian and Pakistani Punjabs might run. The atmosphere in Sialkot was very tense and uncertain. Kuldip Nayar, a former resident of Sialkot and now a celebrated Indian journalist, writes in his memoir of the city: 'Mountbatten's announcement [of 3 June 1947 Partition plan] came as a bombshell to us in Sialkot city...There was suddenly a sense of fear and insecurity...Both Hindus and Muslims began to pass anxious moments because they did not know through which area the dividing line would run.'⁷

While many rural areas of Sialkot suffered from the announcement of the boundary award, the city's economic life was badly hit throughout the summer of 1947. Wealthy and politically astute Hindu and Sikh traders had started to quit the city weeks before the formal Partition happened. Some had begun from June onwards to send their children and female members of their households to the neighbouring Jammu city, and had started shifting assets and capital to other places. Such well-known Sialkoti Hindu traders as H.S. Uberoi and Lala Gobind Ram had shifted their families to Jammu. This anticipatory migration is neglected in standard historical accounts, though it is clear from both the documentary and the oral sources that the commercial class of Sialkot had started to sell and shift its assets to what would become India, months prior to the actual division of Punjab. 'We shifted our family and assets many weeks prior to actual partition', Dr Lal, twenty-six at the time and living in Karim Pura *mohalla* of Sialkot, recalls:

My father was the president of the Sialkot Congress and fully understood the simmering political situation. He started selling assets sometime in late June 1947. One day he came in the house and gathered all of us and said 'pack the possessions I am shifting you to Jammu'...We took the Sialkot train to Jammu...We rented a room in a Jammu hotel. I cannot recall the name of the hotel; it was opposite to a famous cinema in Jammu city.⁸

Dr Lal had returned to Sialkot in early 1947 after completing his degree in odontology from Britain. He operated a family-clinic along



with his father, who was also a doctor. His father, Dr Kishan Chand, was active in Sialkot's local politics and had won the municipal elections. Politically astute, Dr Chand, thus, well recognised the mounting uncertainties in the region as British rule ended and began winding up his assets in advance, weeks before the formal Partition happened. He writes in his autobiographical account that the family, immediately following the announcement of 3 June Partition Plan, not only sold its property and shifted its capital to India but also purchased a plot for a house in advance in Delhi.

I decided to sell off my property. I sold the Sialkot house for Rs 40,000 and adjoining vacant plot for Rs 8,000. Seven plots at Ravi [R]oad Lahore were also sold...I sold my house and took the same on rent of Rs 80 per month from the purchaser and took all the money to Dehra Dun... purchased a plot on Ajmal Road...I had [already] put my jewellery in Punjab National Bank Hoshiarpur locker..., [by shifting it to the Sialkot branch of Punjab National Bank].⁹

This account not only challenges master narratives that present migration as chaotic, disorderly, and hurried, but also provides a clear example of anticipatory migration for the wealthy and educated people, months in advance of any official territorial demarcation. Institutions as well as individuals shifted assets in anticipation of future trouble. The Punjab National Bank stopped lending and began arrangements to transfer its office from Sialkot to Delhi. As early as June 1947, with the growing concerns and shifting of capital out of Sialkot, most of its businesses and commercial activity had come to a 'standstill'. The Muslim labouring classes, which had largely relied on Hindu and Sikh employers, faced economic hardships as a result of the closure of the city's factories. They regularly protested to the district authorities to re-open industrial concerns in order to save them from 'half-starvation'. This resulted in labour unrest. There were some cases of looting and destruction of Hindu and Sikh shops. The intelligence reports received by the British authorities warned that the intense economic hardships, because of the continuing closure of the business activity in the city, would 'create a situation when the labour elements would either turn to crime or take to general lawlessness.'¹⁰

Violence in the city increased in July. Many cases of attacks, arson, and looting were reported with the appointment of Radcliffe to map out the boundary lines. Radcliffe was inundated with claims and counter-claims which further raised the communal temperature. Hindus and Sikhs claimed Sialkot for India and contended that it had historically, geographically, culturally, and above all, commercially been associated with the Sikh community. They claimed that the north-eastern part of the district was for centuries a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the eastern parts of Narowal *tehsil* used to form a part of the Amritsar district. This part had a majority of the non-Muslims. Commercially, they had played a major role in the development of Sialkot and had a large economic and commercial stake in it.¹¹ In the event, however, Sialkot was to be awarded to Pakistan because of its Muslim majority.

Violence aimed at displacing Hindus and Sikhs flared up in Sialkot on the eve of independence, and hundreds were killed. Several residences and businesses went up in flames. Between three and four hundred people were killed between 11–13 August 1947. Rich Hindu and Sikh homes and businesses were prime targets, which after being looted, would be set on fire. It could be seen as an unwarranted assault on Sialkot's businessmen and their wealth, designed to ruin them and drive them from the city in advance of any outcome of the Boundary Award. On 13 August, the house of Baljit Singh, a renowned advocate, was set on fire by a Muslim mob. Dr Badri Nath Chawla, who was a Congressman, was killed and the leading trader of the city, Munshi Ram Chand, along with three of his family members, was mercilessly butchered in his home. The city was under a twenty-one-hour curfew from 27 August onwards. Police began raids and discovered eight guns together with more than one thousand arrows and blades each in the different localities of the city of Sialkot.¹² In another raid, seventeen spears, one hundred and fifty-one hatchets, seventy-three *barchees*, forty-three big knives, five *gandalies*, and twelve daggers were discovered. In another raid, large amounts of arms and ammunition were discovered in a Hindu firm's office.¹³ Such raids, primarily directed towards Hindu and Sikh premises, owed more to the partisan behaviour of the police than to any effective efforts to halt looting and violence.



In the chaos of Partition, by the end of August, most of the properties and businesses of Hindus and Sikhs had been seized, looted, or destroyed. Over three hundred shops in the city's Bara bazaar were plundered and partially destroyed. Twelve major non-Muslim owned factories were destroyed in which thousands of workers were employed. This included one cloth and two rubber factories of Munshi Ram Chand and four sporting goods concerns owned by H.S. Uberoi. Similarly, the wealthy grain merchant Balwaj Singh's depot, worth 'lakhs', was burnt to ashes. Hindu *mohallas* were burnt and looted. They presented a picture of ruin and desolation. 'Most of the Hindu *mohallas* had all been burnt down. Homes lay abandoned with their doors swinging forlornly on their hinges. Household articles and objects the rioters had found of no use or value lay scattered everywhere, on the street and inside the homes', Khalid Hasan, who migrated from Kashmir to Sialkot in September 1947, writes in his memoir of Sialkot.

The most disturbing and by far the saddest things that lay scattered everywhere were children's toys. I do not think I have ever seen in the years since anything so desolate, anarchic and disturbing and I have no desire to see anything like it again.¹⁴

A similar situation was reported in the press. In its issue of 2 September, the daily *Hindustan Times* reported the events in the city with such front page headings: 'Sialkot in Ruins' and 'Sialkot City Deserted'.¹⁵

Unlike the inner city, the cantonment's residents and businessmen remained unscathed throughout the disturbances. Here the Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim shops stood open 'side by side' and the non-Muslims were seen in comparatively 'better spirits'.¹⁶ By the end of August, Hindus and Sikhs had 'entirely abandoned' the inner city and had concentrated in 'the army-run refugee camp' in the cantonment area. Its safety appears to have been assured by the presence of a British officer, Brigadier Cooler, and the Gurkha troops. In other ways the absence of violence in the cantonment area illustrates that the existence of an operational and impartial administrative agency was a crucial element in the containment of strife and the continuing

sustenance of high morale. The violence in the city was accelerated by either the indecision or absence of the law and enforcement forces.

The authorities now saw the removal of Hindus and Sikhs to India as the only way to restore peace. Military trucks and special refugee trains from Sialkot cantonment started transporting non-Muslim refugees to neighbouring towns of India. Sialkot's strategic routes such as the Sialkot-Jammu, Sialkot-Jesser, Sialkot-Gurdaspur, and Sialkot-Narowal-Amritsar were used for transporting these refugees. They were periodically blocked and the trains and trucks carrying refugees were systematically attacked and looted on the way. Between 15–18 August, three trains coming from Wazirabad to Sialkot were attacked and the Hindu and Sikh refugees systematically massacred and their possessions plundered. On 25 August, another train which left Sialkot for Jammu, carrying Hindu and Sikh refugees, was derailed at the border where passengers were callously killed.¹⁷

Many trucks started to evacuate the refugees en masse. But these were also attacked and the complicity of some drivers was a noticeable feature. On 25 August, for example, a large convoy of sixty trucks was despatched from the refugee camp at Sialkot cantonment to Amritsar via the Grand Trunk Road. The convoy was attacked near the Ravi River and several Hindus and Sikhs were 'literally hacked to pieces' and their possessions were looted. The ambush was apparently planned. Some survivors of this ill-fated convoy reported the connivance of the drivers in the attack. 'When the vehicles reached the River Ravi, the Muslim drivers left them and were absent for a couple of hours...', a survivor recalled, 'when they returned and resumed their journey they were attacked by an armed mob estimated at around a 1000.'¹⁸ At Amritsar, when the convoy with its piles of dead arrived, many people rushed to the hospital, calling for revenge and war. Lady Mountbatten was in the city when the shattered remnants of this convoy arrived there. She herself counted fifteen bodies and seven others were in a very critical situation. By the beginning of September, out of 45,000 Hindus and Sikhs who had been sheltered in Sialkot's cantonment camps at the outbreak of the disturbances, only 10,000 remained, though many more were arriving from outlying places, using the district as a transit point.



In Sialkot there were some isolated incidents of forced conversions and abductions of women. In Badomali alone, there were reports of over 500 cases of the abduction of non-Muslims.¹⁹ In Daska, similarly, many girls were abducted. Some Pathans were reported as abducting and buying non-Muslim women in Sialkot. Some Muslim refugees involved in the abduction of Hindu and Sikh women were arrested. Muslim refugees from Gurdaspur, on their way to Sialkot, captured about 300 women, having attacked a train at Jesser-Sialkot border. On their arrival at Sialkot, over forty were arrested and about the same number of women was recovered from them.²⁰ According to an official estimate, by the end of January 1948, over 5,300 'pockets clearance' of abducted women was discovered in Sialkot district.²¹ The brutalisation of women resulted from the way in which men of the opposite religion and community used them as a 'tool' for retribution. As Ayesha Jalal has correctly pointed out: 'the commonality of masculinity' during Partition violence was stronger than 'the bond of religion.'²²

Little, if anything, has been written about the awful experiences of the abduction of the women of Sialkot during Partition. Nothing has been written about its Sikh population's involuntarily conversion at the time. Many cases of forcible conversion to Islam were reported from Sialkot, Daska, and Narowal. In Narowal *tehsil*, where Hindus and Sikhs together formed the majority, more than two dozen Sikhs of all ages were involuntarily converted to Islam. On 2 September 1947, a choice was thrust upon them between getting killed and becoming Muslims. They chose the latter. Their hair was bobbed and their beards trimmed in Muslim style. For many Sikhs it is a treasured article of faith never to cut their hair. The gravity of the situation was echoed in the press and alarmed the state authorities. Almost immediately, Sardar Baldev Singh, the Indian Defence Minister, and Abdur Rab Nishtar, the Pakistani Communications Minister, rushed to the town. They were appalled to see the humiliated Sikhs who were 'weeping bitterly'.²³ They ensured their safe journey to Amritsar. Such sombre aftermath of the forcible conversion of the 'other' religion still awaits its way into scholarship.

There were also other villages and *qasbahs* in Sialkot district, which were burnt, looted, and their Hindu and Sikh population

driven out in a manner reminiscent of Gujranwala. In the village of Kharta, 14 Sikhs were killed, while the non-Muslim casualties at Marakiwal were 118. In Badomali, almost the entire Hindu and Sikh population, of approximately 5000, were murdered.²⁴ The situation in Sambrial also worsened with the arrival of thousands of Muslim refugees from Hissar, Rohtak, Karnal, and Hoshiarpur.

Organised violence was a chief characteristic of the attacks in Sialkot, as in Gujranwala and elsewhere in the Punjab. Its aim was what would now be termed the 'ethnic cleansing' of the unwanted population. Organised violence co-existed with spontaneous assaults motivated by the desire for loot. Many ordinary local people took advantage of the administrative breakdown and amassed property, regardless of their religious background and ethnic affiliations. The police cases, registered in the various local *thanas* of Sialkot, provide several examples of such episodes. These included a case of looting money and jewellery worth about Rs 10,000, which belonged to Chaudhry Hanraj Singh Jat and his brother, by a Sikh neighbour just a day before their departure to India on 24 August.²⁵ In a similar manner, despite Saraj Din and his neighbours' repeated appeals that they 'are Muslims, not Sikhs', some 'Muslim criminals' plundered their properties and cattle.²⁶ On 31 August, a Sialkot Police Sub-Inspector reported: 'a group of Muslims...who belonged to *kamie* caste, was found looting the properties of all communities, including Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims.'²⁷ Another example of such episodes of 'general loot' was noted in a place called Sako Chak, where, apart from plundering Hindu and Sikh houses, members of local population also took away 'everything' from the local school, hospital, and post-office. Perhaps the most appalling was the case of the callous murders of Muslim *Lambardar*, Khusi Mohammad Jat, and his wife, of Bukha Wala, Daska. They were burnt to death by a group of six local Muslims, only because the Jat family had provided cross-community assistance for the safe evacuation of Sikh Jats of the locality, and resisted the looting of their belongings.²⁸ All the indications are that the criminal violence was an important element in a situation of anarchy, yet one of the least discussed features of Partition. At individual level, banded individuals acted out of fear of prosecution and turned the 1947 upheaval into profitable endeavours. The



greatest violence, however, resulted from organised attacks designed to displace the unwanted minority population. They could only succeed because of the quiescence, partiality, and complicity of the local police and officials.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF VIOLENCE AND ROLE OF SIALKOT POLICE

While many individuals, groups, and opportunists merely engaged in looting occasioned by the administrative breakdown, violence in Sialkot, as in Gujranwala, had a purpose and meaning. Organised attacks were perpetrated by members of uniformed organisations, political activists, students, labourers, refugees, serving constables, army troopers, and demobilised soldiers. Both the documentary evidence and some retrospective interviews reveal that the Sialkot violence, in the main, was pre-planned, organised, and aimed at displacing the Hindus and the Sikhs. It was encouraged by the involvement, coordination, and indecision of the local police. The systematic looting of property of Sialkot's biggest businessmen, shopkeepers, and moneylenders was designed to ruin them and drive them from the city. A clear example of this can be seen in the organised looting of the properties of the largest sporting-goods businessman, H.S. Uberoi. On 13 August, throughout the night, two trucks were kept engaged for the removal of luggage from the Uberoi Mansion on Paris Road, while its guards were kept locked in the city police station.²⁹ There is an eyewitness account of this episode that points to not only its careful organisation but the complicity of police as well. Abdul Islam Butt was an active member of the Muslim Students Federation of Murray College and met Jinnah in 1944 when he visited Sialkot. Now a veteran Muslim Leaguer, and a Tehrek-i-Pakistan gold medallist, he lives in the Karim Pura *mohalla* of Sialkot. He has provided a vivid account of the Uberoi Mansion pillaging during the course of an interview.

...Some Muslim League activists with the help of Sialkot police looted the mansion of Ganda Singh [Uberoi] at Paris Road. They carried out this with careful planning; they arranged some trucks and started looting at night.

They did not spare anything...they even stripped off the valuable Iranian rugs and carpets. The trucks took the stolen-stuff to Lahore...All this happened under the supervision of a SSP named Haq Nawaz...I was an eyewitness of this occurrence.³⁰

The ransacking of the city's richest and most influential personality's residence was an important event in Sialkot. The news of the looting of Uberoi Mansion further fanned the mood in the inner city and there quickly followed the destruction and looting of residential and commercial properties of Hindus and Sikhs. Hundreds of shops and businesses in the Sadar, Bara, Truck, and Budhi bazaars were destroyed. Indeed, later on the 'looters' were to surrender some properties worth about Rs 50,000.³¹ Both looting and attacks on the unwanted minorities in the city were carried with social complicity. Eyewitnesses believed that the Muslim League workers themselves were responsible for initiating the attacks on Hindus and Sikhs, but these were not well-reported in the press and did not receive subsequent attention. 'Young Mohammedans used to stand at safe points and when [they] saw a single Hindu they stabbed him and hid themselves in some house of a Mohammedan...', Dr Kishan Chand writes in his memoirs of Sialkot city, 'the police took no action'.³² Malik Abbas, who was twenty-two at the time and was a stenographer of Sialkot's deputy commissioner, provides a vivid account of the communal situation in the city. 'The Muslim League workers were everywhere in the city. The labourers and shopkeepers all were now the Muslim Leaguers. In fact they were celebrating the moments of independence. They thought everything now in Sialkot belonged to them. They thought the police was on their side. They began looting and destroying Hindu and Sikh properties in the city. The district administration was pro-Muslim...', the interview continued. 'Sometimes in late August, I had to travel on a train from Sialkot to Shakargarh for some office work. In my compartment, some young Muslim National Guards, looked like students, found a middle-age Sikh. He wished to go [to] Gurdaspur. They decided to kill him. I tried to stop them; they shouted at me: "you do not know how they are killing Muslims over there [India]"...They threw him out of the train window'.³³



Malik Abbas walked daily from his inner-city residence in Rang Pura *mohalla* to the DC's office and witnessed the violence directly. He denied police involvement, although, he admitted that the police were partisan. Source material drawn from the district police record, however, reveals that, whilst the police in Sialkot were not the main perpetrators of the crimes committed against the minority population, they clearly acted as accomplices, participants, or even co-conspirators in many ways. In several cases, the local *thana* police was 'dispatched to assist' the majority population against the minority. The term '*Badmashs*' [gangsters] was used to describe the Sikh raiders during the encounter. Many individual constables, with the help of local members of Muslim population, not only killed Hindus and Sikhs, but were also either involved in looting or brought their victim's belongings back to the police stations. On 31 August, for example, a party of six policemen from *Thana* Charar, Pasrur, was dispatched, on the demand of a local *Lambardar* Ahmad Ali, for the assistance of Muslims in a place called Bhatwal against the Hindus and Sikhs. They killed one Sikh and injured eleven in this episode. Subsequently, a Sub-Inspector reported the incident in a memo, which clearly signals the partiality of the police:

We loudly warned them [the Hindus and Sikhs] not to make *fasadat* (riot) and go to [India]. But some of them, especially Mann Singh Zalidar of Chak Sarpal, Bhacet Singh of Jhmya Della, and Kashi Ram of Bhatwal were more incited to riot. They wanted to resist. They claimed Muslims wanted to drive them out of the village and intended to loot their possessions. We warned them again and finally fired on them, in which a Sikh was killed on the spot and many injured. Afterwards they ran away and took away the dead and injured men's guns'.³⁴

In a similar case, the police of *Thana* Satra went to 'assist' the local Muslims against the 'Sikh *Badmashs*' of the village Jatol, and in the operation killed twelve Sikhs and brought their possessions to the police station.³⁵ The complicity of the Daska police in 'pillaging Hindu and Sikh houses' along with the Muslim mob was also reported.³⁶

There is thus clear evidence that the police in Sialkot directly participated in violence and looting, in a mirror image of the situation in Gujranwala. The police record itself reveals the criminalization of

individuals among the local police. A clear example of this is evident in an organised attack on the Hindu *Tarkhans* of a village Shala Bagh, Sialkot, by the policemen of *Thana* Shakargarh. On the day of independence, two serving police constables raided the village and pulled the *Tarkhans* out from their houses, before looting and then selling their properties to the local residents. What is most striking about this incident is the fact that the crime was committed, despite the resistance of leading local Muslim Jats and Gujars who had protected and convinced these lower-caste skilled Hindu groups to stay in the locality, as they needed their traditional labour. The local Muslim *Lambardar*, Pir Mohammad himself went to register the FIR but the local *thana* refused to accept the complaints about their fellow constables. After repeated failed efforts, finally in desperation, twenty-five days after the incident, the entire adult male population of the village gathered at the Sialkot DSP's office in a procession, in which they protested and demanded to be allowed to register the case. On 10 October, at the 'special order' of the DSP, the Sub-Inspector Ghulam Hussian registered the FIR against both alleged criminal constables, which provides the following information.

This is an incident of 14 August 1947. Two police constables named Mohammad Ali Shah Police No 427 and Rahmat Ali Police No 312, perpetrated an attack upon the Hindu *tarkhans* of a village called Shahla (Sialkot), where still Hindu *tarkhans* lived there. Both policemen, against the will of local Muslim Jats and Gujars, forced them to quit the village and looted and even sold their belongings to the local people. The purchased-receipts of Hindus' belongings, writing and signature by the hand of Mohammad Ali Shah Police No 427 had been recovered. The local *Lambardar* Pir Mohammed was also an eye-witness of this incident. It is an order of DSP Sialkot that this is an incident of a different nature so this initial report is considered as a special report. Therefore, Panel Code Section 392 is applied here.³⁷

Further evidence of police involvement and lack of professionalism and impartiality could be found in their behaviour when they went to deal with scared and vulnerable minorities. In many instances, the police in Sialkot remained either conspicuously absent, or were slow in responding to the minority population's appeals for assistance.



when attackers went on the rampage in their localities. A wealthy moneylender, Satya Ram of Sambrial, because of his extensive business concerns and lending-recovery, did not want to migrate, and had sought the protection of local police. On 20 October 1947, the police remained within the *thana* while the adjacent shops and house of Satya Ram, no more than two hundred yards away, were being looted and burned by 'a big mob'.³⁸ Similarly, on 28–29 August, the police received 'repeated information' of big gatherings of over 10,000 Muslims in a village Sodra 'to attack and to burn' a nearby Sikh village called Doburg. However, the police from the *thana* just a couple of miles away arrived the next day after the army troopers from Wazirabad, miles away, had already arrived and averted the tragedy.³⁹

Moreover, a most disturbing feature of the situation in Sialkot, as in other places of both East and West Punjab, was the transfer of those professional officials who sought to act impartially in this highly polarised communal situation. The Muslim deputy commissioner of Sialkot, Raja Afzal Khan, who had arrested members of the Muslim National Guards for violating the curfew in the town, was for example, immediately transferred on the special request of a local Muslim minister of the Punjab Legislative Assembly.⁴⁰ Unfortunately, this kind of action, and the failure of the police to maintain law and order for minorities, has been frequently repeated in today's subcontinent. As Asgher Ali Engineer has pointed out that during the 2002 Gujarat pogrom some officers, who handled the situation quite professionally, 'were not given free hand by the political bosses', and were instantly transferred by describing such transfers as 'routine' or 'promotions'.⁴¹

Sialkot increasingly received refugees mainly from Jammu and Kashmir because of the city's close proximity. In this Hindu-ruled Dogra state, just as in neighbouring Sialkot, there was official complicity in the 'ethnic cleansing' of minorities. In Jammu, the Muslims were the victims. It is to this agony of the 'Kashmiri' refugees, which has been overlooked in scholarship that we now turn.

MASSACRES OF JAMMU'S MUSLIM POPULATION AND ARRIVAL OF REFUGEES IN SIALKOT

Violence in Jammu had many parallels with that in Sialkot. What gives the Jammu massacres a special character is that they were mainly ordered by the Maharaja of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and involved political motives to ethnically cleanse the Muslim population. This was intended to ensure a non-Muslim majority in the Jammu region. Violence was undertaken in the main by the state troopers. They received support from disgruntled Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Punjab. The danger for Muslims multiplied 'every hour', as hordes of Hindu and Sikh refugees started pouring into Jammu from areas that were going to become Pakistan. In many ways, Kashmiri Muslims were to pay a heavy price in September-October 1947 for the earlier violence in West Punjab. These killings had created a motive for revenge. 'A large flock' began to arrive after the March 1947 Rawalpindi massacres of Hindus and Sikhs.⁴² By late 1947, over 160,000 Hindus and Sikhs had migrated from the western districts of Pakistan.⁴³ In Jammu city alone, by mid-September, they numbered over 65,000. They carried with them harrowing stories of Muslim atrocities, which were retold in the press and given official sanction by the state media. Their arrival brought the communal tension to 'the breaking point' and further intensified the killings of Muslims and their exodus. For example, a well-circulated, Jammu-based daily, *Kashmir Times*, boasted that 'a Dogra can kill at least two hundred Muslims' which illustrated the communal depths to which the media and parties had sunk. Almost immediately, the Dogra refugees, backed by their relatives from Jammu and the Dogra troopers started a general clearing of the Muslim population. They were provided with arms and ammunition by state officials. Sikh deserters of the Sialkot Unit, who had migrated to Jammu, now put to use the weapons they had taken with them.⁴⁴

It is important to point out here that the Muslim population of Jammu province largely consisted of Punjabi-speakers. Muslims of western Jammu had well-established geographic, historic, economic, ethnic, and cultural connections with West Punjab's cities and towns. They had strongly favoured joining Pakistan, unlike the Kashmiri-

speaking Muslims of the Valley who, in some extent, supported the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah. Within the Jammu province, the location of the majorities of Muslims and Hindus, partially explains their differing aspirations for the state.⁴⁵ Overall, the Dogra Hindus formed a narrow minority in Jammu province, though they formed a majority in its eastern districts such as Udhampur, Kathua, and the Chenani Jagir. Seventy-five per cent of Jammu's Hindus lived in these four districts, which were contiguous to the Hindu-majority districts of Punjab such as Gurdaspur, which was incorporated into India in 1947. The majority of Muslims in the Jammu province lived in the western districts of Mirpur, Reasi, and Pooch Jagir and they were contiguous to the towns and cities of the Punjab. Muslims numbered 158,630 and comprised 37 per cent of the total population in the district of Jammu in the year 1941. Their proximity to Punjab proved significant as they enabled refugees to flow relatively easily into and out of Jammu at Partition. Communal division was much stronger in these areas. Both the RSS and the Jammu Muslim Conference of Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas Kashmir dominated here. Almost all the communal violence took place in Jammu province. Hundreds of thousands were killed and fled to the border cities of Sialkot, Gujrat, and Jhelum.

The worst level of destruction was in Jammu city where Muslims were in a minority. Their major concentrations were in Dalpatian *mohalla*, Ustad da *mohalla*, Pathanan da *mohalla*, and Khalka *mohalla*. These Muslim localities presented a picture of destruction by mid-September 1947. Hundreds of Gujars were massacred in the locality of Ram Nagar. The village Raipur, within the Jammu cantonment area, was burnt down, and its poor communities were to suffer much greater than the upper-class Muslim communities in the neighbouring localities. Indeed, the patterns of violence were as differentiated as was the Jammu Muslim community itself, comprised of army men, professionals, politicians, businessmen, and the milk-suppliers (Gujars). Those who suffered badly, subsequently held the political elite responsible, those who had made an anticipatory exodus. 'I hold our Jammu [Muslim] leaders responsible for the massacres of the Muslims and the abduction of our women', Muharram Hashmi, who migrated from Jammu city to Sialkot in late

1947, writes in his memoir of Jammu city, 'I refer to those who found safety in Sialkot and much abandoned non-Muslim property'.⁴⁶

By mid-September, the city's Muslim population had been halved.⁴⁷ The killings and dispersal of the Muslims from Jammu city were a clear example of the ethnic cleansing of a locality. By late November more than 100,000 Kashmiri refugees had arrived in the border towns of Sialkot, Gujrat, and Jhelum.⁴⁸ The Dogra troops were at the forefront of attacks on Muslims. The state authorities were also reported to be issuing arms, not only to local volunteer organisations such as the RSS, but also to those in the adjacent districts of East Punjab, such as Gurdaspur. G.K. Reddy, a Hindu editor of the *Kashmir Times*, said in a statement published in the daily *Nawa-i-Waqt*: 'I saw the armed mob with the complicity of Dogra troops was killing the Muslims ruthlessly. The state officials were openly giving out weapons to the mob'.⁴⁹ The state administration had not only demobilised a large number of Muslim soldiers serving in the state army, but Muslim police officers, whose loyalty was suspected, had also been sent home. In Jammu city, the Muslim military were disarmed, and in the Jammu cantonment, Brigadier Khoda Bukhush was replaced by a Hindu Dogra officer. There were also reports that the Maharaja of Patiala was not only supplying weapons, but that a Sikh Brigade of Patiala state troops was also operating in Jammu. A main aim of the state authorities was to change the demographic composition of the region by compelling the Muslim population to leave on fear of death, and in this, they succeeded. The Dogra troopers ejected the entire Muslims population of Dulat Chak on 28 November, claiming it was a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The troops of a Sikh Brigade raided the bordering villages and forced the Muslims there to evacuate and go beyond the old Ujh River bed.⁵⁰

After the closure of the Sialkot-Jammu railway line, Muslims started concentrating from isolated pockets to the large enclaves within the Jammu Police Lines. They sought assistance from the Pakistan government to take immediate steps to ensure their safety.⁵¹ In the first week of November 1947, the Pakistan government despatched many buses to Jammu city to transport the refugees into Sialkot. When the convoy arrived at the Jammu-Sialkot road, Dogra troopers, RSS men, and armed Sikhs attacked the caravan and killed

most of the passengers and abducted their women. The fortunate ones managed to escape to reach Sialkot, or returned back to the Jammu Police Lines Camp. Among them was the fortunate Dr Abdul Karim who gives below a graphic eyewitness account of what happened to the unfortunate members of the convoy:

On 6th November 1947, about 25 trucks and lorries were brought into the Police Lines and were at once filled in by anxiously waiting Muslims. Even the roofs were fully packed...A little ahead of Satwari Cantonment, the convoy was halted along the canal side...the convoy was halted to complete the arrangements for the pre-planned attack on us... Simultaneously, all our belongings were looted. Twenty-six members of my family were killed on the spot. My two brothers were killed outright; many members (of my family) were lying in (a) severely wounded condition who died afterwards. My daughter Naeema was abducted. I myself received 11 wounds on my body. The grievous wounds on my head and neck made me unconscious for a considerable time so much so that when I recovered consciousness, it was almost dark.⁵²

According to a statement of another well-educated Muslim refugee who had fled from Jammu to Sialkot, 'Thirty lorries carrying Muslim evacuees out of Kashmir State were attacked by Dogra troops at Satwari in Jammu. Most of the male members were massacred, while the women [were] abducted.' He concluded that the official proclaimed there that 'there was no place for Muslims in Kashmir State and that they should all clear out'.⁵³ According to oral sources, whose accounts have been collected from Sialkot, provide a clear picture of the ethnic cleansing of Jammu's Muslims. Urvashi Butalia writes: 'Memories of violence clearly do not go away easily,'⁵⁴ and that is clear from the following firsthand accounts. Zafar Butt, who reached Sialkot from Jammu in late 1947, stated that his entire family was killed by the Dogra troopers in Nawakot.⁵⁵ Khalid's two brothers and a sister were murdered in Ram Pura *mohalla*, in Jammu city.⁵⁶ Khawaja Tahir lost his parents and a brother in Jammu.⁵⁷ A leading Muslim Conference leader Hameed Ullah's young daughter was abducted in Jammu.⁵⁸

The removal of the Muslim population in Jammu region is evidenced clearly in the 1961 Census of India. In Jammu province,

about 123 villages were 'completely depopulated', while the decrease in the number of Muslims in Jammu district alone topped 100,000.⁵⁹ It is possible to point out that the inter-religious violence that occurred in Jammu included a possible 'genocide' of Muslims in September-October 1947. There were reports that the Maharaja of the state of Jammu and Kashmir 'in person commanding all the forces' which were ethnically cleansing the Muslims. In its issue of 10 August 1948, *The Times* reported the events in Jammu with front page headings: 'Elimination of Muslims from Jammu'. Out of a total of 800,000 who tried to migrate, more than '237,000 Muslims were systematically exterminated...by all the forces of the Dogra State, headed by the Maharaja in person and aided by Hindus and Sikhs. This happened in October, 1947.'⁶⁰ There is evidence of similar behaviour in other princely states. In the princely state of Kapurthala, where Muslims formed 63 per cent of the total population, not a single Muslim was left within a few weeks of Partition.⁶¹ Ian Copland's⁶² and Shail Mayaram's⁶³ accounts about the 'Ethnic Cleaning' and 'Clearing Up Campaign' (*safaya*) of the Muslim minority in the various states, highlights similarities with the events in Jammu. The crime committed on the Kashmiri refugees was nothing less than genocide. Refugees in the Punjab received some protection and assistance in migration through the PBF and the MEO. No such mechanisms were in place for the Jammu Muslims.

By the end of 1947, over 100,000 refugees from Jammu had arrived in Sialkot. They recounted gruesome tales of brutal massacres by the state's own troops and the burning of their homes and crops to a party of Englishmen who visited the city on 21 November. The harrowing images and stories of atrocities against Muslims were retold in the press as well as in the sermons of the Friday (*Juma*) prayer. The refugees' frustrations in trying to find suitable accommodation and livelihood were exploited by radical groups such as the Ahrars and the newly-established Anjuman-i-Jammu Muhajireen. They used the refugees' frustration as a fertile recruiting ground for their own brand of politics. There were calls for revenge and jihad. The newspaper *Zamindar* was at the forefront in encouraging such action. The paper's daily and repeated provocations led to it being banned for a fortnight.⁶⁴

The legacy of violence also contributed in its way to the militarization of Kashmir itself.⁶⁵ Many Kashmiri refugees, in particular the young, offered their services as *razakars* (volunteer fighters). The Anjuman-i-Naujawan-an-Kashmir, Sialkot, was at the forefront in supplying thousands of *razakars* to 'Kashmiri Liberation Movement'. A Jammu migrant writes his memoir of those days: 'Some of us in our enthusiasm sought army training and volunteered to guard the border. The day the Quaid-i-Azam died we had just returned from the day's training which involved crawling.'⁶⁶ There were also reports that around a hundred trucks, loaded with 'tribesmen' equipped with modern weapons and signalling systems, had entered Jammu and Kashmir.⁶⁷

With the controversial accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India and the arrival of Indian troops, 'the complexion of events' changed in the region. In such a warlike situation, 'a state of panic' prevailed at the newly-developed Jammu border towns. Now there were regular attacks 'with automatic weapons' on the Sialkot-Jammu and Gujrat-Jammu borders, leaving behind several casualties on a daily basis. By the turn of 1948, India and Pakistan were heading for a war over the territorial claims of the Kashmir region. On 12 January that year, the Indian District Liaison Officers, who wished to recover 'pocket clearance' of abducted women and converts, were banned from entering Sialkot, although their work continued in Gujranwala and other cities of West Punjab. While official activities could be controlled, the border between Sialkot and Jammu remained porous and free movement between both regions was possible. This was evidenced most clearly in cross-border incursions on the Sialkot border.

SIALKOT AND BORDER INCURSIONS: ROLE OF THE DOGRA REFUGEES AND TROOPERS

Partition transformed Sialkot from a central Punjab town into one bordering Jammu and Kashmir and the East Punjab districts of Gurdaspur and Amritsar. Sialkot's proximity to such towns and cities proved significant as it enabled refugees to move into and out of the district. This was one of the reasons that the refugees had started to

arrive earlier in Sialkot than in other parts of Punjab, and a small trickle of refugees had entered the district some four months prior to Partition in April 1947, following the reaction to the Rawalpindi violence. The influx was, however, especially heavy between September 1947 and January 1948. The daily flood peaked in late 1947, and had tailed off by the early 1950s.

Being a border town, Sialkot saw a number of incursions from the Jammu region in the early weeks and months of independence. The most serious episodes involved fitful incursions by the Hindu and Sikh refugees who had been evicted from Sialkot, and the Dogra troops. These post-Partition raids on the Muslim population appear regularly in the files of Sialkot border *thanas*. For instance, the police FIRs list a string of 'border raids'. On 20 September, in a raid on a border village, the Dogra troopers not only killed sixty Muslims and destroyed their crops, but also carried away eleven women; on 27 October, they killed Abdul Majeed Kashmiri and took away his cattle; and on 25 October, they burned the village Begay Wali. On some occasions, the Dogra troopers encountered the local police and the newly-created West Punjab Home Guards. The former with their 'automatic weapons' outnumbered the latter, who lacked the resources of arms and ammunitions. Ian Talbot, with respect to violence in such Punjab localities as Lahore and Amritsar, has pointed out the traditional form of cross-border 'cattle raids' across the newly-created borders.⁶⁸ In Sialkot, one of the most striking elements was that, in fact, the raids were carried out by the evicted Hindu and Sikh refugees with the involvement of Dogra troopers. In many instances, as the police record reveals, they went to take revenge on those individual Muslims, who had earlier ejected them, and burned and looted their properties. For example, the ejected Sikh residents of Malkhanwala, with the help of Dogra troopers, raided the village on 4 September 1947, and targeted specifically those whom they intended to kill. A registered police report by the relatives of the deceased provides the following information about such 'targeted' killings.

There is a Sikh refugee camp in a village called King, on the right side of upper Chenab River. The camp is under the security of Dogra military.



Yesterday about 4:00 pm between 6–7 Sikhs along with 3 or 4 Dogra soldiers came in Malkhanwala. First, they killed a Muslim Kashmiri, who was working in a garden and then they searched for Ghulam Sial, son of Noor Sial, and found him nearby the graveyard and killed him. Afterwards they moved to Parozwala and killed Wali Mohammad and Noor Mohammad...The local people can recognise the Sikhs because they are the former residents of Malkhanwala.⁶⁹

In another case, on 9 October, there was an attack in a border village of near Sambrial, Sialkot, at the house of Allah Buksh Manhas by former Sikh residents, with the complicity of Dogra troopers. The extent of the targeted destruction and looting is evidenced from a FIR by the victim. The scale of looting shows this could only have been accomplished with the existence of large-scale pre-planning and logistical assistance.

In this village, the majority of Sikh population lived. They owned most of the land and other businesses. Sensing the dangerous communal situation, they altogether left the village on 28 August and went towards Daska. Today, they along with the Dogra soldiers attacked the village and particularly burned my house and plundered many valuable belongings. They did not harm Imam Din, caste Tarkhan, and Allah Ditta Kashmiri, who were present in the village during this incident. Both informed me the former residents of village especially Harnam Singh and Pala Singh set alight to my house...few soldiers from the Dogra Platoon and a Sikh *Jatha* on the horseback were with them. Below is a list of damage and missing belongings with their cost in rupees:

House damage Rs 4000, jewellery Rs 2000, silk and other cloths Rs 4000, 40 sacks of wheat Rs 1000, net case of money Rs 2000, 160 kilograms rice Rs 125, copper and brass pots and pans Rs 800, a sewing machine Rs 285, a cycle Rs 80, a wooden bed and cotes Rs 200, a buffalo Rs 400, two big grain containers Rs 200.⁷⁰

Some displaced Sikhs not only raided the places where they had previously lived, but others from the nearby refugee camps, went in pursuit of loot. One such attack was on the Sambrial Railway Station by over 300 Sikh residents of the nearby King Camp, in which they killed one Muslim railway staff and 'ransacked' the station, looted, and even took away 'office windows and doors.'⁷¹ Such episodes have

not been previously included in standard accounts of the aftermath of Partition, because they concentrate exclusively on the violence inflicted on minority communities in terms of 'revenge', and portray refugee populations, chiefly, as 'victims'. It is, however, evident from material drawn from Sialkot that in some instances, the refugees themselves were the aggressors, although, only after they had first been evicted from their homes. This was certainly the case with respect to the raids on the untouchable 'Chamar' population of Sialkot. It is to this unexplored topic that we will now turn.

SIALKOT VIOLENCE AND THE EXPERIENCES OF 'UNTOUCHABLE' COMMUNITIES

As has been pointed out earlier in chapter one, lower-caste communities of Meghis, Mazbis, Chuhras and Chamars formed a substantial portion of Sialkot's population. They were employed as sweepers, porters, and canteen-servants in different hospitals, factories, and schools, and formed an integral part of the traditional rural menial labour. Together these caste groups formed about 8 per cent of the population of the district. They were the focus of conversion efforts by both Christian missionaries and indigenous religious reformers from the late nineteenth century onwards. During the Indian nationalist movements, they mainly became objects when both the Muslim and Hindu nationalists competed to gather them on their side.⁷² Some untouchable groups of the Punjab had supported the Muslim League and its movement for Pakistan.⁷³ These lower-caste communities were, in part, unaffected by the Partition-related violence because they were seen as being outside the tripartite communal conflict involving Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims.

Until recently, little has been written about untouchables' experiences during Partition and its aftermath, with the exception of Urvashi Butalia's brief reflections.⁷⁴ More recently, Ravinder Kaur, in her work on Punjabi refugee settlement in Delhi has devoted one chapter to the untouchable experience in the violence and resettlement.⁷⁵ Nothing has been written about the untouchable castes and Partition with respect to Pakistan. They were not anticipatory migrants like the upper-caste Hindus and Sikhs. Even at



the time of independence some stayed. While the majority of both Meghis and Mazbis fled to India because of the violence and their associations with Hindus and Sikhs, the 'Chuhras', being seen as Christians and not associated with Hindus and Sikhs, remained largely unaffected by the violence from the main thrust of Partition violence. At the time, majority of the Christian community lived in West Punjab: only 60,000 out of 500,000 Punjabi Christians lived in East Punjab in 1947. As elsewhere in the Punjab, they did not migrate. This does not, however, mean that they remained unaffected. A large number of them faced economic hardship and unemployment, due to the migration of their Hindu and Sikh employers. The impact of the 1947 upheavals on the Punjabi Christians, however, remains seriously under-researched.

Alongside the Muslims, some Christians of Sialkot took advantage of the breakdown of the administration and made attempts to appropriate the resources of Hindus and Sikhs. This fact is evident both from documentary sources and oral accounts. On 31 August, for example, a Sialkot Police Sub-Inspector reported that 'a group of Christians' were found looting the properties of Hindus and Sikhs in a Daska village called Goya Wala.⁷⁶ On another occasion, some Christians assisted the local Muslim Jats in the organised ambush and looting of a refugee camp in a village called Sooinwala. One of the Christians who was involved, a man named Matela, who was twenty at the time, has provided the following information.

They [some Muslims of Sooinwala] planned to loot the Ramkay Hindu Camp at night. Chaudhry Sharif, Nazir and Ayub [all Jats] were with us, when we attacked the camp. They owned one horse and second they arranged. Also they arranged a bull-cart and parked it a few yards away so things could be loaded. We attacked the camp in late night. I killed only one Sikh woman with my *danda*. We looted their belongings and brought them on the horsebacks and a bullock-cart at Chaudhry Sharif's house early in the morning. I did not know what was in those [looted] trunks, perhaps included jewellery. I was a *naukar* (servant); they did not give me anything.⁷⁷

This does not mean that the Christians and Muslims worked hand in glove to appropriate the resources of Hindus and Sikhs. There were

a great numbers of cases in which Muslims looted the properties of Christian community as well.⁷⁸ On the ground level too, many Christians not only sheltered the Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims from aggressors, but also their neutral status was used, in many instances, to assist those who had suffered from the catastrophic effects of Partition. A historical awareness to understanding the immediate and longer impact of Partition on the Christian community in the Punjab region requires much more careful study. The relatively small numbers of Christians and the focus in South Asian history on Hindu-Muslim relations both before and after Partition has encouraged neglect of the Christian experience.

However, the untouchable Chamars of Sialkot could not, unlike Christians, be regarded as neutral, and thus be isolated from the violence. They did not migrate in large numbers at the time of Partition. The Chamars of Sialkot who were settled along the Aik stream did not migrate to India because of their small trade in raw leather. Unlike the mainstream population of the Hindus and Sikhs of Sialkot, they were largely isolated from the main thrust of the violence in August-September. They were not only encouraged by the Pakistan government to stay, in order to avoid the loss of their traditional menial labour, but they were also protected by local Muslim *Zamindars*, because of their cheap human labour. This non-Muslim low-status community of Sialkot, nevertheless, had to pay a heavy price in November-December 1947 for the violence in the Jammu region in September-October. They were largely driven out by the disgruntled Muslim refugees and army deserters from the state of Jammu and Kashmir. These groups were so desperate that even the community's limited belongings were coveted.

A number of complaints against the '*Muhajirian*' (Muslim refugees) and '*Fauji*' (soldiers) were brought to the attention of Sialkot police authorities for the protection and assistance of the members of Chamar community. For example, on 4 November 1947, some members of the community submitted the following letter to the Sialkot DSP.

It is submitted to the Deputy Superintendent Police of Sialkot that we Chamar *Achhut* wished to live in Pakistan. This is an incident of yesterday.



Ghulam Ahmed, son of Fauj Din, and Ismail, Abdul Gufoor, sons of Ghulam Ahmed, and Akbar, son of Nazim Din- all caste of Gujars- accompanied by other eight persons who appeared *Fauji* and were armed with guns entered our houses at 10:00 pm and shouted 'the Chamar *Achhut* have no right to live in Pakistan, they should live in India...come out from the houses and whatever possessions/belongings you want, you can carry with you. We intend to take all of you to the border.' One of the Chamars replied 'we want to live in Pakistan.' As he uttered these words, one of them hit him with gun...Thus all Chamars bundled their belongings and followed them. As we walked about six miles towards the border, they forcefully looted our possessions...A list of the looted-belongings is annexed...

When we arrived back, our houses were locked and the *Lambardar* Ghulam Mohammed took over the keys. Those six *Fauji* had already broken in our houses and had taken away all our remaining possessions. We poor Chamar *Achhut* are now without any belongings please help us and make efforts to return us back. Please take serious action against the culprits.⁷⁹

Such assaults were rationalised by claiming that the non-Muslim Chamars were spies and saboteurs. The insecurity produced by the threatening border situation with the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region, created the conditions for such claims. Despite the support of local population and the local police, the Chamars were attacked, looted, and dragged to the border. On 15 November, a Chamar victim, named Kaka, who had a narrow escape, brought the case, with the help of a local *Lambardar*, against the alleged criminals, to the local *thana*. He stated that:

The Muslim *Muhajirs* (refugees) of the area always accuse us that we Chamar *Achhut* are *jasos kom* (spying caste) and have been doing this for Hindustan. However, the local Muslim *Zamindars* and the police always protected us against these *muhajirs*. Yesterday, at 11:00 pm, between 14-15 people, armed with guns and axes, jumped over the walls of our houses and made us hostages. Some wore *khaki* trousers and others were in *shalwar kameez*, while some had traditional *topi* (hats) on their heads. However, all of them wore scarf around their necks. First, they looted our house-belongings, including my Rs 80, cloths, and quilts. They were whispering 'we do not get any salary so take away whatever you can.' Then they ordered, 'We want to take all of you to the big officer



in Sangra... We had already killed the policemen of Chamal who had been providing you protection. If you make any resistance, we will kill you too.' They tied our hands in the back and tightened our faces with cloths. They locked the children in one room, because they were making noise. They took us to Sangra where in sugar-cane fields they isolated our women. Here, I managed to escape but I came to know they had killed all the men. Still the fate of women is unclear. It is requested please a case be registered against them. The Chamar *Achhut* are suffering too much in Pakistan, please help us.⁸⁰

In another instance, the Chamars of a place called Nathu Kot, had to quit Sialkot for India because they had become a cause of dispute between the local Muslim Gujars of Nathu Kot and Borr Dala, over the issue of controlling their subordination and movement. The former wanted to retain them in their place, while the latter wanted to shift them to their village. Finally, on 27 December, after a prolonged tug-of-war for the control of the low-caste groups, and after many of their families had been forced to move to Borr Dala to serve the influential Gujars, the majority decided to leave for India. A Chamar, Babu Ram, with the assistance of the disgruntled Muslim Gujars of Nathu Kot, was able to report the case in the local *thana*. 'It is submitted that we Chamars *Achhut* want to live in Pakistan, but Gujars of Borr Dala forcibly took us in their village and wanted us either to serve them or leave Sialkot for India forever. Majority of the Chamars had already been forced to quit Sialkot. We are now only small numbers in the area; they wanted to occupy our houses and properties. Please help us.'⁸¹

According to an official estimate by January 1948, over 180,000 '*Achhut*' had been expelled from the region.⁸² A desire to appropriate the resources was the key element in the attacks rather than the desire for revenge attacks, or a backlash. The cold-blooded killings and expulsion of destitute untouchables was rationalised on the pretext of security concerns, which arose as a result of Sialkot being on the hostile border with Jammu and Kashmir and Gurdaspur. The earlier killings and expulsion of Hindus and Sikhs from the region had been justified by the Muslim sufferings in India. It is also clear that the wider political context for violence was a permissive rather than a motivating factor in such episodes, for the majority of the local



population, and even the police, attempted to assist and protect the untouchable Chamars. Such sombre aftermath of Partition for the subaltern class rarely finds its way into scholarship.

CONCLUSION

Both Gujranwala and Sialkot's history of violence confirms recent research which has emphasised that it was planned and politically motivated rather than a religiously inherited. Alongside the individual criminal's desire for loot, the violence clearly had a political background and intent. Violence in both cities was linked with the Muslim League's campaign against the Khizr government for seeking a political advantage. It intensified over the cities' uncertain fate in any boundary award and peaked with the announcement of the boundary result.

The case material has revealed different sets of migrations. It has provided the basis for an incisive analysis of the differing experiences of the elite and the subaltern classes. The wealthy people shifted their capital or assets to safer zones months before the actual Partition, while the poor population, lacking necessary resources, bore the brunt of the violence.

The cases, which form the source material for the chapters, revealed the involvement of the forces of law and order in wanton destruction and looting, and their conspicuous absence and lack of impartiality when they dealt with the minorities. This evidence is further substantiated by the fact that when cases and complaints were filed, they were not followed up. The failure to prosecute the guilty encouraged those involved and intensified the violence. The '*hamlahawars*', both in Gujranwala and Sialkot, were not only free from the possibility of arrest and prosecution because of the breakdown of administration, but they acted with social approval, complicity, and most importantly, with the connivance of the local railway staff and the complicity of district police. The rail links, which had brought prosperity in the region, also paved the possibility for large scale massacres in a general state breakdown of the colonial state and polarisation of attitudes.

Piecing together the story of violence at the micro-level of these two cities and their surrounding areas adds considerable evidential weight to the argument that Partition violence cannot simply be dismissed as temporary madness or aberration. The analysis has sought to point out not only the principal perpetrators of violence in the region, but it also has showed that the killings in both cities bear the hallmarks of what Paul Brass would term a 'retributive genocide'.

Evidence from Sialkot reveals refugees both as the victims and perpetrators of violence. It has uncovered the terrible fate of untouchable Chamars, who, although they had remained safe from the main wave of Partition violence, were victimised in the closing months of 1947. It has also identified the criminal role of the refugees, army troopers, and ex-soldiers who made some resources available by expelling them on the pretext that they were spies in a sensitive and volatile border area. At the same time, the Sialkot case study has revealed that the Jammu violence, which had a backlash effect in the city, was clearly part of a plan by the Dogra-ruled state to ethnically cleanse the Muslims. Violence in Gujranwala was, likewise, planned and designed to drive out minorities but not to the same extent. Many individuals engaged in attacks on minorities did not think in these wider terms, but only worried about loot. However, their criminal actions could not have happened on such a large scale without the complicity of the police and government officials. At the same time, this exploration has demonstrated the extent to which non-communal factors were also at work—in practice, local rivalries, whether political, class-related or personal, could be equally significant as apparent religious differences.

Until recently, very little specific knowledge was available concerning the local level violence at the time of Partition. The case material drawn from Gujranwala and Sialkot adds significantly to this with its identification of the role of the *hamlahawars*. The case studies have revealed not only the value of police records as a historical source for the district-level examination of Partition violence in the Punjab, but also uncovered new material regarding abduction of women, as well as the conversion of Sikhs and the difficulties in acquiring social acceptability by such new converts.



This whole sensitive topic is another under-researched area of Partition histories. Gujranwala is surely by no means unique with respect to such episodes.

The expulsion of the Hindus and Sikhs in the cities made resources available for incoming refugees. The ways and means by which they were rehabilitated in the two cities and how they, alongside the locals, filled economic niches that had been left by the departure of the Hindus and the Sikhs, or created new ones, will form the focus of the final section of the book, beginning with an examination of the situation in Gujranwala.

NOTES

1. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 1 April 1949, p. 1.
2. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week Ending 22 March 1947, p. 106, NIHCR.
3. *Ibid.*, Week Ending 26 April 1947, p. 265.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 363.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 363.
7. Kuldeep Nayar, 'The Trial of Mountbatten', *Dawn* (Karachi) 10 August 2002, p. 6.
8. An Unpublished Autobiography of Dr Kishan Chand of Sialkot, pp. 29-30.
9. *Ibid.*
10. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week Ending 7 June 1947, p. 234, NIHCR.
11. The land revenue paid by the non-Muslims was Rs 844,725 as against Rs 687,391 paid by the Muslims. Singh, *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab*, pp. 223-4.
12. *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore) 7 September 1947, p. 7.
13. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week Ending 23 August 1947, *Disturbances in Punjab 1947*, p. 363; and also see *The Journey to Pakistan*, p. 302.
14. I am grateful to Khalid Hasan for providing me this information, (e-mail correspondence, 22 September 2006). Hasan was a Washington based correspondent of the Friday Times until his death on 6 February 2009. Also see for his work www.khalidhasan.net
15. *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi) 2 September 1947.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. 'Armed Raid at Lahore on Sialkot Convoy', *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi) 28 August 1947.
19. Home Secretary West Punjab to Chief Secretary East Punjab, 9 January 1948, Singh, *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab*, pp. 581-2.

20. Ibid.
21. *The Journey to Pakistan*, p. 103.
22. Jalal, 'Nation, Reason and Religion', p. 2189. Veena Das has adequately showed the meaning and symbolism of violence against women, concluding that 'the political programme of creating the two nations of India and Pakistan was inscribed upon the bodies of women'. See for example V. Das, *Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 56.
23. 'Forcible Conversion of Sikhs', *The Times* (London) 3 September 1947, p. 4.
24. Home Secretary West Punjab to Chief Secretary East Punjab, 9 January 1948, Singh, *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab*, pp. 581-2.
25. FIR no. 106, Thana Sambrial, 24 August 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
26. FIR no. 67, Thana Charar, 13 September 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
27. FIR no. 125, Thana Daska, 31 August 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
28. FIR no. 130, Thana Daska, 5 September 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
29. Singh, *Selected Documents on Partition of Punjab*, Doc, 234, p. 697.
30. Interview with Abdul-Islam Butt, Sialkot, 7 January 2007.
31. *Disturbances in Punjab*, 27 September 1947, p. 386.
32. An Unpublished Autobiography of Dr Kishan Chand of Sialkot, p. 30.
33. Interview with Malik Abbas, Lahore, 23 December 2008.
34. FIR no. 65, Thana Charar, 31 August 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
35. FIR no. 85, Thana Satra, 27 August 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
36. 'Deserted Tracts and Towns in West Punjab', *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi) 2 September 1947.
37. FIR no. 139, Thana Shakargarh, 10 September 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
38. FIR no. 136, Thana Sambrial, 20 October 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
39. FIR no. 117, Thana Sambrial, 29 August 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
40. K.M. Tufail, *Tehrek-i-Azadi main Sialkot ka Kardar* (Sialkot: Institution of the Publications of Pakistan Movement, 1987), p. 212.
41. A.A. Engineer, 'Gujarat Carnage: Role of Police in Gujrat [sic] Carnage', *Secular Perspective*, (16-30 June 2002). Kuldip Nayar, a former resident of Sialkot, has also noted, for example, during the 1992-3 Mumbai riots and the 2002 Gujarat massacres, the 'police instigated and protected the rioters. The day of Partition came back before my eyes. At that time too, the police were hand in glove with rioters or, for that matter, the killers'. See Kuldip Nayar, 'The road taken from Sialkot to Ahmedabad', *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 3 April 2002.
42. 'Refugees Flock into Kashmir', *The Times* (London), 14 March 1947, p. 3.
43. 'Tribal Hazards in the Border Territory', *The Times* (London), 26 January 1948, p. 5.
44. The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, Week ending 26 August 1947, p. 470, NIHCR.
45. According to the Census of 1941, the eastern half of the Jammu province, cutting across a small strip of the Punjab plain, was inhabited by 619,000 non-Muslims, including 10,000 Sikhs and 305,000 Hindus, and 411,000 Muslims. Forming 40 per cent of the population of this whole area, to the north, and astride the Chenab,



Muslims were in a majority in the Reasi, Ramban, and Kishtwar areas, and nearly attained parity in Bhadrawah.

Composition of Communities population in the Jammu Region			
District	1941 Population	Hindu%	Muslim%
Jammu	431,362	57.53	37
Kathua	177,672	74.31	n/a
Udhampur	294,217	56.02	n/a
Reasi	257,903		67
Mirpur	386,655		80.41
Pooch Jagir	421,828		90

46. M. Hashmi, 'My Forgotten City', in R. Rad and K. Hasan (eds.), *Memory Lane to Jammu* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2004), pp. 117-8.
47. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) 19 September 1947.
48. *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore) 20 November 1947, p. 6.
49. *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore) 29 October 1947, p. 2.
50. FIR no. 179, Thana Shakargarh, 28 November 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
51. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) 19 September 1947.
52. Saraf, 'The Jammu Massacres', in Rad and Hasan, *Memory Lane to Jammu*, pp. 178-9.
53. *The Journey to Pakistan*, pp. 298-9.
54. Urvashi Butalia, 'Partition's Memory', *Seminar* 497, (2001), p. 93.
55. Interview with Zafar Butt, Sialkot, 16 January 2007.
56. Interview with Khalid Ali Gujar, Sialkot, 16 January 2007.
57. Interview with Khawaja Tahir, Sialkot, 16 January 2007.
58. Interview with Zarar Hussain, Sialkot, 15 January 2007.
59. The Census of India, 1961, Vol. VI, cited in M.H. Kamili (ed.), *Jammu and Kashmir: Census of India* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1967), p. 42, p. 157, and pp. 359-60.
60. 'Elimination of Muslims from Jammu', Part II, *The Times* (London) 10 August 1948, p. 5. Such writers as Christopher Snedden have found it 'impossible to determine if a massacre of Muslim took place in Jammu Province in 1947'. Snedden has declared that there were no publication of the 'elusive *Times* reports...on the issue of 10 October 1948 because of a Sunday', which claimed that 'widespread murders- up to two hundred thousand people'. The evidence from Jammu contradicts this assertion. For the correction of a record, *The Times* report on the Jammu massacres published in the issue of 10 August 1948, not in 10 October 1948. See an article of Christopher Snedden, 'What happened to Muslims in Jammu? Local Identity, "the Massacres" of 1947 and the Roots of the Kashmir Problems', *South Asia*, XXIV, 2 (2001), pp. 111-34.
61. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 10 September 1951, pp. 3-4.

62. I. Copland, 'The Further Shores of Partition: Ethnic Cleansing in Rajasthan, 1947', *Past and Present*, 160 (1998), pp. 203-39; and also see 'The Master and the Maharajas'.
63. The violence in Alwar and Bharatpur is analysed in Mayaram's 'Speech, Silence and the Making of Partition Violence'.
64. *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore) 1 October 1947, p. 1.
65. C.B. Robinson, *Refugees, Political Subjectivity and The Morality of Violence: From Hijarat to Jihad in Azad Kashmir* (unpublished PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 2005).
66. Hashmi, 'My Forgotten City', p. 118.
67. *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore) 29 October 1947, p. 2.
68. Talbot, *Divided Cities*, p. 69.
69. FIR no. [deleted], Thana Sambrial, 4 September 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
70. FIR no. 132, Thana Sambrial, 9 October 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
71. FIR no. 119, Thana Sambrial, 4 September 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
72. J. Webster, 'Punjabi Christians in the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1919-1947', *Indo-British Review* 15, 1 (1987), pp. 119-32; 'Punjabi Christians', *Journal of Punjab Studies*, 16,1 (2009), pp. 35-56; and also see R. Rawat, 'Partition Politics and Achhut Identity: A Study of the Scheduled Castes Federation and Dalit Politics in UP, 1946-48', in S. Kaul (ed.), *The Partitions of Memory: The Afterlife of the Division of India* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001), pp. 111-39.
73. In particular, the representatives of Punjab Adi-Dharm Mandal, Punjab Ravidass Sabha, Punjab Depressed Classes League, and Punjab Municipal Workers Federation mobilized their community and sent their representatives to the various villages and towns for the support of Pakistan movement. For details see *The Partition of Punjab, 1947*, Vol. 1, pp. 142-9. A prominent untouchable leader Sukh Lal, then the deputy mayor of Lahore, repeatedly stated that 20 lakhs 'Achhut' of the Punjab would make Pakistan their 'homeland' and would continue their struggle for 'Achhutastan'. See *Inquilab* (Lahore) 7 March 1947, p. 3 and 10 April 1947, p. 5.
74. Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence*.
75. Kaur, *Since 1947*, pp. 156-87.
76. FIR no. 125, Thana Daska, 31 October 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
77. Interview with Matela, Sialkot, 19 December 2008.
78. Police records, drawn from different *thanas* of Sialkot, Sheikhpura, Lahore and Gujranwala, reveal that some Muslims were reported looting the properties of Christians.
79. FIR no. 87, Thana Shakargarh, 4 November 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
80. FIR no. 152, Thana Shakargarh, 15 November 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
81. FIR no. 165, Thana Shakargarh, 27 December 1947, DPRO, Sialkot.
82. PLAD, from 5 to 29 January 1948, Vol. I, D-50 (A), p. 223, PSA.



Part III

LOCALITY AND THE AFTERMATH OF PARTITION

It was the conjuncture of Partition and the demands of iron-products after independence of Pakistan which boosted our iron-works trade and manufactures. There was no competition at that time. The government required steel-products because of the stoppage of such material from India.

– Owner of Gujranwala's Climax Engineering, 19 December 2008

Who benefited from the migration of Hindus? Those who had experience, skill, experience, information, and family background (working in sporting goods industry)...Look at the Sublime Industry...Father of the owner of this big enterprise had worked in the city's oldest firm the Uberoi Sports Goods.

– A trustee of Sialkot's Uberoi Co-operative Sports Goods Society,
21 January 2007



5

Refugee Resettlement and Development in Gujranwala

Gujranwala experienced considerable demographic transformation and socio-economic change in the post-1947 period. The city's Hindu and Sikh population was replaced by Muslim migrants from East Punjab, who by the time of the 1951 Census accounted for over 60 per cent of the city's 120,852 inhabitants. This chapter attempts to examine the ways in which Gujranwala's local economy and urban landscape changed in the aftermath of Partition. It focuses on such questions as the role of refugees, as opposed to local Muslim *Lohar* artisans in its development, and the extent to which its industrial growth depended on government assistance. The chapter will highlight the complex experience of post-independence Gujranwala's industrial growth and draw on fresh source material to understand this previously unexplored topic. Oral source material is also utilised to shed light on the role of entrepreneurs who fostered the development of the metal-working industry and informal businesses of hosiery and jewellery in the city. Before elaborating on the contribution of entrepreneurs in the city's development, we turn first to the ways in which Gujranwala adapted to the influx of Muslim refugees from India.

PARTITION AND GUJRANWALA'S DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATION AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

A majority of Gujranwala's Muslim refugees came from Amritsar, Ludhiana, and Patiala. In comparison with localities such as Lyallpur (present-day Faisalabad), which received the large industrial



magnates, such as Sehgal and Chinioti families, a majority of Gujranwala's refugees belonged to the middle-ranking Amritsar refugee families, consisting of Arains, Ansaris, Sheikhs, and Pathans. Refugees also came to the city from the artisan families of Ludhiana and Jullundur, as well the jeweller operators from the princely state of Patiala. The pre-1947 presence of such communities in the city, partly explains why so many East Punjab Muslim refugees sought shelter in the city. A major theme that emerged from the oral narratives of refugees was that family ties and pre-Partition business connections played an important role in the resettlement process, and groups of refugees from the same locality lobbied to settle in one place. Moreover, Gujranwala's strategic road and railway connections made it a logical destination for many refugees. The Pakistan state exerted a much smaller influence on urban refugee resettlement than on that of the agriculturalist migrants. It sought to settle the latter en bloc in specific *tehsils*, localities, and villages. In early September 1947, the Punjab government was actively distributing pamphlets and leaflets at Lahore 'concentration relief camps' that over 100,000 migrants from Karnal, Ambala, Amritsar, Jullundur, Patiala, and Ludhiana had already settled in Gujranwala. Therefore, the refugees from these areas were advised to 'move in' to Gujranwala for their resettlement.¹ By the end of March 1948, a memo of the Ministry of Refugee and Rehabilitation reported that around 400,000 refugees had been resettled and allotted over 311,800 acres of land in the district, which had been abandoned by the departing Hindus and Sikhs.²

The refugees in Gujranwala town, the district headquarters, came from a variety of backgrounds, which included landowners, village menials, petty shopkeepers, and artisans, as well as a few upper-class families who flew in from Delhi. The poor refugees who did not have any entitlement to property claims still settled in the city because of its employment opportunities. Many initially laboured in Gujranwala's grain and fruit *mandis* (markets), construction works, transport and catering businesses, and subsequently, constituted much of the labour for the city's emerging industrial expansion. Overall, the urban refugees in the city numbered over 82,000 by the end of 1947. In addition to the Muslim refugees from East Punjab, a large number

of refugees from the state of Jammu and Kashmir also arrived in Gujranwala because of their pre-existing connections. In early February 1948, there were over 9,000 refugees in the city's four camps³ and their concentration was to increase threefold by the following year, as the Kashmiri refugees from the Mansehra, Wah, and Kala camps started 'pouring in' because many of their relatives had already arrived in the city.⁴

Accommodation was scarce because for every two outgoing non-Muslims, at least three Muslim refugees came into Gujranwala. Over-concentration of refugees in the city created a big administrative problem for the district authority. Wealth and personal connections were very important, not only in assisting the migration process and deciding one's destination, but also for the post-migration resettlement. A clear example of this is the settlement of wealthy members of Kazim Shah's family in one of the biggest evacuated houses of the Civil Lines' locality. Although Kazim Shah flew from Delhi to Lahore and then drove to Gujranwala in August, his father, in the weeks before Partition, had already sent the female family members to Gujranwala. He provides a first-hand account of utilising pre-existing connections for the speedy process of resettlement. 'My father had been district judge in Gujranwala sometimes before Partition. Therefore he knew the city and its people very well. He had many friends and connections in the city. Even before our arrival, one of his friends had already arranged accommodation in the Civil Lines.'⁵ Corruption and nepotism were important factors in the speedy settlement of refugees. Stories of 'making money' from the refugees were occasionally reported by the local press. The Urdu daily *Inquilab* admitted on 4 January 1948, for example, 'several malpractices' involving the Gujranwala rehabilitation staff.⁶ Such instances are now emerging in first-hand testimonies of refugees not only in Gujranwala, but in localities across the subcontinent.

The refugee experience was, frequently, not just a matter of a single dislocation, but involved years of upheaval and moving from place to place. Thousands of Muslim refugees from Gujranwala were persuaded to relocate to Sindh for 'better arrangements' for their resettlement. The first 'Muhajir Train', amid balloons, bouquets, and green Muslim League flags, carried over 4,000 refugees from



Gujranwala to the Sindh province on 9 March 1948.⁷ While some spent years moving from one place to another in search of stability, others quickly occupied old non-Muslim *mohallas* such as Guru Gobind Garh, Baghban Pura, and Guru Nanak Pura. Most of the refugees submitted 'claims' for compensation, but for some it often seemed an arbitrary decision rather than one based on factual evidence. Subsequently, such false claims created a huge problem, when the actual task of planned permanent resettlement finally commenced. The Gujranwala Majilis Ansar-o-Muhajir, set up in April 1948, tried to solve some of the issues relating to 'illegal occupation' in the city, but overall, it had little success. A decade later, there were still problems of illegal occupation, as is evidenced in a 1958 decision of Gujranwala's civil judge, in which over 2,000 such 'fictitious claims' were 'disallowed'. The decision eventually led the police to 'forcefully eject' the refugee families from properties and houses they had occupied since Partition.⁸ On several occasions, refugees came into conflict with local residents as well as with the law and the police.

GUJRANWALA SATELLITE SCHEME

The refugee overcrowding led the state to build new settlements. The Gujranwala satellite scheme was one of the state-developed colonies for the settlement of refugees. It started in 1950 on the south-west side of the city at Daska Road. It initially covered an area of 247 acres that was bounded on the north by the village Khokherkey, on the south by the city canal, on the east the village Shamshabad, and on the west by Ram Basti *mohalla* of Gujranwala. The scheme comprised hundreds of plots ranging from 20 to 5 *marla* in size. Each area was earmarked for more than one type of housing that fell into category A, B, C, or E. Block A, consisting of 147 acres, comprised of 8-*marla* plots, Block B of 819 acres, comprised of 14-*marla* plots, and of 375 acres, Block E consisted of 7-*marla* plots. Block C of 534 acres comprised of between 5-9 *marla* plots and a large part was designed for commercial activity. Initially, an amount of Rs 803,916 was allocated for the basic layout of the area.⁹

Upper middle-class refugees, who had higher claims to compensation, bought most of the plots. The 'allottees' could pay in monthly instalments. Loans for the construction of the houses were also provided by the government; these loans were provided on low interest rates and were repayable in twenty years. Some wealthy allottees had built their houses by the mid-1950s. By that time, there were still a few civic facilities for those who had settled in Satellite Town. The 'plight' of the town's residents is evidenced from a report of a correspondent of the *Pakistan Times* on 22 December 1956, 'even after moving after two years, there is no school, no street lights, and no park and children had to go far for schooling.'¹⁰ Gujranwala's Satellite Town was primarily designed to meet the standards of the rich and the upper-middle-class. Many who could not afford to build houses sold their plots to local established residents. By the end of 1956 a 'notice' was served to the 'allottees', by the Gujranwala Housing and Physical Planning Department, either to complete the construction within two years or face the 'cancellation of allotment' afterwards.¹¹ This deadline led many to sell their 'claim plots' to local residents. In many instances, wealthy locally established members of Sheikhs, Arains, and Kashmiris were the principal beneficiaries. At that time the price for a seven-*marla* plot was Rs 1,879.

In September 1962, Satellite Town was transferred to the Municipal Corporation Committee, Gujranwala for 'civic management'. A series of correspondence and directives was exchanged among the Punjab Rehabilitation Ministry, the Gujranwala Housing and Physical Planning Department, and the Municipal Corporation. This afforded opportunities for legal disputes over ownership involving locals who had occupied unconstructed plots. Gujranwala police department utilised this opportunity and occupied a big 2-*kanal* plot of the migrant family of Kazim Shah, and set up a police *chowki* on its premises. Subsequently, as late as 1982, the police department had to pay over Rs 80,000 in compensation to the allottee on the order of the High Court, as revealed by the Gujranwala Housing Department record.¹²

Apart from the upper-class Gujranwala's Satellite Town, low-cost housing schemes were designed to have one-room, two-bedrooms, and single- and double-storey three-room flats. A D-type colony, as



in the extension of Satellite Town, was started in 1956 and initially covered over twenty acres to the south of the Chaman Shah Cemetery. These 3-*marla* plots were developed slowly throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s.¹³ This D-type colony stands in stark contrast to the other Satellite Town sites. Its streets are narrow, with small cramped apartments, open garbage lots, and unauthorized additions to the apartments for extra space. This poorly constructed and planned colony was exclusively built for the settlement of Kashmiri refugees, over 25,000 of whom were still sheltering in the city's makeshift accommodations in 1956.¹⁴ The first phase of flats was allocated to those Kashmiri refugees whose 'claims' had been cleared by the Government of Azad Kashmir. Many without any claims had to house themselves in illegal squatter settlements over the years. Subsequently, the allotment of the colony was opened to other sets of migrants.

The failure of urban planners to properly plan for the absorption of the rapid influx of population into Gujranwala, has led to the growth of a large network of sprawling *katchi abadis*, or informal and illegal squatter settlements, located in the outer suburbs. The largest of these are the two Kashmiri colonies in the city. The unabated rise in Gujranwala's population (approximately 1,132,509 in 1998), has added many more localities around the so-called original refugee colonies. Its annual population growth-rate of over seven per cent is the highest for any major city in the country. In addition to Partition-related migrants, there has been a continuous influx of workers seeking job opportunities in its manufacturing and commercial centres.

PARTITION AND GUJRANWALA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Gujranwala's industry has developed dramatically since independence from its small beginnings during the colonial period. It is now one of the most important industrial cities of Punjab, and is playing a significant role in Pakistan's economic growth. There were over 6,000 small and medium entrepreneurs and 25,000 cottage-industries of diverse nature operating in the city in 2002.¹⁵ The city's main economic activity has centred on small-scale manufacturing of textiles and made-up steel products, sanitary wares and fittings, and

electrical and light engineering goods. This rapid growth had small beginnings. There were only 39 registered factories in 1947, and by 1961, their number had already grown to 225.¹⁶

How can we explain this growth in the immediate post-1947 period? Some studies have focused on the impact of refugee labour, skill, and capital in the urban regeneration and industrial development of different cities and towns of Punjab.¹⁷ Others have stressed the influence of caste and family background on entrepreneurial manifestation and success.¹⁸ To what extent was this a significant factor in Gujranwala? The new sources uncovered by this research reveal that there was a range of complex factors at work in Gujranwala's post-independence industrial growth. Many of contemporary Gujranwala's metal-working and light engineering industries developed out of iron-works, which were begun in the colonial era by the artisan community of *Lohars*. This community monopolised the sector during its earlier years. The situation is somewhat different in the city's two other important industrial and commercial sectors, namely, the hosiery and jewellery trades. Research involving in-depth interviews with owners and workers, and extensive observation and participation on the shop floor, reveals the significant impact of refugee labour, capital, and entrepreneurial enterprise in their development. Before examining this aspect of Gujranwala's development, we will first turn to the growth of manufacturing steel products and electrical and light engineering goods, where as we have already noted, the community of entrepreneurial *Lohars* played an important role.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUJRANWALA'S IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY

Gujranwala is the third-most important locality in Pakistan for iron and steel production, after the major centres of Lahore and Karachi. The steel industry has emerged as an important source of employment-generating and export earnings. There were over 700 stainless steel units functioning in Gujranwala in 2002, with a production of some 5,000 pieces of various metal products daily. The city was at the same time importing around 5,000 tons of steel sheets



every month from Japan, China, and some European countries. The main manufactures include iron safes, copper, brass, and aluminium utensils, agricultural implements, home electrical appliance, sanitary fittings, and small and medium electric transformers.

Central to post-1947 Gujranwala's success in the steel industrial was the presence of a large number of skilled workers of artisan stock. Most of them were traditionally associated with the metal-work trade in colonial India. As has already been discussed in chapter one, the roots of Gujranwala's modern iron and steel industry go back to the colonial era and to the migration into the town of skilled *Lohars* in search of employment. Up until 1947, they monopolised the trade and there is no evidence of any other community engaged in the manufacturing aspect of this industry, although local Hindus played an important role as traders and financiers. Most of the current unit-owners' occupations are, therefore, simply extensions of their *Lohar* backgrounds, though in recent years some non-*Lohar* castes have also entered this profession successfully.

Many middle-class factory owners of Gujranwala regard themselves as labourers-turned-proprietors. Many who had begun their life as apprentices in a smithy shop, and worked as labourers and machinists, repairing locks and making small agricultural implements, or producers of simple industrial machinery and tools, gradually rose to set up their own workshops and machine tool factories after 1947. Subsequently, some of them diversified their units into production of steel products and electric appliances. In this period, the industrial growth of the city was initially fuelled by the demand for agricultural implements, diesel engines, electric pumps, and tractor-driven implements, and subsequently, by the rising needs of the state and domestic demand for consumer goods. The combined benefits of excellent railroad networks further ensured a prominent commercial position for the city in the Punjab.

In many ways, the artisans benefited from the opportunities brought about by Partition. Possessing entrepreneurial skills and practical experience, combined with the favourable business environment provided by the government, some of these skilled entrepreneurs managed to mobilise equipment and other resources critical to establishing themselves as independent producers. The

business history of Gujranwala's imposing Anwar Mechanical Works and Engineering, illustrates this process. The business emerged as one of the biggest electrical and light engineering units in the city in the early 1950s. Its order books included both the government and the domestic consumers. The enterprise was established by Rafiq Anwar, a *Lohar*, who came to Gujranwala in search of work. In 1944, he joined the Hindu entrepreneur Ram Gopal Arora's Prabhat Engineering Factory and worked there until 1947. Arora's migration to India provided his foreman Rafiq Anwar with an opportunity to take over the control of the foundry, as we see from the account given below by his son Khalid:

My family has been in the iron-works since the Mughal Rule. Our entire family moved from a nearby village to the city during the British period. My father and uncle began iron-work in Ram Gopal Arora's Prabhat Engineering. This workshop manufactured various kinds of metal-works such as pipes, hoes and pumps. My father was eventually promoted to the foreman of factory. Ram Gopal Arora fully trusted in my father and this trust enhanced developing good relations between both families. I heard often my father praising the Arora family. We shared sorrow and happiness on special occasions. They joined us during the *Eid* and we joined them for their festivals such as the *Diwali*. During [the 1947] disturbances in Gujranwala, my family protected them, and in particular at the time of introduction of curfew in the city we used to provide dry food and all other support they required. Weeks before independence, Arora family had migrated to India...and handed over the control of the factory and some of their immovable properties to my father.

After independence, my father and an uncle took over the charge of the industry and resumed steel manufactures. In the meanwhile, the government allotted this industry to [a refugee] named Yaqoob, who from Ambala. He did not know too much about iron-works so he sold out the 'claim' to my father. My father renamed the factory Anwar Mechanical Works...After independence there was a rising demand of the iron-works. My father employed all those artisans who had been working with Arora...many of them eventually set up their own independent workshops. Some of them have emerged much more successful than us.¹⁹

The account not only demonstrates the anticipatory migration of the Arora family but also reveals how a worker benefited from the



departure of his employer. Initially he took charge over the factory, and subsequently, bought it from a refugee. In the post-independence period, Anwar Mechanical Works grew to become the largest integrated foundry in the region, manufacturing such items as electric motors, power pumps, engines, structurals, machine tools, cycles, and power-looms. Subsequently, this small-scale industry successfully diversified into the production of ceiling fans. Gujranwala's well-known and pioneering 'Super Asia Fan' belonged to the firm, which not only fulfilled household consumption needs but also the state needs. The rising empire of Anwar Mechanical Works was, subsequently, plagued by family disputes with each brother establishing his own separate unit. The experience of working with Anwar Mechanical Works was utilised by former employees who used their technical expertise in machine-tools manufacture to establish giant ventures of their own.

The only other pre-Partition unit comparable to the Anwar Mechanical Works is the Climax Engineering Private Limited, Gujranwala. This foundry has established itself as one of the most successful manufacturers in the small mechanical and engineering sectors in the region. The paid up capital of the company was worth Rs 33.12 million in 2002.²⁰ A *Lohar* from a nearby village, Gillawala, migrated to Gujranwala during the Second World War and began the Climax Engineering Private Limited in 1940, as a small-scale foundry, to make cast-iron *moulds*, and then started working in the utensil units before moving into manufacturing machine-tools and electrical appliances. He gradually began making machines and built a workshop to assemble them into lathes, oil expellers, and diesel engines. The Climax Engineering saw rapid growth in the post-1947 era, manufacturing electrical appliances and machine-tools. The owner of the foundry told me during the course of an interview that 'it was demands of iron-products after independence of Pakistan which boosted our iron-works trade and manufacturing. There was no competition at that time. The government required steel products because of the stoppage of such material from India.'²¹

In 1951, the Climax Engineering took off in terms of a wide range of products of electricity and heavy metal to fulfil the needs of state institutions such as the Pakistan Railways and the Military

Engineering Services. In 1956, the foundry initiated its own electric transformers and started manufacturing by the name of Gujranwala Electric Motors. Such new installations not only boosted the company's business, it also, at the same time, began manufacturing heavy transformers with the collaboration of the English Electric Company.²² It not only fulfilled the local demand for home electrical appliances, but also emerged as a major supplier of heavy electric transformers to the leading government and semi-government organisations.

GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE

Much academic attention has been devoted to the Government of Pakistan's fiscal incentives to large-scale migrant entrepreneurial industrialists residing in Karachi, mostly belonging to the Gujarati-speaking Khoja and Memon refugee communities from Kathiawar, Bombay. They comprised a part of the country's well-known 'Twenty-two Families'.²³ Mohammad Waseem has, however, pointed out that government support was also given at an earlier stage to capitalist migrants in West Punjab, such as the Sehgal, Arain, and Chinioti families by influential bureaucrats and politicians from a similar background as Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad and Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali.²⁴ Little has been written about the state's support for the restoration of normal commercial activity in Gujranwala, yet it is clear that the West Punjab Department of Industries made considerable efforts to reopen abandoned factories and shape Gujranwala's industrial landscape. The need for credit was pointed out in a 1948 Punjab Department of Industries survey of small-scale manufacturing not only in Gujranwala, but also in Wazirabad and Nizamabad. The government's response was to encourage self-employment by financing artisanal manufacturing activities. As part of its initial strategy, the government extended its credit to those who had basic skills to help generate a large number of small private firms in sectors such as metal working and machine-tools. The bigger units, such as Anwar Mechanical Works and the Climax Engineering, had been able to obtain credit from the specialised financing agencies, such as the Small Finance Corporation.



Gujranwala's industrial clusters were regarded as important not only in order to meet government requirements for steel and engineering products but also to generate employment. The Anwar Mechanical Works was at the forefront, fulfilling the demand for electric agricultural implements, while the Climax remained a major supplier of electric transformers and other steel-products to the leading state departments.

The government not only provided the start-up capital, but it also helped the more established firms in terms of technical assistance by building industrial estates. For example, in 1960, with the financial assistance of the International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank, the West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation set up two industrial estates for small and medium-scale industries, at Gujranwala and Sialkot, at a cost of \$6.5 million.²⁵ Another manifestation of the state's policy of encouraging the industrial development of backward areas was tax concessions. This support was introduced in April 1959 and the 'tax holidays' period ranged from two to six years. In the 1960s, the easy procurement of raw materials—billets, ingots, and re-rolling scrap—and the appearance of local furnaces in the following decade, played a significant role in the growth of steel mills.²⁶

As Gujranwala's industrial sector expanded, it began to attract entrepreneurs seeking to make their fortunes. The successful entrepreneurs served as a resource and role-model for others, encouraging them to migrate to the city and invest in urban manufacturing. Such rural to urban migration, mainly by *Lohars*, increased considerably in the post-independence era, although not always with such spectacular entrepreneurial results. A parallel is the dominance of the artisan *Lohar* community in Sialkot's surgical instruments industry and the key role of the *Ramgarhias*' and *Viswakarmis*' in Ludhiana's development in the fields of light engineering and machine-tool industries.²⁷

The expansion in the metal-working industry had multiplier effects as it played a dominant role in the growth of a burgeoning hosiery industry, with the manufacture of power-looms, machines, and other tools and equipment. This can be seen in the fact that the number of hand-looms in the city increased from 11 in 1947 to over 1,000 by

mid-1961.²⁸ The substantial concentration of skilled refugee workers in the city provided the basis for expansion of the hosiery industry. We shall turn now to a consideration of the role of refugee labour, skill, and capital in the industrial growth of the city, asking whether it was as significant as in other cities such as Lyallpur.

REFUGEE ENTREPRENEURS AND GUJRANWALA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Gujranwala's hosiery trade, unlike the metal-working industry, is largely a post-independence development in which refugees played a crucial role. The hosiery manufacturing sector is largely situated in the residential areas of Guru Nanak Pura, Guru Gobind Garh, and Garjakh. These are significantly, almost exclusively, refugee neighbourhoods. However, most of the sale points of hosiery products are located in Thatarwali Gali, in the congested area of Sialkoti Gate in Gujranwala. There are about 500 floor shops and this number is constantly rising. This research on the previously under-studied hosiery industry in Gujranwala reveals that it is dominated by migrants from East Punjab, many of whom are Ansaris from Ludhiana and Amritsar. They reside in close proximity and are also related as neighbours and as kin, and such kinship bonds are socially reproduced through socio-economic interactions and intermarriages. This is recognised by both entrepreneurs and workers, in the commonly used expression '*hum sub rashtaidar*' (we all are relatives), from Ludhiana or Amritsar.

What enabled these refugee families to become successful entrepreneurs in the hosiery industry? One of the most important elements was their previous experience and skill in the industry, prior to migration from India. Muslims dominated the workforce in the main centres of textile and hosiery manufacturing in colonial Punjab, namely Amritsar, Jullundur, and Ludhiana although the factory ownership rested with the Hindu commercial castes.²⁹ Refugees from Ludhiana, Amritsar, and Jullundur settled in large numbers in Gujranwala. Here they utilised their pre-existing family ties and business connections, and transferred their skills to the city's textile



and hosiery economy. This process can be illustrated through the case of the city's well-known Muhajir Cloth House.

Muhajir Cloth House was pioneered by a migrant family that had migrated from Amritsar in 1947. The family business has grown from small beginnings to become one of the biggest cloth wholesale operators and dealers in Gujranwala. The owner of Muhajir Cloth spoke about the way he and his brother used their previous skill and experience of working in the hosiery trades in Amritsar's locality Jandiala, to set up a new venture in Gujranwala:

We travelled to Pakistan on train. The journey was full of fear and violence but we reached Gujrat safely...We did not have any kind of business ties in Gujranwala; however, some of our blood relations were living in Gujranwala before independence so we chose to settle here. We were dealing in the business of cloth in Amritsar. We owned cloth shops in Jandiala. Our father used to work as a *pheriwala* (vendor) in Amritsar... We filed claim for the allotment of shop [in Gujranwala]. Government accepted the claim and allotted shops in the main bazaar of the city that proved to be first step towards our success in cloth trade. There were few competitors and things were cheap. In fact, we faced some local competitors such as the Mujiddi, Bukhari and Changa. My father prudently gave the shop name Muhajir Cloth and thus majority of the refugee community of the city became our customers. We brought some money with us from India. We used to buy cloth in wholesale from Lahore and Karachi and established our business by dint of hard work...No government agency provided any kind of help. We never got loan from government or bank. Some people from Amritsar worked with us and many others learnt skill from my father. Our entire family and all relatives are in this business. Some own shops, while others deal with the wholesale trade. We run five cloth shops in the city by the name of Muhajir Cloth House.³⁰

Haji Mohammad Ismail, the owner of Ludhiana Hosiery, provided a similar firsthand account of his business activities. He was a cloth-cum-supplier dealer before Partition. His previous experiences and skills, acquired in Ludhiana, assisted him in seeking a new niche in Gujranwala. Though he, himself, started on a small scale, later on, four of his sons opened separate shops in the city's hosiery market. He recalls:

My family had been in the hosiery trade for many generations. My father was a cutter-master in Ludhiana. After Partition we were allotted a house nearby the Gujranwala's Islamia High School. My father started garments business in 1948. Initially it was very hard to set up the trade. Apart from our own saving, we were lent some money by our relatives. We first set up a hand-loom in our house. Now my four brothers, four nephews and many other relatives own their shops and trade of ready-made cloths and power-looms.³¹

Jabbar Mohammad provides a third personal testimony of the importance of the Ludhiana connection in Gujranwala's hosiery trade. After migration he was allotted a house in the *mohalla* of Guru Gobind Garh in the inner city. Apart from his technical skills, he utilised previous connections from Ludhiana to set up successful hosiery business in Gujranwala. Initially, he did different menial jobs and then worked in the hosiery trade, stitching merchandise. He owned two shops in the hosiery bazaar of the city. He recalls:

Ludhiana was famous not only in the Punjab but all over India for its cloth and hosiery industries. I used to operate a Hindu hand-loom so that it was easy for me to work in this field. I saved some money and also had brought a little money with me from India. I set up a hand-loom in my house and members of the family worked there. The days we started handloom business in Gujranwala, it was difficult to get raw material such as yarn and dyeing material. I knew many people from Ludhiana in Lyallpur and used to go there every week and brought raw material of yarn and silk thread. I used to get yarn from one of my hometown acquaintances and, in return, used to sell finished goods to him. It was a relation of trust. He provided me yarn in advance without money. This relation was based on trust. Afterwards, I started to supply yarn and other related material to the local manufactures. This was less tedious and more profitable. Finally, I ended up a successful wholesale dealer.³²

Another Ludhiana migrant, Maqbool Ahmad, has a similar story to tell. He started a garment trade many years after Partition. Initially he worked for sometime in Sabazi *Mundi* and afterwards with some family members' help entered the hosiery trade.³³ Majeed Baba's family also brought with them from Ludhiana the necessary experience and skill to succeed in the hosiery trade. This comes out



clearly in the extract below from a long interview about their business life:

My father owned a small hosiery shop in [Ludhiana's] Sayed-a-Chowk and my uncle owned a shop in Kampri. Hosiery is our family profession. One of the reasons to come to Gujranwala was our business contact here. Before our arrival to Gujranwala, we used to supply hosiery products to uncle Shafiq. He also used to visit us [in Ludhiana]. He was a nice man and helped us a lot in the settlement. We were allotted a house in the *mohalla* of [Guru] Nanak Pura. We set up a handloom at home. From the start, our business was very successful as uncle Shafiq was very good in marketing and many times he was able to get advance orders. Subsequently, we for the first time set up a [power] loom in Gujranwala and began to supply hosiery products on a large-scale. At that time, there was a big demand for garments. Now we own over two dozen power-looms. Now my four sons own their garments shops and one of them is a big dealer of garments.³⁴

This account suggests how pre-Partition businesses links were vital not only in the settlement process, but also to set up a business in a new environment. The other factor that emerges is the demand for the hosiery products. The availability of locally assembled handloom and power-loom machines was another contributing factor for the rapid development of this industry. Iqbal Mohammad, whose family came from Ludhiana and now live in Gujranwala's D-type colony, also provided a first-hand account of his family's experience of developing a successful business in the city. Like the other respondents he also was able to secure assistance in setting it up because of his pre-Partition connections:

My father owned a *tonga* (horse-cart) in Ludhiana and mainly got labour of delivering hosiery raw material and products one place to other. He knew almost all the hosiery traders of the city. We arrived in Lahore first [and then shifted to Gujranwala]. In fact, my father's many acquaintances either settled in Lyallpur, Jhang and Gujranwala. We opted for the latter. We lived hand to mouth in the first few years.... I was thirteen at the time and started work as a helper in a Kashmiri's *tonga*. After sometime, I bought my own *tonga*. Apart from commuting passengers, I started delivering raw materials and goods to the hosiery traders.... Sometime

later, I began supplying wholesale yarn and this business was very successful. I knew many people who were engaged in this business. I used to get the products and paid money the next months. They trusted me because they knew my father from Ludhiana....³⁵

The account highlights that even a poor individual could possess valuable social capital as a result of personal contacts. The previously, 'being known' was an important element for enhancing 'trust' and developing a business for a *tonga wala* in the new opportunities after 1947. Community support from people who came from similar localities and ethnic backgrounds was another way to deal with the exigencies of resettlement and setting up a new trade. Some of the people and employers acted as the local 'kind man' and patrons, and cared for their kinsfolk or migrants from their former hometowns. For example, Haji Sheikh Taj Palu, the owner of United Hosiery Factory, is well-known as '*onn ka badshah*' (king of cotton) in Gujranwala's hosiery community. He was not only a pioneer in the hosiery trade in Gujranwala, but also encouraged many people from Ludhiana to set up the trade. A migrant hosiery dealer, by the name Maqbool, explained: 'Taj Palu has always been willing to help Ludhiana people out financially and he is a real patron for everyone who is in need in Gujranwala, and not only for those who work in his factory.'³⁶ Taj Palu began from a very small shop and shortly emerged as one of the biggest hosiery businessmen of Gujranwala. His son Sheikh Umar stated during the course of an interview:

My family came from Ludhiana's *mohalla* of Kocha Palwan. My father owned many handlooms in Ludhiana. In Gujranwala my father set up a hand-loom at home. This was the first loom in the city by any *muhajir*. We started from scratch. Now we own this factory and employ more than dozen labourers. They are all from Ludhiana. Many of them had worked with us [in Ludhiana]. My father helped them and provided them with employment when they had nothing to do. They often would come to my father and offer their stuff of yarn and silk materials they fetched with them during migration...Our success in this trade is totally based on self-survival; there is nothing due to the assistance of government.³⁷



It is not only refugees from Ludhiana, however, who utilised pre-existing skills and business contacts to start up enterprises from scratch. Similar cases can be found amongst migrants from Amritsar. In the case of Gujranwala's Amritsar Hosiery business they even perpetuated the name of their former hometown in the firm's title. The owner of Munir Hosiery was a *taypa laganay wala* (cloth-printer) in Amritsar before Partition. The fact that he had distant relatives in the city encouraged him to settle in Gujranwala. Soon after Partition, the family set up a handloom in an allotted house and began knitting *chaader*, and bed-sheets. Now almost the entire extended family is involved in this business. Some own handlooms, while others possess shops in the city.

Oral accounts, whether from Amritsar or Ludhiana migrants, attest to the importance of kinship networks in establishing business activities in Gujranwala. Many of the hosiery traders are relatives connected with each other either through kinship, or are acquaintances because of their previously shared locality (neighbourhood). This is reflected in the use of the term '*hum sam hak ha*' (we all are same), on the shop floor. Some are raw material suppliers, while others operate the shops and own the power-looms. Most power-loom owners depend entirely on the yarn dealer agents of spinning and composite mills at Lahore, Lyallpur, and Karachi. Nonetheless, in these communities, like in any other, cooperation and support coexist with gossip, competition, and rivalry. A few better-off hosiery makers, who run larger units, have purchased power-looms and machines following a trend towards mechanised hosiery. In a few cases, they competed effectively in the cloth business with the local Sheikhs, who had previously dominated the textile trade. Apart from the inner city, a large and increasing number of hosiery units can today be found in the locations of Model Town, Muslim Town, Dhullay, Checherwali, and Garjakh. However, there are only a handful of mechanised hosiery units and most of the yarn hosiery in the area is produced entirely through manual operation.

REFUGEES AND CASE OF THE JEWELLERY TRADE

Some of Gujranwala's most famous refugee entrepreneurs, mainly from Patiala, are associated with the city's jewellery business. The material presented in this section, based on semi-structured interviews with thirty-two jewellery operators, twenty-five service providers and four Sarafa Anjuman leaders, testifies to their economic success. Gujranwala's jewellery industry is informal, unorganised, and unregulated. A significant proportion of the trade is concentrated in the small alleys of the old city, where many Hindus and Sikhs lived previously, and which were then occupied by incoming Muslim refugees. The Sarafa bazaar in the Siakhoti Gate is one such area. A number of interviews were conducted in this locality.

As firsthand accounts reveal, one of the reasons why the refugees set up this labour-intensive small business was the ancestral skill and experience they brought with them to Gujranwala. In addition to this, community ties were crucially important in establishing a trade which depended so greatly on trust. Refugee families from Patiala thus brought with them skills and social capital. In many instances, they started up their trade with the gold they had managed to secrete during their perilous migration. Abdul Saleem, the proprietor of the city's well-reputed Patiala Jeweller, explained to me during the course of an interview, that his family had been in the jewellery business for several generations. Prior to Partition, his father Hafiz Abdul Sattar owned two big jewellery shops in Patiala's Sheranwala Darwaza. Some members of the royal family of the Sikh Maharaja of the princely state of Patiala were their regular customers. Abdul Saleem's family had trade connections and kinship links in Gujranwala and that was one of the reasons why the family had migrated to the city. The family began the jewellery business as a small scale concern in 1950. Today it has extended to many shops and outlets. The following account of the head of the family, Abdul Saleem, provides details of how the family utilised the previously acquired skills, experiences, and capital to establish a business in Gujranwala:

Our family had been in jewellery making trade for many generations. My father was a well-known jewellery artisan in Patiala. We possessed two shops in Patiala and employed four artisans. We were six brothers, five



worked in the shops. We not only used to supply jewellery to the regular customers but the members of royal families of the state of Patiala were also our regular customers. Sometimes, my father would visit the palace of Maharaja of Patiala on the demand of the royal family...and he made ornaments on the demand of the royal women. My father was a prudent man and well aware about the 1947 disturbances. Sometime before the disturbances, he shifted gold to Gujranwala where one of our distant relatives lived. He made the right decision as afterwards some Sikhs of the state looted our shops and houses.

After arriving in Gujranwala, we did not start proper business for many years, but the people who knew us from Patiala often came to our house. Some of them wanted to sell their gold, while others wanted to make up new ones for the marriages of their daughters. From our home we started the business and within a few years it became very successful. We employed some of the artisans who used to work for us in Patiala.... Some of them are now well-known jeweller traders of the city of Gujranwala.³⁸

The owner of Guffar Patiala Jeweller, Abdul Guffar (a cousin of Abdul Saleem), operates one of the most successful shops in the Sarafa bazaar. His family was associated with jewellery business before Partition. He told me that his two brothers, cousins, and an uncle were also associated with this business.

Many Muslims of Patiala were artisans of jewellery. My father was a well-known jewellery artisan in the state. During the riot, Sikhs killed my five brothers and a sister. My father and I remained safe and carried with us some gold. We first arrived in Lahore and then proceeded to Gujranwala because my father-in-law lived here. We were allotted a shop in Sialkoti Gate. We opened a shop in 1950 and began from scratch. My father-in-law helped me set up the business. We brought with us a large amount of gold from Patiala. We would buy also gold from refugee families and re-sold in new shape and design. A jewellery trade relies on trust. You cannot trust others in this business. Therefore only the artisans who worked with us in Patiala were employed again in Gujranwala in polishing and inscribing. Now my sons control the business.³⁹

The above accounts reveal three core factors. First, they show how the refugees, despite killings and disturbances, were able to carry gold to build their future life. The first interview also reveals that some Muslims like the previously documented cases of Hindu traders,



anticipated the disturbances and took measures in advance of August 1947 to move their properties and possessions. Second, they reveal a feature which is common not just to Gujranwala, but to other locality-based studies of Partition and its aftermath that refugees were best able to restart their businesses when they possessed pre-existing skills and contacts. Third, they reveal that fellow migrants could act as trusted employees, suppliers, or valuable customers for refugee businessmen.

Apart from the Patiala house of jewellers, two groups of Amritsar refugee jewellers, by the names of Amritsar Jeweller and Fathagarh Jeweller, control the main business in Gujranwala. Haji Mohammed Hassan, the owner of Amritsar Jeweller, migrated from Amritsar in August 1947. As it increasingly seems to be the case, this location was chosen because of the presence of distant relatives, one of whom had only arrived a month earlier. Haji Mohammad Hussain opened a shop in partnership with a friend. Currently the jewellery trade business is run by his three sons. The eldest son Rana Amjad Khan took over the Amritsar Jeweller, Fadia Hussain opened a shop in his own name, and the youngest son, Rana Akthar Iqbal, opened the New Karan Jeweller.

Another Amritsar refugee family owns the Asim Jewellery. Presently they reside in the city's Satellite Town. The head of the family business recalls its history in the extract below:

My whole family are associated with jewellery business. My four brothers, uncles, and all other relatives are linked with this occupation. My father was an artisan of jewellery in Amritsar. We brought tools when we migrated to Gujranwala. The main reason to move to here was that some of our distant relatives lived here. Many years we did not have any shop in Gujranwala. My father was doing jewellery business at our house. Later on, I do not remember when, my father was able to rent a shop in Sialkoti Gate and that was the beginning of our business.... Now all my brothers had their own shops. About 15 years ago, I bought this shop and shifted my shop from Sarafa bazaar to here. Satellite Town is a posh area; here customers can easily pop in rather than going in [the congested] Sarafa bazaar.⁴⁰



Most of the jewellers of Gujranwala are related, or had business connections before Partition. The operators of Earam Jeweller, Rizwan Jeweller, Ghazal Jeweller, Safina Jeweller, Delight Jeweller, and many others informed me during the course of interviews that they knew each other before their arrival in Gujranwala in 1947. Many stated that the city's existing trade and jewellery manufacture was the creation of migrants. The business simply did not exist before 1947. There was thus no competition and many opportunities opened up for the new arrivals. It is only much more recently that the fierce competition between the Patiala house of jewellers and the Amritsar chain of jewellers has emerged.

ECONOMIC MOBILITY OF REFUGEE ENTREPRENEURS

Many refugees, whether they were jewellery operators from Patiala and Amritsar, or hosiery workers and entrepreneurs from Ludhiana and Amritsar, achieved upward economic mobility in Gujranwala through their own efforts, and because they brought skills and contacts from India, in particular. This reality contrasts with the 'official' history that projects a unified effort to rehabilitate the refugees. The personal accounts of refugee entrepreneurs point to a different history of success. Kinship and previously-shared community values were two of the reasons that led to joint action, co-operation, and the success of the migrant community in the hosiery and jewellery trades. All were neighbours, living only a few houses away from each other. This 'sticking together' in a specific locality or *mohalla* was seen as both a symbol and a factor in the community's success. Refugee businessmen preferred to employ poorer labourers who had also migrated in 1947. The management of both hosiery and jewellery enterprises was of the joint-family type and there was no separation of ownership and control in this trade. Most of the key positions was held by members of the same family or relatives. In many ways, the refugee traders thus depended mainly upon family members and the migrant community for the operation and success of their business.

Lack of credit was cited as a leading initial constraint by most of the refugee entrepreneurs. Despite state schemes to fund refugee

businessmen, the theme which emerges from firsthand accounts is that most of the capital which was raised came from their own family funds. As revealed through interviews, the capital assets which they had carried with them during the migration from India constituted an important source of their investment. The other source was the compensation they received in lieu of their 'claims' of various kinds of immovable properties that they had abandoned in India. The state was of course involved in overseeing this process, but refugees regarded it as part of their 'right'. Therefore, again, they tend in interviews to play down any notion of state assistance in their success. Some refugees from Patiala started the jewellery business with the gold and tools they carried with them at the time of migration, while some utilised the opportunity to buy their fellow refugees' gold at a low price. The exploitation of needy refugees' selling off their gold assets in their search for economic stability is evidenced from documentary sources. A November 1947 West Punjab Economic Inquiry, for example, reported that the 'bullion dealers' were taking a profit of 22 per cent per *tola* in the purchasing of 'refugee gold'.⁴¹ Many of those who did not have the occupational specialization or skill to obtain sufficient credit to become small entrepreneurs tended to remain bazaar shopkeepers and small market dealers.

Pakistan state's agencies, such as the Small Finance Corporation, were not known to many respondents. This contrasts with the official portrait that the state was providing assistance in the form of grants to rehabilitate the refugees. In fact, the class that forms the informal sector of Gujranwala represented little influence or lobbying power in the upper echelons of the state, as was the case in Karachi or Lyallpur. However, constituting over half of the city's population, the migrant community increasingly influenced Gujranwala's local and municipal levels of the government. The strong sense of community identity is visible in a substantial residential concentration, financial independency, and cultural ascendancy. The latter is demonstrated by the establishment of institutions and associations to promote advancement. As early as April 1948, for example, the Gujranwala Muhajir Hosiery Anjuman complained about the 'impracticality' of obtaining cotton yarn and synthetic dyes, which were either imported or produced in large factories in Karachi. Their representatives



criticised the government's attitude towards refugee hosiery traders as 'unjust and brutal'. They demanded that quotas for the import of thread should be 'fixed per city', and the state should subsidise excise taxes.⁴² In one way, the selection of Gujranwala as the venue of the 1954 annual general meeting of the All-Punjab Joint Stock Textile Federation was the result of successful lobbying by the Gujranwala Muhajir Hosiery Anjuman. During the meeting, Gujranwala's traders particularly pointed out the difficulties of importing cotton silk yarn. Subsequently, they were able to convince the Federation to despatch a representative to Karachi, then the capital of the country, for the issue of import licences for cotton silk yarn to the members of the Gujranwala Muhajir Hosiery Anjuman.⁴³ Over the years, this and other associations, such as the Gujranwala Sarafa Anjuman, have become the chief instruments through which the city's key businesses pressure the state for benefits and promotion.

The strong presence of pre-existing ties not only influenced the destination of migration, but also assisted in the process of acceptance by the local population. As Sarah Ansari's recent work has revealed, the Urdu-speaking migration in Sindh resulted in ethnic tensions with the local population.⁴⁴ Despite the fact that the refugees outnumbered the already established population in Gujranwala, however, conflict between refugees and local population in the city, as elsewhere in the Punjab, was muted. Even when refugees did not possess pre-existing ties, assimilation was made easier because of the common Punjabi language and cultural proximity. Sheikhs, Arains, Kashmiris, and Ansaris from India, for example, who migrated to Gujranwala, found fellow *biraderi* members there, even if they did not have any distant family relatives. Tensions may also have been muted because, as we have seen, with respect to Gujranwala's jewellery and hosiery trades, the refugees were not competing with established local businesses, but bringing in new enterprises. Nevertheless, relationships between locals and refugees were based on separation, rather than integration. Refugees had their own clearly defined residential quarters and were unlikely to encourage intermarriage with locals from other *biraderis*. Even those who were economically successful found it difficult to forget their former homes. Hence the establishment of businesses in Gujranwala with

such names as Patiala Jeweller, Amritsar Jeweller, Ambala Utensils, and Ludhiana Hosiery, is just a small way in which memories of the trader's ancestral homes in East Punjab are apparent, or have been preserved.

We will now consider whether similar processes were at work in Sialkot, as well as it began to cope with its demographic transformation, and began a slow economic recovery following the 1947 dislocation.

NOTES

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3. *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore) 10 February 1948, p. 3.
4. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) 21 August 1956, p. 3.
5. Interview with Kazim Shah, Civil Lines, Gujranwala, 27 January 2007.
6. *Inquilab* (Lahore) 4 January 1948, p. 5.
7. *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore) 10 March 1948, p. 6.
8. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 10 July 1958, p. 2.
9. Gujranwala Housing and Property Department Record Office, File No. 32, (Model Town Office, Gujranwala).
10. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) 22 December 1956, p. 2.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
12. Kazim Shah versus State, Gujranwala Housing and Property Department, File No. 32.
13. Gujranwala Housing and Property Department, File No. 39.
14. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) 21 August 1956, p. 3.
15. Gujranwala Chamber of Commerce Record Office, File No. xxii, p. 7, (Civil Lines, Gujranwala).
16. Gujranwala Chamber of Commerce, File No. xxi, p. 33.
17. S. Singh, 'Refugees as Entrepreneurs: The Case of the Indian Bicycle Industry', *Journal of Entrepreneurship*, 3, 1 (1994), pp. 81-96. Talbot's work has revealed the substantial role of Amritsar's Muslim refugee entrepreneurs in Lahore's post-1947 growth in the carpet industries. See for example, Talbot, *Divided Cities*. For the impact of refugee labour in the post-independence development of Lyallpur's textile industry see P. Virdee, 'Partition in Transition: Comparative Analysis of Migration in Ludhiana and Lyallpur', in A.G. Roy and N. Bhatia (eds.), *Partitioned Lives: Narratives of Home, Displacement and Resettlement* (New Delhi: Pearson Longman, 2008), pp. 156-71.
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 20. This reference was taken from the Climax Engineering Record Office, Gujranwala.
 21. Interview with Qayyum Ahmed, Gujranwala, 19 December 2008.
 22. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) 18 September 1956, p. 3.
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 29. Luthra, *Impact of Partition on Industries*, p. 32.
 30. Interview with the owner of Muhajir Cloth House, Gujranwala, 22 January 2007.
 31. Interview with Haji Mohammad Ismail, Gujranwala, 22 January 2007.
 32. Interview with Jabbar Mohammad, Gujranwala, 27 February 2007.
 33. Interview with Maqbool Ahmed, Gujranwala, 23 February 2007.
 34. Interview with Majeed Baba, Gujranwala, 23 February 2007.
 35. Interview with Iqbal Mohammad, Gujranwala, 22 February 2007.
 36. Interview with Maqbool, Gujranwala, 23 February 2007.
 37. Interview with Sheikh Umar, Gujranwala, 17 February 2007.
 38. Interview with Abdul Saleem, Gujranwala, 5 March 2007.
 39. Interview with Abdul Guffar, Gujranwala, 2 March 2007.
 40. Interview with the owner of Asim Jewellery, Gujranwala, 3 March 2007.
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 42. *Inquilab* (Lahore) 17 April 1948, p. 2.
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6

Refugee Resettlement and Development in Sialkot

Sialkot experienced serious economic difficulties in 1947. They arose from capital flight, loss of financial expertise in the banking and business sectors, and loss of access to markets and raw materials. The city faced a powerful regional competitor in Jullundur in the Indian Punjab, where capitalist refugees from Sialkot sought to establish a rival sporting goods industry. Sialkot also now had the locational disadvantage of being situated on the sensitive border with both Kashmir and Indian Punjab. Security worries discouraged new refugee entrepreneurs. The economic dislocation, however, proved to be ephemeral. With the birth of Pakistan, a new chapter was opened in Sialkot's development. But like the colonial era, it was to build on pre-existing skills and capital development to usher in a rapid period of economic growth. The departure of the Hindu community provided space and new opportunities for Muslim traders and artisans.

This chapter will address the important question of how the economic gaps were filled by the indigenous population, and the extent to which Sialkot's industrial growth depended on government assistance. The findings draw on fresh source material, and will provide the key to understanding how Sialkot, despite its border handicap and loss of traditional markets, as well as raw materials, recovered from its Partition-related economic depression to become a thriving industrial town of the region. Before examining Sialkot's urban and industrial growth, we shall turn to the ways in which Sialkot dealt with the influx of refugees.



REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN SIALKOT

What kind of refugee population came to Sialkot? This question is important in understanding both the city's demographic and economic transformation. Although Sialkot received refugees from East Punjab's towns and cities, the city was much less successful in attracting refugee entrepreneurs than cities such as Gujranwala, Lahore, and Lyallpur. A major constraint was its newly-created border location with the attendant security fears. The outgoing Hindus and Sikhs were, therefore, replaced largely by Muslims from the neighbouring Jammu region. The city had a road and railway connection with Jammu, and so was a logical destination for these refugees. Moreover, many Kashmiris already had kinship ties and business connections in the city. The Kashmiri refugee population, thus, not surprisingly, became the most visible community in the city.

The process of refugee resettlement in Sialkot dragged on far longer than elsewhere in West Punjab. The delay in resettling the Kashmiri refugees in the city resulted not only from local difficulties and over-concentration, but was rooted in the government policy. The Punjab government's priority for the settlement of 'agreed areas' of refugees (from East Punjab), delayed the rehabilitation process of the Kashmiri refugees. Moreover, throughout 1948-49, the city being on the border, ballooned with a continued influx of refugees from Jammu and Gurdaspur through the Suchetgarh Crossing and the Pathankhot-Shakargarh route. For these 'new arrivals', a new Lal Kurthi Camp was set up near the cantonment areas. In April 1949, their numbers exceeded 25,000.¹ As relations with India deteriorated, many more arrived, despite the introduction of visa restrictions between the new neighbours.

In addition to refugees who arrived directly, migrants came to Sialkot from elsewhere in Pakistan because they had relatives in the city. In 1949, more than 5,000 refugees from camps at Wah and Mansara were 'ready' to join their relatives in Sialkot.² At a time when the authorities were still struggling to accommodate the earlier refugees, these additional arrivals added to the pressure that characterized the resettlement process.³ By the end of October 1949,

an estimated 200,000 refugees were squatting in camps, abandoned factories, and open spaces in Sialkot.⁴ The most fortunate amongst them, occupied properties abandoned by the Hindus and Sikhs. Many others thronged camps, schools, and military barracks for many years. The least fortunate were accommodated in the 'most appalling', 'de-humanised', and 'like cattle' circumstances in the premises of evacuee factories. Unhygienic conditions in the factory-camps caused health problems. Many refugees and their children suffered some kind of 'mental and physical pain' in an evacuee rubber factory. Almost all 2,000 refugees in the city's Ganda Singh School caught small-pox.⁵

The continued arrivals placed an enormous strain on the district authorities' ability to handle the rehabilitation process, especially since the resettlement of earlier refugees had hardly begun. The district administration lacked the infrastructure to cope with the situation. The gravity of the refugee concentration and the difficulty in their resettlement was reflected in the fact that the Sialkot deputy commissioner reported to the Punjab rehabilitation authority expressing concern that 'the refugees from the [other places] camps must not be sent to Sialkot.'⁶ Many refugees were either without shelter or were lodged in unsatisfactory housing and camps. The district authorities also faced constant demonstrations and resentment by the different refugee organisations. The Anjuman-i-Muhajireen Jammu was at the frontline for protesting over the authorities' handling of refugee resettlement. The Anjuman was established by the Jammu refugees at the end of December 1947, with Dr Bashir Ahmad, as its president. The organisation claimed to speak for all refugees from Jammu and saw one of its main tasks as putting pressure on the authorities, calling for quick accommodation, and some means of earning a living. Not all refugee groups lined up with it. At this stage, the Kashmir Muslim Conference also started to take steps to increase its impact. The representatives of the conference disassociated themselves from the Anjuman on the grounds that it was 'a non-constituted body'. They claimed that their body solely represented over 3,200,000 of the Kashmiri Muslims.⁷ Its president, Ghulam Abbas, during a meeting with the Governor of Punjab, pointed to the abolition of a distinction between 'agreed and non-agreed' refugees. If this was impossible, he emphasised that the



Jammu and Kashmiri refugees should come next to the refugees from the 'agreed areas' in order of priority. His solution for the resettlement of the refugees, together with escaping the 'intense heat of the plains', was the shifting of the Kashmiri refugees to the 'cooler localities' of the Northern Western areas, such as the Kaghan Valley, Abbotabad, Kotli, and Ali Beg.⁸

The refugees frequently protested against the inadequate housing conditions and shortage of rations. There were occasional clashes between the refugees and the district authorities. On 27 April 1949, after visiting a refugee camp at Sialkot, the Governor of Punjab, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, addressed the refugees and sought to calm down the situation by saying: 'Sheikh Abdullah wants to sell you to Indians for his own ends like the British who sold you to the Dogra nearly a hundred years ago. It is better to live in an inhuman manner than in slavery.'⁹ He recounted the government's achievements in providing jobs to 4,000 unemployed Sialkoties in the Military Uniform Clothing Factory, in the cantonment. On this occasion, the Governor exhorted the Kashmir Muslim Conference President, Ghulam Abbas and the Anjuman Jammu President, Bashir Ahmad, to work together for the welfare of the refugees as well as cooperate with local officers for the speedy process of resettlement. The mollification of both the Kashmiri spokesmen towards the government led the Majlis-i-Ahrar to enter the scenario. In April 1949, the Ahrar's annual conference in Sialkot highlighted the refugees' discontent, and their firebrands outspokenly blamed the Punjab government for the misery of the refugees and stressed the need for a jihad against India.

The refugee organisations continued their ceaseless processions and targeted the city's deputy commissioner's office. In October 1949, the pressure culminated in the suspension of Mohammad Akram, deputy rehabilitation officer, on the grounds of the 'too slow' process of resettlement, in which refugees had been 'suffering heavily'.¹⁰ Alongside the refugees, local labourers also protested and demanded free rations, until the government restarted the factories abandoned by Hindus and Sikhs, and provided employment. As the pressure increased, in February 1950, the army took charge over the camps. Almost immediately, it closed down all the refugee camps in the city and moved the refugees to the Wavell Lines in the cantonment. These

military barrack accommodations were considered a 'most airy, comfortable and suitable location.'¹¹ Under the army control of the camps, rations were improved, which raised the morale of the refugees. Within three months, the press reported that refugees were living there 'like an average citizen'.¹²

From now onwards, a self-reliance policy was encouraged. Refugees could engage in paid work while acquiring new skills such as spinning, tailoring, leather-working, weaving, and knitting. Special classes for tailoring and leather-working were arranged at the Government Vocational Training Centre, Sialkot. Refugees, while acquiring new skills, received an amount of Rs 7-8 a month. This lucrative paid training attracted a large number of refugees. In this way, over one thousand male and seven hundred female refugee students were taught knitting and house-spinning respectively. At the same time, more than 1,000 refugees had been trained in leather-working, while a batch of 700 refugee students had been sent to the Lahore Training Centre through the Sialkot Branch of Employment. Stipends were also awarded to Kashmiri students from primary to intermediate schools, which covered tuition fees, books, and stationary. In the 1951-52 budget years, an amount of Rs 200,000 was allocated as scholarships for Kashmiri refugee students.¹³

PARTITION AND SIALKOT'S URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Urban redevelopment following Partition has been the focus of a number of recent studies.¹⁴ The riot-destruction in Sialkot provided an opportunity for the development of commercial and residential schemes. The city's infrastructure was also greatly damaged by the frequent failure of electric and water supplies. The Sialkot Municipal Committee struggled to fulfil its civic duties. Throughout 1947-49, it faced criticism and resentment arising from the frequent failure of electricity supply and shortage of water. Sialkot's civic problems, arising from the social upheavals of Partition, were compounded by the heavy floods of 1948 and 1950, in the local streams of Aik, Tawi, Pulkhu, Bher, and Dek. The damage caused by the 1950 monsoon floods was estimated at over Rs 10,000,000. In the city alone, the cost of house properties damage reached over Rs 400,000.¹⁵ The inadequate



refugee accommodations were, particularly, badly affected. The locality of Ghazipur was completely 'washed out', where more than sixty-two families of Kashmiri refugees were living in more than a hundred inadequate accommodations. The Governor of Punjab, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, visited the devastated area and announced the construction of the new colony of Nishtarabad for refugees on the remains of Ghazipur. At the time, it was estimated that after completion, each house would be allotted at a cost of Rs 5,000.¹⁶ The responsibility for construction was taken over by the Sialkot Improvement Trust.

The Sialkot Improvement Trust was set up on 29 September 1950, under the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922. The Improvement Trust initially turned its attention to the renovation of 'the burnt down' areas of Budhi, Bara, Basanwala, and Raja bazaars, under the West Punjab Damaged Areas Ordinance of 1948. The trust not only built houses and shops, it also widened roads and bazaars, relieving the congestion of the city. For the extension of the congested Budhi bazaar, it acquired about four and half *kanals* of land in the surrounding areas. The aim was to facilitate heavy traffic through the congested old bazaar. In January 1950, the Sialkot Improvement Trust drew up a scheme for the extension of Serai Maharaja Road to south Basanwala bazaar right up to Raja bazaar in the east. It also acquired 28 *kanals* in order to undertake the extension and development of a grain market.¹⁷ Indeed the Sialkot Improvement Trust's refurbishing schemes formed a significant element in the city's riot-damaged redevelopment.

On 22 February 1954, the Governor of Punjab declared that a satellite town would be constructed for the resettlement of refugees in Sialkot.¹⁸ Earlier the Pakistan Housing Building Finance Corporation had sanctioned an amount of Rs 1,000,000 for the scheme.¹⁹ By the end of September, the Sialkot Improvement Trust had procured 302 acres of land, lying between the town and railway station. This old Ugoke area was now given the new name of 'Model Town', which was constructed with all modern amenities, facilities, and sophistication under the supervision of the Model Town Co-operative House Building Society. By the end of September 1954, the society was receiving applications from people from all walks of life.



For the accommodation of Kashmiri refugees, low-cost housing schemes were designed to have one-room, two-bedrooms, and single- and double-storey three-room flats. A Kashmir Colony was started in 1956 and initially covered over twenty-five acres on the east side of Sialkot town, on Pasrur Road.²⁰ Urban rebuilding had to be accompanied by industrial expansion if the large refugee community was to recover from Partition. This was, however, a daunting task in the wake of the physical destruction and dislocation following the violence we have surveyed earlier.

THE IMPACT OF PARTITION ON SIALKOT'S ECONOMY

Until recently, little has been written about the consequences of Partition for Sialkot's industrial development. Anita Weiss has briefly dealt with the post-independence development of Sialkot's sporting goods industry.²¹ She has provided immensely useful overviews of the emergence of a new middle-level entrepreneurial class, and she effectively links the development of the sporting goods industry to larger cultural, class, and kinship-based cooperation issues in the Punjab. Her study is, however, limited to the 1965-75 decade, so she overlooks the dislocation and recovery of the immediate post-Partition period.

Sialkot's trade was badly hit in 1947. Its industrial labour force declined by 90 per cent and its production figure by 93 per cent. In all, nine rubber manufacturing factories, four sporting goods factories, two surgical equipment factories, and one that produced musical instruments, were abandoned. These included former large enterprises such as, the National Rubber Mill, the Munshi Cloth Mills, the Punjab Surgical Instruments, and Uberoi Sports Goods. The city's working capital growth declined by over 90 per cent. Estimates of losses incurred in the sporting goods and surgical instruments industries' production and export were phenomenal. According to one estimate, the production and export of the surgical instruments declined by over 83 per cent, while in the case of the sporting goods, the decrease was no less than 95 per cent.²² Further evidence of the dislocation emerges starkly from the following figure: out of fifty-three registered factories working in 1946, only twelve factories



remained in partial operation after Partition. The year before Partition, Rs 149 *lakhs* worth of capital was invested in Sialkot's factories, but this had decreased by over 90 per cent to Rs 14 *lakhs*, in 1947. The industrial production figure for the year 1946 was Rs 218 *lakhs*, which fell in 1947 to Rs 15 *lakhs* only, a decrease of over 93 per cent.²³ The continuing closure of industries rendered thousands of workers jobless. Over 90 per cent of the labouring classes of Sialkot were laid off and more than five months after Partition, over 35,000 former workers were still 'sitting idle.'²⁴

Sialkot's colonial development had depended greatly on its sound banking system. Due to the extent of businesses and continuing prosperity, the city had become the second most important financial centre in the Punjab. It was surpassed only by Lahore, which was the hub of commercial and financial activity in the province. Most of the leading banks of India such as the Bharat Bank, the Punjab National Bank, Kashmir Bank, and Imperial Bank had opened their offices and branches in Sialkot. The traders and industrialists of Sialkot could obtain loan advances against their stocks of raw materials simply by presenting railway receipts. At Partition, the city's financial system was severely handicapped with the flight of bankers and financial expertise. In November 1947, a senior bank officer summed up the financial handicap situation in Lahore, but it also reflected the situation in Sialkot: 'Never in the history of banking has any country faced such a colossal problem', he noted, 'as the banks of Lahore are being facing [with] at present.' He concluded: 'Banking cannot be taught overnight. Besides, the newly appointed staff, as usual seem to have little aptitude for it.'²⁵ The absence of banking services and insurance facilities also 'struck a death blow' to the Pakistan Stock Market, and it 'stopped functioning altogether.' Indeed the Pakistan Stock Exchange did not start functioning until the beginning of 1948.²⁶ The monetary setback in Sialkot's credit structure is visible by the fact that in early 1947, the number of banks operating in was nineteen. At the end of the same year, only one bank was partially operating in the city and this was the sole Muslim-owned Australasia Bank. It further enforced 'drastic restrictions' in the supply of credit as grave uncertainties loomed over the much dislocated economic structure of the town.²⁷



The problems facing Sialkot's businessmen arising from the lack of credit were compounded by the industries' lacking access to markets and raw materials. The city was cut off from its former trade routes. The basic raw materials for the manufacturing of surgical and musical instruments were traditionally obtained from Calcutta, Kanpur, and Jamshedpur, which were now situated in India. Similarly, the city's sporting goods industries depended largely for their timber requirements upon neighbouring Jammu and Kashmir, which was affected by India's claim over the state. The availability of raw materials from abroad was also hampered because of the lack of adequate transport facilities. The city's rubber factories obtained raw materials from Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka), Burma (present-day Myanmar), Java, and Malaysia. This availability was greatly disrupted because of the 'rapidly changing political situation' in these British colonies, leading to an acute shortage in October 1949.²⁸ Some consignments of raw materials were left stranded midway because of the non-payment of freight and custom duties. For example, the release of a large consignment of feathers for shuttle-cocks from Karachi Port became a 'headache' for Sialkot traders. Despite the tedious efforts of the Sialkot Sports Goods Exporters Union, the stranded cargo could not be cleared until early 1950.²⁹

Sialkot lost traditional markets as well as sources of raw materials following the division of the subcontinent. The city's industries were the main source of supplies of medico-surgical rubber goods, railway sleepers, sports bicycles and automobile accessories for a large part of India. Prior to Partition, about three-quarters of musical instruments, manufactured in Sialkot, had been sold in areas which were now in India. Similarly, about 50 per cent of the production of Sialkot's medico-surgical, dental, and veterinary instrument industries had found their way to areas which had now become part of India.³⁰

In addition to problems of credit, supply, and demand, Sialkot's industrial production was further handicapped by the frequent failure of electricity. Before Partition, the Sialkot Electric Supply Company, by generating 1,200 kilowatts units, had sufficiently fulfilled the power demands of over 85 per cent of the industrial concerns of the city. With the loss of non-Muslim engineering and managerial



expertise, the city faced frequent power failures and was plunged into a complete 'black-out' for a month in April 1948. More than a year later, there were still problems of frequent electricity failure, leading to an acute shortage in August 1949.³¹

The ongoing industrial problems resulted in labour unrest. Workers' representatives throughout 1948, protested to the provincial and central governments, and appealed for the re-opening of industrial concerns in order to save them from 'starvation'. On 7 February a massive *hartal*, including 'a mile long procession', marched through the streets and demanded from the government to 'gear up' all the surgical and sporting goods industries of Sialkot, as quickly as possible.³² The gravity of the labourers' worry can be seen in their desperate appeals for 'free ration' (just like the refugees in the city's camps), until the government reopened the abandoned factories and provided jobs. More than a year later, in a submission to the Federal Minister of Finance and Industry, Chaudhary Nazir Ahmed Khan, during his visit to Sialkot on 14 November 1949, the Sialkot Labourers' Committee reiterated that the government should reopen the city's factories, and raw materials should be provided to the local factory-owners as soon as possible. In this way, the committee hoped, '40,000 labourers of Sialkot could be saved from the clutches of death and half-starvation.'³³

Very little, if anything, has been written about Sialkot's labour unrest and post-1947 economic difficulties. The impact on its Christian and '*Achhut*' minorities is totally neglected in scholarship. The migration of their Hindu and Sikh employers to India left a large number of these lower-caste groups without jobs. Prior to Partition, they were mainly employed in factories, schools, and hospitals as sweepers, porters, and canteen-workers. A great number of the Christians of Sialkot worked in the sporting goods industry and chiefly involved in the handling of gut-works. Their representatives appealed to the government and the local Muslim League leadership to take immediate measures to restore the socio-economic activities in the city. Similarly, on 6 June 1948, a delegation of the local '*Achhut*' travelled to Lahore to meet the Pakistan Achhut Federation leader Sukh Lal, then deputy mayor of Lahore, in order to express the problems they faced, due to economic hardships.³⁴



While such historians as Joya Chatterji have addressed the issues of the return of refugees in Calcutta,³⁵ the impact of the return of Hindu trading families to Sialkot, as elsewhere in Punjab, is totally neglected in existing scholarship. It is, however, evident from both documentary and oral sources that some Hindu trading classes returned to Sialkot in 1948. Obviously, the decisions or reasons for their return were determined by their large stake in the city. Most of the returnees came from a commercial and wealthy background. They notably included Lala Gobind Ram, Lala Karim Chand Agarwala, Lala Gopal Das, and Beli Ram Attar. In early June 1948, they repossessed their residences, properties, and industrial concerns, which had remained un-allotted. They were provided protection and assistance by the district administration in this retrieval. This was because the authorities desperately required their commercial expertise and capital for the city's redevelopment. Locally unemployed labourers obviously were desperate for the reopening of business activities. The returned migrants rationalised their return by saying that they had, earlier, only shifted their families to India, not migrated, and just 'disappeared' from the 'violence scene', and as soon as the situation became 'normal', they returned to their 'homes'. They also asserted their 'pledge' for the recovery of economic activity.³⁶ But the reason for Beli Ram's return was his emotional attachment to Sialkot, rather than any business stakes or other concerns. He resumed his well-reputed practice of traditional medicine. He converted his residence into the 'Women House' and dedicated his life to the recovery, rehabilitation, and returning of abducted Hindu and Sikh women to India. 'He did not want to spend the later part of his life out of Sialkot', Mailk Abbas, a former resident of Rang Pura, and at the time, a stenographer in Sialkot's DC office, recalls, 'despite repeated efforts of his son to take him back to Delhi, Beli Ram spent his entire life in his Budhi bazaar house in Sialkot. He devoted his life for the recovery of abducted women and the welfare of the Sialkot population. He was a well-known *hakim*. He died in the city in 1971.'³⁷

How much did the return of Hindu migrants benefit the economic recovery of Sialkot? Lala Gobind Ram and Lala Karim Chand after taking the control of their residences of Paris Road and the well-known metal-working trading company 'Dittu Mal Gobind Ram'



resumed their involvement in the manufacturing sector of iron-works. Some rapid increase was noticed in the sporting goods trade of Lal Gopal Das in the immediate recovery of post-Partition Sialkot after his return in June 1948. Overall, however, their return contributed only marginally to the economic resurgence and reduction of unemployment. They were few in number and had been daunted by the 1947 violence. The government found little justification for any special treatment towards them, in preference to the Muslim refugees. The returned migrants, unsurprisingly, had to repeatedly prove their loyalty to Pakistan, despite being Pakistani nationals. At the same time, the conflicting stories of the Pakistan government's treatment of these wealthy Hindus in Sialkot were occasionally reported by the Indian press. 'I am a loyal citizen of Pakistan', Hindu businessman, Lal Gopal Das emphasised: 'I am very surprised to read the news in the Indian press. I was compelled by the Pakistan Government and migrated to India and [am] now living in Bikaner state.' He concluded: 'I am residing in Sialkot and spending a happy life after Partition and the Pakistan Government has given me full facilities and civil liberties.'³⁸ A local resident Malik Abbas explained to me that the Hindu traders came back to Sialkot because of their huge stack of properties. 'They sold out their unmoveable assets and properties in a due course of time and returned back to India'.³⁹

Sialkot traders constantly complained to both the provincial and national leaders about their 'criminal neglect of the dying Sialkot enterprise'. In October 1949, the representatives of the Sialkot Sports Manufacturers Association pointed out to the Provincial Board of Allotment of Factories, the continuing closure of five bigger abandoned factories of sporting goods, and appealed that an immediate allotment of these concerns to the local traders would provide employment to 4,000 'redundant skilled labourers'.⁴⁰ They also referred to the difficulties in obtaining capital, import licences, and raw materials. They demanded that the government 'take strong decisions' to enhance the city's exports, and offer concessions to manufacturers and exporters in terms of the reduction on postal charge, and abolition of sales tax on sporting goods. Their immediate solution for the 'industrial crisis of sports goods of Sialkot' was the

advancement of an amount of Rs 3,000,000 against the bills of exports through the banks.⁴¹

The representatives of the Sialkot Rubber Manufacturers Association raised similar complaints about the 'slumber' position of the government in the restoration of the rubber industry, 'even after a year of Partition'. They also complained about the unavailability of raw materials, and demanded the complete abolition of the sales tax on raw materials and imposition of 100 per cent duties on all imported rubber goods. They pointed out that the Indian government had provided tariff protection (with 30 per cent import duties on Pakistani goods) and incentives to the 'rubber migrants'. They also urged the Pakistan government to re-classify rubber goods from Class I to Class II for the purpose of railway freight, in order to reduce costs. They maintained that Pakistan 'railways are starving for their rubber goods supplies and some of the trains have to run without their vacuum system, which exposes the travelling public to serious dangers.'⁴² Similarly, Sialkot's makers of surgical instruments urged the government for its support and sought assured markets in the state and army hospitals.⁴³ How effective was the government's response to these industrial demands?

GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SIALKOT

While Ian Talbot has revealed the key role of the government in the urban and industrial development of Lahore,⁴⁴ not much has been written about the government's support for the revival of commercial and industrial activity in Sialkot. It is nonetheless clear, both from contemporary press reports and such records as those of the *West Pakistan Year Book* and the *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, that considerable efforts were made. The government's assistance was largely fulfilled in terms of organisation, loan, and licences, as well as through other incentives and initiatives. The post-independence development of Sialkot was seen as central to the national interest, because the city's industrial clusters were regarded as important generators of both foreign exchange and employment. The state



assistance in Sialkot's industrial recovery was, therefore, speedier and more substantive than for any other city or town of the Punjab.

In early 1948, the Punjab Department of Industries surveyed 'the special difficulties' of small-scale manufacturers of sporting goods and surgical instruments of Sialkot. In this survey, the main difficulties were pointed out in relation to credit, industrial organisation, and power infrastructure. The department recommended to the Central Ministry of Commerce and Industry the necessity to take consistent measures to restore the city's banking sector. In 1949, to help provide finance, the Small Scale and Cottage Industries Development Corporation was set up, with an authorised capital of Rs 5,000,000.⁴⁵ In April 1950, Pakistan National Bank was opened in Sialkot. In the ensuing year, five leading banks were operating in the city, including the Central Exchange Bank, Habib Bank, and the Central Co-operative Bank, Sialkot. The latter agreed to advance long-term credit to small manufacturers engaged in the local industries. In addition, the Pakistan government persuaded the Bank of Turkey and Bank of Egypt to open their branches in Sialkot, as well.⁴⁶ The Punjab Board of Industries also persuaded the Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation to relax its rules in favour of small-scale industries and to open a branch in Sialkot. The small-scale manufacturers and traders were granted loans at the rate of interest of 3 ¼ per cent annually and repayment period of the loan was fixed at ten years.⁴⁷ Such monetary efforts helped considerably in solving the problems of credit, which was often the main problem of private industrial enterprise.

The government also made some satisfactory arrangements to meet Sialkot's energy supply. Initially, in August 1949, the Military Engineering Services (MES) transferred three electric generating sets and turbines from Karachi to Sialkot. Within five months, it had installed four diesel generators with a daily output of 800 kilowatts.⁴⁸ In the following year, the Punjab Public Work Department (PPWD) took over the Sialkot Electric Company House and the Chief Engineer, electricity, M. Hassan, visited Sialkot and ordered 'with immediate effect', the disconnection of over 2,000 electric-meters of abandoned Hindu and Sikh premises due to the non-payment of electricity bills, and issued notices to the present occupiers for the



registration of new electricity connections.⁴⁹ This action not only increased the department's income but also helped it to increase its supply capacity.

By the early 1950s, there were signs of a recovery for Sialkot's 'benumbed industry'. This can be gauged by the fact that around 675 registered and non-registered concerns, employing about 15,000 workers, were at work. While the value of output of the registered factories in Sialkot was still 83 per cent below 1946, it had increased by over 500 per cent since 1947.⁵⁰ The rubber industry started to grow steadily. In 1948, the government allotted the biggest evacuee factory, the National Rubber Factory, to its former workers on the basis of a co-operative society. Its products were sold to the Pakistan Railways. To overcome the raw material problems, the government planned to use the Chittagong Hill Tract of East Pakistan for the growing of hevea, the best quality rubber plant.⁵¹ This did not mean its recovery was smooth. In 1955, the production of rubber goods was badly affected by the unavailability of coal. The substitution of wood for coal raised manufacturing costs and could not prevent a slowing down in production to three quarters of its previous level. Workers were laid off as machines stood idle. By March 1955, over 1,300 labourers had been retrenched and the factory was in production only 20 days a month.⁵²

In the case of surgical instruments, the demands from the state and army hospitals led the government to invest in the industry. In 1949, an advisory committee of surgical instruments, consisting of the representatives of the surgical industry, the provincial, and central governments, and including the army, was set up. The prime aim of the committee was to devise ways and means for the development of surgical instrument manufacturing as well as to carry out necessary survey work for marketing. By the end of the year, the Government Surgical Instruments and Allied Trades Development Centre was reorganised and additional machinery installed to render effective assistance to the industry. During the first few years of independence, the government not only provided substantial monetary assistance in the development of surgical instruments, but also bought about 40 per cent of the products. A manufacturer of Sialkot's surgical instruments industry applauded the key support of



government which 'saved the lives of hundreds of families drawing their livelihood from the surgical industry.'⁵³ The surgical instrument manufacturers also increasingly found new markets in the Middle East and South East Asian countries. Within three years of independence, the value of the annual output of surgical instruments rose to Rs 1,000,000. It reached Rs 3,000,000 in 1956 but it was still 40 per cent below the pre-Partition annual output.⁵⁴ This is further illustrated in the below Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Annual Output of Sialkot's Surgical Instruments, 1946-55⁵⁵

Year	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1954	1955
Rs	5,000,000	1,000,000	250,000	400,000	1,000,000	1,200,000	1,300,000	1,600,000

DEVELOPMENT OF SPORTING GOODS INDUSTRY

The sporting goods industry provides a further example of the impact of government support. There were similar demands, as in other industries, for support of their manufacture. The fact that the industry's prosperity was export-based meant, however, that issues such as export licenses were raised more often than calls for financial aid or improved power supply, although these were problems as with all of Sialkot's other industries as well. The crisis in 1949, following the devaluation of the sterling, threatened to ruin the industry as its export prices increased.⁵⁶ Pakistan's refusal to devalue its rupee resulted in a great financial loss to all the exporters of the country. Sialkot's sporting goods industry, as a part of a global market, was especially badly affected. Its goods were successful because of their lower prices, so a sudden increase of 44 per cent in the prices of sporting goods forced many UK, European, and Commonwealth firms to cancel their orders. Much of its production stopped, exports collapsed, and a large number of workers were laid off. Within a few months, Sialkot's sporting goods industry lost over Rs 400,000 worth of business, with the result that more than 1,000 labourers were thrown out of work.⁵⁷ Moreover, at the same time, it faced a powerful local competitor just across the border in Indian Punjab, where capitalist refugees from Sialkot sought to establish a rival sporting



goods industry. The Pakistan government thus came under heavy pressure to support its Sialkot-based sporting goods producers.

Until the onset of the sterling devaluation crisis, the Sialkot sporting goods industry had made a steady recovery from the immediate post-Partition dislocation. It continued to serve the overseas markets which had been established in the colonial era. Over 80 per cent of the sporting goods were sold overseas. Low production costs accounted for the industry's international competitiveness. The most popular products included footballs, rugby balls, volleyballs, rackets, hockey sticks, cricket bats and balls, badminton rackets, and various kinds of rubber gloves. Despite the 1947 disruption, the industry revived after independence, as the phenomenal international demand for Sialkot's sporting goods remained unabated. During the six months after Partition, the export of sporting goods was worth about Rs 821,388. Exports rose rapidly in the following years, reaching Rs 3,932,461 in 1948, to Rs 6,700,000 in 1949.⁵⁸ The buoyant demand for Sialkot's products led representatives of foreign firms to visit the city throughout 1949-50. In late 1949, a delegation of British industrialists led by J.A. Stirling, the Secretary of the Board of Trade Commission, visited Sialkot and expressed concern about the required supply of sporting goods for Britain.⁵⁹ Two months later, an Argentina firm deputed Dr Diego Luis Molinari to Sialkot for 'the impressive needs of sports goods'.⁶⁰

At this stage, the industry was not able to profit fully from the international demand for its products because of lack of capital and difficulties regarding raw material. A further handicap concerning production was the power supply problem. This was, in some ways, a similar situation to that of Sialkot's other industries. The president of the Sport Goods Exporters Union lamented in January 1950 that, 'although orders from foreign firms amounting to nearly Rs 200,000 had been received in the last months and dealers were in position to fulfil the orders, the electricity crisis had given rise to a new difficulty and was likely to effect supplies of sports goods to foreign buyers'.⁶¹

Sialkot's traders faced the gravest difficulty in obtaining export licences. As was seen in chapter one, before Partition, the middlemen, organizers, and exporters were all Hindus and Sikhs. Their departure had left the industry without adequate marketing arrangements.



Production was export-led and required export licences. The fact that these needed to be obtained in Karachi compounded the traders' difficulties. Sialkot's exporters consistently expressed concerns about these 'new inconveniences' and exhorted the central government to open an export-import licencing office in Lahore. The desperation of Sialkot's traders to profit from growing international demand is evidenced clearly in that, by the beginning of 1950, over a hundred cases of applications for export licences were pending in Karachi.⁶² Sialkot manufacturers set up an Industrial Advisory Committee to express their concerns for expediting these applications.

Most serious of all, Sialkot faced an economic rival in the sports goods industry as a result of Partition. Jullundur's sporting goods industry was established by Hindu financiers and refugee labourers from Sialkot. They were experts in the techniques of procurement, quality control, and arrangements for export. In a short span of time, they had established many sporting goods units in Jullundur. Their efficiency is evidenced clearly in the fact that by May 1949, they had established about seventy-five large and small centres for the manufacture of sporting goods, and their monthly production was worth about Rs 200,000.⁶³ Some of Sialkot's Hindu capitalists, who earlier had opted to settle in Delhi and Bombay, subsequently, shifted to Jullundur because of the concentration of Sialkot's refugees who totalled over 26,000 in the city in 1951. Jullundur also had an advantage in terms of access to raw materials. The raw materials needed for the industry were willow and mulberry wood. The former was found chiefly in the region of Jammu and Kashmir, and subsequently, the Indian government made efforts to grow willow wood on the banks of the Beas River in the Kulu Valley of East Punjab.⁶⁴

Moreover, Jullundur benefited greatly from the devaluation crisis and began competing with Sialkot's industry. Now 100 Pakistan rupees were equal to 144 Indian rupees. This imbalance priced Sialkot's sporting goods out of many markets. International demand for Jullundur sporting goods increased considerably in Britain, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and the West Indies. Earlier in June 1948, to help develop the sporting goods industry of Jullundur, the Indian government banned the illegal flow of Sialkot-

made sporting goods into the country. During the early years of independence, there was a considerable 'illegal trade' of timber and 'unfinished goods' of sporting goods to India by merchants from Sialkot and Jammu. By mid-1948, unfinished sporting goods worth 'in lakhs', had been smuggled to India through 'illegal channels'. Some indication of the scale of this activity can be seen in the fact that more than 2,000,000 worth of goods comprising of Sialkot sports items had been seized by the Indian government.⁶⁵

The representatives of the Sialkot Sports Exporters Association demanded that the Pakistan authorities provide concessions to the exporters and pointed out that India was able to double the production of sporting goods because of the Government of Pakistan's decision regarding non-devaluation. They pointed out that the Hindu industrialists of Sialkot, who had now established their business in India, had been receiving regular orders from foreign countries. The Indian ambassadors in foreign countries had been taking 'deep interest in securing markets, while our ambassadors [were] not doing anything in this direction'. Sialkot's exporters made demands to the Export Promotion Bureau that rupee-dollar parity should be fixed, to help the exports of sporting goods to Europe and America. They believed that the solution to save this industry lay in securing a foreign market.⁶⁶ Despite the fact that the Government of Pakistan had brought about some changes in import duties and made some arrangements on a 'barter' basis, as a whole Sialkot's industry continued to be hard-pressed until February 1951, when India accepted the 'No-Devaluation Decision' and signed a trade agreement on the basis of the new exchange ratio.

In 1951, the Export Promotion Bureau 'studied' the export problems of Sialkot's sporting goods industry and took some 'drastic actions' for the uplifting of the city's production. It tried to solve the raw material problems by substituting 'Afghan willow' from the forests of Hazara and Swat for the 'Kashmiri willow'. A new willow was also introduced from the state plantations in Changa Manga and the NWFP.⁶⁷ The flexibility of the small Sialkot manufacturers had been demonstrated immediately after 1947. For example, the Trumans Enterprise's speciality before Partition was shuttle-cocks, but then it switched to making sports gloves, balls, and apparel because of supply



problems with imported raw materials of goose feathers and cork used for the base of the shuttle-cock. Similarly, the well-known firm, Centre de Commerce, shifted from manufacturing cricket bats and tennis rackets to wooden hockey sticks because of the unavailability of willow from Kashmir.⁶⁸

The other raw material items were glue and nylon gut strings. They were mainly imported. A leading artisan of Sialkot was trained in gut manufacture in Japan.⁶⁹ Subsequently, the manufacturing of gut strings started locally and it proved 'as good as any foreign made'. Some steps were also taken to standardise sinew gut manufacture to enable it to compete with the nylon gut. The indiscriminate export of raw material, required for the manufacture of sports goods, was stopped. The availability of raw materials led not only to the mushrooming of small establishments, but increased the production as well. This fact, along with rising world demand, enabled the volume of exports in 1951 to exceed the 1947 figure by over 400 per cent.⁷⁰

Government policy in terms of promoting the industry was very clear. The manufacturers received assistance from the government in the form of loans, tax reductions, issuing of import licences, and subsidies. From 1951 onwards, sporting goods were completely exempted from the sales tax. The customs duty on raw-materials was either abolished or reduced. Freight charges were also reduced. Some measures were adapted to control the smuggling of semi-finished sporting goods across the border.⁷¹ The Central Co-operative Bank of Sialkot advanced short- and long-term loans at concessional rates. Most important of all was the development of co-operative society enterprises. These spread across a number of industries, but were most influential in the sporting goods sector.

SIALKOT'S INDUSTRY AND CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES

At the very outset, Sialkot's industries were organised along co-operative lines and several industrial co-operative societies were formed. In November 1949, the Finance and Industry Minister, Chaudhary Nazir Ahmed Khan, announced a set of procedural reforms during his meeting with workers and factory-owners in



Sialkot. He announced that the authorities would only provide grants to those 'businesses built on co-operative basis'. The minister deplored the tendency among industrialists to 'indulge in cut-throat competition' and stressed that 'if industrialists initiate businesses on co-operative lines the government would help them'.⁷² By early 1950, the Punjab Industrial Finance Corporation, in collaboration with the Co-operative Department, had allotted the major evacuee industries to the workers who had been previously working in the concerns. Initially, the Pakistan Sport Co-operative Industrial Society was registered under the Co-operative Societies Act 1925. By the mid-1950s, about thirty co-operative societies had been established in the city.⁷³ They were formed on occupational grounds, corporate linkages, family networks, and kinship basis. There were, for example, weavers, carpenters, and blacksmiths societies. Other important ones included shuttlecock makers, rubber makers, and surgical instruments manufacturers cooperative societies. Their members ranged from a dozen to fifty plus. The most important and largest were the Pakistan Sport Co-operative Industrial Society and the Uberoi Co-operative Sport Society. The former was the main source for procuring and supplying raw materials to small and home-based manufacturers at cheap rates. The latter mainly furnished the common arrangements for marketing. These societies not only gained credit on easy terms, but were also granted export-import licences on a 'more liberal scale'.⁷⁴ The Central Co-operative Bank of Sialkot earmarked an amount of Rs 2,000,000 to advance short- and long- term loans at concessional rates.⁷⁵

The sporting goods industries were largely begun by the workers who had been previously employed in Hindu and Sikh concerns. In 1951, the former craftsmen of the Uberoi Limited bought the factory at an auction for Rs 1,450,000, to form the Uberoi Co-operative Society. Initially, the cooperative had twenty-two shareholders with Khawaja Hakin Din, as its managing director. He was a former supervisor of this firm. To meet the financial requirements, the co-operative loaned Rs 600,000 from the Central Co-operative Bank of Sialkot. In addition to manufacturing, grading, assaying, valuing, and processing of sporting goods, the other main mission of the society was to buy from small-scale producers, and to sell profitably, in order



to enhance foreign-exchange earnings from the sector. It arranged to export small producers' goods through its marketing branch of Global Trading, which was located on the Paris Road. As it was a co-operative-based organization, a society-appointed Board of Directors controlled its day-to-day operations. A managing director—assisted by three departments' heads viz. finance, administration, operations and auditing—headed the corporation.⁷⁶ The society provided valuable marketing information and technical expertise for the small-scale producers in the period immediately following Partition.

'MADE IN SIALKOT': A DRIVE TO PATRONAGE SPORTING GOODS

The government adopted a variety of export-enhancing devices and schemes for the promotion of Sialkot's sporting goods. In order to provide adequate markets for the city's products, the central government, while entering into trade pacts with other countries, took 'special care' to include sporting goods as one of the important items of export. With a view to attract increased demand for the products in other countries, the State Bank of Pakistan increased the rate of commission granted to the 'lobbying agents in the foreign lands'. The United Kingdom Board of Trade was also successfully persuaded to raise the import quota of Pakistani sporting goods by a substantial margin.⁷⁷ The government also publicised the goods worldwide. In this regard, diplomatic and trade channels were used for 'greater publicity' in foreign countries. 'Special Arrangements' were made for the display of 'Made in Sialkot' sporting goods at the British Industrial Fair in London, and other international, commercial, and industrial exhibitions in such cities as Lille, Milan, Izmir, and Prague. A couple of American business magazines were also used for publicity. Sialkot's industrialists were persuaded to open branches of their business offices in foreign countries, especially in London, which imported more than half of the output of the sporting goods industry. By the early 1950s, one such office had already been established, while more were expected to open shortly thereafter.⁷⁸ In the ensuing years, a number of Sialkot firms opened overseas offices and entered into collaborative arrangements with overseas retailers.



By the mid-1950s, Sialkot's industries had recovered to an extent from the setback of Partition and the devaluation crisis. Nevertheless the sporting goods industry's export value of Rs 7,543,000 was still lower than its pre-Partition peak, and around 10,000 former workers were either on casual work or facing unemployment. The city's industries still faced crippling power supply problems. Many factories had to operate twenty days in a month and lay off a number of workers out of jobs.⁷⁹ The government policy for granting export-import licences to small and home-based manufacturers was also restricted. Most of the small firms and manufacturers dealt indirectly with foreign buyers. Many exporters were granted import-export licences for just six months and they had to renew it twice a year (from 1 January to 30 June and 1 July to 31 December). Such limitation was seen as 'uneconomic' in the mushrooming of the industry, and was described by a Sialkot manufacturer as 'a veritable hornets nest for exporters'.⁸⁰ The government was more concerned with the continuing problems surrounding the quality of the range of sporting goods items.

The success of the Sialkot sporting goods industry in the colonial era depended, firstly, on its low prices, and secondly, on the quality of its products. After 1947, the quality of sports products decreased considerably as per international requirements. Many international firms and buyers started complaining about sub-standard products. In August 1951, a delegation of American industrialists, during a visit to Sialkot, registered complaints about the 'very low standard' of sporting goods which had been exported to the USA. Such sub-standardization of both sporting goods and surgical instruments was echoed by the American Consul General of Pakistan.⁸¹ For the government to maintain quality levels was a difficult task, because Sialkot industries largely operated on an unregistered, small-scale, and cottage basis. Even the larger manufacturers depended upon subcontractors and middlemen. There were many kinds of exporters and sub-exporters at work in Sialkot. These included a range of direct exporters and subcontractors. The latter did not always meet the standard of quality required by overseas customers. To try to address this issue, in 1951, the government prepared a scheme for the registration of 'bona fide manufacturers and exporters'. From March



onwards, it became mandatory for the exporters of sporting goods to register with the Punjab Department of Industries and a certification of quality was required for export. This meant that only 'approved manufacturers' were allowed to export sports goods and were required to quote their registration number on consignments so that exporters responsible for 'malpractices' could be traced. The authorities also categorically warned of the cancellation of the registration of any exporter who was found 'guilty of supplying goods to foreign markets below standard.'⁸²

Quality control had become a very high priority in the government's policies and incentives. The Government of Pakistan made all efforts to improve the quality and quantity of sporting goods to meet the arising international requirements. These also included the opening of a Development Centre for Standardization and a Metal Works Institution, for the enhancement of skills courses in the various manufacturing fields. The UK government was approached to provide a sum of Rs 500,000 for the purchase of modern electrical machinery.⁸³

Towards the end of the 1950s, and especially during the early 1960s, different Pakistani governments adopted a number of export-incentive schemes and bonus. The most important was the introduction of the Export Incentive Scheme in 1955. It encouraged the establishment of large industrial firms. At the time, three types of establishments existed in Sialkot: the big establishments, generally geared to export; small manufacturers, who catered to the domestic market; and finally, numerous unregistered home-based units in the urban pockets and rural areas, which were usually run by family members, but at times with the help of a couple of hired employees. To change the composition of firms, the State Bank of Pakistan fixed the deadline of 1 March 1955, for registration of the industrial firms of Sialkot. The key aim was to dismantle the home-based units and encourage the large-scale manufacturing activities. The bank fixed the minimum export value of Rs 5,000 to obtain a certificate for export.⁸⁴ Such measures effectively blocked many small-scale producers who had worked from their own homes, stitching footballs, sanding rackets, and planking hockey sticks. A manufacturer described the scheme as designed to 'kill small firms'. On the



contrary, a number of the Manufacturers of Sports Goods Exporters Association viewed this development as 'a golden chance to get them established on firm basis'.⁸⁵ In the long run, the scheme significantly contributed to the emergence of a new industrial class, largely based on kinship. This also paved the way for the establishment of a separate body of the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industries on 25 February 1955, by the twenty-seven members of the former Sports Goods Exporters Association.

In 1959, perhaps the most significant move was the Export Bonus Voucher Scheme which stimulated new industrial entrepreneurs and exporters. Under the scheme, the exporters received a fixed percentage of their exports in terms of the entitlements to imports. They were entitled to receive the import entitlements to the extent of 20 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively, of their export proceeds. The government received the foreign exchange earnings, and, in turn, gave the exporting firms an additional percentage share from the hard currency transaction. The scheme encouraged firms to boost productivity by using their hard currency vouchers to import machinery. Such measures facilitated access to imported capital equipment and gave rise to a new class of small industrialists. The introduction of the new machinery not only increased production but its quality level as well. The economist Shahid Javed Burki has pointed out that the Bonus Voucher Scheme 'reduced the monopolistic profits of big industrial houses and ultimately resulted in the emergence of a large number of medium and small industrialists. These newcomers to the industrial sector were responsible for creating the now important Lahore-Lyallpur-Sialkot industrial triangle in the centre part of the country.'⁸⁶

By the end of the 1950s, Sialkot's traders had captured the most important foreign markets. The main market was the UK, with over 60 per cent of total export sales. Other major destinations of exports were the USA, South Africa, Egypt, Sweden, Netherlands, Burma, Canada, Malaysia, Germany, Belgium, France, Cyprus, Australia, and New Zealand. These combined accounted for 85 per cent of the exported sporting goods, with over 61 per cent going to the sterling areas, 15 per cent to the dollar areas, and the remaining 24 per cent to the rest of the world.⁸⁷ More than 50 per cent of the sporting goods



that were manufactured comprised different kinds of inflatable balls. Besides the balls, the other sporting goods that were largely manufactured, were tennis and badminton racquets and frames, shuttlecocks, hockey sticks and blades, cricket bats and balls, and different kinds of gloves and protective equipment. In 1959, the overall value of the export of sporting goods from Sialkot had grown to above Rs 14,000,000, but the city was to wait a decade more before it matched the 1946 export amount of Rs 30,000,000. This reveals the setback to the industry arising from Partition and the length of recovery time that was required, despite government assistance and the stock of local entrepreneurial skills. Loss of raw materials, migration of Hindu expertise and capital, the non-devaluation of the rupee, and most importantly, the shifting of former owners of Sialkot to establish a powerful rival in the Jullundur-based business, were all important factors in this slow recovery. It also arose from infrastructural problems which were the bane of all of Sialkot's post-independence industries, as elsewhere in the West Punjab.

While the problems of Sialkot's industries should not be overlooked, they were nevertheless important in regional development in the two decades which followed Partition. The achievements were by no means inconsiderable, given the huge problems arising from Partition. We shall turn now to a consideration of the role of refugee labour and capital in the industrial recovery. Was it as significant as in other West Punjab cities such as Lyallpur? Or did local workers and investors play a more significant role?

Table 6.2: Total Value of Sporting Goods Exported from Sialkot, 1952-9⁸⁸

Year	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956-57	1957-58	1958-59
Rs	4,326,000	5,639,000	5,430,000	7,543,000	9,713,000	11,472,000	13,989,000



Table 6.3: Customer Countries of Sporting Goods and the Exported Amount in Rupees⁸⁹

UK	USA	South Africa	Sweden	Burma	Canada	Egypt	New Zealand	Australia
436,000	158,000	151,000	128,000	65,000	52,000	48,000	48,000	35,000
Netherlands	Switzerland	Malaysia	Germany	Belgium	France	Cyprus	British colonies each	
26,000	20,000	18,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	14,000	

SIALKOT DEVELOPMENT: ROLE OF THE REFUGEE AND LOCAL ENTREPRENEURS

There has recently been an increasing awareness about the impact of refugee labour and entrepreneurs in the urban and industrial development of different cities and towns of the Punjab.⁹⁰ Sialkot's experience of post-independence industrial growth stands in stark contrast with the experiences of such cities as Lyallpur, Lahore, and Gujranwala. This is not only in terms of export-led growth, but the role of locals rather than migrants. In part, the city's geographical handicap of being on the border, particularly with 'disputed' Jammu and Kashmir, provided opportunities for local established people, as it was less attractive for refugee entrepreneurs. The Muslim refugee capitalists preferred to locate further westward, away from the border, to small cities such as Lyallpur, Jhang, Sargodha, and Gujranwala. Many used Sialkot as a transit point to go to other places. East Punjab refugees formed a much smaller proportion of the population in Sialkot than any of the other big towns of West Punjab. Refugee industrialists' attitude to the other border location towns such as Lahore differed sharply. Lahore remained the capital of the Punjab; there was no shortage of applications for evacuee factories from both refugees and locals to the Allotment Tribunal. In the case of Sialkot, by 1951, applications had only been received for half of the total abandoned factories. This situation was explained by the Finance Minister in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, pointing out that 'the government is receiving a few applications in relating to evacuee Sialkot industrial concerns from the agreed areas [East Punjab]



refugees...we cannot allot these to the migrants of Bombay and Calcutta [non-agreed areas]. Only option is left to allot them to the locals.⁹¹

Refugees in Sialkot, as we have noted, chiefly came from the Jammu region. The Kashmiri refugees' migration experience and pattern of settlement were sharply different from their East Punjab counterparts. Although some influential Kashmiri refugees were able to find properties vacated by non-Muslims, the poorer majority had to live in various camps and slums for many years. Despite the central government's sympathy for the Kashmiri refugees, Pakistan's claim over the disputed territory of Kashmir, not only excluded them from the permanent settlement schemes for a long time, but also omitted them from inclusion in the 1951 Census.⁹² The difficulty of settlement was rooted in the government policy. At the beginning, the West Punjab government preferred the Punjabi refugees over the Kashmiri refugees in allocating evacuee properties. Government representatives pointed out that there were not enough evacuee properties in the province to allocate to the Kashmiri refugees, and therefore, a decision of preference for the refugees from Jammu and Kashmir over their counterparts from East Punjab, would 'lead to great discontentment'. The provincial government directed the deputy commissioners of the 'border districts' to 'do their best to liquidate the camps' of refugees from Jammu and Kashmir, but always give preference to 'agreed-areas' refugees in the resettlement processes.⁹³ In 1952, therefore, when almost all the camps of refugees from East Punjab had been cleared, over 110,000 Kashmiri refugees were still squatting in the various government-run camps in Sialkot, as elsewhere in the Punjab, as is evidenced from the below Table.

Towns	Number
Sialkot	110,143
Gujrat	37,474
Gujranwala	4,625
Rawalpindi	5,384
Lahore	1,101
Total	158,727

It was the central rather than the Punjab government that had made arrangements to feed the Kashmiri refugees. It considered that the Muslims of Jammu province had suffered 'proportionally more violence than any other class of refugees', and that they were targets of 'real genocide'. They were not allowed to carry any possessions and property documents with them. Their representatives pointed out that it was impossible to get the records from 'Occupied Kashmir' and it was, therefore, unjust to continue depriving the refugees from the allotment process. The central government considered that the Kashmiri refugees, therefore, should be given 'the first preference in allotment because they had no option but to migrate' from the Hindu-ruled Dogra state.⁹⁵

The central and the Punjab governments differed, not only with respect to allotments for Kashmiri refugees, but also over the issue of financing the refugee camps. The Punjab government tried to evade responsibility for dealing with the Kashmiri refugees. It was of the view that it was spending as much as Rs 50,000,000 to 70,000,000 a year for the mere feeding of the refugees. Early in 1948, the Pakistan Punjab Refugee Council, a liaison body between the centre and the province, invited representatives of the Punjab government to debate the 'political repercussions' that might follow after giving priority to refugees from Jammu and Kashmir over their counterparts from East Punjab. With this in mind, the central government injected an element of coercion. The provincial government was pressed to accept the financial responsibility for the refugees, and compelled to provide help to the Ministry of Azad Kashmir Affairs in the temporary



resettlement of Kashmiri refugees. The Punjab government sent its staff to train and equip the Azad Kashmir government staff in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, and education. The Punjab government also agreed to allow some of their dairy farm experts to visit the Azad Kashmir area for a period of fifteen days. Experts from the Thal Development Authority also visited the region.⁹⁶

On 17 February 1951, in a decision reached with the Punjab Refugee Council, the Punjab Rehabilitation Department agreed to make available about 106,134 acres of land in the Punjab border areas, which had not been claimed by the refugees from 'agreed areas', for the resettlement of 50,000 Kashmiri refugees. The Punjab government also agreed for the temporary resettlement of Kashmiri refugees, both on the 'uncultivated land and the land not allotted but in the unauthorized possession of locals', in the six border districts of Sialkot, Gujrat, Gujranwala, Rawalpindi, Attock, and Jhelum. In addition, the Kashmiri refugees were also included in the various schemes of the 'Grow More Food' campaign in the border and non-border districts, in which they were encouraged to bring under the plough uncultivated land which did not require intensive development. For this purpose, the government granted a loan of Rs 675 to each refugee in the first instance. This marked a new phase of activity on the part of the provincial government. However, in the meantime, the Punjab government dealt with the outstanding claims of the refugees from the 'agreed areas' more quickly than those of the Jammu and Kashmir refugees. It explained to the centre that the previous position no longer obtained and most of the land had been claimed by the refugees from the 'agreed areas.' However, the province was willing to release uncommanded crown land on payment for the refugees from Jammu and Kashmir 'if they could prove ownership of their claims through secondary sources.'⁹⁷

In reality, the Punjab government's attitude towards the refugees from Jammu and Kashmir remained ambivalent. It was quite reluctant to assist the refugees until the distinction between 'agreed' and 'non-agreed' areas was abolished in 1955. The relief and rehabilitation programme for Kashmiris was only produced at the behest of the central government. It was only after the abolition of the categories of refugees that the settlement of Kashmiri refugees



was speeded up. On the basis of secondary sources such as an affidavit, the government issued 'Refugee Claim Card' to refugees regarding their ownership of properties in Jammu and Kashmir. On the basis of these cards, they became entitled to allotted properties. In Sialkot, by late October 1956, more than 125,000 Kashmiri refugees had been settled on land.⁹⁸ Most of the settlers were the Gujars of Jammu. They were mainly settled on the tracts of the Tawi River alongside the Indian-controlled Kashmir border areas. Their largest single concentration was in the Bajwat area, where around 15,000 families were settled in 84 villages, and had been allocated 179,200 acres of land. The refugee settlers were allotted land at the scale of one acre per head in the area irrigated by canals and wells, as opposed to one and half acres in un-irrigated areas. The settlers were granted *taccavi* loans for bullocks and seeds. By the end of 1956, the government had granted Rs 172,500 for this purpose, while an amount of Rs 43,000 was distributed as dole money to the settlers. An additional sum of Rs 151,400 was sanctioned for the following year.⁹⁹ These measures were, however, insufficient to resettle all the Kashmiri refugees. Others were compelled by the authorities to move to such places as Dera Ghazi Khan. Around 32,000 acres of land were reserved in the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage area for the resettlement of Kashmiri refugees, while many others obtained land and property in the Thal areas, under the Thal Project Scheme.¹⁰⁰

The continuing plight of refugees in Sialkot is brought home by the fact that even at the end of 1956, over 59,000 refugees, mainly from urban backgrounds, were still subsisting on government rations. The state authorities attempted to reduce this continued dependence by a series of lump sum donations, loans, and grants.¹⁰¹ Earlier, in September 1954, the Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation had set up a separate Finance Cooperative, exclusively for the Kashmiri refugees, with an amount of Rs 2,500,000.¹⁰² In addition to this, the Pakistan government set aside a 'lump sum' amount of Rs 467,000 for around 1,900 Kashmiri artisan families for 1956, and a further sum of Rs 729,000 was sanctioned the following year. The government also provided funds to skilled refugees to enable them to re-establish their old trades. A loan of Rs 5,000 per family was disbursed to refugees who were engaged in some sort of business in the Kashmir



region before Partition. The Azad Kashmir branch of the Pakistan Refugee Rehabilitation Finance Corporation also granted a loan of Rs 204,000 for the settlement of 130 shopkeepers and small businessmen in Sialkot.¹⁰³

The most important year in the history of the settlement of refugees in Pakistan turned out to be 1960–61. All temporarily transferred properties—houses, shops, buildings sites, factories, and industrial concerns, were given in 'complete ownership' to the refugees. Pakistan's claims over the disputed territory of Kashmir meant, however, that the refugees from that area were excluded from this development. In fact, the UN Security Council Resolutions of 1948 and 1949 established that all refugees who had left the state of Jammu and Kashmir for Azad Kashmir or Pakistan since 1947 were in fact citizens of the state and had 'the right to return to the State'.¹⁰⁴ To represent this fact they were only allotted properties in Pakistan on a purely temporary basis.

There was also a great disparity in the occupations of the incoming Kashmiri refugee community. The refugees in Sialkot were not like those who, as in Gujranwala, Lahore, and Lyallpur, could bring skills and capital to urban regeneration following the destruction during Partition. Rather, they were poor migrants from Jammu and Kashmir who came from the lower-middle class and petty landholding backgrounds. They could not replace the former Hindu and Sikh trading classes. No simple population substitution was possible. The majority of the Gujars of Jammu adhered to their old profession of dairying. The inclination of the majority of the middle-class urban refugees from Jammu, was towards government services and professions. On 27 December 1951, the central government reserved a special quota for Kashmiri refugees living in Pakistan.¹⁰⁵ The educated amongst them took up government jobs. At one stage, in the mid-1950s, almost all the staff of the Refugee Resettlement Department in Sialkot consisted of Kashmiri migrants, under the supervision of settlement officer Arif Mahmood (younger brother of Ghulam Abbas, the president of the Kashmir Muslim Conference). The migration of the Hindu traders, industrialists, and bankers had created a gap in certain occupations which could not be filled by the refugees, as they had no aptitude for this type of work. The following



accounts of Kashmiri migrants provide some insights. Sarmad Mahmud (son of Arif Mahmood) provides an interesting remembrance of the Jammu region, and of the Muslims' overall socio-economic background and conditions:

The majority of Kashmiri refugees remained in camps till the Ayub Khan period. All credit for the rehabilitation of Kashmiri refugees goes to General Azam Khan. He appointed my father as the district settlement officer who issued property claims to the refugees. My father not only knew almost all the Kashmiri refugees in Sialkot, but was also aware about their background...They included petty agriculturalists, fruit-sellers, army-men and policemen.¹⁰⁶

Zarar Hussain's family came to Sialkot from Jammu city in late 1947 and his father found a job in the Sialkot Government Uniform Factory, which would make uniforms for the army.¹⁰⁷ Indeed there were individual refugee success stories, Bashir Ahmed, for example, a refugee from Karnal, moved into the ice-making business; while Shakoor's family took over a transport business. Khalid Shah, a migrant from Amritsar, who obtained the largest evacuee mansion of Ganda Singh Uberoi, found a niche in the hosiery market, after venturing in various non-manufacturing fields and businesses. 'After 1947 we continued our family trade of hosiery in the city and two of my brothers owned two different hosiery shops in the city. However, sometime later I started supplying sports goods to other cities,' Shah narrated.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, a former resident of Amritsar, Iqbal Sathi, now a grocery trader, lives in Karin Pura. He was allotted a shop in Sialkot. After a variety of jobs, he currently owns one of the most successful grocery stores in the town. While some Punjabi and Kashmiri refugees became retailers, they seldom, if ever, initiated manufacturing in Sialkot. Few refugees, for example, entered Sialkot's traditionally important sporting goods and surgical industries. Comparatively, Sialkot refugees' entrepreneurial achievements lagged behind those of their counterparts in other major towns and cities of Punjab. This meant that it was the local residents of Sialkot who, either as individual owners or as members of cooperatives, took up the manufacturing production roles abandoned by the Hindu traders. Khalid Mahmud, a migrant from Karnal, who joined the Uberoi Co-



operative Society in 1968, attests to the absence of refugee entrepreneurs in Sialkot's traditional industries:

Sialkot's industry was not like this as you find it nowadays. At the time, it was largely home-based. In 1947, there was only one big factory in the town that was the Uberoi Sports Goods. The government could not allot this to one businessman. In 1951, therefore, the factory was allotted to twenty-two former labourers of the factory. This factory not only manufactured the sports goods, but also supplied the raw material to all the home-based workers...Who benefited from the migration of Hindus? Those who had got skill, experience, information, and family background... Look at the Sublime Industry [one of the most successful firms of Sialkot]...Father of the owner of this big enterprise had worked in the city's oldest firm the Uberoi Sports Goods.¹⁰⁹

Despite the fact, that Sialkot failed to attract refugee workers and entrepreneurs, the city's workforce still had its pre-existing skills and traditional production techniques, as the workers had mainly been Muslims. Thus, the skilled population of the city utilised the vacuum left by the departing Hindus to their advantage. Most importantly, the government's assistance for industrial growth by means of protectionism, fiscal policy, and economic planning was a pivotal factor. Sialkot's post-1947 economic development differs from that of such other border cities, such as Lahore and Amritsar. Talbot has revealed that Lahore, despite its proximity to the border, retained its economic significance primarily because of its political importance, while Amritsar failed to recover from the loss of markets, access to raw materials and from the migration of its skilled Muslim workers.¹¹⁰ Like Sialkot, it faced economic competition from newly-emerging industries, in this case based not in Jullundur but Ludhiana. Sialkot's experience is midway between the booming post-independence economy of Lahore and the sharp decline of Amritsar.

Knitted on kinship, the cooperative societies in Sialkot played a crucial role in encouraging entrepreneurship and supporting a culture of drive and thrift. Initially, working as the interlocutors, they filled the gap created by the departure of the Hindu middlemen. They supplied not only the raw materials to cottage-based manufacturers, but also in return, arranged to export their finished and unfinished

products. In this way, at the outset, small units survived without investing much capital. Anita Weiss has provided some useful perspectives on the positive role of such societies in the development of the sporting goods industry. She has pointed out the 'small groups of biologically-related craftsmen' relied on one another for 'family's survival' and 'for the collective survival of the industry...fitting in well with Punjabi culture orientations'.¹¹¹ In the long run, however, the cooperative societies could not compete with emerging family firms whose members had pre-Partition experience in the industries they now owned and managed. For example, the Uberoi Co-operative Society, by the mid-sixties, went bankrupt, and its managing director, Khawaja Hakin Din, was fired on charges of malpractice and corruption. A directive of the managing director of the society to the Ministry of Industry gave the reasons for bankruptcy as the 'obsolete' condition of the Uberoi Sports, a 'lack of interest of the then managers, poor management and lack of promotional and marketing techniques'. It concluded that this 'pioneer' and 'mother institution' for all the major firms of the city such as Saga Sports, Sublime Sports, Awan Sports, and Mir Yousaf Industries could not compete with them.¹¹² The president of the Uberoi Co-operative Society, Rizwan Malik Awan, during the course of an interview also bemoaned the 'inflexible rules and regulations' of the *Manual of Co-operative Societies Laws 1925* for the slow recovery and the poor performance of the Uberoi Limited since 1951.

Hakin Din was not solely responsible for the bankruptcy of the Uberoi Cooperative Society. Of course, he was promoted from a foreman to managing director after setting up the society. Basically, many non-professional shareholders entered the cooperative; they did not have interest in it. Thus there was no individual and professional interest for the rapid development of this industry, while the other factories were run by the individuals and family networks. They learnt expertise from this firm and succeeded, while the progress of this industry could not improve. Apart from the shareholders' lack of interest, another reason for the failure of this firm is the co-operative rules and regulations. We had to obey them and could not take risks and initiatives, while the family-based firms were more successful because they do not need first to read this *Manual of Co-operative Societies Laws* to move forward. I think the



success of such family enterprises as the Ali Trading sports goods are good examples.¹¹³

Industrial co-operative societies in other fields, such as the Muhajir Co-operative Society and the Pioneer Co-operative Leather and Rubber Industries also contributed little advancement to the industrial development of the city. Ghazanfar Ali of Sialkot's well-known Ali Trading explains the advantages of the private family-based firm in the interview extract below:

Ali Trading is one of the oldest firms of Sialkot. There is general perception in Sialkot that all the sports goods firms of the city are the offshoots of the Uberoi. This is not true. No doubt, the Uberoi was the pioneer in sports goods. However, Ali enterprise was well-established even before independence...After independence, it continued to manufacture sports goods and fulfilled the demands after meeting the required standard...We did not receive any assistance from the state and banks. The government provided assistance only to the restoration of the Uberoi. But the Uberoi could not meet us in manufacturing, quality and quantity. Because of our firm's contribution in the export of sports goods, Ayub Khan [then the President of Pakistan] awarded the Ali Trading 'Best Quality Award' in 1967.¹¹⁴

Indeed a new merchant-industrial class had begun to gather considerable economic power during the 1950s and 1960s. During the first decade after Partition, a few newcomers entered the sporting goods industries and the departure of Hindus provided new opportunities for the population already associated with this industry. Most of the owners of leading firms of Sialkot described the state's Export Bonus Voucher Scheme as the first major incentive for modern industrial development. In the 1970s and 1980s, further government patronages boosted the industry due to the establishment of joint ventures and transfer of technology.¹¹⁵ In this period, some new communities such as Arains, Sheikhs, and Jats with no previous occupational experience and practical skills entered the industry. For example, the owners of the now leading sporting goods industries, Sublime and Classico, are Arains, while Durus Sports is owned by a Sheikh family. Sialkot has become the third-largest economic hub in

Punjab after Lahore and Faisalabad, but remains dependent on export-led production.

CONCLUSION

This analysis is the first detailed study of both Sialkot's and Gujranwala's post-independence development. It reveals the extent of the refugee impact and how different classes and categories of refugees were accommodated. It adds to our knowledge of the aftermath of Partition regarding industrial development in the Punjab. The Gujranwala case study confirms that the wealthy had an easier time as they had more control over the experience of migration and rehabilitation. Moreover, the state's establishment of satellite towns and refugee colonies mainly catered to the needs of the wealthy migrants. In the case of Sialkot, the delay in the resettlement of the Kashmiri refugees resulted not only from local difficulties and over-concentration, but was rooted in the government policy over the refugee status for the migrants. The suffering of the Kashmiri refugees questions the standard view that resettlement and rehabilitation processed smoothly within the Punjab.

The case studies also reveal the complex and contrasting experiences of industrial development in Gujranwala and Sialkot since 1947. For Sialkot's sporting goods industry and Gujranwala's steel industry, pre-existing skills and colonial inheritance were important for the post-1947 recovery. Partition generated new opportunities. With respect, especially to Sialkot's sporting goods industry, the city's existing artisans and investors utilised the pre-existing global marketing network to their advantage. In a similar manner, locally skilled *Lohar* in Gujranwala saw an opportunity to take over as owners in the entrepreneurial vacuum which was created with the departure of the Hindu and Sikh trading classes. Though they were initially slow to make any headway, with the assistance of government, they began to gain ascendancy and contributed greatly to the city's economic dynamism.

Partition brought opportunities for both locals and refugees in different sectors of the economy, which is not fully recognised in scholarship. The case study of Gujranwala has revealed that the



previously-acquired technical and industrial skills, and the capital acquired in East Punjab, were important factors not only in the individual refugee's rehabilitation, but also in the city's rapid post-independence economic growth. The refugee entrepreneurs played an important role in the growth of the hosiery and jewellery trades, which had barely existed before 1947. These industries depended on the skills, capital, connections, and networks of 'trust' amongst the refugee communities. The growth of the iron and steel industry moved apace, as local *Lohar* craftsmen filled the entrepreneurial roles of the departed Hindus and Sikhs. Government assistance in transforming and diversifying the local skill base and creating the conditions for small-scale capital accumulation among skilled metal workers was also a key element in Gujranwala's economic dynamism.

The Sialkot case-study has revealed a different pattern of recovery compared with other cities of the Punjab. Unlike them it did not receive a large number of refugee entrepreneurs. Sialkot's refugees were, mostly, poor Kashmiris. In the absence of the East Punjab refugee entrepreneurs, the local skilled population filled various niches left by the exodus of Hindus and Sikhs. Research on Sialkot also reveals the important effects of government intervention on economic development, whether these were positive in terms of incentives and protectionism, or negative with respect to the non-devaluation of the rupee in 1949. It also shows that not just in the migrants' personal history, but also concerning the history of business activity, it was often many years before the dislocation brought about by Partition could be overcome. The Sialkot sporting goods industry, which is frequently regarded as a Pakistani economic success story, took many years before it surpassed the 1946 production levels. The case-study material has also highlighted that the Partition crisis would not only cut off industries from former markets and raw materials, but would also encourage new regional rivals as well. With respect to the sporting goods industry this was the result of its former owners setting up rival production centres in Jullundur. This has been, thus far, truly an untold story of Partition.



NOTES

1. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 20 April 1949, p. 5.
2. Maintenance and Resettlement of Jammu and Kashmir Refugees, File No. B132, 169/CF/53, p. 2, NDC.
3. According to an estimate, by the end of October 1947, nearly 200,000 refugees, allocated 115,690 acres of land, had been settled in Sialkot district. Another 66,339 acres were given on lease. The district rehabilitation officer stated that the district at the maximum could absorb 253,917 people and had 489,296 acres of land for the refugees. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) 31 October 1947.
4. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 27 October 1949, p. 7.
5. A.R. Siddiqi, 'Kashmir Refugees: Restore the Refugees', *Civil and Military Gazette's Sunday Digest* (Lahore) 9 October 1949, p. 2.
6. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, File no. B50, Appendix C, p. 11, NDC.
7. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 9 April 1948, p. 5.
8. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 7 May 1948, p. 7.
9. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 28 April 1949, p. 11.
10. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 23 October 1949, p. 4.
11. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 25 February 1950, p. 6.
12. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 11 May 1950, p. 6.
13. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 17 July 1951, p. 5.
14. Talbot, *Divided Cities*; Tan and Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition*; Ansari, *Life After Partition*; R. Kaur, 'Planning Urban Chaos: State and Refugees in Post-partition Delhi', in E. Hurt and M. Mann (eds.), *Urbanization and Governance in India* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), p. 235.
15. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 4 October 1950, p. 5.
16. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 11 January 1951, p. 5.
17. *West Punjab Gazette* (Lahore) January–December 1950, Part III, 6 January 1950, p. 2.
18. *West Punjab Gazette* (Lahore) January–June 1954, p. 155.
19. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 13 January 1954, p. 7.
20. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) 28 September 1956, p. 2. More recently, in the late 1990s, another 4-marla low-cost housing scheme was constructed at Ahrah locality, although, the failure to confine the allotment solely to homeless Kashmiri refugees led to dissatisfaction with the scheme.
21. Weiss, *Culture, Class, and Development in Pakistan*, pp. 120–45.
22. PLAD, from 29 February to 15 March 1952, Vol. III, pp. 663–8.
23. Anwar, *Effects of Partition on Industries*, pp. 61–78.
24. *Inquilab* (Lahore) 8 February 1948, p. 3.
25. Board of Economic Inquiry West Punjab, Monthly Summary, (November 1947), Vol. III, No. 11, p. 6, ST625, O.I.O.C.
26. Board of Economic Inquiry West Punjab, Monthly Summary, (October 1947–June 1948), p. 6, ISPA.11/4, O.I.O.C.
27. Australasia Bank was the only Muslim-owned bank that was functioning before Partition in Sialkot. The bank was established in December 1942 and was owned



- by Khawaja Bashir Bux of Lahore. In 1974, the Board of Directors of Australasia Bank was dissolved and the bank was renamed the Allied Bank of Pakistan.
28. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 14 October 1949, p. 4.
 29. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 31 January 1950, p. 5.
 30. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 26 October 1949, p. 14.
 31. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 18 August 1949, p. 9.
 32. *Inquilab* (Lahore) 8 February 1948, p. 3.
 33. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 14 November 1949, pp. 4–6.
 34. *Inquilab* (Lahore) 6 June 1948, p. 5.
 35. Chatterji, *The Spoils of Partition*.
 36. *Inquilab* (Lahore) 6 June 1948, p. 5.
 37. Interview with Mailk Abbas, Lahore, 23 December 2008.
 38. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 10 September 1949, p. 13.
 39. Interview with Malik Abbas, Lahore, 23 December 2008.
 40. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 4 October 1949, p. 4.
 41. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 14 November 1949, pp. 4–6.
 42. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 26 October 1949, p. 4.
 43. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 31 January 1950, p. 5.
 44. Talbot, *Divided Cities*, pp. 93–6.
 45. First Five Years of Pakistan, 1947–1952, File E1 (9), A 82 (2), p. 34, PSA.
 46. PLAD, from 29 February to 15 March 1952, Vol. III, p. 812.
 47. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 22 December 1951, p. 5.
 48. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 29 January 1950, p. 6.
 49. PLAD, from 29 February to 15 March 1952, Vol. III, p. 812.
 50. Anwar, *Effects of Partition on Industries*, p.102
 51. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 14 October 1949, p. 4.
 52. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 22 March 1955, p. 2.
 53. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 10 September 1949, p. 7.
 54. West Pakistan Year Book, 1956, E 1(12), 1956, p. 125, PSA.
 55. The figures between 1946 and 1951 were quoted from PLAD, from 29 February to 15 March 1952, pp. 663–4; and the figures from 1954 onwards were cited in *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 25 November 1957, p. 3.
 56. On 18 September 1949, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, announced a 30 per cent devaluation of the pound from 4.03 dollars to 2.80 dollars per pound. Almost immediately, the European and Commonwealth countries, including India followed suit, but the government of Pakistan refused to devalue its rupee. The main reason put forward for this course of action was that Pakistan had not had an unfavorable balance of payments mainly because of its agricultural economy.
 57. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 18 February 1950, p. 6.
 58. The Government Statistical Bulletin, January–June 1960, Vol. 8, No. 1, Table 14, p. 25, Central Statistical Office, (Ministry of Economic Affairs, Government of Pakistan).
 59. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 1 December 1949, p. 4.
 60. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 2 February 1950, p. 8.
 61. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 31 January 1950, p. 5.



62. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 25 February 1950, p. 7.
63. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 3 May 1949, p. 7. Sialkot's migrants in Jullundur also greatly contributed in the enterprise of the surgical instruments industry, see for example M. Singh, 'Surgical Instruments Industry at Jalandhar: A Case Study', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 37, 31 (3-9 August 2002), pp. 3298-3304.
64. Singh, *The Economic Impact of Partition*, pp. 160-1.
65. *Inquilab* (Lahore) 9 June 1948, p. 3.
66. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 25 February 1955, p. 2.
67. Manzoor Anwar, 'Sialkot Strives for Trade Revival', *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 18 February 1950, p. 6.
68. Weiss, *Culture, Class, and Development in Pakistan*, p. 127.
69. PLAD, from 29 February to 15 March 1952, pp. 596-7.
70. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 26 July 1951, p. 3.
71. PLAD, from 29 February to 15 March 1952, pp. 596-7.
72. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 14 November 1949, pp. 4-6.
73. Finance and Industry Minister, Chaudhary Nazir Ahmed Khan, to the Governor of Punjab, Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar, 2 December 1949, (Ministry of Industries, Government of Pakistan), File No. 5, pp. 2-3, NDC.
74. PLAD, from 29 February to 15 March 1952, pp. 596-7.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 812.
76. Uberoi Limited Record, Uberoi Co-operative Sports Society, (Uberoi Building, Paris Road, Sialkot).
77. PLAD, from 29 February to 15 March 1952, pp. 596-7.
78. *Ibid.*
79. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 26 February 1955, p. 2.
80. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 27 March 1955, p. 2.
81. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 18 August 1951, p. 10.
82. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 26 July 1951, p. 3.
83. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 4 December 1956, p. 3.
84. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 11 March 1955, p. 2.
85. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 27 February 1955, p. 7.
86. S.J. Burki, 'Politics of Economic Decision-making during the Bhutto Period', *Asian Survey*, 14, 2 (1974), p. 1132.
87. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 27 July 1958, p. 2.
88. The Government Statistical Bulletin, January-June 1960, Vol. 8, No.1, Table 14, p. 25.
89. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 27 July 1958, p. 2.
90. Talbot, *Divided Cities*; Virdee, 'Partition in Transition'.
91. PLAD, from 5 to 29 January 1948, Vol. I, p. 223.
92. According to the 1951 Census, Sialkot's population showed a decrease nearly 2 per cent, which was due to exclusion of the Kashmiri refugees. See for example Population Census of Pakistan, 1951, Vol. 1, pp. 11-20.
93. The Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, File no. B50, Appendix C, p. 11, NDC. Sialkot, Gujrat, Gujranwala, Rawalpindi, Attock, and Jhelum were named the so-called 'border districts'.



94. Maintenance and Resettlement of Jammu and Kashmir Refugees, File No. B132, 169/CF/53, p. 4. NDC.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
96. At the beginning, many attempts were made to resettle as many as possible Kashmiri refugees in the Azad Kashmir region. The Azad Kashmir Rehabilitation Department was set up in early 1949. By the end of October 1949, over 500,000 Kashmiris had settled in Bhimber. By the mid-1951, about 298,231 *kanals* of land had been allotted to the refugees. Apart from the agricultural land, 47,000 meadows, 125 water mills, and 2,500 shops had also been allotted to either refugees or locals. At this stage, the Azad Kashmir government was still supplying free rations to over 88,000 'dilapidated refugees'. See *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 12 July 1951, p. 5.
97. Maintenance and Resettlement of Jammu and Kashmir Refugees, File No. B132, 169/CF/53, pp. 3–6, NDC.
98. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 28 September 1956, p. 2. By that time, 200,000 acres of land had been allotted to over 400,000 Kashmiri refugees in other 'border districts' of Gujrat, Gujranwala, Rawalpindi, Attock, and Jhelum. For details see The Government of Punjab Year Book, 1956, p. 99, PSA.
99. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 4 December 1956, p. 3.
100. West Pakistan Year Book, 1960, E1 (12) 1960, PA, p. 59, PSA. In the early 1950s, the government floated a number of new agricultural colonies and projects for the resettling of the labour and agricultural refugees. These multi-purpose developments brought a vast number of deserted lands into cultivation by harnessing the rivers. Of the multi-purpose developments, which brought a vast number of deserted lands into cultivation, the biggest and most important were the Ghulam Muhammadabad Colony, Tasusa Barrage Scheme, and Thal Development Project. These three projects, combined, rehabilitated more than 100,000 refugees.
101. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 4 December 1956, p. 3.
102. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) 18 September 1954, p. 2.
103. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 4 December 1956, p. 3.
104. K.S. Hosan, *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p. 144. The Kashmiri refugees' uncertain constitutional and legal status was by no means unique to Pakistan. In the Indian Kashmir, until recently, over 300,000 'West Pakistan Refugees' (WPR)—one-third of them from Sialkot—were not granted the Permanent Resident Certificate (PRC). Legally, the migrants were categorized into two sets of migrants; those who migrated from the Pakistan Kashmir side, and those who came from areas that are now part of Pakistan. The former are called Displaced Persons (DPs) and the latter are *Sharnarthis*. While the DPs are the state subjects, the *Sharnarthis* have not yet been granted this right. As the WPR had come from outside Jammu and Kashmir territory, they were not given the PRC. Permanent residency was given to those whose ancestors have been living in the state for at least ten years before 14 May 1954. In principle, only those with PRC can buy property, get employment, vote in the state assembly elections, or are entitled to other privileges. I. Chattha, 'Differential

Treatment: Kashmiri Refugees' Experiences of Rehabilitation and Punjab-Centre Relations 1947–1961', paper presented at Royal Holloway College, University of London, workshop on the theme *From Subjects to Citizens: Society and the Everyday State in India and Pakistan*, (12 August 2009).

105. *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) 27 December 1951, p. 4.
106. Interview with Sarmad Mahmud, Sialkot, 15 January 2007.
107. Interview with Zazar Hussian, Sialkot, 15 January 2007.
108. Interview with Khalid Shah, Sialkot, 20 January 2007.
109. Interview with Khalid Mahmud, Sialkot, 21 January 2007.
110. Talbot, *Divided Cities*; and also see Rai, *Punjab since Partition*.
111. Weiss, *Culture, Class, and Development in Pakistan*, pp. 139–40.
112. File Name: Proposal for Expansion/Modernization of M/S Uberoi Cooperative Sports Limited, Office of Vice President, (Uberoi Building, Paris Road, Sialkot), (n.d), pp. 2–3.
113. Interview with Rizwan Malik Awan, (Uberoi Building, Paris Road, Sialkot), 6 January 2007.
114. Interview with Ghazanfar Ali, Sialkot, 11 January 2007.
115. On Sialkot's sporting goods industrial development during the 1970s and 1980s see Weiss, *Culture, Class, and Development in Pakistan*, pp. 120–45.



Conclusion

The aim of this book has been to further the study of the impact of Partition and its aftermath in the Pakistani Punjab. This topic has been under-researched, particularly with regard to the issue of economic development. This work about Gujranwala and Sialkot has uncovered the complex and differential patterns of violence, migration, and resettlement at the local level. It has not only added to empirical knowledge of Partition and its legacies, but has also questioned the broader understandings with respect, for example, concerning the relative importance of locals and refugees with regards to the post-1947 industrial development within Pakistan. It has demonstrated the insights which can be gained by utilising new sources, and a locality-based approach to Partition. It cuts through the generalities of standardised accounts and reveals the complexities that attended Partition and its aftermath. Until recently, this kind of approach to Partition, with respect to Pakistan, remains, however, all too rare.

The opening chapter of the book explored the colonial urban development of Gujranwala and Sialkot, which has been previously neglected by historians. It revealed that their growth was stimulated by the late-nineteenth century development of the cantonments and civil lines. Their trade was encouraged by the development of railway networks. Employment in construction encouraged large-scale migration of traditional artisans from the surrounding areas. Urbanisation was also encouraged by the growing civic amenities which attracted wealthy Indians, who had similar consumption patterns and accommodation requirements to the Europeans. The chapter highlighted the key role of Hindus and Sikhs in the economic and social life of the two cities. It also pointed out that British rule not only brought increased material progress, but also heightened awareness of communal identity. This was stimulated by the improvements in communication; the spread of religious schools; and

most importantly, the response of indigenous religious reformers to the activities of Christian missionaries.

This analysis has pointed out nonetheless that the cities' Partition-related violence was by no means an inevitable outcome of previous communal conflict. There were obvious divisions put in place by the rigidity of the caste system and religion, but these did not create hostility on an extensive scale, and different communities had lived side by side with some degree of harmony for generations. By the later stages of British rule, heightened religious identities had, however, become politicised. The political and communal polarisation of attitudes that ultimately resulted in Partition of the subcontinent, alongside the division of the Punjab, formed the backdrop to the violence in the localities of Sialkot and Gujranwala, as throughout the province.

The second chapter has addressed the wider issues of violence, migration, and resettlement in the Punjab. It has cast doubt on the rather easily acceptable supposition, so far, that killing and violence were erratic and spontaneous. The violence in both cities commenced at the beginning of March onwards. Therefore, violence at the time of actual Partition was not a sudden eruption but a culmination of five months of tension and conflict. Clearly, its magnitude and intensity was unexpected, but there had been forewarnings. By August all the makings were in place for emptying the minorities in the Punjab region. The collapse of state authority was a precondition for the violence. The participation of law and enforcement forces led the violence to the genocidal situation. The focus of the chapter was also on the West Punjab administration's reactions to violence and responses to the arrival of the refugees and their resettlement afterwards. It also highlighted the tensions between the centre and provincial authorities over the management and settlement of refugees, and the extent to which related priorities changed over the period. The competition for resources and temptations of evacuee property resulted in not only to the detriment of genuine refugee claims and generated conflict between refugees and locals, but also deeply exposed the fissures between the centre and provinces during the period that straddled independence. Most importantly, the dealing of abandoned properties exposed the cracks in the Muslim League's



political ideological outlook at the very outset of the nation-state's creation—an ideological outlook which was anticipated and pledged by the leadership during the Pakistan movement.

Chapters three and four analysed the chief characteristics and identified the principal perpetrators of the violence in Gujranwala and Sialkot. The cities' actual history of violence, as uncovered here, departs from the standardised portrayal of Partition-related violence in a number of ways. It disputes the stereotypical explanation of the Punjab massacres as being a 'temporary madness' by explaining that clear elements of its pre-planning and organisation, coexisted with spontaneity. It breaks new ground in that it has sought to point out the prime perpetrators of violence and their motives in the region. While large sections of society were not on the side of the '*hamlahawars*', and neither did they take part in the violence and looting nor shared their extremist ideology of 'revenge', there was little public denunciation of the attackers. The cases, which form the source material for the chapters, revealed the social approval and complicity of the looting and burning of Hindu and Sikh homes and businesses. Further evidence has been produced that the failure to prosecute the guilty, intensified the violence. The *hamlahawars*, whether they were the Nizamabad's *Lohars*, or Sialkot's labour class, acted largely with relative impunity in their pursuit of material benefits through looting.

Until recently, not enough specific knowledge was available about the local level violence at the time of Partition, especially with its particular characteristics and identification of the exact perpetrators. This work represents an important contribution to this aspect, with its revelations concerning the role of the *hamlahawars*. It would be interesting to see whether similar situations could be identified elsewhere in the Punjab, although the *Lohars*' link with a major centre of production of potential weapons in Nizamabad may be unique. In a similar manner, although, the Chamar community's experience in Sialkot, because of its geographic location, had unique characteristics, it would be interesting to see whether similar situations could be identified elsewhere in the Punjab.

The book thus reveals that at the local level patterns of violence took on unique characteristics. Gujranwala, because of its strategic



situation on the main railway lines and roads, became notorious for its well-organized attacks on 'refugee trains'. The involvement of the *Lohars* in the Gujranwala violence, lent a particular severity to the communal conflict in the region. They were not only experts at manufacturing traditional weapons and thus had easy access to them, but many of them, or their relatives, were employed in the local railways as well. In the case of Sialkot, the city's Hindu and Sikh trading classes were principally targeted in the inner city because of their wealth and properties, aggravated deeply by its sudden transformation into a border city. The study has also revealed that the wide-spread violence within the Dogra-ruled state was politically motivated and received official assistance in driving out the Muslim inhabitants. A parallel can be seen here with the situation in Ian Copland's analysis of the state-led violence in the Sikh princely states of East Punjab.¹ At the same time, Sialkot's Chamar community's support and protection by the members of long-established population and the local police authorities against the incoming '*muhajirs*' and '*fauji*', question the persistent explanations in which the wider political context for violence is considered a motivating factor. In this sense, this work not only breaks new grounds offering the localised patterns of mass violence and displacement arising from Partition, but also seeks to push out its boundaries further.

While the localities thus had specific characteristics of violence, there were also commonalities. One important characteristic was that violence was politically, rather than religiously or culturally, motivated. The political aims were not so much tied into the wider all-India issues, but were to attain local power and territorial control. In order to achieve this, weapons were stockpiled and volunteers were recruited into paramilitary units. These processes began from early March 1947 onwards and sent out a warning to the politically astute. Some wealthy Hindus and Sikhs, in anticipation of future trouble, shifted their assets to safer places weeks before actual Partition.

The deteriorating situation in both cities was accompanied by the increasing unreliability of the police. Indeed there is evidence of individual police officers and constables being directly involved in the violence and looting. Case-study material has revealed that most of the violence, in both localities, was carefully organised. The



temptation to loot the wealthy Hindus and Sikhs was an important element in the attacks in the absence of a restraining authority, although they were largely rationalised in terms of the need to 'revenge' Muslim sufferings elsewhere. To sum up the violence in Gujranwala and Sialkot was not spontaneous, but well-organised. There were a host of culpable people involved, ranging from the fundamentalists on both sides, to powerful unscrupulous politicians, officials, and soldiers. The role of the police and of politicians in the violence has parallels with the situation in today's India, as Paul Brass's work on the 'institutionalised riot system' has revealed.²

In Chapters 5 and 6, attention has been focused on to the issues of refugee resettlement in Gujranwala and Sialkot. What comes across clearly from the research is the differential experiences of this process arising from not only economic status, but the state policy with respect to whether it recognised refugee status for various groups of migrants. Regarding the differential experiences of refugees arising from the social and cultural capital that they brought with them, the findings confirms the understandings found in earlier locality-based studies elsewhere in Punjab. The exploration confirms that wealth and influence, wielded by the rich, meant that they had an easier experience of migration and eventual rehabilitation. For the less fortunate, the refugee experience was frequently not just a matter of a single dislocation or forced resettlement, but of years of upheaval before settling down after having faced the violence.

The analysis goes beyond consideration of the individual refugee experience to examine the processes of urban regeneration and industrial development. Clear differences emerge between the Gujranwala and Sialkot experiences. Gujranwala's capacity to deal with the large numbers of refugees was eased by the skills and entrepreneurial activity of the refugee labour. Pre-existing Arain, Ansari, and Sheikh communities meant that the city attracted enterprising migrants from these communities, who resettled in Gujranwala, chiefly, from Amritsar, Patiala, and Ludhiana. On the other hand, Sialkot because of the geographical handicap of being on the sensitive border of Jammu and Kashmir and Indian Punjab was much less successful in attracting refugee entrepreneurs. This handicap was overcome to an extent by its strong institutional



inheritance and pre-existing skills from the colonial period. However, the process of its regeneration was not, in reality, as smooth as it may appear in hindsight. This work, nonetheless, emphasizes that despite the upheavals of 1947, there were continuities linked to the colonial era regarding urban development in places such as Sialkot. These aspects have not always been fully acknowledged in the past.

One of the arguments of this book has been that Partition brought opportunities for both locals and refugees in different sectors of the economy. These could only be fully seized, however, by those who had pre-existing skills, whether they were the local *Lohars* or refugee Sheikhs and Ansaris. A new artisan-industrial class rose to prominence. With respect, especially to Gujranwala's hosiery and jewellery trades, the refugee entrepreneurs brought new skills and capital. While pre-existing inheritances were prerequisites in the development of post-independence Sialkot, Partition provided an opportunity for the local artisans to fill some of the vacant niches created by the flight of the Hindu and Sikh trading classes. In this sense, Sialkot's patterns of development differed from the experience of Gujranwala and other cities, such as Lyallpur, whose expansion depended greatly on a refugee influx of labour and capital. While state assistance in both the case studies was crucially important, the Sialkot sporting goods industry, which was regarded as a Pakistani economic success story, received greater government assistance for industrial recovery.

Both Gujranwala and Sialkot were demographically transformed by the impact of Partition, but the conflict between the refugees and locals was muted, because of cultural affinity and pre-existing kinship ties. While some of those who were interviewed talk about the difficulty of intermarriage with locals from other *biraderis*, there were far fewer tensions than those that existed between the *muhajirs* and urban Sindhis. Refugees in Gujranwala and Sialkot were neither culturally distant from the local population, nor were they in economic competition. In the case of Gujranwala, the migration of Hindus and Sikhs provided opportunities for the local artisans, while the refugee workers brought a new kind of enterprise. Local *Lohars* established the iron-works and light metal industries, while migrant entrepreneurs were involved in the hosiery and jewellery trades and



businesses in the city. The interviews in chapter 5 reveal the way in which Muslim refugee workers from cities in East Punjab translated their skills into the development of these industries. Their growth, however, was not state-led but was dependent on the capital and skills brought by the refugees to Gujranwala.

The book has introduced a range of new sources on the subject matter. It has, in particular, revealed the value of police records as a historical source for a district-level examination of Partition violence in the Punjab. At the same time it reveals that these records, if they can be retrieved, need to be handled with care and read between the lines, as they tend to reproduce colonial stereotypes of communal mob violence. Despite the planning and careful organization behind the attacks on Hindus and Sikhs, surprisingly, the subsequent police reports merely termed them as 'communal riot'. The police FIRs of the attacks and looting, which form the source material, reveal that they were, in many cases, reported by the local *lambardars* and law enforcement agencies, rather than the victims themselves. Cases were apparently registered for the sake of the record rather than in any serious anticipation of following up on them. For example, in Gujranwala city alone, by 15 August 1947, over 780 FIRs had been registered against *hamlahawars*, however, subsequent records show that few of these were pursued, and hardly any one was indicted. They were merely noted and now provide sources for the historian. Difficulties of access mean that few scholars have as yet utilised them in their accounts.

Partition and Locality has also considered the value of firsthand accounts, not only for the identification of the grass-root perpetrators of violence, but also for the differing experiences of migration and refugee resettlement. For example, the wealthy members of Kazim Shah's family were able to plan their departure from Delhi and sold or shifted their possessions before leaving for Gujranwala. Similarly, Dr Lal's family members shifted their assets from Sialkot to Delhi many weeks before actual Partition and observed the disturbances in the neighbouring Jammu city. But this was not an option open to artisans such as Abdul Guffar, many of whose family members were killed in Patiala, while others were forced to abandon their possessions and flee for their lives. During the course of an interview, Guffar



revealed that it was only after traveling for months and spending time in refugee camps that he finally reached Gujranwala.

The book also utilised the personal testimonies of local established populations. These were as revealing as those provided by the refugees, especially with respect to the organised nature of the violence in the two cities. First-hand accounts by Malik Abbas and Abdul-Islam Butt revealed, not only the partisan role of the police during the violence, but of the individual Muslim Leaguers in Sialkot as well, although, official accounts deny that the members of the Muslim League were involved in such episodes. Similarly, eye-witness accounts from Nizamabad have uncovered the careful organisation behind the attacks on the refugee trains and the connivance of the local railway drivers. The accounts of both Mohammad Ramzan and Mohammad Ali, for example, revealed the planning of attack on a refugee train which was carrying Hindu and Sikh passengers and the involvement of the driver of the train named Rahmat Kashmiri. Such a level of detail rarely exists in the documentary sources, and thus, has not previously entered the historical narrative.

Oral sources not only reflect on the, by now, well-known experience of 'partition from beneath', i.e. from the perspective of the refugee 'victim', but also question the documentary-based official accounts of rehabilitation. This account has revealed that the latter process was not as straightforward as it has been presented and that it was a combination of state support and refugee and local skills that led to industrial growth in Sialkot and Gujranwala. In this respect, this work is a further contribution to the 'new history' of Partition, but one which is not solely preoccupied with the refugee experience. Some of its findings supplement pre-existing locality-based works, as with regard to the differential experiences of violence and refugee resettlement. In other ways it goes beyond them to look at how locals seized opportunities for loot in the violence of 1947, and on a positive note, sought to exploit new economic opportunities following the departure of the Hindu and Sikh business classes. It is clear that the impact of Partition could be as profound for those who did not migrate as those who were uprooted.

These differential experiences of Partition were not limited to individuals. Sialkot and Gujranwala faced different sets of problems



and opportunities in terms of their industrial life after 1947. Sialkot lost its trading and financial class, traditional markets, as well as sources of raw materials. However, the city, because of its pre-existing economic base and entrepreneurial drive, overcame the handicap of proximity to a volatile international border, together with the emergence of an Indian economic competitor in Jullundur. Gujranwala with its good communications, pre-existing skills of the *Lohars*, and the strong presence of refugee entrepreneurs benefited from the 1947 events and experienced rapid economic development after independence. Despite these inheritances and regenerations, the study has shown that the contemporary success of the two cities also depended on timely government action and financial assistance. Standard texts refer only to this last point.

While both Gujranwala and Sialkot took some years to recover from Partition-related economic dislocation, they could be presented as 'gainers' from the 1947 events, as were the cities of Ludhiana in India and Lyallpur in Pakistan. In one way, Sialkot's experience of post-independence industrialisation stands in stark contrast with the experiences of other cities of the Punjab. This is not only in terms of export-led growth, but the role of locals rather than migrants. Moreover, Sialkot's post-1947 economic development differs from that of such other border towns as Amritsar, which have never fully overcome the handicaps of their new geographical location. The demographic transformation certainly facilitated the upward mobility of economically-backward Muslims. Both the skilled migrants and the established local populations contributed greatly to the economic diversification of the cities. The government's support for new ventures, by providing loans and other concessions, was an important factor for such economic mobility. Partition in Sialkot and Gujranwala, as elsewhere in North India, clearly had its winners and losers.

NOTES

1. Copland, 'The Master and Maharajas', pp. 657-704.
2. Brass, *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence*.



Appendix

SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE: INTERVIEWS OF PARTITION-RELATED EVENTS IN GUJRANWALA AND SIALKOT

1. What is your name and how old are you?
2. Where were you born?
3. What is your biraderi/zat/caste?
4. What is your mother-tongue?
5. What was your ancestral locality?
6. Tell us about your family, i.e. parents, brothers, sisters, father's occupation etc.?
7. What were you doing at the time of Partition, i.e. studying, working?
8. Did you have relations with people from other religious communities in your locality before Partition?
9. Could you describe what the other people were like around your neighbourhood, i.e. were they Hindus/Sikhs/Muslims/Christians?
10. Did you celebrate any traditional festivals (Dewali, Eid) with other religious communities?
11. How were your overall relations with other religious communities/castes people before the 1947 disturbances and riots began?
12. Were you afraid as a minority in a majority area around the time of Partition? If so, describe the reasons why?
13. Could you tell us about the tensions which grew between the Hindu/Sikh and Muslim communities in your area/village/locality? If so, when did the riots begin and when did they peak?
14. Did you witness anything yourself? If so, could you describe it?
15. Did you or your relatives/locality people participate in the disturbances? If so, could you please describe what happened and who were involved in these events?
16. Did you help other religious communities' people during the disturbances and migration in your locality?
17. How did you feel when Pakistan was formed and who was/were involved in the movement for Pakistan in your locality?
18. Did you expect you would have to migrate in 1947? If so, when did you become aware of the need to migrate, i.e. before the British departure,



- or after the Boundary Commissions Report's announcement, or because of communal violence?
19. Where did you migrate from in India?
 20. Did any member of another religious community help you during the riots/migration? If so, How? Were they officials, soldiers, ordinary people?
 21. How did you travel across the border, i.e. individually, or in a group, or in a caravan, or by train, or an airplane?
 22. Were you attacked on the way, if so, can you describe what happened? Was any family member injured or killed? Was any family member abducted?
 23. What possessions did you take with you?
 24. Where did you move to in Pakistan?
 25. Why did you settle in Gujranwala/Sialkot?
 26. Before arriving in Gujranwala/Sialkot, did you go to some other place first? Did you first settle in a refugee camp, or with relatives, or in a property evacuated by the Hindus and the Sikhs?
 27. If you were in a refugee camp, how long was it before your family was resettled? What was the name and the location of the camp? Could you describe life as a refugee in a camp?
 28. Did you have connections with Gujranwala and Sialkot before Partition?
 29. How did migration affect your daily life and standard of living?
 30. How were your traditions affected?
 31. Did the departure of Hindus and Sikhs benefit you, i.e. did it provide new economic opportunities to set up an own business? How did you start and how long did it take to set up your own business?
 32. Does your family still talk about the events of August 1947?
 33. Did you put in a 'claim' for compensation? If so, can you describe what happened, i.e. could you name the locality and the type of housing? Was the house more, or less, spacious than the former family residence in India?
 34. Are you still living in the same accommodation or locality you first moved into?
 35. What was your relationship with local residents after your arrival? Has this changed since then?
 36. How have Gujranwala and Sialkot changed since 1947?
 37. What work did you do after the migration?
 38. How long did it take to adjust to your new life in Pakistan?
 39. Did you ever feel that you would return back home?
 40. Do you remember your locality in India now?



41. What is your line of business?
42. Did you resume your old family occupation, or was it a new area for you?
43. How did you start?
44. Did you have any business links with the city/locality before Partition?
45. Did you have any assistance in starting up your business, i.e. government loan, private loans, kinship support?
46. Could you talk about what the conditions were like here when you were starting your business?
47. What do you attribute your success to?
48. What contribution do you feel refugees/local artisans have made to Gujranwala's and Sialkot's development since 1947?

Glossary

<i>achhuts</i>	untouchables—the lowest caste of the Hindus
<i>aghwa</i>	abduction
<i>anjuman</i>	association
<i>anna</i>	formerly, a small unit of Pakistani and Indian currency (one-sixteenth of a rupee)
<i>arains</i>	a caste of cultivators/vegetable growers, mostly in the Punjab and Sindh
<i>arheties</i>	lenders who lend peasants money and agricultural products
<i>asar</i>	late afternoon
<i>azadi</i>	freedom
<i>badmashes</i>	gangsters
<i>bait-ul-maal</i>	treasury of an Islamic state
<i>bania</i>	member of the Hindu trading-caste; shopkeeper
<i>barchees</i>	daggers
<i>bellas</i>	forests which grow on the banks of the rivers
<i>biraderi</i>	brotherhood; kinship group
<i>Brahman</i>	Upper cast Hindu priest
<i>chak</i>	village
<i>chamar</i>	menial worker, usually dealing with leather and animal hides; considered unclean/untouchable
<i>charpay</i>	a wooden-framed bed, which is covered with netted string
<i>chaudhari</i>	the hereditary headman of a village
<i>chowk</i>	crossroads, junction
<i>crore</i>	ten million
<i>danda</i>	a wooden stick
<i>dindar</i>	new converts, referring to those converted forcibly to Islam during the Partition
<i>Dogras</i>	the term refers to an ethnic group that lived in the south-eastern part of Jammu; the ruling



	Hindu family of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir were the Dogras
<i>dopahr</i>	afternoon
<i>dopahr</i>	afternoon
<i>fajr</i>	early morning prayer in Islam
<i>fasaadat</i>	riots
<i>fauji</i>	soldier
<i>gali</i>	narrow alleyway
<i>goondas</i>	thugs, gangsters
<i>Gujars</i>	milk-suppliers; herders
<i>gurdwara</i>	Sikh temple
<i>Gurkhas</i>	Gurkhas are people from areas of Nepal and Northern India best-known for their history of bravery and martial abilities in the British Indian Army's Gurkha regiments.
<i>hajum</i>	crowd, mob
<i>hakim</i>	traditional doctor; practitioner of unani (or ancient Greek) medicine
<i>hamlahawars</i>	attackers, raiders
<i>hartal</i>	political protest
<i>izzat</i>	honour
<i>jagir</i>	an assignment of land revenue in lieu of salary
<i>jagirdars</i>	big landholders
<i>jaishes</i>	armed bands
<i>jat</i>	member of a tribe of agriculturalists, mostly settled in the Punjab; could be from religious backgrounds
<i>jatha</i>	band, armed group
<i>jihad</i>	often refers to religious war in Islam against the non-believers; in Arabic literally refers to 'struggle'
<i>juma</i>	Friday early afternoon prayer
<i>kafirs</i>	infidels
<i>kafleh</i>	foot convoy of refugees
<i>kamies</i>	members of the lower classes in villages
<i>kanal</i>	measurement of land equal to 1/20th of an acre
<i>katcha</i>	often refers to a dwelling made of mud



<i>katchi abadis</i>	informal and illegal squatter settlements
<i>kirpans</i>	A long knife, or sword, generally kept by all baptized Sikhs for self-defence, and symbolically, as part of their faith
<i>kotwali</i>	local police station
<i>kulharis</i>	axes
<i>lakh</i>	one hundred thousand
<i>lambardar</i>	headman of a village; during the British colonial hierarchy, the local <i>lambardars</i> in the Punjab were the collectors of revenue in the area
<i>lathi</i>	wooden stick
<i>lohar</i>	blacksmith
<i>mandi</i>	market
<i>mandir</i>	Hindu temple
<i>marla</i>	measurement of land equal to 1/400th of an acre
<i>mela</i>	traditional fair
<i>mirasi</i>	story-teller in a village
<i>mohalla</i>	neighbourhood
<i>muhajir/mohajir</i>	a refugee; a Muslim who has fled for religious reasons
<i>nalah</i>	ravine, river bed
<i>palang</i>	a wooden bed
<i>pateelay</i>	cooking pans
<i>pir</i>	a Muslim saint
<i>pirhee</i>	sitting cots
<i>qasbah</i>	a small town
<i>razaee</i>	quilt
<i>razakars</i>	volunteers; often used for those who volunteer to fight or work, even without any honorarium, sometimes
<i>roti</i>	bread
<i>sabha</i>	organisation
<i>sahib</i>	sir; a form of respectful address
<i>sahukar</i>	money-lender
<i>sandook</i>	big wooden box, used for storage of household articles
<i>sardar</i>	chief



<i>sepoys</i>	soldiers
<i>shalwar kamez</i>	traditional Muslim dress of the subcontinent
<i>sheikh</i>	a respectable urban Muslim
<i>shuddhi</i>	Hindu re-purification right, adopted by the Arya Samaj for re-conversion purposes
<i>sirkar</i>	district
<i>subah</i>	province
<i>tarkhan</i>	artisan carpenter
<i>tehsil</i>	an administrative sub-division of a district
<i>thana</i>	police station
<i>thanedar</i>	a police officer who is in charge of a police station
<i>thikri pehra</i>	night-patrolling
<i>tola</i>	measurement of weight for gold or silver, just under an ounce
<i>tonga</i>	horse-cart
<i>topi</i>	hat
<i>unani</i>	old, Greek-style medical system; still practised in some parts of the subcontinent
<i>zamin</i>	land, mostly agricultural property
<i>zamindar</i>	landholder in a village
<i>zan</i>	woman
<i>zar</i>	wealth/money
<i>zenana</i>	refers to things relating to or used by women; private part of a house reserved for women
<i>zila</i>	revenue sub-division, district



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PARTITION AND LOCALITY

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