

Khilafat to Partition

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A Survey of major political trends among
Indian Muslims during
1919—1947

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KALAMKAR PRAKASHAN

NEW DELHI

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First Edition : June, 1970

Price : Rs. 35

Composed by Modern Composing Agency, Delhi-6 and
printed at Delite Press, Delhi-6

Published by D. R. Goyal for Kalamkar Prakashan, New Delhi

**To
My Teacher
Dr. G.N. Sharma,
with gratitude and love**

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AUTHOR'S NOTE

This work seeks to trace the course of political thought of the Muslims in India during the period 1919-1947. The historical and cultural background of political thought during this span of about three decades has been provided at some length so as to bring out and explain the prominent features of thought represented by each one of the personalities selected for study. These personalities have been chosen as representing strands of thought and movements in political life and not to make the present work a biographical study. The emphasis throughout has been on the interplay of the forces of religion and politics though prominence is accorded to political ideas and movements; on the almost total failure of the Muslims in India to separate religion and politics and achieve a secular outlook; and on their unwillingness to adapt themselves to the demands of the age—reason, liberalism, modernization and secularism. The Partition of the country in 1947 has been shown as the tragic finale of the separatist thinking of the Muslims and of the extremism of some sections of the Hindu community. The concluding chapter sums up the arguments of the preceding ones and attempts a review of the present problems of the Muslim community in India. It ends with the note of optimism that though the political situation is still charged with suspicion and distrust and communalism has a vicious hold on some sections of the population, grounds for hope are not wanting and a spirit of understanding, fraternity and common citizenship may be found among progressive sections of all communities. It is these sections and their increasing influence in the course of time that the future of our secular democracy rests.

All the available material relating with the subject of this study has been consulted: the bibliography and the references and notes at the end of each of the chapters would indicate my indebtedness to various writers and thinkers. In the collection and the study of the material grateful thanks are due to the librarians of Marathwada University Library, Khuda Baksh

Library, Patna, Maulan Azad Library, Aligarh, National Library, Calcutta, and the Library of the School of International Studies Delhi. The Librarian of the *Times of India* Office Library, Bombay, placed at my disposal the invaluable files of the back issues of the journal and the rare collection of clippings relating to the leaders of India, their thought and work. Similarly the Director of the State Archives, Bombay was kind enough to make available to me the files of the now extinct *Bombay Chronicle*. The author also acknowledges with gratitude the help extended to him by Dr. S.A. Latif, who gave him access to the yet unpublished correspondence between him and Nawab Ismail Khan. He was also good enough to spare time for discussing with me certain aspects of the problem of the thesis. Particular mention should be made of help extended to me by Dr. G. Adhikari who placed at my disposal much significant material and, what is even more important, discussed with me with rare frankness and patience, the questions I raised in my meetings with him. Grateful thanks are due to Dr. G. N. Sharma for his constant encouragement and guidance throughout the course of work. Thanks are also due to Dr. S. A. Bari, C. D. Choudhry and Dr. M. S. Siddiqui.

—Moin Shakir

INTRODUCTION

“This work” says the author, “seeks to trace the course of Muslim thought during the period, 1919-1947. All available material relating to the subject of this study has been consulted.”

This claim is correct. Apart from a few books of transient value, the author has studied a whole library of literature (Muslim, Hindu and foreign) concerning the period. The author, in my opinion, has passed an almost faultless judgement on every Muslim leader of importance.

The first chapter is devoted to a general review of “Muslim Political Tradition in India.” The author then takes up five leaders, representing various aspects of Muslim politics of the period. He does not idolise the Muslim leaders but values their work critically and scientifically, and comes to the conclusion that they could build no system and that their political thought (with the exception of Maulana Azad after 1924) always moved on a very low plane. “On analysis and investigation it is discovered,” Mr. Shakir remarks, “that no Muslim in India can be described as a political theorist ; *and none of them succeeded in making any striking contribution to political thought...* Even the most modern among them were never prepared to face realities, and as such they never succeeded in overthrowing the yoke of Islamic religion and tradition...The nature and character of their political thought was determined by the rigid and orthodox interpretation of Islam. The result was the intrusion of religion into politics and of the politicization of religion. *The outcome is not secular in the basic sense of the term.* Theology was supreme and everything was subordinate to it. Politics, philosophy and economics were not assigned independent position... They were not prepared to welcome changes taking place in countries where Muslims were in a predominant majority... Their petty political interests not only affected their actions but also their opinions.”

The author says he is not concerned with biographies of his chosen personalities, but with “(a) the interplay of the forces of

religion and politics (b) the almost total failure of the Muslims in India to separate religion and politics and to achieve a secular outlook ; and (c) their unwillingness to adapt themselves to the demands of the age—reason, liberalism, modernisation and secularism.”

A careful examination of the thesis, which I have read thrice from cover to cover, has created in me a great respect for Mr. Shakir's extensive and careful study as well as his critical judgement ; his Bibliography leaves nothing to be desired and his innumerable foot-notes refer almost every idea to the text from which it has been derived. I fully agree with his “contempt” for the surprising ignorance of Islamic history and Islamic thought (as well as the character of the present day world) shown by his chosen representatives as well as others (e.g. Deoband School, Khaksar movement, etc.).

But there is a difference in our approach on account of our age. I joined the M. A. O. Collegiate School in the sixth class in 1907. After five years at Oxford, I joined Maulana Mohammed Ali's Jamia Millia in 1922, and later on came to the Muslim University as a Professor in 1923. Apart from the Deoband School, I have had some contact with all the leaders referred to by the author. But while Mr. Shakir can simultaneously study the reprints of the material before him, to me the articles of the *Comrade*, the *Al-Hilal* and the various ghazals and poems of Dr. Sir Mohammed Iqbal came in successive impressions, and I have had to work and think and study to overcome their incorrect and hopeless ideology. Mr. Mohammed Ali's masterpiece as editor of the *Comrade* was his *Choice of the Turks*. I read it with tears—and faith—as an Aligarh undergraduate, and it was not till the rise of Lenin and Kemal Pasha that I discovered that his facts were wholly wrong and that the fall of the Turkish leaders, whom he supported, was not worth a tear.

II

The third chapter is only introductory and calls for no detailed remarks. About Sir Syed I would only say this. The primary object of the Aligarh Movement was to bring the Mussalmans to the same cultural level as the Hindus. Had this

prejudice, superstition, orthodoxy, hatred and intolerance because to the discussion of every problem he used to bring in God and His Prophet, which is repugnant to rationalism.”

His life went through three phases— (a) the Comrade period, (b) the Khilafat period, and (c) the post-Khilafat period.

(a) Mr. Mohammed Ali B. A. (Oxon.) was, as Mr. Shakir points out, a product of the Aligarh Movement ; but he was also a product of the Oxford History School. He left the service of the Baroda government in order to edit the *Comrade*— a weekly for the educated section of the Muslim intelligentsia, who knew how to enjoy good English literature. He criticised the government, the Hindus, the Muslim loyalists and the trustees of the M. A. O. College. He had a powerful pen and got excellent contributions. But the topic that interested him most was the fate of “Islam outside India.” It is easy to be wise after the event. But it has to be realised that with reference to this topic he made three fearful mistakes. (i) He overrated the capacity and character of Anwar Pasha and the Young Turks who, after overthrowing Abdul Hamid II, insisted on continuing the imperialism of the Ottoman emperors, which in practice meant the dominance of the Turks as the governing class of the empire. (ii) He also failed to notice the hatred of the Turks which had developed in the Arab mind, and which impelled all selfish Arab leaders to join the Allies as soon as they could do so with safety. (iii) Lastly, he overlooked that various fragments of the Muslim population (Persians, Afghans, etc.) were not prepared to give up the freedom they had won from foreign domination in the course of centuries.

(b) The Treaty of Sevres threatened to reduce Turkey to the position of an Indian princely State. I still remember the shudder that went through Muslim minds at its terrible provisions. What could the Mussalmans of India do about it? Since English was the main power concerned, the Mussalmans of India could demand that the maintenance of the Khilafat was an integral part of their religious faith. But the demand would be futile unless two conditions were fulfilled— (i) the Hindus of the national movement should be won over and (ii) the demand should be made by the Muslim masses. Mr. Mohammed Ali with his excellent western education and towering personality was the inevitable leader. *He grew a beard, figured as a Maulana*

and became the first Muslim leader of the Muslim masses. The Muslim masses knew nothing of the history of the Caliphate and would believe what they were told. Unfortunately Maulana Mohammed Ali began to believe sincerely in what he said, and he was at this stage of his life a sincere and ardent Khilafatist as well as nationalist. Also the Khilafat movement, as all could see, meant a chaotic collection and mal-administration of public subscriptions.

But the Khilafat was ended by Kemal Pasha and the Turkish National Assembly, who had no illusions about its real character and preferred to organise Turkey as a modern, national and secular state. They saw no reason for obeying the Indian Khilafat Committee. Maulana Mohammed Ali's attempts to keep the Khilafat question alive were unavailing. He went to England and the acting Secretary of State (Mr. H. A. L. Fischer) gave him a detailed interview, but Lloyd George promised nothing. The Turkish leaders informed the Ali Brothers that they were too busy (*mashghul*) to discuss a matter which they considered to be closed for all time. A conference in Saudi Arabia for the institution of 'a new Caliphate', at which the Ali Brothers spoke in Urdu, led to no result. Finally the Cairo Conference of 1927 passed a resolution asking the Mussalmans "to create the international conditions which make the revival of the Caliphate possible." So the sorry story ended.

(c) It is difficult to define with consistency the position of Maulana Mohammed Ali from after the vanishing of the Khilafat agitation up to his death. He stood for an 'independent India'; he was afraid, at the same time, of the dominance of the Hindu majority. His study of England, America and western countries should have assured him that a secular constitution and a secular outlook on life was the basis of the modern state; also that not constitutional provisions, but only the goodwill of the majority, could guarantee the prosperity of the minority—e.g. the Jews and Roman Catholics in U.S.A. He was always talking of the perfection of Islam as a religion and even declared that 'the worst Muslim sinner and criminal was better than Mahatmaji'† In order to contact and guide the

†I remember his saying this quite often. Mr. Moin Shakir takes this sentence from Ram Gopal's *Indian Muslims*.

masses, it is painful to observe that our highly educated leader sank to the level of the cheapest, fanatical and the most ill-informed of Muslim *mullahs*. He showed no clear road; yet no one—and certainly not Mr. Jinnah—could challenge Maulana Mohammed Ali before the Muslim masses. Still the first step had been taken. “It is a sad reality”, says Mr. Shakir, “that those who followed the technique and strategy of Maulana Mohammed Ali ‘fought the battle of Pakistan and won it’.

IV

Constructive Revivalism (*Dr. Sir Mohammed Iqbal*)

Iqbal’s position as one of the greatest poets of India and of Islam cannot be questioned. But he has hardly any value as a consistent thinker in political matters. Apart from the *Masnawi* of Maulana Rumi, no consistent system of thought is to be found in any Persian poet. Iqbal himself admitted that he was no “system-builder.” The two opposite poles of his thought are well stated by Mr. Shakir: “Iqbal believes that Islam is perfect and eternal as a guide for social and political life. He was aware, however, of the fact that the medieval spirit of Islam had rendered it useless to the modern man.”

Between these two poles Iqbal’s thought oscillates according to his moods. *His Asrar-i-Khudi* and *Rumuz-i-Be-Khudi* are pale reflections of the great *Masnawi*. The *Shikwa* and *Jawab-i-Shikwa* are relevant to modern conditions, and one would wish Iqbal had stuck to the wisest thought he ever expressed: “When the unbeliever follows the Muslim ways of life (*a’ten*) he gets both palaces and fine women (*hur wa qusur*). Of the enormous literature we have on Iqbal, Dr. Sachidanand Sinha’s work in English *Iqbal, the Poet and his Message* is by far the best, both for appreciation and criticism, and it has been carefully used by the author who sums up as follows: “Iqbal did not have sufficient courage to break with traditional Islam completely and accept the spirit of modern science and socialism. His thought is replete with paradoxes and antiquarianism. He failed to assimilate liberal forces and could not completely free himself from the moorings of tradition. His inconsistencies and contradictions make it difficult to regard him as a systematic thinker

or a consistent philosopher. The story of Iqbal's thought represents the tragedy of a great genius."

V

Synthetic Nationalism (*Maulana Abul Kalam Azad*)

Maulana Azad was in many respects the very opposite of Mr. Mohammed Ali. The latter started with an excellent modern education, forgot it almost completely, and talked like an ill-informed *mulla* for whom the great achievements of medieval Muslim thought—whether mystic or scholarly—meant nothing whatsoever. His ignorance of Muslim history, as his theory of the Khilafat as an institution definitely proves, was colossal. Maulana Azad came from a very distinguished family of Muslim scholars and divines, who had one foot in India and the other in Arabia. His father and ancestors combined scholarship with mysticism; they enrolled disciples, collected money, and tradition says that Azad inherited several lacs from his father. Mr. Mohammed Ali collected subscriptions both for his own maintenance and for his work. Azad never asked the public for anything. When his press was confiscated by the government, he made up for the loss from his own pocket.

Maulana Azad was born in Arabia and his mother-tongue was Arabic. Mr. Moin Shakir says he was 'a genius'. We find him finishing the old traditional Arabic syllabus, both in theological as well as rational sciences, and beginning his work as a teacher at the age of fifteen. He refused to follow his lucrative ancestral profession of *piri-muridi* and entered public life with the publication of the *Al-Hilal*, an Urdu weekly in a style too Arabicised for the Muslim masses.

Mr. Shakir coins the term 'romantic' for the period of Maulana Azad's life from the publication of the *Al-Hilal* to the end of the *Khilafat* movement.

When the Khilafat movement failed, Maulana Azad, who had been elected President of an extra-ordinary session of the Congress, came to Aligarh for some weeks to think over matters and to write his Presidential Address. Close association with him left upon me the impression that the Maulana had become a hundred per cent Congressman, that the thought of the *mullahs* of India meant nothing to him now, and that he had learnt from

his Congress colleagues and other sources the true nature of parliamentarianism, democracy freedom and all such topics. But the Maulana's mind was also working on the question of the relation of Muslims and non-Muslims.

The Muslim mystics of the highest grade have had no hesitation in answering the question. I can only find space for a few references : (1) Shaikh Mohiuddin Ibn-i-Arabi, the greatest thinker Islam has produced, declared that 'the difference between Islam and *shirk* is phenomenal, not real, for both are the integral and necessary parts of a Divinely ordered universe.' (ii) Maulana Rumi drove this lesson home in his *Masnawi* by many verses of the highest order. In some lines composed as a message from Allah to Moses, the *Masnawi* says : "To every people we have granted a basis of virtue (*sirat*) ; to every people we have granted a religious technique (*istilah*). The religious technique of Sindh is best for the Sindhis (i.e. Mussalmans) ; the religious technique of India is best for the Hindus. (iii) To the vulgar question as to what would happen in the next world to non-Muslims of excellent character who believe in God—a matter on which Mr. Shakir has twice quoted Maulana Mohammed Ali's statement—Shaikh Nizamuddin Aulia of Delhi replied emphatically : "This is a matter for God to decide in His mercy ; you cannot decide the matter for Him." (iv) More to the point, Shaikh Naseeruddin Chiragh of Delhi asked his biographer to remember that in the famous Quranic verse—"And as to those who strive for Us. We will lead them to Our paths (*subulana*)"...the world 'paths' (*subulana*) was in the plural, not singular (*sabilana*). There are many paths to God ; whatever fanatics in their ignorance may assert, Islam did not come to close the gates of Divine mercy on mankind.

No writer on Maulana Azad whom I have read has drawn attention to the fact that he is one of the very few non-Wahabi religious scholars who have remained absolutely uninfluenced by Muslim *tasawwuf* or mysticism ; he only approves of them, when like Saiyyid Muhammad of Jaunpur and Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi, they challenge the government or public opinion.

So he had to find the basis of tolerance and secularism in the Quran itself.

The main problem is the "cursing verses" belonging to the war-period of the Quran. They are in such sharp contrast with

the Quranic injunctions of peace and its conception of Divine mercy that a famous mystic of the tenth century A.D. Abu Said Abul Khair, used to face over them when reading the Quran.

Maulana Azad has (I think for the first time) put these verses in their proper historic place. The Prophet was a pacifist both before migrating to Medina and after the conquest of Mecca. He converted Arabia to Islam with a loss of two thousand lives at the utmost, counting the dead on both sides. These verses are of a temporary character ; and the Quran defines the conditions under which alone it permitted resort to force. 'They drove you out of your city (Mecca) because you believed in God ; you have settled in another place (Medina) and they have come to attack you again ; consequently under these circumstances resort to force (*jihad*) is permitted to you.' To this we must add the fact that the Prophet had always a large number of non-Muslims among his allies and followers.

If this is understood, the Quranic message of peace, human brotherhood and religious freedom is clear : "To you your religion and to me mine." "Mercy is Allah's basic character—*Kataba ala nafs-i hur rahmah*". "No compulsion in religion." "We have not sent you (Mohammed) except as a mercy to mankind." Maulana Azad was not afraid of science. Science is non-moral and non-religious. The first object of science is to discover the laws of nature ; its second object is to invent instruments by which man can increase his power by controlling nature. But how man uses the great powers that science gives him is a question for morality and religion. Thirdly, science broadens man's conception of God and the universe and Azad was prepared to welcome this broadening conception. "We created and then we guided," says the Quran. In one of the letters in his *Ghubar-i Khatir* we find him basing his faith in God on the Doctrine of Evolution—the integration of the highest forms of life from invisible 'rays' and 'particles' through billions of years.

In the Introduction to his *Tarjumanul Quran* Maulana Azad declares that all religions have the same basis—monotheism. But though mankind is one family, different sections of it have different languages, different rites and different laws. Maulana's conception of nationality, democracy, willingness to learn from the west have been well explained by Mr. Shakir and need no

detailed comment. He is also correct in saying that "Azad did not possess all the qualities of a leader in the situation which faced him." But no one did. Muslim communalism had gone mad and there was no cure for it. But mass movement among the Muslims is a very recent phenomena, and in the whole history of Muslim India no one thinker and scholar has been more intensely hated by his coreligionists than Maulana Azad during the ten years preceding the Partition. Jinnah took every opportunity of insulting him ; the Muslim press kept on cursing him, he was abused from every communal platform. Add to it, he had recurring attacks of a fever, which doctors could not diagnose, while the money he had inherited was coming to an end. His thought was correct ; and his faith in God, in his country and in himself was so firm that he would neither bend nor break owing to the onslaught of the mad dogs of Muslim communalism. In those days the Muslim University had become 'the armoury of the Muslim League' and I have good personal experience of that mad-dog Muslim communalism, which has fortunately betaken itself to Pakistan, where it is controlled by military regiments.

VI

The Political Philosophy of Separatist Muslim Nationalism

(Mr. Mohammed Ali Jinnah).

What Mr. Moin Shakir says about the early career of Mr. Jinnah is correct and the following statements of his deserve to be noted : "Jinnah was the most secular of all Muslim leaders. He was least interested in Islam and had no sound knowledge of it." In his early career "he was associated with the topmost leadership of the country." "He accepted the principles of nationalism, democracy, secularism and the unity of the country. His liberal creed stood for freedom, constitutionalism, and the absence of any type of fanaticism in social or political life." "He emphasised that people should forget religious differences ; they may not abandon their religion, but must learn to separate religion from politics." It must be added that he was a great lawyer, who throughout his career showed remarkable personal independence. He could never become a tool of the

British government. But our picture of him will remain incomplete unless we also remember the fact that he could be remarkably callous. When a group of Aligarh students ventured to ask him what would be the fate of Indian Muslims he said he would give his answer when the time came. But when the time came, he declared: "I have written off the Mussalmans of India."

It is not fair to consider Pakistan an achievement of Mr. Jinnah alone, though he had no hesitation in claiming that honour. India was partitioned because it was partitionable. The heart of Hindu culture in pre-Muslim India was the region between the Ravi and Patna. But there were few conversions to Islam here, in spite of the fact that the Sultans of Delhi and the Mughal Emperors had their capital in this region and drew their sustenance from it. But Islam was accepted (for different reasons in different areas) by majority of the population in the backward tracts—N. W. F. Province, Kashmir, West Punjab, Sind and East Bengal. These areas became Mr. Jinnah's 'Muslim homeland'. The administrative efficiency and other virtues of the medieval Muslim governing class, largely of foreign descent, had totally vanished in the time of Aurangzeb and his successors. The mass of the Mussalmans of India in U. P. and Bihar are the descendants of Hindu converts.

Since Mussalmans were not permitted to take interest, big business and banking remained in the hands of the Hindu upper classes in the middle ages and the Delhi rulers operated through them. The Aligarh Movement failed to bring the Mussalmans to the level of Hindu upper classes.

So long as Maulana Mohammed Ali lived, there was no place for Mr. Jinnah at the top, and he would accept no lower place. He was literally hounded out of public life, and retired to England. One of his handicaps was that he could not address a Muslim audience in Urdu, the only language it understood. Maulana Mohammed Ali's death left for him a place at the top. Minor politicians, like Khaliquzzaman, Firoz Noon, Fazlul Haq, etc. could only become his assistants, whom he kept under stern control. Jinnah alone became the *Qa'id Azam*.

Mr. Shakir's paragraphs on the Two Nations Theory of Mr. Jinnah and the partition it involved are well-considered and well-written. But it has to be remembered that, like

Maulana Mohammed Ali before him, Jinnah could only become a leader of Muslim mass-hatred by saying goodbye to his past, and by lowering the political character of both the intelligentsia and the Muslim masses to a depth hitherto unknown.

VII

Islamic Neo-Rivivalist Renaissance (*Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi*)

Islam throughout its history has known a good deal of 'religious adventurism' and its leaders have been sometimes sincere but mostly egoistic and selfish. The first theological adventurers were the Kharijites, who fought with Hazrat Ali and were persecuted and suppressed by the Umayyad rulers. They made the impossible demand "that the Muslim community should go back to the days of the Prophet and the Shaikhan (Abu Bakr and Umar). By its very nature, 'religious adventurism' is reactionary. A large number of Indo-Muslim religious adventurers have been forgotten. But two of them are still remembered. Saiyyid Mohammed Jaunpuri, who claimed to be the *Mahdi* in the fifteenth century and Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi for whom the claim is made that he was the *Reviver of Islam in the Second Millenium* of its history. Since Shaikh Ahmed wanted a war for the extermination of Hinduism, he is highly honoured in Pakistan.

The religious or rather 'theological adventurer' for our generation is Maulana Abdul Ala Maudoodi, the Head or President of the *Jamaat-i-Islami*.

Owing to the theological ignorance of the Indian Muslims, any reactionary fanatic, who condemns everything existing on his pretended knowledge of the Quran, can always find a following. In the decade preceding the partition, three organisations challenged the supremacy of the League among the Muslims—the Ahrars, the Khaksars and Maudoodi. The first two have vanished, Maudoodi remains but with "the ironical result (as Mr. Shakir puts it) that in undivided India he provided cultural arguments for the (Pakistani) separatists, and in Pakistan he remains a forlorn and isolated figure in a Muslim, but non-Islamic state."

"There are grave inconsistencies in his thought," our author says, "which flow from his political opportunism." Maudoodi

straightway rejects the sociological study of religion and claims to have studied all social sciences thoroughly. As a result of it he makes astounding mistakes in explaining social institutions. It has been rightly said (by Mohammed Sarwar) that "Maudoodi's knowledge of social sciences is superficial and journalistic. He lacks scientific training essential to understand the technical aspect of these sciences."

When the Muslim League was trying to consolidate its hold over Aligarh, Maudoodi also paid us a visit. He declared in his address that in India (i. e. in undivided India) the Mussalmans alone should be 'citizens' and non-Muslims should be 'subjects only'. At a tea party that evening we asked his views about interest, usury, banking, monopolistic industries, state economic policy, 'communism' etc. He was driven to confess that he had not studied these subjects.

Maudoodi knows no European language and has not been able to study any European country personally. Nevertheless he condemns everything western on religious grounds—nationalism, election system, organisation of parties, science and secular learning. In my humble opinion 'the ideas of Maulana Maudoodi' (whom his followers consider a great *Mufakkir* or Thinker) are too frivolous to deserve a detailed examination.

But when India was divided and Maudoodi had to go to Pakistan, there was no place for him there. Pakistan was declared to be a "Muslim State", but it continued to teach English and western sciences and to rely on western armaments. Maudoodi drew a distinction between the 'Muslim State', which has a Muslim majority and the 'Islamic State'—a state in which God is 'sovereign' and the rulers are *ashraf* (persons Divinely chosen). It is a distinction with a difference, and confuses political sovereignty (which is a man-made institution for enforcing man-made laws) with God's omnipotence.

Moin Shakir's final verdict on Maudoodi is harsh but correct: "His interpretation of the Quran and the Hadis, however plausible it may sound, is disruptive in practice, and out of touch with the moral as well as the socio-political demands of the day. In Maudoodi's personality are combined self-righteousness, ignorance of modern science, obscurantism, bigotry of narrow theology and the ambition of a power-hungry politician."

Assessment and Evaluation

In his last chapter the author reviews the whole period and its leaders and finally discusses the future of Indian Muslims. He quotes Professor I. H. Qureshi to the effect that in a century or less the Muslim people in India will cease to exist. He also refers to Prof. W. C. Smith's opinion that Islam in India will be more creative than in Pakistan. (1) Though some valuable books on the subject have been written, it is impossible to forecast the future character of either Islam or Hinduism. But the Mussalmans in India are the only section of the Mussalmans who can now venture into the field of "higher religious criticism", as it has been called in the west. (2) Theology will have to give up to secular reason and science many spheres it has wrongly misappropriated. (3) Much will depend upon the effort of the Mussalmans themselves, but given the appropriate ideology and effort their position *vis-a-vis* the majority should be similar to that of the Roman Catholics and the Jews in the United States. (4) The influence of the *ulama* and *mullahs* has vanished with the administrative organisation of the secular state. (5) The Muslims, taken as a whole, are a middle class and upper working class group; unlike the Hindus they have no millionaires and no depressed or scheduled castes. (6) In every country most men and women prefer to marry within their own religious or social group. Nevertheless the test of a united nation is that inter-religious marriages should be permitted by law and not prohibited by public opinion. The legislation and the changing outlook of Free India has made this possible now.

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The Muslim Political Tradition In India

I

THE epoch of Muslim expansion in India forms one of the most significant periods in Indian History. Its impact on all aspects of Indian life and thought is significant. India was invaded in succession by the Arabs, Turks, Afghans and Mughals. Although they professed a common religion they differed from one another in habits, customs and temperament. These differences should not be overlooked in analysing the character and principles of their Governments and their attitudes and policies towards their subjects.

A brief account of the tenets of Islamic policy may serve as a necessary background to our discussion of Muslim political tradition in India. Mohammed preached "simple monotheism, charity and brotherhood, subjugation of passions, the outpouring of the grateful heart to the giver of all good and accountability of human actions in another existence."¹ Apart from this ethical and spiritual teaching Islam provided a distinctive social, economic and political doctrine as well as guidelines for the regulation of these spheres of life. The social and political teaching of Islam was no doubt vitally connected with the milieu of the times. Islam arose in a tribal society where the group interests superseded the individual interests. There was no question of fundamental rights *vis-a-vis* the group. The elders of the individual families elected one among themselves as the head of the society. And the people had to render obedience to him. The economy was in the hands of the dominant group. More often than not the rule was tyrannical. Protests, occasional

though they were, took a religious form but soon became political when they challenged the vested interests and the supremacy of the dominant group. Islam was such a movement. There is a great element of truth in the characterization of the struggle between the infant Muslim community composed of the under privileged and the Meccan oligarchy as a class conflict.² The development of Islam after the era of the Rashidin Caliphs furnished a contrast, a picture of confrontation and adjustment with new realities. The emergence of absolute monarchy, dynastic wars and maintenance of slavery were repugnant to the very spirit of Islam but were facts of Islamic society. Moreover the teachings, sayings and the actions of the Prophet were the guiding principles for Muslims all over the world. The Omayyads would not permit any change or modification of the teaching of Islam in its application to the different peoples who had come under the sway of the Muslims. The real problem was to apply Islam to the changing conditions of these countries which had different cultures and civilizations. The rigid application of original teaching of Islam was not possible. The Quranic verses are ambiguous and can be interpreted in different ways. The Quranic injunctions cannot be employed without alteration and modification. The hands of a thief cannot be severed in all cases of theft. Most of the verses need elaboration. Consequently, the contradictions in the Quran had been utilised to serve the limited purpose either of its interpreters—the Ulema, or the Caliph. At one place the Quran enjoins the need of mutual consultation while at another by making obedience of the people to the ruler obligatory it seems to tolerate absolutism of the ruler and neglects the possibilities of the ruler turning a tyrant.

Secondly, all the Ahadis (sayings of the Prophet) recorded were not genuine. The issue of "succession" to the Prophet involved many complications and the split in the Muslim community into different sects over this question was an unfortunate one. They invented, and distorted many Ahadis (Hadith) for their own purposes.

As indicated earlier Islamic principles were now to be applied to an altogether new situation, to new lands and peoples, to a new world altogether. It was now impossible to interpret

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Islam in terms of tribal life. The Rashidin Caliphs tried to maintain the traditional simplicity of Islam and the tribal values of an earlier age. The period of 23 years of the Rashidin Caliphs started with the Khrosheite-Imamat and ended with the assassination of the last two Caliphs which inaugurated as a long civil war. The Civil War was terminated by the rise of monarchy. But was the "tribal Democracy" a real one? The Quranic concept of "Shura" excluded the voice of the common people. The idea of Ulul Umr made the authority of the Caliphs unquestioned. There is also a Hadith attributed to the Prophet that the Caliphs will be from among the Khuresh. It was justified even by Ibn Khuldun on behalf of the Khuresh, though he says that the Prophet was thinking of the immediate future rather than of laying down a hard and fast rule of succession.³ It is clear that the Prophet himself wanted to impose restriction on the power of the people and was opposed to broadening the basis of the election of the Caliphs.

The Arabs also came into contact with the richer and more vigorous cultures in the course of their wars of conquest. The knowledge of Greek Philosophy which was acquired during the period of their expansion over the East was to have a powerful impact on the theory and practice of Islam.

Arab expansion and wars of conquest resulted in a tremendous increase in their wealth. The conception of private property could now strike roots in Muslim society. The important companions of the Prophet accumulated wealth and property.⁴ The "sacredness" of this new institution was immediately acknowledged by contemporary Islam. "Whoever is killed in defending property is a martyr" such was the Hadith attributed to the Prophet by Abu Amir.

Centralization of authority in the hands of the monarch and strict regimentation of society were becoming necessary to check the disintegrating forces of the empire. This can clearly be traced in the reign of Abdul Malik (585-705), the fifth Ommayyad sovereign of Damascus. The Abbassides (750 onwards) regarded themselves as responsible only to God. Sovereignty was derived directly from the Almighty. Public opinion was made ineffective. The idea of the accountability

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became alien. Obedience to the ruler became tantamount to the obedience to God. Moreover the subject classes, Mawali and Zimmis, posed a challenge to the original Islamic notion of equality. The spiritual notion of equality in Islam ceased to have political and economic reality. The Mawali were socially inferior. A marriage between a Mawali and a full-blooded Arab woman was regarded "appalling misalliance."⁵

This background makes sufficiently clear that at the time of the advent of Muslims in India Islam was no longer in its original form. Monarchy had become the order of the day. Splendour and pomp was gathering round the person on the throne. Purchasing and selling of the slaves revived after the Rashidin Caliphs. The decree of the prohibition of wine was only on paper. The freedom and the independent status of woman had become a myth.

Muslim rule in India developed on the lines of absolute monarchy. The emperors claimed divine superiority. They were the "Deputy of God" on earth. They were not responsible except to God. Their rule was despotic and absolute and authoritarian. Historians, like Barni, were clear on this point that absolute monarchy violates the injunctions of the Quran, the precepts of the Prophet and the traditions of the pious Caliphate. But it was justified by the needs of the age as without it the social order would have perished.⁶

The political theories of the Muslims thinkers were in conformity with the tendencies towards absolute rulership. The foundation of such ideas was the conception of human nature. To them, it was vicious, corrupt and imperfect. Abul Fazal, therefore, says that a king is the origin of stability and possession.⁷ A king is always a good king. Al-Ghazali saw a conflict between the interests of the individual and society, and came to the conclusion that a reconciliation could be brought about by applying a "doctrine of golden mean and creating a sense of proportion."⁸ An arbitrator is necessary to decide what is just and fair.

Another asset to the monarchy was the theory of organic state which necessarily leads to the centralization of the authority of the state. It implies the need of a strong king and

makes him the arbitrator of all conflicts in society. Moreover in Islam there is no separation of Church and State and politics is subordinated to religion and is the handmaid of religion. Therefore "the Caliph is not merely a secular sovereign ; he is the religious head of a Church and a commonwealth ; the actual representative of divine Government."⁹

There was no question of the rights of the people. They were ignorant and did not have any idea of rights which they might assert or demand from their rulers. Obedience to the king was the greatest virtue. The people were hated and treated with contempt by their rulers. Often they were equated with animals. It was justified because of their low lineage and progeny. The people were deliberately kept uneducated. A pious and religious minded historian like Barni was of opinion that "since education makes low born Muslims efficient and capable so that they are able to challenge and suppress their betters, the State should prevent Muslim boys of lower orders from obtaining education and anyone who ventured to teach them should be punished and exiled from the city."¹⁰ Even a king like Akbar said to Abul Fazal that the education of the people might cause disturbance and sedition in society.¹¹

Monarchic rule was sustained by the terror of military force. The army was there to suppress any rebellion or agitation of the people. The Ulema also constituted an integral part of the political system. They justified every action of the ruler which could add strength to the Government. They always propagated the necessity of a strong ruler. If there were no king "The law would be lost in bewildering opinion, strong man would exercise tyranny over the work, order would give place to utter chaos."¹² The king is necessary to protect the people from internal as well as external enemies. Sultan Mohammed Tughluq struck the verse on the coins, that if there were no kings there will be no peace in society.¹³ Thus the king became the chief legislator, final court of appeal, chief executive and the head of the state.

Some historians have suggested that rulers followed a policy of toleration and "Secularism". Such a policy was not based on conviction but expediency. Any king gifted with a

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little political wisdom and foresight could visualise that a successful Government was impossible without the consent and approval of the overwhelming majority of non-Muslims. The preservation of the nonbelievers and the destruction of the temples did not and could not become a rule. By maintaining the attitude of non-interference in the affairs of faith of the people and by over-riding the precepts of the Ulema, the kings made themselves at the same time acceptable and absolute.

Some modern writers have maintained that the Muslim rule was democratic and constitutional. To I. H. Qureshi, the Muslim ruler did not have any power of law making. The holy law guides all the actions of the king. It implies that the holy law is a check on the authority of the king. In theory it may be true but the practice was different. It should be remembered that Muslim rule was founded not on Shariat (holy law) only but also on the laws and regulations of the king.¹⁴ Many times these laws violated the letter and spirit of Shariat. The state used to permit dancing girls, prostitutes and gambling dens.¹⁵ Allauddin Khilji fixed the rate of the slaves for the convenience of slave owners.

The holy law was never an effective check because the machinery to enforce the law had always been under the sway of the emperor. The royal opinion always prevailed over the voice of the Ulema. The appointment of Sadrus Sadur (the chief theologian) was made by the Emperor and he held office during the pleasure of the Emperor. Aurangzeb removed one inconvenient Sadar and found another.¹⁶

Neither the Ministry nor the nobles could provide constitutional checks on the authority of the emperors. The Quran emphasised the need of mutual consultation in the settlement of affairs. An Arab adage says "the bravest of men require arms and the wisest of kings needs ministers"¹⁷ Ziauddin Barni also wanted the king to select his counsellors with care and be guided by their advice.¹⁸ But the position of the ministers under Muslim rule was distinctly subordinate. They were required only to assist and advise the king, and the latter was not bound by the advice. The area of their authority was limited by the discretion of the

king. Moreover the nature of their work was more administrative than political.

The nobles also could not succeed in limiting the power of monarchy. The nobles had their own vested interests. They did not form a well knit and a united body. There were dissensions and differences among themselves. Intrigues were common. Every group looked for the king's support. Such differences and dissensions helped to strengthen the position of the kings. The nobles could not play a decisive role in settling the issue of succession of kingship. This problem was solved not by the opinion of the nobles but by the sword. Moreover friendly relations between the nobles and princes was discountenanced by the emperors. It was regarded as "meekness of spirit"¹⁹ on the part of the prince (for all things depend on predestination).

The election of the king might have provided some check on his autocracy. But here in India the conception of sovereignty was based on power. The system of "beat"—the sacramental oath of fealty—was never employed in India. The capability of the prince was decided by the sword. The nobles, the Ulemas and the people had to accept king whoever could ascend the throne by virtue of his military ability.

The political tradition was also vigorously expressed in the interplay of Shariat and political power. There had always been a conflict between the Ulema and the monarchs. The former claimed to be the upholders of Islam. Their approach was orthodox, rigid and bookish. They did not take into account the new forces of Islamic society. The Original principles of Islam did not appeal even to those emperors who had to rule over the population with a Muslim Majority. This changed character of the Muslim society represented a "transition form the city State to the territorial state."²⁰ In this context in India, the approach of the Ulema ought to have been liberal and flexible. The forces of orthodoxy competed with those of liberalism for ascendancy.

The conflict between the Ulema and the monarchs can be characterized as a struggle for supremacy between theology and political wisdom. The Ulema were the priestly class conversant with Shariat (holy law) and Fiqh. The rulers were

not capable of preaching and propagating Islam among the people. Their interest was primarily political ; their interest in religion, though pronounced, was subordinate to the political interest. The state was a great instrument in the hands of the rulers for checking the orthodoxy of the Ulema and inculcating among the followers of Islam respect for those who professed other creeds. They had no faith in the forcible conversion of people to Islam. During the reign of Altamash (1210 to 1235) a representation was made by the Ulema before the king complaining that crores of people were still unbelievers and that they were either to be executed or compelled to embrace Islam. On behalf of the king, Junaid, the Vazir, replied that the Muslims were a microscopic minority and an anti-Hindu policy would be suicidal.²¹ The Ulema could never transcend their orthodoxy and antiquarian outlook. They never questioned the un-Islamic features of the prevailing social system with its institution of slavery. They wanted "an all-out war against Hinduism" which the king refused to undertake.²²

Muslim rule was, of course, not theocratic. But the Ulema were a part of the political system. They had their share in the state income. Generally the kings were not hostile and inimical to them. They (kings) disagreed with the Ulema when the latter tried to encroach on the royal authority. The conflict between the divergent approaches of the Ulema and kings found a precise expression in the dialogues between Qazi Mughisuddin and Allauddin Khilji. When the former was asked, "How are the Hindus designated in the law as payers or givers of tribute" ?, the Qazi replied, "They are called payers of tribute, and when the revenue officer demands silver from them, they should, without question and with all humility and respect, tender goods. If the officer throws dirt into their mouths, they must without reluctance open their mouths wide to receive it. The due subordination of the Zimmia (Tribute payers) is excluded in this humble payment and by this throwing dirt into their mouths. The glorification of Islam is a duty and contempt of religion is vain. God holds them in contempt for he says, 'keep them under subjugation'. To keep the Hindus in abasement is especially a religious duty, because they are the most

inveterate enemies of the Prophet, and because the Prophet, has commanded us to slay them, plunder them and make them captive saying, convert them to Islam or kill them, enslave them and spoil their wealth and property.”²³ The Sultan gave a classic justification to his policy towards the subjects : “Although I have not studied the science or the Book, I am a Mussalman of a Mussalman stock. To prevent rebellion, in which thousands perish I issue such orders as I concieve to be for the good of the state, and benefit of the people. Men are heedless, disrespectful and disobey my commands, I am then compelled to be severe to bring them into obedience. I do not know whether this is lawful or unlawful. Whatever I think to be for the good of the state or suitable for the emergency, that I decree.”²⁴ Sher Shah was of the opinion that “it is incumbent upon the kings to give grants to Imams, for prosperity and populousness of the cities of Hindus are dependent on the Imam and the holy men...whoever wishes that God Almighty should make him great should cherish Ulema and pious persons, that he may obtain honour in this world and felicity in the next.”²⁵ This soft attitude sometimes resulted in the weakness of the kings and tarnished their policy. Sikandar Lodhi on the advice of the Ulema killed a Brahmin who said that both Islam and Hinduism are true religions.²⁶

The Mahdvi movement also expressed the same conflict of Shariat and monarchs. It stood for the revival of the pure life of the Prophet's time. It was reactionary, militant and aggressive. It did not hesitate to employ force to achieve the end.²⁷ This movement gathered popularity in the army and among the people.²⁸ The Sur king, Islam Shah, successfully suppressed it and tried to secure the sanction of the state as the basis of law.²⁹

In Akbar's time the revivalist and orthodox forces were suppressed but not extirpated. The greatness of Akbar lies in the fact that he incorporated the spirit of religious tolerance and understanding in the state policy towards non-Muslims. Akbar's policy was the need of the hour. It was not only in the interest of the empire but also of Islam. It was the only way to prevent conflicts between the various sects of Islam and between the rulers and the subjects as also to restore peace in society. Akbar wanted to be above sects—Shia, Sunni and Mahdvi

etc., and desired to reconcile the Shia, Sunni and Rajput notions of sovereignty. This effort is commended by the historian Shibli. "Akbar's conduct," he said, "was in harmony with that of the pious caliphs."³⁰ The guiding principle of Akbar's policy was laid down in his speech made before the participants in the *Ibadat Khana* : "Man's outworn profession and the mere letter of Mohammedanism, without a heart-felt conviction, can avail nothing. I have forced many Brahmins by fear of my force, to adopt the religion of my ancestors, but now my mind has been enlightened with beams of truth, I have become convinced that the dark clouds of conceit, and the mist of self-opinion have gathered round you and that not a step can be in advance without the torch of proof...obedience is not in prostration on the earth. Practise sincerity, for righteousness is not borne upon the brow."³¹

The prohibition against making slaves of prisoners, the remission of pilgrim tax and Jazia are examples of his tolerant policy towards non-Muslims. Akbar set an example to his successors in making the empire great and strong. Such policies made Akbar more popular and therefore really more powerful than any other Muslim king in India.

But the most orthodox section of the Ulema reacted violently to Akbar's lenient policy towards Hindus. This section of Ulema was responsible for the emergence of the revivalist movement of Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi (1563-64 to 1624-25) known as Renovator of the second millenium. He was the most vehement critic of Akbar's policy. According to him the duties of the king are the enforcement and propagation of the holy law, and strengthening of the community.³² He stood for the submission to the Sunnah and resistance to innovation.³³ He was against the abolition of Jazia. He denied the essential unity of all religions. He maintained that Akbar's policies weakened the position of Islam and encouraged the Hindus to humiliate and insult the Muslims.

The political implications of Sirhindi's movement were far-reaching. It was one of the influences that shaped Aurangzeb's religious and political policies. It is also apparent that the

motive behind this movement was to secure the supremacy of the Sunni concept of the Khilafat.

It would thus be clear that the narrow political interest of the ruler and the narrow religious interest of the Ulema were equally unhelpful to the task of building up a broad-based empire and the peaceful propagation of the faith of Islam. The emperors were preoccupied with the law and order of the country and the Ulema distorted the Islamic principles. Islam as a religion reached the common man through the Sufis³⁴ like Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti, Bakhtyar Kaki, Shaikh Fareed Gunjshakar, Makhdoom Alladdin Sabir, Hazrat Chiragh Delhvi etc., who were neither attracted to the riches nor the prestige of the empire. They lived among the people and spoke their language and were the upholders of true Islam. Their influence contributed to the peaceful social and religious life of the people. But their influence on the political affairs of the state was not of considerable importance. The reason for the existence of stable Government was that the kings did not fall a prey to the prejudices of the Ulema. They generally followed the advice of Babar that not the sword but a new policy, a new approach and human outlook is required to win over the hearts of the Indian people³⁵ and build up a powerful government and administration. Even Aurangzeb failed to establish a theocratic state. He once said, "What connections have worldly affairs with religion? What right have makers of religion to enter into bigotry. For you is your religion and for me is mine."³⁶

The role of the Ulema in the history of Muslim India was essentially reactionary.³⁷ They all accepted the existing system as if it was a divine one. They forgot that even a common man might question the great caliph, Omar, that people are not bound to obey him who possessed a little more cloth than him. They had nothing to say about one lakh and eighty thousand slaves kept by Feroze Tughlaq. They only prayed God for the victory of the king and called each of his campaigns a religious war. They authorised him to appropriate people's wealth whenever he desired.³⁸ Mohammed Tughlaq was not liked by them because he punished some corrupt Quazis and Ulema and allowed the Hindus to hold some important posts. Whenever there was a

conflict between the emperor and the people they always took the side of the former.³⁹

With the death of Aurangzeb the disintegration of the Mughal empire began. New forces were emerging on the scene. The knotty problems of society and religion called for a new solution. Aurangzeb had made a radical departure from Akbar's policy. Moreover Akbar's policy was not without lacuna. It could not effectively reconcile the "Ancient Hindu" and Medieval Muslim" cultures nor could it bring about unity between the Hindus and Muslims who were faithful to their own religious principles. He could also not evolve a common political patriotism among the different communities.⁴⁰

Aurangzeb by undoing the policy of Akbar offered a new solution which proved disastrous to the cause of the Empire. He left behind him a number of problems unsolved. The tragedy was that after Aurangzeb there was no strong and wise ruler who could restore peace and unity in the Empire. The impact of the past was so deep that the Muslim mind was not prepared to face the new realities. The immediate effect of Aurangzeb's policy was that 'India was given over to internal strife, exposed to external invasions and plunged in anarchy.'⁴¹ The Muslim thinkers explained the new situation in terms of Kafir and Momin, controversy of Darul Islam and Darul Harb; the questions of Imamat, Khilafat and Jihad still continued to be the themes of current discussion. The character of the Government and the necessity of obedience to the rulers was sought to be understood with reference to such outmoded ideas.

The structure of medieval society was characterized by the spirit of hierarchy and the consciousness of class. It was therefore difficult to create political patriotism and unity in the people. Discontent could not find effective expression and revolutionary movements were inconceivable as they could be thwarted by the vested interests that dominated society. Even those who showed signs of promise were unable to attain their full stature as their growth was obstructed by the petty interests of their family and class.

Shah Waliullah (1703-1763), proved himself an exception to the general rule. He made an original contribution towards

the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam and he recognized the need of presenting Islam in a new way and creating unity among the conflicting Islamic sects. His social and political thought is as significant as his religious thought. His real greatness lies in his analysis of the social forces and trends. According to him Indian society had become corrupt and it was not based on justice. It was a society in which interests of one class were antagonistic to those of the others. He maintained that there were two main causes of the decline of State and the misery of the people. In the first place "the parasitical dependence of unworthy persons on the state and the drain on the treasury.....secondly, as a consequence of expenditure on such unproductive workers the state was obliged to levy heavy and unbearable taxes on peasants, traders and artisans, with the result that those who obeyed the state were ruined and others were turned into rebels and tax-dodgers."⁴²

Shah Waliullah also discussed the problem of inter-relationship between ethics, economics and politics. His comments are interesting and bear the mark of originality.⁴³

The way out of the vanity and luxury of the ruling class and impoverishment of the lower classes, as proposed by Shah Waliullah, was "the restoration of justice and the re-establishment of harmony."⁴⁴ His views on these questions reveal the deep influence on him of Plato, Ghazali, Ibn Khaldun and Razi. But the vital question was to enforce this programme. Shah Waliullah had not lost hope for the Mughals. He did not have any sympathy for the agitations of the peasants among the Sikh, Jat and Maratha communities. This approach makes him "the foremost inspirer of all revivalist schools of the 19th Century."⁴⁵ Therefore for the implementation of his scheme he chose champions like Najib-ud-Daula, Nizamul-Mulk and Ahmed Shah Abdali who were "either incapable" or "unworthy."

II

THE Wahabis in India were directly inspired and guided more by the teachings of Shah Waliullah than by those of Mohammed b. Abdul Wahab of Najd. The Wahabi movement

was revivalist and terrorist in character. The Farazia movement was the direct result of the disintegration of Muslim society and the oppression of the peasants by the landed aristocracy especially in Bengal. Shariatullah of Faridpur launched this movement in 1804. The "real object of the Farazias was the expulsion of the alien rulers and the restoration of Mahammedan power."⁴⁶ Shariatullah's son Dudu Mian continued the anti-British activities. He could mobilize against the British 80,000 Farazias who were drawn from the "lower classes." Dudu Miyan also organized peasants' riots in 1838, 1841, 1844 and 1846.⁴⁷

The Wahabi movement was a call for a restoration of the conditions of life as obtained during the time of the Prophet. They were "anabaptist in faith" and "red republicans" in politics.⁴⁸ They were the first terrorists. In Bengal it agitated the downtrodden Muslim peasantry in certain areas. In the Frontier it could not become a living faith because the majority of the population were the followers of Abu Hanifa, the celebrated jurist.

In the initial stages the Wahabi movement was certainly anti-British. Shah Abdul Aziz, son of Shah Waliullah, who saw that even Delhi in 1803 was taken away from the hands of the Muslims, declared that India was no more Darul Islam. It implied that either the Muslims should rise against the Britishers or migrate elsewhere from this country. He said that in India Islam was not secure because the civilized society was disturbed. He regarded the non-Muslims as companions and friends and sounded a call for unity between the two communities. It is true that Shah Abdul Aziz did not lay down a clear cut policy for fighting the real enemy. After the death of Shah Abdul Aziz, the greatest leaders of the Wahabi movement were Syed Ahmed Barelvi and Shah Ismail. Unfortunately the new leadership turned against the Sikhs instead of the alien rule of the British. During this phase of this movement (1825-1831) the Wahabis declared Jihad against the Sikhs. They established their government at Peshawar. Later on this city was sold by Sultan Mohammed Khan of Kabul to Ranjit Singh.⁴⁹

It is said that the purpose of the Wahabis was "to free themselves both from the political tyranny of the British and

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the Muslim oppressors, as well as from the economic exploitation of Indian vested interests.”⁵⁰ They wanted to establish an Independent government in Punjab and drive the Britishers out the country. But Sir Syed Ahmed held a different opinion about the real purpose of the Wahabi movement. It was, according to him, anti-Sikh because Ranjit Singh interfered in the religious life of the Muslims. When some of the followers of the Wahabi movement asked why Jihad be not launched against the Britisher, Shah Islamil opposed the suggestion on the grounds that the Britisher maintained an attitude of non-interference towards the religion of the people. The British government was in conformity with Islam and was necessary.⁵¹

Some writers are of opinion that the ideal for which the Wahabis were striving was not different from a feudal system. They wanted to have a sort of loose central system where the native states might remain intact. The letters written by Syed Ahmed Bareilvi to the Sardar of Gwalior reveal that the Wahabi movement wanted to have their support. He assured them that there would be no change in the status of the native rulers. On the contrary he made a plea that if the Britishers leave this country they would become more powerful and strong.⁵² It is curious that the Wahabis actually stood for the restoration of the old traditional system, although they held that society was to be based on the concept of social and economic justice. Although they were critical of the exploitation of the impoverished people they were unable to visualise a system of society in which feudalism was completely abolished and responsible government established. Therefore their government was an uneasy compromise of the interest of both the native rulers and the people. The two-tier system of government—central government and governments of the native states—may indicate that the Wahabis had a vague idea of Federalism. The provisional government under Bakht Khan which was supported by the common people and the army shows in effect that the “Wahabi government was largely in the interests of the people.” Bakht Khan “abolished duty on such articles of common consumption as salt and sugar, penalized hoarding and offered five bighas of rent-free land in perpetuity to the families of those soldiers who

happened to die in the fight against the British.”⁵³

Unfortunately the Wahabi movement could not get stabilised. R. C. Majumdar is of opinion that it did not leave any permanent impact on Indian politics. It is difficult to agree with him. The Wahabis played a vital role in the rebellion of 1857. In a way the revolt of 1857 was the culmination of Wahabi ideas and methods. Even after the revolt, as Hunter said, the Wahabis were considered to be “a persistently belligerent class” and a “source of permanent danger to the empire.”⁵⁴ In the last quarter of the 19th century they declared their support to the Indian National Congress. But it did not appeal to the Muslims because they were under the spell of the Aligarh movement. During the First World War they took the lead in establishing an independent government at Kabul. They also participated in the non-cooperation movement after the War.

The Muslim tradition in India was thus dominated by the prevailing social system ; it was medieval in its modes of thought, superstitious and unrealistic. The Muslims were deeply religious. But Islam in India had departed from the Arabian type. As most of the Muslims were converts from the Hindu fold, they shared with the Hindus the same passion and love for the soil. They had many things in common with the Hindus. The true spirit of Nationalism, however, was alien to medieval India. The attitude of the people towards the government was one of remoteness. There was no democracy. The consciousness of rights was also lacking.

Till the downfall of the Mughal Empire the Muslims had the illusion that their rule was eternal. The disintegration of the Mughal Empire led them to adopt the attitude of revivalism. The Wahabi and Faraizi movements are examples of this trend. The revivalist approach of the Wahabis turned them to terrorism. But their vague notion of federalism and the benevolent aspect of their administration can be considered as the healthy elements of the Wahabi movement in India. With the defeat of the Indians in 1857 and the emergence of Aligarh movement, most of the elements—absolutism, closed thinking, revivalism and terrorism—died their natural death.

III

SIR SYED AHMED (1817-1898) may be regarded as the greatest liberal among the Muslim thinkers in India. It is necessary to point out that he was not a philosopher in the strict sense of the word. In the field of political thought he was not a system-builder. His reflections upon events and institutions, however, provide sufficient materials for a discussion of his political ideas. Sir Syed influenced a whole generation and dominated the political scene from 1858 to 1898. He was the spokesman of the inchoate aspirations of the Muslims, ruined and uprooted by the rebellion.

Sir Syed was the product of his time. His mind had been moulded by western education, and was under the powerful impact of the liberal forces of the modern age in Indian history. The British had established a stable and powerful government. Sir Syed was fully aware of the changes taking place in Indian society. The 'New', as he envisaged it, was not only a change in the government but the symbol of a different pattern of economy and of culture. He wanted to make all Muslims realise the significance of the age and take up the challenge of the times. This constituted the basis of his efforts at Muslim awakening known as the Aligrah Movement. Such a movement was necessary because the Muslims suffered from the depressing feeling that they had lost political power for ever and were in danger of losing their culture and civilization. They were frustrated and lacked a sense of direction and aspiration. The Wahabi Movement had failed. Shah Ismail and Syed Ahmed Bareilvi were dead. There was no hope of the revival of the cherished "Islamic Rule".

Sir Syed was also influenced by the Wahabi movement in India, which was revivalist and terrorist in character. At the initial stages—in the early decades of the 19th Century—Shah Abdul Aziz, the redoubtable anti-British Wahabi leader, gave a clarion call of unity to the people (Hindus and Muslims). He declared that India is no more Darul-Islam (abode of peace). But he did not lay down a clear-cut policy for fighting the British Raj. As a result, the anti-British trend did not last long.

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The new leadership after Shah Abdul Aziz became more anti-Sikh. Primarily Sir Syed was a Wahabi; but his Wahabism was confronted with the realities of a situation, in which the movement could be neither anti-British nor anti-Sikh. Therefore he emphasized that the aim of Wahabism was not to establish an "Islamic" Government but to secure religious liberty for the Muslims. He also pleaded that so long as the British did not interfere with the religious affairs of the Muslims, obedience to the existing government was necessary and in conformity with the teachings of Islam.⁵⁵ This interpretation was obviously a complete departure from the original teachings of Wahabism, but for a mind like Sir Syed's such a development was inevitable. He could not renounce the philosophy of the Wahabi movement because the people would not accept anyone as their leader whose thoughts were not firmly based on religion. Sir Syed, however, refused to follow the footprints of the religious philosophers of the past; his interpretation of religion was rational and free from dogma. He believed that there was no antagonism between Islam on the one hand and reason and science on the other. It may be mentioned that there had so far been no movement of social reform and renaissance among the Muslims of India. The Wahabi leaders were preoccupied with political action and gave little attention to social reform.

Thirdly, Sir Syed was inspired by the liberalism of the West—by Burke, Bentham, Lord Macaulay and J.S. Mill. He largely anticipated the basic tenets of liberalism as advocated later by Dadabhoi Naoroji, Surendranath Benerji and others. This impact of liberalism led him to resolve the conflict between the new values of the West and the conservatism and dogmatism of the Indian Muslims.

Lastly, Sir Syed was greatly impressed by the reformist Movement among the Hindus, led by Ram Mohan Roy. This was an attempt to adjust Hinduism to modern conditions. The Muslims were now facing a similar problem. Therefore, Sir Syed decided to launch a movement on the same lines. There is much common ground between the thought of Raja Ram Mohan Roy and that of Sir Syed. Both of them welcomed Western culture and education, the parliamentary form of

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government, social reforms and religious liberalism. Sir Syed said that his movement, was aimed at free enquiry, large-hearted tolerance and pure morality.

Sir Syed was a staunch Muslim. But he was critical of traditional philosophical and religious thought. He was also contemptuous of the leadership of the Ulema (the trained theologians). Sir Syed advocated a reconciliation between the interests of the ruler and the ruled. Behind this plea lay his faith in the justice and fairplay of the British Raj. This approach was in keeping with the liberal tradition in India. He himself said that he was a radical, not because he was inspired by modern science but because he had his roots in Islam. Islam, he said, is opposed to personal rule and monarchy. It sanctions the rule of one person but only when it is supported by all the people. Sir Syed's faith in democracy and liberalism was based on the assumption of the basic rationality of man. Even his religious beliefs were subject to reason and science.

Sir Syed had great regard for the dignity of the individual. He thought this could be maintained through the liberties the individual enjoyed in society. Aristocratic rule and concentration of wealth in the hands of a few (which are disapproved by Islam) are detrimental to the cause of political liberty. It should be made clear that Sir Syed used the term "Freedom of expression" in a wider sense. To him, it meant getting rid of imitation and orthodoxy. It implied reform in the religious beliefs and customs (purification of Islam) education of children and women, and popularisation of the scientific point of view. He was of opinion that before the advent of the British rule, India had the tradition of political liberty. They had no opportunity to make their voice effective in politics. Even the rule of the East India Company was characterized by exploitation, extortion and plunder. According to Sir Syed, the rebellion of 1857 was a result of the utter disregard by the British rulers of the political freedom of the people of India. He was perhaps the first Indian to point this out to the British, and to make a plea for responsive and representative Government.

Sir Syed's theory of Government constitutes one of the important aspects of his thought. According to him there are

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two types of Government, civilized and uncivilized. By the latter he means a government without civil and criminal law, devoid of fair administration and also lacking in tolerance for faiths other than its own. Such a government brings about the decline of the whole country under its domain.⁵⁶ Sir Syed held the view that good government has nothing to do with religion and that genuine religion is not concerned with worldly affairs. Religion, of course, prescribes certain ethical principles of conduct which are essentially universal and not narrow dogmas.⁵⁷ The main purpose of religion is to help spiritual progress. Sir Syed said, in reply to his critics who held that in Islam religion and politics are one, that the Ulema of Islam had made even those institutions of the Prophet an integral part of religion which had as a matter of fact nothing to do with politics or even with religion in the true sense of the terms.⁵⁸ This separation of religion from politics is a great contribution not only to politics but also to the development of Islamic policy in India. According to Sir Syed, a good government should not interfere with the religious life of the people. At the same time he maintained that the people are not required to accept the religious beliefs of the ruler. The ruler is the shadow of God on earth. If he is tyrannical he is responsible to God, and this is the saying of the Prophet.⁵⁹ If the people protest against the government, the latter is right in suppressing them. Sir Syed advised Indians to give up the idea of rising against the British. The British connection, he thought, was providential and would last for ever. Sir Syed was however, inclined to make loyalty to the existing government conditional, on the provision of religious liberty. Contradictory as it may seem, while on the one hand he viewed government as divinely ordained, and the ruler as responsible to God and not to the subjects, in practice he was a supporter of limited and responsible government. Government should be limited. Only a limited government is democratic. Like the English Government, it should be based on the principle of justice and public opinion. Such a government had never existed in India. Under the Mughals, the Ulema and Islam were subordinate to kings. The people had no real freedom. Injustice was rampant, the nobles were no better than slaves.

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Thirdly, a smooth working of the institutions of the government is essential. They should function independently. To Sir Syed, the legislature is the barometer of the will of the people. If the government ignores the legislature, the consequences are grave. The people may misunderstand the policies of the government. Moreover the latter may enunciate such policies as are against the wishes and feelings of the people. This results in bad administration and ineffective organization of the armed forces, and ultimately in the outbreak of revolution. As far as the method of representation to the legislature was concerned, Sir Syed supported the system advocated by J. S. Mill. He visualised the development of an Indian Parliament composed of the representatives of the people, as the supreme law making body for the country. But at the same time Sir Syed did not, in this context, overlook the realities of the Indian situation unlike Mill who advocated the principle of proportional representation. He favoured the method of nomination as the people were divided and illiterate. This was probably because Sir Syed thought that no section of the population should go unrepresented. There is no homogeneity in India, so he thought that the method of nomination would provide opportunities to all the classes to secure representation in the legislature. In one of his speeches in 1883, Sir Syed pointed out that "In a country like India, where caste distinctions still flourish, where there is no fusion of various races, where religious distinctions are still violent, where education in its modern sense has not made an equal or proportionate progress among all the sections of the population, I am convinced that introduction of the principle of election, pure and simple, for the representation of various interests on the local boards and district councils should be attended with evils of greater significance than purely economic considerations."⁶⁰ This appears to be a departure from the theory and practice of democracy. But what it indicates is that Sir Syed was fully aware of the obstacles to the growth of democracy in India, though he never lost faith in democracy and liberalism.

Another important aspect of Sir Syed's political thought is his concept of nation and 'nationalism'. He used the term

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'nation' to denote the people. All Indians constitute one single nation. The British rulers in India, according to him, constituted a separate nation. He used the word 'Hindu'. also in a broader sense. He who lives in India is a 'Hindu'. In this sense, he was the prophet of the ideal of one 'Nation'. According to him different religions do not militate against the essential unity of the people. 'Hindu' and 'Muslim' are religious denominations, and India could build up a composite culture. In one of his speeches he said that India is the native land of both Hindus and Muslims, both drink the holy water of the Ganges ; both are of the same colour. Muslims have borrowed hundreds of customs from the Hindus; Hindus also acquired many habits from the Muslims. This process of assimilation gave birth to a new language, Urdu. Therefore, the preservation and strength of Hindu-Muslim unity is the primary condition for the welfare and progress of both. The Hindus and Muslims of India, he said, are the two beautiful and charming eyes of a bride. This shows that Sir Syed thought in terms of the interests of the entire people. But from 1867 the Hindi-Urdu controversy started. Sir Syed took a very serious view of it. He thought that any attempt to impose Hindi on Muslims in particular would undermine the vitality of India's composite culture. It was to him a symbol of the beginning of communal consciousness and revivalism among the Hindus.

In 1885, the Indian National Congress was established and Sir Syed chose to oppose it. This phase of the Aligarh movement led certain writers to think that its logical culmination was the idea of Pakistan. This, however, is not true. The foundation of Pakistan was the two-nation theory to which Sir Syed was opposed. It is said that Sir Syed was against the policies of the Indian National Congress because he was interested in educational and not political activities. But this too is far from the truth. He was of the opinion that 'the aims and objects of the Indian National Congress are based upon an ignorance of history and present day realities ; they do not take into consideration that India is inhabited by different nationalities ; they presuppose that the Muslims, the Marathas, the Brahmins, the Kshatriyas, the Banias, the Sudras, the Sikhs, the Bengalees, the

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Madrasis and the Peshawaries all should be treated exactly alike and all of them belong to the same culture. The Congress conducted itself on the complacent assumption that all Indians profess the same religion, speak the same language, have the same way of life, that their attitude to history is similar and is based upon the same historical traditions. For the successful running of democratic government it is essential that the majority should have the ability to govern not only themselves but also unwilling minorities.’⁶¹

Tufail Ahamed says that Principal Beck was responsible for the ‘anti-Congress’ character of the Aligarh Movement. Sir Syed under his influence opposed the idea of conducting competitive examinations for civil service in India. He supported the nomination of the Europeans on the Viceroy’s Council.⁶² Mr Beck had also realised that Hindu Muslim unity would be a great factor in the weakening of the Empire. Communal harmony and unity, was therefore abhorred. Mr. Beck wanted Sir Syed to take the initiative in the formation of some anti-Congress organization. Thus in 1888, the United Indian Patriotic Association was established. It was composed of Muslims as well as Hindus. In the formation of the Mohammedan Defence Association (after the communal disturbances in Bombay, 1893 and the establishment of ‘Anti-Cow-Killing Association’, and the like), Principal Beck played some role.

It was claimed that not only the reformist but also the revivalist movements were ‘really so many threads in the strands of Indian nationalism and the nation’s duty was to evolve a synthesis so as to be able to dispel prejudice and superstition, to renovate and purify the old faith and Vedantic Idealism, and reconcile it with the nationalism of the new age and that Indian National Congress was destined to fulfil this great mission,’⁶³ as a matter of fact the revivalist movements were tainted by Hindu orthodoxy. They stood for the ‘Re-awakening of Hindudom.’ The Muslims had no share in the development of such movements. Despite this Sir Syed never championed the two-nation theory. It is to be noted that this poisonous theory was the handiwork of moribund nationalism and revivalism. Sir Syed was not revivalist or communal in his thinking.⁶⁴

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Lastly, he believed that due to their educational backwardness, the Muslims lacked sufficient political consciousness. Moreover it was no use their supporting the Congress as Muslim society was lacking in a sound middle class. And in Sir Syed's mind, the Congress was not a mass organization but a representative of the interests of the middle class. However, support to the Congress and nationalism were not convertible terms. He believed that Congress was harmful even to the Hindus.

It is interesting to point out that Sir Syed had no enthusiasm for the Pan-Islamic movement of Jamaluddin Afghani. He had no faith in the validity of the institution of Khilafat. In the context of power politics, the Caliph might become a tool in the hands of a powerful nation.⁶⁵ In 1857 Sultan Abdul Majeed advised the Muslims in India to maintain peace and friendship with the Britishers, and this was not ineffective. Sir Syed knew the futility of Pan-Islamism, because in the system of nation-states, national interest, not religion, plays a decisive role. And secondly nationalism is a potential force even in the Islamic countries. Thirdly, Khilafat is one of the forms of worldly government. Therefore if the Caliph makes mistakes he and not Islam should be held responsible. It shows that Sir Syed wanted to nationalise Khilafat and to subject it to checks. He was also afraid of the growth of Pan-Islamism because he thought it would give an impetus to the leadership of the orthodox Ulema, which would be fatal to Muslim interests.

Despite his rationalism in politics and radicalism in religious matters, Sir Syed was not progressive in his views on social matters. He supported the system of Pardah.⁶⁶ and considered the education of men more important than that of women. He even opposed women's education and never made any direct effort for their upliftment and education.⁶⁷ Another limitation of Sir Syed was that he confined his efforts only to the promotion of the upper and middle classes. He deplored the economic exploitation of the people, but had no solution to offer to the problem of the starving weavers who had been dislodged by the economic policies of the British.

IV

THE Aligarh movement undoubtedly formed the most important landmark in the development of Muslim ideas in modern India. It inspired, in one way or the other, almost all the political and religious movements in India in the 20th century. The liberals supplemented it. Radicals like Mohammed Ali and others got inspiration from it. Even those who claimed to have deviated from the Aligarh movement conceded that all their efforts would have been fruitless but for the strength they had derived from Sir Syed's inspiration.

The Aligarh movement had its own drawbacks. The limitations of Sir Syed Ahamed's social and political thought have already been discussed. He accepted the existing system as final. He would not approve of any change in the prevailing structure of society, of which he was a part and product. He failed to realize that only a radical change in society would lead to the eradication of the evils of political and social degeneration.

Sir Syed not only failed to assess properly the historical significance of British rule in India but also to distinguish between "Western"⁶⁸ and "Modern" civilization.⁶⁹ He may be regarded as a supporter of western ways and outward modes of life and it is doubtful how far he can be credited with a genuine love of modernity as an attitude to life. He could not formulate the essential principles of modernization and lay down a programme for their application to India. He accepted the British system as ideal and perfect. This inherent weakness is easily discernible in his system of education. He did not work out the implications of the impact of science on the life of the people. He was not a thorough-going rationalist and being unable to abjure his reliance on faith, he only sought to accommodate it with the spirit of science. Aligarh produced men "modern on the surface but (are) mostly fanatical and stagnant in mind...what they call religion was merely religiosity,"⁷⁰ and they regarded Islam not as a way of life but as a means to political ends.⁷¹

SIR SYED cannot be regarded as an effective force either in the realm of politics or religion. So far as his religious ideas are concerned he could not launch any movement, as it was inexpedient to take such a step. In politics he pursued a policy which was doomed to ultimate failure. The logical end of his political programme was isolationism, separatism, withdrawal and adherence to mendicancy. It would, however, be unfair to deny that Sir Syed influenced certain individuals though not society as a whole. In the religious field, Mohsin-ul-Mulk is an example in point. In a letter to Sir Syed he wrote that word of God and work of God are all illusions. The light of knowledge has exposed the hollowness of these obsolete ideas. According to modern science God is non-existent. Prayer and worship created fear among ignorant people. Prophethood is a hoax and fraud played upon the ignorant. *Wahi* is a fiction, and Revelation is nothing but a dream. The Soul is not eternal and the Last Day of Judgement is a delusion. Divine reward and punishment are baseless superstitions. Hell and Heaven are deceptive concepts. Man is but an evolved monkey. After death there is no reward and no punishment.⁷² Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Viqarul Mulk were the successors of Sir Syed in the political field. They attempted to carry forward Sir Syed's policy. But from the point of view of thought their contribution is negligible. It was the liberal group of Ameer Ali, Khuda Buhksh and the Aga Khan, who made an original contribution to Islamic thought in India although they agreed with Sir Syed only in certain respects.

According to Ameer Ali (1848-1928) Islam is pronouncedly liberal and democratic. It is not a mere creed ; it is a life to be lived... a religion of right doing, right thinking, and right speaking, founded on divine love, universal charity, and the equality of man in the eyes of the Lord⁷³. The evils which are associated with Islam are not really the evils of that religion but are "The result of a want of culture among the community generally."⁷⁴ Ameer Ali believed that Islam is not only concerned with the relationship between man and God. It is

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concerned equally with earthly matters, with man and the activities of living. It seeks to prescribe the social, political and economic values.

Therefore, Ameer Ali held that the political system advocated by Islam is no less perfect and all embracing than its religious teaching. Moreover the Prophet had a "thoroughly democratic conception of divine Government" and that "Affiliates him with the modern World."⁷⁵ Mohammed was the first to give a written constitution to the world—a constitution, thoroughly liberal, democratic and secular in the context of the times. The constitution did not take into account racial considerations. The constitution clearly stipulated that those who make common cause shall constitute one nation. The "State of peace and War shall be common to all Muslims—The Jews of the various branches... domicile in Yathrib, shall form with Moslems one composite nation; they shall practise their religion as freely as the Moslems ; the clients and allies of the Jew shall enjoy the same security and freedom"⁷⁶ ... "According to the constitution there was to be rule of law. Justice was to operate evenly without considerations of wealth or political or social status. The Islamic history provides many examples of the impartial working of justice."⁷⁷ Ameer Ali even held that during the authoritarian phase of the annals of Islam the (departmental) ministers and prominent members of the family formed a body of Unauthorised Councillors."⁷⁸ Thus Islam "Conferred on the state a flexible constitution based on a just and fair appreciation of human rights and human duty. It limited taxation, it made men equal in the eye of law, it consecrated the principles of self-Government, established a control over the sovereign power by rendering executive authority subordinate to the shariat, a law based upon religious sanction and moral obligations."⁷⁹ The Islamic polity, according to Ameer Ali, is not only democratic but contains the elements of a welfare state. Ameer Ali even held that "the tendency of the rulers and principles of Islam is towards democracy with a strong tinge of socialism."⁸⁰ This attitude towards Islam is almost identical among all the liberals of the 19th and early 20th century India. However though there are certain differences

among them they are differences of degree only. All of them projected the spirit of Islam faithfully. But their ideas cannot be said to have made any significant impact on the life of the community. Ironically enough even the liberal Muslims could not shake off the dominating influence of Sir Syed. It is interesting that Ameer Ali had vital differences with Sir Syed on the question of the interpretation of Islam and on the Muslim problem in India. He held that Islam in its original form is an ideal religion but in its modern form it was lost in un-Islamic customs, rituals and practices. Therefore, he pleaded that they should be discarded, while Ameer Ali was not so critical. "Sir Syed had looked at Islam through rationality (while), Ameer Ali tried to project rationality into Islam."⁸¹

According to Sir Syed the backwardness of the Muslim community, since its forfeiture of political power was largely educational and social. Therefore, what was urgent was to accept the Western system of education. To Ameer Ali the crux of the problem was political. The Muslims, then, did not have any political body to voice their needs and aspirations. One of the main reasons for the backwardness into which the Mohammedan community had fallen was lack of organization and of a representative body to take action on its behalf.⁸² This began to forge unity and solidarity among the Muslims themselves. In a letter to Badruddin Tyabjee, Ameer Ali stated "our main object is to bring about some degree of solidarity among the disintegrated masses of Mohammedan society ; to reconcile in some measure the conflicting aims and objects of different sections and parties, to introduce some amount of harmony among the discordant and jarring elements of which the Mussalman educated classes are composed, to devise some means of self-help for Mohammedan advancement and lean less upon the Government patronage ; to give a real impetus to the process of self development perceptibly going on among our community ; to safeguard our legitimate and constitutional interests under the British Government... and to serve as the means of reconciliation between our Hindu fellow subjects and our community."⁸³ With these ideals and objectives, Ameer Ali formed his own association and also supported

the establishment of the Muslim League, and advocated separate electorates for the Muslims. He believed that "any attempt at amalgamation at the present stage would mean the submergence of an ill-organized, badly equipped, and badly trained minority under a majority vastly superior in numbers, and immensely better organized."⁸⁴ Ameer Ali stood for the separate cultural identity of the Muslims. But it hardly implies that he championed the cause of separate nationhood or partition. Ameer Ali was no "separatist". He wanted unity, cooperation, compromise, and toleration between the Hindus and the Muslims. In 1819 he wrote, "Unity of sentiment and consciousness of identity of interest which in due course will remove the necessity for special representation is clearly developing at the top and if details are rightly handled it should not take long before it reaches the bottom."⁸⁵ Even when the Muslim League chose to support the Government on the questions of the partition of Bengal, Ameer Ali's association declared "no portion of Bengali speaking race should be separated from Bengal without the clearest necessity for such separatism; and in the present case such necessity does not exist."⁸⁶

Ameer Ali's contribution to Muslim thought in India is significant. He attempted to train the Muslim mind to face the real problems of the community. Although his version of Islam might not have inspired the Muslims to undertake constructive political and social activity, he made them conscious of the necessity of a representative organization. He did not attack the West on political grounds and therefore he does not mark the beginning of temporal resurgence of Muslim power.⁸⁷ Ram Gopal asserts that Ameer Ali's contribution to Muslim politics was more important and more powerful than that of Sir Syed⁸⁸ (it was Ameer Ali who created the Muslim Association and extended its activities from Karachi to Bangalore). His positive contribution is that he organized the Muslims politically and forged their loyalty to the British and, by stressing the inequality of Hindus and Muslims, prepared the latter for the separatist movement.⁸⁹ It has to be borne in mind, however, that Ameer Ali was not a separatist in the sense that Jinnah was after 1940.

It may be wrong to regard the Lahore Resolution (1940) of the League as the direct outcome of Ameer Ali's political programme. In whatever way his programme and activities be interpreted it is obvious that Ameer Ali looked towards the future, and not the past.⁹⁰

Another important representative of this liberal school is the Aga Khan. In his thought liberalism finds vigorous expression with all the political and social implication. His work has not so far received due consideration or appraisal. Writers have either underestimated or overestimated his influence. Aziz Ahmed is certainly wrong when he says that for him Indian politics was a hobby and he had always been a decorative figure.⁹¹ In fact the Aga Khan represents a compromise between Sir Syed and Ameer Ali. He not only carried forward the legacy of Sir Syed but also enriched it by borrowing considerably from Ameer Ali.

The Aga Khan was a confirmed liberal. He never deviated from the liberal track. The influence of Sir Syed and Ameer Ali as well as G. K. Gokhale, is clearly manifest in the thought and work of the Aga Khan. He admitted that Gokhale was the spokesman of deep and strong forces in India⁹² and in his autobiography he acknowledges Gokhale's influence on his thought and outlook.⁹³ His liberal convictions might have been strengthened by his association with Pheroze Shah Mehta who was their family friend and had known him (the Aga Khan) since his childhood.⁹⁴ The Aga Khan had a strong dislike for the extremists in Indian Politics. He describes them as "foolish and mad individuals who may be styled anarchists, since they regard separation from the Empire as the legitimate aim and ambition of the country."⁹⁵

Another decisive influence which moulded the thought of the Aga Khan was that of Islam. He believed that "Islam...within it...has the capacity to be a moral and spiritual force of enormous significance, both stabilising and energizing the communities among whom it is preached and practised. To ignore Islam's potential influence for good, Islam's healing and creative power for societies as also for individuals, is to ignore one of the most genuinely hopeful factors that exist in the world of today."⁹⁶

He always tried to prove that "Islam is essentially a progressive and tolerant faith."⁹⁷ In the true spirit of Sir Syed's religious thought the Aga Khan attempted to battle against orthodoxy and reactionary ideas prevailing among the Indian Muslims. He condemned the attitude of Indian Muslims for constantly looking for "sentimental satisfaction at the Islamic States outside of India."⁹⁸ The average Indian Muslim "looked upon himself as a member of a universal religious brotherhood"⁹⁹ which was termed as Pan-Islamism. The Aga Khan made a clear distinction between political and cultural or spiritual Pan-Islamism. The Aga Khan borrowed this idea from Sir Syed and this was developed further by Iqbal. The Aga Khan stood for spiritual Pan-Islamism, and he held that "the spread of this spiritual and cultural Pan-Islam,.....in our time has been promoted by the growth of the spirit of liberty, and by the general awakening of the East which began late in the 19th century. It has nothing to do with and nothing to receive from the Court of Istamboul. The hopeless theory entertained by Abdul Hamid of reaching political unity among such scattered and different nationalities was as futile as it would be for the Pope of Rome of gathering Catholics throughout the world under a common temporal sovereignty."¹⁰⁰ But Aga Khan had denounced the extension of the influence of Islam over fields other than cultural. What he intended to show was that in the modern world religion has become more a spiritual force and less a temporal one.¹⁰¹ Cultural and spiritual Pan-Islamism represents a belief in the theory of the spiritual brotherhood and the unity of the children of the Prophet.¹⁰² To the follower of the Prophet "It is the foundation of the life of the soul."¹⁰³ As a keen observer of the political developments in the Islamic states the Aga Khan came to believe that not political Pan-Islamism but national freedom alone could liberate the Muslims from the fetters of the dead past. He rightly thought that it would raise the Muslim countries "to a higher standard of civilization."¹⁰⁴ According to him what the Indian Muslims needed was not political Pan-Islamism but national freedom, that is, freedom for the country or countries in which they lived. "Political Pan-Islamism had its foundations on sand, and could not endure,"¹⁰⁵ he asserted.

That was why he issued repeated warnings against false ideas and the alluring dreams of Pan-Islamism, reminding them of their duty to serve the Government loyally and faithfully.”¹⁰⁶ These ideas regarding Islam are perfectly consistent with the liberal philosophy of which the Aga Khan was the chief spokesman. But what is surprising is that he could not fully visualise the implications of his own liberal thought. Granting that Religion is to become less and less temporal, is it to be separated from politics or the political life of the people? The Aga Khan, perhaps, had no answer, to such a question. His political activities create the impression that his politics were an off-shoot of his religious faith. He seemed to believe that “the founding of the Aligarh University was a useful instrument for arresting the decadence of Islam.”¹⁰⁷ He sought to buttress his liberal faith in the virtues and necessity of the British Empire by invoking the aid of the Mosque and the Temple. “He had instructed the priests in every mosque,” as he told Lady Minto, “to issue a decree that any Mohammedans who incite rebellion, or go about preaching sedition, will be eternally damned” and suggested that a similar manifesto should be issued by the Hindus.¹⁰⁸ Like Sir Syed, the Aga Khan could not think of the termination of British rule in India. He advised the Indian people that if they had any political grievances they should approach the government with a true sense of loyalty and humility.¹⁰⁹ This consciously or unconsciously made him virtually a tool in the hands of the imperialist government.¹¹⁰ He was trusted by the British Government to such an extent that he was requested by Lord Kitchner to use all his influence with the Turks to persuade them not to join the central power, and to maintain their neutrality.¹¹¹ He felt elated that Lord Kitchner was by no means alone in the idea of deputing him for ensuring the maintenance of neutrality of the Turks.¹¹² It can certainly be debated whether this did not amount to an exploitation of religion for political purposes and whether loyalty to the British government was a corollary of the Islamic faith. But then it may be argued that the Aga Khan enjoined loyalty to the British in his capacity as the religious head of the Community. In any case, as the nationalist movement against the British rule began to gather

momentum, the Aga Khan lost touch with the people. He "even received letters threatening to murder him unless he left India or changed the pro-British tone of his speeches."¹¹³ There is another aspect of the Aga Khan's political thought—the theory of nationalism. It represents a synthesis of the ideas of Sir Syed and Ameer Ali. Like Sir Syed, he recognizes the differences between the various sections of the Indian people and emphasises that unity should be sought in diversity.¹¹⁴ The Aga Khan had many suggestions to make for promoting such unity. His contention was that the nation should achieve many-sided development which could synthesize the richness and variety of its parts. The first requirement, according to him, was that the people should develop social and political consciousness. The greatest obstacle to it, as he put it, was illiteracy. In his memoirs he writes "I continued to put a great deal of faith on educational advancement. Illiteracy I saw as a menace to people and Government alike. Poverty and diseases were its sinister consequences and accompaniments...I urged the adoption of a system of Universal primary education such as almost every civilized country possessed."¹¹⁵ He had a great respect for Sir Syed because he accomplished educative and regenerative work in Aligarh.¹¹⁶

The Aga Khan believed in the promotion of understanding between the rulers and the ruled. He was so much exercised over this that he considered the question of form of the government or the nature of the rule irrelevant and immaterial.¹¹⁷ When Gandhiji asked him to contribute to the Amritsar Memorial, he declared himself "ready to subscribe handsomely for the relief of innocent victims of the tragedy but would not give a penny to a memorial which might perpetuate hostility between the people of India and Great Britain."¹¹⁸ The Aga Khan sincerely hoped that this attitude would remove discontent from the minds of the Indian people. Otherwise he held that a discontented India would be a promising field for the rise and spread of 'Bolshevism' in the country.¹¹⁹

The Aga Khan also thought that it was essential that people should be provided with effective authority to ensure a democratic way of life. The essence of democracy, as he conceived it, was that people must have the right to choose

their leaders. The principle of representation, therefore, assumes crucial importance. If a privileged class alone has the right of representation then the government becomes inherently weak. "The greatest mistake made in the successive reconstitutions of Indian provincial legislatures has been that of limiting the right of representation, in practice if not always in theory, to what may be termed privileged classes, the best educated and the richest sections of the population. Owing to this serious error the national conservatism necessary to the evolution of a normal modern State, and in India characteristic of the man at the plough, has been artificially prevented from making its voice effectively heard. An exaggerated mid-Victorian form of Liberalism, natural to the classes that now form the narrow electorates, has been dominant. Taxation and representation have not gone together. The provincial legislatures have been far too small to be really representative bodies in such large areas."¹²⁰ The Aga Khan had his own ideas about the basis of representation. Since the Indian people are not homogeneous religious and other differences could not be ignored in constituting representative bodies. The Aga Khan pleaded for separate electorates for his community. Sir Syed had experienced in the Municipal Elections that the voting behaviour in India was determined by non-political considerations. That would reduce the religious minorities to a status of permanent tutelage. The Aga Khan suggested that the separate representation should also be extended to the Brahmins of Madras, and to the British and Anglo-Indian communities.¹²¹ He was of the view that even in democracy the danger of "tyranny of majority" remains. This can be done away with by the adoption of a flexible and suitable scheme of representation. This belief led him to wait upon Lord Minto at Simla and demand separate representation for the Muslims. This logically led him to think in terms of a separate organization as the mouthpiece of public opinion among the Muslims. Sir Syed also had thought likewise. But he did not believe in its exclusively Muslim character. It was Ameer Ali who vigorously advocated an exclusive Muslim organization as a suitable remedy. The Aga Khan says that "When our hopes were frustrated, it was a great encouragement

that Syed Ameer Ali, with his personal prestige, and his great knowledge of Hindu-Muslim relations (especially in Bengal) urged us on in our efforts for the establishment of a separate Muslim organization, and gave us quiet constant support when Nawab Mohsen-ul-Mulk and I argued that our only hope of getting a fair deal from the British was to convince them of the width of gulf-historical, cultural, and religious that yawned between us and our neighbours."¹²² The Muslim League owed its origin to these people.¹²³ During the earlier phase the Muslim League did not aim at the division of the country but the problem of the future did agitate the minds of the Indian Muslim leaders. The Aga Khan was probably the first to visualise that federation would resolve the political deadlock in the country. He was of course alive to the difficulties of adopting a federal polity as a means of reconciling communal differences. No federal scheme, the Aga Khan felt, could be implemented in all its details and implications unless it is adapted to the Indian setting and tradition.¹²⁴ He knew that the Indian problem could be solved only by a compromise between the demands of the various sections of the people. The crux of these demands had been autonomy and decentralization. The federal scheme could operate only if it took note of these forces. The Aga Khan observed that "the real danger of break-up does not come from meeting the wishes of the different component parts, but from over-centralization, and the enforcement of an unnatural uniformity."¹²⁵ For instance Aurangzeb according to the Aga Khan, made "the greatest political mistake by overthrowing the independent states of the South and tried the impossible task of bringing the whole of India under Delhi."¹²⁶ Another powerful argument and case in favour of federalism was the existence of the diversified and widely scattered interests in the country, which goes to make a central sovereign parliament an impossibility.¹²⁷ He also discusses the role of religion, history, race etc.¹²⁸ Federalism, the Aga Khan believed, would give an independent and stable executive and at the same time provide adequate legislative control over the finances of the country.¹²⁹

The Aga Khan, unlike many other Muslim leaders, did not speak of an ideal Islamic society. Perhaps his pragmatism saved him from the doctrinaire and unrealistic approach characteristic of most of the leaders of the community. It is significant to note that he hoped that the successful functioning of Indian federalism would pave the way for a South Asian federation." The part of beneficial and growing union must be based on a federal India, with every member exercising her individual rights, her historical peculiarities ; and national interests ; yet protected by a common defence system and customs union from external danger and economic exploitation by stronger forces.....We can build a great South Asian federation by now laying the foundations wide and deep on justice, on liberty, and on recognition for every race, every religion and every historical entity."¹³⁰

The role of the Aga Khan in Indian Muslim politics is of tremendous significance. In his approach, one finds on the whole realistic and secular appraisal and assessment of the forces at work. He does not deny the importance of religion but attempts to offer a non-religious solution to the Muslim problem. The Aga Khan was the first Muslim to consider the Muslim problem in a wider perspective. This problem according to him is analogous to that of any other religious or linguistic minority in the country. Therefore, it cannot be solved without taking stock of the problems of other minorities. It is in this context that we can properly appreciate the solution offered by the Aga Khan, that harmony between communities in India could be achieved only through federalism.

Liberals like Ameer Ali, Chiragh Ali, Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Viqar-ul-Mulk, Aga Khan etc., were the champions of the Aligarh movement. They carried forward and improved upon the work undertaken by Sir Syed. Their effort was to stick to Sir Syed's programme. They worked for the achievement of the goal, set by Sir Syed, the welfare of the Muslim community. Liberals did feel that Sir Syed's policy required modification and reorientation. The modifications however did not essentially affect the spirit of Sir Syed's programme.

Sir Syed while establishing the Aligarh College thought

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that philosophy will be at our left, natural science at our right and the crown at the head will be the *Kalima*—there is no Good except God and Mohammed is our Prophet. It meant that Aligarh would be an institution which would forge the reconciliation of religion with science. But Sir Syed could not succeed.¹³¹ Sir Syed also could not fully succeed in making Aligarh, the rendezvous of intellectual renaissance.¹³² The Aligarh students received education and training only for government jobs. They developed no noble ideals of action and conduct. They remained ignorant of their religion and religious traditions. They were enamoured of Western culture and civilization. With this sorry state of affairs, the radicals were not satisfied. An anti-Aligarh movement thus inevitably started. It embodied the germs of religious revivalism,¹³³ reaction against the West,¹³⁴ going back to original Islam and hero-worship. In the transcendentalist political thought of Maulana Azad and Maulana Mohammed Ali, these tendencies are prominent. But the roots of the anti-Aligarh movement can be traced in the ideas of Maulana Shibli, a comparatively obscure and ignored figure in Muslim politics. He is now presented as an opponent of the Aligarh movement. Some feel that he was anti-government while Sir Syed was pro-government. Both these notions are oversimplifications and misinterpretations. It is true that Maulana Shibli (1857-1914) was not happy with the Aligarh students. They could not imbibe the Islamic spirit nor were they the representatives of Islam. Moreover Maulana Shibli felt that changes in the Aligarh programme were indispensable. It was not Maulana Shibli alone but many others like Rashid Ahmed Gangohi, Maulana Lutfullah of Aligarh and Mulla Mohammed Murad of Muzzaffarnagar that felt that Sir Syed's opposition to the Indian National Congress was not justified. Maulana Shibli thought that the time for independent thinking had arrived. It is strange that he also did not agree with the programme of the Muslim League. The reason behind it was that the League had failed to analyse the problem in its proper perspective.¹³⁵

Maulana Shibli stands for a specific ideal. This ideal should not just be in support of the government or in opposition to it,

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Like Sir Syed, he believed that loyalty to the British Government was almost a religious obligation.¹³⁶ But at the same time he saw nothing wrong in the activities of the Indian National Congress. This created some misunderstandings. He held that the Congress programme would lead to self-government. The Muslim League lacked national feeling, and its leadership had till then no mass contact. Maulana Shibli was in favour of the constitutional struggle of the moderates. It implied the establishment of responsive and responsible government. Therefore he demanded that the Muslim League should support the Bill submitted by Gokhale for the adequate share of Indians in the Administration. Thus he is the bridge that spanned the isolationists of the Aligarh movement and the radical group of Mohammed Ali, Maulana Azad and Dr. Ansari. He stands half way between Sir Syed's pro-British attitude and the anti-British sentiment of later writers.¹³⁷

There were many facets of radicalism in the ideas of Shibli. They were characterized by the renunciation of isolationism and separatism. All the radicals had a great regard for Sir Syed but believed that Sir Syed's policies were bound to lead to undesirable consequences. Maulana Mohammed Ali, Dr. M.A. Ansari, Maulana Azad, H. Ajmal Khan, Zafar Ali Khan etc., constituted the galaxy of the radical group. There were, however, variations in the ideas of these leaders. Maulana Azad was the foremost representative of this school. Unlike Dr. Ansari and Hakeem Ajmal Khan, Maulana Azad was essentially a writer and had more opportunities and talent to give expression to his ideas. Dr. Ansari (d. 1936) also like Ajmal Khan, did pioneering work in systematising the ideology of nationalism, which was both Islamic as well as Indian. He found no contradiction between Islam and Indian nationalism. According to him a true Muslim could also continue to live as an Indian. The Muslims while extending their sympathy with Turkey and Iran could also stand by their motherland.¹³⁸ He therefore held that pan-Islamism need not be given up. It is as he puts it the "Most sacred and exalted passion"¹³⁹ of the Indian Muslims. Islam, according to Dr. Ansari, is the embodiment of liberty, democracy and progress. He denounced "narrow religion". He believed that democracy

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and narrow religion are incompatible. Therefore, in the context of India "theological subtleties"¹⁴⁰ ought not to be allowed to complicate modern political issues. The logical consequence of it will be that religion should be divorced from politics in the interest of both. There appears more clarity of outlook, broader vision, and preciseness in Dr. Ansari's writings than in those of Maulana Azad. Dr. Ansari is one of the very few Muslims who thought that a broad and enlightened nationalism is capable of playing a vital and constructive role in the history of modern India. In a letter to Halide Edib Dr. Ansari wrote, "I consider the brotherhood of man as the only real tie, and partitions based on race or religion are, to my mind, artificial and arbitrary, leading to division and factious fights. Nationalism of a general and liberal type, I can appreciate,..... nationalism as a step to internationalism, I can put up with....."¹⁴¹

Dr. Ansari was one of the very few Indian Muslims who rightly assessed the character and nature of imperialism. According to him the most formidable difficulty is "the aggressiveness of imperialism and the greed of High Finance the two most fruitful sources of trouble and misery in the world to-day. Empires are carved and nations are deprived of their liberties to satisfy the imperialist ambition and to monopolize resources in raw materials to feed the factories in Europe and to secure exclusive markets for their output....."¹⁴² Therefore political independence is the first step for bringing imperialism to an end. In this context "India is the keystone of the arch of imperialism. Once India is free, the whole edifice will collapse. The best guarantee for the freedom of Asia and the peace of the World is a free self-governing India."¹⁴³ Independence of the country meant "Offering equal opportunities to all, and recognizing and guaranteeing the just and legitimate rights of all sections and classes at peace within herself and friendly with the rest of the world."¹⁴⁴ To Dr. Ansari independence of the country is not an end in itself. He believed that social and economic content should be supplied to the political concept of independence of the country.

In his Congress Presidential Address (1927) Dr. Ansari

indicated : "Every worker in the social cause knows the havoc played by seclusion and segregation of our female population, early marriages and rules confining the choice of marriage to a limited circle. The rigidity of the social rules affecting our domestic life is so cramping that it dwarfs the physical and mental growth of the family and has a particularly harmful influence on children."¹⁴⁵

Besides, political independence need not result in cultural isolation and exclusiveness. He believed that there was close cultural affinity between India and other West Asian countries. Their economic interests also were not different. Therefore, he supported the scheme of C.R. Das for an "Asiatic Federation"¹⁴⁶ This obviously was an anti-imperialist scheme.

National independence, as Dr. Ansari thought, should result in communal harmony. It should be based on the idea of preserving the diversity of the country, while ensuring its unity. To Dr. Ansari the Hindu-Muslim problem was not a religious one. It "is only part of the broader problems of the rights of minority and backward classes."¹⁴⁷ He held that "if there be any Hindu brother of mine who imagines that he can get rid of seventy millions of his Muslim fellow countrymen, he is labouring under a great delusion and the sooner he is disillusioned the better for him and the country: Similarly, if any Muslim brother of mine is dreaming of Lording it over 250 millions of his Hindu countrymen, he is living in a fool's paradise and the sooner he opens his eye the better for the Muslim community and India. The swaraj we are striving for will be neither Hindu Raj nor Muslim Raj. It will be joint Raj protecting the just, the legitimate rights and privileges of all."¹⁴⁸

Dr. Ansari was far from being an idealist. He was not a dreamer. The best expression of Dr. Ansari's sanity and realism is his idea of cultural coexistence. "The political and religious differences which are straining the relations between the two communities are but the outward manifestation of a deeper conflict, not peculiar to India and unknown to history. It is essentially a problem of two different Cultures, each with its own outlook on life, coming in close contact with one another. The best remedy lies in a recognition of the right of each culture to

exist, in a development of the spirit of tolerance and respect and in the encouragement and cultivation of Culture all affinity by the establishment of national institutions where young people of both the communities will come into touch with each other..."¹⁴⁹

All these ideas of national independence were the basis of his scheme of federation ; federalism, he held, was a means to achieve the goal of National Independence. He was not wedded to a particular policy like Gandhi's policy of non-violence, nor did he consider any programme sacrosanct or binding for ever. "Every programme and policy should be judged by its suitability to peculiar social and political conditions, by its practicability and by the result which it is likely to give within a measurable period of time."¹⁵⁰ Still he firmly believed that the future Constitution of India "will have to be on Federal lines providing for a United States of India with existing Indian States, as Autonomous Units of the Federation..."¹⁵¹

Dr. Ansari is one of the noted spokesmen of radical nationalist school in India, and a fine product of the progressive movement in Muslim society. His realistic analysis of the situation in India and the world at large takes him ahead of the Aga Khan. He even excels Maulana Azad in his deep accent on Secularism. It was Dr. Ansari who examined the Hindu-Muslim problem in a non-religious light. Maulana Azad on the contrary, failed to see most of the problems of the community and the country in straight and direct manner of Dr. Ansari but looked at them with a religious bias.

The Deoband school constitutes one of the important schools of Muslim political thought in India. It was primarily a religious and nationalist group of thinkers. The founder of the school was Maulana Qasim Nanotvi (1832-1880). It is significant to note that Sir Syed and Maulana Qasim were the disciples of a Wahabi *Alim*—Maulana Mamluk Ali. The Aligarh movement of Sir Syed aimed at the welfare of the Muslim community through western education and with the support of British Government. Maulana Qasim, though not opposed to modern sciences, considered that the primary emphasis should be on Islam and the traditional learning (*Ulume-i-Naqli*).¹⁵² He considered that lending support to the British Government meant

slavery which was contrary to the spirit of Islam. What needs to be emphasised here is that after 1857 these two were the main currents of the Muslim Politics in India. Sir Syed had great respect for Maulana Qasim but vital differences existed between their policies. From the point of view of political thought the Deoband school becomes prominent after the death of Maulana Rasheed Ahmed Gangohi. True, the Deoband leaders were inspired by the heroic and glorious legacy of Syed Ahmed Bareilvi and Shah Ismail Shaheed. But it appears that after 1857 the religious leaders were incapable of formulating any definite or clear-cut programme. Their adherence to the orthodox view of Islam was an indication of "defeatist and outmoded mentality." They never created a proper climate within the campus of Darul-Ulum to encourage their students to develop a passion for modern science. In this context Rasheed Ahmed Gangohi's characterization of Philosophy as "devilish Art" and "useless discipline"¹⁵³ is significant.

In the political field too the Deoband school failed. The slogan of Jihad was unhelpful to the cause of the Muslims. Their anti-British attitude was so exaggerated that they feared that the movement for modernization would before long turn the Muslims into Christianity and that the strength and status of Islam would be in peril. F. Rahman has described their attitude as not only "idealistic" but utterly 'romantic' and as an "immense emotional outburst of a deepseated and profound Islamic sentiment against the oppressive foreigner."¹⁵⁴ There was no political philosophy behind their support to the Indian National Congress. The support which the Deoband school extended to the Indian National Congress was not the reflection of well thought-out policy but was contingent on the differences within the community and among the leaders. The programme of the Congress was not really inconsistent with that of Sir Syed. Besides the Indian National Congress, during the period 1885-1905, was certainly not anti-British. Moreover the Deoband leaders never made it clear that they were supporting the extremist wing of the Congress. In 1885 Rasheed Ahmed Gangohi (1820-1905) issued a *Fatwa* and warned the Muslims not to associate themselves with the activities of Sir Syed.¹⁵⁵ It

would seem that the Deoband leaders upto the advent of Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan were more bent on opposition to Sir Syed's pro-western programme than opposition to the British Government. Their support to the Indian National Congress was more a reflection of their antipathy to Sir Syed than of a positive programme of opposition to the British. The consideration of India as *Darul-Harb* is also an example in point. It is obvious that the Deoband leaders could not construct any systematic political philosophy. They relied on outdated Islamic slogans like *Darul-Harb* which had no relevance to modern times.¹⁵⁶ Till 1905 the political programme appears to be vague and indefinite. It was Mahmud-ul-Hasan (1851-1920), successor of Rasheed Ahamed Gangohi, who attempted to provide political and intellectual content to the religious ideal of the Deoband school. He was aware of the need for vigorous political activities and the importance of organization. The need of rapprochement between the Ulema and the western educated youth, the establishment of Jamiyat-ul-Ansar and role of Nizarat-al-Ma'rif, throw sufficient light on the influence of Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan. In his inaugural address to the Namia he said that "my elders never issued a *Fatwa* (of *Qufu*) prohibiting the learning of any foreign language or sciences of other people. Yes, they did say that the ultimate result of English education, as has been generally seen, was that its acquirers were dyed deep in the ways of Christians, were in the habit of showering blasphemous remarks over their religion and coreligionists or turned out to be the worshippers of the Government of the day. Hence they considered it better to remain ignorant than to acquire knowledge in such fashions."¹⁵⁷ What Mahmud-ul-Hasan wanted to emphasise was a synthesis "of Islamic principles and National aspirations."¹⁵⁸ The Jamiat-ul-Ulema in its programme enunciated the same principle upheld by Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan: protection of religious and political rights of the Muslims, moral and social reforms, unity with the people of the other religions in order to achieve the national objectives.¹⁵⁹ One finds that the idea of "United Nationalism" propounded by Hussain Ahmed Madani was the logical result of Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan's idea of reconciling Islam with national

aspiration. The Muslims must participate in the National movement side by side with the Hindus because such a programme was not only politically necessary but also had a religious sanction."...It is the treaty of Hudabiyah which was the precursor of the conquest of Mecca and that of the whole of Arabia ; and the very day the treaty of Hudabiyah was concluded the Quranic verse (We have indeed given thee victory...) was revealed. Umar was surprised at this revelation and said "Is this a victory, O'Prophet of Allah ! Good mutual relationships, a decrease in mutual hatred, a studying of the character and teachings of the Muslims and a removal from the hearts of stubbornness—it was these factors which attracted the dear sons of Quraish, made them Muslims, and brought them from Mecca and Madina after the treaty of Hudabiyah."¹⁶⁰

In Mahmud-ul-Hassan and Hussain Ahmed Madani religious nationalism becomes an expression of the cultural crisis resulting from the British rule in India.¹⁶¹ But neither Mahmud-ul-Hassan nor Hussain Ahmed Madani could be accorded the status of a political theorist. It was Ubaidullah Sindhi (1872-1944), trained by Mahmud-ul-Hassan, who evolved a political philosophy which, on the one hand was influenced by the revolutionary traditions of Wahabies and, on the other, by the "Indo-Islamic" joint programme of Mahmud-ul-Hassan. He was the first Indian Muslim to adopt the nationalist point of view in the interpretation of the history of the Islamic world. But to Maulana Sindhi it was Islamic as well as humanist. This historical approach is the culmination of the revolutionary teachings of Shah Waliullah.¹⁶² He also makes an attempt to apply the dialectical and materialistic approach; specially with reference to Islamic and Indian history. He deplores that while studying the history of Islam the historians, by and large, adopted an un scientific approach. Whenever they wrote about the Prophet, they did not take into consideration the collective life in Mecca, the National Administration of the Quraish, the basis of its organization, and the causes of its expansion, factors which had deeply influenced the Prophet and his mission.¹⁶³ He is the first historian of India who thought that the

economic factor was dominant in shaping events and in the development of history. He was also aware of the importance of other factors—like race, language, law and even personalities. But unlike the Marxists, Maulana Sindhi held that their view of religion does not hold good in India. In India religion is not only a creed or institution but a way of life. India's history is nothing but the history of her culture and of her religious quest.¹⁶⁴ But Maulana Sindhi would never permit religion or any other institution to become a tool for the exploitation of the people. He believed that religion had a progressive role to play in the life of the individual and the Nation. But what is required is that religion should be understood and interpreted in the right spirit. Islam, therefore, is no exception. Moreover Maulana Sindhi, on the basis of his interpretation of the religion of Islam had arrived at the perception of the essential unity of all religions. All religions aim at the unity of mankind. The basic teaching of the Geeta, the Bible and the Quran is the unity of mankind.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, the most important element of Maulana Sindhi's religious and political thought is humanism. It is drawn from the Quran.¹⁶⁶ According to him this is the real religion ; it is close to God ; it is above sects, nations and races.¹⁶⁷ It is the spirit of religion which is the avenue to the knowledge of God.¹⁶⁸ Mankind is fundamentally one though the sense of unity may be incomplete and hidden. The Quran and other Divine Books are the revelation of this Universal Unity.¹⁶⁹

On the basis of this approach Maulana Sindhi effects a re-conciliation between nationalism and Islam, and works out the implications of Pantheism on Indian Society. The Jamaat-e-Islam condemns this as absolutely wrong, misleading and hostile to Islam.¹⁷⁰ In Maulana Sindhi rationalism and religion meet and combine without detriment to each other.

Maulana Sindhi was of the opinion that mysticism and spiritualism are only aspects of the life of a growing soul and that the importance of the material basis of life can never be underrated. He went to the extent of saying that the development of knowledge, and science should form the basis of life.¹⁷¹ According to him the most important thing to be

learnt from the British people is industrial progress and democracy.¹⁷² Sir Syed was the first to advocate the value of modern science. He was, perhaps, motivated by social and political considerations. He justified the acceptance of a modern educational system as a political expedient. Maulana Sindhi's approach is rather different. He pleaded for modernity on the basis of his concept of religion. He attempted to sift out the basic principles of Islam and discard the non-essential accretions. He believed that most of the outward characteristics of Islam, were the product of the needs, character, traditions and the history of the people, who professed it. The sanctions regarding theft, adultery, murder etc., are an example in point.¹⁷³ Except the principle of unity of mankind everything therefore is subject to modification or change. But one should not think that Maulana Sindhi regarded matter as the ultimate and final reality. Like Iqbal he stood for the conquest of matter by the spirit.¹⁷⁴ To him it was only one aspect of reality. Another aspect is *Aakhrat*—life after death.¹⁷⁵

Under the influence of Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan he had been advocating religious nationalism which meant a synthesis of Islam and national aspirations. In practice it implied co-operation with the non-Muslims in the struggle against the foreign oppressive rule.

In 1915 Maulana Sindhi went to Afghanistan—a country with a predominant Muslim majority. The political conditions there compelled him to believe that nationalism is a permanent reality.¹⁷¹ In 1922 he visited Russia where he witnessed the efforts of the communists for the consolidation of the country.¹⁷⁷ There he found “real religiosity” in a non-religious system.¹⁷⁸ He was also profoundly inspired by the new experiment in modernization which was being conducted in Turkey.¹⁷⁹ The defeat of Turkey in the First World War was a strong factor in bringing Muslims closer to the Hindus.¹⁸⁰

What the Deoband leaders were preaching provided a theoretical and religious foundation to Maulana Sindhi's concepts of nationalism. He held that Islam does not deny or obliterate nationalism but transforms it. The Arabs remain Arabs in spite of Islam. The Turks rendered a valuable

service to Islam but remained Turks.¹⁸¹ But to Maulana Sindhi, the Islamic concept of nationalism and internationalism are convertible.¹⁸² He gave the example of Quresh nationalism.

Maulana Sindhi's application of the Islamic concept of nationalism is interesting. It is also different from the interpretation by many other Muslim leaders, including Hussain Ahmed Madani. He thought that India is only a distinct geographical entity but not a nation.¹⁸³ India included different nationalities which ought not to be brought under an artificial or mechanical unity, although unity was politically necessary. All the nationalities should remain independent or autonomous¹⁸⁴ within the framework of political unity.

Maulana Sindhi also knew that politics in a country like India should be based on economic realities. Religion should not be mixed up with it. Political parties especially the main political party should be above religion. Therefore Maulana Sindhi said that the Indian National Congress should be a political organization, "based on a philosophy of pantheism" and should pursue an economic policy directed towards the progress of the community in the widest sense of the term.¹⁸⁵ The association of religious customs with the National movement would ruin the country.¹⁸⁶

Maulana Sindhi denounced Gandhiji's leadership. For Gandhi's politics, according to him, were tainted with Hinduism. It might result in the Hinduisation of the country. It was opposed to the concept of unity as advocated by Maulana Sindhi. This was the bone of contention between him and the leadership of the national movement, as also the other Deoband leaders like Hussain Ahmed Madani. The Hussain Ahmed group thought that the radical Nationalism of Mustafa Kamal Pasha of Turkey was something opposed to Islam. But according to Maulana Sindhi the real danger to the Indian Muslims lay in Gandhiji's movement.¹⁸⁷

Maulana Sindhi had differences with the Congress leadership but he did not support the scheme of partition of the country. It is also interesting to note that the various Muslim groups opposed partition on various grounds. The Hussain Ahmed group

held that the Congress guaranteed the protection of every religion, culture, language and custom.¹⁸⁸ But it was this group which prepared the political and constitutional issues of Pakistan, by elevating them into a religious issue.¹⁸⁹ There was another group which opposed partition on a preposterous ground. It was positive reaction to the atrocities committed by the Sikh leaders on the innocent Muslim women and children, before 1830.¹⁹⁰ The Hindus of modern India have, according to the historian Ghulam Ali Azad, inherited the legacy of the Sikhs and the Marathas and have developed ambitions of aggrandizement.¹⁹¹ The solution of this problem according to this group is not partition but faithful and firm adherence to the Quran. It visualized that in India there might be the danger of aggressive and militant Hindu nationalism but it also realized, that even after partition the problem could not be solved.¹⁹² Therefore the demands for partition reflected a defeatist mentality.

It was this leadership, according to W.C. Smith, which could not give any lead to the community in "coming to terms with modernity,"¹⁹² making the entire movement essentially reactionary and feudal¹⁹³ "Maulana Sindhi did not belong to any of these groups. His theory of nationalism was different from that of the Congress and the reactionary Ulema. A real federation would provide a true solution of the Indian problem. His theory of nationalities, would however not have been acceptable to Jinnah also. It should also be noted that Maulana Sindhi, unlike the Jamiat-ul-Ulema group, was critical of Gardhian leadership. According to him, Gandhiji had equated Indian with Hindu and elevated Hindi into a symbol of Indian nationality¹⁹⁵. These ideas would take India centuries back. He was also opposed to the principle of non-violence. He believed in war—a just war. If one fights for the good of humanity one does perform, according to him, the noblest act¹⁹⁶.

Maulana Sindhi is the most original and progressive thinker of modern India. After Shah Waliulla and Sir Syed, he made a sincere attempt to interpret Islam in accordance with the requirements of the age. He visualized the possible impact of Islam on the social, political and economic life of the people. Maulana Sindhi's pronouncements appeared to the Ulema as ultra

revolutionary and repugnant to the scripture and therefore unacceptable. He always stood for liberty, economic equality, social progress and political awakening in society. Any religion which comes in the way of this purpose is, according to him, reactionary. If power goes into the hands of bigots and fanatics religion will become a "dangerous weapon."¹⁹⁷ He has evolved his own Muslim social theory which is "anti-capitalist and envisages Islam as an unfinished social movement..."¹⁹⁸ Maulana Sindhi is the only Muslim thinker who supported the establishment of a democratic socialist state and society.¹⁹⁹ This is characterised by Aziz Ahmed as a kind of "Pseudo-Waliullahi communism."²⁰⁰

Maulana Sindhi, curiously enough, is one of the most neglected thinkers of Islam. He is condemned without being studied and understood. His concept of religion, nationalism and nationalities and Islamic communism is an original contribution to Muslim political ideas in India.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Ameer Ali : *The Spirit of Islam*, P. 138.
2. Bernard Lewis : *Arabs in History*, P. 39.
3. Quoted by Ameer Ali : *Op. cit.* P. 127
4. Compare Khuda Bhaksh : *Politics in Islam*, P. 12.
"Zubair left behind property worth 50 million Dirhams. Abdur Rahiman Abn' Auf owned, when he died, 1000 camels and so much in cash that every one of his four widows (according to another report, three), after the deduction of the children, obtained 80 to 100 thousand Dirham. Sa'd Abi Waqqas had a beautiful palace in the neighbourhood of Madina where he lived in comfort and peace. Talha left behind on his death 2,200,000 Dirhams and 200,000 Dinars in cash. His capital and landed properties were valued at 30 million Dirhams."
5. Bernard Lewis : *Op. cit.*, P. 69.
6. Mohammed Habib and Mrs. Afsar Sultana : *The Political Theory of Delhi Sultanate*. PP. V-VI.
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60. Mohammed Noman : *Muslim India*. Pp. 35-36.
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62. Tufail Ahmed : *Mussalmanon Ka Raushan Mustaqbil*, Pp. 288-829.
63. P. Sitaramayya : *The History of Indian National Congress*. Vol. I., P. 14.
64. Compare R. C. Majumdar : *History of Freedom Movement*, Vol. I, P. 492. "Sir Syed was not so much anti-Hindu as pro-Muslim: it was not that he loved the Hindus less but that he loved the Muslims more."
65. Tufail Ahmed : *Op. cit.* Pp. 272-273.

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66. Sir Syed : *Miqalate Sir Syed*, Ed. by Abdullah Khan.
67. Sir Syed : *Maktubate Sir Syed*, Ed. by Shaikh Mohammed Ismail, P. 380.
68. S. Abid Hussain : *Op. cit.* Pp. 52-53.
69. *Ibid* : P. 53.
70. Halide Edib : *Inside India*, P. 127.
71. *Ibid* : P. 127.
72. Sir Syed : *Miqalate Sir Syed*, Vol. II. Ed. by Shaikh Mohammed Ismail, Pp. 221-222.
73. Ameer Ali : *Op. cit.* P. 178.
74. *Ibid* : P. 257.
75. *Ibid* : Pp. 122-123.
76. *Ibid* : Pp. 58-59.
77. *Ibid* : P. 279.
"When a brother Muslim was ill treated by Jabala, King of Ghassanides the former complained to Caliph Omar, Jabala defended himself, I am a king, and other is only a common man, but the Caliph reminded that 'King or no king, both of you are Mussalman and both of you are equal in the eyes of Law.'"
78. *Ibid* : Pp. 283-284.
79. *Ibid* : P. 277.
80. Ameer Ali : *History of Saracens*, P. 58.
81. S. P. Verma : *The Problems of Democracy in India*, P. 7.
82. Quoted by B. Mujumdar : *History of Political Thought* Vol. I, Pp. 392-393.
83. Bombay Government : *Source Material for Writing History* Vol. II. P. 65.
84. Quoted by Azim Hussain : *Fazl-i-Hussain*, P. 98.
85. *Eminent Mussalmans* : P. 162.
86. Quoted by Ram Gopal : *Indian Muslims*, P. 93.
87. Grunebaum : *Islam*, P. 193.
88. Ram Gopal : *Op. cit.* P. 44.
89. A. K. Mujumdar : *Advent of Independence*, P. 46.
90. Blunt : *India under Ripon*. P. 99.
91. Aziz Ahmed : *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, P. 270.
92. Aga Khan : *The Memoirs of Aga Khan*, P. 74.
93. *Ibid* : P. 74.
94. *Ibid* : P. 75.
95. Aga Khan : *India in Transition*, P. 283.
96. Aga Khan : *The Memoirs of Aga Khan*, P. 332.
97. M. Dumasia : *The Aga Khan and his Ancestors*, P. 94.
98. Aga Khan : *India in Transition*, P. 24.
99. *Ibid* : P. 22.
100. *Ibid* : P. 157-158.

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101. *Ibid* : P. 158.
102. *Ibid* : P. 157.
103. *Ibid* : P. 157.
104. *Ibid* : P. 24.
105. *Ibid* : P. 156.
106. Jackson : *The Aga Khan*, P. 30.
107. Quoted by Ram Gopal : *Op. cit.* P. 118.
108. Quoted by Kanji Dwarkadas : *India's Fight for Freedom*, P. 102.
109. Aga Khan : *The Memoirs of Aga Khan*, P. 187.
110. Compare Aga Khan : *Op. cit.* P. 142.
"It has fallen on the Aga Khan to serve in vastly wider fields than Sir Salar Jung to exert much more than local or provincial influence in a crisis of British Rule even greater than that of Mutiny."
111. *Ibid* : P. 132.
112. *Ibid* : P. 132.
113. Jackson : *Op. cit.* P. 129.
114. Compare Aga Khan : *India in Transition*, P. 67.
"Not chaos like together crush and bruised,
But, like the world, harmoniously diffused,
Where order in variety we see,
And where, though all may differ, all agree."
115. *Ibid* : P. 75.
116. *Ibid* : P. 61.
117. *Ibid* : P. 187.
118. Jackson : *Op. cit.* P. 75.
119. *Ibid* : P. 76.
120. Aga Khan : *Op. cit.*, P. 49.
121. *Ibid* : P. 57.
122. Aga Khan : *The Memoirs of Aga Khan*, P. 77.
123. Compare *Eminent Mussalmans*, P. 218.
"In September, 1901 Mian Mohammed Shafi wrote a series of articles in Observer and advocated the formation of a political organization among the Indian Mussalmans for safeguarding the community interest, sketched its constitution and that it should be called the Indian Muslim League."
124. Aga Khan : *India in Transition*, P. 40.
125. *Ibid* : P. 40.
226. *Ibid* : P. 39.
127. *Ibid* : P. 39.
128. *Ibid* : P. 35. According to Aga Khan the other factors which lead to the establishment of a federation are : intensive culture of localities, high development of local economic interest, existence of various forms of civilization and relatively minor differences of race, religion, history & development.
129. *Ibid* : P. 42.

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130. *Ibid* : Pp. 117-172.
131. S.M. Ikram : *Op. cit.* P. 149.
132. *Ibid* : P. 150.
133. *Ibid* : P. 107.
134. *Ibid* : P. 308.
135. Mehta and Patwardhan : *Communal Triangle in India* Pp. 29-30.
136. Abdul Majid Daryabadi : *Khutute Mashahir*, Pp. 22-23.
137. S.P. Verma : *Op. cit.* P. 50.
138. Quoted by Mohammed Noman. *Op. cit.* P. 185.
139. In the Preface to *The Conflict of East and West in Turkey* by Halide Edib: P.V.
140. Quoted by Halide Edib : *Inside India*, P. 323.
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142. Quoted by Lajpat Rai : *Unhappy India*. P. 424.
143. *Ibid* : P. 425.
144. *Ibid* : P. 423.
145. *Congress Presidential Addresses*. Vol. I. P. 848.
146. *Ibid* : P. 846.
147. *Ibid* : P. 838.
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150. *Ibid* : P. 827.
151. *Ibid* : P. 842.
152. Z.H. Faruqui : *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, P. 30.
153. *Ibid* : P. 31.
154. *Ibid* : Pp. 54-55.
155. *Ibid* : Pp. 44-45
156. Compare Z.H. Faruqui : *Op. cit.* Pp. 79-80.
"It was really unfortunate that the Ulema in general and the Darul-Ulum in particular understood Islam primarily in the legal form ; their medieval conception of Shariah remained unchanged, orthodox and traditional in to-to and they accepted it as finished goods manufactured centuries ago by men like Abu Hanifa and Abu Yousuf. Their scholasticism, couched in the old categories of thought, barred them from creative thinking and properly understanding the problems, social or philosophical, confronting the Muslim society in a post-feudal era."
157. Husain Ahmed Madani : *Naqshe Hayat* : Vol. II, P. 257.
158. *Ibid* : P. 257.
159. Quoted by Mohammed Mian : *Jamiat-ul-Ulema kya Hai*, Part I Pp. 90-91.
160. Z.H. Faruqui. *Op. cit.* P. 155.
161. B.B. Misra : *Indian Middle Classes*, Pp. 357-358.

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162. Compare Maulana Maudoodi : *Tarjumanul Quran*, Vol : 25. No. 1-4, Pp. 116-117.

“Even without a reference to the teachings of religion, the laws of evolution and decline can be discerned from the history of mankind. This shows that there is no necessity of Prophethood and Intuition (Wahy). Even the Will of God synchronises with the spirit of age.”

163. Maulana Sindhi : *Shah Waliullah aur Unka Falsafa*, P. 64.

164. See D. P. Mukerji : *Diversities*, P. 144.

165. Mohammed Sarwar : *Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi*, P. 35.

166. *Ibid* : P. 36.

167. *Ibid* : P. 37.

168. *Ibid* : P. 22.

169. Maulana Maudoodi : *Op. cit.* P. 118.

170. *Ibid* : Pp. 116-118.

171. Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* Pp. 60-61.

172. *Ibid* : P. 364.

173. *Ibid* : Pp. 249-254.

174. S.M. Ikram : *Op. cit.* P. 416.

175. Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* P. 61.

176. *Ibid* : P. 24.

177. Compare Maulana Sindhi : *Nuqush Lahore Makatib* Number, Pp. 310-313. Part I. 1968.

“I have never made communist revolution as my creed ; In future also it is impossible to accept for men like me....., but I formulated such programme which will not be opposed either by the socialists or the communist.”

178. Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* P. 126.

179. *Ibid* : P. 28.

180. *Ibid* : P. 339.

181. *Ibid* : P. 239.

182. *Ibid* : P. 200.

183. *Ibid* : P. 364.

184. *Ibid* : P. 367.

185. *Ibid* : P. 372.

186. *Ibid* : P. 371.

187. *Ibid* : P. 359.

188. Mohammed Mian : *Ulema-i-Haqq*, part II, Page 138.

189. Mohammed Sarwar : *Mulana Maudoodi ki Tahrike Islami*, P. 125:

190. Manazir Ahsan Gilani : *Tazkera Shah Waliullah* , P. 44.

191. *Ibid* : Pp. 44-48.

192. *Ibid* : P. 48.

193. W C. Smith : *Islam in History*, P. 286,

194. W. C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India* P. 321.

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195. Mohammed Sarwar : *Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi*, P. 359.
196. *Ibid* : P. 53.
197. Quoted by Mohammed Sarwar : *Maulana Maudoodi ki Tahrike Islami*. P. 233.
198. W. C. Smith : *Op. cit.* P. 244.
199. A. A. A. Fyzee : *A Modern Approach to Islam* Pp. 72-73.
200. Aziz Ahmed : *Op. cit.* P. 269.

The Cult of Pan-Islamism

MAULANA MOHAMMED ALI
(1878—1931)

MAULANA MOHAMMED ALI represents a remarkable synthesis of apparently conflicting trends and currents of Muslim religious and political thought in India. He stressed the need of modernity and science as well as the need to follow the spirit and values of Islam.

He was inspired by the Aligarh Movement and was, in a sense, its byproduct. His dissociation with the Aligarh College, and ultimately the establishment of Jamia Millia, should not lead one to the conclusion that he was against the Aligarh movement. He was fully aware of the historic importance of Sir Syed's role during the latter half of 19th century. He also considered that the Aligarh movement was in the interests of the Muslims in India. He never denied the usefulness of the western system of education either. But he thought that the western system should not be blindly copied, or the oriental and Indian tradition recklessly discarded. He was also fully aware that Sir Syed, while supporting the western system, had advocated the need to synthesize philosophy, science and religion. It was apparent, however, that the Aligarh movement with all its merits signally failed to achieve the intended results. While he retained all personal regard for Sir Syed, he was convinced that the Aligarh movement was in need of reform. Even Mohsin-ul Mulk commanded his respect. Whatever Mohsin-ul-Mulk did, was done with the sincere motive of serving the Muslim

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community and not out of opportunistic considerations.¹ Mohammed Ali also expressed his gratitude and loyalty towards Viqar-ul-Mulk. On his death, Mohammed Ali said that "India is deprived of a leader and we of our father".² Like Shibli Nomani and Maulana Azad, Mohammed Ali vehemently criticised the system of western education which was in vogue in India. "The present generation is an immature product of modern education with crude, half-formed ideas, not familiar with orders of things—new as well as old,"³ wrote Mohammed Ali. He held that the western education, "tended to breed in the student an arrogant omniscience, and to destroy alongwith age-old beliefs in superstition all respect for Tradition and Authority."⁴ What Mohammed Ali advocated was the genuine spirit of enquiry, the search for truth as well as respect for tradition. He believed that the system of education which had come into vogue was not suited to the genius of the people or even the needs of the modern age. Mohammed Ali also argued that education should not be in the hands of the State.⁵ He complained that the modern education had produced men who were "more communal than religious" and who know "so little of their religion and their orthodoxy was more than suspect."⁶ Mohammed Ali believed that Sir Syed really did not desire this type of education. He said that "we have no hesitation in saying that we have assisted in the matter in a way that would have met with the approval of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and his cordial and active encouragement, had Providence spared him to guide today the policy of his community and his country."⁷ Shibli Nomani and Maulana Azad had also made a departure from the political aspect of the Aligarh movement. But Mohammed Ali's deviation is altogether of a different nature. Firstly, he never challenged its necessity and usefulness. Secondly his ideas had their nucleus in Sir Syed's educational, social and political philosophy. Although Sir Syed's influence on Mohammed Ali was decisive, circumstance obliged him to modify Sir Syed's programme radically. Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Viqar-ul-Mulk too supported Mohammed Ali's stand. He regarded Sir Syed as "an arch-rebel" and not a loyalist of the British

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Empire for he said that "It is my firm conviction that he had always aimed and intended to produce staunch Muslim and patriotic Indians, even if he could not contemplate a near enough future for India."⁸ In 1907 when the strike of the Aligarh students occurred and in the same year fell the death anniversary of Sir Syed, Mohammed Ali said in an Ode written in Urdu :

It is you that had taught the community all this 'Mischief';
If we are its Culmination, you are its Commencement.⁹

Mohammed Ali acknowledged B. G. Tilak as his political 'Guru'. Like Tilak, he believed in providing a popular basis to the nationalist movement in the country. Both of them aimed at the same goal—Self-Government. Both of them disapproved of the means and methods employed by the liberals. Mohammed Ali favoured militancy and the method of mass agitation. The influence of Tilak made Mohammed Ali the leading exponent of extremist Muslim nationalism. Sir Syed, Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Viqar-ul-Mulk, the Aga Khan, Jinnah and a few others had been expatiating on the providential mission of the British Government and supporting the programme of the liberals. No one thought of associating the common people with the political movement. Because of Tilak's influence Mohammed Ali had realized the necessity and significance of mass contact. There is another striking similarity between Tilak and Mohammed Ali. Both of them used religion to provide a mass base to Indian politics.¹⁰ But Mohammed Ali's anti-British stand was the outcome of the British policy towards the Muslim countries. Moreover, the supranational character of Islam awakened and strengthened the latent feelings of Pan-Islamism amongst the Muslims in India.

Mohammed Ali believed that the basic teaching of Islam is peace and not war and hatred. Therefore, he had no hesitation in joining the non-cooperation movement launched by Gandhi. Although Gandhi exercised some influence on Mohammed Ali, he was very conscious of "communal individuality". He said "I do not believe either in the spiritualism or the intuition of

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Gandhiji. I also do not consider him the saint of God. His religion is different from my religion. But I regard him as my political leader. He is the greatest and most sincere leader of the country. We can become free from the British subjection only through his leadership." Mohammed Ali with all his association with Islamic politics¹² did not lag behind in lending support to Gandhi in the freedom struggle. Political expediency brought him closer to Gandhiji. He held that "there is no clash between Hindus and Muslims. The real conflict is between Malaviaism and Gandhism. I am supporting the latter to serve India and Islam."¹³ To Mohammed Ali politics should be the handmaid of religion. He held that the Hindu customs and rituals of which Gandhiji was a vigorous champion needed reform. Once he said that "according to my religion and creed, I do hold an adulterous and a fallen Musalman to be better than Mr. Gandhi."¹⁴ This shows how Mohammed Ali's thinking was dominated by his religious creed and how little was Gandhi's influence on the religious ideas of Mohammed Ali.

The influences on Mohammed Ali cannot be appreciated properly unless one knows his views on Islam. He was not prepared to accept anything that conflicted with Islam. According to him "Islam is not a bundle of dogmas and doctrines that theologians plague humanity with. It is a complete scheme of life, a perfect code of right conduct and a comprehensive social polity as wide as the human race and in fact as wide as the human creation."¹⁵ Mohammed Ali's philosophy of religion is comprehensive enough to include all the important aspects of life. It guides "man in every concern of life" and teaches "him how to live and how to die."¹⁶ He believed that religion is not a ritual and that it is "an interpretation of life."¹⁷ It is "a culture, a polity, an outlook on life."¹⁸ He held that Islam alone provides an example of such a true religion. Islam was a complete culture, polity and outlook on life. It keeps tradition, reason and mystic intuition "within proper limits."¹⁹ The Quran is a book of guidance regulating the activities of all those who profess Islam. It is a "perennial fountain of truth."²⁰ According to him the Quran propounds two basic principles—unity of

God and the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. He held that God is "the Supreme Ruler and Omnipotent Creator, Sustainer and Developer of all Creation."²¹ He learnt from the Quran that "The entire universe was one. The unity of the creator postulated, the unity of his creation, and all was one vast Theocracy with Allah for its king and Man for his earthly viceregency."²² Man is the servant of the Lord and his function is "the service of his Maker and the fulfilment of His Divine purpose."²³ He is the rightless slave of God."²⁴ Mohammed Ali said that surrender to God "will make him free for ever and equal of kings and emperors in the greatest of all Republics, and even superior to them."²⁵ Both Mohammed Ali and Iqbal drew heavily on Islam. Mohammed Ali explains that Iqbal's notion of Man's realization of self was the discovery of the purpose of life without which life would be a wilderness. This 'life purpose' is nothing but the divine purpose for which Theocracy exists in the Universe. Man identifies his 'life purpose' with God's Purpose running through all his creation.²⁶ It must not be forgotten that Mohammed Ali, while elaborating the importance of religion in the life of man, had Islam always in his mind. He was not prepared to accept that all religions are as true and sound as Islam. Unlike Maulana Azad he never supported the principles of the unity of all religions. To him Islam is the eternal truth. He said : "Islam was unchanging and has remained unchanged in more than 13 centuries that have passed over"²⁷ and has been guiding the people in spite of the efforts of theology. He failed to understand that the character of Islam was determined by the prevailing economic, sociological, political and social philosophies. "Ancient Islam" was not concerned with "the individual quest for salvation" and mysticism but with "wealth, power and glory"; even the paradise was pictured as a "soldier's sensual paradise"; the feudal orientation of Islam radically changed its character.²⁸ Mohammed Ali ignored the sociological aspect of religion. He recognised, like most of the liberals, that there existed no conflict between religion and science, *i.e.*, Islam and science. As there is no "possibility of conflict between the two and there is nothing to reconcile."²⁹ If the interpretation of a particular verse of the

Quran is rejected and supplemented by a more rational one, it is not a sin.³⁰ He agreed with Sir Syed who "exposed the futility and the mistake of Ibn Rushd's un-natural and irrational division of mankind into philosophers and fools."³¹ He held that Islam is neither opposed to rationalism nor to mysticism, provided that they do not transgress their limits. The philosophers should not "make Muslim theology their battle ground and divert the energies of Muslims from righteous action."³² At the same time Islam does not conflict with mysticism. But Islam cannot let "Sufism degenerate into a wild fantastic ritual, or worse still, leading him (Sufi) to consider his kind above and beyond the claims of Islam's Shariat which prescribes the simplest of duties for all alike."³³

Mohammed Ali's view of Islam was similar to that of the advocates of "romanticism" in politics. Maulana Azad was the most influential representative of this trend till the end of the First World War but Maulana Maudoodi still continues to adhere to it. The romantic approach to religion and its application to politics implies that Islam is the only criterion of truth and could provide an answer to all the problems that confronted mankind. Its exponents do not see any conflict between Islam and Modern Science because Islam according to them is a progressive force, a rational and scientific system. But the limitations of this approach are obvious. Mohammed Ali did not recognise any hostility between Islam and positive science and non-conformist philosophy.³⁴ However, the history of Islam denies the validity of such a claim. Mohammed Ali believed that the most vital function of religion is the creation of faith. Nationalism has faith in the systematic pursuit of knowledge. This is quite contrary to the spirit of religiosity.³⁵

Mohammed Ali's interpretation of Islam is not liberal. Liberalism is accepted to a certain limited extent and was never carried beyond that. Mohammed Ali stood to defend each and every aspect of Islam. This did more harm than good to the cause of liberalism as well as Islam. The liberalism of Mohammed Ali "suffers from ethical poverty ; it makes no demands upon the Muslims, it is beautiful but inspires no actuality."³⁶

Mohammed Ali's religiosity vitiates his political philosophy.

and makes it anti-secular. It does not make any distinction between the spiritual and the mundane. Mohammed Ali thought that secularism would limit the range of Islam and render it ineffective in non-spiritual matters. He held that it was against the spirit and injunctions of the Quran and the practices of the Prophet. He was of the opinion that there is compulsion not in religion but of religion.³⁷ In a letter to Maulana Abdul Bari he writes "ordinarily in political affairs there are leaders in every community. But the most important question in life is religion and in this matter we cannot succeed unless some one from the venerable group of Ulema is our leader."³⁸ He said "I must disprove that the doctrine that politics should be separated from religion, which either meant that Mussalmans should not be allowed to follow their religion which governed their politics as every other aspect of their private or public life, or that politics should be divorced from all spirituality and should become the plaything of pretenders and self-seeking charlatans."³⁹ Secularism, he thought, is a western notion, which cannot be applied in the East. According to Mohammed Ali the problem essentially was one of defining the province of religion. In the West politics had set the limits of religion whereas in the East politics were still determined by religion. Mohammed Ali held that "What is politics to the West today, religion is still to the East."⁴⁰ This attitude renders human legislation unnecessary and superfluous in the presence of Islamic jurisprudence drawn from the Quran and Hadith. Islam should be placed above "human legislation."⁴¹ On this score he criticized the instruction imparted at Aligarh and stigmatised it as worldly, and without any concern for the world hereafter.⁴² In a letter to Ghulam Bheek Nairang he clearly stated the need of "Islamic Politics" and his opposition to Mustafa Kamal Pasha and Ismat Pasha who were working for a secular state.⁴³ He admired Sir Syed not because he wanted to keep the state and religion distinct but because he was a "zealous and even a stern Muslim in his polemics in defence of his creed against European and Christian critics."⁴⁴ He always held that the Islamic polity is realizable; "The post-War Europe would not be the pre-war Europe and after the terrible nightmare of this war it could be easily awakened into a recognition of the Kingdom of God in

which every man would be a brother and a fellow—subject of God, the sole, Sovereign of His Universe.”⁴⁵ He was never prepared to discard the notion of divine government. All his social and political ideas were conditioned by his orthodoxy. Mohammed Ali observed “If I am supposed to err from the right path, the only way to convince me of my error is to refer me to the Holy Quran or to the authentic traditions of the last Prophet.....or religious pronouncements of recognized Muslim Divines, past and present....”⁴⁶ Thus Mohammed Ali’s approach was traditional and religion-oriented. Unlike Maulana Azad, he never abandoned his romantic approach. All these characteristics of his Islam are reflected in his political ideas. Such an approach logically leads to Pan-Islamism, aggressive Muslim Nationalism and the rejection of democracy.

Mohammed Ali is considered to be the initiator of Pan-Islamism in India. This is partly true. In India Pan-Islamism was the concomitant of romanticism of which the best representative was Maulana Azad. Mohammed Ali did not employ the term Pan-Islamism to describe the efforts of the Muslim world to bring about united opposition to the Christian Powers of Europe⁴⁷ as it was used originally in the eighties of the 19th century. It was advocated because the spirit of Islam called for the unity of Muslims. Patriotism and Pan-Islamism were not irreconcilable. “If patriotism has a rationale, surely it can be nothing else but the similarity of culture and civilization.—Whether due to similar ethnic origin, geographical unity or identity of historical associations—expressing itself in similar laws and institutions. Now the rationale of the Brotherhood of Islam or Pan-Islamism is exactly the same rationale of patriotism, with the difference however, that the Islamic fraternity has not achieved an identity of laws and institutions through an identity of ethnic origin or geographical unity, but has received it as a direct gift from God.”⁴⁸ Mohammed Ali asserted that Pan-Islamism is nothing more nor less than Islam itself, the “Supernational Sangathan of Muslims in five continents.”⁴⁹ Islam as a religion and social polity binds all Muslims together. It recognizes neither the sanctity of colour nor the virtue of geography, and by offering a set of common

ideals, offers the only rational basis for unity and cooperation among its followers. The sympathies of a Mussalman are co-extensive with his religion because they have been bred into him by the unifying spirit of his creed.⁵⁰

According to Mohammed Ali the basis of Pan-Islamism is one God, One Prophet, One Ka'ba and one Book, the Quran. But "this spiritual unity would have been of no avail if it did not provide a social unity...a common social policy."⁵¹ He put great emphasis on "the main principles underlying the social synthesis...throughout the Islamic World."⁵² Pan-Islamism is not an institution. It is not concrete. But Pan-Islamism has been more an abstract and emotional factor than a pragmatic concept.⁵³ It was not motivated by hatred against the non-Muslims. Mohammed Ali, therefore, held that Pan-Islamism and Islam are synonymous and neither is aggressive and provocative.⁵⁴ It will be wrong to separate it from the events in the Islamic world. The defeat of the Islamic countries at the hands of the European countries disheartened the Muslims all over the world. It touched the chord of religion in the sub-conscious being of the Muslims⁵⁵. Mohammed Ali described that his feelings during the disastrous war in the Balkans were so overpowering that he even contemplated suicide.⁵⁶ Inside the country the "settled fact" of the Partition of Bengal was made null and void. Therefore he felt that the Muslims are betrayed both in India and abroad⁵⁷ The disillusionment that followed the First World War, led to the development of the idea of the unity of all the Muslims of the world. It was the illusion of subject Muslims who were disappointed due to their helplessness. Though essentially a political issue, Mohammed Ali deliberately made it religious. The sympathy with Turkey was described as religious and not as political. The purpose was to exercise the "right as British subjects to put such pressure upon our Governments as we lawfully could to respect our religious requirements on the satisfaction of which our political allegiance rested."⁵⁸ He declared, 'God before everything—God before loyalty, God before King, God before patriotism, God before my country, God before my father, Mother and child. This is

my faith.”⁵⁹ He preached Pan-Islamism from the Khilafat Committee as well as the Congress platforms. Mohammed Ali wanted to accomplish this in India. “To die for a cause is not difficult. The harder thing is to live for a cause, and if need be, suffer for it,..... and the cause we must live and suffer for must be the realisation in India of the Kingdom of God,”⁶⁰ Mohammed Ali declared.

For good or ill Mohammed Ali got an opportunity owing to the Turkish problems immediately after the First World War to advocate Pan-Islamism in the form of the Khilafat movement. It should be particularly mentioned here that the question of Turkey and the Khilafat had been agitating the minds of the Indian Muslims since the last quarter of the 19th century. Sir Syed too had to deal with it. He held that the king of Turkey would remain the sovereign of Turkey alone. But this view was not acceptable even to his colleagues. Mohsin-ul-Mulk declared that loyalty to the government does not exclude the idea of sympathy with one’s coreligionists. Those who think they are conflicting are ignorant both of their religious duties and their political relations.⁶¹ Mohammed Ali’s deviation from the Aligarh movement was in his advocacy of Pan-Islamism. He said that the question of Khilafat lay at the root of Islamic polity. To him the Khilafat is “the most essential institution of the Muslim Community throughout the world.”⁶² He held that “the foundation of the Khilafat unites both temporal and spiritual work, which Islam believes it is charged with doing. At all time since the death of the Prophet there has been a Khilafat, and it must be pressed at all time by the entire body of the Mussalmans. There has been no such thing as merely the spiritual headship of Islam. Islam, as we regard it, is the last word in ethics and the last word in guidance in all our affairs.”⁶³ Therefore, the Khilafat question assumed greater importance than all the other problems in India.⁶⁴ Besides political consideration, religion was the dynamic factor behind the Khilafat question. Mohammed Ali declared that “our sympathy with Turkey was not political or territorial but religious, for the sovereign of Turkey was the successor of the Prophet and the commander

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of the faithful.”⁶⁵ The Caliph is the viceregent of God, “he (the slave of Allah) had full force of the universe at his back and had the entire omnipotence of his Master at his beck and call.”⁶⁶ So the Muslims were asked to do their best for the preservation of the Institution of Khilafat. Mohammed Ali exploited the Khilafat question for propagating Pan-Islamism. He found no conflict between the Khilafat and the independence movement in India. To him freedom of India was only a springboard for “the realization of Eastern Federalism.”⁶⁷ He advised Muslims to fight for the country’s freedom. For, a “slave India will be of scant help to the Turks and the Khalifa.”⁶⁸ This gave birth to what can be termed as Islamic Nationalism. Both Khilafat and Islamic Nationalism were the logical result of the Pan-Islamism of Mohammed Ali.

Mohammed Ali, advocating the doctrine of Pan-Islamism, thought that the doctrine is an assertion of the supremacy of Islam. The adherence to Islam demands the religious unity of its followers, transcending all territorial and other considerations.⁶⁹ The chief aim of Pan-Islamism since Jamaluddin Afghani had been “the unification of all Muslim people under one Islamic Government, over which the Supreme Caliph should bear undisputed rule, as in the glorious days of Islam.”⁷⁰

The political doctrine of Pan-Islamism resulted in disastrous consequences to the Muslims because of its inherent incapacity for “readjusting the outlook and realising the aspirations of the Muslim world.”⁷¹ The main reason for this was that it was based on the medieval concept of Muslim solidarity which was no more than a “relic of medieval superstition.”⁷² But neither Afghani nor Mohammed Ali took into account the striking developments in the spirit and organization of modern life, in the fields of law, economics and politics. Thus it remained “a wrong ideology, romantic and out of touch with actualities.”⁷³ Mention may be made here of the distinction made by Gibb between “Islamic Universalism” and “Pan-Islamism.”⁷⁴ According to him the former term signified “loyalty to the ideals and institutions of Islam,” while the latter came to be understood only as loyalty to the political head. Mohammed Ali failed to distinguish between the two. Even

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Ibn Khaldun had said that "Government and Kingship are a Caliphate of God amongst men, for the execution of His ordinances amongst them"⁷⁵ Mohammed Ali failed to comprehend the real character of the Turkish Government, the extent to which it was executing the ordinances of God, the extent it was popular with the people and whether the 'Caliph' was the true instrument and representative of the sacred law. That is why Gibb says that "it was ardently accepted by those who had least personal experience of the Government of the Ottoman Empire."⁷⁶ Though dangerous and illusive, as the doctrine of Pan-Islamism was⁷⁷, it satisfied the ambitions of religious leaders and their ignorant followers who cherished the supremacy of Islam.⁷⁸ The Khilafat movement was opposed by a very few persons, like Jinnah, Fazl-ul-Haq and Fazl-i-Hussain, because denouncing the Khilafat movement meant "obviously a bold step and certain political suicide"⁷⁹. The truth was that "with all their petty differences and sectarianism, the whole Muslim world, be it Shiat or Sunniyat has got but one word on the Caliphate. The Caliphate in Islam is the temporal and religious leadership of the Muslims."⁸⁰ The doctrine of Pan-Islamism was so dominant among the people that Khilafat was regarded "a necessity for the Muslims, not only because it is rendered necessary by the words of the Holy Quran, but also because the word of God has told the Muslims that weakening of the Caliphate means the weakening of religion of Islam, and is a clear sign of insecurity for the Muslims in the World."⁸¹ This attitude, in fact, obstructed the growth of national consciousness among the Indian Muslims. The "Muslim intellectuals of Modern India awoke, not to nationalism, but to the dream of extra-national existence whose realization, however, has been rendered impossible by various factors outside India and beyond their control and comprehension"⁸² said Roy. There was no one like Ali Abdul Razak in India to declare that the Khilafat has always been, and continues to be "a misfortune of Islam" and a "source of evil" and "corruption."⁸³

The weakness of Mohammed Ali lies in his ignorance of the movement of secularization which was afoot in Turkey under

the energetic leadership of Kamal Pasha and in his support of the Khilafat which was by then a lost cause⁸⁴. It was no more than an "historical relic."⁸⁵ It is true that Mustafa Kamal was opposed to religion itself. To him it was a poison that had decomposed the body politic and, therefore, required to be rooted out.⁸⁶ As Taufiq-Rushdi Arab told Khaliquzzaman, "the small portion of Turkey that was left with us could not be strong enough to justify a claim to retain the Khilafat of the Muslim world. It was not we who abolished it but the Muslim world which made us incapable of retaining it."⁸⁷

Mohammed Ali also did not visualise the disastrous effects of the doctrine of Pan-Islamism. The Khilafat movement led to the emigration of a large number of Muslims from India. Mohammed Ali lacked balanced outlook and a sense of realism. He characterised India as *Darul Harb* while Sir Syed had said that there could be a country like India which is neither *Darul Harb* nor *Darul Islam*. Mohammed Ali felt that if the Muslims could not protect Khilafat, the symbol of Pan-Islamism, and if the British government would not help them do so, the Muslims should leave India and migrate to some Islamic country.⁸⁸ It was nothing but playing with the fate of thousands of people. Such propaganda produced its inevitable and unhealthy consequences. The "latent Muslim feelings of hatred against unbelievers sprang up; the old Muslim religion of the sword was reasserted; the exclusiveness of Arabia was revived; the extra-territorial allegiance to Afghanistan which was shown by Muslim leaders nourished Pan-Islamic tendency; the primary allegiance of Muslims to Muslim countries stressed; the dream of establishing Muslim Raj caught many Indian Muslims; the loyalty of Indian Muslims to India was found to be spurious."⁸⁹ Gandhiji supported Mohammed Ali in order to attract the support of the Muslims for the Nationalist Movement. Gandhiji, by supporting Mohammed Ali, wanted to save the cow. But Thompson says that "he never met a Hindu who thought Khilafat claims anything but nonsense, and rather immoral nonsense at that"⁹⁰. Even the educational institutions were

made, the handmaid of the evershifting exigencies of politics.”⁹¹

Mohammed Ali, however, never recognized that “the fiasco of the Hijrat (Khilafat emigration) revealed the superficiality of religious sentiment” which was unable⁹² to save the Caliphal empire from dissolution and to prevent that dissolution from following largely national lines.⁹³ Therefore, when the institution of Khilafat was abolished, Mohammed Ali considered it the greatest mistake, while Iqbal thought it “to be a perfectly sound exercise of the right of *Ijtehad*.”⁹⁴ Khuda Baksh also held the same view. He held that it could open “the path of development of nationalism and remove the embargo in liberalism. It will fashion for Islam a new sense of unity founded on truth, upon cultural traditions and materialized interests.”⁹⁵ Unlike Azad, Mohammed Ali was not prepared to abandon romanticism and accept realism, or to recognize the increasing role of nationalism, divesting it of the context of religion.⁹⁶

Nevertheless, Mohammed Ali was able to create a stir among the Muslims in India and to invest Pan-Islamism with the fervour of a mass movement. The Muslims “felt the impulse of the same social upheaval as shook their Hindu compatriots from their age-long resignation and apathy...it was the revolt of the exploited masses still unconscious of their purpose.”⁹⁷ Interpreters of Indian history like L. Hutchinson and Hiren Mukerjee, explain the significance of the Khilafat movement in Marxist terms : “The wretchedness of the Hindu peasants found expression in the National Congress : that of the Muslim peasants in the otherwise absurd Caliphate movement.”⁹⁸ Hiren Mukerjee insists that the content of the Khilafat movement was anti-Imperialistic or anti-British.⁹⁹ The credit for the mobilisation of the mass energy must go to Mohammed Ali. This was earlier accomplished by the Hindu extremists in the history of the Indian nationalist movement. Religion for the Hindu extremists however was not an end but a means whereas to Mohammed Ali religion was an end in itself.

Mohammed Ali was not only the author of Pan-Islamism but also the most important spokesman of Islamic Nationalism. If Pan-Islamism was a reality to him, “Indianism” was no less so. This was no doubt illogical but he was not prepared to

surrender either of the two. What Mohammed Ali attempted was a compromise between Pan-Islamism and Indian nationalism. In the Khilafat movement he appeared to see the blending of the two. We see in Mohammed Ali's thought the struggle between two irreconcilable lines of thought—Islamic universalism and Indian (Muslim) nationalism. He declared, "Where God commands I am a Muslim first, and Muslim second, and a Muslim last, and nothing but a Muslim.....but where India is concerned.....I am an Indian First, an Indian second, an Indian last, nothing but an Indian."¹⁰⁰ He said "I belong to two circles of equal size, but which are not concentric. One is India and the other is the Muslim World."¹⁰¹ In India the Muslims are "the blood-brothers of the Hindus"¹⁰² but outside India there are millions who share their faith. It "is a priceless heritage, the wonder of the age, the most vital and binding human cement."¹⁰³ But the fiasco of the Khilafat Movement obliged him to think in terms of Islamic nationalism. In practical politics it was an emphasis on separateness of the Muslim community as a distinct cultural and political entity.

Mohammed Ali's love of Islam and the Muslim world should not lead to doubt his devotion to Indian nationalism. Though his Indianism was subordinate to his loyalty to Islam he was a true Indian. He accepted one reality—God. But God also made it obligatory to serve the people of one's own country. Thus the country was as fundamental as the faith.¹⁰⁴ Mohammed Ali did not approve of any nationalism which was based solely on religion.¹⁰⁵ Mohammed Ali regarded western nationalism as undesirable and harmful because of its secular character.¹⁰⁶ A secular nationalist not only lacks vision and perspective and the sense of ultimate reality. This nationalism deals with man as a citizen of a particular part of the world. The worship of motherland is its creed. But as a human being he owes loyalty to his faith, which may transcend the limits of nationalism. Even Jesus has preached, Renon says, that "a man's country is not everything, and that man is before, and higher than, the citizen."¹⁰⁷ Islamic theocracy assigns no place to territorial nationalism as it does not make any distinction between an Arab and a non-Arab. Mohammed

Ali writes : "The theocracy of Islam naturally condemned the narrow prejudices that created nationality and killed humanity, for to God, the universal King, there would be no distinction between Arab and Ajam, of Aryan and Semitic, of Anglo-saxon and Teuton, I had seen in this terrible war the natural consequences and culmination of nationalism."¹⁰⁸ He held that Islamic theocracy is "supernationalist" in character and therefore opposed to secular nationalism which is the work of Satan and not of God. Nationalism and religion are poles apart. One divides and the other binds.¹⁰⁹ Nationalism without religion kills our sense of right and wrong.¹¹⁰ A true Muslim should turn away from the shrine of nationalism that has for its creed "My Country, right or wrong." Whereas nationalism demands worship of one's country, Islam recognises one sovereignty alone, the sovereignty of God, which is supreme and unconditional, indivisible and inalienable.¹¹¹ Thus the excess of territorial and secular nationalism disrupts the peace of God and sets nation against nation.¹¹² But nationalism would become acceptable if it is based on Islam, for it would then cease to be territorial or secular and become "non-spatial and non-racial."¹¹³ This attitude perfectly agreed with Mohammed Ali's approach to Islam or Pan-Islamism. Maulavi Abdul Haq described this as an extreme type of "Mullaism," which included prejudice, superstition, orthodoxy, hatred and intolerance because for the discussion of every problem he used to bring in God and His Prophet which is repugnant to rationalism.¹¹⁴ To him the more important question was the liberty of conscience and the preservation of the sanctity of souls.¹¹⁵ It was an attempt to retain the institution of Khilafat on the one hand, and the unity of the people and independence of the country on the other. Gandhiji was also convinced of the sincerity of Mohammed Ali and the purity of his faith in Islam. "The brave Brothers (Mohammed Ali and Shaukat Ali) are staunch lovers of their country, but they are Muslim first and every thing else after and it must be so with every religiously minded man. The Brothers have for years past represented all that is best and noblest in Islam. No two Mussalmans have done more than they to raise the

status of Islam in India...They have shown themselves true nationalists"¹¹⁶ wrote Gandhiji. Gandhiji was so much influenced by Mohammed Ali that "the action of Gandhi in launching non-cooperation on (20th August, 1920) was the direct outcome of the Khilafat movement."¹¹⁷ It should be noted that Mohammed Ali stressed more on Pan-Islamic ends than the nationalist objects. The Khilafat movement could mobilize and awaken Muslims but did not bring about the unity of Hindus and Muslims. For, to achieve this end, Mohammed Ali himself wrote that "The communal temper must change and interests must grow identical before the Hindus and Muslims can be welded into a united nationality."¹¹⁸

Mohammed Ali was not obsessed with the question of means to be employed in politics. Even violent and un-constitutional means, he felt, could be employed for achieving the end of Pan-Islamism and Khilafat. He, therefore, could not avoid a conflict between territorial nationalism and Pan-Islamism. Khaliqzaman described how it was stated by the Ali Brothers that "it was time that we started sounding our strength to defy the British should they ever intend to finish Turkey and the Khilafat, and suggested that we should find some way to explore the conditions of arms' factories in the tribal area and what should be their maximum production at any given time."¹¹⁹ The extremist wing of the Khilafat leadership also asserted that the Indian Muslims could seek the help of any Muslim Power to invade India. Dr. Ambedkar says that in 1919 the Indian Mussalmans "who were carrying on the Khilafat movement actually went to the length of inviting the Ameer of Afghanistan to invade India."¹²⁰ Dr. Kitchlew is also reported to have said that "if you put an obstacle in the path of our *Tanzeem* and do not give us our rights, we shall make common cause with Afghanistan or some other Mussalman Power and establish our Rule in the country."¹²¹ This was perhaps one of the important though unintended results of Mohammed Ali's view of Nationalism and Islam.¹²² Mohammed Ali disclaimed any personal responsibility for the idea of inviting the Ameer of Afghanistan to act as the liberator of India. In 1923 he said that "If India ever needs a humble soldier to resist an aggressor, be he Muslim or

non-Muslim, your comrade...will fill his place in the ranks. He certainly will be no desester."¹²³ It was a popular belief that the Muslims were trying to get the military aid of the Muslim countries to establish Muslim Raj. Sir Abdul Qadir refuting this said that "this theory seems to be the product of the heated brains of a few faddists and is propagated in order to wean Hindus from nationalism and work upon their fears for party purposes."¹²⁴ This may be only an emotional posture of the helpless and frustrated Indian Muslims who were convinced of the British policy: "Even pre-War policy was not neutral in Near East but hostile to all independent Muslim Kingdoms."¹²⁵

Mohammed Ali, however, had a real passion for the liberty of the individual and the freedom of the country. Mohammed Ali got inspiration from Islam in his efforts for freedom for he believed that Islam was opposed to all kinds of subjection except subjection to God. He, therefore, said that when the Mussalmans of India voiced their demand for complete independence, they were only repeating the command of the Quran, which was made 1310 years ago."¹²⁶

Mohammed Ali supported the non-cooperation movement as a proper means for achieving the independence of the country. He argued that it was sanctioned by the Quran: Co-operation in righteousness and piety, but not in sinfulness and transgression.¹²⁷ But these objects could not be obtained without making sacrifices especially in the cause of religion and freedom.¹²⁸ He explained to the Muslims that "*Swaraj* means *Swadharma* and if you value religious freedom more than others as you think, yours must be the larger sacrifice."¹²⁹ He also advised his countrymen in general and Muslims in particular, not to join the British Army. For God's Command was, "I want you to serve Me and not a creature of Mine."¹³⁰ Mohammed Ali applied the Islamic concept of liberty to the Indian situation. He was therefore committed to complete independence.¹³¹ In his speech at the Round Table Conference, he declared, "I want to go back to my country if I can go back with the substance of freedom in my hand. Otherwise I will not go back to a slave country. I will even prefer to die in a foreign country."¹³² This meant to him equal freedom for all communities

in India and not for the majority community only. On this issue Mohammed Ali even parted company with Gandhi. "We refuse to join Mr. Gandhi," he said, "because his movement is not a movement for the complete independence of India but for making the 70 million of Indian Muslims dependent on the Hindu Sabha."¹³³ It is generally said about Mohammed Ali that after the end of the Khilafat movement, he turned out to be a communalist. This is far from true. Nationalism in India is not and has never been a concept with a definite meaning accepted by all the leaders of all the communities. To Mohammed Ali nationalism implied independence of the country—as well as freedom for the communities from the fear of domination by one another—and continuity and preservation of what is best in Muslim culture. He also thought that nationalism was unacceptable and harmful to the Muslims if it violated the spirit of Islam. He therefore argued that "in India the nation could be the synthesis of various races and creeds on the political and to some extent, on the social plane."¹³⁴ Commenting on B.C. Pal's concept of nationalism Mohammed Ali said that Pal's definition of nationalism was more in terms of Hindu religion and culture than in terms of Indian geography or in terms of the variety and complexity of Indian society. Indian nationality cannot be viewed as coextensive with the Hindu religion because it leaves out millions of different creeds,¹³⁵ who have considerably influenced Indian society. Mohammed Ali had always been apprehensive of Hindu-oriented Indian nationalism which was upheld by communal patriots. It alarmed the Muslims and had driven them into a position of sullen isolation. "The veils of separation can be broken down only if a radical change takes place in the concept of communal duty and patriotism,"¹³⁶ he insisted. Mohammed Ali who once regarded the demand for separate electorates as untenable found it necessary later to support it. What he regarded as the extremist character of Hindu leadership made Muslims suspicious even of the demand for Swaraj. He pleaded for communal representation and separate electorates because the Muslims became "suspicious of Swaraj becoming a Hindu Raj in practice."¹³⁷ He was of the opinion

that the interests of the Muslims were separate and distinctive and required to be safeguarded by separate electorates.¹³⁸ Though closely associated with the Indian National Congress, he criticised the attitude of many Congress nationalists, "It is a cant and hypocrisy on the part of a very large section of Hindus to talk of nationalism and to rebuke those who give expression to the apprehensions they feel as regards the rights of minority communities or Backward Classes and who would devise safeguards for them through communal and class representation,"¹³⁹ he said in 1925. Even in 1913 he had written, "it has been a convenient belief professed by every Congressman that the Indian national unity would best be protected if the Mussalmans ceased to think for themselves. All serious differences in tradition, history, creed, temperament and secular outlook are lightly brushed aside by perfervid appeal to non-existent patriotism in the name of the nation that is yet to be."¹⁴⁰ To him such a concept of nationalism would be a "sterile sentiment."¹⁴¹ For the Muslims this type of nationalism and nationalist arguments were "a snare if not a delusion."¹⁴² Mohammed Ali expected an appreciation and understanding of "vital differences of feelings, temper, ideals and standards"¹⁴³ between the members of the two communities. Where nationalism was not tempered by such understanding, it was no more than communalism.¹⁴⁴ He also realized that it was communalism which was becoming popular and giving rise to the idea of revenge in the minds of young men whose education in Indian history was tainted by political interest and bias.¹⁴⁵

Lastly Mohammed Ali's nationalism cannot be regarded either chauvinistic or a glorification of everything Indian. It was not a 'fanatical and irrational revulsion against everything Western.'¹⁴⁶ On the contrary, it was based on the faith that Europe had much to teach¹⁴⁷ and that India, the East, required to be quickened and enlightened by the rapid diffusion of scientific knowledge.¹⁴⁸ But while he emphasized the need for material progress, he warned the country against gross materialism.¹⁴⁹

The foregoing discussion suggests that Mohammed Ali's ideas of nationalism and religion are interwoven. His concept

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of nationalism was so much tainted by Islam that ultimately it was difficult to separate the two. Nevertheless, this agrees at some points with Gandhian nationalism which insists on spiritual foundations and that of Nehru which is more concerned with anti-imperialism. Gandhi, Nehru and Mohammed Ali had been internationalists in their own ways. All of them believed that internationalism is possible only when nationalism becomes a fact. They, at the same time, condemned the exclusiveness and narrowness of nationalism. It has, however, been mentioned that Mohammed Ali contributed more to the promotion of the feeling of Pan-Islamism than of national consciousness among the Muslims in India. This was perhaps natural in view of the medieval traditions of Islam flourishing in the country where the Muslims were a minority.¹⁵⁰ It cannot be gainsaid that his passion for Pan-Islamism and that even his concern for Muslims in India was subordinated to his major interest in religion.

Mohammed Ali's ideas on nationalism had a practical bearing on the growth of Muslims in India. His was an extremist type of nationalism. There are many similarities between Hindu and Muslim extremist nationalisms, for instance, their violent anti-British tone and the employment of unconstitutional means. The only and perhaps not so very important difference¹⁵¹ was that the former was inspired by Islam and Muslim domination in India and the latter by Hinduism. The Hindu as well as Muslim extremists clearly constitute a break from the loyalist policy of the moderate Congressites and liberal Muslim Leaguers. The basic differences between the nature and spirit of Islam and Hinduism constituted the complicated communal problem in India. The Indian Muslims being part of an international community have had a feeling of loyalty and belongingness to the cause of Muslims all over the world. But there could be no real political and economic unity, even among the Muslims in India. Religion was only a factor of identity among them. But to Mohammed Ali it was more than that. Islam, to him, was more than a religion. It was a source of inspiration for the struggle against the alien British rulers. When Mohammed Ali protested against imperialism and pleaded for the national liberation of the Indian people he

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was motivated by the feeling that the British were the moral enemies of Islam. It was the aggressive spirit of Pan-Islamism which was inspired by the triumph of the young Turks.¹⁵² The analysis of this trend will show that it was the "latent reactionary resistance"¹⁵³ which was stronger than the reform movement in Islam. And thus the orthodox Nationalism of the Hindus as well as of the Muslims becomes "a political outburst of the forces of reaction."¹⁵⁴ Seen from this angle, ideologically Mohammed Ali's Islamic nationalism would appear absurd, but politically it played a positive role in creating a mass basis for Indian politics. A careful scrutiny would reveal that Mohammed Ali's political ideas were dominated by considerations of religion and loyalty to the restricted Muslim community. There could be no possibility of winning the support of the Hindus, for even Gandhiji's Khilafat movement could not gain enthusiastic popular support. Pan-Islamism, communalism and Indian nationalism could not be reconciled.

Mohammed Ali's concept of nationalism was dangerous. It could not offer a constructive solution to the problems of composite nationalism. Religion as the basis of nationalism would produce competitive nationalities and communal conflict in the country and would always act as a disruptive and destructive force. Mohammed Ali argued that nationalism based on Islam alone would be healthy as Islam was a world religion. Muslim nationalism could be hardly separated from Pan-Islamism. In practice it would mean a Muslim Raj in India with unspecified loyalties, looking outward towards Muslims rather than towards fellow citizens of different faiths. Mohammed Ali believed in the supremacy of Islam. He was so convinced of the righteousness of Islam that an adulterous and a fallen Mussalman was according to him better than Gandhi. True to his genius for inconsistency, he also advocated the ideal of the "united faiths in India." He perhaps did not see that unity of faiths was incompatible with his aggressive and illiberal view of Islam. Mohammed Ali also considered deeply about the establishment of a democratic federation in the country. But he failed to reconcile the cause of Islamic nationalism with a non-

Islamic government. Mohammed Ali raised many questions but did not answer any.

To Mohammed Ali, democracy is a form of Government. Considering its merits and demerits, it was comparatively better than any other form of government. That is why Mohammed Ali insisted that the most important problem of any country is to determine the form of its government. If the basic law, that is the constitution, is sound the country would be free. A sound constitution is one which does not make the people slaves of one another,¹⁵⁵ but vests ultimate power in the people. But at the same time Mohammed Ali emphasises the importance of temperament, habits and attitude of the people towards life as more important than even a well framed constitution.¹⁵⁶ Thus monarchy need not necessarily be bad. Under a capable monarch there would be the assurance of speedy progress ; but if the monarchy was debased, rapid degeneration would be certain. In democracy, however, there would be neither rapid decline nor rapid progress. Besides, its great virtue is that it is based on the liberty of all the people, and is completely in keeping with human nature.¹⁵⁷ Mohammed Ali substantiated his point by citing the example of monarchy during the Moghal period. When it began to decline even a strong king like Alamgir could not arrest the process of decay.¹⁵⁸ Mohammed Ali also said that the Quran and the Bible do not support monarchy ; they advocate theocracy. He considered theocracy as "Republicanism, and republicanism that will not have any king but God."¹⁵⁹ While elaborating theocracy he held that "Islam is a theocracy and in the language of the Quran there is no government but God's and Him alone are we commended to serve."¹⁶⁰ On the basis of this concept of theocracy Mohammed Ali built up his theory of Khilafat. Since Islam does not make any distinction between things temporal and things spiritual, the Khalifa is something more than a Pope and cannot be Vaticanised'. "But he is also less than the Pope, for he is not infallible and in all matters in which Muslims...cannot see eye to eye with him the arbiter is Allah Himself and we must refer back to the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet. We are not at his mercy and human conscience is still free. In fact, if he

persists in un-Islamic conduct we can depose him,..."¹⁶¹ This concept of theocracy and of the position of Caliph is Islamic "though it bears a semblance of democracy. It is, however, important to note that the authority of the Caliph is restricted to the religious sphere only. Secondly the history of Caliphate shows how autocratic and vindictive a Caliph could be. While discussing Islamic theocracy Mohammed Ali ignored its practical aspect. This view of Islamic democracy is linked up with the structural element of Universalism in Islam. He argued that Islamic religious nationalism was an article of faith with him, that the example set by the Rashadin Caliphs was his final aim, besides the establishment of Islamic Government in Hejaz.¹⁶² Mohammed Ali speaks of deposing the Caliph if he persists in un-Islamic conduct. That involves the question of association of the people with the governing authority. He, unlike certain Muslim leaders, held that the people collectively were capable of taking better decisions than an individual; separately the leaders are required only for quick and decisive action.¹⁶³ But the Islamic concept of the people was exclusive and restricted to a select few during the period of the first 30 years of Islamic rule. Mohammed Ali wanted that the authority of the people should be real and, therefore, he actively supported the demand for the introduction of adult franchise in India. According to him it will not only bring about the unity of the people but also produce national consciousness among them. The British Government believed in communal and separate representation. Mohammed Ali at the outset considered it a British plot but later on he realised that separate electorates would hasten rather than hinder Indian Unity. He believed that the creation of separate electorates helped greatly in curbing inter-communal warfare.¹⁶⁴ Mohammed Ali saw that the existing system of electorate had complicated the question of minority and majority. He always advocated power to the majority and adequate protection to the minority.

Mohammed Ali has also reflected upon the question of employment of means to resist the authority of the Government. If nonviolent of means are found to be inadequate, all other means could be employed. He advocated that Islam does not

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preach a war of armed might : the Holy War is a war of spiritual conversion.¹⁶⁶ This view implied that the Muslims should not be afraid of the Hindu majority. He emphasized that the obedience to the Government was "conditional" upon the protection of religion and its privileges : "We only claim that religious obligations should be respected, since it is on respect that our loyalty to His Majesty has always been based."¹⁶⁷ He said, "I think we can achieve victory without violence ; that the use of violence for a nation of 320 millions of people should be a matter of reproach to it ; and finally,...that victory achieved with violence must be not the victory of all sections of the nation but mainly of the fighting classes, which are more sharply divided in India from the rest of the Nation..."¹⁶⁸ Mohammed Ali argued that the realization of Swaraj should be accompanied by the "minimum sacrifice of the maximum number and not the maximum sacrifice by the minimum number."¹⁶⁹

Mohammed Ali discussed with reference to the Indian situation the conditions for successful working of democracy in various articles which he contributed to the "*Comrade*". He thought that unity more than anything else is supremely desirable in the country. He also hinted at the organized movement towards the growth of better relations between Hindus and Mussalmans.¹⁷⁰ He thought that the active corporation of the people in public affairs is essential. He said that if there is a genuine feeling of goodwill it would "evoke harmony in political work and create the sense of genuine, generous and self-sacrificing patriotism."¹⁷¹ It would create "a robust faith in the future of Indian Nationalism as any of the most ardent nationalists can have."¹⁷²

Secondly, Mohammed Ali felt that no country in which minorities are insecure could be considered to be real democratic country. What must bind the minorities and the majority community is the sentiment of healthy patriotism. The minority should feel that the patriotism of the majority community has ceased to be "communal and exclusive and the safeguards of the minorities will fall away as useless encumbrances."¹⁷³ He suggested mixed leagues and conferences, private personal relations and increasing opportunities for social contacts.¹⁷⁴

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Thirdly, Mohammed Ali emphasized that the ideal of democracy or self government demands supreme sacrifice from the people of the country. According to him "the pride and egotism of race, the glory of self-assertion, the greed of selfishness and the joy of racial battle,"¹⁷⁵ are the fatal obstacles in the path of democratic development.

Fourthly, Mohammed Ali held that democracy required a system of education which has got to be adapted to the life and genius of the people.¹⁷⁶ To him the existing system of education was inadequate. He spoke of the immaturity of the present generation which is a consequence of modern education. He, therefore, suggested that the system of education should reflect the needs of the people and should even be managed democratically. He welcomed the Hindu and Muslim University movement as manifesting the protest against the artificial system.¹⁷⁷

Fifthly, Mohammed Ali had realized the importance of public opinion in the functioning of the government. He said that public opinion in India consisted of "loose, disjointed ideas reflecting themselves in many moods,"¹⁷⁸ and did not represent a "full grown National mind, finding a complete and united expression."¹⁷⁹ Mohammed Ali said that for having an intelligent and instructed public opinion, there is a need for "a vast process of change, rapid, incessant, and even painful—in fact, in all essentials, a revolution."¹⁸⁰ He said that India "is yet in the stage of political tutelage and has not evolved a self-reliant political personality."¹⁸¹ Indian society had no "organic mind" and the mass-consciousness was still only a medley of unique impressions.¹⁸² Therefore he concluded that public opinion had not yet become a reality. Mohammed Ali was of the opinion that if the basic structure of the political system is democratic, public opinion finds many opportunities for effective operation ;¹⁸³ otherwise it becomes almost non-existent or irresponsible. He argued that "the political language of the community as a whole becomes intemperate simply through the abnormality of the conditions under which its political thinking is done."¹⁸⁴

Lastly, Mohammed Ali said that women should be encouraged to participate in public affairs for Islam does not dis-

countenance such participation. That "Ayesha was often consulted particularly in matters of women's affairs and in matters of Law generally"¹⁸⁵ showed that there was no such restriction imposed by Islam. Mohammed Ali held that "the Muslim society in India in the days of decadence had sinned against the light in nothing so much as in condemning womanhood to all but universal ignorance."¹⁸⁶ He advocated that "women should not be "confined within the fourwalls of the Zenana."¹⁸⁷ Their cooperation is needed in the settlement of communal and national problems. He, therefore, hoped that the conventional Pardah would not last.¹⁸⁸ There should be as many opportunities for female education as possible.

Mohammed Ali was anxiously concerned with the future of India. The future of India lay in democracy. He evolved his theory of "cultural federalism", of "federation of Faiths" in order to meet the unique situation prevailing in India. The basis of this theory of cultural federalism is the principle of unity in diversity, the religious philosophy of oneness of God, tolerance, brotherhood and fraternity and adequate measures of security to ensure the preservation and growth of the culture of various parts which will comprise the Indian nation. Mohammed Ali has been misunderstood because of his advocacy of rights and safeguards for the Muslims in India. His interest in and approach to communal harmony was not different from that of Gandhi. He endeavoured to satisfy "the pressing needs of the present which may inevitably bring it now and then into conflict with other elements in the body politic. It should never lose sight of the prospects of the future when ultimately all communal interests had to be adjusted in order to harmonise with the paramount interest of India."¹⁸⁹ Besides, people in India are attached to religion but at the same time infinitely split-up into communities and sects. There could not be any mechanical solution to the problem of such a cleavage. In addition to this there was a section of the population which was susceptible to the extra-territorial consideration. And the Indian leaders failed to provide a firm foundation to the unity of the country. Mohammed Ali therefore suggested the working out of a new synthesis in which would be embodied a Federation of Faiths.¹⁹⁰ There will

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be something like a union of faiths in India where every section of the population would contribute "to territorial patriotism without abating a jot of the fervour of their extra-territorial sympathies."¹⁹¹ In his speech at the Round Table Conference, he explained the nature of this kind of cultural brotherhood, harmonious but not unified, in the following verse :

"Not like to like, but like in difference ;
Self reverent and reverencing each ;
Distinct individualities,
But like each other even as those who love."¹⁹²

Mohammed Ali thought that the unity achieved through such a process would be a permanent reality. It would be based, as Gandhiji had said, upon "exquisitely delicate regard and toleration of one another's views and habits."¹⁹³ Mohammed Ali was no doubt aware that the achievement of such unity would be no easy task.¹⁹⁴

Mohammed Ali insisted that India cannot become a composite state unless the principle of unity in diversity is accepted. He was convinced of its practical utility. He visualised that India would eventually be a cultural federation in which all cultural and religious minorities would enjoy a sense of security. "Is not that possible in Palestine and so called Armenia within the scheme of Ottoman sovereignty ?"¹⁹⁵ If this is not adopted then India will remain a geographical misnomer.¹⁹⁶ The only ultimate goal according to him would be a union of faiths in India which would be "grander, nobler and infinitely more spiritual than the United States of America."¹⁹⁷ He also knew that India was not a nation of homogeneous people, but still hoped that "a concord like that of Canada is not beyond the bounds of practicability. It may not be a love marriage, born of romance and poetry but a marriage of convenience honourably contracted and honourably maintained."¹⁹⁸ For Mohammed Ali self-government was desirable for the achievement of self-realisation and India as a whole has not yet realised herself.¹⁹⁹ The lack of unity in India is mainly because of her conflicting interests, warring creeds and rival communities.²⁰⁰ Even for that the policy should not be to annihilate "the smaller units

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that may appear to conflict with the ultimate scheme of unity but by recognizing their force and inevitableness."²⁰¹ This was his vision of Future India. His was a passionate plea for the ideal of a many sided oneness, healthy nationalism, and democracy. In spite of the fact that Mohammed Ali cherished the religious ideal of Pan-Islamism, he emphasized to the Muslims in India that India was their homeland and that their political loyalties ought to be centered on India and not outside. In 1923 he pointed out to the delegates of the Indian National Congress that "if you carefully examine the history of the last dozen years (you) will come to know how our disasters in foreign affairs have thrown us back on you. We feel grateful for the concentration of the Mussalman on foreign affairs outside the confines because it has made us realize that we must after all come to Indians for the proper solutions of our difficulties in the foreign countries abroad."²⁰² He followed this attitude to its logical end.

It is against this background that the charges of communalism levelled against Mohammed Ali need examination. He was, from the very beginning, conscious of the religious differences prevailing in India. But that did not lead him to break with Gandhi or with the Indian National Congress. But after the failure of the Khilafat movement the communal riots had become a common feature. The leaders belonging to both the communities sincerely attempted to bring about unity between the two communities. The Delhi resolution was one such attempt. Mohammed Ali felt that Gandhiji was not rising to the situation and he wondered how he had fallen under the spell of Hindu communal organizations. He felt that what was wanting in Gandhiji was moral courage and sincerity of convictions. Secondly Mohammed Ali had begun to develop serious differences with the Congress, of which Gandhiji was the guiding spirit, because of its undemocratic character. "I do not wish to create," said Mohammed Ali, "a home-made incubus of a caste of shopkeepers of our own. To my mind most of the agitation is being financed, and partly for selfish reasons, by the Baniyas of Bombay and Gujrat."²⁰³ He regarded this as suicidal to the interests and the ideals of the Congress. In his letter to

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the Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1931 he said that it was the caste of Banias which aspired to have the sovereign power and the effective hand in determining the faith of the Hindu nation.²⁰⁴ If it was only on this ground that he parted from the Congress he cannot be accused of being communal in his outlook and policy. Even his Pan-Islamism did not preclude him from thinking along nationalist lines for even in 1919 he wanted to move the resolution for the Complete Independence of the country.²⁰⁵

Mohammed Ali was not a gifted philosopher. He had neither the mind nor the time for philosophical exercises. He was a passionate propagandist. His preoccupation with journalism was not conducive to philosophizing about religion and politics. He was essentially a revolutionary. His western education and the influence of Islam moulded his ideas. Khaliq-zzaman rightly said that Mohammed Ali "was not a man to accept facts as facts. He was a born revolutionary aiming to destroy all that did not conform to his ideal, even though he might not be able to reconstruct what he had destroyed."²⁰⁶ And as a revolutionary he was an egotist interested in his own self with an effort to identify himself with Islam. Afzal Iqbal says, "He started with the life of the Prophet and ended with his own."²⁰⁷ He carried in his self "the pathos of a great but fallen race."²⁰⁸

Mohammed Ali's loyalty to Islam was unquestioned. His aim was the glorification of Islam. Though educated in western ideas of liberalism, he always regarded Islam as his guide. All his political activities were inspired by his love of Islam. One can say that Islam was the source of inspiration in his political life and thought. In his thought religious and political ideas converged. According to him political power is co-extensive with faith. Both Mohammed Ali and Iqbal aspired for the betterment of all the Muslims of the world. But Mohammed Ali wanted to achieve his ends through political means like agitation and revolution while Iqbal relied more on spiritual purification, intellectual revolution and assertion of the self. The Khilafat movement was based on the unrealistic assessment of the internal conditions of the Muslim countries.²⁰⁹ It demanded that the

Khilafat of Turkey should be maintained as an effective international religious organization.²¹¹ The failure of the Khilafat movement did not make him a pessimist. Even after the Khilafat institution was abolished by Mustafa Kamal, he wanted to keep the Khilafat Committee alive and continue to fight against the British to concede real independence to the Arab world with a view to liberating the liberated.²¹² He had no doubt about the efficacy of democracy. He described himself as a "confirmed republican."²¹³ His concept of democracy is significant because it is a statement of the elements of Muslim political thought and in the name of Islam he wanted to establish a democratic federation—that became a reality after the independence of the country.

Mohammed Ali's contribution to Muslim politics cannot be ignored. He carried forward the legacy of Sir Syed. He himself was the product of the Aligrah movement. The movement, rescued the Muslims from ignorance, lethargy, and hopelessness. Mohammed Ali taught them "to discard foreign influences in life, to learn self reliance, live for causes and die for them."²¹⁴

Mohammed Ali was the first leader who consciously and successfully attempted to explore the possibilities of bringing together the Ulema and the western educated youth. He thought that this would strengthen Islam as well as promote Indian Independence. The Ulema as well as the western educated youth would be benefited by such cooperation. The Ulema would inspire religious spirit among the Muslim youth. He complained that the people who received western education were "shamefully ignorant of its (Islam's) teachings and of its world-wide, centuries old history."²¹⁵ The Khilafat movement symbolises the unity of the Ulema and the western educated youth by purposively subscribing to the single object of the solidarity of the Muslims. After the death of Mohammed Ali the gulf between the Ulema and the educated youth widened. The legacy of association of the common people with political movement which Mohammed Ali left behind was utilised and exploited by both. Both the Ulema and the educated youth began to outbid each other in courting the support of the masses—the

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only lesson they seem to have learned from the teaching and activity of Mohammed Ali. It is a sad reality that those who followed the technique and strategy of Mohammed Ali "fought the battle of Pakistan and won it."²¹⁶

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1. S. M. Ikram : *Mauj-i-Kausar*, Pp. 132-33
2. *Ibid* : P. 138.
3. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade, 1st March, 1913*, P. 180
4. Mohammed Ali : *My life—a Fragment*, P. 18
5. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade, 1st March, 1913*, P. 180
6. Mohammed Ali : *My life—a Fragment*, P. 42
7. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade, 17th May, 1913*.
8. Congress Presidential Addresses : (1923) P. 617
9. *Ibid* : P. 616.
10. Moin Shakir : *Myths in Muslim Politics, Mainstream October, 1966*.
11. Abdul Majid : *Mohammed Ali*, Part I.P. 158
12. *Nuqush, Makatib Number* ; P. 361.
13. *Ibid* : P. 363.
14. Ram Gopal : *Indian Muslims*, P. 166.
15. Selected Writings and Speeches of Mohammed Ali, P. 170.
16. *Ibid* : P. 200.
17. *Ibid* : P. 465.
18. *Ibid* : P. 465.
19. Mohammed Ali : *My Life—a Fragment*, P. 209.
20. *Ibid* : P. 81.
21. *Ibid* : P. 101.
22. *Ibid* : P. 95.
23. *Ibid* : P. 43.
24. *Ibid* : P. 95.
25. *Ibid* : P. 96.
26. *Ibid* : P. 128.
27. *Ibid* : P. 164.
28. Max Weber : *Sociology of Religion*, P. 264.
29. Mohammed Ali : *Op. cit.* P. 167.
30. *Ibid* : P. 168.
31. *Ibid* : P. 205.
32. *Ibid* : P. 209.
33. *Ibid* : P. 209.
34. Moin Shakir : *Islam in Modern India, Mainstream, 3rd June, 1967*.
35. *Ibid*
36. W. C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India*, P. 65.
37. Mohammed Ali : *Op. cit.* P. 101.
38. Khaliqzamn : *Pathways to Pakistan* ; P. 29.
39. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade, 16th October, 1925*, P. 186.
40. Mohammed Ali : *My life—a Fragment*, P. 10.
41. Selected Writings and Speeches, P. 482.

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42. Mohammed Ali : *My life*, P. 42.
43. *Nuqush : Makatib Number*, P. 362.
44. Mohammed Ali, *Op. cit.* P. 7.
45. *Ibid* : P. 135.
46. S. Sen : *Birth of Pakistan*, P. 73.
47. *Encyclopaedia, Britannica* : Vol. 17, 1951, P. 185.
48. Selected Writings and Speeches, P. 101.
49. *Ibid* : P. 389.
50. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade, 12th April, 1913*, P. 290.
51. Selected Writings and Speeches, P. 102.
52. *Ibid* : P. 101.
53. Compare : W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, P. 88-89.
"Pan-Islamism, and always has been, primarily a sentiment of cohesion. It is not cohesion itself or any institutional or practical expression of it. The unity of the Muslim world is a unity of sentiments."
54. Selected Writings and Speeches, P. 61.
55. Mohammed Ali : *My Life*, P. 43.
56. *Ibid* : P. 37.
57. *Ibid* : P. 37.
58. *Ibid* : P. 139.
59. Selected Writings and Speeches, P. 232.
60. Congress Presidential Addresses (1923) P. 657.
61. Quoted in *Eminent Mussalmans* : P. 91.
62. See Griffiths : *British Impact on India*, P. 311.
63. Quoted by S. M. Abbas : *All About Khilafat*. Pp. 91-92.
64. Congress Presidential Addresses : (1923) P. 639.
65. Mohammed Ali : *My Life*, P. 138.
66. S. Sen : *Op. cit.* Pp. 66-67.
67. Congress Presidential Addresses : 1923, P. 709.
68. *Ibid* : P. 709.
69. See *the Quran* : 49 : 10.
70. C.C. Adams : *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*. P. 13.
71. H.A.R. Gibb : *Whither Islam*, P. 44.
72. R. Karim : *Pakistan Examined* ; P. 95.
73. W.C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India*, P. 240.
74. H.A.R. Gibb : *Modern Trends in Islam*, Pp. 111-112.
75. Quoted by C.C. Adams : *Op. cit.* ; P. 145.
76. H.A.R. Gibb : *Whither Islam*, P. 43.
77. *Ibid* : P. 41.
78. Compare : F. Gunther : *Revolution in India*, P. 30.
"Pan-Islamism as a political slogan is dangerous as would be a political Catholicism or a Pan-Anglicanism that cut across national geographic frontiers. The Muslims, or Islamic countries of the Middle East today base their claims to independence

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on Nationalist, not on religious grounds.”

79. Azim Hussain : *Fazl-i-Hussain*, P. 106.
80. K. Kamaluddin : *India in Balance* : P. 80.
81. Mohammed Ali Lahorie : Quoted by K. Kamaluddin. Op. cit. P. 80.
82. M.N. Roy : *India in Transition*, P. 224.
83. Quoted by C.C. Adams *Op. cit.* P. 263.
84. H.C. Armstrong : *Greywolf* : P. 247.
85. *Ibid* : P. 243.
86. *Ibid* : P. 241.
87. Khaliquzzaman : *Op. cit* ; P. 202.
88. Compare Zafar Ali Khan, Quoted by, Azim Hussain : *Fazl-i-Hussain*, P. 105.

“Remember your Government will perish. Remember that India is now Darul-Harb. Our religious Freedom has been snatched away. Baghdad has been occupied and virgin Turkish girls are outraged. The treaty with Turkey is a useless scrap of paper and we must destroy it. What should be done under present circumstances ? It is incumbent on every Muslim to perform Hijrat.”

89. S. Sen. *Op. cit* ; P. 72.
90. Edward Thompson : *The Reconstruction of India*, P. 123.
91. Azim Hussain : *Op. cit.* P. 107.
92. M. N. Roy : *Op. cit.* P. 238.
93. G. E. Grunebaum : *Islam*. Pp. 36-37.
94. Quoted by H. A. R. Gibb : *Whither Islam* ; P. 225.
95. *Ibid* : P. 225.
96. Compare Don Peretz : *The Middle East Today* ; P. 46.

“From the seventh to the tenth centuries, when the Muslim world was more or less culturally and economically self sustaining, it might have developed and maintained a religious state. But such an accomplishment is no longer possible in a world becoming increasingly interdependent, economically, culturally, and politically. Under the circumstances, it is impossible for any state or group of states characterised by radically different political and social systems to exist without coming into conflict with the rest of the world as evidenced by a contemporary bipolar conflict.”

97. M. N. Roy : *Op. cit.* P. 238.
98. L. Hutchinson : *The Empire of Nabobs*, P. 217.
99. Hirendranath Mukerji : *India Struggles for Freedom*, Pp. 101-102.
100. Selected Writings and Speeches, P. 465.
101. *Ibid* : P. 465.
102. Raza Ali quoted by Jayakar : *The story of My Life* Vol : II, P. 513.
103. *Ibid* : P. 513.

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104. Abdul Majid : *Mohammed Ali*, Part II, P. 192.
105. Mohammed Ali : *My Life*, P. 134.
106. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade, 15th June, 1925*, P. 347.
107. Congress Presidential Addresses : 1923, P. 347.
108. Mohammed Ali : *My Life*, P. 125.
109. Selected Writings and Speeches, P. 465.
110. *Ibid* : P. 165.
111. Quoted by S. Sen : *Op. cit.*, P. 74.
112. Khaliqzaman : *Op. cit* ; P. 320.
113. A. Panjab : *Confederacy of India*, P. 72.
114. *Urdu-e-Mussafa* : P. 29.
115. Selected Writings and Speeches, P. 158.
116. Mahatma Gandhi : *To the Hindus and Muslims*, P. 27.
117. R. C. Majumdar : *History of Freedom Movement in India*. Vol : III, P. 75.
118. *Ibid* : P. 62.
119. Khaliqzaman : *Op. cit* ; P. 30.
120. B. R. Ambedkar : *Thoughts on Pakistan*, P. 156.
121. Quoted by B. R. Ambedkar : *Op. cit* ; P. 270.
122. *Ibid* : P. 332.
123. Congress Presidential Addresses : (1923), P. 705.
124. Mohammed Noman : *Muslim India*, Pp. 238-239.
125. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade, 24th May, 1913*, P. 419.
126. Ram Gopal : *Op. cit* ; P. 206.
127. Selected Writings and speeches, p. 349.
128. *Ibid* : P. 350.
129. *Ibid* : P. 369.
130. *Ibid* : P. 211.
131. *Ibid* : P. 461.
132. *Ibid* : P. 460.
133. Coupland : *India, A Restatement*, Pp. 136.
134. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade, 5th April, 1913*, P. 264.
135. *Ibid* : P. 264.
136. Selected Writings and Speeches, P. 69.
137. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade, 7th August, 1925*, Pp. 61-62.
138. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade, 11th January, 1913*, P. 33.
139. Selected Writings and Speeches, P. 357.
140. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade, 11th January, 1913*, P. 33.
141. Mohammed Ali : *Op. cit.* ; P. 33.
142. Selected Writings and Speeches, P. 68.
143. *Ibid* : P. 68.
144. *Ibid* : P. 363.
145. *Ibid* : P. 481.
146. Mohammed Ali : *My Life*, P. 50.
147. *Ibid* : P. 50.

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148. *Ibid* : P. 50.
149. *Ibid* : P. 50.
150. A. R. Desai : *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, P. 265.
151. Compare Lajapt Rai : *Young India* Pp. 238, P. 238, P. 239.
" There is every chance of the Hindu extremists and Muslim extremists making alliance and joining hands, while even the Mohammedan moderates are coming nearer the Hindu moderates. The former may not actually join the Congress in large numbers, but they are thinking and acting the same way. The Mohammedan moderates are wiser than the Hindu moderates. They use their extreme party as a trump card in their negotiations with the government more effectively than the Hindus do or have ever done. The Mohammedan extremist receives more substantial support and sympathy from his moderate co-religionists than the Hindu extremists from the Hindu moderates. The Mohammedan moderate is more outspoken in his criticism of government measures that injuriously affect the Mohammedans ; he is a skilful negotiator and a decidedly better and more successful diplomat."
152. M. N. Roy : *Op. cit* ; Pp. 227-228.
153. A. Yousuf Ali : *The Making of India*, P. 286.
154. M. N. Roy : *Op. cit.* ; P. 189.
155. Rais Ahmed Jafri : *Ifadate Mohammed Ali*, P. 94.
156. *Ibid* : P. 94.
157. *Ibid* : P. 105.
158. Mohammed Ali : *Op. cit.* P. 105.
159. Quoted by H. G. Alexander : *Indian Ferment*, P. 206.
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161. *Ibid* : P. 170.
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163. Abdul Majid : *Mohammed Ali*, Part. I. P. 31.
164. Quoted by Jayakar : *The Story of My Life*, Vol : II, P. 173.
165. Rais Ahmed Jafri : *Mohammed Ali ke Europe ke Safar*, P. 221.
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167. Selected Writings and Speeches. P. 177.
168. Congress Presidential Addresses ; (1923) P. 655.
169. *Ibid* : P. 656.
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171. *Ibid.* : P. 436.
172. *Ibid.* : P. 436.
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175. *Ibid.* : P. 437.
176. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade*, 1st March, 1913, P. 180.
177. *Ibid* : P. 180.
178. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade*, 15th February, 1930 ; P. 136.
179. *Ibid* : P. 136.
180. *Ibid* : P. 135.

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181. *Ibid* : P. 135.
182. *Ibid* : P. 135-136.
183. *Ibid* : P. 136.
184. *Ibid* : P. 136.
185. R. Kamal : *Concept of Constitutional Law in Islam* ; P. 92.
186. Mohammed Ali : *My Life*, P. 14.
187. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade*, 4th December, 1925, P. 254.
188. *Ibid* : P. 254.
189. Mohammed Ali : *My Life*, P. 35.
190. *Ibid* : P. 35.
191. *Ibid* : P. 35.
192. Quoted by Chakrabarti in *Cultural Fellowship in India* P. 37.
193. Mahatma Gandhi : *Op. cit*; P. 58.
194. Compare Mohammed Ali : Quoted by Jayakar : *The Story of My Life* : Vol : II, P. 173.
 "The work of unity is not an easy task but it is one worthy of the sons and daughters of India and deserves their toil and self sacrifices. Of unity :
 Thou will come, join me knit Nation unto Nation;
 But not for us who watch today and burn,
 Thou will come; but after long years of trial,
 Weary watching, patient longing, dull denial."
195. Selected Writings and Speeches ; P. 176.
196. Congress Presidential Addresses : (1923); P. 623.
197. *Ibid* : P. 623.
198. *Ibid* : P. 625.
199. *Ibid* : P. 635.
200. *Ibid* : P. 635.
201. Mohammed Ali : *Comrade*, 4th January, 1913, P. 9.
202. Congress Presidential Addresses : 1923 ; P. 626.
203. Selected Writings and Speeches ; P. 476.
204. Quoted by Mohammed Sarwar : *Maulana Maudoodi ki Tahrik-i-Islami* ; Pp. 127-128.
205. Khaliqzaman : *Op cit* ; P. 51.
206. *Ibid* : P. 69.
207. Afzal Iqbal : *Preface to My Life a Fragment*, P. VI.
208. Selected Writings and Speeches, P. 140.
209. Abid Hussain : *The Destiny of Indian Muslims*. Pp. 80-81.
210. *Ibid* : Pp. 80-81.
211. Mohammed Noman. *Op. cit* ; P. 203.
212. Khaliqzaman *Op. cit* ; P. 69.
213. Selected Writings and Speeches ; P. 481.
214. Khaliqzaman : *Op. cit* ; Pp. 109-110.
215. Selected Writings and Speeches ; P. 416.
216. Khaliqzaman : *Op.cit*. P. 110.

Towards Constructive Revivalism

MOHAMMED IQBAL

(1876—1938)

THE great watershed of Muslim political philosophy in modern India is Iqbal (1876-1938). He attempted to provide a systematic Islamic basis to the political ideas of the Indian Muslims. The major strand of his philosophy was Islam as practised by the Prophet and the first four Caliphs. He himself has admitted that he was no system-builder. "I am afraid," he once reflected, "I have no philosophy to teach. As a matter of fact I hate systems of Philosophy nor do I trust principles or conclusions of Philosophy. No man has condemned human intellect more than I, *i.e.*, as applied to ultimate realities of religion. No doubt I talk of things in which philosophers are also interested. But with me these things are matters of living experience and not of philosophical reasoning¹." Islam according to Iqbal is a perfect system. It can fulfil all the spiritual and material needs of modern man. It is an "ever vitalising idea." It is neither rigid nor static but a dynamic system. It is "a society...a civic Church²." Though Islam is a superb form of spiritual idealism, present day Islam needs emancipation from medieval fancies of theologians and legists. "Spiritually we are living in a prison house of thoughts and emotions which during the course of centuries we have woven round ourselves.³" It is a law given by the Prophet, which "is realisable as arising from the very core of human conscience.⁴" Iqbal believes that Islam is perfect and eternal as a guide for social and political life.

He, however, was aware of the fact that the medieval spirit of Islam had rendered it useless to the modern man. But

he believed that this was not due to any inherent weakness of Islam ; but to the fact that the people did not understand its true spirit. Iqbal thus threw all blame on the orthodox, narrow-minded and self-seeking sufis. To Iqbal medieval mysticism robs its followers of their healthy instincts and gives them only obscure thoughts in return. During the course of centuries it has absorbed the best minds leaving the affairs of the state to mediocrities.⁵ It “enervated the people and kept them steeped in all kinds of superstitions.”⁶ In one of his poems ‘Disciples in Revolt’ he echoes this feeling in the clearest tones.⁷ He believed that if true Islam is revived all the ills of the world would be cured. What is needed is a careful study of Islam which will give “a kind of insight into its significance as a world-fact.”⁸ It has the potency of becoming a “living force.”⁹

The society and the state which Iqbal visualized was based upon his view of Islam. The ideal society on earth will be established by the Muslims—chosen people of God, the ‘deputies of God on earth. A Muslim is “the embodiment of good to all the world.”¹⁰ He is a perfectly sociable individual and possesses the qualities of “justice and benevolence.”¹¹ The Muslim is not a titan but a common man who possesses the traits of obedience to law and self-control and these make him capable of “Divine Viceregency.”¹³ Iqbal believed that only by “self-affirmation, self-expression, and self-development can the Muslims once more become strong and free.”¹³ These three, according to Iqbal, are the stages towards achievement of uniqueness by the ego. This philosophy of ‘egoism’ or ‘self’ of Iqbal is also significant from the point of view of political ideas. Iqbal is not satisfied with the existing economic and political system in society. This has been creating institutions which enslave the individual. It undermines not only religion but all the ethical principles. Iqbal, therefore, offers a higher ideal worth living and dying for. It will create self-consciousness among the people. Obedience and discipline are essential to keep the “ego” within proper limits. Here Iqbal’s mind seems to be working on the same lines as the English idealists.¹⁴ It will ultimately lead to the Viceregency of God. Iqbal believed that this mission will be fulfilled by the Muslims who are guided by the Book of Wisdom—the Quran.

Iqbal displayed profound distrust of the west and of western civilization. To him, the west is the symbol of the values of materialism. It is the negation of all the high values of spiritualism or religiosity.¹⁵ The west stands for reason and discards love which constitutes the basis of the eastern civilization.¹⁶ This conflict of east and west—reason and love—forms a cardinal element of Iqbal's political thought. This led him to discuss the need for the creation of an ideal society. Iqbal was well aware of the achievement of the west and its shortcomings. All these defects are found in the structure and working of the system of society. The capitalist society is the typical product of this material civilization.¹⁷ To Iqbal society should exist for making the life of its members happy and good. There should be complete concord and harmony between the individual and collective interests. Every member should find enough opportunities for the development of his 'ego' and personality. The capitalist society, Iqbal believed, cannot secure the good of the people. Its basis is the profit of the few. Every thing is made subordinate to the interests of the ruling elite. Science, philosophy, democracy, constitution and the fundamental rights of equality and liberty are subservient to the exploiting class.¹⁸ The 'Triumphs' of this society are want and unemployment. It lacks 'visionary light'. It is determined by steam and electricity. The machines crush all humanity. The hours of the labouring class are gruelling and it is condemned to eternal slavery. Man in this society has lost his individuality. In spite of all his so-called progress and learning he has 'lost count of good and ill'. Iqbal pointed out that "in the domain of thought he is living in open conflict with himself; and in the domain of economic and political life he is living in open conflict with others. He finds himself unable to control his ruthless egoism and his infinite gold-hunger which is gradually killing all higher striving in him and bringing him nothing but life-weariness."¹⁹ The modern man finds himself helpless. He has lost control over his own creations. He is no more the master but has become the slave of the system.²⁰

Iqbal knew that the capitalist system was responsible for the emergence of the nation-state. Nationalism, therefore, provides to such states, a psychological and political justification for exis-

tence. This Nationalism is based on the consideration of territory. It is not, however, merely an attachment to one's own country. Patriotism, according to Iqbal, is different from nationalism. Patriotism is "a perfectly natural virtue and has a place in the moral life of man."²¹ Nationalism, according to Iqbal, is a political concept and is not in consonance with the true spirit of Islam.²² The Quran (Sura 49 : 10) also instructs that all the believers are brethren. If nationalism is accepted as an Ideal, Islam will cease to be a living factor. Nationalism "comes into conflict with Islam only when it begins to play the role of the political concept, and claims to be a principle of human solidarity demanding that Islam should recede to the background of a more private opinion and cease to be a living factor in the national life."²³ Iqbal knew the evils of irreligiousness. He firmly held that irreligiousness will create a corrupt society. He did not have any idea of 'secular ethics'. Therefore he could not visualize a moral state without a religious basis. Absence of religion will lead to selfishness, petty materialism, worldliness, and disregard for the interests of others. "I am opposed to it" Iqbal observed, "because I see in it the germs of atheistic materialism which I look upon as the greatest danger to modern humanity."²⁴

Iqbal, however, was not opposed to that type of nationalism which has all the potentialities of uniting the people of a particular country for the achievement of freedom. This, according to him, was not inconsistent with the spirit of Islam. But what could more effectively unite the people is religion and not nationalism.²⁵ The westerners wanted to use nationalism "to shatter the religious unity of Islam to pieces."²⁶ It will be wrong to conclude that Iqbal was opposed to the freedom movement. But he viewed nationalism as a disturbing element in politics. If, at all, it brings about unity in the sense of fusion of communities which unity itself is not desirable.²⁷ Iqbal Singh rightly says "that he found it unsatisfactory for deeper emotional and spiritual reasons...the concept...appeared to be a continuation, even a throw-back, to the tribal mentality."²⁸ Iqbal thought that the growth of nationalism tantamounts to the weakening of attachment towards Islam.²⁹ What really matters is "man's faith, his culture, his historical traditions."

One of the reasons for Iqbal's opposition to nationalism was his philosophy of history. History is made by the individuals whose personality is determined by faith. Iqbal fully knew the contributions made by Islam towards the enrichment of human civilization. Islam has always been a civilizing force. It is not yet spent-up. But he always insisted that Islam should be viewed as a way of life. It is not an abstract theory. Iqbal was alive to the danger in the modern world which aims at 'de-Islamisation' of the Muslims. One such great danger was nationalism. "At the present moment the national idea is racializing the outlook of Muslims and thus materially counteracting the humanizing work of Islam. And the growth of racial consciousness may mean the growth of standards different and even opposed to the stand of Islam."³⁰

Iqbal did not only attack western nationalism, but was also afraid of its growth in India. He started with the premises that India is not a nation. Firstly, because the Muslims are in a minority. Therefore, Islam and nationalism are not practically identical. In those countries where the Muslims are in a majority Islam has accommodated nationalism.³¹ The Muslims here constitute a separate cultural unit. Do the Muslims form a separate nation? Iqbal has no clear-cut answer to this question. The Muslims form a community. The Quran refers to the community as a "party of men and this party can come into being.....upon the basis of tribe, race, colour, language, land and ethical code. *Millat*, on the contrary, will carve out of different parties a new and common party. In other words *Millat* or *Ummat* embraces nations but cannot be merged in them."³² He believes that the Muslims are "bound together not by racial, linguistic, or geographical ties, but by their communal brotherhood."³³ Iqbal thus concluded that India is not a single nation. He believed in diversity. The idea of one nationhood implies the obliteration of this diversity and this, according to him, would be most undesirable. Moreover, nationalism according to Renan's definition *i.e.*, presence of moral consciousness, is not possible in India. But it does not mean that Iqbal was not in favour of United India. "A United India," he said "would have to be built on the

foundation of concrete facts, i.e., this distinct existence of more than one people in the country. The sooner Indian leaders forget the idea of a unitary Indian nation based on something like a biological fusion of the communities the better for all concerned.”³⁴ Iqbal had in mind the failure of the mission of Nanak and Kabir in the past. History also bears witness to the futility of attempts to secure the fusion of the communities. Now in the 20th century unity should not be “sought in the negation, but in the mutual harmony and cooperation of the many.”³⁵ Iqbal had realized that the people as well as the leaders lacked clarity of thought and insight regarding the unity of India. He, therefore, characterized all talk of one nation as “futile” and likely to continue so for a long time to come.³⁶ Even in 1909 he had come to the conclusion that present conditions did not hold out any promise for the crystallisation of the idea of one nation with a common culture.³⁷ Iqbal’s insistence on the maintenance of the distinct communities by recognizing them as separate entities, gave rise to what is described as Muslim Nationalism. This has also directly or indirectly made him the Father of the idea of Pakistan. There is a feeling that the Muslim League carried Iqbal’s concept of Muslim Nationalism to its logical end. But this does not appear to be valid. Firstly, Iqbal never thought of partitioning the country. The politics especially in the Punjab and generally in India, the emergence of Hindu militant groups, communal riots, general conditions of Muslims and lack of discipline and organization amongst them led him to remark that “the problem in India is international and not national.”³⁸ He also suggested the idea of a separate Muslim State in the North in his Presidential Address to the Muslim League in 1928. This demand was only for “a state within a state”, and not for an altogether separate state. No question of partition was involved. Probably he would have been satisfied with the establishment of a true federation in which full internal autonomy is guaranteed to the constituent units. Edward Thompson states that Iqbal was disillusioned with his idea of ‘a state within a state’, regarding it as disastrous to the British, to the Hindus as well as to the Muslim community.³⁹ Thus Iqbal’s scheme seems to have no

relation to the League demand for partition. Jinnah and others of the League were closer to Choudhary Rahmat Ali than to Iqbal regarding the concept and scheme of partition. There were others who had also advocated such schemes before Iqbal. But the League leadership exploited Iqbal's name to give strength and sanctity to the demand for Pakistan.

Secondly, Jinnah and many other Muslim leaders in the forties were rallying anti-Hindu forces under the guise of the Two Nation Theory. Here, too, the League was more profoundly inspired by Rahmat Ali than by Iqbal. Iqbal had great respect for the non-Muslim communities.⁴⁰ He believed that no religion teaches hatred of other religious communities. Iqbal is reported to have said to Ranjee G. Shahani "I am sprung from the same stock ; India is older than Hinduism and Islam, and will remain when we and our creeds have become one with Yesterday's Seven thousand years..."⁴¹ Iqbal would never have agreed to the demand of Pakistan, because he felt "that Islam in its pure form had a contribution to make towards the building of new India."⁴² From this, one can conclude that Iqbal was very much opposed to sectarian and narrow nationalism inside and outside India as the basis of polity. But the nature of opposition was more Islamic than political. By attacking nationalism he never wanted to create obstacles in the way of Independence of the country. On the contrary he had a passion for India's freedom.⁴³ He sounded a note of warning that nationalism, the product of the west, will be anachronistic and dangerous to the interests of humanity. His aim was to expose the game of the west and explode the myth of nationalism.

Iqbal regarded democracy as another major ingredient of the modern western system. This democracy, however, is different from and even opposed to Islamic democracy. Both are poles apart. The present form of democracy is the invention of the west. It believes in the sovereignty of the people. Its cardinal principles are equality and liberty. The political and social set-up in democracy is the result of reaction to the past autocratic and feudal structure of Europe.

Although Iqbal favoured the basic principle of democracy, he thought that the theory and practice of western democracy is

not consistent with tenets of Islam. The fact is that democracy envisaged by Islam is not democracy in the western sense of the word. Sovereignty according to Islam is vested not in the people but in God. Secondly, the practice of government even under the rule of the first four Caliphs can be termed as more tribal than democratic. Besides the concept of *Ijama* (consensus) in Islam excludes the common people.

Iqbal realized that the democratic set-up of India, as he found it, did not effect any radical change in the economic relations in society. The western society is based on materialism and exploitation. The so-called democratic rights given to the people are unable to take away the economic power from the hands of the few people (top dogs). According to Iqbal, it is because of certain inherent drawbacks and shortcomings in the theory of democracy. It rightly believes in equality but its notion of equality is misleading. It does not take into account the distinctions in the inherent capacities and endowments of the individuals. The heads are counted and not weighed.⁴⁴ Wisdom is not accorded due consideration in democracy and its principle is majority rule. The majority⁴⁵ may not always be wise and therefore Iqbal found it unacceptable.

Iqbal also saw that the liberty which western democracy confers on the people was a sham. Democracy is accompanied by imperialism and furthers the interests of the exploiters. Therefore, democracy—as rule of the people, by the people—cannot be a reality.⁴⁶ In the garb of democracy Iqbal found “the demon of autocracy.”⁴⁷ Liberty, rights etc., of democracy are the camouflage of capitalism.

Iqbal also held that democracy is only a continuation of the old authoritarian rule of the past. There is no vital difference between democracy and autocratic rule. Democracy is a fraud on the people who are given the semblance of power and denied it substance. Then why should it be considered better than other forms of government ?

Lastly, democracy is not an ideal form of polity. It “lets loose all sorts of aspirations and grievances which were suppressed and unrealized under autocracy. It arouses hopes

and ambitions often quite unpractical and it relies not on authority but argument or controversy on the platform, in the press in parliament, gradually to educate people to the acceptance of a solution which may not be ideal but which is the only practical one in the circumstances of the time."⁴⁸ Iqbal viewed western democracy as imperfect and undesirable because it lacked spiritual content. The democracy of Europe, overshadowed by socialistic agitation and anarchical fear—originated mainly in the economic regeneration of European societies.⁴⁹ Nietzsche, however, abhors this rule of the herd and the plebeian, and preaches the gospel of the Superman. On these grounds, Iqbal condemned democracy. His attack on democracy proceeds from the Islamic point of view. According to him Islamic democracy did not "grow out of extension of economic opportunity ; it is a spiritual principle based on the assumption that every human being is a centre of latent power, the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character. Out of the plebeian material, Islam has formed men of the noblest type of life and power. Is not, then, the democracy of early Islam an experimental refutation of the ideas of Nietzsche ?"⁵⁰

Thus in Iqbal's Islamic democracy the emphasis is more on moral considerations. Unlike Nietzsche, he does not abhor the herd and unlike Marx he does not overstress the economic aspect of social and political life. What matters to him is righteousness. But will Islamic democracy be democracy in the modern sense and acceptable to the modern man ? Iqbal does not consider this question at all. It is certain that Iqbal's democracy is not of the common people but of the unique individuals—the elite. It will be "presided over by the most unique individual possible on this earth. Nietzsche had a glimpse of this ideal race, but his atheism and aristocratic prejudices marred his whole conception."⁵¹ Iqbal was convinced that his Islamic democracy will not degenerate into autocracy. Its basis is shifted "from economic exploitation to a spiritual purification and better economic adjustment."⁵²

Iqbal thought that a government based on the concept of One God (*Tawheed*) will be more stable and better than democracy of the western type. The principle of unity of God

is a "living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind."⁵³ The other cardinal principles of Islamic democracy will be 'obedience to Law',⁵⁴ 'tolerance,'⁵⁵ 'universalism.'⁵⁶ Here it should be noted that Islamic democracy remained mostly an ideal and a nostalgic dream. Iqbal was aware that for a very short period of 30 years it existed in the early period of Islamic history. The subsequent history of Islam is one of absolute and un-Islamic rule. In modern times also, Iqbal knew, no Muslim country was making any conscious efforts to realise this ideal. Iqbal in his book '*Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*' refers to the democratic development in Muslim countries. He "approved of a growth of republican spirit in Muslim countries, which he regarded as a return to the original purity of Islam."⁵⁷ Iqbal also appreciated the adoption of democratic institutions in the Muslim countries. But they should be in conformity with the basic principles of Islam. He was also aware of the necessity of reform and a proper change in religious instruction. Thus *Ijtehad* (Independent enquiry) can be used to re-interpret the law "in the light of modern experience and the altered conditions of the modern life."⁵⁹

Iqbal adopted the same attitude towards democracy in India. He was of the opinion that the western institutions of democracy did not suit Indian conditions and the genius of our people. He held that the Indian Muslim was not essentially opposed to the democratic ideal. But he had reason "to be afraid of communal oligarchy in the garb of democracy in India. He wants to ensure the substance of democracy even at the expense of its conventional form."⁶⁰ Therefore he pleaded for a modification of the democratic institutions. He said that the "minorities of India can ill-afford to accept the principle of Western democracy until it is properly modified to meet the actual conditions of life in India."⁶¹

From the foregoing exposition of Iqbal's concept of 'Islamic democracy' one is led to conclude that Iqbal stood for removing the defects of modern democracy. Iqbal was inclined to think that monarchy possessed certain merits as compared with other forms of government. Therefore, he stressed more on obedience to the perfect man. But at the same time Iqbal abhorred certain

features of monarchic government. Eternal monarchy appeared unnatural to him.⁶² But if the monarch is guided by a religious and ethical code, he may establish a government which may aim at the realization of the spiritual ideal through a human organization. Iqbal says that it should not be based on mere domination. But if the kingship or monarchy is just political form un-modified by the spirit of religion, it is the most undesirable thing to have on this earth.⁶³

Iqbal's Islamic democracy, like Plato's Second Best State, combines the virtues of monarchy and democracy. One can describe it as Islamization of democracy and monarchy. Iqbal's emphasis on Government by the perfect man may be construed as a preference for monarchy and his emphasis on equality as a preference for democracy. Iqbal, like the Marxists, believes that liberty is not possible in democracy because of the economic forces that prevail in the social structure. Moreover the notion of liberty in a democracy is usually perverted and leads to licence. It is boundless and therefore perilous. Such liberty is destructive⁶⁴ for those who have no aptitude for original thought and independent views. Iqbal was convinced that real liberty was possible only in Islamic democracy. Iqbal was a great champion of the liberty of the individual. To him slavery was a curse. The unfree cannot even trust his own eye.⁶⁵ But this liberty can be sustained only by power. Iqbal had nothing but admiration for all who attempted to achieve power. He praises Mussolini for this reason only. But power devoid of ethical consideration is a weapon of terror and evil. "The rise and fall of the power to act free is an important fact of human psychology and Islam is anxious to retain the power to act freely as a constant and undiminished factor in the life of the age...Prayer in Islam is the ego's... escape from mechanism to freedom."⁶⁶ The western democracy is unable to realize the essential significance of the individual and results in the subordination of the individuals to the mass. In Islamic democracy the principle of unity with God liberates the individual from slavery.⁶⁷ Besides, only in Islamic democracy does obedience provide a sound basis for the enjoyment of liberty. There are no man-made laws. The divine laws are perfect and eternal. One should not complain about the

strictness and rigidity of the laws because they are the means for the liberation of the individual.⁶⁸

Thus Iqbal made a clear distinction between western democracy and Islamic democracy as he conceived it. And the preference for the latter led him to reject the west and its culture. To him "...Europe became the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical advancement."⁶⁹

Iqbal was also critical of the socialist developments in the west. Iqbal knew the significance of scientific socialism as expounded by Marx and practised in Soviet Russia. Socialism rejects capitalism, democracy and nationalism. Iqbal fully agreed with this aspect of socialism. He whole-heartedly appreciated the revolutionary role played by Marx and his ideology.⁷⁰ He agreed with Marx's view of the character of bourgeois philosophy and society. The bourgeois society set up false gods of creed, colour and culture to be worshipped by the proletariat. This is done to perpetuate the rule of the few over the overwhelming majority of society. The people are opiated with a false religion and the institution of an unreal democracy. But experience had showed that for all their high professions and pretensions they had only increasingly impoverished the workers and peasants. Iqbal recognised the significance of the message of Marx. Marx's philosophy has no more been a dream. In the East as well as West he saw the "Dawn of the age of the common man."⁷¹ Iqbal also knew that the Russian revolution was not an insignificant event in world history. It was the triumph of the people. It was the realisation of the dream of the underdog. It was the victory of those forces which brought the entire bourgeois system of Government and society to an end and unleashed ideas and energies which could drastically change and reshape social, political and economic relations. It was a challenge to western imperialism. It would end colonialism and slavery from the face of the earth.⁷² Their lies the greatness of Marx.⁷³ Iqbal finds many points of similarity between Islam and Marxian ideology. Both "aim at destruction of autocracy in the world, both view capitalism with disfavour, both disapprove of priesthood and the church as organized institutions."⁷⁴ Islam,

“tends to make the people more and more indifferent to religion and will eventually completely eliminate the important factor of religion from the life.....”⁹³ Iqbal feared that the substitute to religion will only be atheistic materialism which he looked upon as a great danger to modern humanity. Iqbal was also in favour of imparting religious instruction and was opposed to secular system of education.⁹⁴

The foregoing discussion shows that Iqbal rejected capitalism, nationalism and democracy on religious grounds. He believed that their character is essentially un-Islamic. Iqbal's object was the “exposition of Islam's message and main features of its ethical code”⁹⁵ as a basis for the unity of mankind. This object of Iqbal should not be confused with Pan-Islamism, an ideal to which he was not committed. Certain verses⁹⁶ of Iqbal led to the mistaken idea that he was championing the cause of Pan-Islamism. Pan-Islamism stood for “the movement towards the political unity of all the Muslims of the World.”⁹⁷ Iqbal knew that it was not only a futile but a dangerous idea. In 1934 while discussing the origin of Pan-Islamism, he said “this doctrine was formulated by a French man whose name I cannot now recall, with a view to inflaming the feelings of European nations against Muslim countries and by frightening them of Muslim aggression to give them an excuse for influence in their countries. English statesmen themselves gave currency to it in India in order that Muslims should not attend to internal political questions and should dissipate their power of action by lip-sympathy with the Muslim world ; they wished that Indian Muslims should not become practical but theoretical.”⁹⁸ The authenticity of Iqbal's information is doubtful.⁹⁹ On 19th September, 1933 he said “Even Jamaluddin Afghani whose name is closely associated with what was called the Pan-Islamic movement, never dreamed of unification of Muslims into a political state...It is significant that in no Islamic language—Arabic, Persian, or Turkish--does there exist a phrase corresponding to Pan-Islamism.”¹⁰⁰ He therefore agreed with Fazl-e-Hussain that political Pan-Islamism never existed.

Pan-Islamism according to Iqbal, signifies, the “humanitarian ideal.”¹⁰¹ It was a “recoil from the politics to religion”

because "political sentiments degenerate into jingoism and earth-hunger—."¹⁰² Halide Edib rightly said that Iqbal's Pan-Islamism was the result of his dissatisfaction with "a religion confined within geographical boundaries...it is more the struggle of extreme individualism to lose itself in the community than a political creed."¹⁰³ This community was constituted on the higher principle of spiritualism and faith. Islam, Iqbal held, is not "Nationalism or Imperialism but a League of Nations, which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the horizon of its members."¹⁰⁴ This was a "multi-national concept of Pan-Islamism."¹⁰⁵

Mohammed Sadiq holds that Pan-Islamism is "pure moonshine, an iridescent bubble with which Iqbal used to beguile his visionary moment."¹⁰⁶

Iqbal's political philosophy had two aspects—critical and constructive. The constructive aspect of Iqbal's political thought consisted in his recommendation of the principles of social, political and economic order as a remedy for the existing strife and conflicts. In one of his lectures Iqbal had pointed out that "humanity needs three things today—a spiritual interpretation of the Universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual and basic principles of universal importance directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis."¹⁰⁷ Here Iqbal attempts to show what the modern age lacks. The crisis is produced by the materialism of modern science which discards spiritual values. In 1938 he said, "So long as this so called democracy, this accursed nationalism and degraded imperialism are not shattered so long as men do not demonstrate by their action that they believe that the whole world is the family of God, so long as distinctions of race, colour and geographical nationality are not wiped out completely, they will never be able to lead a happy and contented life and the beautiful ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity will never materialize."¹⁰⁸ Iqbal believes that these ideals will be materialized in the spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam.¹⁰⁹ He knew that Islam will act as a regulator of society as well as a psychologically integrative force.¹¹⁰ Iqbal, however, was not guided by "a false reverence

for past history and its artificial resurrection because he knew that they constitute no remedy for a people's decay.¹¹¹ But he could not at the same time ignore the Islamic past. The origin of his ideal society can be traced to the glorious period of the Rashidin Caliphs which "was a model of sociological excellence."¹¹² Iqbal advocated the revival of that society "to bring about a rapprochement between knowledge, and vision which is fruit of love and intuition."¹¹³ This rapprochement is necessary because power without vision tends to become destructive and inhuman. Therefore, this unity is essential for the "spiritual expansion of humanity."¹¹⁴

Iqbal described the main features of this ideal society or spiritual democracy in his poem "Mysteries of Selflessness," in which he has depicted his ideal society. It is a community based on divine principles enunciated by Prophet Mohammed. It is composed of ideal men following in the footsteps of the Prophet who have been enjoined to establish such a society. They are made by God to be the seal of all people dwelling upon earth.¹¹⁵ But no such society exists because the so-called followers of the Prophet have fallen "so far astray from Mecca's Holy Kaaba."¹¹⁶

Iqbal begins the discussion of his ideal society by considering the position of the individual therein. According to him the individual is inseparable from society. His truest self achieves fulfilment in it. He wins respect as being one of them, and society is organized by such individuals.¹¹⁷ The highest aim of the individual is to achieve union with society.¹¹⁸ The society watches and controls all the actions of the individual. He owes his body and soul to it.¹¹⁹ It is in society that his individuality achieves firmness and stability and unity in multiplicity.¹²⁰ Society or the community is the supreme entity. The individual cannot fulfil the purpose of life in isolation from society. The interests of the individual and society are not antagonistic. They are mutual and complementary.¹²¹

Does the merger of the individual amount to the death of the individual self? Iqbal was not prepared to accept that the unity of the individual and society would mean the extinction of the self. Islam and the Islamic community are not hostile to the uniqueness of the individual. Iqbal was aware that the

social and economic arrangements prevailing in society were the greatest hurdles to liberty and individualism. Iqbal held that this was due to the lack of Islamic spirit. Iqbal's view was that Islam recognizes the worth of the individual, and disciplines him to give away his all to the service of God and man. Its possibilities are not yet exhausted. It can still create a new world where the poor tax the rich and where human society is founded on the equality of spirits.¹²² Iqbal's philosophy of individualism achieves a synthesis of the claims of the individual and society and considers the needs for the realisation of self in the context of the world of selves.¹²³ Iqbal was aware that uncontrolled ego or individualism will lead to anarchy. What is needed is to discipline it. Iqbal's emphasis is not so much on the self alone but on selflessness.¹²⁴ Otherwise the individual will be lost in vain surmise.¹²⁵ The nature of the self "is to be both free and bound."

*Itself a part, it has a potency
To seize the whole.*¹²⁶

Such a community of selves owes "the perfecting of its education to the unity of God"¹²⁷ Belief and faith in the unity of God and man is essential for the promotion of the goodness, strength and stability of society. The unity of man with God guides one's secret powers. From it are derived religion, wisdom, law, unflinching vigour, power and authority.¹²⁸ It is the inspiration and stimulus for all human action. Iqbal believed that such a basis would successfully remove the evils of racialism and nationalism.¹²⁹

Iqbal believed that the concept of the unity of God delivers the people from the chains of earthly things. It infuses the spirit of brotherhood amongst all the members of the community. The notion of Unity of man in God cultivates certain qualities which make him a good citizen and an ideal man. It delivers him from despair, grief and fear which poison the very blood of life.¹³⁰ Fear, save of God, is the dire enemy of work, the highwayman that plundereth life's caravan.¹³¹ All the evils within one's heart originate from fear.¹³² A believer should be free from fear. He should be merciful to all.¹³³

Another fundamental principle of the Islamic community is the recognition of Prophethood. The belief in the finality of the Prophet is vital to the existence and survival of society.¹³⁴

The mission of Apostleship is to "found freedom, equality and brotherhood among all mankind."¹³⁵ Iqbal holds that the history of mankind has been the history of injustice and tyranny of which the victim has been the common man. As a result of this the highwaymen were enthroned and subjects were fettered and chained hand and foot.¹³⁶ These tyrants were the High Priest, the Pope, the Sultan and the Prince. The Prophet assigned rights to the people. He brought dignity to honest toil and robbed the task-master of the tyrant's over-lordship.¹³⁷ He shattered every ancient privilege.¹³⁸ The sum and substance of the Prophet's message was freedom. His "soul was pregnant with equality. Therefore his sons stand up erect and free."¹³⁹ Since the Muslim community is founded upon the belief in the unity of God and Prophethood of Mohammed, nationalism in the western sense is alien to the spirit of Islam. Iqbal would place the first emphasis on the spiritual bond of common faith as the foundation of the community. Islamic society was to be identified by common spiritual allegiance and common religious belief rather than by what he considered the accidental factor of territory. To a Muslim no country can be dearer than Islam. What governs the minds of the Muslims is not the habitation but their faith.¹⁴⁰ The life of the Prophet is an example in point. The *Hijrat* (migration) of the Prophet from the ancestral home teaches an important lesson to the Muslims.¹⁴¹ Iqbal was aware that in modern times the motherland has been given the pride of place by communities with a political identity. It has become the darling of the people's hearts with the result that humanity is whittled down into dismembered tribes.¹⁴² It has caused bitterness and violence among men by its emphasis on love of territory rather than on love of God. The essential spiritual unity of mankind is lost sight ¹⁴³ of and religion is dethroned by politics.¹⁴⁴ This, according to Iqbal, is the tradition of the west. All these ideas found expression in the writings of Machiavelli who worshipped falsehood and whose false reasoning and imagery shattered the vision and faith of man.¹⁴⁵ He proclaimed that

the only worshipful deity is the State.¹⁴⁶ He advocated that success and gain is the only test of truth.¹⁴⁷ Deception and expediency are the legitimate means of achieving individual and communal power and glory.¹⁴⁸ His doctrines sanctified falsehood. Strategem became a fine art.¹⁴⁹ The Islamic community, Iqbal held, discards Machiavellism however attractive it might appear. It transcends time for God has promised its eternal survival.¹⁵⁰

The Islamic community is not organized through human laws. It follows the Divine law propounded by the Quran. The Law is the inner core of the Apostle's faith. The Quran is a living book, whose wisdom is eternal and uncreated.¹⁵¹ Its words are undoubted and unchanging.¹⁵² The secrets of life are written therein.¹⁵³ There is no question of free speculation regarding legal matters in the Islamic community. Strict conformity to divine law will give stability and tranquillity.¹⁵⁴

The visible focus of such an Islamic community will be Mecca. Iqbal thought that it is quite natural to have such a focus, because the people will win their bond and order from Mecca.¹⁵⁵ It is the law of life,¹⁵⁶ which will keep the people's soul alive.¹⁵⁷ Iqbal sounds a note of warning to the enlightened Muslims that the people of Moses met a tragic fate when they were scattered from their home.¹⁵⁸

The Islamic community will achieve strength and perfect solidarity by adopting a fixed communal objective. The object is "the preservation and propagation of unitarianism."¹⁵⁹ It is to make everyone believe and utter the Name of God. In other words Islamisation of the entire world should be the common communal objective. This also implies that whatever comes in the way of the propagation of unitarianism should be destroyed. The Muslim should see that the false gods of nationalism, race, colour etc., are shattered in order to save humanity.¹⁶⁰

In order to propagate unitarianism effectively the community should expand. This expansion depends upon controlling the forces of world order. The Muslim should be a masterful being. The 'mountain, river, plainland and sea are the scholar's slate on which the man of vision learns to read.'¹⁶¹ The Muslims should realize that they are the deputies of God on earth.¹⁶²

They should discover the "sensation of self" and this can be realized through guarding the communal traditions. Here Iqbal underlines the function of history. It is the record of the past and should illumine the conscience of the people. It should contribute to the process of self-awareness. If history is forgotten the people will be lost into nothingness.¹⁶³ It is neither legend nor fable, but the instrument of knowing the "true self"¹⁶⁴ History, therefore, should be preserved.¹⁶⁵ The everlasting life is not possible if there is a break between the past and the present. Life itself is nothing but "a wave of consciousness of continuity."¹⁶⁶

The idea of Superman figures prominently in the writings of Iqbal. It is not alien either to Islamic or Indian or Western thought. Iqbal did approve of certain traits of the Superman as delineated by Nietzsche. However, he was clearly influenced by Islamic teachings in his characterisation of the Superman. The Superman is not above morality and is to follow the discipline prescribed by Islam. Nietzsche and Iqbal both agreed that the Superman should possess power. But Nietzsche released his Superman from all conventional moral and religious restraints whereas Iqbal would not concede such freedom.

The Superman is the rider of destiny. He will establish the brotherhood of man and bring peace to the World. The Quran also speaks of the Superman.¹⁶⁷ He possesses all the attributes of a true follower of Islam. He is "lowly with the believers and mighty against the rejectors."¹⁶⁸ He "will fight in the way of God." Al-Jili also says that the Superman is the image of God. He is a "mirror reflecting his name and attributes."¹⁶⁹ Iqbal is in complete agreement with Al-Jili. Iqbal also borrows some features of Superman from Aristotle's Ideal Man.¹⁷⁰ But the Superman of Iqbal is always bound by the ethical code of Islam.

The Superman of Iqbal is not the Superman in the usual sense of the word. He is a perfect citizen and an Ideal member of the Islamic community. The Islamic community will be composed of such Supermen. Iqbal's concept of Superman throws light on the notion of the place, importance and function of the individual in the community. According to Iqbal, it is

not impossible to develop such individuals. What is required is only to understand the spirit of Islam and to create a society in keeping with that spirit. Iqbal had immense hopes of the realization of such a society.

The ideal society of Iqbal is, to a great extent, closer in character with the metaphysical theory of the state in the west.¹⁷¹ The worth of the individual is recognized but while society presumes the value of individuality it will prevent him from asserting his voice. He is expected to possess self in order to attain spiritual courage and freedom, because want of courage "produces a hundred diseases—poverty, pusillanimity, lowmindedness—and this amounts to the decline of moral culture". Iqbal also wanted to see in the individual the creation of a purely human consciousness. Islam does not aim at the moral reformation of the individual alone ; it also aims at a gradual but fundamental revolution in the social life of mankind."¹⁷² More often than not, Iqbal emphasises the paramount need for the realization of the 'self' of the individual. But Iqbal held that this self has no meaning if it does not identify itself with general objectives of society. It cannot have an independent existence. There is no question of dissenting from established objectives of the community. Disagreement with it means disruption and anarchy¹⁷³ The individual will have no freedom of expression. If one goes against the communal objective, he weakens the very basis of the community.

Iqbal also speaks not only of the self of the individual but also the nation. The self of the community is obviously more important because the individual owes his body and soul to it. Hegelian notion of "the personality of the state" is analogous to this self of the community. But the ethical presumption of the Quran upholds individualism. On the Day of Judgement men will be judged as individuals.¹⁷⁴

Iqbal believed that obedience is the highest virtue. Iqbal always stresses upon the danger of unlimited liberty. He feared the consequences of unlimited liberty so much that he laid restrictions on the individual which amounted to the annihilation of liberty. This is beautifully described by Schimmel as the "wonderful paradox of freedom in servanthip." This attitude

of Iqbal is strictly in keeping with the general trend of Islamic thought. The Muslim jurists generally believed that unlimited liberty means self-destruction.¹⁷⁵

Iqbal wrongly thought that these limitations on liberty are determined by considerations of utility. He did not comprehend the real implications and significance of individual liberty. He never vigorously advocated freedom of thought and association. The liberty with which he was keenly concerned was religious liberty which in practice meant the liberty of Muslims to practice Islam. There appears to be no hint of toleration of free thought. This implies that religion should be allowed to play its dynamic and decisive role in the affairs of the society and state. He always condemnend free speculation. He regarded it as the "invention of Satan." Iqbal does not say anything about the authority which will determine or express the communal objective. Is it synonymous with the General Will? Does it represent only the majority opinion? Is it subject to any modifications? Iqbal, due to his inclination towards authoritarianism, insists on the primacy of the communal objective—and regards it as divinely determined.¹⁷⁶ The ideal of a society depicted in the "*Mysteries of Selflessness*" approaches closely the ideal of totalitarianism;¹⁷⁷ Iqbal's authoritarian leanings are clear from his concept of Law and rights. According to Iqbal rights are not the product of the needs of the individual. They are not the product of the wisdom of the legislators. Iqbal took it for granted that the laws of the Quran are eternal and unchangeable. Iqbal did not deny the reality of change of society. But he held that these changes do not necessitate any change in the eternal Quranic Laws. Man cannot make and unmake laws. The eternal laws have the sanction of Divinity. The human laws are always imperfect and inadequate. What man, at the most can do, is to interpret them. Iqbal, no doubt, seems to be more liberal than other religious thinkers, regarding the interpretation of the laws. The right to interpret may be vested in the parliament (Assembly) and not only in the body of experts of the Islamic law. The transfer of legislative authority to a non-political authority is not desirable. The Quranic Law at various places lays greater emphasis on the community than on the individual.

Iqbal does not exhaustively deal with rights. He agreed that laws and rights do go hand in hand. The individual can have those rights which are permitted by the eternal laws of the Quran. Iqbal was critical of the pre-Islamic society where no liberty and equality and rights existed. But the irony of Iqbal's liberalism was that he could not appreciate the efforts of modern state towards the realization of the ideals of Islam as he conceived them. Iqbal was also not prepared to accept that Islamic theory was yet to catch up with the trends of modern history and thought. And the realization of these ideas, in fact, will not only fulfil the task of Islamic ideology but also achieve those objects of which Islam never dreamt. Iqbal's views on the rights of the individual are inadequate as well as conservative. In the Presidential Address of 1932 he said that the ideal Islamic society was one in which an "untouchable can marry a daughter of a king, where private ownership is a trust."¹⁷⁸ This system according to Iqbal will sanction economic rights to the individual. However, "it has inspired those who have made an emotional rather than an economic programme, in that it has looked back to a time when the poor were treated with sympathy, legal justice, and dignity rather than looking forward to a time when, thanks to science and industry and socialism, there will be no poor."¹⁷⁹ The Islamic community of Iqbal is thus authoritarian and un-equal in essence.

Iqbal's view that democracy is possible only in an Islamic community is debatable. The predominant religious basis of Islamic society precludes the possibilities of the formation of any party with conflicting ideology or even an alternative programme. Iqbal was not also in favour of the elections without which obviously there can be no democracy. To him the system of elections is absolutely undesirable because it only counts heads. Thus in Iqbal's ideal society there will be an aristocracy of talent rather than a democratic government based on the consent of all the people. Another undemocratic feature is that all the authority is concentrated in a small group *i.e.*, the aristocracy of talent which dominates the community.

There is diffusion and dispersal of power. In practice the Islamic system results either in absolute monarchy or in revolution.

Still Iqbal's ideal society is very much admired. This admiration is nothing more than "literary snobbishness."

Iqbal's ideal of the supernational character of the ideal community is a corollary of his principle of cultural Pan-Islamism. This shows that Iqbal wanted to stress cultural and humanitarian elements of Islam.

Much has been written on and about Iqbal. After the establishment of Pakistan, he came to be considered as "the spiritual founder of Pakistan."¹⁸⁰ The conflicting interpretation of a few of the writers critical of Iqbal do not also help to understand his philosophy.¹⁸¹ Iqbal described himself as a "visionary idealist"¹⁸² in the Presidential Address of All India Muslim Conference. He complained that no one knew him well and no one understood his message too.¹⁸³

Iqbal's ideas are a product of the Indian situation and a response to the impact of the west on India. Iqbal forms a synthesis of the two important schools of thought, existing side by side, but never coming together, represented by religious fanatics like the Wahabis and modernists like Sir Syed. Therefore, Iqbal's thought should be viewed against the background of the resurgence of the Muslim community. Its process started even before the mutiny with Zakaullah and others and it gathered force in the last quarter of the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th century. Iqbal also enriched the process of Muslim renaissance though he was not its initiator. He was "the product rather than a generator of the movement."¹⁸⁴ He was undoubtedly "the poet of Islam's re-awakening in India in the 20th Century."¹⁸⁵ Like his predecessors—Sir Syed, Ameer Ali, Chiragh Ali, Khuda Baksh, and Shibli, he "devoted himself to the war against *Taqlid* and to the resurrection of Islam from lethargy and tradition."¹⁸⁶ Iqbal shows a strange ambivalence when he makes common cause with the liberals as also with the orthodox who rejected the west outright. Unlike the liberals Iqbal was inspired by "the vision of a new Mecca, a worldwide, theocratic, utopian state."¹⁸⁷ The liberal school criticises Iqbal on political ground. The liberals defended democracy,¹⁸⁸ developments in science and industry on Islamic grounds. They identified Islam with progress. The liberals did

not entirely disagree with all the aspects of Iqbal's philosophy but held that Iqbal did not carry his liberal convictions to their logical end. Iqbal liked the scientific view point and the dynamic way of life of the west. But he contradicted himself in his writings and pronouncements. S. Abid Hussain points out that while dealing with the concept of self he "over-emphasised the elements of power to such a degree that to a casual observer it appeared not as a mere self-assertion but as aggressive individualism. Similarly he seemed to extol Love which for him was the key to the intuitive realisation of truth and to decry reason, the means for the intellectual perception of reality, so that enemies of science and reason began to quote him as an authority in support of their obscurantism."¹⁸⁹

The liberals concede that Iqbal's thought formed an advanced stage in the development of Islamic liberalism in India. Unlike Sir Syed, Iqbal realised that Muslims were passing through not a crisis of faith but of life. Therefore he strove for effective assimilation of the new, while retaining the moral spirit of Islam.¹⁹⁰ This implied full support to all the liberal movements. Iqbal, on the contrary, was afraid of such movements.¹⁹¹ Abdul Majid Salik says that Iqbal was not happy with the Turkish secular reforms.¹⁹²

The liberals also appreciated the patriotic poetry and thought of Iqbal, but they did not agree with his outright condemnation of nationalism. They held that nationalism and liberalism are not antagonistic. Nationalism in its extreme form is undesirable. Iqbal, however did not make any such distinction. He forgot that nationalism in India was not a dividing but a unifying force, And there could not be any other alternative for marshalling the forces of freedom in the country. Abid Hussain says that when Iqbal began to censure nationalism he went on sometimes to an absolute and outright condemnation of this sentiment "owing to this lack of balance his poetry could not give a fully consistent and rational image of the new man or the new society of his conception."¹⁹³ Iqbal regarded nationalism as "new tribalism" which is exclusive and intolerant of outsiders. This analogy is not correct.¹⁹⁴ If nationalism is as a principle

undesirable, it should be so even in a country where the Muslims are in a majority.

Iqbal's approach towards Islam was dynamic. His cry was not merely to go "back to the Quran" but also to "go ahead with the Quran."¹⁹⁵ But he lacked the courage and confidence of a *Mujaddid*. Although his philosophy is called the philosophy of action he, as a matter of fact, had "little aptitude for action." Iqbal's apotheosis of action, according to Mohammed Sadiq, was a "speculative person's exaltation of what he most admired in others."¹⁹⁶

Another school of thought which can be described as "historically modern" is also bitterly critical of Iqbal's religious and political thought. Iqbal wanted to revive the old Islamic polity. He perhaps could not take into account how the simple polity of earlier Islam is incompatible with the complexity of modern civilization. S. Sinha, therefore, concludes that Iqbal had no correct understanding of history. "Had he but reflected with a correct historical perspective, and tried to appreciate the causes of the decline and fall of the states, the poet would have learnt that such historical phenomena...occur...not as a result of the influence of mysticism, but of moving forces which were and are physical and territorial, and not mystic or super-sensual."¹⁹⁷ The lack of historical understanding led Iqbal to combine religion and politics, and to support theocracy and the medieval concept of Muslim solidarity. He also failed to free his interpretation of Islam from the influences of romanticism which had already met its waterloo in Turkey.¹⁹⁸ Sinha says that Iqbal did not present Islam in true perspective and in accordance with its true spirit.¹⁹⁹ Consequently he had to fight a losing battle. On the question of nationalism in Asia where "it was still in its infancy and had to become a budding force, whose tide no romanticism of Iqbal's brand could ward off."²⁰⁰ Sinha also raises the point that Iqbal was "a dogmatic theologian."²⁰¹ His interpretation of theology is outdated and does not fit the modern times. Gibb, while elucidating this point, said that we cannot even accept "the plea that in his new theology he at least laid a foundation which others might build

after him, clarifying his vision and supplying an appropriate ethical content."²⁰²

The Marxist writers also criticised Iqbal on the basis of the class character of Iqbal's philosophy. Of late, Iqbal's poetry is explained in terms of socialism.²⁰³ Shorish Kashmiri describes him as the "Karl Marx of the East."²⁰⁴ The Marxist critics considered Iqbal as the philosopher of the rising new class among the Muslims in the 20th Century. W. C. Smith says, "Iqbal was himself a bourgeois, and in some respects a contended one; he never really deserted his class."²⁰⁵ His 'chapter of deeds' appears "to reflect a certain degree of opportunistic equivocation and ambivalence right at the very centre of will and purpose"²⁰⁶ and the "fault was of a class and of a period."²⁰⁷ This should not mean that Iqbal was in favour of a capitalist society. On the contrary he was aware of the "soul-destroying frustration of most individual lives in even a prospering capitalist society."²⁰⁸ As a Prophet also, Sinha says, Iqbal "stands between two epochs, the old feudal and patriarchal and the modern capitalist bourgeois. He belongs partially to both and wholly to neither."²⁰⁹ Dr. Yousuf Hussain Khan points out that Iqbal was in disagreement with socialism because Islam tolerates a particular form of capitalism.²¹⁰

Whatever may be the reason of Iqbal's hostility to socialism, the Marxist writers are more interested in the implications of his approach. In Smith's opinion Iqbal becomes too contradictory and unsystematic to permit of a systematic assesment. And thus Iqbal's philosophy gives birth to "illiberal nationalistic and apologist dynamism."²¹¹ Both Akhtar Hussain Raipuri and W.C. Smith say that his philosophy became a tool in the hands of fascists and the reactionaries. According to Smith, one of the reasons is his "ignorance of economics and sociology."²¹² His mind was simply incapable, apparently, of dealing with men in community.²¹³ Another reason is his "fundamental idealist attitude."²¹⁴

What is lacking in the writings of the liberal and the modernist critics of Iqbal is an awareness of the reality of the emerging new class, its aspirations and ambitions. Moreover, the creed of liberalism had no alternative to offer. It will be

wrong to say that Iqbal's criticism of the west and his suggestions are altogether irrelevant. Iqbal's own concept of Pan-Islamism gave an impetus to Muslim Nationalism ; his ideal community found expression in the form of a separate state.²¹⁵ This made him "the official philosopher of Pakistan." Iqbal always faced the dilemma of the old and the new. He did not have sufficient courage to break with traditional Islam completely and accept the spirit of modern science and socialism. His thought is replete with paradoxes and oscillates uncertainly between modernity and antiquarianism. He failed to assimilate liberal forces and could not completely free himself from the mooring of tradition. His inconsistencies and contradictions, make it difficult to regard him as a systematic thinker or a consistent philosopher. The storp of Iqbal's thought represents the tragedy a great genius.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Eminent Mussalmans* : Page 397.
2. Shamloo : *Statements and Speeches of Iqbal* P. 38.
3. *Ibid* : P. 55.
4. *Ibid* : P. 120.
5. *Ibid* : P. 129.
6. *Ibid* . P. 133.
7. Poems . *Kutub*. P. 90.

“Not an earthware lamp in our Cabins :
His Worship’s fine hall one electric and luminous Blaze,
Townsmen are Yokel, the Muslim’s a simpleton—
To Mussalman Brahmins, like idols, he Prays :
No more gifts, but high interest, these pontiffs extract,
For each canting disguise hides a usurer’s Breast ;
For the seeds they inherit they bawl out their judgements.
Like crows come to tenant the Eagle’s bare nest”.

In another poem he says,

“Law, Logic and Theology,
Burn insense to Idolatry.
Truth Swallowed in Gibberish, Ritual Maze
Engulfing the creed ; the Preacher’s Phrase
May charm the ear, but all is blank, Bare,
Of all loves Fervour : Every Hair
With Syllogistic niceness split,
And Ravelied with Metaphysic wit
A Muslim ? A Heap of Ashes : No
More Fires, Alas ! On lover hearth Grow.”

(Poems Kutub Pp. 76-77)

8. Shamloo : *Op. cit.*, P. 3.
9. “With Islam’s fire the songs of strong lands blend ;
To weld the Nations is its secret end.
Empty of concord is the brain of Europe ;
The Frankish ways to no blest Mecca bend.”
10. *Mysteries of Selflessness* : P. 70.
11. “No music sounds but his triumphant song,
His loud Allha Akbar. Great is he
In justice, Clemency, Benevolence ;
Note his temper, even in chastisement
At Festival his Lyre delights the Mind ;
Steel melts before his ardour in Fight.”
(*Mysteries of Selflessness* : P. 77)

Towards Constructive Revivalism

12. Nicolson : *Secrets of Self*, P. XXVII.
13. *Ibid* : P. XIII.
14. Compare Green :
 "Man realises himself by being conscious of his higher self by making his self real—by identifying it with the better self."
 (Quoted by M. Richter ; *Politics of Conscience.*) P. 104.
15. "The land of Syria gave the Franks a Prophet
 Most pure, Most full of pity, hurting none,
 And Syria from the Franks has in return
 Gambling and drink and hordes of prostitutes."
 (Poems : *Kutub*, P. 102).
16. "Leave reason behind ; for its light is the lamp
 That showeth the road, not mark the destination."
 (Poems : *Kutub*, P. 67)
17. "Hear me
 You whom this age's culture has ensnared !
 To have no faith is worse than slavery."
 (*Ibid* : P. 67)
18. "Bright Metals are the deities of the West,
 Where flares the forge, where blaze the lamp of knowledge—
 A darkness barren of the fount of life !
 In splendour, in seduction, and in grace
 The gorgeous bank outsoars the House of God ;
 They play at commerce with a gamester's dice :
 Profit for one, for thousands sudden death ;
 Science, Philosophy, College, Constitution,
 Preach man's equality and suck men's blood.
 Naked debauch and want and unemployment—
 Are these main triumphs of Occident."
 (*Ibid* : P. 72)
19. Quoted by W.C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India.* P. 164.
20. "Love fled, Mind stung him like a snake ;
 He could not
 Force it to vision's will ;
 He sought the orbits of the stars, yet could not travel his own
 thought's world ;
 Entangled in the labyrinth of his learning,
 Lost count of good and ill ;
 Enchained the sunbeams, yet his hand no dawn
 On life's dark-night unfurled."
 (*Ibid* : P. 99)
21. Shamloo : *Op. cit.* P. 39.
22. "The Architect of Arabia has raised it as a unique edifice in the
 World :
 The foundation of the Fort of our people is not the unity of
 native land."
 (Quoted by A. Beg : *The poet of the East.* P. 175).

Khilafat to Partition

23. Shamloo : *Op. cit.* P. 141.
 24. *Ibid* : P. 38.
 25. *Ibid* : P. 205.
 26. *Ibid* : P. 204.
 27. *Ibid* : P. 194.
 28. Iqbal Singh : *The Ardent Pilgrim*. P. 50.
 29. "The biggest among these new gods is native land,
That which is its attire is the shroud of religion."
(Quoted by A. Beg : *The Poet of the East*. P. 180).
- See also "It divides the people of God into nations,
It cuts at the root of Islamic nationhood." (*Ibid* : P. 180)
30. Theodore De Bary : *Sources of Indian Tradition*, P. 764.
 31. Shamloo : *Op. cit.*, P. 142.
 32. *Ibid* : P. 214.
 33. Dr. Javed Iqbal Quoted in R.N. Sparrn (Editor) : *Constitutionalism in Asia*. P. 137.
 34. Shamloo : *Op. cit.* P. 194.
 35. *Ibid* : P. 9.
 36. *Ibid* : P. 71.
 37. A.M. Salik : *Zikre-i-Iqbal*. P. 94.
 33. Shamloo : *Op. cit.* P. 30.
 39. Edward Thompson : *Enlist India for Freedom*. P. 58.
Yousuf Hussain Khan says that when he met Iqbal in 1937 Iqbal had not renounced the Idea of a Separate State. He was "very anxious about the future of the Indian Muslims...unless they have a separate state their religion and culture will be in jeopardy."
(*Yadon ki Duniya*. Pp. 194-95)
- Also compare Iqbal on Partition :—
Quoted from an "*Unpardonable Crime of Jinnah*" P. 16.
"In the circumstances it is obvious that the only way to a peaceful India is a redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities." (1937)
40. "It is wrong to utter a bad word ;
The infidel as well as the faithful are God's creations ;
Humanity consists in respect for man
So acquaint thyself with the dignity of man."
Translated by S.A. Vahid : P.
 41. Quoted by S. Sinha : *Iqbal : The Poet and his message*. P. 34.
 42. *Ibid* : P. 35.
 43. Abdul Majid Daryabadi : *Mazamine Abdul Majid*, P. 52.
 44. "A European has given away this secret
(Though wise men, knowing such things, should not flaunt them)
Republicanism is a mode of ruling
In which instead of weighing heads, you count them."
(Poems : *Kutub*, P. 109)

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45. "Runaway from democracy and be the slave of the Perfect man ;
For out of Two hundred asses human wisdom cannot be derived."
(Ibid. P. 46)
46. "In the West the people rule, they say ;
And what is this new reign ?
The same old trap, the same strings play the empire old refrain
In demos' costume now is seen
The demon's Tyranny's fairy queen,
The fairy's azure glance.
Those parliaments and their reforms,
Those charters bill of Rights—
The Western pharmacopoeia swarms with opiate delights.
(Ibid : 46)
47. "Was it not we when men began to observe
And to reflect, who dressed autocracy,
In democratic costume ? The true power
And purpose of Dominion lie elsewhere,
And do not stand or fall by the existence
Of prince or Sultan. Whether parliaments
Of nations meet, or Majestet holds court,
Whoever casts eye on another's field
Is tyrant born. Have you not seen in the West
Those demos—governments with rosy faces
And all within blacker than Chengiz."
(Poems : Murry. P. 81)
- See also "For such a sort of freedom has this modern age bestowed
on me,
That outwardly liberty but inward—slavery's abyss."
(Poems : Kutub. P. 59.)
- See also ".....
Licence of thought is Satan's own device."
(Poems : Kutub : P. 90)
48. Shamloo : *Op. cit.* P. 152.
49. Quoted by A. Beg : *Op. cit.* P. 299.
50. *Ibid* : P. 299.
51. Nicolson : *Secrets of Self.* P. XXIX.
52. H.H. Bilgrami : *Glimpses of Iqbal's Mind and Thought.* P. 152.
53. Iqbal : *Reconstruction of Religious Thought of Islam.* P. 142.
54. H.H. Bilgrami : *Op. cit.* P. 107.
55. *Ibid* : P. 108.
56. *Ibid* : P. 109.
57. Dr. Javed Iqbal : Quoted in Spann : *Op. cit.* P. 138.
58. A.M. Salik : *Op. cit.* P. 123.
59. Dr. Javid Iqbal : *Op. cit.* P. 138.
60. Shamloo : *Op. cit.* P. 194.

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61. *Ibid* : P. 53.
62. ".....Nature rejects eternal monarchy,
However pleasing be its juggling tricks ;
Ferhad the patient however still lives on
Parvez's haughty power is dead and gone."
(Poems : *Kutub*. P. 109)
63. "The fire of hunger has consumed a whole world.
His sword is followed by famine and plague,
His building lays a wide land waste.
The folk are crying out because of his indigence ;
His empty-handedness causes him to plunder the weak.
His power is an enemy :
Human-kind are the caravan and he the brigand.
The beggar's hunger consumes his own soul,
But the sultan's hunger destroys state and religion."
(*Secrets of the Self* : Pp. 120-121.)
64. A. Beg : *The poet of the East*. P. 307.
"We cannot trust the (Inner) sight of the slaves,
Only the freeman's eye can see in this world."
Quoted by A. Beg. *Op. cit.* P. 233
- See also "The 'not-good' has turned into 'good'.
Because the conscience of Nations changes in slavery !"
Ibid : P. 236
- See also "Only the slaves can afford to have time.
For a free man there is no leisure in this world." *Ibid* : P. 238
66. *Ibid* : P. 321.
67. "Whoever maketh compact with the one
That is, has been delivered from the yoke of every idol."
(*Mysteries of Selflessness*. P. 26)
68. "Since Law make everything within,
Why dost thou neglect this source of strength ?
O Thou art emancipated from the old custom,
Adorn thy feet once more with the same fine silver chain ?
Do not complain of the hardness of the Law,
Do not transgress the statutes of Mohammed."
(*Secrets of the Self*. P. 74)
69. Iqbal : *Reconstruction of Religious Thought*. P. 179.
70. "The Prophet of no Sinai, that Messiah
Without a cross—no messenger of God,
Yet in his clasp a Book ?
What dire pestilence
Could out do this ! The slaves have cut the ropes
That held their lords' Pavilions.
(Satan's parliament. Poems : *Murray*. 81)
71. Like the old Man of the Mountain they have fed you with
Hashish,

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You thought it sugar candy, silky spaniel on their leash :
For the bourgeoisie is cunning, and from
Patriotism and creed, colour, culture, race and Kingship,
 has brewed drugs to serve its need ;
For these false gods, Oh poor witless, you have rushed upon
 your doom,
You have thrown away life's leisure because for the Taste of
this made fume.
Your sharp paymasters have swept the board,
They cheat and know no shame----
You forever unsuspecting, have forever lost the game
But now rise ! new ways are growing in the assembly of earth.
In the Orient and Occident your age comes to birth."

(Poems : *Kutub*. P. 47)

72. "From the Old Womb of the universe a red new sun is born :
How much longer, Oh dull skies, for stars extinguished will
 you mourn ?
When the human mind has made of all his claims a broken
 heap,
For how long must Man his banishment from paradise
 bewep ?"

(Poem : *Kutub* : P. 47)

73. "The spirit of Mazdak come again ! Not long,
And every mantle will be rent to shreds
And tatters by his fury."

(Satan's Parliament. Poems : *Murry*. 82)

74. S.A. Vahid : *Iqbal—His Art and Thought*. P. 225.

75. Rais Ahmed Jafari : *Iqbal Aur Milli Siasat*. P. 96.

76. "The Author of the capital from the race of Abraham,
That is—the prophet sans Gabriel
As truth is mixed with his untruth,
His heart is a believer and his brain a non-believer,
The Westerners have lost the heavens,
They see the sacred soul in the stomach,
The holy soul does not take colour and smell from the body—
Socialism has no business, but with the body.

(A. Beg : *The Poet of the East*. 224-225)

77. Shamloo. *Op. cit.* P. 135.

78. *Ibid* : P. 151.

79. Rais Ahmed Jafri : *Op. cit.* P. 96.

80. "Come, I will explain to you the secret of the verse :
Inn-l-Muluk.

Government is the art of sorcery, practised by the dominating
races."

(A. Beg : *The Poet of the East*. P. 190)

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81. "The hand that labour is paid wages
As if the rich peoples give away alms to the poor"
(*Ibid* : P. 191)
82. Dr. Javed Iqbal : *Constitutionalism in Asia*,
(Edited by R.N. Spann. P. 138)
83. W.C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India*. P. 127.
84. *Ibid*. P. 128.
85. *Ibid* : P. 128.
86. See Elie Kedourie : *Nationalism*. Pp. 25-26.
87. Theodore de Barry. *Op. cit.* 760.
88. "In my eyes this irreligious politics is—
The hand-maid of Satan, of low nature, with a dead heart."
(A. Beg. *Op. cit.* P. 374)
89. "The skirt of religion is being lost, where is unity ?
And if unity has left us, the nation is gone." (*Ibid* : P. 394)
90. "Be it the grandeur of sovereignty or democratic Tamasha,
If politics is separated from religion, it is nothing but
Changhasism. (*Ibid* : P. 409)
91. Theodore de Barry : *Op. cit.* P. 765.
92. A. Beg. *Op. cit.* P. 392.
93. Shamloo. *Op. cit.* P. 99.
94. *Ibid* : P. 189.
95. Mohammed Ali : *My Life—A Fragment* P. 128.
96. "We are not Afghans nor Turks nor Tartars,
Born of a Garden we belong to single bough,
Discrimination in colour or caste is forbidden to us.
For we are the blossoms of a single spring,"
(Quoted by S. Sen : *Birth of Pakistan*, P. 83)
97. S. Abid Hussain : *The Destiny of Indian Muslims*, P. 7.
98. Mohammed Sadiq : *History of Urdu Literature*. P. 371.
99. Compare Mohammed Sadiq : *Op. cit.* P. 372.
"Any one who has a rudimentary knowledge of
European statesmanship in India knows only too well that it
was not."
100. Shamloo : *Op. cit.* P. 187.
101. *Ibid* : P. 87.
102. Quoted by Mohammed Sadiq. *Op. cit.* 370.
103. Halida Edib : *Inside India*. P. 93.
104. Quoted by A Beg. *Op. cit.* P. 403.
105. Aziz Ahmed ; *Op. cit.* P. 70.
106. Mohammed Sadiq. *Op. cit.* P. 371.
107. Iqbal : *Op. cit.* Pp. 178-179.
108. Shamloo : *Op. cit.* P. 203.
109. Iqbal : *Op. cit.* P. 179.

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110. Expressions are borrowed from L. Binder : *Ideological Revolution in Middle East*. P. 132.
111. Iqbal : *Op. cit.* P. 144.
112. W.C. Smith : *Op. cit.* P. 133.
113. K.G. Saiyidain : *Educational Philosophy of Iqbal*, P. 113.
114. *Ibid* : P. 113.
115. *Mysteries of Selflessness* : P. 1.
116. *Ibid* : P. 1.
117. “And the society is organized
As by comprising many such as he. (Ibid. P. 1)
118. “When in the congregation he is lost
It is a drop, which seeking to expand,
Becomes an ocean. It is strong and rich
In ancient, a mirror to the past
As to the future, and the link between
What is to come, and what has gone before
So that its movements are as infinite as is Eternity.”
(Ibid : P. 1)
- See Also “The connection of an individual with society is a boon ;
Its reality attains perfection through society (*Millat*)
(A. Beg. *Op. cit.* P. 205)
119. *Mysteries of Selflessness* : P. 6.
120. “His singleness in multiplicity is firm and stable and itself
supplies
A unity to their innureate swarm.” (Ibid : P. 6)
121. “His nature is mad after ‘oneness’
His protection is due to his appearance in a society”
(A. Beg. *Op. cit.* P. 393).
122. Shamloo : *Op. cit.* Pp. 54-55.
123. “The individual,
Alone is heedless of high purposes ;
His strength is apt to dissipate itself ;
The people only make him intimate
With discipline, teach him to be as soft and tractable as is the
gentle breeze
Set him in earth like a well-rooted oak,
Close-fetter him, to make him truly free
When he is prisoner of the chain of law
His deer, by nature wild and uncontrolled.
Yields in captivity the precious Musk.”
(Mysteries of Selflessness : P. 6.)
124. Compare. T.H. Green :
- “Our common formula then is that God is identical with the
self of every man in the sense of being the realization of its

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determinate possibilities, the completion of that which. as merely in it, is incomplete and therefore unreal ; that in being conscious of himself man is conscious of God..."

Quoted by Melvin Richter : *Politics of Conscience*. P. 104.

125. Iqbal : *Op. cit.* P. 6.

126. *Ibid* : P. 7.

127. "So unto one goal drawing each on, he circumscribes the feet
Of all within the circle of one law,
Reschools them in God's wondrous unity,
And teaches them the habit and use,
Of all surrender to the Will Divine." (*Ibid* : P. 10)

128. "That what leads to unison in a hundred individuals,
Is but a secret from the secrets of Tawhid.
Religion, Wisdom, and Law are all its effects,
Power, strength, and supremacy originate from it
Its influence exalts the slave and virtually creates a new
species out of them
Within it fear and doubt depart, spirit of action revives,
And the eye sees the very secret of the Universe."
(Translated by S.A. Vahid)

129. "It is dull ignorance to put one's boast
In lineage ; that judgment rests upon
The body, and the body perishes.
Other are the foundations that support
Islam's community ; they lie concealed within our hearts."
(*Mysterles of Selflessness* P. 13)

130. *Ibid* : P. 14.

131. *Ibid* : P. 15.

132. *Ibid* : P. 15.

133. "The nature of Muslim through and through,
Is loving kindness ; within both hand and tongue
He strives to be a mercy in the world,
As he whose fingers split the moon in twain embraces in his
mercy all mankind." (*Ibid* : P. 47)

134. *Ibid* : P. 20.

135. *Ibid* : P. 21.

136. *Ibid* : P. 21.

137. *Ibid* : P. 22.

138. *Ibid* : P. 22.

139. *Ibid* : P. 23.

140. "The true Muslim is not contained in any land on earth ;
Syria and Rum are lost within his heart." (*Ibid* : P. 30)

141. "Flight is the law that rules the Muslim's life
and is a cause of his stability ;

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- . Its meaning is, to leap from shallowness,
To quit the dew, the ocean to subdue." (*Ibid* : P. 31).
142. *Ibid* : P. 32.
143. *Ibid* : P. 32.
144. *Ibid* : P. 32.
145. *Ibid* : P. 32.
146. *Ibid* : P. 33.
147. *Ibid* : P. 33.
148. *Ibid* : P. 33.
148. *Ibid* : P. 33.
149. *Ibid* : P. 33.
150. "The glory of Egypt and Greece and Rome has gone
Yet still the voice of Muezzin rings
Throughout the earth, still the community of world-Islam
maintains its ancient forms." (*Ibid* : P. 36)
151. *Ibid* : P. 37.
153. *Ibid* : P. 37.
154. *Ibid* : Pp. 40-41.
155. *Ibid* : P. 50.
156. "Life closeth to confine
Itself within the body's solitude ;
And life createth mighty companies." (*Ibid* : P. 50)
157. "Upon this earth
By congregation lives a people's soul.
And congregation is the mystery,
Of Mecca's power." (*Ibid*. P. 51)
158. *Ibid*. P. 51.
159. "Allahu Akabar ! *This secret holds*
Of thy existence ; wherefore let it be
Thy purpose to preserve and propagate
No other God. If thou a Muslim art,
Till all the world proclaims the Name of God
Thou canst rest one moment.
Knowest thou not
The verse in the Holy scripture, calling thee
To be a people just, God's witnesses ?" (*Ibid* : Pp. 54-55)
160. ".....In these days
It follows once again Old Azar's trade,
And man creates an ever novel god,
Whose joy is shedding blood, whose hallowed name
is colour, Fatherland, Block-Brotherhood.
Humanity is slaughtered like a sheep
Before this worthless idol". (*Ibid* : P. 55)
161. *Ibid* : P. 57.

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162. "Man is the deputy of God on earth
And O'er the elements his rule is fixed ;
On earth the narrowness receiveth breadth,
Thy toil takes on fair shape." (Ibid : P. 57-58)
163. *Ibid* : P. 61.
164. *Ibid* : P. 61.
165. "Preserve this history, and so abide
Unshaken ; vital with departed breaths ;
Fix in firm bond today with yesterday ;
Make life a bird accustomed to the hand." (Ibid : P. 60)
166. *Ibid* : P. 62.
167. *Quran* (LXX : 40-42).
168. *Quran* (V : 57).
169. Quoted by S.A. Vahid : *Op. cit.* P. 103.
170. *Ibid* : P. 169.
171. Compare T.H. Green.
"Man's consciousness of God has in manifold forms been the moralizing agent in human society, nay the formative principle of that society itself. The existence of specific duties and the recognition of them, the spirit of self-sacrifice, the moral law and reverence for it in its most abstract and absolute form all no doubt presuppose society ; but society of a kind to render them possible, is not the creature of appetite and fear, or of the most complicated and indirect result of these. It implies the action in man of principle of virtue of which he projects himself into the future...as some more perfect being than he actually is, and thus seeks not merely to satisfy the momentary wants but to become 'another man' to become more nearly as this more perfect being."
Quoted by M. Richter : *Op. cit.* P. 105.
172. Shamloo. *Op. cit.* P. 206.
173. Compare Nicolson,
"It is obvious that the Iqbalian conception of selfhood, if developed in isolation from society ends in unmitigated egoism, anarchy." (Preface, *Mysteries of Selflessness*, P. XI)
174. Watt : *Islam and Integration of Society*. P. 11.
175. D. De. Santillana : *The Legacy of Islam*, Edited by Arnold & Gallume, P. 292.
176. Compare T. H. Green.
"An unrealized ideal of a best which is his God, and giving divine authority to the customs or laws by which some likeness of his ideal is wrought into the authority of life."
(Quoted by Richter : *Op. cit.* P. 105.)
177. Compare Nicolson" Iqbal... escapes from libertarianism by limiting

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the individual. making him a member of a homogenous, community, and from totalitarianism by limiting the community's authority making it a challenge and not insurmountable obstacle to the individual's self realization."

(Preface, *Mysteries of Selflessness*. XI)

178. Shamloo : *Op. cit.* P. 55.
179. W. C. Smith : *Op. cit.* P. 134.
180. Theodore De Barry. *Op. cit.* P. 749.
181. See also Javid Iqbal in his preface to *Iqbal : Stray Reflections*. P. XXVII.
182. Shamloo : *Op. cit.* P. 37.
183. Compare "When I packed my belongings to depart from the earth
They all said : We know him well
But truly no one knew this traveller,
No one knew whence he came, what he said and to whom".
184. George Schuster and Guy Wint : *India and Democracy*. P. 182.
185. Mohammed Ali : *Op. cit.* P. 126.
186. K. Cragg. *Op. cit.* P. 59.
187. Nicolson : Preface to the *Secrets of the Self*. P. X.
188. Compare Khwaja Kamaluddin ; *India in Balance*. P. 70.
"Democracy in its present form has its birth and home in Islam."
189. S. Abid Hussain : *Op. cit.* P. 60.
190. S. Abid Hussain : *Hindustani Mussalman*. P. 100—101
191. *Ibid* : P. 101.
192. A. M. Salik : *Op. cit.* P. 123.
193. S. Abid Hussain : *The Destiny of the Indian Muslims*. Pp. 60-61.
194. Compare Elie Kedourie : *Nationalism* Pp. 74-75.
'A tribesman's relation to his tribe is usually regulated in minute detail by custom, which is followed unquestioningly and considered part of the natural or the divine order. Tribal custom is neither a decree of the General Will, nor an edict of legislative Reason. The tribesman is such by virtue of his birth, not by virtue of self-determination. He is usually unaware that the destiny of man is progressive, and that he can fulfil this destiny by merging into the will of the tribe. Nationalism and tribalism, then, are not inter-changeable terms, nor do they describe related phenomena.'
195. H. H. Bilgrami : *Op. cit.* P. 120.
196. Mohammed Sadiq. *Op. cit.* Pp. 368-369.
197. S. Sinha : *Iqbal*, P. 161.
198. Z. H. Farooqui : *Deoband School and the Demand of Pakistan*, P. 85.
199. S. Sinha : *Op. cit.* P. 455.
200. Z. H. Farooqui : *Op. cit.* P. 85.
201. S. Sinha : *Op. cit.* P. 57.

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202. H. A. R. Gibb : *Modern Trends in Islam*. P. 84.
203. See Aziz Ahmed : *Iqbal ki ek nai Tashkil* and Sardar Jafri ; *Taraqui Pasand Adab*.
204. Shorish Kashmiri ; *Chehre*. P. 37.
205. W. C. Smith : *Op. cit.* P. 112.
206. Iqbal Singh : *Op. cit.* P. 127.
207. *Ibid* : P. 129.
208. W. C. Smith : *Op. cit.* P. 114.
209. Iqbal Singh ; *Op. cit.* P. 233
210. Yusuf Hussain Khan : *Ruhe Iqbal*. P. 285.
211. W. C. Smith : *Islam in Modern History*. P. 69.
212. W. C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India*. P. 156.
213. *Ibid* : 156.
214. *Ibid* : P. 157.
215. Compare Dr. Khwaja Abdul Hamid Irfani : *Iqbal Iraniun ki Nazar men*. P. 125.
"Formation of Pakistan as a state is a living Miracle of the Sufistic Vision of Iqbal."

A Study in Synthetic Nationalism

MAULANA ABUL KALAM AZAD

(1889—1958)

MAULANA AZAD was a typical and outstanding Muslim intellectual of modern India. The range of his mind was encyclopaedic and he was not only the embodiment of the comprehensive genius of the present age but also a unique synthesis of the East and West. By training religious and by conviction rational and modern, he tried to reconcile religion with reason without injuring either. He is close both to Gandhi and Nehru alike. Here is seen the confluence of tradition and the forces of change. In his life and action he served as a bridge between the new and old worlds of thought. An examination of his thinking is incomplete without a reference to the revivalist movement of the 19th Century, which played a decisive part in shaping his personality. "Distinction", he elaborated in his own characteristic way, "is no doubt, usually made between the old and the new learning. But, in my search for truth, this distinction has never counted with me. The old I have received as my heritage, and the new is as familiar to me as the old, and I have delved in both...

I have been in life a libertine and a man of piety too

One by one, I can recognize—alike the pious and the
libertine."¹

In the shaping of Azad's mind the influence of his ancestors cannot be ignored, He had a great admiration for certain fundamental values which he derived from his ancestors. What was dearer than anything else was truth. "Three great families"

Azad wrote, "combine in my ancestry whose members were famed in India and Arabia for their scholarship and learning ; but none of them ever cared or wished for worldly wealth."² He mentioned Maulana Jamaluddin with pride as one who refused to sign the "Infallibility decree" of Akbar.³ His son, Shaikh Mohammed, did not hesitate to go against Jehangir and support Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi.⁴ Qazi Sirajuddin, the grandfather of Maulana Azad, was the champion of Islam and was killed in a war between the Sikhs and Muslims.⁵ His grandfather, Maulana Munnuwaruddin, was a great critic of the absurdities of the un-Islamic practices prevailing among the Muslims of his times.⁶ He became very critical of Bahadur Shah's Shiaism.⁷ He also strongly condemned Maulana Ismail Shaheed's exposition of Islam. The differences were about the finality of Prophethood, necessity of innovation (*Bida*), unity of God (*Shrik*) etc.⁸ Like his father, Maulana Khairuddin was also an orthodox anti-Wahabi. His intense denunciation of Wahabism was responsible for his strained relations between the Indian Wahabis and the Sheriff of Mecca and also of Constantinople.⁹ In consequence many prominent Indian Wahabis had to leave Mecca. To him, Wahabism was synonymous with Paganism (*Kufr*). Maulana Azad inherited from his ancestors a legacy of orthodoxy and rigid adherence to the letter of the scriptures. Right from Maulana Jamaluddin to Maulana Khairuddin one observes a vigorous current of religious reaction. They betrayed lack of political insight and wisdom and failed to grasp the political implications of orthodoxy. While Azad did not fully share their orthodoxy nor supported their reactionary political role, he appreciated their erudition and their courage in defying political authority. They could utter truth in a down right manner before the kings with a courageous disregard of consequences.

The early education imparted to Maulana Azad under the rigid guidance of his father was of the traditional type.¹⁰ Being a genius, Azad mastered all the subjects taught to him within a few years. His logical bent of mind, infinite vastness of knowledge, and command over expression, led him to discussions with notable theologians like Abdul Haq Haqqani and Maulana Abdulla Taunki.

But Azad did not regard the merits of ancestry as the sole token of honour.¹¹ He was not a blind follower of his father. His restless mind was not satisfied with the orthodox religious approach. He was gifted with the faculty of original thinking and independent judgement. He expressed openly his repugnance to imitation (*Taqlid*) even if it be the imitation of his father.¹² He was inspired by the rationalism of the Mutazzilites. Azad, unlike his father, did not consider the Mutazzilite cult as atheistic.

The result of Azad's inclination towards rationalism was his acceptance of Sir Syed's religious approach. He had great regard for Sir Syed's efforts which aimed at an intellectual revolution in the Muslim mind. Under the influence of Sir Syed, he realized that a person has no claims to be called "educated in the modern world unless he studied modern science, philosophy and literature."¹³ He also displayed distrust in the anachronistic institution of the Ulema.¹⁴ Education in English, according to him, produced "a great mental crisis"¹⁵ and knowledge of modern sciences revolutionized faith. Many old concepts and values became outmoded and unnecessary. He thought that every old value need not be useful and relevant to the modern age. Modern science and technology have rocked the foundations of religion. Azad, therefore, considered Sir Syed as a great Mujjadid.¹¹ Sir Syed's conception of Islam transcended the narrow consideration of the Sunni and Shia cults.¹⁷ Azad endeavoured to follow and employ Sir Syed's rational technique. This phase, however, lasted for a very short period. In the meantime he came into contact with the writings of Rashid Raza of Egypt. Thereafter he began to deviate from Sir Syed. He found that the application of rationalism results firstly in scepticism and then leads to the negation of religion. Azad could not reconcile himself to such possibilities. He began to think that Sir Syed's approach to religion was faulty and unconvincing.¹⁸ It was inadequate and illogical. He believed that Sir Syed had no answer to questions like existence of God, attributes of God, eternity of soul, inspiration of Prophethood etc.¹⁹ These theological deviations became the basis of differences in political approach as well. He held that the political lead given to the Muslims by

Sir Syed was misdirected and "a blunder."²⁰ The Aligarh movement was confined to the problems of the Muslims of India. Azad believed that no local or national movement could be beneficial to the Muslims. What was needed was an universal movement in the Islamic world.²¹ Azad held that the 'higher education' of Muslims which was the object of the Aligarh movement was of no use. The Muslims wasted 40 years for the achievement of this object.²² But it will be unfair to Azad to infer that he rejected the views of Sir Syed in toto. Rejection of some elements of Sir Syed's thought did not connote a recession to orthodoxy either. The influence of Sir Syed's approach on Azad was abiding. Under Sir Syed's influence he strongly felt that there is no conflict between the Quran and Science. He believed that the theory of evolution expounded by Darwin and others is not new to the Quran. There are many expressions analogous to "the survival of the fittest" and "natural selection" in the Quran.²³ Moreover, Azad never denied that what is of lasting value in Sir Syed's thought was an attempt to do away with imitation (*Taqleed*) and vigorous support to *Ijtehad*.²⁴ Azad's religious and political philosophy was guided by these principles and he emphasized that this legacy of Sir Syed should never be lost sight of.

Maulana Azad had some basic differences over the political programme of the Aligarh movement. Although Shibli, for certain personal and other reasons, was convinced that the political programme of the Aligarh movement was not without serious snags and shortcomings, he did not carry his criticism to its logical end. In this context, his support to the policy of the Congress Party assumes paramount significance. This certainly illustrates his deviation from the Aligarh movement. Moreover Shibli did not hold the western educated elite in high esteem. He felt that they were neither well-versed in western learning nor in Islam. But Shibli was on the horns of a dilemma and could not decide whether or not the entire system of education should be discarded as formulated and developed by Sir Syed. Azad had met Shibli for the first time in 1905, when he (Azad) was getting disillusioned with the rational features of Sir Syed's theology. Being the editor of *Al-Nadva* he had an opportunity

to work with Shibli. The futility of Sir Syed's political programme and the distrust in the western educated class which formed the characteristic features of Shibli's thought tremendously influenced Azad. His journal *Al-Hilal* became a medium of dialogue with the masses and attained no mean success in popularising the ideas of Shibli. He wrote that the educated people are just imitators of the west, distorting the image of oriental culture, civilization, ethics, literature and learning, as well as religion.²⁵ He also wrote that the western system had not contributed anything to learning, culture and civilization and that it had even failed to develop among the Muslims the true spirit of English Life.²⁶ He was thus led inevitably to a reactionary and medieval concept of religion. During this period Maulana Azad was opposed even to the idea of equal rights for women and the discarding the age old practice of Purdah or the veil.

Azad was also influenced and inspired by the teachings of Jamaluddin Afghani. An anti-imperialist by conviction, Jamaluddin Afghani could not reconcile himself with the pro-British attitude of Sir Syed. Besides, Sir Syed was concerned only with the problems of the Muslims in India, while Jamaluddin was free from such a narrow outlook. Shibli was also inclined towards the ideal of Pan-Islamism under the influence of Jamaluddin Afghani. Maulana Azad who was also under the impact of Pan-Islamism would not extend his support to the 'local' Aligarh movement.²⁸ and was opposed to territorial nationalism. He too propounded the concept of Pan-Islamism. Azad also borrowed from Mohammed Abduh the method of the study of religion and its presentation in the modern age. Mohammed Abduh's approach to the essence of providence,²⁹ the relationship of reason with religion³⁰ and Prophethood³¹ is more or less the same as of Azad. Curiously enough Azad who admired Mohammed Abduh and Rashid Raza was unsparingly critical of the modernists in India. His view was that they were lacking in Islamic learning, grasp over Fiqh and command over expression.³²

Maulana Azad outlined his own programme of Islamic politics through his journal *Al-Hilal*. It should be noted that *Al-Hilal's* political mission revealed clearly the influence of

Jamaluddin Afghani and Shibli. Azad's anti-British attitude was a later development. Before 1905 he was not hostile to the British Raj in the country. In 1932 he admitted that in the entire history of the country there had been no government which developed so much regard and respect for the liberation of the people, irrespective of their caste, creed and community³³ He also expressed his gratitude to the British Emperor³⁴ for maintaining the independent existence of Islam and to the West for preserving Islamic Arabic literature.³⁵ In *Al-Hilal* one finds a metamorphosis of the earlier ideas of Azad under the impact of Pan-Islamism and Shibli's Anti-Aligarh attitude. His earlier political attitude was in accordance with sanctions of conventional religion, which Azad regarded as unfailing guide for all action and as the final and eternal word of God.³⁶ Islam presents the sovereign remedy to all evils. According to Azad the nature of the prevailing situation and crisis was not very different from that of the 6th Century A. D. in which Islam originated. Even in the modern context Islam alone could provide salvation to the world.³⁷ What was required was true adherence to Islam which provides most comprehensive and perfect law to mankind.³⁸ This view of Islam represents the 'romantic' ideals of the Indian Muslims. It verily forms the basis of the idealistic and Pan-Islamic trends of Muslim politics. In Islam, according to Azad, religion and politics are the obverse and reverse of the same coin.

Azad's earlier life, political thought and programmes are characterised by this 'romanticism'. The chief aim was the realization of Shariat and the integration of the Millat.³⁹ Azad made a minute analysis of the stagnant conditions of the Muslims in the prevailing society and the crisis which it was facing and stimulated them for fresh action. He criticised the role of both Congress and the League. According to him the partition of Bengal and its rendition had no religious significance.⁴⁰ He complained that even the Muslims failed to grasp the fact of Islam which makes no distinction between the political and religious life of the individual.⁴¹ He enjoined a study of the Quran as a qualification for anyone who would undertake the political, social and cultural reconstruction of the life of his countrymen.⁴² The substance of the political programme outlined

in Al-Hilal during this "romantic" period was the sovereignty of God, establishment of the Divine Kingdom, maintenance of peace, order and good government and the supremacy of truth.⁴³

Azad surveyed Indian politics in terms of religion. He accepted the conventional division of mankind made by Islam into believers and non-believers and described them as people of paradise and people of hell. The former are the "friends of God" and the latter the "friends of devil."⁴⁴ The "friends of God" are always ready to die for truth. They are not afraid of anything in this world or the next.⁴⁵ The Quran has promised that they will be rewarded and commands the friends of God to resort to force for exterminating the non-believers. Thus Azad concluded that the politics of India needed a drastic overhauling. The prescription suggested by him was that the friends of God should organize themselves into one party, the party of God. Their success is certain as it is ordained by God.⁴⁶ Believing that Islam ensures complete equality, liberty, tolerance, freedom of conscience and expression, fraternity, brotherhood, Azad made an attempt in 1914 to organize all the Ulema to take up the cause of Islam. Most of them considered it as a disruptive and mischievous attempt. Azad stigmatized it as an example of schiism (*Nifaq*).⁴⁷

Azad attempted to develop a systematic Islamic theory of politics along the lines of his romanticism. He was perhaps the only Muslim intellectual who sincerely applied his theory to the existing problems. With its help Azad tried to understand the complexities of political life in India. When Azad found that the social and political life of the Muslims appeared to be divorced from Islam, he tried to establish an Islamic party for a radical and comprehensive reorientation on the intellectual plane. He sincerely felt that this would be the only remedy for the serious deficiencies of Muslim society. Till the end of the First World War Azad cherished and pursued this aim. But after the War he came to realize that the romantic approach to politics would not achieve the desired ends. This realization was destined to have a profound impact on his political outlook. The factors which revolutionised his outlook were varied. The currents and cross-currents inside and outside the country obliged him to

change this approach. It turned him into an uncompromising anti-imperialist. Consequently he advocated unity in the ranks of his countrymen to reach the threshold of independence. He came to realise that nationalism is not inconsistent with the spirit of Islam and that Pan-Islamism was nothing short of a misnomer. This drastic change in his outlook resulted from his objective study of the developments in the Islamic countries. Before the First World War, Azad had visited Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Turkey. He was struck by the progress made by these countries in social, economic and political spheres.⁴⁸

Moreover the leaders in the Islamic countries had reconciled territorial nationalism with Islam. But there the Muslims were the predominant majority. In India the situation was different and called for a realistic and non-romantic approach. Only such an approach could destroy the vestiges of imperialism. Azad believed that in India there were safeguards for the survival of Muslim culture, and that there could be no harm in Muslims joining the Indian National Congress. That would not amount to an un-Islamic act. This conclusion marked the end of Azad's Utopian and sentimental romanticism and formed the preamble for the union of diverse intellectual and religious forces in the country for a combined fight for national freedom.

Within the country the British Government displayed scant regard for the liberties of the people. Azad was convinced that an imperialist government was invariably anti-democratic. The rendition of Bengal, Kanpur Mosque incident, the Jalianwala Bagh tragedy on the one hand, and the anti-Muslim foreign policy of the British Government on the other, constrained Azad to join the Indian National Congress which stood for the establishment of justice, liberty and equality for one and all in the country. In the circumstances, the Congress was the only organization with which the Muslims could join hands. Mohammed Sarwar says that in the Indian National Congress, Azad had to work with leaders who were in no way inferior to him.⁴⁹ And this was a blow to the egotism of the self-centred Azad. Besides, the end of the Khilafat movement was practically the end of the romantic phase of Muslim leadership. It revealed to Azad the futility of spiritualized politics and of Pan-

Islamism as an instrument for the liberation of India. The abolition of the institution of Khilafat shocked Mohammed Ali and drove him, like Iqbal, to Muslim Nationalism, but brought Azad closer to Indian nationalism. The Indian nationalism, as Azad conceived it, was neither Hindu nor Islamic. It was secular and a synthesis of Hindu and Muslim cultures. This made him an advocate of Islam in the liberal and progressive sense. Here is a prominent point of divergence between Azad and Iqbal and also Mohammed Ali. The earlier political ideas of Azad were the logical outcome of his traditional religious philosophy. But the secular approach of his later life made his religious views liberal and flexible. He no longer remained hostile to the west and the civilization of the occident. Although he was profoundly conscious of the oriental contribution to the development of human thought he acknowledged fully the energy and practical direction of the occidental character. Unlike the approach of Sir Syed, Azad's was a creative approach because Azad sought to achieve a creative unity and synthesis of the East and West. He stated, "just as it was not proper for you to lose yourself in the slavish love of western civilization or literature to the extent that you might forget the grand and proud civilization of your own country, similarly it would be wrong to put yourself in a cage so that no ray of light of western learning and civilization may enter it. Do not forget that you can seal all your worldly possessions within national or geographical limits. But no seal can be put on learning and civilization."⁵⁰ Azad believed that there could not be a healthy social, political and religious philosophy unless realities were faced boldly and appraised with an open mind. Narrow-mindedness in the domain of religion appears "in the form of blind faith and wants to deceive...in the name of orthodoxy."⁵¹ Azad did not consider that Western education would destroy the spirit of Indian culture and civilization. He held that "It heralded a new world of science and modern technology. It inculcated a progressive spirit and brought India near educational standards obtaining elsewhere. It has led to reawakening of the national spirit and the growth of a modern and progressive outlook in all affairs of the world."⁵² He denied emphatically that there was any necessary opposition

between faith and reason, between religion and the spirit of western civilization. "The path of religion," Azad said, "is not in fact opposed to that of reason and knowledge but unfortunately this has often been represented to be so. The usual cry was that Western education was opposed to the teachings of religion..."⁵³

Azad's monumental work *Tarjumanul Quran*,⁵⁴ presents the best exposition of Azad's religious thought. He was intent on discovering the unity of all the religions rather than maintaining that Islam was the one true faith. He employed this approach for the study of the realities of the present day.⁵⁵

There are three major elements in Azad's philosophy of religion. The first is the unity of God. Azad's concept of God lays emphasis on the "inherent universal urges of human nature."⁵⁶ The quest for God is one's own personal quest. If a man is introspective he will notice that "his life, every moment of his existence, discloses a world of activity propelled by the Rububiyat of God."⁵⁷ In the context of this fundamental agreement, other differences, according to him, were of no consequence. Shariat or "the path" of rules of conduct do vary from religion to religion. Azad says that "they differ not in the roots but in leaves and branches, not in the spirit but in the outward form or body."⁵⁸ This difference is inevitable because intellectual and social aptitudes have varied from time to time and from country to country, necessitating variations in Shariat and Minhaj.⁵⁹ The universal message, Quran says, has been communicated to all mankind.⁶⁰ This message is the "law of goodness of life... It is the law of belief and righteous living, of belief in one supreme Lord of the Universe, and righteous living in accordance with that belief."⁶¹ Azad said that "there is really no difference between the teachings of the Quran and the teachings of Christ."⁶² The attitude towards purification of soul is common to all religions.⁶³ The God of the Muslims is no different from the Gods of other people.⁶⁴

The second element in Azad's philosophy is the emphasis on right action. It implies actions based upon the eternal truths laid down by all scriptures. This is also the teaching of the Quran.⁶⁵ While interpreting the Quran Azad stated that the

Quran sets before itself three distinct objectives : (I) It made faith and action the sole need of salvation, and not affiliation to any particular group ; (II) It emphasised the fact that religion revealed by God was but one for all mankind, and that therefore any deviation from this is not permissible ; (III) It also implied that monotheism⁶⁶ is the consummation of true religion. The aim of all religions has been to establish a good society. The Quran enjoins upon Muslims the duty of *Amar Bin Marouf Wonahi Anil Munkir* (To establish justice). It is the middle path of moderation.⁶⁷

The third element in Azad's thought is life after death. Death is not the end of life. It opens out a new life where one has to account for one's past action which would, in turn, determine the character of future existence.⁶⁸ Azad rejected the dualism and divorce between the spiritual and physical life. Spiritual life is not only connected with physical life but is inseparable from it.⁶⁹ The idea of life after death is always an impulse and incentive for righteous living in this world. "The essence of religion," Azad asserted, "is godliness and right conduct ; it is not against worldliness. It will create a perfect life and harmony between worldliness and other-worldliness."⁷⁰

Azad arrived at the concept of the unity of man from his principle of the unity of God. All people belong to one family. It is the family of God. Azad reached the idea of the unity of man on the strength of man's religious consciousness. The aim of all religions, according to Azad, has been to prepare men for the conquest of sin and eliminate hatred against the sinner.⁷¹ Azad also gave a new shade of meaning to the traditional Islamic division of mankind into *Momin* and *Kafir* (believer and non-believer). The Quran condemns non-believers as "transgressors" (Q : 5 ; 86 : 21), "wicked" (Q ; 10 :17) "disbelievers" (Q : 23 : 113) and "mischiefmongers" (Q : 108 : 81), and says that they shall never prosper. Azad held that the principle underlined here does not suggest that the door of guidance or correction is closed or that those falling under these categories will be damned for ever. It is a matter of regret that the commentators on the Quran have failed to emphasize the redeeming grace which is a significant aspect of the teaching of the Prophet.⁷² According to

Azad, the scope of divine forgiveness is vast and limitless. In the scheme of providence human unity and understanding will ultimately be realized in spite of the present differences and divisions among mankind. The ideal of unity will be realized if every person sincerely followed the essential spirit of his own religion, and the path of righteous action. Thus from the second element of his religious philosophy—righteous action and conduct—Azad developed a further element of his doctrine, the necessity and importance of tolerance. This is essential in social, religious and political life. Azad posed a question which he himself answered : “Does the Quran express itself strongly against those who differ in views, or against those who resort to violence against its message ? Even a cursory glance of the Quran will make it clear that the remonstrance of the Quran is for those who had wilfully persecuted the followers of the Quran, and displayed violent hostility towards them. To show mercy to such would be disservice to the cause of humanity. It would be a mercy subserving the interests of wickedness or cruelty and injustice,”⁷³ The Quran enjoins resort to violence only in self-defence and in extreme circumstances when there is no other alternative. Azad, while elaborating his concept of tolerance, said that the law of truth does not assert that everything that appears contrary to it should be extinguished forthwith but should be allowed time to mend itself.⁷⁴ Every action in life “takes its own time to produce its result.”⁷⁵ The principle of toleration is the core of his religious philosophy. Tolerance is a condition precedent for the realization of the unity of all religions. “But even as your way is excellent in your own eye, even so in other people’s eyes their way is excellent. Toleration therefore is the only way.”⁷⁶

Azad’s philosophy of religion was rational. He regarded the reasoning faculty in man as the noblest of his faculties.⁷⁷ Reason is the driving force which leads to “an endless vista of progress.”⁷⁸ As K. G. Saiyidain says, Azad is a rationalist but that his rationalism does not, clash with his belief in religion but draws strength and inspiration from it.⁷⁹ Azad held that religion would never lose its importance in the scheme of human life, as it is essential for the development and satisfaction

of the human spirit.⁸⁰ Unlike philosophy and science religion supplies faith to man.⁸¹ This shows that this view of Islam was flexible, liberal, tolerant⁸² and "humanitarian."⁸³

There are two aspects of Azad's concept of nationalism. One is his attitude towards the British Raj and the other his attitude towards his countrymen. Owing to the influence of Sir Syed, Azad was initially not anti-British, but a supporter of the British government. Even upto 1905 there was no change in his stand. He advocated to his fellow Muslims the need for aloofness from active politics and the steady pursuit of a peaceful way of life.⁸⁴ The second phase of his career began with disillusionment with the British regime leading to anti-imperialism. He realized that the Britishers were out to suppress all the movements for liberation in the Muslim countries, and that their policy would be no different in India. Azad evolved his own strategy to destroy the fabric of imperialism. The Muslim should be organized as one body with the Quran as their guide to conduct. They should become true or ideal Muslims and should form a party of God with the battle cry of Jihad. Such a party would be able to liberate the Muslims from the tyranny of British imperialism. But should the Muslims make common cause with the Hindus, who are aspiring for the liberation of the country? Azad's view was that they should not join any non-Muslim organization, whatever its objects may be. They should follow Quran alone and should neither yield to the British nor to the Hindus; to follow the Hindu would be "disgraceful."⁸⁵ Such were the ideas of Azad when he was yet to reckon with the new social forces which had emerged within the Indian society.⁸⁶ Azad was still under the spell of the force of Pan-Islamism and was not prepared to identify himself with the Indian conditions or to recognize the territorial basis and claims of nationalism.

The third phase in the evolution of Azad's thought was the acceptance of Indian nationalism as a reality. This was due to the recognition of the unalterable facts of Indian politics, the rise and growth of Indian nationalism and nationalism in the Middle East. In India a reassessment of the Muslim problem was imperative. To many of the Muslim intellectuals the

situation was challenging and provoked different types of response—Pan-Islamism of Maulana Mohammed Ali, Islamic nationalism of Iqbal, and the two nation theory of the Muslim League. But Azad's approach to religion gave a distinctive shape to his political ideas. The principle of tolerance and brotherhood, and a long history of the growth of composite culture had forged unity between Hindus and Muslims against the alien rule. He saw the unity that asserted itself against the rich background of diversity in the country. It was at this stage, that Azad came into contact with Gandhi.

The growth and development of Indian nationalism was not always coherent or consistent.⁸⁷ The moderates and the extremists formed the main rival forces upto the advent of Gandhi in Indian politics. The confluence of religion and politics under the extremists succeeded in broadening the base of the nationalist movement and giving it a mass appeal. Religion and nationalism became almost convertible terms in the speeches and writings of Sri Aurobindo and Tilak. Azad, being orthodox, should have joined the extremists. But he refrained from doing so. He was aware of the failure of Maulana Mohammed Ali's mission. Gandhiji was one half a liberal and the other half an extremist. C.R.Das, Motilal Nehru etc., represented progressive and liberal nationalism. Azad was alive to the hard reality that militant nationalism would lead to religious obscurantism and mysticism in politics and weaken the secular character of the political movement.⁸⁸ Azad had come out of the shell of religiosity by abandoning his romanticism. He could clearly comprehend that politics and religion had combined to turn the radical wing. Indian nationalism as envisaged by Azad was however, democratic and secular. In this respect there is a similarity between the attitudes of Azad and C. R. Das. Indian nationalism, according to C.R. Das, was a "process through which a nation expresses itself and finds itself ; not in isolation from other nations, not in opposition to other nations, but as a part of a great scheme by which in seeking its own way, expression and therefore its own identity, it materially assists the self-expression and self-realization of other nations as well : diversity is as real as unity."⁸⁹ Azad

also believed that nationalism is the goal and the struggle for independence, the only course for a subject country. Its end is independence or self government, and an equal and respectable position in the society of nations. The spirit of Indian nationalism was not created, as Craddock thought, by the development of transport and communications,⁹⁰ but by imperialist exploitation⁹¹ and the suffering of the Indian people. It is not parochial and inward looking.⁹² C. R. Das and Gandhiji had clearly enunciated the broad and healthy character of Indian nationalism.⁹³ Azad never had any misgivings about the veracity and efficacy of his view of nationalism. He forcefully advocated that such nationalism would not kill the spirit of Islamic brotherhood but would rather enrich and strengthen it. Khuda Baksh and other liberals had already arrived at the same conclusion. To Khuda Baksh "this nationalism of today does not supersede—much less annihilate—that spiritual brotherhood of Islam which includes the entire Islamic fraternity in its large and inlarging embrace. It does not weaken Islam. It strengthens it within its own geographical limits. Each nation may work out its own destiny. But it will never forget that beyond the national limit there is a brotherhood of Islam."⁹⁴

Azad believed that nationalism was capable of being a progressive force if it was liberated from religious orthodoxy and narrow-mindedness. Azad held that narrow-mindedness is a "disease."⁹⁵ in politics under the guise of nationalism. Nationalism was for the liberation of subject peoples against autocratic regimes ; but it was necessary, he believed, to guard against nationalism becoming a hindrance to world unity and peace. The future of mankind would be dark indeed, if the force of nationalism was not subdued to the larger interests of mankind.⁹⁶

Azad's faith in nationalism, as Gandhi described it, was "as robust as his faith in Islam."⁹⁷ Azad's interpretation of Islam made a compromise with nationalism. He was as devoted to his religion as he was to the ideal of the liberation and independence of his Country. Azad made it clear that the Prophet of Islam proclaimed the truth of human brotherhood as soon as he delivered the message of monotheism and announced

his Prophethood. The Prophet used to pray "O God, I bear witness that all people are brothers to one another. Differences they might have created amongst themselves, but you have united them together with a single bond of humanity."⁹⁸ Thus Islam fosters nationalism avoiding communal and racial prejudices.⁹⁹

Every Indian Muslim according to Azad, is a member of the Indian nation and could not by virtue of the common bond of religion, separate himself from the larger Indian society and claim the status of independent nationhood. Religious to the core as he was, Azad would not countenance nationalism based on religion, especially in the Indian context of multiplicity, as it would be a force for division, rather than unity in the wider sense.¹⁰⁰ Even Gibb reflects that strict adherence to the teaching of Islam would lead to conflict with the secular character of the state.¹⁰¹ But Azad felt that the Muslim minority cannot, and should not, brand Indian nationalism, as un-Islamic for it embodies the broad vision of Islam. Nationalism in India was impossible of realization without Hindu-Muslim unity. Azad stressed unity so much that he considered it dearer than the freedom of the country itself.¹⁰² Azad did not deny differences—so called religious and other differences—between the Hindus and the Muslims. As Nehru had observed "Lesser men have sometimes found conflict in the rich variety of Indian life. He (Azad) has been big enough not only to see the essential unity behind all that diversity, but also to realize that only in this unity can be hope for India as a whole and for those great and varied currents of national life which course through her veins."¹⁰³ Therefore outer and external form of religion was not of any substantial value for Azad. Every thing has to be subordinated to the interest of communal harmony.¹⁰⁴ Azad laid great emphasis on Hindu-Muslim unity, which he regarded as a legacy of our long history. After the loss of political power the Muslims have betrayed lack of strength and confidence while the Hindus have lost their largeness of mind and heart.¹⁰⁵ This has been a great impediment to the achievement of Hindu-Muslim unity.

Azad, like C. R. Das, never adopted the communal approach for the solution of political and economic problems. He

observed that "in a future constitution determined by Indian's representatives, the Hindus and Muslims will have to think of the position and interest not as a Hindu or Mussalman, but as a peasant or a Zamindar, as a labourer or a capitalist, and so on...it will be nothing worth unless it reflects equality of opportunity and economic freedom for all."¹⁰⁶ He, therefore, wanted that a concerted effort should be made in this direction. C. R. Das' Pact of Bengal, for which Azad had great admiration is an example in point.¹⁰⁷ He was always optimistic and felt that the differences between the Hindus and the Muslims would never become so grave as to lead to mutual warfare and bloodshed. They are to be resolved in a spirit of compromise and toleration. In India "every kind of faith, every kind of culture, every mode of living was allowed to flourish and find its own salvation."¹⁰⁸ The question of Indian first or Muslim first was irrelevant for him. "I am proud of being an Indian. I am part of the indivisible unity that is Indian nationality. I am indispensable to this noble edifice and without me this splendid structure of India is incomplete," he observed in 1940.¹⁰⁹ Azad believed that the interplay of the Muslim and Hindu cultures has given birth to what can be described as a composite and common culture. "Eleven hundred years of common history," said Azad, "have enriched India with our common achievements. Our languages, our poetry, our literature, our culture, our art, our dress, manners and customs, the innumerable happenings of our daily life, everything bears the stamp of our joint endeavour. There is indeed no aspect of our life which had escaped this stamp...this joint wealth is the heritage of our common nationality and we do not want to leave it and go back to the time when this joint life had not begun. If there are any Hindus amongst us who desire to bring back the Hindu life of a thousand years ago and more, they dream and such dreams are vain fantasies. So also if there are any Muslims who wish to revive their past civilization and culture which they brought a thousand years ago from Iran and Central Asia, they dream also and the sooner they wake up the better. These are unnatural fancies which cannot take root in the soil of reality. I am one of those who believe that revival may be necessary in

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a religion but in social matters it is the denial of progress.¹¹⁰ This very lucidly underlines Azad's broad view of nationalism—and his firm faith in it. In the fourth decade of this century these views were vehemently criticised by those who had no faith in composite culture. Azad was not very particularly occupied with problems like representation or recruitment to public services, though he was deeply concerned with the welfare of the Muslim community. He shared with C.R. Das the view that the problem is necessarily of an economic character. He thought that unless the Muslims "were given the necessary assurances for their economic future, they could not be expected to join the Congress whole-heartedly."¹¹¹ Azad said about C.R. Das, "I am convinced that if he had not died a premature death, he would have created a new atmosphere in the country."¹¹² When the followers of C. R. Das repudiated the assurances, Azad said, "the result was that the Muslims of Bengal moved away from the Congress and the first seeds of partition were sown."¹¹³ He, therefore, asserted that both the communities should have a common objective—freedom of the country. The Muslims should join the Congress because the Prophet did the same thing when he had to overcome Abu Sufian."¹¹⁴

Azad was opposed to the partition of the country not only on political and cultural but also on religious grounds. He held that the scheme of Pakistan is "harmful not only for India as a whole, but also for Muslims in particular, and in fact it creates more problems than it solves."¹¹⁵ It was, as he felt, against the spirit of Islam for it stresses on division more than on unity and synthesis. The Prophet had said: "God has made one whole world a Mosque." Azad also argued that the Muslims are a minority of 90 million people, "who are in quality and quantity a sufficiently important element in Indian life to influence decisively all questions of administration and policy."¹¹⁶ This should also be emphasised that Azad's political ideas were in complete harmony with his philosophy of religion.

From the foregoing discussion it would be evident that Azad's programme of nationalism was composed of two parts : the overthrow of the British Raj and the achievement of the

unity of all the people. All the people of India must have the sense of oneness and belongingness to the country. The question of the means to be employed for the liberation of the country had been a subject of controversy and a major source of division between the liberals and the extremists since the closing decades of the 19th century. Azad would not agree with the liberals, (like Sir Syed among the Muslims) that the British connection with India was providential. Azad was also not very much interested like the liberals in the issue of social reforms. But like the liberals he emphasized the need to follow constitutional methods though he would not rule out extremism altogether. If constitutional methods were to prove ineffective and fail to bring about the desired end, the people might justifiably resort to violent resistance. Azad had also to work with Gandhi whose philosophy, like his own, was partly liberal and partly extremist. But he had differences with Gandhi because he believed that the means should be appropriate and effective, not necessarily non-violent. In this matter Azad was guided by the teachings of Islam.

Azad believed that Islam did not sanction war unless it became inevitable : "War and Islam are contradictory and are poles apart. Islam has a message of peace for mankind. Islam preaches Jihad not war as the means for the establishment of permanent peace. Jihad does not necessarily imply warfare but katharsis, quietness and patience."¹¹⁷ He also quotes many verses from the Quran which indicate that the essence of Jihad is patience, determination and sacrifice.¹¹⁸ The purpose of Jihad, when it implies warfare, is not the accumulation of wealth or territorial expansionism but to end injustice, war and tyranny.¹¹⁹ He knew too that consequences of war were not only cruel but disastrous. It has adverse effects on morality. In war the distinctions of ethics disappear and spying becomes an art. Kind-heartedness ceases to be a virtue and all other normal virtues lose their value and utility.¹²⁰ Azad, no doubt, supported the Khilafat movement. For him it was not an entirely religious issue. He said that it was a movement for the freedom of the country, which could inspire Muslims to fight against the alien rulers and unite them with their countrymen. It had awakened

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an awareness of India's problems,¹²¹ among the people of the country. Islam does not permit slavery. Faith in Islam and love of freedom are synonymous. Thus the Khilafat movement meant liberation of the country and the establishment of the system of Shariat.¹²² Moreover, support and participation in the Khilafat movement not only exposed the character of the British government but made Azad think of the propriety of methods employed by the liberals. He observed ; "I was of opinion that these methods—begging, petitioning, waiting in deputation and so on—could not be of much avail. We had to try to find some means of exerting direct pressure. But most people fought shy of this line of thinking."¹²³ Azad however could not suggest hostility towards the British, but drafted a plan of non-violent non-cooperation. It was characterized by conviction of unity, righteous action, patience, organization and the spirit of sacrifice for the cause of freedom.¹²⁴ This approach of Azad brought him very close to Gandhi's line of thinking. But although Gandhi was to become the sole exponent and practitioner of non-cooperation, the idea did not originate with him. Azad had already come to understand the usefulness of such a programme. Azad says that a similar programme was outlined by Tolstoy in 1901. "I had myself suggested a similar programme in some articles in *Al-Hilal*"¹²⁵ said Azad. Hiren Mukerji also holds that Azad's role in the formulation of that policy was decisive : "Four Months before the Congress did so, the All India Khilafat Committee in 1920 adopted Gandhiji's non-cooperation programme in the formulation of which Maulana Azad was perhaps no less responsible than Gandhiji himself."¹²⁶ Azad, unlike Gandhi regarded non-violence as a policy and not as a creed. He maintained that war is permissible to maintain freedom of religion and conscience.¹²⁷ If tyranny can be eradicated by war, then war is justified.¹²⁸ Azad admitted : "For me, non-violence was a matter of policy, not of creed. My view was that Indian's had the right to take the sword if they had no other alternative."¹²⁹ Though Azad adopted non-violence as a matter of policy only, he gave his sincere and unstinted support to Gandhi and became his close and trusted associate and a prominent leader of the Indian National Congress. "Congress must place

greater emphasis on the freedom of India than on non-violence as a creed," Azad asserted.¹³⁰ On the question of support to the British Government during the 2nd World War, Azad wrote, "the issue was one of pacifism and not of India's freedom. I declared openly that Indian National Congress was not a pacifist organization but one for achieving India's freedom. To my mind the issue raised by Gandhiji was irrelevant."¹³¹ Gandhi was of the opinion that War should not be supported "even if such participation meant the achievement of Indian freedom."¹³² Gandhiji was a convinced pacifist and the logic of facts would hardly persuade him to modify his position. He was opposed to the Cripps proposals more on account of his aversion to war than his objection to the proposals as such.¹³³ Azad's mind was not certainly governed by such a consideration. On many questions, like settlement with the government on the issue of boy-cotting the Prince of Wales at Calcutta, holding of the Round Table Conference, calling off the non-cooperation movement, and support to the Japanese vis-a-vis the British, during 2nd World War, Azad openly expressed disagreement with Gandhiji. When the non-cooperation movement was called off, both C. R. Das and Azad felt the need of an alternative programme.¹³⁴ That such an alternative programme could not be formulated may be attributed to the premature death of C. R. Das. Had such a programme been formulated, it is conceivable that Azad might have supported it whole heartedly and challenged Gandhi's leadership. But because of C. R. Das's untimely death and also because of the subsequent emergence of an aggressive League leadership, Azad could leave neither Gandhi nor the Congress. One of the reasons for Azad's unbreakable association with the Indian National Congress was his aversion to communal politics. He never approved of the communalism either of the minority or the majority. Hence his loyalty was with the progressive sections of the Congress. His reaction to B. G. Kher's Chief Ministership is an example in point.¹³⁵ Azad was thus secular and progressive in his views and was essentially a liberal though he was not halting and incurably moderate like the liberals of the past combining in himself the core of the liberals' faith as well as a readiness for action,

Azad could discover enough common ground between himself and Gandhi.

Azad had been a consistent and unflinching democrat. During the "Al-Hilal" phase of his politics he advocated democracy. When he abandoned romanticism his faith in democracy was not shaken. But during these two periods he preached two distinct views on democracy. During the earlier phase, Azad did not regard democracy as a way of life. It was accorded a subordinate status in the Islamic scheme of life. It was a period when he considered Islam as the only true and perfect religion. He derived all his ideas from the Quran and Hadith. He regarded the Prophet of Islam as the personification of all values beneficial to mankind.¹³⁶ Azad insisted that the theory and practice of Islam were both against kingship and the authority of one person. Liberals like Ameer Ali and Khuda Baksh had already argued on the same lines. "Foreign to the Arabs was the idea of hereditary kingship, or of divine conseration, or of sacerdotal confirmation of the royal authority, such as prevailed among the theoretically minded Hebrews. Among the Arabs the prince owed his authority to a general election. "The only source of authority which they recognize,"¹³⁷ says Khuda Baksh. Azad too advanced the same thesis. But his stress was more on the theory of Islam rather than the practices of the Caliphs. Azad also held that unity and sovereignty of God and the establishment of the supremacy of a righteous order are the real elements of democracy. Unity of God is a vital principle of Democracy because Dualism of God is "insulting to human intelligence and a negation of Human dignity."¹³⁸ Azad believed that unity of God implied the sovereignty of Islam and that Islam aims at the abolition of the sovereignty of man. It is "*Shirk Fissafath*". Only God is supreme and is above everything.¹³⁹ "Islamic democracy" is subordinate to spiritual authority.¹⁴⁰ It does not admit of expediency but enjoins definite attachment to righteousness and ethical values.¹⁴¹

He held that democracy was a form of government based not on force but on the will of the people, characterised by tolerance, equality and liberty. Azad believed that liberty is essential for the development of the personality of the individual

in every society. Absence of liberty results in slavery which is contrary to the teachings of Islam. He was also aware of the dangers of unrestricted liberty but he believed that the cure for the mistakes of liberty is more liberty. Even the disadvantages of liberty can be removed by liberty itself.¹⁴² The "argument for creating a favourable atmosphere and certain preconditions for liberty is absurd,"¹⁴³ said Azad. Islam was essentially a liberalizing force. It freed men from the shackles of customs and the tyranny of earthly powers. It does "not recognize any aristocracy or Bureaucracy. It came to restore the lost freedom of humanity, the freedom which has been confiscated by kings, foreign governments, selfish religious leaders and powerful elements of society. The autocrats thought that might was right; but Islam proclaimed from its very birth that might was not right,"¹⁴⁴ Azad always held. "It is my belief" stated Azad, that liberty is the natural and God given right of man. No man or bureaucracy consisting of men has got the right to make the servants of God its own slaves. However attractive be the euphemism invented for subjugation and slavery, still slavery is slavery, and it is opposed to the will and the canons of God."¹⁴⁵

It should be emphasised that to Azad neither Islam nor liberty was an abstract concept. Both demand faith and action. He, therefore, supported the movement for the freedom of the country. That was why he championed the cause of the Khilafat, that is also the reason why he joined the Indian National Congress. He always advised his countrymen to strive for the freedom of the country and to give up scepticism and inaction.¹⁴⁶ He reminded fellow Muslims how their ancestors had fought for liberty.¹⁴⁷ The Khilafat movement had certainly a religious appeal. But Azad's view was that "the presence of the Islamic Caliph is not antagonistic to National freedom and democracy."¹⁴⁸ Thus Azad had no hesitation or reservation in supporting any movement against the Government. Even in 1912 he had said, "We believe that it is the will of God that the nations and countries should be free to govern themselves."¹⁴⁹

Azad pointed out that Islam recognizes the value of equality. Islam "swept off racial and national distinctions and showed the world at large that all human beings held an equal rank and all

the right to resist unjust rule is justifiable. Azad said that if righteous government can be established by waging war, war may be resorted to. This righteous government may be Islamic but will necessarily be a democratic government. "If today there was to be established in India an Islamic government ; but if the system of government was based upon personal monarchy or upon bureaucratic oligarchy, then, to protest against the existence of such a government would still be my primary duty as a Mussalman. I would still call the government oppressive and demand its replacement,"¹⁵⁷ said Azad. The denial of the rights of conscience is worse than the violence and brute power of the tyrant. It is then the duty of the subject to wage war and to destroy tyranny.¹⁵⁸ The Prophet also insisted on resistance to tyrannical rule by all means. When he extracted from any one the promise of righteousness, one of the clauses of such a bond used to be, "I will always proclaim the truth in whatever conditions and wherever I happen to be..."¹⁵⁹.

Unlike Gandhi, Azad held that "opposing of violence with violence is fully in harmony with the natural laws of God in those circumstances under which Islam permits the use of such violence."¹⁶⁰ He justified the action of Imam Hussain, because Islam in his opinion sanctions disobedience and resistance against a tyrant.¹⁶¹ Open rebellion is permitted against a government founded on untruth and injustice.

It should be noted that during the Al-Hilal phase Azad supported democracy. Even during the Khilafat movement he did not give it up completely. He was, however, more inclined towards the secular basis of democratic order. He welcomed the democratic movement in Iran and Turkey which aimed at replacing dictatorial regimes by constitutional governments.¹⁶² Azad now did not explain his concept of democracy in terms of sovereignty of God. What he now meant by it was : (I) The country belongs to the people ; (II) All the people should enjoy equal rights ; (III) The Caliph or the head of the government be elected by the people, he should not claim privileges vis-a-vis the people ; (IV) The people with insight (*Ahlur-Rai*) should be consulted on all administrative and legal matters ; (V) The

country's treasury (*Baitul Mal*) should be the property and possession of the people.¹⁶³

Azad seems to have been convinced (during the post-romantic phase) of the final authority of the people in non-spiritual matters.¹⁶⁴ He did not take inspiration from Islam alone but also from the west. "Ours is essentially a democratic age and the spirit of equality, fraternity and liberty is sweeping over all the peoples of the world. The Asian countries must reconstruct their polity and their society in conformity with that society"¹⁶⁵ said Azad. He never favoured the idea of developing "Islamic nationality,"¹⁶⁶ though he pleaded for the implementation of the programme of social education which would produce the consciousness of citizenship among the people and the promotion of social solidarity among them."¹⁶⁷ It is "an instruction in the law of personal and public health," and "an attempt to effect some improvement in their economic status, proper training and refinement of emotions ;" "an element of instruction in universal ethics and tolerance, mutual appreciation and universal principles of right conduct."¹⁶⁸ In his broad spirit of synthesis Azad could even reconcile the seemingly opposed concepts of aristocracy and democracy. He argued that an aristocracy of merit and talent may not supplant democracy but may enrich it with the richness and grace of a cultivated minority. Aristocracy may serve democracy by supplying the cultural deficiencies of a broad-based power structure. Democracy is not opposed to aristocracy if the latter serves "as an adjunct to democracy and seeks to fulfil its purposes,"¹⁶⁹ According to Azad aristocracy "develops a width of vision and a far-reaching imagination"¹⁷⁰ and thus enriches democracy.

Convinced by the utility and the necessity of democracy, Azad made a conscious effort to determine the type of democracy which would suit the Indian environment. The traditions built up by the British rulers and the prevailing communal situation in India, posed baffling problems to the leaders of the freedom struggle. Azad was convinced that the contribution made by the British people in India had enriched Indian polity. The basis of British Administration which has been an instrument in unifying the country should be retained. Moreover India

advocated a progressive and genuine democracy. He thought such a system would compose economic differences in a modern spirit. "Differences will no doubt persist. But they will be economic, not communal. Opposition among political parties will continue, but they will be based not on religion but on economic and political issues. Class and not community will be the basis of future alignments, and politics will be shaped accordingly,"¹⁷⁶ said Azad. He predicted that the events would substantiate his thesis.

As far as the cultural problem was concerned Azad believed that if a genuine democracy came into being it would present no great difficulties. The culture and the cultural rights of the minorities would be protected and safeguarded. This is described in a beautiful manner by Lala Lajpatrai when he said : "what we aim at is not the merging or absorption of one into the other but the integration of all into one whole, without in any way injuring or lessening each group individually...this involves the separate existence of each religious community, with the fullest possible religious and communal freedom, each of them contributing its best to the constitution, continuance, independence and prosperity of one National whole."¹⁷⁷ Azad believed that the Indian polity after independence would be democratic and would transcend communal considerations. But would the class differences be resolved in a democratic order ? Is socialism or communism to be adopted as the goal ? He found no conflict between democracy and socialism. Azad certainly belonged to the bourgeois class. But his view was that democracy is not just "the political reflection of our bourgeois society."¹⁷⁸ To him democratic and national government signified the same thing. He supported socialism as, in his opinion, it fulfilled the requisites of democracy. During the Al-Hilal phase he had said Islam and socialism are poles apart¹⁷⁹ as Islam does not accept economic equality and opposes the abolition of the propertied class.¹⁸⁰ Afterwards he gave up this stand and pointed out the similarities between socialism and Islam. Both the systems disapprove of the concentration of the means of production and exchange of wealth.¹⁸¹ Concentration of wealth should be prevented and private property may even be abolished in the national interest. This is a question of policy

and is wholly unconnected with religion.¹⁸² Azad believed that progressive democracy could control the economy of the nation without being bound by *laisse faire* philosophy. It cannot rely on big business for solving the economic problems of the nation. If "the rich people give alms or such associations to help the poor are formed the national economic problem will not be solved. In Britain and America no fund could prevent the poverty of the middle and the lower classes... The solution is that a part of the entire income of the nation, by legislation, should be earmarked for the welfare of the poor people in the society,"¹⁸³ Azad, however, did not accept socialism minus democracy for his passion for democracy was primary. But the inadequacies of democracy constrained him to support socialism which is complimentary and not repugnant to the spirit of democracy.

Azad's acceptance of the philosophy of democratic socialism inevitably led to a broadening of his moral ideas. These are not connected with any exclusive creed but are commonly acceptable. Therefore there should not be any objection to making such morals the religious instruction in the government schools.¹⁸⁴ This was the core of what he advocated after becoming the Education Minister of free India. He complained that private religious institutions were not broadening the outlook and inculcating the spirit of toleration and goodwill,¹⁸⁵ because "we are surrounded by over-religiosity. Our present difficulties, unlike those of Europe, are not the creation of the materialist zealots but of religious fanatics. If we want to overcome them, the solution lies not in rejecting religious instruction in elementary stages but in imparting sound and healthy religious education under our direct supervision."¹⁸⁶ Azad thought it necessary to strengthen democracy at all costs. He regarded the philosophy of religion, democracy and socialism as a universal necessity.

The internationalism of Azad is neither Pan-Islamism nor the world wide unity of the working class. What is basic to Azad's internationalism is Man and his Thought. "Man all over the world had adopted common methods of reasoning and thought. The human reason is one and identical. Human feelings are largely similar. The human will operates more or less in a similar manner in similar situations everywhere. It is

therefore natural that the human way of looking at himself and the world is largely common in different parts of the World.”¹⁸⁷ He thought that such a type of internationalism can be achieved by the right teaching of geography and history. Geography should be taught in a manner helpful to the creation of a world outlook.¹⁸⁸ History should be made the medium for the achievement of the unity of mankind.¹⁸⁹ In this context Azad believed that Islam could play a useful role. It would be able to maintain a balance between the extreme opposites of “the anarchy of European nationalism” and “regimentation of Russian Communism”¹⁹⁰ He was aware of the fact that “Islam possesses a magnificent tradition of interracial understanding and cooperation...Islam had still the power to reconcile apparently irreconcilable elements of race and tradition-”¹⁹¹ Islam will become a potent instrument of internationalism. Thus Islam is an effort of man to know the “secrets of the Universe” as well of the “self.”¹⁹²

Azad is regarded as the greatest leader of the “nationalist Muslims.” Their attitude is generally described as progressive since it was in line with the spirit and policy of the Indian National Congress. It was opposed to the separatist Muslim nationalism which asserted itself under the leadership of Jinnah. It should be noted that there are striking similarities between Hindu and Muslim nationalisms. Both of them have a strong tinge of religiosity. Muslim nationalism, like Hindu nationalism, looked back to its own tradition and was fearful of losing its identity under the dominance of the Hindu majority.¹⁹³ Pandit Nehru rightly says that both Hindu and Muslim nationalisms “tried to fit in as far as possible, the new scientific and political ideas derived from the West with their old religious notions and habits.”¹⁹⁴ They could neither challenge the old nor reject the new. Thus the attempt to harmonize them was bound to fail.¹⁹⁵ This is true also of those Muslims who were within the Indian National Congress while this characterization of the state of mind of the Muslims is broadly true both of those inside and outside the Congress. Maulana Azad must be recognized as an exception. He would never disavow his leadership of the nationalist Muslims but it

would be wrong to regard him as representing the general divided state of mind and thought of the community.

The nationalist Muslims were "all upper middle class folk, and there were no dynamic personalities among them. They took to their profession and business... Their method was one of drawing-room meetings and mutual arrangements and pacts and at this game their rivals, the communal leaders were greater adepts... the collapse and the elimination of the nationalist Muslims as a factors responsible for this story."¹⁹⁶ There are various factors responsible for this sorry state of affairs. Humayun Kabir points out that the policy of the British Government (conferring of Communal Award), lack of mass support, and dependence on sentiments of loyalty to the past made them ineffective.¹⁹⁷ They became "very much like the Irish Home Rule Movement..."¹⁹⁸ It is also to be noted that there was a lack of ideological clarity among the nationalist Muslims. "In the Bijnor by-election the Congress Muslim workers were dressed in the Green Islamic colour, carried the Islamic flag with the crescent and star, and raised the cry of Allah-u-Akbar at their meetings,"¹⁹⁹ says professor Suhrawardi. A. K. Majumdar asserts that "even in the Congress, the Muslims never coalesced with the Hindus to lose their identity as did the Parsis."²⁰⁰ The tragedy of the nationalist Muslims was that they could "neither influence Muslims and their leaders nor the Hindus and their leaders. They were helpless and remained in the vacuum," says Acharya Kriplani.²⁰¹

The assessment of the nationalist Muslims would be incomplete and misleading if the character of the Indian National Congress is not properly analysed and without a reference to Azad's role in politics and his personality. The greatest single factor weakening the nationalist Muslims was Congress itself. W.C. Smith has discussed the point in detail with special reference to Gandhi's attitude to the Muslim problem in India.²⁰² The bourgeois character of the Congress, the socially reactionary policy of Gandhi, the pro-British proclamation made by the top leaders of the Congress, and the encouragement of communalism by the Congress leadership. In addition to this, the Congress never had a clear-cut policy on the Hindu-Muslim question.

The "militant leaders of Hindu Mahasabha who were also members of the Congress could not fail to have some influence on the Congress," says A.M. Dykov.²⁰³ More often than not, this influence has been great. The 'uncompromising attitude of the Congress and its wishful thinking that it represents the whole of the India'²⁰⁴ antagonized a large section of the Muslims which indirectly weakened the position of the nationalist Muslims.

No leader of the Congress could properly estimate the potentiality of the League leadership. Till 1937 no attempt was made for mutual understanding. As a matter of fact "there was no difference in social or economic policy serious enough to make Congress-League coalitions unnatural or unworkable, and the Muslims therefore felt, rightly or wrongly, that they were excluded from office, merely because the Congress was essentially a Hindu body."²⁰⁵ Moreover, as Dr. Z. A. Ahmed has pointed out, the attitude of the Congress was that of "a highly deplorable vacillation and lack of self-confidence...the field was left entirely open to cummunal and reactionary individuals and organizations."^{206(a)} Consequently all the nationalist Muslims were not only misunderstood but denounced even by their colleagues in the Congress^{206(b)} and their contribution to political life was lost sight of. They were regarded as mere tools of the Hindu majority by the Muslims outside the Congress fold. Qazi Abdul Ghaffar has rightly said that it was the nationalist Muslims who made Congress a "National organization. It was their leaders who fought tooth and nail against Jinnah's slogan of "separate Islamic nationality."²⁰⁷ And the tragic conclusion to the politics of the nationalist Muslims and the life mission of Azad was the acceptance of partition by the Congress.

Azad, however, was more than a leader of the nationalist Muslims. It was, of course, the responsibility of the leaders including Azad to educate them. But Azad did not possess all the necessary qualities of a leader in the situation which faced him. He was a thinker who could work from above and not with the people. His temperament was lofty and aloof. In one of his letters he wrote that "it was politics which discovered me."²⁰⁸ He was the product as also the projector of Islamic renaissance. His source of inspiration was the wide world of

Islam and he sought to work out the lessons of that inspiration in the land to which he belonged. Though India was the field of activity, he exercised considerable influence on the life of other Islamic countries. "Very deeply read in the philosophy of the East and the West he has shaped the nationalist movement even outside India by the power of his pen,"²⁰⁹ says Yusuf Meherally. He is justly compared to the "Pre-Revolution philosophers of France—The Encyclopaedists."²¹⁰ It will be a very great injustice if Azad is to be wholly equated with the nationalists inside and outside the Congress. His *Tarjumanul-Quran* is capable of producing an intellectual revolution in India as well as other Muslim countries. A. B. Rajput describing the influence of Azad says "Caesar was a man of the moment and Paul a man of the future, for Caesar was the symbol of his age and Paul was the embodiment of those prophetic qualities which create a future age. But Abul Kalam Azad happily combines in him the qualities of both Caesar and Paul, for his action and achievements, though symbolical of the present age, required yet another age to be fully understood and recognized."²¹¹ His *Tarjumanul-Quran* is as important as the *Commentaries* by Ibn Tamyaaan and Hafez Ibn Qayyum. It is also based upon "truth, reason and wisdom."²¹² It is a contribution "to the cause of man's intellectual emancipation."²¹³ The greatness of Azad lies in the fact that he fully embodied and represented the spirit of his age. John Gunther therefore says that Azad was a modernist though an orthodox Muslim.²¹⁴ His modernism lay in his correct appreciation of the existing situation and in evolving a philosophy and programme of action which synthesized the legacy of the past and the promise of the future. As Kripalani says, Azad regarded the Indian national struggle as not only a duty to the motherland but also to Islam."²¹⁵ S. M. Ikram has delineated the basic merits of Azad's religious writings as a refutation of *Ilmul-Kalam* (Dialectics), wide publicity of Quranic teachings and raising the standard of religious writings.²¹⁶ Azad discussed the problems of philosophy of religion with the same insight. His philosophy of religion provided a firm basis to his political ideas. He departed from religious revivalism after 1920. He was closer

to Motilal Nehru and C. R. Das than to Maulana Mohammed Ali and Jinnah. Thereafter he not only realized but advocated the futility of Islamic government and Quranic politics.²¹⁷ Dr. Ashraf who worked with Azad as his secretary says that Azad began to consider socialism as a healthy system and therefore supported progressive movement in politics and literature.²¹⁸ It is really unfortunate that "his artistic sensitiveness and scholarly detachment made him shy of coming closer to the masses and assuming active leadership,"²¹⁹

It should also be made clear that when criticism is made of Azad, what is criticised is not his political ideas but his role in the Congress. On the one hand he was criticised by fanatic Muslims like Maulana Maudoodi and by the leaders of the Muslim League on the other. Maudoodi is critical because he believed that Muslims themselves should form a party guided by the Quran. He therefore described Azad's advice to the people to join the Congress as suicidal.²²⁰ But what Maudoodi really resents is Azad's abandonment of revivalism and romanticism. Azad, however, would never have taken such a retrograde step.

The Leaguers whose approach was fanatical and unreal, criticised Azad as the enemy of the Muslim interests in India. Jinnah's telegram to Azad is an example of it. "I refuse to discuss with you by correspondence or otherwise as you have completely forfeited the confidence of Muslims in India. Can you not realize you are made a showboy Congress President to give it a colour that it is national and deceive foreign countries. You represent neither Muslims nor Hindus."²²¹ It is also not true that Azad failed in evolving from within Islam a political doctrine which could justify a composite Indian nationalism, which he could equate with human fraternity."²²²

Mohammed Sadiq expresses the view that Azad "was quite as destitute of self-restraint and self-criticism as Maulvi Zafar Ali and was almost always carried away by his love of rhetoric and flamboyant effects."²²³ A. B. Rajput more pointedly discussed this aspect. He says that Azad "can understand the situation well, but he cannot mould himself accordingly. He can fathom the mind of the public, but he cannot go beyond convictions to satisfy them. He can keep his mind and heart at

ease during tumult and strife but he cannot use the heights of public emotion for his own good.”²²⁴

The critics of Azad’s philosophy are short sighted. He correctly visualized and understood the character of Islam which is no longer “unitary power, no more caliphal, no more Pan-Islamic. It is fractured into numerous nations.”²²⁵

Azad remained an intriguing and dominant figure in the world of Islam.²²⁶ It was mainly because of his epoch-making personality. A “more colourful personality than that of Abul Kalam Azad has rarely walked across the stage of modern Indian history.”²²⁷ Azad’s political ideas present a good example of modern Islam in India. Unlike Sir Syed he was completely successful in erecting the edifice of progressive and modern religion and political philosophy. His political ideas can be compared with any great thinker or philosopher of the Islamic world. In India and Pakistan they will have an abiding influence and relevance.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. A. B. Rajput : *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad* ; Pp. 6-7.
3. A. R. Malihabadi : *Azad Ki Kahani Khud Unki Zabani*. P. 30.
4. *Ibid* : P. 34.
5. *Ibid* : P. 40.
6. *Ibid* : P. 50.
7. *Ibid* : P. 54.
8. *Ibid* : P. 56.
9. *Ibid* : P. 86.
10. He learnt Arabic from his mother, Persian and Urdu from his father, Islamic theology from an old Arab teacher. From his early childhood he became conversant with the tenets of Islam and memorized verses from the Quran.
11. Compare Azad, Quoted by A. B. Rajput. *Op. cit.* 7.
"For a man the best test of honour is his personal merits and attainments and not the moth-eaten tables of ancestry. Therefore by the grace of God, I do neither believe in such cheap popularity nor ever desire for it."
12. A. R. Malihabadi : *Op. cit.* P. 108.
13. Azad : *India Wins Freedom*, P. 3.
14. A. R. Malihabadi : *Op. cit.* P. 217.
15. Azad : *Op. cit.* P. 3.
16. A. R. Malihabadi : *Op. cit.* P. 383.
17. *Ibid* : P. 383.
18. *Ibid* : P. 405.
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22. Azad : *Subhe-Ummed*. Part I. P. 156.
23. Azad : *Hijr-o-Visal*, P. 56.
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34. *Ibid* : P. 213.
35. S. M. Ikram : *Op. Cit.* Pp. 283-284.
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38. Azad : *Nigarishat-e-Azad.* P. 15.
39. Azad : *Tanziyat-i-Azad.* Pp. 82-85.
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41. *Ibid* : P. 11.
42. A. B. Rajput : *Op. cit.* P. 35.
43. Azad : *Subhe Ummad.* Part I. Pp. 86-87.
44. Azad : *Intekhab-e-AlHilal (Karachi)* P. 52.
45. *Ibid* : P. 55.
46. Azad : *Mazamin-e-Abul Kalam Azad,* Part I. Pp. 34-39.
47. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran.* (Urdu) Vol. 2. P. 95.
48. Compare : Azad, *India Wins Freedom.* P. 6.
"I kept up...correspondence with them for many years after...return to India."
49. Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* P. 102.
50. *Speeches of Maulana Azad (21st December, 1949)* P. 20.
51. *Ibid* : P. 20.
52. *Ibid* : P. 1.
53. *Ibid* : (20th February, 1949) P. 76.
54. The *Tarjumanul Quran* was published in 1930. It is important to note that he wrote it when the Romantic phase of his political and religious ideas was over.
55. A. B. Rajput : *Op. cit.* P. 36.
56. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran* (Ed). by S. A. Latif : Vol. I. P. 4.
Also compare Quran : (51 : 20-21)
*On earth are signs for men's firm belief,
And also in your own selves
Will ye not then notice that ?*
57. *Ibid* : P. 21.
58. Mahadeo Desai : *Maulana Azad.* Pp. 70-71.
59. Azad : *Op. cit.* P. 158.
60. *Ibid* : P. 154.
61. *Ibid* : P. 155.
62. *Ibid* : P. 82.
63. *Ibid* : P. 82.
64. Azad : *Malfuzat-e-Azad.* P. 28.
65. A. B. Rajput : *Op. cit.* P. 38.
66. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran.* (Ed) by S. A. Latif. Vol. I. Pp. 162-63.
67. Azad : *Mazamin-e-Abul Kalam,* compiled by Sifarish Hussain, Part, I. P. 134.
68. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran.* Edited by S. A. Latif. Vol. I. P. XVIII.

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69. *Ibid* : P. 83.
70. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran* (Urdu) Part I. P. 304.
71. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran* Edited by S. A. Latif. Vol. I. P. 81.
72. *Ibid* : P. 70.
73. *Ibid* : P. 84.
74. *Ibid* : P. 68.
75. *Ibid* : P. 69.
76. Mahadeo Desai : *Op. cit.* P. 73.
77. Azad : *Op. cit.* P. 149.
78. *Ibid* : P. 149.
79. K. G. Saiyidain : *Humanist Tradition in Education*. P. 126.
80. Azad : *Malfuzat-e-Azad* : P. 24.
81. Qazi Abdul Ghaffar : *Asar-e-Abul Kalam Azad*. P. 282.
82. C. C. Adams : *Op. cit.* Pp. 142-43.
83. W. C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India*. P. 146.
84. S. M. Ikram : *Op. cit.* P. 85.
85. Azad : *Subhe-Ummed* : Part I. P. 85.
86. A. R. Desai : *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*. P. 137.
87. *Ibid* : P. 342.
88. *Ibid* : P. 293.
89. C. R. Das. Congress Presidential Addresses (1922). P. 568.
90. Craddock : *Dilemma in India*. P. 8.
91. Shelvanker : *The Problem of India*. Pp. 197-198.
92. D. G. Tendulkar : *Mahatma*. Vol. 2. P. 200.
93. Compare *Gandhiji* quoted by D. G. Tendulkar : *Op. cit.* 200.
"Hatred is not essential for nationalism. Race hatred will kill the real national spirit...we want freedom for our country, but not at the expense or exploitation of others, not so as to degrade other communities...even so a country has to be free in order that it may die, if necessary, for the benefit of the world."
94. Khuda Baksh : *Islamic Civilization*. Vol. II. P. 43.
95. *Speeches of Maulana Azad, 21st December, 1947*. P. 20.
96. *Ibid* : (24th March, 1951) P. 152.
See also *Mazamir-e-Adul Kalam*. Pp. 147-148 and P. 160.
97. Mahadeo Desai : *Op. cit.* P. 3.
98. A. B. Rajput. *Op. cit.* P. 38.
99. D. S. Margoliouth : *Mohammedanism*. P. 75.
100. Compare R. P. Dutt : *India Today and Tomorrow*. P. 241.
"It is obvious that this attempt to base nationality on religion (together with the degree of common culture associated with religion) runs contrary to every accepted historical and international experience of the character of the Nation. It would be as practical to regard the Catholics of Europe as a nation. And the logic of the argument would imply that.....the theory of Pakistan would find its final completion in Pan-Islamism."

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101. H.A.R. Gibb : *Whither Islam* : P. 72.
102. Qazi Abdul Gaffar : *Op. cit.* P. 87.
103. Quoted by Abdullah Butt : *Abul Kalam Azad*. P. 34.
104. Mahadeo Desai : *Op. cit.* P. 29.
105. Azad : *Tahrik-i-Azadi*. P. 90.
106. Quoted by A.B. Rajput : *Op. cit.* 158-59.
107. Azad : *Tabarrukat-e-Azad* : P. 382.
108. *Speeches of Maulana Azad, 21st December, 1947* P. 21.
109. Quoted by Abdullah Butt : *Op. cit.* P. 100.
110. *Ibid* : Pp. 102-103.
111. Azad : *India Wins Freedom*, P. 20.
112. *Ibid* : P. 21.
113. *Ibid* : P. 21.
114. Azad : *Azad ki Taqriren*. Compiled by A. Arif.
115. J.P. Chunder : *India Steps Forward* P. 85.
116. *Ibid* : P. 85-86.
117. Azad : *Mazamin-i-AlHilal*. Pp. 38-37.
118. *Ibid* : P. 37-38.
119. *Ibid* : Pp. 60-67.
120. Azad : *Hijr-o-Visal*. P. 68.
121. Azad : *Khutbat-e-Azad*. P. 46.
122. Qazi Abdul Gaffar : *Op. cit.* P. 66-68.
123. Quoted by Mahadeo Desai : *Op, cit.* P. 42.
124. Qazi Abdul Gaffar : *Op. cit.* P. 73.
125. Azad : *India Wins Freedom*. P. 9.
126. Hiren Mukerji : *India Struggles for Freedom*. P. 112.
127. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran*. Vol. (Urdu). P, 302.
128. *Ibid* : P 308.
129. Azad : *India Wins Freedom* P. 34.
130. Azad : *Op. cit.* P. 40.
131. *Ibid* : P. 33.
132. *Ibid* : P. 25.
133. *Ibid* : P. 50.
134. *Ibid* : Pp. 18-19.
135. *Ibid* : P. 15.
136. Azad : *Maqalat-i-Abul Kalam (Karachi) 2nd edition*. P. 30.
137. Khuda Baksh : *The Orient Under the Caliphs*. P. 245-243.
138. Azad : *Malfuzate-Azad* ; P. 76.
139. Azad : *Subhe Ummad* ; Part I. P. 161.
140. Azad : *Intekhab-e-AlHilal (Karachi)*. P. 119.
141. *Ibid* : P. 11.
142. *Ibid* : Pp. 26-27.
143. *Ibid* : P. 28.
144. Quoted by Dr. Syed Mahmood in *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, A Memorial Volume* edited by Humanyun Kabir P. 44.
145. Mahadeo Desai : *Op. cit.* P. 51.

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146. Azad : *Azad Ki Taqreeren*. Compiled by A. Arif. P. 170.
147. *Ibid* : P. 173.
148. Azad : *Tabarrukate-Azad*. P. 241.
149. Quoted by Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* P, 289.
150. Humayun Kabir (editor) : *Abul Kalam Azad*, P. 44.
151. Mahadeo Desai : *Op. cit.* ; P. 51.
152. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran (Urdu)* Part I.P. 340.
153. *Ibid* : P. 341.
154. Azad : *Tanziyat-e-Azad* : P. 88.
155. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran : (Urdu)* Part I,P. 340.
156. Khalifa Abdul Hakim : *Islamic Ideology*, P. 211.
157. Mahadeo Desai : *Op. cit.*, P. 53.
158. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran (Urdu)* Part I. P. 302.
159. Quoted by Mahadeo Desai : *Op. cit.* P. 54.
160. Quoted by Gandhiji : *To the Hindus and Muslims* ; P. 362.
161. Azad : *Miqalate Azad* (Karachi) 2nd edition ; P. 73.
162. Azad : *Islam awr Azadi*. P. 18.
163. *Ibid* : Pp. 30-31.
164. Azad here quotes the verse from Quran :
 "Washvar hum hum fil amr" and the saying of the Prophet:
 "Woh amrhum Shura Bainahuma".
165. *Speeches of Maulana Azad* (1949) P. 115.
166. Azad : *Tabarrukat-e-Azad*. P. 39.
167. *Speeches of Maulana Azad* (1948) P. 38.
168. *Ibid* : (1948) P. 39-40.
169. *Ibid* : (1949). P. 87.
170. *Ibid* : (1949). P. 87.
171. Azad : *India Wins Freedom* P. 233.
172. Moin Shakir : *Mainstream, Delhi 29th October, 1966*.
173. J.P. Chunder : *Op. cit.* Pp. 85-86.
174. Azad : *Op. cit.* P. 141.
175. J.P. Chunder : *Op. cit.* P.87
176. *Ibid* . P. 88.
177. Lajpat Rai : *Ideals of Non-cooperation*. P.4.
178. M.N. Roy : *India in Transition*. P. 176.
179. Azad : *Azad ki Taqreeren, Compiled by A. Arif*. P. 10
180. *Ibid* : P. 11.
181. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran*. Part II. P, 136.
182. Azad : *Malfuzat-e-Azad*. P. 99.
183. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran. (Urdu)* Part II, P. 133.
184. Quoted by Qazi Abdul Gaffar. *Op. cit.* Pp. 152-153.
185. *Speeches of Maulana Azad*. P. 4.
186. *Ibid* : (1948) P. 28.
187. *Ibid* : (1951) P. 179.
188. *Ibid* : (1591) P. 151.

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189. *Ibid* : P. 152.
190. Gibb : *Op. cit.* P. 378.
191. *Ibid* : P. 2.
192. *Speeches of Maulana Azad. (1951)*, P. 179.
193. Pandit Nehru : *India's Quest*. P. 217.
194. *Ibid* : P. 217.
195. *Ibid* : P. 217.
196. Nehru : *Autobiography*, P. 139.
197. Humayun Kabir : *Muslim Politics*. P. 5.
198. George Schuster and Guy Wint : *India and Democracy*, Pp. 182-83.
199. Professor Hassan Suhrawardi : *Hindustan or Pakistan*. P. 9.
200. A.K. Majumdar : *Advent of Independence*. P. 37.
201. Quoted by *Dawat (Urdu daily) 25th July, 1967*.
202. W.C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India*. P. 250-53.
203. A.M. Dyakov : *A Contemporary History of India*, P. 138.
204. J. Chinna Durai : *The Choice before India*. P. 77.
205. P. Griffith quoted by Bolitho : *Jinnah*. P. 114.
206. (a). Quoted by Thomson : *Enlist India for Freedom*. P. 60.
206. (b) Compare W.C. Smith ; *Op. cit.* P. 213.
 "The Censorship and the press together work, of course, to play up communalism for the outside world. Abundant space has been given in London papers to communalist questions, very little to nationalist ones, and none at all to nationalist Muslims".
207. Qazi Abdul Gaffar : *Op. cit.* P. 105.
208. Azad : *Ghubar-i-Khater*, P. 107.
209. Yousuf Meherally : *Leaders of India*, P.11.
210. *Ibid* : P. 11.
211. A. B. Rajput. *Op. cit.* P. IX.
212. Sulaiman Nadvi quoted by A. Butt : *Op. cit.* P. 41.
213. Azad : *Tarjumanul Quran*, Edited by S.A. Latif. Vol. I.P. IX.
214. Quoted by Abdulla Butt : *Op. cit.* P. 48.
215. Humayun Kabir : *Abul Kalam Azad (A Memorial Volume)* P. 30.
216. S.M. Ikram : *Op. cit.* Pp. 293-296.
217. Dr. Ashraf : *Muslim Siyasat (Urdu)* P. 144.
218. *Ibid* : P. 145.
219. Abid Hussain : *The Destiny of Indian Muslims*. P. 112.
220. Abul Ala Maudoodi : *Mussalman awr Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash*. Vol. I. P. 40.
221. *Leaders' Correspondence with Jinnah* Edited by Peerzada. P. 213.
222. Aziz Ahmed : *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, P. 269.
223. Mohammed Sadiq : *History of Urdu Literature*. P. 403.
224. A. B. Rajput. P. 197.
225. Kenneth-Cragg : *Islamic Surveys*, Vol. III. P. 7.
226. *Ibid* : P. 135.
227. T. V. Parvate : *Modern Indian Thought*. P. 97.

The Political Philosophy of Separatist Muslim Nationalism

MOHAMMED ALI JINNAH

(1876—1948)

IN THE history of Indian Muslim life and thought Mohammed Ali Jinnah is one of the most striking and 'enigmatic figures'.¹ He displayed least concern and love for Islam and Islamic thought and yet he had developed an abiding interest in the problems of the Muslim community. By all standards, he was a paradox. He was 'a European of Europeans'², but rendered the Muslims of India the unique service of creating a separate home for them.

Jinnah belonged to the class, "Indian in blood and colour but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and intellect" of Macaulay's dreams. That way he was a genuine product of the western system of education. At the age of 16 he went to London. The west directly influenced "his mind, his ambition, and his taste; which was to imbue him with an Englishness of manners and behaviour which endured to his death."³ He belonged to the first generation of modern educated intelligentsia who are described as "de-Nationalized, because they were more English than Indian. Their religion was that of Spencer and of Comte, their philosophy that of Bentham and the Mills."⁴ The English educational system under which Jinnah was trained enabled him, as it did other leaders, to "stand in the Council and deliberate upon the affairs of our Nation and of our Country."⁵ Jinnah characterized those Indian students and leaders as "great missionaries in the cause of progress."⁶ Besides imbibing the British influence, Jinnah was also associated with the topmost

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liberal leadership of the country. For sometime he acted as private secretary to Dadabhoy Naoroji. Bolitho rightly holds that "it is reasonable to suppose that Jinnah learned much from Naoroji's speeches; that he absorbed some ideas from the Grand Old Man."⁷ Jinnah was also a friend of Gokhale. He is also reported to have said that "it is my ambition to become a Muslim Gokhale."⁸ He was also influenced by Surendranath Banerjee and C. R. Das. "I learnt my first lesson in politics at the feet of Sir Surendranath Banerjee...I looked upto him as a leader."⁹ The lesson which he drew from the careers of S. N. Banerjee and C. R. Das was "that in unity lies salvation."¹⁰ Jinnah's early liberalism was the product of English education and the influence of liberal Indian leaders. He accepted as facts nationalism, democracy, secularism and the unity of the country. These are the logical outcome of his uncompromising faith in liberalism. It is also to be noted that British liberals exerted a notable influence on Jinnah. As he told Dr. Ashraf, "I happened to meet several important English liberals with whose help I came to understand the doctrine of liberalism. The liberalism of Lord Morley was then in full sway. I grasped that liberalism, which became part of my life, and thrilled me very much."¹¹

The core of liberalism as an ideology is liberty—civil, fiscal, personal, social, economic, political, national and international.¹² Jinnah believed in that liberalism which implies "the inherent moral worth and spiritual equality of each individual, the dignity of human personality, the autonomy of individual will, and essential rationality of men."¹³ But liberty demands law. The resultant is equality, impartial judiciary, cheap procedure and accessible courts, abolition of privileges of class, abolition of power of money.¹⁴ Thus Jinnah's liberal creed stood for freedom, constitutionalism, and the absence of any type of fanaticism in political and social life. The elements of his liberalism were co-operation with the British Government, constitutional agitation for the right cause, unity of the country, rule of law.

Jinnah held that the British Government had led the country towards renaissance and progress. Its contribution had been "the birth of great and living movements for the intellectual

and moral regeneration of the people...and a creation out of the diverse mass of race and creed, a new India fast growing to unity of thought, purpose and outlook, responsive to the new appeal of territorial patriotism and nationality striving with new energy and aspiration and becoming daily more purposeful and eager to recover its birth-right to direct its own affairs and govern itself.”¹⁵ Jinnah thought that India was brought up through the agency of the British Government. British civilization had exerted a tremendous influence on all aspects of life in India. He had respect for British fairplay and justice which had been an article of faith for the Indian liberals. For Jinnah, the British Government had maintained “unbroken peace and order in the land, administered evenhanded justice... brought the Indian mind in touch with the thought and ideals of the West, and thus led to the moral regeneration of the people.”¹⁶ He believed that the new national consciousness of the Indian people owed much to the attitude and policy of the British Government. “Among the many benefits that have been conferred upon India by British rule, has been the birth of a genuine spirit of patriotism.”¹⁷ Concomitant with this faith in justice was the demand for the implementation of the ideal of democracy on British lines. This also he learnt from Dadabhoj Naoroji. In 1906, Naoroji made a plea for Swaraj... self government, and Jinnah at that time was acting as his secretary. In his address to the Muslim League he emphasized that democratic institutions could thrive in the environment of the East and that the Indians are fit to govern themselves, contrary to the common view that the only form of government suitable to India was autocracy tempered by English efficiency and character.¹⁸ This attitude was based on the argument that the laws of Nature and the doctrine of common humanity are not different in the East.¹⁹ Democracy requires for its effective functioning the educated and enlightened people. Even if it might be a danger to the continuance of autocracy, education of the people must be boldly accepted as a duty by every progressive and civilized government.²⁰ If the government does wrong and undermines the interests of the people, constitutional means should be employed for the redress of the grievances. The government is not above

criticism. A civilized government is one which has respect for public opinion and functions in accordance with the wishes of the people. The people have every right to criticize the government. Criticism should be free and frank. But when the government is right it is the duty of every educated man to support and help government.²¹ The right to rebel cannot be given to the people. Jinnah considered that anarchy and disorder are inimical to the collective welfare of the people and deserved "the strongest condemnation and the highest punishment."²² Obedience to civilized government of which the British government was a model, was an article of faith with Jinnah. But the word "civilized government" is a very broad term with a large connotation. It must be a democratic government devoted to the welfare of the people. If the people are disappointed or disillusioned with the government or if they lose faith in its fair play and justice it leads to Bolshevism or to Sinn Feinism as it happened in Russia and Ireland respectively.²³ Jinnah was convinced that if the functioning of the government is undemocratic it inevitably leads to revolution, because it does not correspond with the liberal creed.

Jinnah held that democracy was not to be bestowed upon the Indians as a gift and that they ought to get it as a matter of right. Jinnah's approach to politics was secular; he emphasized that people should forget religious differences. They may not abandon their religion but should learn to separate politics from religion. It necessarily implied co-operation among all the communities for the cause of the motherland. If secularism becomes the guiding principle in the life of the people there will be true understanding, harmony and progress.²⁴ If Indians fulfil this task they will be able to say that they are fit for "real political franchise, freedom and self-government."²⁵ Jinnah did not agree with the leaders of the Aligarh movement that if the Britishers leave the country, Hindu Raj would be established. He posed this question to the Muslims: "Do you think that because the Hindus are in majority, therefore they would carry on a measure, in the legislative assembly and there is an end of it? If 70 millions of Mussalmans do not approve of a measure, which is carried by a ballot box, do you think that it could be

enforced and administered in this country ?”²⁶ What Jinnah wanted to emphasize was that if politics are rational the terms “religious minority” and “religious majority” lose their significance. Once this is accepted other issues become insignificant. Although as a liberal he would not approve of a separate electorate for the Muslims, his solicitude for public opinion led him to assert that if the Muslims are “determined to have separate electorates, no resistance should be shown to their demand.”²⁷ In India, however the question according to him, was not of a few seats going to the Muslims or Hindus, but one of the “transfer of power from bureaucracy to democracy.”²⁸ The provision of the separate electorates was after all a method and a means to an end.²⁹ and was not to be taken as a principle of political bargaining.³⁰ To Jinnah the end was Home Rule or self government. No authority, even of the government, had any right to silence the people of India from carrying on their constitutional agitation.³¹

To sum up, the ingredients of Jinnah’s liberalism were “education, agitation and organization” which are also “the essential prerequisites for the successful prosecution of any National programme that will materially advance the cause of Sawaraj”³². Jinnah’s attitude was always one of “honourable cooperation with the government and of “self reliance” as a basis for the organization of national activities.³³ Jinnah’s secular attitude to the problems of society must be regarded as an essential component of his liberalism. He was secular in the true sense of the word. It is significant that his secular attitude distinguished him from Gandhi. According to him the mixing up of religion and politics was detrimental to the harmony of political life of the country. Unlike Gandhi he did not have interest in the Khilafat Movement, firstly because it was not a political movement³⁴ and secondly because it was not in keeping with his liberal creed. He believed that religious frenzy “would ultimately result in confusion, and would do more harm than good to India in general and to Mussalmans in particular”³⁵. He, along with Umar Sobhani, warned Gandhi not to encourage the religious fanaticism of the Muslim priests, and their equally ignorant, illiterate and superstitious Muslim

followers.”³⁶ Gandhi ignored the warning and spearheaded the Khilafat movement but Jinnah refused to support it. One of the consequences of this movement was the “foolish scheme”³⁷ of Hijrat from India to Afghanistan, supported by the leaders of the movement including Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.³⁸ Gandhi and the Muslim priests considered religion as the dominant factor in life while Jinnah resolutely denied it. The notion of the unity of religion and politics introduced the element of irrationalism and mysticism in the political life of the country. The non-cooperation scheme was the direct result of the Khilafat movement jointly sponsored by Gandhi and the Ali Brothers. Jinnah firmly believed that the anti-liberal programme and methods adopted by Gandhi would lead to disaster, “complete disorganization and chaos.”³⁹ His resignation from the Home Rule League is a consequence of his serious misgivings about the non-co-operation movement. Jinnah would never contemplate the achievement of responsible government by the employment of extra-constitutional methods.

Jinnah had no respect for the new emerging Muslim leadership which was characterized by bigotry and sectarianism. He wished to discard the political ideology of the Aligarh movement which, in a way, was producing fanatical leadership—a leadership intent only on finding ways and means for “Muslim security in a future Independent India against a non-Muslim majority.”⁴⁰ Jinnah tried to explain and interpret the actual process of social, political and economic change in terms of his doctrine of liberalism. He followed it conscientiously until the logic of facts, as he saw them, convinced him of its futility. Jinnah adhered to it because he was the spokesman of the liberal middle class and his middle class liberalism could not accord with a movement of the masses. It is notable that this type of liberalism had intimate relationship with the commercial interest of the rising middle class. Sir Syed had chosen to oppose the Indian National Congress, because the Muslim middle class had not come of age. But by the beginning of the 20th century Jinnah had begun to feel that liberalism could express the intellectual and economic aspirations of the middle classes to all the communities. Liberalism operated as the

dominant mode of thought until the emergence of mass politics under the leadership of Gandhi and Maulana Mohammed Ali. Jinnah felt constrained to leave the Indian National Congress when he realized that it had shed its liberalism and transformed itself into a mass organization. He started denying and contradicting whatever he had said before. The landmark which divides the two phases was the year 1920. The nature of this change needs to be understood and explained in the light of his theory of nationalism.

It was the firm opinion of Jinnah that Indian nationalism was the product of British rule in this country. The English language, the British system of education, and the establishment of universities contributed to a considerable extent to the making of Indian nationalism. Indian nationalism was more than a question of the attitude of Indians towards the British Government. The one nation theory which Jinnah held at one time had to be abandoned in the light of certain facts of the Indian situation, which became more and more prominent in course of time. He was inclined to think that they were only of a religious character and were of no political significance. He often emphasized the necessity of friendly relationship between the Hindus and Muslims. He always advised the Hindus as well as the Muslims to create and maintain mutual goodwill and brotherly feelings. This was a paramount political necessity. Religion, he felt, was no hindrance as Islam also enjoins Muslims to live peacefully with the people professing different religions.⁴¹ And to Jinnah religion was a private affair of the individual. This was the basis of his theory of single nationality. He never made any attempt to analyse the nature of Hinduism and Islam nor was he competent to do so. His conviction that politics and religion are to be separated was an expression of his indifference to theology and religious dogma. He was prepared to join hands with liberals to whichever community or religion they might belong. This was the nationalism which was propounded by leaders like Dadabhoy Naoroji, Feroz Shah Mehta, G. K. Gokhale, Badruddin Tyabji. It was a liberal and secular nationalism. Jinnah also realised that this type of nationalism is a comparatively recent phenomenon. It had the

potentiality of welding the people of India into a national entity. His speeches in the Council were a profound expression of his liberal nationalism. Here it is important to note that Jinnah did not approve of the extremist Hindu view of nationalism or separatist or communal nationalism of the Muslims. He never accepted the view that patriotism should be elevated into religion, or that religion should be transformed into patriotism.⁴² He would not accept God as the leader of any political movement nor complete freedom as its goal and passive resistance as its method.⁴³ Jinnah also chose to remain aloof from the separatist phase of the Aligarh movement. He agreed with Shaikh Raza Hussain that the Congress was not a "Hindu body".⁴⁴ Jinnah also held that the progress of the country demanded co-operation between the two communities and adherence to legal and constitutional methods.⁴⁵ Jinnah visualized that India could remain a part of British Empire and that liberal democracy of the British type would be established in the country. Sir Syed's leadership, in its last phase, had assumed a separatist turn and under Viquar-ul-Mulk's leadership it was carried on further in the political field. Viquar-ul-Mulk said, "God forbid if the British rule disappears from India, Hindus will lord over it; and we will be in constant danger of our life, property and honour. The only way for the Muslims to escape the danger is to help in the continuance of the British Rule. If the Muslims are heartily with the British, then that rule is bound to endure."⁴⁶ Jinnah considered this as communalism of the most extreme sort, harmful to the Muslim community itself. He was not prepared to think in terms of Hindu nationalism or Muslim nationalism. It was this communalism which was to become the "nationalist ideology of the emergent and precarious Muslim middle class in its struggle against domination within India by the much more developed Hindu middle class."⁴⁷ This unawareness, perhaps, was a great factor which deepened and strengthened his liberal convictions.

Jinnah did not consider Pan-Islamism as a sound ideology for the Muslims in this country. That seems to be the only reason for opposing "the Islamic nationalism" of Maulana Mohammed Ali. He was afraid that the consequences would

be disastrous if religion were brought into politics. It would lead to the emergence of religious and fanatic leadership while the country needed a secular and rational leadership. He would withdraw his support to the Khilafat movement even if it meant political suicide. This was not because he was indifferent to the interests of the community or country but because he believed that any ideology short of liberalism would inflict a permanent injury on the community as well as the country.

Considering Jinnah's changed outlook regarding nationalism, one significant difference between him and other Muslim leaders should not be ignored. In case of Maulana Mohammed Ali or Maulana Azad, ideology shaped their politics while it was the practical politics which determined Jinnah's ideology and thought. After the advent of the Gandhian leadership, Jinnah found that liberalism was becoming an inoperative ideal. In a fit of disappointment with the spirit and shape of Indian politics he left India and planned to settle down in England. It was quite possible that during this period he might have been seriously thinking of improving his ideology, making it more realistic and adequate for purposes of effective leadership in the country. In the presence of Gandhi, however, he had no chance of reviving his leadership in the Indian National Congress. His attempts towards bringing together all the liberals and Swarjists had failed.⁴⁸ The only alternative was to revitalise the Muslim League which had become an insignificant organization after the establishment of the separate Khilafat Committee. The introduction of provincial autonomy, the elections of 1937 and the Congress attitude in the matter of the formation of the ministry in U.P. led Jinnah to the renunciation and denial of whatever he had said and stood for before. He was destined to become the greatest advocate of the Two-Nation Theory though he was not its author. It was not conceived by him or by his adherents. It had its roots in the history of the last fifty years. Unfortunately Indian nationalism did not have a set doctrine with a definite meaning and was composed of contradictory trends. In a way they were responsible for the birth of Muslim nationalism and the political ideology and leadership of the League. One may mention that the idea of Hindu Raj had come into being

immediately after the formation of the Indian National Congress. A Muslim newspaper in 1893 wrote ; "There is another party in the Congress whose sole object in joining the movement is oppressing the Yavanas. They are all Hindu revivalists...their object is nothing more or less than to establish a purely Hindu Government."⁴⁹ A.O. Hume, wrote to the Secretary, Standing Committee of the Indian National Congress : "You will remember the worthy gentleman who desired to pass a resolution in the Congress that cow killing should be made penal."⁵⁰ But the president of Congress was a Mussalman. This letter was written in 1886.

After the establishment of the Muslim League which was to a great extent a non-religious organization, the social tendencies of the majority community did create suspicion, more false than genuine, in the minds of the Muslims. The Hindu Mahasabha as well as the Responsivist Party displayed great fear of the growing strength of the Muslims. "The Hindus transgressed the limits to such an extent that even an arch nationalist like Hakim Ajmal Khan was forced to admit the on-slaught of Hindu enmity and contemplated a grave fight if Hindus did not take warning and change their attitude and methods,"⁵¹ says Mohammed Noman, an interpreter of the point of view of the League. Jinnah did not lose faith in the Congress dominated by Gandhi. He agreed to the abolition of separate electorates if the Congress leadership accepted some of the reasonable and rational demands of the Muslims. This he proposed on the 20th March, 1927 in a conference of which he was the Chairman.⁵² In 1928 the Congress rejected the Delhi Proposals. Maulana Mohammed Ali characterized this as an attempt on the part of Gandhi and Pandit Motilal Nehru to maintain their popularity with the Hindu masses. In his letter to the British Prime Minister in 1931, Pandit Nehru rightly describes this attitude as capable of producing Muslim nationalism in India. "The Bania exploitation especially when the agriculturists were Muslims and machine-made goods which hit the Muslim trader more than the Hindus strengthened Muslim nationalism, which looked to the community rather than to the country."⁵³ In addition to this, certain expressions of Gandhi like Ram Raj and "spiritua-

lised politics' were producing undesirable effects especially on the middle class intellectuals of the Muslim community. Gandhiji's fast unto death in 1932 on the issue of separate electorates for the untouchables can be cited as an example in point. Dr. S.A. Latif's comment reflects this trend. "Politics, even with the Congress", commented Dr. S. A. Latif, "is inseparable from religion."⁵⁴ Because of this attitude and approach of Gandhi, the Muslims were constrained to demand separate electorates, safeguards and concessions. At the root of it all, the feeling was whether a particular type of electoral arrangement would or would not be helpful for the consolidation of religion or fostering the cause of religious nationality.⁵⁵

There were two alternatives left for the Muslims on the ideological plane—to determine their own destiny by adopting Pan-Islamism and or adjust with the realities of the Indian situation. The second alternative did not mean subordination to the majority community or the abandonment of culture and religion. It is significant that Muslims after the First World War were realising the futility of any Pan-Islamic movement. At least the leaders of the Muslim League were fully aware of it. Yaqub Hassan had rightly said "if Great Britain ever had any fear of Pan-Islamism surely that body had been laid to rest by the war. Islam as a power has reached its lowest ebb..."⁵⁶ A powerful tradition of anti-Pan-Islamism established by the Aligarh movement was to influence Jinnah and the Muslim intellectuals. Mohsin-ul-Mulk went to this extent that "his community could hope for no progress so long as they merely glorified in the achievements of their ancestors."⁵⁷ One should bear in mind that Pan-Islamism was criticised—mainly because it regarded Islam as a political power. Jinnah certainly had no liking for Pan-Islamism or religious politics. He too could not escape the influence of Mustafa Kamal⁵⁸ who abolished the institution of Khilafat and who believed neither in "a League of Nations of Islam" nor in the unity of religion and politics. It is unfortunate that orthodoxy and conservatism of the Muslim community did play a role in the intellectual make-up of Jinnah, at least in his later years. The Muslims could never forget that they constituted an international community. This

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may not be of any political importance but in the spiritual and cultural sphere its importance cannot be denied. It implies an attachment to an ideal which upholds the feelings of brotherhood and "respect for the Sunnah or "beaten Path",⁵⁹ H. Risby made a very pregnant remark about this feature of Islam. He says "Islam is a force of a volcanic sort, a burning and integrating force, which, under favourable conditions may even make a nation. It melts and fuses together a whole series of tribes and reduces their internal structure to one uniform pattern in which no survivals of pre-existing usages can be detected."⁶⁰ Therefore the intellectuals of the Muslim League including Jinnah exploited the religion of Islam for the purpose of the organisation and the consolidation of the community.⁶¹

All these factors were responsible for the birth of separatist Muslim nationalism. It existed even before the League Resolution on Pakistan was passed. But its character and content was cultural. Jinnah made it a political weapon for the creation of a new State. The idea of composite nationalism was not acceptable to several influential Muslims. Dr. S. A. Latif held that it could not be an operative ideal. His argument was that Hindu religion itself "is not a religion." It was "a federation of religions and cultures." So even a single stable nationality for the Hindus is a trying task.⁶² He continues to say that "to talk of a single nationality for the whole of India, therefore, in the absence of all material factors indispensable to its existence, is a bold venture."⁶³ He emphasized that there is no common culture in India. The interaction between Hindus and Muslims "is primarily in the externals of life, and has left the inner soul of the two cultures unaltered... real blending should be of the spirit, and manifest itself in common ways of thought and living, in common personal laws, in common ideals and in common worship."⁶⁴ Dr. Latif presented his thesis without keeping in view the political development in the country. His concept of culture is more religious and metaphysical than material. The behaviour of many important Congress leaders after the election of 1937 revealed that the Congress was not prepared to recognize the importance of the Muslim League. It was a real challenge to the leadership of Jinnah. The easy course was

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to establish that the Muslims were not represented by the Congress and that the Congress was a Hindu body. Swaraj meant Hindu Raj and National Government was, by implication, Hindu Government. And Gandhi's ideal was "to revive Hindu Religion and establish Hindu Raj in this country."⁶⁵ On the basis of the working of the Congress Jinnah described it as a "Fascist Grand Council under a dictator who was not even a four-anna member of that body."⁶⁶

A careful student of Indian history will realize that Jinnah was merely repeating those ideas which came in the wake of separate electorates and the Muslim League. The letters written by Sir Mohammed Shafi in 1909 are an instance in point.⁶⁷ Jinnah was only rearranging the scattered notions of the various non-progressive Muslim leaders about Indian politics in order to establish that he was right, whereas Gandhi was wrong in the assessment of the political situation. Others also tried to do the same thing but without success.⁶⁸

Jinnah successfully gave an ideological and religious tinge to the Two Nation Theory. He began to emphasise that since the Muslims in India are a nation they must preserve their culture, and separate identity. Such a desire has always been in the subconscious mind of the Muslims. It was the Hindu extremist element which made this inarticulate desire open and insistent. Jinnah in his Presidential Address to the Muslim League in 1940 quoted the letter of Lala Lajpatrai to C. R. Das to prove that Hindu extremism could be dangerous to Muslim existence. Lala Lajpatrai wondered how a Muslim could override the Quran⁶⁹ and be loyal to India as against Islam. Jinnah's conclusion that there was no possibility of harmony between "the inconsistent elements in India,"⁷⁰ would appear to be logical in the context of such expression from Hindu extremists. If Jinnah's reasoning is accepted then his conclusions regarding the position and future of Indian Muslims would appear to be incontrovertible. The democratic goal pursued by the nationalist movements only meant "Hindu Raj" and Democracy for which the Congress High Command was agitating ; it would only mean the complete destruction of what is most precious in Islam."⁷¹ It would lead to the creation of private armies by

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both the communities and to Civil War.⁷² He argued that the Indian nation and Central Government do not exist.... It is pure intellectual and mental luxury, in which some of the Hindu leaders have been indulging so recklessly."⁷³ The end of all such arguments was the partition of the country.

The second ingredient of the Two Nation Theory was the "Historical" and the "Spiritual" differences existing between the Hindus and the Muslims. To Jinnah, they were real and could not be dismissed as superstitious. The history of one thousand years could not unite them and make them one nation. Therefore "the artificial and unnatural methods of a democratic constitution will not create a sense of nationality."⁷⁴ Jinnah also argued that both the communities are deeply religious. The dissimilarities between the two religions are too deep and too wide to admit of spiritual harmony which is a basic necessity for the making of a nation. Jinnah held that Hinduism and Islam are "two entirely distinct and separate civilizations."⁷⁵ Emphasising this point he said the Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and cherish two distinct bodies of literature.⁷⁶ They neither intermarry nor interdine. They belong to two different societies. Their views on life and their attitude to life are different."⁷⁷ There was another difficulty which was not exclusively religious but social. Both Hinduism and Islam "are definite social codes which govern not so much man's relation with his God as man's relation with his neighbour. They govern not only his law and culture but every aspect of the social life and such religions, essentially exclusive, completely preclude that merging of identity and unity of thought on which Western democracy is based and inevitably bring about vertical rather than the horizontal division democracy envisages."⁷⁸ What Jinnah was expounding was the typical anti-liberal attitude of the Muslim reactionary leadership. Jinnah's compromise with this leadership on the political level had to be followed by a compromise in ideology. It is unfortunate that Jinnah who could be expected to play the role of a modern and progressive leader, fell a prey to the reactionary forces in Muslim society for reasons of political and personal ambition and ceased to be a forceful advocate of

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the complete separation of religion and politics. M. Yunus put forward an interesting reason for the unity of religion and politics. The "divorce (of religion from politics) leads on the one hand to the renunciation of world like the Sufis and Sanyasis and on the other to the emergence of the ugly spectacle of imperialism."⁷⁹ The feudal leadership and the illiterate people were so much under the sway of medieval Islam that they could not think of such a bold deviation. Every social, political and cultural problem was made a problem of Islam. Any opposition or criticism of this order was debunked as an attempt to de-Islamize the Muslims.⁸⁰ Jinnah's Two Nation Theory was the logical corollary of this situation. It was the ideological aid and political fulfilment of the League's anti-Congress and anti-Hindu attitude. How adroitly Jinnah made use of the Two Nation Theory is shown by various reports on the Hindu-Muslim tension such as Pirpur Report, Sharif Report, Kewal Yar Jung Report and *Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule* by A. K. Fazl Haq.

Jinnah's Two-Nation Theory also distorted his earlier concept of liberal democracy. His concern with democracy was limited by his interest in the Two Nation Theory and in his idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims. He did accept the rationale and logic of democracy. But when he realized that democracy in India would be different from that of the west he began "to counter the logic of democracy with the logic of nationalism."⁸¹ Although Jinnah did not care to deny the elements of spiritual democracy⁸² in Islam, he was indifferent towards seeking theological props for his notion of democracy in the context of his interest in the Two-Nation Theory.⁸³ What Jinnah opposed was the political democracy of the western type in the Indian environment. His argument was that India was not fit for democracy because she lacked its pre-requisites. India was not in a position to overcome the obstacles to this political system. So his conclusion was that democracy might be desirable in England but not in India. "A democratic system of Parliamentary Government.....based on the concept of a homogeneous nation and the methods of counting heads, was impossible in India."⁸⁴ he said in 1939. Besides, the over-

whelming majority of the population in India are "totally ignorant, illiterate, untutored, living in centuries old, superstitions of the worst type, thoroughly antagonistic to each other, culturally and socially,.....It is impossible to work a democratic parliamentary government in India."⁸⁵

But what was agitating the mind of Jinnah and of other Muslim leaders was the fate of the Muslim minority in India. The Muslims became aware or were made aware of this problem towards the end of 19th Century. In 1899 a resolution was forwarded to the Government of India that "democratic theories are wholly unsuited to this country, and if carried into effect, would result in establishing 'equal rights' about which so much is said, but in introducing a monopoly of power, the communities in minority being carefully excluded from all the sweets of office."⁸⁶ Jinnah never ignored this danger inherent in democracy. He realized that any government, including democracy, must give security and satisfaction to the minorities. In 1915 he said, "A minority must above everything else have a complete sense of security before its broader political sense can be evoked for co-operation and united endeavour in the national tasks..."⁸⁷ Earlier, when he was more optimistic, Jinnah had expressed that parliamentary democracy might be workable provided safeguards for the minority were guaranteed.⁸⁸ However, in 1936 he said that a representative government meant "the rule of majority, and naturally the minorities had apprehensions as to what the majority would do. Majorities were likely to be tyrannical. Power and authority were likely to intoxicate people—therefore provisions for safeguards are essential for minorities in any scheme of a democratic constitution."⁸⁹ After 1938 Jinnah felt convinced that the Hindus would form a permanent hostile majority and by virtue of their numerical strength would rule over the country and reduce Muslims to a position of permanent slavery. Jinnah said that even if the majority assumed a non-communal label, and made pretences of liberalism and tolerance, they would never shed their Hindu spirit and would always act as the aggressive and intolerant majority.⁹⁰ He feared that "under the cover of democracy the aristocracy and leisured classes"⁹¹ might dominate the communities. This would not be

a satisfactory arrangement from the point of view of the minorities and would inevitably lead to revolution and civil war.⁹² The Muslims, in particular, would be crippled in their spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life.⁹³ Jinnah built up his case against democracy on the basis of his concept of separate nationalism. His criticism of democracy amounted to an open claim for a separate nation State for the Muslims.

The theory of a separate homeland for the Muslims in India forms the central point in Jinnah's thought. In order to win his point Jinnah had now to be pragmatic, practical, beguilingly reasonable and logical. Jinnah could not afford to be speculative. It must be remembered that Jinnah was not the originator of the idea of Pakistan. It was eagerly adopted by the emerging middle class of the Muslim community as it satisfied their isolationist modes of thought and even by the common man as it seemed to be the only solution to all their grievances, real as well imaginary. Since the leadership of the Muslims was in the hands of the feudal and reactionary classes the idea of Pakistan was deliberately given, a religio-cultural character. In fact it was "the end product of Muslim anxiety at first to attain cultural and political autonomy within the framework of a Federal India and later of their bold assertion that Muslims, being a separate Nation, must have a sovereign state."⁹⁴ The British did play a role in the development and formulation of this theory as it served their purpose of weakening the nationalist movement. In the last decade of the 19th Century Mr. Beck, principal of the Aligarh College interpreted the Indian National Congress as a force against the British Government and the movement against cow-slaughter as directed against the Muslims.⁹⁵ He also spoke of "inevitable antagonism between the two communities, of historical memories, of customs and culture."⁹⁶

The religious and revivalist movement of the 19th Century made the Muslims conscious of their cultural and social isolation. Maulvi Abdul Haq in a letter to Mahatma Gandhi pointed out that the Arya Samaj movement of Dayanand Saraswati which aimed at the revival of Vedic Culture, Vedic Traditions, Vedic Religion and Sanskrit was largely responsible

for the creation of the Two Nation Theory.⁹⁷ Hindu nationalism threatened the foundations of the common culture to which Muslims had made a remarkable contribution. This generated fear and suspicion among the Muslims and finally created the mentality of separatism. Sir Syed's opposition to the Indian National Congress should be viewed in this context. But more vocal than Sir Syed was Viqar-ul-Mulk who succeeded to the leadership of the Aligarh movement. He said in a speech in 1907 that if the Britishers leave this country the Hindus will become the rulers and the life, property and religion of the Muslims will be in danger.⁹⁸ He also added that the Muslims are not opposed to the Congress, but they only want to preserve their rights⁹⁹. It is also surprising that Viqar-ul-Mulk condemned representative democracy on the some grounds as Jinnah was to do later. He expressed the fears of the minority, the possibility of the Muslims being reduced to slavery, and of the tyranny of the majority and its complete hold on the administration, and of the danger of the minority losing its identity. At the same time Viqar-ul-Mulk suggested that the Muslims could become a separate Nation¹⁰⁰ and attain distinct statehood. Viqar-ul-Mulk is the first leader of the Muslims who deliberately attempted to formulate the Two Nation Theory in order to protect the cultural and political rights of the Muslim community. Opposition to the Congress and support to the British Government were the only adequate techniques to achieve their object. He was not afraid of the Congress but of the aggressive Hindu mentality which, he feared, was now dominating the Congress. Viqar-ul-Mulk also opposed joint electorates on various grounds—he feared that the Hindu majority would deprive the minority of all representation;¹⁰¹ he distrusted the very process of voting as he was sure that it would be dominated by religious considerations, to the detriment of the Muslims.¹⁰² He believed that the institution of joint electorates would ultimately lead to the enslavement and virtual extinction of the minority community. This aspect of the Aligarh movement immensely influenced the later phase of Jinnah's politics and thought.

Even some of the liberal statesmen among the Hindus

seem to have sensed the same apprehensions. In 1907 Gokhale is reported to have said that "confronted by an overwhelming Hindu majority Muslims are naturally afraid that release from the British yoke might in their case mean enslavement to the Hindus."¹⁰³

In 1913, Maulana Mohammed Ali suggested as a solution of Hindu-Muslim problem that North India may be assigned to the Muslims and the rest to the Hindus.¹⁰⁴

The Lucknow Pact (1916) and the Khilafat movement exercised a salutary effect on the Muslim mind. The former was thought to be a recognition of the League as a representative of the Muslims and their right to be protected and the latter was an experiment in unity of the two communities. In 1921 Mr. Nadir Ali of Agra wrote a pamphlet in which he discussed the partition of India as one of the methods of settling the Hindu-Muslim problem in the country.¹⁰⁵ In 1923 Mohammed Gul Khan, a tribal chief "suggested the establishment of separate homelands for Muslims in the North West extending as far as Agra."¹⁰⁶ In 1924 Maulana Mohammed Ali said that if the Hindu-Muslim problem is not settled India will be divided into Hindu-India and Muslim-India."¹⁰⁷ In 1925 Lala Hardyal said that "a joint Hindu-Muslim State is sheer nonsense, which under no circumstances can exist."¹⁰⁸ He also advocated Hindu Sanghathan, Hindu Raj, Shuddhi of Muslims and Shuddhi of the Muslims of Afghanistan and the Frontiers.¹⁰⁹ The Muslims reacted towards it sharply. In the same year "when Gandhi was in Calcutta, and a Muslim youth approached him with a catalogue of grievances : First was untouchability as observed against the Muslims by the Hindus ; ..second, differences about cow-slaughter ; third, insufficient representation : fourth, books and pamphlets against Islam ; fifth, newspaper reports about abduction and such other alleged crimes by the Muslims ; sixth, exclusion from services ; seventh, exactions by Mahajans ; eighth, Abvabs by Zamindars for Kali-puja, Gandhiji told him... the real grievance was the first."¹¹⁰ This clearly indicates the state of mind of the Muslims. Iqbal in his Presidential Address to the Muslim League in 1928 advocated his theory of state within state. It is considered to be a great landmark in the

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development of the Two Nation Theory. Iqbal believed that from the point of view of religion and culture the Muslims were a sufficiently distinctive group which required to be preserved and protected. The development of their culture could be fostered, if they are given a separate area, a state with complete autonomy in matters of religion and culture. It is clear from Iqbal's address that he did not envisage the partition of India in the way of the League or of Jinnah. Still Iqbal tried to philosophize and spiritualize the Muslim politics. He undoubtedly provided the Muslims with an ideological weapon which they effectively used. Iqbal's Address is certainly an improvement on Viqar-ul-Mulk's thesis of Muslim Politics. Viqar-ul-Mulk dwelt upon the problems of the Muslim community from the point of view of a politician. Iqbal discussed the same question but focussed all his attention on its ideological aspect. Iqbal's Address went unnoticed as the League's politics remained comparatively unaffected by it till the advent of Jinnah's leadership. But it gradually led to the idea that India is not one nation. The problem of India is international and not national in the sense that India is composed of two nations. What are popularly known as communal differences, are really national jealousies.¹¹¹

Mention may be made in this context of the religious section of the Muslim community which was also getting enamoured of the ideal of an Islamic State—an idea which was also dear to the supporters of the Khilafat. Apart from those who were active in politics even a theologian like Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, did speak something of Pakistan or the Islamic State as early as 1928.¹¹² His criticism of the existing government was not so much because it was foreign as it was un-Islamic in character¹¹³ Maulana Ashraf Ali in 1938 decided to support the Muslim League and believed that the League would be successful in establishing a separate State which would be guided by the Ulema.¹¹⁴ On 21st August, 1931, *Madina*, a nationalist paper, quoted a letter of one Mr. Ploden that there is only one solution of the Indian problem : it should be partitioned into Muslim India and Hindu India. In Ireland after the parliamentary struggle of 35 years the same principle

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was applied to resolve the conflict between the Protestants and the Catholics.¹¹⁵

Meanwhile the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Gandhi seemed to be utterly unaware of the trends of Muslim opinion and proceeded as if refusal to recognize reality was the remedy that the situation called for. The Indian National Congress was "becoming increasingly metaphysical, having lost all touch with reality, thereby also losing its primary purpose which was meant to be political."¹¹⁶ Even among the Hindus extremism was becoming pronounced with its emphasis on Hindu Muslim difference. In 1937 V. D. Savarkar clearly said "India cannot be assumed today to be an uncertain and homogeneous Nation; but on the contrary, there are two Nations in the main, the Hindu and Muslim in India."¹¹⁷

The credit of coining the word "Pakistan" goes to Chaudhari Rahmat Ali, a student of the Cambridge University. He, alongwith Mohammed Aslam Khan, Shaikh Mohammed Sadique and Inayat Ullah Khan formulated the scheme of the division of the country in a four-page pamphlet, entitled "Now or Never in 1933." The authors proclaimed that "India is not the name of one single country, nor the home of one single nation," and expressed the need for the establishment of a separate Muslim State in the North West of India—P standing for Punjab, A for Afghanistan, K for Kashmir, S for Sind and Tan for Baluchistan. It will be no exaggeration to say that Jinnah echoed the voice of Rahmat Ali and the League adopted the message of Jinnah.¹¹⁸ What is common between Rahmat Ali and Jinnah is agreement on the partition of the country. The motivation, however, was different. They also differed about the nature of the State that was to be created and about the purpose of the State.¹¹⁹ Rahmat Ali's scheme was essentially "Islamic" in character while Jinnah's scheme was political. Unlike Rahmat Ali, Jinnah was opposed to nationalism; what he resisted was the equation of Indian nationalism with Hinduism and the Hindu majority to the exclusion of other minorities. If the Muslims cannot be guaranteed their fundamental religious and social rights in a State dominated by the Hindu majority, they should be given a separate State where such rights would

be secure. Rahmat Ali believed that Muslims are to be free from "the soul-killing cult of Indianism" and their "reaggregation in South Asia,... through the land of the Crescent, stirring the spirit of Islamic regeneration and strengthening the hope of its realization."¹²⁰ This scheme was very close in spirit to political Pan-Islamism which had exhausted its potentiality after the First World War. Unlike Jinnah, Rahmat Ali wanted to create a free Muslim Nation in the Islamic stronghold of Pakistan, Bengal and Osmanistan and to bring them together by an alliance of mutual solidarity and defence."¹²¹ Rahmat Ali's concept of Islamic Nationalism was also different from that of Iqbal. Iqbal was more philosophical and poetic while Rahmat Ali was a fanatic and propagandist, Jinnah was more pragmatic. Rahmat Ali created a "a myth of Indianism"¹²²— to bring together all Muslims under the threat of cultural extinction.¹²³ The objective of Rahmat Ali was to convert India into a "*dinia*" which to Jinnah would have been an absurdity.

The idea of dividing the Country along communal lines was thus not new. The Jinnah scheme as approved by the League was important because it commanded the support of the masses. All such schemes were based on the assumption that Hindu-Muslim differences were irreconcilable. Once a supporter of reservations for the Muslim community, Jinnah began to preach separate Muslim nationalism which led ultimately to the creation of a separate Muslim Homeland. Jinnah was getting more and more convinced of the dire fate of the Muslims which would follow if the British left the country, leaving the management of affairs in the hands of the Congress Hindus. The "terrible suffering"¹²⁴ of the Muslims during 1937-39 strengthened the fears of the Muslims and their demand of Pakistan. Khaliqzaman claims that it was he who converted Jinnah to the ideal of Pakistan. In May, 1939 he suggested that the partition of India appeared to be the only solution to the communal problem.¹²⁵ Although Jinnah was hesitant at the outset he was convinced by the arguments of Khaliqzaman. This brief historical sketch of the evolution of the idea of partition and Jinnah's acceptance of it raises not only socio-political but ideological questions. The idea of partition

should, however, be viewed against the background and in the context of nationalism as a living ideal or force.¹²⁶ The Muslims were getting dissatisfied with the popular notion of nationalism. Jinnah became a supporter of the idea of partition in order to ensure the proper growth of Muslim culture. Other leaders were also voicing the same feelings.¹²⁷ The Muslim leadership considered Independence not merely a national necessity but religious necessity as well, for the achievement of the spiritual and worldly benefits, which Islam promises.¹²⁸ Jinnah elaborated the same point in his statement : "I do not wish to quarrel with any community. We want to preserve and guard our inherent rights. Some Hindu leaders are, however, out to crush Muslims and I must warn them that this cannot be tolerated."¹²⁹ It was precisely this situation which gave birth to the idea of Pakistan. Was this ideal capable of fulfilling the hopes of the Muslims ? Jinnah used to argue that it was absurd to attempt to spell out the details of Pakistan ; what was required was to accept it in principle. The foundation of this principle was the Two Nation Theory. The other less important leaders were busy in putting forward historical, economic, social, political, religious and ideological arguments in favour of Pakistan. This went to such a length that Nawab Shah Navaz Khan of Mamdot pointed out that "Pakistan had existed in India for nearly twelve centuries and all that the All India Muslim League was seeking was a constitutional sanction for its Independent future."¹³⁰ The proposed partition would lead according to another thinker (A. Punjabi) to the "economic emancipation" of the Muslims from "the economic domination of the Hindus."¹³¹ Jinnah was also concerned with the economic problems of the Muslims." The Muslims were financially bankrupt, economically zero and educationally at the bottom of the ladder...,¹³² he said. Jinnah was not wrong when he spoke of the economic and social grievances of the Muslims. But Pakistan was the outcome of communal politics which seemed to have run to a dead end and called for a desperate remedy. It was the result of the Muslim fears of Hindu domination and also of inevitable historical forces. Muslim leaders were taken aback when Pakistan was announced : (Sri Prakash). It was the British determination to leave, agreement or no agreement

between the Hindus and the Muslims which brought the Muslims the sudden gift of a separate State. But Jinnah blamed Gandhian leadership for the partition of the country. It would be wrong to think that Jinnah took interest in Muslim problems only after 1940. He spoke for the Muslims and was always considered to be quite an important representative of the Muslims. After the emergence of Gandhi, Jinnah found that his proposals of (the unity of the two communities) were being rejected without consideration. When his demand for one third of Muslim representation in the Central legislature was rejected, he said "I am not speaking on this question as a Mussalman but as an Indian... The two communities have got to be reconciled, united and made to feel that their interests are common... We are sons of this land, we have to live together, we have to work together and whatever our differences may be let us not arouse bad blood. Nothing will make me more happy than to see Hindus and Muslims united."¹³³ He also opposed the extension of the communal electorates to the District Boards and Municipalities.¹³⁴ In 1938 he said to the Aligarh students, that it was not because he did not love India passionately but because he was feeling so utterly helpless, that he thought of the desperate remedy of leaving the country.¹³⁵ Events, however, were to show that he was capable of overcoming this mood of desperation and of exploiting the very factors of a situation of despair to rise to unquestioned leadership and eminence. The rise of Jinnah to power is a proof for the potency of the psychological appeal of clever leadership, for the rational foundations of his cause were so debatable and weak. In this light one should understand the meaning of N.M. Dumasia's statement that "It was Mr. Gandhi who was the father of Pakistan, not Mr. Jinnah. Mr. Gandhi had driven every body to desparation."¹³⁶ Jinnah chose to support the Two Nation Theory in spite of its theoretical and practical unsoundness because of its powerful psychological appeal. He himself was not clear and precise about the implications of his demand. Speaking at Otacamand in 1941, he said that the "time was not far distant when Pakistan would be adopted by every Indian and that it was the only and quickest means of securing the country's freedom. He denied that Pakistan meant vivisection

of India and demanded that the Hindus where they are in a majority and the Muslims where they are in a majority should be allowed to follow their own respective way of life, each according to their own philosophy, faith and culture.¹³⁷ This raises many problems particularly of those Hindus and Muslims who would be in a minority in either part of divided India. If, however, India was to be a composite State with equal economic opportunities for all communities would the guarantees of cultural rights to minorities be enough? The one would be an answer to the economic arguments of the separatists as the other would be an answer to the religious and cultural arguments.

Jinnah did not have any definite answer to these questions. He believed that in democracy the Muslims could not accept to be reckoned as equal with the majority community much less as the dominant force."¹³⁸ This was the crux of the matter. The fundamental issue behind the communal problem and the demand for Pakistan was "neither economic nor religious but...sharing of the power that might be transferred to Indians in a new constitution."¹³⁹ Therefore the idea of Pakistan was more than "a catching phrase"¹⁴⁰ as Sikander Hayat Khan put it. It was, as Sir Mohammed Yaqub pointed out, essentially the recognition of the fact that "the subcontinent of India embodies many nationalities, each one of which would be allowed to develop according to its own genius, its own culture, and its own traditions"¹⁴¹ It was a basic necessity to ensure that "the Central Federal Government is not established unless it is not with the consent of the individual units. The provinces have to be developed and given greater power until they become fully autonomous and independent."¹⁴² H. S. Suhrawardy believed that this scheme would pave the way for a lasting federation but according to "A. Panjabi" it would not be a federation of different units but a confederation of various states.¹⁴³ Jinnah however thought that the parts of the country where the Muslims would be in a majority should be constituted as a separate and sovereign state and was not much concerned with the nature and shape of their future relations. He would be satisfied with immediate gains and the realization of his ambitions.

Jinnah did not elaborate the methods to be employed for the achievement of Pakistan. Jinnah who once bitterly denounced the extreme and fanatic methods¹⁴⁴ of Hartal, picketing and similar activities of the non-cooperation Movement,¹⁴⁵ began now to justify the obstructionist and extreme methods of the Muslims by drawing an analogy between the Indian Muslims and the tactics of the Sudetan Germans in 1938.¹⁴⁶ This attitude shows that Jinnah was not too scrupulous about the question of means for the attainment of his ends.¹⁴⁷ The other leaders of the Muslim League even thought of obtaining it, if only time permitted.¹⁴⁸ The demand of Pakistan amounted to a clear repudiation of the ideal of the joint political life of the Hindus and Muslims.¹⁴⁹ It is no wonder that Iqbal's allegedly Islamic poetry was used and misused by the League leaders. Aurangzeb was compared with Akbar and was glorified in the new context. Any arguments, rational or irrational, in support of the League demand were welcome. Aligarh came forth in support of the scheme in the most hysterical manner : "..... from the University library dangerous books were removed. The writings of James Harvey Robinson on rationalism, of Freud on religion, and the like."¹⁵⁰ The critics of Pakistan and the nationalist Muslims in particular were denounced and condemned on absurd grounds in the most intemperate language. One supporter of Pakistan said, "In fact, by accepting Congress money as a price for their patriotism, these wanderers in no man's land have remained neither Nationalists nor Muslims, and they have lost the confidence of the latter."¹⁵¹ The formation of Pakistan cannot, however, be regarded as just the result of the ambition and intrigue of selfish leaders. Such a view would leave out of account the larger impersonal forces¹⁵¹ without the aid of which results of such magnitude would be impossible. Jinnah's consummate political skill lay in the manner in which he harnessed these forces under his personal direction for the achievement of personal glory and the establishment of the political identity for the community. The leadership of the League mostly belonged to the middle class. The Muslim bourgeoisie class was not happy about the competition which it had to face from its

indicates the peculiar non-rational trait of the Muslim mind. It was a self-defeating project and an escape from hard realities. No one denies that there are differences between the Hindus and the Muslims. The nature of the differences, undoubtedly, has been more religious than cultural. The defect of this theory is that it claims that the Muslims are a separate nation only on religious grounds. It did not take into account the large area of common life which the Hindus and Muslims quietly shared. The writings of El Hamza and "Panjabi" show the force of the idea of nationalism.¹⁶¹ The religious differences did not necessitate the creation of a separate nation State. Partition of the country was "neither inevitable nor was it necessarily inherent in Hindu-Muslim differences."¹⁶² It is also to be noted that "even in matters of religion the differences are not so sharp and strong as they are generally made out to be."¹⁶³ A careful study of Indian Islam reveals that "Islam in India is an Arabic version of Sanathan Dharama just as Sikhism and Arya Samaj are more or less Gurmukhi or Hindu Editions of Islam."¹⁶⁴ Dr. S. Ansari argues that nationalism is more than a religion. It means "the corporate life of the people, derived from its customs, laws and institutions taken together."¹⁶⁵ He stated that the Hindus are small minded in the social field and exclusive in the economic field.¹⁶⁶ The Two Nation Theory according to him is not more than a myth—a camouflage to cover up humiliation in the social sphere, and inequality in the economic sphere.¹⁶⁷ Rahmat Ali also supported the same view: The whole social system needs a radical transformation and the complete emancipation of the country is but a step towards the disappearance of the Hindu-Muslim conflict."¹⁶⁸ Ashok Mehta and A. Patwardhan believed that the problem had a social basis. It required a 'change of heart' wherein the good will of both the communities comes into full play and makes understanding possible. The responsibility, to start with, rested with the Hindus.¹⁶⁹ No purpose would be served by mere idealising and philosophizing over the issues. The differences might be minor, but the "suspicion of the organized section of the Muslim communities against the Hindus was greater than its mistrust of the political leaders."¹⁷⁰ The Two Nation Theory can also be

judged constitutionally as the problem of establishing one single government in India agreeable to all and in this context, especially to the Hindu and Muslim communities. The Muslim argument was that if such a government was set up, the minorities will permanently be excluded from power. A separate State was therefore necessary for the large Muslim minority. The Muslim League demanded Pakistan to preserve and promote the Muslim culture and way of life. But there were two difficulties. Partition of the country was no solution of the problem. Complete exchange of population between the two units was impracticable. The second difficulty was that the Muslims did not give serious thought to this problem. It was, in the last analysis, leading to the political issue of autonomy of the constituent units. A federal constitution distributing power between the state and central governments and according full autonomy in the internal affairs of the units, might have solved the problem.¹⁷¹ The Pakistan scheme was not at all desirable because it would have meant a position of "eternal orphanage" for the Muslims in an "Independent Hindu India."¹⁷² Secondly, the newly created state would be a weak state. In the words of Dr. S. A. Latif "It will either lapse into the position of a dependency or protectorate of some foreign power or return chastened in spirit to the Indian Union."¹⁷³ Thirdly, Pakistan would not be a rule of God or *Hukumat-e Ilahiya*.¹⁷⁴ Thus the solution of the Muslim problem in India, was not partition but true federation—political as well as cultural. Coupland expressed a great truth when he said that "Regionalism meets half the Moslem claim. It concedes the first demand of the Pakistan resolution.....It provides the Muslims with a National Home which they can call their own. They would be autonomous states, not secondary or subordinate units of administration."¹⁷⁵ Even those who were opposed to the partition of the country,¹⁷⁶ supported the idea of regional or provincial autonomy.

Still the problem never remained so simple. Muslim society was dominated by the interests of the upper classes, and by the religious and pseudo-religious and cultural forces. Jinnah may be considered as the "typical bourgeoisie politician."¹⁷⁷

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of such a community.”¹⁷⁸ He was never a reactionary in politics and social reforms.¹⁷⁹ The class character of the Muslim League demonstrates the “logical consummation of the work that was begun by Sir Syed Ahmed.”¹⁸⁰ The career of Jinnah reveals in the clearest light the ambitions, aspirations and the vanity of his class politics. Though he called himself a proletarian he never made himself known to the masses.¹⁸¹ His very aloofness perhaps created distant respect from the masses which closer contact might have dispelled. Certain virtues of his character—sincerity, determination, devotion to the cause, integrity, self confidence—gave him a peculiar position, similar to that of Mussolini, at least in his community. He “gave always the same order to his Muslim followers : organize yourself on the lines I have laid down. Follow me, be ready—if need be—to die at the supreme moment and I will tell when the time comes.”¹⁸² Such a man could accept no superior. Self confidence bred an extreme type of self-righteousness.¹⁸³ His behaviour towards Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, Saadullah, Fazlul Haque, Begum Shah Nawaz, Sir Sultan Ahmed is an example in point. There is some truth in the statement that this man is more haughty and arrogant than the proudest of Pharaohs.”¹⁸⁴ Jinnah, however, had many of the necessary qualities of leadership. There should not be any misunderstanding¹⁸⁶ about his integrity, ability, devotion, sincerity to the cause of his party. He certainly was not a “powerful weapon in the hands of British Government.”¹⁸⁷ On the contrary he fully exploited “the weakness of the British position”¹⁸⁸ in India which was the result of the changed international situation during the Second World War, specially in its last phase.

Sometimes an inconsistency is pointed out in Jinnah’s thought and political conduct. The Two Nation Theory is described as a convenient tool for strengthening the position of the Muslims. Khaliqzaman says that on 11 September, 1947 Jinnah “took the earliest opportunity to bid goodbye to his Two Nation Theory.”¹⁸⁹ This is very seriously misleading. Jinnah did certainly make a speech asking people to forget religious denominations in the political life of the country. But what is missed is the character and the objectives of the class to

which he belonged. He wanted the common people to be associated with the movement of the Muslim League in order to realise the goal and protect the interests of the middle classes. The story of the growth of the Muslim League is the story of the rise of the Muslim Middle class.¹⁹⁰ This class had its own characteristic features. It was not essentially a religious group, in the sense, that it “developed quite independent of the religious unity of the Muslim world. Its interest in Pan-Islamism, when it existed, was purely that for a fashionable cult without any vital attachment.”¹⁹⁰ But it had in order to broaden its base to strike a compromise with the common people who were not prepared to renounce the Islamic Past and who were governed by the dogmas of religion. Consequently it had to emphasize the aspect of religion. To a great extent, it was successful. Religion became the basis of politics. The implications of this development were far reaching. B.B. Misra rightly says that since Hinduism and Islam “were mutually exclusive, any resort to religion as a basis of politics tended to cause communal violence.”¹⁹² In this class orientation lies the vital difference between the thought of Jinnah and Maudoodi. Like Maudoodi, Jinnah spoke of solidarity and the unity of the Muslims because under this cry the exploiting class had the advantage of disguising and hiding their exploitation. Moreover the young bourgeoisie—both Muslims and Hindus—felt the need of having the state apparatus in its own hands. Therefore Jinnah was more interested in the political liberation of the Muslims than in the social and economic emancipation of the exploited masses. Jinnah, thus, was led by the aspiration (Aziz Ahamed describes them as a Muslim consensus), of his class. His “role was that of a sincere and clear-headed lawyer [who could formulate and articulate in precise constitutional terms what his client really wanted.”¹⁹³

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. K. Cragg : *Islamic Surveys*, Part. III, P. 21.
2. S. Jackson : *The Aga Khan*, P. 169.
3. H. Bolitho : *Jinnah*, P. 7.
4. M. N. Roy : *India in Transition*, P. 167.
5. Quoted by Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 52.
6. *Ibid* : P. 57.
7. *Ibid* : P. 11.
8. M. R. Duggal : *Jinnah*, P. 11.
9. *Eminent Mussalmans* : P. 439.
10. *Ibid* : P. 439.
11. Quoted by Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 9.
12. L. T. Hobhouse : *Liberalism*, Pp. 37-45.
13. John Hallowell : *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology*, P. 5.
14. L. T. Hobhouse : *Op. cit.* Pp. 23-24.
15. Mohammed Ali Jinnah : *Writings and Speeches*, Pp. 29-30.
16. *Ibid* : P. 29.
17. Quoted by Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 65.
18. M. A. Jinnah : *Op. cit.* P. 100.
19. Mohammed Noman : *Muslim India*, P. 158.
20. Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 52.
21. *Ibid* : P. 52.
22. *Ibid* : P. 52.
23. *Ibid* : P. 82.
24. M. H. Saiyid : *Jinnah*, P. 131.
25. Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 63.
26. M. A. Jinnah : *Op. cit.* P. 160.
27. *Ibid* : P. 100.
28. M. A. Saiyid : *Op. cit.*, P. 126.
29. *Ibid* : P. 625.
30. *Ibid* : P. 267.
31. Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 68.
32. Quoted by M. R. Jayakar : *The Story of My Life*, Vol. II, P. 558.
33. *Ibid* : P. 559.
34. Compare Gandhiji : *To the Hindus and Muslims*, P. 138.
"I have always said that my politics are subservient to my religion. I have found myself in them, as I could not live my religion *i.e.*, a life of service, without being affected by them. I should discard them today if they hindered it."
35. M. H. Saiyid : *Op. cit.* P. 268.
36. Kanji Dwarkadas : *India's Fight for Freedom*, P. 153.

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37. Mohammed Noman : *Op. cit.* P. 200.
38. *Ibid* : P. 200.
39. See S. K. Majumdar : *Jinnah and Gandhi*, P. XII.
40. Khalid B. Sayeed : *Pakistan, the Formative Phase*. P. 61.
41. Compare Mohammed Yaqub, quoted by Lajpatrai : *Unhappy India*. P. 420.
"The action of His Holiness in making a settlement with the Jews of Madina in a spirit of give and take should regulate their conduct. Unity would not mean absorption of the community by another."
42. R. C. Majumdar : *History of Freedom Movement in India*, Vol. II, P. 140.
43. *Ibid* : P. 140.
44. Compare Shaikh Raza Hussain : *Some material for a history of freedom movement*. Vol. II, P. 30.
"It is an unfounded allegation that Congress is a Hindu Body...In my opinion no country can prosper in which there is not a national Unity. We may differ in religious views but in our aspirations I hold that we are one. We have a common goal before us..." (1886).
45. Compare Nawab Reza Ali Khan, *Ibid* : P. 30.
"You will ever find us side by side with you in every legal constitutional endeavour to raise the political status of the people, of our common home and country." (1886)
46. Quoted by Ram Gopal : *Indian Muslims*, P. 101.
47. W. C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India*. P. 211.
48. M. R. Jaykar : *Op. cit.* P. 561.
49. Quoted by M. H. Ahluwalia . *Freedom Struggle in India*, P. 366.
50. *Source Material for Writing History* : Vol : 2. P. 66.
51. Mohammed Noman : *Op. cit.* 236.
52. Mohammed Sarwar : *Maulana Maudoodi ki Tahrik-e-Islami*. P. 119.
53. Quoted in M. R. T : *Nationalism in Conflict in India*. P. 185.
54. Dr. S. A. Latif : *Cultural Future of India*, P. 7.
55. Compare S. A. Latif ; *Ibid* : P. 7.
"If the Congress electoral arrangement is to consolidate Hinduism or further the cause of a Hindu Nationality,...separate electorate is considered necessary to prevent the disintegration of Islam in India and to preserve the Muslim National individuality,...".
56. Yakub Hassan : *Times of India, January, 20, 1919*.
57. Quoted by Ram Gopal. *Op. cit.* P. 115.
58. Compare Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 102.
"For many days afterward he talked of Kamal Atatürk so much that his daughter chaffed him and nicknamed him 'Grey Wolf' ".
59. M. Watt : *Islam and the Interpretation of Society*, P. 175.
60. H. Risby : *The People of India*, P. 208.

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61. Compare M. R. T : *Pakistan and Muslim India*. P. 70.

“Pan-Islamism may be impossible of attainment as an ideal to unite the Muslim countries under a common system of Government, but it is still alive to inspire Muslims everywhere to liberate themselves from the domination of others.”
62. S. A. Latif : *The Muslim Problem in India*. P. 11.
63. *Ibid* : P. 11.
64. *Ibid* : P. 30.
65. *Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* ; P.71.
66. *Ibid* : P. 233.
67. Compare Sir Mohammed Shafi : *Journal of Asiatic Society of Pakistan*, Vol. XV. No. 1., 1964, P. 174.

“Hindu Nationalists comprise by far the larger portion of the Hindu community and events which have, of late, been occurring all over the country and particularly the controversy relating to the question, which is being hotly discussed in these days, of ‘National Congress’ Versus ‘Hindu Congress’ have made it abundantly clear to those who have the ability to see the political horizon that this section of the Hindu Community is gradually but steadily expanding in influence and number.” (15th June, 1910).
68. Like Jinnah, Maudoodi also possessed fanaticism, egotism, and opportunism. Their ideology also comprised of the same element. But Maudoodi lacked strategy and failed.
69. *India's Problem of her Future Constitution* : P. 10.
70. *Ibid* : P. 11.
71. *Ibid* : P. 14.
72. *Ibid* : P. 14.
73. *Ibid* : P. 19.
74. *Ibid* : P. 12.
75. *Ibid* : P. 12.
76. Compare Sir A. Rahim, quoted by Coupland : *Constitutional Problem in India*. P. 31.

“Whereas the Indian Muslims felt at home in the Muslim Countries of Asia, in India we find ourselves to all social matters total aliens when we cross the street and enter that part of the town where our Hindu fellow townsmen live.”
77. *India's Problem of her Future Constitution*. P. 13.
78. *Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, P. 130.
79. Mohammed Yunus : *Frontier Speaks*, P. 168.
80. Compare A. K. F. Haque : *Times of India* ; 1st January, 1940, P. 8.

“It (Wardha Scheme) is but a device to de-Islamise Muslim Boys and Girls in the formative period of their intellectual lives. Muslims will never barter their cultural autonomy, educational freedom and religious independence to any system of free education

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which is calculated to undermine the foundations of their Nationality.”

81. Coupland : *India, a Re-statement*, P: 188.
82. Compare, Jinnah, quoted by Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 173.
“I give an example. Very often when I go to a Mosque my chauffeur stands side by side with me. Mussalmans believe in fraternity, equality and liberty...”
83. Quoted by G.W. Choudhary, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan*. P. 64.
84. Coupland : *Op. cit.* P. 188.
85. *Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*. P. 86.
86. Quoted by M. H. Ahluwalia : *Op. cit.* P. 369.
87. *Eminent Mussalmans* : P. 455.
88. *Ibid* : P. 465.
89. M. H. Sayyid : *Op. cit.* P. 538.
90. *Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*. P. 41.
91. *Ibid* : P. 225.
92. *India's Problem of her Future Constitution*, P. 14.
93. Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 94.
94. Khalid Bin Sayeed : *Op. cit.* P. 6.
95. Mehta and Patwardhan : *Communal Triangle in India*. Pp: 59-60.
96. *Ibid* : P. 60. See also T. W. Wallbank ; *A Short History of India and Pakistan*. P. 104.
97. *Urdu-e-Mussaffa* : Pp. 4-5.
98. Amin Zubery ; *Tazkera-i-Viqar*, P. 172.
99. *Ibid* : Pp. 172-73.
100. *Ibid* : P. 176.
101. Ikramullah : *Viqar, a Hayat*. P. 675.
102. *Ibid* : Pp. 682-84.
103. Jamiluddin Ahmed : *Through Pakistan to Freedom*, P. 12.
104. Moin Shakir : *Radical Humanist, Calcutta 4th February, 1968*.
105. Khaliqzaman : *Pathway to Pakistan* : P. 237.
106. Aziz Ahmed : *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*. P. 257.
107. Quoted by Khaliqzaman : *Op. cit.* P. 237.
108. K. L. Gauba : *Consequences of Pakistan*, P. 14,
109. *Ibid* : P. 15.
110. D. G. Tendulkar : *Mahatma*, Vol : II, P. 191,
Also compare Pandit Sunderlal, quoted in “*Unpardonable Crime of Jinnah*” Pp. 35-36. The truth may be unpalatable to you, but it must be admitted that the Hindus themselves are responsible for the cry of Pakistan raised by the Muslims. The Pakistan scheme is not the scheme of Mr. Jinnah. It is the Hindus who started Pakistan; you have a Pakistan in each Hindu household. If a non-Hindu comes to your house for water you refuse to give him your vessel.”

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111. Theodore Morrison : *Political India*, P. 105.
112. Abdul Majid Daryabadi : *Hakimul-Ummat*, P. 23.
113. *Ibid* : P. 23.
114. Munshi Abdul Rahman Khan : *Seerat-i-Ashraf*, 559.
115. Quoted by Mohammed Miyan : *Ulma-e-Haq*: P. 129.
116. Sasadhar Sinha : *Indian Independence in Perspective*. P. 24.
117. K. L. Gauba : *Op. cit.* P. 18.
See also Malik Fazl-e-Hussain : *Plans of Hindu Raj*.
118. Khan A. Ahmed : *Founder of Pakistan*, P. 20.
119. There were temperamental differences as well. Jinnah never liked him and dubbed as "irresponsible person" while Rahmat Ali characterized Jinnah as "Buozna of Bombay." One thing is also there : Rahmat Ali did not bequeath any influence on the Muslim mind. K. Cragg therefore says, "no doubt the kindest thing is to ignore him". *Islamic Surveys*, Vol. III. P. 25.
120. Khan A. Ahmed : *Op. cit.* P. 1.
121. *Ibid* : P. 12.
122. Theodore De Barry : *Sources of Indian Tradition*. (Editor) P. 829.
123. *Ibid* : P. 829.
124. *Dawn* (November, 1945) Quoted by A. B. Rajput : *Abul Kalam Azad*, P. 198.
125. Khaliquzzman : *Op. cit.* Pp. 210-211:
126. Compare Eli-Hamza : *Pakistan : A Nation*. P. 127.
"The strength of national feelings is derived from instinctive source...the love of one's own country is a noble feeling. It is an effort of the individual self to expand and become coextensive with the national self, and as such it is a necessary stage in the advancement of the individual towards becoming one with the Universal self...it would be wrong to make nationalism our despair."
127. Compare Khaliquzzaman : *Pathway to Pakistan*, P. 132.
"Indian Nationalism cannot live on the crumbs of foreign countries. If it is to be a living force in the country it will have to evolve its own meaning and significance in the light of the peculiar position which the communities occupy in the country."
128. A Panjabi : *Confederacy of India*. P. 98.
129. *Times of India*, 24th January. 1940, P. 7.
130. *Times of India*, December, 1st 1941, P. 7.
131. A Panjabi : *Op. cit.*: P. 269.
132. *Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*. P. 127.
133. Quoted by Kanji Dwarkadas *India's Fight for Freedom*. P. 341.
134. Raza Ali : *Aamal Nama*, P. 328.
135. Quoted by Bolitho : *Op. cit.*, P. 100.
136. *Times of India* : December 3, 1941, P. 6.
137. Candidus : *Times of India*, 11th June, 1941, P. 6.

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138. Candidus : *Times of India*, 1st January, 1941. P. 6.
139. *Times of India* : 30th April, 1941, P. 3.
141. S. K. Majumdar : *Jinnah and Gandhi*, P. 280.
142. H. S. Suhrawardy : *Times of India*, 7th November, 1941, P. 6:
143. A. Panjabi : *Op. cit.* P. 152.
144. Compare Jinnah,
"Do not decry fanatics. If I had not been a fanatic there would have never been Pakistan."
(Quoted by Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 167.)
145. *Times of India* : 21st January, 1922.
146. R. Coupland : *The Constitutional Problem in India*, Part III, P. 76.
147. Quoted by A. B. Rajput : *Abul Kalam Azad*, P, 199.
148. Compare Feroze Khan Noon, quoted by K. L. Gauba : *Consequences of Pakistan*, P. 246.
"If there was any agreement between the Cabinet Mission and the 'Indian Banyas' leaving out the Muslim League the only course left open to Muslims was to look to Russia, There was already a great movement in the Panjab, including landlords, in favour of communism."
149. Candidus : *Times of India*, 27th March, 1940, P. 8.
150. W. C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India*, P. 182.
151. Hoder Ali Dairkee : *Times of India*, 2nd January, 1946. P. 4.
152. Y. V. Gankovskay and L. R. Gordon-Golonskaya : *A History of Pakistan*, P. 8.
153. P. Moon : *The Future of India*, P. 27.
154. Quoted by Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 158.
155. *Ibid* ; P. 158:
156. Mohammed Noman : *Muslim India*. P. 157.
157. P. Moon : *Op. cit.* P. 24.
158. Mohammed Noman : *Op. cit.* Pp. 357-359.
159. Vide Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 118.
160. Quoted by Khaliqzaman : *Op. cit.* P. 141.
161. Compare El-Hamza ; "The Pakistani Hindus are true children of the soil and are of the same race as their Muslim countrymen."
Quoted by Dr. S. Ansari : *Pakistan*, P. 141.
See also A. Panjabi : *Confederacy of India*. P: 17:
"The foreign elements amongst us is quite negligible and we are as much sons of the soil as the Hindus are. Ultimately our destiny lies within India not out of it."
162. S. Sinha : *Iqbal* : P. 123.
163. Dr. S: Ansari : *Pakistan* : P. 2.
164. *Ibid* : P. 25.
165. *Ibid* : P. 27.
166. *Ibid* : P. 27.
167. *Ibid* : P. 28.

168. Quoted by Mehta and Patwardhan : *Communal Triangle in India*, P. 112.
169. *Ibid* : P. 123.
170. D. P. Mukerji : *Modern Indian Culture*. P. 46.
171. Moin Shakir : *Myths in Muslim Politics, Mainstream, Delhi, 29th October, 1966*.
172. Dr. S. A. Latif : *Pakistan Issue* : P. XI.
173. *Ibid* : P. IX.
174. *Ibid* : P. XII.
175. R. Coupland ; *Constitutional Problem in India*, Part III, P. 126.
176. Maulana Mohammed Miyan : *Ulma-e-Haq* P. 124.
177. Feaner Brockway : *The Indian Crisis* P. 121.
178. Kanji Dwarkadas : *India's Fight for Freedom*, P. 289.
179. *Ibid* : P. 323.
180. R. C. Majumdar : *History of Freedom Movement in India*, Vol : III, P. XXIX.
181. Bolitho : *Op. cit.* P. 104.
182. Aga Khan : *Memoirs of Aga Khan*, P. 296.
183. Compare Jinnah (*Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* edited by Jamiluddin Ahmed, Vol : I, P' 132.
"My entire equipment was confined to an attache-case, a typewriter and a personal assistant."
184. P. R. Ramchandrarao : *Blitz, 6th January, 1945*.
185. D: P. Mukarji : *Op. cit.* 53.
186. Quoted by P. R. Ramachandrarao : *Op. cit.*
"The Hindu thought he was a Muslim communalist, the Muslims took him to be pro-Hindu, the princes deemed him to be too democratic, the Britishers considered him a rabid extremist,... with the result that he was everywhere but no where. None wanted him."
187. M. R. Duggual ; *Mufti-e-Azam of Malabar Hill*, P. 5.
188. S. P. Verma : *Problem of Democracy in India*, P. 76.
189. Khaliquzzaman : *Pathway to Pakistan*, P. 321.
190. Compare N. K. Bose : *Studies in Gandhism*, Pp. 173-71.
"...the riots were utilized as a lever for wresting a heavier representation of the upper classes in economic affairs than was justified by numbers, while the demand of being treated as a separate community, marked off by cultural and religious distinctions went hand in hand with it: One may be permitted to remark that distinction between literate and illiterate, propertied and property-less classes were progressively camouflaged under this consolidation in terms of a cultural nationalism."
191. M. N. Roy : *India in Transition*. P. 225.
192. B. B. Misra : *Indian Middle Classes*. P. 386.
193. Aziz Ahmed : *Studies in Islamic Culture in Indian Environment*.

Islamic Neo-Revivalist-Renaissance

MAULANA ABUL ALA MAUDOODI

THE advent of the British Raj following the collapse of Muslim rule in India, gave birth to various political and social movements among the Muslims in India. These movements were defensive and reformative in character. The latter accepted the reality of the British Raj and tried to explore the possibilities of progress—social, political and economic—by remaining loyal subjects of the British Empire. The former type of movement asserted the spiritual and cultural superiority of Islam over the west and suggested a crusade for establishing Muslim supremacy in India. The reformative movements offered a new and a radical interpretation of the old principles of Islamic polity.¹ The leaders of the defensive movements regarded any deviation from the traditional interpretation of Islam as un-Islamic and upheld the strictly traditional approach to Islam. Politically these defensive movements were at once revivalist, reactionary and terroristic. The consolidation of the British power made the employment of violent methods futile. But the spirit of these movements, however, survived. Shah Ismail Shaheed, Syed Ahmed Bareilvi, and Mohammed Kasim Nanotvi represent the revivalist aspect of the defensive movement. In the 20th century the most notable expression of the political ideas of the defensive movement is found in the writings of Maulana Maudoodi. It may be pointed out that though he is apparently critical of the defensive movements, he was politically and philosophically akin to advocates of the school. His criticism is chiefly directed against the methods resorted to by the revivalists of the 19th century and not with their policy and objects.

Maudoodi did not agree with their stress on mysticism² nor did he share their enthusiasm for Jihad in North Western India where the Muslims were still not prepared for such a movement.³ He came out with burning zeal for progressive revivalism and awakening of the Muslims.

Maudoodi himself does not claim to be a philosopher, nor even a political thinker. He is at best a brilliant interpreter. Smith calls him "the most systematic thinker of modern Islam."⁴ This is perhaps because he has written much on almost all issues exercising the minds of modern man. In the process of discussing these issues he certainly transformed Islam while struggling to retain its rigidity and orthodoxy. A study of the sources of his thought would reveal how firmly he was rooted in tradition and orthodoxy.

His father, a pious and righteous man, exercised a profound influence on his mind. Abul Khair Maudoodi says that his (A. A. Maudoodi) mental attitude and religiosity owes much to his father's training.⁵ Maudoodi also says the same about his father.⁶ He was brought up in a religious atmosphere. This was perhaps a deterrent to Maudoodi's speculation and independent judgement and a break on his non-conformist tendencies.

Secondly it will be wrong to consider this religiosity responsible for Maudoodi's association with certain religious and political movements aiming at Muslim supremacy in the country. In the Hyderabad State (to which he belonged) where the ruler belonged to a microscopic minority and the Muslims possessed the complete power and authority of the ruling race, there was no enthusiasm for a democratic movement, especially among the ruling minority community. Nevertheless there were movements to justify the rule of the monarch on religious grounds. Even in British India the Muslims were under the sway of the politics which can be termed as romantic. This romantic approach of the Muslim intellectuals gave birth to the unrealistic politics of Maulana Mohammed Ali, the earlier political theory of Maulana Azad, religious poetry of Iqbal, journalism of Zafar Ali Khan and the historical writing of Shibli Nomani. This romanticism had a deep impact on the mind of Maulana Maudoodi. Because of these influences

Maudoodi became adherent of the school of thought which represented a strange combination of Islamic orthodoxy, political irrationalism, emotionalism and uncompromising hostility to the west. Maulana Azad after some time broke away from this school but Maudoodi consistently adhered to it.

Reference may be made in this context to the journal which was edited by Abul Mohammed Musleh. The journal—*Tarjumanul Quran* was started in 1351 A.H. The editor was a comparatively unknown figure but striking similarities are found between his religious attitude and that of Maudoodi. Abu Mohammed Musleh pleaded for an universal movement based on the Quran. The elements of this movement were : Divine Government *Hukumat-e-Illahiya* ; total submission to God (*Abdiyat-e-Illahiya*) and Love of God (*Mohabbat-e-Illahiya*).⁷ This view of religion does not exclude politics.⁸ In spite of its reference to the Quran, Musleh's thesis was meant not so much for the advocacy of the faith as for the establishment of a theocracy in which religion would be the sole driving force behind State.⁹ This movement was, as claimed by Abu Mohammed Musleh, inspired wholly by *Quran* and *Sunnah*. It was opposed to any modification or alteration in the *Quran* or *Sunnah*. Those who want to introduce reform and innovation are not doing any service to the cause of religion. The movement therefore was opposed to the efforts of Mustafa Kamal Pasha, Raza Shah Pehelvi and others.¹⁰ Abu Mohammed Musleh believed that the cause of all the evils was that society was lacking in an ethical foundation. But the religious revolution¹¹ cannot be brought about unless the religious consciousness of the people is awakened and society resolutely renounces secularism ; for if religion is divorced from the State people would develop an attitude of indifference to spiritual values.¹² The secularist trend of politics in Turkey was a gross infidelity from the Islamic point of view. In India too the establishment of a secular state will be dangerous.¹³

To Abu Mohammed Musleh Islam is not a religion in a strict sense. The five Arkans (The pillars of Faith) do not represent the whole of Islam. It is a way of life. He also says that there is nothing like Indian culture or Muslim culture. The

culture of the Muslims should be based on the Quran. The habits, customs, beliefs, education etc., of the Muslim should be in tune with the spirit of Quran. The language of the Muslim should be the language of the Quran.¹⁴ The culture of the Quran will be superior to all the cultures on earth.¹⁵ Abu Mohammed Musleh passionately advocated the formation of a party to bring about an Islamic revolution.¹⁶ Maudoodi borrowed most of his ideas from Abu Mohammed Musleh. His concept of Islam, approach towards the past, attitude towards Indian politics and the ideas of separate organization with the object of bringing about an Islamic revolution were all advocated by Musleh.

The writings of Maulana Azad in '*Al-Hilal*' and in '*Al-Balagh*' also influenced Maudoodi's religious and political ideas. Azad had an unshakable faith in the dynamism of Islam. It is universal and it is the voice of God¹⁷ and is a complete and perfect code of life. Every action of the Muslim is motivated by the Quran. It is a source of guidance to the Muslims even in economic, political and social affairs.¹⁸ Muslims will become leaders of the world by following the political policy laid down in the Quran. They will have to yield neither to the British government nor to the Hindus.¹⁹ All these ideas²⁰ of Maulana Azad were systematized in the form of Islamic doctrine. Maulana Azad also had enunciated the idea of a party of God (*Hizbullah*). Its ideal, according to him, was to be Islam alone and its purpose was to establish the rule of God on Earth and to revive the glory of Islam.²¹ Maudoodi carried the romantic idea to its logical end. Neither Abu Mohammed Musleh nor Maulana Azad could establish any "party of God". But Maudoodi did form a party—Jamaat-e-Islami and became its unquestioned leader since 1941. Like Maulana Azad he believed that what counted was not the size of membership but strength of faith.²² It should be noted that what Maudoodi borrowed from Maulana Azad was his theology for he was more interested in it. Maulana Azad wanted to break away from the Aligarh tradition of politics while Maudoodi disagreed with Sir Syed mainly on the question of the rational interpretation of Quran and on the question of supporting western education.

The political principles which Maudoodi advocated were

drawn from the thought of Ikhwan-ul-Muslamin of Egypt. It constitutes another source of Maudoodi's thought. The Ikhwan was established in 1928 by Shaikh Hassan Albanna. Both the leaders and their parties aimed at infusing the Islamic point of view of righteousness among the people.²³ Both the leaders believed that whatever they stood for was Islamic. Both the leaders denied the necessity and utility of nationalism. Islam, they held, was above geographical boundaries. The founder of Ikhwan had made it clear that all the Muslims belong to one and the same community (*Ummat*). All the Islamic countries are like a single unity though dispersed and separated geographically, their common spiritual bond transcends barriers of space and unites them, so to say, in a single spiritual homeland."²⁴

Maulana Maudoodi and Shaikh Hassan Albanna regard Islam as a religion which determines the relation between man and God as well as between man and man. No aspect of life is excluded from Islam and it is therefore a complete guide to life and conduct and needs no change or improvement. Every thing should conform to Quran, Sunnah, and Raison D'etre (*Hikmat Aqli*).²⁵ Both the leaders denounce schism in Islam.²⁶ From this one can deduce that what Maudoodi borrowed from Albanna was his anti-western attitude. It can be described in terms of rejection of nationalism, democracy—party system, legislature, sovereignty of the people—and women's participation in politics. Moreover the Jamaat-e-Islami was organized on the pattern of Ikhwan. They are religious as well as political organizations. To secure power is the goal, because the basis of religion (*Deen*) is political power. Maudoodi also reflects that the word '*Deen*' (Religion) carries the meaning of state in the context of the modern world.²⁷ The same is the view of the Ikhwan.²⁸ The purpose of political power is to establish an Islamic rule by righteous Muslims. This is the cardinal principle of his political programme.²⁹

Maudoodi was equally influenced by certain aspects of socialism. After the First World war those Indians who went abroad came back with revolutionary ideas of socialism. Maudoodi knew the Khairi Brothers who went to Europe and returned as converts to the socialist doctrine. They accepted

socialism without surrendering religion. The Khairi Brothers emphasised the "unity of dictatorship". Maulana Maudoodi used to attend the meetings organized by the Khairi Brothers.³⁰ They then started an organization named—Jamaat-e-Islami. The very name was adopted by Maudoodi for the organization which he established in 1941. Very little is known about the political ideas of the Khairi Brothers. The writings of Maudoodi however reveal a deep concern with socialist philosophy. What he likes in communism is the organization and the role of the Communist Party³¹ and not its philosophy. He was more enamoured of the authoritarian aspects of communism than with its economic doctrine for he was one of the vehement critics of socialism. He was equally attracted towards faith (*Iman*) and obedience (*Itaat-e-Amr*) which are responsible for the rise of Hitler and Mussolini.³² Maudoodi admires them because their principles are in agreement with Islam.³³ Mehrul Qadri, one of his admirers, speaks of Maudoodi's interest in the communist literature.³⁴ It seems that he began to take interest in socialism or even in fascism because of his association with the Khairi Brothers.

Maudoodi always claimed to be "*Dai!*" —one who gives a call to the people towards Islam. The interpretation of Islam which he accepted was that of Maulana Azad (of Al-Hilal period) and Ikhwanul Muslimin which was over-charged with orthodoxy and fanaticism. It was anti-rational and unhistorical as well as undemocratic and anti-socialist. A religion which claims to be all sufficing inclusive and all perfect necessarily gives birth to reactionary politics and out-dated political ideas. Maudoodi is a typical follower and advocate of this religion in the 20th century. No other Indian Muslim thinker seems to be so committed to such an interpretation of Islam.³⁵ "Islam," he said, "is the best of all religions. It is the real emancipator of man. No other system can give social justice, and a balance in human relationship."³⁶ The Muslims can only be followers and preachers of Islam.³⁷ Moreover, Maudoodi regarded Islam as not merely a religion but a movement. His concern is primarily with Islam and not with the Muslims who claim to be the followers of Islam. The "difficulties of the Muslims are the

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difficulties of the nation and not of a movement.”³⁸ He said, Islam is the only ideal to be pursued by all. It presents to all mankind “a social system of justice and piety based on creed and morality.”³⁹ And the ultimate goal of Islam is a ‘world state’.⁴⁰ For the achievement of the goal of a world state, Islam acts not only as a mere religion but as a movement, like communism, and those who adhere to it do not constitute a community or a nation but a party like that of the communists and the fascists,⁴¹ for a nation represents the settled goal of a people while the idea of a world State calls for infinite effort and expansion.

Maudoodi’s political thought is based on the medieval tradition of Islam which aims at the establishment of the rule of God on earth. This is not an easy task. It is a process of revolution which requires propagation, organization and the acquisition of political power by the righteous leaders of the movement. The political philosophy which is the basis of this revolution is presented as the only acceptable way of life. In the contemporary world, however, the most inadequate system is that of the west, which stands as a great challenge to the Islamic society. Maudoodi is perhaps the only thinker who displayed such stubborn hostility to western culture. Western influence, according to him, has led to the degeneration and de-Islamisation of the Muslims. The western civilization has forcibly severed religion from society and created a slavish mentality among the subject people and has deprived them of the will and ability to resist. He maintains that western education in India has done permanent harm to the Muslim mind and culture by spreading rationalism, irreligion and atheism.²⁴ The impact of the west has made the Muslims ignorant of the vitality and virility of Islamic culture. Islam according to him is opposed to all the values which are dear to the western mind. The western principle is disruptive in social life and the stability of the family is rudely shaken by the equality of sexes which characterizes western society. In the political sphere the west has created the false gods of nationalism and democracy. Religion is alienated from the state and the latter has become a tool in the hands of the opportunists and has ceased to be an

instrument for the promotion of the moral life of man. In the economic sphere the western system has failed to end the exploitation of man by man. The economic principles of the west do not guarantee good life for all the members of society. The cultural values of the west are dominated by the Epicurean principle which is incapable of satisfying the demands of the human mind and spirit. The corruption of the Muslim mind in India, is the consequence of western dominance. Therefore what is needed is rejection of the west and the enthronement of Islam as the one supreme reality. Maudoodi thus disparaged the entire system of western values and culture. Iqbal, on the contrary, thought that it was capable of contributing to the development of the Muslims in the world. It is mainly because Maudoodi looked upon Islam as not merely a faith but as a system which has provided mankind with set answers to all its problems. While discussing western civilization Maudoodi does not take into account its characteristic features, namely the spirit of liberty, recognition of rights, dedication to national and collective good, truthfulness, fair dealing, fair mindedness, dutifulness, discipline, spirit of inquisitiveness, science and philosophy.⁴⁴ Maudoodi fails to appreciate the western attempt to apply rational methods for solving the problems of society. The west also rightly lays emphasis on "man against system, believing that man formulates system to serve his needs."⁴⁵ The westerner has come to understand that "man's technique of knowledge has, by its achievement, been demonstrated to the science"⁴⁶ and those achievements, constitute man's control over nature. Thus the essence of western civilization is the concept it has of "man himself and his inherent dignity"⁴⁷ which ultimately made him the master of the forces of nature. Unlike Iqbal's Maudoodi's attitude towards the west represents not only a reaction to the negative features but also the "cultural sanction of the capitalist civilization—the humanism, rationalism and liberalism,"⁴⁸ Maudoodi regarded these cultural sanctions as not in keeping with the Islamic spirit. Maudoodi held that the west was a menace and an impediment to the spread of Islam. He vehemently opposed the western system of education and its emphasis on utilitarian morality and materialist welfare, seeking to make

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man independent of God,⁴⁹ and to replace the sovereignty of God by the sovereignty of man. Maudoodi advocates Islamic revolution as the remedy for this crisis. The revolution cannot, however, be effected without a radical change in the present system of education which ignored God and in the present system of society which discarded religion.⁵⁰ The present system of education results in a mass scale immolation of our manhood at the altar of learning. "Can I be accused of exaggeration when I condemn much vaunted seats of learning as dignified slaughter-houses"⁵¹ he asked. It is therefore imperative to do away with secular education and to reinstall Islam as the core of the system of education.⁵²

Maudoodi does not regard nationalism a sentiment or a subjective feeling which produces unity of purpose. Nationalism is a characteristic ideology of the west. According to Maudoodi the theory and practice of nationalism is not only defective but fatal to the interests of mankind as it is based on selfishness. "What is selfishness in individual life is nationalism in social life."⁵³

Maudoodi holds that there are four ingredients of nationalism. (I) The sentiment of national pride...which compels a nation to exalt itself over all other nations in every respect⁵⁴ ; (II) the sentiment of national consciousness which.....obliges man to support his nation whether it stands for right or wrong;⁵⁵ (III) the sentiment of self-preservation which, to protect its actual and visionary interests, compels every nation to adopt tactics which commencing with self-defence end in invasion;⁵⁶ and (IV) the sentiment of national prestige and national aggrandisement which produces in every progressive and powerful nation the assertion that it should dominate over the nations of the earth...⁵⁷

Thus the basic elements of the political philosophy of nationalism are national consciousness and pride, national self-preservation and aggrandisement. This philosophy treats man not as a part of humanity but as a member of a particular country set against other countries. It necessarily leads to the division of mankind on considerations of race and territory and

is nurtured on the sentiments of hostility and revenge.⁵⁸ It is unable to visualize the goal of 'world state'. "Apparently," Maudoodi says, "it rises to redress the injustices inflicted or supposed to have been inflicted on one nation by another nation or nations, but since it is not guided by and regulated by any moral code, by any spiritual teachings, by any God-made law, it exceeds its limits and assumes the forms of imperialism, economic nationalism, racial hatred, war and international anarchy."⁵⁹ Maudoodi believes that this has become "the most important philosophy of life that is today governing not only India but the entire world."⁶⁰ It has been making "life miserable on this planet."⁶¹

Maudoodi rejects nationalism and makes a strong plea for the acceptance of Islam as the only alternative to nationalism. Islam and nationalism are diametrically opposed to each other.⁶² Those who accept the principles of Islam are not divided by any distinction of nationality or race or class or country.⁶³ The Islamic appeal is to mankind in general and "dissociates men from their national traditions with their sentiments of racial pride, and from their love of sanguinary and material affinities."⁶⁴ "A man who wants to be loyal to Islam, as well as nationalism only betrays confusion of mind and looseness of thinking."⁶⁵

Nationalism thwarts the "peaceful evolution of human civilization."⁶⁶ It also blights "the sacred ideals for which the messengers of God have endeavoured since the earliest times."⁶⁷ It stands against the law of God. It results in narrow-mindedness. Here the difference in nationalism and Islam is clear. Islam wants to bring together mankind "into a moral and spiritual framework and make them mutually assistant to one another on an universal plane."⁶⁸ Unlike nationalism, Islam provides the highest opportunities of free contact between man and man,⁶⁹ and on it depends the progress of human civilization. Islam wants that every individual or group should obtain "full opportunities of developing its natural characteristics and its inherent potentialities so that it may be able to subscribe its due share to the collective progress of mankind."⁷⁰ Islam believes that "the rights of man are based on a moral code and not on force."⁷¹ Islam is not opposed to "individual self-preservation;" it also encourages

national self-loving "which should extend to humanity at large its sympathy, co-operation and well-wishing."⁷² Islam will make man well disciplined and man will "relate his behaviour to permanent laws which would not alter with individual and national interests."⁷³ Islam as "truth" and "divine teaching" is not "confined to one nation or country."⁷⁴ These are not the exclusive features of Islam but are common to all the "Shariats of God." Thus according to him no religion can glorify nationalism. The unity of the two is not possible. What do these Shariats of God signify? Which is the religion which represents these Shariats of God? His answer is Islam and Islam alone. The Hindus, the Sikhs and the Parsis who are adopting the cult of nationalism, Maudoodi believes, do not have "that guidance and teachings."⁷⁵ The Shariats of God are represented only by the Muslims in this world.⁷⁶ Only Islam can do away with the "Devil of Nationalism" and its "Satanic principles". The Islamic solution is the Islamic nationalism which is based on *Kalma*—there is no God but one God and Mohammed is His Prophet. Maudoodi says that acceptance of this tenet brings about unity and rejection results in disunity.⁷⁷

Maudoodi was aware of the popularity of the doctrine of nationalism with the Indian people irrespective of religion. He regards it as an imitation of the western doctrine of nationalism. It is adopted not on account of its inherent righteousness and truth or its moral worth and propriety but on account of pure expediency and utility.⁷⁸ But Maudoodi holds that the nationalists who are fighting against the British Raj are not on the "right path" as expounded by Islam.⁷⁹ What is needed according to him is righteousness of viewpoint which is wanting in the nationalists. What matters is not independence but the object of independence. If the object is not Islamic all fight against the British rule is *Haram* (Religiously illegal).⁸⁰ The nationalists in India claimed that British Rule would be replaced by a democratic system. Maudoodi regards such system as not only "un-Islamic but anti-Islamic."⁸¹ Therefore from the Islamic point of view there is no difference between democracy and imperialism.⁸² Moreover Maudoodi says that the nationalists openly criticise religion and proclaim their atheism and belief in communism.⁸³

He describes the Indian National Congress as politically Indian, ideologically communist and culturally western.⁸⁴ He therefore fails to make distinction between nationalism and communism ; they are not different from *Shuddhi* and *Sanghatan*.⁸⁵

Here Maudoodi raises the question of the desirability of nationalism in India. He says that the nationalists are not in a position to examine the question of nationalism dispassionately because they do not possess " True insight"⁸⁶ and are unable to be free from their mental slavery to the west.⁸⁷ Maudoodi believes that nationalism will not lead to the salvation but to the ruin of the country. Firstly, because "to achieve freedom by this means would be a long and tiresome business"; it will mean "the destruction of cultural nationality" and "its getting enkindled into nationalism."⁸⁸ If the attainment of political liberty depended on nationalism India will have to wait, as he says, for several generations more.⁸⁹ Secondly, freedom through nationalism would "ultimately hurl down the whole country into the inferno of moral degeneration."⁹⁰ Thirdly, "all those nations which have the least consciousness of their individuality would certainly resist this nation-making most stubbornly"⁹¹ and the dream of political independence may never be realized.⁹² Maudoodi, therefore, concludes that for liberty and political and economic progress of India, national unity and nationalism are in the least essential.⁹³

It is necessary to note that in order to understand fully Maudoodi's Islamic nationalism his view about what is described as Muslim nationalism should be taken into account. Maudoodi was opposed to Indian nationalism because of its communistic and western character. Moreover he thought that the nationalism of Congress was merely political nationalism, and a reaction to alien domination. He held that it is not sufficient to originate the sentiment of nationalism.⁹⁴ What is needed is cultural nationalism which will give birth to genuine nationalism. The Indian people do not constitute a cultural nationality which signifies "the mental temperament and moral constitution of a nation."⁹⁵ It is not an artificial product but evolves "through centuries in a natural order."⁹⁶ In India it will lead either to the absorption of one culture by another or to the evolution of a

common culture which would deny the identity of both. This implies that India is not a single nation. Do the Hindus or the Muslims constitute a separate nation? Is it Islamic to divide the people in this manner? If the Muslims constitute a nation then are they entitled to have a separate state? According to Maudoodi the Muslims are not a Nation. They are a Party. Here Maudoodi seems to be confused on this issue. His own definition of cultural nationalism makes the Muslims a nation. They are not only a nation but are also different from the Hindus. The "differences between these nations (Hindus, Muslims etc.) are more deep-rooted than those found between the different cultural nationalities in Europe. The principles of one culture are certainly different from those of another. There is a wide gulf between the systems of morals. There is little unity between the sources of traditions. Emotions and sentiments are mutually repulsive and antagonistic."⁹⁷ The nature of these differences between the various communities in India is not "communal" but "international"⁹⁸ which implies that the Hindus and Muslims are two different nations. Moreover, the movement of independence of the country aims at the establishment of "Hindu Raj under the Britishers."⁹⁹ Maudoodi therefore, suggests that the solution of the Indian problem is not to be sought in the unitary principle but in the federal principle. The permanent status and individuality of every nation should be recognized; every one of them should be allowed autonomous and sovereign control over its national "subjects" and the different nations should agree upon a joint action only in so far as the common interests of the country were concerned."¹⁰⁰

All these ideas provided the Muslim League an ideological foundation. The circumstances also led to the creation of mutual distrust and suspicion. Politicians became communal and the idea of Muslim nationalism in India came into being. The Lahore Resolution on Partition is the expression of this new trend. "The Pakistan movement", Sardar Iqbal Ali Shah says, "is a political ideology evolved by Indian Muslims...in a narrower sense Pakistan means the political system which the Muslim Indian Nation has aimed at establishing and which it demands as its contribution to the solution of the Indian problems."¹⁰¹ In

the evolution of this political ideology, Maudoodi certainly played a distinctive role. What the League leaders began to say after the passing of the Pakistan Resolution was already spoken by Maudoodi. However, instead of lending firm support to the idea of Pakistan, he stood curiously aloof from it. The Muslims were creating political nationalism out of cultural nationality which according to Maudoodi was not opposed to Islam, and stood for the maintenance of its individuality.¹⁰² The League leaders who claimed to be Muslims argued that Muslim cultural nationality could not be secure in India where the domination of the Hindu majority was inescapable. The interests of Islam and cultural nationalism therefore made the creation of Pakistan imperative. The Muslim League was inimical to Indian nationalism which it regarded as tainted by Hindu revivalism. Maudoodi despised both Indian nationalism as well as Muslim nationalism. According to Maudoodi the Muslim nationalists are those people "who are little concerned with Islam and its principles and aims, but are concerned with the individuality and the political and economic interests of that nation which has come to exist by the name of Muslim and they are so concerned only because of the accident of their birth in that community."¹⁰³ Indian nationalism and Muslim nationalism are both un-Islamic. Muslim nationalism is as vicious as Indian nationalism,¹⁰⁴ The Muslims have accepted nationalism because of their 'basic weaknesses.' They are "unaware of Islamic culture and its characteristics"¹⁰⁵ Secondly they are disintegrated and disorganized.¹⁰⁶ Thirdly poverty, ignorance and slavery have made them opportunistic.¹⁰⁷ Fourthly Muslim society contains a large number of *Munafeqeen*¹⁰⁸ (not true followers of faith). Moreover the Muslims have forgotten the spirit of Islam. Their soulless religiosity has deprived the Shariat of all flexibility.¹⁰⁹ Maudoodi regards Muslim nationalism as a consequence of the ignorance of Islam. To him the considerations of minority and majority are absurd. There was a time when the Prophet was in the minority of one.¹¹⁰ Islamic society does not rely on the strength of population but on the strength of faith. The demand of national government, protection of fundamental rights, national independence, opposition to imperialism are all the "voices of sheep"

and not the virtues of a "Lion" who is entitled to govern.¹¹¹

Maudoodi was always conscious that the liberalism of many Muslim nationalists was divorced from the Islamic notion of sovereignty. "I am interested only in the basis of Pakistan polity—sovereignty of God or sovereignty of the People. If the former is the basis then it will be Pakistan, otherwise no Pakistan,"¹¹² he says. The leaders of the Pakistan movement were never inspired by the same principles of Islam, and the Islamic view point according to Maudoodi was that the Muslims in India are not Muslims¹¹³ in the real sense. Therefore the entire movement is un-Islamic. If Pakistan is at all formed the government would be un-Islamic though it may be a government of the Muslims.¹¹⁴ The movement of Pakistan will therefore be positively harmful to the cause of Islam.¹¹⁵ It will become an obstacle in the way of solidarity and expansion of Islam.¹¹⁶ Maudoodi's concern over the Pakistan movement was that Islam was not its foremost aim. Maudoodi's preoccupation was primarily religious and he did not pay any attention to the social problems of his community, the education of the Muslims, economic prosperity and political organization. This was due to his reaction from the Aligarh movement which, according to him, laid emphasis on secular problems neglecting the interests of religion.¹¹⁷

Maudoodi's alternative to the Pakistan demand was the establishment of "*Shade Darul Islam*" which meant that under the Indian government the national organization of the Muslims should be Islamic in character.¹¹⁸ It implies an Islamic educational system, the maintenance of *Zakat*, the organization of *Awkaf* and the maintenance of Islamic personal law without change. Its administration as well as social and cultural reconstruction should be in accordance with the principles of Islamic culture and civilization.¹¹⁹ The armed forces of the country should, not be used against any Muslim country or nation.¹²⁰ Muslim society would thus be "a state within a state."¹²¹ It should, however, be noted that Maudoodi is not oblivious of the question of Muslim supremacy. He wants to see the Muslim nation autonomous and independent, by reinstating the Islamic Power.¹²² Maudoodi favours an Islamic movement for domina-

tion¹²³ (*Ghalba*). It will appeal not to groups or classes but to men as men. He makes a clear distinction between Islam and Muslim nationalism. Naim Siddiqui, a faithful disciple of Maudoodi, says that Maudoodi is the first thinker of our age who could make a distinction between the two. Even Iqbal, according to him, approached Islam through Muslim nationalism.¹²⁴

Maudoodi while dealing with the problem of nationalism seems to ignore the historical and liberal approach. His dogmatic attitude disables him from appreciating the events of the past in the right perspective. He does not regard nationalism as an urge for overthrowing the alien rule...It is not only compatible with Islam but part and parcel of Islam's modern resurgence."¹²⁵ Maudoodi does not take into account the political developments in the modern world. Nationalism has been a reality even in Islamic history. The "repeated wars of Berbers against the Arabs were really nothing more or less than the assertion and manifestation of the spirit of nationality against a foreign rule."¹²⁶ "Moreover after the waning of the Arab character the followers of Islam found themselves loosely united. The spirit of faction and rivalry, born of the feeling of nationality began to assert itself. The idea of nationality, once fully awakened to life, led to the most fateful results. It proved stronger than the tie of religion, and made the first breach in the profound edifice of the Caliphate."¹²⁷ In the earlier period of Islam the strength of the Caliphate rested on the national sentiment of the Arabs.¹²⁸ An unbiassed reading of history might have led Maudoodi to the right appreciation of the value of nationalism. But his approach is based on the letter and not on the spirit of the Quran. He has a set formula to assess every historical phenomenon. Any thing which does not fit into his formula is described as anti-Islamic or un-Islamic. Khuda Baksh even cites instances of nationalism from the so called Golden period of the Caliphs. Caliph Omar in his concern for Arab nationality, went even to the length of granting more favourable terms as regards payments of taxes to genuine Arabs than those of foreign origin.¹²⁹ Maudoodi cites a verse from the Quran¹³⁰ to show that the Holy Book entirely discountenances the force of nationalism. Dr. Hamidullah

on the basis of the same verse, remarks that this was "a new orientation of human thought on the subject of nationality, and infact a character of Muslim nationality."¹³¹ He also accepts the reality of political subnationalities right from the beginning of early Islam.¹³² Thus Islam and nationalism are not opposed to each other. Nationalism as a historical force could be discerned in the Islamic world even from the early beginnings whether it was supported by the Quran or not. Failure to take note of this force constituted a major weakness of Maudoodi's thought and his idea of cultural nationalism solely based on religious sanctions led to religious and political reaction. While the leaders of the Muslim League were prepared to make political capital out of his idea of cultural nationalism, Maudoodi was disdainful of their political ambitions. The ironical result was that in undivided India he provided cultural arguments for the separationists and in Pakistan he remains a forlorn and isolated figure, a bitter critic of the Muslim but un-Islamic State. In the last analysis he becomes an ally of British imperialism.¹³³ Maudoodi was, nevertheless, right in describing nationalism as an important force in Indian politics.¹³⁴ But he thought in terms of the Islamic revivalist movement of Shah Waliullah who stressed on the medieval idea of Islamic solidarity and the disunity of the Hindus and Muslims.¹³⁵ His orthodoxy could not find in nationalism an "extension of liberal and democratic ideas, and as their application, beyond the individual to the entire ethnic groups, with which the individual regards himself as linked."¹³⁶

Maudoodi criticized the Indian National Congress because it represented Hindu nationalism. He ignores the social and political development of the last one hundred years. Indian nationalism was the product of numerous ideas and forces—the revivalism of Dayanand Saraswathi, reformism of Raja Ram Mohan Rai, extremism of Tilak and Lajpat Rai, moderation of Gokhale, the charismatic leadership of Gandhi and secularism and socialism of Azad and Nehru. It would be an over-simplification of the phenomenon to equate it wholly with any one of these and to characterize it, as Maudoodi did, as Hindu Nationalism or revivalism. Maudoodi did not recognize that the "national state and nationalism are empty vessels in which each

epoch and the class relations in each particular country pour their particular content."¹³⁷ Maudoodi also speaks of cultural nationalism based upon the foundations of Islam.¹³⁸ Cultural nationalism flourishes on the idealization of "medieval values" and mystical traditions,"¹³⁹ and becomes a basic factor in the growth of fascism. In spite of serious shortcomings in attitude and thought such as the absence of an open mind, lack of historical sense and an insufficient recognition of the variety and complexity of social facts and a pronouncedly reactionary and fanatical outlook, Maudoodi is regarded by his followers as "the first great thinker of this age to define and explain this ideology and point out not only to the soldiers and leaders of the Indian political movements but to the people of this world in general that it is not nationalism but only Islam which provides a true and just social philosophy for the organization of human society on this earth."¹⁴⁰

Maudoodi held that democracy, like nationalism, poses a challenge to the effective functioning of the Islamic state in the modern world. It is the political expression of a basically materialistic view of life. Democracy in the west proved an effective device to check the arbitrary authority, corruption and selfishness of the ruling class. Its basic principles were formulated according to the needs and aspirations of the peoples of the west. It was also a protest against the soulless religiosity and its bad effects in the political life of the people. Democracy as a system of government is based on the sovereignty of the people, party system, rule of majority and the accountability of the rulers to the people. In course of time democracy has also become a way of life. There arose the problems of upholding the value of democracy in order to prevent a violent revolution in society, to secure government based on consent or will of the people, and peace in the world.

The domination of the western nations over the eastern brought the latter a knowledge of the system of democracy. Although imperialism and democracy were in course of time to come into conflict in the east the people in the colonies did appreciate the inherent virtues of democracy. The western system of education, the establishment of legislatures with limited

powers, of courts and the universities democracy led to the demand for the full establishment of democratic government. The liberal movements in India and in other countries stood for the acceptance and adoption of this system of government. They believed in the superiority of western civilization and progress. These aims are not only in conformity with those of religion but perhaps have the sanction of religion too. Among the Muslims a concerted effort was made to demonstrate that the western values are not opposed to Islam. Democracy, some of them said, was practised even by the Prophet. The rule of the first four Caliphs was perfectly democratic. They also refuted the monarchic theories propounded by the Muslims in the middle ages. They regarded them as against the true spirit of Islam. Ameer Ali says that the first written constitution was drafted during the reign of the Prophet and forms the first chapter of the freedom of conscience.¹⁴¹ According to Ameer Ali the religion of Islam as well as the practices of Islamic rulers lend strong support to democracy and socialism. Islam, like democracy, is based on rule of law.¹⁴² When king Jabla and a brother Muslim who was ill-treated by the king appeared before Caliph Omar, the Caliph said "King or no king, both of you are Mussalmans and both of you are equal in the eyes of the law"¹⁴³ and gave his verdict against the King. In the same way Chiragh Ali who was influenced by the teachings of Shaikh Mohammed Abduh¹⁴⁴ demanded separation of religion from the State. Nawab Syed Mohammed in his presidential address before the Indian National Congress said that Islam is based on the widest conception of liberalism and democracy and that a policy of narrow aloofness, of intolerant hostility, is alien to its spirit.¹⁴⁵ Shibli tried to find the roots of democracy in the Quran¹⁴⁶ and the methods of the Prophet who said "be with the majority." About Suleman Nadvi, Halide Edib says that "The Islamic scriptures have all the necessary sanctions for adapting life to change. He goes even further than other Muslim thinkers and admits the separation of church and state in Islam."¹⁴⁷

The revivalist movement dealt a great blow to liberalism and democracy. Due to its hostility to the west, the movement

regarded everything western as un-Islamic. The liberals attempted to prove that Islam and democracy are not opposed. Maudoodi, however, took the opposite position and regarded Democracy and Islam as antithetical.

Maudoodi thinks that democracy and Islam cannot go together. He interprets the Hadith "Be with the majority" in a manner unacceptable to many other modern interpreters of Islam. He says that what the Prophet meant by the majority was the majority of the "real" Muslims. Islam has nothing in common with the modern concept of democracy. Modern democracy according to him, has necessarily to function through the party system. It exercises an effective check over the autocracy of one individual or individuals, or even of a single party. But Islam cannot accord sanction to such a system. What makes the party supreme is not righteousness but strength in terms of number. The individual acquires leadership in the party by means of demagoguery. Islam cannot permit the adoption of such a system. In an ideal Islamic state there will be only one party—Hizbullah—the party of God. This concept of one party is contrary to the theory and practice of democracy.

Modern democracy upholds the principle of the sovereignty of the people. The final authority in the State rests with them and they are the makers of law. Law expresses the desires, aspirations and needs of the people. It provides conditions for the fulfilment of the rights of the people. The will of the people is expressed through the Assemblies which are composed of the representatives of the people. Maudoodi regards all this as inconsistent with the basic principles of Islam. He believes that sovereignty must rest only with God. Man cannot become the sovereign as he is only the servant of God. Islam assigns him the function of becoming the viceregent of God on earth. He is responsible only to God and to no one else. But Maudoodi's concept of "man" does not include common people, but only the "chosen" ones. Adherence to Islam is the prime duty of the ruler. Non-Muslims have to accept the position of second-rate citizens—*Zimmi*. The criticism of the entire system of democracy follows from this concept of sovereignty of God. The system of elections is undesirable because it leads to the

formation of assemblies which are to make laws for the people. The human intelligence is not equipped to make perfect laws. For perfection presupposes the sanction and grace of the divinity. Maudoodi holds that popular franchise and membership of the legislative assembly is religiously illegal (*Haram*) and absolutely prohibited by Islam. It is a violation of the fundamental principle of the unity and sovereignty of God.¹⁴⁹

Maudoodi argues that no human agency can make law. The Islamic state has just to implement the Shariat, which is "synonymous with law, because the entire code of life has been decreed by the All-Powerful-Sovereign of the universe."¹⁵⁰ The Shariat is all comprehensive. It prescribes "directives for individual as well as collective life. These directives touch such varied subjects as religious rituals, personal character, morals, habits, family relationship, social and economic affairs, administration, rights and duties of citizens, the judicial system, and law of war and peace and international relations".¹⁵¹ Another feature of the Shariat is that it is an organic whole. So any arbitrary division of the scheme is bound to harm the spirit and structure of the Shariat.¹⁵² Thus Maudoodi takes away the power of law-making from the hands of the common people. Thus Islam challenges the very foundations of democracy.

Maudoodi does not believe in the concept of majority and minority. Majority rule is the logical result of the party system. Maudoodi argues that the followers of Islam should not accept this principle of majority and minority. It is the outcome of a defeatist mentality.¹⁵³ The goal of the Muslims should be an Islamic state where there will be no Muslim majority or Muslim minority but only Muslims and non-Muslims.

Maudoodi is also very critical of the democratic set-up that was proposed to be established after the independence of the country. According to him democracy is neither acceptable to the Muslims nor suitable to the country. The establishment of democracy in India only means slavery of the minority and the independence of the country to the minorities would only mean a change of masters.¹⁵⁴ The minorities in India, according to him, desired "self government" and not the rule of the majority.¹⁵⁵ Moreover there is an obvious difference between

British and Indian democracy.¹⁵⁶ Due to lack of homogeneity among the people and the difference in the fundamental principles of life among the various sections of society, "the majority in India will be a permanent majority and minority will be a permanent minority."¹⁵⁷ But can the interests of the minority be safeguarded by the incorporation of a list of fundamental rights in the constitution? Maudoodi has no faith in such safeguards, because the tyrannical majority can render them ineffective.

Maudoodi also believes that the organization of a party system will be harmful to the minorities and especially to the Muslims.¹⁵⁹ The discipline of the party will make its members indifferent to the interests of the community. The freedom of expression would be suppressed by the Party in the interests of Party discipline. The Muslims would suffer particularly as they would in no case be able to convince the Hindu majority.

In his writings Maudoodi builds up a powerful case against democracy as repugnant to Islam, to the Indian situation and the genius of the Indian people. Thus his refutation of democracy is based on theoretical as well practical grounds. What is most surprising is that he could never understand the significance of the democratic movement in the west, and in India. Islam, it is true, does not provide a systematic scheme of government. Maudoodi insists that there is no sanction for democracy and Sunnah. Therefore he does not take into account the existence and the utility of Democracy even in the Muslim countries. On the other hand he speaks in utopian terms of reviving medieval ideas and ideals which even if they were real at one time are now out of place. The democratic movement, according to Maudoodi, is directed by the spirit of nationalism. But he never appreciated that this movement aims at the establishment of a society to which Islam should have no objection, a society in which the people will be emancipated from slavery and exploitation and in which good life would be within the reach of all. Maudoodi, at least by implication, stood for the perpetuation of British rule in India which was characterised by exploitation and injustice. He was not concerned so much with the end of the prevailing system but to win over the

hearts of the British people and to explore the possibility of spreading the Islamic faith.

Moreover, Maudoodi's narrow and theocratic ideas of government undermine the aspirations of the people for self-government. In the name of the sovereignty of Government, which in the last analysis, is the rule only of a few nobles (*Ashraf*) responsible to God. It should be noted, as Mohammed Sarwar points out, that Maudoodi's opposition to democracy is not the result of heart-felt conviction but of political opportunism.¹⁶⁰ Maudoodi's role in the newly born state of Pakistan bears it out. In the pre-independence days he served the British interest and in the post-independence period he has been championing the cause of reaction.

Maudoodi's attitude towards socialism also throws sufficient light on his approach to Islam and to the West. Maudoodi is aware that socialism is the result of the inherent evils of a capitalist society. He recognized that the movement had gathered vigour and popularity and constituted a threat to the very existence and survival of Islam. Maudoodi is however impressed by the spirit of dedication and sacrifice characteristic of communism and the victories it had won as a result of its virtues and vigour. But he is equally influenced by the success and achievements of fascism. We may therefore conclude that Maudoodi looked for an alliance of the faith of Islam with the decisive and victorious force characteristic of authoritarian movements.

Maudoodi believes that the communist movement cherishes high ideals and aims at establishing a society where there will be no injustice, no exploitation and no in-equality. He holds that Islam also stands for the realization of such a social order. It does not mean that there is no difference between Islam and communism. Islam is superior, in many respects, to communism. What Ismail Ragi Al Faruqi says about Muslim Brotherhood would also serve as an apt description of the faith of Maudoodi and the Jamaat-e-Islami: If the communists preach their principles its answer will be "so be it. Our principles do more than include yours. You cannot boast of a principle we cannot match or accept."¹⁶¹ This is to claim the

absolute superiority of Islam. An examination of the doctrines of Islam and communism shows that it is far from true. The false claim of superiority and the slogan of "Islamic socialism" is nothing but an attempt to detract the Muslims from communism. Maudoodi's version of Islam does not agree either with dialectical materialism or with the economic interpretation of history or with the object of abolishing the class structure of society while Communism repudiates the spiritual basis of society and government.

Maudoodi does not believe in class conflict as an important factor in the development of History. The economic interpretation of history is alien to Islam and to the interpretations of Islam. Maudoodi is in favour of the maintenance of economic classes—haves and have nots. Islam, he says, does not want the abolition of the haves.¹⁶² He is not very much concerned with the evils of class society. He does not believe that the institutions—economic, social or political—are creation of a particular stage of economic development and cannot last beyond that stage. Although Maudoodi would agree that the motives of the Prophet were sometimes conditioned by political expediency,¹⁶³ he always maintained that the economic institutions set up by the Prophet, *Zakat* and *Sadqa*, would secure economic justice whatever may be the stage of social development.¹⁶⁴ Such a claim would no doubt appear absurd to a Communist. The precepts of Islam would find in monopolistic capitalism a stubborn adversary to contend with.

The communists believe that unless the means of production are nationalized a socialist society cannot come into being. The imperative need is to abolish the institution of private property. Maudoodi also says that Quran is not silent on the issue of private property, but has sanctioned the old Zamindari System.¹⁶⁵ Maudoodi does not agree with the view that the Zamindari System is illegal according to Islam.¹⁶⁶ When Maulana Aslam Jairajpuri argued that Islam does not favour private property,¹⁶⁷ on the basis of the verse from Quran: "*Val Arza Wazaha Al Inam.*" Maudoodi explained that the instruction of Quran is not to abolish all private property as this verse contains just a vague hint on the subject and not a call for a

revolutionary change in the social order. Moreover the Prophet himself, Maudoodi maintained, did not abolish private property.¹⁶⁸ Maulana Aslam Jairajpuri quotes another verse from the Quran : "*Lakum Ma Fil Arz Jamia*" (Q : 3 : 2) which means that property should be held in common. This interpretation is also unacceptable to Maudoodi,¹⁶⁹ as he says that property should be governed only by Shariat. But he does not elaborate his point. Does it mean that certain limitations should be imposed on property ? Maudoodi explicitly saw that imposing limitations on the property of individuals in society is not sanctioned and justified by the Quran or Surah.¹⁷⁰ He does not favour any movement for the extension of economic equality. The idea of common economic interest and equality is a product of human selfishness.¹⁷¹

It is interesting to note, however, that he always insists that all usury (*Riba*) is illegal, according to Islam. On the other hand he supports the system of private property which is inseparable from investment, interest and profit. Such a system is also supported by the Ikhwan in Egypt. But for bringing about the development of industries either the present banking system will have to be continued or all property will have to be made national property. Maudoodi has not considered these alternatives seriously or expressed a preference for either. "*Chattan*", an Urdu weekly (17th October, 1949), has rightly observed that Maudoodi's economic policies, in view of his opposition to capitalism as well as socialism, will lead to the pre-capitalist feudal Zamindari System.¹⁷³ In this context we might appreciate the significance of the ban on interest in the religion of Islam and communism.

Another point on which Maudoodi is very critical is the atheism implied in Marxist philosophy. He believes that it is a corrupting influence which would destroy the very basis of Islamic society. He maintains that in the west religion is distorted and that its Divine Mission is ignored while in the east religion is still a dominating force and a way of life for the people. Eastern culture and civilization embodies spiritual principles. Maudoodi regards communism as the enemy of spiritualism for it characterizes all religions as the opium of the people.

According to Maudoodi communism is "The philosophy of bread and butter."¹⁷⁴ An examination of Maudoodi's arguments will show that his understanding of Marxism is superficial and misleading. Marxism does not deny the importance of mind or spirit. It only denies the dualism of spirit and matter.¹⁷⁵ Maudoodi also thinks that communism does not take into consideration any factor in the evolution of society except the economic one. This is also not true. F. Engels, while elucidating the point, wrote that the economic factor is not the only factor : there are others too which are equally important in the making of history.¹⁷⁶ Communism is not opposed to the essence of the moral teachings of religion. But it cannot accept any form of religion or religious institutions which have become tools in the hands of the exploiting classes. But history is of the least importance to Maudoodi. While criticising certain aspects of communism he frequently cites examples from the Russian practice of communism. But when one criticises Islam from the historical stand point he disagrees emphatically and says that it was the fault of the rulers or the people and not of Islam. Maudoodi's writings on socialism and property are full of inconsistencies. The reason for this is political opportunism. In pre-independence days he supported the soulless and inhuman system of Zamindari. His movement and his organization were financed by the vested interests which sought religious sanction for the Zamindari System from the Quran and the Sunnah. But after partition he realized the futility of his support to the Zamindari System and began to oppose it. This too he did on Islamic grounds. In 1956 he said that eighty per cent of the Zamindari System in East Pakistan is against Islam and the same is the case with West Pakistan.

Another reason seems to be Maudoodi's consistent support to the British rule in India. He used all possible arguments against nationalism, democracy and socialism in order to weaken the hold of the nationalist movement on the Muslim mind by cleverly quoting verses from the Quran and the Hadith to prove his point. In August, 1936 he asked the British people to choose between communism and Islam. He said that the Britishers should not oppose Islam because the Indian Muslim

was no longer the Anglophil of 1910 but was considerably changed and inclined towards communism. The growth of communism would be dangerous to the survival of the British rule. The only factor which can contain its growth is Islam and Islam alone.¹⁷⁸

While discussing the evils of western culture and modern civilization with all its "cultural sanctions" Maudoodi comes to the conclusion that the only solution to the problems created by the impact of the west, lay in establishing the Islamic social and political order. Maudoodi accepts without question the principle of submission of the individual to the Will of God which he regards as the cardinal tenet of Islam. And those "who surrender to his Divine Will and undertake to regulate their lives in accordance with the commandments of God are called Muslims".¹⁷⁹ The Muslim social order can come into being only by the consolidation of the Muslims into a united society based on the ideology of "Islam".¹⁸⁰ It is "the result of deliberate choice and effort; it is the outcome of the contract which takes place between human beings and their creator."¹⁸¹ This Muslim society is governed by the Book and the teachings of the Prophet. This code of life can be described as Shariah. It will regulate the entire life of the people. Its main object is "to base human life on *Marufat* (Virtues) to clear it of the *Munkarat* (Vices)."¹⁸² The *Marufat* "are in harmony with human nature and its requirement in general. And the *Munkarat* are just the opposite."¹⁸³

According to Maudoodi Shariat provides Islamic society with a body of constitutional law, a basic theory of State, source of authority for legislation, qualifications of rulers, the functions of the legislature, executive and judiciary. It also answers the problems of administration, prescribes rules of conduct for the police and defines the responsibilities of the rulers, the sphere of the state and the rights and duties of the citizens. It also deals with international law and with the problems of war and peace, neutrality and alliances.¹⁸⁴

If society is established on the foundation of Shariat, the Islamic state will come into existence and will realize the spiri-

tual and moral ends which are prescribed by the Prophet and will be an ideological state—built exclusively on principles—spiritual and moral.¹⁸⁵ In the Islamic state, the sovereign will be God. It will be a divine Caliphate. Islam holds that man is not supreme and sovereign but “rightless slave” of God. Therefore what is vested in man is viceregency. It implies that the earth and all that it contains belongs to God, who alone is sovereign.¹⁸⁶ Man only carries out His will and purposes. God is the Sustainer, Sovereign, and Lord of mankind.¹⁸⁷ He is the Owner of the Kingdom.¹⁸⁸ His sovereignty is indivisible.¹⁸⁹ Man is God’s agent and also of His Prophet. But there will be “popular viceregency” for all Muslim citizens in an Islamic state.¹⁹⁰ Thus the Caliph is the representative of the Muslim Citizens and wields authority on their behalf.¹⁹¹ In that sense there is democracy in the Islamic state. All the believers are considered to be repositories of the Caliphate.¹⁹² The Prophet has also said that “every one of you is a ruler and every one is accountable for his subjects and one Caliph is no way inferior to another.” The Caliph, the ruler, will be the head of the government and of the state. He will be one who is trust-worthy,¹⁹³ God-fearing,¹⁹⁴ and selfless. No woman can become the Caliph for the Quran says that men are the guardians of women (IV:31). Maudoodi also quotes the Hadith to the effect that the state that entrusts its affairs to a woman can never prosper.¹⁹⁵

The Caliph will not be above criticism.¹⁹⁶ He cannot assume a dictatorial position in the state for he will be liable to deposition. In the eye of the law his status will be that of an ordinary citizen. He will not be entitled to any discretionary treatment in the court of law.¹⁹⁷

The object of the Islamic state will not be “merely to prevent people from exploiting each other, to safeguard their liberty and to protect its subjects from foreign invasion.”¹⁹⁸ Its purpose will be “to secure social justice in accordance with the criterion formulated by God in His Book which gives explicit instructions for a well-disciplined mode of life.”¹⁹⁹ Maudoodi, therefore, concludes that “an Islamic state is...bound to be just, for it is the most powerful institution for administering justice among people.”²⁰⁰ It is just, in the sense, that the life and

property will be scrupulously safeguarded.²⁰¹ The above picture of the Islamic state depicted by Maudoodi shows that it will be a kingdom of God. It will be an all-comprehensive state making no distinction between the spiritual and the temporal life of man. In this sense, it is a theocracy no different from that of the west. In the western theocracy "the priestly class sharply marked off from the rest of the population exercised an unchecked domination and enforced law of its own making in the name of God, thus virtually imposing its own godhood upon the common people. Such a system of government is more Satanic than Divine."²⁰² In the Islamic theocracy on the other hand, "the whole community including the rank and file run the state in accordance with the Book of God and the example of His Prophet."²⁰³ Maudoodi terms this states as "Theo-democracy"—divine democratic government. Now the question, however, is, what is the guarantee that this theo-democracy will not degenerate into western theocracy? Maudoodi does not attach much importance to this question. The people would unconditionally surrender their will to the Will of God. That is a contract as Maudoodi has described it. What is implied in that contract is that man is not competent to become his own legislator. Even if he secures deliverance from the service of other *Ilhas* (gods), he becomes a slave of his own foolish desires and exalts the devil in him to the position of a supreme lord.²⁰⁴ Therefore God has deprived man of his natural propriety to error and sin in order to safeguard his real freedom, to save him from destruction.²⁰⁵

Will Maudoodi's state be democratic? Maudoodi himself says that Islamic polity is not democratic. He denies the existence of democracy anywhere in the world. In England the rulers are "the Directors of the Bank of England and a few high-class capitalists and statesmen"²⁰⁶ and in America "a handful of Wall Street capitalists."²⁰⁷ Thus he points out that democracy is nowhere practised and moreover, its inherent shortcomings render it incapable of solving the problems confronting mankind. Whenever man exercises overlordship and domination over others the result is "tyranny, excess, intemperance, unlawful exploitation, and inequality."²⁰⁸ There will be no natural freedom for the human soul". Man's mind and

heart and his inborn faculties and aptitudes are subjugated to such vexatious restrictions that the growth and development of his personality is arrested.”²⁰⁹

Therefore, Maudoodi finds many similarities between the State he visualizes and the totalitarian fascist state. “The Islamic state”, he explains, “is a universal and all-inclusive state. Its sphere of activities is co-extensive with the whole of human life. It seeks to mould every sphere of life and activity in consonance with its peculiar moral theory and programme of reforms. In such a state no one can regard any of his affairs as personal and private.”²¹⁰ Still Maudoodi assures that “individual liberty is not suppressed nor is there any trace of dictatorship in it.”²¹¹ Maudoodi says that there will be equality in Islamic society. But the non-Muslims will not enjoy the rights and privileges of the citizens. He himself concedes that since the Islamic state is built on the ideology of Islam a non-believer “will not be allowed to influence the policy of the state.”²¹²

In the pre-independence days, Maudoodi did not evince much concern with government and its structure. But after Independence and Partition he found occasion for elaborating his idea of government and discussing the functions of the legislature, executive and judiciary which he described as the organs of the state.²¹³

Maudoodi says that according to Islamic terminology the legislative body can be termed as a body which resolves and prescribes (*Ahl-ul-hall-i-wal-aqd*). In the Islamic state, the legislature is not sovereign. It is “beyond the purview of the legislature to legislate in contravention of the directives of God and his Prophet, and all such pieces of legislation...be considered ultra-vires of the constitution.”²¹⁴ The legislature “will be competent to make Rules and Regulations within their (Directives of God and His Prophet) frame work,”²¹⁵ for the purpose of enforcing them. Secondly, where the directives of the Quran and Sunnah are capable of more than one interpretation, the legislature would decide which of those interpretations should be placed on the Statute Book.²¹⁶ Thirdly,

wherever there is no explicit law on a subject the legislature will frame new law in keeping with the general spirit of Islam.²¹⁷ Wherever there is no basic guidance in the Quran, Sunnah or the tradition of the righteous Caliphs, the legislature is free to enact laws.²¹⁸

The "sole distinguishable feature"²¹⁹ of the Islamic state will be its executive. It aims at the enforcement of the Directives of God and the Prophet. The Quran describes the executive as *Ululamr* and Hadith of *Umra*. The people are asked to obey it provided it avoids the "path of sin and transgression."²²⁰

The judiciary (In the Islamic terminology *Qada*) establishes Divine justice. Those who do not adjudicate in accordance with the Divine code are heretical and unrighteous.²²¹

Maudoodi says that according to the conventions of the period of the righteous Caliphs "the head of an Islamic state is as such, also the supreme head of these three different organs."²²² The head of the state is expected to seek the advice of the legislative council because it is composed of those who are well-versed in the affairs of the state. Every "Tom, Dick and Harry is not entitled to legislate for Islamic society. We do not recognize the right of every passerby to give verdicts on legal problems. Undoubtedly, it requires profound legal knowledge and a trained mind to enable one to speak with authority on any legal matter."²²³ says Maudoodi. The jurist, according to him, should be fully conversant with the Arabic language and literature, must possess a complete grasp of the historical background and origin of Islamic legislation, special insight into the Quranic style of expression, thorough knowledge of the vast literature and tradition of Islam, a keen sense of legal judgment, capacity for interpretation of facts on the basis of analogy, complete understanding of the Islamic scheme of life, and a sense of appropriateness and continuity in such legislation.²²⁴ But it does not imply that the legislature is only an advisory body for the head of the state. Maudoodi says that the Quran enjoins decision-making by mutual consultation while consultation is normally regarded as compulsory²²⁵ the king is allowed the power of veto.²²⁶ The decision of the council will generally

be made by a majority of votes. But Islam does not regard the verdict of its members as the absolute criterion of truth and rectitude,²²⁷ for such absolute standards are laid down by religion. Maudoodi also holds that there is no room in Islam for elections and electoral propaganda. The methods of "Satanic democracy," of duping the voter by issuing posters and placards, holding public meetings, engaging in press propaganda, are repugnant to the spirit of Islam.²²⁸ Maudoodi disapproves of any division in the legislature on party considerations. He insists on the independence of every individual member and on his right to express his opinion independently.²²⁹ This shows that the position of the legislature vis-a-vis executive or the head of the state is dubious and precarious because the chief executive is not bound to follow the advice of the legislature. He can disagree with the minority group or with the majority group of the legislative body and can act even against its unanimous opinion. The legislature would then be just a body of counsellors (subservient to the King) as in the Mughal period. According to Maudoodi's scheme the executive occupies a dominating position as compared with the legislature.

Maudoodi prescribes that the judges should be appointed by the executive though they should function independently of the executive.²³⁰ Moreover the judge is responsible to God Almighty and not to the Ameer or the Caliph.²³¹

This is the ideal state of Maudoodi's conception. It is medieval, in form as well as spirit. It is dominated by abstract notions and not with "the harmless purpose of building utopia," but with "the sinister design of hiding the concrete realities of life."²³² Maudoodi's role in pre-independence days shows that he used religion as a tool for political purposes.

The idea of the sovereignty of God is dangerous if it is transferred from the metaphysical to the political sphere. Maudoodi's concept of religion is based more on medieval thought and practice than on the traditions of the righteous Caliphs.²³³ Medieval Indian history unfolds the baneful political role of the religion of Islam. Maudoodi's insistence on the sovereignty of God stands as an obstacle to the forces of progress. In the Islamic countries the advocates of the sovereignty of God

were in reality seeking to establish the sovereignty of their own religious groups.²³⁴ This concept is also responsible for the intellectual stagnation of the Muslim society.²³⁵ Religion became the prop of reaction and orthodox belief. Every problem and every new situation was approached in the light of rigid dogma. Man became a non-entity as his will and judgement were written off by the dictates of religion. Every thing is prescribed by God and man's voice is of no avail in the face of the decrees of Divinity. This made the Muslims narrow-minded separatist and obscurantist. Mohammed Sarwar says that this was perhaps natural.²³⁶

Acceptance of the idea of sovereignty of God implies the revival of medieval institutions in the changed context of the modern age. This finds expression in the writings of Maudoodi on the economic system. He rejects banking, insurance and securities and wants to establish *Baitul Mal* and *Zakat*. These are not only impracticable but anti-progressive. Since nationalism and democracy were alien to Islam and the medieval tradition, Maudoodi refuses to accept them as Islamic. Moreover democracy stands for the principle of individualism which was almost unknown to the medieval times. Maudoodi does not also admit the operation of the principle of equality among the subjects of the State. The *Zimmis* will have to pay *Jaziah* as a sign of submission to the laws and the constitution. It is compulsory for them because the government provides them peace and justice.²³⁷ It would be entirely against the spirit of modern times to revive such an institution in the modern state. Difference of creed between the rulers and the subjects ought not to lead to the denial of equal rights for the latter and a denial of equal political status with the majority. If they adopt the religion of the ruler, they become sharers of sovereign power for Sovereignty rests with the Muslim citizens. This may be in keeping with the spirit of medieval society but not with that of modern society. Another feature of Maudoodi's Islamic state is the identification of religion with state. The separation of the two, it is claimed, is against the spirit of Islam by which is meant the theory and practice of Islam. Maudoodi holds that modern secular society separates religion from the state. This,

according to him, is irreligion. The elements of secularism, as he analyses them, are "religious tolerance, patronizing a particular faith and cold indifference to all other faiths."²³⁹ This is a strange meaning of secularism indeed. In India, he thinks, secularism is a sham. It is a hollow concept and a device to impose the culture and religious ideas of the majority community over the minorities. He comes to the conclusion that secular nationalist democracy is inimical to faith. Its acceptance is a deviation from the Quran. Any attempt to establish it is reason to the Prophet. And pleading for it is a rebellion against the rule of God."²⁴⁰ Maudoodi does not take into account the result of unity of religion and politics. The Prophet himself was not charged for founding a kingdom in the political sense. Abdul Razak argues that Mohammed was but an apostle sent in response to religious summons, one pertaining entirely to religion and unmarred by any taint of monarchy or of summons to a political state, and he possessed neither kingly rule nor government.²⁴¹ Modern liberal interpreters of Islam emphasise that secularism is not repugnant to Islam. Khalifa Abdul Hakim says that "a truly Islamic state would possess all the good qualities of a secular state without being secular in the modern sense."²⁴² It means that even an Islamic state will have to adopt all the virtues of secular state. It will be Islamic, in the sense that it will retain certain virtues of democracy.²⁴³ When Maudoodi speaks of religion he does not mean "morality or spiritual quality which is common to all great religions; for thereby politics and organizations are cleansed and made sweet and wholesome."²⁴⁴ The consequences of Maudoodi's dogmatic religion will be disastrous both to religion and politics. If at all Maudoodi's state is realized it will be forced to build a "modern house" on "fictitious traditionalist foundations."²⁴⁵ Much as we may criticize the theocratic basis of the State of Pakistan, Maudoodi regards it as incompletely Islamic and is therefore in the ranks of the opposition.

This "modern house" of Maudoodi is not only completely medieval but also influenced and inspired by fascism. In the medieval Islamic attitude of Maudoodi the roots of modern fascist ideology are discernible. He demands the unconditional

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submission of the individual to the Will of God. And this is the "psychological mainstay and moral sanction for authoritarianism..."²⁴⁶ This deprives the individual of his freedom. Maudoodi, like the fascists, is interested in idealizing the negation of freedom as "the escape from the tyranny of modern civilization."²⁴⁷ The crucial defect of Maudoodi's political thought is the assignment of an insignificant position to the individual and the absolute exaltation of Divinity. Power is, however, actually exercised on behalf of God by the leader, the Ameer, who will be responsible not to the people, but only to God. Obedience to him will be a supreme virtue and necessity. Maudoodi himself has described his state as comprehensive. Besides, the Ameer is not bound to obey the decision of the legislature. The fascist idea of "superhuman" leader has taken the form of "Ameer" in Maudoodi's thought and belonging to the Aryan race has its analogue in the idea of "righteous Islam."²⁴⁸ Like fascism, Islam, as interpreted by Maudoodi, cherishes an imperialistic design. He argues that if the Muslims form a party along the lines of the Nazi Party, not only a large part of India but even of the world would become the possession of the Muslims. There will be no question of minority and majority.²⁴⁹ Maudoodi also glorifies the achievements of Hitler without taking into consideration the disastrous consequences of Hitler's policy and programme. Maudoodi's ideal Islamic state attempts to establish a medieval and autocratic state where the reins of government will be in the hands of the feudal aristocracy.²⁵⁰ It will be a state where there will be no equality. It is really strange that Maudoodi defends the institution of slavery. When Maulana Aslam Jairajpuri said that the Quran had abolished slavery, Maudoodi replied that "this institution of slavery was retained by the Prophet and his successors. And as such there should not be any conflict between the words of the Quran and the deeds of the Prophet. The actions of the Prophet were in consonance with the spirit of the Quran. The maintenance of slavery was just and inevitable. Its abolition was against the demands and expediency of the circumstances."²⁵¹ Half of the population—the women of this state—will not be permitted to participate in public affairs. Maudoodi holds that by and large

women should not be allowed even to leave the home. To give her freedom would be to expect from her to do certain functions for which she is naturally not fitted.²⁵²

Maulana Maudoodi is considered to be one of the most influential and powerful interpreters of Islam in modern India and Pakistan. He has been an effective organizer and popularizer of Islam. Khursheed Ahmed says that he is a "great thinker and man of action...a practical idealist"²⁵³ He is a pioneer of the struggle for the establishment of Shariah. The admirers of Maudoodi regard him as not only an interpreter of Islam but also as a philosopher and political thinker. His political ideas have a theoretical foundation though drawn from antiquated religious ideology. These ideas are the product of his unrealistic approach towards Islam. He does not show any awareness of the changed realities of society. He believes that Islam transcends time and space. Maudoodi straightway rejects the sociological study of religion and claims to have studied all social sciences thoroughly. As a result of it he makes astounding mistakes in explaining social institutions. It is rightly said that Maudoodi's "knowledge of social sciences is superficial and journalistic. He lacks scientific training essential to understand the technical aspects of these sciences."²⁵⁴

In interpreting the theological problems of Islam he employs the methods of "historical criticism."²⁵⁵ But he never questions the utility and relevance of the social, political and economic institutions of the Prophet's time. Thus consciously or unconsciously his philosophy champions the cause of reaction. For example he says that Islam is above economic interests and classes in society. Thus his approach has no economic class orientation. He is critical of those who apply this method in the study of the development of society. He mistakenly believes that "the Islamic society has no bourgeoisie and proletariat. This economic interpretation is a blow to Muslim solidarity. It will bring collective existence in jeopardy."²⁵⁶ It does not mean that he has no class interests to serve. His appeal and concern is with the middle class. He has also commented on the ineffectiveness of this class in bringing about any social change or revolution.²⁵⁷ William Muir has described medieval Islam

(which is that of Maudoodi) as "swathed in the hands of Quran ...is powerless to adapt itself to varying time and place, keep pace with the march of humanity, direct and purify social life, or elevate mankind. Freedom in the proper sense of the word is unknown ; and this apparently because in the body politic, the spiritual and the secular are hopelessly confounded. Hence we fail in finding anywhere the germ of popular government, approach to free and liberal institutions. The nearest thing to this was the brotherhood of Islam ; but that as a controlling power confined to the Arab race, and with it democracy disappeared."²⁵⁸ Maudoodi is so much overpowered by the myth of faith that he ignores the social realities which gave birth to Islam.²⁵⁹ He is therefore fanatical and dogmatic, blind to experience and under the spell of illusion.

This interpretation of Islam formed the ideological foundation for the movement started by Maudoodi. He did not join any organization but formed his own and became its Ameer or president. He gathered around himself a group of admirers and followers. Maherul Qadri claims that Maudoodi is not the product but the maker of history.²⁶⁰ Professor Mohammed Osman says that Maudoodi's approach to the problem of the interpretation of the Quran and Hadith is superb,²⁶¹ in its emphasis on the moral, ethical and practical values of Islam.²⁶² One may agree with Professor Mohammed Osman, but the point is that Maudoodi's interest is not academic but pronouncedly practical. The value of his contributions is lessened by his emphasis on the importance of feudal and retrogressive forces. Even Mohammed Osman confesses that Maudoodi had committed great mistakes. He cites his disagreements with Iqbal, Jinnah and the Congress as examples of such mistakes.²⁶³ Under the pretext of the Quran or Will of God, he prevented Muslims from participating in the anti-British struggle.²⁶⁴ If the Muslims join such a struggle the minds of the Britishers will be turned away from Islam.²⁶⁵ And then Maudoodi developed his own theory of Islamic nationalism. Nationalism was an inevitable and progressive force. While Islamic nationalism was "a spontaneous reaction of the moribund old order against this progressive force rather than a revolutionary struggle against foreign

rule.”²⁶⁶ In fact it was the ministry of the foreign domination. It was nothing but an attempt to reinforce social and religious conservatism. Yosuf Meherally rightly said that Maudoodi was “the high priest of a newer and more seductive theology, painted in all the colour of the rainbow, and calling upon the Faithful to return to a revived Islam.”²⁶⁷ Maudoodi, unlike Maulana Azad, does not believe in the unity of all religions. Islam is the only true and perfect religion according to him. This is perhaps the source of his opposition to Indian nationalism and its ideals of secularism and tolerance. While criticising the Wardha Scheme he points out that the purpose of the framers of this scheme “is to create a society of the followers of various religions, discarding religious individuality. The framers desire to impress that there is no basic difference between the religions. They want to further nationalism and unity. They want to create a respect for the India of yesterday.”²⁶⁸

It is generally said and understood that Maudoodi's political thought supplements what Iqbal had advocated in his poetry. This is extremely misleading. Iqbal had a better understanding of the realities of life and society than Maudoodi and had a clearer and nobler vision of the future. He could understand the significance of the changes taking place in the Islamic world. Iqbal's attempt at adapting Islam to the modern world is creative. Maudoodi is indifferent to history and historical change and his vision does not extend beyond feudal Islam. Cragg is obviously wrong when he says that “Maudoodi is a better disciple of the universalism of Iqbal than many of those who freely invoke his name.”²⁶⁹ Iqbal's opposition to political Pan-Islamism and support to Muslim nationalism are not only political reactions but reflections of a basic attitude to Islam. One of the followers of Maudoodi, Naim Siddiqui, says that Iqbal did not make a distinction between Islam and Muslim nationalism. The greatest liberal critic of Maudoodi is Mohammed Sarwar who considers that he has been making Islam a tool for achieving political power. He sounded a note of warning about the revival of “Islamic polity” in Pakistan. W.C. Smith comments on Maudoodi's “lack of progressive concepts”, and his reliance on the outmoded science of the 18th

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century and his fatalism,²⁷⁰ and concludes that Maudoodi is "a normal member of old school of ignorant intolerant, repressive, religionsists."²⁷¹ His interpretation of the Quran and the Hadith however plausible it may sound is disruptive in practice, and out of touch with the moral as well as socio-political demands of the day.²⁷² In Maudoodi's personality are combined self-righteousness, ignorance of modern science, obscurantism and bigotry of narrow theology and the ambition of a power-hungry politician.

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2. Maudoodi : *Tajdeed wo Ahyai Deen* : P. 132.
3. *Ibid* : P. 136.
4. W. C. Smith : *Islam in Modern History*, P. 236.
5. Mohammed Sarwar : *Maulana Maudoodi ki Tahrike Islami*, P. 13.
6. Quoted by Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* P. 39.
7. *Tarjumanul Quran* : Vol. I. No. 1. Pp. 9-10.
8. *Ibid* : P. 41.
9. *Ibid* : P. 41.
10. *Tarjumanul Quran* : Vol. I. No. 2, P. 10.
11. *Ibid* : P. 41.
12. *Tarjumanul Quran* : Vol. I. No. 3, P. 34.
13. *Ibid* : P. 34.
14. *Tarjumanul Quran* : Vol. I. No. 5, P. 47.
15. *Ibid* : P. Vol. I. No. 6, P. 18.
16. Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* P. 67.
17. *Ibid* : P. 66.
18. *Ibid* : P. 66.
19. Maudoodi : *Islam Ka Nazria-e-Siyasat*, P. 4 and *Tanquihat*, P. 220.
20. Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* P. 69.
21. *Ibid* : P. 73.
22. *Ibid* : P. 168.
24. Vide Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* P. 172.
25. *Ibid* : P. 179.
26. *Tarjumanul Quran* : November, December, 1944.
27. Vide Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* P. 183.
28. *Ibid* : Pp. 183-184.
29. Maudoodi : *Tahrik-e-Islami Ki Akhlaqi Bunyanden*. P. 184.
30. Vide Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* P. 258.
31. *Tarjumanul Quran* : May, 1936.
32. *Tarjumanul Quran* : December, 1934.
33. He explain the phrase from the Quran "*Anzalna Alhadid*" as political force of coercive Power.
34. Naim Siddiqui : *Maulana Maudoodi, Apni awr Doosron ki nazr main*, P. 35.
35. Azad gave it up after the first World War. Iqbal had come to believe the validity of Muslim Nationalism as a League of Nations ; Hussain Ahmed and other Deobandies found no conflict between

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Indian Nationalism and Islam ; Ubaidullah Sindhi rejected this type of Islam outrightly.

36. Maudoodi : *Mussalman awr Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Vol. 3. P. 14.
37. *Ibid* : P. 110.
38. *Ibid* : P. 87.
39. Maudoodi : *Nationalism and India*, P. 9.
40. *Ibid* : P. 9.
41. Maudoodi : *Mussalman awr Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Vol. 13, P. 44.
42. Maudoodi : *Tanquihat* : P. 128.
43. W. C. Smith : *Op. cit.* : P. 836,
44. Naim Siddiqui: *Maulana Maudoodi, Apni awr Doosron ki Nazar main*, P. 569.
45. Peter Wales : *Europe is My Country*, P. 48.
46. *Ibid* : P. 38.
47. Quoted by Peter Wales : *Op. cit.* P. 49.
48. M. N. Roy. *The Problem of Freedom*, P. 22.
49. Maudoodi : *Naya Nizam-e-Taleem*, P. 16.
50. *Ibid* : P. 21.
51. Maudoodi : *Convocation Address*, P. 6.
52. Maudoodi : *Naya Nizam-e-Taleem*, P. 31.
53. Maudoodi : *Nationalism and India*, P. 24.
54. *Ibid* : P. 14.
55. *Ibid* : P. 14.
56. *Ibid* : Pp. 14-15.
57. *Ibid* : P. 15.
58. *Ibid* : P. 16.
59. *Ibid* : P. 16.
60. *Ibid* : P. 1.
61. *Ibid* : P. 1.
62. *Ibid* : P. 9.
63. *Ibid* : P. 9.
64. *Ibid* : P. 10.
65. *Ibid* : P. 11.
66. *Ibid* : P. 21.
67. *Ibid* : P. 21.
68. *Ibid* : P. 22.
69. *Ibid* : Pp. 9-10.
70. *Ibid* : P. 22.
71. *Ibid* : P. 23.
72. *Ibid* : P. 23.
73. *Ibid* : P. 25.
74. *Ibid* : P. 25.
75. *Ibid* : P. 36.
76. *Ibid* : P. 36.

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77. Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* P. 137.
78. Maudoodi : *Op. cit.* P. 6.
79. Maudoodi : *Mussalman awr Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Vol. I, P. 26.
80. *Ibid.* Pp. 30-31.
81. Maudoodi : *Op. cit.* Vol. III, P. 101.
82. *Ibid.* P. 79.
83. Maudoodi : *Op. cit.* Vol. I. P. 16.
84. *Ibid* : P. 16.
85. *Ibid* : P. 45.
86. Maudoodi : *Nationalism and India*, P. 49.
87. *Ibid* : P. 49.
88. *Ibid* : P. 49.
89. *Ibid* : P. 49.
90. *Ibid* : P. 49.
91. *Ibid* : P. 49.
92. *Ibid* : P. 50.
93. *Ibid* : P. 50.
94. *Ibid* : P. 40.
95. *Ibid* : P. 43.
96. *Ibid* : P. 43.
97. *Ibid* : P. 47.
98. Maudoodi : *Mussalman awr Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Vol. III, P. 126.
99. *Ibid* : P. 239.
100. Maudoodi : *Nationalism and India*, P. 50.
101. Shah : *Pakistan, A Plan for India*, P. 1.
102. Maudoodi : *Nationalism and India*, Pp. 54-55.
103. *Ibid* : P. 42.
104. Maudoodi : *Mussalman awr Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Vol. III, P. 79.
105. Maudoodi : *Op. cit.*, Vol. I. P. 19.
106. *Ibid* : P. 20.
107. *Ibid* : P. 21.
108. *Ibid* : P. 22.
109. Maudoodi : *Op. cit.* Vol. III, P. 15.
110. *Ibid* : P. 86.
111. *Ibid* : P. 83.
112. *Ibid* : P. 78.
113. *Ibid* : P. 107.
114. *Ibid* : P. 109.
115. *Ibid* : P. 93.
116. *Ibid* : P. 106.
117. *Ibid* : P. 122.
118. Maudoodi : *Op. cit.* Vol. I. P. 81.
119. *Ibid* : Pp. 31-32.

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120. *Ibid* : P. 32.
121. *Ibid* : P. 41.
122. *Ibid* : P. 5 and 30.
123. Maudoodi : *Op. cit.* Vol. III, P. 40.
124. Naim Siddiqui : *Maulana Maudoodi Apni awr Doosron ki Nazar Main*, P. 502.
125. W. C. Smith : *Op. cit.* P. 80.
126. Khuda Baksh : *Politics in Islam*, P. 72.
127. *Ibid* : P. 102.
128. *Ibid* : P. 103.
129. Khuda Baksh : *The Orient Under the Caliphs*, P. 122.
180. Compare Quran (49 : 13.)
O mankind ! lo ! We have created you
from a single male and female,
and we have made your nations and
tribes that ye may distinguish one another.
131. Dr. Hamidullah : *Muslim Conduct of the State*, P. 323.
132. Compare : Dr. Hamidullah : *Op. cit.* P. 325.
"I know Muslim history has been recording political 'sub-nationalities' among Muslims from very early days. It began with Shiah and Sunni differences,..."
133. Maulana Maudoodi's view about British rule in India is expressed very clearly in *Mussalman awr Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Vol. III.
134. Compare : L. F. Rushbrook Williams : *India*, P. 4.
135. Manazir Ahsan Gilani : *Tazkera Shah Waliullah*, Pp. 119-123.
136. Benjamin Azkin : *State and Nation*. P. 51.
137. Roza kuxemberg : Quoted by A. R. Desai : *Recens Trends in Indian Nationalism*, P. 51.
138. M. N. Roy : *Op. cit.* P. 16.
139. *Ibid* : P. 22.
140. Qamruddin Khan : Foreword to *Nationalism and India*, P. II,
141. Ameer Ali : *Spirit of Islam*, P. 58-59.
142. Ameer Ali : *History of Saracens*, P. 58.
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- 154- Blunt : *India under Ripon*, P. 70.
145. *Congress Presidential Addresses (1913)*, P. 152.
146. The Quranic Verse is
"Settle your matters by consultation."
147. Halide Edib : *Inside India*, P. 92.
148. Maudoodi : *Mussalman awr Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Vol. III, P. 92.
149. Maudoodi : *Rasail Awr Masail*, Part I. P. 25.
150. Maudoodi : *Islamic Law and Constitution*, P. 31.
151. *Ibid* : P. 26.
152. *Ibid* : P. 27.

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153. Maudoodi : *Mussalman awr Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Vol. III, P. 44.
154. Maudoodi : *Op. cit.* Vol. II, P. 131.
155. *Ibid* : P. 191,
156. *Ibid* : P. 191.
157. *Ibid* : P. 201.
158. *Ibid* : P. 214.
159. *Ibid* : P. 246.
160. Mohammed Sarwar : *Jamaate Islami awr Islami Dastoor*. Pp. 94-97.
161. Quoted by K. Cragg : *Islamic Surveys* : ; Vol. III, P. 11.
162. *Tarjumanul Quran*, Vol. VI, No. 1 , P. 73.
163. Maudoodi : *Rasail Awr Masail*, Pp. 78-79.
164. *Tarjumanul Quran*, Vol. 6. No. 1, P. 73.
165. *Ibid* : P. 71.
166. Maudoodi : *Rasail awr Masail*. P. 480.
167. *Tarjumanul Quran*, Vol. 5. No. 1, P. 60.
168. *Ibid* : P. 61.
169. *Ibid* : P. 61.
170. Vide Mohammed Sarwar, *Op. cit.* P. 92.
171. Mohammed Sarwar : *Maulana Maudoodi ki Tahrik-e-Islami*, Pp. 322-323.
172. *Ibid* : P. 225.
173. *Ibid* : P. 226.
174. Maudoodi : *Mussalman awr Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Vol. II, (*Tarjumanul Quran*, Oct. Nov. Dec. 1938), P. 126.
175. Maurice Cornforth : *Dialectical Materialism*. Vol. III, P. 13.
176. *Selected Correspondence, Moscow*, P. 498:
177. Quoted by Mohammed Sarwar, *Op. cit.* P. 92.
178. Maudoodi : *Tanquihat* : P: 128.
179. Maudoodi : *Islamic Law and Constitution*, P. 22.
180. *Ibid* : P. 23.
181. *Ibid* : P. 23.
182. *Ibid* : P. 24:
183. *Ibid* : P. 24.
184. *Ibid* : Pp. 31-33.
185. Maudoodi : *Process of Islamic Revolution*. P. 5.
186. *Ibid* : P. 11.
187. *Quran* . (12 : 40).
188. *Quran* : (14 : 1-3).
189. *Quran* : (18 : 3).
190. Maudoodi : *Op. cit.* P. 82.
191. *Ibid* : P. 82.
192. Maudoodi : *Political Theory of Islam*. P. 48.
193. *Quran* : (4 : 58).
194. *Quran* : (LIX : 13).

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195. Maudoodi : *Islamic Law and Constitution*, P. 86.
But he supported Fatema Jinnah in the Presidential Election in 1964. It is nothing but political opportunism.
196. Maudoodi : *Political Theory of Islam*, P. 56.
197. Maudoodi : *Op. cit.* 56-57.
198. *Ibid* : P. 4.
199. *Ibid* : P. 42.
200. Maudoodi : *Islamic Law and Constitution*, P. 91.
201. *Ibid* : P. 33.
202. Maudoodi : *Political Theory of Islam*, P. 31.
203. *Ibid* : P. 33.
204. *Ibid* : Pp. 36-37.
205. *Ibid* : P. 33.
206. *Ibid* : P. 22.
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209. *Ibid* : P. 24.
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212. *Ibid* : P. 46.
213. Maudoodi : *Islamic Law and Constitution*, P. 116.
214. *Ibid* : P. 117.
215. *Ibid* : P. 117.
216. *Ibid* : Pp. 117-118.
217. *Ibid* : P. 118.
218. *Ibid* : P. 118.
219. *Ibid* : P. 119.
220. *Ibid* : P. 119.
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223. *Ibid* : P. 36.
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226. *Ibid* : P. 125.
227. Maudoodi : *Political Theory of Islam*, P. 57.
228. *Ibid* : P. 58.
229. *Ibid* : P. 59.
230. *Ibid* : P. 60.
231. *Ibid* : P. 60.
232. M. N. Roy : *Op. cit.* P. 131.
233. Mohammed Sarwar : *Mamlat-e-Islami awr Islami Dastoor*, Pp. 186-187.
234. *Ibid* : P. 190.
235. *Ibid* : P. 190.
236. *Ibid* : P. 191.

237. Maudoodi : *Al Jihad Fil Islam*, P. 90.
238. Compare Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.* Pp. 158-159.
 "Jazia is not the invention of the Arabs, The word Jazia is not Arabic. The Greeks for the first time imposed it on the people of Asia Minor. The Romans imitated it and the Muslims maintained it."
239. Maudoodi : *Mussalman awr Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Vol. II. P. 184.
240. Quoted by Mohammed Sarwar : *Maulana Maudoodi ki Tahrike-Islami*, Pp. 246-47.
241. Quoted by C. C. Adams : *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, P. 264.
242. K. A. Hakim : *Islamic Ideology*. P. 240.
243. *Ibid* : P. 245.
244. S. Srinivas Ayengar : *Congress Presidential Addresses*, 1926, P. 818.
245. Von Grunebaum : *Islam*, P. 229.
246. M. N. Roy : *Op. cit.* P. 15.
247. *Ibid* : P. 16.
248. Mohammed Sarwar : *Op. cit.*, P. 264.
249. *Tarjumanul Quran*, December, 1945.
250. Compare E. From : *The Fear of Freedom*, P. 33.
 "In those times, rationalism pointed to the general lack of personal freedom, to the exploitation of the mass of the population by a small minority, to its narrowness which makes the peasant of all surrounding country a dangerous and suspected stranger to the city dweller—not to speak of a person of another country—and to its superstitiousness and ignorance."
251. *Tarjumanul Quran* : Vol. V, No. 1. Pp. 59-60.
252. Maudoodi : *Parda*. Pp. 159-60.
253. Khurshid Ahmed in *Islamic Law and Constitution*, P. 204.
254. Mohammed Sarwar. *Op. cit.* P. 188.
255. *Ibid* : P. 188.
256. Maudoodi : *Mussalman awr Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Vol. I P, 39.
257. Shorish Kashmiri : *Chehre*. P. 44.
258. William Muir : *The Caliphate*, Pp: 599-600.
259. Compare Max Weber : *Sociology of Religion*, P. 264.
 "Islam displays other characteristics of a distinctly feudal spirit. The obviously unquestioned acceptance of slavery, serfdom and polygamy; the disesteem for and subjection of women; The essentially ritualistic character of religious requirements and the even greater simplicity of the modest ethical requirements."
260. Naim Siddiqui : *Maulana Maudoodi Apni awr Doosron ki Nazar main*, P. 355.
- 261, *Ibid* : P. 559.
262. *Ibid* : P. 560.
263. *Ibid* : P. 595.
264. Maudoodi : *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, P. 140.

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265. *Ibid* : P. 122.
266. M. N. Roy : *India in Transition*, P. 187.
267. Yousuf Meherally : *A Trip to Pakistan*, P. 96.
268. Maudoodi : *Op. cit.* Vol. II. P. 259.
269. K. Cragg : *Islamic Surveys*, Vol. III, P. 122.
270. W. C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India*, P. 179.
271. *Ibid* : P. 179.
272. W. C. Smith : *Islam in Modern History*, Pp. 284-285.

Assessment and Evaluation

MMUSLIM political thought in modern India is medieval in spirit, though sometimes it appears modern in form. This form is the result of the modern times and the influence and impact of western knowledge and culture. One of the reasons for the medievalism of thought was the lack on the part of Muslim thinkers of "strenuous effort to liberate Islam from the fetters of Authority, from the Dead Hand of Past ages"¹

Muslim thought, largely dominated by religion and tradition, could not completely ignore the new changes brought about during the British Rule in India or the developments that were taking place in the intellectual life of the West. "The vast English literature with its remarkable range, beauty and power, the romance of the history of modern science, the thrill and fascination of world politics, the scope of modern effort and achievement in art, invention, industry and commerce, the modern thought and modern philosophy, the dreams of the elect of humanity, the griefs and doubts of its afflicted sons, the wonder, the beauty, the joy of things that have nourished the spirit of man through the ages and keep it in full trim of battle under the stress of modern conditions"² indicate numerous directions in which modernity could confront the Muslim mind. The entire political thought, in a way, was response "to Western impact of democratic ideologies and political concepts."³ The western impact brought enlightenment into the dark nooks⁴ of the Muslim mind and provided the atmosphere which was congenial to the development of a sense of history and politics.

However it is to be noted that the Muslim thought even under the pressure of the West, followed a typical pattern. It first took the form of religious revivalism and then attempted to arrive at an adjustment and reconciliation with the new

forces. During the 19th century the Wahabi and the Aligarh movements clearly represent the same pattern. In the 20th century the Khilafat movement is the manifestation of the first and the Muslim League that of the second. This can conveniently be described as "reactionary revivalism" and "liberal reformism."⁵ There is a small group of writers, like Maulana Sindhi, who may be described as radical. There are important writers who represent these trends. This categorisation is useful for understanding and assessing not only the religious but also the political view of the Muslims. The attitude of the "reactionary revivalists" is feudal and anti-modern. They include Maulana Mohammed Kasim Nanotvi, Mirza Ghulam Ahmed Qadiyani, Maulana Ali, Maulana Abdul Ala Maudoodi, Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, Allama Mashriqui, Dr. Hamidulla and others. The liberal reformist interpretation finds expression in the writings of Sir Syed, Ameer Ali, Chiragh Ali, Shibli Nomani, Dr. Iqbal, Maulana Azad, Maulana Aslam Jairajpuri and others. This liberal school champions the bourgeois capitalist and Zamindari System.⁶ It should be borne in mind that neither of the categories represents a monolithic block; writers have differences on many issues. In spite of such differences, each group of thinkers and writers is characterized by a common approach towards contemporary problems.

The writers in the first category believe in the finality of Islam. They regard the Quran as the most perfect, most precise and most correct Divine book⁷ which is superior to all other scriptures. They do admit the deterioration and decline of the Muslims, and hold that if the Muslims follow the Quran all their problems will be solved. Their religious and political thought is revivalist in character. It is strange that with the exception of the leaders of the Deoband School, all Muslim thinkers (of this category) were pro-British. They held that it is in keeping with their interpretation of religion. Maulana Maudoodi is an example in point. Allama Mashriqui even considered independence of the country as "wishful thinking."⁸ He wrote that the English man rules India because of the will and consent of God.⁹ The leaders of this trend discountenanced the concept of Jihad.¹⁰ In all his books according to Ilyas

Barni, Ghulam Ahmed Qadiyani advocated obedience and loyalty to the British Government.¹¹ Mahmood Ahmed Quadiyani also expressed his sense of obligation and gratitude to the British Government.¹² In addition to their pro-British attitude they were opposed to democracy and the democratic movement in the country. To enthrone the crowd as the king is the most preposterous and absurd political act.¹³ Allama Mashriqui thought that foreign rule was "far better and it was the duty of the Muslims to convince the British government that they should never accept the rule of the majority. The real inheritors of power were Muslims and not the Hindus."¹⁴ He himself confessed that "the entire system of the Khaksar movement from the beginning to the end is based on dictatorship."¹⁵ Further he observed, "Our aim is to be once again kings, rulers, world conquerors and supreme masters on earth. This is our religion, our Islam, our creed, and our faith."¹⁶

The nature and character of political thought was determined by the rigid and orthodox interpretation of Islam. The result is the intrusion of religion into politics and of the politicization of religion. The outcome is neither secular in the modern sense nor religious in the basic sense of the term.¹⁷

In this context the Deoband School merits special notice. The Deobandis were anti-British, because those who upheld the cause of separatist Muslim nationhood were not considered ideal Muslims. Secondly their view of the development of post-Mughal Indian History led them to think that the partition of the country was no solution¹⁸ to the Muslim problem. Its role in Indian politics appears insignificant. It was, undoubtedly, "a temporary ally" of progressive forces but had been "essentially reactionary and feudal."¹⁹

Writers and thinkers of both schools lacked a broad social and political outlook. They could not distinguish between social and political issues. Theology was supreme and everything was subordinated to it. Politics, philosophy, and economics were not assigned independent status and position. Khaliquzzaman writes that "the Ulema in Unity Board were insisting that every candidate of the Board should pledge himself not to move any Bill in the assembly if in the Jammiyat's

view it was necessary to protect the Shariat but I did not agree to it..."²⁰ Their views on Islam and state would not support a change in the personal and religious laws. They were not prepared to welcome the changes taking place in countries where the Muslims were in a predominant majority. Egypt, the Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia etc., were all moving towards modernization of the Law.²¹ Moreover their writings on the subject of society were politically motivated and in effect anti-modern.²² Their petty political interest governed not only their action but also affected their opinions. Iqbal rightly reflects that "the function of Ahmadism in the History of Muslim religious thought is to furnish a revelational basis for India's present political subjugation."²³ Allama Mashriqui states that Islam as a religion is "big politics"²⁴ The Deobandi view of society and state is not very different from that of Maulana Maudoodi. None of these writers had any programme for abolishing the class structure of society nor were they willing to support those forces which were aiming at its abolition. Inadmissibility of communism was taken for granted. This orthodox school never realized the futility of fighting against reason and modern science. One should not be surprised at the support which it won from the Muslim masses. The factors which contributed to its strength were many. The currents of 19th century thought were such that the social reform movements in India could never break their connection with religion and the support which these movements gained was the result of the combined appeal of the social and the religious cause. Even so, the religious factor must be assigned a predominant place,²⁵ But the predominant factor has been that "the bulk of the population was profoundly suspicious of pro-Western educated classes."²⁶

The Muslim liberals made a genuine contribution to the development of religious and political ideas in India. Unlike the feudal school they did not denounce the west and its Industrial civilization. It is regarded as the fulfilment of Islamic ideas. Sir Syed is the founding patriarch of this school. He very ably developed the concept of progressive Islam. He is the greatest protagonist of modernism in Islam in India. Those

who believe that modernism or modernity does not mean "abandonment of religion or arriving at the state of benevolent indifference in which religious beliefs would become in-offensive" would find in Sir Syed a great guide and inspirer. He considerably borrowed from his predecessors. But his interpretation of certain verses of the Quran regarding the complete abolition of slavery in Islam and crucifixion of Christ are certainly original.²⁷ Sir Syed's views on Jihad, mysticism, Wahy, Gabriel (the Messenger Angel), Miracles, ascension (*Mairaj*), Paradise and Hell are astonishingly liberal, rational and progressive. Sir Syed made the first concerted effort to reconcile Islam with reason and western science. He laid the foundations for a modern interpretation of Islam. But this failed to assume the character of a popular movement. Sir Syed firmly believed that Islam is not very much concerned with worldly affairs and criticised the orthodox Ulema for misleading the community.²⁸

According to the liberal school Islam possesses sufficient elasticity to enable it to adapt itself to the social and political transformation going on around it. "The Mohammedan common Law or Shariat is by no means unchangeable or unalterable,"²⁹ says Chiragh Ali. The same writer also says that the teachings of the Quran are "neither barriers to spiritual development or free thinking on the part of Mohammedans nor an obstacle to innovation in any sphere of life whether political, social, intellectual or moral."³⁰ This supplements Sir Syed's view of Islam.³¹ Maulana Mohammed Ali also subscribed to the same view although he departed from it. Maulana Azad was also influenced by Sir Syed but that was not a lasting influence.

Islam according to Sir Syed is able to keep pace with science. The principle of man's primacy over nature was promulgated by the Quran.³² Secondly, Islam and rationalism go together. Khawja Nazir Ahmed says that Islam does not deny due place to human intelligence. It does not recommend meditation, but self-exertion. Islam accepts "Matter as the mother of the morals and spiritualities which in common parlance pass as the human soul."³³ On the basis of this liberal interpretation of Islam it is convenient to discuss the nucleus of liberal political ideas. The first principle that was

advocated by the liberal Muslims was that politics and religion are two different entities and that they should be kept apart.³⁴ This is to disprove the contention that Islam as a way of life comprehends all the aspects of human life.³⁵ The early liberal Muslim thinkers—Sir Syed, Chiragh Ali, Ameer Ali, Shibli Nomani—supported democracy. Their radicalism is however rooted in Islam. Sir Syed held that Islam is opposed to personal rule or monarchy. It sanctions the rule of one person but only when it is backed by all the people. His faith in democracy and liberalism was based on the assumption of the basic rationality of man.³⁶ The liberals had a great regard for the dignity of the individual.³⁷

Mention may be made here of the idea of nationalism enunciated by the liberals. Sir Syed for example used this term to denote the people. All the Indians according to him belong to one single nation. Variety of religions does not detract from the essential unity of the people. It is however to be noted that Sir Syed made a departure from these ideas during the last phase of his life³⁸ by opposing the Indian National Congress.

The liberals also opposed the Pan-Islamism of Jamaluddin Afghani³⁹. Thus Muslim liberalism has two facets...religious as well as political. It attempts a new interpretation of Islam⁴⁰ and builds a new system of political ideas as well. The contribution which liberalism made cannot be over-estimated.⁴¹

In the beginning of 20th Century liberalism was being reoriented by Viqar-ul-Mulk, Maulana Mohammed Ali, Maulana Azad, and Iqbal among others. Maulana Mohammed Ali denies that there is any conflict between science and Islam.⁴² The Quran is not the Book on worldly life and, therefore, it cannot come into conflict with secular knowledge and science.⁴³ Maulana Azad⁴⁴ did actually try to lead the opposition against the Aligarh movement. He wanted to rehabilitate the authority of the Ulema in the religious as well as in the political life of the people. The Ulema did not find any place in Sir Syed's liberal scheme of politics. Maulana Azad's early writings express a romantic view of Islam which is more akin to orthodox revivalism than to liberal reformism. During this period Maulana Azad thought that Muslims should be organized on the lines

prescribed by the Quran : There must be one Imam and obedience to him should be made obligatory on the Muslims.⁴⁵ He was also keen to see that none except he should be made the Imam, He actually campaigned for achieving the position.⁴⁶ He also favoured armed revolution against the British Government. He played an important role in launching the Khilafat movement on the basis of Islamic nationalism.⁴⁸ This was carried further by Maulana Maudoodi. The romanticism of these thinkers could not offer a positive and constructive solution to the social and political problems. Their approach is devoid of any content⁴⁹ as F. Rahman rightly observes. When the institution of Khilafat was abolished it was welcomed by the liberals. The Khilafat had spent its force and had outlived its aims and objects.⁵⁰ Its abolition ended a fiction and laid the path open for the development of nationalism and finally removed once and for all the embargo upon liberalism.⁵¹ Maulana Azad also thought on the same lines. He accepted nationalism and democracy as realities. Abdul Razzak Malihabadi says that Maulana Azad could not go beyond the concept of nationalism and western democracy. He (Azad) persistently opposed communism. Communism was against his temperament, family tradition and environment. During the last years of his life he came closer to the socialism of the Congress party (a copy of the Socialism of the British Labour Party) which is nothing but another name for capitalism.⁵²

Maulana Azad, after renouncing his earlier romanticism held, like other liberals, that Muslim solidarity should be merged into "a higher, nobler Indian solidarity, mightily single"⁵³ as was described by Khuda Bhaksh. To achieve this purpose Maulana Azad and other nationalist Muslims functioned as a group in the Indian National Congress. But one should not forget the inherent lacuna in the creed and the operational methods of the nationalist Muslims which prevented them from being effective and decisive.⁵⁴ Their insular position in relation to the masses gave an air of unreality to their politics. They had no set of consistent beliefs and no single idea was uniformly accepted.⁵⁵ Their doctrine was a strange mixture of nationalism, religion and mysticism. They were all guided by

the medieval concept of theocratic state. They lacked faith in socialism and in secularism. As a result of it one finds that they, along with Gandhiji, made many issues—political and economic—unnecessarily religious.

Maulana Mohammed Ali and Iqbal are the leading representatives of Indian Islam. Maulana Mohammed Ali was more a journalist than a serious thinker. He was a spokesman of popular causes. He is more important in practical politics than in the sphere of ideas. He was genuinely interested in the “International Muslim Idealism” but had neither any perspective nor proper method to secure the object.⁵⁶ To him Pan-Islamism was an integral part of Islam. This doctrine was politically futile and was characterized by “mental confusion, reckless enthusiasm and fanatic self-sacrifice.”⁵⁷ He ultimately shifted to the camp of Muslim separatists. Iqbal, willingly or unwillingly, aided the evolution of the concept of separate nationhood for the Muslims. Maulana Azad opposed this and consequently remained unpopular.⁵⁸ The movement for separate Muslim nationhood is a confession of the failure to resolve the duality of the Indian Muslim who is at once Indian and Muslim.⁵⁹ The Muslim League made this the basis of its popular political movement with the object of generating separate culture among the Muslims. The movement may also be attributed to the sense of political and cultural frustration among the Muslim community. It was an attempt to preserve their cultural identity and to arrest further degeneration. The Muslim community wanted to protect its social structure and spiritual background⁶⁰ from destruction. If the argument of the Muslims was restricted only to religious and cultural grounds, no exception might be taken to it. But the trouble with such arguments is that they invariably extend into the realm of politics and become the call for the establishment of a separate State.⁶¹ The harm that political separatism did was realized only after the establishment of the separate State. Nawab Ismail Khan’s letter (unpublished) to S.A. Latif is significant in this context.^{61a} Communalism may not necessarily be condemnable if it is motivated by the healthy desire to preserve the culture and tradition of a community. It is “a problem which every where arises when

a society is not homogeneous but is divided into separate and rival communities and when each community fears to be subjected to government by another."⁶² The distinction between healthy and unhealthy communalism must never be neglected. The former is deemed right and necessary. According to C. Manshardt one should "seek to cultivate all that is best in his culture and tradition."⁶³ It becomes unhealthy when it leads to hatred of other communities.⁶⁴ Communalism however has in general taken the latter form and in India Muslim communalism as well as Hindu communalism have turned into a "struggle for power and the opportunity which political power confers."⁶⁵ Against this background one is inclined to agree with C. Manshardt, that "In fact it is the political situation which is militating against the improvement of communal relationships in other directions."⁶⁶ Thus Muslim communalism has been the violent expression of the will for the maintenance of separate identity. Sir Syed's idea of nation and nationality is an instance of such an expression. Ameer Ali, Viqar-ul-Mulk and Iqbal provided the intellectual and the political support and content for the political argument. Even in the Khilafat movement it was working as a dominant factor. The Khilafat committees were not the branches of the Indian National Congress in the strict sense. These "branches" worked independently though they worked in the name of or in association with the Congress. It must be said that all this paved the way for the demand for a separate Muslim state. But even the more broad-minded Muslims could never overcome the sense of their separate identity and in due course they established a nationalist Muslim Conference or Azad Muslim Conference. Even Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan was contemplating to launch an Islamic movement in recognition of the religious temperament of the Pushtu nation.⁶⁷ In the thirties he did not merge his organisation with the Congress. He accepted non-violence as desirable and expedient. But he would not in the last resort object to the use of force to gain Pakhtoonistan.⁶⁸ He favoured the affiliation of the Khudai Khidmatgars with the Congress because the Muslim League which was pro-British was not prepared to support them.⁶⁹ He remained in the Congress, because under

the influence of Gandhi he came to believe in the unity of all religions and in the primarily economic and not religious character of the Muslim problem. He thought that after independence it would be solved on these lines.⁷⁰ What is to be emphasised is that the Muslims in general have consistently been conscious of their separate identity. Muslim communalism became "the nationalist ideology adopted by the emergent and precarious Muslim middle class in its struggle against domination within India by the more developed Hindu middle class."⁷¹ This is to say that the demand for the partition of the country was a middle class affair. It is interesting to note that this point was conceded by the League spokesman (M.R.T.) who says that the same is the case with the demand for independence made by the Congress. Herein is embedded the strength and force of Jinnah's leadership. What the Congress did in 1886 by moving the resolution for the introduction of representative institutions for arresting "the growing poverty of the Indian people" in order to win over the masses, the Muslim League did in the forties. Congress did not visualise interference with the oppressive conduct of the Zamindars or, the usurious operation of moneylenders.⁷³ In the struggle for Pakistan, W.C. Smith sees the sign of "the masses striving towards freedom in new terms, in the limited cultural terms that they can understand."⁷⁴ Its success meant a collapse of "non-communal, unitary Indian Nationalism."⁷⁵ It is true that Jinnah was not a religious leader. He and certain other leaders of the Muslim League opposed the leadership of the Ulema. But he knew the importance of the Ulema. The role of Maulana Shaukat Ali and Bahadur Yar Jang, speaks for itself. Khaliqzaman gives a list of the Ulema who were "consistently on tour"⁷⁶ to propagate the League ideology. It was verily the lack of secular leadership on the part of the Muslim League which led to such virulent activity by the reactionary elements in Muslim society. It was certainly not in accord with Iqbal's desire "to humanize politics through religion."⁷⁷ This was harmful even to the movement and provided an opportunity after partition to those who are inspired not by Iqbal or Jinnah but by Maulana Azad, the romanticist, to rule over the country.⁷⁸ It was hypocritical for the Muslim League

to claim to be the heir of Sir Syed's rational and progressive thought on religion and politics.⁷⁹ The success of the League only proves that "Pakistan...is not based on facts or principles but it has all the romance of a battle-cry and all the potentiality of a crusade."⁸⁰

The radical school of Muslim thought found its best spokesman in Maulana Sindhi. He did not only get rid of orthodoxy and reactionary politics but boldly advocated revolutionary changes in social and religious thought and the infrastructure of the political system. Allama Mashriqui also appears to be a revolutionary but his mission did not develop into a specific movement.⁸¹ He preached action and called for soldier's life of bravery and sacrifice which he regarded as the essence of Islam. But the ultimate object according to him is the reform of one's own self.⁸² His spade is only a symbol of catharsis, reformation of the self and dignity of labour.⁸³ The inherent defect of the movement was its violent and reactionary political role. On the contrary in Maulana Sindhi's writings and teachings one finds a systematic attempt to construct the religious thought and at the same time to formulate a political programme based thereon. He believed that spirit is the developed form of matter.⁸⁴ He held that Islam should be viewed historically. According to him Islam always supported revolution which is against the exploiting classes in society. Maulana Sindhi holds that the Prophet's sympathy was always with the suppressed tillers of the land.⁸⁵

Maulana Sindhi's line of revolutionary action is very much akin to the Communist approach. Revolution, according to him, cannot be brought about without an ideal, a party, and a programme.⁸⁶ The ruling class does never surrender authority willingly. Therefore, a revolutionary party is necessary which would regard war as a legitimate means for the attainment of political goals.⁸⁷ Revolutionary conflict, however, was to be resorted to with circumspection and discretion. Maulana Sindhi disapproved of Gandhian non-violence as inadequate and self-destructive.⁸⁸ In 1926 he visualized the solution of the Indian problem through the self-determination of national units. India was to be a

voluntary union of sovereign national republics. Landlordism was to be abolished and key industries were to be nationalized.⁹⁰

Baljon holds the view that Islamic thought is definitely anti-Communist.⁹¹ But this is not true in the case of Maulana Sindhi and Abdul Razzak Malihabadi. The middle class Muslim writers generally regarded Islam and communism as two hostile and irreconcilable systems of life. A Punjabi thought that "if socialism is accepted in India there would be a union of Muslims and Socialists on economic issues but these socialists would be divided on cultural and religious grounds."⁹²

Maulana Sindhi and A. R. Malihabadi believed that the present society which is based on profit, injustice and dishonesty, cannot guarantee good and harmonious life to the people. The only solution is socialism which is derived from the principles advocated by the Prophet.⁹³ To Malihabadi socialism is nothing if it is not a struggle for justice and truth, against property and inhuman conditions.⁹⁴ He believed that in socialism there is nothing which can be described as un-Islamic. True Islam and socialism aim at the same goal—justice and equality.⁹⁵

Both Maulana Sindhi and Malihabadi opposed Hindu communalism.⁹⁶ Both opposed Gandhi when he tried to build up his leadership on foundations of myth and superstition and without regard for realism advised the workers of Ahmedabad to withdraw their strike.⁹⁸ Both believed that unity was not possible unless political recognition is given to all the communities. This alone would build up sympathy and understanding among them, and bring about unity of action.⁹⁹

We may well recognize that the radicals were to a great extent free from the defects of the liberal school of thought. Liberalism in India suffered from "ethical poverty and was incapable of producing any concrete results. Its appeal was superficial in spite of the pleasing notes of the doctrine and it failed to evoke positive response from the Muslims."¹⁰⁰ The liberals were inconsistent in their attitude to the west—Sir Syed and Chiragh Ali were enthusiastic admirers of western culture while Iqbal vehemently revolted from its spirit and influence. Again, in spite of their profession of liberalism they consistently glorified the past of Islamic society and created a false sense of its

superiority. It prevented them from understanding the new forces and ideals which were changing the world. They were "oppressed by the weight of ancient habits and tradition"¹⁰¹ The liberals also lacked moral courage. Their writings were unconsciously addressed either to the western readers or to the highly educated and sophisticated Muslims. Ameer Ali, for instance, wrote wholly in English. It is significant that Sir Syed was not on the committee which was to frame the syllabus for theology in his own college. The contradictions in Iqbal's English prose and poetry (for example on Turkish reforms) speak for themselves. Abul Kalam Azad's nationalist politics made his religious ideas unacceptable. But one should concede that the radicals also were not effective in influencing either religious or the political life of the community.

It would be difficult to envisage the lines along which Muslim thought in India may develop in the new context of an independent India for while Pakistan has satisfied the demands of the separationists it has thrown an added burden on the Muslims who are now a smaller minority than they were in undivided India. The task of understanding and accommodation has to be faced squarely in the background of the new Indian State. If it was unrealistic on the part of the Muslims (and their Hindu allies) in undivided India to seek for unity and understanding by espousing the cause of the distant and unreal Khilafat, the Muslims in independent-India have to look within not without for inspiration and guidance in forging the bases of unity for our secular democracy. There should be no ground for scepticism regarding the future of the Muslims in India. I. H. Qureshi, however, says "in a hundred years, perhaps in a shorter time, the Muslim people may cease to exist"¹⁰² in India. This is far-fetched. W. C. Smith presumes that Indian Islam will be more creative than that of Pakistan.¹⁰³ May this be so. The present conditions however do not hold out any promise of such a consummation. Firstly, because the Muslims are surrounded by an overwhelming non-Muslim majority. They have some genuine and some false fears of the aggressive posture of Hindu nationalism. It breeds an attitude of suspicion and hatred among the minorities. The Muslim unwillingness to change

or modify personal law is an expression of this fear, resulting in reactionary conservatism and fanaticism. It certainly forms a great obstacle to creative and independent thought—a necessary condition for vigorous political thinking.

Secondly the Muslims are still very much under the sway of the orthodox and fanatical Ulema. The slightest hint of liberalism is unacceptable to them as it may be the possible beginning of a revolutionary upheaval. Most of the liberals have been considered as free thinkers and deviationists. The unpopularity of Sir Syed's religious idea, indicates the attitude of the people towards the liberal outlook. In addition to this Muslim leadership in the political field is in the hands of the reactionaries. "It has deliberately kept the Muslim masses" observes Mir Mushtaq Ahmed, "away from the current of the movement for economic emancipation of the Indian working class and tried to scare them away from the contemporary social philosophies...It has made them a citadel of reaction and victims of political and social stagnation, having tied them down to the decadent social and economic order, based on social-economic exploitation."¹⁰⁴ The background of the Muslim's imperial past, the complex of subordination generated during the British period and the dark and uncertain future which faces them in India today, have all combined to make the Muslim community by and large apathetic, hidebound and myth-ridden. The earlier the burden of the past is exploded and the fears and dark forebodings of the future are set at rest, the easier it would be for the community to think and act creatively¹⁰⁶ and to develop a sense of common commitment to the ideal of secular democracy.

Lastly one more factor which should be taken into consideration is that of communal riots. This might destroy faith in secularism and democracy among the minority as well as the majority. Communalism is a hard and painful reality in Indian politics. But it is criminal to equate the communalism of the minority with that of the majority.¹⁰⁸ The problem of unity between the Hindus and Muslims "arises not out of its lack of integration but out of the popular nature of Indian society."¹⁰⁷ The lack of understanding and tolerance not only demoralizes the Muslims but strengthens the tribal feelings of solidarity and

makes them think in terms of religion and strengthens reactionary leadership. The Muslims may thus once more be led to revive the old arguments of separatism with all its implications. The arguments may initially appear innocuous¹⁰⁸ but in the long run become brutally assertive and lead to unintended and fatal consequences.¹⁰⁹ The chronic problem of communal riots is a challenge to the nation, to the majority and minority communities alike. It is a call for tolerance and mutual accommodation and for a dedication to the constructive task of achieving a synthesis which does not absorb and of progress in which all can share without losing their identity.

Modern Muslim political thought reveals a conspicuous absence of originality.¹¹¹ During the period under review we find no one of the stature of Ibn Khaldun as a broker of ideas or of Abul Fazl as the architect of synthesis. Almost all the thinkers were preoccupied—the solitary exception being Jinnah—with religion, but no one could establish a distinction between religion “as a matter of ritual” and religion as “an inner experience¹¹²” or emphasize the distinction between politics as the realm of the public and the secular and religion as the realm of the individual in his relation to the Transcendental. Islam was taken as a guide in the social, political and economic life of the community. It was in Egypt, not in India, that Mohammed Abduh had the courage to point out that Islam declined as a result of the illegitimate involvement of religion with politics.¹¹³ The Muslim writers never showed any interest in the sociology of religion. How Islam was influenced by the social organization and social and political forces in a particular country, none ventured to analyse. Maulana Sindhi tried to offer an answer but a systematic attempt in this direction was not undertaken.

Modern Muslim political thought in India revolves around two concepts—nationalism and democracy. The Muslim thinkers, however, were not able to achieve philosophic detachment in their approach to the problems of society because of their political involvement and commitment. Their ideas were thus determined by their emotional identification with the issues which agitated the community. They were a reflection of the facts of the situation rather than a philosophy of the situation.

Muslim thinkers, that is to say, were not able to transcend the limitations of time and fact and to arrive at the vantage point of philosophical reflection. When Khaliqzaman wrote, "I believe it is an inherent right of an individual to fight against the will of the majority in matters in which his conscience is involved,"¹¹⁴ he was not laying down a philosophical doctrine of individualism or of the rights of conscience but was justifying Muslim separatism, distinct cultural identity and making a plea for a separate homeland. The result is that there are some scattered political ideas but no political system of ideas or philosophy. What Muslim political thought lacked was a "constructive and bold humanism to re-state Islamic social ideas,"¹¹⁵ taking rationalism to its logical end and a revolutionary interpretation of the Quran. These are the minimum requirements for independent political thinking. This task will call for men of genius and imagination and a vision of the future.

To conclude, the Quran and the Hadith have been the fountain-spring of Muslim political ideas in India. These sources are not specific about the nature and form of the Islamic polity. One is therefore left with an unfettered choice to draw his own inferences. In India there has been no unanimity on the nature of the Islamic polity. The causes of democracy as well as authoritarianism have claimed sanction from the same Quran and the same Hadith, according to the interest, conveniences and even the fancies of theologians. Their outlook was narrow and their resistance to the realities of the age was stubborn. Islamic society refused to take notice of changing pattern of the economic and political reality and the overwhelming forces of democracy and socialism. It has been allergic to science and the scientific approach and has remained static and stagnant. There can hardly be any hope of healthy survival and growth unless the community takes up the challenge and creates with determination a social atmosphere congenial to the development of genius and originality. The problem of independent India is one of creating a common citizenship and of inculcating in the mind of every citizen a sense of belongingness and participation in the life of the community, so that differences of creed and religion would cease to be politically relevant. The task is challenging indeed and

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the forces of aggressive reaction and obscurantism have a hold over both the majority and minority communities. But at the same time it must be recognised that forces of enlightenment and progress have prevailed on the whole so that since independence the community has withstood the strain and stress of communalism. Our hope lies in harnessing and strengthening these forces for sustaining the life and progress of the community.

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2. *Select Writings of Mohammed Ali* : P. 149.
3. E. Malcolm House : *Studies in Indian Democracy*, Ed. by S.P. Aiyar and R. Srinivasan, P. 6.
4. D.P. Mukerji : *Diversities*, P. 165.
5. The expressions are borrowed from B.B. Misra : *The Indian Middle Classes*, P. 16.
6. Moin Shakir : *Mainstream*, 3rd June, 1967.
7. Allama Mashriqui : *Tazkera*, P. 33 and 59.
8. Allama Mashriqui : *Al-Islah*. 1st October. 1937. P. 11.
9. Quoted by Hiralal Seth : *The Khaksar Movement*, P. 69.
10. cf. H. A. Walter : *The Ahmadiya Movement* and see also Ilyas Burni : *Qadiyani Mazhab ka Ilmi Mahaseba*, P. 242.
11. Ilyas Burni : *Op. cit.*, P. 241-245.
12. *Ibid* : Pp. 250-51.
13. Allama Mashriqui : *Hukumat ki Bunyad* : P. 10.
14. *Ibid* : P. 11.
15. Hiralal Seth : *Op. cit.* P. 34.
16. W.C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India*, P. 278.
17. Kamla Devi : *At the Cross-Roads*, P. 71.
18. Manazir Ahsan Gilani . *Tazkera Hazrat Shah Waliullah*, Pp. 44-48.
19. W.C. Smith . *Op. cit.* P. 221.
20. Khaliqzaman : *Pathway to Pakistan*, P. 133.
21. Rom Landau . *Arabs and Islam*, P. 139.
22. The process of modernization which is "the major form of acculturation in the contemporary world" necessarily stands for the abolition of feudal order, industrialization, scientific and technological development. Here a distinction should be made between modernization and modernity. Both do not go hand in hand. Scientific meta-physics in some advanced Western Countries is an example in point. Modernity basically is a scientific attitude of mind which does not take any thing for granted.
23. *Statements and Speeches of Iqbal* : Ed. by Shamloo, P. 127.
24. Quoted in *Al-Islah* : 15th October, 1935.
15. S.P. Verma : *The Problem of Democracy in India*, P. 44.
26. B.B. Misra : *Op. cit.* P. 16.
27. S.M. Ikram : *Mauj-e-Kausar*, Pp. 166-167.
28. Moin Shakir : *Quest*, Spring 1968, P. 59.

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29. Chiragh Ali : *The Proposed Political Legal and Social Reforms*, P. 11.
30. *Ibid* : P. XXXV.
31. Compare : Khuda Baksh . *Op. cit.* P. 41.
"There is nothing in Islam to hamper or hinder the advancement of man. The Quran gives naught but counsels of perfection and the Quran is our Light and Guide."
32. Khwaja Kamaluddin : *Islam and Civilization*, P. 15.
33. *Ibid* : Appendix, I. Pp. 139-140.
34. Sir Syed : *Miqalate Sir Syed*, Ed. by S.M. Islami. Vol. P. 4.
35. Compare Chiragh Ali : *Op. cit.* P. XXXIV.
".....Islam as a religion is quite apart from including a social system. The Mohammedan polity and social system have nothing to do with religion." And "The Prophet never combined the Church and State into one." (P. XXXVI) And compare also Khuda Baksh : *Op. cit.* P. 105, that subordination of religion to the state is a "long long step forward...in the direction of reform and progress."
36. Moin Shakir : *Op. cit.*, Pp. 58-59.
37. *Ibid* : P. 59.
38. Theodore De Bary (editor) : *Sources of Indian Tradition*, P. 747.
39. Moin Shakir : *Quest, Spiring* 1968—, P. 61.
40. Compare Al Beruni : *Makers of Pakistan*, P. 60.
"Sir Syed's long life...bridged the gulf between the medieval and the modern Islam in India."
41. Blunt's remarks about Chiragh Ali's book are interesting. Compare Blunt : *India under Ripon*, P. 70.
"His book contains nothing more than Mohammed Abduh or any of the liberal Ulema of Cairo, would subscribe to. Indeed, the reforms it suggests have all been advocated by them, and are defended with much the same reasoning."
42. Mohammed Ali : *My life*, P. 5.
43. A.R. Malihabadi : *Hind Weekly*, 27th May, 1935, P. 4.
44. Compare J.M.S. Baljon ; *Modern Muslim Quran Interpretation*, P. 11.
"Actually he (Azad) aims at a kind of reconciliation between the Ulema who should be better acquainted with modern views and stand-points, and Westernized youth who ought not neglect what is valuable in the age old articles of faith."
45. A.R. Malihabadi : *Zikr-e-Azad*, P. 24.
46. *Ibid* : Pp. 24-28.
47. *Ibid* : P. 272.
48. Compare B.A. Dar : *Why Pakistan ?* P. 9.
"Islamic Nationalism is nourished neither on a doctrine of race-superiority, nor on the militant theory of a father land Uber Alles : It is ideological from beginning to end."
49. F. Rahman : *Pakistan Quarterly, Spring 1958—*, P. 28.

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50. Khuda Baksh : *Op. cit.* P. 99.
51. *Ibid.* Pp. 105-106.
52. A.R. Malihabadi : *Op. cit.* Pp. 279-280.
53. Quoted by Lanka Sunderam : *A Secular State for India*, P. 47.
54. Sajjad Zaheer : Quoted in *Manshoor*, 26th December, 1943.
55. Moin Shakir : *Radical Humanist*, 4th February, 1965. P. 53.
56. Sharif Al-Mujahid : *Pakistan Quarterly*, Winter, 1955, P. 57.
57. Hafeez Malik : *Muslim Nationalism in India and Pakistan*, P. 238.
58. Compare Hafeez Malik : *Op. cit.* P. 274.

"The pathos of the situation lies in the fact that after 1920's he (Azad) and the Muslim nation ceased to recognize each other."
59. Compare W.C. Smith : *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, Ed. by C.H. Phillips, P. 322.

"The Indian Muslim is both Indian and Muslim. The existence of this duality, and the endeavour to stress either one or the other fact than both, have proven, shall we say, explosive. There has been a failure to intellectualise the duality, to hold the two poles synthetically in creative tension."
60. Khaliqzaman : *Op. cit.* P. 180.
61. Compare G. T. Garrett : *Indian Commentary*, P. 117.

"The introduction of the machinery of democracy and the introduction of communal electorate have further confused religion and economics. Every politician knows that it is easier to arouse popular feeling upon a simple religious issue than upon a complicated social or economic question."
61. A. In a letter (29th February, 1948) Nawab Ismail Khan writes :

"...you are right that extremism carried away most of us, but the disappointment has soon followed in its trail. The Mussalmans in the Indian Union now realize what stupendous mistakes they made in supporting this partition movement and what disaster and ruin have ensued as its result. Your Dominion is also in the grip of extremism at the present moment. Your people should take a lesson from what has occurred here..."
62. Guy Wint : *India and Democracy*. P.
63. C. Manshradt : *The Hindu Muslim Problem in India*, P. 51.
64. Compare Khaliqzaman : *Op. cit.* P. 183.

"The only communalism that I call dishonourable is the communalism which seeks its protection in British imperialism."
65. J.C. Durani : *The Choice Before India*, P. 137.
66. C. Manshradt : *Op. cit.* P. 126.
67. Farigh Bukhari : *Bacha Khan*, P. 95.
68. Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan ; *Times of India*, 22nd April, 1968.
69. Farigh Bukhari : *Op. cit.* P. 144-145.

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70. *Ibid* : P. 298.
71. W.C. Smith : *Op. cit.* P. 211.
72. M.R.T. : *Nationalism in Conflict in India*, P. 189.
73. B.B. Misra : *Op. cit.* P. 350.
74. W.C. Smith : *Muslim League*. P. 8.
75. *Ibid* : P. 3.
76. Khaliqzaman : *Op. cit.* P. 190.
77. M.H. Rahman : *Pakistan Review* : April, 1954. P. 27.
78. Alberuni : *Makers of Pakistan*. P. 147.
79. Compare Liaquat Ali Khan : Quoted in *India unreconciled*, P. 150.
“...I do not approve or believe in spiritualized politics. I believe in honest, clean and practical politics and that is the only way if this country is to make any advance...”.
80. B.M. Choudhari : *Muslim Politics in India*, P. 47.
81. W.C. Smith : *Modern Islam in India*, P. 270.
82. Allama Mashriqui : *Islam ki Askari Zindigi*, P. 20.
83. Allama Mashriqui : *Al Islah*, 1st October, 1937. P. 11.
84. Allama Mashriqui . *Isharat* : P. 118.
85. Maulana Sindhi : *Qurani Dasture Inquilab* : P. 81.
86. *Ibid* : Pp. 107-108.
87. *Ibid* : P. 18.
88. *Ibid* : P. 19.
89. *Ibid* : P. 122.
90. Nafis Ahamed : *The Basis of Pakistan*. P. 16.
91. Baljon : *Modern Muslim Quran Interpretation*. P. 106.
92. A. Punjabi : *Confederacy of India*, Pp. 93-94.
93. A.R. Malihabadi : *Hind Weekly 15th October, 1934*, P. 3.
94. *Ibid* : 28th January, 1935, P. 3.
95. *Ibid* : 22nd April, 1935, P. 5.
96. *Ibid* : 25th February, 1935, P. 5, and 25th March, 1935, P. 5.
97. *Ibid* : 28th February, 1935, P. 5.
98. *Ibid* : 4th February, 1935, P. 4.
99. *Ibid* : 9th December, 1935, P. 4.
100. W.C. Smith : *Op. cit.* P. 65.
101. Pandit Nehru : *India's Quest*. P. 217.
102. I.H. Qureshi : *Muslim World XLIV*. P. 8.
103. W.C. Smith : *Islam in Modern History*, P. 287.
104. Mir Mushtaq Ahmed : *National Unity and Solidarity*. P. 33.
105. Moin Shakir : *Mainstream*, October, 1966.
106. Moin Shakir : *Mainstream*, 10th February 1968.
107. K.M. Panikkar : *Foundations of New India*, P. 222.
108. See Amin Zubairi : *Mussalmanane Hind ki Siyasate Watni*, Pp. 35-36.
Viqar-ul Mulk supported the separate electorate for keeping up good relations with the Hindus.
109. *People's Democracy* : (editorial) 17th March, 1968.

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110. Compare : F. Whyte : *The Future of East and West*. P. 57.
"The literature of India contains no political treatise comparable with Aristotle's *Politics*, Plato's *Republic*, Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois*, Burke's *Essays and Speeches*, Mill's *Liberty*, or Alexander Hamilton's *Federalist*. This shows that the habit of political thought has never grown in India. It is only another way of saying that India is a religious and not a political continent."
111. Wensinck : *Muslim Creed*. P. 36.
112. Quoted by L. Binder : *Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*, P. 60.
113. Khaliquzzaman : *Op. cit.* P. 179.
114. F. Rahman : *Islam*, P. 234.

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