



**PAKISTAN
AUTHORITARIANISM
IN THE 1980S**

*Edited By
Craig Baxter
& Syed Razi Wasti*



Pakistan
Authoritarianism in 1980s

Edited by

Craig Baxter & Syed Razvi

VANGUARD

Pakistan Authoritarianism in 1980s

Edited By

Craig Baxter & Syed Razi Wasti

VANGUARD

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing from the author and publisher

Copyright : Craig Baxter and Syed Razi Wasti, 1991

**First Published in Pakistan by
Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd
Lahore Karachi Islamabad Peshawar**

**Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd
Head Office: 45 The Mall Lahore Pakistan
Ph: 57783, 311064, Fax: 042-321680 Tlx: 47421 SCOOP (PK)**

**Branch Office: D-212, KDA 1 A, Stadium Road, Karachi
Ph: 423571, 421564**

**Branch Office: Jinnah Super Market, Islamabad
Ph: 822443, 814452**

Printed at Intikhab i Jadeed Press,
Abbot Road, Lahore

Title designed by Ashraf Kamal

ISBN: 969-402- 038-7 Hardback
969-402-037-9 Paperback

CONTENTS

384
P32484
1991

Foreword.....	i
1. Pakistan's Authoritarian Heritage.....	1
<i>Syed Razi Wasti</i>	
2. Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Limited Options.....	12
<i>Craig Baxter</i>	
3. Pakistan and the Superpower.....	29
<i>Leo E. Rose</i>	
4. Pakistan and the "Afghan Problem".....	45
<i>Louis Dupree</i>	
5. Domestic Politics in the 1980s.....	67
<i>William L. Richter</i>	
6. Zia and the Civilian Bureaucrats: Pakistan's Bureaucracy in the 1980s.....	88
<i>Charles H. Kennedy</i>	
7. Pakistan's Economy, 1947-2000: Economic Performance and Strategy for Future Growth.....	101
<i>Shahid Javed Burki</i>	
8. Pakistani Women in the 1980s and Beyond...	134
<i>Anita M. Weiss</i>	
9. Pakistan's <i>Zakat</i> System and the Status of Women.....	153
<i>Grace Clark</i>	
10. Pakistan and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.....	172
<i>Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada</i>	

FOREWORD

The papers that follow are a selection of those presented at a conference on Pakistan in the 1980s held at Columbia University, New York, April 16-17, 1987. They cover a number of aspects of the political, economic, and social systems of that country.

Syed Razi Wasti introduces the series with an essay, adapted from his opening address, signifying the importance of the changes in Pakistan as the country moves from martial law to a form of representative government on its way, one hopes, to a renewal of democratic rule. Craig Baxter and Leo Rose look at the security and foreign policy options available to Pakistan and come to compatible but different conclusions. Louis Dupree explores a specific international relationship, that between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and does so through an historical survey. William Richter discusses the internal political scene as the political system of Pakistan undergoes change. Charles Kennedy writes on a particular aspect of the political system, the bureaucracy, and the changes it has undergone during the Zia-ul-Haq period. Shahid Javed Burki continues his studies on the economic system of the country.

To these articles, we have appended the inaugural address of Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, the secretary general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. His address provides a valuable survey of the connections between Indian Muslims (before 1947) and Pakistani Muslims (after 1947) on the one hand and the Islamic *ummah* on the other.

The editors and all those at the conference wish to express their appreciation for the hospitality of Columbia University and its Southern Asian Institute directed by Ainslie Embree. Thanks are also extended to the two moderators of the working sessions: Howard Wriggins of Columbia University and Muhammad Afzal, rector of the International Islamic University in Islamabad.

C.B.
S.R.W.

1

Pakistan's authoritarian heritage

Syed Razi Wasti

From the day it gained independence in 1947, Pakistan has faced crises in every arena: political, economic, ethnic, regional, and international. Its creation was opposed by both the Indian National Congress and the British, and after independence attempts were made to jeopardize its existence. The Radcliffe Award, which fixed the boundaries between India and Pakistan was considered unjust by Pakistanis and created many more problems than it solved.¹ The Kashmir dispute remains a source of great irritation between the two countries, but the immediate crisis resulting from the Award was the influx of millions of Muslim refugees from East India to Pakistan and departure of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan to India. The new state had neither the resources nor the personnel to cope with these massive population shifts.

There were many administrative and economic problems: the transfer of assets from India to Pakistan; the lack of experienced administrative staff; the reorganization of the army; and the cost of establishing a central government with a new capital, offices and office equipment.

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), the founder of the new state, had always been a member of the opposition and had never joined the British Indian government, but on August 14, 1947 he assumed the office of governor general. He was already in his seventies, frail and ill, but he worked with great zeal until his death on September 11, 1948. His death was a severe blow to

Pakistan. His lieutenant and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan (1895-1951) took control and handled state affairs with confidence and tact until his assassination on October 16, 1951. There was no leader left who could command the respect of the whole nation.

In the meantime there arose some regional problems. It was actually in Jinnah's time that the question of whether Bengali should be a National language was raised, but Jinnah declared that there would be only one National language and that would be Urdu.² Liaquat's successor as Prime Minister was Khwaja Nazimuddin (1894-1964). A Bengali, he had earlier succeeded Jinnah as governor general. He was gentle and experienced, but weak and lacked charisma. The regional leaders took advantage of this and intrigued against the central government. In the Punjab a movement was started against the Ahmadis or Qaidianis (a religious community that the Muslim majority considers outside the bounds of orthodox Islam). Resentment against the Ahmadis dated to the beginning of the century and the Ahrar group of politicians had long opposed them; nonetheless nobody raised any objections when Jinnah appointed Sir Zafar Ullah Khan (1893-1985), an Ahmadi as Foreign Minister. He ably advocated Pakistan's case on Kashmir in the United Nations, but a campaign was started for his ouster with the connivance of the Punjab Chief Minister. Khwaja Nazimuddin could not tackle the issue politically and rioting, shop burning and looting started in Lahore. The law and order deteriorated so much that the civil authorities could not control it, so Martial Law was imposed in Lahore in 1953. This was the first taste of power by the military and the beginning of a series of martial law periods in Pakistan. Pakistan suffered a grave food shortage and generally economic conditions were deteriorating. Thus lack of confident central popular leadership, the economic situation, and regional problems (in East Pakistan, the question of the Bengali language was raised again and the demonstrations in 1952 resulted in the death of a few demonstrators),³ all conspired to pass control of the government into the hands of bureaucrats. They assumed that since the politicians had failed to control the situation, it

was their responsibility to restore law and order. Chief among them was Ghulam Muhammad (1895-1956), the ailing governor-general, who had succeeded Nazimuddin when he stepped down to assume premiership after Liaquat's assassination.

Ghulam Muhammad was an able officer, but he was ambitious and ruthless. Soon differences developed between him and Nazimuddin. He first dismissed Nazimuddin in 1953 and then in 1955 dissolved the Constituent Assembly, which had failed to produce a constitution. The members of the assembly had not been able to resolve such issues as parity between the two wings and the question of whether there should be a separate electorate or joint electorate. These actions of the governor general created a constitutional crisis and when reference was made to the Supreme Court, Justice Muhammad Munir (1895-1981), endorsed the actions of the governor general. Within a short span of a few years the Muslim League, the party that led such a successful movement for Pakistan, was defeated and lost all control. New parties were formed and some old politicians who had opposed Pakistan's creation, like Dr. Khan Sahib (1882-1958) of the Northwest Frontier Province, became prominent leaders of Pakistan. Religious groups also became active.⁴ Ghulam Muhammad was removed and another bureaucrat, Iskander Mirza (1907-1974), became governor general. In 1956, a constitution was framed, the result of the efforts of still another leading bureaucrat, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali (1905-1980), but it was never fully enforced. No elections were held under the constitution, and, ultimately, General Muhammad Ayub Khan (1907-1974) the commander-in-chief of the army, took control of administration by imposing Martial Law in 1958. Ayub Khan's rule was the first under martial law at a national level. He created a system of "Basic Democracy" that included indirect election and lasted until 1969.⁵

Despite all this crisis and turmoil, Pakistan played an important role in international bodies such as the United Nations, CENTO, and SEATO. Although tension existed between India and Pakistan, they were able to sort out their differences regarding distribution of canal waters, by signing

the Indus Water Treaty in 1960. They even fought a war in 1965, but at Tashkent, Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Indian Prime Minister, met and signed an agreement that led to the withdrawal of troops to the pre-conflict boundaries. During Ayub's regime Pakistan and China came closer to each other while the relations with the United States became less cordial. Pakistan did not have very warm relations with the Soviet Union owing to the U-2 incident and the presence of an American Air base near Peshawar. Nevertheless Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, played an important mediatory role during the Tashkent talks between India and Pakistan.

Economic and industrial progress during Ayub's regime was extensive. During this period 22 capitalist families dominated much of the industrial development; however, the political influence in the rural area of the prominent landlord families was not diminished despite Ayub's limited land reforms. His basic democracy system did not lead to the development of democratic institutions. He was an autocratic ruler and the army and the bureaucrats, along with most businessmen and feudal lords were his supporters. A former prime minister Husain Shahid Suhrawardy (1893-1963), was among the leaders in the opposition and tried to keep the democratic tradition alive, as did Nazimuddin. Fatima Jinnah (1893-1967), the sister of Jinnah, opposed Ayub in the 1964 election, but was defeated owing to, some say, machinations by the bureaucracy.

It was clear that even during these crises and autocratic rule, the democratic spirit of the people was not successfully suppressed. Whenever they found an opportunity, they rose against autocratic rule. East Pakistan was always in the forefront and the Bengalis became so frustrated that they ultimately decided to break away from West Pakistan. The movement that was started against Ayub Khan in 1968 ultimately led to his resignation in March 1969, and reimposition of Martial Law under General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan. Yahya's policies hastened the separation of East Pakistan and enabled Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928-1979) to gain unprecedented popularity in West Pakistan. It can safely be said that East Pakistan would not

have become Bangladesh, at least not so soon, but for Indian military intervention and the Soviet rôle in the United Nations. The loss of East Pakistan was the biggest crisis that Pakistan had to face. The nation mourned not only the loss of East Pakistan, but also the humiliating defeat, the capture of 90,000 soldiers as prisoners of war and the loss of hundreds of square miles of territory in West Pakistan (which would be regained following an agreement with India at Simla in 1972).

At that moment, Bhutto, whose Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had won a majority of the West Pakistan seats in the National Assembly elections of 1970 and in the Punjab and Sind legislative assemblies, appeared on the scene as the saviour and messiah. His speech on December 20, 1971 instilled a new spirit and enthusiasm amongst Pakistanis. He was a popular charismatic leader, who had won the people's support by resorting not only to speaking in their language, but also adopting their style of dress. His slogan of *roti, kapra aur makan* (food, clothing and shelter) had won him a large number of followers. It was hoped that he would be the builder of Pakistan on a sound footing, that he would usher in an era of democratic government.

He started well. He toured Muslim countries and tried to reactivate the spirit of Muslim brotherhood. The conference of the heads of Muslim states held in Lahore in 1974 was a great success. He was even able to convince the people to accept Bangladesh as a brother Muslim country. He tried to break the power of bureaucrats by introducing "Lateral Entry System". The army, which had been completely demoralized, was remodelled and a new spirit was infused into it. He nationalized heavy industry, banks, insurance companies and even introduced some agrarian reforms, but personally he could not rise above his feudal background. His arrogance, autocratic nature, and personal weaknesses resulted in turning a sizeable section of people against him. He was particularly unpopular among the National Awami Party leaders of North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Soon the religious leadership in the Punjab and other areas turned against him. Despite the fact that in 1973 he was able to give the nation a constitution

in which the question of regional autonomy seemed to have been successfully tackled, it was apparent that he was not sincere to his own creation and amended the constitution to suit his temperament. But the tide turned completely when it was rumored that he had rigged the elections of 1977. He tried hard to make amends, but the people had been disillusioned and this provided another opportunity for the army to intervene. General Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial law in July 1977.

Zia-ul-Haq began his government in a very modest manner, by promising elections within 90 days. However, events kept taking different turns. The Bhutto government's misdeeds were published in a series of voluminous white papers. Bhutto himself was tried on a murder charge and hanged in 1979. Zia, a simple, modest man, has proved to be an extremely shrewd politician and clever statesman. He very early realized that the people of Pakistan were missing the enforcement of the program which was the basis for its demand. Its ideology was Islam, but the introduction of Islamic principles had been ignored by successive governments on one pretext or another and only lip service had been paid by some. He assumed that he had a mission and the mission was to introduce *Nizam-i-Mustapha* (administrative system introduced by the Prophet). On that basis he started his program of Islamization. *Hudud* laws were promulgated, interest free banking was introduced, *Zakat* (Islamic collection of funds for charitable purposes) and *Ushr* (Islamic tax on agricultural lands) were enforced. He took many steps which were appreciated by the religious classes and Pakistanis as a whole. He was also aware that the real aspiration of the people was the introduction of democracy. They wanted participation in the government. Although he himself is averse to politics and politicians and is not very fond of the western democratic system, he made attempts to associate people in his government at various levels and in different ways. His convening of the appointed *Majlis-i-Shura* (Islamic consultative assembly) was one such attempt, but it failed to satisfy demands for elective democracy. The campaign begun by the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in 1983 caused him to

realize that he had to take some more steps, not only to legitimize his rule, but to satisfy people's aspirations. He decided first to hold a referendum on Islamization and his continuance in office in December 1984 (which he carried, although some have alleged the result was rigged or, at least, exaggerated) and then non-partisan elections to the national and provincial assemblies in January 1985. After the elections, Mohammad Khan Junejo was selected as prime minister and confirmed by the National Assembly. Martial Law was lifted at the end of December 1985 and political activities were permitted. In the non-party election, opposition had hoped that the people would boycott the elections, but this did not happen. On the other hand 52.9% of registered voters cast their ballots in the National Assembly elections and 56.9% in the provincial elections - Punjab 61.8%, Sind 49.2%; N.W.F.P. 47.6% and Baluchistan 46.6%.⁶

While the election results pleased Zia's government, they certainly disappointed the opposition. As far as Zia was concerned it appeared that he had been able to steer Pakistan through another serious crisis. He could claim that he was the first military ruler who willingly, deliberately, and peacefully was able to transfer power to civilian hands. The opposition parties were in disarray. A few oppositionists had been elected in the non-party poll and formed an opposition group in the assembly. They opposed the amendments to the 1973 constitution proposed by Zia and Junejo. The latter were able to overcome this difficulty by making a few compromises. Constitutionally and legally a civilian government was in power and Zia had obtained his legitimacy and presidentship for five years. Being fully confident of his strength Junejo, decided to re-introduce the party system and to rejuvenate the Pakistan Muslim League - successor to the All India Muslim League. This was a signal for other political parties to reactivate their efforts as well, but they had to have a program and some charismatic leaders. It was not possible for previously rejected leaders to revive the defeated parties and mobilize people to strive to strengthen democracy.

There is an intense desire at the level of the common man for participation in the electoral process, in a democratic manner with accountability of the rulers and the rule of law. Although the ruling elite had paid lip service to these norms, they had often violated them. A highly elitist and exploitative socio-economic and political system was perpetuated and caused widespread alienation in the society. Hence, there was a chance for a young, energetic leader to come forward.

Although the Pakistan People's Party did not participate in the election, it still had a sizeable following. Most of its leaders were out of the country. There were criminal and other charges against some of them. Leaders like Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi were too cautious to make any open commitment. Zia tried to enlist their support but was not successful. At this moment Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, came forward. She had judged the people's temperament, when she returned to Pakistan in 1985 with the body of her brother, Shah Nawaz, who had died in mysterious circumstances in Europe. During his funeral rites the people of Sind especially showed great loyalty to the Bhutto family, and loyalists from the Punjab had supported her as well. When the government announced that political activities had been restored, political parties started organizing themselves.

Benazir Bhutto made the most of this opportunity, and returned again to Pakistan on April 10, 1986 to start her tour of the Punjab and other parts of the country. The crowd that had gathered to receive her at Lahore airport was unprecedented and her procession through the streets of Lahore was momentous. Wherever she went she was received with the same enthusiasm. This made her think that she could topple the government anytime.⁷ The strategy that she adopted was to ask for mid-term elections in September 1986. But the month of Ramadan and the summer heat compelled her to postpone her movement. In view of her success, the MRD, (an alliance of eight political parties formed in 1981) leaders urged her to carry on the movement under the auspices of MRD. The PPP is a component of MRD, but Benazir was projecting only the PPP.

The 1980s could be the years of the strengthening of democratic institutions and gradual opening up of political activity. The government has made a commitment to hold elections on party basis. The only question is when. The opposition demands mid-term elections, but the government had announced that elections would be held as scheduled in 1990. The opposition, though fairly vocal, is divided. Among supporter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada and Mumtaz Bhutto have formed a party that is focussed against the Punjab, and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi has formed the splinter National Peoples' Party. Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Ghaus Bux Bizenjo and retired Air Martial Asghar Khan are not with PPP. With 25 parties already registered by the Election Commission and at least the same number still unregistered, the people may have a choice of some fifty options. A changed feature of the political climate in the country is the replacement of the horizontal division by a vertical polarization. Politics once provincially motivated are now speedily being nationalized, both in the area of party appeal being extended to the whole country and the programs that are framed in the interest of the entire population. This change of attitude of the leaders might well prove to be a happy augury for the future of democracy in Pakistan.

Despite the political upheaval and crises, Pakistan has made great economic progress. World Bank economist Shahid Javed Burki, notes that Pakistan's per capital income is \$390, which is close to the standard of \$440, the World Bank's dividing line of low income and low middle income countries. He expects that within the next five years Pakistan will cross that line and "join the ranks of middle income nations."⁸

Pakistan's greatest problem in the 1980s has been Afghanistan and the more than three million refugees in Pakistan. The United States, The Soviet Union, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed an Accord at Geneva on April 14, 1988, under which the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and ultimately normal conditions will prevail. But there are still many hurdles to cross. Pakistan has to continue seeking aid from friends especially the

United States for its defense. This is bound to affect its development program and cramp its ability to move independently in many international fields. Yet it has shown its independence in certain matters, e.f., pursuit of its nuclear program for peaceful purposes despite pressure from the United States and India. Pakistan, also will continue to play a prominent role in the Islamic Conference, where a Pakistani has been Secretary General, in the United Nations, and in the Non-Aligned Movement.

Pakistan is strategically too important for the world to ignore and strong enough to stand by its principles, but some of its programs and policies are misunderstood. Scholars, the western media, governments and people of the western world especially, have suspicions and doubts about Islamization, Pakistan's nuclear program, and even about the democratic future of the government.

NOTES

1. Syed Sharif-ud-Din Pirzada on the Radcliffe Award in *The Partition of the Punjab, 1947* (Lahore, National Documentation Centre, 1983), Vol. I. pp. VII-XI.
2. Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1950). *Speeches as Governor General, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah*, Speech at Dhaka, March 19, 1949.
3. Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).
4. Khalid Bin Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
5. Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era*, (Syracuse University Press, 1971), Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

6. *Pakistan Affairs*, Washington, 38:5, March 1, 1985, p.1.
7. *New York Times*, April 12, 1986.
8. *The Muslim*, Islamabad, July 9, 1985.

2

Pakistan's foreign policy: limited options

Craig Baxter

----"India and Pakistan defuse tensions, but distrust remains," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 6, 1987.

_____"U.S. Objects to Pakistan's N-plan," *Dawn Overseas Weekly*, February 26, 1987.

_____"Afghan jets kill 51 in Pakistan," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, March 24, 1987.

_____"Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb; India's Options," Cover of *India Today*, March 31, 1987.

These headlines in early 1987 highlight some of the concerns which confront foreign policy makers in Pakistan. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is, and has been, indeed in a pincers between unfriendly India and unfriendly Afghanistan. The former since 1971 has been a formal ally of the Soviet Union and since the early sixties has utilized Moscow as its principal arms supplier; the latter since the coup of 1978 and especially since the invasion of 1979 has had its government firmly in the control of the Soviet Union. Pakistani planners must also be concerned that turmoil could erupt in Iran and that this could result in increased Soviet influence in that neighbour, a country with which Pakistan has traditionally enjoyed close relations especially during the time of the Shah but continuing under Khomeini's regime.

Pakistanis engaged in the formulation of foreign policy thus are now, and may be further, limited in choices of

partners in the international relations game. The obvious option, for reasons which will be detailed later, is the United States, but this could be obviated if progress toward a nuclear weapon capability continues and leads to possession of a nuclear device. China's poor relations with India (and other factors) have resulted in a close Sino-Pakistan relationship, but there are occasional signs of a rapprochement between New Delhi and Beijing. Islamic and geographic ties have given Pakistan military and economic benefits from some countries of the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia. Pakistanis may now wish for more normal relations with the Soviet Union, as they had during Ayub Khan's regime in the sixties, but it will be difficult in present conditions to move ties to a level that will have practical benefits for Pakistan given the Soviets' close and long-term relations with India.

Pakistan's Interests

It goes without saying that the primary interest of any nation is its own survival within its current boundaries - a goal which Pakistan was unable to attain as in 1971 it became the only country since World War II to be divided through a civil war, one in which the secessionists were openly and directly aided and abetted by India. Beyond mere survival, however, Pakistan has a number of additional goals to which it has devoted its energy. Its primary interest must be to live peacefully, even if not amicably, with its eastern neighbour, India. A second interest is to find a means by which, at a minimum, Soviet troops are withdrawn from its western neighbour, Afghanistan; a step coupled, if possible, with a return of that country to some semblance of non-alignment. Pakistan also has an interest in maintaining and improving its defense capability, for which it must rely on the United States, China, and, for financial assistance, Saudi Arabia. It must also secure economic assistance to sustain a quite creditable development record; this requires acceptable relations with the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the international lending agencies and the oil-rich Middle

Eastern nations. The Middle East also is important to Pakistan for the markets for both goods and labor the area represents and the religious association with these nations and throughout the Islamic world. Finally, Pakistan has a more generalized interest in enhancing its reputation in the community of nations; examples in this category could include greater attention to human rights and participatory government and a sharp decrease in its reputation as a major international source for narcotics.

The Tools of Foreign Policy

Before examining these interests in more detail, note must be taken of the tools with which Pakistan can work in the field of foreign relations. Pakistan is not by any means an inconsiderable country, even though it often suffers in comparison with its huge neighbour, India. In economic terms, it is now on the threshold of breaking out of the low-income category (as measured by the World Bank) as its gross national product per capita per annum approaches \$400¹ (although some recent studies suggest that this figure may be overstated). A caveat is necessary in interpreting the data in that a significant proportion of this amount is the product of remittances from migrant workers, a benefit which seems to be headed downward as oil prices remain low. Pakistan also has been able to overcome chronic cereal deficits and now is able to export wheat and rice; the permanence of this is not ensured, but the frequent requirement for large purchases or grants of cereals from overseas seems to be a thing of the past. Overall the economy has grown at rates of the order of 6%,² providing a strong underpinning for many basic needs, although the country has been notably backward in such social services as education and health delivery³ and faces a potentially serious energy shortage.

Pakistan has been able to play its dual role of being a part of South Asia and Southwest Asia with some skill. As will be discussed below, it has been an active and useful member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and, after some initial reluctance, has played an

important role in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).⁴ It has also achieved membership, despite Indian objections, in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and participated in such associated groups as the Group of Seventy. All of this is to say that Pakistan has developed diplomatic skills with which to enhance its positions on many issues and in many fora. This was not always the case, in this writer's opinion. He can recall, for example, many instances of Pakistani reactions to Indian presentations at conferences which did no credit to the reactor or his cause.

In what is perhaps the most usual measure of power, military strength, Pakistan cannot match (or, expect to match) the strength of its historic rival, India.⁵ Even with the present modernization, which is actually minimal, probably the best Pakistan can hope for is a force which will either serve as a deterrent (with or without nuclear weapons) to any Indian adventure in the sense that India's costs would be greater than any possible gain or that with regard to both India and the Soviet Union that Pakistan could hold out for the time necessary to mobilize international activity to halt the fighting (as happened in 1965, although in that case Pakistan initiated the hostilities). There is no prospect that Pakistan could again initiate conflict and expect to be anything other than the loser. (To put it more concretely: Kashmir is divided and will remain so despite the rhetoric of both India and Pakistan.) To overcome these security shortfalls, Pakistan cannot count on either U.S. or Chinese support; diplomatic activity and the current (or somewhat improved) level of armament are the items on which Pakistan must depend. (The nuclear option will be touched on later).

Another measure of power, one which is less exact in its quantification, is the unity of the country. Here Pakistan has not done, and is not doing, well. That the country has failed in nation-building is evidenced both by the separation of Bangladesh and by the disaffection of Sindhis, Pathans and Baluch. Although the current leadership seems not to recognize it, Islam as a unifying force has been tried and found wanting. It was once said, only partly in jest, that

east and west wings of united Pakistan were held together by Islam, fear of India and Pakistan International Airlines. Each may be a factor in the reasonably cordial relations today between Pakistan and Bangladesh, but they were not a sufficiently strong cement to keep the country unified. A great danger in the present antagonism among the provinces (and, if one prefers, also the "fifth nationality," the *muhajirs* [refugees from India]) is the ability of outside powers to exploit grievances and further to weaken the fabric of Pakistan. While this writer finds some of the dire predications regarding, say, Baluchistan exaggerated, the danger is surely there.⁶ For example, as Soviet proposals on ending the Afghan conflict are being discussed, groups in the Frontier are reviving earlier pro-Soviet positions. India has been accused of a direct role in disturbances in Sind; this may well not be true, but the then Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi, did express sympathy with the Sindhis.

India

As mentioned earlier, the first priority in foreign relations for Pakistan must be to live peacefully, but not subserviently, with India. The two countries have been at loggerheads continuously since August 1947 and before if one considers also the conflict between the Congress and the Muslim League on their visions of what India would be after the withdrawal of the British. The conflict after independence has resulted in three wars, in 1948, 1965, and 1971, as well as a "skirmish" in 1965 over the Rann of Kutch.⁷ In each case, Pakistan has failed to attain its objectives: Kashmir in 1948 and 1965 and the continued unity of Pakistan in 1971. It is interesting to note, however, that on the issue which has the greatest practical effect on present Pakistan, the division of the Indus waters, the settlement came about without armed conflict and with international mediation.⁸ Perhaps there is a lesson to be learnt from this as we look at the present areas of conflict between the two original successor states to the British Raj.

Most Pakistanis probably would identify Kashmir as the principal point of contention between India and Pakistan;

many, but not all, Indians might also do so. It seems, however, that Kashmir is an issue which is not only dead from the point of view of real politics, but also is an issue which has little to do with the development of either country (nor, for that matter, does the Chinese "occupation" of the frozen wastes of the Aksai Chin in northern Kashmir affect Indian development). Pakistan's expenditure of effort and resources in 1965 gained it nothing, lost it considerably in terms of economic and military costs, and, perhaps most importantly, evoked no response from the Muslims on the Indian side of the then cease-fire line, who, Pakistanis were led to believe, were waiting with bated breath to rise against their Indian oppressors. As has been confirmed as recently as the March 1987 election, the Muslims of Kashmir give very little support to alleged "pro-Pakistani elements" (or to Muslim fundamentalists, often thought to be the same people) and a high degree of support to those parties which favor continuance of the present arrangement for the association of Kashmir with the Indian Union.

This is not to say that there is not some psychological hurt in Pakistan that the Muslims of Kashmir are not a part of the nation formed as a homeland for Indian Muslims. It is said that this is a denial of the two-nation theory. This theory, too, is realistically as out of date as the dinosaur. The two-nation theory died when a third of the Indian Muslims remained in India after 1947, and, if life had not been entirely extinguished then, it was by the departure of Bengali Muslims in 1971. Two points can be made: first, to reiterate an earlier point, Islam alone cannot be the basis of Pakistani nationalism; second, Kashmir is not a real issue between India and Pakistan and each country would be well advised to leave this blind alley and concentrate on issues which are of more current importance.

It is important to note in winding up a look at Kashmir that the present line of control was established by an agreement between the two countries (at Simla in 1972) although that agreement did follow armed conflict the year before. Also disputes over the use of waters arising in or passing through Kashmir (such as those of the Chenab) have been settled by negotiation as probably the current dispute

over the Wular Dam will be. Now if one could melt the Siachin Glacier (a place which must appear only on the maps of the foreign and defense ministries in Islamabad and New Delhi), another stumbling block would be out of the way.

There are other issues which could be settled or, at least ameliorated, by actions on each side. In many cases this might be accomplished simply by muzzling politicians and journalists, more required now on the Indian side than the Pakistani. In the past few years President Zia-ul-Haq and his government have taken a number of significant steps toward normalization of relations with India. He has visited India several times (most recently in "cricket diplomacy"),⁹ but, despite invitations, Rajiv Gandhi has not reciprocated.¹⁰ The gesture of a "no-war" pact may be simply that, a gesture, but India has responded only with a complicated proposal and now appears to have stymied negotiations toward an agreement. Pakistan has suggested a number of ways in which relations, not only between the governments but between the peoples, can be improved. Not all of these, of course, accord fully with Indian positions but negotiations toward a pact have been slowed. Meanwhile, statements, without proof, are broadcast of Pakistani interference in India, especially in the Punjab. The Pakistanis may well be aiding the Sikh terrorists, but this has not been clearly demonstrated. I am aware, however, of no statement by a responsible Pakistani leader that would indicate even verbal support for the position of the terrorists. This contrasts with the statements made about Sind by then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi.

Rajiv Gandhi and Zia-ul-Haq did join in an important statement in 1985, when they agreed not to attack each other's nuclear installations. It is not clear where in this paper the nuclear issue should be placed, but, as India is the country most immediately concerned about Pakistani nuclear developments (and Pakistan about Indian developments) this may be the best location.

If the recent reports of the interview between Abdul Qadir Khan, the head of Pakistan's nuclear program, and Kuldeep Nayar, an Indian journalist,¹¹ are correct, we have

been told that Pakistan now has a nuclear device of some sort. This changes the equation between India and Pakistan at the least and could have much wider ranging effects as well. India demonstrated in 1974 that it has a nuclear capability. The possession of this ability by each country does considerable damage to the goal of non-proliferation supported by the United States and the Soviet Union, but it need not necessarily add to the dangers to peace in the sub-continent and indeed may strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence (to borrow a term) in the area.

With these capabilities (assuming the Abdul Qadir Khan report to be correct), limited though they may be, both India and Pakistan face what the superpowers have faced since the early fifties: the risk of a conventional conflict escalating to a nuclear one. The superpowers, under the leadership of rational persons, have thus avoided lower level direct conflict: there have been no wars in which both Soviet and American troops have been involved directly. There is no indication that either Zia-ul-Haq or Rajiv Gandhi are irrational in their actions, although they (especially the latter) may be bombastic in speech (so, for that matter, have been Soviet and American leaders). It is argued here, then, that the possession of nuclear capabilities by each country could be a stabilizing factor between them as also between India and China. This question will again be touched upon in discussing Pakistan's defense requirements.

Now then, what are the real disputes between India and Pakistan? Once the big brother attitude of India is dispatched to the dustbin on the basis that "sticks and stones will break my bones, but names will never hurt me," there is really very little left. What is needed, beyond the psychological aspects and beyond the unsolvable Kashmir issue, is the opening up of channels of communication on such issues as trade, tourism, narcotics control and the like. There are differences of opinion between the two on these topics, but the differences are hardly insurmountable.

One forum for some of these discussions, which embraces more than the two countries, is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The areas in which SAARC is permitted to operate are limited, but

cooperation among the seven members in such matters as travel allow for broader statements of policy which in that context may be more acceptable to both India and Pakistan. It should not be forgotten that meetings of SAARC bodies, from the foreign secretary level to the summits, provide occasions for bilateral corridor talks between pairs of governments, as occurred between Prime Ministers Muhammad Khan Junejo and Rajiv Gandhi in 1986 at Bangalore.

Afghanistan

If Zia looks out his window at Army House in Rawalpindi in the direction opposite India, he sees what is a more clear and present danger to Pakistan: the Soviet army in neighbouring Afghanistan. The danger is both internal and external. The more than seven years war has resulted in about three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the use of Pakistani territory as a haven, source of supply and training location for the *mujahideen* struggling against the Soviets and its Kabul ally. The early welcome to Muslim brethren fleeing atheistic communism has long since been tempered and the refugees are now looked upon as a burden to Pakistan and its society and economy. The hospitality of Pakistan has drawn attacks on Pakistani soil by the Soviet-managed Afghan air force and there are reports, which are probably correct, that Kabul and Moscow have infiltrated terrorists and narcotics dealers under the guise of refugees. There is a strong interest in Pakistan, therefore, to settle the conflict and create conditions under which most, if not all, of the refugees will return. Pakistan has, of course, gained some benefits, not the least of which is the resumption of American military and economic assistance.

The Soviets have indicated that they are now finding the Afghan adventure a serious drain on their resources. Gorbachev's comments in Vladivostok and New Delhi have been followed by marginally more concrete proposals. These have been investigated by visits to Moscow by the foreign minister and the foreign secretary of Pakistan and in further discussions at the proximity talks in Geneva. It would appear

that the Pakistanis must follow up the Soviet initiative in an effort to reach some acceptable settlement or to call the Soviets' bluff.

There are many Pakistanis who believe that the United States would prefer that the struggle in Afghanistan continue to drain further Soviet resources and to keep the Soviet Union in a position of being condemned annually at the United Nations for its invasion of Afghanistan. One trusts that this is not the case (and assumes that it is not). Pakistan would be no less a "front-line state" (President Carter's gratuitous designation) facing a "Finlandized" Afghanistan than it is today.

Defense Needs

Commentators on the state of Pakistan's defense forces seem to agree that modernization is very much needed. The Pakistan military certainly holds this position. As the cost of modernization is beyond the means of Pakistan, it must seek assistance both in kind and in funding. The potential sources are limited to the United States, China and Saudi Arabia, although the bases on which aid from these countries can come differs. As these needs are largely for state of the art equipment the sources are all but reduced to one: the United States.

Pakistan's constituency in the United States is not strong. From the beginning, it has been looked upon by many in the United States as an anachronistic throw back to the days of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries when states were identified by religious and sectarian standards. The series of periods of martial law have not enamored Pakistan to Americans who see participatory democracy and enforcement of human rights as prerequisites for access to American assistance. Even when Pakistan opens its polity, as it has now, this is often looked upon as transitory and partial. The steady movement of Pakistan toward a nuclear capability, whether it has actually been reached or not, goes against the prevailing opposition to proliferation (many who so staunchly hold this position

seem conveniently to forget that India, not Pakistan, headed the march of South Asia to nuclear capability).

At this writing it is unclear whether a six-year renewal of the 1981 agreement with Pakistan for American military and economic assistance will be approved by the Congress. An additional waiver of the Symington amendment as it applies to Pakistan is mandatory if assistance is to be continued. The Reagan administration supports this. It would seem that with or without a nuclear device (preferably, without) and so long as the Soviets occupy or control Afghanistan the role of Pakistan as a limited partner to American interests remains; it is, therefore, in the interest of the United States to continue assistance and to continue diplomatic efforts to dissuade Pakistan from a nuclear weapons program and encourage it toward progress in democracy and in the area of human rights. By the same token, the task now for Pakistan is to use its diplomatic and information capabilities to convince the administration, the Congress and the American people of Pakistan's continued importance to the United States; with the Congress, there may well be very high hurdles to cross to achieve this.

While it is clear that the Zia-Junejo regime wishes to continue its relationship with the United States on terms that would allow Pakistan a maximum of flexibility, it seems that were the People's Party to come to power there would be no substantial change. Benazir Bhutto has been careful in recent months to convey the message that she too believes Pakistan needs the American connection.¹² Part of this may well be playing to the gallery, especially in the Congress, as she seeks to portray herself as Pakistan's Corazon Aquino but part is also her recognition of the limits placed on Pakistan in the foreign policy arena. An additional thought: she would be unlikely to discontinue the nuclear program begun by her father.

Middle East

The opposition of Pakistan and many of the Islamic countries to the Soviet action in Afghanistan is mutual. Interests in other areas also contribute to Pakistan's often

close relations with most of the countries of the Arab world. These include markets, especially in the Gulf, for Pakistan's products and labour, both civilian and military. These as well as Islamic ties contribute a basis for Saudi assistance in funding military purchases.

Pakistan began in earnest to develop markets in the Middle East after the loss of the markets of East Pakistan in 1971. The Zia regime has further developed relationships in the area building on the start during the Bhutto period. Although there has been a decline in the relative share of the market of the OIC countries (not all of them in the Middle East) in Pakistan's foreign trade from about 28% in 1975-76 to about 23% in 1984-85, the total value of this sector of trade has almost tripled (in current prices). The exports have been mainly in food, food products and light manufactured goods.¹³

With the rise in oil prices in the 1970s, the Gulf region in particular became a major area of employment for migrant Pakistani workers and a source for very substantial remittances. Pakistan received about \$2.5 billion in 1984 through official channels, compared with less than \$100 million in 1970. The decline in oil prices is expected to result in a significant decline in both opportunities for workers and their remittances, although contrary to the expected trend it has been reported that there was a slight rise in remittances in 1986.¹⁴ On the other hand, the return of workers has exacerbated the situation with regard to Afghan refugees as the refugees have occupied places in the work force now demanded by those returning.

The Pakistani military presence in the Middle East is substantial; Zia himself was once posted in Jordan. There have been formations and training groups in such countries as Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Benefits to Pakistan include arming and provisioning of troops, opportunities for officers and men to earn higher wages and remittances from those posted abroad. It is doubtful, however, that this commitment can be translated to a commitment to defend the Gulf region should there be an attack from outside the area, whether this be from the Soviets (or their surrogates) or from a widening of the Iran-

Iraq war. Pakistan tries to maintain close relations with both Iraq and Iran.¹⁵

Pakistan has also been an active member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and was host to an Islamic summit meeting in Lahore in 1974. It also served as host to a meeting of foreign ministers in 1980 in Islamabad when the OIC condemnation of the Soviet action in Afghanistan was adopted. At the Casablanca summit in 1984 Zia reminded the Arab members that the organization was one for the entire *umma* and not solely for Arab causes and recommended the read mission of Iran and Egypt to the group.

Islam

Ties beyond economic, security and social bring Pakistan close to the Middle East. In the OIC and elsewhere Pakistan has drawn on Islam to extend relations with other Muslim states. From the Arab point of view, Pakistan has regularly said the right things about Israel and Jerusalem especially during the Bhutto and Zia periods; the seeming indifference of Suhrawardy to the plight of Egypt during the 1956 war has long since changed. In fact, Zia was able to enlist the assistance of Hosni Mubarak during the 1987 Kuwait summit by having Mubarak telephone Rajiv Gandhi to urge a mutual withdrawal of forces by India and Pakistan during the most recent border sabre-rattling by the two countries in late 1986.

Zia's Islamization program has been viewed favourably by Saudi Arabia in particular and this has aided the close ties between the two countries. As a general statement, it may be said that Pakistan has closer relations with other Muslim countries whose political systems are "Islamic" than with those whose systems tend in the direction of secularism, for example Syria and Iraq.

Reputation

Finally, Pakistan has an interest in enhancing its international reputation. Some of the difficulties with

American opinion have already been mentioned. The nadir of Pakistan's reputation probably occurred during the Bangladesh civil war, but the excesses of the Bhutto period were also great, although to a degree overshadowed in the international press by their coincidence with the state of emergency in India. At this writing, Pakistan displays a vastly improved level of openness which might well be modestly exploited abroad. For example, the unobtrusive inclusion of opposition press opinion in embassy newsletters might be a step in this direction.

Pakistan is not operating a democratic form of government which can be favourably compared to a New England town meeting. But it does have an elected parliament, elected by an exercise of the franchise by a share of the voters which slightly exceeded that in Pakistan's only other free National election in 1970. The opposition boycott did not work.¹⁶ Ultimate control by the military remains, but there is a hope that a fully civilian and widely representative government can emerge from the present mixed system.

The question of narcotics is a serious one in relations with the United States and with some other countries. Pakistan has become a principal source or conduit for much of the opium-derived drugs which reach the West. After a period of decline, poppy production increased in 1986. The heroin problem is no longer one of supply to outside markets but has clearly become one for Pakistan internally. Pakistan needs outside assistance in eradicating poppy growing, but it also needs to take firmer action itself. This is not easy; the resistance in the Frontier and the tribal areas has already been shown to be strong and, at times, violent.

Conclusion

Pakistan, like all countries, has many interests and many problems in the international arena. It faces more limitations on its freedom of action than most. Politically and in the security area the major problems are with immediate neighbours, India and Afghanistan. It is suggested here that the real problems with India are few and

are susceptible to solution through negotiation taking place in a climate where the bombastic views of every minor league politician and the big league ones, as well -- need not be taken into account. This will not be an easy course; one does not expect an immediate end to hostility and the setting up of an American-Canadian or French-German relationship soon. Pakistan has taken the boulder steps. It should continue and India should be expected to reciprocate.

Afghanistan is more difficult, although a settlement of sorts could come long before India and Pakistan lie down like the Biblical lion and lamb. Pakistan must pursue to a conclusion, whatever it may be, the Soviet initiative and it has the right to expect American support along the way. This will not alter Pakistan's strategic position, an area in which American, Saudi, Chinese and other support should be sought.

The options for Pakistan in pursuit of its foreign policy goals are severely limited. It cannot achieve credible security on its own. Its choices of partners are few. It has survived even in spite of its own blunders (as in 1965) and in many ways has thrived. It will need continued support from the United States and others if it to live and grow.

NOTES

1. *World Development Report*, 1987 (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1988), p. 202 (Table 1).
2. *Economic Survey, 1985-86* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Adviser's Wing, 1986), p.23.
3. See, for example, Shahid Javed Burki, "A Charter of Economic Rights and Duties," *The Nation* (Lahore), December 4, 1987.

4. The April 1985 issue (XXX:4) of *Asian Survey* contains a number of articles on SAARC. Among these, see, in particular, Mohammad Ayoob, "The Primacy of the Political: South Asian Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Perspective." The group was originally named South Asian Regional Cooperation (SAARC) before the current name (adding the word "association") was adopted.
5. See Jerrold F. Elkin and W. Andrew Ritezal, "The Indo-Pakistan Military Balance," *Asian Survey*, 26:5 (May 1986).
6. An example is Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981).
7. See Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistan Conflicts Since 1947* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).
8. The most comprehensive study is Aloys A. Michel, *The Indus Waters: a Study of the Effect of Partition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).
9. See the vivid description of the visit to Jaipur in *India Today*, March 15, 1987.
10. Gandhi did pay a brief condolence visit to Peshawar following the death of Adul Ghaffar Khan in January, 1988.
11. See *India Today*, March 31, 1987.
12. See, for example, her interview with *The Christian Science Monitor*, published May 31, 1988.

13. Derived from tables in *Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1986* (Islamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1986, p. 462 ff.
14. *World Development Report*, op. cit., p. 230 (Table 15).
15. See my chapters "Pakistan and the Gulf," in Thomas Naff, ed., *Gulf Security and the Iran-Iraq War* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985), chapter 5, and "The Role of Pakistan in Southwest Asia in the 1990s," in Thomas Naff and Phebe Marr, eds., *U.S. Strategic Interests in Southwest Asia in the 1990s* (Washington: National Defense University Press, forthcoming). In December 1987, Saudi Arabia announced that Pakistani troops would be withdrawn.
16. See the conclusion by the editor in Craig Baxter, ed., *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in Frontline State* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1985), p. 114.

3

Pakistan and the superpowers

Leo E. Rose

The 1970s were a difficult decade for Pakistan's international relations as its foreign policy literally disintegrated in the painful aftermath of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. The trilateral policy, President Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan introduced as the basic operating principle of Pakistan's foreign policy in the mid 1960s had sought to use the U.S., USSR and China as support forces or, at least, to neutralize their role in South Asia, but it did not survive the 1971 disaster. The American security relationship had lost of its rationale by 1972 given the failure of the U.S. to respond to Pakistan's needs in 1965 and 1971 and Pakistan's pro-China position on the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1965 Vietnam War. Both sides found it convenient to maintain the pretence, if not the substance of the alliance relationship until 1979, but then the developments in Iran and the preoccupation of the Carter administration with non-strategic issues led to its formal demise. Pakistan's post-1965 war efforts to seek an accommodation with Moscow that would neutralize the USSR as a factor in South Asian geopolitics collapsed, temporarily in 1971, and then far more dangerously in 1979. China's support of Pakistan in South and Southwest Asia continued through the 1970s, but the limits of Beijing's capacities to provide effective assistance in periods of crises had been clearly demonstrated in 1965 and 1971.

But while the 1970s were a traumatic period in Pakistan's Foreign Policy, the integrity of the new bifurcated

national system that emerged in 1972 was not seriously threatened. There were various sources of internal dissension, but probably less interest among external powers to support and manipulate these dissident forces than in the pre-1971 period. It would appear that both the Soviets and Indians reduced their aid to the Pathan and Baluchi "separatists", as neither state found it necessary or expedient to continue to apply this kind of pressure upon Pakistan. India had achieved what it perceived to be dominant position in the Subcontinent through the 1971 war, and New Delhi seemed to have concluded that this was a propitious time to reach agreements with Pakistan on a broad range of issues. Moscow was more interested in an accommodation with Pakistan than in undermining the regime in office--either Bhutto or Zia--or destabilizing the polity. Both the U.S. and China maintained a formal relationship with Pakistan, but Islamabad was not a significant factor in key foreign policy issues in either country through the 1970s.¹

The 1970s ended, however, with a series of developments in Southwest Asia, Iran, Afghanistan and, more specifically, with respect to Soviet and American policy toward this highly strategic area that complicated foreign and security policy issues for Islamabad. Pakistan had survived the 1972-78 period without a well-coordinated foreign and security policy toward the superpowers since one had not been deemed necessary in view of their reduced interest in the India-dominated Subcontinent after the 1971 War. This was no longer possible in the 1980s with the new and potentially dangerous developments in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf area.

In 1980-81 the Pakistan Government inaugurated a careful and thorough review of its foreign policy options under the novel circumstances then prevailing, but avoided making a hasty decision on the overtures that came from various sources - the U.S., India, and the USSR. By mid-1981, Islamabad had made several decisions based on pragmatic considerations that served its vital interests and assured Pakistan the widest *possible* external support that its difficult and threatening geopolitical situation allowed. It was not an emotionally satisfying policy for some elements

in the Pakistan political elite for it revived the close relationship on security issues with the United States -- a favourite target of Pakistani denunciations in the 1970s because of the alleged lack of credibility of U.S. security commitments. But with the limited options available in the context of Soviet aggression against the neighbouring Islamic Society in Afghanistan, there appeared to be a clear understanding within the broader Pakistani public that this was the policy that best served Pakistani perceptions of their interests and needs. In any case, on balance, Pakistan's record in the conduct of its relations with the superpowers in the 1981-86 period was impressive⁸ given its limited capacity to exercise a significant influence on the course of events in adjacent areas.

By 1987, however, Pakistan's geopolitics were changing in significant ways - or at least that appeared to be the perception of a large and growing proportion of the Pakistani "foreign policy elite". It is widely assumed in Pakistan that more policy options are now coming open, and deserve serious consideration. Moreover, the need to revise and expand Pakistan's Foreign Policy is seen as necessary and feasible because of both internal and international developments. It is important to note that these views do not *necessarily* constitute a rejection of current policies, but rather the perception that some other things are possible now which a few years ago seemed implausible.

In any case, every fundamental feature of Pakistani Foreign Policy is now up for reconsideration. This process is being undertaken quietly and informally in most instances, and accompanied by reassertions of the operating principles of the present foreign policy by officials at the higher levels of government. What I will try to do in this paper is examine some of the themes of enquiry underway in Pakistan on relations with the superpowers and project some of the alternative policies available -- as expressed by Pakistanis of various political persuasions and in different positions in the governmental and political system of Pakistan.

The "Accommodate The Soviets" Issue

While there has long been a small and rather insignificant element in Pakistan's political public arguing for a foreign policy titled toward the USSR, it had virtually disappeared in the 1970s in the emotive aftermath of the 1971 Bangladesh War. In the 1980s, however, it re-emerged on a much broader political basis, arguing essentially for an "accommodation" with the Soviet Union on the Afghanistan issue in the place of (1) the "American connection" supportive of the Afghan Resistance or (2) an accommodation with India on New Delhi's terms for a South Asian regional system. While there is little evidence that the "accommodate the Soviets" groups had broad popular support -- quite the contrary indeed -- they did have ready access to the foreign media through their Soviet, Indian and Western sources. They constituted a minor problem for the Pakistan government, but not a serious threat on policy issues.²

Several developments over the past year, however, have substantially expanded the support base of the "accommodate the Soviets" faction in Pakistan's political elite. The most important are:

- i) the gradual "normalization" of Sino-Soviet relations;
- ii) the Soviet Union's more sophisticated policies in and around the Afghanistan issue under Gorbachev -- e.g., the cease-fire and national reconciliation offer in January 1987; and;
- iii) domestic upheavals in Pakistan having their source in the Afghan War. These present both opportunities capable of exploitation and potential complications for Pakistan, and selecting the proper response has not been easy.³

The normalization process underway in Sino-Soviet relations has caused some concern in Pakistan for it raises serious questions on Sino-Pakistani relations as well. It has

been an unquestioned axiom of Pakistan Foreign Policy that it could depend upon China in any dispute with the Soviets over Afghanistan or with India. But now there are even some doubts about Beijing's reliability, and the suspicion that China might be prepared to sacrifice Afghanistan (and Pakistan?) in exchange for Soviet concessions on the more important -- to China -- "three obstructions" to improved Sino-Soviet relations. Islamabad welcomed the rather caustic language Beijing used to describe the withdrawal of a small proportion of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in the Fall of 1986. But the Pakistanis also noted the much more ambivalent initial Chinese response to the "cease-fire" offer from the Soviets and the Republic of Afghanistan in early 1987 -- although presumably they have also noted that Beijing's comments on this subject had become harsher by March 1987.⁴

China's support of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy is a decided advantage to the Government of Pakistan in domestic political terms. Pakistani critics of Islamabad's Afghanistan policy invariably identify it as an "American policy", ignoring the PRC's earlier support role and more hard-line position on the Afghan resistance movement or, indeed, the fact that Pakistan had assumed a critical position on Afghanistan before the U.S. and at a time -- during the Carter Administration -- when Washington's response could not be predicted. But it is not good politics for the critics to identify the Pakistan's Government policy as "China's policy" or "Pakistan's policy". The PRC is carefully kept out of this debate by the critics of the policy while the government uses every opportunity -- e.g., visiting Chinese dignitaries -- to note the similarity in the Chinese and Pakistani positions. A basic change in Beijing's Afghanistan policy, thus, would be a serious complication for the Pakistan Government and a great boon to its domestic critics.

There are, however, some positive aspects to the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, potentially at least, for Pakistan and these are noted in Islamabad. There is, of course, the possibility that the Soviets may finally give *serious* consideration to a compromise political solution in Afghanistan as part of the fallout of its broad range of

negotiations with the PRC. The notably more friendly and open Soviet attitude toward Pakistan in early 1987 can be interpreted, in part at least, as a consequence of Gorbachev's "new" China (and Asian) policy. The comparatively equivocal position that Gorbachev took on India's disputes with China and Pakistan during the Soviet leader's "grand tour" of New Delhi in November 1986 was one welcome indication to Islamabad of a more balanced position by the USSR on South Asian issues.⁵ When this is combined with Beijing's somewhat more hard-line position in 1987 on its own disputes with India, the trend in major power politics in South Asia appeared to become more favourable to Pakistan than at any time since Ayub Khan's "trilateral policy" was flying reasonably high in the 1960s. Moscow, Beijing and Washington are all openly solicitous of Pakistan's cooperation in the highly volatile politics of the South Asian-Central Asian border areas, though there are, presumably, strict limitations on what they would be prepared to concede to Islamabad in exchange.

Pakistan, like India, had benefited from the hostile Sino-Soviet relationship by soliciting and obtaining external support for its regional policies. In contrast to India, however, it is possible that Pakistan may also benefit from the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. But this will require some policy responses on Pakistan's part or at least an open attitude toward the recent Soviet overtures. And Islamabad's responses to Moscow's overtures have been careful but positive. As the Pakistanis state it, they are prepared to test Soviet *bona fides* on Afghanistan. But until and unless the Soviets prove amenable to a real compromise on a political settlement, Pakistan will maintain its Afghanistan policy intact. If Moscow should be ready for a settlement, however, obviously Pakistan will have to be ready to move as well.

It is, of course, encouraging to Pakistanis that Soviet leaders are now admitting, in public, that their intervention in Afghanistan was a mistake - something they did only in private and in less than precise language earlier. Moscow has indicated an interest in getting out of Afghanistan if "reasonable" terms can be arranged, and the Soviets have

argued that Pakistan should help them do so. The two governments have been in what amounts to an ongoing process of discussion and negotiation on Afghanistan in 1987, with some progress reported though no broad basis for agreement as yet. The renewal of Soviet (Afghan) bombings of Pakistani border areas has been discouraging, but then Pakistan is very familiar with the rather blunt way in which Moscow uses "carrot and stick" tactics to press its foreign policy objectives in Asia. Islamabad is not likely to be either intimidated into accepting Soviet terms or dissuaded from continuing the negotiation process with the Soviets by such tactics.

Improvements in Soviet-Pakistani relations are also seen to have positive aspects for Pakistan on a range of issues because:

- i) it may encourage the Soviets to assume a more equitable and nonpartisan position on Indo-Pakistani disputes; and
- ii) it may limit the scope for Soviet interference, overt and covert, in Pakistani politics through support of such regional and ethnic leaders as Khan Abdul Wali Khan and the Pathan-Baluchi-Sindhi coalition. Pakistan will give top priority to the complex task of establishing a viable national political system over the next few years. Islamabad's foreign policy objectives, thus, will be directed toward reducing external factors in the internal political processes, and this will have an impact on its policies toward the USSR, U.S., Afghanistan and India.

The "American Connection"

An apparent corollary of any substantial improvement in Pakistan-Soviet relations would require avoiding any major expansions in Pakistan's "American Connection". This is not too serious a problem for Islamabad as neither Pakistan nor the U.S. would appear to be pressing for any substantial changes in their current "limited alignment" relationship.

The real question for the Government of Pakistan, therefore, is whether the current relationship with the U.S. should be retained and at what level. And there are certainly some persuasive arguments for the retention of the relationship with the U.S. on its present terms for much of the Pakistani political elite.

One obvious plus factor for the "American Connection" are the uncertainties Pakistanis face in their emerging relations with the Soviet Union, India and China, and the felt need to retain other options. At this stage, at least, Pakistan could retain its U.S. relationship on the present somewhat ambiguous terms without necessarily complicating its dialogues with Moscow and New Delhi. And it would make little sense to many Pakistanis to give up something that has proved as useful politically and economically as the "American Connection" for a more precisely "nonaligned" but more vulnerable position on security issues. At this point, Pakistan does not necessarily have to give up the U.S. "connection" in order to expand ties with other connections - the USSR and India.

There is also, of course, the importance of economic factors in Pakistan's foreign and domestic policies, and this is liable to increase over the next few years. The Soviets have been offering Pakistan economic assistance for some time now as part of its overtures to Islamabad on Afghanistan, while India has been pushing for a substantial expansion of economic relations between the two South Asian states since the late 1970s. While both could be useful, neither would replace the role that U.S. bilateral aid plays in Pakistan's economic and social policy and, more importantly perhaps, the vital role of the U.S. in access to various multilateral aid sources. Furthermore, too hasty and egocentric an expansion of ties with the Soviet Union that paid no attention to the interests of the Afghan Muslims, if combined with a decline in Pakistan-U.S. relations, might have a negative effect on the still very important economic benefits Pakistan derives from its widely varied security and economic relations with various West Asian states. In this broader policy perspective, the U.S. is probably more important to Pakistan's economic well-being in 1987 than at any time since the mid-1960s.

There are, thus, strong and probably effectively persuasive arguments against Pakistan doing anything at this time that might complicate relations with the United States. But this should not disguise the strong doubts held by most Pakistanis, including some in the Government, about the reliability of the U.S. in any crisis situation.⁶ There are the usual embarrassments that Pakistanis feel about being too closely aligned with the United States on such issues as the Arab-Israeli disputes, Libya, Central America, and probably Iran and Lebanon. But the Pakistanis can live with these by making periodic symbolic gestures that do not really affect relations with the United States.

More critical are Pakistani doubts about the U.S. response to external aggression against Pakistan from *either* the east or west. Pakistanis cite the non-response of the U.S. in the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani Wars as proof of American unreliability. But when pushed on these issues, some Pakistanis also refer to the U.S. abandonment of its South Vietnamese allies in 1975 against a communist enemy as indicative of an American failure to uphold commitments. We can presume that the Pakistanis are projecting that the Reagan administration will display the same kind of weakness and incapacity to act during the remainder of its term due to the fallout from the "Iran-Contra Affair" that deterred the Ford administration from fulfilling its obligations to South Vietnam in 1975 because of the fallout from Watergate.

The basic theme in Pakistan, thus, even from those supportive of the "American Connection", is that they appreciate having U.S. commitments on security issues but they could never feel any sense of assurance that Washington would honor its obligations in a crunch.

We are in the midst of one of those periods in the U.S. when some Congressional leaders, who tend to see the complex world of international relations in single-issue terms, are once again in a position to exert a substantial influence on U.S. policy on critical issues. Unfortunately, this is also the time when the basis of the U.S.- Pakistan security relationship -- the military sales and economic aid programs -- are again up for consideration. It is predictable that, even

without the Iran-Contra affair's imposition of serious limitations on the capacity of the administration to make difficult foreign policy decisions, the usual gamut of Congressmen and Senators who place the highest priority on the nuclear nonproliferation issue will demand the termination of the U.S. military and economic aid program to Pakistan if Islamabad does not comply with American terms on nuclear programs. They are not bothered by ideological contradictions: if the Afghan people have to live under a Soviet-imposed dictatorship in order to preserve the pretence of maintaining the principles of nuclear nonproliferation in Pakistan, than they would have it so. They are even less concerned that the fragile democratization process in Pakistan would face great difficulty in surviving the termination of its security relationship with the United States because of the termination of American military and economic aid on the nuclear issue.

There is a tendency to misread Washington's capability to influence, much less dictate, terms to states that are on the front-line strategically, very vulnerable to external intervention, and uncertain about the reliability of external sources of support. In my view, Pakistan's position on the nuclear weapons question is quite clear even if public statements by a variety of Pakistani officials are not. Given the strong Pakistani perceptions of the unreliability of external sources of support--primarily, but not only the United States--Pakistan is determined to do what the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, Britain, France and India did before them under similar circumstances -- develop a nuclear capacity. Islamabad would probably prefer to follow India's example and refrain from the actual production of a nuclear weapon once it has the capacity if the current security relationships with the U.S. and China have not changed significantly. But it intends to be ready and able to "go nuclear" if and when, as in the past in the Pakistani perception, the sources of external support do not fulfill Pakistan's security requirements.⁷

The standard line among the nonproliferation crowd in Washington is that the effort by the Reagan Administration to use economic and military aid to dissuade Islamabad from

going nuclear has failed.⁸ They argue that the rules of the game a la the Symington Amendment should be strictly applied to force Pakistan to exercise restraint or punish it if it does not. The mindset of this group is the immediate post-World War II period when, for a while, aid was vital and the U.S. was the only source available. Very conveniently, they choose to ignore the failure of President Carter's efforts in 1979 to force Pakistan to halt its nuclear program by cutting off both economic and military aid at a time when the international situation around Pakistan was deteriorating seriously and there were fewer policy options available to Islamabad than there are in 1987. It is safe to presume that the Pakistan public will not allow *any* Pakistan government to submit to U.S. pressure on this issue, and that the major opposition leaders, including Benazir Bhutto, support the Government on this issue. Islamabad would prefer to keep its economic and security relationship with the U.S. intact as this is very important to Pakistan. But it would have no alternative but to sacrifice the relationship if the dominant group within the American political system should try to impose terms that are unacceptable to the vast majority of the Pakistani public.⁹

On the other hand, if such issues are not allowed to intrude into the sphere of U.S. - Pakistani relations, it is doubtful that any *feasible* Pakistani Government would seriously consider changing the basic terms of the U.S. relationship, no matter how controversial the issue becomes in domestic political debates in Pakistan. After all, the U.S. - Pakistan "alliance" has been constructed on Pakistani terms essentially and indeed the minimum Pakistani terms in most respects. This is understood in Pakistan, even by some of the opposition political leaders who have used -- or rather misused -- the "American Connection" as the focal point of their public critiques of the Zia/Junejo government. What is more likely is that the "American Connection" will become just one of several Pakistan - major power relationships that are treated on a balanced basis by a more assertively nonaligned Pakistan. In such circumstances, some of the more informal ad hoc concessions the U.S. has obtained from Pakistan on a more non-formalized basis may

disappear, but the basic terms of the security relationship will continue as it serves the interests of both states and is the product of joint consultation and agreement.

Pakistan and the Afghanistan Trap

While the troubled relationship with India may sometimes get more attention in Pakistan, there can be little doubt that it is the highly volatile war in Afghanistan that is the most critical and threatening issue today. Pakistanis of all political persuasions dislike admitting this, as it would require that they *publicly* direct their security policy to the northwest rather than to the east, as well as avoid playing silly but provocative little games that make no sense for either Pakistan or India. But some of the more sensible and well-informed Pakistanis will admit that their primary security concerns these days are on the western border, even in the context of the "Greatest Show on Earth" moves and counter moves by the Indian and Pakistani military forces in early 1987. These Pakistanis now understand that Indian security and regional objectives would not be served by the defeat and subsequent disintegration of Pakistan, and that this is a powerful inhibition to any major Indian military action against Pakistan. The Indian bureaucratic foreign policy Establishment, meanwhile, does understand that India's regional objectives are served by the programs under which the Resistance in Afghanistan is assisted, no matter how much they may bewail some aspects of the Afghan War in their public declarations.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the official Pakistani response to the January 1987 cease-fire declaration in Afghanistan differed in some respects from that of the U.S., China, and the Afghan Resistance. Islamabad did not accept the cease-fire as reflecting a basic change in Soviet policy in Afghanistan, but nevertheless it preferred to wait and see what actually happened before responding. It is now clear that the Soviets were preparing major offensive actions before and during the first phase of the cease-fire, and it is not being unfair or unduly harsh to

suggest that this whole episode was yet another public relations farce. But perhaps not just that.

What should be noted is that Pakistan, while withholding judgment on the cease-fire proposal, made it clear that its support of the Afghan Resistance would continue. This was done, despite the fact that the price paid domestically for the Pakistan Government's support of the resistance has risen considerably over the past year. While only a small, if highly vocal, section of the Pakistani elite has been prepared to endorse a sellout of the Afghan[†] resistance, a growing number of ethnic, regional, and social subunit political factions has begun to see considerable merit in a political settlement that will lead to the return of most Afghani refugees to Afghanistan. This more comprehensive amalgam of political elites crosses all political boundaries, and includes some Pakistanis that have been sympathetic generally to the Afghan Resistance. They insist upon a political settlement that is not a total acceptance of Soviet terms, but they might be inclined to accept almost anything that will pass as a compromise solution, get the Soviets out of Afghanistan and the Afghan refugees out of Pakistan.

There are a number of factors that have made this more broadly-based Pakistani elite more receptive to a Soviet-defined compromise settlement. An important one, of course, has been the explosive ethnic communal riots in Karachi around the end of 1986 and throughout 1987 in which Pathans from both sides of the border are reportedly involved, and in a variety of politically-related capacities. The *only real* solution, some argue, is an Afghanistan settlement that will, hopefully remove one of the combatants from this ethnic strife in Pakistan.¹⁰

There are also the curious and, indeed, almost ideologically contradictory positions taken recently by some Muslim fundamentalist "leftists" -- mainly, but not exclusively pro-Iranian Shi'ites -- e.f., the Islamabad daily, *The Muslim*. Their propensity for giving priority to "anti-American" rather than "pro-Islamic" criteria in their commentaries on Afghanistan may be an indication of massive confusion on their part, but it does set the line for one section of the Shi'a community's political elite in Pakistan. On the broader

international Islamic front, there would appear to be few, if any tangible payoffs to Pakistan from the Islamic international community for Islamabad's expensive support of the Afghan Resistance. Most of the Islamic states vote at OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) meetings for resolutions lauding Pakistan for its noble stand on Afghanistan, but then coincide this with other unilateral actions that, in effect, reward the Soviet Union for its involvement in the complex politics of West and Southwest Asia.

There would appear to be fewer and fewer benefits for Pakistan's forthright but, in the views of an increasing number of Pakistanis, too expensive policies supporting the Afghan Resistance. In the past, Pakistan's relation with the U.S., China, and several of the Islamic states were an important factor in Islamabad's decision-making on this critical issue.¹¹ These will continue to be important now but with some different impacts, given the doubts in Pakistan about the strength of the commitments by all these major external powers to the Afghanistan Resistance.

The Government of Pakistan has stated on occasion its intention to move very carefully and cautiously on this potentially explosive subject; but it does consider it necessary to move, and the results are not likely to be encouraging to the Afghans -- or the United States. Several high-level talks between Pakistan and the USSR have been held in 1987, and it is likely that both sides will continue these efforts to reach a "compromise" on Afghanistan, with the Soviets probably becoming more hard-line in their real position as the Pakistanis become even more eager for an agreement. The "cease-fire, national reconciliation" policy gimmick has not worked as yet with the Afghan refugee community, but we have not yet seen the response of the Pakistani public to this seemingly generous offer. It is probable that the Government of Pakistan will find it necessary for both domestic and international political reasons to be seen as open and flexible on this subject, and it will be difficult to stick to the basic features of its old policy without at least one or two symbolic concessions, and possibly substantive concessions, to Moscow.

NOTES

1. Latif Ahmed Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1980), pp. 195-223. For a classic Indian analysis of the "US-China-Pak axis" theme, see Sainen Chaudhuri, *Beijing-Washington-Islamabad Entente: Genesis and Development*. (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1982).
2. W. Howard Wriggins, "Pakistan's Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan," *Pacific Affairs*, 57:2 (Summer 1984); and Rasul B. Rais, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," in Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Husain (eds.), *United States-Pakistan Relations*. (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985), pp. 197-218.
3. Riffat Hussain, "Pak-Soviet Relations Since 1947: A Dissenting Appraisal," *Strategic Studies* (Islamabad), X:3 (Spring 1987), pp. 80-81.
4. Aileen Qaiser, "China's Interest in Afghanistan in the Context of Sino-Soviet Rivalry," *Strategic Studies*, (Islamabad), X:2 (Winter 1987), pp. 56-66.
5. Gerald Segal, "The USSR and Asia in 1987: Signs of a Major Effort," *Asian Survey*, XXVIII: 1 (January 1988), pp. 6-7.
6. Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making*. (Boulder Co: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 188-189; and Ataur Rahman, *Pakistan and America: Dependency Relations*, (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1982).

7. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: the Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 130-131.
8. *Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security*, (Report of the Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian Security), (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988), p. 111.
9. Akhtar Ali, *Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma: Energy & Security Dimensions*. (Karachi: Economist Research Unit, 1984).
10. Tom Rogers, "Afghan Refugees and the Stability of Pakistan," *Survival* (London), XXIX:5 (September-October 1987), p. 429.
11. Agha Shahi, "Pakistan-India Relations and Superpowers' Policies". *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, (Spring 1987), pp. 20-35.

4

Pakistan and the "Afghan problem"

Louis Dupree

Afghan-Pakistani relations can be discussed in the following manner:

1947-1953:	"Pushtunistan," Phase I;
1953-1963:	"Pushtunistan," Phase II;
1963-1973:	A Gradual Loosening Up;
1973-1978:	Movement Toward Rapprochement;
1978-1979:	The Khalqi Interregnum;
1979-1988:	The Soviet Intervention;
1988-????:	The Geneva Accords: What Ahead?

1947-1953: "Pushtunistan"

Phase I

Problems arose before 1947 when the Afghan Ambassador to British India made enquiries concerning the past-Partition status of the Pushtun on the British Indian side of the Durand Line, drawn in 1893. The Afghan government claimed that the Line had never been declared an international boundary, and the claims were supported by a number of British soldiers and statesmen.

Numerous British writers¹ have commented on the Amir's antagonism to the Durand Line and the lengths to which Durand went in order to get Abdur Rahman's signature on the 1893 agreement. For example, the Amir's subsidy from the British jumped from 1.2 to 1.8 million

rupees, plus increased arms and ammunition quotas, and Durand found it necessary to aim several veiled threats at the Amir.

The last paragraph in the final agreement of November 12, 1893, is vague and inconclusive:²

"Article 1, Paragraph 2: The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territory lying beyond this line on the side of India".

Another quote by Sir Olaf Caroe³ is interesting:

"It is true that the agreement did not describe the line as a boundary of India, but as the frontier of the Amir's dominions and the line beyond which neither side would exercise interference. This was because the British Government did not intend to absorb the tribes into their administrative system, only to extend their own, and exclude the Amir's, authority in the territory east and south of the line. In the international aspect this was of no account, for the Amir had renounced sovereignty beyond this line".

The Amir might question: voluntarily? At what point does coercion cease to be legal?

Other British administrators, however, contend the Durand Line was never meant to be an international boundary: "The Durand Agreement was an agreement to define the respective spheres of influence of the British Government and the Amir,"⁴ (L/P & S/7: Letter from Elgin to Hamilton: Political and Secret letters and enclosures received from India. Vol. 85, Foreign Dept. Letter No. 77, 1896. India Office Records, London). Many Englishmen later serving in the frontier also considered the Durand Line and the boundary (administrative border) between the Tribal Agencies and Settled Districts of the North-West Frontier Province as simply delineating zones of influence and responsibility, e.g., " ... the tribes between the administrative border and the Durand Line were a buffer to a buffer, and the line had none of the rigidity of other international frontiers".⁵

The Kabul negotiations were peaceful, however, compared to the experiences of the commissions assigned to

fix the boundary in the field. Antagonism greeted the British Commissions in most areas, and tribesmen (particularly in Waziristan) several times attacked the group. Local mullahs, some probably in the pay of Kabul, spread the word that the *farangi* planned to annex and occupy Pushtun lands on both sides of the Line. Occasionally the commissions treated their jobs as pleasant hunting trips. When a village could not decide on which side of the Line it wished to fall, the British Commissioners shouldered their Wesley-Richards bird-guns and "went shooting," asking that the villagers please make up their minds before they returned. In several instances split village loyalties resulted in placing parts of villages on separate sides of the Line. In addition, sometimes the fields of a village lay on the British side, the village itself on the Afghan side. British interest appeared to be more concerned with the topography rather than the decisions of the people.

The Durand Line, designed to bring stability to the frontier regions, failed. In reality, it little resembled the Line agreed to by Durand and the Amir,⁶ and the Durand Line proved politically, geographically, and strategically untenable. British and Indian troops fought many bloody engagements with the fiercely independent border mountaineers. Much of the fighting was the direct result of British attempts to demarcate the hated Durand Line or control the tribes near the Line.⁷

Also, official British Indian documents frequently referred to the Durand Line in terms less than concise. One will suffice: "The Line was not described as the boundary of India, but as the eastern and southern frontier of the Amir's dominion, and as the limit of the respective spheres of influence of the two Governments, *the object being the extension of British authority, and not that of the Indian frontier*". (Emphasis added),⁸ (Source: *Military Report on Afghanistan*, classified publication of the General Staff Indian, Government of India Press, 1925, p. 69).

In spite of this, Lord Mountbatten, last British Viceroy of undivided India, assured Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League that the Durand Line was a *de facto* and *de jure* international boundary. He advised the Afghans to take

up the matter with the successor Government of Pakistan, which inherited the British position on the frontier.

This bureaucratic waffling did not satisfy the Royal Government of Afghanistan, which in 1947 cast the only negative vote when Pakistan applied for admission to the United Nations. The government later changed its vote, but the Afghan negative vote had called international attention to the Durand Line dispute.

India and Pakistan fought the First Kashmir War (1947-49) for control of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Hindu Maharaja opted to India, in spite of the fact that Kashmir had a dominate Muslim population. Pushtun tribesmen from both sides of the Durand Line flocked into Kashmir to join the fighting, which ended with the Indians in control of the more important parts of the state.

The Government of India sent advisers and experts in several fields to Afghanistan, to join those already there, who had been sent by the British before 1947. An important contingent of advisers were in the Afghan department of journalism (government controlled) and this group devised the name "Pushtunistan" and encouraged what appeared to be Afghan irredentism.

On their part, the British did hold a referendum in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and tribal *jirgahs* were held in five Tribal Agencies. The Afghan government protested that the Tribal Agencies should have been given a third alternative. The two alternative were: join India or join Pakistan, with the latter gaining a majority of those voting. The referendum in the NWFP was boycotted by several important groups, including the Congress party members who followed Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his brother, Dr. Khan Sahib. The *jirgahs* also voted to join Pakistan. Indian agents operated in Afghanistan until at least 1951, when it became fairly certain that the Pushtun issue would not destroy Pakistan. I met several of these agents in the Kandahar area in 1950-51.

Tension continued to intensify, as three Afghan *lashkar* (tribal warrior) columns, one led by the Pushtun leader Wali Khan Afridi, (not to be confused with current political leader, Khan Abdul Wali Khan) crossed the Durand Line in

1950 and 1951 with the avowed intention of planting "Pushtunistan" flags on the Indus River. Pakistan protested and the first "blockade" of Afghan intransit goods occurred. The Afghan Government denied any connection with the irregulars, merely stating they were "freedom fighters" trying to free their Pushtun brothers from the "imperialistic yoke" of Pakistan.

The 1950-51 tribal incursions adversely affected the two countries' relations, and their respective ambassadors departed, leaving charge d'affaires in charge of the embassies. Patient Pakistani initiative finally resulted in another exchange of ambassadors in March 1952.

Another incident could have very well exploded the relationships between Afghanistan and Pakistan into a general conflagration: Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in October 1951. His assassin was an Afghan living in exile in Pakistan, and some Pakistanis believe the Afghan government had something to do with the assassination, but the Pakistan government officially accepted the Afghan denials.

Frustrated by the "Pushtunistan" stalemate, increasing United States aid to Pakistan, and the apparent American lack of interest in its problems, Afghanistan turned north and listened to soviet overtures. In July 1950, Afghanistan and the USSR signed a four year barter agreement under which the soviets agreed to export petroleum products, cotton, cloth, sugar, and other commodities in return for Afghan wool and raw cotton. The Soviets offered a much higher exchange rate than any capitalist country could afford. This agreement made the Afghans partly dependent of the Soviets for many items formerly imported exclusively from the West. The 1950 agreement went beyond barter.⁹ The Soviet offered to construct several large gasoline-storage tanks, and to take over the oil exploration of north Afghanistan from a Swedish company. The USSR also agreed to permit Afghan goods free transit through soviet territory.

Disturbed by the Afghan-Russian deals, the Pakistanis relaxed the "blockade" (actually never a blockade; "slow-down" would be more accurate, and very easy to accomplish

because of the Pakistani adaptation of the British imbued law-and-order bureaucratic system), but the swing to the north, with its immediate economic benefits, continued.

By 1952, Afghan-Soviet trade had doubled, and the Soviets established a trade office in Kabul, something not permitted by previous Afghan foreign policy makers since the time of Amanullah (1919-29). The Russians exported enough gasoline to make rationing unnecessary. Tashkent cotton cloth competed successfully with more expensive Indian and Japanese textiles. Russian cement satisfied Afghanistan's needs; previously it had depended upon Pakistani, Indian or European cement. Soviet technicians (including oil geologists, seismic engineers, veterinarians, and agricultural specialists) entered Afghanistan, though not in great numbers. Oil surveying teams increased appreciably after the 1957 visit of King Muhammad Zahir Shah to Moscow, at which time the Soviets contributed another \$15 million for oil exploration in north Afghanistan.

Between 1950 and 1955, Afghan transit trade through Pakistan actually *increased* annually, but trade with the Soviet Union mushroomed.

1953-1963: "Pushtunistan"

Phase II

Lt. General Muhammad Daoud Khan seized power in Afghanistan in 1953, and the "Pushtunistan" issue escalated. Ultimately, Afghanistan demands for an independent "Pushtunistan," including North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan down to the Arabian Sea, the idea of a "Greater Pushtunistan" from Central Asia, to the warm waters of the south was launched.

Twice (September, 1960 and May, 1961), acting on faulty intelligence advice which indicated that the Pakistani Pushtun were ready to revolt, Daoud sent his troops (dressed as tribesmen) into the Bajaur area. In fact, what was happening was only the usual tribal conflicts between the Khan of Khar and the Khan of Bajaur, both of whom turned to counter the Afghan force. And when the

Pakistanis sent Punjabi troops into tribal territory, the Pakistani Pushtun turned to fight them as well. Also, when the Pakistani air force bombed the area, it gained no friends nor influenced people.¹⁰ The Afghan troops withdrew hastily when they met resistance.

A major international event was to change international affairs in the South and West Asian region for years to come: the creation of CENTO (earlier called the Baghdad Pact) and SEATO. Pakistan was the link between the two.

The Afghans remained non-aligned (*bi-tarafī*, without sides, as they prefer to refer to it), but permitted the Soviets to train and arm the Afghan army in response to the U.S. military involvement in Pakistan.

A number of incidents led to the second closure of the border in 1961. This was the climax of Phase II. Actually, it was more a bureaucratic slow down, but it amounted to a closure. Much of the economic aid from the USA and Western Europe to Afghanistan was bogged down in Pakistan, and much of it rotted or rusted.

Also, Pakistan blocked the annual movement of about 300,000 Afghan nomads and seminomads, which initially caused regional disruptions as the herdsmen had to shift their migratory patterns inward. But enough unused pasture land existed so that the nomads and seminomads were able to readjust to annual migrations inside Afghanistan. Only about 2-3,000 Daftani Pushtun continued to make the trek from Dasht-i-Nawur (summer) in Afghanistan to neighboring Pakistan.¹¹

From 1961-63 the Durand Line closed to all but a few intrepid smugglers and nomads. Therefore, Afghanistan began to depend more and more on overland routes through the USSR for trade and economic aid. As dependence on Soviet routes grew, many in the Afghan government and business communities expressed concern. With the Shah of Iran acting as broker, an agreement was reached to open the Durand Line, but this occurred only after the resignation of Prime Minister Daoud.

1963-1973: A Loosening Up in Spite of "Greater Pushtunistan"

In the relatively free Afghan press during the parliamentary experiment in constitutional monarchy, such newspapers as *Afghan Mellat* pushed the "Greater Pushtunistan" concept, but successive Afghan governments tended to down play the issue and gradually move toward a rapprochement with Pakistan. Because of this, the Afghans did not interfere in two Indo-Pakistan wars: The Second Kashmir War of 1965 and the Bangladesh War of 1971.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became president of Pakistan in 1971 and East Pakistan became Bangladesh. Bhutto immediately undertook a campaign to mollify Pakistani regional dissidents in the minority provinces of North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind. The new 1973 constitution guaranteed a form of regional autonomy which was accepted by all Pakistani opposition parties, but Prime Minister the (title adopted after the constitution was approved) Bhutto began carefully to orchestrate the dismantling the provincial governments.

1973-1978: Moves Toward Rapprochement

Afghanistan suffered a traumatic change in July 1973, when former Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud, first cousin and brother-in-law of King Muhammad Zahir, overthrew the government with the assistance of the *Parcham* (The Banner) leftist party led by Babrak Karmal.

Daoud initially once again raised the "Pushtunistan" issue, but as he grew confident he sounded less and less aggressive. His second regime witnessed two major shifts in foreign policy, one of which would contribute to his ultimate downfall. Daoud began to reach out to the Muslim world, not only the traditionally friendly Iranians and Turks, but also the Arab world - and to Pakistan. His goal was to reduce reliance on Soviet and U.S. foreign aid for development. The Shah of Iran promised Daoud as much aid as the Afghans had received from *all sources* in the

proceeding twenty years, including funds for an extensive rail system.

Uprisings in the Panjsher Valley and elsewhere in Afghanistan flared and threatened the rising good relations with Pakistan. Dissident Afghans trained and equipped by Pakistan attempted an abortive coup in July 1975. Whereas a similar uprising in the same area in 1928 had overthrown King Amanullah, the 1975 Panjsher Insurrection failed.

Several reasons accounted for this. Communications were much better than in 1928, and the gendarmerie, army and air force were quick to react. Also, Daoud was not all that unpopular in the countryside.¹²

Afghans let it be known informally that they were willing to talk and left the ball resting squarely in Prime Minister Bhutto's court. A natural disaster provided the occasion for a formal breakthrough. March and April 1976 proved to be cruel months for Afghanistan. An earthquake of massive violence struck the Tashkurghan (Khulm) area of northern Afghanistan on March 19, 1976, destroying at least 600 houses in several villages, killing about 30 people and injuring 60. Then in April, unrepresented floods swept through most of the major lowland areas of Afghanistan, washing away bridges, drowning people and livestock. Several nations and international and bilateral agencies responded to the tragedy. Pakistan donated \$4 million (including 2,000 tons of rice) to the victims, a gift gratefully - and publicly - acknowledged by the Afghan government. About the same time the radio "war" ceased abruptly. Then, in late May, Pakistan experienced severe flooding and the Afghans responded to the disasters with reciprocal gifts of relief supplies, duly publicized by both nations.

Several Islamic countries, led by Libya, Iran, and Turkey (not jointly, however) quietly served as go-between, and arranged for Prime Minister Bhutto to visit Afghanistan, to be followed by a visit to Pakistan by President Daoud. With great fanfare Prime Minister Bhutto arrived in Kabul on June 7, for a four day official visit. The result was a giant step toward reconciliation. Press and radio comments from Pakistan and Afghanistan were virtually identical, as both had agreed beforehand to issue joint daily press releases to

avoid misunderstandings. "The Kabul Times" (government-controlled, English-language newspaper) and counterpart Pakistani newspapers of the National Press Trust printed, in essence, the same report (simply substitute "Afghanistan" where "Pakistan" occurs):

Whereas the government of Pakistan acted with sympathy and humanitarian sentiments towards the people affected in Afghanistan by floods and quakes, the government of Afghanistan was gratified. When Pakistan markedly toned down her publicity and propaganda campaign, Afghanistan construed the move as a positive one, and as one contributing to the creation of an atmosphere which would allow direct contacts to establish mutual confidence and amenity".¹³

Between June 7 and 11, Bhutto and Daoud met twice privately with only an interpreter present. (Bhutto understood some Persian, and Daoud understood some English). Both sessions lasted for about two and one-half hours. The official, across-the-table conference between the two prime ministers and their advisers took place in the afternoon of June 10. In between, Bhutto and his entourage squeezed in a flying trip to the famous Buddhist site of Bamiyan, where two gigantic Buddhas (55 and 38 meters tall), carved into the side of a sandstone cliff, dominate the valley.

An innocuous-sounding communique (*Kabul Times*, June 12, 1976) was issued as the meetings ended, but its implications proved more far-reaching. For the first time, the Pakistanis admitted that a "political difference" existed between the two nations. (Previous Pakistani statements either ignored or ridiculed the "Pushtunistan" issue). On their part, the Afghans agreed to solve the "political difference" within the spirit of the *Panch Sheela* (Five Principles) of the 1955 Bandung Conference.

The two most important "Principles" for the nascent Afghanistan-Pakistan rapprochement are respect for the boundaries of neighbors and non-interference in the affairs

of others. In other words, Afghanistan would probably accept the Durand Line as an international boundary if Pakistan effectively implemented the regional autonomy articles (Part V) in the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Pakistan virtually admitted that the British sold them a bill of goods concerning the legality of the Durand Line as an international boundary, and the Afghans seemed willing to accept that the Baluch and Pushtun problems on the Pakistani side of the line were internal affairs. In theory, all that remained after the first Daoud-Bhutto moot was to complete the drawn out choreography required by diplomacy, those time consuming steps which international law (if not justice and reason) demand.

The two governments also exchanged views on the Baluchistan Insurrection, the outlawed National Awami Party (NAP) and its leaders, particularly Khan Abdul Wali Khan, son of the Frontier Gandhi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The Pakistan Supreme Court had earlier supported the legality (if not the propriety) of the government's order to outlaw NAP, seize its assets, and arrest its leaders for activities inimical to Pakistan's security. The Pakistanis had been pleased - and surprised - at the restraint with which the Afghan government greeted the Supreme Court decision, another key factor promoting rapprochement.

The Bhutto-Daoud talks paid an unexpected dividend: they discovered they liked each other. Both chided their respective aides for the false impressions created by external reports. This was particularly true in the case of Bhutto, for many foreign educated Pakistani foreign service officers retain the plainsman's contempt for the rude, crude barbarians of the hills, a hangover from the days of the British Raj. But times and attitudes have changed among some Afghan and Pakistani intellectuals. As recently as March 14, 1976, early in Pakistan's current time of troubles, Prime Minister Bhutto told me emphatically that he and Daoud were among the few leaders in the region with a real sense of historical process.

Rapprochement edged slowly forward. President and Prime Minister (he held both titles until elected President

after the constitution *Loya Jirgah* in January 1977) Muhammad Daoud attended the Fifth Summit Conference of the Heads of States and Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 15-19, 1976.

At the conclusion of the summit, Prime Minister Daoud flew directly from Colombo to Islamabad, on August 21, arriving in the late afternoon. At the banquet that evening, Prime Minister Bhutto said: "Please believe in our sincerity, and please believe the efforts we are making, along with you, to reach a solution, because once our differences - or difference as you like to put it - are resolved we know that many vistas will open up for the betterment of both peoples".

The Pakistanis spared no effort to make the visit a public and official success, but even they were surprised at the warmth with which the crowds greeted Daoud. The reception the next day in the famed Moghul Shalimar Gardens of Lahore proved to be the climax. Visibly moved by the crowd's enthusiastic response, Daoud read his speech with an animation rare in his other public appearances. At Murree, the hill resort near Islamabad, Prime Minister Daoud went on an unannounced walk, and was photographed talking to Pakistani children. Pakistani news media duly publicized the event.

In public both sides emphasized their "neighborliness" and desire to solve their political problem; in private, the ball bounced squarely in Bhutto's court. The brief joint communique (August 24) replicated the points spelled out in June: ... dialogue initiated ... "to find an honorable solution of their 'political difference' (author's emphasis) and other differences". An invitation was issued to President Fazal Elahi Choudhry and Prime Minister Bhutto to "pay official visits to Afghanistan in the near future". The invitations were accepted with pleasure.

"Pushtunistan Day," celebrated annually in Afghanistan on August 31, fell flat after Daoud's trip to Pakistan. Usually an occasion for anti-Pakistan speeches and boisterous street demonstrations which civil servants and students are "encouraged" to attend, in 1976 the crowds were small and subdued, attendance by civil servants and students not being

required. Many key government officials and dignitaries did attend the ceremonies.¹⁴

All seemed to be well "from Dan to Beersheba". However, within a short period, Bhutto, the Shah, and Daoud would all be history. Bhutto was hanged in April 1979 for complicity in a murder; the Shah-in-Shah was ousted by the forces of revolutionary Islam and hounded until his death from cancer; Daoud was killed in a coup led by leftist Afghan officers and the Khalq (The Masses) party came to power.

1978-1979: The Khalqi Interregnum

Afghan Refugees began to flow across the border immediately after the so-called Inqelab-i-Saur (Saur Revolution; Saur = April 21 - May 21 in the Afghan calendar), which created the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The first refugees were mainly urban businessmen, anti-Communist intellectuals, associates of and members of the lineage of the royal family.

Because farming and fighting do not mix, the first major revolts occurred in the late summer of 1978 at the end of the annual agricultural cycle. The Soviet-trained and armed Afghan army and its Soviet advisers overreacted with bombs, invasion which began on December 24, 1979.

Until April 1979, the Government of Pakistan (GOP) would not admit to a refugee problem. But when the number exceeded 85,000, the GOP invited the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to send a team to survey the needs of the growing refugee population. In addition, the GOP permitted a number of national and international private volunteer organizations to assist the refugees, but the brunt of the administration was borne by Pakistan. Pakistan maintained correct though cool diplomatic relations during the period of Prime Ministers Nur Muhammad Taraki (April 27, 1978 - March 28, 1979) and Hafizullah Amin (March 28 - December 27, 1979). The GOP denied that any arms and other supplies reached inside Afghanistan, but one look at the map indicated the importance of Pakistan as at least a *potential* route of supply.

By early fall 1979, it was obvious to most observers that unless the Soviets directly intervened, the anti-DRA guerillas would ultimately prevail. Prime Minister Amin attempted to contact Pakistan, Iran and USA, but it was too late, and, nothing could have - or probably should have - been done to salvage his regime.

1979-1988: The Effects of the Soviet Intervention¹⁵

The second share of the communist period began with the December 24, 1979, Soviet invasion, which brought in Babrak Karmal to head a new DRA government. The GOP made a wise move when it institutionalized refugee assistance by late summer 1979, because in the aftermath of the invasion came masses of refugees, now numbering more than three million.

Pakistan was a leader in the Organization of the Islamic Conference's (OIC) move to condemn the Soviet Union. Muslim nations and observer groups (including the Palestine Liberation Organization) met in Islamabad from January 27-29, 1980, and unanimously condemned the Soviet invasion. This extraordinary session of the OIC foreign ministers used no inconclusive terms such as "immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops" which appeared in later United Nations, Non-Aligned Movement and OIC resolutions. The resolution specifically named the soviet Union. And, the Islamabad moot expelled the DRA from the OIC. However, like most nations (including the USA), Pakistan did not break diplomatically with the DRA, but downgraded its embassy in Kabul to the charge level.

Both the USA and the USSR have major stakes in the Afghan war, and Pakistan sits on one of the stakes. And, in Pakistan, the internal stakes are just as high. President Zia, Prime Minister Junejo and the people of Pakistan generally support assistance to the *mujahedin* and *Muhajirin*, because the tradition of accepting fellow religionists as refugees runs deep in the Muslim psyche, dating from the movement of the Prophet and his followers from Mecca to Medina as the first Muslim refugees. But opposition to both grows in the

Pakistani opposition parties, some of which demand direct talks with the DRA, now headed by General Secretary Dr. Muhammad Najibullah.

Most opposition parties (particularly the literate intellectuals) also want the refugees out of Pakistan at any cost. In fact, the farther south one travels from Peshawar, the refugees tend to disappear in a wealth of disinformation and rumors. By the time one reaches Karachi, the refugees as refugees simply do not exist. They are all bandits, religious fanatics, dope pedlars, arms smugglers, displaced large landowners, shopkeepers, the lineage of the former royal family and their sycophants, wealthy businessmen, and nomads that the Pakistani government refuses to let return home. The belief is also that the farmers among the refugees have never had it so good, and would not return home even if permitted.

The opposition also pushes the theme that General Zia uses the Soviet invasion and refugees to garner favor and aid from the USA, the People's Republic of China and other nations interested in the war in order to maintain and extend his power.

Afghan refugees have made great negative impacts on the Pakistani ecology and economy, particularly in the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan. Three main ecological problems have evolved:

- (1) the road system has been badly damaged;
- (2) deforestation has reached major proportions, because of fuel consumption by the refugees and the dietary requirements of the refugees' herds, totalling three million sheep, goats and other livestock; and
- (3) the reduction of the water table and damage to irrigation systems.

However, World Bank projects and others initiated by voluntary agencies have attempted to redress these ecological situations, but the problems are enormous. It is hoped that when - and if - the Soviets recross the Amu

Darya, these projects now being placed on the landscape will benefit the local Pakistanis.

Economically, rental and produce prices have risen to new heights in the city and town bazaars near the 350-plus refugee camps. Pakistani contractors seem to prefer Afghan laborers, because they can be paid less and work harder. Urban rents have skyrocketed. Afghans have brought their lorries, buses, tractors and other motor vehicles and in some areas virtually control the transportation sector. Shopkeepers and artisans will return home, but leave part of their investments in Pakistan, thus helping the Pakistani economy. The building boom in urban areas has certainly been a plus to the Pakistani economy in general. As more and more Pakistani expatriate laborers return from the Gulf States, however, competition for jobs with the Afghans will increase.

Even though Pakistan has suffered ecologically and economically, it has also received massive aid from the outside world to help in refugee assistance. The substantial increase in military assistance from the USA is a direct result of the soviet invasion of Afghanistan, although many Pakistanis look on this aid as a mixed blessing: it improves Pakistani defense capabilities, but, according to some, helps maintain President Zia in power.

Probably the three most important things concerning the Afghan refugees are three negatives: there has been no starvation, no epidemics, and no *major* outbreaks of violence. Some violence has occurred. The latest reports I have access to (1985) indicate that there has been no precipitous increase in crime because of the refugees. But, explosions, assassinations and other outbreaks of violence are on the increase in the urban areas. In all probability, these outbreaks are the result of WAD (formerly KHAD, the Afghan DRA's KGB) in order to spread dissention between the Afghans and Pakistanis and between the various groups of Afghan refugees, as well as the Afghan political parties in Pakistan and resistance groups across the border.

1988-????: The Geneva Accords: What Lies Ahead?

After six years of negotiations the United Nations-brokered Geneva Accords were signed on April 14, 1988. the Accords consist of the following documents:

- (1) Bilateral Agreement Between Afghan and Pakistan on Principles of Mutual Relations, in Particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention;
- (2) Declaration on International Guarantees;
- (3) Bilateral Agreement Between Afghanistan and Pakistan on Voluntary Return of Refugees;
- (4) Agreement on Interrelationships for Settlement of Situation Relating to Afghanistan.

The "non-interference" and "non-intervention" clauses have been interpreted in several ways. The Soviets insist that since arms shipments were not specifically covered in the Accords, they must honor previous arms agreements with Afghanistan. The U.S. government, using the same logic, insists that the Accords allow "symmetry," which permits both sides to continue arms shipments. Such arms supplied do not, therefore, the logic continues, constitute interference. Both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. signed the Declaration on International Guarantees, under which they agreed to abide by the principles of non-interference and non-intervention. However, it is reported that protocol exists that defines "positive symmetry," but it has not publicly surfaced.

The Afghan government protested to Pakistan about continued shipments through Pakistan but Pakistan has ignored the charges.

The first Soviet troops began to withdraw on May 15, the date the Accords came into force. If the Soviets continue their withdrawals according to plan, all 115,000 (or so)

Soviet troops should be out of Afghanistan by the end of March 1989.

The question will then be which Afghan problem - or problems - will face Pakistan. The first problem is the one which worries Pakistan the most: the return of the three million-plus refugees to Afghanistan. Will they all return? Probably most will, even those who have invested capital, but they will leave their investments behind with their Pakistani partners. More economic interaction between the countries will result.

But if sizeable numbers of well-armed Pushtun remain behind, will they become a factor in the politics of Pakistan. In all probability, yes. Already, President and General Secretary Najibullah has tried to exploit this possibility. He has once again brought up the question of the validity of the Durand Line (discussed earlier), but has not pushed the issue to extremes yet.

But Pakistani Pushtun nationalism may increase after the Afghan Pushtun return home. The refugees in their midst and the war across the border held down political pressures during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.¹⁶

Another question which plagues Pakistan is: will the U.S. and others continue to support Pakistan *after* the refugees leave? The First Russo-Afghan War has seen a return of large-scale US economic and military assistance to Pakistan. The first offer of the Carter administration was called "peanuts" by President Zia. The Reagan administration, however, substantially increased aid, including F-16 aircraft, to Pakistan.

Whatever time period is involved, the Afghan government that arises, phoenix-like, out of the ashes of war, will probably shake down, after initial conflicts, into an Islamic Republic based on regionally-federated provinces, anywhere from six to nine, depending on how those in power perceive ethno-linguistic and ecological zones. Whatever form the future government takes, the Afghan government and people will not forget the way Pakistan treated them in their time of trouble.

Pakistan initially wanted an interim Afghan government appointed because the Accords as worded indicate the

refugees will return as citizens of the government *now in power*: "all returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, including freedom of religion, and *have the same obligations* [emphasis mine] and responsibilities as any other citizen of the Republic of Afghanistan without discrimination" (Bilateral Agreement ... Article II e).

Finally, the most provocative question of all: Is there a federation of Afghanistan and Pakistan in their future?

NOTES

1. Barton 1939; Holdich 1901, 1910.
2. Caroe 1965:463.
3. Caroe 1965:382.
5. Elliott 1963:53; also see Poullada 1969:22, L. Dupree 1961 for similar quotes from British sources.
6. Hamilton 1910:413.
7. Churchill 1916; Davies 1931; Elliott 1968; Hutchinson 1898; G. Robertson 1898; W. Robertson 1898; Swinson 1967; Young husband 1895.
9. Franck 1960; Fry 1974.
10. Fraser-Tytler 1967:323-324.
11. L. Dupree and Davis 1977.
12. L. Dupree 1978:2-7.
13. L. Dupree 1978:9.
14. L. Dupree 1978:9.

15. A number of sources should be consulted for various aspects of the Soviet invasion. Among them:
Henry Bradsher: *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*. (Duke University Press: Durham, N.C. 1985);
Joseph Collins: *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, (Lexington Books, New York, 1985);
Louis Dupree: *Red Flag Over the Hindu Kush, Parts I-Vi*, American Universities Field Staff Reports, Asia, Nos. 44,45, 1979; Nos. 23, 27-29, 1980);
Edward Giradet: *Afghanistan: The Soviet Way*, (William Morrow: New York, 1985);
Olivier Roy: *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1986).
16. Grant Farr (Personal Communication)

Sources cited

Barton, W.

India's North-West Frontier, London, 1939.

Caroe, Sir Olaf.

The Pathans, London, 1953.

Churchill, W.

The Story of the Malakand Field Force, London, 1916.

Davies, C.

The North-West Frontier, 1890-1908, Cambridge, 1932.

Dupree, L.

"Toward Representative Government in Afghanistan. Part I: The First Five Steps". *American Universities Field Staff Reports, Asia*, No. 1, 1978.

Dupree L.

and R. Davis. *"Dasht-i-Nawur, Afghanistan Journal* 4(1):41, Graz, Austria.

Elliott, J.

The Frontier: 1839-1947, London, 1968.

Franck, P.

Afghanistan Between East and West, Washington, 1960.

Fry, M.

The Afghan Economy, Leiden, 1974.

Hamilton, A.

Afghanistan, London, 1906.

Holdich, T.

The Indian Borderland: 1880-1900, London, 1901.

The Gates of India, London, 1910.

Hutchinson, H.

The Campaigns in Tirah: 1897-1898, London, 1898.

Poullada, L.

"Some International Legal Aspects of Pushtunistan Dispute," *Afghanistan* 21(4):10-36, Kabul, 1969.

Robertson, G.

Chitral, London, 1898.

Robertson, W.

Official Account of the Chitral Expedition, London, 1898.

Swinson, A.

North-West Frontier Peoples and Events: 1835-1947, London, 1967.

Younghusband, F.

The Relief of Chitral, London, 1895.

5

Domestic politics in the 1980s

William L. Richter

Decades, like centuries, are somewhat arbitrary units for categorizing the realities of political history. There is no necessary logic which dictates that the significant epoches of a country's political history should divide neatly into ten-year segments or that watershed events should occur at the beginning or end of a decade.

In several respects, Pakistan's politics in the 1980s also have a certain *deja vu* quality. There are many elements of continuity with the past. The military continues to play a central role, as has been the case since the 1950s except for a brief interlude in the early 1970s. Ethnic regionalism, which divided the country in 1971, continues to erupt periodically. The political system continues to be beset by violence, mutual suspicion, and incomplete legitimacy. Class disparities remain important, with landed and other elites dominant in whatever electoral politics exists.

In many other respects, however, decades are meaningful historical categories and the current decade of Pakistani politics differs considerably from its predecessors. The 1980s, dominated by the personality and priorities of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, seem radically different from the 1970s of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto or even the 1960s of Muhammad Ayub Khan. With some degree of license, and ignoring some major intervening events, we might therefore characterize Pakistan's four decades since independence as follows:

Decade	Years	Characterization
1950s Decade	1947-1958	The Independence
1960s	1958-1969	The Ayub Decade
1970s	1969-1977	The Bhutto Decade
1980s	1977-present	The Zia Decade

In each of these instances, the major political watershed points occur from one to three years earlier than the beginning of the actual calendar decade. In two cases, namely the military coups of 1958 and 1977, the dividing points and the justification for the specific periodization are fairly obvious. In the other instance, the formal end of Ayub's presidency is somewhat more arbitrary. One might make an equally plausible case for 1971, or perhaps even 1967. This discussion of Pakistan's politics in the 1980s will therefore define its time period somewhat ambivalently, focusing in part on the ten years following the July 5, 1977, coup (the Zia decade) and in part on the ten years following January 1, 1980.

Whatever the specific parameters, each decade seems to differ radically from the one before or after. In fact, each is in large measure a reaction to its predecessor. At the same time, despite its distinctiveness, each is also the repository both of the political residues and wreckage of the previous decade and of the seeds of the following one.

Given this perspective, it is not difficult to characterize Pakistan's politics in the 1980s along several dimensions. We might note a few of the more obvious features:

1. The international environment

The most obvious external factors have been the war in Afghanistan and the consequent resurrection of extensive security ties with the United States. Also related has been the sporadic dialogue with India and the progressive development of functional regional ties among the seven countries of the South Asian Association for Regional cooperation (SAARC). The extensive migration of Pakistani

labor to the Gulf has also had important effects upon Pakistan's internal politics.

Throughout the 1980s, Pakistan's politics have taken place in the shadow of the Afghan war.¹ The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan since December 1979 and the reestablishment of a major United States-Pakistani security relationship in 1981 have significantly altered the context within which Pakistani domestic politics has operated. The flow of Afghan refugees, which had begun well before 1979, grew to a flood after the Soviet occupation. The more than three million refugees who remain in Pakistan have perhaps had less damaging an impact than might have been predicted, but the cumulative social and economic burden of their presence has not been negligible, especially in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. Of related importance have been the increased problems of drugs and privately-held arms within Pakistan, outbreaks of violence between Pushtuns and other ethnic groups in Karachi, and other social disruption.

What has been the impact of all of this upon politics and policies? From one point of view, the Soviet occupation and the subsequent Pakistani security relationship with the United States have served primarily to entrench Muhammad Zia ul-Haq in power, to reinforce his suppression of domestic dissent, and to prolong military rule. From an opposite perspective, the "American connection" can be interpreted to have provided the United States "leverage" to pressure Pakistan to liberalize its political order, improve relations with neighboring India, and abstain from taking the decisive step of testing an explosive nuclear device.²

2. Economic Growth

Partially fueled by external assistance from the United States, the World Bank, and other donors, partially strengthened by extensive remittances from overseas workers, and partially the result of other factors, Pakistan's economic growth over the past decade has been rather impressive. This has both reduced the possibilities of mass

discontent and provided valuable resources to the ruling government.

3. Prolonged Martial Law

Throughout the first half of the 1980s Pakistan was under martial law. This was not the first time military rule had been imposed in Pakistan, of course, but it was by far the longest in duration.³ General Zia's martial law regime differed from its predecessors in other respects as well. In contrast to Ayub Khan's "revolution" or Yahya Khan's commitment to restore a parliamentary system, Zia's martial law government seemed much more directionless and uncertain.⁴

4. Islamization

The Islamic thrust of the Zia regime, discussed in greater detail below, also gave a very different character to Pakistani politics during the 1980s. The resurgence of Islam as a dominant theme in Pakistani public discourse, the establishment of new Islamic-inspired institutions, and the frequent reiteration of the ideal of creating an Islamic system all serve to make contemporary politics different from those of earlier decades.

5. Civilianization and democratization

In some respects, the orderly movement from martial law to civilian rule which has occurred in Pakistan during the mid-1980s constitutes an unprecedented process in Pakistan's political history. There is considerable controversy, however, surrounding the questions of how far this process has actually progressed and whether it can ultimately succeed.

This essay will review these and other features of contemporary politics in the context of five broad processes of political change:

- (1) evolution of governmental structure and authority;
- (2) evolution and change in the political opposition;
- (3) the rise of a new political elite;
- (4) Islamization; and
- (5) ethnic integration. Before doing so, however, it will be helpful to consider a few more aspects of the "Zia Decade".

The Zia Decade

The 1980s have been the Zia decade. Like earlier leaders, Zia has set the political agenda and established directions and priorities for the country. This is a point which needs to be emphasized because scholars, journalists, and other commentators on Pakistani politics often underestimate or ignore Zia's role. There is exceptionally little if any biographical or autobiographical material available on Zia, especially when compared with the extensive writings by and about Bhutto and Ayub which appeared during their periods in power.⁵

The observation is demonstrated further by comparison of the topics covered at scholarly meetings on Pakistan in the 1980s with those during earlier decades. The conference at Columbia University which led to the present volume, for instance, covered a wide range of domestic and international political issues, but featured no paper or presentation with a specific focus on Zia. By contrast, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's name figured prominently in comparable conferences and volumes a decade earlier.⁶

General Zia's politeness and mild manner are probably not the only or even the most important reasons for the lack of scholarly or journalistic attention accorded him. A more plausible explanation, perhaps, lies in the generally low expectations people have had concerning Zia from the beginning. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq has more than a decade in power. At the end of 1987 he surpassed

Muhammad Ayub Khan as Pakistan's longest-ruling leader. Yet throughout the decade he and his regime have been regarded by many as ephemeral phenomena. There have been numerous premature reports of his political demise. In 1979 or so an anonymous author in a political risk analysis report declared flatly that General Zia and his regime would not last eighteen months. A similar sentiment is echoed in the title of Tariq Ali's *Can Pakistan Survive?* and in the prognostications of other commentators.⁷ This very tendency to underestimate Zia's abilities and staying power has led in turn to an understating of his role in shaping Pakistan's politics in the 1980s.

Evolution of Governmental Structure and Authority

The Zia decade began July 5, 1977, when the military coup led by General Zia toppled Prime Minister Bhutto and ushered in Pakistan's third and longest-lasting period of martial law. The ten years since the coup can be divided into at least three phases, each distinctively different with respect to governmental structure and authority relationships:

- (1) The "de-Bhuttoization" period, which lasted from the coup until the end of 1979;
- (2) The "labyrinth" period, which lasted from the end of 1979 until August, 1983;
- (3) The "democratization" period, which officially began August 12, 1983, and lasted at least until the end of 1985;
- (4) The period since December 30, 1985, when martial law was officially ended, might easily be regarded as a further continuation of the democratization phase or treated alternatively as a separate "post-martial law" period.

We shall review each of these periods, with greater emphasis events since 1979.

De-Bhuttoization

Even after a decade, the causes and explanations of the 1977 coup are not entirely clear. The goals of the new regime were certainly mixed, and they appeared to evolve during the military's first few months in power.⁸ Prominent in the initial justification of the coup was the promise to restore order and to hold a new set of national and provincial elections "within 90 days". Shortly after the coup, however, Zia realized several things he had apparently not previously perceived -- that Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party still retained a great amount of popular support, that Bhutto would be vindictive if allowed to return to office, and that Bhutto had greatly abused the powers of his office. A campaign of "accountability" was instituted against the former Prime Minister and his followers.

The October 1977 elections were postponed and charges were brought against Bhutto for his alleged involvement in a 1974 murder. A series of White Papers were issued by the military government detailing the corruption of the previous regime, including the rigging of elections, control of the media, and other wrong-doing. Bhutto was finally convicted in March, 1979. His conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court and he was executed in early April.

A few weeks before Bhutto's execution, General Zia announced that a second attempt to hold nationwide elections would take place in November. When the complex rules established for the elections ultimately proved unworkable, the elections were cancelled. More stringent martial law regulations were imposed, including heavy censorship. In terms of strategies of returning governmental authority to civilian control through the electoral process, Pakistan was "back to square one" by the end of 1979.⁹

Throughout this first phase of his rule, Zia continued to voice the goal of reestablishing civilian rule. The 1973 Constitution was partially suspended but not abrogated. The military regime still portrayed itself as a caretaker which

would oversee the transition from Bhutto to a new civilian regime. But Bhutto's continuing popularity thwarted that scenario. Even after Bhutto's execution, there appeared to be no clear way to accomplish that goal without running the risk of putting power back into the hands of the Pakistan People's Party.

Labyrinth

The second phase of Zia's rule, from the end of 1979 until August, 1983, was a period of reaction and regrouping, of experimentation and casting-about for alternative governmental directions. The predominant feature of this second period was uncertainty of direction, accompanied by considerable political repression, censorship, and discontent. Zia appeared to be in a labyrinth of his own making, unable to find an exit but apparently aware that prolonged military rule would be detrimental to both the country and the military.

The persistence of the Bhutto mystique and the failure of the first two election attempts precluded any easy options and forced the military and its civilian advisers to seek longer-range means of finding a civilian government to which they -- and the voting public -- might entrust authority. Zia explored several alternatives, sometimes simultaneously, including:

- (a) cooptation of civilian politicians and technocrats;
- (b) cooptation of religious leaders, such as ulema and pirs; and
- (c) further modification of the constitution and reshuffling of courts.

Some of these actions were forced by pressures from the political opposition and the courts. Facing judicial challenges to his increasingly repressive regime, Zia promulgated on March 24, 1981, a Provisional Constitutional Order which eliminated judicial jurisdiction over the actions of the

martial law authorities, gave President Zia the power to amend the Constitution at will during the period of martial law, and provided for the establishment of a new Federal Advisory Council, or *Majlis-i-Shura*. Members of the judiciary were required to sign a new oath. Those who refused, including the Chief Justice, three other Supreme Court Justices, four High Court Judges, and twelve other senior members of the judiciary, were summarily stripped of their authority.¹⁰

During this period it was unclear which of several possible political scenarios might prevail:

- (1) The restoration of some form of parliamentary democracy;
- (2) creation of some sort of Basic-Democracy type of system, resembling that under Ayub Khan during the 1960s;
- (3) transition to an Islamic system;
- (4) institutionalization of a praetorian system on the model of Turkey or Indonesia;
- (5) prolongation of unconstitutional military rule, perhaps through successive coups; or some other possibilities.¹¹

The establishment of the appointive *Majlis-i-Shura* in 1981-1982 was somewhat symbolic of this casting-about for alternatives. Its name and intended function drawn from Islamic tradition, the body was purely advisory with no legislative powers. Its nearly 300 members included religious leaders (*ulema*), local government officials, and other "judged to be of high character". Yet in its actual operation, the *Majlis* had a "Speaker" (Khwaja Muhammad Safdar), debated the actions and policies of the government, and in other ways acted much like a national assembly. Although the *Majlis* was perhaps more in keeping with the Islamic model than the parliamentary democratic one, it did provide

a valuable transition from absolute military authoritarian rule to a more representative system.

Democratization

The third phase of General Zia's rule began with his August 12, 1983, announcement of a plan to hold non-partisan nation-wide elections prior to march, 1985. Most of Pakistan's political history since that date can be regarded as occurring within the framework of that plan, or in reaction to it.

The plan sparked an immediate and intensive public protest from opposition politicians, who saw it as a deceptive means of prolonging military rule. They also opposed the notion that the elections, when held, would be on a non-partisan basis. Augmented by regional discontent in Sind, the protest erupted into several weeks of violent demonstrations. The government was able to contain the protest, however, and proceeded to implement its August 1983 democratization blueprint.

However, the plan became modified somewhat as the dates for the projected elections approached. Still apprehensive of transferring power to elected representatives too rapidly, President Zia devised a mechanism which would permit him to share power with the elected representatives. A national referendum was held on December 19, 1984. The referendum was not a part of Zia's announced plan in 1983. Although the notion was mooted occasionally during mid-1984, it was not until December 1, less than three weeks in advance of the event, that the referendum was announced to the Pakistani public. It was ostensibly intended as a test of public approval of the government's Islamization policies.

Despite rather heavy governmental campaigning for the referendum and penalties prescribed for those who campaigned against it, the opposition parties conducted a fairly successful boycott. Nonetheless, General Zia not only claimed a strong turnout and a 99% approval of his policies, but interpreted the results as a mandate for him to remain in office as president for another five years, i.e., until 1990. Zia

needed a guarantee that his personal position as head of state would remain strong through whatever constitutional and political transition might take place following the 1985 elections. By asking the voters to approve of Islam rather than of himself, Zia ensured strong approval with relatively little risk. The referendum might also have been something of a "dry run" of the electoral machinery prior to the elections two months later.

National and provincial elections were held in late February, 1985. Shortly thereafter a civilian government was established, with veteran Sindhi politician Muhammad Khan Junejo named as prime minister. Civilian governments were also set up in Pakistan's four provinces and members were elected from each province to the national Senate. These various legislative bodies demonstrated their determination not to be mere rubber stamps of General Zia, but they also proceeded cautiously enough not to provoke Zia into reversing the process. By the end of 1985, the Junejo government had provided the conditions for the formal lifting of martial law, and during the first weeks of 1986 provided for the re-establishment of legal political parties.

If the second phase of the past decade was one of deadlock and uncertainty of direction, the third was characterized by rather remarkably rapid movement in the directions outlined by Zia in 1983. Whether the change has been meaningful and real, or merely a civilian facade for continued military dictatorship, is a matter of some dispute. Certainly, continued progress toward a fully representative and legitimate democratic government is neither inevitable nor irreversible, but the prospect seemed much more likely in the second half of the 1980s than it had four or five years earlier.

Post-Martial Law

Following the formal end of martial law on December 30, 1985, Pakistan has functioned as much like a parliamentary democracy as at any other time in its history. As President and Chief of Army Staff, Zia retains ultimate authority, but Prime Minister Junejo and his fellow elected

politicians play an increasingly responsible and prominent role in governmental affairs. The government does not enjoy complete legitimacy, but it does seem to have sufficient popular support at this point to remain in power until the scheduled 1990 elections.

The Evolution of the Political Opposition

As political environments change, coalition and confrontational patterns change accordingly. The 1977 elections were largely a battle between Bhutto's PPP and the 9-party Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Bhutto's fall from power initiated processes of disintegration and realignment. By 1981, most of the PNA components had joined their former arch-enemies in the PPP to form the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). Such a uniting of diverse political elements was not easy, but both the PPP and its former adversaries were united by their common opposition to further persistence of military rule, and by their perceptions that restoration of democratic order would have wide public appeal. Two important components of the former PNA -- the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) abstained from the MRD, both because of their greater willingness to collaborate with the military regime.

The MRD has had at least four major confrontations with the government during the 1980s. When it was first created in February 1981, it launched a nationwide agitation in demand of free and fair elections to national and provincial assemblies. The movement was cut short, however, when a PIA jet was hijacked to Kabul by al-Zulfiqar, a terrorist organization in which one of Bhutto's sons was prominent. The action discredited the opposition movement, particularly the PPP which was then led by Bhutto's widow and daughter, and temporarily drove a wedge between the PPP and the other MRD parties.

The late 1983 protest movement which followed Zia's August announcement sparked Sindhi regional discontent and continued for several weeks, but failed to spread in

significant intensity to the rest of the country, especially to the crucial province of Punjab.

The MRD boycotted the December, 1984, national referendum -- despite heavy governmental pressures against such a boycott -- and was by most neutral accounts relatively successful. However, the successful boycott of the referendum led the MRD to miscalculate on their next confrontation with the government. Relatively confident of public support, they chose to boycott the February, 1985, elections. The voters, faced with the opportunity of voting in national and provincial elections for the first time in more than seven years, turned out rather strongly, although not necessarily in support of General Zia. Six of Zia's pre-election cabinet members were defeated at the polls, including one who had been touted as Zia's top choice for Prime Minister.

The consequences of the election for the MRD were doubly disadvantageous. Popular support of the electoral process and the later stages of democratization has undermined the MRD's very *raison d'être* and the MRD politicians are effectively isolated from having any positive role in subsequent developments. Characteristic of the futility of such a position was their reaction to the formal lifting of martial law on December 30, 1985. The MRD protested on the ground that Zia still held power despite the apparent termination of martial law. The protest had little appeal, however, to Pakistanis who had grown weary of military rule and who were willing to accord some plausibility to the democratization process.

A further series of confrontations between the MRD and the government came during 1986. Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan in April. She was greeted by tumultuous crowds throughout the country. Her own charisma, coupled with the rekindled popular support of her father, boosted the possibilities that successful protests might force Zia to hold fresh elections in which the PPP and the other MRD parties might participate. However, the strength of the movement faded. There were three phases of the protest -- in April-June, July, and August -- each weaker than the one before it. Part of the reason for the decline lay

in intra-MRD factionalism, part in intra-PPP factionalism. In both cases, Benazir's apparent inability or unwillingness to share power alienated those elements whom she failed to include, leading to fragmentation and withdrawal of support.

At the same time, new alliances emerged, based upon more specific ideological assumptions than mere opposition to the incumbent ruler. Four regionally-based leftist parties, for instance, merged to form the Awami National Party.

The fragmentation and weakening of the opposition movement in Pakistan during the 1980s has resulted from both the apparent success of the democratization process and the political miscalculations of the opposition leaders themselves. As long as the present government appears to be making reasonable progress in the direction of a viable representative political system, it seems to be able to maintain popular support, leaving the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy to appear redundant. If elections do take place in 1990, they should be a major test of the political opposition as well as of the current government.

Development of a New Political Elite

The failure of the MRD to dislodge Zia and the new civilian order has made it possible for Zia and the new order to discredit the MRD. At the same time, the process has given prominence and credibility to many individuals who were at best relatively minor players in earlier political dramas in Pakistan. Many of the current members of the national assembly were active in politics before 1977, but few if any had achieved much prominence. The major events which have brought these individuals to the top, at least for the present, have been the local elections in 1979 and 1983, the appointment of the Majlis-i-Shura, and the 1985 elections. All of these provided both exposure and experience to the new political elite.

"New" is perhaps an inappropriate term to describe the civilian leadership of the current government, since many were involved in politics before 1977. Some have careers which can be traced back through the Pagaro Muslim League, the Convention Muslim League, and the

Republican Party to the early 1950s. Others are a part of that large political group in Pakistan which has always gravitated to power, shifting loyalties from Ayub to Bhutto to Zia with relative ease. Even some of the younger newcomers are offspring of earlier political figures.

The future shape of Pakistani politics will depend upon how well these people deliver, particularly in the three crucial areas of economic development, foreign policy, and progress toward a stable and open political and constitutional system.

It is unlikely that any political pundit, viewing Pakistani politics from the perspective of the mid-1970s, would have predicted that Muhammad Khan Juñejo or any member of his present cabinet would be so prominent today. Meanwhile, most of the prominent characters of the 1970s are either dead (e.g., Z. A. Bhutto; Mufti Mahmood; Maulana Maudoodi) or in the political wilderness (e.g., Benazir Bhutto; Abdul Hafeez Pirzada; Asghar Khan; Wali Khan). It is perhaps equally difficult today to predict with much confidence how lasting the current cast of characters will be, whether for instance the current "ins" will still be in power in the 1990s, or whether they will be replaced by the current "outs," or whether some as yet unforeseen leadership may arise to supplant both.

Islamization

Islamization has been a prominent feature of the Zia regime from the beginning. The past decade has seen the implementation and application of a wide variety of Islam-inspired institutions and laws: Zakat and Ushr, Shariat Courts, Profit and Loss Banking Schemes, and others.¹¹ Despite the pressures of the Jamaat-i-Islami and other fundamentalist groups, these Islamic reforms have been applied relatively cautiously and pragmatically.¹² By proceeding fairly slowly with Islamic reforms, and by spreading participation more widely, the political processes in the 1980s have served both to moderate and to institutionalize Islamization.

I have suggested elsewhere that the resurgence of Islam as a central focus of Pakistani political discourse grew out of a variety of social and political processes and events in the 1970s. Among these were the identity crisis created by the traumatic Bangladesh War, the increased political and economic importance of the Islamic Middle East, the exploitation of Islamic "reforms" by the Bhutto government, and the symbolic unity which Islamic slogans provided the diverse anti-Bhutto movement in the 1977 elections.¹³

Similarly, the future of Islamization in Pakistan will depend on political developments. One could imagine that a return to power of the Pakistan People's Party under Benazir Bhutto could radically change direction on the Islamization issue, but this appears unlikely at present. More likely, as a female member of the National Assembly recently commented, "Islam will somehow have to be in the picture".

Islamization is inextricably tied to the political processes we have already noted, but it is also tied to Pakistan's sense of national identity. Throughout its four decades of independence, Pakistan has suffered from a "dual peripherality". That is, Pakistan has been on the periphery of South Asia, dominated by India. At the same time, it has been on the periphery of the Arab-Islamic world. Islamization has permitted Pakistan to reassert its distinctive identity separate from India and to reaffirm its legitimacy as a member of the Islamic community. Pakistan's active participation in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), its cooperative ventures with other Islamic countries, and its export of large numbers of workers to the Gulf countries have all been related to these post-Bangladesh shifts in identity. Islam provides a unifying symbol which is shared by most Pakistanis, whether devout or not, and one which links the present with the past.

However, there is still a question whether Islam provides an open enough formula for everyone to participate. There are still problems with those groups whom Islamization threatens to exclude from political participation. Some women, as Anita Weiss notes in this volume and elsewhere, see Islamization as a reactionary force which would deprive

them of their rightful participation in their country's political, economic or cultural life. Minority sects, such as the Ahmadiyyas, have felt the tyranny of the majority as religious repression. Regional groups, particularly in Baluchistan and Sind, have seen Islamization as a tool to maintain the political dominance of the Punjabi and Muhajir elites. "Secular" politicians see Islamization being used in the guise of an "approved ideology" to disqualify any left-of-center groups or parties from political participation.

Islamization is likely to remain a part of the Pakistani political picture for the foreseeable future, at least through the remainder of the 1980s. Its longer-term fate, however, will depend upon how inclusive it can become for all significant political forces in the country.

National Integration

Ethnic conflict and regional discontent continue to be important political problems in Pakistan in the 1980s. The 1983 agitation in Sind drew heavily on regional discontent which has simmered for decades. Riots have erupted periodically in Karachi between various ethnic or religious groups, most recently between Pathans and Muhajirs but frequently between the Sunni and Shia Islamic sects.¹⁴ Alienated elements of all three of the minority provinces have banded together to form the Sind-Baluch-Pakhtoon Front (SBPF) and to demand greater decentralization of Pakistan's federal system.

It is important, however, not to exaggerate the separatist threat to Pakistan. The SBPF does not appear to have much popular support. The frequent predictions over the past decade of the impending "balkanization" of Pakistan have thus far not materialized. Selig Harrison warned in 1981, for instance, that Baluch nationalism threatened a potential disintegration of the Pakistani federal system and an invitation to further Soviet expansion.¹⁵ Whether the fact that this has not taken place has resulted from good luck or good politics and policy is open to enquiry. To the extent that the democratization process succeeds, thereby providing more orderly channels for the articulation of regional

interests, national integration should be enhanced. In the short run, however, the greater opportunity for open expression of dissent which has come with the ending of martial law may create the appearance of an increase in separatism.

Conclusion

Pakistan's "experiment of the eighties" differs from the political experiments of previous decades in several respects. Moving gradually from a praetorian to a representative democratic regime is not only a novelty for Pakistan; it is a relative rarity anywhere in the modern world. The process is by no means complete and major challenges and problems remain. Among these are especially the future role of the current extra-parliamentary opposition, particularly the PPP and the other MRD parties, and the place of Islam in the future political formula.

If the experiment succeeds, it could provide Pakistan with the sort of stable, decent polity it has sought in vain throughout four decades of independence. The issue hangs in the balance and the remainder of the 1980s should determine the outcome.

NOTES

1. The metaphor is borrowed from the title of Selig Harrison's book, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York and Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981).
2. These arguments were used as a justification for the assistance package in 1981. Cf. *Security and Economic Assistance to Pakistan* (Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

House of Representatives, and its Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, on International Economic Policy and Trade, and on Asian and Pacific Affairs. September 22, 1981. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981).

3. Zia's martial law lasted almost eight and one-half years (1977-85). By contrast, Ayub's lasted four years (1958-62) and Yahya's less than three years (1969-71).
4. Cf. Herbert Feldman's classic accounts of the two earlier periods: *Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); and *The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-1971* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975). For succinct accounts of the Zia regime, cf. Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, (3rd ed.), pp. 218-253; and Craig Baxter, ed., *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Front-Line State* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985).
5. Cf. Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Third World: New Directions* (London: Quartet Books, 1977).
6. See, for instance, Manzooruddin Ahmed, ed., *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy and Society* (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980); Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti, and W. Howard Wiggins, ed., *Pakistan: The Long View* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977); and J. Henry Korson, ed., *Contemporary Problems of Pakistan* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974).

7. Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive?: The Death of a State* (London: Penguin, 1983); Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (Boulder: Westview, 1980), pp. 248-253.
8. Cf. William L. Richter, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime," *Pacific Affairs*, 51:3 (Fall 1978), pp. 406-426; Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1986* (Lahore: Progressive, 1986), pp. 225-235.
9. Cf. W. Eric Gustafson and William L. Richter, "Pakistan 1979: Back to Square One," *Asian Survey*, 20:2 (February 1980), pp. 188-196.
10. Stephen Philip Cohen and Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Pakistan in 1981: Staying On," *Asian Survey*, 22:2 (February 1982), pp. 140-141. The political developments which made each of these scenarios seem plausible are discussed in greater detail in William L. Richter, "Prospects for Political Freedom in Pakistan," in Raymond D. Gastil, ed., *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1981*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 117-123.
11. Cf. Anita M. Weiss, ed., *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 129-140; Lucy Carroll, "Nizam-i-Islam: Processes and Conflicts in Pakistan's Programme of Islamization, with Special Reference to the Position of Women," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 20 (1982), 557-95; and William L. Richter, "Pakistan," in Muhammad Ayoob, ed., *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 141-162.

12. Shahid Javed Burki, "Economic Management within an Islamic Context," in Weiss, ed., *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan*, pp. 49-58.
13. William L. Richter, "The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, 196 (June 1979), pp. 547-557; and William L. Richter, "The Political Meaning of Islamization in Pakistan: Prognosis, Implications, and Questions," in Weiss, ed., *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan*, pp. 129-140.
14. Cf. Shada Islam, "Chaos and Carnage," and Akbar S. Ahmad, "The Approach of Anarchy," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 19, 1987, pp. 38, 40.
15. Selig S. Harrison, Op.Cit.

Zia and the civilian bureaucrats: Pakistan's bureaucracy in the 1980s

Charles H. Kennedy

On well-established thesis regarding civilian-military bureaucratic interaction in military-dominated regimes posits that military governments tend to be supported by, and be convivial to, civilian bureaucratic interests. Military governments need the expertise and support of the civilian bureaucrats; civilian bureaucrats need the stability and order generated by the depoliticized environment characteristic of military-dominated states. This argument or a variation has been applied often to describe the political system of Pakistan, particularly in analyses of the Ayub years. In this vein, Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy and particularly the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was often referred to in such literature as constituting a "governing corporation" or as "unarmed bureaucrats". Such perceptions and characterizations undoubtedly contain more than a kernel of truth. Certainly such images and beliefs were exploited skillfully and helped to legitimize Bhutto's ambitious administrative reforms.

It is contended here, however, that such a simple comity of interests paradigm has not characterized the relationship between the civilian bureaucrats and Zia-ul-Haq's military regime. Zia has kept intact many of the "anti-bureaucratic" policies of his civilian predecessor; and he has introduced a new irritant of his own, recruitment from the military, which has proven inimical to civilian bureaucratic interests. To

lateral recruitment program; and then, Zia's military recruitment program.

Service Reforms

In the fall of 1973, Prime Minister Bhutto promulgated a package of administrative reforms whose avowed purpose was to disestablish the system of service cadres.¹ One motive underlying such actions was to weaken bureaucratic resistance to Bhutto's ambitious social and economic policies and specifically to challenge the core of such resistance -- the CSP. Several policies crafted to lead to this latter end included:

- (a) the abolition of the CSP Academy;
- (b) the adoption of a uniform pay scale which reduced CSP officers' comparative advantage in salary structure;
- (c) the elimination of the reservation of posts for CSP officers;
- (d) the abolition of the CSP as a group; and
- (e) the introduction of lateral recruitment, designed in part to politicize the bureaucracy and to undercut the dominance of the CSP.

The implementation of Bhutto's service reforms generated considerable opposition from within the bureaucracy. Such opposition came from three main sources. First and most obviously, the erstwhile members of the CSP perceived the reforms as diluting their status and authority within the bureaucracy. Second, the lateral recruitment program challenged the corporate interests of the senior bureaucracy by bypassing the established mechanisms of promotion and transfer. Finally, the bureaucracy perceived the overall thrust of Bhutto's reforms as targeted at eroding administrative neutrality. Namely, Bhutto's policies were

perceived as an attempt to wrest control of administration from civilian bureaucrats by enhancing the role of political appointees. Following the military coup of 1977, such opposition was encouraged by the publication of the *White Papers* which related in painstaking detail the excesses of the Bhutto regime in regard to the implementation of the administrative reforms.²

Therefore by 1978, the Zia regime had both the political motivation and the support of significant sectors of the civilian bureaucracy to rescind, or at least to substantially modify, Bhutto's administrative policies. Accordingly, in February 1978, Zia appointed the Civil Services Reform Commission under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq to examine the efficacy of Bhutto's reforms.³ The recommendations which emerged from this Commission envisaged profound departures from Bhutto's system. For instance, among its many recommendations the Commission urged the abolition of all occupational groups including the Secretariat Group; the disestablishment of the administrative grade of the Section Officer; the disencadrement and dispersal of officers of the Office Management Group (OMG); the creation of several technical "branches" to accommodate engineers, physicians, educators, agriculturalists, scientists, and statisticians; the wholesale revamping of district administration; the establishment of a National Administrative Reserve (which paralleled the functions of the defunct CSP); the emasculation of the lateral recruitment program; the revision of the regional quota system; the modification of pre-service training and selection; and the merger of the District Management Group (DMG) and the Tribal Areas Group (TAG) into a "District Management Branch".

Despite such wide-ranging recommendations, however, President Zia has moved cautiously in the realm of administrative reform. In fact, Zia's administration has made only four significant changes in the service structure it inherited. First, Zia abolished the lateral recruitment of civilian bureaucrats. This move had the support of virtually all sectors of Pakistan's bureaucracy, with the possible exception of some technical services, (discussed later).⁴

Second, following the recommendations of the Anwar-ul-Haq Commission, Zia abolished the TAG, merging its members into the DMG.⁵ This policy had been urged by members of both of the affected groups and by erstwhile members of the CSP. Third, the Zia regime expanded reservations for military personnel in the civilian bureaucracy. Fourth, Zia halted direct recruitment to the OMG.

Combined, such policies (with the exception of military recruitment) lean in the direction of reestablishing the administrative *Status quo ante*. Indeed, the cessation of lateral recruitment, the abolition⁶ of the TAG, and the disencadrement of the OMG all tend to blunt the thrust of Bhutto's service reforms. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue that Zia's policies have obviated Bhutto's initiatives. At least as important as what Zia's policies have done are what Zia's policies did not do. First, Zia's government never seriously considered the re-encadrement of the CSP. Second, Zia has not reestablished the use of service designations nor sanctioned the reformation of service associations. Third, Zia's government has consistently rejected recommendations to expand the number of occupational groups to include technical cadres.

Indeed, the most adequate way to describe the changes wrought by the service reforms is to compare the composition of the federal bureaucracy before, during, and after the reforms.⁶ Such comparisons reveal that:

- 1) The service reforms reduced the positional dominance of the CSP in the federal bureaucracy. In 1969, CSP officers held 93 percent of all posts of Joint Secretary and above in the federal government.⁷ By 1973, the comparable figure had been reduced to 44 per cent.
- 2) The positional dominance of the CSP has continued to decline since 1973. Comparable figures to those above reveal that the CSP cohort controlled 42 per cent of all senior posts in 1976; and 36 per cent of such posts in 1982. That is, the positional dominance

of the CSP has continued to plummet during the Zia administration.

- 3) Conversely, the representation of other groups in senior administrative positions has proportionally increased. Such gains have been registered predominantly by members of the Federal Unified Grades and since 1980 by military recruits to the civilian bureaucracy.

Such trends are likely to continue. First, recruitment to the CSP has been discontinued. Second, the size of Pakistan's bureaucracy continues to expand. Third, there is no indication that military recruitment will be discontinued.

Lateral Recruitment Program

A similar pattern emerges when one examines the fate of Bhutto's lateral recruitment program. The lateral recruitment program was the cornerstone of Bhutto's administrative reforms. During its heyday (1973-75), 324 officers were inducted into the Secretariat Group at the level of Deputy Secretary or above. Owing to a variety of factors (perhaps the most important being intra-bureaucratic opposition), however, the program was largely defunct when General Zia assumed power in July 1977. In the spirit of critical examination of the policies of his predecessor, Zia created a Review Board within the Establishment Division in the spring of 1978 to investigate cases of individual lateral recruits.

The Review Board found many cases of irregularities of appointment. Among such irregularities were the selection of candidates who had failed the written examination; those who had bypassed the scrutiny of the Special Selection Boards (set up to interview prospective recruits); those who had been promoted to posts without the requisite qualifications of experience or education; those who had been or were active members of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP); and those whom the Federal Security Force (FSF) had deemed to be "anti-Pakistan".⁸ In all, the Board reviewed

the cases of 113 officers of the Foreign Affairs Group (FAG) and 199 cases of officers inducted into the Secretariat Group. Of the former, 41 officers were retained in service; the cases of 24 were sent to the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) for further review; 28 were reverted to their former posts within the government; and 20 were removed from service.⁹ In regard to the Secretariat Group, 94 officers were retained in service;¹⁰ the cases of 10 were sent for further review to the FPSC; 59 were reverted to their former posts within government; and 36 were removed from service. It is important to note that those officers "reverted to former posts" were originally public servants before their selection under the terms of the lateral recruitment program and that those "removed from service" had originally been employed by the private sector.¹¹

Subsequent to the actions of the Review Board, the FPSC conducted interviews and examinations¹² of lateral recruits whose cases had been referred to them by the government. In all, the FPSC examined the credentials of approximately 200 individuals and recommended that "all but a handful" be retained in service.¹³ Most of the "handful" were later reinstated by the government. Neither the details of the review process nor the names of reinstated officers were ever released by the government, but by piecing together available information it is possible to make some fairly accurate estimates of the composition of such groups.¹⁴

First, approximately 60 percent of the lateral recruits inducted into the Secretariat Group, District Management Group, and the Tribal Areas Group were still in service in 1982. Or, conversely, that around 40 percent of the lateral recruits had been removed for whatever reason between 1977-82.¹⁵ The obvious presumption is that many of the latter were deemed to have been "political appointees, while those retained were deemed to have been appointed on the basis of merit. Second, and an implication of the foregoing, is the fact that the government's actions (1977-82) belie the more extreme charges advanced by the *White Papers* concerning wide-scale political manipulation of the lateral recruitment programme by the Bhutto regime. Some of the lateral recruits selected between 1973-75 were never assigned to

their new posts. Indeed, as of January 1978, only 280 of the original inductees were still in service. Therefore, between 60 and 78 percent¹⁶ of the lateral recruits screened by the new government were actually retained in service. Further, by July 1982, 13 per cent of those retained had received promotions under the Zia government,¹⁷ a figure comparable to regular recruits. Clearly Zia's actions had not gone as far as the regular bureaucracy had wanted him to in regard to the lateral recruits. Indeed, around two-thirds of the lateral recruits appointed by Bhutto had been retained in the government and more importantly their services had been regularized by governmental action.

Military recruitment program

Although both the Ayub and Bhutto governments inducted retired and released military personnel into Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy,¹⁸ Zia has both qualitatively and quantitatively extended such policies. At first (1977-80), President Zia followed the precedents of his predecessors by re-employing senior retired military officers on a contractual basis in civilian posts. The number of such military inductees was small, and such re-employed officers never became regular members of the public service nor did they enter occupational groups. Since 1980, however, President Zia has broken from such precedents by introducing rules which formalized such recruitment and which established military quotas for recruitment to the civilian bureaucracy. Under this program up to 10 per cent of the vacancies in federal bureaucracy in Grades 17 and 18 are reserved for retired or released military officers. Importantly, such military appointees become regular and permanent members of the civilian bureaucracy and they become members of occupational groups.¹⁹ Similarly, up to 10 per cent of the senior vacancies (Grades 19 and above) in the Secretariat Group, Foreign Affairs Group,²⁰ Accounts Group, and Information Group have reserved for former military officers re-employed on three to five year contracts. Although such re-employed military officers have no security of tenure, they become full fledged members of the

occupational groups to which they are assigned.²¹ The selection of military recruits and their assignment to occupational groups is governed by the "High Powered Selection Committee". The latter institution is chaired by President Zia.

Translated into numbers this means that military officers are entitled to permanent appointment in approximately 13 posts at Grade 17 and 15 posts at Grade 18 annually. Also, approximately 10 military officers are eligible annually for appointment to senior level positions.²² In practice the government has not departed from this quota. In August 1985, 98 former military officers were in permanent government service in Grades 17 and 18, while 111 held senior appointments on contract.²³ That is, since 1977, an average of 12 former military officers have entered permanent government service (Grades 17 and 18); and an average of 14 have been re-employed on contract (Grades 19 and above) annually.²⁴

Therefore, President Zia's military recruitment program has departed from the policies of his predecessors in four significant respects. First, it has inducted comparatively more military officers into civilian governmental service. Second, it has placed such officers in comparatively higher ranks. Third, Zia's military recruitment program has become an institutionalized part of the selection process to the federal bureaucracy. Unlike previous military recruitment policies, Zia's program entitles military officers to, what in effect is, an annual recruitment quota. Finally, military officers inducted under Zia's program are integrated more closely with the civilian bureaucracy than their counterparts under previous military recruitment programs. Some of the military recruits become regular and permanent members of the bureaucracy; all become regular members of occupational groups.

No surprisingly, Zia's military recruitment program has encountered considerable resistance from within the civilian bureaucracy. Patently, the extension of military recruitment has increased the capabilities of the government to exert political influence on the bureaucracy. Through the mechanism of the High Powered Selection Board, President

Zia and his advisors appoint around 30 former military officers to civilian bureaucratic posts annually.

Partisan considerations undoubtedly play a role in such appointments. Arguably from the perspective of administrative efficiency such increased political control may enhance the coherence of governmental policy. However, from the perspective of civilian bureaucrats the military recruitment program constitutes a challenge to their corporate autonomy. Indeed, many of the liabilities associated with Bhutto's ill-fated lateral recruitment program are applicable to Zia's military recruitment program. Most importantly, military recruits are perceived as constituting a threat to the career patterns of established civilian bureaucrats. Often military recruits are assigned to much coveted administrative postings; their induction also often blocks or retards the promotional prospects of their civilian counterparts. The cost to morale is correspondingly high. Further, military recruits are sometimes perceived by their civilian counterparts as unqualified or ill-qualified to assume their administrative assignments. Military recruits have not undergone the process of civilian bureaucratic socialization nor are they likely to have extensive administrative experience.

On balance, however, military recruits have met far less civilian bureaucratic resistance to their incorporation than did Bhutto's lateral recruits. Unlike the lateral recruits, military recruits still generally have a reputation for probity, loyalty, and hard work. Military recruits also share many of the characteristics of Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy. They have similar social class backgrounds, have undergone analogous training programs, and they predominantly share the Westernized ethos of their civilian counterparts. Finally, unlike lateral recruits, military recruits have benefitted from strong institutional affiliations. The military recruitment program has the unquestioned support of the military and, of course, military recruits remain former military officers. Therefore, military recruits belong to the functional equivalent of a service cadre -- a cadre of retired military officers. Such affiliation has afforded military recruits with

far more institutional authority than the lateral recruits could mobilize.

Conclusion

After General Zia seized power in 1977 it appeared as if he would reestablish the reciprocal comity of interests with the civilian bureaucrats that had typified President Ayub's regime. Indeed, Bhutto's administrative reforms were characterized in the *White Papers* as politically motivated and as blatant attempts at unprecedented control of the bureaucracy. But from the vantage point of nearly a decade of Zia's administration, his policies, although departing from the reformist zeal and style of his predecessor, have only marginally reversed Bhutto's administrative policies. And, instead of forging a firm condominium with the interests of the civilian bureaucrats, Zia's regime has introduced new points of discord with the civilian establishment. Perhaps Zia's policies constitute good politics. After all, Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy has never generated much popular support. Perhaps also, Zia's policies constitute an unintentional or at least grudging compliment to the craftsmen of Bhutto's administrative reforms.

NOTES

1. Details of the history and development of the service cadres in Pakistan are found in Charles H. Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), especially pp. 29-53.
2. See Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime* (Islamabad: Manager, Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1979)

3. The Commission was established in February, 1978 and it issued its report in September, 1979. However, the report was never made public.
4. See Kennedy *op. cit.* for details, pp. 129-152.
5. The groups were merged in accordance with Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, S.R.O. 1294 (1)/81, December 3, 1981.
6. The following data is presented in tabular form in Kennedy, *op. cit.* pp. 103-5.
7. Computed from Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, *Services Reorganization Committee Report*, Vol.2 (Islamabad: Manager, Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1971), p. 422.
8. Interview with a member of the Review Board, August 17, 1978. According to the information provided only three officers were reverted/removed from service because of their affiliation with the PPP; and only two were removed because of their alleged status as "anti-Pakistan". The *White Paper op cit.* Vol. 2, pp. 139-142 supports this assertion.
9. Interview with a member of the Review Board August 17, 1978. For additional information concerning the dismissal of the FAG lateral recruits and for some examples of individual irregularities see *Dawn* June 9, 1978; and *White Paper, op. cit.*
10. The names of these officers are found in the *Pakistan Times* August 18, 1978.
11. Interviews with members of the Review Board, August 17 and 18, 1978.
12. Both written examinations and interviews were administered to Grade 19 officers; Grade 20 officers

- were subjected to only an interview; and Grade 21 officers were not referred to the FPSC.
13. Interview with a member of the FPSC, 19 June 1982. The only published record of the review process is found in Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1979*, (Islamabad: Manager, Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1980).
 14. Data is found in tabular form in Kennedy, *op.cit.*, pp. 147-148.
 15. Owing to the limitations of the data it is impossible to be precise regarding the number of lateral recruits removed as a consequence of the actions of the Zia government and the number who had already left service before July 1977.
 16. It is likely that the percentage retained is closer to the higher figure.
 17. In all, 24 lateral recruits had received promotions by July 1982: five Grade 21 recruits, eight Grade 20 recruits, and eleven Grade 19 recruits.
 18. See Kennedy, *op. cit.* p. 122 for details.
 19. Entry to Grade 17 is limited to officers with less than eight years of military service, such officers are typically captains when they enter civilian service. To enter Grade 18 the officer must have attained the rank of major. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 14/5/79-D.III, February 10, 1980. With the exception of the Economists and Planners Group, Commerce Group, and Office Management Group, military officers (Grade 17 and 18) may enter any occupational group. Government of Pakistan, Establishment

Division, O.M. No. 1/22/80-Ind. Cell, November 29, 1980.

20. The Foreign Affairs Group's (FAG) name was changed on October 5, 1983 to the "Foreign Service of Pakistan" (FSP). Perhaps this revision was related in part to acronymal considerations. See Foreign Affairs Group (Change in Nomenclature Rules, 1983. S.R.O. 936 (1)/83. *Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary* October 5, 1983.
21. Entry to senior level positions is limited to military officers who carry the rank of major or higher. Such re-employment on contract is restricted to the Secretariat, Information, Foreign Affairs, and Accounts Groups. Government of Pakistan, O.M. No. 1/22/80-Ind. Cell, November 29, 1980.
22. Calculated by the author from military recruitment rules and from relevant numbers of vacancies and posts in 1983.
23. Statement of Minister of Finance, Mahbubul Haq, reported in *Dawn* August 13, 1985.
24. Owing to retirements of military recruits re-employed on contract, these figures are low estimates. The best estimate of average annual military recruitment to the civilian bureaucracy, therefore, is around 30 officers. In 1982, seven military officers held the rank of Secretary; seven the rank of Additional Secretary; 25 the rank of Joint Secretary; and 23 the rank of Deputy Secretary in the Secretariat Group. Kennedy, *op cit* 103. Reportedly, 22 retired military officers held the rank of Ambassador (Grade 21 or above) in the Foreign Affairs Group in 1985.

Pakistan's economy, 1947-2000: Economic performance and strategy for future growth

Shahid Javed Burki

Introduction

A nation that cannot look its past in the eyes is going to make a mess of its future. Why haven't the Pakistanis looked at their economic history with a steady eye? I can perhaps offer some explanations. There are several ugly warts in our economic history which may have inhibited scholarship. There is also a close association between economics and politics in our history and it is not possible to render a credible account of our economic history without providing a political explanation for some of the decisions that were taken. Up until recently, our governments did not encourage such an analytical approach and undoubtedly dampened the enthusiasm for this kind of scholarship. There has been a similar lack of academic interest in our future. The Planning Commission's five-year plans speculate about the future but that is not "ex-ante history". Once again, the reluctance to think about what lies ahead may be due to the fear that such an exercise would show some things that would not sit well with people in authority. Is this lack of respect for the past and disregard for the future a particularly Pakistani trait? If it is not - for I am sure there are many other societies

around the world which are similarly consumed by the problems of the day - then at least the intensity of interest in the present is perhaps unique to Pakistan.

It is not that we lack the intellect or that we have not discovered the needs or the tools of analysis which keep us from examining our past or thinking about our future. The problem is that we find it difficult to define what is for us the past and what could be for us the future. The timing of Pakistan's past is difficult enough when we write its political history. Does the story of Pakistan begin with the Muslim invasion of India, or with the establishment of the Mughul empire, or with the arrival of the British and the accompanying alienation of a large segment of the Muslim community, or with Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's campaign to bring the Muslims into the western world, or with the political ascendancy of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, or with the passage of the Lahore resolution, or with the founding of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, or with the dismemberment of original Pakistan in December 1971? Each one of these events would be legitimately regarded as the starting points for Pakistan's political history. The story, however, depends in what is chosen as the point of beginning.

The timing of the beginning of Pakistan's economic history is a difficult task. Even after its establishment as a separate state, Pakistan did not have an independent economy. Economic independence was achieved a few years later. The separation of East Pakistan created another beginning for Pakistan's economy. My story will begin with 1947, not earlier, since that would complicate the picture, and not with 1971 since that would omit a number of essential points.

The future is equally difficult to define. Pakistan is now a remarkably open economy subject to a variety of external influences. Its economic future cannot be mapped with competence unless we define the shape of its external environment. But what is Pakistan's external environment? Is Pakistan a part of the Middle Eastern economy, or does it belong to the West-Asian economic system, or should it be regarded as a South Asian economy? These questions are not easy to answer. Even the international financial and

development institutions have not fully resolved the question of where Pakistan belongs or where it is going. The International Monetary Fund has Pakistan located in its Middle East Department. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) sees its jurisdiction stretching from Pakistan to Indonesia and then on to Korea. For fifteen years, the region of South Asia in the World Bank started with Pakistan and ended with Burma. After the World Bank's reorganization in 1987, Pakistan was moved to the region called EMENA -- Europe, Middle East and North Africa. In other words, at least in the minds of the international bureaucracy, Pakistan straddles a number of different economic, social and geopolitical systems.

In one other respect, Pakistan's exact location is uncertain. Is it a poor country or is it a middle-income economy? The latest World Development Report from the World Bank places Pakistan close to the threshold between poor and middle-income nations. With a little bit of effort, it should be able to make the transition from the ranks of poor into that of middle-income countries.

These problems of definitions, even though daunting, should not discourage scholarship. They should not inhibit the writing of history of any kind -- economic, political or social. In this chapter, I intend to make one kind of beginning. My purpose is to explore some hypothesis about the past in order to explain the present and speculate about the future. The article has three parts: the first deals with the past forty years. The second deals with my understanding of the present situation to see how much of it is dictated by the past. The third will speculate about the future.

1. Pakistan's Economic History: 1947-1987

There are a number of striking features about the performance of Pakistan's economy in the last forty years. Let me first identify six of them and then offer some explanation for why I consider them to be important.

- * *First*, the country's humble beginning. Although it is not easy to reconstruct national income accounts for what is Pakistan today, income per head of the population in 1947 was not much more than \$100 in today's prices. In other words, Pakistan in 1947 was about where Ethiopia is today. It was one of the most underdeveloped regions of British India.
- * *Second*, the country's extraordinary performance since 1947. In 1947, Pakistan's gross domestic product was on the order of \$3.2 billion (again, in today's prices and exchange rate); today, forty years later, it is 12 times as large - about \$36 billion. Since the country's population has increased more than three times -- from 32 million in 1947 to 100 million 1987 -- income per head of the population has grown by a multiple of only four. I would estimate the gross city product of Karachi at about \$7 billion, twice the size of the gross domestic product in 1947.
- * *Third*, wide fluctuations in performance during the past forty years. Raj Krishna, the late Indian economist, once argued that for a variety of reasons India's structural growth rate was on the order of 2.5 to 3.0 percent a year. According to him, year after year, the output of the Indian economy would go on increasing at that rate -- sometimes by a little less, sometimes by a trifle more. The fluctuations around this average would never be very pronounced. Raj Krishna called this structural rate of increase the Hindu rate of growth. The historical rate of expansion of Pakistan's economy has not only been much higher than that of India's, the variations around the mean have also been much greater. The volatility displayed by Pakistan's economy perhaps reflects the Muslim temperament.
- * *Fourth*, the economy's subjection to repeated external shocks. These shocks have taken different forms. They included such dramatic demographic

changes as the arrival of 8 million refugees following the partition of British India in 1947, the migration of 2-3 million Pakistanis to the Middle East, the arrival of 3 million refugees from Afghanistan after the movement of Soviet troops into that country in 1979, the migration of 20 million people from the rural area to the country's towns and cities over the last four decades. These shocks also include the first trade war with India in 1949, when the Pakistani consumer, still recovering from the dislocation caused by partition, found himself suddenly deprived of manufactured goods. But what India denied by shutting down its borders, Pakistan was able to obtain from other sources by using the unexpected boom in export earnings occasioned by the war in Korea. The separation of East Pakistan delivered another blow to Pakistan's economy: producers in Pakistan had to find new markets for the goods they had earlier sold in the eastern wing. To these demographic changes and turbulences in external trade, we should also add another kind of uncertainty: those in external capital flows. The 1954 defense pact with the United States brought large quantities of external assistance to Pakistan. The 1965 war with India and the 1971 civil war in East Pakistan brought an abrupt end to this type of flow. The war in Afghanistan that started in 1979 altered Pakistan's geopolitical status once again, and with this change came a significant amount of new official capital flows. The migrants to the Middle East have remitted some \$30 billion back to Pakistan over a period of a dozen years. But the change in the fortunes of the oil exporting countries has significantly reduced this flow.

* *Fifth*, the profound influence of politics on Pakistan's economic development. If Pakistan's political history could be divided into four periods: 1947-58, the period of competitive democracy; 1958-71, Pakistan's first and second martial laws with a period of

controlled democracy sandwiched in between; 1971-77, the period of populist civilian rule; and 1977-85, Pakistan's third martial law; then, to each of these periods, we can attribute a unique set of economic developments. The association between politics and economics appears to be a very close one for Pakistan.

- * *Sixth*, the extraordinary impact left by some individuals on Pakistan's economic development. Even within the fondness of the various political systems with which the country has experimented, half a dozen individuals were able to influence the course of economic development.

These are then the six pillars on which I will build the structure of Pakistan's economic history.

The country's humble beginning

It is for three reasons why it is pertinent to recall the extent of Pakistan's economic backwardness at the time of its establishment. In 1947, the areas that now constitute Pakistan displayed all the characteristics that economists associate with extreme backwardness and deprivation. It is only by reminding ourselves of the economic situation that Pakistan inherited at the time of independence that we can fully appreciate the distance the country travelled in the last forty years. If we do make the transition from being a poor country to becoming a middle-income nation, this feat would have been accomplished in less than half a century. It took the industrial countries of today about one hundred years to go from economic backwardness to a situation of semi-industrialization. In today's third world, only two countries have managed to make this transition.

Indonesia and South Korea

In the case of Indonesia, the oil boom of the seventies lent a helping hand. But, Pakistan's natural resource is weak;

its remarkable overall performance has to be attributed in part to its people's enterprise and in part to the country's geopolitical situation. In that respect, the experience can be equalled to that of South Korea.

The other reason for remembering our weak economic inheritance is to grasp an important fact about our history. The Pakistan of today remained a neglected part of the Indian British Empire for nearly one century. It took a series of Afghan and Sikh wars for the British to pacify the provinces that today constitute Pakistan. But even with pacification, the British suspicion did not entirely disappear. It was because of the fact that Punjab, Sind and the Northwestern Frontier Province did not cause the British any problem during the difficult days of the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857, that the British did not see any need to put government resources into them for their development. The large infrastructural development sponsored by the *raj* went into eastern, central and western India but not into the provinces of the northwest. It was only with the series of crop failures in the early years of this century that the British began to introduce irrigation into Punjab and Sind and to turn to cultivation of the virgin soils of these provinces in order to generate the food supplied they required for the deficit areas of their Indian empire. The Punjab colony districts served their purpose well -- they became the granary of British India. But the New Delhi administration obtained this surplus at a low price; terms of trade were kept deliberately against the agriculture sector in order not to place an excessive burden on the exchequer. By the time partition came, this tradition of siphoning off the large food grain surpluses of Punjab and Sind at not very rewarding prices was well established. This is a point to which I will return presently.

The third reason for reminding ourselves about Pakistan's considerable economic backwardness at the time of independence is that it created a set of attitudes that were very important for shaping our early economic history. The fact that what is Pakistan today was one of the poorest regions of the British *raj* encouraged the belief on the part of the leadership of the Indian National Congress that the

country the Muslims demanded and Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah won for them would find it difficult to survive for long as an independent economic identity. This belief colored the approach of the Government of India toward Pakistan in the years immediately following independence and contributed to the first trade war between the two countries. Pakistan's relative poverty at the time of independence also did not inspire confidence among the country's early leaders and influenced their thinking about the way they should conduct their economic relations with India. They were prepared to accept arrangements such as a customs union, a virtual common currency and a common banking system. These arrangements might not have been put into place if the first generation of leaders had greater confidence about the ability of the country to stand on its own feet. Therefore, when the break with India finally came, its impact was traumatic. The break had a profound influence on Pakistan's economic history.

In other words to start an account of Pakistan's economic history with some analysis of its extreme backwardness at the time of the country's establishment is not only to underscore the extraordinary developments that have occurred in the past forty years but to understand also that the poverty of the resources the country inherited at the time of independence had a number of other subtle influences on the way it has developed since 1947.

Pakistan's extraordinary performance since 1947

The second important feature in Pakistan's economic history is its sustained performance over a period of forty years. Growth in gross domestic product of nearly 5.5 percent a year puts Pakistan among the top performers in the third world, which is why Pakistan has moved up in the ranks of developing countries; from among the poorest third world countries in 1947 to the most prosperous of the poor countries in 1988. The remarkable thing about this record of performance is not only the high rate of GDP growth but the fact that it was produced without a consistent set of government policies. The stimuli the governments provided

kept changing over time. The trade war with India persuaded the government of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to place emphasis on industrialization. The industrial sector's response to the stimulus that was provided was electric; manufacturing output increased at the rate of over 11 percent per year. The government of Ayub Khan introduced a different set of politics: it encouraged agricultural growth alongside industrial development. The agriculture sector responded vigorously to government's encouragement and the result was the launching of the green revolution which transformed Pakistan's agriculture sector. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's administration seemed less concerned with increasing the economy's material output and more with the ownership of assets and with the provision of social services. The economy's response was predictable. Agriculture and industry stagnated while the output of the service sector expanded. Pakistan's third martial law government went back to the balanced approach to the 1960's and the economy's response was a significant increase in material output. The lesson to be drawn from Pakistan's economic history is clear: its economic progress over the last forty years, although impressive by any reckoning, is the result of a variety of different approaches. Since none of the stimuli that were applied were sustained over any length of time, many loose ends remain that, together, constitute a number of structural weaknesses in the economy. These weaknesses will have to be overcome if the country is to move forward.

Volatility in performance

The volatility in economic performance provides another important perspective from which to view Pakistan's economic history. No economy, no matter how well managed, can produce a steady rate of growth in its output year after year. For long, economists have recognized trade and investment cycles which are the consequence of the confluence of economic forces not easy to counter and control. For developing countries, with a high level of dependence on agriculture and, therefore, on unexpected

changes in weather, fluctuations in performance can be -- in fact are -- even more pronounced. In the case of Pakistan, output fluctuations had causes other than the economists' cycles or the changes induced by weather. They were the result of sharp changes in public policy. The changes were exceptionally sharp in the period immediately following independence; when the average growth rate was 3.2% from 1947 to 1955, the deviation from this mean was of the order of 4.0%. First, second and third plans produced some stability; but in the 1970-1978 period, the economy went back to wide yearly fluctuations once again. The fifth and sixth plan periods (1978-1988) proved to be the most stable period of all with a standard deviation of only 0.6 around the average growth rate of 6.6% per year.

Politics and economics

That economics react on politics and politics on economics is not a new discovery -- in its formative years, the science of economics was called political economy. In the case of Pakistan, however, the relationship between the two has been especially close. Since the country experienced political stability only spasmodically, and since its political history is punctuated with all manner of political turbulences, the economy reacted to political changes with exceptional volatility. And, since Pakistan did not evolve a stable political system based on a broad consensus between its many socio-economic groups, it failed to provide the economy with an institutional cushion to absorb the shocks delivered by the political system. Two examples should suffice to illustrate this point. Recall the sugar crisis of 1967-68, when sugar cane output declined by 14% from 22 million tons the year before to 19 million tons which contributed to the political movement that brought down the government of President Ayub Khan in March 1969. It was unfortunate for Ayub Khan that the sugar crisis came precisely at the time when his government was celebrating the Decade of Development with considerable fanfare. The dramatic escalation in the price of sugar contributed to the people's

skepticism about the advances the government claimed the country had made in the 1958-68 period.

The second example is from what to until 1971 was the eastern province of Pakistan and is now Bangladesh. The cyclone of 1970 and the resultant economic disruptions underscored for the people of that province the meaning of what their political leaders and academics had been saying all along: that West Pakistan had generated surpluses in the eastern wing to invest in its own development. It mattered little that by about the middle of the third plan period (1965-70), reverse resource transfer had already begun. It is one of the great ironies in Pakistan's economic history that East Pakistan left the fold of Pakistan and became Bangladesh just at the time when the people and the leaders of the western wing had come to accept their responsibility to the eastern province.

Personalities, institutions and economics

The absence of a political framework that would have allowed the aggregation of broad group interests made it possible for a number of individuals and institutions to play important roles in economic decision-making and, consequently, in the development of the country's economy. In this context it is worth examining the parts played by six individuals, all remarkable in their own ways.

Chaudhri Mohammad Ali and Ghulam Mohammad: I would like to describe Mohammad Ali and Ghulam Mohammad as the architects who shaped the basic features of Pakistan's economy as the economy sought to free itself from that of India. Some elements in the design they used are still visible today. Mohammad Ali's most important contribution was made before independence, as the economic advisor to Liaquat Ali Khan who was Finance Minister in the interim government led by Jawaharlal Nehru. Liaquat's budget vividly demonstrated to the leadership of the Indian National Congress that Jinnah's two-nation theory also meant that the Muslim League's style of economic management would be different from that of the Congress. This episode convinced the leadership of the

Congress party that they would have a better control of their economic destiny if they rid India of the Muslim majority province. Ghulam Mohammad, as Pakistan's first Finance Minister, laid the ground on which to build an independent economy. This he did by refusing to follow the countries of the sterling area in 1949 in devaluating Pakistan's currency against the dollar. India's response was probably not anticipated; the trade war that resulted between the two countries set the stage for Pakistan's rapid industrialization in the late forties and the fifties.

Zahid Husain: Zahid Husain was an institution-builder par excellence. He was responsible for designing most of the institutions that were to play critical roles in Pakistan's economic development in the early days. The institutions for which he should be remembered are the State Bank of Pakistan, the Planning Commission, and the Karachi Stock Exchange.

Mohammad Shoaib: Shoaib in implementing Ayub Khan's economic vision left his own imprint on the development of the economy during the sixties. Brought in by Ayub Khan to manage the economy as the Finance Minister, Shoaib's main contribution was to produce a workable synthesis between the army's penchant for civil controls and his own belief in market forces. His stint at the World Bank had exposed him to the developments in other parts of the third world. This knowledge of Pakistan's external environment came in handy at the time the country was beginning to open to the outside.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan: Ishaq became the main architect of the economic policies adopted by the martial law government of General Zia-ul-Haq. His control over the economy during this period was total: all economic ministries and departments reported to him. The only constraint imposed on him was a political one: that the policies he adopted should not cause political embarrassment to the military government. Within this framework, Ishaq managed brilliantly but conservatively. From 1977 to 1985, the years of his stewardship, Pakistan was able to overcome a number of difficulties in its external economic environment to which many third world countries

had succumbed. The model pursued by Ishaq differed from the Ayub-Shoaib model in the sense that Ishaq was not totally unequivocal about the virtues of an unrestrained private sector. He believed that for a developing country the only option was to seek a symbiotic relationship between private entrepreneurship and government management.

Mahbub-ul-Haq: Mahbub-ul-Haq is the enfant terrible of Pakistan's economic history, prepared to throw on their heads his own cherished beliefs if he is convinced that they are no longer relevant to the changes in the environment in which an economy must function. In any history of Pakistan's economy, he will be remembered for at least two things. His "22-family speech" of 1968 in which he questioned the basic assumption of the Shoaib-Ayub model: that the benefits of rapid development will ultimately trickle down to all segments of the population. The speech had a profound political impact and set the stage for the expansion of the government's control over the economy during the Bhutto period. In the budget of 1985, Mahbub-ul-Haq sought to balance his views about distributive justice with the need to deploy the dynamics of the private sector for achieving public good. He had gone full circle, back to 1960 when as the principal architect of the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) he had put a great deal of confidence in the private sector to generate rapid economic growth.

Capacity to absorb external shocks

Developing countries, by the very nature of their circumstances, have a poor capacity to absorb shocks. In this and in many other respects, Pakistan's experience has been an typical one. Not only were a variety of different shocks absorbed with remarkable ease; the shocks and the processes used to absorb them left a number of positive things in their wake. Let me illustrate this important point with three examples. I have already referred to the large-scale migration of Muslims from India to Pakistan in 1947-1948 as an important event in the country's economic history. However, historians have as yet to grasp the full significance of this movement of people on an

unprecedented scale in human history. The movement involved 14 million people: 8 million came to Pakistan and 6 million left Pakistan for India. A country as poor as Pakistan was in 1947 could have easily buckled under the pressure of immigration and emigration on such a massive scale. But Pakistan not only survived, it benefitted from this movement of people. By 1951, when Pakistan took its first census, one out of every four Pakistanis was a refugee. A vast majority of these refugees had come to Pakistan from the areas in India that were economically and socially more developed. The average level of urbanization and education in the refugee community was higher than that of the indigenous population. With one stroke, therefore, Pakistan saw an immense improvement in its human capital. With this human capital it was able to launch the industrialization of the 1950s and the green revolution of the 1960s.

The second example of making virtue out of external shock is the first trade war with India. Without the sudden dropping of the curtain between India and Pakistan in 1949, I doubt that Pakistan would have embarked upon the massive effort to industrialize or that it would have succeeded in evolving an economy which was totally independent from that of India's.

The third illustration is from the 1970s when the oil exporting countries increased the price of oil eight-fold in a period of just six years. While other oil-importing countries reeled under this shock - in fact, many of them are still to recover from it - Pakistan benefitted by exporting manpower to the Middle East. The migration to the Middle East has had a profound impact on Pakistan's economy: not only did it help Pakistan pay for the enormous increase in the import bill occasioned by the readjustment in the price of oil, it also helped to alleviate the worst forms of poverty.

Conclusions

What does Pakistan's economic record indicate? It shows an economy that started with modest resources, shaky foundations, and enormous teething problems but managed not only to survive but grow at a respectable rate. It also

shows an economy that grew and developed without a long-term purpose or a set of objectives. It had many architects, all of whom left their imprint -- perhaps indelible imprints -- on the economy's form. Most of them were managers with great abilities to overcome crisis. Most of them were not visionaries who could lay a straight course that the economy could unerringly follow. But that was perhaps just as well. The result was not just ad hocism but unsteady performance. In other words, the record has been a mixed one. But even though the structure that has been erected does not have fine, recognizable lines, it is an extraordinarily robust one. This then is my basic conclusion. What we have today in Pakistan is an economy that is not easy to describe by using conventional terms. It is a poor country with many characteristics of middle-income nations. It has a large state sector but is not a socialist economy. It has an enormously vibrant class of private entrepreneurs who deploy their resources pretty much as they please but it is not a pure capitalist economy. It has a powerful central government but with enough residual power in the provinces and local communities to block large projects or throw back budget proposals. It has a penchant for various types of auturkic approaches (food self-sufficiency, self sufficiency in steel and chemicals and so forth) but it has not managed to shut itself behind a high wall of tariff and a tightly closed door. It is an economy that is quite extraordinary in being so open to outside influences.

Some, perhaps many people, find all this very confusing and therefore lamentable. Since no easy label can be applied to describe the economy, there must be something serious the matter with it. But I reach a different conclusion. I see the economy as robust and with a future that would take it out of the ranks of the poor countries. The economy is strong simply because it is an aggregation of so many different trends and parts. It has been subjected to repeated shocks but has been able to withstand them all because history, mostly unwillingly, has given it strength that may not be visible on the surface but can be found if you care to examine the innards.

II. Pakistan's Current Economic Situation

In 1988, forty one years after Pakistan was born, its economy stands at a threshold. It could within the next five years cross into the ranks of the middle income countries or it could stay where it is today: a poor country in Southwest Asia, barely able to feed its large and growing population from the output of its agriculture sector; dependent on large flows of external capital to permit investment that would allow the economy to grow at a rate marginally higher than the increase in population; subject to social and political upheavals as its people express their dissatisfaction with the performance of the economy; with rapidly expanding cities unable to cope with new migrants as they arrive to escape poverty in the countryside. Could government action and public policy take Pakistan along the high route, toward relative prosperity? Or is the country destined to take the low route and remain a poor country with large pockets of absolute poverty? The government could help enormously in setting the course the economy will take but to do so it must recognize the weaknesses from which the economy suffers and which require urgent and sustained action by policy makers.

Although the economy in the closing years of the 1980s has many strengths, it has several weak spots that should receive attention.

- * The economy is in a state of transition; it needs considerable restructuring before it can develop the base that would help to move it into the ranks of middle income countries.
- * The level of social development remains low in spite of the remarkable progress made by the economy over the past forty years.
- * There is deterioration in physical infrastructure and there is the need for committing a larger share of gross domestic income to investment.

- * There is continued dependence on foreign capital flows and on non-government domestic savings to generate resources for investment.

An economy in a state of transition

An interesting feature of Pakistan's current economic situation is that while income per head of the population estimated in terms of the official rate of exchange places the country in the ranks of poor nations, it has many characteristics of a middle-income country. For instance, the contribution that agriculture makes to Pakistan's economy today is much less significant than normal for a poor country. The share of agriculture in GDP is now less than one-quarter; the average for all poor countries is 32%, for India it is 31% and for China it is 33%. The contribution made by agriculture on average for the lower middle-income countries is 22%, much closer to the situation in Pakistan. On the other hand, manufacturing output provides 22% of Pakistan's gross domestic product as against 12% for low-income countries and 17% for lower middle-income countries. The only other semi-industrialized poor country is China, where manufacturing provides slightly more than a third of the gross domestic product. As the data of Table 1 below reveal, Pakistan's industrial sector has also matured; it is now as diversified as the industrial sectors of such other middle-income countries as Turkey. The share of food and other agriculture-based industries is no longer as large as it is in poor countries and as it was in the early years of industrialization in Pakistan, when agro-based industries accounted for over three fourths of industrial output. The proportion of these industries in total output had declined to slightly over one-half by 1984.

Table 1
Structure of Manufacturing Distribution of manufacturing value added (% , 1980 prices)

	Food & Agriculture		Textiles & Clothing		Machinery & Transport Equipment		Chemicals		Other	
	1970	1984	1970	1984	1970	1984	1970	1984	1970	1984
Pakistan	19	28	57	23	7	10	7	21	11	18
India	11	12	37	26	14	19	8	11	30	32
Turkey	16	21	27	16	12	16	8	11	38	37
Korea	13	9	16	17	9	29	16	11	43	35

Source: The World Bank, *World Development Report 1987*, (Washington, D.C., 1987), pp. 214-215.

The share of primary commodities in total exports is another characteristic that distinguishes low-from middle-income countries and here as well Pakistan seems to have made quick progress. In 1965, 64% of Pakistan's exports were classified as primary commodities; in 1985, twenty years later, their share had fallen to only 37%.

The level of urbanization in Pakistan is closer to that of the lower middle-income countries than for poor nations. Pakistan now has about a third of its population living in towns and cities. In the lower middle-income and poor countries, the ratios are 36% and 22% respectively. And, unlike in most poor countries, Pakistan's urban population is not concentrated in one or two major cities.

In spite of a low level of social development, Pakistan has a fairly large pool of skilled workers who could be mobilized to modernize and restructure the economy.

If Pakistan has many characteristics typical of a middle-income country, why is it still counted as a poor country? There are two answers to this question, the first is familiar to development economists, the second is drawn from the analysis presented in Part I of this paper. Economists have long debated the problem posed by inter-country comparisons of national incomes. The usual methodology is to present estimates of national income in U.S. dollars. However, with a large proportion of developing countries' income coming from commodities that do not enter international markets or from activities on which it is difficult to put any kind of money estimate, national income comparisons based on conversions at official exchange rates do not produce very meaningful results. To overcome this problem, the World Bank has supported a project in which national incomes are estimated on the basis of purchasing power. This methodology estimates the real purchasing power of domestic incomes. Consumption baskets are constructed for different groups of countries and then the value of these baskets is estimated in dollars if purchases were to be made in the United States rather than in Pakistan or any other developing country. When this methodology is used to estimate national income, the outcome is very different. ICP comparisons estimate Pakistan's 1985 per

capita income at over \$1700; the average income per head on the basis of conversion on official exchange rate is only \$384. As shown in Table 2, Pakistan's per capita income when converted into U.S. dollars at the official rate of exchange is only 53% higher than that of India. However, expressed in terms of purchasing power, Pakistan's income per head is 91% greater. If the ICP comparison is more accurate, Pakistan should already be regarded as a middle income rather than a poor country.

Table 2

Gross Product Per Capita by ICP and Atlas Methods, 1985						
	ICP 1/		Atlas 2/		Pakistan Ratio	
	%	U.S.	%	U.S.	ICP	Atlas
Pakistan	10.3	1720	2.3	384	100	100
India	5.4	900	1.5	250	.52	.65
Philippines	12.1	2020	3.7	618	1.17	1.16
Korea	27.3	4556	13.3	2220	2.65	5.78
U.S.		16,690		16,690		

1. Estimates of national incomes based on purchasing power method.

2. Estimates of national incomes based on official exchange rate.

Source: The World Bank, *World Development Report 1987*, *Op. cit.*, p. 270.

If we stay with per capita income measures that use official exchange rate for conversion and comparison, then the reason for Pakistan exhibiting many characteristics of a middle income country while continuing to have income per head of the population of a poor country may be the result of its economic history. Lack of a consistent approach towards economic policy making and successive governments trying different approaches toward economic planning have produced highly developed parts of the economy that have emerged over time and now co-exist with those that remain extremely backward.

There is a lesson in this paradox for the future. For Pakistan to make sustained progress, its economic leaders -- the central and provincial governments, managers of public sector enterprises, private entrepreneurs -- will have to

design policies and adopt approaches that are consistent with the country's endowment and its geographical location. Only then will the country be able to iron out the rinkles that remain in its economic fabric.

Low level of social development and incidence of poverty

Statistics on poverty -- household expenditures, consumption of basic needs, etc. -- are notoriously weak in Pakistan. Any conclusions based on the information that is available are suspect and, therefore, should be treated with a great deal of caution.

Official statistics show some improvement in income distribution from 1963-64 to 1970-71 and then some worsening from 1970-71 to 1979. The trends are somewhat different for rural and urban areas. In the urban areas, there was an improvement of 20% in the 1963-64 to 1970-71 period and then a 10% deterioration from 1970-71 to 1979. In the countryside, income distribution improved up to 1971-72 by about 20% but then there was a 6% deterioration from 1971-72 to 1979. Data are not available for the period after 1979.

There are no reliable national estimates of the incidence of absolute poverty if absolute poverty is defined as the income at which it is not possible to have access to the basic necessities of life. This paucity of data notwithstanding, it is possible to reach the conclusion that Pakistan no longer suffers from absolute poverty to the extent of its prevalence among many of its neighbors. Pakistan's villages, towns and cities do not show the kind of desperate deprivations clearly visible in the cities of India and Bangladesh. The Pakistani countryside seems more prosperous than the countryside of such middle-income countries as Thailand and the Philippines. Per capita food consumption in Pakistan is also considerably higher than the average for mainland Asia, a good indicator that the number of people who are absolutely poor must not be very large.

The reason why Pakistan seems to be relatively free of absolute poverty has less to do with deliberate government

policy; it is more the result of remittances from the Middle East.

A simple calculation should help to illustrate this point. The pool of migrant labor created by Pakistan in the Middle East is estimated at about two to two and a half million people. The building up of this pool and its maintenance probably involved some 6 to 7 million people over a period of a decade and a half. Some three-fourths of these people were from poor households defined as those belonging to the bottom 40% of the population in an income distribution scale. Discounting for the fact that the poor households contributed more than one worker to the pool means that some 4 million out of 6 million poor households directly benefitted from migration. If 60% of this total flow of remittance was received by these households, the addition to household income was perhaps of the order of \$5,000 or about 30-40 times their average annual incomes. If this income was received over a period of five years for a typical household, there has been a very large infusion of money into the budgets of the poor families. A fairly significant amount of this infusion went into the purchase of food, clothing and shelter -- three of the more important basic needs. In other words, the significant reduction in the incidence of poverty witnessed in recent years is the result not of deliberate government policy but of private initiative that took millions of Pakistanis abroad, who generated external savings and transmitted them back to their families. Alleviation of the worst forms of poverty, therefore, is the consequence of one of the external shocks which have played such a critical role in giving shape to Pakistan's economic history. The recent reversals in the economic fortunes of the countries of the Middle East mean that this safety valve is no longer available to Pakistan in the future. It appears that the pool of migrants in the Middle East is shrinking and, with no significant reduction in the rate of population growth in sight, Pakistan will now have to take action to prevent the impoverishment of its population. However, as indicated by several indices that measure the level of social development, Pakistan will have to make an extraordinary

effort in order to stop a large proportion of its population to slip back into absolute poverty.

In spite of the rapid growth in Pakistan's GDP over the last four decades and in spite of the fact that many sectors of the country's economy have acquired the level of sophistication not normally associated with poor countries, the level of social development remains very low. For a country at Pakistan's level of overall development, we should expect a much higher level of achievement in the social sectors. This, unfortunately, is not the case. Weaknesses are exceptionally telling in three areas: education, health and fertility.

Table 3

Pakistan's Social Development in a Comparative Framework, 1985

	Pakistan	India	Sri Lanka	Low- Income Countries	Lower Middle- Income Countries
Education					
Primary Enrollment					
Male	54	105	105	109	110
Female	29	73	101	84	97
Total	42	90	102	97	103
Health					
Infant Mortality	115	89	36	72	82
Child Mortality	16	11	2	9	11
Life Expectancy					
Male	52	57	68	56	60
Female	50	56	72	60	61
Fertility					
TFR	6.1	4.5	3.2	3.9	4.3

Source: The World Bank. *World Development Indicators, 1987* (Washington, D.C., 1987), various tables.

Not only is the rate of overall literacy very low in Pakistan -- estimated at about a quarter of the total population and as low as one percent for some segments of the female population -- recent trends do not point to a

significant improvement in the near future. As shown in Table 3 above, the rate of enrollment for primary school age children is only 42%, which is less than one-half of the average for low income countries. The situation for girls is even worse: with less than a third of the primary school age girls attending classes, the women of Pakistan will not achieve respectable levels of literacy for many years to come. With well recognized links between female literacy and fertility, it would appear that Pakistan will continue to register high rates of population growth unless it is prepared to make a special effort to improve school enrollment, especially for girls.

Health statistics of Table 3 also point to a number of disturbing things about the level of social development in Pakistan. Infant and child mortality rates are much higher and life expectancy at birth is much lower than the averages for low income countries. This is surprising, especially in view of Pakistan's success in alleviating the worst forms of poverty and in achieving a relatively high rate of nutrition. There are two reasons for this paradox: poor levels of literacy which promotes indifference toward preventive care and poor coverage of health facilities, especially in the countryside.

It would be exceedingly difficult for Pakistan to make much economic progress in the future unless it is able to successfully tackle the problem posed by persistent low level of social development. A highly skilled pool of human resource which Pakistan possesses is an asset but a very large reservoir of poorly educated people in poor health would continue to act as a drag, keeping the economy from realizing its full potential.

Deteriorating physical infrastructure

A continuing deterioration in physical infrastructure adds to the problem posed by the low level of social development. Pakistan needs to increase significantly the amount of investment in maintaining the existing physical plant and in creating new forms of physical infrastructure.

The structural changes of the type discussed above will not happen on their own. They will need to be induced through a combination of private initiative, public policy and state programs. Not only is Pakistan's physical infrastructure now antique, it is neither strong enough to sustain the move towards a modern agro-industrial economy nor does it have the qualitative features to help promote such a transition. This point can be illustrated with the help of the examples given below.

Investment in power generation has not kept pace with the spectacular increase in demand. Pakistani planners underestimated the growth in demand for electric power -- for instance between 1971-72 and 1985-86, consumption of electricity nearly quadrupled -- while the fourth (1970-75), fifth (1979-83) and sixth (1983-88) five year development plans continued to predict a much lower rate of growth. There were a number of reasons for this extraordinary growth in demand. Government pricing policies encouraged waste and growth in consumption by the sectors that did not contribute to the country's material product. In the fourteen year period since 1971-72, household consumption of electricity has multiplied nine-fold which means an increase of 17 percent a year. Consequently, the share of household consumption of electric power increased from only 12 percent in 1971-72 to nearly 30 percent in 1985-86. A high rate of growth in the economy also contributed to a sharp increase in demand while improvements in the incomes of poor families added to household consumption. And yet, consumption of energy in Pakistan is not high for its level of development. In 1985, energy consumption per capita of the population was 218 kg. of oil equivalent as against 201 kg. for India and 515 kg. for China. For the lower middle income countries, the corresponding number was 358 kg. The conclusion is obvious: public policy has distorted the pattern of consumption in such a way that energy is not contributing as much as it should to economic development. This pattern of consumption will obviously inhibit the country's future progress.

The second example of infrastructural constraint on development comes from the sector of communication. The

best way of illustrating this problem is to use a simple index: the change over time in the number of vehicles per kilometer of what Pakistani statisticians describe as high grade roads. In 1970-71, the total length of such roads was estimated at 18,000 km. By 1985-86, the length of the roads had increased two and a half times to 46,000 km. At the same time, the number of vehicles using these roads increased from 360,000 to 1.84 million. In 1970-71 there were, therefore, 20 vehicles per km. of high grade roads; in 1985-86, their number had increased to 41 per km. This level of road density contributes not only to a very high rate of traffic accidents -- Pakistan today has the highest rate of traffic mortality per km of road in the world -- but also results in economic and financial waste.

There are other areas of physical infrastructural constraints that are not-so-well recognized. Pakistan began with 8,500 km. of railway track; in the forty years since independence, it added only 200 km. of additional track to its system. Railways now carry only 12 million tons of freight, 50 per cent less than the maximum carried in the mid-sixties. The stagnation of the system is the consequence of a number of developments, including the sharp increase in the number of road vehicles. Another important reason is that the design of the system has not changed while the economy has gone through a period of rapid modernization. With the increasing sophistication of the agricultural and industrial sectors and with dispersal of industrial capital over a number of areas, it will be necessary to accommodate the railways to cater to the growing need for bulk haulage. A qualitative change in the railway system must be accompanied by a qualitative change in the capacity of Pakistani ports. We will deal below with the remarkable openness of Pakistan's economy and the role it is playing in economic and social development. If these trends are to continue, then the railway and port systems must be developed to move in unison with economic change or they will continue to constrain the movements of goods and commodities into and out of the country.

To support Pakistan's structural transformation, physical infrastructure will need to expand enormously and change

qualitatively. Without its expansion and reorientation, the economy's growth will fall short of its potential.

Investment and domestic savings

Without getting involved in the old controversy about real or potential substitution between external and domestic savings, the important point can still be made that the present trends in domestic savings rates will not be able to support rapid economic growth and modernization. The statistics in Table 4 illustrate vividly the conclusion that Pakistan can no longer afford to depend on external flows for meeting its investment needs to the extent it has done in the past.

Table 4

Flows of Foreign Capital into Pakistan

	1970	1985
Public & publicly guaranteed debt (\$billion)	3.1	10.7
Private, non-guaranteed debt (\$ billion)	.005	.026
Use of IMF credits (\$ billion)	.045	1.3
Total debt (\$ billion)	3.05	12.7
Disbursements of publicly guaranteed (\$ million)	485	986
Repayment of principals (\$ million)	112	766
Net flows (\$ million)	373	220
Total interest payments (\$ million)	77	308
Net transfer (\$ million)	296	.88
Debt as a % of GNP	1.9	3.2
Debt as a % of exports of goods & Services	23.5	30.0

Source: Calculated from Government of Pakistan, *Economic Survey, 1986-87* (Islamabad: Minister of Finance, 1987), Statistical Annex.

Because of its failure to generate a sufficient amount of domestic resources for meeting investment needs, Pakistan has had to rely heavily on external flows. Consequently, it has built up a large stock of debt which has increased four-fold over a period of fifteen years. In 1985, the country received just under one billion dollars of disbursements in

external flows but it paid out just over a billion dollars in principal and interest payments on external debt. There was, therefore, a negative transfer of \$88 million in 1985 compared to nearly \$300 million of positive flows in 1970. In other words, Pakistan has to work very hard in order to secure new financing in order to be able to pay back what it owes from the past.

Poor mobilization of savings by the public sector, at a time when domestic expenditure was increasing rapidly, has further aggravated the resources picture. Today, the government of Pakistan is a net dissever which means that it spends more than it earns through taxation and other forms of revenues. The gap between investments by the government and its capacity to raise funds through taxation and earnings by public sector enterprises has been met mostly by non-bank borrowing. The government now has a number of savings schemes in operation aimed at obtaining privately owned funds for government use. While this type of resource mobilization has been non-inflationary, it has created a large pool of domestic debt which has to be financed at an increasing cost.

With large amounts of investments required to finance social development and improve physical infrastructure, Pakistan must urgently tackle the resource picture by improving its export performance and by expanding the government's tax base. Both areas pose problems: Pakistan, like so many other developing countries, faces shrinking external markets for its products. At the same time, its political leadership lacks the will to allow the government to tax incomes that have remained outside its reach. The handling of the budget of 1987 when the government withdrew a number of announced tax measures demonstrates the political difficulties that have to be surmounted.

However, without external and internal resource bases that are rapidly expanding it would not be possible to realize the high rate of growth in the future which Pakistan achieved in the past.

III. Pakistan in the year 2000

Part I of the paper described the main features of Pakistan's economic history. Part II looked at the current economic situation, focussing in particular on the problems that Pakistan will have to address in order to attain the status of a middle income country in the near future. The main conclusion of Part I was that, despite a very inauspicious beginning, Pakistan's economy performed extremely well; in fact, so well that by one measure it can be said to have already achieved the middle income country status. The main conclusion reached in Part II was that in achieving rapid progress over the last forty years, Pakistan has allowed a number of weaknesses to develop in its economic structure. Part III will deal with the question of Pakistan's future: what shape the economy will take if it overcomes the problems identified in Part II and is able to sustain for another decade or so the rate of growth experienced in the forty year period after independence. In other words, what will Pakistan's economy look like in 2000 A.D. How large will be its population; what will be the level of urbanization? Would Pakistan be able to manage a couple of mega-cities that will dominate the urban landscape?

Demographic scenarios for the near term have a greater degree of robustness about them than scenarios in other socio-economic fields for the simple reasons that basic attitudes that determine fertility rates change slowly. Accordingly, we can be a bit more confident about the size of Pakistan's population in the year 2000 than we can be about the size and structure of the economy.

Pakistan's population, estimated at some 100 million in 1988, will increase to a little over 145 million in the year 200 AD. By the end of this century, Pakistan's population will be 4 1/2 times the size the country inherited at the time of independence. The implied rate of growth in this projection puts Pakistan among the half a dozen or so rapidly expanding world populations.

Table 5

The World's ten largest countries				
	1985	2000	At the time of reaching population stability ^{1/}	
1. China	1040	1274	1600	(2000)
2. India	765	996	1700	(2010)
3. USSR	277	308	375	(2005)
4. U.S.	239	262	288	(2010)
5. Indonesia	162	212	361	(2010)
6. Brazil	136	178	293	(2010)
7. Nigeria	118	163	528	(2035)
8. Pakistan	96	146	353	(2035)
9. Bangladesh	114	141	310	(2030)
10. Japan	121	129	129	(2000)

^{1/} The dates in parentheses indicate the year when populations are estimated to attain stability.

Source: *The World Bank World Development Report, 1986, op. cit.*, pp. 254-255.

Pakistan's relative position in the league of nations will change; from being the tenth largest country in terms of population in 1987, it will become the eight largest, overtaking Japan and Bangladesh as it moves towards the close of the century. A further change is likely to occur when Pakistan finally achieves demographic stability. About the middle of the next century, Pakistan's population is likely to stabilize at about 350 million at which time it will be the sixth largest country in the world. (See Table 5)

The current rapid urbanization trend is likely to persist into the future with urban population increasing at the rate of 4.8% per year. Consequently, some 55 million people will live in Pakistan's towns and cities in the year 2000. In other words, Pakistan's urban population in 2000 will be one and a half times its total population at the time of independence. At present there are 8 cities with more than one million people; by 2000, their number will increase to 13. Several hundred villages of today will have to be reclassified as small towns of tomorrow.

The most dramatic demographic change will occur in large cities. Karachi's population would have doubled from about 6.7 million estimated for 1987 to 12.5 to 13.0 million by the end of the century. Lahore's population would have

increased from about 4.4 million to 8.5 million by the year 2000 but the city's current boundaries would have become meaningless by then. These boundaries will need to be drastically redefined to include Kasur, Shahdara, Muridke, perhaps also Sheikhpura as well. Thus redefined, Lahore in terms of population size as well as geographic spread would be a city much larger in size than Karachi. The mega-city of Lahore could have a population of some 15 million people. In the year 2000, Karachi and Lahore will present two very different urban pictures. Karachi will become even more heterogeneous than it is today. In terms of its gross economic output, it would also be much richer than today. Since one-half of the increase in its population will be the result of internal migration, income disparities will worsen even more. This deterioration in income distribution could have serious social implications. If December 1986 and May 1988 were bad dreams for Karachi, the year 2000 could become a terrible nightmare.

As discussed above, Lahore's conversion from a big city to a mega city will be the result not of a very high level of internal migration but of urban sprawl - a phenomenon that makes boundaries between proximate cities totally meaningless. Consequently, Lahore, which as a city is likely to be more viable than Karachi, will still pose some important administrative and infrastructural problems. A new institutional structure will have to be evolved to oversee the conversion of three or four independent urban entities into one mega-city. Pakistan's urban problems will be severe but not much more so than those faced by semi-industrialized countries of today.

The structure of Pakistan's economy should change in many profound ways between now and the year 2000. On the basis of present trends, its gross domestic product should more than double between 1987 and 2000; from \$35 billion to \$80 billion. GDP of \$80 billion and a population 145 million in 2000 A.D. will mean income per head of the population of about \$550 in today's prices and exchange rates. Pakistan will have finally graduated from a poor to a semi-industrial, lower middle income economy. If present trends continue, we can be quite precise about the time

Pakistan will make this transition. If we accept the World Bank's threshold of \$410 that separates poor from middle income countries, we see Pakistan making the transition in the year 1992.

Assuming that the structure of the economy - meaning the distribution of gross domestic product between agriculture, industry and the service sector -- as revealed by the available data is roughly correct and assuming that the rates of increase in the output of these sectors registered in the recent past will continue into the future, we can speculate about the shape of Pakistan's economy in the year 2000. The contribution of agriculture to the country's gross domestic product will be considerably less than today's. In the year 2000, agriculture will account for between 15 to 16% of the GDP. In that respect, Pakistan will become more like the upper middle income countries of today - countries such as Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico and Korea - where agriculture contributes around 14% to the gross national product. On the basis of these trends, Pakistan will make another transition: Sometime between now and the year 2000, the share of agriculture in employment will drop below 50%. Today, agricultural employment accounts for over 52% of the total; by 2000, this proportion will have declined to 45%. This will happen in spite of the fairly sharp increase in the size of the labor force. A combination of a high rate of increase in population and some improvement in labor participation rate means that total labor force will increase from 29 million to 44 million. However, in this increase of 15 million, only one third - about 5 million workers - will find jobs in agriculture, the rest will be accommodated in other sectors of the economy. A vast majority of this increment in non-agricultural labor force will be looking for jobs in the urban areas, probably in the large cities. International migration will cease to be the safety valve it was from 1974 to about 1985 but people's hopes of looking for job opportunities outside Pakistan will not totally disappear. A good proportion of the unemployed will, therefore, still head towards Karachi, Pakistan's traditional port of exit, in the hope of being able to leave the country. This will further compound Karachi's social and economic problems.

Still continuing to work on the basis of present trends, the year 2000 should see Pakistan become a semi-industrialized country with the manufacturing providing 35% of the gross domestic product. At that time, Pakistan will have achieved the level of industrialization already attained by such middle income countries as Turkey (34% of its GDP earned from industry in 1985), Brazil (33%), Mexico (35%) and Singapore (37%). But there will be a difference between the pattern of industrialization already visible in the middle income countries and the one Pakistan is likely to achieve on the basis of present trends. Somewhat more than a quarter of Pakistan's current manufacturing output comes from small scale industries, by the year 2000, this proportion is likely to increase to nearly a third. Related to this trend will be a far greater dispersal of industrial assets. It appears that Pakistan will have several pockets of industrialization rather than a few areas concentrated around a couple of major cities.

In other words, Pakistan in the year 2000 will be economically very different from what it is today. In terms of income per head of the population, it will be like the lower middle income countries of today but in terms of the structure of the economy it will be more like the upper middle income countries. Its economy will be much more diversified than those of middle income countries and its urban population and industrial capital will be located in several clusters scattered around the country. Whether this hypothetical country will become a reality will depend upon a number of circumstances: among them the course of political development, changes in the geopolitical situation, economic growth in the states neighboring Pakistan. These three factors will have a major impact on country's economic evolution from now until the end of the century.

Pakistani women in the 1980s and beyond

By Anita M. Weiss

Any discussion of Pakistani women in the 1980s must take into consideration many contradictory facts. The lifestyles and status of most Pakistani women today are little different from that of the past, though the lives of some women are profoundly different. Women remain burdened by household obligations and constrained by low literacy levels, the necessity of maintaining their family's *izzat* (respectability), and the social encumbrances to increased economic participation in the formal sectors of the economy. However, some women (e.g., Benazir Bhutto, Syeda Abida Hussain, Asma Jahangir) have surmounted these barriers and have achieved national recognition during this decade. The Women's Division of the Government of Pakistan, organized in 1979 at the Cabinet Secretariat level, has supported some outstanding research and projects promoting the advancement of Pakistani women. Yet, with the government's Islamisation program, women's legal status has been seriously compromised, and advances won over the past decades, particularly in the realm of family law, may be further reversed if the proposed 9th Amendment to the Constitution and Shariat Bill are passed. Finally, women, like men, cannot be grouped into one category: class and rural-urban differences as well as regional ones are critical and must be taken into consideration when discussing women's conditions. Nonetheless, certain broad areas can be distinguished which have a direct impact upon all women in Pakistan.

For the purposes of this chapter, I consider the three most important areas to be women's economic participation, legal status, and political mobilization. While issues such as access to health care, education and portrayals in the mass media are also important aspects of the composite picture of Pakistani women, they must lie beyond the scope of this discussion.

Economic Participation

Official statistics tend to obfuscate women's labor in the formal sectors of the economy and ignore their productive contributions in the informal, subsistence, and domestic sectors. For example, at the outset of this decade, government planners reported that women accounted for only some 3 million laborers, or less than 4 per cent of the total work force. In urban areas, women officially comprised only 5.5 per cent of the employed labor force.¹ Data is occasionally poorly collected and skewed, as evidenced in the 1981 Lahore district census which claims an unrealistic (albeit optimistic) 41 per cent literacy level among women over age 10.²

Alternatively, from research carried out by the Women's Division, we realize that the reason for such beguiling data is that, at least in the Punjab, most urban women engaged in remunerative labor do piecework in the informal sector, instead of being engaged in formal employment.³ Their piecework contributions are often counted as part of the total family's labor. In a recent random sample which I conducted of 100 women in the Old City of Lahore, 55 were involved in piecework or informal sector labor.⁴

Farida Shaheed and Khawar Mumtaz (1983) studied conditions confronting female pieceworkers in the Kot Lakhpat *Muhalla* (neighborhood) on the outskirts of Lahore. Over 8 per cent of the women surveyed in 300 households were engaged in piecework, far above the 3 per cent estimated by the government when the area was officially surveyed in 1977. Most of the women observed some sort of *purdah* (seclusion) and were the first to ever work in their families. The vast majority were engaged in

traditionally female tasks of sewing, knitting and embroidery, while fewer were engaged in making cosmetic jewelry, scouring brushes, tinsel garlands, and paper bags. A variety of topics were surveyed, including how such labor affects women's social relations, their perceptions of their labor, and their self-appraisal. Shaheed and Mumtaz found a strong correlation between the amount of money earned and the degree of confidence which women gained from their work. In addition to the main monetary problems which these women faced, they also suffered from a lack of information (concerning work availability, work rates, and workers' rights), lack of skills, and adverse conditions of work (e.g., low pay, negative attitudes of males towards work, dual burden of housework and piecework). The study recommends that home pieceworkers be entitled to unionize and be covered by protective legislation such as the Minimum Wage Act. In addition, they recommend that Kot Lakhpat should establish an industrial home for skill improvement and for training in other areas to enhance income generation potential. Provision should also be made for women's cooperatives, day-care centers, and health care facilities.

It appears that there is a negative income effect on women's labor force participation: women work out of economic necessity and withdraw from the labor force when their contribution is no longer required.⁵ In rural areas, while women engage in labor for their family's subsistence, few own productive resources and have little opportunity for paid employment (Ahmed, 1985). In urban areas, factory employment tends to be temporary and insecure, void of such luxuries as maternity leave and medical benefits. Work within the home is possible because of its anonymity - but precisely because of this, wages are unreasonably low.⁶

An unusual study of working class women in Lahore has come out from Sayeed Engineers in the form of a 1987 calendar, based on a survey conducted in November 1986. It is unfortunate that the conditions under which the survey was conducted and respondents contacted is sketchy, but the photographs very skillfully illuminate the reality of women's labor in six categories: factory, kiln, building construction,

road construction, pieceworkers, and sweepers. The study reports wages, household income, ownership of consumer durables, housing, debt levels, and social conditions. On the average, 25 per cent of household income was earned by the respondents in the survey, which is substantially more than urban working class women are generally credited. Almost 20 per cent have at least matriculated from school, while nearly half dispel the prevailing myth of sexual segregation in that they favor working jointly with men. However, are we to assume that such attributes have always been characteristic of working class women but went previously undocumented, or that circumstances confronting women in this class today are intrinsically different than in the past, forcing these women to play a more central role in their family's economy?

My sense is that both assumptions have some merit. Urban working class women have always played critical economic roles which have largely gone undocumented, but circumstances today require even more from them. Nuclear families have become the norm in industrializing urban Pakistan, and women are increasingly being recruited as wage-earners. This is highlighted in a series of graphic portraits of working women in Lahore written by Khawar Mumtaz in various issues of *Viewpoint* (Lahore) between 1985-87. She details the problems facing female "temporary workers" who labor for years at a transnational pharmaceutical plant; the daily routine - as well as the hopes and aspirations - of a maidservant; and the myriad problems confronting women in the informal sector. The stark reality depicted is often more than a reader would like to be exposed to: the shattered dreams of an industrial worker; the 20-hour day of a domestic worker who returns home to six children, a tired husband and a *Katchi abadi* (ramshackle shack) at night; and the vegetable seller in her fifties who supports her invalid husband. These are the tales left out of official statistics. Such portrayals circumvent problems confronted in quantitative data collection and allow for vivid descriptions of these women's lives to argue the case for more attention to be paid to circumstances facing women.

Male out-migration to the Gulf has affected women's labor force participation in two ways: First, it has opened up job opportunities for educated women which men once held; and second, has enabled many women in migrants' families eventually to stop working. Abbasi & Irfan (1986:182) have found that remittances apparently also reduce female unpaid family work in rural areas and low-wage employment in urban areas. There have also been substantial psychological effects of this migration on women left behind, referred to by Akbar S. Ahmed (1986) as the "Dubai Syndrome".

Conditions for women to work in the Punjab and Karachi albeit limited and problematic - are vastly different from those existing outside of these relatively industrially advanced parts of the country. For example, a report for the Women's Division based on conditions in the Northwest Frontier Province looked at the extent to which women participate in cottage and small scale industries in Peshawar, Mansehra, and Swat districts (Nazeer & Aljalaly, 1983a). Women were consistently found doing tasks which were extensions of work done at home (e.g., canning, tailoring, weaving, spinning). Essentially, women either undertake work associated with female tasks or jobs which men do not like to do. The traditional view that "home is the proper place for women"⁷ is still reported as the main impediment to female participation in industrial employment, even at the government level. Apparently, while social customs and taboos, illiteracy, job scarcity, and lack of segregation at the work place still serve to inhibit female participation in the Northwest Frontier Province (Nazeer and Aljalaly, 1983b), these same factors have been modified when the demands of industry, such as exist in the Punjab and Karachi, require them.

Women's economic power in the next decade in Pakistan, and on into the next century, will most likely continue to increase; such trends are prevalent worldwide. However, two factors will significantly affect their prospects: the state of Pakistan's economy on the whole and legal changes affecting the status of women.

Legal Status

I would argue that women's legal status has received some severe setbacks this decade. Initially, the Islamisation program was fairly limited in its specific effects on women. While some conservatives had argued that judicial reforms setting up a Federal Shariat Court would allow only men to sit as *Qazis* (judges in religious courts), the Attorney General struck this down in 1982. Quoting *Shari'a* (Islamic Law sources, he saw no reason to ban women as qazis. Also, no gender restrictions were placed on membership in the *Majlis-e-Shura* (the federal consultative assembly).

The first hint that the government's implementation of an Islamic penal code would not favor equality of status for men and women came with the promulgation of the Offense of *Zina* (sexual offense) Act.⁸ In particular, President Zia-ul-Haq (1979:19) stated that a person could be proven guilty of *Zina-bil-Jabr* (four types of sexual intercourse without consent, e.g., rape) "with or without the consent of the parties". For our purposes, the importance of this law's implementation is that punishments have been meted out in a highly discriminatory fashion. Women have been proven guilty through medical examinations or from becoming pregnant following a rape, while men have often been let off due to lack of evidence.⁹

It was the issue of evidence which became central to the concern for women's legal status, not only in penal issues but in all aspects of the legal code. The *Qanoon-e-Shahadat* (Law of Evidence) modified the existing pre-independence Evidence Law in October 1984. Initially, it was thought that women might be restricted from testifying in certain kinds of *hudud*¹⁰ cases and their testimony in other matters would be irrelevant unless corroborated by another woman. The final version restricts stipulation that the testimony of two women is equal to that of one man to financial cases; in other instances, acceptance of a single women's testimony has been left to the discretion of the judge. However, the fact that a women's evidence in financial cases is not equal to that of a man's may well constrain women's economic participation. One can foresee occasions when a woman will

not partake of certain economic opportunities for fear that her testimony will not be sufficient in a court of law.

The proposed Law of *Qisas* (retaliation) and *Diyat* (blood money) has not yet been decreed, and it now appears doubtful that it will be. Essentially, the law if enacted would allow only half the amount of compensation given for the murder or maiming of a man to be given for the murder or maiming of a woman. This could be interpreted as an affirmation by the state that a women's value is only half that of a man's, which could have serious implications in all spheres of social life for women. While the law has not been decreed, that it has been promoted to the extent that it has discredits the government's statements that it strives for the improved position of Pakistani women. That it has not been promulgated portends well for the future of women.

However, possible new legal dangers have recently come on the horizon. There are the proposed Ninth Amendment to the Constitution and the Shariat Bill. The Ninth Amendment would give government organs the power to interpret Muslim personal law and would, most likely overturn the Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 which gave women

minimal protection against arbitrary divorce and polygamy, and gives orphaned children the right to inheritance, and was to be the forerunner of further legislation on women and children's rights.

The Shariat Bill would give more power to interpretations of Shari'a in the country. For example, clause 13 states:

Every member of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary shall observe all the injunctions of Shariah and shall refrain from all acts prohibited by it.

A foreboding clause 14 states:

Mass media shall be purged of such programmes which are against the Shariah.

The jurisdiction of the Shariat Court would be widened significantly, and it would have the final say on all legal issues within the country. However, the court has established a precedence of decisions often considered unfavorable to women. Opponents of the Shariat Bill fear it would ultimately serve to diminish further women's power and status in the country.

As we approach the end of this decade, women's legal status remains secure within the parameters of the 1961 Family Laws Ordinance, although this could soon change. In the economic arena, women are not popularly perceived as equal social actors to men, which is reflected in the *Qanoon-e-Shahadat*. The women can still serve in the legislature and in the judiciary is an important legal achievement which must be recognized. However, it is difficult to predict which direction future legal changes will take. While most of the important laws proposed thus far in this decade would serve to diminish the legal status of women, many of these laws, whose proposals have met with controversy and strident protests, have not been decreed.

It is in the highly visible territory of law that women have been able to articulate their objections to certain pronouncements of the state, and have been able to mobilize against their implementation.

Political Mobilization for Women's Rights

The period 1983-87 witnessed the emergence of grassroots movements in urban areas of Pakistan whose aim was to attract attention to the effects of the government's Islamisation program on women. Cries of discrimination against women were initially raised in response to the then proposed *Qanoon-e-Shahadat* in February 1983, when women lifted the veil of silence which had fallen over Pakistan since the 1979 execution of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Syeda Abida Husain, Chairman of the Jhang District Council and the sole directly elected female

member of the National Assembly, said then that women in Pakistan were in the midst of fighting the biggest *jihad* (holy war) in history, and that "Islam enjoins rights and responsibilities on Muslim women which are not subject to any dispute".¹¹

Since independence in 1947, the only long standing women's organization of note in Pakistan has been the All Pakistan women's Association (APWA), headed by the wife of the first prime minister of Pakistan, Begum Ra'ana Liaquat Ali Khan. During its first thirty-five years, APWA was commonly regarded as a charity organization made up of the wives of the elite (Chipp, 1980). However, APWA's image has been changing in this decade as it has supported the two national activist women's groups, the Women's Action Forum (WAF) and the Pakistan Women Lawyers' Association (AWLA) in many of their demands for women's equality. Begum Ra'ana Liaquat Ali Khan, in assessing the relevance of the United Nations' Decade for Women on Pakistan, has publicly states:

...we the women of Pakistan find that in spite of the progress we have made, we are still dispossessed of equal rights and equal opportunities ... I categorically state Islam affords complete equality of men and women. That instead of being wrongly associated with total suppression, severe physical punishments and denial of human rights, in Islam every principle is to be tempered with understanding, justice, a sense of brotherhood and forgiveness. I, therefore, assert that it is necessary to repeal certain laws and to enact new legislation which will give women their due rights and a challenging stake in the destiny of Pakistan.¹²

That a woman of her stature would support the women's movement¹³ gave it greater credibility in the eyes of many Pakistanis. For example, following APWA's demand at its Triennial Conference in Lahore in 1982 that the government establish a Commission on the Status of Women, the government did so. However, the commission's report has

since become a subject of controversy as the government still refuses to release its findings publicly. Even though the government had appointed all of the members of the commission, the report it submitted apparently criticizes many policies which have hindered women, and makes many recommendations which, once made public, may open new avenues for criticism of the government.

The Women's Action Forum, an independent group, was organized in 1982 by women in Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad to strengthen women's position in the country. The first national convention was held in Lahore in October 1982, with the intention to hold the second the following October in Karachi. However, owing to the dramatic protests against the *Qanoon-e-Shahadat* held in early 1983, the second convention was moved ahead to July. At that time, WAF members reiterated the organization's aims and objectives: that it was to be, first and foremost, a consciousness-raising group remaining non-political, non-governmental and non-aligned.

In the fall of 1983, WAF, along with other women's groups, organized demonstrations throughout the country to protest both the *Qanoon-e-Shahadat* and the public flogging of women. In late 1983, a disagreement over WAF's internal organization caused it to split into two distinct groups which have since reunited.

APWA has also played an important role in protesting against the imposition of certain aspects of the government's Islamisation program. For example, it has passed the following resolutions

- 1) February 21, 1983: against discriminatory laws which falsely claim to be based on Islam;
- 2) May 19, 1984: noted with anxiety that crimes and violence against women have been on the increase;
- 3) (No date given): noted with regret that "despite the hopes raised by the Sixth Five Year Plan, progress in women's literacy is appealingly slow," and that the

government must implement a crash program to raise female literacy levels...

WAF had also criticized the Sixth Five Year Plan's failure to place adequate resources at the disposal of various development programs which focus on women.

In November 1985, the International Women's Lawyers Conference convened in Lahore and, led by the PWLA, urged the government of Pakistan to sign the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and to support the establishment of a

non-government international commission ... to recommend a uniform and universal code of personal laws under Islam with equal representation of women and embodying these in specific provisions of law in the light of international norms and standards of justice, peace and equity.¹⁴

However, to this date, the government has not signed the Convention - and it appears doubtful that it ever will.

More protests and organized opposition occurred in 1986 in the wake of the debate over the Shariat Bill and the Ninth Amendment. On August 1, 1986, 28 organizations representing lawyers, trade unions, cultural and literary organizations, students, and women issued a joint statement opposing the Shariat Bill on the grounds that it negated principles of justice, democracy and fundamental rights of citizens, and that it would give rise to sectarianism and serve to divide the nation. On September 21st, the Shahrah-i-Quaid-i-Azam in Islamabad witnessed two simultaneous processions: over 1,000 women representing 25 women's organizations gathered under WAF's banner protesting the Shariat Bill, and about a hundred *'ulema* (religious leaders) shouting threats and slogans against the women and demanding the bill's passage.¹⁵ In early January of 1987, ten women's organizations in Lahore passed a resolution protesting against the Ninth Amendment, considering it "extremely injurious" to the rights and status of women in Pakistan,¹⁶ and more groups have since joined them. These

organizations were not small, fanatical groups on the fringe of society, but rather included the Business and Professional Women's Club, APWA, the Democratic Women's Association, and the YWCA. Syeda Abida Husain urged women "to unite and launch an immediate campaign to force parliament to reject the Bill".¹⁷

But soon afterwards, a new issue unfolded. Two sisters were kidnapped, presumably raped and then murdered in Karachi. There were subsequent allegations that the police, on finding the bodies of the Masoom sisters and afterwards, incompetently destroyed much of the evidence which could have led to solving the crime. This case has since been expanded into a larger issue: that the police are unable to control the mounting crimes against women, evidenced by four cases of rape occurring in Karachi in January 1987 alone (Irshad, 1987). Protest riots broke out in the major cities; crowds were lathi-charged by police in Karachi, women set their veils ablaze in Lahore. At the same time, a controversial delegation led by Salma Ahmed (former Secretary of the Women's Division) was addressing the United Nations' Commission on the Status of Women in New York. It was controversial in that two female members of the National Assembly had refused to join the delegation, protesting that "women had no status to speak of in the country". But the official delegation assured the United Nations that the government was working towards promoting the full participation of women in all spheres of life. *Viewpoint's* January 14th edition includes an account of what occurred:

Then Mrs. Salma Ahmed continued, "Pakistan's national machinery established in response to the forward looking strategies is planning a national conference that will study these strategies within the framework of the priorities of Pakistan's six-year plan". She also informed the panel that a national workshop on statistics and indicators on women and development had been recently organized, as well as a special women's action programme which would set up projects for co-operative banking facilities

solely for women (this has not yet been implemented) ... Meanwhile, the women of Lahore advanced towards the barricades again, and faced the three-deep line of riot police. Young men attempting solidarity were pushed back by raised lathis.

Women protesting in front of the Sind Assembly were lathi-charged, which caused additional public outcry. The issues raised remain unresolved at this time.

In 1983, women's organized protests enjoyed little public support; that support seems to be growing as popular participation in politics increases. The support is related to three events:

- 1) the increased politicization of many Pakistanis with the lifting of martial law at the end of 1985;
- 2) a possible side effect of Benazir Bhutto's popularity, as she is a strong supporter of women's causes in the country;
- 3) the murder of the Masoom sisters which struck a chord in many people who finally felt compelled to join the protests as they realized that as women's basic human rights are taken away and their status is diminished, crimes against women tend to increase.

I cannot write that women's political mobilization campaigns will only go as far as the government will let them: we must recall that it was women who held the first demonstrations which Pakistan had seen in seven years in their protest against the Qanoon-e-Shahadat in 1983. I do not know how far such action will get women, as there may well be a backlash against such *jadidi* (modern) ideas as was reflected in the fall of *kameez* (long fitted shirts) hemlines nearly to women's ankles in late 1983. But the momentum is there, and my assumption is that it will continue to increase.

And Beyond?

Social developments, as Burki (1984:406) argues, lag terribly behind in Pakistan, and their absence severely hinders women. However, for women to play a more integral role in Pakistani society in the coming years, they will need more than to receive better quality education,¹⁸ have better access to health care, and enjoy greater caloric consumption. Paul Streeten (1981:226), one of the World Bank's foremost authorities on basic needs, realizes that there is more to social development than feeding, clothing and housing people, and that it should also include:

individual and group participation in the formulation and implementation of projects, and in some cases political mobilization. This widely ranging sociopolitical interpretation sometimes verges on the notion that the satisfaction of basic needs is a human right: freedom from want is like the right not to be tortured.

Few scholars address where women fit into this paradigm, especially when talking about Pakistan's future.¹⁹ Instead, it is Pakistani women who have taken the first steps - in their analyses on women and economic participation, in their research on women and Islamic law, in their successful mobilization campaigns for women's rights, and in establishing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which address particular, practical needs. It is heartening that the Government of Pakistan appears to be in favor of the creation of a special fund to assist NGOs in their activities, which will by extension benefit women. Severe limitations for women certainly exist, but while Pakistan's economy might face constraints on growth, its expatriate workers return from the Gulf with minimal job prospects at home, and its political institutions seem to have growing pains, prospects for Pakistani women in the future appear boundless if they continue on their present path.

Notes

1. Compiled from Government of Pakistan, Finance Division *Economic Survey: 1982-83* Islamabad: Economic Advisor's Wing, 1983, and Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission *The Fifth Five-Year Plan: 1978-83* Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1978.
2. Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, *1981 District Census Report of Lahore* Population Census Organization, Islamabad: February 1984, Table 8, page 20.
3. Sabeeha Hafeez, 1983. *Women in Industry: Phase I, Basic Survey* Report prepared under the auspices of the Women's Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. Completed in 1983, it was based on responses of more than 2,000 women, 500 labor leaders, and 500 male executives from diverse sectors of industry in 30 Pakistani cities.
4. This research is part of a larger study *Walls Within Walls: Life Histories of Working women in the Old City of Lahore* (in Civilization Program, May-August, 1987).
5. For example, refer to Khan & Bilquees, 1976, and Abbasi & Irfan, 1986:179.
6. The wages I have uncovered in my recent research are so low that women are able to only minimally contribute to their household maintenance expenses. However, these families are often so poor that the average monthly income of Rs. 500 (US\$ 30) can have an impact upon their standard of living.

7. The actual Urdu expression is *Chador aur Char Diwari*, translated as wearing a veil and remaining within the four walls of the home.
8. For a complete discussion of *zina* (adultery) and other aspects of the government of Pakistan's Islamisation program, refer to Anita Weiss (ed.) *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: the Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State*. Syracuse University Press, 1986.
9. A well known case is that of Safia Bibi, a young blind domestic servant who was raped by her employer. Her punishment of fifteen lashes was ultimately remitted, although the two men involved were acquitted. See Weiss, 1986:100.
10. Hudud crimes are those that are against God's commands as delineated in the *Qur'an*, and are consequently absolute. For further discussion, refer to Ignaz Goldziner, *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law* (Princeton University Press, 1981); and Mustafa A. Kara, "The Philosophy of Punishment in Islamic Law" (Unpublished dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1977).
11. As quoted in *The Muslim*, February 17, 1983.
12. All Pakistan Women's Association, "The U.N. Women's Development Decade - Its Relevance to Pakistan" (Karachi: Victoria Printing Works, 1985), p. 4.
13. For the record, it should be noted that both of the mentioned groups consist mainly of wealthy women; few working class or rural women are even aware of their activities at this time.
14. *Dawn* (Karachi), November 7, 1985.

15. *Dawn*, September 22, 1986, p. 1.
16. *Viewpoint*, January 15, 1987, p. 15.
17. As quoted in *Viewpoint*, January 15, 1987, p. 16.
18. According to the most recent available statistics (Government of Pakistan, 1983b:178), only 13.7% of the adult female population in 1981 could "read a newspaper and write a simple letter". Less than 1/4 of all matriculating students are female.
19. For example, not one article in Burki & LaPorte (1984) addressed the position which women may play in Pakistan's development options.

References

Ahmad, Akbar S.

1986. *Pakistan Society: Ethnicity and Religious Identity*
Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Burki, Shahid Javed.

1984. "Pakistan's Sixth Plan: Helping the Country Climb Out of Poverty" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 24, No. 4, April, pp. 400-422 and Robert LaPorte, Jr. (eds.)
1984. *Pakistan's Development Priorities: Choices for the Future* Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Carroll, Lucy.

1982. "Nizam-i-Islam: Processes and Conflicts in Pakistan's Programme of Islamisation, with Special Reference to the Position of Women" *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 20, pp. 57-95.

Chipp, Sylvia A.

1980. "The Modern Pakistani Woman in a Muslim Society" in S. Chipp & Justin Green (eds.) *Asian Women in Transition* University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 204-226.

Govt. of Pakistan, Finance Division.

1983a. *Pakistan: Basic Facts, 1982-83* Islamabad: Economic Adviser's Wing 1983b *Economic Survey: 1982-83* Islamabad: Economic Adviser's Wing.

Govt. of Pakistan, Planning Commission. 1978. *The Fifth Five-Year Plan: 1978-1983* Karachi: Manager of Publications.**Govt. of Pakistan, Women's Divi., n.d.**

Development Programmes and Projects for Women in Pakistan: July 1980 to June 1981 Islamabad.

Hafeez, Sabeeha.

1983. *Women in Industry: Phase I, Basic Survey* Report prepared under the auspices of the Women's Division, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

Hooper, Emma.

1985. *Working Women in Lahore* unpublished dissertation, University of London.

Irshad, Sairah.

1987. "A Licence to Rape?" *The Herald* 18 (2), February, pp. 93-96.

Mumtaz, Khawar & Farida Shaheed.

1987. *Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back* London: Zed Press.

Patel, Rashida.

1979. *Women and Law in Pakistan* Karachi: Asia Foundation.

Shah, Nasra N. (ed.).

1986, *Pakistani Women: a Socioeconomic & Demographic Profile* Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics & Makhdoom A. Shah, 1980. "Trends and Structure of Female Labour Force Participation in Rural and Urban Pakistan" in Alfred de Souza (ed.) *Women in Contemporary India and south Asia* New Delhi: Manohar, pp. 95-123

Streeten, Paul, et. al.

1981. *First Things First: Meeting Basic Needs in Developing Countries* New York: Oxford University Press. Published for the World Bank.

Weiss, Anita M.

1984. "Tradition and Modernity at the work place: a Field Study of women in the Pharmaceutical Industry of Lahore" *Women's Studies International Forum* (7) 4, 1985. "Women's Position in Pakistan: Sociocultural Effects of Islamisation" *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXV, No.8, August, pp. 863-880, (ed.), 1986. *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: the Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Zia, Shehla; Jilani, Hina; and

Jahangir, Asma.

1982. "Muslim Family Laws and the Implementation in Pakistan" Islamabad: Study sponsored by the Women's Division, Government of Pakistan.

Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad.

1979. "Introduction of Islamic Laws: Address to the Nation" Islamabad, 10 February.

9

Pakistan's *Zakat* system and the status of women

Grace Clark

Introduction

Pakistan's national *Zakat* system, introduced in 1980 as part of the Zia government's Islamization program, is a public welfare system based on the traditional Islamic practice of *zakat*, or the giving of a certain portion of one's wealth to the poor (Zia, 1980).

The *Zakat* Ordinance of 1980 (Chapter 4, Section 8) specifies that *zakat* funds may be disbursed for both subsistence and rehabilitation, as well as other purposes cited in Shariah. The same section of the ordinance specifically names widows first, along with orphans, the disabled, and the handicapped, as the targeted recipients of *zakat*. *Zakat* is closely related to issues affecting the status of women because the majority of adult recipients are women.

When *zakat* was introduced as an "Islamic welfare system", (Zia, 1980), it inherited the burden of enormous expectations. Islamic economists, politicians, and would be ideological engineers of the perfect Islamic state have written extensively about what *zakat* can and should do. They have convinced many people that an Islamic socio-economic system, with *zakat* as a base, will produce economic justice, eliminate poverty and beggary, rehabilitate the poor to self-support, and increase the total wealth and well-being of the whole society (Qureshi, 1979; Mannon, 1980; Crane, 1981; Naqvi, 1981; K. Ahmed, 1983; and Haddad, 1982). Politicians throughout the Islamic world have fueled this vision. Naqvi (1981) cautioned that *zakat*

alone should not be expected to bring about these goals, especially a partial implementation of *zakat*, but the rhetoric has had the effect of raising expectations.

Like most public welfare systems, Pakistan's *zakat* is residual, i.e., it picks up the pieces when other social institutions fail. It provides short term, supplementary support to meet part of an individual's need (Wilensky and LeBeaux, 1985; Kahn, 1969). *Zakat*'s modal benefit of 50 rupees per month, distributed on an irregular basis (Clark, 1985), is insufficient to be a sole source of support for even the most destitute. Instead, *zakat* benefit payments provide cash to supplement food, clothing and other contributions of friends and neighbors.

Pakistan has also invested some *zakat* funds, as well as consolidated funds (i.e., funds from general revenue) toward the goal of rehabilitating *zakat* recipients to self-sufficiency. The goal of rehabilitation to self-support applied to all able-bodied *zakat* recipients, both men and women, although in practice rehabilitation is emphasized more for men than women.

As a residual system, Pakistan's *zakat* provides insight into the other institutions whose breakdown creates the need for *zakat*. Thus, it is not possible to consider *zakat* without considering institutions in the society as a whole. Moreover, Pakistan's *zakat* policy provides an excellent example of how the potential success of one government policy can be limited when that policy implicitly contradicts both traditional practice and other current government policies.

This chapter argues that the status of Pakistani women and its consequences are major factors in creating the need for *zakat*. The status of women in Pakistan creates a long-term need for maintenance support which cannot be met by any residual program. Women's status is also a major factor inhibiting *zakat* women's successful rehabilitation to self-support without a change in the status of Pakistani women; at the same time, changes in the status of women, either in traditional practice or by government policy, or both would do far more than *zakat* or any other type of public welfare

system to help women establish a solid base for economic security and self sufficiency.

Brief Review of the Status of Pakistani Women

The status of Pakistani women can best be described as "dependent". From birth to death, they depend on some men. This dependence is rooted in biology, as the average Pakistani woman has eight pregnancies. From the time she is married as an adolescent until well into middle age, she is either pregnant, nursing, or caring for small children (Inayatullah, 1983).

Pakistani culture and tradition reinforce this. A woman is expected to marry and bear children as her major life goal; her personal status increases at marriage, then with the birth of the first child, then with each subsequent son. Failure to marry or failure to bear children are highly stigmatizing. Except for a small minority of educated professional women, there are few acceptable social roles for a woman other than that of wife and mother.

A little girl is taught that she can and should depend first on her father, then on her husband, and in old age, on her son to protect her, to make decisions for her, and to provide her support. She learns to expect that if something happens to her father or husband, other men in the family will take care of her. Her education usually consists of her mother teaching her the skills she will need to be a good wife and mother. She receives little formal schooling -- only 14 per cent of Pakistani women ten years of age and older are literate (*Pakistan Economic Survey*, 1983-84).

A Pakistani girl is taught that her family's honor depends on her virtue. To protect her from undesirable contacts with men, she is taught that it is wrong to speak to unrelated men. At no point in the normal acculturation process are women, even upper class women, taught how to function as economically independent individuals, nor are they encouraged to do so.

Pakistani men are also expected to marry and have children, but a man is expected to provide for the economic security of his family. A great portion of his personal status

is based on how well he does this. Boys are expected to learn some occupation or skill and to work successfully with other men outside the family. Dependence of an adult Pakistani male on another male for economic support is considered demeaning.

In the last several years, some women have begun to work for money, either outside the home in factories or at a home doing piecework. These jobs tend to be inadequate to support families, but do supplement the husband's income. There is considerable stigma attached to such work, and it is often seen as a reflection of a man's inability to provide for his family. Even when the woman's earnings form a considerable share of the family income, it tends not to be acknowledged because of the reflection on the husband (Weiss, 1986).

Pakistani law codifies a woman's dependence. It places girls under the legal control and responsibility of their fathers and women under that of their husbands. Men are legally required to support their wives and children, but it is difficult to enforce this because of the broad discretionary power men are granted over their wives. Women may be able to inherit and own property, which allows some of them some degree of economic security if their father or husband has been prosperous, but almost all are still highly dependent on men.

During the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, a long series of legal changes improved the status of women by increasing their recognition as individual persons with individual rights. Government policy supported, or even initiated, many programs to improve the legal, educational and economic status of women (Weiss, 1986).

Pakistan's current government has also undertaken a program to improve the health, education, and protection of women. Unfortunately for women, these goals have become entwined with and subordinated to the program of Islamization. Government initiatives, such as women's universities and courts, however well-intended, have been structured to be consistent with a conservative view of Islam. These, along with reforms which make no pretense about being well-intended toward women, all have the result of

decreasing the recognition of Pakistani women as individuals, limiting their opportunities for individual accomplishments outside of marriage, and increasing the dependence of women on men as arbiters of their fate.

Furthermore, the status of Pakistani women is also "poor". The majority of all Pakistanis live in poverty, both women and men. For the majority of Pakistan's people, intact families, with all members working at traditional roles, scrape along at subsistence levels. (*Pakistan Economic Survey*, 1982-83). For all the poor, both men and women, there are few hard economic assets to provide any cushion against economic disaster.

Dependent status is limiting to the dignity and opportunities of upper class and middle-class women, but, when the dependence of Pakistani women is viewed in conjunction with the extent of widespread poverty, it becomes obvious how vulnerable most Pakistani women are in terms of economic security.

The Status of Women and the Zakat System

The status of women is an irrelevant issue to the government's collection of *zakat*. The government is a completely equal opportunity tax collector. When *zakat* is collected, the computer deducts it from all accounts above Rs.3000, for which the account holder has not filed for an exemption, whether the account holder is a man or a woman.

It is *zakat* distribution which is so deeply intertwined with the issue of the status of women. Like most public welfare systems, the majority of adult *zakat* recipients are women. Furthermore, because the majority of Pakistani women live their lives in poverty, a large proportion of Pakistan's female population is vulnerable to the possibility of needing *zakat* at some time in their lives.

Women come to need *zakat* when the traditional institution of the family cannot support them adequately - or at all. Even in the traditional villages where primary life-long relationships provide strong incentives to carry out traditional responsibilities, people do not always do what

they are supposed to do. A woman may not have sons. Male relatives, poor themselves, may already be extended to the limits of what they can support.

For urban families, the strong kinship ties to the extended family in the village are weakened by geographical distance and infrequent contact. If the male breadwinner cannot work, the extended family may not be available to help. As marginal farmers are displaced by agri-business and go to the city, this problem will increase (Belokrinitsky, 1984). Then, too, men going to the city or another country alone to earn a living may succumb to the distractions of city life and forget their responsibilities at home.

Women *zakat* recipients have in common that they are very poor and have only marginal ways to be supported, often only the in-kind charity of neighbors. They have expended any assets they may have had, usually their jewelry, and they have no profession from which to earn an income. Women's life-long status of dependency does not prepare them to be able to function to support themselves, even if they want to.

There is no strong stigma attached to a woman's receiving *zakat* because a woman is expected to be dependent. What lowered status she may experience is more often related to the cause for needing *zakat* - no sons or having been deserted by her husband - rather than the receipt of *zakat* itself. As long as a woman takes good care of her children and her home and maintains her personal virtue, she is carrying out her normally expected social role.

While the majority of adult *zakat* recipients are women, men control the distribution of *zakat*. In 1983-84, out of 37,436 Local *Zakat* Committees (LZCs) throughout Pakistan, each with seven volunteer members, there were no women. The only woman reported to be in the system at any level was a woman District Health Officer in Hyderabad. Other than that, this system, which makes decisions about a woman's needs for *zakat* and the expectations placed on her as a condition of receiving it, has no women in policy making or operational decision-making roles from the LZCs up to the Central *Zakat* Committee and the President. To a great

extent, Pakistan's *zakat* system reinforces the general *status quo*. Men make decisions about women's economic security.

Zakat as a Maintenance System

Zakat, as it has been instituted in Pakistan, does not have the funds or the structure to meet the on-going subsistence needs of the largest groups of the needy: widows and orphans. As a residual system, Pakistan's *zakat* is designed to meet short-term occasional need in what are presumed to be temporarily desperate situations.

In a survey of 350 local *zakat* committees, no committee provided enough cash in monthly benefit payments to sustain a family at the subsistence level. The largest payment to a family by any LZC was 550 Rs. per month for a family of eight in Karachi. Most payments were much, much smaller. Some LZC's payments averaged as little as 12 Rs. month. (Clark, 1985). The model payment was 50 Rs. a month. As a point of contrast, for the same period of time Afghan refugees received one tent per family, and per person rations of food, clothes, blankets, water and kerosene plus an allowance of 150 Rs. per person per month (U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees, 1983).

Not only is *zakat* insufficient to support a dependent person, its payment is irregular and unpredictable. Only one third of the committees surveyed made payments monthly. Some paid every other month, some quarterly. About 25% said that they paid only when they received a disbursement of *zakat* to them, about every six to eight months.

Additionally, if a widow receives *zakat* in one disbursement, there is no guarantee that she will receive it again. LZCs all state that they have more people identified to them as truly needing *zakat* than they could ever pay. They make decisions about who receives *zakat* based on a variety of factors, not all of them clearly defined by policy. Because there are more eligible people than money to pay them, many eligible and needy people may not receive *zakat*.

While Pakistan's *zakat* system is designed to provide temporary help, a basic problem is that widowhood in Pakistan is rarely temporary. It almost always lasts for the

rest of a woman's life. When the husband on whom she was dependent died, she lost her regular source of income. If she has no male relatives to support her, her dependant status forces her into dire poverty. Small and irregular payments may help alleviate particular needs from time to time, but they are not adequate as a source of income.

What the widow needs is long-term insurance that will provide her a regular and reliable source of maintenance payments. *Zakat* is not now designed to do this. Small children left fatherless do grow up and may be able to support their mother, eventually, but their dependent status usually lasts for several years. *Zakat* is not structured or funded to support them through this period.

The Status of Women, and Rehabilitation from *Zakat*

Although most of the more than quarter-million men involved in administering this system understand, accept, and support the dependent status of women, Pakistan's *zakat* system is under enormous pressure to rehabilitate *all zakat* recipients to self-support, including the women. This "rehabilitation fantasy" is based on the romantic vision of *zakat* cited earlier. The current status of Pakistani women directly limits the degree to which Pakistan's *zakat* system can achieve this enormous expectation.

"Rehabilitation" to self-support implies that the person was once self-supporting and will be again through training and counseling. While this model of rehabilitation may be appropriate for disabled male recipients who are young, have previous work experience and are otherwise healthy, it is not appropriate for most women *zakat* recipients. It is theoretically impossible to be "rehabilitated" to a type and level of functioning never previously acquired. For old widows, it is simply unrealistic to expect that a 60 year old woman, who is arthritic, toothless, and nearly blind will be trained in anything that can make her self-supporting.

Younger women, both widows and orphans, do have the innate capacity to be trained to self-support. Pakistani women, especially poor women, are certainly used to hard

work and are as adept as their foreign sisters; it is their expectations, fears and culturally-imposed limits which so inhibit success.

First, the acculturation process for a poor Pakistani woman leaves her without readily marketable, income-producing skills. She cannot read and write. She has no work experience and no knowledge of the business world, how it functions, its expectations, and its pitfalls. Her lifelong occupation as a homemaker is not valued as a marketable skill.

Second, women see themselves as dependent, and appropriately so. Nothing in their background or training prepared them to expect to be financially or socially independent. Self-support requires women to leave a socially-approved norm and break new ground. The more a woman has followed the traditional role or believes it to be divinely ordained, the harder it is for her to think in terms of becoming independent and the more afraid she may be to try.

Third, most women, especially those with small children, believe their primary duty is working at home. Most people in Pakistan support this view. However much these women see the need for income, they feel guilty cutting back on family-centered activities to engage in training or work outside the home.

Fourth, most Pakistani women consider it demeaning to work outside the home or to travel alone in public to work or to a training site. Some may well believe that it is morally wrong, even disgraceful, to have to deal directly with unrelated men, although this is almost always required at some point for self-supporting women.

Even if she overcomes these barriers to self-support, there really are not many jobs that exist for her to take. Unemployment and under-employment are already common conditions for Pakistani men. What jobs do exist for women (Weiss, 1987) fail to provide enough income to enable a woman to be self-supporting.

Finally, in addition to all of these factors, the government's Islamization policies concerning women and the public discussions about them create an atmosphere

which makes it difficult for any Pakistani woman to seek financial independence. Whether or not a particular piece of "women's" Islamic legislation is enacted, the discussion about it characterizes women as a vulnerable group whose rights and lives can be determined by others, not themselves. It puts all of the actions of any woman up for public review and commentary. All women must be careful of what they do and say for fear of being labeled "un-Islamic".

Some people say that women on *zakat* do not care about these issues. In talking to them and other village women about *zakat*, they, not I, often raised these issues. Because women on *zakat* have no man to protect them, they are especially concerned about anything that threatens their already precarious low status role. Many expressed fear of entering training programs or of taking jobs for fear they might be seen or labeled as "too aggressive" "poor mothers" or, worse, have their moral reputations impugned.

The most common attempt at rehabilitating *zakat* women, providing them with a sewing machine, serves as an excellent example of the problems cited above. Most LZCs simply buy the machine for Rs. 500 - 700 and assume it will enable the women to be self-supporting. But being a seamstress is a small business which requires at least elementary skills of advertising, planning, record-keeping, selling, machine maintenance and bill collection. A seamstress must function independently making decisions based on her own judgement. If she has small children she must arrange her schedule to care for them and carry out a business. Moreover, not every woman knows how to use a sewing machine. Existing training centers do a good job teaching this skill, but they serve less than 1% of the *zakat* sewing machine recipients. Then, too, there is a limit to the number of seamstresses a small village can support. In addition to these concerns, she must worry about her reputation and how people perceive her. To a great extent, the local charity on which she depends most for her subsistence is conditional on her maintaining a good reputation.

Some women can overcome these barriers, but most of the very few *zakat* women who have become self-supporting

through sewing received training in sewing and a formal program supporting the idea of working as a good thing for women to do. They used their skills to take a factory sewing job, or become part of a large distribution system, or began sewing for men as well as women. They received both moral and practical support. Rehabilitation to self-support is very difficult through individual cottage industry.

Pakistan's *zakat* system has undertaken a vast number of efforts and spent lakhs of rupees trying to achieve the goal of making *zakat* women economically independent. It has had little success. While these efforts may provide women some cash income, it is almost always insufficient to achieve economic independence. Even the Salai Markaz, the government's show piece training center for *zakat* recipients in Islamabad, finds that only 10-15% of their graduates can earn a living.

What is important to recognize is that the limited success of these rehabilitation efforts is not the "fault" of the women receiving *zakat* or of the *zakat* officials, most of whom have worked very hard to make *zakat* rehabilitation programs successful. The problem is that the *zakat* system cannot by itself overcome the institutional barriers to *zakat* women's economic security which are created by both tradition and policy.

It is also important to recognize that Pakistan is not alone in having general issues about the changing status of women impact on public welfare policy. To a greater or lesser extent, all countries who have tried to establish a public welfare system or more complex economic support systems have found that it forces societies to face and deal with value dilemmas about what role they expect women (or the elderly, or children, or the disabled) to have in providing for their own support. (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1984). These value conflicts tend not to be resolved simply and logically in a short time. Instead Pakistan is following a fairly standard pattern of considerable contradiction in government policies as it tries to negotiate a workable middle ground between what conflicting social entities believe is ideally desirable and what is both reasonable in

terms of actual social functioning and realistic in terms of the government's ability to pay.

There are two possible approaches to helping *zakat* women to achieve economic security. The first is to modify the *zakat* system to be more logically consistent and culturally sensitive to the current status of women. The second is to recognize the residual nature of *zakat* and change the social institutions which create the status of women that leads to the need for *zakat*.

Changing the Current Zakat System

There are a few ways that Pakistan's *zakat* could help women more effectively by modifying its system to be more culturally compatible with their current dependent status.

1. Recognize the long term nature of the dependence of women who have lost the male breadwinner and establish a regular system of benefit payments to provide a predictable and adequate base of support to enable them to carry out their responsibilities in the home.
2. Redefine "rehabilitation" as Boulding (1967) does to mean reincorporation into the mainstream of society. An example of this is the provision of dowries for orphan girls. Grants of about Rs. 1000 appear to be minimally sufficient. Of LZCs surveyed in 1984 by Clark (1985), 20% used this form of rehabilitation. They felt that they had done more to protect the woman's life-long honor and insure her economic security than any sewing machine could.
3. Include women in the *zakat* system at all levels. Many wealthy and educated women already have experience working with the very poor through the All Pakistan Women's Association and other groups. These and other articulate female advocates of women's special needs should be incorporated in the policy-making process of *zakat*.

At the local level, prominent local women are in a much better social position than men to work directly with women to identify need and to provide essential moral support for any rehabilitation efforts. In the traditional informal system of personal *zakat*, women often carried out the household's responsibilities of caring for the poor. At the local level, it should not be at all difficult to find women who have experience working with those who need *zakat*.

4. Recognize that it is inconsistent to limit the life and choices of women as a group, then expect the most vulnerable women in the society to overcome the prevailing social climate to become independent.

Changing Institutions

The changes discussed above might help the *zakat* system be somewhat more effective for helping women. They would, however, do little to change the vulnerability which creates the need for *zakat* because they do little or nothing to change the basic status of Pakistani women.

To protect women from the vulnerability of poverty and dependence, it is necessary to modify the social institutions that create them and the government policies that reinforce them. There are at least four changes necessary to change this dependent status of women. Three of the four have general concurrence in Pakistan with some government programs supporting these changes underway. To mention these briefly:

1. Universal education:

This would enable become literate, to learn better skills for self-support, and to expand their knowledge base beyond that of their primary contacts. The government is currently expanding the accessibility of primary education to both boys and girls through

its program of using mosques for schools, especially in rural areas.

2. Family planning:

This most basic step in self-determination enables a woman to gain physical control over her own body. Family planning changes the status of a woman from a physical receptacle for her husband's potential child to an equal, if not controlling, partner in the decision to have a child. This major power and status shift on the home front affords a woman an increased degree of emotional independence. Moreover, planning the number and spacing of children a couple has allows them to provide better for those they do have and may allow for some savings, investment, or insurance to protect against economic disaster.

3. General development of the economy:

This would provide more and better job opportunities for Pakistanis of both sexes and various levels of education and skill. If women are to be economically self-sufficient, employment opportunities for women need to be developed in the mainstream of Pakistan's economic life with a mainstream rate of pay. It is hard to be self-supporting in purdah.

While there is general consensus in Pakistan's government for these changes, the fourth is more controversial.

4. Allow each woman to decide for herself what is Islamic:

If the government wishes women to be socially and economically independent when they have no husband, then the government needs to allow women

to be able to make choices which affect them throughout their lives. To accomplish this, the government needs to cease its role as the arbiter of what is Islamic on issues of personal behavior; instead, the government should return to individual Pakistanis, including women, the right to determine how to interpret the Holy Quran and the Sunnah. This is actually a very traditional Sunni Muslim view because it places the responsibility for behavior and the use of God-given gifts directly on the individual, whether male or female. There is no shortage of maulvis in Pakistan to assist individuals in this process.

To some extent, the continuing resource-consuming debate about "the rights and proper role of the Islamic woman" is a red herring. It is a classic example of one group of people telling another group of people how to be religious. Given the proportion of men in Pakistan's government, one might logically expect them to focus on "the proper role of the Islamic man".

The real issue is not the rights and responsibilities of women, but the rights and responsibilities of each individual under the law. Legislation which supports the legal rights of all individuals support women and that which limits women sets the precedence for limiting others, too. All Pakistanis have a stake in preventing limitations to the rights of any people as a class. To become economically self-sufficient, Pakistani women do not need so much to be protected by legislation as from it. Pakistani women are citizens of their country and an essential resource to it. They need to be able to lead their lives without justifying their existence daily.

The worst consequence of government by Islamic minutiae is that it creates a view of Islam as a petty, mean-spirited, feudal, misogynistic force and is counter productive to the government's basic goal of increased respect for Islam. A secondary consequence with critical impact for the implementation of *zakat* is that it undermines the *zakat* program's attempts to help vulnerable and needy women to

become self-supporting by creating a general social atmosphere which is unsympathetic to this goal.

Conclusions

The majority of Pakistani women are both dependent and poor. This limits their life options and leaves them economically vulnerable. *Zakat* as implemented in Pakistan has a limited capacity either to provide long-term maintenance support or to enable women to achieve self-support. Some changes to the *zakat* system might make it more supportive of women who are currently destitute, but the changes will do little to lessen women's vulnerability. Preparing each Pakistani woman to function as an independent adult with the right to make individual choices would do far more to protect her economically as well as socially and legally. To do this, though, social structural changes are necessary which men in Pakistan may find difficult to make.

Bibliography

Afzal ur-Rahman.

Economic Doctrines of Islam. Three volumes. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1974.

Ahmad, Khurshid.

"Economic Development in an Islamic Framework" in Khurshid Ahmad, ed., *Studies in Islamic Economics.* Jeddah: The International Center for Economics, 1980.

Al-Qardawi, Allama Yusuf.

Economic Security in Islam. Translated by Muhammad Iqbal Siddiqi. Lahore, Pakistan: Kazi Publications, 1981.

Baluch, Faqir Muhammad.

"Zakat System in Baluchistan" in *Daily Baluchistan Times*, Quetta, April 9, 1983.

Baquai, Moin.

"Pakistan's Pattern of Development and Prospects". *Pakistan Economic and Social Review*, Vol. XVII, Autumn-Winter 1979, Nos. 3-4, pp. 1-62.

Belokrenitsky, Vyacheslav.

"Rural-Urban Migration and the Urban Poor in Pakistan". *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. VIII, No.1, Fall 1984, pp. 35-46.

Boulding, Kenneth E.

"The Boundaries of Social Policy" in *Social Work*, Vol. 12, No.1 January 1967, pp. 3-11.

Carroll, Lucy.

"Nizam-i-Islam: Processes and Conflicts in Pakistan's Programme of Islamization, with Special Reference to the Position of Women" in *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. II, No.1, March 1982, pp. 57-95.

Clark, Grace.

Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr System: An Islamic Public Welfare System in a Developing Country. Unpublished dissertation, 1985.

Clark, Grace.

"Zakat as a Public Welfare System" in Weiss, Anita, Ed. *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan*. Syracuse, 1986.

Inayatullah, A.

Lecture in Islamabad, November, 1983.

Kahn, Alfred J.

Studies in Social Policy and Planning. New York; Russell Sage, 1969a.

Khan, Dilawar Ali.

"Planning for the Poor in Pakistan: Rhetoric and Reality". In R.P. Misra ed., *Humanizing Development*. Singapore: Maruzan Asia, 1981, pp. 301-321.

Korson, J. Henry.

"Islamization and Social Policy in Pakistan". *Journal of south Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. VI, No.2, Winter, 1982, pp. 71-90.

Mannon, M.A.

Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1980 (1st edition, 1970).

Naqvi Syed Nawab Haider.

Individual Freedom, Social Welfare and Islamic Economic Order. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1981.

Pakistan Government of Central Zakat Administration.

The Zakat Manual. Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, 1982.

Pakistan. Ministry of Finance.

Economic Survey, 1982-1983. Islamabad, 1983.

Pakistan Ministry of Finance.

Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1983-1984. Islamabad, 1984.

Qureshi, Anwar Iqbal.

The Economic and Social System of Islam. Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1979.

Ramazani, N.

"Islamization and the Women's Movement in Pakistan" > *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. III, No.3, Spring, 1985, pp. 53-64.

Sharif, M. Raihan.

Islamic Social Framework. Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1954.

Weiss, Anita.

"The Effects of Islamization on Pakistani Women's Lives, 1978-83". Paper presented at the Conference of the Association of Asian Studies Meeting, Washington, D.C. March 23, 1984.

Weiss, Anita, ed.

Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan. New York: Sage, 1986.

**Wilensky, Harold L. and
Charles V. Lebeaux.**

Industrial Society and Social Welfare. New York: The Free Press, 1958, p. 230.

Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad.

English translation of a speech in Urdu at the *Jamia Musjid*, Islamabad, June 20, 1980 and broadcast nationally. The English translation appears in Tanzil-ur-Rahman, *Introduction of Zakat in Pakistan*.

Pakistan and the organization of the Islamic conference

Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada

I propose to devote my address to a broad review of Pakistan's role in the OIC from a historical perspective. As you know, Pakistan is a founding member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. It has played a vital role in the establishment of Organization and a number of its subsidiary organs and affiliated bodies. Pakistan has hosted numerous conferences and meetings which have facilitated the growth of the institutional infrastructure of the OIC. These meetings have also led to the preparation and adoption of action oriented plans and programme for increased contacts and cooperation among the Member States in the political, economic, social, cultural and information fields.

At present, Pakistan is a member of a number of the OIC ministerial-level committees entrusted with follow-up and implementation of measures approved by the OIC conferences. Pakistan is expected to continue its active participation in the activities of the OIC in all fields.

Pakistan's role in the establishment and evolution of the OIC can be better understood in the context of the enduring guiding principles of its foreign policy. The guidelines for Pakistan's external relations are derived from the Pakistan Movement and the historical commitment of the Muslims of South Asia to the promotion of the collective interests of the

entire Islamic Ummah of which they regard themselves as an integral component.

The abiding solidarity of the Muslims of the subcontinent with the Ummah was manifested in their spirited efforts during the early decades of the twentieth century to salvage the Ottoman caliphate and their consistent opposition to Jewish immigration to Palestine following the Balfour Declaration. The fact that the All India Muslim League Session held in Lahore in March 1940, which adopted the historic Lahore Resolution signalling the resolve of the Muslims of the subcontinent to establish a national homeland, also passed a resolution on Palestine highlights their commitment to the common causes of the Muslims every where.

It is significant that within one month of the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution, the British Government became aware of the far-reaching implications of this historic development. In his letter dated 24 March 1940, addressed to Lord Linlithgow, British Viceroy of India the Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland stated:

....the Call of Islam is one which transcends the bounds of country. It may have lost some of its force as a result of the abolition of the Caliphate by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, but it still has a very considerable appeal, as witness for example Jinnah's insistence on our giving an undertaking that Indian troops should never be employed against any Muslim State, and the solicitude which he has constantly expressed for the Arabs of Palestine. I cannot help thinking that if a separate Muslim State did indeed come into existence in India, as now contemplated by the All India Muslim League, the day would come when they might find the temptation to join an Islamic Commonwealth of nations well nigh irresistible.¹

Lord Zetland's "fears" proved prophetic and found reflection in the attitude and pronouncements of the Muslim League before the establishment of Pakistan and the policies

adopted by Pakistan from 1947 onwards. Pakistan was established on 14 August 1947. King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia declared that the emergence of Pakistan symbolised "the greater glory of Islam".² *The Times* of London saw Pakistan as "a new center of Muslim cohesion and a rallying point for Muslim thoughts and aspirations".³

To place the contribution of the Muslims of the subcontinent and subsequently of Pakistan to the evolution of the OIC in a historic setting, we could begin by noting that the ideas of Jamaluddin Afghani - who can be credited with having revived the concept of Pan-Islamism - for the setting up of an International Islamic Congress found a positive echo within the Muslim community of the Subcontinent.

In or about 1892, Jamaluddin Afghani devised a plan for a Muslim Congress. He proposed that, from each of the major Islamic lands, one person be selected by the state as an official representative, and one person from the first ranks of the Ulema of (each) people (*millet*) be selected by the people as a true people's representative, would assemble and meet in Istanbul. A great Congress was to be founded and organized in Istanbul to consider the important problems facing the Islamic countries. All states and peoples of the Muslim faith were to recognize the obligation to respect and follow the decisions and verdicts of the Islamic congress.

As Martin Kramer has mentioned in his book *Islam Assembled*:

The purpose of the Sayyid [Afghani] in Organizing this Islamic congress was to amass the means for progress and fulfillment of the Muslim peoples collectively, and to restore the glory and might of early Islam. Whenever a European state acted unjustly against a Muslim land, this great Islamic congress would immediately issue a proclamation to all Muslims of holy war against that state, as well as pronounce a boycott of the products and commercial agents of that state. All Muslims would rise and draw sword from sheath for battle".⁴

On November 11, 1919, thirty seven persons met in a school at Zara in Turkey in the First General Congress of the Society of Muslim Unitarians. There were twenty representatives from Turkey including Mustafa Kemal. The remaining participants were from Anatolia, Transcaucasia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Najd and Crimea. It was announced by the sponsors that the Second Congress would include participants from Morocco, Algeria, Muscat, Afghanistan, the Indian subcontinent and Bukhara. The participants elected Mustafa Kemal as the President of the Society, and approved its Charter.

In early 1923, the idea of a broader Congress of Muslims in the setting of Istanbul gained ground. In the beginning it was understood that the Congress would simply serve the Caliph in an advisory capacity. Later it was felt that an elected Caliph through an Istanbul Congress of representative Muslims would be preferable. Caliph Abdul Majid protested and declined to participate in the Congress. The failure of the proposed Istanbul Congress to meet was perhaps one of the considerations leading Mustafa Kemal to propose the abolition of the Caliphate which was approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in March 1924.

On May 30, 1924, the late King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, then a prince, addressed a letter to Maulana Abdul Bari of Farangi Mahal, Lucknow, a noted scholar of the subcontinent, conveying therein that the problem of Caliphate could be solved through General Islamic Conference.⁵ On April 28, 1926, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud cabled invitations to various Muslim rulers and associations to attend the Muslim Congress to be held at Mecca in June 1926. The participants from various Muslim countries included Maulana Mohammad Ali and Maulana Shaukat Ali, the prominent leaders of the Khilafat Movement who are referred to as the Ali Brothers, and representatives of the Russian Muslims. Kemal Ataturk's representatives were also there but with a watching brief only. The Congress however could not produce consensus.

In 1929, Sir Mohammad Iqbal, the poet-philosopher, in his famous lectures on Islam, opined: "For the present every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self,

temporarily focus her vision on herself alone until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics".⁶

A Muslim Congress was convened in Jerusalem in December 1931 by Mufti Aminul Husaiyni. The principal objectives were to adopt measures for the preservation of the Muslim Holy places and to express support for the cause of Muslim Palestine. Among the Delegates were Abd Al Rahman Azam, later Secretary-General of the Arab League; Shukri Al Quwatali, later President of Syria and Said Al Jazairi of Algeria. Maulana Shaukat Ali and Sir Mohammed Iqbal represented the Muslims of the subcontinent.

The Egyptian Parliamentary Committee for the Defence of Palestine organised a Congress of Arab and Muslim countries in Cairo in October 1938. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, deputed a five member delegation to represent the Muslim League at the Congress.⁷

The All India Muslim League session at Patna on 29 December 1938, under the presidency of Mr. Jinnah, adopted a resolution which stated:

This session declares that the problem of Palestine is the problem of the Muslims of the whole world, and if the British Government fails to do justice to the Arabs and to fulfil the demands of the Muslims of the world, the Indian Muslims will adopt any programme, and will be prepared to make any sacrifice that may be decided upon by a Muslim International Conference, at which the Muslims of India are duly represented in order to save the Arabs from British exploitation and Jewish usurpation.⁸

When the British Government convened the Palestine Conference in London on 7th February 1939, Mr. Jinnah urged the Government to give representation to the Muslim League but the British Government declined. However, two representatives of the Muslim League met the Secretary of State for India and submitted a Memorandum on Palestine problem. The Council of the All India Muslim League held at Delhi on 28th August 1939, denounced the proposals

embodied in the British White Paper on Palestine and directed the Muslim League to get in touch with Islamic Countries.⁹

After the adoption of Pakistan Resolution on March 23, 1940, Mr. Jinnah continued to press for close cooperation and coordination among Muslim countries. In a message to the Muslims of Malaya on October 29, 1940, he said: "Muslims of the world are attached to each other by their common faith, religion and culture".

On November 2, 1940, Muslim Solidarity Day was observed to demonstrate deep sympathy and concern of the Muslim countries. Addressing a huge congregation after Friday prayers, Mr. Jinnah said: "It is our duty to help our Muslim brethren wherever they are".¹⁰ He expressed full support for the independence and sovereignty of Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and other Muslim countries.

Explaining the creed of Pakistan to Shaukat Hayat Khan, a Punjab minister, in April 1943, Mr. Jinnah said: "Pakistan would be a base where we will be able to train and bring up Muslim intellectuals, educationists, economists, scientists, doctors, engineers, technicians, etc., who will work to bring about Islamic renaissance. After necessary training, they would spread to other parts of the Islamic World to serve their co-religionists and create an awakening among them eventually resulting in the creation of a solid, cohesive bloc - a third bloc - which will be neither communistic nor capitalistic but truly socialistic based on the principles which characterised Caliph Umar's regime".¹¹

It appears that in November 1946, an understanding was reached between Mr. Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, and Nahas Pasha, President of the Wafd Party in Egypt, to bring into being as soon as practicable of Federation of Muslim States with Cairo as its center. In an interview on November 7, 1946, Mr. Jinnah expressed the hope that "a Conference would shortly be held which would be attended by leading representatives of All Muslim countries. The people of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Muslim countries have many interests in common and much could be gained for mutual cultural and ideological

understanding and advancement through the contacts such a meetings would give".¹² On November 10, 1946, Quaid-e-Azam in his reply to Syedna Tahir Saifuddin, Head of the Bohra Community, stated that he had already given an interview a few days earlier with regard to the matter of holding a conference of the representatives of Muslim countries.¹³

When the American Secretary of State, George Marshall, announced that a State Department Planning Committee was making an exhaustive study of the economic and political situation in the Middle East, the London representative of the Egyptian Wafd Party wrote a letter on May 22, 1947, to the American Ambassador in London giving the broad outlines of the Nahas-Jinnah agreement about the Federation of Muslim States.

In a message to Muslim States on 27 August 1948, on the occasion of the Eid just before his death, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah said:

My Eid Message to our brother Muslim States is one of the friendship and goodwill. We are all passing through perilous times. The drama of power politics that is being staged in Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir should serve as an eye-opener to us. It is only by putting up a united front that we can make our voice felt in the councils of the world.¹⁴

The legacy of the historic commitment of the Muslims of the subcontinent to Palestine and other Islamic causes served as a determining factor of Pakistan's foreign policy and became one of its principal objectives. Pakistan pursued the achievement of this objective through a policy of active advocacy of Islamic causes and initiatives for consolidating Islamic unity and solidarity.

The first foreign policy issue which engaged the attention of the newly established state of Pakistan was the Palestine question which had come before the UN General Assembly in 1947. Pakistan took the position that the Balfour Declaration and the mandate of the League of Nations were contrary to the wishes of the Palestinian

people and in disregard of the pledges of independence given to the Arabs. Pakistan strongly opposed the proposal to partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish parts. Pakistan was a member and later Chairman of sub-Committee II, one of the two sub-Committees set up by Adhoc Committee of the General Assembly to which the question of Palestine had been referred by the General Assembly. Under Pakistan's influence, sub-Committee II, opposed the partitioning of Palestine which had been recommended by the sub-Committee I. Sub-Committee II, recommended a unitary state for the whole of Palestine with constitutional safeguards for the rights of all its inhabitants.

Pakistan resolutely opposed the partition plan. The UN General Assembly's resolution regarding partitioning of Palestine was widely condemned in Pakistan by the Government, leaders and people of Pakistan.¹⁵ Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah sent a telegram on December 8, 1947, to President Harry Truman informing him of the "terrible shock" felt by the Muslim World "owing to the most unfortunate decision of the UNO to enforce partition of Palestine" and addressing a personal appeal to him to desist from depriving the Arabs of Palestine from their homeland and to "avoid the gravest consequences and repercussions" resulting from the resolution adopted by the General Assembly.¹⁶

In February 1949 a World Muslim Congress was held in Karachi which decided to revive the Motamar Al Alam Al Islami - which had been set up in 1926 in Mecca - and to reconvene a conference on a bigger scale in February 1951.¹⁷

In International Islamic Economic Conference held in Karachi in November-December 1949 which was organized by Pakistani industrialists and businessmen with the encouragement, support and patronage from the Government of Pakistan, may be considered the first serious attempt at the establishment of a comprehensive institutional mechanism devoted to forging closer cooperation and collaboration among Islamic states in the economic field.

George McGhee, in his book *Envoy to the Middle East - Adventures in Diplomacy* - recalls his meeting on December

9, 1949, with the then finance minister of Pakistan: "Mr. Ghulam Mohammad turned to the subject that was undoubtedly uppermost in his mind, namely, the International Islamic Economic Conference, called the Exposition - and the formation of a permanent organization to continue the work of the conference. He accepted the responsibility for being the prime mover for an Islamic bloc, an idea originally introduced by Jinnah".¹⁸

The Conference (29 November - 5 December 1949) was attended by industrialists, businessmen and officials from 18 Islamic states, namely: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Muscat, Oman, Afghanistan, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Maldives and Lebanon. The Conference was also attended by representatives of Azad Kashmir and Arab League. It was inaugurated by Mr. Ghulam Mohammad, then finance minister who subsequently became governor general. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan also addressed the Conference. An International Islamic Industrial and Commercial Exhibition was also organised during the Conference.

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in his speech called on the Muslim countries to undertake "a planned cooperation to banish poverty, hunger, disease and ignorance from their midst." The inaugural speech of Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad contained a comprehensive review of the socio-economic conditions of the Muslim states. He said that "although Muslim countries have become politically independent, there is hardly anyone which is not victim of economic imperialism" and lamented that the economic resources of Muslim countries were in "foreign hands." He emphasized the importance of economic cooperation as a means of strengthening political contacts and declared that "politics is 3/4th of economics." He called upon the Conference to consider and identify "advantageous and practical fields to start economic cooperation" and suggested banking, insurance, shipping and ship building obvious fields for cooperation. He called for measures to boost industrialisation in the Islamic world on a regional basis. He proposed setting up of an institution to train Muslim economists.

Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad called upon the Conference to "consider whether a conference of this kind does fulfil a real need and whether it should not be put on a permanent footing so that each year or at suitable intervals the conference meets in different countries and should have a permanent secretariat". He expressed the view that "the earlier an organisation of this character is set up on a permanent footing the better," adding that "the need for a cooperative and continuous efforts of this nature is widely realised and has become essential." He expressed the hope that the Conference will "lay down the first concrete steps for cooperation between Muslim countries for their early economic development."

In a message to the Conference, Miss Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the Founder of the Nation, expressed the hope that the participants would agree upon measures that would "cement the bonds of existing friendship between each other and create amongst them an urge of collaboration for the benefit of us all." She expressed the view that "unity among the Muslim states and their efforts to exploit their natural resources would enable them to hold their crown in the chessboard of world politics."

Miss Fatima Jinnah hosted a reception for the Conference delegates on December 3, 1949. This was her first social engagement since the passing away of the Quaid-e-Azam. In her speech at the reception she declared that "the idea of unity among various Islamic states was always uppermost in the mind of the Quaid-e-Azam and he always visualized an association of these countries united together in their efforts and to solve their common problems."

The Conference appointed 11-subject Committees dealing with various aspects of economic cooperation such as trade, finance and banking, transport and communications, industrial development, technical and scientific education, geological survey, agriculture and labour and manpower. The Committees subsequently submitted their detailed reports which were discussed and approved by the Plenary Session on December 5, 1949. The Conference adopted a Declaration on December 5, 1949 which was signed by the participants. The declaration stated "the

conviction that we are united in the pursuit of common ideals" adding that "for the progress and prosperity of Islamic countries we recommend application of economic cooperation and mutual exchange of knowledge and expansion of trade."

The decisions adopted by the Conference included the establishment of an International Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the setting up of an Islamic Aviation Company and periodic meetings among experts dealing with various aspects of economic cooperation. The Conference also called for the establishment of a permanent International Islamic organisation which would exert efforts "to develop trade, commerce, industry, mining, banking, insurance, transportation by land, sea and air and such other forms of economic activities as are calculated, to raise living standards and enhance the national prosperity and well being of the people in the Muslim World".

In order to enhance implementation of the decisions adopted at the Conference, it was decided to establish a General Council comprising a representative from each Muslim state to run the organization and raise funds for it.

The daily *Dawn's* editorial on November 25, 1949, stated that the Conference "constitutes an important step towards fulfillment of a cherished dream of the Quaid-e-Azam". The editorial added that "it was soon after the establishment of Pakistan that the Quaid-e-Azam appealed for a unity and cooperation among the Muslim countries". *The Dawn* also reported that the second session of the Conference might be held in Iran in 1950 and the third session in Egypt in 1951. Delegates from Turkey and Saudi Arabia had reportedly offered to host the Conference in their countries.¹⁹

The proceedings of the International Islamic Economic Conference make fascinating reading. The recommendations of the various committees incorporated in the Declaration adopted on December 5, 1949, contained the initial blueprints of nearly all the organizations and institutions that have been established within the framework of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

As stated earlier, a World Muslim Conference was held in Karachi in February 1949 which had resolved *inter alia*

that the Conference be reconvened on a bigger scale in February 1951. In the 1951 Conference, a resolution was adopted declaring that aggression against any Muslim country must be treated as aggression against the entire world of Islam. It was also decided that the headquarters of the Motamar would be in Pakistan in Karachi.

In the 1950s Pakistan took a number of initiatives at the United Nations with a view to accelerating the independence of Muslim countries which were still under colonial domination. Pakistan vigorously supported the independence of Indonesia at the United Nations and in the Conference of Asian and Australian countries held in Delhi in January 1949. When Indonesia became independent in December 1949, the Government of Pakistan declared a nation-wide holiday to celebrate the event.

In 1952 Pakistan invited the heads of government of 12 Muslim countries to a conference in Karachi in order to examine the possibility of establishing a system of high level consultations on matters of common interests. The Conference however, could not be held.

Pakistan spearheaded joint moves by countries of the Middle East and other Third World countries against the attempts to place different parts of Libya under British, French and Italian trusteeship. Pakistan called for grant of independence to a united Libya and proposed that if immediate independence was not feasible the region be placed under United Nations trusteeship. Pakistan also opposed the proposal for an Italian trusteeship over former Italian Somalia land. Pakistan's efforts bore fruit on November 21, 1949 when the General Assembly decided that Libya should become independent by January 1952. Pakistan was elected a member of a commission which was charged with the task of preparing for the independence of Libya. Pakistan also exerted efforts for the establishment of an independent sovereign state of Eritrea which did not bear fruit. However its efforts for the independence of Somalia were successful.

Pakistan played a leading role in supporting the freedom movements of the three countries of the Maghreb, namely Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. Pakistan was one of the 11

Asian and African governments which in April 1952 requested the Security Council to consider the Tunisian situation and used its influence as a member of the Security Council to expedite the arrangements for the independence of Tunisia. Pakistan opposed persistent efforts by France to perpetuate its control and domination of Tunisia and finally succeeded in securing the inclusion of the Tunisia Question in the Agenda of the eighth session of the UN General Assembly. Pakistan participated in the drafting of the resolution calling for the independence and sovereignty of Tunisia.

Pakistan initiated efforts in 1952 for the adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly for the independence of Morocco in the face of concerted opposition by the Western powers. Pakistan opposed the French contention that the Treaty of Fez between France and Morocco precluded UN involvement in the question of Morocco. Finally the General Assembly adopted a resolution on Moroccan independence at its ninth session in 1954 which was followed by Morocco's independence and admission to the UN as a member in 1956. Pakistan also worked actively for discussion on independence of Algeria by the United Nations and sponsored a number of resolutions on the subject.²⁰

While serving as a major spokesman of the Islamic countries and communities at the UN, Pakistan persisted in efforts to foster the spirit of Islamic unity and solidarity. In this regard, Pakistan enthusiastically supported the activities of the principal non-governmental Islamic organisations such as the Higher Arab Committee, headed by Mufti Amin Al Hussayni, and the Motamar Al Alam Al Islami.

A Conference held in Mogadishu, in 1964 and attended by many representatives of Islamic countries and movements, called for the convening of an Islamic summit conference to discuss the problems afflicting the Islamic Ummah and to agree on the means to resolve them.

The convening of an Islamic summit conference was also called for at the conference of the Muslim World League held in Mecca in 1965. In his opening address at this Conference, His Majesty the late King Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz made the following statement:

We support the call for an Islamic Summit Conference which would discuss the problems of the Muslims and decide Islamic destiny.

The Conference issued a resolution supporting this call and requesting His Majesty King Faisal to "continue his efforts for the achievement of this great Islamic objective."

The proposal was reiterated by the late King Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, during his visit to Iran in December 1965. The Joint Communique issued on the conclusion of the visit called on the Islamic states' leaders to hold a Summit Conference to boost their unity and defend their mutual interests. King Faisal later visited Jordan, Sudan, Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco, Guinea, Mali and Tunisia in 1966.²¹ The proposal of King Faisal was supported by Somalia and Pakistan.

I recall that in or about July 1967, Mr Adam Malik, the then Foreign Minister of Indonesia, had suggested to me to raise the issue about Islamic Conference with the Egyptian and Arab leaders. There was a positive response from Egypt.

Pakistan expressed full support for and solidarity with the Arab states during and after the June 1967 Israeli aggression against Arab States. I had the honor as leader of the Pakistan delegation at the fifth emergency special session of the UN General Assembly to move the UN General Assembly Resolution No.527 declaring as invalid the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of Jerusalem and calling upon Israel to rescind all such measures and to desist from taking any such action again in the future.

During its membership of the Security Council in 1968-69, Pakistan was instrumental in the adoption of a number of resolutions by the Security Council which questioned Israel's occupation of the Holy City of Jerusalem. The various resolutions sponsored or co-sponsored by Pakistan followed the June 1967 war included resolution No.248 adopted by the Security Council on March 24, 1968, condemning Israeli aggression against Jordan; resolution No.250 adopted on April 27, 1968, asking Israel to refrain from holding a military parade in Jerusalem; resolution

No.252 adopted on May 21, 1968, calling upon Israel to rescind all measures taken by it to change the status of Jerusalem and resolution adopted on September 15, 1969, rejecting Israel's position on the question of Jerusalem.

The incident of the burning of the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque by Zionist elements in Jerusalem on August 21, 1969 caused widespread anger and indignation throughout the Islamic world. The Zionist sacrilege exposed the danger posed by the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem to the Islamic monuments and Holy places in Palestine. The President of Pakistan issued statements on August 23 and August 28, 1969 condemning the sacrilege of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Pakistan responded positively to the call by King Hassan II, of Morocco to convene an Islamic Summit Conference, and was one of the 25 Islamic countries which participated in the First Islamic Summit held in Rabat on September 22-25, 1969. President Yahya Khan who led Pakistan's delegation strongly objected to the presence of an Indian delegation which was not allowed to participate.

The first Islamic summit declared the resolve of the Muslim States to "consult together with a view to promoting between themselves close cooperation and mutual assistance in the economic, scientific, cultural and spiritual fields." The Summit decided upon the convening of a meeting of foreign Ministers of member states in March 1970 to discuss the "subject of establishing a permanent Secretariat, charged *inter-alia* with the responsibilities of making contacts with governments represented at the Conference to coordinate their activities."

Pakistan hosted the second Islamic conference of foreign ministers in Karachi on December 26-28, 1970. In his inaugural address at the Conference, the President of Pakistan declared that the "objective of peace with honor could be achieved through a meaningful association among the Muslim peoples based on mutual cooperation and solidarity." At the conference Pakistan submitted a proposal for the setting up of either an Islamic bank or an Islamic federation of banks. Pakistan also proposed the establishment of the international Islamic news agency.

Pakistan actively participated in the third Islamic conference of foreign ministers, held in Jeddah from February 29 to March 4, 1972 at which the charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference was approved. It is significant that the third Islamic conference of foreign ministers discussed the conflict between Pakistan and India. The Conference declared "full support for Pakistan, its territorial integrity, national sovereignty and independence".

Pakistan hosted the second Islamic summit conference in Lahore, February 22-24, 1974. The summit was attended by 35 Member States of the OIC and the PLO, 26 being represented by their monarchs or heads of state or government. In his inaugural address at the summit, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan declared that "Pakistan's support for the just causes of the Muslim world is organically related to its own national vocation" and that Pakistan had "never suffered a severance between its national impulse and the urges of Muslim emancipation." The Prime Minister declared that the conference had been conveyed "as a sequel of the war of October 1973" and was expected to address itself "to the specific purpose" of a resolution of the Palestine and Middle East question. He stated that while "there are other vital issues which agitate Muslim minds ... this Conference is primarily concerned with the pre-eminent issues that are inscribed on its agenda that concern the hot line of Muslim concerns and culture." The Prime Minister reminded the Islamic states of their commitment, as enshrined in the OIC charter pertaining to the restitution of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian peoples.

The Lahore Declaration and the resolutions adopted by the second Islamic summit outlined the Islamic Ummah's considered responses on all vital issues, especially the Palestine question and Al-Quds (Jerusalem). The summit's resolutions on economic subjects broadened the scope of the activities of the OIC and laid the basis of cooperation among the member states in the economic field.

During the period following the convening of the second Islamic summit in Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan actively participated in efforts to implement the

commitments contained in the Lahore Declaration. At the fifth Islamic conference of foreign ministers held in Kuala Lumpur from June 21-25, 1974, Pakistan submitted a study containing specific recommendations for cooperation among the Islamic states in the economic and technical spheres. The Conference also adopted a resolution on the international Islamic news agency.

Pakistan participated in the meeting of the finance ministers of OIC member states held in Jeddah in August 1974 at which the decision to establish the Islamic Development Bank was formally taken. The bank has played an important role in the socio-economic development of the Islamic states.

The sixth Islamic conference of foreign ministers held in Jeddah from July 12-15, 1975. The conference approved Pakistan's proposal that the OIC seek observer status at the United Nation. Pakistan was one of the 12 countries elected to serve on the Jerusalem Committee constituted by the fifth Islamic conference of foreign ministers.

At the seventh Islamic conference of foreign ministers held in Istanbul from May 12-15, 1976, Pakistan submitted a number of proposals pertaining to political and economic matters. These included a proposal for the extension of material support to the liberation movements in southern Africa and to the newly independent states. Pakistan was also instrumental in bringing about the adoption of the resolution pertaining to the Turkish Cypriot community and the call contained in the final declaration of the conference for equitable sharing of the Ganges waters between India and Bangladesh. The conference approved Pakistan's proposal for transforming the committee of eight representatives and experts into a more representative Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs.

Pakistan hosted the First Session of the Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs in Karachi from January 24-27, 1977. The recommendations adopted by the Commission related to cooperation among the Islamic states in various economic fields, such as trade, transfer of resources, money and finance, food and

agriculture, industrialisation and technology. The commission has since developed into an important forum for detailed examination of plans and programs pertaining to economic and socio-cultural cooperation among the Islamic States. The commission usually meets every year, in one of the member states or in Jeddah, and undertakes detailed examination of the activities of the OIC subsidiary organs and bodies. The recommendations of the commission greatly facilitate the task of Islamic conferences of foreign ministers to which they are submitted for formal adoption.

In response to a proposal by the Government of Bangladesh, Pakistan hosted the first extra-ordinary session of the Islamic conference of foreign ministers on January 27-29, 1980 in Islamabad to consider "the situation in Afghanistan and the developments in the region which are closely inter-linked with the situation in Afghanistan." The conference was attended by 40 Member States of the OIC and Nigeria and a number of Islamic Organizations. The conference condemned the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and called for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. The conference expressed solidarity with the countries in the immediate neighborhood of Afghanistan (meaning Pakistan and Iran) and resolved to give them full support. The conference called all countries and peoples to secure Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan through all possible means. The conference decided to suspend the membership of Afghanistan in the OIC and invited member states to withhold recognition to the illegal regime in Afghanistan and to sever diplomatic relations with it until the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The Conference called upon member states to consider non-participation in the Moscow Olympics in July 1980 unless Soviet Union withdraws all its troops from Afghanistan.

The extra-ordinary session of the Islamic conference of foreign ministers was the first meeting of its kind, having been prompted by the intervention of a super-power in the internal affairs of a Member State of the OIC. The holding of the conference signified the importance of the OIC in the context of the evolution of joint positions by the Islamic

states on matters of common concern to all of them. The position on Afghanistan evolved at the Islamabad Conference has since been reiterated, with such changes of nuance and substance as have been warranted by developments relating to the Afghanistan problem, by all subsequent Islamic summit and foreign ministers conferences, the latest being the fifth Islamic summit held in Kuwait in January 1987.

Pakistan hosted the eleventh Islamic conference of foreign ministers on May 17-22, 1980 in Islamabad. The decisions taken by the eleventh Islamic conference include the establishment of the Afghanistan Committee comprising Pakistan, Iran and the OIC Secretary General (to which Tunisia and Guinea was subsequently added) to seek ways and means for a comprehensive solution of the Afghanistan problem. The conference took cognizance of a proposal contained in the inaugural speech of the president of Pakistan and adopted a resolution on "The Security and Solidarity of Islamic countries," declaring that the security of each Muslim country is "the concern of all Islamic countries," the conference resolved to "strengthen the security of the Member States through cooperation and solidarity of Islamic countries." The conference decided to set up an inter-governmental expert group to recommend "concrete measures ... for strengthening the security of the Islamic countries by enhancing and further developing political, economic and cultural cooperation" among them. The recommendations of the expert group have since been considered by a number of Islamic conference of foreign ministers and are likely to be taken up by the seventeenth Islamic conference of foreign ministers scheduled to be held in Amman in 1987. The conference also adopted the resolutions proposed by Pakistan for the establishment of nuclear free zones in Africa, Middle East and South Asia and the resolution on "strengthening the security of non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat to use nuclear weapons".

The eleventh Islamic conference of foreign ministers adopted a number of important decisions in the cultural sphere. These decisions related to the establishment or

effective functioning of a number of Islamic universities and Islamic cultural organisations, including the Islamic Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), the International Commission for the preservation of the Islamic Cultural Heritage and the Islamic Foundation for Science and Technology.

The Conference decided to establish an international Islamic law commission to conduct research on Shari'a and make special efforts on the premises of *Ijtihad* to bring about the application of Islamic concepts to the existing institutions. It also decided to follow up the recommendations of a seminar organised by the Government of Pakistan in Islamabad on the application of Shari'a in October, 1979. The conference called for the preparation of a new document on human rights in Islam. In pursuance of the decision of the eleventh Islamic conference of foreign ministers the President of Pakistan addressed the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly on behalf of the Islamic states.

At the third Islamic summit conference held in Taif and Mecca from January 25-28, 1981, Pakistan participated in the drafting of the historic Mecca Declaration adopted by the Summit which spells out the resolve of the Islamic States to defend their independence, security, honor and dignity and to promote the socio-economic development and cultural revival of the Islamic Ummah. The Summit adopted a number of historic decisions pertaining to the strengthening and deepening of mutually beneficial contacts and cooperation among the Islamic States.

One of the most important decisions of the third Islamic summit was the setting up of three standing committees to follow up the implementation of resolutions adopted by the Islamic conferences in the various fields. The three standing committees are concerned with economic and commercial cooperation, scientific and technological cooperation, and information and cultural Affairs. The President of Pakistan was elected Chairman of the standing committee of scientific and technological cooperation.

Pakistan hosted the first ministerial consultations on Industrial cooperation among the member states of the OIC

in Islamabad in February 1982. The meeting was attended by 31 Member States and representatives of eleven subsidiary organs and specialised agencies of the OIC. The ministerial consultations adopted the Islamabad declaration on industrial development of Islamic world which calls upon the member states to exert concerted efforts to achieve collective self-reliance, particularly in the fields where immense potential exist for joint ventures, such as agro-based industries, agro-supporting capital goods, engineering and other basic industries.

Pakistan also hosted the first meeting of the standing committee for scientific and technological cooperation (COMSTECH) in May 1983 in Islamabad. The meeting adopted the Islamabad declaration on science and technology and a perspective 20-year Plan containing specific projects and targets to be pursued through a series of 5-year programme.

Pakistan hosted the Second Session of COMSTECH in Islamabad from December 13-15, 1983. The meeting identified eight priority areas for program activities: food and agriculture; health; manpower development; research and development; information and documentation; development of current and future technologies; development of resources; and energy.

At the fourth Islamic summit conference held in Casablanca from January 16-18, 1984, the President of Pakistan played a historic role in facilitating the re-entry of Egypt into the OIC. The fourth summit adopted the report submitted by President Zia-ul-Haq containing the recommendations and decisions of the two sessions hosted by Pakistan in May and December 1983. The summit adopted the report and approved its recommendations.

The fifteenth Islamic conference of foreign ministers held in Sana'a in December 1984, unanimously elected me as the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. This signified, among other things a recognition of Pakistan's role in the OIC.

Pakistan hosted the second general conference of Islamic Scientific, Education and Cultural Organization in Islamabad in September 1985 and the third meeting of

COMSTECH in Islamabad from November 19-22, 1986 to which all member states of the OIC were invited. The meeting took several important decisions which were submitted by President Zia-ul-Haq to the fifth Islamic summit held in Kuwait in January 1987. The decisions adopted by the session included the appointment of an executive committee comprising representatives of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Malaysia, Senegal and IFSTAD in order to speed up the implementation of the decisions taken by the committee. The committee held two meetings in Islamabad prior to the fifth Islamic Summit.

Pakistan has not only contributed to the adoption of important decisions by the Islamic summit and foreign ministers conferences, it has taken practical steps to fulfil the commitments contained in the resolutions adopted by the Islamic Conferences. In the political sphere, Pakistan's diplomatic moves and initiatives on all major issues facing the Islamic Ummah, such as the question of Palestine, Jerusalem and the Middle East conflict, the Afghanistan problem, the Iran-Iraq war, and solidarity with the African states have been strictly in accordance with the common positions evolved in OIC Summits and Foreign Ministers Conferences.

Pakistan has been a member of the Jerusalem committee of the OIC since the establishment of the committee in pursuance of a resolution of the sixth Islamic conference of foreign ministers held in Jeddah in 1975. In March 1976 Pakistan took a leading part in bringing about the UN Security Council's debate to consider the situation following a decision by a Israeli court upholding the right of Jews to pray in Al-Aqsa Mosque. Pakistan served as chairman of the Jerusalem committee in 1979-80. Pakistan has been making regular contributions to the Jerusalem Fund and has implemented nearly all the decisions adopted by the Jerusalem committee.

Pakistan attaches great importance to the position taken by the OIC on the question of Afghanistan and keeps the OIC and its member states regularly informed of developments pertaining to the various aspects of the

problem including the UN-sponsored indirect talks for a political settlement of this problem.

Pakistan has made persistent efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the Iran-Iraq conflict. The President of Pakistan as chairman of the Islamic Conference visited Tehran and Baghdad in September 1980 immediately after breaking out of hostilities.

Pakistan has played a leading role in facilitating an active role by the member states of the OIC in providing assistance to the countries of the African Sahel region afflicted by drought and famine. Pakistan has taken practical steps to implement the decisions of the third and fourth Islamic summits and the Committee of Islamic Solidarity with the Peoples of the Sahel. It has extended food assistance to a number of the Sahel countries and offered technical assistances to the African states to help improve their agricultural productivity.

Pakistan has played a pioneering role in promoting economic contacts and cooperation among the Islamic states. In addition to advocating the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank and the Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs and the convening of the first ministerial consultations on industrial cooperation, Pakistan has actively participated in the various meetings held within the framework of the OIC, specially the meetings held within the framework of the standing committee for economic and commercial cooperation headed by President Kenan Evren of Turkey. Pakistan also actively supports the activities of the OIC institutions such as Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Center for Islamic Countries in Ankara, Islamic Center for Development of Trade in Casablanca, and Islamic Center for Technical and Vocational Training and Research in Dhaka in forging cooperation and collaboration among the Islamic states in the economic fields.

Pakistan has been especially active in the cultural activities pursued by the OIC through the general secretariat, the standing committee for cultural and information affairs and the OIC subsidiary Organs and affiliated bodies such as the Islamic Solidarity Fund,

Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture; the International Commission for the Preservation of Islamic Cultural Heritage; and the Islamic Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (ISESCO). Pakistan has been participating in all the meetings of these Organizations and has regularly paid its contributions to their budgets.

Pakistan has regularly contributed to the Islamic Solidarity Fund, the major source of financial assistance to Islamic cultural centers located in different parts of the world. It has also provided assistance to some of these centers, such as the Islamic University in Niger, the Islamic University in Uganda, the Zeitounia Faculty for Sharia in Tunisia, the Regional Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Timbuctu, Mali, the Islamic Center in Guinea-Bissau, the Islamic Cultural Center in Comoros Islands and the Islamic Translation Institute in Khartoum.

Pakistan has taken a number of steps to celebrate the advent of the fifteenth Hijra century. A National Hijra Centenary Committee was established in April 1978 which was subsequently reconstituted as the National Hijra Council. Nationwide celebrations were held throughout Pakistan and a number of seminars and symposia were organised for scholarly deliberations on various aspects of the Islamic faith.

Pakistan played a key role in the establishment of the International Islamic Court of Justice. I have had the honor to serving as the Chairman of the 12-Member drafting committee which formulated the statute of the government. The fifth Islamic Summit, held in Kuwait in January 1987, has approved the statute and the court is expected to be set up in the near future after the completion of procedural formalities.

The Government of Pakistan has lent full support to the Islamic Fiqh Academy and has nominated an eminent jurist to serve on the Council of the Academy.

This concludes my brief survey of the Pakistan's role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the practical measures undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to fulfil the commitments contained in the resolutions adopted by the Islamic Conferences. The political leaders and high

officials of the Government of Pakistan have repeatedly reiterated their resolve to work assiduously for the achievement of the objectives enshrined in the charter of the OIC, and for expanding and strengthening cooperation among Islamic countries in the political, economic and commercial, scientific and technological, information, cultural and other fields. This commitment is a cardinal principle of Pakistan's foreign policy and is not transient in nature. I am confident that Pakistan's unstinted support to the OIC and to the Islamic world will continue to grow and contribute positively to the political and economic emancipation of the Islamic Ummah.

I would like to conclude by thanking once again the Pakistan Center of the southern Asian Institute of Columbia University for the opportunity afforded to me to address this meeting and for meeting such an impressive galaxy of intellectuals and scholars.

NOTES

1. M. EUR. Document No.609, Volume II, India Office Library.
2. *Deccan Times*, 15 June, 1947.
3. *The Times* of London, 15 August, 1947.
4. *Islam Assembled* by Martin Kramer, pp. 20-21.
5. Copy of letter given to the author by Maulana Jamal Mian Frangi Mahal.
6. *Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam*, p. 151.
7. For text of the report of the delegation. Please see Atique Zafar Sheikh and Mohammed Riaz Malik; *Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim World*, Karachi, 1978, pp. 27-41.

8. S.S. Pirzada: *Foundations of Pakistan*, Volume II, pp. 315-318.
9. Quaid-e-Azam papers (printed material accession, p. 26).
10. Quaid-e-Azam papers file No. 1023, p. 6.
11. *Quaid-e-Azam as seen by his contemporaries* by Jamiluddin Ahmed, p. 42.
12. *The Patna Times*, 14 November, 1946.
13. S.S. Pirzada's article in *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol.XXIX, No.4, 1976.
14. *Ibid*, pp. 70-71.
15. K. Sarwar Hassan's *Pakistan and the United Nations*, New York, 1960, pp. 165-186.
16. S.S. Pirzada, *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol.XXIX, No.4, 1976, pp. 67-68.
17. *World Muslim Gazetteer*, p. 771.
18. Ambassador George McGhee's *Envoy to the Middle World - Adventures in Diplomacy*, New York, 1969, p. 91.
19. The information and quotations from speeches in connection with the International Islamic Economic Conference, have been obtained from the *Daily Dawn* issues of November 26 and December 7, 1949.
20. K. Sarwar Hassan's *Pakistan and United Nations*, New York, 1960, pp. 186-205.
21. *Islamic Solidarity: 5th Islamic Summit*, p. 162.

INDEX

- Afghanistan, 9; and Pakistan, 12; war in, 16, 20-21, 24, 26; developments in, 30; Soviet action in, 31-32; dispute over, 33; Soviet-Pakistan talks, 35-36; as a trap for Islamabad, 40-41; relations with Pakistan, 45; (1893) agreement on, 46-47; Durand Line dispute, 48-49; dependence on Soviet cement, 50; in Phase II, 51; in turmoil, 52-53; towards reconciliation, 54-55; Democratic Republic of, 57; the aftermath of Soviet invasion in, 58-59; role in US-Pakistan relations, 60; and Geneva Accords, 61-62; adding a new dimension to Pakistan politics, 68-69; and refugees, 105
- Afridi, Wali Khan, 48
- Afghani, Jamaluddin, 174
- Ahrar, 2
- Ahmadis *see* Qadianis
- Ahmed, Salma, 145
- Aksai Chin, 17
- Al-Saud, King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz, 175; address at the Muslim World League Conference, 184; in Iran, 185
- Ali, Chaudhry Muhammad, 3, 111
- Ali, Maulana Mohammad, 175
- Ali, Maulana Shaukat, 175; representing Muslims at the Jerusalem Congress, 176
- Al-Zulfiqar, 78
- All Pakistan Women's Association (APWA), 142-43, 145
- American, aid to Pakistan, 20; policy on Afghanistan, 33; *see also* United States
- Amin, Hafizullah, 57-58
- Anwar-ul-Haq, 90; Commission, 91
- Awami National Party (ANP), 80
- Azam, Abd Al-Rahman, 176
- Bangladesh, 5
- Bari, Maulana Abdul, 178
- Bhutto, Benazir, 8; on US aid, 22, 39; return of, 79; in power sharing, 80; in political wilderness, 81-82; achieving national recognition, 134, 146
- Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 4; government, 6, 8-9; statements on Israel, 24; in (1970s), 30; as president of Pakistan, 52; on road to Afghanistan, 53; meeting with Daoud, 54-57; and domestic politics, 67-68, 71; downfall of, 72; as a popular figure, 73-74; and PNA, 78; and party politics, 81; reforms, 88-90, 94; and military reforms, 96; administrative reforms, 97, 109; change in economic plans, 113; the execution of, 141; address at the Second Islamic Summit, 187
- Bhutto, Mumtaz, 9
- Bizenjo, Ghaus Bux, 9
- Bohra community, 178
- Britain, 38
- Burki, Shahid Javed, 9
- Business and Professional Women's Club, 145

- Carter, Jimmy, 21; on non-strategic issues, 29; and Afghanistan, 33; and Pakistan, 39, 62
- Caroe, Sir Olaf, 46
- Casablanca, 24
- China, relations with Pakistan, 4; poor ties with India, 13, 15; occupation of Aksai Chin, 17; and nuclear equation, 19; defence aid to Pakistan, 21, 29, 30; as a reliable friend, 33; "New", 34; and Pakistan, 36, 38, 40, 42; interests in Afghan war, 59; as a semi-industrialized country, 117
- Choudhry, Fazal Elahi, 56
- Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), 88-89, 91
- Convention Muslim League, 80
- Democracy, Basic, creation of, 3, 75
- Democratic Women's Association, 145
- Egypt, 24
- Farangi Mahal, 175
- Family Laws Ordinance, of (1961), 140-41
- Federal Security Force (FSF), 92
- Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC), 93
- Ford, Gerald, 37
- France, 38
- Gandhi, Indira, 16, 18
- Gandhi, Rajiv, 18-19; and Junejo, 20; with Mubarak on the phone, 24
- Geneva Accords, signing of, 61
- Gorbachev, Mikhail, 20, 32; and China, 34
- Group of Seventy, 15
- Hudud*, 6, 139
- human rights: in Pakistan, 14
- Husain, Zahid, 112
- Hussain, Syeda Abida, 134; on mobilization for women's rights, 145
- Husaini, Mufti Aminul, 176, 184
- Indus Waters Treaty, signing of, 4; division of, 16
- Indonesia, 106
- India, 10, 14; as a historical rival, 15; role in Kashmir, 17; and Pakistan, 18-20; nuclear capability, 22; state of emergency in, 25; aid to "separatists", 30; in accommodation with others over Afghan issue, 32-33; disputes with China, 34; and Pakistan, 36, 38, 40; in sporadic dialogue with Pakistan, 68; and Islam, 82; spiral growth in economy, 104; and trade war in (1949), 105, 108, 113; share of agriculture in GDP, 117
- International Islamic Congress, 174
- investment: and domestic savings in Pakistan, 127-28
- infrastructure, deterioration in physical, 124-27
- Iqbal, Sir Mohammad, 175; at the Muslim Congress, 176
- Iran, 12; (1979) revolution, 29; as a significant factor in Pakistan's foreign policy, 30, 37
- Israel, 24; disputes with Arabs, 37
- Islamic Conference, 10

Islamization: in Pakistan, 81-83, 134, 139

Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa, 8-9

Jahangir, Asma, 134

Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), 78

Jazairi, Sir Mohammad, 176

Jerusalem, 24

Jinnah, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali, 1; and Bengali language, 2; and Mountbatten, 47; political ascendancy of, 102, 108; and two-nation theory, 111; deputing delegation to Cairo Congress, 176; address to Muslims of Malaya, 177; address to Muslim states, 178; and Truman, 179; introduction of an Islamic bloc, 180; the daily *Dawn's* editorial on, 182

Jinnah, Fatima, 4, 181

Junejo, Mohammad Khan, 7; talks with Rajiv, 20; regime, 22, 39; in support for *Mujahedin*, 58; as prime minister, 77, 81

Karmal, Babrak, 52; as new head of DRA government, 58

Kashmir, dispute, 1; case on, 2, 15-16; as a bone of contention between India and Pakistan, 17; as an unsolvable issue, 19; First War (1947-49), 48

Kemal, Mustafa, 175

Khalq Party, 57

Khan, Liaquat Ali, 2; assassination of, 49; and industrialization, 109; as finance minister, 111; and anti-poverty campaign, 180

Khan, Sir Zafar Ullah, 2

Khan, Gen. Muhammad Ayub, 3; on trilateral policy, 29, 34; and domestic politics, 67-68, 70-71; as longest-ruling leader, 72; and "Basic Democracy", 75; and party politics, 81, 88; military

recruitment program, 94; the downfall of, 110; and economic plans, 112

Khan, Begum Ra'ana Liaquat Ali, 142

Khan, Muhammad Yahya, 4; and restoration of a parliamentary system, 70; at the First Islamic Summit, 186

Khan, Khan Abdul Wali, 9, 35, 48, 55, 81

Khan, Asghar, 9, 81

Khan, Abdul Qadir, 18-19

Khan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, 48, 55

Khan, Lt.Gen. Muhammad Daoud, 50; resignation of, 51; role in uprising, 52-53; and Bhutto, 54-57

Khan, Sir Sayyid Ahmad, 102

Khan, Ghulam Ishaq, 112; devising new economic model, 113

Khan, Shaikat Hayat, 177

Khilafat Movement, 175

Khomeini, Ayotullah, 12

Kosygin, Alexei, 4

language question: during Jinnah's time, 2

Libya, 37

Lebanon, 37

Linlithgow, Lord, 173

Majlis-i-Shura, 6, 75, 80, 139

Mahmood, Mufti, 81

Mahbub-ul-Haq, 113

- Maudoodi, Maulana, 81
 Masoom sisters, the bodies of, 145; the murder of, 156
 Middle East, 22; development of Pakistani markets in, 23; vs. Pakistan's foreign policy, 24
 migrant Pakistani workers: in the Gulf region, 23
 Mirza, Iskander, 3
 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 47
 Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), 6, 8, 78; boycotting of (1984) polls, 79-80; the future role of, 84
 Mubarak, Hosni, 24
 Muhammad, Ghulam, 3, 111; building an independent economy, 112; and George McGhee, 180; and International Islamic Economic Conference, 181
 Munir, Muhammad, 3
 Muslim League Party, 3, 47, 80; the session of, 173; adoption of resolution, 176

 Najibullah, Dr. Muhammad, 59, 62
 narcotics: in Pakistan, 14; as a thorn in US-Pakistan relations, 25
 National Awami Party (NAP), 5, 55
 Nayar, Kuldip, 18
 Nazimuddin, Khwaja, 2
 Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal, 111
Nizam-i-Mustapha, 6
 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 15
 "no-war" pact, Rajiv's gesture of, 18
 nuclear issue, 12; Pakistan's option, 15; Indo-Pakistan agreement on, 18-19, 21; in South Asia, 22; non-proliferation, 38-39

 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 13
 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 14, 23-24, 42; condemnation of Soviet invasion, 58; Pakistan's participation in, 82, 172; and the Second Islamic Summit, 187; participation in Jeddah meeting, 188-89; the secretary-general of, 190; member states at the COMSTECH meeting, 193; role in assistance to the African Sahel region, 194

 Pakistan People's Party (PPP), 5, 8-9, 22, 73-74, 78, 80, 82, 84, 92
 Pakistan Muslim League (PML), 7, 78
 Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), 78
 Pakistan Women Lawyers' Association (PWLA), 142, 144
 Pakistan, signing of Geneva Accords, 9; *see also* Geneva Accords
 Pirzada, Abdul Hafeez, 9, 81
 Planning Commission, 101, 112
 Provisional Constitutional Order, 74
 Pushtunistan, 45; the devising of name, 48; flags on the Indus River, 49; escalation of, 50; Greater, 52; as a "political difference", 54; Day, 56

 Qadianis, resentment against, 2; religious repression against, 83
 Quwatli, Shukri Al, 176

 Radcliffe Award, 1
 Rann of Kutch, Indo-Pak skirmish over, 16

- Reagan, Ronald, 22, 37; policy on Pakistan aid, 38; F-16s sale to Pakistan, 62
 referendum, of December (1984), 76
 Republican Party, 81
- Safdar, Khwaja Muhammad, 75
 Sahib, Dr. Khan, 3, 48
 Saifuddin, Syedina Tahir, 178
 Saud, King Abdul Aziz Ibn, 174; cabling invitations to various Muslim rulers, 175
 Saudia Arabia, 13; military aid to Pakistan, 21, 23
 "sectarianism": in Pakistan, 83
 Shah, King Muhammad Zahir, 50
 Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 4
 Shoaib, Mohammad, 112; and Ayub economic model, 113
 social development: in Pakistan, 121-24
 South Korea, 107
 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 15, 19-20, 68
 Southwest Asia, 30
 Soviet Union, 4, 9; arms sale to India, 12; relations with Pakistan, 13, 15; proposals on Afghan issue, 16, 19; as a danger to Pakistan, 20; initiative on Afghanistan, 21; and Pakistani "separatists", 30; aggression against Afghanistan, 31; the "Accommodate Issue", 32; ties with China, 33; friendly attitude towards Pakistan, 34; renewal of bombings of Pakistani areas, 35; uncertain relations with Islamabad, 36; dictatorship in Afghanistan, 38, 40; terms on Afghanistan, 41; overtures in Kabul, 49; trade with Afghanistan, 50, 52; training of Afghan army, 57; invasion of Afghanistan, 58-59; and Geneva Accords, 61; withdrawal from Afghanistan, 62; occupation of Afghanistan and side-effects, 69, 105
 Suhrawardy, Husain Shahid, 4; apathy towards (1956) war, 24
 Symington, Stuart, 22; Amendment, 39
- Taraki, Nur Muhammad, 57
 Tashkent, 4
 Truman, Harry S., 179
- United States, 4; signing of Geneva Accords, 9; aid to Pakistan, 10; as a partner, 13; policy on Afghanistan, 21; and Pakistan, 22; on question of narcotics, 25; support to Pakistan, 26, 31, 37, 49; and defense pact with Pakistan, 105
 U.S., as a support force, 29; formal ties with Pakistan, 30, 35; role among Pakistani politicians, 36; aid program to Pakistan, 38; post-WWII assistance to Pakistan, 39; response to cease-fire, 40, 42; and Daoud, 52; interests in Afghanistan, 58-59; massive military support to Pakistan, 60; signing of Declaration on International Guarantees, 61; and continuation of aid to Pakistan, 62; security ties with Pakistan, 68-69
 Ushr, 6, 81
 USSR, and Pakistan, 29, 42; *see also* Soviet Union
- Women's Action Forum (WAF), 142; the setting-up of, 143; on criticism of the Sixth Five-Year Plan, 144


World Muslim Congress, 179

Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), 145

Zakat, the enforcement of, 6, 81; Ordinance of (1980), 153; and the status of women, 157; as a maintenance system, 159-60; changing of, 164

Zetland, Lord, 173


Zia-ul-Haq, Gen. Muhammad, 6; and election results, 7-8; and Rajiv, 18-19; and Junejo's government, 22-23; statements on Israel, 24; and superpowers, 30, 39, 58; on attack by the opposition, 59; maintaining power through US aid, 60; and Carter, 62; and domestic politics, 67-69; and Martial Law, 70-72; and de-Bhuttoization, 73; amending the Constitution, 75; and non-partisan elections, 76-77; electoral support for, 79; vs. MRD, 80; and other parties, 81; relationship with civilian bureaucrats, 88; military recruitment program, 89; and modification of Bhutto reforms, 90; abolishing the TAG, 91; and CSP, 92; and recruit policy, 94; as chairman of "High-Powered Selection Committee", 95-96; seizure of power in (1977), 97; and women's legal status, 139; role in re-entry of Egypt into the OIC, 192; at the COMSTECH meeting, 193; towards a peaceful settlement on Iran-Iraq war, 194



YOUTHMANSHIP
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LIBRARY

WITHDRAWN FROM
JUNIATA COLLEGE LIBRARY

JUNIATA COLLEGE



2820 9100 117 849 4



JUNIATA COLLEGE LIBRARY

Pakistan Authoritarianism in the 1980s

This is a selection of papers presented at the 2nd Pakistan Conference held at Columbia University, New York, USA, in 1987. They cover a number of aspects of the political, economic and social system of Pakistan.

Dr Wasti draws attention to the importance of changes in Pakistan as the country moves to a more representative form of government in the 1990s. Craig Baxter and Leo Rose examine the security and foreign policy options for Pakistan; Louis Dupree surveys the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan and William Richter discusses the internal political scene as the country's political system undergoes change. Charles Kennedy writes on administrative changes in the bureaucracy during the long years of Martial Law while Shahid Javed Burki continues his studies on the economic system of the country.

Anita Weiss looks at the role and status of Pakistani women in the 1980s and beyond while Grace Clark discusses the Zakat system and its impact on women.

This is an invaluable record of the most important decade in Pakistan's chequered history.

Craig Baxter is the author of several books including *Government and Politics in South Asia*, *Zia's Pakistan*, etc. Prof **Razi Wasti** is the author of, among others, *Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905-1910* and *The Political Triangle in India 1858-1924*.

Price Hardback Rs 250.00 Paperback Rs 100.00