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INDIA'S FREEDOM STRUGGLE AND THE  
ROLE OF HARYANA



# INDIA'S FREEDOM STRUGGLE AND THE ROLE OF HARYANA

S.P. SHUKLA

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“In welcoming you I am painfully reminded of backwardness of our Province in public life and politics and especially in the District of Hissar. You may find here some wealth, you may find the simplicity of Indian life and the frank credulous poverty-stricken agriculturists; you may find Jats, Rajputs and other communities ready to enlist and sacrifice themselves for the sake of their KING and Country; but public life has hitherto stood divorced with all these elements till now. The preparations therefore of this Conference, though by no means worthy of this great occasion or of you our distinguished guests, and full of imperfections, and I take leave to assure you, the outcome of the sincere zeal and enthusiasm of thousands of men, who may not be title holders or *darbaries*, but are true and patriotic supporters of the great national cause.”

Welcome address presented to Mahatma Gandhi on 22 October 1920 by K.A. Desai, Chairman Reception Committee, First Ambala Divisional Conference, Bhiwani.



## PREFACE

Both fascinating and momentous is the rapidity with which in India to-day the old and tradition-bound regional areas are being studied through their uneven processes of Social Change and Nationalism. Herein the influences of Western ideas and institutions were so synthesized with traditional ways that, on the one hand, this interaction unleashed many forces of cultural and political contradiction and, on the other, gave rise to a new middle class with its roots neither in tradition nor in modernity. Obviously this generated a dialectical process resulting in a society which ceased to be closed without being open.

Haryana society largely adhered to this model. The process of change including that of Nationalism began as early as the middle of the nineteenth century. The impact of forces consequent to British rule like the growth of a universalistic legal super-structure, expansion of education, urbanization and industrialization, increased network of communications and, lastly, the politicization of the society, caused a major breakdown in the feudal and semi-feudal society of Haryana without strengthening the forces of capitalism in any significant way. As a consequence the feudal heritage remained an important force though at the same time values of humanism, rationalism, universal equality, dignity and freedom of man found expression in the ideological peculiarities of the new elite. The entrenchment of the British power in the 20th century further accelerated this process and created material conditions for the emergence of the national-liberal type elites rather than the pre-British monarchical-feudal type. This elite structure was, however, conspicuous for the increasing influence of rural-based political elites and greater articulation of interest and caste-group oriented goals in political ideology. Obviously this elite structure was bound to create attitudes that were strongly inclined towards accepting charismatic leaders having deep emotional roots in the traditional symbols of authority such as religion,



caste, joint family and village community. The pivotal element in the factors mentioned above is the change in the structure of relationship between the urban-rural groups, based on the cumulative character of British colonial system as practised in this region.

Within this conceptual framework the present study seeks to analyze not only the liberation struggle in Haryana between 1930 and 1945, but also intends to examine the dynamics of Punjab politics as also the compulsions of the Indian politics in its totality. Furthermore, this study intends to highlight the historical forces and trends rather than a few personalities who on diverse occasions acted in ways which normally provided a coloured picture of the basic truth. Throughout the attempt has been to highlight socio-economic trends which in ultimate analysis shaped the entire relationship of the nationalists vis-a-vis the British imperialism. In other words, the present study is largely devoted to an overview of the nationalism in Haryana, indicating both internal interactions and external dynamics. The work is divided into five chapters.

Chapter-1, 'Historical Perspective' is a review of variables, both perceptible and intangible, which acted as the major force in the sharpening of nationalist forces in Haryana. In the present chapter the growth of the middle class, which played the role of a launching pad for liberation struggle in Haryana, has been critically examined. The shortcomings in its development and the logical inadequacies attributable to its lop-sided development have been highlighted. It is contended that in size and magnitude this class was too small, therefore, it failed to deepen nationalism to any significant extent. However, at the end of the chapter it is maintained that the process of social change did represent a cultural breakthrough from the past though the organizational base of this class was weak and largely limited to the urban groups and student population. Its importance in mobilizing the forces of nationalism has been accepted here as more qualitative than quantitative.

In chapter II, 'The Gathering Storm', we analyzed various aspects of the growth of nationalist aspirations in Haryana under

which the concepts of liberation struggle were loaded with ideological meanings. The chapter mainly deals with the internal dynamics. However, the influences of external forces have also been referred to insofar as they were seen as having a bearing on the national movement in Haryana which constitutes the real focus of this chapter. The chapter further examines the activity of the Congress party in Haryana and Punjab between 1939 and 1940 with a view that in high politics Congressmen had deep faith in the leadership of Gandhi and other members of the High Command. They were prepared to go the whole hog with their leaders in disciplining the British imperialism provided they had a clear brief of the activities to be undertaken by them. However, this conclusion does not permit us to dismiss the idea that the bug of friction politics had not bitten the Congress leaders for there were unmistakable attempts to gain popularity at each other's expense.

The chapter III, 'The Individual Satyagraha Movement', takes the story further on the basis of this hypothesis. The chapter deals in detail the progress of Individual Satyagraha Movement in Haryana including the various stages through which the movement passed, finally ending in ignominy. Consequent to it the stabilization of anti-imperialist stance of the Congress in Haryana could not be durable because it was taking place under such objective conditions which warranted a reappraisal of diverse convictions of the leadership of this party, its rank and file and also the strength of forces ranged against the nationalist element in it.

Chapter IV, 'The Quit India Movement', studies this movement in all its aspects. Here an attempt has been made to analyze various cross-currents in the Haryana Congress and Punjab politics. The chapter highlights the fact that the crisis engendered by the failure of Individual Satyagraha Movement as an alternate device to channelize mass resentment in Haryana was partially answered. However, the development of the liberation movement in which the tasks of national independence could be linked with the task of revolutionary upsurge was found wanting. This is all the more significant as the wave of anger against the Punjab

Government (in alliance with British imperialism) was very much evident despite the virulent Congress-baiting in the Punjab.

The concluding chapter, 'The Final Analysis', attempts to review the entire period with an object to examine the hypothesis that the national movement in Haryana from 1939 to 1945 was largely an expression of the needs and dissatisfactions of the urban-educated middle class. The mass support was throughout halting as the people at large were taught by the colonial power to consider themselves inferior, unsure of themselves and their values as a consequence of the changes which were constantly occurring in the social structure.

In the present work, the following hypotheses have been tested.

Firstly, the middle class, in some significant sense of the term, had emerged in Haryana in the 20th century and politically this middle class was of actual importance. As such the development of political nationalism was its specific contribution. Secondly, the correlation between the size, economic status, degree of organization and consciousness of common interest of the middle class with the uneven development of national movement in Haryana was complete. In consequence it is possible to identify the strength and weakness of the national movement with the moral or ideological viewpoints of the emerging middle class in Haryana. Thirdly, the increasing influence of rural-based political elite in Haryana due to the rise of petty landowners largely roadblocked the anti-imperialist tide in this region, for this group was more pragmatic and had little interest in generalized anti-imperialistic themes. Its interest was in the specific issues which formed part of the social structure of its community or region. Curiously enough they were spokesmen for the West as far as their people were concerned, and spokesmen of their people as far as the rulers were concerned. The present book is being written in order to test these hypotheses and it is hoped that it might fill a gap in the series of studies conducted on the history of Freedom Movement in Haryana.

This work is mainly based on original sources, both published and unpublished, available in the National Archives of India (New Delhi), Nehru Museum and Library, Teen Murti

(New Delhi), Punjab Archives (Patiala), and Haryana Archives (Chandigarh). Besides Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, official reports, minutes, gazetteers, contemporary and semi-contemporary works as well as the Punjab Press, particularly *The Tribune*, have also been consulted and utilized. Finally, in order to understand the factors that were at the root of the problem, it was also found necessary to study the literature on the freedom movement of India and Punjab.

Rohtak

S.P. SHUKLA



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## CHAPTER I

### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

“Englishmen cannot govern a people without understanding it, and the understanding of it must be gained through a knowledge of its language, its literature, its institutions, its customs, its poetry and mythology, its land and agriculture. This was said by Dr. Jowell<sup>1</sup> about 60 years ago, but to consolidate their colonial rule, the British practised it ever since they began to nourish the ambition of establishing their rule in India.

Unlike other regions the British arrived in Haryana rather late. In 1803, a large part of Haryana territories fell into the hands of Lord Lake after he forced a treaty popularly known as the treaty of Surji Arjangaon on the Daulat Rao Sindhia—a Maratha Chieftain.<sup>2</sup> In order to consolidate their power, the British colonial administrators started the process of understanding this region through numerous<sup>3</sup> settlement reports<sup>4</sup> labourously prepared to gain foothold in the region and also to extract the maximum revenue from its agriculture. The handicraft of the region was wilfully destroyed to seek predominant position for their trade and commerce. On October 25, 1806 C.T. Metcalfe was assigned the job of the Superintendent of Revenue and remained in office till 1808. Later in May 1811 he came back again as a resident of this area for 7 years. In 1825 he was again brought back to Delhi to provide proper direction to this area. Trained under aggressive colonialism of Lord Wellesly he passed through conservative influence to liberal influence of Bentham and Lord William Bentinck. As such his rule in the region became a symbol of his cumulative personality, liberal at heart but conservative in practice.<sup>5</sup> The intervening period between his departure from this region and the great holocaust of 1857 was marked for slow and tardy progress in practically all spheres. This was so, because

the imbalance in material conditions due to the backward rural setting on the basis of unchanged agrarian productive relations, combined with feudalistic and semi-feudalistic control, stagnated the forward march of history in Haryana. After 1858 this region, better known as Delhi territories, was forced to join with Punjab (as part of punishment to people for joining the 1857 national war) under the stewardship of Sir John Lawrence.<sup>6</sup> Thereafter, this area for administrative convenience was called the divisions of Delhi and Hissar.<sup>7</sup> Between 1857 and 1821 Hissar, Rohtak Gurgaon, Karnal and Sirsa were added by transfer from the old North-West provinces; Thanesar was abolished as a district and its areas distributed between Ambala and Karnal.<sup>8</sup> Between 1881-1891 Sirsa was abolished and its area distributed between Ferozepore and Hissar.<sup>9</sup> After 1911 the tehsil of Sonapat of Delhi with an area of 448 square miles was transferred to Rohtak, while Ballabgarh tehsil of Delhi district was transferred to the Gurgaon district.<sup>10</sup> Later on it was named Ambala Division of United Punjab comprising districts such as Gurgaon, Rohtak, Hissar, Karnal, Ambala and Simla. As mentioned above, it was only in 1961 that the first five districts (now divided into twelve districts) of Ambala Division attained their independent identity in the form of the New State known as Haryana.

The term 'Haryana' as it was generally used might be misleading. Earlier only one part of the entire territory, i.e., Rohtak and Hissar was known as Haryana, but for our present study, this area consists of Punjab districts of Gurgaon, Rohtak, Hissar, Karnal and Ambala. The area also includes the native states of Pataudi, Jind, Loharu and some portions of Patiala. Thus the Haryana region consisted of several regions. Its heart was the famous area of Rohtak and Hissar districts. North of this heartland was the district of Karnal. Further north was the district of Ambala and the native state of Jind. In the south was the district of Gurgaon and Pataudi another native state. West of centre was the area of Sirsa tehsil, now a separate district. In the east was the Rewari tehsil, now another district created after the formation of Haryana state.<sup>11</sup>

Significantly, much of the Haryana territory bordered the imperial-metropolitan town of Delhi. The borders of other districts were tied with United Provinces or with Rajasthan. All

the provinces bordering Haryana were historically important for the region. The area of United Provinces and Rajasthan had great cultural identity with Haryana. The proximity of Haryana with the metropolitan Delhi had contributed greatly to its modernization. The relationship represents the relationship of city with countryside. In other words, Haryana had been and continues to be but one part of the wider cultural and linguistic region embracing Delhi, United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) and Rajasthan. As such there were sufficient chances for Haryana to model its political, economic and social life on the pattern of these areas. However, this did not happen. Because of the Haryana districts of the 1940's—(which are our subject of study) being part of United Punjab and the nature of new opportunities offered by the Punjab Government to the peasant-proprietors, a new political culture was ushered in this region which, on the one hand, led to the complex social structure with internal centres of power, status and wealth and, on the other, under the influence of paternalistic Punjab administration<sup>12</sup> some agriculturist groups possessing landed property revealed yet another piece of their cultural baggage by their belief in the maintenance of Law and Order, thus working to secure security through the imperial system and not by opposing it.

For any meaningful analysis of historical development of the region, it is necessary to ask some relevant questions which can lead to definitive conclusions. These questions can be: Firstly, was there any geographical cohesiveness in Haryana which could support a distinctive type of society? Secondly, how did such a society come into existence and what was its demographic and productive composition? Thirdly, to what extent did the British play a destructive and regenerative role in this society? Fourthly, to what extent did the relations of conflict among the antagonistic classes carry the society to an advanced stage of social and economic transformation? Finally, what was the manifold gradation of social rank, and in what manner did they challenge the British imperialism in the region and with what effect? The answer to these questions will take us to other fundamental issues which will require clear analysis of facts such as: (a) the development of capitalism in Haryana and the regional bourgeoisie, (b) the relationship of bourgeoisie with imperialism, (c) the character of the

democratic revolution with particular reference to the national struggle in Haryana setting, and (d) the development of other classes, their achievement, position, perspective and historical role in supporting or opposing the liberation struggle against an Imperial power.

To answer the first question let us take the geographical position of Haryana. The Haryana territories can be classified into three regions: (a) the region of Shivalik hills, (b) the Duab of Gaggar-Yamuna rivers, and (c) the desert region comprising the hills of Aravalli range. Among these the first two regions have great agricultural potentials. However, in the third region a considerable part is occupied by small hills of Aravalli range and semi-desert. The climate is hot and arid with considerable daily and seasonal fluctuations of temperature.<sup>13</sup> As a rule, farming can not be carried on without artificial irrigation of the land. There is no major river system except that of the Yamuna, but it too only touches the fringes of the Haryana region. The river Gaggar is dry most of the time and has less practical value. The area is however drained by canals, in particular by the eastern Yamuna canal. This canal is an important irrigation work irrigating Ambala, Karnal, Hissar, Rohtak, Delhi and parts of the Indian states of Patiala and Jind. Its Delhi branch was opened in 1819. Among other branches the Hansi branch was opened in 1833 and the Sirsa branch in 1888. The Gaggar canal is yet another canal of some significance. It irrigated Sirsa area. It was constructed with famine labour in 1896-97 and began to irrigate in the monsoon of 1897.<sup>14</sup> Thus, it can be seen that Haryana is not only having geographical cohesiveness but is capable of withstanding the weight of a large number of people for its society. All combined, the area is quite small measuring 44,056 square miles, i.e. about the size of England.

The old Haryana was a nobulous cluster of various village communities, religion, castes and joint families. The total population of the British territory (excluding native states of Loharu, Jind, Pataudi and some portions of Patiala now in Haryana), according to the Census of 1941, was 4,656,886. District-wise the population figures were: Hissar: 1,006,709, Rohtak: 956,399, Gurgaon: 851,454, Karnal: 994,575 and Ambala: 847,745.<sup>15</sup> As compared to these figures Census of 1931 recorded the following

figures: Hissar: 899,479, Rohtak: 805,621, Gurgaon: 740,175, Karnal: 852,614 and Ambala: 742,902. The total of population in 1931 of British territories in Haryana came to 4,040,791.<sup>16</sup> A comparison of both the Census figures would prove that the variation between the two Census did not exceed beyond that of 616,095 people.<sup>17</sup> It is, therefore, presumed that in 1939-40 too the population figure must be somewhere near to the figures as provided by the Census of 1941.

The bulk of the population as stated above was attached to agriculture. The land was divided among the villages. At least 80% of the village population and 60% of urban population depended almost entirely for their subsistence upon the produce of agriculture. These villages largely exhibited all the marks of the Bhaichara villages where the whole area was claimed in shares. These village communities were united by some kind of blood and proprietary bond and claimed the entire area of the village (both waste and cultivated) according to the shares which their customs had established. The term 'bhaichara' included villages where some special form of division or occupation at founding was adopted. It also included those villages which were once ancestrally shared, but where the shares had been lost or upset. Excluding these groups of villages some 'raiyatwari' villages also became 'bhaichara' villages under the revenue system established by the North-West Province and Punjab administration.<sup>18</sup> The comment of scholars on Indian village communities that they were semi-autonomous was equally applicable to the Haryana village communities.<sup>19</sup> C.T. Metcalfe's observation that "village communities are little republics, having nearly everything that they want within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations"<sup>20</sup> has become a classic formulation. In Haryana the sense of village-identity was quite strong. At times, concern for the village solidarity was verbalized and was indicative of an 'organic' rather than 'mechanical' unity. Jajmani system bound villagers together into a cohesive moral order consisting of economic, political and social functions.<sup>21</sup> However, the balance of relationship was not always harmonious. Usually the dominant castes swing the balance in its favour to capture the power structure.<sup>22</sup> Behind these institutional changes were the land reforms, modernization in the mode of production, commercialization

of agriculture and inter-linking of agriculture with the international market under the impact of industrial and finance capital of British imperialism. Though the pre-capitalist structure in agriculture production was predominant, the capitalist structure had begun to manifest through the cultivation of cash crops such as sugarcane and cotton seeds. Moreover, the modernization of agricultural tools had also started.<sup>23</sup> Obviously, this process extended its influence in all aspects of social relations. Benefits of development and progress in agriculture and cohesion among the village communities based on caste loyalties proved to be a triumph on the eve of second world war for the conservative propertied land owning class, particular small peasant proprietors who had their "heart on the left, their wallet on the right".

The pre-capitalistic nature of Haryana society was ingrained not only in the system of village communities but also in the value themes originating from various religious groups inhabiting this region. According to the Census of 1931 the community-wise distribution of district population was as follows: In Hissar the figure of all religions was 899,479. Among main religious communities the Hindus were 583,420, Muslims 2,53,784, Sikhs 55,169 and Jains 5,988. The district Rohtak figures for all religions were 805 and 621. Among them the Hindus were 6,55,963 followed by Muslims 137,880, Sikhs 596 and Jains 6,375. The Gurgaon district figures were: all religions 7,40,163, Hindus 493,174, Muslims 242,357, Sikhs 500 and Jains 2,665. The northern district of Karnal had total figure of all religious groups as 8,52,614 with Hindus, 5,65,286, Muslims, 259,730, Sikhs 16,928 and Jains 4,190. The Ambala district, however, records a slight change. The total of all religious groups was recorded as 7,42,902, with Hindus 3,46,711, Muslims 2,30,837, Sikhs 1,55,555 and Jains 2,550. The total figures of all religions in Haryana territory comes to 4,040,791 with Hindus 2,644,654, Muslims 1,124,588, Sikhs 2,28,748 and Jains 21,768.<sup>24</sup> As the figures of all religions in the Census report of 1941 was 4,656,886 with variation of only 6,16,095 between the Census report of 1931 and 1941,<sup>25</sup> it can be promised that the community-wise figures during 1939-40 must have been somewhere between the Census reports of 1931 and 1941 figures.

Thus on the eve of the second world war the Haryana region had Hindus as majority. The Muslims were only next to Hindus

being around 40 per cent of Hindu population. This religious graph was, however, tilted greatly in favour of Muslims if the entire Punjab figures are taken into consideration. The Census report of 1941 gives the percentage of distribution of Punjab population as Muslims 57.06, Hindus 27.9, Sikhs 13.22 and others 1.7. The percentage of Indian States of Punjab of the same Census was Muslims 53.22, Hindus 29.11, Sikhs 14.91 and others 1.46.<sup>26</sup> The relevance of Punjab figures is that while in the whole United Punjab the Muslims were in majority, with Hindus following as second largest group. In Haryana the process was reversed. As far as the other communities were concerned, the Sikhs in Haryana had little following and, therefore, their influence was equally negligible. Being in majority, the Hindu influence was most marked in social and political life. Their principles of hierarchy, holism, continuity and transcendence alongwith the Hindu concepts of human nature, occupational life (ashramas) and moral duties posited that legitimization of traditional values which in a way sidetracked the complete victory of capitalism over the pre-capitalist Haryana society. Moreover, the conflict between the traditional Hindu value system with the British imperialism was not and could not be very sharp as the British Government had least desire to put any obstacle in the Hindu way of life. Rather they were too willing to convert Hindu passion into communal feeling against their historical adversary—the Muslims.<sup>27</sup> However, due to Punjab's peculiar geographical position, the military traditions of its people, the paucity of Muslims and non-Muslim population and existence of Sikhs, the role of British imperialism was reversed in this region.<sup>28</sup> Significantly, in the Punjab including Haryana, the British attempt had always been to encourage Hindu, Muslims and Sikh community leaders to identify with the Unionist party—a party representing landlord and peasant proprietor's interest based on secularism. A note on the Punjab politics sent to Acharya Kriplani by Brij Lal, Secretary to the Punjab Hindu Board on September 10, 1945 brings in clear relief the pathetic picture of the Congress as anti-imperialist but urban based organization in the united Punjab. The note said:

“It is evident that Congress could secure only 2 seats out of a total of 89 Muslim seats and 5 out of a total of 33



Sikh seats. It could only secure 19 seats out of a total of 41 general seats secured by the caste Hindus and only one seat out of the 8 seats reserved for the scheduled castes. Even this one member ultimately deserted the Congress in favour of the Unionist. Congress secured 8 urban seats for the Hindus but rural stand with Hindu Election Board and the Jat members of the Unionist party".<sup>29</sup>

The interlocking traditional symbols of authority such as the village communities and religion will not give the complete picture unless an overview of caste relations is also taken into consideration. The unique social heritage and historicity of circumstances will get fully explained only if the focus is directed at caste and race loyalties<sup>29a</sup> while formulating the conceptual frame that urban middle classes and land owners modelled their role largely as the competitors and collaborators vis-a-vis the British imperialism.

In a society like Haryana's where caste solidarity had been endemic both in rural and urban areas, it can be promised that it acted as an evil omen to wider and universalistic loyalties for emerging nationalism. The majority of the population being Hindu their social relations strictly conformed to the time-honoured traditions of Brahminical society. However, with the advent of British rule in the region, the traditional cultural structure experienced some significant changes. These changes were by no means revolutionary but they did occur on many levels. The visible symbols of this change were the processes of status mobility and Sanskritization of lower castes consequent to the closure of stratification system in respect of social roles, occupation, economic competition and competition for power status. However, the notion of caste hierarchy was not discarded. Rather the cultural life was interlocked with political life in such a way as to provide an easy method to aspirants of power to climb up in political position. Obviously this development was fraught with contradictory pulls. On the one hand the Jat community in alliance with other agricultural communities which were numerous and economically and politically powerful directed the society and, on the other, various castes competed with each other to form their own associations and establish their educational institutions. Added to it socially the higher caste of Brahmins and economically prosperous

Banias—the trading community—also competed to maintain their time-honoured hegemony over the society. The Bania-Jat rivalry (with Brahmins as supporters of the trading classes) for power in Haryana had been the main factor especially in elections to the assemblies, to district bodies and in matters of distribution of offices in the institutions run by the Government. In such situations wherever the agricultural castes were successful in exploiting their numerical power they did alter the traditional configuration of power.<sup>29b</sup> Land reforms too had produced changes in dominance relationship among castes.<sup>30</sup> In consequence, Haryana, on the eve of the second world war, was experiencing the increasing influence of rural-based castes elites and greater articulation of interest and caste group-oriented goals in political ideology.

Similarly, the role of joint families cannot be discounted. The social impact of joint families had remained constant from caste to caste and so had the attitude of each caste towards joint families. This institution of the joint-family was the basis of Hindu Community<sup>31</sup> and it also found expression in other communities such as the Sikhs and Muslims.<sup>32</sup> Its chief merit had been the strengthening of the family bond. But at the same time it served to increase subordination of the individual to corporate ends. Moreover, it acted as a core social institution to govern the common living, common sharing of social heritage and linked an individual with the continuity of social structure.<sup>33</sup>

These pre-capitalist sources of traditional authority cannot be viewed as a thing apart.<sup>34</sup> In fact the impact of forces consequent to British rule had begun to break the time-honoured monopoly of village community, religion, caste and joint-family. By destroying the self-sufficiency of village community the British produced “the greatest and the only social revolution ever heard of in Asia”.<sup>35</sup> The process of disintegration was sharpened after the local produce began to be exported and the imports found their way into the countryside. High rents and increasing indebtedness pushed the village youths to seek employment in urban areas or with the government. The old values began to disappear after the British succeeded in destroying the balance of economic life in villages and towns. For instance, people began to condemn caste system and joint family for it was unable to bear the strain of the modern

conditions of life. Similarly, due to economic exigencies persons were forced to live separately. The democratic and individualistic concepts of the West shook the very foundations of the joint family system and caste solidarity. The process did not halt there. Practically every social institution, custom and usage was in the pipe-line of change due to the unavoidable requirement of the new reality.

How did this new reality come into existence? Karl Marx in 'Das Capital' has posed two methods for revolutionary way in society. According to him the revolutionary way number one occurs when the objective conditions of society mature on their own account, i.e. the capitalist society is formed through the ripening of forces which are totally indigenous and seek strength from within. The revolutionary way number two, however, is imported from outside due to the incapacity of indigenous forces to fructify into capitalism.<sup>36</sup> Haryana like the rest of India experienced the revolutionary way number two, for the British through their legal, revenue and administrative systems created new economic conditions. Moreover, some other institutional changes were also brought about by them. These institutional developments included, among others, the expansion of education, urbanization and industrialization, increased network of communication and finally the western claim to principles of reason, humanism, universal equality, dignity and the freedom of man.

Haryana society like any other society in colonial situation was, therefore, the product of a dual history. One history, as reported earlier was entirely indigenous. A society which was stable and seemingly immobile all resulted from the variable combinations of diverse people who were thrown together, clashed with one another or were super-imposed on each other by historical events—a history that brought together (in a relationship of domination or assimilation) homogeneous social forms; while the other history, largely conditioned by British domination, brought into contact social forms that were radically heterogeneous and presented a picture of disintegration. The three main forces which have been referred to even earlier<sup>37</sup> i.e. governmental administration, missionaries and the new economy, were closely associated activities exerting great influence on the people. The paternalist argument of the Punjab government was closely related to

missionaries' insistence that backward communities of the region need western civilization. Similarly, the colonial policy pursued by the British was the child of industrial policy. Moreover, these policies were the offspring of monopoly, of the exportation of capital and the quest for spheres of economic influence. Thus the colonial question was not fundamentally different from the social question because the metropole-colony relationship was in no sense different from the capital-labour relationship, or the relationship, Hegel had termed master-servant. The dislocations brought about by these factors resulted in new problems primarily with rural questions with changes affecting the pre-capitalistic structure.<sup>38</sup> Further, this development got identified into a birth of a new social class. Moreover, it also resulted in antagonism between the colonials and the colonized.

The question one can pose here is: what exactly does one mean by the middle class in the context of 20th century Haryana, and how did it come about? The term 'middle class' can be used as an equivalent of the French bourgeoisie, which refers to those who either own property on a substantial scale or are engaged in professions like law or medicine, enjoying a well-established social status. Another French term 'classe moyenne' is also applicable to this class as it denotes in the main relatively small scale entrepreneurs, traders, and the less exalted ranks of the salariat.<sup>39</sup>

The emergence of middle class in Haryana was almost parallel to the eclipse of the feudal lords as the focal-point of anti-imperialism. The middle class evolution in Haryana cannot be isolated from pre-capitalistic mode of production and its relationship with traditional sources of authority. The village community, religion, caste, and joint family continued to deeply influence the social composition of the emerging middle class.<sup>40</sup>

Under the British control Haryana underwent an economic change but while the Haryana is benefited from the development, they were only in small measures its direct agents. The peasant-proprietor of village communities lived in an economy in which money was used for some exchanges. The large number of peasants took no conspicuous part in it. But even so, their role in the new economy was by no means unimportant. The peasantry adapted itself to producing cash crops on small holdings. By taking advantage of the limited educational opportunities offered

by Government, some peasants' sons were able to move into the lower ranks of the civil service and something like a rudimentary middle class emerged on the basis of the administration. However, the traditional caste system and religion persisted in its main outline within the new framework. The upper castes of Hindus (Brahmins and Banias) some Muslims and Sikhs were now the trading members of the new administrative class, some of their former personal links with the people being transmuted into bureaucratic relationship. The Brahmins historically and economically had been bound up with the prestige of ruling classes of this region. However, compared to other regions their hold on the masses was weaker. The Arya Samaj Movement thinned out this influence further as the Brahmin's area of reference was mainly control of spiritual side of the people and not the economic as it was of the trading classes.<sup>41</sup> The traditional role was worn out after the British control of the region. Their traditional hierarchy on intellectual plan gave them the advantage of acquiring English education and assuming the role of intellectuals of the nascent middle class in Haryana. By the Act of 1900 they were not regarded as statutory agriculturists. However, in 1907, this right was also granted to them. Prem Chawdhary says, "This declaration sowed the seeds of further dissensions between the Gaur Brahmins and the Jats. Statutory agriculturists these Gaur Brahmins were now included among Hindu agriculturists who were beginning to be preferred for appointment to government services and becoming entitled to other concessions at the hands of the government."<sup>41a</sup>

The Bania sources of power were, however, different. They controlled the economy of the region. This segment of Haryana population was by origin predominantly rural but its pursuits had been so commercial and industrial as to keep it either urban or, when rural, of a rather urban cast.<sup>42</sup> They filled the growing towns which were called into being by historical compulsions. They set themselves up as the traders, money-lenders and shopkeepers of Haryana par excellence, collecting, distributing and acting as sources of credit.<sup>43</sup> Thus, they were too large a part of the population to form a homogeneously middle-class group; the commercial and industrial middle class had been predominantly their preserve. Their economic strength and consequent exploitation which they tried on numerous peasantry led to social conflict

which later on affected the political alignments of the region. Zaman Mehdi Khan who was the Deputy Commissioner of Rohtak in 1931 observed "There is no love lost between the Mahajans and the Hindu Jats. If the Hindu Jats had their way they would loot and kill the leading Mahajans. Last year as a result of the civil disobedience campaign there was a large crop of decoitation (Sic) in the district. All these dacoities were organised by Jats and many Mahajans were looted and lost their lives at the hands of the Jats and their associates. The Mahajans were so terror-stricken that well-to-do from among them migrated to towns and even now some of them have not recovered from the shock."<sup>41b</sup>

Among other religious groups, Muslims were quite numerous. However, compared to the percentage of the Hindu middle class, their middle class in Haryana was small and thinly spread. Moreover, the bulk of their population was largely concentrated in the towns excluding the Meo areas where they had rural base.

Compared to these two communities of Hindus and Muslims, the Sikh middle class had little influence in terms of number, social and political life of the region. The two areas of Ambala and Karnal were their strongholds and here to some extent their middle class had begun to exert its influence.

Apart from this convergence of traditional bases of power with the new middle class, other factors were also operating. They were in the main English legal, revenue, and administrative systems. Excluding these some other factors were: education, urbanization, industrialization, communication and transport.

If we follow Emile Durkheim, Law is a "visible symbol" of the invisible fact of social change in a society.<sup>44</sup> Talking about the British legal system in Haryana, it can be deduced that it did cause a major breakdown in the principles of hierarchy—the pivotal value of the traditional social structure. Conversely, it established the principle of equality and the creation of a consciousness of positive rights. However, there was marked difference between potential and actual change. Darling points out instances and according to his analysis although the lower classes in villages had become increasingly conscious of their legal rights, yet they were usually unsuccessful in enforcing it through law courts. The better knowledge and economic resources of privileged classes always meant to foil the effort of the lower classes.<sup>45</sup> However, there is

little doubt in the fact that the new middle class did succeed in participating effectively in the economic and social life of the wider community.

Similarly, the revenue system became an agent of a drastic change in the existing order. The system of fixed money payments referred to as rents reduced a large group of peasantry to the status of tenants. The introduction of the English Landlord system, individual landholdings, mortgage and sale of lands and a whole apparatus of the British legal conception (administered by an alien bureaucracy which combined in itself, legislative, executive and judicial functions) transformed the entire basis of relationship between the British Government and the peasants. The process of this transformation was, however, carried on with the help of the surviving old institutions of the village community, so that they might provide a social base to the British policy of land revenue in this area.<sup>46</sup> The British supported the Zamindari and Mahalwari systems of property rights over land because they realised that these zamindars or peasant-proprietors would act as their main social base, shielding the government from the consequences of direct confrontation with the tenant cultivators and landless labour. The net result of this above-mentioned revenue structure was the growth of a seizable landowning agriculturists. Haryana had the singular distinction of possessing a strong class of small landholders which enjoyed some democratic tradition within the class itself.

The post 1857 military policy of British in India resulted in the birth of new social class which was dependent on the British imperialism for its upkeep and social prestige. The British had very bitter experiences of recruiting upper castes in the Indian Army during the East India period. Consequently with Lord Canning taking over as Viceroy and Governor-General of India the peasant castes were chosen as an alternate.<sup>46a</sup> And to give them a sense of pride they were called Marshall races. The British imperialism impelled by its own interests converted Punjab in a recruiting base. Col. Elliott writes, "These various classes differed considerably in temperament, but they had things in common which gave the Indian Army its peculiar quality. They came from small Yeoman farmer families and were frugal, hardy and unsophisticated men—Although they generally enlisted from

economic necessity, they were not in the strict sense of word mercenaries”<sup>46b</sup>.

The peasant castes of Punjab were thus declared the best Indian material for the recruitment in the Army” and Punjab the “Sword of India”. It became imperative to keep this fighting material happy and contented. The Land Alienation Act of 1900 was the offspring of this line of thinking. P.J. Fagan, Deputy Commissioner of Hoshiarpur wrote:

“Our decision as to any particular tribe must turn largely on political considerations. The whole Act itself is confessed by an attempt to check results which naturally flow from the educational, legal and fiscal systems which we have established in this country. The main pretext for such action is the political danger of the expropriation of the agricultural tribes, and therefore before a tribe is declared agricultural and brought within the direct scope of the Act, it seems proper to consider whether its numbers, position, etc., render it of sufficient political or social importance to be considered as agricultural tribe”.<sup>46c</sup>

From now on the concrete situation began to change and a new reality emerged. The region of Haryana sent a large number of recruits from Land-owning peasant proprietors. From Ambala division excluding Simla district the combatants in the Indian Army on January 1, 1915 were 14,160. The district-wise numbers of Combatants were Hissar 3,046, Rohtak 6,245, Gurgaon 2,481, Karnal 633, Ambala 1,755. By November 30, 1918. The total numbers of Indian Army and Imperial service troops were: Ambala division excluding Simla district 71,366. The position of troops district-wise was: Hissar 15,461, Rohtak 22,144, Gurgaon 18,867, Karnal 6,553 and Ambala 8,341.<sup>46d</sup> Since Rohtak topped the list it will be quite revealing if we make caste analysis of district Rohtak recruits. Nearly 50 per cent were Jats, followed by Brahmins 11.57, Ahirs 5.6, Rajputs (Muslims) 2.6 Sikhs negligible, other Hindus, 12.68.<sup>46e</sup>

A fair idea can be arrived at of recruits of the region on the basis of military pensions. In 1927-28 and 1928-29 the data of military pensions district-wise is as follows: Ambala Rs. 2.70 lacs in 1927-28. Rs. 2.62 lacs in 1928-29. Hissar Rs. 7.60 lacs in 1927-28,



Rs. 7.51 lacs i.e. 1928-29, Karnal Rs. 0.34 lacs in 1927-28 Rs. 0.53 lacs in 1928-29, Rohtak Rs. 7.67 lacs in 1927-28, Rs. 7.61 lacs in 1928-29, Gurgaon Rs. 6.60 lacs in 1927-28 Rs. 6.65 in 1928-29.<sup>46h</sup> Similarly the number of pensioners in each district of the Ambala division in 1939 was, Ambala 3,303, Hissar 6,011, Karnal 466, Rohtak 5,377 and Gurgaon 6,939.<sup>46k</sup>

From this it will be apparent that a large number of recruits belonging to the statutory agriculturist castes joined army. Obviously a major portion of their income flowed back to their villages, with this money they began to purchase land and after their retirement many of them adopted money-lending as their occupation. It may be pointed out that due to their military background their sense of loyalty for the British rule was very strong. Moreover, they had vested interests in capturing the power in their villages. In Army they were also fed on caste lines. In other words their social consciousness was very different from the illiterate peasants. With the political power behind their backs they were destined to play a leading role in changing and shaping the social consciousness of small land-owning peasant proprietors. Significantly it was this section of the peasantry which later on became the main strength of Sir Chhotu Ram politics.

Along with it the British administrative system too created new social conditions.<sup>46p</sup> The individuals, who had the necessary training and who had the opportunity to join the new administration, capitalized on these conditions and became wealthy and secured what Burhall would call 'managerial posts'. A new class was thus born in Haryana society. It is this class which became the 'respectable natives' after its members had settled down as lawyers, judges, doctors, civil servants and teachers.

Although Haryana could not be a major beneficiary of British education because of its backwardness, yet the British educational system unconsciously created a solid though small English-educated middle class. In size and magnitude this class was too small; nevertheless, its importance lay in being the forerunners of westernization.

The educational graph of Haryana makes depressing reading largely because it lacked in education. The advantages of English language and western education were denied to the people of this area because the people were rebellious in 1857.<sup>47</sup> In March,

1858, the Director of Public Instruction of Punjab took some initiative in improving the quality of indigenous schools and also in the establishment of a school at the centre of six villages."<sup>48</sup> This policy accelerated the progress of primary education. Ambala got one school for every 10 square miles, Karnal and Gurgaon one for every 15 square miles, and Rohtak one for every 18 square miles. Hissar was at the bottom—one school for every 49 square miles. However, as regards the opening of new schools, Hissar topped. From only one school in 1980 the number rose to 105 in 1900. Karnal was a good second i.e. from 42 schools to 203 during the same period. The progress in Rohtak District was disappointing. In 1880, the number of schools was 40, whereas in 1900 it was 98. The figures of girls' education at the end of the 19th century are baffling. Ambala and Karnal had 4 schools whereas these districts had respectively, 9 and 10 schools in 1870. The districts of Gurgaon, Rohtak and Hissar, however, showed slight improvement over the figures of 1870. Regarding higher education, the picture was all the more frustrating. Except Delhi which had two colleges, there was no college catering to the needs of people in this area. Between 1900-1940 the picture changed for the better. In Rohtak alone there were 271 schools for boys and 49 for girls. An intermediate college was started in Rohtak in May, 1927. In 1941 this college was upgraded. The Teachers' Training Colleges were opened in almost every town. The religion and caste organisations also established schools and colleges in Ambala, Rohtak, Rewari, Bhiwani and Hissar. In this the leading role was played by Arya Samaj, followed by Sanatan Dharam Sabha, Jat Mahasabha, Yadav Mahasabha and other communities like Vaishis, Sainis, Badhairs, Brahmans, etc.

The progress report of six years' development in Punjab which inaugurated by Sir Chhotu Ram in April, 1938 said that during the years 1938-39 and 1939-40, the education department would utilize the funds placed at its disposal under the rural development scheme by establishing model schools in selected tehsils of the districts.<sup>49</sup>

All told the education could not spread beyond the minimum level. The Census of 1931 (which approximates with the picture of 1939-40) analysed the literacy figures of Hissar, Rohtak, Gurgaon, Karnal and Ambala. The Table XIII of the Census Report gave complete details of literacy in all the districts. According to

it, in Hissar out of 8,99,479 people, 30,091 were literate but only 3,166 had working knowledge of English. In Rohtak, 27,890 people were listed as literate against the total population of 8,05,621. The number of English knowing people was reported to be 3,615. In Gurgaon 24,601 were literate and 2,986 were literate in English. The total of the population being 7,40,163, Compared to these districts Karnal fared better in literacy. The figure for the literate was 2,7,938, and that for the literate in English 4,041. The population of Karnal was also only next to that of Hissar i.e. 8,52,614. The figures for Ambala given in the Table were: total of population 7,42,902, literate 49,504 and literate in English 11,519. It is, therefore, evident that Ambala topped the figures of literacy.

The community-wise total figure of Hindu literate was 1,04,806. Among them 13,884 were educated through English. In Muslim communities, the literacy appeared to be quite small. The total of literate was 32,153 and literates in English numbered only 5,888. The figures for the Sikh community were equally frustrating. The total of literates was 12,739. Among them only a marginal number of 1,773 were literate in English.<sup>50</sup>

Thus the literacy figures were quite alarming. The Census report of 1931, commenting on these figures, tried to analyse the causes behind this large number of illiterates in the region. The report said:—

“One of the important causes for the comparatively small number of literates among Muslims is that unlike the Hindus and Sikhs they do not, to any appreciable extent, acquire literacy without going to school. The only sphere of life, which gives them an opportunity to become literate in adult age, is military service. In the case of Hindus and Sikhs their occupations very often help them in learning to read and write. . . As compared with Muslims the proportion of literates among Hindus and Sikhs becomes higher at ages over 15. This may be due to several causes such as the greater possibility of relapse into illiteracy among Muslims or the greater advance made by them only in recent years. A corroborative fact is that the proportion of the primary-passed is smaller among Hindu and Sikh literates than among the Muslims.”<sup>51</sup>

After tracing the educational graph, the general conclusion which can be drawn is that the objective conditions for the emergence of the middle class in the region were disheartening.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, even the literates were not westernized to any significant extent. However, it remained true that within a society in which illiteracy was a dominant fact, to be educated constituted a privilege which opened the door to non-manual jobs and ensured immediate prestige.

Another factor which contributed to the emergence of middle classes was the level of industrialisation in the Haryana society. Haryana had little opportunity to industrialize itself. The area is not rich in minerals, the only products of some significance being kankar, salt petre, ammonium chloride (at Kaithal and Gulila). Salt is found at Sultanpur mahals in the Rohtak and Gurgaon districts and slate at Kund in Rewari. The manufacturing of these was under the European control.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, the process of urbanization was slow. The towns with the population of 15,000 were few. In 1931 only Hansi (18,356), Bhiwani (35,866), Sirsa (18,909), Hissar (27,179), Rohtak (35,235), Jhajjar (12,232), Sonapat (15,050), Rewari (26,269), Karnal (26,610), Panipat (32,915), Ambala (86,592) had this singular distinction.<sup>54</sup> In 1921, this picture was somewhat similar. Only 11 towns had more than 15,000 population. The towns of Kaithal (15,477) and Narnaul (20,410) which did not figure in 1931 Census were also included in 1921 Census.<sup>55</sup> These statistics are a testimony to the fact that there was very little advancement in urbanization.<sup>56</sup>

The industrial graph of Haryana, as it unfolded itself in the late 19th and early 20th century shows that Haryana made little stride in the field of industrialization. A cement factory at Charkhi Dadri, Textile Mills at Bhiwani and Rohtak and Sugar Mills at Yamunanagar were the sole exception in an otherwise, bleak record of industries in Haryana. Among the traditional industries the only survivals were woollen and handicrafts industries at Karnal, Hissar and Panipat.<sup>57</sup> The iron works in Rewari, glasswork, cotton rugs, daris and shatranjis at Ambala were the other small-scale industries.<sup>58</sup>

There were other industries too. For instance, foundry industry was established at Bhiwani and Farrukhanagar. Apart from it, Ambala had hosiery factories, iron and steel-rolling mills,

oil mills, flour-mills and rice-husking mills. The Government Metal Works Institute at Ambala specialized in the training of mechanics and engineers.<sup>59</sup> The demand for industrialization came from those seeking to employ capital, and from middle class seeking employment outside the over-crowded literary professions.

Agriculture as an industry was also subjected to decreasing returns. Agriculture beyond a certain unit is said by economists to give diminishing returns for the capital and labour used on it. The increasing pressure on land, unaccompanied by any great advance in the method of agriculture or introduction of improved implements resulting in increased output, must react on the economic conditions of the cultivators. The capitalist mode of production was, however, manifested in cash crops of sugarcane and cotton seeds.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the wheat grain was the principal export of the region. The main centres of this export were Sonapat, Bhiwani, Rohtak and Kaithal.<sup>60</sup> This sequence of development appears natural because the area is landlocked. Further, the lack of raw materials, thin base of industries, rural setting and lack of urban areas were the handicaps which were difficult to overcome by any government, and definitely not by the British who were opposed to any industrial advancement,<sup>61</sup> their main interest being an attempt to convert India into a farmland of England and not an alternate centre. Further, the natural basis for capitalist production, i.e. the centralisation of capital, was in an embryonic stage in a backward Haryana. There was little scope for the growth of a middle class because of the uneven development of capitalistic social means of production.

The capitalist-property relations were also delayed in Haryana because of the lack of proper communication and transport. There were only three branch lines of Railways passing through the territories of Haryana. They were 'Delhi-Umballa Kalka', 'Rewari-Bhatinda-Fazilka and Rajasthan-Malwa Lines'.<sup>62</sup> Only in early 20th century Rohtak got rail lines. Between 1921-31 the Ambala-Lahore line was also doubled. In 1926-27 the Shahdara-Narowal line was completed.<sup>63</sup> In 1928-29 the Rohtak-Panipat line (Milcage 44.01) was laid.<sup>64</sup> The telephone system was available to some Haryana towns in 1931. These towns were Rohtak, Kalka, Ambala Cantt. and Ambala City.<sup>65</sup> As the interior of Haryana was not touched by these means of communication and

transport, the road transport was also undertaken, particularly the Grand Trunk Road which was metalled. Delhi-Hissar road was also completed by 1931.<sup>66</sup> Between April 1, 1932 and December 1931, according to the statement in the Punjab Assembly, 11.86 miles of road was metalled by the Public Works Department. Apart from it, Rohtak-Jhajjar (metalled, 19.81 miles), Najafgarh-Bahadurgarh and Jhajjar-Rewari (both unmetalled) roads were provincialized. In Gurgaon district Nuh-Palwal (metalled 18.71 miles) and Sohna-Palwal (metalled 17.62 miles) were provincialized. Similarly, in Karnal and Ambala the following roads were taken over by the Punjab Government—Karnal-Indri (metalled 5.0 miles), Pipli-Pehowa (metalled 19.60 miles), and Ambala-Shahzadpur (metalled 18.00). The mileages of metalled roads in the jurisdictions of the Public Works Department and District Boards that existed before April 1, 1937 district-wise were Hissar 110 miles (Public Works Department) and 22 (District Board); Rohtak 140 miles (Public Works Department) and 97 (District Board). Similarly, in Gurgaon 144 and 50, Karnal 137 and 33, Ambala 103 (including mileage of Indian States); 33 were looked after by the Public Works Department and the District Board, respectively.<sup>67</sup>

The devastating effects of these material conditions, could have been checked, had the Government of Punjab followed the policy of protection to the backward areas. The official records of the Punjab Government during the entire period of the national movement produce a disheartening impact, for there was no statistical support to make a claim that the region of Haryana was progressing satisfactorily even as compared to other parts of Punjab. A view of the level of poverty can be had by one example. Daulat Ram Gupta, a veteran freedom fighter of Rohtak, invited Lala Lajpat Rai in 1926 to his town; there was no motor car in Rohtak to take him round the city. He had to depend on a friend from Delhi to lend his car on this occasion.<sup>68</sup> It will thus appear that the situation was not ripe for the steady growth of the urban middle class.

This analysis of the middle classes in Haryana also points to the fact that both the landowning peasantry and the middle classes had feet of clay for dissimilar reasons. The middle class was weak because of its numerical disadvantage and the rural group was

unable to feel its weight because of the largely pre-capitalistic productive power of Haryana society and a peculiar combination of monopoly capitalist domination with caste, communal and tribal institutions.<sup>69</sup>

To answer another question posed earlier in this chapter about the manifold gradation of social ranks and the manner in which they challenged the imperialism, it is necessary first to look into the political contour of the region. Haryana like any other region of India was passing through the agonising experience of the colonial situation. Obviously, this resulted in sharp antagonism between the colonials and colonized. Added to it, there were other humiliating aspects—the means by which the English rendered themselves untouchable. The English in the region kept contacts with the people at a bare minimum. They prided over and used political and moral force to offer the British life as the model for emulation without in any way permitting assimilation with the people. Moreover, they maintained ideologies which justified their position of the dominant group. Their political tactics were also designed as to preserve the imbalance in favour of the colonial power. The British were also determined to demonstrate their ability to control the administration without sharing their coveted authority with any social class though they kept offering concessions to all those who were opposed to or were lukewarm towards the national theme of anti-imperialism.<sup>70</sup>

It is thus clear that colonialism had been the matrix out of which action and counter-action emanated from the spokesmen of the society. Before 1857, the traditional aristocracy led the anti-imperialist front by consolidating their links with the peasants and artisans of the region.<sup>71</sup> Dreading most the experience of 1857 spirit, the British imperialist won over the feudal lords. The feudal lords too got a new lease of life and were willing to act as tools in the British plan of political authority and economic exploitation.<sup>72</sup> By uniting the Haryana territories with Punjab in 1858, the British further hoped to provide effective checks to the growing unrest of Haryana people who had given ample proof of their anti-imperialism in the first national war of 1857. After the exit of traditional aristocracy the new middle class which had appeared on the social scene rushed to fill the vacuum in the body politic of Haryana. However, from the very beginning this

middle class strived not for revolution but for a change in social conditions by means of the existing society.<sup>73</sup>

The objective conditions in the area had little promise for any anti-imperialist strike. In Haryana the small landed proprietary class was numerous and strong. There was a growing belief in this class that only a country that had sound economic, social and cultural base could provide meaningful scope for their advancement. Moreover, they performed all political functions, monopolized power and enjoyed the advantage that power brings. The concept of belonging to the martial races, thanks to the British propaganda, was so strong that they in all sincerity began to believe that non-violent struggle for India was not their meat. Bamford quoted a speaker at Lahore on April 5, 1919 who said:

“Passive resistance was a question of soul force, and for that reason it might not be easy for the Punjabis. For them it was the easiest thing to lay down their lives in a just cause. But to bear every humiliation, to undergo every indignity, to put up with every suffering, not to lift the little finger and not to let the heart feel the slightest resentment is rather impossible. . . . For the other provinces it was easy to resort to passive resistance, but for the Punjabis it was more difficult.”<sup>74</sup>

The consequence of this wrong propaganda combined with the vested interest of the peasant proprietors, the region largely developed respect for the status quo, and compliance of political authority. As such it became a great stronghold of the British particularly after 1920's and also a good hunting ground of caste and religious elites. To say this is not to deny the progressive role of some of siezable group of the peasant proprietors who against heavy odds from within and outside opposed the goals set by the British to make solid their position in the entire region. They opposed the British Government and their Indian allies and brought credit to their community as also to the Haryana region of Punjab.<sup>75</sup>

Politically we witness two major dimensions of middle class in Haryana. The first was that of the competitors and the second was that of collaborators. The competitors performed the role of 'organic intellectuals'—the thinking and organising element opposed to imperialism. Alongwith the Bourgeoisie and proletariat (rural and urban) they marched together against imperialism with



the aim of over-throwing it and replacing imperialism by their class rule. In other words, they sought to consolidate their position by receiving majority support. Thus they succeeded to win the applause being the representative of the whole people, because the majority was passive and unresisting.

Moreover, there was a certain resonance between their ideological positions and a keen desire to share the political power reserved for the English middle and upper classes. Consciousness of English racial arrogance together with their own rapid impoverishment, unemployment and increasing loss of socio-economic status, almost compelled them to radicalize their sense of anti-imperialism.

The historical evolutionary view of imperialism, was already deeply rooted and was even a central component in their thought. They attacked the British Government and demanded action for the good of all men rather than fulfilment of a particular obligation. In fact due to their little home-work, they were so isolated from the main stream of the rural Haryana that their theory of nationalism, secularism and democracy became almost an end in itself and was taken as a substitute for reality. In other words, they championed the cause of the people without weighing their own resources, interests and positions of the different classes. The result was their complete isolation from the masses.

The collaborators were liberals depending on the imperialist support for constitutional reforms against absolutism. They demanded diminution of state expenditure by a curtailment of the bureaucracy. They also demanded public credit institutions and laws against usury. Further, they opposed feudalism through their demands of establishing bourgeois property relations in the country-side. Moreover, they hoped to secure the ultimate goal of Indian independence by having complete faith in the British character and in their promise of self-determination to the people of India.<sup>75a</sup>

The peasantry, so far neglected by the competitors, therefore, became an object of fraternization by the collaborators—a class less trammelled by official control. The significance of this argument can only be comprehended if we keep in mind and analyse the peasant rebellion of early twenties under Baba Ram Chandra and Jawaharlal Nehru in the United Provinces. The peasant revolt

had revealed their agrarian origins by frontally attacking the zamindars, landlords and money-lenders, irrespective of their religion. They had also clashed with British imperialism and did great damage to their belief that middle class interests are incompatible with the interest of the peasantry. The lessons of this revolt were fresh to the British Government of this region. The necessity to make proper analysis in keeping with their national interest was eminent. They, therefore, made full use of class contradictions and sought support of the landlords in Punjab and Haryana. As such, it was thought desirable by the British, supported by the landlord class to have a party which could foster an illusion that the peasant agrarian interest would be protected only by them. Moreover, efforts were made that the general objectives of the British colonial policy should also be taken care of. For this class differences were encouraged and the business community identified as money-lenders became the target. The martial race concept was also used to win over the peasantry to their side. The important fact to note here is that prior to 1857 the Haryana people were not the favourites for the army. The martial race concept gave new avenues to the large segment of the population of Haryana (this included the major communities such as Jats, Rajputs, Muslims, Ahirs, etc.) to join government service in the Army. Sir Chhotu Ram was one of the leading leaders of this party, known as the Unionist party. How far this party derived the support of the British Government and in what way this party was able to build mass support for itself can be a subject of new researches.<sup>75b</sup> But here it should be sufficient to note that this party out-classed the middle class leadership of the Congress in Haryana in winning the support of the large sections of the land-owning peasantry.

Before the final battle-lines of the contradictory forces as explained earlier were drawn, Lala Lajpat Rai raised his powerful voice against imperialism from Haryana. From Hissar and Rohtak Lala Lajpat Rai learned to tune his nationalism. Lalaji's rejoinder to Sir Syed Ahmed Khan on his advocacy of Muslim separatism was the beginning of liberation struggle in Haryana.<sup>76</sup> With the departure of Lala Lajpat Rai to a bigger field of national activities in Lahore, Haryana was once again looking for leadership from middle class. After the advent of Gandhi in the national movement

and the blowing of a storm over Amritsar tragedy, Haryana throw us a number of leaders big and small. District-wise, Dr. Gopi Chandra Bhargava, Pt. Neki Ram Sharma, Lala Shyam Lal, Thakur Dass Bhargava and Mr. K.A. Desai belonged to Hissar. Daulat Ram Gupta, Tanshuk Lal, Sardar Bhuta Singh, Pt. Shri Ram Sharma, Com. Mange Ram Vats, Com. Lakshman Das, and Chhotu Ram had Rohtak as their base. Deshbhandhu Gupta, Iswar Chandra Gupta, Dr. R. Krishna, Dr. Madhu Ram and Dr. Parmanand were from Karnal. Babu Dayal Sharma, Roop Lal Mehta, Hari Har Lal Bhargava, Yogendra Pal Bharti, Pt. Roop Narain, Pt. Prasadi Lal and Pt. Chandra Sen belonged to Gurgaon. Lala Duni Chand Ambalvi, Abdul Gaffar Khan and Bhagat Ram Shukla spoke from the Ambala platform.

All these leaders belonged to the middle classes. Out of these leaders, one was a business executive, five belonged to the family of government officers or were themselves retired officers (both British or Riyasti governments), four were advocates, five had adopted the medical profession, four belonged to the traditional intelligentsia and were teachers in the schools, five came from small land-lord families, six were from the class of small business and only one was a news paper editor.<sup>77</sup>

In terms of caste grouping thirteen were Brahmins, ten Vaish, one Jat, one Muslim and three other castes. Significantly, only five had rural background coming from the interior but even they operated only in the urban areas. The remaining came from the urban areas with more than 10,000 population. Among the leading leaders only three had socialist leadings. The remaining were loosely aligned with the right wing of the Congress and some of them (such as Pt. Neki Ram) were regularly financed by the Birla Brothers.

On an average, none of them had sound financial base. Their frequent jail-going left their family on a critical family budget. As time went on, their personal lot became much worse. The characteristic Haryana leader was a son of a lower middle class, son of a merchant or of some other urban person. Very few had upper middle class family. There was a small coterie of petty bourgeois intellectuals. At first there was a goodly sprinkling of men from professional or intellectual families. Alongwith these, however, was a group consisting of sons of peasants, but they were

very few and had little influence.

After Chhotu Ram fell out from Congress and formed a Zamindara party, the Congress became more urban and more of a business class party, whereas Chhotu Ram's party was attracting more rural leaders. The same thing stands out if we look at the geographic origins of these leaders. The Congress leaders came mostly from towns such as Rohtak, Hissar, Gurgaon, Panipat, Karnal and Ambala, while the greatest concentration of Zamindara party was from areas which were rural. This geographic distribution of leaders was significant as it showed not only the influence of certain general urban-rural difference, but also the impact of caste politics. The Brahmin and Bania domination in the Congress was exploited by Chhotu Ram to arouse a feeling of hatred from the agriculturist class—more particularly Jats—though ideologically his stance was secular<sup>78</sup> giving artificial effect of being a friend and leader of agriculturist masses. Shri Ram Sharma in his transcript available in the Nehru museum and library, New Delhi, compared his politics with the emotive politics of Hitler, who advocated the cause of the so-called German Aryans against the hateful Jews.<sup>79</sup> Sir Chhotu Ram's sharp tongue-lashing against the Banias was well-known.<sup>80</sup> His language went deep into the heart of the common peasantry which had genuine grievances against the money-lenders.

The support of the British and partial success in bestowing benefits on the peasantry made him a leader who, not so much for his ideals as for the mass support, became the front ranker in Haryana.<sup>80a</sup> Prem Choudhary no doubt made an objective assessment on Sir Chhotu Ram's Jat consciousness<sup>80b</sup> and peasant support which according to her was limited only to the big and middle landowning peasantry.<sup>80c</sup> However, she misses the main point that Sir Chhotu Ram in his own life time had become an emotional experience of a large group of peasantry. The question is not what the real face of Sir Chhotu Ram was—though it is relevant but a more searching question would be to ask why the mass of landowning peasantry not only of Jats but some sections of others also such as Brahmins, Ahirs, Gujars, Rajputs, etc., spontaneously supported him, in spite of the fact that he was a known supporter of British imperialism. Historical analysis on the basis of subaltern point of view would take us nearer to objecti-

vity, In the major contradiction of peasantry and the British Raj, the usuary capital was acting as junior partner of British Capitalism. The illiterate mass of farmers was not expected to make an objective analysis of exploitative nature of British Raj. They, however, had first hand experience of Baniya money-lander who as an agent of British capitalism used to expropriate the entire produce of the farmer. The peasantry suffered from indebtedness.<sup>80d</sup> No doubt the agriculturist money-lenders were not attacked, but the aggressive tone of Sir Chhotu Ram and the psychological climate which he helped to create for farmers proved to be a great support when no body was there to give them genuine lead. They were politicised and began to assert their right. The 'golden Acts' were not so golden. His articles collected in a small pamphlet, 'Bachara Zimindar', 23 articles serialised under the heading "Bazar Thagi Ki Sair" including his article 'Mr Lincoln Phir Thashrif La Rahe Hain on Rohtak Deputy Commissioner Zaman Mehdi Khan might have been written to take the wind out of Congress, Sails, but the obvious fact that the net result was positive on suffering peasantry can not be ignored.<sup>80e</sup> It is not only the motive behind any act or writing but also the impact which needs to be emphasised. These writings in Jat Gazette did awaken the articulate section of peasantry and made them aggressive to protect their economic well-being. This is not to say that he did not exploit pre-capitalist formations such as caste. It is true he succeeded to roadblock peasant's enthusiasm and channelised them towards loyalty for the British Raj—which happened to be the main contradiction of the period. The process let loose by him was not without gains. In his own life time a seizable section of peasantry including the peasant proprietors formed the rising tide of anti-imperialist movement. The national movement's success secured in this region was to a large extent due to this rank and file of Congress. Generating a new consciousness howsoever unscientific due to false lead, was a major contribution. If Sir Chhotu Ram stopped due to his background, compulsions or interests. Congress failed because of inefficient leadership always full of Sir Chhotu Ram but never seriously working to harness such energy as was unleashed by him through his pen or oratory. The high Congress ideals of democracy and nationalism were too far from the realities of Haryana and they made little impact against a common

echo of the people for a placid acceptance of the status quo. The contrast between the aspirations and social determinants was bound to influence the brand of national movement. Chhotu Ram being established in power, got the careerists, while the Congress got the idealogists. Very few of these Congress leaders had any career or sources of income outside the movement. For a long time theirs was distinctly the harder lot. The conflict was mainly the conflict between social stability and anti-imperialism, the former being the expression of a prevailing malice and disorganization seeking moral justification with privatized attitudes.

What is the explanation of the strange phenomenon that the Congress leaders in spite of their commitment to high ideals of secularism, democracy, and nationalism failed to make a serious dent in the popularity of Sir Chhotu Ram's party, which was in all intent reactionary, pro-British and encouraged caste distinctions cutting Haryana society vertically on issues which were hardly relevant to face the foreign enemy? The answer flows from the class composition of Congress in Haryana and its failure to radicalize the rural masses of the region. The middle class leadership cannot be credited to possess the hardness and determination, which made revolution a success. Haryana leaders were no exception. The toughest of the lot, Pt. Shri Ram Sharma, was found wanting in democratic functioning.<sup>81</sup> He hardly had the capability to stay at the top without annoying his other colleagues. There were complaints made to the All India Congress Committee about Shri Ram Sharma considering himself as a Gandhi of Rohtak. His role in Haryana Congress exposed him not only as a little dictator but also as a leader who must maintain his power by hook or by crook. He was alleged to be instrumental in giving District Board tickets of the Congress party to persons who were rank careerists and had no compunction to join the British if favours flowed from them.<sup>82</sup>

In September, 1938 complaints were received by A.I.C.C. against B. Sham Lal, Pt. Shri Ram Sharma and Sultan Singh for appropriating the funds of District Congress Committee of Rohtak which also included a sum of Rs. 900 collected by Pt. Shri Ram Sharma in the name of Jhajjar Conference in February, 1930. Sixteen charges were brought against them, which included among others, embezzlement of Congress funds, a plea for mercy from the

police against the best interest of the Congress, forgery in the elections of members of the Provincial Committee in 1938, opposition to the Congress candidates, the lack of interest by them in the ideologies of the Congress etc. with such caustic comments as:

“If this is the Ram Rajya, then good-bye to this Congress, and God save us from such self-seekers, who are masquading under the cloak of truth and non-violence”

and further:

“There are some other facts (regarding character) which are not published and the very thought of them makes our hairs stand on end. We think, if “Mahatmaji” comes to know of them, he might have to keep another long fast an account of such people’s action”.<sup>83</sup>

Although the names of complainants were not given, it was apparent who they could be as earlier Daulat Ram Gupta and his partisans had sent a similar complaint to the A.I.C.C. In one of his letters to the General Secretary of A.I.C.C., Shri Ram Sharma not only defended his position against a complaint of audit and District Congress Committee, Rohtak, but severely attacked the complainant Daulat Ram Gupta. Defending his position on Rohtak Congress Committee accounts, he wrote:

“Your A.I.C.C. Auditor last year came to the Punjab, and Rohtak was the only (District) Congress Committee the accounts of which were audited by him. He spared hardly half an hour in the office and then went straight to that Daulat Ram Gupta’s House.

The impressions that were gathered from this gentleman crept into his report, and much suspicion was aroused at the publication. You were again pleased to direct the P.P.C.C. to take further action. Provincial Auditor came to Rohtak and audited for full five days. His report does not reveal any scandalous state of affairs, as alleged in the complaint”.

He further added:

“I would simply ask you to get these accounts compared with the remaining 28 District Committees of the Punjab, and an average District Congress Committee”.

In addition to this indirect demand to open the accounts of other District Committees (majority of whom were controlled by Dr. Gopi Chand group) he charged Daulat Ram Gupta with mala fide intention and suggested that he should not be taken seriously by the A.I.C.C. mainly due to his personal hostility against him and also hostility against the Congress organisation. He said:

“This gentleman sent a man to the Superintendent Police, Rohtak, offering to help the Government, to involve us in a criminal case of embezzlement and misappropriation”.

He also alleged that... .. “this gentleman who is not a four anna member opposed all the Congress nominees in the recent municipal election of Rohtak, but we captured almost all the seats that we contested; not only now, he always opposed the Congress”.

He also challenged the A.I.C.C. for playing into his hand, and observed:

“Sometimes we are very sorry to see that even men of this life (sic) are being taken seriously in the High Command whose motives and bona fides are most reproachable”.<sup>84</sup>

This style of functioning was nearly institutionalized in the Haryana districts of Punjab.<sup>85</sup> Consequently, among others, Sir Chhotu Ram's relatives also tried to fish in the troubled waters by winning over certain individuals and projected the Congress as a divided house.

This atmosphere of malicious propaganda against each other and of washing their dirty linen in public contributed a great deal to the sapping of the vitality of the Congress organisation in this region. Not surprisingly this organization failed to win over the support of common masses by putting heart and soul in the good of famine-stricken people. Satya Narain Saraf, President, City Congress, Hissar, swallowed much of his pride by reporting to the A.I.C.C. that “one Swami Brahmanand was fasting for the famine-



stricken and also as protest against the alleged indifference of Congress leaders in the matter.<sup>86</sup> Moreover, Municipal elections also raised clouds of controversy. Invariably Shri Ram Sharma was the target. It was widely accepted even among well-meaning Congress workers that the party squabbles had begun to take more time than the actual party work. Some 13 active members of A.I.C.C. from all over Punjab, including some prominent Haryana Workers, issued an "Appeal to Members of A.I.C.C." suggesting that "An impartial inquiry committee from outside should tour the whole province making searching inquiries in every district in order to effect a compromise among the Congress workers."<sup>87</sup> The consequence of all this infighting was that Daulat Ram Gupta severed his relations with the Congress and many others also left the organization in sheer disgust. The party factions went so deep and hard that even leaders like Dr. Gopi Chandra Bhargava,<sup>88</sup> Pt. Neki Ram Sharma, and Lala Duni Chand of Ambala<sup>89</sup> had to operate under this never-ending handicap. The love of power was present in practically all these leaders and none was prepared to serve the other for a bigger cause of national liberation.<sup>89a</sup>

Moreover, there was a tendency in leadership to become differentiated into two sets of roles—the ideological leaders and the task leaders. The ideological leader looked for the conditions supporting work performance and goal orientation. The task leader maintained the morale of the followers and the harmony of the group he was leading. Significantly, in the Haryana Congress, the leadership could not express itself beyond the role of task leadership. As an articulator of the movement, this leadership found itself at once fighting against heavy odds. Added to it were the limits and possibility of actions in the light of the power and ideologies of influential persons and organizations outside or the movement and the sharp disjuncture between the values of the society and those of the movement. Haryana being a rural area was conservative and slow to organise itself on ideologies which were highly advanced and demanded a greater sense of sacrifice understanding. Here middle class leaders of the Congress were faced inward, towards the goals and ideals of the masses. In their role as negotiator and communicator with the general masses, they were often inconsistent and were unable to produce permanent impression on the masses. The effectiveness of the task leadership

role is best assessed in relation to the attainment of goals established by the ideologue of the movement. The leadership which facilitates communication within the group makes for a better morale increases member's satisfaction, promotes greater confidence and helps the group to move towards its goals without causing much friction, is considered as effective leadership. Within this parameter none of the Congress leaders in Haryana had special skills, personality resources and knowledge of the dynamics of leadership. As such, the responsibility for the failure of the national movement in Haryana heavily fell on the shoulders of these leaders and this in more than one way was due to the limits imposed on them by their class character and tainted education.

The effect of the heavy reliance on the political support of the middle class also had a crippling effect. The middle class has a tendency to shy away from the actual confrontation, its enthusiasm takes the back seat when the issues have to be decided through actual fight. The fight against the British Raj was no child's play. The issues were sharp and clear. The statistics would show that in 1921 during the Non-Cooperation Movement not more than 100 courted arrest in Haryana.<sup>90</sup> Similarly, during the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1931-33, the number of persons filling the jails did not exceed 363.<sup>91</sup> The stray incidents in a few places do not in any way indicate the mood of the people. The number of people arrested during 1921-22 and 1931-33 compared to the other provinces of northern India was diminutive and insignificant. The nature and limitation of middle class support was thus exposed and the masses stood utterly defeated and humiliated. In such a situation overt action could be touched off by peasant mobilization. However, the pattern of class leadership in no way inspired confidence in them. Rather, they turned to Zamindars party for guidance and support. The middle class leadership of the national movement watched the whole drama being enacted as silent spectators. The old positions were thus re-established only with the difference that the landlords not only controlled the village economy but also the thought and social code of the villages. In short, the landowning peasantry in alliance with the British succeeded in planting their leadership in the country-side, leaving the middle class to operate in the urban centres of Haryana,

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Cited from W.C. Neate, *Economic Change in Rural India : Land Tenure and Reform in Uttar Pradesh, 1800-1955*, p. 32.
2. K.C. Yadav, *Haryana Ka Itihas*, p. 154.
3. For details see Kaye. *Papers on Lord Metcalfe*, and also, *Memorandum respecting the present state of the Parganas composing the Assigned Territories*. A detailed study of these minutes has been made in D.N. Panigrahi, *Charles Metcalfe in India: Ideas & Administration*.
4. There had been a long list of settlement reports. Some of the most important are: C.A.H., Townsend, *Hissar Settlement Report* A. Anderson & P.J. Fagan, *Report of the revised settlement of the Hissar, District 1857-92*, B.T. Gibson, *Gurgaon Settlement Report, 1903-09*; A. Kensing Ton, *Ambala Settlement Report*, W.F. Purser and H.E. Fanshawe, *Rohtak Settlement Report*; D. Ibbertson, *Report of the Revision of Settlement of Panipat and Karnal and Edward Lake, Report on the Settlement of the Pergunnahs formerly comprising the Thenesur District*. etc.
5. For details see D.N. Panigrahi, *Charles Metcalfe in India : Ideas & Administration*, pp. 1-23.
6. K.C. Yadav, *Revolt of 1857 in Haryana*, pp. 108-129. Also see K.C. Yadav, "Some Reflections on origins, Scope and Nature of the Uprising of 1857: A Case Study of Haryana", *Journal of Haryana Studies*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 1-2, 1976.
7. Perceval Spear, *Twilight of the Mughals*, p. 117. Also see *Census of India 1921*, Vol. XV, Punjab and Delhi, Part I, p. 2.
8. *Census of India, 1921*, Vol. XV, Punjab and Delhi, Part I, p. 42.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, p. 2
11. K.C. Yadav, *Haryana Ka Itihas*, pp. 1-7, see R. Bosworth Smith, John Lawrence in Haryana, ed. K.C. Yadav, *Journal of Haryana Studies* Vol. III, No. 1, 1971 and Vol. III, No. 2, 1971. Also see David Ross, Haryana: Sketches Historical and Descriptive, ed. K.C. Yadav, *Journal of Haryana Studies*, Vol. VI, Nos. 1-2, 1974.
12. For details on the Impact of Paternalistic Administration in Punjab, see E. Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India*. Punjab was a non-regulation Province. As compared to three Presidencies and other regulation, provinces, the bureaucracy was more powerful. See P. Roberts, *History of India*, p. 517. He says: "The Punjab was administered by a famous school of district officers, who were purposely left by the government a large degree of freedom and initiative. Their relations with the people were personal and intimate and as long as their methods were justified by success, they suffered little interference from Calcutta or Simla". Also cited by D.C. Verma, *Chhotu Ran: Life and Times*, p. 3.
13. R. Bosworth Smith, John Lawrence in Haryana 1931-45, A Study of Administration and Society, ed. K.C. Yadav, *Journal of Haryana Studies*, Vol. III, No. 1, 1971 and Vol. III, No. 2, 1971. David Ross, Haryana: Skethes

- Historical and Descriptive, ed. K.C. Yadav, *Journal of Haryana Studies*, Vol. VI, Nos. 1-2, 1974.
14. Chhabra, *Social and Economic History of Punjab*, p. 181. Also see B.S. Saini, *Social & Economic History of the Punjab*, pp. 1-38.
  15. *Census of India, 1941*, Vol. VI, Punjab, Table I, p. 2
  16. *Census of India, 1931*, Vol. XVII, Punjab, Part II, Table II, pp. 6-7
  17. *Census of India, 1941*, Vol. VI, Punjab, Table I, p. 2.
  18. B.H. Baden Powell, *The Land System of British India*, Vol. 1, pp. 104-78. Also see O'Malley L.S.S., *India's Social Heritage*, pp. 102-03, V.B. Singh's article "Changing Patterns of Indian Village Community", *Agra University Journal of Research*, Vol. III and C.T. Metcalfe's Minute to the Board of Revenue, November 17, 1830.
  19. The detailed comments of Maine, Baden Powell, Karl Marx, Radha Kamal Mukerjee had been studied by Yogendra Singh, in his article, "The Changing Pattern of Socio-Economic Relations in the Countryside" (Lucknow University, 1958). Also see Mainc, *Village Communities in the El West*, Baden-Powell, *The Indian Village Communities: The Origin and Growth of the Village Communities in India*; Karl Marx, *Das Capital*, Vol. I-III, R.K. Mukherjee, *Democracies of the East*, Vol. I, III.
  20. C.T. Metcalfe's Revenue Report, 11 June, 1811, Bengal Revenue Consultations, 2 July, 1811, 43. This theme was later developed in the subsequent well-known report of 4 September, 1915 and the minutes of 7 November, 1830.
  21. For a comparative analysis of Jajmani, see P.M. Kolenda, "Toward a Model of the Hindu Tajniani System." *Hindu Organization*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring, 1963) pp. 11-32.
  22. For a study of caste behaviour see Mekim Marriott, *Caste Ranking and Community Structure in Five Regions of India and Pakistan*. Also see Andre Beteille. *Caste, Class and Power*.
  23. B.S. Saini, *The Social & Economic History of the Punjab*, pp. 177-219. Also see M.L. Darling, *Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt*, p. 17. Baden Powell. *The Land Systems of British India*, Vol. III and H. Calvert, *Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab*, pp. 112, 170.
  24. *Census of India, 1931*, Vol. XVII, Punjab, Part II, Table XIII, pp. 229-262 and Table V, pp. 24-25.
  25. For details of Towns arranged territorily with population by communities of 1941, see *Census of India, 1941*, Vol. VI, Punjab, Table V, pp. 29-39.
  26. Cited from 'A Note on the Punjab Politics sent to Acharya Kriplani by Brij Lal, Secretary to the Punjab Hindu Board, dated 10th September, 1945—File No. P-16, Punjab, 1942-46, (Nehru Memorial Museum Library, New Delhi).
  27. It was officially informed in the Assembly that between 1 April, 1935 to March, 1939 the following communal riots took place in various districts of Haryana:

District Rohtak	Case	Arrest
1. 1st April, 1935 to 31st March, 1937	1	44
2. 1st April, 1937 to 31st March, 1939	1	25

*District Hissar*

1. 1st April, 1935 to 31st March, 1937	nil	nil
2. 1st April, 1937 to 31st March, 1939	28	112

*District Karnal*

1. 1st April, 1935 to 31st March, 1937	5	14
2. 1st April, 1937 to 31st March, 1939	1	35

The report did not give the figures of Gurgaon and Ambala Districts. See *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 1940*, Vol. XI, p. 28.

28. For Punjab's peculiar geographical situation see, Azim Hussain, *Fazl-i-Hussain—A Political Biography*, p. 71. For Military tradition and its significance see, Bhagwan Josh, *Communist Movement in Punjab (1926-47)*, pp. 17-23, Also See A Note on the Punjab Politics sent to Acharya Kriplani by Brij Lal, Secretary to the Punjab Hindu Board, dated 10 September, 1945, File No. P. 16, Punjab, 1942-46. (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi).
29. *Ibid.*
- 29a. Many a times, Caste distinction predominated over and above religious distinction. Rohtak Deputy Commissioner wrote to the Delhi division Commissioner in 1900.
- The Hindu Jat and Mula Jat, the Hindu Goojar and Muhammadan Goojar think more of the common ancestor from whom they have descended than the fact that he is a Hindu or the other a Mohammadan and live in the same village with as much peace and good feeling towards one another as if they were members of the same race and religion, instead of being members of the same race, but of a different religion. The officers and Zamindars with whom I have cultivated freely are also of the same opinion, that any religious distinction would be most unpopular and also unwise. It is no feeling of uncertainty that I advance this view as it represents the feeling of the district itself."
- See *Confidential Files from the Record Room, Rohtak I VI-V*, p. 101. cited from Prem Chowdhry, *Punjab Politics: The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 100.
- 29b. Writing on Chhotu Ram's caste politics Prem Chowdhary says, "Chhotu Ram utilised this tension and antagonism between Jat Landowners and other castes to mobilise the farmer. Social mobility within and along caste lines served him as an effective weapon of organised politics. The slogans in the process of mobilisation were directed at the entire Jat caste, and on behalf of all of them. He attempted to bring all the Jats under one banner and on a single platform. That there was a clash of interests among different sections of Jats themselves was ignored and only the caste identity was emphasised." Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics: The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 96.
30. Madan Gopal, *Sir Chhotu Ram: A Political Biography*, pp. 31-37, and pp. 109-110. see Azim Hussain, *Fazl-i-Hussain, A Political Biography*, pp. 86-128. Also see, Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics: The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*. pp. 233-293.

31. R. Mukerjee, *Economic Problems of Modern India*, Part 1, p. 56.
32. *Census of India, 1911*, Punjab, Vol. XIV, p. 30.
33. For details see B.S. Saini, *The Social & Economic History of the Punjab*, pp. 57-60.
34. D.P. Mukerjee has emphasized the economic aspect of the structural change which can bring meaningful change. He says "Traditions have great power of resistance and absorption. Unless the force is extraordinarily strong and it is that strong only when the modes of production are altered—traditions survive by adjustments. The capacity for adjustment is the measure of the vitality of tradition—the Indian Sociologist should precede the socialist interpretations of changes in the Indian tradition in terms of economic forces." See D.P. Mukerjee, *Diversities*, p. 229.
35. Karl Marx, "*The British Rule in India*" collected works, Vol. I, In the same article he further says:
 

"England, it is true, is causing a social revolution in Hindustan, was actuated only by the vilest interests and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is: can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crime of England, she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution."
36. Karl Marx, '*Das Capital*', Vol. III, p. 393.
37. Radha Kamal Mukerjee *Land Problems of India*, pp. 225-28, Also see Moreland's statement while giving evidence to the Royal Commission on Agriculture, cited from H. Colvert, *Wealth and Welfare of Punjab*, p. 367.
38. Writing about the character and disposition of the peasantry, D. Ibbetson says: "I have a great liking for the ordinary villager. His life is one of monotonous toil under very depressing circumstances. He grumbles much, but only as a farmer is bound to do; and he is marvellously patient, cheery and contented on the whole. He is often exceedingly intelligent considering his opportunities, he is hospitable in the extreme, and he loves a joke when the point is broad enough for him to see." D. Ibbetson, *Report on the Revision of Settlement of Panipat & Karnal Pargauah, Karnal District*, para 34, p. 138.
39. A Study of Indian middle class has been made by Dr. B.B. Misra, *The Indian Middle Class*.
40. B.S. Saini, *The Social & Economic History of Punjab*, pp. 39-75. A trend in the middle class leaders of India and Asia towards greater identification with traditional sources of authority & culture has been observed in many recent studies. See P.E. Sigmund, Jr. *The Ideology of Developing Nations*, and Clifford Geertz, ed. *Old Societies and New States*.
41. For a detailed study on this question, see K.W. Jones, *Arya Dharma*; Ranjit Singh, *Haryana Men Arya Samaj Ka Itihas*; Channupati, *Arya Samaj Ke Pachas Varsha*; and Lala Lajpat Rai, *History of Arya Samaj*.
- 41a. See Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics: The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 86.
- 41b. See *Handing Over Notes*, Nov. 4, 1931, cited from Prem Chowdhary,

*Punjab Politics; The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 98. Also see *Ibid.*, pp. 91-95. In this connection. Also see *The Haryana Tilak*, June 30, 1934, May 23, 1935, March 10, 1936 and February, 14, 1940.

42. *The Provincial Banking Inquiry Report* (1930) p. 133. The report, while giving reasons for the decrease in money-lenders in villages, gives the following reasons: (a) the legal protection given to the peasant proprietor borrower, combined with a greater tendency on his part to take full advantage of it; (b) the rise of the agriculturist money-lenders; (c) the rapid growth of cooperative credit societies; and (d) counter-attractions of trade.
43. Writing about the role of Bania, D. Ibbetson says: "In fact the function of a Baniya in a village is very like that of the air-chamber in the fire engine. He receives the produce of the village, the supply of which is fitful and intermittent, stores it up and emits it in a steady and effective stream. And if some power is lost in the process, it is only the cost at which all machinery is worked, for force cannot be transmuted from one form into another and more serviceable one without some part of it being lost on the way." D. Ibbetson, *Report on the Revision of Settlement of Panipat and Karnal Parganas, Karnal District*, para 275, p. 112.
44. See Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, p. 64.
45. For details see M.L. Darling, *Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt*.
46. In this context, Lord William Bentinck's statement which was made in connection with permanent settlement of Bengal is significant. He said, "If security was wanting against extensive popular tumult or revolution I should say that the permanent settlement, though a failure in many other respects and in most important essential, has this great advantage, at least, of having created a vast body of rich landed proprietors deeply interested in the continuance of the British Dominion and having complete command over the mass of the people." See A.B. Keith, *Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy, 1750-1921*, Vol. I, p. 216.
- 46a. M.O. Dwyer, *India as I know it. 1885-1922*. He observed "The argument of those great military authorities, Lord Kitchner was, however, irrefutable that if India could only afford a small army of seventy-five thousand British (now reduced to under 60,000) and one hundred and sixty thousand Indian troops for the protection of a sub-continent of over 300 million of people, it should be unwise to take any but the best Indian material and this was to be found mainly in the Punjab".
- 46b. I.G. Elliott, *A Role of Honour : The Story of Indian Army* (1939-45). p. 5. See, Phillip, Manson, *A Matter of Honour*, p. 22. Also see S.P. Cohen, *The Indian Army*. p. 32-56.
- 46c. N.G. Barrier, *The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900* (Monograph, Duke University) cited from Bhagwan Josh *Communist Movement in Punjab* (1926-47), p. 30.
- 46d. M.S. Leigh, *The Punjab and the War*, p. 59.
- 46e. See Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics: The role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 31.
- 46h. *Punjab Provincial Banking Enquiry, Report*, 1930, p. 362.
- 46k. *Soldier's Savings*, Punjab Board of Economic Enquiry, Publication No. 68.

- 46p. The one such example was of Job reservation for agriculturists. See Chhotu Ram to Hardwari Lal, Rohtak Feb. 19, 1935. and other letters by Chhotu Ram to Hardwari Lal, March 2, 1941, April 25, 1941 cited from Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics: The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, pp. 342-346.
47. For details see K.C. Yadav, Chapter 'Historical Background'; Shanker & Kundu, ed. *Education in Haryana: Retrospect & Prospects*. Also see K.C. Yadav, A Brief History of the Development of Education in Haryana during the 19th century, *Journal of Haryana Studies*, Vol. I, No. 2, 1969.
48. Foreign Miscellaneous, No. 365 (NAI); Richey, Vol. II, 10305.
49. See K.C. Yadav, "A Brief History of the Development of Education in Haryana during the 19th century", Tables I & II, *Journal of Haryana Studies*, Vol. I, No. 2, 1962.
50. *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1940, Vol. XI, pp. 440-448.
51. *Census of India, 1931*, Vol. XVII, Punjab, Part II, Table XII, pp. 229-262.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 252-53.
53. Chhabra, *Social and Economic History of the Punjab*, pp. 18, 20.
54. *Census of India, 1931*, Vol. XVII, Punjab, Part II, Table V, pp. 24-25.
55. *Census of India, 1921*, Vol. XV, Punjab and Delhi, Part II, subsidiary Table 1, pp. 720-21.
56. Commenting on why this limited increase in urbanization took place in 1931, the Census Report says:  
 "A Study of the increase in urban population is not altogether a simple matter, because there are certain places which were treated as towns at past censuses but ceased to be treated at the succeeding censuses as a result of decline in their population or a change in their characteristics, while some places heretofore treated as villages were declared as towns owing to an increase in their population or a change in their characteristics." See *Census of India, 1931*, Vol. XVII, Punjab, Part I, p. 90.
57. For details see:  
 District Gazetteers, Hissar; District Gazetteers, Rohtak; District Gazetteers, Ambala; District Gazetteers, Karnal and District Gazetteers, Hissar.
58. *Census of India, 1931*, Punjab, Vol. XVII, Part II, Table X, pp. 155-217.
59. *Ibid.* Also see *Census of India, 1921*, Vol. XV, Punjab and Delhi, Part II, Tables XVII to XXII, pp. 349-50, and (Industrial) Subsidiary, Table I, p. 399.
60. *Review of the Trade of India, 1939-40*, p. 197.
61. B.S. Saini, *The Social & Economic History of the Punjab*, pp. 260-296.
62. Punjab Government, *Land of the Five Rivers*, p. 314.
63. *Census of India, 1931*, Punjab, Vol. XVII, Part I, p. 51.
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
67. *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1940, Vol. XI-A, pp. 864-871.
68. Daulat Ram Gupta, *Meri Atma Katha*, (unpublished). A copy of it is in personal library of Dr. K.C. Yadav, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra.
69. Communication Studies have revealed that within a structural framework of ranking and distance from the cities, new ideas from the cities. For



details see Y.B. Damle, *Communication of Modern Ideas and Knowledge in Indian Village*.

70. For details on this subject see, Pt. Shri Ram Sharma, *Haryana Ka Itihas, and Haryana Men Congress Ki Tahrir*; Daulat Ram Gupta, *Meri Atma Katha*. Also see Dr. K.C. Yadav, *Haryana Men Swatantrata Andolan Ka Itihas*, and Jagdish Chandr, *Freedom Struggle in Haryana (1919-1947)*, (unpublished Thesis, Kurukshetra University).
71. K.C. Yadav, *The Revolt of 1857 in Haryana*, pp. 88-102.
72. *Ibid.*
73. Karl Marx, writing about this class in the Communist Manifesto says :  
 "They are . . . . . not revolutionary, but conservative, Nay, more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of History. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat, they they thus, defend not their future interests; they desert their own stand point to place themselves at that of the proletariat." See *The Communist Manifesto*.
74. For details see Banford, *Histories of the Khlafat and Non-Cooperation Movements*.
75. Some of the leaders belonging to the agriculturists classes who participated in the freedom movement of Haryana were : Headmaster Baldev Singh, Sahib Ram, Mantu Ram, Mangli Ram Vaid and Kashturba Bai. *The Haryana Tilok*, January 21, 1930. The paper observed that three-fourths of 2000 Congress members in Rohtak district were from the agriculturist castes. See *The Jat Gazette*, January 6, 1937 October 27, 1937. Also see the Statement of Malik Zaman Mehdi Khan, Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak, November 4, 1931 cited from Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics: The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 161.
- 75a. For details-see Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics : The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, pp. 165-198. Also see, D.C. Verma, *Sir Chhotu Ram, Life & Times*, pp. 149-162.
- 75b. This work was completed in 1978. Since then new researchers have been conducted. Recently Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics: the Role of Sir Chhotu Ram* a Ph. D. thesis, under Prof. Bipin Chandra (J.N.U.) has been published. The writer made full use of this work before he sent his manuscript for publication.
76. "For details see Lala Lajpat Rai in Haryana, An Autography note" *Journal of Harayana Studies*, Vol. V, Nos. 1-2, 1973.
77. For biographical details of Haryana freedom fighters, see Pt. Shri Ram Sharma, *Haryana Ke Swatantrata Sainani*, and Fauja Singh, *Freedom Fighters of Punjab*, Vol. I.
78. Details about his life and politics have been provided by Dr. Madan Gopal, *Sir Chhotu Ram—A Political Biography* and Y.P. Bajaj, *Sir Chhotu Ram: Life and Work* (unpublished Thesis, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra. Both the scholars have tried to prove that he was opposed to the demand of Jat power. He, however, according to them emphasized on economic programme.

79. *Oral History Transcription—Pt. Shri Ram Sharma* (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi), p. 94. Sir Chhotu Ram declared (occasion his 61st birthday), "It was born and brought up in rural surroundings which gave me a close and deep insight into the handicaps difficulties, trials and tribulations of the rural population. This insight could not have failed to influence the whole course of my psychological and moral growth. Side by side with the imperceptible and constant working of this factor a deep and passionate love for the Jat tribe in which I was born, warmed my heart from early life. A Sanskrit couplet which I read in one of my text-books the *Hitopadesha*, for the first time in 1897, sowed in my young breast the seed of the inchoate desire which in later years grew into a powerful passion for uplifting my tribe, educationally, socially, economically and politically. The simple rendering of this couplet in English is : For the ordinary course of nature thousands upon thousands are born everyday, but he alone is truly born, whose birth leads to the elevation of his race."
- See D.C. Verma, *Sir Chhotu Ram: Life and Times*, p. 168.
80. *Oral History Transcription—Pt. Shri Ram Sharma* (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi) pp. 94-95. Also see, Linlithgow Collections, 88, Craik to Linlithgow, January 5, 1939. Mr. Craik observed in 1943. "His dislike of Baniya money-lender is quite ineradicable. He has little, if any, regard for the feelings of others and in his public speeches, which on normal occasion take the form of vernacular harangues lasting for several hours, he is frequently indiscreet and gratuitously [offensive. This is unfortunately an inherent defect in his composition."
- 80a. *Oral History Transcription—Pt. Shri Ram Sharma* (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi), pp. 95.
- 80b. Prem Chowdhry, *Punjab Politics: The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, pp. 40-60, 61-126.
- 80c. *Ibid.*, pp. 198-293.
- 80d. For indebtedness see, M.L. Darling, *Peasant in Prosperity and Debt*. H. Calvert, *The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab*. Also, see, *Punjab Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee Report*.
- 80e. Most of the works on Sir Chhotu Ram give him the credit of an eminent Peasant Leader and the Champion of underprivileged. See V.P. Bajaj, *Chowdhary Chhotu Ram and his Work*, (Ph.D. thesis Kurukshetra University) Madan Gopal, *Sir Chhotu Ram: A Political Biography* D.C. Verma, *Sir Chhotu Ram: Life and Times*. H.L. Agnihotri and S.N. Malik, *A Profile in Courage—A Biography of Chhotu Ram*; Raghbir Shastri, *Chowdhary Chhotu Ram, Jeevan Charitra* (Hindi) etc.
81. Complaining against Pt. Shri Ram Sharma's dictatorial attitude to A.I.C.C. Shri Dilawar (Jhajjar) on 24th September, 1940 wrote :  
 "Pandit Shri Ram Sharma, M.L.A. who is more or less a Dictator of Congress affairs in the district threatens the workers that whosoever dares to go against his command, whether it conforms to the Congress ideals or principles or not, shall be knocked down by the sword of disciplinary

- action. He says that his words are the words of Congress in the District just as Gandhiji is the final authority in the Congress." See the letter of Shri Dilawar Singh, B.A.P.O. Jhajjar, Rohtak to A.I.C.C. dated 24 September, 1940. Also see letters by the same complainant dated 26 and 27th September, 1940 to A.I.C.C. On the basis of these letters A.I.C.C. officiating Secretary Sadiq Ali wrote back to P.P.C.C. on 5 October, 1940 to enquire into the complaint. See File No. G-66 (Punjab) P.P.C.C.—A.I.C.C. 1941, Part-I, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.
82. A complaint lodged by one Dr. S.S. Bhatnagar of Rohtak to A.I.C.C. (undated) against Pt. Shri Ram Sharma. Also see his letters to A.I.C.C. Dated August 1, 2, 10, 1940. See file No. G-66 (Punjab) 1940-41, PPCC-AICC Part II (Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi).
83. File No. G-66 (Punjab) 1935-39, PPCC-AICC, Part I (Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi). See the letter to the A.I.C.C. dated September 16, 1938. The Inspector of the A.I.C.C., R.S. Pande, had also submitted his report partially justifying the charges. See Inspector A.I.C.C. Report, December 15, 1938 signed R.S.P. Pande.
84. *Ibid.*, Letter of Shri Ram Sharma to Aeharya J.B. Kriplani, General Secretary, A.I.C.C., Allahabad, dated November 13, 1939.
85. *Ibid.* See Report filed by Nagar Mal and Tek Chand against Ch. Baldev Singh, President District Congress Committee, Rohtak (undated) received by A.I.C.C. dated December 21, 1939. Receipt No. 2478. The complaint was addressed to the President, P.P.C.C., Lahore.
86. *Ibid.* See the letter written by Satya Narain Saraf, B.A. LL.B. President City Congress. Hissar to Kriplani, General Secretary, A.I.C.C. dated December 19, 1939 received in A.I.C.C. office on December 21, 1939, Receipt No. 2473.
87. *Ibid.* This appeal was issued in September, 1938 and the prominent Haryana leaders associated with this appeal were Pt. Neki Ram Sharma, Daulat Ram Gupta, Mange Ram Vatsa, etc.
88. See A complaint of Shri Ram Sharma dated January 1, 1940, against P.P.C.C. controlled by Gopi Chandra Bhargava. Receipt No. 2577. Punjab 1939-40, Municipal Election Disputes etc. (Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi).
89. During the election of President P.P.C.C., 1938, Comrade Shabir Aslam had charged that "Lala Duni Chand of Ambala as having suggested to him that he should run away with the ballot papers in case it was noticed that Dr. Kitchlew would win." See Inspector Report of A.I.C.C. Inspector, Narsingh. File No. G-66, Punjab 1935-39, PPCC-AICC Part-1, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.
- 89a. In 1937 Nehru commented on the Punjab Congress by observing that Congress in Punjab is nothing but "a handful of persons in a few cities, and that handful quarrelling continuously" see, Nehru, *Selected Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 402. Also see, S.L. Malhotra, *From Civil Disobedience to Quit India*, pp. 55-57.

He says . . . "there were two main groups in the provincial Congress

headed by Satyapal and Gopichand Bhargava. There were some neutrals who, though quite important in their individual capacities, had no power to end factionalism. Besides, there were several splinter groups having dubious devotion to Congress ideology and programme . . . since none of the major groups had absolute majority in the P.P.C.C., each of them banked on the support of the splinter groups to acquire control over the organisation and also to humble the rival group in the struggle for power."

For further details, also see *Bhargava Papers*, (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi).

90. The District-wise list of volunteers total was, however, 8100. Jagdish Chander, *Freedom Struggle in Haryana 1919-1947*, (unpublished thesis, Kurukshetra University, Kuruckshetra) pp. 54, 96.
91. *Ibid.* pp. 119-155.

## CHAPTER II

### GATHERING STUDY

In 1939 the international scene was full of violence and duplicity, ideologically the world was divided between Democracies, Fascist governments and Communist Russia. Hitler after successfully exploiting the fear psychosis of democracies against Communism, had begun to over react to the point where his reactions seem a symptom of paranoid insanity. To fight Fascism the Democracies had sufficient sources of strength they could carry the war for long. However, their power was composite and based upon countries with divergent interests. The British appetite for glory and aggrandizement sharpened to the verge of megalomania nibbled at the rights of communist Russia. This led to fear and suspicion among the enemies of Fascism. Thus the Democracies and Soviet Union in their own way sought decisive shifts in the arrangement of power. The question was whether Fascism would operate with equal effectiveness against both Great Britain and Soviet Union or Soviet Union would whitewash England in this war of nerves and enter into an alliance with Germany. Within the alliance mechanism in the balance of power system Soviet Union kept in the advantage. On the eve of world war II the alliance between Soviet Union and Fascist Germany improved Soviet Union's bargaining position.

The ideological fall out of all these developments was complex. The left forces in India saw the main contradiction with imperialism, while for Congress the contradiction of Fascism appeared to be stronger. Before the Congress parted company with Great Britain due to unilateral decision of Britain to involve India in war, the Congress politics was primarily dominated by anti-Fascist instance. Imperialism was seen as a smaller threat. It was believed in the Congress circles that under the pressure of Fascism

British Imperialism would offer concessions and accept the Congress demands for the participation in the world war II.

In Punjab the pattern of politics was fundamentally novel in essential respects. On the one hand we see the uneven development of middle class with uncertain ideologies, and on the other the emergence of Landowning peasantry increasingly stabilising its position with the connivance of British imperialism. The victories of Unionist party in the election of 1937 and the formation of Unionist ministry in Punjab were welcome developments for the Government of India. There was even talk in Unionist party to invite Congress to join the Government and seek cooperation with them.

The Congress was unwilling to play a second fiddle. It was a divided house. The dream of a united Congress in the face of Unionist activities became more than over a vision without apparent hope of achieving reality. In 1939 the friction among the Congressmen in Punjab was further sharpened. The victory of Dr. Kitchlew over Comrade Ram Krishan in the election of Punjab Congress President by 177 to 72 votes ignited group rivalry among the warring camps.<sup>1</sup> The election results convincingly proved the strength of Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava in the Congress circles. The other group of Dr. Satya Pal was, however, bitter as it was claimed by them that the majority of Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava in the Congress was fraudulent as his group's success in the elections was the direct result of imbalance created by the Akalis.<sup>2</sup> Pt. Shri Ram Sharma complained to Abul Kalam Azad in January 1940. He said that Gopi Chandra Bhargava had acquired control over the P.C.C.C. by questionable methods and sought help of Akalis which would only harm the cause of Congress.<sup>2a</sup> Attempts to reconcile the opposing interests failed to create a conciliatory atmosphere. The appointment of Nar Singh by A.I.C.C. to make thorough enquiry on the request of Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava only helped to open the wounds and even neutral leaders like Lala Duni Chand of Ambala came under scathing attack by the vested interests.<sup>3</sup>

The auditor appointed by the A.I.C.C. to report on the work of the Congress in Punjab and to inspect the accounts, during 1936-38 observed. "The difficulty is that they are only willing to work if they are put in office. They have no interest in the work

as such. They fight for self-importance and prominence. Where one party is in power and controls the office, the other would not let it do any work and would rather put obstructions in the carrying on of its business".<sup>3a</sup>

The split in the Congress High Command between Subhash Chandra Bose and Mahatma Gandhi not only intensified the Punjab frictions but weakened the Congress cause and considerably strengthened the position of the Government in Punjab.<sup>3b</sup> All misunderstandings about the strength of the Congress and the loyalty of its supporters had now been removed by the Congress itself. Dr. Gopi Chand's group which was in power issued a circular opposing the enlistment in the Congress of members of the Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League, because they were communal organizations. But in fact it was only an insinuation of Dr. Satya Pal. Dr. Satya Pal had also retorted in reply to this circular that Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava depends for his present position on the Akali Sikhs alleged to be "the most bigoted communalists in the province".<sup>4</sup> Soon after, Satya Pal group called a meeting of 40 members to form the Forward Bloc. But in fact the meeting did not proceed to form any organization; rather it decided to summon a more representative gathering from all the groups in the province.<sup>5</sup> Another meeting called on 24 May, 1939 as a follow-up action "gathered" more representatives than the first one convened for the same purpose.<sup>6</sup>

The crescendo raised by the *dramatis personae* in the muddled politics of Punjab Congress affected the District Congress Committees, more particularly in the Haryana region. Although there were many points of contact between them on the higher as well as on the lower levels, their narrow political interests divided them on the basis of group loyalties.<sup>7</sup> As a result, the situation was one of not only tension but also of very active and repeated conflicts. In the Ambala district the leadership of Lala Duni Chand was challenged by Bhagat Ram Sukul, Comrade Shaheer Aslam and Abdul Gaffar Khan. In Rohtak and Hissar Pt. Shri Ram Sharma was tied down under the concentrated attack of Daulat Ram Gupta and his allies. Pt. Neki Ram and Lala Sham Lal were also pitifully shaken by the lists of grievances and allegations hurled on them. The reverberation of conflict and tension among the Congressmen was also heard in the District Board elections. All

these happenings had far reaching consequences. They set in motion these forces which gave rise to ill-will and hatred. This weakened the already fragile fabric of national solidarity under the Congress. However, the only rift in the lute or rather the only tune not in harmony with that of the discriminating politics of Congress stalwarts was their anti-imperialist slant. Practically all of them organised themselves to rise as one person exhorting their fellow beings to come out in the open against the British Raj.<sup>8</sup> The Congress leaders ridiculed the Government for the unrest and uneasiness caused by the prolonged drought and scarcity conditions in Hissar district.<sup>9</sup> The Government was further accused of running the administration with the help of Police Thugs.<sup>10</sup> To buttress this point the Asandh incident in the Rohtak district was frequently recited. It was these that the Zamindara league in collusion with Government thwarted all attempts of the Congress to hold a meeting.<sup>11</sup> Haryana leaders in the Congress also showed deeper inclination to organize the Punjab National Congress volunteers corps and the National Militia having in no uncertain terms some revolutionary tendencies.<sup>12</sup> The majority support to Subhash Chandra Bose in Congress presidential election from Punjab (186 to Bose and only 82 for his opponent) was interpreted by the officials as an indicator of the Congress hostility towards the Punjab Government. A Government report said: "Congressmen are united in their hostility to the present Government and hatred of the British connection. The right wing of the Congress in the province shows itself in these matters to be as extreme as the left wing elsewhere".<sup>13</sup>

The agrarian measures of the Government were also referred to in derogatory terms. The Government was accused of price spiral and destroying rural credit endangering feelings of insecurity, dealing a blow to the rule of law and giving the back-seat to higher precepts of morality, honesty and integrity in public life. The people were invited to resist forward business transactions, to refuse to stock crops and to withhold cooperation from the Government and withdraw deposits from cooperative banks.<sup>14</sup>

The blue book of British cruelty and exploitation was read in open for the exhausted and exploited people to muster more courage and open the gates of freedom, by refusing to seek recruitment in the British Army. There was considerable activity



in the Congress circles on the occasion of Bhagat Singh's death anniversary. A martyr's fair was organised at Marauli Kalan in Ambala, the place being the birth place of a terrorist executed many years ago.<sup>15</sup> The Press also indulged in highly sentimental outbursts over the death of Lala Hardayal and "People in high places, many of them employed by the crown, gave messages appreciating Hardayal's qualities".<sup>16</sup> Attempts were also made to involve the people of neighbouring Indian States. The agrarian agitation against Patiala was supported from Ambala and Hissar.<sup>17</sup> On 26th March, 1939, a Congress meeting was held at Punahala in the Gurgaon district. In the meeting people from Bharatpur State asked British Indians to help their state brothers. They commented on the condition of peasants and the corruption of officials in the State.<sup>18</sup> It was also reported that there had been some excitement in the Gurgaon district among the Meos over a case affecting the Bharatpur and Alwar States. The Government took extensive precautions to meet any exigency.<sup>19</sup> The Congress supported to urban trading class against the Government's marketing legislation was half hearted though, hartals were organized.<sup>20</sup>

On 19th May, 1939, a Conference was held under the presidency of Dr. Kitchlew. The object of the meeting was to carry favour with the famine stricken Jats of the districts by urging the Government to provide further measures of relief and to stir up agitation among the subjects of neighbouring states against their rulers.<sup>21</sup>

On 21st May, 1939, the Congress celebrated a political Prisoners' Day in each district.<sup>22</sup> The Congress also announced in the press that it proposed to appoint ten sub-committees to intensify its activities on the eve of the second world war.<sup>23</sup>

On the 5th June, a meeting was organised by the Congress at Rohtak to highlight the problems of the people and fix responsibility on the Government.<sup>24</sup> Subhash Chandra Bose's visit to Punjab heightened the people's enthusiasm.<sup>25</sup> On June 20, 1939 a Congress workers' training school was opened. A Government report said:

"Actually the school is being conducted on exactly the same lines as recent Kisan Schools and the lectures and subjects are also the same. Political and economic history is

wildly perverted to prove the enormity of British imperialism, but most of the lecturing is done in vague and all-understood communist terms which may impress but certainly do not educate the hearers".<sup>26</sup>

In July, 1939 the Punjab Province Congress Committee met again to take stock of the whole situation and a new programme was devised. According to this programme, the committee was to enlist more whole-time paid workers, to hold another session of the Congress Workers' Training School in October, 1939 and to organize a Congress Volunteer Corps with branches in all districts of the province.<sup>27</sup>

On July 1 and 2, 1939 Socialists (Congress) organized their conference at Rohtak. It was a great bonanza for the people. Acharya Narendra Dev, President of the All-India Kisan Committee, was selected to preside. He was served with an order at Delhi under Section 3 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1932, forbidding him to enter the province. However, he defied the order. But before he could participate in the conference, the Government removed him from Rohtak to Delhi under Section 4 of the said Act.<sup>28</sup>

As stated earlier it was a great day for Rohtak. People from neighbouring districts and villages flocked to hear their leaders. The Government reports acknowledge that the conference was well attended. The main feature of this conference was the speech of Jaiprakash Narain, who was then General Secretary of the All-India Congress Socialist Party. In his major speech delivered in the last session, he remarked that the real enemy of the Muslims was the British empire which was instrumental in damaging Muslim solidarity in Afghanistan, Iran and other Muslim countries. He exhorted them to join hands with the Hindus "to driving out the common enemy". He also spoke in favour of 'no rent' campaign and supported strike movement on the part of industrial workers.<sup>29</sup>

Between August 15 and 22, 1939, the Congress organized 'Mass Contact Week' programme in all the districts of Punjab, including Haryana. The mass contact week was "designed to carry the Congress propaganda into rural areas and to enlist Muslim support".<sup>30</sup>

It, therefore, seems safe to assume that the Congress in Haryana was determined to win the support of the people. In high politics the Congressmen in Haryana had deep faith in the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and other members of the High Command of the Congress party. They were prepared to go all along with their leaders in disciplining the British imperialism provided they had a clear brief of the activities to be undertaken by them. In the politics of Punjab their main worry was Sir Chhotu Ram, who was still riding the popular wave and had commanding position in the Government. However, this conclusion does not permit us to dismiss the idea that the bug of friction politics had not bitten the Congress leaders in this region and there were unmistakable attempts to gain popularity at each other's expense. There is also substantive evidence to prove that the provincial leadership made every possible attempt to broaden the social base, particularly in rural areas and in seeking Muslim support.<sup>31</sup>

The Congress support over famine and scarcity conditions in certain districts of Haryana, did help the Congress to cut some slice of mass support. The concern over agrarian problems such as heavy taxes and non-payment of taxes, price spiral and agrarian agitation in the neighbouring states formed a kind of background which gave the Congress a better image among the peasantry.<sup>31a</sup> Among the Muslim, Majlis-i-Arar leadership showed deeper understanding of British imperialism and wished to make up with the Congress but the party's rank and file was openly against it.<sup>32</sup> The Congress attempt to remind Muslims of British conspiracy against Philistine and Afghanistan, etc., did in no way remove their age-old suspicion of Congress politics.<sup>33</sup> Instead Hindu-Muslim Communal rivalry did appear again and again to vitiate the atmosphere.<sup>34</sup>

In September, 1939, the outbreak of the Second World War not only overshadowed all other events but concretized the emerging ideological context of world politics. It, therefore, became imperative for the Congress High Command to take note of the changing context of international politics. The stock taking process was not easy, for the directions of adaptation were not very clearly pointed out. Nevertheless, adoption was envisaged. On the international front, it was apparent that India would still count

on the British goodwill, but in no case align with either of the groups. The Congress line of action was, however, based on two contradictory urges—promoting peace and giving moral and ideological support to the Allies on the one hand and on the other, endeavouring to the best of its capacity to free India from the British in the name of social justice and democracy. The Congress hierarchy was convinced that the credit side of this framework outweighed its debit side. As a result the Congress leadership saw these goals as a valid, relevant, desirable and, widely respected principles.

A tissue appeared imminent from this policy mode. The High Command of the Congress party had to streamline its party at provincial and district levels and impress on the British Government in India to expedite Indian independence and settle peacefully the question of British withdrawal.

The going was rather rough for the Congress in Haryana, the reason being that the Congress was in opposition and lacked the prestige it enjoyed in other provinces of India. Moreover, this area was inhabited by many a group (officially recognized as the martial races) who were ever willing to seek recruitment in the Army on a large scale.<sup>35</sup> The peasant-proprietors dominating the economy of the area too hoped that the war would provide relief from their financial embarrassments of the past few years of low prices.<sup>36</sup> And to cap it all this background was favourable to the Unionist party, which not only controlled the political string of the region but had the overt ambition for acting as a mouthpiece of these vested interests. Writing about the civil liberties in the Punjab province, the A.I.C.C. Inspector R.K.L. Nand Koelyar says :

“I think no province has suffered so much repression by the Government as the Punjab. In its anxiety to help in the war efforts of the British Government, the Punjab ministry has not scuffled to gag or detain any body about whom it had even the slightest suspicion of being in the way. Its irresponsible action will be clear when it is seen that 33% of those tried in court were released either by the trial court or by the appellate courts”.<sup>37</sup>

The Political parties such as the Forward Bloc, Congress Socialists and Majlis-i-Ahrar had also decided to oppose the British Government following the lead given by the Congress. A swing against the British rule was a noticeable feature of Haryana's public opinion in this period. The outbreak of the Second World War led to the inflation of prices and most shopkeepers went in for profiteering. The urban people and the rural poor were fleeced out of all proportions. They obviously regarded these adverse changes with great apprehension. The hope that the peasant-proprietors might benefit from the price spiral proved illusionary. The benefit of all round price increase could not react beneficially to the village producer, rather he was sucked of the little capital he possessed. Moreover, he was called upon to contribute liberally to the war fund. Thus peasants, who had a long, lean period and who were looking forward to a substantial increase in the prices of agricultural products, were sadly disappointed.

Riding on the wave, the Congress decided to oppose the Government policy of recruitment.<sup>37a</sup> A section of the Congress tried to follow Subhash Chandra Bose in efforts to make capital out of the war situation.<sup>38</sup> Anti-war speeches were delivered in a number of Congress meetings. In September, 1939, 2 persons were prosecuted in Karnal for sedition under Defence of India Rules.<sup>39</sup> In Hissar 5 persons were prosecuted for sedition under Defence of India Rules.<sup>40</sup> The suppression let loose by the British Government under the Ordinance to curb seditious propaganda caused great discomfiture among the public. The Congress party detested any flare-up on account of its policy. As a result, the President of the Punjab Congress decided to issue a circular letter directing workers to refrain from delivering anti-recruitment speeches until further orders.<sup>41</sup>

In spite of this circular some activity was displayed in Rohtak when municipal elections began on October 2, 1939.<sup>42</sup> The resignation of the Congress ministers (against the British decision of declaring India as a belligerent power without consulting Indian opinion), sent a wave of jubilation in the region as a whole. A Government report said :

“Congressmen in the Punjab were at once disappointed and jubilant-disappointed because the Congress had not got

the very thing that it demanded and jubilant at the prospect of the renewal of hostility with Government, because in the Punjab they are almost all of the extremist school and their position as a minority in opposition leaves them with little to lose in a clash with Government".<sup>43</sup>

In anticipation of the decision of the All-India Working Committee to refuse cooperation, a new drive of enrolment was made with great success.<sup>44</sup> Local war committees were also formed in a number of districts.<sup>45</sup> The volunteers' names for civil disobedience were also collected. Meetings were also held to give general publicity to the Congress decision on the war issue.<sup>46</sup> The Punjab Government had suspicion that "attempts are being made to put records beyond the reach of the authorities by them (Congress) over to persons not likely to be suspected of having them."<sup>47</sup>

This preparation was no call for confrontation. It lay in the logic of situation that local Congress leaders would wait for the final orders from their High Command. However, some Congressmen picked up willy-nilly hostile mentality which the Congress in general so far held as antithetical to her policy aims.<sup>48</sup>

While the Congress party maintained low profile throughout the later part of 1939, the Majlis-i-Ahrar and the Forward Bloc aggressively remained in the field to oppose "all war measures generally and recruitment in particular."

Instead of appreciating the unusual quiet"<sup>49</sup> in the Congress circle, the Government responded by clamping an Ordinance to punish 'seditious' activities. The Government also ordered the forfeiture of the Haryana Tilak Press, Rohtak, under Section 4(1)(11) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, XXII of 1931.<sup>50</sup> Press censor was fully clamped. Many newspapers (circulating in Haryana) were warned for reproducing false news. After the distribution of the "Note for the guidance of the Press during the War", the editors were directed to follow the instructions in toto. This had the immediate effect. Commenting on the good behaviour of certain papers in Punjab a Government report observed:

"This cannot be regarded wholly as the result of the promulgation of the Defence of India Ordinance and the passing of the Act; much of the improvement is the true reflection of

the general sympathy of the province with Government and with Britain and the desire to help and not to embarrass Government in the present circumstances".<sup>51</sup>

Similarly, the government showed confidence in its relations with the landlords. They (landlords), according to the Government estimate, were loyal and "would stand by the Empire at all costs and were ready to offer their last pic and to consecrate their last drop of blood to the services of the Empire against barbarity".<sup>52</sup> Earlier in July 1938 Sir Sikander Hayat Khan had come to Sonapat. In a large gathering of about 30,000 peasants had appealed to them to join Army and defend India against foreign invasion.<sup>52a</sup> Sir Chhotu Ram who had become indispensable for the success of Unionist ministry in Punjab<sup>52b</sup> had openly declared in October 1939 that "if England fights the Punjab fights."<sup>52c</sup>

This show of confidence was, however, lacking in its analysis of urban people. The report accepts that "The prices of foodstuffs still tend to rise and among the poor, particularly in urban areas, perturbation is growing. The Press comments at length on the increases and demands action by the government but shows little appreciation of the intricacies of the problem and the importance of correlating action in different provinces. Communists and socialist agitators are making use of the situation to create unrest and discontent".<sup>53</sup>

Thus, it appears that the Government was suffering from bad conscience. The British composure could only be noticed broadly in the sphere of peasant-proprietors and the lifeless elite controlling the press. But the fear of the Congress influence was also a reality which they had to live with under the cover of a brave face. The government was fully aware that the spirit of an agitation had been manifest in the Congress and a gentle stream would soon turn into a powerful torrent once the masses' interest was reawakened and lost momentum regained. And this really happened in 1940's.

After the Congress mode of advancement getting stabilized by the end of 1939, certain fresh conceptual openings were visible in Haryana's national movement from 1940. The new dimensions of freedom-struggle which thus came to develop could not acquire sufficient coherence till September, 1940, after which date another

phase of development indicative of intense fighting spirit was noticeable. Also the war situation obtaining between September, 1939 and September, 1940 appeared to be in a flouncing state. The Allied powers were passing through a phase of crisis and humiliation. The victories of the Fascist powers from one front to another were bound to stir the whole of international politics. Under tight international position, the British attempt to intensify recruitment front, war collection fund and floating war loans cut across the mounting tide of nationalist awakening in India. Haryana being a focal-point of large scale recruitment, liberal war funds and loans appeared to many as a test case to demonstrate the inner strength of nationalism among the people. Haryana's bellicosity on these issues was suspect as Sir Chhotu Ram, the Development Minister in Punjab and a prominent leader of this region and the Unionist party had come out in the open to support British efforts. However, the people's reactions were much more broadbased than this apprehension suggested. Lala Duni Chand of Ambala in a letter addressed to the A.I.C.C. General Secretary reproached the Congress Working Committee for not giving any direct lead to the either by way of a fight to wrest power or by way of accepting the offer made by the British Raj. He added:

“India is passing through critical times and she may have to face internal disorder or external aggression or both. At a time like this, capture of power by the Congress howsoever limited can enhance the importance of the Congress as an instrument to face and meet these two dangers”.<sup>54</sup>

The people of Haryana thus showed a big sweep in their appreciation of Congress response to the British war efforts and Congress terms to secure complete independence from the British yoke. Consequently, while clouds had begun hovering over British-Congress amity, the Congress did succeed in deepening social base for freedom struggle. In the face of problems of foreign Government and administration, the leaders of Congress in Haryana displayed a disarming readiness to learn from their own shortcomings and a willingness to experiment with Satyagraha without losing their grip from political pragmatism. This was also true of their attitude to friction-ridden politics of Punjab Congress.



In 1940, the temper of national movement in Haryana was strengthened by successfully celebrating 'Independence Day' on a greater scale as compared to the previous year.<sup>55</sup> It took a great deal of organization and agitation to create necessary enthusiasm. The Congress decided not to organize defiance of the Law on this occasion but left individual members free to court arrest if they wished. In Karnal 2 persons courted arrest under Defence of India Act. A Government report said:

".....Except for the independence pledge and the usual vague seditious sentiments voiced in connection with it, speeches were temperate and restrained at most places".<sup>56</sup>

Unlike other areas of Punjab, Haryana villages and towns also celebrated the Independence Day—though the main activity was confined to major urban centres where students swelled the meetings with real enthusiasm and spontaneity. As stated above this was more marked in Karnal district. To match with this unexpected enthusiasm shown by the people the Congress leaders tried hard to achieve better cohesiveness in its rank and file by sending the hardcore amongst them to attend a central volunteers training camp held at Lahore from February 1, 1940 to February 15, 1940. The training included the use of the lathi and lectures on political and economic subjects and twenty-two volunteers attended the course. Herein, the Congressmen once more reiterated their love of motherland and arrived at important conclusions concerning the need for and the possibility of unity of action in the anti-imperialist struggle to be waged at the opportune time. During the lectures and physical training stress was also laid on the fight for immediate needs and on the most urgent economic and political demands of the people. It was declared that the Congress could not be indifferent to the national interest and would act as the genuine protagonist of national freedom and independence of the people. The volunteers were expected to train other volunteers on the same lines and prepare them ideologically to better withstand the challenge posed by the British imperialism. They, however, preferred these volunteers getting harnessed to restrained and responsible conduct rather than being provoked to become more and more aggressive.<sup>57</sup>

The visit of Abul Kalam Azad to Punjab (after his elevation to the Presidentship of All-India Congress) was utilized in Haryana to create maximum deterrant against the British rule. The time was opportune to revive interest in the Muslim mass contact campaign which had practically died of inanimation. The Congress leaders lost little times in getting into touch with as many Muslim individuals and Muslim organizations in any way inclined towards the Congress. However, this contact was generally confined to the urban centres where this community had much better presence. Pursuant to these developments the towns of Rohtak, Ambala, Karnal and Gurgaon witnessed a further effort to mobilize Muslim forces and popularize the Congress among the Muslim masses.<sup>58</sup>

The Haryana leaders more particularly Shri Ram Sharma, M.L.A., who among others represented his own group in the Congress politics of Punjab,<sup>59</sup> joined Azad in his unity efforts in the Congress. He impressed on the All-India Congress President the need to pressurize the various groups in the Punjab Province Congress Committee to work in unison and cooperate with each other. It seemed for the time being that Azad made substantial gains and managed to maintain a semblance of unity although its members were drawn from various fractions composing the Punjab Congress.<sup>60</sup> It will be interesting to mention what R.K.L. Nand Koelyar who submitted his report on the Punjab Province Congress Committee, had to say on this subject. He observed:

“The Congress organisation in the Punjab is good for agitation but not for constructive work. There is very little contact between the P.C.C. and the D.C.Cs. or the D.C.C. and its subordinate Committees. The P.C.C. sends all its circulars direct to all primary committees, but the response is rather poor...”<sup>61</sup>

Finding this time as opportune, the Haryana Congress leaders appeared picking up the strength rather fast. “The only meeting of any importance outside of Lahore”, said a Government Report” was the Rohtak District Political Conference held at village Jasawar Kheri on the 24th and 25th of February”.<sup>62</sup>

The meeting showed a tendency towards confrontation with the Government. Some fiery speeches were delivered and loyalists

including police were openly boycotted by the villagers. The Report said:

“Most of the speeches betrayed bitter communal feeling and there were the usual attacks on Ministers in general and the Minister for Development in particular. During the conference the police and loyalists were boycotted by the villagers, the majority of whom are Congressmen; this is believed to have been in retaliation for the opposition offered by the loyalists to the holding of a Congress conference at the nearby village of Asandh last year”.<sup>63</sup>

The rapid revolutionary development stirred all classes even in the face of odd turns in circumstances. The British were at work with their divisionary tactics. To begin with, the Punjab Government notified a ban on public processions on February 28, and later on March 31, 1940. A Government Extraordinary Gazette said:

“In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (1) of rule 56 of the Defence of India Rules, the Governor of the Punjab is pleased to direct that for a period of six months no person shall hold or take part in any public procession within the boundaries of the municipalities of the following places”.<sup>64</sup>

Among the municipalities of Haryana area mentioned in the Extraordinary Gazette were Hissar, Bhiwani, Rohtak, Rewari, Karnal, Panipat, Ambala City and Sadar Bazar Ambala Cantt. further added:

“Nothing in this order shall apply (a) to any procession in respect of which a licence has been duly issued under sub-section (3) or section 30 of the Police Act, 1861; or (b) to any funeral or marriage procession; or (c) to any customary religious procession to which the District Magistrate by an order in writing grants exemption subject to such conditions, if any, as he may think fit”.<sup>65</sup>

Owing to dissatisfaction with this order attempts were made to sidetrack the national issues by inciting and abetting the communal riots in the region. Thus in the towns like Rohtak, Hansi tehsil in Hissar and Ambala angry scenes of communal riots were staged.<sup>66</sup> On the occasion of the Muharram the Congress made an

appeal to the people and stressed the need to control their passion and see in these orgies the black hand of British imperialism. The fact that the trouble blew off without doing great harm was taken as a positive sign giving strength to the prestige and influence of the Congress. Obviously the Congress was in no mood to oblige the Government by taking a back-seat under the shock of communal riots. The Congress, therefore, felt encouraged to direct the volunteers to make anti-war speeches and court arrest.

In Karnal one person courted arrest in February, 1940, under Defence of India Act.<sup>67</sup> In March it was reported that the sentence of Dr. Murli Manohar, (who had been convicted by the Additional District Magistrate of Hissar under sections 124-A and 153-A, I.P.C. and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently) was on appeal to the High Court, set aside under section 153-A, I.P.C. and confirmed under section 124-A, I.P.C., but reduced to the period already undergone, namely, four months.<sup>68</sup>

In May, another person was prosecuted in Karnal under section 153-A, I.P.C.<sup>69</sup> On June 6, 1940, a report of arrest appeared. Mehroo Singh, son of Sheo Jee Jat of Madina, District Rohtak, was prosecuted under prejudicial act and sentenced to three years on two counts under Rule 38(a), Defence of India Rules. The sentences were to run concurrently.<sup>70</sup> Under the pretext of increasing subversive actions of the Communists, more arrests were made between June 15 to June 30, 1940. They were charged of prejudicing the internal peace of the province and interfering with the efficient prosecution of the war under rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules.<sup>71</sup> From Karnal, Jagdish Chandra was prosecuted for prejudicial act under Rule 38, Defence of India Rules, and sentenced to 6 months' rigorous imprisonment.<sup>72</sup>

Similarly, Shri Ram, a Mahajan of Jhajjar, was charged for creating panic in rural Ilagi and prosecuted under Rule 38, Defence of India Act.<sup>73</sup> Risala, belonging to Rurki and Jat by caste, was prosecuted for refusing to pay land revenue under Rule 38 of the Defence of India Act.<sup>74</sup> It was alleged that he was persuading other villagers of his village to do the same. Two others, Kishan Lal<sup>75</sup> and Gulzara Singh,<sup>76</sup> were also prosecuted for acting in a manner prejudicial to public order for subversive and anti-war activities under Rule 26(1), Defence of India Rules. Further, there

were other reports from Gurgaon, Rohtak<sup>77</sup> and Hissar.<sup>78</sup> Nathwa, Gabdu, Chhote and Bhoja of village Qadarpur in District Gurgaon defied the Government by refusing to pay land revenue.<sup>79</sup> From Hissar Ude Singh a Rajput of Sham Sukh was nabbed for spreading alarming news among the villagers.<sup>80</sup> The people stubbornly continued the struggle. The number of arrests continued to rise. For instance, Dr. Manohar Lal of Hissar who was released in March, 1940 was rearrested for making an anti-Government and anti-war speech.<sup>81</sup>

From Ambala, the number of arrests was much more impressive. Joti Parshad was charged for refusing to accept a rupee coin bearing effigy of Queen Victoria.<sup>82</sup> Shadi Singh<sup>83</sup> and Hazara Singh<sup>84</sup> were alleged to have acted in a manner prejudicial to public order. The number of persons prosecuted for sedition and other offences in August, 1940 was one in Ambala, three in Hissar,<sup>85</sup> and, in September, one in Gurgaon.<sup>86</sup> One more civil register was convicted for sedition in Gurgaon.<sup>87</sup> Among those who were sentenced, in September, 1940 were: Hira Lal Chamar, who was charged for spreading alarming news,<sup>88</sup> Pitamber Singh for an anti-British and anti-Government speech relating to recruitment,<sup>89</sup> Dr. Krishna Nand, a Dentist of Panipat, for an objectionable speech<sup>90</sup> and Mange Ram Vats, a leading socialist, for acting in a manner prejudicial to public order.<sup>91</sup> In late October, before the individual Satyagraha movement was launched by Vinoba Bhave, the number of persons prosecuted from Gurgaon and Ambala was one each. Among them Suraj Singh, a Rajput of Ladhauti, Gurgaon District, was sentenced for anti-war propaganda. Muhammad Yusuf was arrested and sentenced on September 30, 1940 for exhorting members of his community to refrain from subscribing to war fund.<sup>92</sup>

The theme of speeches of those who courted arrest was usually the demand of self-determination through a Constituent Assembly. They also vehemently condemned to arrests of persons in political cases and under the Defence of India Rules. Other explosive issues such as the rise in the cost of living standard caused by the Second World War, the incidence of land revenue and canal waters rate were also raised to stimulate the anti-imperialist movement in Haryana. Towards the close of May, 1940, the Congress found the climate favourable to demand

national militia and the organization of India's defences on modern lines.<sup>93</sup> This was occasioned due to the panic among the urban people, particularly after Germany's success in their invasion of the low countries. This unhappy event in the war fortune began to tell heavily on the Banks. There was a run on the Banks, followed by a demand for gold and silver, and reluctance to accept currency notes and the cashing of Post Office Savings Certificates. The Landowning Statutory Agriculturists were also alarmed and their confidence in the stability of the Government was shaken as the price of wheat had fallen considerably. A government report said:

“Public confidence in the stability of Government has to some extent been undermined, and in many quarters there is the fear of internal disorder. Much alarm is reported to have been caused by German broadcasts which are more generally appreciated than those of the British Broadcasting Corporation. Although much of the news broadcast from Berlin may be discounted among the educated classes as enemy propaganda, its glib claims to continuous success, nearly always uncontradicted, have proved disquieting and demoralising factors”.<sup>94</sup>

Meanwhile on the instructions of the Punjab Congress Working Committee,<sup>95</sup> the districts' Congress met and converted itself into Satyagraha Committees. In Haryana districts two primary committees existed in Ambala and one each in Gurgaon and Hissar. They were called upon to enlist members as active and passive Satyagrahis. The district-wise figures of Satyagrahis from Haryana were: Gurgaon 24, Karnal 9, Hissar 206, Ambala 125 and Rohtak 24.<sup>96</sup> The Inspection Report of the Punjab Province Congress Committee submitted by A.I.C.C. Inspector R.K.L. Nand Koelyar mentioned that till June, 1940 Punjab Provincial Congress Committee met twice and the Punjab Working Committee five times. In the second meeting on May 31 some resolutions were passed. According to the resolution I, it was decided to organize volunteer corps in the province. The resolution II appointed a sub-committee to propose changes in the constitution. The resolution III requested all District Congress Committees to

start Satyagraha camps so that each district might have its camp between June 10 to July 10, 1940. By the other two resolutions, the British policy of repression within the British India and repression in the Indian States was condemned.<sup>97</sup> The Working Committee of the Punjab Congress also decided on April 5, 1940 to convert itself into Supreme Satyagraha Council. The actual conversion into Supreme Satyagraha Council, however, took place in the meeting on April 19, 1940 when 15 of the 21 members present signed the Satyagraha pledge. It also decided to run a Provincial Satyagraha training camp at Lahore from May 7 to May 14 wherein all the delegates and M.L.As. who signed the pledge were admitted.<sup>98</sup>

The All-India Congress Working Committee also issued a circular in May, 1940, directing all members of the Congress Committees to resign if they were not willing to sign the Satyagraha pledge. It seems that the enlistment of volunteers for Satyagraha ran into heavy weather due to intense rivalry, among various groups. But as the popular indignation against the colonial oppressors reached its height and the repression increased, the Congress campaign, particularly in Haryana, was quite a success. Jawaharlal Nehru's visit to Lahore on May 24, 1940 to open the Punjab Province Congress Committee Satyagraha training camp, in which the Haryana Congress volunteers were also participating, inculcated a new vision among the participants.<sup>99</sup> More so, his speech to the Lahore public on May 25, 1940 left a far-reaching impact on the whole of Punjab province.<sup>100</sup> Reporting on the effect of Nehru's speech, a government report said:

“The capitulation of France has caused less consternation than might have been expected, but the insidious propaganda of Congress and Kisan workers and particularly the recent speeches in the Punjab of Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru have unsettled people's minds and have created an impression in many quarters of impending resolution and disaster. The bitter anti-British tone of Nehru's speeches and his repeated forecasts of Britain's early collapse have tended to spread a feeling of doubt whether Britain can now expect to win the war alone”.<sup>101</sup>

The Congress, more particularly the Socialists, seized this opportunity to urge a revolt against the British imperialism. They also demanded from the people whole-hearted opposition to any war effort by the British Government in India and preparation for mass revolution by a no-rent and no-tax campaign.<sup>102</sup> The repression under Defence of India Rules only succeeded in hardening the mood of the Congress. Directions were issued to the District Committees by the Punjab Province Congress Committee "to be ready to control the activities of Satyagrahis should civil disobedience be started".<sup>103</sup> An appeal was also issued by the wife of the General Secretary of the All-India Congress Committee to encourage women to enlist in large numbers as active Satyagrahis.<sup>104</sup> The arrests of about 85 leading lights of Punjab by the Government under the cover of stopping the subversive activities of Communists<sup>105</sup> was strongly resented by the Congress Working Committee of Punjab on June 29, 1940.<sup>106</sup> On July 7, 1940 a protest day was organized all over Haryana vigorously condemning the arrests and describing them as a direct attack on Congress. The Congress resolution on war passed at the Ramgarh session was also read in these protest meetings. The arrest of Subhash Chandra Bose was also resented as an attack on civil liberties. These meetings were organized as part of All-India Political Prisoners' Day.<sup>107</sup>

At this time all the districts of Haryana were hemmed in with gainful activity. The enlistment of National Guards was demanded. In addition each district organized Satyagraha camps and recruiting campaigns by volunteer organizations. To consolidate and sustain the enthusiasm parades in private grounds were also held.<sup>108</sup>

On the legislative front, the Congress M.L.As. from Haryana helped to intensify the struggle against British imperialism. They joined other Congress opposition members in the Punjab Legislative Assembly in demanding a special meeting of the Assembly to discuss the recent arrests of five members of the Assembly and other Congress workers.<sup>109</sup> In pursuance to this request, the Assembly meeting was called but the proceedings were "conducted in secret".<sup>110</sup>

The visit of Rajendra Prasad to Lahore<sup>111</sup> and Viceroy's August statement<sup>112</sup> further embittered the Haryana people against



the Government. The people's dissatisfaction against the method of collection of war purposes fund developed the struggle along the revolutionary lines. At several Congress meetings in the Hissar district speakers urged the people not to contribute to the war funds and open allegations were made about the forcible collection of subscription.<sup>113</sup> The fact that the Hissar district, which had been badly hit by famine during the past three years, contributed Rs. 1,40,000 to purchase a fighter plane and was reported to provide sufficient funds for a second plane,<sup>114</sup> speaks volumes of the repressive measures used to squeeze people of their meagre resources. A Government report indirectly admitted:

"... a senior officer who has been touring the Province reports a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction with India's war effort... May people would welcome an announcement regarding imposition of taxation to finance the war".<sup>115</sup> In another Government report, hopes were expressed for better collection, if Britain would win. It said:

"Money for war funds and loans has been coming in slowly but steadily. The Hindu moneyed class, however, is still hesitant about subscribing. This is probably due partly to Congress sympathies, partly to extreme caution which counsels delay until the political situation is clarified and there are further clear signs that Britain is going to win".<sup>116</sup>

The Congress stand on August offer also worried the Government and the liberal opinion. The Tribune was critical of the offer but at the same time was against launching of Civil Disobedience Movement. It said:

"That any Government set up at the centre after the Congress rejection of Government's offer would necessarily be minority Government buttressed by the authority of the British Government and not a national Government in any sense of the term. "Any contribution by such a Government." The paper went on to declare that it felt no hesitation in saying that any attempt to go beyond the proposed protest at the present time would be a profound mistake. Few could doubt that the best interests of India were

ultimately bound up with British success. There should be no form of Satyagraha at present to enforce the national demand".<sup>117</sup>

But the Congress did not stop to look behind and meetings were organized in September, 1940 to secure public sympathy on this constitutional issue.<sup>118</sup> Almost parallel to the Congress efforts to regain strength, other forces were also emerging splitting the movement horizontally. The rupture between Akalis and Congress sharpened due to the controversy started by Tara Singh against Mahatma Gandhi on the issue of enlistment in the Army. Master Tara Singh was willing to join civil disobedience movement "provided that civil disobedience did not extend to preventing Sikhs from joining the Army"<sup>119</sup> Gandhi had snubbed him for this loose talk.<sup>120</sup> The lukewarm attitude of an influential section of Muslims and rural elite among the Hindus further roadblocked the efforts of an advanced section of the masses to travel on the road to struggle. These forces concocted new ways, forms and methods of struggle. Thus there emerged in Haryana a fairly strong dissent, representing several political trends. These forces generally maintained that the British were not our enemy but friends and that to fight them would mean to weaken the forces of the nation.<sup>121</sup> They did everything to confine the struggle for freedom in this region while exhibiting liberal national stand. This stand had indirect support of some of the liberal nationalist Press.<sup>122</sup>

While these forces were busy in raising a barbed wire to arrest the gathering of The Storm in Haryana, the British were also disturbed by the growth of the popular movement and they brought pressure to bear on the Congress and resumed repressive measures to stop the offensive slowly getting momentum in this region. In revaluation, the British Government used every arm in their armoury. They worked on the fears of liberal nationalists who believed that democracy should be saved from totalitarian Fascism.<sup>123</sup> They also depended on the support of Indians who owed their prosperity to the goodwill of British rulers.<sup>124</sup> Further, they used communal issues including riots to balance the number of religious and caste groups in the region.<sup>125</sup> The horrible crime picture did not disturb them,<sup>126</sup> nor the genuine needs of the

people were met by the district officers. They were busy in saving their nation and for this every conceivable help, often forced, was welcome to them. For this they also used press censor<sup>127</sup> and strong arm methods,<sup>128</sup> which were generally Punjab's preserve. Their confidence matched their efficiency in repression. A Government Report of August, 1940 said:

“There is little doubt that if Congress decided to launch civil disobedience, it would not have the backing of even its own followers, although extreme Congressmen and the riff-raff of the cities, who are always prepared to welcome disturbance of any kind, would give considerable trouble to the administration”.<sup>129</sup>

The same opinion was maintained about the Punjab Press. A Report said:

“One point that is clear is the opposition of almost the whole press, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh, to the launching of civil disobedience”.<sup>130</sup>

Thus down to 1940 the forces championing anti-imperialism were splendidly revived in Haryana. The people were willing to come forward and protest against the ways and methods of the British Raj. However, the repression let loose by the Unionist party on the Congress created an atmosphere of fear which in a way diffused the enthusiasm of the people. On March 5, 1940, while speaking in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, Lala Duni Chand of Ambala observed: “The shift of authority from a foreign race to an indigenous oligarchy has not improved the actual conditions under which the ordinary individual, whatever his caste or creed or political complexion may be, has to live and discharge obligations. Aggression, hatred and repression are still the ruling principles of our provincial administration”.<sup>131</sup> Similarly, Pt. Shri Ram Sharma felt disenchanted with the role of provincial administration. While referring to the Governmental action on the nationalist press, he said, “I can assert without fear of contradiction that the intensity of repression in this respect under the present government cannot find a parallel in any country of the world”.<sup>132</sup> He complained that the *Jat Gazette*

of Sir Chhotu Ram was unduly patronized by the Government and, added: "The circulation of this paper is no more than 1,000, two-thirds of which are supplied free to the people. Its monthly expenses are Rs. 200 only, but it gets three thousand rupees a year as payments from the debt conciliation boards. This sum amounts to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  times its expenditure. This is the difference between the treatments meted out to an independent paper and to the patently so called popular paper of one of the so-called popular ministers of this so-called popular Government.<sup>133</sup> The Government was also accused of choking the Congress party into submission.<sup>134</sup> It was further alleged that approximately 2,000 people had been shut up by the Government behind iron bars during the past three years.<sup>135</sup> Significantly, this figure did not include Kisan Morcha prisoners, who were resorting to civil disobedience against the Government.<sup>135a</sup> Lala Duni Chand openly accused that in the name of Kisan Morcha and civil disobedience many a congress worker in Karnal had been imprisoned by the Government. Referring to Karnal he said "the Government have tried to suppress the movement by shutting up active Congress workers in jail."<sup>136</sup>

Thus in spite of the Unionist Government trying to govern "at the point of the bayonet"<sup>137</sup> subsequent development of the national liberation movement in Haryana showed that the new conditions could still give rise to new ways and forms of deepening the anti-imperialist strike in the region. Chapters III and IV would give details about the revolutionary process within the framework of the Congress ideology.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See Punjab P.C.C. 1939—Dispute, election of the President, Punjab P.C.C., Investigation Report (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi).
2. *Home Political*, F. No. 18; 1, 1939. First Half p. 1 January, 1939. The Punjab Report said that the power position of both the groups seemed equally balanced. However, the balance of power rests with the Akalis and not with the Congress Socialists as was the case last year.
- 2a. *A.I.C.C. Papers*, p. 17/1930-40—A Letter written by Pt. Shri Ram Sharma to Abdul Kalam Azad, dated 1-1-1940.
3. Punjab P.C.C. 1939—Dispute, election of the President, Punjab P.C.C.

Investigation Report (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi). It mentions that Comrade Shabeer Aslam (Kalka) told Lala Sham Lal that "Lala Duni Chand of Ambala suggested to him that he should run away with the ballet papers in case it was noticed that Dr. Kitchlew would win". Shabeer Aslam also told Abdul Gaffar Khan (Ambala) that he would not permit Lala Duni Chand to enter the hall".

- 3a. Cited from S.L. Malhotra, *From Civil Disobedience to Quit India*, p. 61.
- 3b. Gandhi had openly criticised Dr. Satyapal in 1935 on Congress defeat for Central Assembly in 1934. This had strengthened Dr. Gopi Chandra Bhargava's hands. Gandhi in his letter to Lala Duni Chand Ambali had observed "Dr. Satya Pal needs no defence from you; and if he does, I think your letter has spoiled his case. Public workers have to possess the hide of a rhinoceros. They can not be sensitive to the extent of being thin skinned. But I must confess to you that though I have not talked to more than two or three persons and that too when the talk became relevant, I have laid the blame of the Punjab defeats at Dr. Satya Pal's door. His unexhaustible energy, courage and suffering are undeniable. But he has a knack of often estranging good people from him. I intended to talk to him about it, but unfortunately he went to jail before I could do so. It is my opinion that if Dr. Satya Pal had been wise and judicious, not one of the Punjab seats would have been lost."
 

From a *photostat-GMMSL* 5592. p. 22. Also cited in Jagdish Chandra, *Gandhi and Haryana*, p. 108.
4. *Home Political*, F.N. 18, 5.1939. First Half, May, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, Second Half, May, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
7. *Ibid.*, File No. 18, 6, 1939, Second Half, June, 1939. Punjab, p. 2. The report said "Dr. Gopi Chand's group is using the irregularities detected during the auditing of Congress accounts by R.S. Pandit to embarrass its opponents".
8. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 2, 1939, First Half, February, 1939. Punjab, p. 1.
9. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 1, 1939, First Half, January, 1939. Punjab, p. 1.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.* F. No. 18, 2, 1939, Second Half, February, 1939 Punjab, p. 2. Also see *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 3, 1939. First Half, March, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
12. *Ibid.*, File No. 18, 1 1939, Second Half, January, 1939, Punjab p. 2.
13. *Ibid.*, File No. 18, 2, 1939, First Half, February, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
14. *Ibid.*, Second Half, February, 1939, Punjab, p. 3.
15. *Ibid.*, File No. 18, 4, 1939, First Half, April, 1939, Punjab, p. 3.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
17. *Ibid.*, File No. 18, 6, 1939, Second Half, June, 1939, Punjab, p. 3.
18. *Ibid.*, File No. 18, 4, 1939, First Half, April, 1939, Punjab, p. 3.
19. *Ibid.*, Second Half, April, 1939, Punjab, p. 3.
20. *Ibid.*, F.N. 18, 5, 1939, First Half, May, 1939, Punjab. p. 2. Commenting on this, Prem Chowdhary says, "The Congress in Punjab could not support the agrarian programme of the Unionists because by doing so they stood to

invoke the wrath of the urban mercantile and middle class population and press among whom the Punjab Congress had its real following. At the same time, they could not oppose the agrarian legislation as it meant alienating the rural majority of Punjab. In failing to safeguard the interests of the professional and trading classes on one hand, and in failing to project a radical agrarian stand on the other, the Congress of Punjab lost greatly in influence both among the rural and urban section of Punjab society”.

See, Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics: The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 160.

21. *Ibid.*, Second Half, May, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
22. *Ibid.*, Also see *The Tribune*, May 23, 1939.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 6, 1939, First Half, June, 1939, Punjab, p. 1. The report said that “disorderly scenes were the main features”. Also see *The Tribune*, June 7, 1939.
25. *Ibid.*, Second Half, June, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
27. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 7, 1939, First Half, July, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2. Also see *The Tribune*, July, 4, 5, 1939.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 8, 1939, First Half, August, 1939, Punjab, p. 1. The report said, “Reports from districts show that this has been almost everywhere a dismal failure. A number of Congress meetings had to be abandoned owing to local opposition and in many instances it proved impossible to enlist the minimum of fifteen members necessary to establish Congress Committees in villages”. Also see *The Tribune*, August 18, 24, 1939.
31. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 3, 1939, Second Half, March, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
- 31a. See Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics: the Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 215-218.
32. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 1, 1939, Second Half, January, 1939, Punjab, p. 2. Also see *Ibid.* F. No. 18, 4, 1939, First Half, April, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
33. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 7, 1939, First Half, July, 1939, Punjab, pp. 1-2.
34. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 2, 1939, First Half, February, 1939, Punjab, p. 2. Also see *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 5, 1939, Second Half, May, 1939, Punjab, p. 1. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 6, 1939 First Half, June, 1939, Punjab, p. 1, *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 9, 1939, First Half, September, 1939, Punjab, p. 2. and *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 10, 1939, First Half, October, 1939, Punjab, p. 2.
35. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 9, 1939, First Half, September, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
36. *Ibid.*
37. 6/1940, Papers brittle Punjab P.C.C. (1) Inspection Reports of Punjab P.C.C., submitted by R.K.L. Nandkoelyar (2) Urdu Reports, Pamphlets, etc., pp. 16-17.
- 37a. Speaking on anti-recruitment policy, the Congress Socialist leader Ram Manohar Lohia had declared on May 6, 1938,

"The Governor of Punjab in course of a speech to the Lahore Old Soldiers' Association expressed his distress at the attempts to discourage enlistment to the Indian Army. He referred in particular to the motives of the non-martials who were trying to disaffect and mislead the races of Punjab. I belong to what the British Government pleased to call the non-martial races and it was a less than month ago that I spoke in Lahore on the necessity of refusal of military service. Many other, like me, who concern themselves with the freedom and peace of the world and their own country have to speak in the Punjab on the subject of the Indian Army. Our motives are now suspect to the Punjab Governor. Is the Punjab Governor suggesting that we non-Punjabis are desirous of replacing the Punjabis in the military services of the country? I look upon the Indian Army as one of the greatest instruments of reaction that the world has ever known. In the event of a future world war the Indian Army will be used to keep India in bondage and to help to win the war for the British Empire. Therefore we don't want our countrymen to enlist in the Indian Army. Inevitably, we address our appeal to the Punjabis, for the British Government has degraded the Punjab into a recruiting ground of its military forces". Cited from Bhagwan Josh, *Communist Movement in Punjab.*, p. 153.

38. *Home Political*, F. No. 18, 9, 1939, Second Half, September, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
39. *Ibid.*, Appendix I.
40. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 10, 1939, First Half; October, 1939, Punjab. Appendix I. *Ibid.*, Second Half; October, 1939 Punjab. Appendix I. Also see *Ibid.* F. No. 18, 11, 1939, Second Half; November, 1939, Punjab. Appendix II.
41. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 9, 1939, Second Half; September, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
42. *The Tribune*, October 4, 1939.
43. *Home Political*. F. No. 18, 10, 1939; Second Half; October, 1939; Punjab, p. 1.
44. *Ibid.* The total enrolment in Punjab was 1,92,000. The number of primary members was, however, 1,82,000. For this the argument given in the report was: "This figure swollen as it is by the unscrupulous efforts of both factions to secure as many members in their own interest as possible, is far from impressive".
45. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*, The report says "Already illegal postures threatening violence and resistance and calling for opposition to Government in war measures are being distributed". It was believed that these saboteurs were communists.
49. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 11, 1939, Second Half; November, 1939; Punjab. p. 1.
50. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 10, 1939. First Half, October, 1939; Punjab, p. 3.
51. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 11, 1939, Second Half, November, 1939, Punjab, p. 2.
52. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 9, 1939, Second Half, September, 1939, Punjab, p. 1.
- 52a. *The National Front*, July 3, 1938.

- 52b. Glancy wrote to Linlithgow in January 1942 "Sir Chhotu Ram is made of sterner stuff than his leader (Sir Sikander Hayat Khan). He still pursues his ideals persistently and often passionately. But though his outlook is the same as ever, he has been of late more circumspect in his public utterances. He is an effective and hardworking Minister of marked capacity whose instinct is to ride straight at his fences, whatever their dimensions".  
*Linlithgow Coll.*, 91, January 11, 1942, Also cited by Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics : the Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 186.
- 52c. Note of Sir Brayne "The Honourable Sir Chhotu Ram". cited from Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics : The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 228.
53. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 11, 1939, Second Half, November, 1939, Punjab, p. 3.
54. Lala Duni Chand of Ambala to the A.I.C.C. General Secretary (undated). In contrast to this, in another letter to the A.I.C.C. General Secretary, received at A.I.C.C. office on June 8, 1940, he wrote "I have been invited to serve on the Punjab War Board the object of which is to promote conditions that are calculated to win War to maintain internal peace. I am of the opinion that the maintenance of internal peace is the greatest need of the hour. I am a Congress member of Punjab Legislative Assembly and a member of A.I.C.C. I want to know at the earliest, if it is open to me to accept the invitation to serve on the Punjab War Board consistent with my loyalty towards the Congress". He was, however, refused permission to accept the offer—See Letter of Acharya Kriplani, General Secretary, A.I.C.C. to Lala Duni Chand dated June 12, 1940. For details see *Punjab 1939-40, PPCC to AICC Part I* (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi).
55. *Home Political*. F. No. 18, 1, 1940, Second Half, January, 1940, Punjab, p. 1.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
57. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 2, 1940, First Half, February, 1939, Punjab, p. 2.
58. According to the Census Report, 1941, the data of Muslim population towns-wise was as follows : Hissar, 6,335 Male and 4,781 Female. Rohtak, 1,348 Male and 11,649 Female. Karnal 8,664 Male and 7,180 Female. Ambala, 14, 288 Male and 11,625 Female. Ambala Cantt. 14,071 Male and 7,897 Female. For the details of other towns see Census of India, 1941, Vol. VI, Punjab. Table V, pp. 29-39.
59. Out of the 21 members on the Working Committee of Punjab Congress, the group representation was as follows: "Seven belonged to the Akali Party, four to Sardar Sohan Singh Josh, five were party to Dr. Satya Pal, and Shri Ram Sharma "represented his own small party". For details see *Home Political*. F. No. 18, 2, 1940, Second Half, February, 1940, Punjab, p. 1.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 1. The Government Report, however, differed from this assessment of the Congress in Punjab. It said "The Maulana's claim to have achieved unity in the Punjab has not been substantiated. The exclusion of such old stalwarts as Dr. Kitchlew, the retiring president and Lala Duni Chand, M.L.A. from office is causing some bitterness".



61. See 6/1940. Papers brittle, Punjab P.C.C. (1) Inspection Reports of Punjab P.C.C. submitted by R.K.L. Nand Koelyar (2) Urdu Reports, Pamphlets, etc., p. 17.
62. *Home Political*. F. No. 18, 2, 1940, Second Half, February, 1940, Punjab, p. 2.
63. *Ibid.*
64. *The Tribune*, March 31, 1940.
65. *Ibid.*
66. *Home Political*. F. No. 18, 2, 1940, Second Half, February, 1940, Punjab, p. 2.
67. *Ibid.*, Appendix I.
68. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 3, 1940, Second Half, March, 1940, Punjab, p. 6.
69. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 5, 1940, First Half, May, 1940, Punjab Appendix II.
70. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 6, 1940, First Half, June 1940, Punjab, Appendix II-A.
71. *Ibid.*, Second Half, June, 1940, Punjab, p. 1. It said that in the whole of Punjab the arrests between these dates were 84. This also included 5 members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly.
72. *Ibid.*, Appendix II-A.
73. He was a son of Phul Chand Mahajan, Jhajjar, Rohtak. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 7, 1940, First Half, July, 1940, Punjab, Appendix II-A.
74. *Ibid.*, Risala was a son of Tirkka, Jat of Rurki, P.S. Sampla, Rohtak.
75. *Ibid.*, His full name was Krishan Lal Azad. His father's name was Ramji Lal, Jhajjar, Rohtak.
76. *Ibid.*, Gulzara Singh was the son of Albel Singh of Mateur, Ambala.
77. *Ibid.*, Appendices I and II. From Gurgaon one person was arrested and from Rohtak two. However, their names were not reported.
78. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 8, 1940, First Half, August, 1940, Punjab, p. 1. Only one person under Defence of India Rules was arrested from Hissar in August, 1940.
79. *Ibid.*, He was prosecuted under rule 38, D.O.I.R.
80. *Ibid.*, They were prosecuted under rule 34 (6) (G), D.O.R.I.
81. *Ibid.*, Second Half, August, 1940, Punjab, p. 1. He was prosecuted under rule 38, D.O.I.R.
82. *Ibid.*, Appendix II-A. Joti Parshad was the son of Mukandi Lal Khatri of Ambala and was sentenced under rule 90, D.I.I.R.
83. *Ibid.*, Shadi Singh's father was Inder Singh belonging to the Jat Community of village Kallawala District Ambala. He was sentenced under rule 26, D.I.I.R. and was lodged in Ambala District Jail.
84. *Ibid.*, Hazara Singh was a brother of Shadi Singh. He too was sentenced under rule 26, D.I.I.R. and lodged in Ambala District Jail.
85. *Ibid.*, Appendix I.
86. *Ibid.*, F.No. 18, 9, 1940 First Half, September, 1940, Punjab, Appendix I.
87. *Ibid.*, Appendix II.
88. *Ibid.* He belonged to village Mitnauti, P.S. Palwal, Gurgaon. He was arrested under rule 38, D.O.I.R.
89. *Ibid.* He was a son of Dalil Singh and belonged to Pataudi. He was

- sentenced under rule 38, D.O.I.R.
90. *Ibid.* He was sentenced under rule 38, D.O.I.R.
  91. *Ibid.* Second Half, September, 1940, Punjab, p. 1.
  92. *Ibid.* F. No. 18, 10, 1940, First Half, October, 1940 Punjab, Appendices I and II.
  93. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 5, 1940, Second Half, May, 1940, Punjab, p. 1.
  94. *Ibid.*
  95. *Ibid.* F. No. 18, 4, 1940, First Half, April, 1940, Punjab, p. 1.
  96. For details see 6/1940. Papers brittle, Punjab P.C.C. (1) Inspection Reports of Punjab P.C.C. submitted by R.K.L. Nand Koelyar (2) Urdu Reports, Pamphlets, etc.
  97. *Ibid.*
  98. *Ibid.*, Also see *The Tribune*, April 20, 1940.
  99. *Home Political.* F.No. 18, 6, 1940, First Half, June, 1940, Punjab, p. 3.
  100. *The Tribune*, May 26, 1940.
  101. *Home Political.* F.No. 18,6,1940, Second Half, June, 1940, Punjab, p.1.
  102. *Ibid.* p. 2. In Haryana the lead was in the hands of Congress Socialists such as Mange Ram Vats. He was later imprisoned under rule 26, D.O.I.R. and sent to Muzzafargarh Jail.
  103. *Ibid.*
  104. *Ibid.*
  105. *Ibid.*, The report said that orders under rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules were issued for the detention of 84 of the more dangerous, including 5 members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly.
  106. *The Tribune*, June 30, 1940.
  107. *Ibid.*, July 8, 9, 10, 1940.
  108. *Home Political.* F. No. 18,7, 1940 First Half, July, 1940, Punjab. p. 1.
  109. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
  110. *Ibid.*
  111. *The Tribune*, July 13, 1940.
  112. *Home Political.* F.No. 18, 8, 1940, Second Half, August, 1940, Punjab, p. 1.
  113. *Ibid.*, First Half, August, 1940, Punjab, p. 2.
  114. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
  115. *Ibid.*
  116. *Ibid.*, Second Half, August, 1940, Punjab, p. 1.
  117. *Ibid.*
  118. *Ibid.*
  119. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18,9,1940, First Half, September, 1940, Punjab, p. 1. Another Government report of October 1940 quoted Master Tara Singh as saying, "My fundamental difference with Mr. Gandhi is that he wants Swaraj without military power, whereas I hold that there can be no Swaraj without an Army. If I were asked to choose between Swaraj and the Army, I must choose the latter". See *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 10, 1940, First Half, October, 1940, Punjab, p. 2.
  120. *Ibid.*

121. For details see Madan Gopal, *Sir Chhotu Ram: A Political Biography*. Also see Y.P. Bajaj, *Sir Chhotu Ram: His Life and Works* (unpublished thesis, Kurukshetra University) and Prem Chaudhary, "Social Basis of Chaudhary Sir Chhotu Ram's Politics", *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol. X, Part I, 1976.
122. The comments of *The Daily Herald*, *The Milap*, *The Pratap* and *The Tribune* were generally critical of the British Raj. However, the Punjab Press opposed any move of sharpening the struggle through civil disobedience movement.
123. *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1940, Vol. XI, p. 126.
124. *Ibid.*
125. Some of the important riots that took place were in Rohtak, Hissar and Ambala in February, 1940. See *Home Political*. F.No. 18, 2, 1940, Second Half, February, 1940, Punjab, p. 2. Also see *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1940, Vol. XI, p. 28. A communal riots table has been provided from 1937 to 1939. This was done in response to a question started 4788 on January 8, 1940.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 3. The report showed upward trend in the crime picture of Punjab. For instance 90 murders were reported upto the end of January, 1940 as against 85 and 65 for 1939 and 1938. 1382 burglaries were reported in the same period as against 1,277 and 1,251 in 1939 and 1938. The total of all reported crimes exclusive of security cases upto the end of January, 1940 was 4,134 as against 3,883 and 3,779 for 1939 and 1938.
127. On February 23, 1940, 'unauthorizing' of The Haryana Tilak in Punjab was debated in the Assmby. Pt. Shri Ram Sharma read a notice issued by the District Magistrate, Rohtak to a local agent. It said, "It has been reported to me that you are the Agent of Haryana Tilak in Rohtak. The said paper has been declared to be an unauthorized publication within the meaning of Section 2(a)(b) of the Indian Press (Emergency) Powers) Act". The question regarding Haryana Tilak was disallowed by the speaker. See *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1940, Vol. XI, p. 516.
128. The Drills and carrying of arms by volunteer bodies were banned on February 28, 1940 under Defence of India Rules. The order was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (1) of Rule 58 of the Defence of India Rules. See *Home Political*. F. No. 18, 2, 1940. First Half, February, 1940, Punjab, p. 2.
129. *Ibid.* F.No. 18, 8, 1940, Second Half, August, 1940, Punjab, p. 1.
130. *Ibid.* F.No. 18, 9, 1940, First Half, September, 1940, Punjab, p. 2.
131. See *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1940, Vol. XI, 1940, p. 81.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 535.
133. *Ibid.*, p. 536.
134. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
135. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
- 135a. See, Bhagwan Josh, *The Communist Movement in Punjab*, pp. 157-161.
136. *Ibid.*
137. *Ibid.*

### CHAPTER III

## INDIVIDUAL SATYAGRAHA MOVEMENT

Towards the end of September 1940 the pandulam of World War II was swinging from one direction to another. The Fascist victory over continental Europe was complete but it was not final. At the end of December 1941 the main highlights were the fall of France, massive invasion on England and Hitler's adventure against Soviet Union which brought the smoldering conflict to open flame.

The immediate result of these developments was the general impression that the English defeat was imminent. The Congress Socialists, the Forward Bloc saw in the English troubles an opportunity to achieve freedom which England otherwise might have been able to thwart. The communists in India to begin with advocated that the war situation should be exploited to achieve India's independence. However, German attack on Soviet Union transformed the character of the imperialist war into people's war.<sup>1</sup> For Congress the line between Fascism and Imperialism was getting blurred. In a press interview at Lahore on May 24, 1940 Nehru was saying that the gulf between Congress and British Government would be bridged only after the "complete elimination of British imperialism".<sup>2a</sup> Gandhi, however, would not seek India's independence out of Britain's ruin.<sup>1p</sup>

The decision of the Congress to recall Mahatma Gandhi for accepting leadership after the heated controversy on the issue of its attitude towards War and non-violence was the starting point of the Congress resolve to launch a civil disobedience struggle in the form of Individual Satyagraha Movement. This mode of operation resulted from the Gandhian outlook crystallised by the perception of the mounting crisis in existing international politics, national

situation, unity and struggle within the Congress on the War issue and ascending pressure of the Indian left to start a genuine liberation struggle. There were several occasions before this idea was born when the Congress moved in the twilight zone, failing to choose between compromise, and confrontation with the British Raj. Even after the decision was made and during October, 1940 to December, 1941 when this novel experiment of protest was tried, the Congress continued to hope that Government would have no objection to its anti-war propaganda since it was directed against the Allied powers. Calculations were also made to conclude that the British Government would finally seek an honourable settlement and thus all doors for smooth settlement should not be closed by any hasty militant posture as suggested by the Congress Socialist, the Forward Bloc and the Indian Communist Party.

The Individual Satyagraha Movement as a conceptual part of Gandhian struggle was based on non-violence, constructive programme, daily spinning, and Khadi. Gandhi believed that non-violence could be used as an alternate ideological current of world politics. He hoped by this method, to awaken the world conscience. He neither willed to turn his opponents' (British imperialism) hour of crisis into his opportunity, nor he would consent to the doom of Germany,<sup>1</sup> in the Second World War. He, however, maintained his option to judge "between the two combatants and wish success to the one who has justice on his side".<sup>2</sup>

With this in mind he called upon the people throughout the country to refrain from assisting British India's war efforts. The modus operandi was that Satyagrahi would give notice to the District authorities for raising anti-war slogans and would not hinder authorities to arrest them if they so desired.<sup>3</sup> Significantly, he did not make India's freedom the main issue. Instead, he took circuitous road by declaring 'freedom of speech as his main plank.' He said, "I claim the liberty of going through the streets of Bombay and saying that I shall have nothing to do with this war, because I do not believe in this war and in the patricide that is going on in Europe".<sup>4</sup>

The decision to start Satyagraha was thus taken at the Ramgarh session of All-India National Congress. On September 27 and 30, 1940, Gandhi<sup>5</sup> sought interview from the Viceroy which

was refused.<sup>6</sup> By September, 1940, Gandhi had clearly visualised that struggle with the British was inevitable and that sooner or later the people would charter their own course to overthrow the British rule from India. This set him to start Satyagraha Movement on October 17, 1940.<sup>7</sup>

Following the lead from Vinoba Bhave, who was the first to be chosen for Satyagraha, the Congressmen in Haryana showed great enthusiasm to go out in the streets shouting anti-war slogans.<sup>8</sup> These Satyagrahis were selected from eminent Congressmen, mainly the members of A.I.C.C., Provincial Legislature and office-bearers of District Congress Committees. There were other leading members of the party, considered as heavy weights who also joined this movement.<sup>9</sup>

The preparation to inaugurate the movement was taken up with great zeal. The Punjab Congress Secretary invited the Presidents and Secretaries of all District Congress Committees to meet in Lahore on October 21, 1940.<sup>10</sup> In the meeting a detailed discussion took place on the various methods and plans to make a big beginning. It was also decided to despatch Vinoba's speech delivered on October 17, 1940 to assert the right of Congress "to state freely what we feel about the war". Finally, a decision was also taken to issue a circular letter to all subordinate committees with instructions to have it printed and broadcast.<sup>11</sup>

There were also some discordant voices which disagreed with this technique. They argued that the Individual Satyagraha Movement might not infuse sufficient ardour among the people. They felt "that it will take something like a mass civil disobedience movement to turn the tide in favour of the Congress by removing the present apathy."<sup>12</sup> The issues involved in the Satyagraha were considered as narrow and irrelevant.<sup>13</sup> The fear was also expressed that the Satyagraha was waged not for the achievement of Swaraj but for the assertion of Gandhi's faith in non-violence which the Congressmen of Haryana did not share. However, the Congressmen in Haryana by and large were willing to participate in the movement and make it a success.<sup>14</sup> Between October 17, 1940 and November 17, 1940 when the Individual Satyagraha Movement was replaced by representative Satyagraha, many arrests were made in various districts of Haryana. In district Hissar two Satyagrahis were arrested for anti-recruitment and

anti-war subscription speeches. Another civil resister was also arrested for dissuading people from buying war loans and subscribing to war funds.<sup>15</sup> In Gurgaon district also two arrests were made. They were charged for dissuading people from subscribing towards war loans.<sup>16</sup> Syed Muttallabi Sahib Faridabadi, who was a member of the Working Committee of Punjab Congress was also arrested on October 26, 1940. He was arrested in connection with his presidential address at the District Multan Political Conference. The Tribune reported that he will be tried under Defence of India Rules at Khanewal.<sup>17</sup> In other districts it appears that the movement did not start during this period, though one Tara Singh Ambalvi was arrested at Amritsar on November 7, 1940 for an anti-recruitment speech. He originally belonged to Lorahara in district Rohtak.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile Mian Iftikar Uddin toured some districts of Haryana extensively to create enthusiasm for the coming session of the Indian National Congress and to prepare Congressmen to meet the present political crisis. On November 15, 1940 he went to Karnal and later to Sonapat and Rohtak. Pt. Shri Ram Sharma had come down to receive him at Karnal. The Tribune reported that after meeting the workers of Sonapat, Mian Sahib proceeded to Rohtak in the evening of November 15, 1940. In Rohtak the leader of the Congress Municipal Party gave a dinner which was attended by prominent Hindu and Muslim citizens. Mian Iftikar Uddin and Shri Ram Sharma both addressed a public meeting on the next day. They also spoke to the Congress workers of Rohtak.<sup>19</sup> However, his visit aroused little interest and certainly no enthusiasm in Karnal and Rohtak. There were obvious reasons for this which have been outlined elsewhere. As a way out of the situation, Mian Iftikar Uddin, the President of the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee, cancelled his tour on the receipt of further orders from Wardha about the extension of civil disobedience.<sup>20</sup> The Congress High Command invited Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava to Wardha to take stock of the situation in Punjab. He, in turn, met provincial leaders to seek advice about what he was to tell them.<sup>21</sup> Meanwhile Congress celebrated 'Nehru Day' "with meetings which could hardly be termed successful".<sup>22</sup> Bhiwani Congressmen organised a hartal on November 16, 1940 to protest against the arrest of Nehru.<sup>23</sup> On November 18, Mian Iftikar Uddin visited Ambala and addressed a largely attended

public meeting.<sup>24</sup> On the same day Padam Parkash Azad, Secretary of the Congress Socialist Party, Ambala, was arrested by the police under Defence of India Rules.<sup>25</sup> On November 23, 1940 in a meeting of the P.P.C.C. a resolution was moved by Nawabzada Mahmud Ali which reaffirmed Punjab's determination not to submit a policy which suppressed "the true expression of public opinion and which would lead to the degradation of people and their continued enslavement". Further the resolution said:

"Therefore, at this hour of trial and tribulation this meeting of the P.P.C.C. expects and calls upon the Punjab to stand by Mahatma Gandhi and continue the non-violent and peaceful struggle for freedom till it is won and be prepared for suffering and hardships inevitable in a final struggle".<sup>26</sup>

A show of weakness in the Congress organization was apparent throughout the Punjab province. In Haryana this was more particularly in Ambala where "two Sikhs were removed from membership for opposing the Congress candidate in the election to the presidency of the District Board, while one Sikh and one Muslim were turned out for contributing to war funds".<sup>27</sup>

This, in no way, was the solitary example as there was general depression in the Punjab Congress circles. Even a demand was made to the High Command to exempt Punjab from launching the movement as Sind was exempted. The Tribune gave two reasons for such exemption: one, Punjab had to arrange for the next session of the Congress and the removal of leaders would be prejudicial to the success of the session. Two, Punjab was one of the four provinces where the new constitution was still functioning and the Congress party was the most important in a none too strong opposition. If Congress members of the Assembly were arrested, the opposition would become negligible and the Congress interest would suffer irretrievably.<sup>28</sup>

However, this request was not granted. Instead Abul Kalam Azad, the President of All-India Congress, visited Lahore and tried to seek unqualified support from all the Congressmen. He also laid down certain directions to be followed by the Punjab Congress. In his speech he pointed out that "no youths were to be accepted as Satyagrahis as their acceptance might make the



movement disorderly and violent.”

According to the schedule given by him, the Punjab Congress President was to initiate the Satyagraha. Thereafter, all the members of the Congress Assembly Party “would turn back towards the Assembly Chamber and look forward to the Jail gates”.<sup>29</sup> He also warned that in the event of Gandhi’s arrest the responsibility of the Congress would be at an end and the Indian masses would themselves be responsible for carrying on Satyagraha.<sup>30</sup>

The visit of Abul Kalam Azad was followed by the tour of Iftikar Uddin in all major districts of Haryana. His tour was intended to project the Congress views on Satyagraha as against the lukewarm attitude of other parties such as the Akali Party, Hindu Mahasabha and Majlis-i-Ahrar which stood divided on this issue. After concluding his tour he went to his home village of Baghbanpur in Lahore and courted arrest to mark the beginning of Satyagraha.<sup>31</sup> The Punjab thus inaugurated Satyagraha marked by the virility, the dynamism as well as vagueness and generality without clear cut acceptance of non-violence.

The second important Satyagrahi was Dr. Gopichand Bhargava who was not only a front ranker in the Punjab politics but also wielded decisive influence over Haryana Congress. He was arrested on November, 30, 1940.<sup>32</sup> The student activities were reported to be on the increase.<sup>33</sup>

With these two stalwarts in jail, the responsibility to conduct the movement fell on Lala Duni Chand of Ambala who became the interim President of the Congress Committee of Punjab.<sup>34</sup> He further tried to put vigour in the movement with the help of Mahatma Gandhi by clearly defining the conditions necessary for a Satyagrahi. He insisted that a Satyagrahi should necessarily have complete faith in non-violence, constructive programme, daily spinning and wearing of Khadi. He also decided to permit Akalis to join the movement if they vowed that they were opposed to the recruitment to the Army.<sup>35</sup> The district committees were directed to maintain tempo and win over the mass support for Satyagraha.

Mrs. Duni Chand, M.L.A. of Ambala gave notice of her intention to break the law on December 5, 1940 by shouting anti-war slogans in Lahore city. She was detained under Rule 129 of the Defence of India Rules, 36 Gurmukh Singh Ambalvi was also

arrested for anti-war activities.<sup>37</sup> In Karnal district, Hamid Hus-sain courted arrest by delivering anti-war speech and criticizing the recruitment policy followed by the British Government.<sup>38</sup> Pandit Neki Ram Sharma, a Congress leader of great reknown offered himself for Satyagraha at Bhiwani in the Hissar district.<sup>39</sup> His speech stirred the people. The Government was compelled to take account of the feelings of the masses and growing influence of the movement. An official report acknowledged this in a symbolic tone. The Government report said:

“Pandit Neki Ram Sharma created temporary enthusiasm at Bhiwani in the Hissar district by making an objectionable speech and he has since gone to Jail for a year and a half”.<sup>40</sup>

While the movement was picking up, the Sampuran Singh case assumed new proportions.<sup>40a</sup> His statement to Gandhi at Wardha that “no one in Punjab believed in non-violence except as a matter of discipline” distressed Gandhi beyond words. He considered it as a “most serious matter” and advised all those who accepted this view to withdraw from the field.<sup>41</sup> Gandhi also sent Abul Kalam Azad to Punjab on December 27, 1940 “to find out for himself what the Punjab thought of the Congress and the fundamental issue of non-violence”.<sup>42</sup> Reporting on Punjab situation, according to S.L. Malhotra “Azad admitted that after having met about one thousand representatives of the Congress in this province, he was convinced that in the matter of non-violence as indicated in the Bombay resolution, Punjab Congress workers were in no way behind the Congress workers of any other province. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a large number of Congressmen offering Satyagrah did not have full faith in non-violence, for, only a few years earlier they had rejected Gandhi’s recommendation of changing the creed of the Congress from peaceful and legitimate means to truthful and non-violent means. The President of All India Congress himself appears to have diluted the concept of non-violence. In an interview to a journalist in Lahore on 30 December, he denied that absolute non-violence was the creed of the Congress.”<sup>42a</sup> In Haryana region, of course, the Gandhi movement found full expression. The districts of Hissar and Rohtak became the centre of activity. Pandit Shri Ram Sharma carried out a

whirlwind tour of Rohtak before offering himself for arrest at Hissar on January 6, 1941.<sup>43</sup> On January 8, 1941, Lala Sham Lal was arrested at Hissar after giving notice that he intended to break the Law.<sup>44</sup> Choudhari Sahib Ram was sentenced for shouting anti-war slogans at Sadalpur in the Hissar district on January 10, 1941.<sup>45</sup> The Table Nos. I and II give a complete picture of what happened during the first phase.

TABLE I

**The list of persons prosecuted during the first phase of Individual Satyagraha Movement**

	<i>October (Second Half) 1940</i>	<i>November 1940</i>	<i>December 1940</i>	<i>January (First Half) 1941</i>	<i>Total</i>
Hissar	2(38R)=2	—	—	4(38R) =5 1(38R/121)	7
Rohtak	—	—	1(38R)=1	1(38R/121)=1	2
Gurgaon	1(38R)=1	1(38R)=1	—	—	2
Karnal	—	—	1(38R)=1	2(38R) =2	3
Ambala	—	1(38R)=1	—	1(38R/121)=1	2
	3	2	2	9	16

On January 15, 1941, the first phase of Satyagraha in Punjab was declared closed and preparations were made to perfect the second phase which was expected to start from January 27, 1941.<sup>46</sup>

During the first phase, the progress of Satyagraha movement in Haryana was not very impressive. Only 4 Congress members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly from Haryana region offered themselves for arrest. Among the members of All-India Congress Committee from Haryana the figure was 3 out of 4 members. The fourth member, Lala Duni Chand of Ambala, had later resigned the membership of the A.I.C.C. during this Satyagraha movement. Gandhi who had intimate relations with Lala Duni Chand significantly accepted his resignation. In his letter dated July 11, 1941,

he wrote "In the circumstances you mention, I agree you have no option but to give up all the responsible position in the Congress. You deserve rest after 40 years of unbroken service. Put your news on non-violence Satyagraha and we have to tolerate one another's difference of opinion. The incidence mentioned by you, there is no question on unfruitfulness. It is at the bottom of interpretations of your own action".<sup>46a</sup> The figures from the Provincial Congress Committee show further fall in the statistics.

TABLE II

The list of persons convicted during the first phase of Individual Satyagraha Movement

	October (Second Half) 1940	November 1940	December 1940	January (First Half) 1941	Total
Hissar	—	—	2(38R)=2	4(38R) 1(38R/121)=5	7
Rohtak	—	—	—	2(38R/121)=2	2
Gurgaon	—	1 (conviction in Sedition)=1	—	1(38R/121)=1	2
Karnal	—	—	1(38R)=1	—	1
Ambala	—	1(38R)	=1 —	—	1
			2	3	8 13

These figures, however, are encouraging when the data from the Punjab Congress are read in totality. From the whole of Punjab only 13 out of 38 M.L.As. and their allies, courted arrest during the first phase. From Punjab, there were 27 members of the All-India Congress Committee and out of this lot only 9 had been arrested for civil disobedience and the remaining 8 from the total of 17 were arrested for offences other than formal participation in Satyagraha movement. Similarly, 11 out of 21 members of the Provincial Congress Committee had been arrested as Satyagrahis while 6 had been dealt with for other offences.<sup>47</sup>

The disappointing show of strength can be traced to many an

incompatible factors. The one view was that "Individual Satyagraha makes no appeal either to Punjab Congress leaders or to the rank and file". This view finds collaboration from the savoury comments of Pro-Congress papers. The tribune held the view that the Satyagraha was waged not for the achievement of Swaraj but for the assertion of Gandhi's faith in non-violence which the Congressmen of Punjab did not share.<sup>48</sup> The Milap felt that the issue involved in Satyagraha was 'narrow' and 'irrelevant'.<sup>49</sup> As already stated, Sardar Sampuran Singh, who was the third important leader to be arrested, made it clear at the time of arrest that he did not support Gandhi's views on non-violence and that he had resorted to civil disobedience only for the sake of Congress discipline.

The official reports also support this point of view.<sup>50</sup> There is another side of the picture also. The Congress, for all practical purposes, was a badly divided house. The deep animosity and bitterness between Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava and Dr. Satya Pal can be cited as an example. Dr. Satya Pal had his last laugh over the failure of Satyagraha. He threw the whole responsibility of failure on Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava and claimed that if Gandhi entrusted Satyagraha in the Punjab to him, he would make a success of it.<sup>51</sup> Soon after he resigned from Congress. He accused Gandhi of dictatorial ways and challenged the principle behind the individual Satyagraha Movement. The Tribune reported his statement on July 16, 1941 "I have resigned the membership because I have no other alternative. Mahatmaji's formula is get under or get out. If one can't find himself in full agreement with the views of Mahatmaji he cannot be allowed to remain in the fold of the Congress.....Mahatmaji has ordered that whoever differs from the policy and programme enunciated and promulgated by him must not be permitted to remain within the Congress.... Had I not resigned I would have been expelled...."<sup>51a</sup>

Finally, the political climate of Punjab was also responsible for the slow start. The Akali Party, a one-time ally of the Congress, was critical of the non-violence issue. The party openly supported the Sikh recruitment to the Army.<sup>52</sup> The Forward Bloc which was running a parallel civil disobedience movement in early 1940 was clearly lukewarm in extending support to this movement. The Hindu Mahasabha too was equally determined to remain aloof.

Another opposition party, Majlis-i-Ahrar, was divided on this issue. Apart from these political groups, the press was also hostile. The news dailies such as the *Vir Bharat*, the *Pratap* and the *Milap* criticized non-violence and wrote that India's salvation lay in "possessing superior military power". Some of them felt that more publicity should be given to the part that the Indian Army played in the Western Desert offensive.<sup>53</sup> The *Tribune* on November 26, 1940 wrote an editorial, "Representative Satyagraha", and criticized the policy of the Congress party of asking M.L.As. etc. to court arrest. The paper said that this would go against the national interest, and added:

"They will suffer equally grievously and in some cases irretrievably in the provinces in which the constitution is still functioning if all Congress members of the legislatures resort to Satyagraha or even if there is a substantial reduction in their strength or their cumulative ability. Making the fullest allowance for the value of such action as a gesture of protest, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that it would be poor compensation for the positive loss which the constituencies would suffer by the prolonged absence of their representatives from the legislatures".<sup>54</sup>

The Government in Punjab too had many pockets of strongholds spread all over the region. The Zamindara party in Haryana and the Muslim-dominated Unionist party in other parts of the Punjab had bases among peasant proprietors and were sure to roadblock any up-tide in the Congress movement.<sup>54a</sup> The Government had also divided the masses by pursuing the policy in setting the rural classes against the urban people.<sup>55</sup> The Congress attempt to support the agitation against the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act and the Punjab Sales Tax Bill, in the hope to secure support of the privileged section of urban centres, did little to boost its image. An official report over-reacted when it observed:

"The part played in the agitation by rich capitalists, who are likely to be hit hardest by the legislation, leads the general public to suspect the good faith of the opponents of these measures".<sup>56</sup>

Moreover, the Government was quick to take necessary precautionary measures. The circular letter by the Provincial Congress Committee, as reported earlier, was intercepted in the past.<sup>57</sup> The press was also warned to refrain from publishing the speech of Vinoba Bhave delivered on the eve of his arrest.<sup>58</sup> Later on, these restrictions on the press were further increased. The Milap criticized censoring of the news and feared that the cutting down of authentic news might give rise to alarming and dangerous rumours.<sup>59</sup> The British Government, however, turned a deaf ear to such criticism.<sup>60</sup>

However, the Tribune editorial "Satyagraha Sentences" on January 7, 1941 criticized the Punjab Government for the severity and harshness of punishment given to the Satyagrahis in this province. The editorial said:

"The Premier of the Punjab once boasted that his province being a pioneer in the field of constructive endeavour or not may be debatable, but in the severity and harshness of punishment awarded to some of the Satyagrahis, the Premier's boast has without doubt been justified".<sup>61</sup>

The second phase of Satyagraha starting from January 27, 1941 was, however, an improvement over the first phase. From Punjab, the list of 702 volunteers was sent to Gandhi.<sup>62</sup> About 100 of these persons belonged to Haryana district.<sup>63</sup> In January, 1941, one Satyagrahi from Hissar offered for Satyagraha.<sup>64</sup> From Ambala, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a well-known leader of the Congress sent intimation to offer Satyagraha and was convicted for the same.<sup>65</sup> In the month of February, 1941, this number of Satyagrahis recorded appreciable rise. Persons who were prosecuted for political anti-war activities under ordinary Law and Defence of India Rules in Haryana totalled 43. The district-wise figures were: Rohtak 12, Hissar 8, Gurgaon 6, Karnal 8, and Ambala 9. Among those whose names also figured in the list of convicted persons were: from the whole of Haryana 22—district-wise: Rohtak 9, Karnal 8 and Ambala 5.<sup>66</sup> Prominent among these Satyagrahis were Anand Swarup, Haji Khair Muhammad Khan and Badhi Ram from Rohtak, Muhammed Hassan from Karnal, Girdhari Lal Shauq, Pohlhu Bhagat and Muhammed Yasin from

Ambala.<sup>67</sup> In Hissar, the most important leader to be arrested in February, 1941 was Mrs. Sham Lal, wife of Lala Sham Lal, who was a member of Provincial Legislature. These volunteers were convicted for charges such as sending intimation to offer Satyagraha, shouting anti-war slogans, and delivering anti-war speeches. The first week of March symbolized the complete flowering of movement in Haryana. The uptide was noticeable particularly in Hissar. Out of 40 Satyagrahis of Haryana on whom the action was taken, 11 belonged to Hissar, 9 to Rohtak, 9 to Gurgaon, 2 to Karnal and 9 to Ambala. Prominent among these Satyagrahis were Balwant Rai, Murli Manohar, Murli Dhar, Kastura Bai, Mool Chand, Banarsi Dass, Abdul Hamid and Jagdish Prasad. The official figures differentiate between persons prosecuted and persons convicted. For example, the list of persons prosecuted for political or anti-war activities under the ordinary law and Defence of India Rules during the second phase is higher compared to the list of persons who were convicted for political and anti-war offences. This is further explained by the Table Nos. III and IV given below:

TABLE III

**List of persons prosecuted during the Second Phase of Individual Satyagraha Movement**

	<i>January (Second Half)</i>	<i>February</i>	<i>March (First Half)</i>	<i>Total</i>
Hissar	2(38R)= 2	4(38R)= 8 4(39R)	9(38R)=9	19
Karnal	2(38R)= 2	8(38R)= 9 1(38/121R)	3(38R)=3	14
Rohtak	1(38/121R)=1	1(38R) 4(39R)= 12 7(38/121R)	5(38R)=5	18
Ambala	1(38/121R)=1	5(38R)= 7 2(38/121R)	5(38R)=5	13
Gurgaon	nil	6(38R)= 6	2(38R)=2	8
		6	42	24
				72



TABLE IV

**List of persons convicted during the Second Phase of  
Individual Satyagraha Movement**

	<i>January (Second Half)</i>	<i>February</i>	<i>March (First Week)</i>	<i>Total</i>
Hissar	1(38R)= 1	—	11(38R)=11	12
Karnal	—	7(38R)= 8 1(38/121R)	2(38R)= 2	10
Rohtak	—	1(38R)= 9 8(38/121R)	9(38R)= 9	18
Ambala	1(38/121R)=1	1(38R)= 5 4(38/121R)	9(38R)= 9	15
Gurgaon	—	—	9(38R)= 9	9
	2	22	40	64

The tables also explain that the Satyagraha was more marked in Hissar followed closely by Rohtak, Ambala and Karnal. The activities in Gurgaon, however, appeared to be quite weak. The reason behind this phenomenon was the quality of leadership from this district. Hissar and Rohtak had some prominent leaders such as Pt. Neki Ram Sharma, Pt. Shri Ram Sharma, Lala Sham Lal and Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava. In Ambala and Karnal there were leaders like Lala Duni Chand, his wife Mrs. Duni Chand, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Bhagat Ram Shukla and Jagdish Prasad. In Gurgaon, however, the leadership was not so dynamic. The leaders such as Khushi Ram, Chandar Bhan and Abdul Hamid lacked the calibre of Pt. Neki Ram Sharma or for that matter, of Shri Ram Sharma and Duni Chand of Ambala. As such, it is not surprising that compared to other regions of Haryana, Gurgaon trailed behind and showed less enthusiasm in conducting the Satyagraha.

Another point, which needs further explanation is whether the reasons responsible for the weak start of Individual Satyagraha during the first phase were still operative? There is little doubt — that the Congress was still faction-ridden and the non-violence was

at best a matter of tactics and not a matter of faith for most of the leaders of Haryana.<sup>67a</sup> The Press continued to create the impression that the Congress Satyagraha lacked correct directions and often suggested covenants of cooperation and not crusades of conflict with the British imperialism. The Government too was bitter and vindictive.<sup>68</sup> The punishments awarded to the Satyagrahis which ranged from six months imprisonment to 2 years' imprisonment with fine etc. were unfortunate and most deplorable. In addition, coercion in realisation of war funds from Rohtak and other districts was reported. The Tribune observed:

“A number of complaints lodged by villages show that coercion is used by the Patwaris and Lambardars upon the public and they are threatened to face the consequences of arrest in case they failed to subscribe towards the war fund”.<sup>69</sup>

Nevertheless, an impression came to be formed by design that the Government was mild in its reactions and people were cooperative and ever willing to raise funds for war. The Governor visited Rohtak in the beginning of February and was presented a purse of Rs. 1 lac from the district for the Provincial War Fund.<sup>70</sup> He also visited Hissar and received a cheque of Rs. 70,000 for a fighter plane.<sup>71</sup>

The commensurability of relationship of these forces in a way dampened mass support.<sup>72</sup> Thus in spite of the evident improvement in the Satyagraha, saturation in the movement was clearly evident. Not more than 50 per cent of the volunteers whose names were forwarded to Gandhi courted arrest. The pace of the Satyagraha campaign slackened due to the long list of exemptions. The exemption appeals were originally made direct to Mahatma Gandhi, and he had issued orders requiring them to go first of all to the Provincial Congress Committee. These appeals were so numerous that Gandhi's Secretary suggested that it would be convenient and cheaper to send them by railway parcel.<sup>73</sup> The Congressmen seized on every excuse to avoid or postpone their going to Jail. However, if a comparison is made with other regions of Punjab, the Satyagraha in Haryana as a whole was quite satisfactory. Extraordinary increase in exemption appeals occasioned the demonstration of Haryana Congress's capacity to adjust her

stand, even in the face of odd turns in circumstances, with the imperatives of further sharpening the Satyagraha. The Haryana Tilak, a Pro-Congress paper edited by Pt. Shri Ram Sharma continued to feature the Satyagraha movement in a way hardly envisaged in the agreement between the British Government and the press at Delhi.<sup>74</sup>

This paper, particularly in Haryana, had intensified anti-imperialist struggle of the masses and simultaneously gave the Congress leaders new confidence in its demand that the British should grant freedom to the Congress at their earliest.<sup>75</sup> Thanks to its anti-imperialist activity, its editor's prestige grew and its membership increased. The redicalization of masses in Haryana was even accepted in the official reports of the period. One such report said:

“The Punjab is proud of and enthusiastic about the part played by Indian troops in the capture of Karen. This enthusiasm has given a fresh impetus to provincial war efforts and all districts report considerable progress in every kind of activity. The response to the call for civic guards in Karnal and Gurgaon has, however, been disappointing but elsewhere recruitment continued steadily and guard are taking an increasing part in police duties of all kinds”.<sup>76</sup> ■

This ‘temper’ of Haryana increased in the third phase. The new phase started in the second half of March to April 10, 1941. The provincial Congress Committee, which was presided over by Lala Duni Chand of Ambala properly reprimanded exemption seekers and orders were issued to the effect that all the people already required to court arrest and permitted to do so must offer themselves for arrest by April 5, 1941, otherwise their names would be removed from the list. The instructions issued by Provincial Committee further demanded that the Congress members of District Boards, Municipal Committees and other local bodies should resign latest by April 10, 1941. The office bearers of all Congress Committees were also required to sign the Satyagraha pledge and court arrest. The possible recalcitrant members were threatened with disciplinary action and they were to voluntarily resign from their offices,<sup>77</sup> if they did not offer themselves for arrest.

The initiation of the third phase of Individual Satyagraha Movement was preceded by recruitment volunteers. Though the exact number of volunteers from Haryana whose names were approved by Gandhi is not traceable, it appears that the list was fairly long. The district of Rohtak during this phase emerged as a nerve centre of the movement. Between March 16 and 31, 1941, the number of persons prosecuted for delivering anti-war speeches or sending intimation to offer Satyagraha was 35. After Rohtak, Hissar was the poor second with 8 civil resisters during this fortnight. The number of Satyagrahis from Gurgaon and Karnal was 5 each. In Ambala, Satyagraha made little headway. Only one Satyagrahi offered himself for arrest.<sup>78</sup>

In April (between 1 and 10), 1941, the trend of Satyagraha appears to be the same. Rohtak topped with 38 Satyagrahis (out of 124 from entire Punjab) who were prosecuted for political or anti-war activities.<sup>79</sup> The Satyagraha movement also received a great fillip in Ambala district. There were 20 Satyagrahis from this district.<sup>80</sup> The progress of the movement in Hissar was equally satisfactory, as 16 persons courted arrest.<sup>81</sup> Only Gurgaon and Karnal lagged behind with 4 and 3 civil resisters, respectively.<sup>82</sup> During the entire third phase the number of people prosecuted in Haryana region was 135—divided month wise—March '54, April '81. However, the total number of persons convicted during the months of March and April was 47 and 81 respectively, making a grand total of 128 persons on whom action was taken. The Table Nos. V and VI further explain the trend of Satyagraha movement in Haryana districts. As suggested earlier, Tables V and VI amply prove that during the period under review Rohtak became a formidable base of anti-imperialism. The significant increase not only in the number of persons courting arrest but also in the size of audiences attending meetings, created severe headache for the Government officials. An official Report of March, 1941 observed:

“The Hindus of Rohtak, however, provide by far the biggest number of civil resisters during the fortnight—thirtyone out of a total of one hundred and twenty-three according to available figures”.<sup>83</sup>

TABLE V

**List of persons prosecuted during the Third Phase of  
Individual Satyagraha Movement  
(16 March to 15 April, 1941)**

	<i>March</i>		<i>April</i>		<i>Total</i>
Hissar	8(38R)	=8	16(38R)	=16	24
Rohtak	5(38R)	=35	—		
	30(38/121R)		38(38/121R)	=38	73
Gurgaon	5(38R)	=5	3(38R)	= 4	9
			1(38/121R)		
Karnal	5(38R)	=5	3(38R)	= 3	8
Ambala	—		2(38R)	=20	21
	1(38/121R)	=1	18(38/121R)		
		54		81	135

TABLE VI

**List of persons convicted during the Third Phase of  
Individual Satyagraha Movement  
(16 March to 15 April, 1941)**

	<i>March</i>		<i>April</i>		<i>Total</i>
Hissar	7(38R)	= 7	17(38R)	=17	24
Rohtak	—		—		
	30(38/121R)	=30	40(38/121R)	=40	70
Gurgaon	5(38R)	= 5	3(30R)	= 3	8
Karnal	5(38R)	= 5	5(35R)	= 5	10
Ambala	—	—	16(38/121R)	=16	16
		47		81	128

Compared to the figures of Punjab Satyagrahis, available through official reports and Congress records, it appears that Haryana region claimed the top honours. The total number of

civil resisters from Punjab during this phase was 247. Haryana alone provide 135 Congressmen, i.e. more than 60 per cent Satyagrahis came from this region.<sup>84</sup> This position must have been noted by the Congress High Command. The visit of Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur, one of Gandhi's Secretaries, to Punjab and her address to the Congressmen of Punjab was meant to administer a strong rebuke.<sup>85</sup> She had also written on Congress performance in Punjab before she came to Punjab on her 'private' visit. She felt that Gandhi was sore at heart about the Punjab and would like stopping Satyagraha there.

While addressing Presidents and Secretaries of District Congress Committees and other workers on April 10, 1941, she explained what the Satyagraha movement really meant and how it was to be carried on.<sup>86</sup> However, she was rudely shocked when she was told in this meeting that ninety per cent of the Congressmen in the Punjab had no faith in the efficacy of the Charka and Mian Iftikhar Uddin had told them to fulfil in their pledges whether they believed fully in it or not.<sup>87</sup>

Reference in her speech to the Congress Socialists having taken cover under Congress in this Satyagraha, was a deliberate hint to warn the Congress about the 'considerable activity' of the Socialist Controlled Kisan Committees which were quite anxious to see the campaign "spread and become mass movement". This influence was well marked in Haryana region. The influence of Mange Ram Vats, particularly in Rohtak and Hissar, who had been dispatched to Deoli Camp cannot be minimized. The imperialist lie in seeking communist 'Tarzan Horse' everywhere was also evident in the C.I.D. reports on Kisan Committees. A Government report said:—

"Kisan committees continue to display considerable activity. They are concerned in the civil disobedience campaign only in as far as it tends to create disturbance and unrest in which communist principles are more likely to flourish".<sup>88</sup>

The contradiction and cracks in the ideological framework of Individual Satyagraha Movement in Punjab, no doubt worried the Congress High Command, but it at the same time, brought into limelight the fact that Gandhi's views were still suspect among the

rank and file of the Congressmen. Even the leaders who were expected to support and appreciate Gandhi better were fighting battles half-heartedly, thus in effect trying to paralyse the movement and splitting the enthusiasm of the people. There was much truth in what an official report had to say while quoting some reliable Congress sources. The Report said:—

“The hesitant Satyagrahi points out that Gandhi wants quality and not quantity and that the quality represented by members of the Legislature, district Boards and Municipal Committees, advocates and doctors has not yet come forward. They explain too that ordinary Satyagrahis are treated as C class prisoners and receive no help or attention from the Congress once they go to jail, while leaders are placed in a higher class and their families are looked after well. Disparity of treatment by the Congress itself as revealed by the petitions by the High Court Bar Association as *amicus curiae* in some cases has created great resentment among the rank and file of Congressmen”.<sup>89</sup>

Consequently the Congress, not withstanding the mass enthusiasm, only distinguished itself as a party completely exhausted due to its own internal contradictions. The enthusiasm in Haryana did not stop the credibility gap. The efforts to deepen the movement in the fourth phase only accelerated the crisis and heightened its antagonism beyond any reprieve.

The end of the third phase marked the beginning of the fourth and final phase. The period of this phase covers the entire span from April 16 to December 31, 1941. This phase can be divided into two parts. The first, between April 10 and May 31st, 1941, and the second would embrace the remaining time up to December 31, 1941.

During the second half of April and May, 1941, the Satyagraha wave rose still higher in Haryana, though the reverse was true in other regions of Punjab. This was so, in spite of the fact that the agitation against the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act and the Punjab General Sales Tax Act was in ascendency and many Congressmen wanted to be exempted from Satyagraha so that they might freely take part in this agitation.<sup>90</sup>

In April, 100 persons were prosecuted on usual charges under Defence of India Rules. District-wise the position was as follows: Hissar 17, Rohtak 53, Gurgaon 5, Karnal 7, and Ambala 18. Out of these, only 92 were convicted for political and anti-war offences under Rule 38 and Rule 38/121 of Defence of India Act. Among these 14 belonged to Hissar, 52 to Rohtak, 2 to Gurgaon, 6 to Karnal and 18 to Ambala.<sup>91</sup> In May, the total number of Satyagrahis was 84, thus recording a significant fall in the numbers of civil resisters. In Hissar, 19 persons were prosecuted. Rohtak once again led other districts of Haryana. From this district, the number of persons courting arrest was 45. The figures of other districts were: Gurgaon 1, Karnal 3, and Ambala 16. The total figure of persons convicted during this month was once again 84. District-wise this figure stood as follows: Hissar 19, Rohtak 44, Gurgaon 2, Karnal 3, and Ambala 16. Thus the difference in figures between persons prosecuted and persons convicted only related to Rohtak and Gurgaon.<sup>92</sup> This is further explained with the help of Table Nos. VII and VIII. From the Table Nos. VII and VIII, it is evident that during this period 184 persons were prosecuted though the total number of the persons convicted is only 178. As shown in the Table No. VII, 56 persons were

TABLE VII

**The list of the persons prosecuted during the fourth phase  
(Division I) of Individual Satyagraha Movement**

	<i>April (Second Half)</i>		<i>May</i>		<i>Total</i>
Hissar	17 (38R)	=17	19 (38R)	=19	36
Rohtak	—		12 (38R)		
	53 (38/121R)	=53	33 (38/121R)	=45	98
Gurgaon	5 (38R)	= 5	1 (38R)	= 1	6
Karnal	1 (38R)		1 (38R)		
	6 (38/121R)	= 7	2 (38/121R)	= 3	10
Ambala	—		—		
	18 (38/121R)	=18	16 (38/121R)	=16	34
		100		84	184



TABLE VIII

**List of persons convicted during the fourth phase (Division I)  
of Individual Satyagraha Movement**

	<i>April (Second Half)</i>		<i>May</i>		<i>Total</i>
Hissar	19 (38R)	=19	2 (38R) 2 (39R)	=4	23
Rohtak	14 (38R) 30 (30/121R)	=44	— 52 (38/121R)	=52	96
Gurgaon	2 (38R)	= 2	14 (38R)	=14	16
Karnal	1 (38R) 2 (38/121R)	= 3	2 (38R) 4 (38/121R)	= 6	9
Ambala	3 (38R) 13 (38/128R)	=16	— 18 (38/121R)	=18	34
			84	94	178

prosecuted under Rule 38 of Defence of India Rules. The remaining i.e. 128 were booked under Rule 38/121 of the same Act. According to Table VIII, 57 persons were convicted under Rule 38, 119 under Rule 38/121 and, 2 under Rule 39 of Defence of India Act.

To have an overall view during this period, some other developments influencing Satyagraha directly or indirectly must also be taken into consideration. For instance, the agitation against the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act and The Punjab General Sales Tax Act was showing no sign of slackening. The social milieu of this agitation being petty shop-keepers and small businessmen, it was bound to cut substantially the volunteers for the Congress movement. This obviously caused worry and created obstacles in the smooth functioning of the Satyagraha programme in the entire region. The Congress party looked helplessly on this unfortunate situation. The party was badly rewarded after some in its rank and file sought permission to join this agitation. This factor, not only harmed the material interests of the Congress party but even the social bases which were to ensure the effectuation of these interests were questioned by the

leaders of the Unionist party. From the point of view of social demands of the Congress, the rural point was weakened and a petty bourgeoisie turn was given to it by its opponents. This enfeebled the Congress party's nationalist thrust and much-desired hold on the rural population.

A significant turn in the group rivalry within the Congress was another new dimension which needs some elaboration. Mian Iftikhar Uddin, after the completion of his reduced sentence, returned to the Congress politics and became a focal-point of this rivalry. One point that his release raised was whether he was to resume the presidentship or allow Lala Duni Chand of Ambala, who took over when he went to jail, to carry on. Though it had been decided that he was to become President again, yet the abrupt way in which this was done caused great offence to Lala Duni Chand.<sup>93</sup> The Congressmen were also intrigued over the manner Mian Iftikhar Uddin was behaving. They complained to Gandhi against him. This related to his request for a radio-set and the demand for special food when he was in jail. His open criticism of the non-violent creed of Mahatma Gandhi, his failure to do the daily allotted spinning task and his avoidance of other Satyagrahis in jail became the subject of intense controversy.<sup>94</sup> He was also taken to task for acquiescing in the petition filed on his behalf by the High Court Bar Association as *amicus curiae* in the High Court.<sup>95</sup> It was believed in the Congress circles that the powerful group of Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava was all out to discredit him in the eyes of Mahatma Gandhi.<sup>96</sup> The position appeared to be explosive and the morale of Congress was thus completely shaken.

The British responses were equally unproductive. Turning a deaf ear to the Indian demands, the Government sharpened antagonism and left itself with incurable barrenness. The British response as reflected in the statement of the Secretary of State on the situation in Punjab served to create adverse results. Reporting this statement the Tribune wrote editorially:

“The Punjab has self-government. This is what the Secretary of State for India told the members of the House of Commons. Questioned as to whether the remarkable willingness of the population of the Punjab to come forward to serve

the throne "was not" a good reason to give the people self-government', Mr. Amery said, "The Punjab has self-government." We are not told whether Mr. Amery's reply was accepted by the House or whether it was challenged by any one. But Mr. Amery must have been laughing in his sleeves when he made that statement, for no one knows better than he does that the statement is wholly incorrect".<sup>97</sup>

Similarly, the judgment of Mr. Justice Bhide and Mr. Justice Skemp of the Punjab High Court had melodramatic impact on the legitimacy of arrests during the entire Satyagraha movement. The British action taken in order to preserve its colonial stance stood condemned, thus tearing up the legal roots of British imperialism. The Justice Bhide High Court ruling said:

"The giving of notice to the District Magistrate of intention to take part in civil disobedience did not constitute an act preparatory to a contravention of the provisions of the Defence of India Rules and was therefore not punishable under rule 121".<sup>98</sup>

Mr. Justice Skemp had agreed with this view and acquitted a Satyagrahi on the same grounds.<sup>99</sup> The Government of Punjab was naturally puzzled. It hastened to remove the lacunae and decided the release of all persons who were convicted for merely giving notice of intention to contravene the rules. It further withdrew pending cases under rule 121 and District Officers were instructed not to make use of rule 121 in this connection.<sup>100</sup> The Government, however, felt that these judgements were "unfortunate at this stage when interest in the movement is waning."<sup>101</sup>

However, the strengthening of the ranks of Satyagrahis by the release of a large number of prisoners as a result of the High Court judgements did little in reviving Satyagraha even in Haryana, which compared to other regions of Punjab, had given better account of itself. The official reports mention complete demoralisation in the Congress circles. Referring to Satyagrahis of Punjab, an official report said:

"Persons on the approved list continue to ask for exemption;

all defaulters have been called upon to fulfil their pledge, but many have not even replied to the enquiries of the committees about their failure to court arrest. A few civil disobedience prisoners applied for release on parole on various grounds, such as their own illness or the illness or death of their relatives. Government not wishing to release prisoners like this on parole freed them altogether. Other prisoners, who heard of this, quickly put in similar applications and the growing number of these applications shows how eager Punjab Congressmen are to get out of jail. There is yet no sign of any desire on the part of these released to take any further share in civil disobedience".<sup>102</sup>

A new stage in the Satyagraha began from June, 1941 and continued till the Individual Satyagraha was declared officially closed, i.e. December 1941. During this period, the movement appeared to be in a jerking state. The period witnessed the widening of credibility gap within the Haryana Congress. The communal nightmare pushed the movement into a phase of deadlock. While the Satyagraha 'fever' quickened, the British ruling circles retained their confidence in making the Punjab Government cooperate to help imperialism preserve their political position. Without reflecting any basic change in the past attitude, the reaction of the Punjab press towards Satyagraha indicated some improvement. Critical approaches to Gandhi's views on non-violence and suitability of time factor for Satyagraha involved complaints, insinuation and retorts but hardly any condemnation by the press.<sup>103</sup>

Sensing the declining graph of the movement, Mian Iftikhar Uddin toured some districts of Haryana region. Apparently this tour was meant to work for the communal unity but in fact it was undertaken to revive interest in the Individual Satyagraha Movement.<sup>104</sup> A report of the press that Satyagraha movement had been suspended in the Punjab was denied by Mian Iftikhar Uddin. He explained the slow pace of the movement as temporary and due to the fact that Mahatma Gandhi had not approved of more lists of Satyagrahis.<sup>105</sup> Meanwhile, the released Satyagrahis, as a result of the High Court Judgement, were invited to tour the region and make speeches, "ostensively in favour of communal

unity but actually designed to hinder the war efforts and impede recruitment more effectively".<sup>106</sup> Similarly, Congress members of District Committees and other local bodies were called upon again to submit their resignations to the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee by June 20, 1941, so that they might be sent on the Government.<sup>107</sup> There was added emphasis on the strictness of party discipline and on the veneration of Gandhi's personality and political acumen.<sup>108</sup> Hereafter, the Satyagrahis were required not to make speeches at meetings while courting arrest but should only shout anti-war slogans.<sup>109</sup> Recognising the sluggish pace of Satyagraha in this region Mahatma Gandhi issued instructions in July, 1941 to the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee not to insist on signing the Satyagraha pledge from the members of the local bodies elected on the Congress ticket, but only demand resignation from those bodies with immediate effect.<sup>110</sup> Gandhi's intervention appeared to have been designed to keep the movement alive and kicking, so that the movement might not suffer a premature death, and the demand for any form of mass Satyagraha movement during the war might not gain momentum.

The tepid nature of the movement in Haryana district brought some scepticism particularly during June and July, 1941. In June Rohtak provided only one person who was prosecuted for anti-war activities. The figures of persons prosecuted in other districts were equally disappointing. They were: Hissar 5, Karnal 2, Ambala 1.<sup>111</sup> The persons convicted in connection with Satyagraha were: Hissar 2, Rohtak 1, Karnal 1 and Ambala 3.<sup>112</sup> In July too the Satyagraha was soft pedalled. Ambala headed the Satyagrahis prosecuted with the figure of 4, followed by Hissar and Gurgaon with 3 and 1 respectively. The number of those who were convicted under civil disobedience in various districts were: Ambala 9, Hissar 2 and Karnal 1.<sup>113</sup>

Irrespective of the set-back caused to the movement during June and July, Haryana Congressmen still hoped to regroup and show something generic in character. This was fully expressed in August. It was not so much because the Haryana Congress was changing her outlook as because the hardcore Congressmen released after the High Court Judgement were willing to play the game under rule and not flout Congress discipline. Reporting the

progress of Satyagraha during the first half of August, 1941, an official report said:—

“Whether considered quantitatively or qualitatively, the response to the instructions issued by the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee for the revival of Satyagraha in the Second half of July proved extremely disappointing to its promoters. Out of 873 previously approved and 340 recently released Satyagrahis only 54 and 37, respectively, courted arrest, and of these 70 came from two districts in the East of the Province.... None of the persons arrested was of any particular political or social importance. The “campaign” continued into August and in the first week 70 arrests were made again mostly in the same two districts in the East of the Province, but the number of cases reported in the second week of the month fell to 7”.<sup>114</sup>

The reference of two district in the East was Rohtak and Ambala. The district-wise figures of persons prosecuted for political or anti-war activities between August 1 and 15, 1941 were: Rohtak 52, Ambala 16 and Gurgaon 1. All of these Satyagrahis were held under Rule 38, Defence of India Rules. The number of people convicted was, however, less compared with that of the persons who were prosecuted. The breakup was: Rohtak 40, Ambala 17 and Gurgaon 1.<sup>115</sup> During the other half of August i.e. between August 16 and 31, 1941, the figures of Satyagrahis dwindled and had a vertical fall. Only in Ambala 2 persons were prosecuted under Rule 38 of the Defence of India Rules. The list of the convicted Satyagrahis, however, showed improvement. The statement of persons convicted for political or anti-war offences was: Rohtak 12, Ambala 3 and Gurgaon 1.<sup>116</sup>

Thus, the first week of August saw the strengthening of Satyagraha. Afterwards, anti-imperialism was at best effervescent. The Congressmen, though resentful, were mute and the movement in Haryana was to all intent quiescent.

There had been practically no Congress activity during September, 1941. Only a few unimportant meetings were held and arrests for Satyagraha fell to 7. The district-wise figures were: Hissar 1, Rohtak 4 and Ambala 2. The statement of persons

convicted for political and anti-war offences under Rule 38 of the Defence of India Rules was only 6. The district-wise division was: Hissar 3, Rohtak 1 and Ambala 2.<sup>147</sup>

During October, 1941, the picture of the Satyagraha in no way improved. It was only struggling to survive. The leaders did try to pull the Congress up by the boot-straps but they failed. There were no arrests of Satyagrahis in the first week of October. The Congress was short of funds and Satyagrahis designate were reluctant to go to jail unless shown the way by their leaders. Dr. Satya Pal's refusal to withdraw his resignation from the Congress on the grounds that the Congress party had no policy and should either launch a mass agitation against the Government or cooperate with it during the war, further sapped the will of Congressmen in Haryana.<sup>148</sup> The Congress remained in wilderness with little to contribute in the form of Satyagraha. The total number of Satyagrahis during this month was 8. Out of them Rohtak provided 3, Gurgaon 3 and Ambala 2.<sup>149</sup>

The Satyagraha was practically a dead letter during November and December, 1941. Gandhi who was still convinced of this programme announced his intention to continue Individual Satyagraha Movement. However, for Haryana the movement was a dead weight round her neck. The self-esteem of the Congress was completely shattered. The security prisoners' hunger strike at Deoli attracted considerably less attention than might have been expected. The rumours of the impending release of Satyagrahis and the reported agreement between Gandhi and the British Government to reconsider the present policy of the Congress took the wind out of its sails and the pace of movement was without deep interest. This is fully explained by the figures of arrests during these months. In November only 3 persons were prosecuted. Among them, 2 belonged to Hissar and 1 to Rohtak.<sup>150</sup> In December this figure fell to only 2, both from Karnal.<sup>151</sup>

When all is said and done, a review of the fourth phase would reveal that the movement saw itself condemned in its unavailing efforts to maintain consistent pace throughout the period of about 7 months. By December, 1941 the hour-hand of the clock gave the signal for its complete disintegration. The temporary enthusiasm in August, 1941 did generate a political temperature, but soon after the movement again decomposed and suffered complete

set-back as is indicated in Table Nos. IX and X. (see the next page).

The miscarriage of the movement between June and December, 1941 was due to a peculiar combination of heterogenous social circumstances. The Congress had not done well due to its own timidity, dissension and lack of faith in Gandhian pacifism. The absence of real conviction among Congressmen and a reluctance to go to jail for a cause, the correctness of which they doubted, had resulted in an almost total collapse of the Individual Satyagraha Movement. The petty squabbles for control over the party between Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava, Mian Iftikhar Uddin and Dr. Satya Pal, who later resigned, uncovered the head of the monster who throughout the period chanted scriptures for the Congress unity and reverence to Gandhi and his ideology.<sup>122</sup> The Congress was divided on the issue of classification of Satyagrahis in the jail. The order issued for some released Satyagrahis under the High Court Judgement to refrain from offering civil disobedience, as their services were required for the communal unity campaign, was misconstrued as an attempt to shield leaders from jail going.<sup>123</sup> A number of '*amicus curiae*' petitions for leaders in the Congress, in spite of Gandhi's public criticism against the same, caused unpleasantness. The political prisoners continued to complain bitterly of their neglect by the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee. The Satyagrahis designate appointed to take charge of the District Congress Committees were unwilling to go to jail.<sup>124</sup> By December 3, 1941, the Congress members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly openly sent a deputation of Wardha to try and persuade Gandhi to reconsider his decision for the boycott of legislature though they were rebuffed.<sup>125</sup> Thus Haryana Congress could not take a step forward and failed to tear up the material roots of imperialism as the objective conditions in the Punjab Congress and the behaviour of their leaders stood in their way. The Haryana Congress leaders too belonged for the most part to this group of malleable leaders who would prefer to talk fire but never renounce their Lazzaroni Character.<sup>126</sup>

There were other factors also which operated to weaken the movement. The new developments in communal disharmony<sup>127</sup> created exaggerated fears between the Muslims and Hindus. An official report said:



TABLE IX  
The list of persons prosecuted during the Fourth Phase (Division II)  
of Individual Satyagrah Movement

	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
Hissar	5(38 R)=5	3(38 R)=3	—	1(38R)=1	—	2(38R)=2	—	11
Rohatak	1(38 R)=1	—	52(38R)=52	4(38R)=4	3(38R)=3	1(38R)=1	—	61
Gurgaon	—	1(38 R)=1	1(38R)=1	—	2(38R)=2	—	—	4
Karnal	2(38 R)=2	—	—	—	—	—	2(38R)=2	4
Ambala	1(38 R)=1	3(38 R)=4	18(38R)=18	2(38R)=2	2(38R)=2	—	—	27
		1(108 Cr.P.C.)						
	9	8	71	7	7	3		2 107

TABLE X  
The List of persons convicted during the Fourth Phase (Division II)  
of Individual Satyagraha Movement

	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
Hissar	3(38 R)=3	2(38R)=2	—	2(38R)=3 1(39R)	3(38R)=3	2(38R)=2	2(38R)=2	15
Rohtak	2(38 R)=2	—	52(38R)=52	1(38R)=1	3(38R)=3	—	—	58
Gurgaon	—	—	2(38R)= 2	—	1(38R)=1	1(38R)=1	1(38R)=1	5
Karnal	1(38 R)=1	1(38R)=1	—	—	—	—	2(38R)=2	4
Ambala	1(38 R)=1	9(38R)=9	19(38R)=21	2(38R)=2	2(38R)=2	—	—	35
			1(C.L.A. Act)					
			1(38R)					
	7	12	75	6	9	3	5	117

“Gandhi’s faith in the unpractical policy of Satyagraha is intensifying misgiving among Hindus who are beginning to look to the Mahasabha rather than to Congress for support against the growing power and increasingly communal outlook of the Muslim League”.

Referring to the conversion to Sikhism in U.P. and its baneful effect on the Hindu-Sikh relations in Punjab, the report added:

“In the present state of communal mistrust in the province communal organisations are diverting attention from Congress which is regarded as a body devoid of political initiative and power to promote communal unity”.<sup>128</sup>

A large section of people, generally petty traders and conservative Hindus, were willing to extend support to the Congress against the Unionist Party,<sup>129</sup> but they had little faith in Satyagraha. Left to themselves, they would like to see Congress Party return to the Legislative Assembly if only to act as a brake on the alleged pro-agriculture and pro-Muslim policy of the Unionist Party.<sup>130</sup>

Similarly, there was one section of the Congress, that was greatly disturbed over Germany’s invasion of Soviet Russia and felt that cooperation in the war was as much in her own interest as in Britain’s. They were, therefore, willing to reconsider the wisdom of the Congress attitude of non-cooperation. In this connection the resignation from the Congress by Dr. Satya Pal and his application for employment with the Indian Medical Services, can be cited as a case prophesying the beginning of a new look at the realities of war.<sup>131</sup>

Finally, the nationalist press was also not sympathetic to the Congress movement. *The Tribune*, and, *The Milap* had repeated their assertions that the civil disobedience campaign at least in the form conceived by Gandhi, is likely to achieve nothing and should be terminated.<sup>132</sup> These papers, however, expressed sympathy with the resolve of traders to resort to another strike and had also expressed sympathy for the Deoli detenus in connection with their hunger-strike.<sup>133</sup> In November, 1941, rumours were afloat on the impending release of Satyagrahis. Reporting this the

Tribunc had observed that such a gesture on the part of the Government would in itself be insufficient to resolve the political deadlock.<sup>134</sup>

Meanwhile, the Unionist party Government showed more confidence. In June, 1941, Hissar district provided funds for its fourth fighter plane.<sup>135</sup> The District Committee and other organizations engaged in the collections of funds were henceforth asked to arrange for the allotment of more funds for defence loans and war charities rather than for the purchase of war weapons.<sup>136</sup> An action was taken on the *Gram Sevak*, a Hindi fortnightly of Hissar. The fortnightly was asked to deposit security of Rs. 500 on August 26, 1941 under Section 7(3) of Act XXIII of 1941. The reason for action was the publication of an article headed "Bhakra Dam Andolan Ko Nasht Karne Ke Upaya, Hissar Ke Nehri Gawon par Naya Sankat".<sup>137</sup>

A review of the movement will help us to identify some of the salient features which were operating within the framework of this Satyagraha. Between October 17 and November 20, 1940, though certain arrests were made, yet the Congress High Command had not unlocked the door and Satyagraha had not been formally inaugurated. On November 21, 1940, the first phase began. The determination of the Congress party men became immediately obvious in the number of leading Congressmen from Haryana districts courting arrest. The political temperature had risen and the Congress appeared fully committed to a particular course of action. During the second phase and the third phase, the Satyagraha attained its fulfilment. Hundreds of people courted arrest though most of them had no political or social status. There was no lumbering in the movement. The Congress was active in an anti-imperialist campaign. On the ground of anti-imperialism the Congressmen in Haryana identified themselves with the Gandhian movement. The exciting finale of Satyagraha in Haryana districts in comparison to other regions of Punjab could also be looked upon as a personal triumph of the leaders in Haryana, particularly for Lala Duni Chand, who also presided over the Congress during this period. The districts, of Rohtak and Hissar were able to play a leading part because Pt. Neki Ram Sharma and Pt. Shri Ram Sharma had prepared the people in the Congress for this role. By arousing deep emotions and clarifying the nature of the war, they

were able to sustain a large consensus in favour of the present struggle. In the fourth and final phase, there was more talking against each other rather than waging a concrete struggle. Except in the first week of August, the ebbing tide of the Satyagraha Movement led to a rapid decrease in the activity of the political forces engaged in this campaign. The stabilization of an anti-imperialist stance of the Congress in Haryana could not be durable because it was taking place under the objective and subjective preconditions developed by complex and contradictory ways.

Thus the movement begun with such fan fare ended in ignominy. It is arguable whether Satyagraha could not have been declared closed, say by August, 1941 in Haryana and Punjab. The objective conditions in this region warranted a reappraisal of diverse forces such as the Congress morale, ideological convictions of the rank and file, and the strength of forces against the Congress. Surprisingly the movement was made to drag on for a pretty long time on artificial heart transplantation. The struggle against imperialism weakened due to ideological deformations and mistakes of opportunism. The disruptive activities of some of the leaders further deepened the split among the Congressmen in this region. The grim shadow of crisis was evident from the very beginning as the leaders and the rank and file in the Congress Party had little faith in Gandhian non-violence and his strategy. It was not very long before these prognostications came true and dealt shattering blows to the Satyagraha movement. Moreover, the strength of forces arrayed against the Congress was constantly enriched by the support given by peasant-proprietors to their leader, Sir Chhotu Ram. The Unionist Party rivetted the attention of the people to the fact that anti-imperialism was no panacea and their best interest would be served only if they joined its bandwagon. Commenting on the Rawalpindi speech of Sir Chhotu Ram and his concern for the poor, the Tribune in its editorial on November 21, 1940, said:

“But the truth will gradually travel to the remotest corners of the Punjab and everybody will learn that Sir Chhotu Ram and his friends have created castes of privileged men and ensured the protection of their vested interests by manipulations in the Legislature. It is not the poor tillers of the soil and workers

in factories but men belonging to his caste or that in certain cases rolling in wealth—to whom a comfortable and undisturbed life has been promised”.<sup>138</sup>

After citing certain Agrarian Acts initiated by him through the Unionist Party, the paper said:

“After having created such a situation it is possible only for an irresponsible person like Sir Chhotu Ram to claim that he should be treated as the greatest friend of the poor in the Punjab”.<sup>139</sup>

Sir Chhotu Ram's hold over small peasants increased. His tours in the region of Haryana became very popular. Thousands used to assemble to welcome and listen to him. Analysing the role of Sir Chhotu Ram in the Agrarian legislation in Punjab, Prem Chowdhary comments, “Hailed as the Champion of the downtrodden and the have-nots” Chhotu Ram was considered, even by some of the Congressmen, to be “genuine” in upholding the cause of small Landowners. When Chhotu Ram spoke of benefiting the “small Landowners” by the agrarian Legislation he was not entirely incorrect. This was partly because of the widely differing patterns of landholdings in Punjab. The big landowner of Rohtak district and indeed that of south eastern Punjab, was a “petty Landowner” of western Punjab where Landholdings were far larger than the “big Landholdings” of Haryana region. Chhotu Ram alone, among the “aristocratic sort of “unionist party, emerged as the representative of wider interest”.<sup>140</sup>

In spite of if the magnitude of Satyagraha movement and the mass support extended to it in Rohtak and Hissar districts was a matter of great satisfaction. To what extent this phenomenon sent jitters into Sir Chhotu Ram, whose political base emanated from Rohtak district, can be guessed by anybody. Apparently the position of Sir Chhotu Ram, a minister and a front ranker of the Unionist Party, was greatly compromised. Sir Chhotu Ram had striven particularly after 1921 Non-cooperation Movement to direct the peasants' dissatisfaction against the Congress in alliance with Unionist Muslim politicians of the Punjab and British Government. His politics in actual terms sought to prevent the

anti-feudal struggle from developing along revolutionary lines. Relying on the support of some agricultural communities in Haryana villages, among whom his prestige was the highest, he endeavoured to undermine anti-imperialist stance of the rural population. Thus the success of Satyagraha from these areas, to say the least, was a set-back to his great prestige which he enjoyed not only in Haryana but in the whole of Punjab.

It has been claimed that after 1937 elections and between 1938 and 1940, Sir Chhotu Ram became the guiding spirit of Jat Community in Rohtak<sup>141</sup>. The Congress heavily lost the jat support. The Jat participation in Congress anti-imperialist movement became negligible. Only 'Majdoor' Jats were left in Congress.<sup>142</sup> This line of arguments can be challenged if a detailed analysis is made of Satyagrahis social bases who went to jail from Rohtak district in Individual Satyagrah Movement. Out of 217 Satyagrahis who courted arrest in 1940-41, 124 were Jats. Tehsil-wise the position was Sonapat 56, Gohana 25, Rohtak 21 and Jhajjar 32. Though the top leadership of the Rohtak district was in the hands of non-jats, there were stalwards such as Ch. Bharat Singh, Ch. Badlu Ram, Ch. Ranvir Singh, Ch. Ram Singh Jakhar, Ch. Mehar Singh Dangi, Ch. Charan Singh (brother of Ch. Lahri Singh), Ch. Chandgi Ram and Mahant Chandra Nath who led the Jat community on the path of struggle for freedom.<sup>143</sup> In district Hissar Ch. Sahib Ram and Ch. Devi Lal were active leaders of Congress.<sup>144</sup>

The interviews with leading Freedom fighters of Haryana has further revealed that out of the total Satyagrahis during the entire period of individual Satyagraha Movement in Haryana a large majority of them belonged to villages. Among the town dwellers the petty shop-keepers, doctors, businessmen and teachers played leading roles. From the list of villagers, who fought against the British under the Congress label, the majority belonged to the peasant—proprietors-though many of these farmers. Like the urban Satyagrahis did not enjoy a sound economic position. Another point which needs elaboration is that the percentage of rural participation in this movement would prove that a great majority of them had not shied away from this anti-imperialist protest particularly in Rohtak district. However, the same logic can not be applied for other districts of Haryana in which a

majority of Satyagrahis belonged to towns having middle class origins.

If we try to analyse these Satyagrahis in terms of religion and make a communal graph of these civil-resisters, it becomes quite clear that most of them were Hindus. Only a very few were Muslims and Sikhs. Thus the picture becomes all the more clear if we say that the movement largely remained confined to the middle class, which was the most articulate section of the people during 1940's.

In short, the mercurial rise and fall of Satyagraha fortunes in Haryana represent on the one hand a rising revolutionary tide and, on the other, the aggravation of contradictions growing out of its middle class character. The proper development of Satyagraha was not possible because Gandhi was less inclined to make it a mass movement. The ideological and theoretical level of this movement was deliberately worked out in such a way as to fight with British imperialism and at the same time thwart the attention of left parties to steal the show. In both the motives, Gandhi was successful. Viewed from this angle the Individual Satyagraha Movement in Haryana pointed to the organic connection that existed between the Congress and Gandhi, emphasizing the contradiction between the non-violence as viewed by the Congress and the non-violence as adopted by Gandhi.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. P.C. Joshi, *C.P.I. : Its Policy and Work in the war of Liberation, September, 1942.*
- a. S. Gopal. *Jawahar Lal Nehru: A Biography.* p. 212.
- b. The Harijan June 19, 1940.
- c. *All-India Congress Committee Report*, Swaraj Bhawan, Allahabad, December 20, 1945, see A.I.C.C. Papers F.No. G-22 Part I, 1940-46 (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi).
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*, see Coupland, *The Indian Problem* (II) p. 247. For Kriplani's Instruction which were issued in consultation with Gandhi (June 1941) see, D.G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, Vol. VI, p. 13.
5. R.C. Majumdar, *History of Freedom Movement*, Vol. III. p. 607,
6. *The Times of India*, September 28 and October 1, 1940,



7. The Forward Bloc, led by Subhash Chandra Bose, had already launched the civil disobedience campaign with increasing vigour and many among the rank and file of Congressmen had joined the campaign. See R.C. Majumdar, *History of Freedom Movement*, Vol. III, p. 606.
8. *The Tribune*, October 26, 1940, ed. "Intensifying the Struggle". The editorial suspected that the Congress would intensify its activity after the arrest of Vinoba.
9. The All India Congress Committee had sent direction to all provinces to select the eminent Congressmen. This was done to ensure non-violence from the Satyagrahis. For details see *All-India Congress Committee Report*. Swaraj Bhawan, Allahabad, December 20, 1945.  
A.I.C.C. Papers F.No. G-22 Part I, 1940-46 (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi).
10. *The Tribune*, October 22, 1940. Also see *Home Political* F.No., 18, 10, 1940; Second Half; October, 1940; Punjab. p. 1.
11. *Home Political*. F.No., 18, 10, 1940; Second Half; October, 1940; Punjab. p. 1.
12. *Ibid.*, F.No., 18, 11, 1940; First Half, November. 1940; Punjab. p. 1.
13. *Ibid.*, The report quoted *The Milap* and other Punjab newspapers for having similar opinion. Also see *The Tribune*, October 19, 1940.
14. For details see Shri Ram Sharma, *Haryana Ka Itihas* and *Haryana Men Congress Ki Tahrik*. Also see Daulat Ram Gupta, *Meri Atma Katha* (unpublished—K.C. Yadav collections).
15. *Home Political*. F.No., 18, 10, 1940; Second Half; October 1940; Punjab. Appendix II-A. The names of these civil resisters were Pat Ram s/o Khatu Kumar and Ladhu Ram s/o Lekha Kumar, both belonging to Mandi Ellanabad, District Hissar. The third one was Pahlal Singh of village Hathin. He was a teacher in the village school of Churasi, District Hissar.
16. *Ibid.*, F.No., 18, 11, 1940; First Half; November, 1940; Punjab. Appendix II-A. The names of the persons arrested were Babulal Pandit of Malpura, P.S. Rewari Sadar, District Gurgaon, and Giyasi, a barber of Asoti Police Station, Palwal, District Gurgaon.
17. *The Tribune*, October 28, 1940.
18. *Ibid.*, November 9, 1940.
19. *Ibid.*, November 17, 1940.
20. *Home Political*. F.No., 18,11,1940; First Half; November, 1940; Punjab p.1.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, Second Half; November, 1940, Punjab. p. 1. The Tribune wrote editorials on Nehru's arrest. The paper indirectly attacked the Government for its share in intensifying the movement. See *The Tribune*, November 7, 1940; ed. "A Shocking Sentence" and *Ibid.*, November 11, 1940, ed., "Sentence of Pandit Nehru." Also see *Ibid.*, November 19, 1940, ed., "Struggle Intensified".
23. *The Tribune*, November 22, 1940.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.* November 24, 1940.
27. *Home Political*, F.No. 18, 11, 1940; Second Half; November, 1940; Punjab. p. 1.
28. Cited from *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.* Commenting on this statement of the Congress President Abul Kalam Azad, the Government report said "This remark throws an interesting light on Gandhi's intentions for he and indeed the Congress as a whole must know that uncontrolled masses are likely to resort very quickly to violence".
31. *Ibid.* Also See, *The Tribune*, November 30, 1940.
32. *The Tribune*, December, 2, 1940.
33. *Home Political*, F. No., 18, 11, 1940; Second Half; November 30, 1940; Punjab. p. 3.
34. *Ibid.* F. No., 18, 10, 1940; First Half; December, 1940; Punjab. p. 1.
35. *Ibid.* Second Half; 1940; Punjab. p. 2. The report said that Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir went to Wardha to strengthen the relations between the Sikhs and Congress on the issue of non-violence. Gandhi handed over a letter to Giani which ran as follows: "You have asked me for my interpretation of the teachings of the ten Gurus. I regard the Guru Granth Sahib as one of the scriptures of the world. I consider myself as a humble follower of their teachings, as of the teaching of Islam, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Hinduism. The essence of the teaching, so far as non-violence is concerned, and that is what you want to know from me, is that they all enjoin non-violence as a duty. But they tolerate violence when the choice before the votary is between cowardly surrender and the use of the sword.
36. *The Tribune*, December 7, 1940.
37. *Home Political*, F. No., 18, 12, 1940; First Half; December, 1940; Punjab. Appendix II.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
40. *Ibid.*
- 40a. On December 3, 1940 Sampuran Singh Offered himself for arrest. His statement before the magistrate that he had little faith in non-violence and his offer to court arrest was only for the sake of Congress discipline raised a lot of controversy. In reality, however, support to Sikh recruitment and his business interests with Defence Department were the underlaying causes behind his attempt to ridicule the movement. For details see, *Linlithgow Collection*, 1940 No. 85 *From Craik to Linlithgow*, December 29, 1940. Also cited by S.L. Malhotra, *From Civil Disobedience to Quit India*, pp. 115-116.
41. *Ibid.*, Second Half; December, 1940, Punjab. p. 1. See *The Tribune* December 9, 1940, December 19, 1940. Also See. S.L. Malhotra. *From Civil Disobedience to Quit India*. p. 116.
42. *The Tribune*, December 28, 1940, December 31, 1940.

- 42a. See, S.L. Malhotra, *From Civil Disobedience to Quit India*. p. 117.
43. *Ibid.*, January 8, 1941.
44. *Ibid.*, January 9, 1941.
45. *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 1, 1941; First Half; January, 1941; Punjab. Appendix III. Also see *The Tribune*, January 12, 1941.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
- 46a. From a Photostat GMMML & L Vol. 83. G.N. 5593, 23.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Cited from *Home Political*, F. No., 18, 10, 1940; Second Half; October, 1940; Punjab. p. 1.
49. *Ibid.*
50. On this point a Government report observed: "There is reliable evidence to show that Individual Satyagraha makes no appeal either to Punjab Congress leaders to the rank and file and this is believed to account for the weakness displayed in this province during the first phase of the civil disobedience movement." See *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 1, 1941; Second Half; January, 1941 Punjab. p. 1.
51. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 12, 1940; First Half; December, 1940; Punjab, p. 2. Later in July 21, 1941, Dr. Satya Pal, in the course of a statement to the press at Lahore, made a suggestion to the Gandhi to reconsider the situation and to devise a really useful course instead of the Satyagraha movement which was doing to no one. See *The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. II, 1941, p. 7.
- 51a. *The Tribune*, July 16, 1941.
52. For instance Master Tara Singh tabled a resolution in the Punjab Legislative Assembly on December 16, 1940 asking for the exclusive right of the martial races to be recruited in the Army. See *The Tribune*, December 17, 1940. For details of Akalis stand on anti-war and anti-recruitment campaigns see, *Linlithgow Collection* No. 19, 1939 *From Moon to Laithwaite*, No. 19, March 2, 1939 No. 52, 1940, July 6, 1940. Also see, *Jawahar Lal Nehru Papers Part I*, Vol. LXXXX VII, Letter from Nehru to Master Tara Singh, December, 1939 and *The Tribune*, July 11, 1940. *The Harijan* of Gandhi also gives details of this controversy. See *The Harijan*, September 29, 1940, p. 307. In reply to a letter Master Tara Singh wrote to President, All India Congress (a copy had been sent to Gandhi). Gandhi had advised Master Tara Singh, "With your mentality, you have to offer your services to the British Government unconditionally and look to it for the protection of the rights of 'your community', you do not suppose for one moment that the British will take your recruits on your conditions. They would commit suicide if they did. You have to be either fully nationalist or frankly communal and therefore dependent upon the British or other foreign power" cited from M.L. Malhotra, *From Civil Disobedience to Quit India*, p. 128.
53. For details of these unfavourable comments of the press see *Home Political* F. No. 18, 12, 1940; First Half; December, 1940; First Half; December,

1940; Puajab, p. 2.

54. *The Tribune*, November 26, ed. "Representative Satyagraha."  
 54a. In Haryana the *Aman Sabhas* were organised. The member of these Shabhas (Jaildar, Safedposh, Havaldar, Sepoy etc) used to move from village to village along with Bhajan parties. Wherever they would go, the Bhajnies used to sing the following song:

Bharti Hoei Lovea  
 There bhahar khare Rangroot  
 Adhe Tootte Leether Pairoore  
 Udhe Pahareeyo Peetee Shoez  
 Adhe phatee dhoti phate a  
 kurta pahadoore  
 udhe pahareeyo Malasiya soot

In reply to this propaganda, the Congress volunteers used to sing:

Aur Desh ke Chhore Khaile  
 Azadi ki Holi  
 Amar Desh ke Chhore khave  
 Roti per Goli  
 Shani Jeski Bholi Bhali  
 Ghar per Robe Nari jawan  
 Sub Desho se Desh Hamara  
 Dhukheya Hindustan.

*Interview—Ram Singh Jakhar* 28, 5, 84.

55. On November 21, 1940, *The Tribune* published two editorials "The Finance Bill Thrown Out" and "Sir Chhotu Ram as Protector of the Poor." The second editorial exposed Sir Chhotu Ram as the representative of his caste and peasant proprietors. See *The Tribune*, November 21, 1940.
56. *Home Political*. F.No., 18, 1, 1941; First Half; January, 1941; Punjab. p.4.
57. *Ibid.*, F.No., 18, 11, 1940; First Half; November, 1940; Punjab, p. 1.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
60. *Ibid.*
61. *The Tribune*, January 7, 1941. ed., "Satyagraha Sentences."
62. *Home Political*. F.No. 18, 1, 1941; Second Half, January, 1941; Punjab. p. 1. The report said that among these Satyagrahis 652 were approved, and "in some cases subject to the securing of assurances from persons who had not completed their pledge properly".
63. See Shri Ram Sharma "Haryana Ke Swatantrata Sainani".
64. *Home Political*. F.No., 18, 1, 1941; Second Half; January, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II.
65. *Ibid.*, Also see *Oral transcription—Abdul Ghaffar Khan* (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi). And see *The Tribune*, January 17, 1941.
66. *Ibid.*, F.No. 18, 2, 1941; First Half; February, 1941; Punjab. Appendix I and *Ibid.*, Second Half; February, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II.

67. *Ibid.*
- 67a. *Interview*: Ram Singh Jakhar, p. 771, 28. 5. 84.
68. *The Tribune*, January 7, 1941 ed., "Satyagraha Sentences"; *Ibid.*, January 15, 1941, ed. "Political Stunts"; *Ibid.*, January 17, 1941, ed., "Responsibility for Deadlock".
69. *Ibid.*, January 22, 1941.
70. *Home Political*. F.No., 18, 2, 1941; First Half; February, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
71. *Ibid.*
72. Giving figures of the Congress membership, the Government report stated: "Such figures as are available show that there has been a decrease in Congress membership in the Punjab during the past year. It is reported that the membership in 1940 was 109,534 as compared with 189,074 in the previous year and 182,000 in 1938". For details see *Home Political* F.No., 18, 2, 1941; Second Half; February, 1941; Punjab. p. 2.
73. *Ibid.*, F.No., 18, 3, 1941; First Half; March, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
74. For details see *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1940, Vol. XI, pp. 515-517. Also see *The Haryana Tilak*, *The Jila Vatan*, and *The Desh Bakt* From January 1941 to March, 1941.
75. In contrast to this, the Government report observed: "The effects of this, however, appear to be slight for the movement attracts little attention and arouses no enthusiasm". See *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 3, 1941; First Half; March, 1941; Punjab. 1, and Appendix I.
76. *Ibid.*, Second Half; March, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
77. See F.No. C-37 (Part-1) *Circulars No. 37 and No. 39, 1941*; *P.C.C. reports on arrests made in their respective provinces under D.I.R.* (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi). Also see 33/1940-41 *Reports: Provincial Reports, Collected by A.I.C.C. on Satyagraha Movement* (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi).
78. See *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 3. 1941; Second Half; March, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II.
79. *Ibid.* F.No., 18, 4, 1941; First Half; April, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II.
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.*
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18,3,1941; Second Half, March, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
84. This data has been computed on the basis of Government reports of March and April, 1941.
85. *The Tribune*, April 10, 1940. Also see *Home Political*. F. No. 18, 4, 1941; First Half; April, 1941; Punjab. pp. 1-2.
86. A Government report thus commented on the subject thus: "Uncasiness about discipline in the Punjab had led Gandhi to invite attention again to the conditions imposed on Satyagrahis and the Provincial Congress Committee has been directed to check the list again to see that the conditions are fulfilled. Tests must be carried out to ensure that approved persons can spin fifty yards of yarn daily. Satyagrahis, even those in jail,

must keep to their pledges as honourable men and women. It is emphasized that a few men with faith are more useful to Gandhi than many with lukewarm faith". See *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 4, 1941; First Half; April, 1941; Puniab. p. 1.

87. *Ibid.*
88. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 3, 1941; Second Half; March, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
89. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 4, 1941; Second Half; April, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
90. *Ibid.* p. 2.
91. *Ibid.*, Appendix II-A.
92. *Ibid.*, Appendix II-B.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
94. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 5, 1941; First Half; May, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 4, 1941; Second Half; April, 1941; Punjab. p. 1. The report said: "Dr. Gopi Chand and his followers have been steadily poisoning the mind of Mr. Gandhi against him with, it is admitted, considerable justification".
97. See *The Tribune*, February 22, 1941, ed., "Punjab Has Self-Government".
98. *Home Political*. F.No.. 18, 5, 1941: First Half; May, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
99. *Ibid.*
100. *Ibid.*
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Ibid.*, Second Half; May, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
103. Cited in *Ibid.*
104. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 6, 1941; First Half; June, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
105. *Ibid.*, Second Half; June, 1941; Punjab. p. 1. The report said, "He did not mention, however, that about 1,000 persons who had been approved in the first phases had not yet courted arrest".
106. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
107. *Ibid.*
108. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 7, 1941; First Half; July, 1941; Punjab. p. 2.
109. *Ibid.*
110. *Ibid.*, Second Half; July, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
111. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 6, 1941, First Half; June, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II, and *Ibid.*, Second Half; June, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II.
112. *Ibid.*
113. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 7, 1941, First Half; July, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II and II-A. Also see *Ibid.*, Second Half; July, 1941; Punjab Appendix II and II-A.
114. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 8, 1941; First Half; August, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
115. *Ibid.*, Appendix II (A) and II (B).
116. *Ibid.*, Second Half; August, 1941; Punjab. Statement. Appendix II (A) and (B).
117. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 9, 1941; First Half; September, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II Statement (A) and (B). Also see *Ibid.* Second Half; September, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II Statement (A) and (B).

118. *Ibid.*, F.No., 18, 10, 1941; First Half; October, 1941; Punjab. p. 3.
119. *Ibid.*, Appendix II Statement (A), (B) and Appendix II-A. Also see *Ibid.*, Second Half; October, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II Statement (A), (B) and Appendix II-A.
120. *Ibid.*, F.No., 18, 11, 1941., First Half; November, 1941; Punjab Appendix II Statement (A) and (B). Also see *Ibid.*, Second Half; November, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II Statement (A) and (B).
121. *Ibid.* F.No. 18, 12, 1941; First Half; December, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II Statement (A) and (B). Also see *Ibid.*, Second Half; December, 1941; Punjab. Appendix II Statement (A) and (B).
122. For instance when Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava was released from detention under Rule 21 of Defence of India Rule, his friends in the Congress Party explained to him the reason why they did not participate in Satyagraha. They argued that if they had gone to jail, members of the opposing Congress group would have had a clear field to establish their position of dominance. See *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 6, 1941; First Half; June, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
123. *Ibid.* F. No., 18, 8, 1941; First Half; August, 1941; Punjab. p. 1
124. *Ibid.*, F.No., 18, 10, 1941; Second Half, October, 1941; Punjab. p. 1. The report said that out of 21 P.P.C.C. Working Committee members only 5 were in jail. Similarly out of 41 M.L.As. of the Congress, only 5 had offered Satyagraha.
125. F.No., 18, 12, 1941, First Half; December, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
126. Karl Marx used this expression in "The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850." Lazzaroni name was applied in Italy to the declassed, Lumped proletarian element of the population repeatedly used by the absolute governments for counter-revolutionary purposes.
127. During this phase communal riots had taken place in Karnal and Hissar. See *Home Political*. F.No., 18, 6, 1941; Second Half; June, 1941; Punjab. p. 2. Also see *Ibid.*. F.No., 18, 10, 1941; Second Half; October, 1941; Punjab. p. 2. This report also mentions that the Congress party had organized a committee but without much success.
128. *Ibid.*, F.No., 18, 9, 1941; First Half; September, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
129. For instance, a trader's conference at Rohtak in June, 1941 declared that the Marketing Act and the Sales Tax Act and the rules made under them were impracticable, insulting and injurious to traders and it called upon the Punjab Marketing Act Protest Standing Committee to resort to direct action against the Government. See *Ibid.* F.No., 18, 6, 1941, Second Half; June, 1941; Punjab, p. 3. Sir Sikander Hyat Khan had uttered a warning to the traders who had boistered up an unconstitutional and unwarranted agitation. On April 28, 1941 he said 'if the growers and consumers, who constituted 90 per cent of the population took upon themselves to flout the Law there would be bloodshed. the responsibility for which would lie on the soulders of the agitators. See *The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. I, 1941, p. 245.
130. *Home Political*. F.No., 18, 10, 1941; Second Half; October, 1941; Punjab. p. 2.

131. *Ibid.* F.No., 18, 7, 1941; First Half; July, 1941; Punjab. p. 2.
132. *The Tribune*, July 13, 1941; Also See *The Milap*, July 11, 1941. The expansion of the Viceroy's E.C. and the formation of a National Defence Council were also critically commented upon by these papers.
133. *Home Political*. F.No., 18, 10, 1941; Second Half, October, 1941; Punjab. Appendix I.
134. *The Tribune*, November 6 and 7, 1941.
135. *Ibid.*, June 8, 1941;
136. *Home Political*. F.No., 18, 6, 1941; First Half; June, 1941; Punjab. p. 1.
137. *Ibid.*, F.No., 18, 9, 1941; First Half; September, 1941; Appendix 1.
138. *The Tribune*, November 21, 1940, ed., "Sir Chhotu Ram as Protector of the Poor".
139. *Ibid.*
140. Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics: The role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 284.
141. *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 164.
142. *Ibid.*, pp. 163-64.
143. For the role of Mahant Chandra Nath See *Maya Milee Ne Ram*, his autobiography and Sabhal ker Chaloo.
144. See, Patram Verma, *Amar Gatna-Sirsa*. pp-36, 39.



## CHAPTER IV

# QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT

Before an attempt is made to analyse various cross-currents in the Haryana Congress and Punjab politics, it is necessary to recapitulate the development of Indian National Congress and put it in proper perspective along with the development in Haryana districts so that a correct assessment of the Quit India Movement might be made in this region.

Soon after, the withdrawal of Individual Satyagraha Movement, Gandhi urged the need for flexible approach. Before him were the problems of rescuing the Congress party out of the humdrum channel, converting the party into the vanguard of anti-imperialist movement by linking it more and more closely with the masses and imbuing the rank and file with revolutionary consciousness and rousing them for the struggle in accordance with the exigencies of the situation. The war scene had changed for the worse. The marching columns of Japan on the borders of India had posed the task of fighting and defending India not only against the exhausted British masters but also from the Japanese hordes. Despite the anti-fascist ideological consolidations with the allied powers, Gandhi was actively engaged in mapping out his strategy for gaining victory at a single decisive blow through the Quit India resolution passed on August 7, 1942 at the Bombay All-India Congress Committee session. However, the August resolution was not a solitary example of bravado. Behind it was the quiet, steady, calm, not very rapid, but profound work of creating genuine atmosphere for anti-imperialism. The Allahabad meeting of the All-India Congress Committee between April 29 and May 2, 1942, the Wardha Congress Working Committee meeting of July 6, 1942 and the Congress Working Committee resolution of July 14, 1942 were steps one after another to

consolidate the 'Quit India' demand which Gandhi had emphasized in the policy of the revolutionary phase.<sup>1</sup>

In all probability, the time was opportune as there was hardly any political group or party on the Indian scene which could successfully compete with the Congress for striking the final blow to the British imperialism. Moreover, underlying this belief was the idea that in standing for 'Quit India' one could unite the broad strata of the masses, defeat imperialism, restrict the power of fascism and create a favourable condition bolstering up the prestige of the Congress party which had declined quite perceptibly since the failure of the Individual Satyagraha Movement. The belief in historical destiny of the Congress and fear that non-violence on the national scene might be condemned to sterility if mass-action was not launched, was taken as real. This was openly accepted by Acharya Kripalani in his All-India Congress Committee Report. He said:

“There is such a terrible amount of violence in the country that small addition to it would make no material difference. It is not that Gandhiji worked on this addition with indifference. He had to choose (sic) must he allow his dread of a possible addition to violence in the country to prevent him from using even the non-violent strength people had gathered during the past twenty years. If he allowed this dread to overcome him, non-violence would be condemned to sterility at a critical period in the nation's life”.<sup>2</sup>

The Congress examined the question concerning the methods of struggle against the British Raj. Mahatma Gandhi pointed out that the outcome of the fight against imperialism depended on the degree of activity of the broad masses to stage “an open rebellion” with determination to “free India or die in the attempt”.<sup>3</sup> Throughout he maintained intriguing silence over the detailed programme except emphasizing full adherence to non-violence in the struggle. However, in the event of contingency when the All-India Congress Committees or their leaders could not be contacted, the people were authorized “to function for themselves and strive to be their own guides along the high road where there is no resting place and which leads ultimately to the independence

and deliverance of India".<sup>4</sup> The tasks of revolution were deliberately kept flexible though in some cases the guidelines of the previous movements launched by Gandhi were reaffirmed. The people were shown the panacea of successful revolution and were promised victory with record 'speed'. To achieve unity of action the Congress High Command invited provincial committees to organise campaigning with the sole aim of demonstrating to the masses their great power in order to work for expelling the British imperialism from India. It, however, made it clear to all concerned that "by embarking on mass struggle it has no intention of gaining power for the Congress. The power, when it comes, will belong to the whole people of India".<sup>5</sup>

Following the political activity of the Congress High Command, the Punjab and Haryana Congress leaders who were the sinews of the same political wave-length effectively responded. Between January and August, 1942 anti-imperialist struggle flared up in Haryana districts more particularly at Rohtak, Ambala and Hissar. The Congress Committees were reorganised and volunteer corps was formed to assist the public in the event of air raids and internal disorder. The instructions issued to Punjab Provincial Congress Committee from the Congress High Command had laid particular emphasis on mass contacts, village food crops and the constructive side of the Congress programme.<sup>6</sup> There was a definite atmosphere of unrest and discontent among the people.<sup>7</sup> This was reflected in some form in the protracted hartal of Beopar Mandal against the Sales Tax beginning from January 9, 1942 and "Independence Day" celebrations on January 26, 1942, when a large crowd assembled to join the functions, particularly in Rohtak and Ambala.

On June 5, 1942, a significant development took place at Hissar, which should have forewarned the Congress about the mood of the Punjab Government on any crisis situation.<sup>8</sup> Lala Balwant Rai Tayal, Secretary, City Congress Committee, Hissar was arrested on this date on the charge of possessing a copy of the resolution passed by the All-India Congress Committee at Allahabad in April, 1942. He was kept in the judicial lock up at the city police station for three days by the magistrate as the police represented that they wanted to gather evidence with regard to its publication and to make further enquiry from him.<sup>9</sup> This

case, unfortunately was the solitary example of its kind in the whole of India.<sup>10</sup> The illegality of arrest became a subject of hot discussion. The Tribune of June 13, 1942 contained proceedings of Parliament in which the Secretary of State had stated that the carrying away of the copy of the banned resolution was a mere routine operation and no prosecution had followed from this action.<sup>11</sup> The Congress High Command took up this matter on the request of Pt. Neki Ram Sharma and communicated to the press that the Secretary of State was wrong when he said that no prosecution had taken place.<sup>12</sup>

In Karnal also voices were raised against the Government "denouncing the police for high handedness in enforcing A.R.P. restrictions on recruiting civil guards".<sup>13</sup> The Congress speakers continued to make it clear that the Congress volunteer corps will not cooperate with any government organisations". The people's anger was also apparent from their unwillingness to cooperate with the Government in civil defence measures and panic transactions in savings bank accounts and the discharge of cash certificates above issues.<sup>14</sup> The arrests under the rules, 81<sup>15</sup> and 56<sup>16</sup> of the Defence of India Rules amply prove the increasing bottleneck in financial matters of the region.<sup>17</sup> The Government of India wheat control policy came for severe criticism in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. In an adjournment motion, moved by Surajmal (a member of the Legislative Assembly belonging to the Unionist Party), the Punjab Government was taken to task for its inability "to prevent the export of wheat from this province at a time when the province is faced with a serious wheat famine".<sup>18</sup> The notion received unanimous support from all sections of the House including the Congress party and was passed without a single dissentient voice after a two-hour debate.<sup>19</sup> Thus, owing to the marked deterioration in the economic situation the Congress organization had an opportunity to rise rapidly on the crest of a nationalist wave. However, the Congress did not utilize this opportunity in this region. Within the organization itself Mian Iftikhar Uddin was challenged by Bhim Sen Sachar having full support of Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava. Abul Kalam Azad's visit made little impact.<sup>20</sup> Mian Iftikhar Uddin's tour for raising Congress volunteers in the province including Haryana districts became more notable for the criticism of his support of

the C.R. formula, and his favourable attitude to the Pro-war Communist policy.<sup>21</sup> Dr. Satya Pal's group had also formed a new organisation called the Punjab Congress Workers' Party. Its influence in Haryana and its role in 1943 and 1944 is discussed elsewhere in this chapter. The Haryana Congress obviously suffered in this melee. To remove these organisational problems Pt. Shri Ram Sharma took personal initiative to write a letter to the All-India Congress Committee General Secretary on July 19, 1942 in his capacity as a President of District Congress Committee, Rohtak. The letter sought clarifications regarding the Problems of membership, formation of committees, election procedure and facts to be taken into consideration for designating one as Satyagrahi. The letter was written in defiance of the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee.<sup>22</sup> Another letter of Lala Duni Chand to the General Secretary of the All-India Congress Committee further exposed the internecine disputes and fraying tempers in Haryana Congress. Lala Duni Chand, who demanded that his letter be placed before the next meeting of the Congress Working Committee on July 6, 1942<sup>23</sup> openly accused Punjab Congress leaders for appeasing the Akalis and not opposing the Unionist-Akali Pact. While severely criticising the fractional politics of Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava, the Akalis and Mian Iftikhar Uddin, he observed:

“They have invariably pursued the policy of hobnobbing and cultivating friendly relations with the Unionist Party Government for paltry advantage and selfish gains. They mishandled the Satyagraha movement in various ways, which can be easily proved. They have condoned actions and doings of prominent Congressmen, which have brought the Congress into mire. They have allowed the Akalis to carry on openly anti-Congress activities without taking any action. The continued process of demoralisation as stated above has resulted in the above mentioned pact which is in my opinion the severest blow to the Congress cause in the province. An immediate inquiry is urgently called for....”<sup>24</sup>

On the basis of events taking place between January and August, 1942, in the Haryana Congress one can easily see the

contradiction existing between the tempers of public and the Congress leadership. In the course of these events and on the basis of this experience, it was not unnatural to find the sinister shadow of British imperialism threatening to creep across the whole of Haryana districts and successfully maintaining a more reactionary and aggressive line than in any other region of India.

The Quit India Movement had begun in Haryana on August 10, 1942 i.e., soon after the August resolution was passed in the All-India Congress Committee session at Bombay. The movement continued till the Indian National Congress officially withdrew this resolution in March, 1945. While the entire period has been treated as a whole, its trends have been examined in various phases for the critical analysis of their bearing on the development of anti-imperialism in Haryana. The first phase was the phase of Mass upsurge. It began from August 10, 1942 and concluded on August 31, 1942. The period for the second phase was from September 1, 1942 to February, 1943. This phase was characterized by an inwardized approach to the question of expelling British power from India. The third and last phase covered the remaining period between February 10, 1943 to May 6, 1944, the date when the movement was suspended. The significance of this period lies in the concerted attempts by the well measuring leaders to prove for settlement with British Imperialism. This period was also marked for the renewed emphasis on comprehensive view of constructive programme of Gandhi.

The mass arrests on August 8 and 9, 1942 at Bombay were the starting point of the Quit India Movement in Haryana. The events in Bombay signalled the Punjab Government to act. Consequently, the repressive character of the Government was revealed in its true colours when it began its frenzied attacks at the anti-imperialist forces of Haryana.<sup>25</sup> Some of the All-India Congress Committee members from Haryana who had gone to Bombay to attend the historic session were nabbed by a prompt and decisive action of the Government. The number of persons detained without trial or otherwise dealt with under Defence of India Rules 26 and 129 during August by the Punjab Government was 337. Among them 279 persons were detained under Rules 26, 57 and 127 and only one under Rule 26 was restricted. However, the people showed resentment against the large scale arrests of

the government. There were sizable demonstrations in several districts of Haryana. The shops in the bazars of Rohtak and Jhajjar remained closed on August 12, and 13, 1942.<sup>27</sup> In Karnal too demonstrations were held and the market remained closed on August 12, 1942.<sup>28</sup> In Hissar, Pandit Neki Ram Sharma and about a dozen other Congressmen of Hissar were detained. They were taken to Shahpur Jail on August 15, 1952. It was reported in the Tribune that they were handcuffed and were carried in another compartment.<sup>29</sup> In Ambala, Lala Duni Chand, M.L.A., was taken into custody on August 16, 1942 by the Ambala police under Rule 129 of the Defence of India Act.<sup>30</sup> On August 20, 1942 the office of the District Congress Committee, Ambala, had been taken in possession by the police.<sup>31</sup> The attempts to sabotage telephone wires and letter-boxes were reported from Ambala.<sup>32</sup> In Ambala Cantt. as many as 15 persons were arrested in connection with the Quit India Movement. Among them, Maharshi Munisi Ram Arya, the Secretary of the Cantonment Congress Committee, and Lala Joti Prasad were arrested while addressing a public meeting in Ambala Cantt. Lala Mangat Ram, a member of the Provincial Congress Committee, was arrested immediately after his arrival from the Bombay Congress section. Lala Basheshwar Nath was arrested on August 19, 1942, while addressing a public meeting at Shazadpur in Naraingarh Tehsil. About a dozen other persons were arrested while going in tongas and raising anti-war slogans in Ambala city.<sup>33</sup> The Government was, however, unable to arrest Abul Ghaffar Khan, the President of the District Congress Committee, Ambala. He had gone to Bombay to attend the All-India Congress Committee session but since then he had not returned, nor was there any news about him.<sup>34</sup> On August 23, 1942, Section 144 Cr. P.C. was clamped in Rohtak, prohibiting assemblage of five or more persons.<sup>35</sup> The promulgation of Section 144 Cr. P.C. preceded distribution of objectionable literature and sporadic attempts to sabotage telephone wires and letter-boxes.<sup>36</sup> Pandit Shri Ram Sharma, M.L.A., who was successfully evading arrest to direct this movement along a revolutionary course, was arrested on August 23, 1942 from his residence in Jhajjar.<sup>37</sup> On August 25, 1942, Ambala was once again in the news. On this day, Lala Hari Chand, Manager of the Khadi Bhandar, Ambala, and Lala Nand Lal, Inspector of the All-India Spinners' Association,

were arrested under the Defence of India Rules.<sup>38</sup> The Punjab police also raided the premises of the Khadi Bhandar and the residence of the Manager and claimed to have seized some objectionable literature.<sup>39</sup> No other detail was given about this incriminating material. Earlier, similar search parties were sent to raid the District Congress Office, Ambala, on August 22, 1942. This party too claimed to have seized papers earlier proscribed by the Punjab Government.<sup>40</sup> On August 27, 1942 Lala Duni Chand (who was earlier arrested under Rule 129 of Defence of India Rules) was released and soon thereafter orders were issued to restrict him at his residence. His old age and the tragedy of his sons' death perhaps forced the government to rescind the earlier orders. However, under restriction he was not to take part in any meeting, procession or other political activities.<sup>41</sup> At village Shahpur near Ambala Cantt. five arrests were reported under the Defence of India Rules.<sup>42</sup> Another person was arrested at Kurali while spreading objectionable propaganda.<sup>43</sup> A report from Kharar in Ambala district stated that 9 persons, who were asking the shop-keepers to close their shops, were also arrested by the police.<sup>44</sup>

Apart from the arrests made in Haryana, the Punjab Government also tried to tackle the rising tide of revolutionary activities by other methods. On August 10, 1942, the Government in Punjab, acting on the behest of British imperialism, issued a notification by which the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee and the District Congress Committees including the Haryana districts were declared unlawful.<sup>45</sup> On August 13, 1942 Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the Premier of Punjab attacked the Congress party for being "cowardly". At Cario, where he was on a visit to meet the Indian soldiers, he observed:

"I am confident that all patriotic Indians and Punjabis particularly, will see to it that the brothers fighting our battles against a most formidable and unscrupulous enemy are not betrayed".<sup>46</sup>

This was a clear ruse to win over the people on emotional grounds. The mind of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan would become much clearer to an observer if this statement is read along with



his speech he made at Lahore on August 1, 1942, in which he had said:

“As far as the Punjab is concerned, we have a special reason to resent the movement which the Congress leaders threatened to launch. Hundreds of thousands of gallant sons of this province are fighting the enemy on various points of the battle field and the province as a whole is wedded to a policy of giving all possible help to win the war”.<sup>47</sup>

On August 15, 1942 new posting orders were issued for the Haryana region. Significantly, all these officers in Key positions belonged to one particular community. M. Muhammad Shafi, P.C.S., Extra Assistant Commissioner, Jhang, was transferred with immediate to Panipat. K.S. Agha Muhammed Sultan Mirza, P.C.S. District and Sessions Judge, Gujranwala was posted to Karnal. In Gurgaon Abdul Har, Deputy Superintendent of Police, was called upon to officiate as Superintendent of Police.<sup>48</sup>

The Government also tried to win over the maximum sympathy of the people on its side. On August 17, 1942, a Press note issued by the provincial Government announced further concessions to relatives of soldiers killed on active service. The concession related to the exemption from payment of fees charged in respect of entries relating to the acquisition of a right or interest by inheritance in the property of the deceased.<sup>49</sup> Special attention was paid to Hindu susceptibilities. On a casual resolution passed by the Hindu Sanatan Dharm Association, Ambala, on August 10, 1942 the demand that there should not be a blackout on Janmastami was liberally granted.<sup>50</sup> Thus, while the Government was taking good care of social and religious interests of the people, it was also finding ways and means for mastering them. To terrorise the people into submission, the Punjab Government notified the Penalties (Enhancement) Ordinance No. J.H. of 1942 for the whole province which included, inter-alia, all the districts of Haryana region. The Ordinance provided for enhancement of penalties including whipping and extending up to the extreme penalty of death for certain types of offences such as looting, arson, voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons and sabotage.<sup>51</sup> On August 20, 1942, N.M. Deputy Buch,

Commissioner, Ambala, cautioned the members of the District War Board to keep alert and cooperate in maintaining peace in the district.<sup>53</sup>

The government, in spite of its great power and force, was, however, kept on tinter-hooks by the national press,<sup>53</sup> though in the beginning it appeared to be passive, neutral, mediatory and conciliatory. For instance, the Tribune which had a great number of subscribers in Haryana towns began by supporting the policy of restoring political status quo.<sup>54</sup> On August 11, 1942, in its editorial, the paper adjudged both parties (the Congress and the Government) as guilty of serious miscalculation. It criticised the Congress leaders for saying that "the struggle would be short and swift". Similarly, the editorial took the British to task for believing "in the policy of procrastination and for relying on measures of repression for prolonging their tenure of irresponsible power in India".<sup>55</sup> This opinion of the paper, however, took a new turn when it tried to defend the Congress and Gandhi by exonerating both of them from the responsibility of mob-violence.<sup>56</sup> The paper repeatedly wrote editorials focussing mainly on the barren policy of the Government.<sup>57</sup> Sir Sikander Hyat Khan was also criticized for his lack of judgment and irresponsible statements.<sup>58</sup> The paper, nevertheless, viewed mass upsurge as hooliganism and appreciated the demand of a National Government and the stand taken by Rajagopalachari and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru for "they want independence for India certainly, but they want independence to come to India through British goodwill and not through the success of any such mass struggle as the Congress proposed to start in the event of its demand not being conceded voluntarily".<sup>59</sup>

This appreciation, in fact, reflected the perception of the power itself.<sup>60</sup> From this account it would appear that the Quit India Movement even in its heyday in Haryana region could not assume the form of mass movement. It remained confined to the known and tried volunteers of Congress. Some arrests in the village of Rohtak, Hissar and Ambala districts could be seen only as an exception to this general tendency of the movement. The temper of the movement even in urban centres was not quite impressive. Except for the hardcore of the Congress, only a very small section of the middle class participated. The student power,

except in Ambala and Rohtak, remained weak and submissive. It made no major impact though some cases of incendiarism in post-offices and tampering with telephone wires were reported. The distribution of anti-Government literature was, however, more common and the C.I.D. reports do make a mention of this area being quite sensitive in this regard.

Conversely, the early phase was marked by the astounding success of the Government. The collective fines ordinance was never applied as no occasion arose for its use in this region. The bureaucracy in this region fully cooperated with the Government. The press also remained opposed to the movement in the name of mass-violence though, in its own way, it tried to deepen anti-imperialism by exposing British acts of omission and commission.

The initial victory of the British generated crude die-hardism in their attitudes towards 'Quit India' demand. Instead of adopting flexible tactics and taking recourse to manoeuvring and compromises, they were still flexing their muscles with the aim to intensify imperialist oppression. They failed to appreciate that a mass struggle for liberty in the case of a country which had been kept in subjugation for more than a century and a half could not possibly end in a month. It must naturally be protracted over a long period. This happened on the Indian Scene and its fall out in Haryana region, though by no means sizable, appeared to break a noticeable new ground.

Between September, 1942 and February 10, 1943, Haryana countered the British offensive along the following lines. A section of the people refused to soft-pedal anti-colonialism and efforts were made to establish rapport with the main stream of Resistance Movement in India. The struggle was conducted despite terror and persecution. Another section, while opposing violence, demanded independence which was the basis of the Congress policy, as was interpreted by the Congress President himself. Their task was to find common language with the under-ground supporters of the 'Quit India' Movement. They worked in defence of revolutionaries' urgent and most elementary demands. Their idea was to unite the vast unorganized mass of people for the common cause and work for the destruction of imperialism by exploiting every conceivable opportunity which surfaced from time to time.

The real state of affairs in Haryana and Punjab was quite

unlike the picture painted by Sir Sikander Hyat Khan in his press conference at New Delhi on September 10, 1942. In reply to one question he had observed that the "Congress represents only one percent of India's population" and alleged that there were many pro-Japanese elements in the Congress. Referring to the movement, he declared, that happily it had "not affected the war effort in the Punjab. Recruitment in this province had gone up".<sup>61</sup> However, the truth was some where else. Despite the apparent signs of an ebb in the revolutionary tide as a result of the initial defeat, the situation remained an objectively revolutionary one. The proof for the same can be had from a reply of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to Mrs. K.L. Rallia Ram's letter. He said:

"I am confident that the police are doing their best and will continue to do so, as you will no doubt realise; there are handicaps and limitations on what the police can do in the present circumstances.....I think it is your duty and that of all public—spirited persons to take active steps to ensure that even in urban areas the atmosphere is such that attempts to break the peace are impossible. Once such an atmosphere is established, it would be possible to release large number of police for their more normal duties of protecting the lives and property of the private citizens".<sup>62</sup>

The deployment of hundreds of policemen notwithstanding, the fight against imperialism was considerably stepped up in this region. On October 5, 1942, a show cause notice against Lala Jugal Kishore of Hissar, along with others, came for hearing at a full Bench consisting of the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Ram Lal and Mr. Justice Munir. Lala Jugal Kishore was issued a notice asking why he should not be removed from the roll of advocates for participating in the Congress struggle.<sup>63</sup> On November 2, 1942, his case was heard again by the Bench and he was warned by the High Court, while cases against others were adjourned.<sup>64</sup> On October 24, 1942, B. Onkar Nath Sehgal, a clerk in the office of the Controller of Accounts, Air Force, Ambala Cantt., was arrested for suspected sabotage. Among other victims whose names figured in the press were Nathi Ram of Jagadhari, Lala Amar Nath of Shahzadpur, Shabbir Aslam of Jagadhari, Khairati Ram

of Multanpur, Garibdas and Narata Ram of Tiwar. All of them belonged to Ambala district and were sentenced under the Defence of India Rules.<sup>65</sup> In Ambala alone 19 persons were convicted in October, 1942. Among them only 5 had been charged with economic offences.<sup>66</sup> Significantly, these arrests coincided with the transfer of M.N. Buch, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner of Ambala as Chairman of the Lahore Improvement Trust. He was replaced by an Indian officer, A.K. Malik, I.C.S. This officer was Deputy Commissioner, Jullundur, and had earned a reputation for his anti-Congress activities.<sup>67</sup> However, things did not seem to improve much. The cases of incendiarism in letter-boxes and tampering with telephone wires were detected. There were also cases in which certain lengths of field cables used in military manoeuvres were cut and removed. Reports about the distribution of anti-Government literature were received by the Home Department regarding districts of Ambala, Hissar, Gurgaon and Rohtak. An official report said:

“In addition, an unsuccessful attempt was made on the 31st October to set fire to the Library of the Government College of Rohtak”.<sup>68</sup>

As many as 58 persons were arrested in Rohtak, under Rule 38 and 54 under Rule 54 of the Defence of India Rules. Gurgaon with 5, and Karnal with 12 also figured in the official reports. In Hissar, one person was convicted in connection with the ‘Quit India Movement’.<sup>69</sup> The official report also mentioned that ‘Ekta’, a paper having nationalist leanings and published from Bhiwani, was warned by the District Magistrate, Hissar, for Publishing objectionable matter in the issue dated October 15, 1942.<sup>70</sup> This temper of Hissar also finds expression in persons convicted during the first half of November, 1942. Hissar topped with 16 in its tally with 15 under Rule 38 and 1 under Rule 39, followed by Rohtak with 5 under Rule 38 of the Defence of India Rules.<sup>71</sup> Among those who were prosecuted in connection with the nationalist struggle during November, 1942, Gurgaon, provided the maximum with 13. From Hissar 7 persons were netted and 3 were provided by Karnal.<sup>72</sup> From Ambala, however, the major exploit was the arrest of Pt. Bhagat Ram Shukla under Rule 129 of the Defence

of India Rules. Pt. Bhagat Ram Shukla was one of the prominent leaders of Ambala and was the President of the District Congress Committee at the time of his arrest.<sup>73</sup>

The arrest of Pt. Bhagat Ram Shukla, signalled a new wave of arrests in Ambala. The police machine went into action and 25 persons were hauled up in this district. Later they were convicted under Rule 38 and 39, Defence of India Rules.<sup>74</sup> In December, 1942, official figures about persons convicted under Civil Disobedience campaign in Haryana totalled 43. Out of them, Ambala provided 25 as already stated, followed by 15 from Gurgaon, 2 from Rohtak and 1 from Karnal.<sup>75</sup> The persons prosecuted in Haryana during this month, however, were 9 only. The district-wise figures were as follows: Rohtak 5, Gurgaon 1 and Karnal 3. The movement continued at a snail's pace in January and the first 10 days of February, 1943. The number of persons convicted in connection with the Congress struggle during this period was 18, with these district-wise figures: Gurgaon 7, Rohtak 5, Ambala 4 and Karnal 2.<sup>76</sup> These figures, however, do not tell the whole story. The number of persons accused of economic offences during this phase was quite significant. The persons prosecuted for these crimes mainly under Rules 81 and 90, Defence of India Rules, from Haryana totalled 259. District-wise figures were: Rohtak 133, Hissar 20, Gurgaon 75, Karnal 31 and none from Ambala. The total number of persons convicted under Rule 81, 90, 52 and 76-A, Defence of India Rules, amounted to about 129. District-wise, this figure could be divided as: Rohtak 48, Hissar 19, Gurgaon 23, Karnal 20 and Ambala 19. The same can be seen in Tables Nos. I and II.

TABLE I

	<i>Rohtak</i>	<i>Hissar</i>	<i>Gurgaon</i>	<i>Karnal</i>	<i>Ambala</i>
October	15(81R)	6(81R)		1(83R) 2(81R)	—
November	1(81R) 2(81R)	— 1(81R)	— 2(81R)	2(81R) 2(81R)	—
December	2(81R) 24(81R)	—	9(81R) 11(81R)	2(81R) 6(81R)	—

	<i>Rohtak</i>	<i>Hissar</i>	<i>Gurgaon</i>	<i>Karnal</i>	<i>Ambala</i>
January	11(81R) 1(90R) 11(81R)	1(81R) 3(90R) 2(81R)	18(81R) 1(90R) 1(81R)	3(81R) 13(81R)	—
February (Ist Half)	62(81R) 4(90R)	6(81R) 1(90R)	30(81R) 3(90R)	—	—
	133	20	75	31	Total 259

TABLE II

	<i>Rohtak</i>	<i>Hissar</i>	<i>Gurgaon</i>	<i>Karnal</i>	<i>Ambala</i>
October	—	12(81R) 1(81R)	3(81R) 6(81R)	2(81R)	2(81R) 3(81R)
November	4(81R)	3(81R) 1(81R)	2(81R) 2(81R)	— 2(81R)	—
December	4(81R) 24(81R)	— 1(81R)	1(81R)	— 6(81R)	1(52R) 1(90R) 5(81R) 1(76-A)
January	1(81R) 9(81R)	—	1(81R) 1(90R)	10(81R)	3(81R)
February (Ist Half)	3(81R) 3(90R)	1(90R)	6(81R) 1(90R)	—	2(81R) 1(90R)
	48 47(81R) 1(90R)	19 18(81R) 1(90R)	23 21(81R) 2(90R)	20 all (81R)	19 15(81R) 2(90R) 1(52R) 1(76-A)
(Total=129)					

The difference between these two lists appears mainly in February 1943 when Mahatma Gandhi started his fast on 10th of

this month. Intriguingly, the number of arrests for economic offences during the first half of February show an extra-ordinary rise in Rohtak and Gurgaon, the fortnight figures of February for Rohtak being 66 followed by 33 of Gurgaon.

All those who did not join the movement and disagreed as to the methods and ways of the struggle also contributed indirectly to highlight the tyrannies perpetrated by the Punjab Government. They were thus instrumental in focussing imperialistic stupidities and the opportunistic policies of Unionist leaders. In the Punjab Legislative Assembly the questions of atrocious treatment of the Congress detenus, the unlawful activities in the name of Law and order in the state, and the increasing hold of police on state machinery were debated. On October 30, 1942, Sardar Santosh Singh, who was the leader of opposition, supported the cut motion placed by Pt. Bhagat Ram Sharma. He charged the Punjab Government for treating the Congressmen who deserved the 'highest respect' from people "like most ordinary prisoners" and lamented that "most of them were handcuffed like criminals". He hoped that the premier was not vindictive and advised him that the Congress detenus "would not be starved physically and intellectually". Referring to the anarchy in the name of Law, he said, 'it was a pity that, instead of being engaged in eradicating crimes in the province, the Punjab C.I.D. was actually engaged in pulling into Jails and causing wrong to the greatest patriots of the province'. He had known cases where blank printed warrants had been given to police officers, who arrested any person they liked after filling up the warrants. Indiscriminate arrests were made by police officers, in some cases, without even consulting the District Magistrate.<sup>77</sup> Earlier, Pandit Bhagat Ram Sharma severely criticized police and said that "arrests are made on the sweet will of police officers" and added that "he knew that Sir Manohar Lal, who was incharge of the Jails, was not incharge of these Congress detenus; they were under the Premier but were actually being handled by D.I.G., C.I.D."<sup>78</sup> Sardar Teja Singh<sup>79</sup> and Sardar Sohan Singh Josh<sup>80</sup> also emphasized these points. Sir Sikander Hyat Khan's defence of the Punjab police and the C.I.D. viz., that "to arrest and detain men on mere suspicion is better than to have them shot on mere suspicion"<sup>81</sup> provoked the Tribune to write an editorial on November 3, 1942. The editorial said that in this



case the established principles of the administration of justice had not been taken into consideration and added: "In the eyes of the law to deprive a person of his liberty without trial is as grave a matter as it is to deprive him of his life".<sup>82</sup> The Tribune's war against the political beggary of the Unionist Party was praise-worthy.<sup>83</sup> Similarly, this paper's stand on Churchill's speech in the House of Commons<sup>84</sup> on the Congress responsibility for violence<sup>85</sup> during the movement, and Amery's attempt to compare Gandhi with Hitler<sup>86</sup> sharpened anti-imperialism and deepened the people's suspicion of the government.

Conversely, the government also felt encouraged in promoting her cordiality with the people. The rostrum of the government agencies was utilized to create an arena of struggle in which a section of peasant-proprietors and urban people participated as rivals of each other. Obviously, this stance of the people was of great benefit to the British position in this region. The laws relating to the Punjab General Sales Tax, the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness (Amendment) Act, the Sugar Cane Punjab Amendment, the transfer of the Common Land (Interpretation of Contracts) bill and the Punjab District Board Bill were attempts to maintain the status quo and peaceful conditions. Similarly, the use of honeyed tongue (in praise of martial classes<sup>87</sup> and the Punjab Legislative Assembly resolution on October 22, 1942, proposing that "an amount of at least Rs. 150 crores out of the Central Revenues should be placed at the disposal of the Punjab Government for being spent on schemes calculated to ameliorate the condition of the discharged Punjab soldiers after demobilisation"<sup>88</sup>) was a demonstration of the goodwill designed to secure maximum benefit in a difficult situation.<sup>89</sup> On November 19, 1942 Governor Bertrand Glancy was received in Karnal by the representatives of some pro-government peasants. A purse of 1 lac was presented to him. On January 29, 1943, a Gazette Extraordinary announced that the Punjab Government had cancelled their order of September 1942, requiring all printers, publishers and editors of newspapers and periodicals published in the Punjab, to submit before publication security to the special press adviser, Lahore.<sup>91</sup> However, on the question of the Congress, the government showed no relentness. On September 28, 1942, the Congress was declared unlawful in the Punjab. The notification said:

“whereas in the opinion of the Governor of Punjab the associations known as City, Town, Tehsil and Village Congress Committees throughout the Punjab interfere with the maintenance of law and order and constitute a danger to the Public peace:

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 16 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, the Governor of the Punjab is pleased to declare the said associations to be unlawful”.<sup>92</sup>

On October 30, 1942 the Premier of Punjab extended full support to the C.I.D. and police in the Assembly against “the unrest and chaotic conditions” created by the Congress.<sup>93</sup> The questions aimed at eliciting information regarding the health of Congress detenus on November 3 and November 6, 1942, in the Assembly were spurned in all contempt.<sup>94</sup> In addition, every attempt was made to heap insults on the Congress detenus. For instance, when Ratan Lal of Rohtak was transferred from the Lahore Jail to the old Central Jail of Multan, he was handcuffed like any ordinary criminal.<sup>95</sup> The only exception to this policy of stifling the Congress was the meeting of Lala Duni Chand, M.L.A. with William Phillips, President Roosevelt’s personal envoy, regarding the political situation in India in general and Punjab in particular.<sup>96</sup> The peculiar alignment of political forces and the nature of aims and task of the British imperialism in Punjab during this phase accounted for the fact that the anti-imperialist forces in Haryana could not make any sizable gains. The statistics of the period, however, indicate that this tendency was counter-balanced by another tendency reflected in the pressure of the masses. This contradiction helped from the very outset to perpetuate the fear psychosis of the Punjab Government and to exert pressure on the Government to make unusual concessions to the people.

This position further pointed to the fact that they realised how dangerous the situation could become at any given time. Haryana during this period was witness to a police firing at Palwal. Serious damage to tracts, an attack on the Railway buildings, attempts to damage Government buildings including school and college properties, sabotage of telegraph and telephone lines, and pilferage of letter-boxes and distribution of anti-Government

literature, showed more and more that a section of the masses was determined to give a ruthless fight to the imperialists.

The arrests of this phase also point to the fact that the Government deliberately strove to have the movement turn into an anti-social activity. The figures of arrest given in connection with the Quit India Movement in government records do not indicate the objective situation as it existed in the region under study. For greater thoroughness, it is therefore imperative to have a closer look, as has been done, on the lists of arrested persons under the Defence of India Rules, who were nabbed in connection with economic offences. The significance of these lists becomes all the more greater if we look back at the instructions of the All-India Congress Committee issued, particularly, after the collapse of the mass uprising of the first phase. Moreover, an important item in the agenda of the Punjab Government was to destroy or to enfeeble the urban social base of the Congress, which was largely among the traders and shop-keepers of the towns. This could be done only by want on arrests which in turn would roadblock the upswing of anti-imperialism in this section of the people.<sup>96a</sup>

There is a tendency among scholars to regard all those who did not join the wave as opponents of the movement. This is, however, not true. To be fair, a large section of these people, irrespective of the political labels put on them, contributed to the advance of the revolutionary struggle. In its totality, the support to the Congress detenus from such elements focussed growing contradictions of Punjab policies and served as a new strategic line arising from the changed graph of mass pressure which was becoming more and more conspicuous and had the effect of creating embarrassment to British imperialism.

The fast of Mahatma Gandhi from February 10, 1943 started a new phase of the 'Quit India' Movement and continued till the release of Gandhi on May 6, 1944. Soon after the release of Mahatma Gandhi, the 'Quit India' Movement was suspended. The movement was finally withdrawn in March, 1945. The fast had a clear message. The message was to unite the people behind his leadership and to pursue non-violence as an ideological and theoretical basis for any anti-imperialist strike. The complex situation prevailing in Punjab made it difficult for the people in Haryana to clarify all the aspects of the struggle. However, a

strong emphasis was laid on the need for resolutely opposing all tendencies likely to lead to a policy of compromise with British imperialism.

As indicated above, this period was marked by the indirect pressure built by the rank and file of the Congress to support the Quit India Movement. The Congressmen relied on press support to further their cause. Despair of stirring up trouble by direct action, they also made subtle attempts to inflame anti-Government feelings by spreading "panic and alarm" among the people over the worsening food situation. Likewise attempts were made to 'sabotage' the recruitment policy of the Government. The national spirit was kept high by making the Congress and allied funds such as Kasturba Gandhi National Fund a success.

Apart from these dominant features, there were also instances when the rank and file of the Congress tried to conduct their meetings through "allied organizations." Some of the extremists who were active in the underground movement resorted to acts of violence on such dates as had assumed special significance such as August Day and Gandhi birth-day. Another section of the Congressmen did not go so far but staged passive protests on these occasions. The released detenus were also active and made repeated attempts to revive the movement and used all kinds of manoeuvres to sharpen the anti-imperialist feelings in the region. The papers with the Congress sympathies demanded immediate resumption of negotiations between the Government and the Congress. In May, 1943, Amery's statement that there was no immediate prospect of resuming negotiations for a political settlement was criticised.<sup>97</sup> The new appointments to the Viceroy's Executive Council too came in for attack and comments were made that this would not afford any solution to the constitutional deadlock.<sup>98</sup> On May 18, 1943 the Muslim Rajput, a Paper published from Rohtak was warned by the District Magistrate for publishing objectionable matter in the issues of paper on March 20 and 27, 1943.<sup>99</sup> In the political field the possibility of a Muslim League ministry in Punjab exercised the minds of the editors of the nationalist press.<sup>100</sup> The *Vir Bharat* stated that no political settlement between Akalis and nationalist Hindus was possible so long as the former did not withdraw their secret support of the Pakistan Scheme and dissociate themselves from the Azad Punjab Scheme.

The Sikh press, however, deplored these attacks; and though denying that Akali-Muslim League negotiations were in progress, asserted that Sikhs had as much right as Hindus to negotiate with the Muslim league, if this was likely to further their interests.<sup>101</sup> The economic situation continued to receive considerable attention. The reports appeared in the press regarding the wheat policy of the Punjab Government and it was clearly anticipated that this would worsen the food situation in the region.<sup>102</sup> According to the Tribune, the worsening food conditions and price rise would continue unless the inflationary expansion of the currency was stopped and drastic measures were introduced to assure an equitable distribution of food and cloth at cheap rates. The paper added that in any case the 'bureaucratic' government of Punjab and Haryana could not expect the cooperation of the people. It demanded a popular national Government. The paper concluded by asserting that the present inflation was due to the supply of rupee finance by the Government of India to Allied Government to enable the latter to make their war purchases in return for payment of sterling in London and demanded that this practice should cease forthwith.<sup>103</sup> The shortage of coins, kerosene oil and, sugar was reported in the Haryana region.<sup>104</sup> Delay in the receipt of quotas and of inequity in distribution of sugar caused much distress to the people. The Commissioner of Ambala Division had the following comments to make on this subject:

"The sugar position seems to have eased somewhat and I am now inclined to somewhat discount complaints that villages do not get sugar which is vitally required. The main impression which I have reached regarding control of articles by District officials is that their methods require thorough inspection from the office of the Director of Civil Supplies to secure more uniformity and more intelligence in operation, i.e., I have been finding that supply of sugar is almost invariably from shops in the middle of congested bazars where there is every facility for illicit backdoor sale and every inconvenience for handling of queues. Considering that the retailers of sugar have a valuable concession it should not be too much to require them to vend from premises under observation of the nearest local body office or Police Station".<sup>105</sup>

The speech of the Food Minister, Government of India and the subsequent debate on the food question were specially chosen for comment. The nationalist press declared that it revealed a "shameful picture" of the incompetence of the Central Government and of the obstruction offered by the Provincial Government. The papers asserted that India's economic difficulties can only be solved by a national Government.<sup>106</sup> The official reports of the period indicate that the government was panicky over this new method of attack on British imperialism. An official report said, "The Congress Nationalist Press maintains an inordinate and unquenchable craving for endless verbal entertainment and perverse criticism in preference to the objective consideration of practical realities."<sup>107</sup> Referring to the Tribune, the report observed: "Even the Tribune so far exceeded itself as to contrast the lack of action against hoarders and profiteers with Government's success in shooting down hundreds of those whom they chose to call rebels".<sup>108</sup> In another report, the criticism of the press was equally vociferous. The report said: "The nationalist press continues its dreary and perverse efforts to focus attention on any incident, speech or shortcomings, however, trivial, likely to support the Congress cause or to bring the administration into contempt of disfavour".<sup>109</sup> The press further appealed to the Government to release Congress detenus. In this connection, full publicity was given to the appeal issued by non-Party leaders to release the Congress political prisoners.<sup>110</sup> The freedom of the press issue was also raised; while criticising the remarks of Sir Sultan Ahmad, the Tribune observed that the Defence of India Rules were being used not to prevent military information from reaching the enemy but to suppress legitimate discussion of internal politics.<sup>111</sup> Commenting on the anniversary of Gandhi's arrest, the Tribune asserted that the rebellion was now a thing of the past, that it would only accentuate bitterness to prolong the deadlock, and that the government should now release the Congress leaders without delay.<sup>112</sup> With the release of Sir Oswald Mosely, a British fascist leader, the demand for the release of Congress leaders was further sharpened. Reporting the news of the press in Punjab, a government report said:

"Certain extremist Hindu papers did not fail to allude to the

release of Sir Oswald Mosely and asked Government what justification it had for the continued imprisonment and intorment of Indian leaders who had never professed Fascist tendencies such as had been displayed by Sir Oswald in England".<sup>113</sup>

The news of the impending release of some Congress detenus brought cheer. The Tribune observed that a far large number would have to be released before humanity and justice could be satisfied.<sup>114</sup> The decision of the Punjab Government that members of the Assembly released on restriction order would not be permitted to attend the Assembly also received wider publicity and the nationalist press protested against the restriction imposed on the Congress M.L.As.<sup>115</sup> The release of Gandhi on May 6, 1944 was regarded as a prelude to a possible political settlement and was welcomed on personal, humanitarian as well as political grounds.<sup>116</sup>

While the direct opposition to the recruitment policy of the Government was wearing off, the indirect struggle, however, continued. Between February 1943 and August 1943 recruitment figures recorded a perceptible fall. The recruits of a good type were becoming increasingly scarce.<sup>117</sup> In August, 1943, however, an increase in the monthly figures was recorded.<sup>118</sup> The figures between September, 1943 and December, 1943 were also described as unsatisfactory. The recruitment figures for December, 1943 showed a general falling off as compared with October and November, 1943.<sup>119</sup> Between January, 1944 and May, 1944 the recruitment graph continued to decline.<sup>120</sup> An official report described the recruitment among the educated in Haryana region as grave. It said:

"The Provincial recruiting figures for June have not been received, but advance reports show little improvement. The Commissioner, Ambala, has reported that Emergency Commission candidates continue to be of a low standard and that during the last eight months the Central Board has only accepted eight candidates from the Ambala Division".

The official arguments for this "disquieting situation" had been many and diverse. The apathy and complacency among

educated youngmen in Haryana was attributed by the Commissioner of Ambala to "Allied success all over the world, high salaried civilian employment and official luke-warmness to the Japanese crusade as shown by the lack of intensive anti-Japanese propaganda".<sup>121</sup> The reference to the Japanese crusade by the Commissioner of Ambala Division signified that the danger of anti-imperialism from this social milieu was still regarded as the real threat. The scarcity of goods and high prices created anxiety mainly among this group. Consequently, little money had been deposited in the savings Banks of Post offices. Similarly, this class scrupulously avoided investing in war loans. A section of the small producer, however, escaped unhurt. In fact, they were marginal beneficiaries in a new situation. The condition of peasant proprietors was reported to be "prosperous".<sup>122</sup> Referring to the economic situation, an official report observed:

"High prices have enabled Zamindars to hold up stocks in the hope of a further rise in prices and to lay in a year's supply against an uncertain future.... Meanwhile, the peasants are quietly proceeding with the purchase of land, the construction of houses and purchase of cattle, the redemption of mortgages and the liquidation of their debts to cooperative Banks and money-lenders".<sup>123</sup>

These immediate gains coupled with the patronage received from the official machinery under the leadership of Sir Chhotu Ram generally operated against the dissipation of the newly acquired political strength of the middle class urban Haryanvis who gave the leadership to the national struggle in this region. Sir Chhotu Ram's climbing down on the issue of imperialism and the support he claimed of a large section of peasantry was greatly appreciated in the British Circles. Glaney wrote to Linlithgow in January 1942 "Sir Chhotu Ram is made of sterner stuff than his leader".<sup>123a</sup> The leader in question was Sir Sikander Hayat Khan. He was praised for being "an effective and hard-working Minister of marked capacity whose instinct is to ride straight at his fences, whatever their dimensions".<sup>123b</sup> This opinion of Punjab Governor was shared by Linlithgow, the viceroy who was keen, to appoint him as a member of viceroy's Executive Council<sup>123c</sup> Wavell



equally appreciated his great qualities and found in him a person who was a great support to the British Raj.<sup>123d</sup>

Thus, the Congressmen were faced with these difficulties. One of their crowning services could be to boost anti-imperialism in the region by supporting and collecting funds related with the activities of the allied Congress organizations. The Kasturba Gandhi National Fund was mooted in Punjab and Haryana. The collection in the districts of Rohtak and Ambala was even noted by the official records.

Apart from this manifestation, the unity of action was, further achieved through a revolutionary action, though its development was uneven, varied and complex. In spite of the "strict vigilance in order to ensure that their (Congressmen) plans do not mature".<sup>124</sup> The Punjab Government failed to stop revolutionary action by the people of Rohtak and Gurgaon on the anniversary of the arrest of Gandhi and other Congress leaders, in August, 1943. Widespread hartals were observed in these districts. The trade was disrupted and educational institutions were closed.<sup>125</sup> Reporting this an official report said:

"One case of incendiarism in a letter-box was reported from Rohtak; and a small amount of Congress literature urging the holding of demonstrations and the closing of shops on the 9th August was recovered. It was also found necessary to ban meetings in a few localities, and to make a small number of preventive arrests, including the arrest in Rohtak of twelve Congressmen who were suspected to be planning to proceed to Poona".<sup>126</sup>

Referring to the activities in Gurgaon, the same report observed:

"In addition, two Congressmen were arrested of shouting anti-Government slogans at Rewari in the Gurgaon district".<sup>127</sup>

The significance of these activities assumes greater dimensions because such operations of the nationalists could still occur,

particularly when the "proof of importance of the Congress agitation"<sup>128</sup> in the whole of Punjab was more than evident.

The manner of the struggle already referred to in no way formed the general pattern. Generally it was marked by passive resistance. For instance, the underground Central Congress Directorate instructions asking for the observance of a Satyagraha programme to be carried out in honour of Gandhi's birthday during the week starting from October 3, 1943 was complied with. Throughout a low profile was maintained. The Khadi Bhandars in Haryana towns celebrated the occasion by increased sales of Khadi. The exhibitions and spinning competitions were also held to mark the occasion. In Rohtak, a meeting was also held preceded by a flag hoisting ceremony.<sup>129</sup> However, the attitude of the "less important and dangerous Congress detenus"<sup>130</sup> remained subdued. In the large majority of cases prisoners who had been released were restricted to their towns and villages. Generally, no attempt was made to break the restriction. The only exception was the Rohtak district where some released detenus were reported to be active. A Government report said;

"For the most part, Congressmen who have recently been released from detention show no signs of attempting to revive agitation, though a few released detenus of Rohtak are reported to be touring the district and conducting Congress propaganda under the cover of appeals for relief to Bengal".<sup>131</sup>

All this seems innocuous enough. But now let us reflect over the entire period of the Quit India Movement in Haryana and fit it into the ideological world that the Congress and its leader envisaged. In doing so it becomes quite evident that some serious changes calling for a searching analysis were taking place in this region. The mass upsurge in August, 1942 collapsed soon after it began. Not more than 4 Railway stations were attacked. About 11 post offices bore the brunt of mass anger. The assaults over the police stations and other Government buildings were few and imperfect. Dr. Jagdish Chandra gives 8 such occasions when the revolutionaries went into action. Similarly, he states that 45 incidents of cutting telegraph wires and 6 attempts to remove the

fish plates from the railway lines were undertaken.<sup>132</sup> Apart from it some cases of the distribution of anti-Government literature were reported. The areas where this activity was more marked were Rohtak, Hissar, Ambala, and Palwal in Gurgaon district. The social base of the Congress volunteers arrested during Quit India Movement largely conformed to the pattern of arrested Satyagrahis of Individual Satyagrah Movement. There was clear dominance of non-Jats and urban middle class at all Haryana level. However, in Rohtak the Jat participation was impressive. Most of these arrested Congressmen were rural or rural-urban based. For instance the total volunteers arrested from Rohtak were 169. Among them the caste division was as follows: Jat 82, Brahmin 30, Bania 27, Ahir 3, Lohar 3, Sonar, Rajput, Kumhar, Saini 1 each. The volunteers belonging to rural areas were 140 as compared to 29 of towns of Rohtak district. From Tehsil Jhajjar, out of 34 volunteers 12 were Jats. The details of other tehsils were: Gohana 3 Jats out of total 6, Rohtak 27 Jats out of total 56, Sonapat 40 Jats out of 73. Urban-rural clarification is equally interesting Jhajjar total 34—rural 17 and urban 17, Rohtak total 56—rural 47, urban 9, Gohana total 6 all rural, Sonapat total 73—rural 69, urban 4.<sup>132a</sup>

It may be pointed out that as compared to U.P., Bihar or Bengal the number of arrested volunteers was very low—though in the context of Punjab the activity in Haryana was better and more organised. According to S.L. Malhotra “It can not be denied that the Congress in the Punjab could not consolidate its position after the suspension of the Individual Satyagrah. It was finding it difficult even to enrol enough primary members. The Punjab intelligence had received a report of Gandhi’s dissatisfaction with the working of the Congress in this province and was reported to have instructed a prominent Congress Leader of the province to re-organise it with a view to making it a vanguard of a mass movement against the British. Internal dissensions had virtually paralysed it. The faction formerly owing allegiance to Satyapal was engaged in raising a parallel organisation under the name ‘Punjab Congress Workers’ Party and a rival volunteer corps’.<sup>132b</sup> Thus the revolutionaries failed to make a serious dent in the prestige that the British imperialism enjoyed in the Punjab. Surprisingly, the collective fines Ordinance was never applied, as

no such occasion arose for its use in Haryana. During the entire period i.e. from August 10, 1942 to May 6, 1944 when the movement was officially suspended, the activists of the movement suffered heavy defeats due to their lack of revolutionary thoroughness and false trappings. On August 25, 1945, while on a visit to Punjab, Nehru noted this naked truth. He observed:

“Despite perfect tranquility prevalent in the Punjab during the last three years, the Punjab Government’s attitude was most reprehensive, disgraceful and mean.”

and added that the Punjab traders were also responsible for submitting meekly to all such orders.<sup>133</sup>

However, the crisis in the Quit India Movement did not seriously affect the whipping up and deepening of the contradiction between the people and the British imperialism. Though standing on the sidelines, the people generally showed sympathy for the Congress cause. The more articulate among these sections sought utmost consideration for the Congress detenus. On March 10, 1943, the Tribune in an editorial wrote:

“It is the duty of the Premier (of Punjab) to see that these men who include many of his colleagues in the Legislative Assembly, are treated with the utmost consideration. The present state of affairs is deplorable, it does more harm than good. The Premier should put an end to it”.<sup>134</sup>

The Punjab Premier’s statements on March 8<sup>135</sup> and 12, 1943<sup>136</sup> asking for a solemn assurance by the detenu not to thwart the war efforts of the province” were severely criticized.<sup>137</sup> It was argued that the expression “Public interest” had been badly misused in Punjab.<sup>138</sup> The oppressive nature of the Punjab Government was also condemned. On December 14, 1944, the issue became a public controversy. The Punjab Assemble fiercely debated the issue of allowing the Congress M.L.As. to participate in the Assembly debates.<sup>139</sup> As a consequence, the Punjab Government was forced to remove this restriction in July, 1945.<sup>140</sup> Pt. Shri Ram Sharma was released along with Lala Kīdar Nath

Sehgal, Pratap Singh and Gopal Singh Qaumi.<sup>141</sup> On September 11, 1945, the Punjab Government removed restriction on 33 Congress workers. Among them Mange Ram Vats, Kali Charan and Muttavi Syed belonged to Haryana.<sup>142</sup> This was also a time when a very sensitive problem was building up in the form of a demand for the release of the I.N.A. prisoners.<sup>143</sup>

Not less important than this dimension of the people's reaction is the question which relates to the idiom of the Quit India Movement and its resonance with the ideological world of the Congress party. Dr. Arun Bhuyan has discussed this question in detail. However, it is necessary to point out that the Tribune (which was the spokesman of the Punjabi middle class) had consistently opposed 'mob violence'. The reasoning behind this opposition was that the Congress had nothing to do with mob madness. In an editorial entitled "Don't say No to Sir T.B. Sapru", the paper said:

"It is sheer non-sense to talk of Mr. Gandhi as a fifth columnist" said General Smuts sometime ago. It is also sheer non-sense to talk of Gandhiji as approving the madness that recently took place in the country after his arrest and the arrest of other Congress leaders".<sup>144</sup>

This was not a solitary comment. There are many more such observations made from time to time by this paper, which prove that the responsibility of mass upsurge was never assigned to the Congress party.<sup>145</sup> As such, it can be deduced that the Quit India Movement was never taken seriously by The Tribune. On the contrary, this movement was disapproved and declared unconstitutional. This emphasis on the opinion of The Tribune is deliberate, for more or less it represented the view-point of the middle class in Haryana. In such a situation it is not difficult to assess the reason why this movement failed to sharpen in the Haryana region. In other words, the middle class antagonism with imperialism had not fully developed, nor it had courage to take up an anti-imperialist position.

Moreover, the Congress-managers in Haryana failed to realise the importance of the rural masses in order to strengthen their party. This lacuna in the leadership generally appeared to be

a slight one but the dangers arising out of it were enormous. The one direct effect of this mistake was that while the other regions in India worked out new ways of development of the liberation movement in which the tasks of national independence was linked with the task of revolutionary upsurge, the Haryana region remained quiet maintaining peace of the grave yard. This is all the more significant as the wave of anger against the Government was very much evident among the general masses in Haryana despite the virulent Congress baiting in the Punjab. Reporting about Jawaharlal Nehru's tour of Punjab towns in August 1945, The Tribune said editorially:

“Scenes reminiscent of the balmy days of the non-cooperation movement were witnessed in the Punjab during the brief but hurricane tour of some towns in the province by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Unprecedented crowds greeted him wherever he went. In Lahore the crowds were so big that he himself declared at a public meeting that he was addressing the biggest gathering of his life. No doubt the personality of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who is the idol of the people, was an important factor in attracting huge crowds at the functions arranged in his honour. But the crowds would not have been actuated by a keen desire to support the Congress in its great fight for the freedom of India”.<sup>146</sup>

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *All India Congress Committee Report 1940-46*, Swaraj Bhawan, Allahabad See A.I.C.C. Papers. F. No. G-22 Part-I, 1940-46 (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi). The report observed, “There are moments in national existence when fight-failure and suppression are preferable to continued safe existence at a low, degraded level. The fourth year of war was one such moment in India's upward march”.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 1, 1942; First Half; January, 1942; Punjab. p. 1 and *Ibid.*, Second Half; January, 1942; Punjab. p. 3. Also see Report, from P.C.C., 1942. F. No., p. 22 (Part II) (Nehru Memorial

Museum and Library, New Delhi). The letter of Pratap Singh Kairon, General Secretary, P.P.C.C. to the General Secretary, A.I.C.C. on July 1, 1942 referred to the tour of Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava and Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon to Ambala and Karnal. These district Committees were formed for Qaumi Khidmatgar Dal, and the programme of self-sufficiency and Self-protection was explained. This letter was written in response to the A.I.C.C. circular No. 9.

7. An official report said: "The general uneasiness caused by the war news in the Far East and the intractability of the Congress has been fanned by the widespread and prolonged suspension of business by the traders as a protest against the sales Tax Act, and by the increasing cost of essential, everyday commodities, both of which factors have combined to create a feeling of unrest and discontent". See *Ibid.*, Second Half; January, 1942; Punjab. p. 1.
8. *The Tribune*, June 7, 1942.
9. The letter of Pt. Neki Ram Sharma, President, District Congress Committee, Hissar and Member, A.I.C.C. to General Secretary A.I.C.C., dated June 15, 1942. For details see *Punjab 1942-46*. F. No., p-16 (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library New Delhi).
10. *Ibid.*, See the letter of official General Secretary A.I.C.C. (Sadiq Ali) to Pt. Neki Ram Sharma, dated June 19, 1942. Also see General Secretary (Ram Krishan) of P.P.C.C. letter to Off. General Secretary A.I.C.C., dated June 29, 1942 and another letter of Off. General Secretary, A.I.C.C., letter to General Secretary P.P.C.C. dated July 2, 1942.
11. *The Tribune*, June 13, 1942. The paper quoted Reuter's message giving a reply (to Mr. Soren Sen) to Mr. Amery in the House of Commons. Mr. Amery said, "I imagine that the resolution has an undesirable character but not necessary justifying prosecution.
12. See letter of Off. General Secretary, A.I.C.C. to Pt. Neki Ram Sharma dated June 19, 1942. *Punjab 1942-46*. F. No., P-16 (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi).
13. *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 6, 1942; First Half; June, 1942; Punjab. p. 1.
14. *Ibid.* F. No., 18, 2, 1942; First Half; February, 1942; Punjab. p. 1.
15. Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules related to profiteering.
16. Rule 51 of the Defence of India Rules related to financial offences.
17. Under Rule 81, D.O.I.R., 8 persons were prosecuted in January. In February this number increased to 15. In June this number was 18. In August, it was 52. In this month two other Rules, i.e., 38 and 56, D.O.I.R. were also applied.
18. For details see *The Indian Annual Register*, 1942, Vol. I. p. 56.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 2, 1942; First Half; February, 1942; Punjab. p. 3.
21. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 6, 1942; First Half; June, 1942; Punjab. p. 1. Mian Iftikar Uddin was trenchantly criticized, particularly for his press conference on May 9, 1942. In the press conference he had said: "The best way to work for unity is by conceding the right of succession.

Mr. Raja-gopalachari's move, therefore, instead of being a Pakistan move, is actually the most effective unity of India move"; Also see *The Tribune* May 10, 1942.

22. The letter of Pt. Shri Ram Sharma to the A.I.C.C. General Secretary, dated July 19, 1942. Also see the letter written by Sadiq Ali, Off. General Secretary, A.I.C.C., to Pt. Shri Ram Sharma, dated July 24, 1942. *Punjab 1942-46*. F. No., p-16 (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi).
23. *Ibid.*, See letter of Lala Duni Chand, M.L.A., Ambala to the General Secretary A.I.C.C. (undated).
24. *Ibid.*
25. *The Tribune*, August 2, 1942. In support of this one can cite the speech of Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan at Lahore on August 1, 1942. He said: "As far as the Punjab is concerned, we have a special reason to recent the movement which the Congress leaders threatened to lunch. Hundreds of thousands of gallant sons of this province are fighting the enemy on various fronts of the battlefield and the province as a whole is wedded to a policy of giving all possible help to win the war. This policy has the full support of the popular will, as voiced by the representative Assembly of the province".
26. *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 8, 1942; First Half; August, 1942; Punjab. Appendix II-A. Also see *Ibid.* Second half; August, 1942; Punjab. Appendix II-A.
27. *The Tribune*, August 14, 1942.
28. *Home Political*. F. No. 18, 8, 1942; First Half; August 1942; Punjab, p. 1.
29. *The Tribune*, August 16, 1942.
30. *Ibid.*, August 20, 1942.
31. *Ibid.*, August 21, 1942.
32. *Ibid.*, The paper said: "Two windows were damaged and some telephone wires cut as a result of stone throwing by some boys at the post office building in Ambala City".
33. *Ibid.*, August 21, 1942.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*, August 24, 1942.
36. *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 8, 1942; First Half; August, 1942; Punjab. p. 2.
37. *The Tribune*, August 25, 1942.
38. *Ibid.*, August 27, 1942.
39. *Ibid.*
40. This news was published after nearly a week. See *Ibid.*, August 29, 1942.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Ibid.*, August 30, 1942.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.*, August 11, 1942. Also see *Ibid.*, ed., "The Arrest and After."
46. *Ibid.*, August 14, 1942.



47. *Ibid.*, August 2, 1942. Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan's Message for the Third Anniversary of the war on September 3, 1942, and his press-conference at New Delhi on September 10, 1942 emphasized the same theme. See *Ibid.*, September, 5 1942 and *Ibid.*, September 12, 1942.
48. *Ibid.*, August 16, 1942.
49. *Ibid.*, August 18, 1942.
50. *Ibid.*, August 20, 1942.
51. *Ibid.*, August 26, 1942. Commenting on the collective Fines Ordinance, The Tribune said : "Happily for the Punjab no occasion for its use has so far arisen in this province".
52. *Ibid.*, August 21, 1942.
53. Home Political files give ample references about the Government's apathy to The Tribune during this period. See *Home Political* F. No., 18, 8, 1942; First Half : August, 1942; Punjab, and *Ibid.*, Second Half; August, 1942; Punjab.
54. *The Tribune*, August 26, 1942. ed. "Profit and Loss Account".
55. *Ibid.*, August 11, 1942. ed., "The Arrest and After". Also see *Ibid.*, August 14, 1942. ed. "Repression No Remedy".
56. For details see *Ibid.*, August 13, 1942; ed. "The Vicious Circle", Also see *Ibid.*, August 26, 1942, ed. "Profit and Loss Account".
57. *Ibid.*, August 11, 1942, "Notes and Comments", *Ibid.*, August 12, 1942, ed., "Mr. Amery's Tactics". Also see *Ibid.*, August 21, 1942, ed. "A Barren Policy." and *Ibid.*, August 29, 1942, ed., "A Gross Libel".
58. *Ibid.*, September 1, 1942, ed., "Unavailing Report". Also see *Ibid.*, September 2, 1942. ed. "CEM and the Congress".
59. *Ibid.*, August 27, 1942, ed., "The Need of the Hour".
60. *Ibid.*, September 1, 1942, ed., "Unavailing Report". Also see *Ibid.*, August 15, 1942, ed. "Way to Peace." and *Ibid.*, August 17, 1942, ed., "The Only Way".
61. *Ibid.*, September 11, 1942.
62. *Ibid.*, October 1, 1942.
63. *Ibid.*, October 7, 1942.
64. *Ibid.*, November 3, 1942.
65. *Ibid.*, October 26, 1942.
66. For details see *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 10, 1942; First Half; October, 1942, Punjab. Appendix II. Also see *Ibid.*, Second Half; October, 1942; Punjab. Appendix II and II-A.
67. *The Tribune*, October 26. 1942.
68. *Home Political*. F. No. 18, 11, 1942; First Half; November, 1942; Punjab, p. 1.
69. *Ibid.*. F. No., 18, 10, 1942; First Half; October, 1942; Punjab. Appendix II. Also see *Ibid.*, Second Half; October, 1942, Punjab. Appendix II and II-A.
70. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 11, 1942; First Half; November, 1942; Punjab. Appendix I.
71. *Ibid.*, Appendix II.

72. *Ibid.* Also see *Ibid.*, Second Half; November, 1942; Punjab. Appendix II and II-A.
73. *The Tribune*, November 19, 1942.
74. *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 2, 1942; First Half; December, 1942; Punjab. Appendix II-A.
75. *Ibid.*, Also see *Ibid.*, Second Half; December, 1942; Punjab. Appendix II-A.
76. For details see *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 1, 1943; First Half; January, 1943; Punjab. Appendix II-A. Also see *Ibid.*, Second Half; January, 1943; Punjab. Appendix II-A, and *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 2, 1943; First Half; February, 1943; Punjab. Appendix II-A.
77. *The Punjab Assembly Legislative Debates*, 1942, Vol. XX pp. 62-63. In March 1943. Sardar Sohan Singh Josh gave details about how the Government arrested even innocent persons engaged in private professions, Also see *The Punjab Assembly Legislative Debates* 1943, Vol. XXI pp. 429-30.
78. *Ibid.*, 1942 XX pp. 62-63.
79. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.
82. *The Tribune*, November 3, 1942. ed., "Police Demand".
83. *Ibid.*, November 5, 1942; ed., "Punjab Assembly at Work".
84. *Ibid.*, September 14, 1942, ed., "One Good Effect". The editorial said that Churchill's speech "had made all patriotic Indians, irrespective of their party affiliations, realise what they and their country have to expect from the British Government as long as Mr. Churchill remains the Prime Minister".
85. *Ibid.*, September 15, 1942, ed., "Congress and Violence."
86. *Ibid.*, October 10, 1942, ed., "Mr. Amery's Latest." The editorial made a significant observation. It said : "To think that the British Government can ignore this party and yet bring political peace to India and solve India's constitutional problem, whether now or after the war, as Mr. Amery did appear to think, is a vain illusion".
87. *Ibid.*, September 5, 1942. Also the statement of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan in the Assembly on October 30, 1942. See *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates* 1942. Vol. XX pp. 62-63.
88. *The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates.*, 1942, Vol. XX p. 62.
89. *The Tribune*, September 20, 1942. The paper published a report which said that the executive committee of the Martial classes union had passed a resolution suggesting a basis for negotiations on the subject of finding a practical solution of the existing political deadlock.
90. *Ibid.*, November 20, 1942.
91. *Ibid.*, January 30, 1943.
92. *Ibid.*, September 29, 1942.
93. *Ibid.*, September 1, 1942.
94. *Ibid.*, November 4 and 7, 1942.

95. *Ibid.*, November 6, 1942.
96. *Ibid.*, February 5, 1943.
- 96a. It should be noted that the Congress was ever keen to maintain its hold on the shop keepers and petty traders. In December, 1941 a deputation of the Congress members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly went to Wardha to persuade Gandhi to reconsider his decision of the boycott of legislature in Punjab. They finally got the approval. This demand was made to satisfy the traders and shop keepers who were agitating against the Punjab Government for policy hostile to their economic interests, Pt. Shri Ram Sharma was one of the M.L.As who had gone to Gandhi for the same. See Pt. Shri Ram Sharma, *Haryana Ka Itihas*, p. 126. Also see *A.I.C.C. papers*, p. 16 (1942-46).
97. Cited in *Home Political* F. No. 18, 5, 1943; First Half; May, 1943; Punjab. Appendix I. Also see *Ibid.*, Second Half; May, 1943; Punjab. Appendix. I.
98. *Ibid.*
99. *Ibid.*, Second Half; May, 1943; Punjab. Appendix I.
100. *Ibid.*
101. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 7, 1943; First Half; July, 1943; Punjab. Appendix I.
102. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 10, 1943; First Half; October, 1943; Punjab. Appendix I. Another Government report said: "...the anti-unionist Press is interested in exploiting this exaggeration still further in order to represent the issue as one between the big landlord and the small man". See *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 11, 1943; First Half; November, 1943; Punjab. p. 1.
103. Cited in *Ibid.*, F. No. 18, 7, 1943; Second Half; July, 1943; Punjab. Appendix. I.
104. *Ibid.*, F.N., 18, 8, 1943; First Half; August, 1943; Punjab. p. 1.
105. *Ibid.*
106. *Ibid.* Appendix 1.
107. *Ibid.*, Second Half; August, 1943; Punjab. p. 2.
108. *Ibid.*, Appendix. I.
109. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 1, 1944; Second Half; January, 1944; Punjab. p. 2.
110. See *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 7, 1943; Second Half; July, 1943; Punjab. Appendix I.
111. *Ibid.*
112. *The Tribune*, August 10, 1943.
113. *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 11, 1943; Second Half; November, 1943; Punjab. Appendix I.
114. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 1, 1944; Second Half; January, 1944; Punjab. Appendix I.
115. *Ibid.*, F.No., 18, 3, 1944, First Half; March, 1944; Punjab. Appendix 1.
116. *Ibid.*, F. No. 18 5, 1944; First Half; May, 1944; Punjab. p. 3., and Appendix 1.
117. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 7, 1943; First Half; July, 1943; Punjab. p. 1.
118. The Government report said: "Meanwhile, for the first time since last February, there has been an increase in the monthly figures for

- recruitment." See *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 8, 1943; First Half; August, 1943; Punjab. p. 1.
119. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 1, 1944; Second Half; January, 1944; Punjab. p. 1.
120. As the figures about Haryana region are not available, the figures regarding the whole of Punjab can be a useful guide. Comparative figures for this period were :

	1943	1944
1st quarter	27,304	20,016
2nd quarter	18,774	17,369
3rd quarter	17,298	
4th quarter	11,146	

- For details see *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 7, 1944; Second Half; July, 1944; Punjab. p. 2.
121. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 8, 1943; First Half; August, 1943; Punjab. p. 1.†
122. *Ibid.*
123. *Ibid.*
- 123a. Linlithgow Collection, 91; "Note on Punjab]Ministers" January 11, 1942. Also cited by Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics, the role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 186.
- 123b. *Ibid.*
- 123c. Linlithgow Collection, 12; March 2, 1943, 92 : March 13, 1943. Also cited by Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics : the role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 186.
- 123d. Penderel Moon (ed). *Wavel; The Viceroy's Journal*. pp. 51-53.
124. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 7, 1943; First Half; July, 1943; Punjab. p. 2.
125. *The Tribune*, August 10, 1943. The paper while commenting on the anniversary of Gandhi's arrest, observed that the rebellion was now a thing of the past, that it would only accentuate bitterness to prolong the deadlock, and that Government should now release Congress leaders with out delay".
126. *Home Political*. F. No., 18, 8, 1943; First Half; August, 1943; Punjab. p. 1.
127. *Ibid.*
128. *Ibid.*
129. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 10, 1943; First Half; October, 1943; Punjab. p. 1.
130. *Ibid.*, F. No., 18, 8, 1943; First Half; August, 1943; Punjab p. 1. The Government report said; "In view of this fresh proof of the importance of the Congress agitation in this province, it is now proposed to release a further number of the less important and dangerous Congress detenus, though influential Congressmen and those with terrorist leanings will have to remain in custody".
131. *Ibid.*
132. Jagdish Chander, *Freedom Struggle in Haryana 1919-1947*. p. 162 (unpublished thesis, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra.)

- 132a. *Interview: Ram Singh Jakhar* 28, 5, 84. Also the author is obliged to Shri Jakhar for supplying list of arrested volunteers, including an information about their castes and origin (rural or urban).
- 132b. See S.L. Malhotra, *From Civil Disobedience to Quit India*, pp. 152-53.
133. *The Tribune*, August 26, 1945.
134. *Ibid.*, March 10, 1943, ed., "Detenus in the Punjab".
135. *Ibid.*, March 9, 1943.
136. *Ibid.*, March 13, 1943.
137. *Ibid.*, March 16, 1943, ed., "Punjab Premier and the Congress".
138. *Ibid.*, March 18, 1943, ed., "Public Interest".
139. *Ibid.*, December 15, 1944. Also see *Ibid.*, November 23, 1944, ed., "No More of this Farce Please".
140. *Ibid.*, July 25, 1945.
141. *Ibid.*
142. *Ibid.*, September 12, 1945.
143. For detail see *Ibid.*, August 25, 1945, ed. "Subhash Chandra Bose", *Ibid.*, August 30, 1945, leader article, "The Indian National Army: How it should be treated" by Dilip Singh; *Ibid.*, September 1, 1945, ed., "Indian National Army, Political and Constitutional Issues". *Ibid.*, September 13, 1945, ed., "Fate of INA Men." Also see *Ibid.*, September 27, 1945, Article "Indian Independence" originally published in the Free Press Journal, Bombay, but reproduced in The Tribune.
144. *Ibid.*, March 14, 1943, ed., "Don't Say No. to Sir T.B. Sapru".
145. The various comments and observations made by the Tribune from 1942 to 1945 as has already been mentioned in this chapter. See footnotes 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 85, etc.
146. *The Tribune*, August 30, 1945, ed., "Pandit Nehru's Tour".

## CHAPTER V

### THE FINAL ANALYSIS

The freedom movement in Haryana in 1940s had embraced a dual quest: for self-generated regional identity and for self-sustained national status. The report of the search, so far as the regional identity was concerned, consisted largely of gaps, lacunae in understanding and the ambiguities of competing realities inherent in the united Punjab politics. However, an indication of the trend of unity within Haryana can be had from the study of the peculiar role of British imperialism in this region as also from the trends of change in the objective conditions of social and economic fabric of society, including the change in elite-structure which had appeared long before the beginning of the second world war.

As we contemplate the vast panorama of the Haryana history, it may at first appear that there was nothing so peculiar about the role the British played in this region. But this is far from the truth. Among the British in Haryana, C.T. Metcalfe was one of the first to have conceived and applied an administrative system founded on principles based on the strange blending of two dominant administrative traditions—the British and the Indian.<sup>1</sup> Under him the evangelical fervour and the utilitarian concept of ‘good for many’ was united with the concept of authority and completeness of control.<sup>2</sup> Dr. E. Stokes saw in him a false apostle of liberalism for “at heart” he was “the most conservative of his group”.<sup>3</sup> Obviously, he patronized village communities and established the Mahalgujari system in which the village Zamindars were engaged for revenue and were made responsible for its collection. These zamindars were the occupants of the land, possessing the right of sale, mortgage, transfer and gift “within the village” and “the whole village by prescriptive right could sell or transfer their zameendaree rights and title to the zameendars of another

village or to any individual".<sup>4</sup> The relations between the zamindars and their tenants were also governed by the customary laws. The mode of collecting the share of revenue was a matter of internal management with little or no interference of the government. Apparently, the system worked well. The villages largely arose from notions of family property and of the joint and equal inheritance of the members which had formed the basis of the Hindu law and customs in Haryana. However, its baneful effects were not far to discern. Many of these joint-villages were the creation of the British system which lacked 'a strong principle of coherence'. A new class of land proprietors was created which had little attachment to land, since they did not belong to castes who themselves cultivate the soil. In those areas of Haryana where the joint-villages existed in reality, the peasant-proprietors developed a sense of union and the vested interests in power by maintaining their original status with a strong "clannish feeling". The ideologies used to justify colonialism, strangely enough, emanated from the concept of establishing the "supremacy of the mother country" at all costs.<sup>5</sup> Metcalfe, at one stage, favoured an exorbitant tax on grain in spite of obvious economic reasons against it. He said: "I want the Government to increase its army and levy a duty on grain to pay it".<sup>6</sup> The history of the assessments was a series of unsuccessful efforts to extract an 'economic rent' which was frequently identified with the 'net produce'. The attempt was to get as large a share as possible. The impression was created that the British assessments reduced demands on the farmers but actually things were quite different. H. Calvert, writing about the whole of Punjab, says, "It would seem that cash payments and rigidity of collection largely set off the advantage to the cultivator".<sup>7</sup> Moreover, other taxes were imposed which were never demanded during the pre-British times. The revenue assessment was oppressive. George Campbell reported that the demand was so high that ordinarily it would require the whole gross produce of the land and cattle to defray the government demand.<sup>8</sup> The result was that the government exacted all that could be got and the remainder accumulated as balance. The arrears were finally settled by selling their land. Thus the violence of the British revenue system compelled people to abandon their lands and homes and migrate to distant parts for subsistence. In 1826, the

Collector of Karnal reported:

“The tehsildar has urged the people to the extremity of their means, and they are consequently exhausted by a continuance of extraordinary struggles grievously impoverished, and tremblingly apprehensive of a repetition of the grinding system. In many instances, and often in the largest villages, the whole village has fled in a body; for after the usual process of imprisonment and sale of property desertion remained the common ultimatum”.<sup>9</sup>

The situation did not change for the better even after the lessons of the ‘Mutiny Spirit’ which apparently the British dreaded most. All told, nothing concrete emerged during the entire period for the good of common people. The simple tribute of the earlier period, buttressed mainly on land revenue, had given place to the network of other forms of exploitation of the colonial system with hosts of subsidiary parasites in the Haryana economy.

This process can also be traced in the wider economic field. The union of agriculture and manufacturing pursuits in the village economy was destroyed by the invasion of British capitalism. The manufactures practised in the villages were weaving of the cotton and wool, cloth, rope making, pottery and bricks, and other minor handicrafts such as the making of baskets and mats. These industries could not withstand the storm of British capitalism.

The colonial situation in Haryana thus appeared to have assumed a spurious character. Herein existed the ever-widening gap between the announced principle of “the civilizing mission” and the actual practice of political dependency, economic exploitation and virtually non-existent social benefits. The feudal and semi-feudal characteristics of the Haryana Society were deliberately retained to subserve the allotted role of metropole-colony relationship. This would be apparent if the geographical proximity of Haryana region with the Delhi-metropolitan town is kept in view. Apart from these factors, another point which needs emphasis is the late entry of the British in Haryana as compared to other regions. In consequence, the backwardness of society was a manifestation of the peculiar relationship forced on the people of Haryana by the British. It was thus the economic reasons that the British



invoked to justify their presence. Later in the 20th century they desperately tried to maintain these gains even by tempting the peasant proprietors with inducements calculated to appeal to their self-interest and reducing the leaders of these communities to the assigned role of the ruling elite enlisted for the cause of British economic imperialism.

Obviously, the unity among the people stemmed from the colonial situation due to the common experience of exploitation and common desire to challenge the established order. However, the benefit of this sense of oneness first went to the landlords and the other remnants of feudal classes in this region. The feudal lords who were under direct attack from the British rulers in 1857 made common cause with the people and tried to regain their power against the increasing ambitions of the British to grab their lands and deprive them permanently from exercising position of authority over the masses. Their resistance was weak and unorganised. In consequence, Haryana witnessed the inglorious record of these lords falling as ninepins before the foreigners who had the support of a section of the Indian military and superior gun-power. Thereafter, the Queen Victoria proclamation, the policy of Lord Canning and the selfishness of the decomposed feudal lords combined to produce a new effect in the laboratory of Haryana under the colonial rule. The British move of uniting Haryana territories with the loyal Punjab to provide effective checks to the growing unrest of Haryana people created a lamentable effect on the psychological development of the people. It resulted in completely unhinging them. Moreover, under the new set up of administrative and economic action and of educational policies, the tranquil waters of the social fabric based on traditional sources of power were greatly disturbed and a new social force emerged which though numerically small and unorganised, became an alternative to fill the vacuum for future anti-imperialist strike.

An anti-imperialist strike in the present context depended upon two ingredients simultaneously present: a society that for reasons domestic or external, was in a state of flux or pressing change. A body of leaders was motivated to seek political power in order to effect radical institutional changes in the society. Haryana society lacked none, but these ingredients were never so strong as to

completely over-power the traditional bases of authority in society i.e. village communities, religion, joint family and caste. While many aspects of these traditions were rejected, the other aspects beneficial to the leadership were retained with varying degrees of motivations and programmes. A large number of these leaders were born in the middle or late 19th century. Each reflected the historical context in which he operated and each in a way left his mark for better or for worse. All of them were, however, conscious of being Haryanavis in part separate from the united Punjab. This is testified by Pt. Shri Ram Sharma, a veteran of the freedom movement in Haryana.<sup>10</sup>

We have just considered facts which relate to the question of identity and regional unity in the Haryana society. For another aspect of self-sustained national status for the freedom struggle launched in Haryana we have to refer back to the main hypothesis tested in this study. Let us take each hypothesis, one by one, and see whether what was promised was true?

The first hypothesis relating to the emergence of the middle class in Haryana in the 20th century and its political importance has been answered in Chapter I. The geographical cohesiveness of the Haryana territory, demographic and productive composition of society, socio-religious movements in the 19th century, the pre-capitalist traditional sources of power, the change in the mode of production and its relations with the means of production due to the destructive and regenerative role of the British in this area, and finally the uneven development of capitalism, were factors which were primarily responsible for the birth of the middle class in Haryana. In size and magnitude this class was too small. Economically it swung from the minimum subsistence level to the stage of affluence. However, the majority of them was not so prosperous materially. As a class, it originated from the interaction of various forces and cross-currents. Consequently, it was largely fragmented into many sub-groups such as the educated, industrial and commercial middle classes.

The toughest of the lot was the educated middle class. It was most vocal. The plus point in its favour was its strong position on the political scene of India. Its importance among the simple Haryanvis was due to its capacity to communicate in English and live in a value system which apparently had roots in

the western world-view. The enthusiasts among British colonialists were happy, for this class came very near to the wild expectations of Lord Macaulay who visualized the English-educated as "a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions who we govern . . . a class of persons Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect".<sup>11</sup> It is hardly necessary to point out that he went to extremes. His characterization of the educated class was patently absurd for the more astute among the British administrators such as Lord Hastings had correctly understood the potentials of this class. In 1818, he had remarked that this class would demand representative political institutions and was convinced that the demand would have to be conceded.

Equally significant was the industrial and commercial middle class. Its social composition, unlike other regions of India, was primarily from the merchant class. These middlemen were not westernized to any significant extent. However, due to the novel circumstances created by the British colonial rule their jobs required specialized training and education. This learning was based on new professional skills in trade and commerce. They were not idlers. On the contrary they were one of the busiest classes of the society but their labour was directed towards accumulating wealth by force or cunning. They took little part in the actual production of wealth by sweat or skill.

This class comprised money-lenders, shop-keepers, traders, merchants, managers and the proprietors of industrial concerns. The money-lender enjoyed a unique position in the rural economy. For a money-lender, according to D. Ibbetson, was "an agency which shall furnish capital to a class who are, as a rule, without it and shall receive the produce of the fields in exchange for the hard cash in which alone Government will receive its revenue".<sup>12</sup> In the urban centres, the other sections of this class predominated. In towns and cities they controlled money transactions and market machinery. The British support to peasant proprietors, particularly after the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900, created a fear complex among the trading community. As a consequence, they were not only alienated with the British but sought bases of support from forces which were antagonistic to the British rule in this region. With the emergence of the

Unionist party their latent anger found full expression and this class began to assert and press for its local and political importance.

Apart from the educated industrial and commercial middle class, a new group of peasant proprietors also forced its entry into the Complex Structure of Haryana Society. It is this class which became the 'respectable native' after its members had settled down as landlords. Based on village communities and Bhaichara land tenure, Haryana was able to boast of possessing a large group of peasants who were men of substance and looked resentfully at the encroachment of the rising middle class English-educated urban Haryanvis. Moreover, their attachment to their proprietary rights was in no way opposed to the goals set by the British to consolidate their position in the entire region. In one of the speeches Sir Chhotu Ram (who was the leading spokesman of this class) said, "I was a Congressman, both inwardly and outwardly, and thus, anti-government. This conflicted with my conviction that a backward class, and the class to which I belonged was admittedly a backward class, cannot afford to fight against the government".<sup>13</sup> By a backward class' Chhotu Ram meant the agriculturist class, particularly the 'statutory agriculturist', and not the landless labour and tenants-at-will.<sup>14</sup> The reason why the 'statutory agriculturist' could not fight was purely self-interest. The interest was of seeking benefits from the powers of soil and other favours which came easily for being with the establishment.

All in all, this amorphous picture created a peculiar situation in the political face of social reality. Those sections of middle class, which were a vigorous offspring of modernization and were associated with distinct activity of education, commerce and industry, acted in the main as anti-imperialist. But the Land-owning peasant which sought subsistence through agriculture and was endemic to rural areas and old towns, where traditional values were paramount, relied on communal partisanship for mass support. However, their, leaders adopted circuitous ways to realize their objectives. On the one hand, they stood "on the basis of common secular and economic interest"<sup>15</sup> and, on the other hand, they derived social support from tribal, caste and class ties for their political action. The British obviously enlisted their support by means of concessions offered through a systematic programme

involving the co-operation of these leaders and their political arm, the Unionist party.

The other hypothesis established in this study is the correlation between the size, economic status, degree of organization and consciousness of common interest of the middle class with the uneven development of the national movement in Haryana.

Chapters II, III and IV amply suggest that the graph of national movement in Haryana in no way differed with the size, economic status and the degree of organization which the middle class had succeeded to build for itself. The entire history of the national movement in Haryana during 1940-45 stands testimony to the fact that the movement was led by the Congress. This party acted as a political educator of the people. It was the main force rallying the political elements of the anti-imperialist movement. It coordinated and directed the activities of the people, as required by the overall programme of the movement. However, it failed to ensure the stability and continuity of the freedom movement. It also failed to train dependable leaders who could carry out an anti-imperialist political struggle with success. Between 1939 and 1940, the Congress party in Haryana was enmeshed in petty party squabbles. There were distinct groups of Pt. Shri Ram Sharma, Pt. Neki Ram Sharma, Lala Duni Chand of Ambala and Mange Ram Vats. Except for Mange Ram Vats, who represented a side-current, none of them appeared to possess an ideological slant.<sup>16</sup> The wrangles between them came to such a pass that they degenerated into clashes against each other. This behaviour obviously threatened a slipping down into methods of phrase mongering for narrow gains. The task of uniting these warring groups fell on the shoulders of Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava and Dr. Satya Pal (the big two of the united Punjab) who had their own axe to grind against each other. The Congress High Command too failed to act in time. It took no concrete steps to make the party in Punjab and Haryana organisationally more fighting fit. Despite this low morale, the first round in the extended series of anti-imperialist strike was undertaken. Ground was prepared by highlighting the oppressive nature of the British rule. The volunteer corps and national militia were organised. Committees were formed in each district of Gurgaon, Rohtak, Hissar, Karnal and Ambala. The Punjab leaders toured these districts and a conference

of Congressmen was held under Dr. Kitchlew in May, 1939 to chart out a programme and to stir up an agitation. Important days in national life were celebrated and to keep the tempo high the socialists organised their national conference at Rohtak on July 1 and 2, 1939. After the outbreak of the Second World War in September, 1939 and the entire year of 1940, a new sense of responsibility was shown by the Congress. The visits of national leaders enthused the people and the party work was streamlined. Following the direction of the High Command the Congress party in Haryana organised meetings to oppose the government policy of recruitment and many a Congressman offered himself for arrest. Local war committees were formed in some districts and the volunteers' names for impending civil disobedience were collected. The arrests of and demonstration of confidence by the Congressmen had the desired effect. This in a way made it possible to remove the inertia and build the psychological basis for the Individual Satyagraha Movement.

A second round in Haryana struggle for liberation was the Individual Satyagraha Movement. The beginning of the movement saw a switchover in liberation struggle from the lurking sense of compromise to full confrontation with the British. Based on the Gandhian model of non-violence, a constructive programme, the daily spinning and wearing of Khadi, the movement began with a psychological barrier for the people in the region. Not many in the Congress rank and file showed any awareness of the ideological current of "struggle and unity" with the British Raj which was in the midst of life and death struggle against the Fascist powers. Notwithstanding this gulf in understanding between the national leadership and the Congressmen in Haryana, the movement was started in an atmosphere of harsh persecution. The modus operandi was shouting of anti-war, anti-recruitment slogans or making speeches before courting arrest. The Satyagrahis were instructed to keep district authorities informed of their activity. In no case they were permitted to default. The movement was to be conducted with dignity and restraint. It had a limited objective, to defend the honour of the people and some of its elementary rights and it achieved that objective in a fair measure.<sup>17</sup> The progress of Satyagraha in the first phase was not very impressive. Not all members of the

All-India Congress Committee, Provincial Legislature and office bearers of District Congress Committees offered themselves for arrest, though they were instructed to do so. The second phase of the movement was, however, an improvement over the first phase. About 100 of the Satyagrahis presented themselves for arrest. The Congress in Haryana was still faction-ridden and the conceptual part of the Gandhian movement was flouted at will. Compared to the first two phases, the third phase was better organized. The interim President of the Punjab Congress, Lala Duni Chand of Ambala, took the Gandhian principles in all seriousness and saw to it that the instructions from the High Command and Punjab Provincial Congress Committee were fully obeyed. About 135 Congressmen offered Satyagraha in March, 1941. The total number of civil resisters from the United Punjab during this phase was 247. In spite of the rebuke of Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur to presidents and secretaries of the District Congress Committees of Punjab during her visit on April 10, 1941, the contradiction and cracks in the ideological framework of Individual Satyagraha Movement continued to reappear again and again. In April, 100 Satyagrahis were prosecuted. In May, the total number of Satyagrahis was 84, thus recording a significant fall in the numbers of civil resisters. In the fourth phase, the movement appeared to be in a floundering state. It was just struggling to survive. In June only 9 Satyagrahis courted arrest. This figure fell to 8 in July. In August, 1971 people were prosecuted. In September, the number of arrests for Satyagraha fell to 7. Between October and December the total number of Satyagrahis was 11. Except for highlighting the fundamental rights of people to air their views on war issues, the Congress in Haryana in no way attempted to win over social forces potentially capable of joining the anti-imperialist movement. The policy of the Government towards the Congress also remained unchanged.

A third round of development in the liberation struggle of Haryana obscured the Individual Satyagraha phase and led to a drastic transformation in both structure and ideology of the freedom movement. This round exploded into action particularly after the events of August 8-9, 1942 and is best remembered as the Quit India Movement. The formal mode of operation was to stage "an open rebellion"<sup>18</sup> with determination to "free India or

die in the attempt".<sup>19</sup> Deliberately no detailed programme was chalked out. The people were left free to strike and oust the British imperialism root and branch with the avowed purpose of bringing freedom to the people of India.

The Haryana Congressmen responded by first doing elementary spadework and later embarked on a determined struggle for national liberation. The District Congress Committees were organised and volunteer corps were raised to establish mass contacts with the people. The first phase from August 10, 1942 to August 31, 1942 witnessed the mass upsurge. The second phase between September 1, 1942 to February, 1943 was characterized by an inwardized approach and resistance against the British imperialism was strengthened, entering upon a stage of a more or less protracted development of the liberation struggle. However, the third phase beginning from February 10, 1943 to May 6, 1944 brought down the temper to its lowest ebb and was marked by probing for settlement and a renewed emphasis on Gandhian non-violence and constructive programme. Throughout the period, the movement largely remained confined to the towns in Haryana. Except for stray incidents of sabotage, the atmosphere was of hiding the face and not of agitating in the street. The total number of people arrested in the Quit India Movement did not exceed 350. As the party hard core numbered less, the British offensive proved successful. The British manoeuvred the Congress party into open fight and thus gained a further advantage in exposing its thin base among the masses. Even the middle class, which to a large extent was the social base of the movement, withdrew to the safety of their professions and homes.

If we recapitulate the entire gamut of freedom movement in Haryana between 1939 and 1945, it becomes evident that the whole movement was characterized, *inter alia*, by the leading role played by the middle class with all its internal gradations and the alliances which it succeeded in establishing with other sections of society. Throughout the period under study, the middle class actively participated in the liberation struggle. As a class, they felt the need for liberation struggle because they were oppressed by the British imperialism and fettered by the peasant proprietors. However, they could not display consistent enthusiasm for fighting imperialism as economically and politically this class was flabby



and had economic links both with the British imperialism and the feudalism. Moreover, the objective conditions of the middle class in Haryana, as stated in Chapter I, did in no way inspire confidence in their capacity to successfully widen and intensify the struggle against the British imperialism.

This brings us to the third hypothesis, i.e. the increasing influence of the rural-based political elite in Haryana, which, as a consequence of the rise of landowning agriculturists and retired military men turned into money-lender largely roadblocked the anti-imperialist tide for this group was more pragmatic and had little interest in generalized anti-imperialist themes.

Prem Chaudhary in her article on the 'Social Basis of Chaudhary Sir Chhotu Ram's Politics' has made pointed reference to this hypothesis. She refers to the figures supplied by the Census of India, 1921 and says that the peasant proprietors termed as 'statutory agriculturists' "came to be specially privileged classes in the eyes of the administration in the Punjab".<sup>20</sup> According to her, Sir Chhotu Ram was aware of this fact and "consequently he made 'Jatism' the social and political basis of his political action."<sup>21</sup> In her recent work, 'Punjab Politics : The role of Sir Chhotu Ram' She has developed this thesis in great detail and says "casteism fostered by the British—provided Chhotu Ram the basis of successful political organisation. In his hands "casteism" took the form of promoting "Jat interests" at their surface level, it was enlarged to encompass "Hindu Zamindar interests" in the context of the entire province".<sup>21a</sup>

To consider this theme it is desirable to mention that Haryana had been an agrarian region with rural population comprising the overwhelming majority. As such, it was evident that the number of persons employed in agriculture was enormous. The increase according to the 1931 Census of India was the biggest in the districts of Gurgaon and Hissar. It was fairly big in Rohtak. In Ambala the increase was between 11 and 20 per cent and in Karnal about 10 per cent.<sup>22</sup> As for the statutory agriculturists, the total for five districts of Ambala division was 3,781,288.<sup>23</sup> Excluding them, there were landless labour and tenants-at-will. The predominance of Jats in the whole of Punjab (about 53.3 per cent) had new dimensions for political importance.<sup>24</sup> Significantly, the Unionist Party was largely the party of this group among the

peasant proprietors. It comprised the Hindu Jats and the Muslim Jats. This helped the Unionist Party to maintain non-communal image and yet seek power on communal lines. Communalism was thus re-channelized on the basis of class struggle and economism, maintaining artificial division between the rural and the urban people.

Sir Chhotu Ram was the moving spirit of the party. In his political life he had two clear-cut circles. Many a time, these two circles overlapped each other. In his early career, he was a Jat leader determined to ameliorate the backward conditions of his community. He was also a Congressite having faith in its ideology of secularism, democracy and nationalism. However, after the first strike of anti-imperialist non-cooperation movement, his first circle began to dominate. He had fears that the no-rent campaign would harm the land-owning classes first, the government would launch oppression by expropriating their land. Second, the trading communities would rush in with money to purchase new land, and third, the centre of social power would greatly be disturbed and the landless peasantry would get an upper hand over powers of soil. With this in view, he began to compromise with the British Raj against the nationalist forces laced with anti-imperialism. From now on his emphasis was on the necessity of restructuring the economic and social bases of the peasant proprietors—his political base. He had planned to complete his life-mission with the support of the government. He said "Though old and infirm I can assure you that the god of Death will fail miserably to remove me from the arena of activities, until and unless I succeed".<sup>25</sup> On a question that this section of peasantry (zamindars) is not more than 19 per cent in the whole of the Puajab and what his programme would be for other categories of farmers, he replied "That is too hasty and revolutionary a step".<sup>26</sup> For urbanites he had contempt. At a meeting in Jullundur he went to the extent of telling the villagers who had voted for an urbanite to be ashamed of themselves.<sup>27</sup> Strange as it may seem, the fact remains that he led the peasant proprietors to the camp of British imperialism and that to by making full use of traditional sources of authority like caste relations. He freely exploited the fears of peasant proprietors and promised them political safety. The simple peasants easily fell in the political game, for many of them

did not possess enough land and only a small section of them had surplus land. In other words the model Sir Chhotu Ram built for his politics was simple and clear. His ambition was to play a decisive role in the politics of Punjab. He could have done this by championing the cause of freedom by entering into an anti-imperialist movement which Congress had launched under the leadership of Gandhi. This path, however, he did not adopt. Instead of confronting with British imperialism he decided to co-operate with them. At a time when country was marching from one anti-imperialist movement to another, this path was bound to be unpopular. As against this the objective conditions of Punjab including Haryana made his task easier. The British had plans to permanently keep away the ghost of 1857. By 1900 they had unfolded their plan. The plan was to win over the agriculturist castes on their side. The Land Alienation Act and subsequent amendments created much needed loyalty of peasant proprietors. The martial race concept was superimposed to recruit these peasant castes in Army in great numbers. These two steps largely altered the material conditions of Punjab. The Act of 1919 had envisaged the participation of Indians in provincial politics. The landlords and rich peasant proprietors tried to organise themselves with the blessing of British Government, Sir Chhotu Ram had a keen eye. A practical politician that he soon realised the advantages of winning over his own community. The retired soldiers who were back as peasant proprietors and money-lenders in their villages were willing to lend him full support. Moreover, the in-built resentment of a large section of peasantry against Banias who were expropriating their hard earned income was for all to see. Sir Chhotu Ram utilised this antagonism that existed between Banias—the owner of usury Capital and the poor peasantry. This made him earn the title of peasant leader. However, he was a peasant leader with a difference. His role was to advise peasants, in the absence of Congress programme of peasant resistance against British, to concentrate exclusively on self-interest which meant seeking co-operation of British imperialism. To do this he needed popular slogans which could directly touch the heart of a peasant and distort his social consciousness. It was out of this need that Bania-Brahmin versus Jat and rural versus urban slogans were born. The Congress was declared as a party of Banias and

Brahmins—a party representing the interest of urban people. The Jat peasant proprietors were shown the golden path to fight against their economic and social exploiters. The Banias as already stated were their direct exploiters always hurting their material interests. Similarly Brahmins had a long history of exploiting the peasantry socially. With the British becoming the political masters of India Bania the owner of usury capital had come to play the role of new elite. As the Baniyas were the new patron of the traditional intellectual—the Brahmins, the anger of peasantry was equally directed against them. Sir Chhotu Ram in his relentless fight against Congress utilised these contradictions in the village society and successfully projected himself as a great leader. This he could do because the peasant proprietors do not form a class. They can not represent themselves. They must be represented. Writing about the characteristics of small holding peasants in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Karl Marx says:

“The identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organisation among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name whether through a Parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them. . . The political influence of the small holding peasants, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself”.<sup>28</sup>

Here, a note of caution is necessary. Though it is true that Sir Chhotu Ram did not broaden his vision to embrace anti-imperialism, yet there were other leaders among the peasant proprietors who made a contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle conducted by the Congress party. Headmaster Baldev Singh, Chaudhari Sahib Ram and Matu Ram joined the national struggle and were an important motive force of the national struggle in Haryana. Among the Yadav community, Mangli Ram Vaid and Kastura Bai belonging to the same class of peasant proprietors joined the anti-imperialist ranks and also did organizational work for the Congress.

The historiography on Haryana's freedom struggle has not gone beyond assumptions certain deliberately planted by Sir Chhotu Ram. However, in recent years this picture has changed rapidly while the old fields have continued to be cultivated new ideas too have begun to find their roots. The historical writings have become more analytical. This has introduced new lights and shades. For instance there is no truth in the myth that Jats of Rohtak and Sonapat shied away from Congress. In fact majority of Congress volunteers belonged to this caste both in Individual Satyagrah Movement and Quit India Movement. Similarly the Haryana region being largely rural the Congress Satyagrahis were either rural settled in urban centres. It is, however, true that majority of landlords and rich peasant proprietors as also a section of middle peasants had their heart with Sir Chhotu Ram. This was not only true of Jats. Even other communities including some Gaur Brahmins villages of Rohtak district openly accepted Sir Chhotu Ram as their leader.<sup>29</sup>

In contrast to it a sizable section of rural masses belonging to all communities and castes remained inactive in other districts. In any case they were not hostile to the national struggle.<sup>30</sup>

True understanding of Haryana is difficult unless a comparison is established with other regions of India.

The social and economic complexities of Haryana region were different as compared to the objective realities of United Punjab. Unfortunately whenever an attempt is made to understand the history of Haryana the images of Punjab social reality overshadows the historical writings on Haryana. The predominant note in Punjab politics was communal. It was not so in Haryana. In Punjab the big landlords and rich peasants of canal colonies controlled the levers of power. In contrast to it the region of Haryana did not possess many big landlords or rich peasants. Being largely a small landowning peasant area only section of it participated in the power game. In Punjab there was a sizable middle class. In Haryana the infant middle class was critically placed. Throughout the period of our study it was facing teething trouble. Like Punjab, Haryana did not possess big towns. Even its towns were not better than enlarged villages. Except for Ambala Haryana could hardly boast of any urban centre. Within this canvass the political pattern of Haryana had to be different.

If we analyse the objective conditions of Bengal, the role of middle class in alliance with peasantry will be apparent. Bengal mirrored a new society. The introduction of permanent settlement and the elimination of the old handicrafts in the villages created new material conditions. On the one hand there was a vast number of ruined peasantry who were unable to support themselves, even though they desperately tried to work. This section of peasantry was cruelly rejected by the ruling order. Parallel to this impoverished peasantry a loyal class of proprietors was born which was attached to the British as Lord Cornwallis himself pointed out "should be attached to us from motives of self-interest. A landholder who was secured in the quite enjoyment of a profitable estate could have no motive for wishing for a change". This class was of money Sharks who were not interested in agriculture acted as the main props of British tyranny and plunder. This class was permanently won-over to the side of imperialism. The middle class another child of British Raj, however, began to raise voices of angry dissent. With the increase in their strength and size this class became the main bulwork against British imperialism.

A radical section of this class resisted oppression of the foreign rulers and provided leadership to these ruined paupers.<sup>32</sup> An irresistible momentum was given to new forces of history. The process of struggle led to revolutionary consciousness. Bengal achieved what in retrospect appears to be a decisive victory by the middle class in alliance with impoverished peasantry.

But this did not happen in Haryana. Historically Haryana had anti-imperialist tradition. In 1857 Haryana peasantry along with some feudal lords participated in the struggle against the British Raj. It was only after 1900 that its tradition began to change. The emergence of its middle class was also distorted. It was weak. Unlike Bengal middle class its contradiction with British imperialism could not mature. This class could not intervene effectively in the basic contradictions which the British had created vis-a-vis a large section of peasantry due to their extraordinary greed to amass wealth from land revenue. Due to commercialisation of agriculture and over taxation on land indebtedness was as common in Haryana as in Bengal. The British due to war colonialism (i.e. their recruitment policy in Punjab) deserted Banias who were the traditional owners of usury capital.<sup>33</sup> In their place

Landlords, retired soldiers who had returned to their villages filled the vacuum. Unfortunately due to this mode of relations, the peasantry in whom the British imperialism should have their worst enemies, no antagonism developed. The middle class which generally leads this class in the revolutionary situation had no ground to walk. Moreover the Haryana (as also the united Punjab) was a landlocked area. The apathy of Government combined with natural resources of the region hastened the ruin of industries. The process of adjustment which should have begun under the British was deliberately hindered. This deprived this region from the active role of regional bourgeoisie. Similarly the absence of proletariat resulted in complete absence of radicalism.

Kerala in the south provide yet another example. It has a long Lineage of popular democratic struggles. It shows us that despite retreats and defeats the people made history even under conditions of oppression and exploitation. In Kerala we find a strong tendency to form caste organisations. These organisations tackled various social problems. These caste organisations were in many respects different from what they were in the past. Together with the tenancy movement these organisations laid the basis for the peasant movement in Kerala. E.M.S. Namboodiripad analysed these organisations in his book.<sup>34</sup> He says that in their early stages effort had been made to consolidate the caste separatism of the people in general and of the peasantry in particular. However at the same time caste organisations had progressive content. When the peasant masses rose in revolt against feudalism these organisations simultaneously fulfilled the historical task of leading the peasants in the struggle. Subsequently caste organisations were brought into the fold of the anti imperialism freedom struggle and class organisations of peasantry. He says "Each of these castes began with agitation for some of the specific demands of that caste alone, but they all moved steadily forward and, in a couple of generations, came to the general slogan of abolition of all caste restrictions". With the induction of middle class particularly after the end of World War I these organisations altered their forms. They went out of their purely social reform and cultural limits and transformed their world-view by acquiring the character of a political movement. This entry of the middle class into the arena of political activity provided the peasantry with

leadership in national struggles. The success of Kerala experiment was due to stable middle class forming alliance with the peasantry. Although middle class played an important part in the anti-imperialist movement, the radical instance was due to the progressive role of peasants particularly those who were hard hit by the economic changes and social dislocation caused by the British rule in the region.

In Haryana, however, the opposite was true. The much needed alliance between the impoverished peasantry and middle classes could not take place. The rural elite who assumed the leadership with the connivance of British imperialism stole the merch. Unlike Kerala the caste organisations did not acquire the progressive role. Their earlier form not only remained frozen but began to cast its dark shadow on political struggles of the region. It was the ideology of status quo of rural elite which distorted the growth of peasant militancy. The fear of social and political revolution from below greatly disturbed the rural elites and their leader Sir Chotu Ram who was more pragmatic and had little interest in generalised anti-imperialist movement.

This analysis will remain incomplete if the politico-economic framework of village communities in Haryana is overlooked. As suggested earlier, these village communities created a new form of politicalization of society. The Haryana peasantry was a heterogeneous peasantry in terms of class formation, but not so in terms of community or caste formations. The small peasantry instead of identifying with the landless agriculturist, sought caste links with middle and rich peasantry. The social and cultural cleavage remained endemic in the prevalent idiom of village society. Almost all the landless agriculturists belonged to low caste Harijans. This was largely so as the Haryana society contained within itself strong elements of pre-capitalist society.<sup>35</sup> Neither the British colonialism nor the uneven growth of capitalism delivered those smashing blows which were necessary for the free development of society dominated by caste, communal and tribal institutions.

It is thus quite evident that due to the contradictory pulls, the anti-imperialist movement could not maximize its hold over the people. The blame squarely lies on the middle class Haryana. It was they who failed to interpret their grievances. Mass movement is possible only if a revolutionary party under a revolutionary



leadership makes a correct analysis of their objective conditions. The peasantry is generally conservative and has a great attachment with land. Because of the hold of traditional sources of power, it tends to move backward and is never revolutionary unless it is cultivated for the same. Such a force could be misled unless and until it is educated about its potential powers. But once it is put on the rails, it becomes a force which can bulldoze mountains and sweep all the garbage of the past. Unfortunately this could not happen in Haryana, as the leadership was weak, selfish and undecided, falsely relying on the support of the urban middle class whose achievement was bound to be small with disappointments frequent and trying.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Archipald Seton, was the predecessor of C.T. Metcalfe. He was the first British administrator in Haryana who, on the basis of his rich experience in revenue, judiciary and public gave a relationalized administration to this region. See K.C. Yadav, *The Revolt of 1857 in Haryana*, p. 12.
2. See D.N. Panigrahi, *Charles Metcalfe in India : Ideas and Administration*, pp. 1-23.
3. E. Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India*, p. 18.
4. C.T. Metcalfe's Revenue Report, June 11, 1811. Cited from D.N. Panigrahi, *Charles Metcalfe in India : Ideas and Administration*.
5. Metcalfe to Lord Stanley, March 30, 1844, see E. Thompson, *The Life of Charles Lord Metcalfe*, p. 391.
6. Metcalfe to Elphinston, November 29, 1811. Cited from D.N. Panigrahi, *Charles Metcalfe in India : Ideas and Administration*, p. 66.
7. H. Calvert, *Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab*, p. 112. Also see Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, p. 127.
8. See D. Ibbetson, *Report of the Revision of Settlement of Panipat and Karnal Parganah, Karnal District* paras 122 and 125, pp. 45-46 and 47.
9. *Ibid.*, para 126, p. 48.
10. See oral History Transcription, Pt. Shri Ram Sharma (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi) p. 88. He says :
11. *Ibid.*
12. D. Ibbetson, *Report of the Revision of Settlement of Panipat and Karnal Parganah, Karnal District.*, para 273, p. 111.
13. Cited from Prem Choudhary, "Social Basis of Chaudhari Sir Chhotu Ram's Politics, *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol. X, Part I, 1976, p. 159.

14. *Ibid.*
15. Madan Gopal, Sir Chhotu Ram, A Political Biography, p. 70.
16. Mange Ram Vats, an old freedom fighter, belonged to the Congress Socialist party of India and was kept in Deoli Jail for a long time.
17. All India Congress Committee report, P.I. See A.I.C.C. Papers File No. G-22, Part I, 1940-46.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. Prem Choudhary, "Social Basis of Chaudhary Sir Chhotu Ram's Politics." *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol. X, Part I, 1976, p. 160.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
- 21a. Prem Chowdhari, *Punjab Politics : The role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 3.
22. *Census of India 1931*, Vol. XVII, Punjab, Part I, p. 221.
23. *Census of India, 1921*, Vol. XV Part II, pp. 30, 194 to 254. The Census gives 11, 228 castes and tribes including minor castes and unspecified ones. The total Jat population of Hissar, Rohtak, Gurgaon, Karnal and Ambala was 7, 29, 766.
24. Sir Chhotu Ram pointedly made reference to the political importance of the Jat community in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. He said: "It is true that on one occasion, I had used the expression, Raj Karega Jat in my own constituency to a gathering of 25,000 to 30,000 people, 95% of whom were Jats. All that I mean by this expression is that under the principle of democratic rule in number, whether it is India as a whole or any province, that community is ultimately bound to get a representation in Government in proportion to its strength". See *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, Vol. XXII, 1944, p. 493. Cited from Prem Choudhary, "Social Basis of Choudhary Sir Chhotu Ram", *Punjab Past and Present*, Vol. X, Part I, p. 161. footnote No. 31.
25. Cited from Madan Lal, *Sir Chhotu Ram: A Political Biography*, p. 109.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.
28. Karl Marx, Eighteenth Brunaire of Louic Bonaparte, See *Collected Works*, part I.
29. For Gaur Brahmin's attitude towards Jat, See Prem Chowdhary, *Punjab Politics : the role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, p. 86. Also see the *Haryana Tilak*, June 21, 1932, May 23, 1940, April 10, 1940.
30. Interview : Pt. Shri Ram Sharma. 20, 5, 84; *Interview Ch. Ram Singh Jakhar*. 28, 4, 84.
31. See H.H. Dodwell (ed.). *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V. pp. 450-51. Also see F.D. Ascoli, *Early Revenue History of Bengal and Fifth Report*. C. Ross *Correspondence of Marquess Cornwallis* Vol. 1-3.
32. See Gautam Chattopadhyay, *Bengal Electoral Politics and Freedom Struggle 1862-1947*, pp. 1-18.
33. S.S. Thorburn, *Mussalmans and Money Lenders in the Punjab* pp-37, 39, 97. He characterized Banias as a "poor cringing creature" and a

person who had "miserable physique" and "no manliness of character." He further observed that "no government" particularly, a handful of foreign sojourners, such as we are, can permit the hereditary and Land-holding class who compose the people of the country," to be subjected to money lenders. Cited from Satya M. Rai, *Legislative Politics and the Freedom Struggle in the Punjab 1897-1947*, p. 14.

34. For details See E.M.S. Nambodaripad, *History of Kerala; From Pre-Feudal to the Present*.
35. On Proprietorship of land parcels by peasants Karl Marx says :  
 "This form of landed property presupposes as in the earlier order forms, that the rural population greatly predominates over the town population, so that even if the capitalist mode of production otherwise prevails, it is but little developed..."  
 See Karl Marx, *Das Capital*, Vol. III, pp. 808.

## APPENDIX I

### LIST OF EMINENT SATYAGRAHIS 1940-45

#### (I) INDIVIDUAL SATYAGRAHA MOVEMENT 1940-41\*

##### Ambala District

Hamid Hussain Pundari, Gulzara Singh, Jyoti Parsad, Shadi Singh, Hazara Singh, Muhammad Yusuf, Gurmukh Singh Ambalvi, Abdul Gaffar Khan, Jaswant Singh, Muhammad Yasin, Pohlu Bhagat, Kehar Singh, Sampuran Singh, Neraza Ram, Bichha Ram, Rattan Singh, Daya Ram, Hari Chand, Joshi Ram, Jagdish Parsad, Lal Chand, Mehtab Singh, Inder Singh, Giani Ram Singh, Gauri Shankar, Sobha Singh, Baldev Singh, Ram Singh, Khairati Ram, Karta Ram, Norta Ram, Kedar Nath, Bhopal Singh, Munshi Ram, Narendra Nath, Suraj Bhan, Hira Lal, Maman Rai, Ram Lal, Ram Karan, Bishan Singh, Kirori Mal, Mukand Lal, Giani Ram, Jamna Dass, Hari Singh, Jagdish Rai, Shiv Karan, Bihari Lal, Data Ram, Sodhan Singh, Mehar Chand Zilendar, Kartar Singh, Kundan Lal, Ram Dev, Uttam Singh, Shri Ram, Prithvi Nath, Sahir Aslam, Bhagat Ram, Salig Ram, Ralla Singh, Ganda Singh, Rati Ram, Ram Singh, Jagat Singh, Banarsi Dass, Hazara Singh, Sumer Singh, Mehar Singh, Sardar Singh, Gurcharan Singh, Bachan Singh, Norta Singh, Basta Singh, Balwant Singh, Kaka Singh, Sampuran Singh, Kartar Singh, Gauri Shankar, Banarsi Das, Salig Ram, Janarthan Das, Sadhu Ram, Hazari Lal, Muhammad Ramzan, Asa Singh Niranjan Das, Jagat Singh, Rai Singh, Hazara Singh, Sadhu Singh, Mehar Singh, Sardar Singh, Nirala Singh, Buta Singh, Amar Nath,

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\* Source: *Fortnightly Report of the Panjab*, 1940-41, *The Tribune* 1940-41, K.C. Yadav, *Haryana Men Swatantrata Andolan Ka Itihas*, pp. 170-80, *Haryana Samvad*, 1 February, 1973, pp. 17, 21-22, 34. Also see Jagdish Chander, *Freedom Movement in Haryana 1919-1947*, (thesis unpublished Kurukshetra University, pp. 242-255).

Rattan Singh, Ram Swarup, Sewa Singh, Asa Singh, Padam Parsad, Niranjan Das, Munshi Ram, Lal Chand, Lachhman Singh, Rattan Singh, Munshi Singh, Ram Swarup, Babu Ram, Pran Nath, Shamsher Nath, Vidya Parkash, Vijay Parsad, Faqir Chand, Lachhman Das, Jagan Nath, Dwarika Parsad, Puran Chand, Bannu Ram, Bhiksha, Jassu Ram, Daya Ram, Jyoti Ram, Baldev Sahai, Rarta Ram, Kirpa Ram, Hira Lal Bhatia, Dwarka Das, Radha Krishan, Bhagat Ram.

### **Karnal District**

Krishna Nand, Hamid Hussain, Man Singh, Madho Ram Sharma, Babu Ram, Muhammad Hussain, Girdhari Lal, Atma Ram, Ram Partap, Sadhu Ram, Panna Lal, Chet Ram, Kasturi Lal, Khajan Singh, Ram Swarup, Vishnu Datt, Ishwar Chand, Harswarup, Phagu Ram, Raghu Nath Sahai, Jyoti Parsad, Gurib Ram, Brij Mohan Lal, Om Parkash, Madho Ram, Kaka Ram, Jug Lal, Banarsi Das, Chander Kirti, Swarup Singh, Niyadar Mal, Nathi Ram, Basu Ram, Muhammad Hussain, Hotu Ram, Deshbandhu Gupta, Radha Krishna, Sewa Ram, Man Singha Rai, Ram Lal, Chand Ram, Ishwar Chand, Dungar Mal, Geru Mal.

### **Gurgaon District**

Nathna, Gabdari Ram, Chhote Lal, Teja, Hira Lal, Pitambar Singh, Suraj Singh, Sayyed Mutalbi, Babu Lal, Giarsi Ram Singh, Banarsi Das, Radhey Sham, Pat Ram, Abdul Hai, Hahashay Bhagwan Das, Chander Bhan, Khasi, Ram, Babu Dayal Bhola, Janardan, Gobind Ram, Deep Chand, Paras Dayal, Bhawani Singh, Ram Swarup, Buddi Parkash, Rup Lal, Prabhu Dayal, Shadi Ram, Ganga Parsad, Sat Narain, Shanti Swarup, Jagdish Parsad, Parushotam Balaji, Rup Lal Ganga Sahai, Ram Chander, Fateh Chand, Abdul Gani, Balak Ram, Sita Ram, Bishambar Dayal, Haji Khan Mohammad Khan, Swami Shiv Nath, Badru Ram, Muhammad, Naranjan Singh, Lal Chand, Seva Das, Mohender Shohan Vaid, Shri Krishan, Shambu Nath, Shanti Swarup, Gurbax Singh, Kartar Singh, Darshan Singh.

### **Rohtak District**

Shri Ram Sharma, Risala, Kishori Lal Azad, Mehar Singh, Jagdish Chander, Tara Singh, Shri Ram, Anand Swarup, Haji

Khan Muhammad, Jai Narain, Ram Chandra Sehgal, Badlu Ram, Sheo Nath Jogi, Ram Singh, Joga Rao, Mangli Ram, Tuhi Ram, Bishambar Dayal, Chatar Bhuj, Mam Chand, Bharat Singh, Hazara Singh, Bakhtawar Mool Chand, Mange Ram, Rudhir Singh, Har Narain Singh, Daya Chand, Mauji Ram, Kabul Singh, Jai Lal, Ramji Lal, Sultan Singh, Dwarika Parsad, Fateh Chand, Chuni Lal, Polu Ram, Munni Devi, Harnam Singh, Sunder Lal, Mange Ram, Chhotu Ram, Ram Swarup, Ami Lal, Giani Ram, Ram Swarup Viphlan, Dalip Singh, Roop Ram, Tek Chand, Dharam Singh, Chander Bhan, Kanehya Lal, Shri Ram, Mange Ram, Bhajna Nand, Prit Singh, Swarup Singh, Manohar Das, Bhai Ram, Dhani Ram, Mange Ram, Bhola Ram, Amar Singh, Rai Singh, Tek Chand, Ram Singh, Ganga Datt, Shish Ram, Sadhu Ram, Ganga Sahai, Bansi Lal, Bhagwan Singh, Ranbir Singh, Chhotu Ram, Kali Rai, Rati Ram, Mani Singh, Mange Ram, Harphul, Moda Singh, Kirpa Ram, Jot Ram, Jage Ram, Shri Chand, Har Phul Singh, Khem Chand, Neki Ram, Phul Singh, Paras Ram, Tara Chand, Bishamber Dayal, Risal Singh, Mange Ram, Tek Chand, Munshi Ram, Bhim Singh, Badri Parsad, Om Parkash, Ram Swarup, Murli Dhar, Amar Singh, Hardwari Lal, Jai Dayal, Paras Ram, Surat Singh, Bharat Singh, Banwari Lal, Paras Dayal, Lakhi Ram, Ranjit Singh. Bhagwan Singh, Nandu Ram, Banarsi Das, Shish Ram, John, Mehar, Jug Lal, Ram Kishan, Prithi Singh, Shambhu Datt, Charan Singh, Hari Ram, Jagan Nath, Deep Chand, Chander Bhan, Megh Raj, Raghu Nath, Abhai Ram, Risal Singh, Harphul Singh, Ami Lal, Sheo Karan, Sawal Singh, Hirde Ram, Amar Singh, Sadhu Ram, Sahib Ram, Chandgi Ram, Lahri Singh, Pahlad Singh, Ramji Lal, Puran Mal, Rupan, Badlu, Lahri Ram, Kheta Ram, Amar Singh, Maru Singh, Badlu Ram, Chhatar Singh, Rattan Singh, Ujjal Singh, Jhandu, Chandgi Ram, Vasdev, Gobind Ram, Shri Ram Dharam Veer, Rattan Singh, Bhagwan Singh, Udai Singh, Rameshwar, Hukam Chand, Chhotu Kam, Mela Ram, Gian Chand, Chuni Lal, Jag Ram, Rattan Singh, Muhammad Bagar Khan, Dilawar Singh, Rati Ram, Maru Singh, Rup Chand, Maman Singh, Ram Swarup, Daya Ram, Jai Ram, Sumer Singh, Bhagwat Dayal, Mool Chand, Udai Ram, Kanehya Singh, Gharsi Nath, Badlu, Bansi Ram, Rup Ram, Fateh Singh, Jyoti Ram, Chander Parkash, Kalu Ram, Hari Ram, Ranbir Singh,

Garib Das, Harnam Singh, Jag Ram, Ramji Lal, Ganga Sahai, Har Narain, Net Ram, Monge Ram, Murli Dhar, Harphul Singh, Kali Ram, Badlu, Jai Lal, Rati Ram, Surat Singh, Chandgi, Bhagwan Singh, Shiv Nath, Ramji Lal, Bhura Singh, Prit Singh, Fateh Singh, Amar Singh, Lahri Singh, Bhagwan Das, Chandgi Ram, Rai Singh, Bhola Ram, Swarup, Yoja Nand, Sadhu Ram, Rudha Singh, Mange Ram Saran, Bansi Singh, Chander Bhan, Jug Lal, Rati Ram, Charan Singh, Polu Ram, Risal Singh, Parsa Ram, Phul Singh, Harphul Singh, Amar Singh, Nanu Ram, Kali Charan, Sita Ram, Banwari, Jhandu, Jage Ram, Kasturba Bai, Haji Sher Muhammad Khan, Swami Manchar Das, Shiv Narain, Gurdial Singh, Ram Nath Agarwal, Devi Datta Mal, Karam Vir Singh, Chet Ram, Giani Ram, Ramji Das, Hari Singh, Dwarka Parsad, Swami Shiv Nath.

#### **Hissar District**

Udai Singh, Banarsi Das Gupta, Manohar Lal, Ladhu Ram, Neki Ram Sharma, Pahlad Singh, Brij Lal, Pat Ram, Sham Lal Shahib Ram, Devi Lal, K.A. Desai, Nanda, Ram Dayal, Chand Bai, Balwant Rai Tayal, Madan Lal Gopal, Kundan Lal, Murli Manohar, Parma Nand, Hardwari Lal, Murli Dhar, Babu Nand, Jugal Kishore, Mussadi Lal, Ganeshi Lal, Mutalbi Hussain, Mussadi, Madan Gopal, Chhabil Das, Kirpa Ram, Nand Lal, Inder Raj, Sant Lal, Parma Nand, Tansukh, Diwan Singh, Dhanpat Rai, Jay Narain, Arjan, Dhiru Mal, Dungar Mal, Jiya Muhammad, Madan Mohan, Budh Ram, Bhupendra Nath, Hardyal, Kanshi Ram, Chiranji Lal, Tonkal, Raghu Nath, Harchand, Sohan Lal, Mehar Chand, Nand Kishore, Diwan Chand, Lekh Ram, Pat Ram, Rishi Ram, Man Singh, Chandgi Ram, Ram Parsad Rameshwar Das, Har Narain, Munshi Ram, Phul Chand, Tara Chand, Shivaji, Ranpat Singh, Jugti Ram, Gauri Shankar, Lekh Ram, Deep Chand, Hazara Singh, Narain Singh, Hardev Sahai, Hamid Hussain, Shadi Ram, Atma Ram, Chiranji Lal, Mahesh Chander, Brahma Datt, Prem Dayal, Sittal Parsad, Pyare Lal, Jay Muhammad, Gheru Lal, Prayagi Das, Kirpa Ram, Mangla Ram, Mehtab Singh, Mansa Ram Tyagi.

#### **(II) QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT**

##### **Ambala District**

Duni Chand, Abdul Rashid, Bhagat Ram Shukla, Arya Nand,

Babu Ram, Nauhria Ram, Kashi Ram, Wilayati Ram, Mangat Ram, Banarsi Das, Sewa Ram, Priti Lal, Lachhman Das, Bihari Lal, Basant Nath, Chandi Ram, Har Dayal, Munshi Ram, Bhagat Singh, Ram Nath, Govind Singh, Ram Gopal, Amar Nath, Rajeshwar Nath, Kehar Singh, Sewa Ram, Kundan Lal, Nanak Chand Gandhi, Diwan Chander Datt, Ram Chander, Banarsi Das, Kapur Singh, Kartar Chand, Mehtab Singh, Mool Chand, Inder Singh, Bachan Singh, Amar Nath, Raj Kumar, Ram Chander, Kedar Nath, Nanak Chand, Randhir Singh, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Sadhu Ram, Rattan Parkash, Lajja Ram, Ran Singh, Mehtab Singh, Inderaj Singh, Rattan Singh, Sher Singh, Panni Das, Swaran Singh, Mamraj Singh, Multan Singh, Ram Singh, Harnam Singh, Gurbachan Singh, Jaswant Singh, Puran Singh, Niranjan Singh, Hari Singh, Chuhar Singh, Zaildar Singh, Nanak Singh, Kuldeep Singh, Noorata Ram, Hari Chand, Shri Ram, Sardari Lal Shabnam, Bipin Chander, Shiv Rao, Warayam Singh, Sardar Singh, Gian Singh Granthi, Bachan Singh, Dārbara Singh, Gauri Lal, Sewa Singh, Jaswant Singh, Cherhar Singh, Shamsheer Singh, Jaswant Singh, Kanshi Ram, Dharam Chand, Mehtab Singh, Girdhari Lal, Thakar Singh, Janardan Datt.

### Karnal District

Man Singh Rahi, Baso Ram, Harswarup Gupta, Ishwar Chand, Suraj Parkash, Comrade Ram Piara, Lila Krishna, Ram Swarup, Khusi Ram, Chiranji Lal, Ram Singh, Mange Ram, Manohar Lal, Khazan Singh, Anant Ram, Harnam Singh Bagi, Roshan Lal Bharu, Nathi Ram, Mool Chand Jain, Madho Ram, Joti Parsad Jain, Parma Nand, Hira Nand, Holu Ram, Hans Raj, Om Parkash, Bhag Mal, Harnam Singh, Hari Ram, Bal Kishan, Tara Singh, Suraj Datt, Swarup Singh, Sukha Singh, Krishna Kumar, Ramesh Kumar, Krishna Lal, Muhammad Hussain, Tara Chand, Krishna Lal Comrade, Ram Prasad, Chander Kirti, Rati Ram, Jage Ram, Ram Swarup, Vasudev Tyagi, Kasturi Lal, Khazan Singh, Chet Ram, Vishnu Datt, Mai Ram, Abhai Ram, Kanshi Ram, Shiv Dhan, Risala, Kartar Singh, Giani Ram, Jemadar Singh, Arath Bhan Singh, Kaka Ram, Panna Lal, Bannu Ram, Hazari Lal, Om Parkash, Banarsi Das, Radha Krishna, Deshbandhu Gupta, Atma Ram, Sadhu Ram, Shanti Swarup, Lachhman Singh, Piara Singh, Karam Chand Grover, Rup Chand, Mool Chand Jain,



Man Singh Rani.

### **Gurgaon District**

Pat Ram, Chander Bhan, Janardan, Bishan Chand, Ramji Lal, Fateh Chand, Sant Singh Gopal, Janardan Gopal Jiwan, Jai Ram Raghunath Lottu Ram, Bihari Lal, Hardwari, Vidya Rattan, Chhutan Lal, Harihar Lal, Ramji Lal, Madan Lal, Govind Ram, Faqir Chand, Yoginder Pal, Nanwa Mal, Laxmi Narain, Baldev Singh, Dhanpat Rai, Laxman Das, Bishan Chand, Shiam Sunder, Karam Singh, Harbans Lal, Ram Chander, Kanwar Kishan, Mohar Singh, Shanti Swarup, Satya Narain, Banarsi Das, Bhagwan Das, Surya Bhan, Jawala Parsad, Devi Sahai, Chuni Lal, Prem Swarup, Kishori Lal, Jagdish Prasad, Janardan Datt, Tikka Ram, Krishna Kumar, Hari Kishan, Kanti Parsad, Gulab Rai, Shiv Datt, Kishori Lal, Govardhan Das, Triveni Giri, Prabhu Dayal, Bhola Ram, Prabhu Dayal, Daya Ram, Mata Din, Inder Mani, Mam Chand, Gauri Shanker, Radhey Sham, Ram Singh, Jagdamba Parsad, Babu Dayal, Ramji Lal, Dungar Mal, Ram Manohar Minshi, Ram Narain, Bhagirath Parsad, Bhoju Parsad.

### **Rohtak District**

Shri Ram Sharma, Anand Swarup, Kasturba Bai, Manhi Devi, Mange Ram, Tulsi Ram, Ram Baksh Saini. Rattan Lal, Balbir Singh, Abdul Gani, Paras Ram, Kali Charan, Gian Chand, Jugmandar Das, Chander Bhan, Abhe Ram, Tek Chand, Din Dayal, Ram Chander, Shasi Bhushan, Lachhman Das, Chhotu Ram, Sultan Singh, Danpa Devi, Kesho Ram, Badlu Ram, Harnam Singh, Rattan Ram, Prabhu Dayal, Banwari Lal, Ranbir Singh, Pyare Lal, Puran Chand Azad, Laxmi Devi, Gurmukh Singh, Kali Ram, Rati Ram, Rudra Singh, Nathu Ram, Hari Ram, Kheta Daulat, Hari Ram, Chatar Singh, Jai Lal, Singh Ram, Mange Ram, Bani Singh, Abhe Ram, Ram Kishan, Daya Ram, Risal, Shiv Narain, Sahib Ram, Surat Singh, Chandgi Ram, Fateh Singh, Ranbir Singh, Manphul Singh, Ramji Lal, Prahlad Rai, Jag Ram Uddham, Giani Ram, Megha Ram, Daya Ram, Tek Chand, Ram Swarup, Lal Chand, Chhotu Ram, Kishan Lal, Maru Singh, Sheo Chand, Jauhra Singh, Banwari Lal, Hazari Lal, Lekh Raj, Kheta Ram, Ram Swarup, Udai Ram, Dani Ram, Bakhtawar Lal, Tara Chand, Banarsi Das, Puran Mal, Hari Singh, Anar Singh, Muni Lal, Jhunda Ram,

Deep Chand, Jagan Nath, Fateh Singh, Kishan Lal, Manphul Singh, Jage Ram, Mai Dhan, Chandgi Ram, Giani Ram, Ami Lal, Daya Chand, Badlu Ram, Dwarka Parsad, Rai Singh, Raghu Nath, Hargu Ram, Rup Chand, Lahri Singh, Ram Kishan, Giani Ram, Neki Ram, Kanwal Singh, Man Singh, Chiranji Lal, Kanehya Singh, Ghasi Ram, Khushi Ram, Maman Singh, Bhagwant Singh, Ramji Lal, Mam Chand, Ram Swarup, Swarup Singh, Sadhu Ram, Bholu Ram, Chandgi Ram, Badlu Ram, Rattan Singh, Ujjal Singh, Mehar Singh, Gobind Singh, Munshi Ram, Des Raj, Narain Singh, Ganga Sahai, Ram Singh, Ami Lal, Harphul Singh, Tuhi Ram, Fateh Singh, Jota Ram, Nanha Ram, Mange Ram, Bani Singh, Ram Singh, Hardwari Lal, Munshi Ram, Dilawar Singh, Om Parkash, Sadhu Ram, Bishambar Dayal, Laxmi Datt, Hazari Lal, Sanwal Singh, Shiv Lal, Gagan Singh, Murli Dhar, Paras Ram, Chander Bhan, Udai Singh, Bhagwan Dayal, Banarsi Das, Rameshwar Das, Mange Ram, Ram Singh Fateh Singh, Hargulal, Mauji Ram, Swami Shiv Nath, Fateh Singh, Jodha Ram, Hari Singh, Sumer Singh, Manphul, Goverdhan, Mangli Ram, Duli Chand, Bhagwan Das, Kundan Lal, Sis Ram, Shiv Chand, Bal Kishan, Mange Ram Vats, Shri Krishan, Mool Chand, Chhotu Ram, Ram Chander Singhal, Prithvi Singh, Shambhu Datt, Lilavati Singhal, Tek Chand, Sunder Lal, Mahabir Parsad, Ram Dhan, Amar Nath, Ram Sahai, Risal, Khem Chand, Udai Singh, Shish Ram, Giani Ram, Ram Chandra, Jage Ram, Deep Chand, Ram Swarup, Mauji, Kalu Ram, Shri Chand, Hari Singh, Roop Chand, Dharam Veer, Fateh Singh, Chatar Bhuj, Mange Ram, Hukam Chand, Palu Ram, Ram Swarup, Inderaj, Garib Ram, Sultan Singh, Mange Ram, Bahadur Singh, Ghamandi Lal, Lakhi Ram, Sita Ram, Dalip Singh, Tara Chand, Tek Chand, Amar Singh, Bansi Lal, Sunder Lal, Chander Bhan, Jai Dayal, Duli Chand, Rati Ram, Risal Singh, Bhim Singh, Shri Ram, Dharam Singh, Nanhu Ram, Harphul Singh, Jage, Ram, Phule Ram, Rattan Singh, Raghuvir Singh, Roop Chand, Chander Parkash, Roop Ram, Mool Chand, Chuni Lal, Neki Ram, Banarsi Das, Bakhtawar Singh, Jot Ram Phulu, Risal Singh, Shri Chand, Parbhu Dayal Jangra, Mange Ram, Ranjit Singh, Bharat Singh, Paras Ram, Kanehya Lal, Charan Singh, Jug Lal, Rati Ram, Udai Singh, Giani Ram Chootu Ram Suraj Bhan, Girdhari, Rohshan Lal, Karan Singh, Rameshwar Datt,

Ram Parsad, Daya Ram, Singh Ram, Puran, Ram Kishan, Bhagwana, Vasudev, Moti Chand, Fateh Singh, Jai Ram, Kirori Mal, Bakhtawar Singh, Hira Singh, Ram Narain, Padam Sain, Ram Chand Bani Singh, Chet Ram, Roop Chand, Kirpa Ram, Gopi Ram, Mai Ram, Duli Chand, Bhagwana, Dhan Singh, Chandgi Ram, Dhan Singh, Manohar Das, Harphul, Kabul Singh, Badri Parsad, Bharat Singh, Hazari Lal, Mool Chand Jain, Ramji Lal, Kidara Singh, Mauji Ram, Bhura Singh, Maman, Dharam Vir, Panna Lal, Jage Ram, Badlu Ram, Hem Raj, Lachhman Das.

### **Hissar District**

Sham Lal, Mela Ram Moda, Ram Chander Baid, Noon Karan Das, Bridhi Chand, Gokal Chand, Diwan, Chand, Ram Kumar Bidhat, Akhe Ram, Kirpa Ram, Mansa Ram, Chand Bai, Madan Gopal, Lekh Ram, Balwant Rai Tayal, Ganeshi Lal, Jugal Kishore, Mahesh Chand, Lachhman Das, Sadhu Ram, Ganpat Ram, Ram Kumar, Laxmi Narain, Chanan Mal, Mool Chand Lachhi, Hardwari Lal Sharma, Murli Manohar, B.N. Rai, Arjan Singh, Dheru Mal, Mangat Rai, Sahib Ram, Devi Lal, Ram Kishan Gupta, Shish Pal Singh, Dunger Mal, Ram Dayal, Chhabil Das, Dhanpat Rai, Purana Nand, Babu Nand, Sita Ram Jagga, Jagdish Parsad, Hari Singh Saini, Tara Chand, Nand Kishore, Hamid Hussain, Sita Ram, Purna Nand, Parma Nand, Maman Ram, Bishan Singh, Rughnath, Jamna Ram, Giani Ram, Jugti Ram, Ram Lal, Shiv Karan Singh, Chiranjit Lal Net Ram, Chandgi Ram, Mam Chand, Ram Bhagat, Har Narain, Ranjit Singh, Atma Ram, Indraaj Singh, Hardev Sahai, Chandgi Ram Verma, Chander Bhan, Radha Krishna Varma.

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\*Source: These interviews were taken by Dr. Jagdish Chander. The copies of the same are with Dr. K.C. Yadav.



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