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K. K. Aziz

A Study of British Public Opinion vis-à-vis the Development of Muslim Nationalism in India, 1857-1947

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To the Rt Hon. Sir P. J. Grigg,

who was generous enough
to give me his friendship
and thus to extend my liberal education

Preface

CONTROL over men is authority; control over things is power. In India the British enjoyed both authority and power. Authority and power make up politics, and public opinion is to politics what grammar is to language. The manner as well as the direction in which these controls were exercised was determined by public opinion in Britain. In this book I have tried to describe and analyse the impact of this opinion on the position of the Muslims in Imperial India.

In this assessment I have endeavoured to be as objective as possible. But objectivity is a relative virtue and bias a relative vice. Parts of the story told in these pages are still in that period of twilight which intervenes between the blinding glare of newspaper controversy and the steady light of history. If at times the nearness of events *seems* to cloud my judgment I crave the indulgence of future historians who will be advantageously placed to view the entire episode as solid, cold history.

This study was prepared in 1957–9 when I was at the Department of Government of the University of Manchester and has greatly benefited from the help and guidance given—ably and ungrudgingly—by Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie and Dr A. H. Birch (now Professor of Government at the University of Hull). They saved me from many pitfalls and errors of judgment and put their knowledge and experience of research at my disposal. They have contributed more to the writing of it than their modesty would permit them to acknowledge. To them my gratitude is as sincere as it is deep.

The book was read in typescript by Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Sir George Cunningham, the Rt Hon. Sir James Grigg, Mr H. V. Hodson, formerly Editor, *Sunday Times*, Professor Kenneth Robinson, Director, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, the Rt Hon. Earl Swinton, and Mr Guy

Wint, Fellow, St Antony's College, Oxford. I owe them a great debt of gratitude for this favour and also a word of apology for not always accepting all their criticisms. I am particularly beholden to Earl Swinton and Sir James Grigg for their keen interest in the progress and publication of this book.

Several people were kind enough to see me and discuss various conclusions reached in this study. I particularly wish to express my thanks to Mr Waris Ameer Ali, the late Lord Birdwood, Sir Olaf Kirkpatrick Caroe, Professor John Coatman, Sir Hugh Dow, the late Viscount Elibank, the late Sir Herbert William Emerson, Sir William Kerr Fraser Tytler, Sir John Gilbert Laithwaite, the late Sir Arthur Cunningham Lothian, Mr Kingsley Martin, Mr William Moore, Rt Hon. the late Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Frederick Hale Puckle, Sir Stanley Reed, Earl Russell, Professor Arnold Toynbee, Sir Alfred Henry Watson, Mr Woodrow Wyatt.

In two cases an interview was not practicable and an exchange of notes had to be carried on by correspondence. I am grateful to the late Rt Hon. Earl Winterton, and the late Sir Findlater Stewart, for having replied to my letters in generous detail.

I should like to thank the librarians and staff of the following libraries for the help and unfailing courtesy received by me during research undertaken for this book: the Library of the University of Manchester, the Central Reference Library, Manchester, the *Manchester Guardian* Library, the British Museum Reading Room, and the British Museum Newspaper Collection, the India Office Library, the University of London (Senate House) Library, the Library of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, and the Library of the Royal Commonwealth Society.

The Bibliography lists only those books which I read or re-read while writing this book and the periodical literature which was consulted for contemporary opinion.

I need hardly mention that I alone am responsible for the facts stated and opinions expressed in these pages.

September 1962

K. K. Aziz

Contents

1: *Introduction*

Public Opinion

PUBLIC opinion is an elusive concept, which cannot easily be defined with any degree of precision. Superficially, it seems easy to say what public opinion is. It is the opinion held and expressed by the public. But, what is opinion? Is it the rational conclusion of a conscious thought process or just a 'hunch', an irrational feeling? How is opinion distinguished from sentiment and attitude? What, in short, goes to make up opinion? The other half of the phrase is equally vague and misleading. What constitutes the public? Does it mean all the adult people in a given society, irrespective of education, interest and intelligence: the mythical 'men in the street'? Or does it mean one or more groups, or sections of society, known for their capacity and other requisite qualities?

Let us compare notes with authorities. Bryce used the phrase to denote 'the aggregate of the views men hold regarding matters that affect or interest the community'; recognized that it was 'a congeries of all sorts of discrepant notions, beliefs, fancies, prejudices, aspirations'; and realized that it was 'confused, incoherent, amorphous, varying from day to day and week to week'. However,

> in the midst of this diversity and confusion every question as it arises into importance is subjected to a process of consolidation and clarification until there emerge and take definite shape certain views, or sets of interconnected views, each held and advocated in common by bodies of citizens. It is to the power exerted by any such view, or set of views, when held by an apparent majority of citizens, that we refer when we talk of Public Opinion as approving or disapproving a certain doctrine or proposal, and thereby becoming a guiding or ruling power.

Here Bryce exposed himself to criticism by using the qualifying phrase 'held by an apparent majority of citizens'; to equate 'public' opinion with the majority of citizens is an assumption of doubtful validity. Perhaps he realized this himself, for he continued,

> or we may think of the Opinion of the whole nation as made up of different currents of sentiment, each embodying or supporting a view or a doctrine

> or a practical proposal. Some currents develop more strength than others, because they have behind them larger numbers or more intensity of conviction, and when one is evidently the strongest, it begins to be called Public Opinion *par excellence*, being taken to embody the views supposed to be held by the bulk of the people.[1]

Thus, according to Bryce, public opinion is the name we give to the views held either by a majority of people or by certain sections so strongly and intensely that they may be presumed to be shared by a majority.

Wilhelm Bauer distinguished between public opinion proper and 'opinion which is voiced in public'. The latter, which is merely the 'publicly expressed opinion of an individual or small group that happens to possess the knack of making itself heard', tries to impose itself on the collective mind of the community, 'just as poems of a folk character, although the work of an individual poet, are able under certain circumstances to develop into genuine folk *Lieder*'. Public opinion proper, on the other hand, is a 'deeply pervasive organic force, intimately bound up with the ideological and emotional interplay of the social groupings in which since the earliest times gregarious individuals have come together'; it 'articulates and formulates not only the deliberative judgments of the rational elements within the collectivity but the evanescent common will, which somehow integrates and momentarily crystallizes the sporadic sentiments and loyalties of the masses of the population'.[2] Public opinion 'represents the formulation of a certain group will'. It is not rationally thought out in detail, yet 'confers on the judgment and expression of will of most individuals a certain equal colouring'.[3] This is not very helpful, and obviously Bauer was dodging the question. He tried to convey the meaning without committing himself to a definition, though at the expense of clarity and precision.

Some more direct attempts at definition may be glanced at briefly. Public opinion is that 'sentiment on any given subject which is entertained by the best-informed, most intelligent and most moral persons in the community, which is gradually spread and adopted by nearly all persons of any education or popular feeling in a civilized state'.[4] It is 'a more or less rational collective judgment formed by the action and reaction of many individuals'.[5] Lowell defined it as 'the acceptance of one among two or more inconsistent views which are capable of being accepted by a rational mind as

true'.[6] A sociologist defined it as 'the attitude of a significant portion of a population towards any given proposition, based upon a measurable amount of factual evidence and involving some degree of reflection, analysis and reasoning'.[7]

Such abstract definitions are not very useful for our inquiry, for each definition is related to its author's point of view and gives us but a partial picture of the concept. The definitions quoted above, for example, point to certain agreed propositions. There is always an element of reason and reflection in public opinion. Public opinion does not mean the opinion of all the citizens or even a majority of them. Some writers prescribe qualitative and quantitative tests, for example earnestness, rationality, persistence and volume. But such generalizations are far from helpful. How do we know whether an opinion is held on rational grounds or not? Are there not always an element of reason *and* an element of prejudice? Isn't objectivity a relative term? How do we know that a given opinion is the opinion of a majority or a minority? Who can say whether a person holds an opinion earnestly and sincerely? Who will judge this sincerity, and how? What is sincerity? To ask these questions is not to sound a carping note, but to point to the difficulties involved in adopting any abstract definition. What we need is a practical definition, not an academic exercise.

In ascertaining public opinion on a particular issue we need not try to discover every minute variety of opinion or take into account every passing flash of like or dislike. Everything that is said or done is not public opinion. A given public opinion is likely to be anywhere between a highly emotional, ignorant and prejudiced point of view and a highly intelligent, informed and thoughtful opinion. There is a very wide range between the views borrowed by an ignorant reader from an equally ignorant and sensational newspaper and the attitude adopted, say, by a don after reading many books, hearing many speakers and talking to many well-informed persons. This spectrum—from one extreme of bias and ignorance to the other of reason and knowledge—may be split up into three sections. According to Bryce,[8] three classes of persons have to do with the formation of public opinion. The first consists of men who seriously occupy themselves with public affairs, such as journalists, members of legislatures, professional politicians, civil servants and university dons. They attend constantly to what passes in the political world.

Collectively these people make up a very small fraction indeed of the whole society or even of the voting citizenry, but they *make* opinion. They are well informed, educated and capable of producing arguments. They influence the rest of the vast public. The second class consists of those who are neither so highly educated nor so well informed, but take an interest in politics. They read their newspapers regularly and their books occasionally, and are capable of forming an opinion on the facts presented to them. They make judgments. They *form* opinion. The third class consists of all others who are indifferent to public affairs, read little and think less. They borrow their views from the second class. They *adopt* the prevailing public opinion.

If such an analysis is applied to British public opinion about Muslim India, it would seem very doubtful whether the third class need be taken into consideration at all. The 'common man'[9] knew little of India and cared less. It may be alleged that at times he took a vicarious pride in reminding himself that he was one of the rulers of India; but any knowledge of India's complex problems or even the awareness of their existence was beyond him. The second class admirably reflected itself in the daily press of the period. The people who wrote the newspapers were generally in the first class, but those who read them were in the second. Thus newspapers are of prime importance in gauging British public opinion; they tell us a great deal, not only of what a section of the makers of public opinion thought and felt but also of what the nation as a whole was thinking and feeling. To ascertain the views of the rest of the first class we will look to more solid material. Since newspapers, in a way, cut across all the three classes (even the third class read newspapers of some sorts), we will first consider the role of the press in British public opinion.

The Role of the Press

The press, in particular the daily press, has two peculiar and somewhat disturbing features. It has, in the words of Lord Bryce, no element of compulsion and no element of responsibility. There is no compulsion on anyone to buy or read or believe in a paper. The paper has no legal duty and is subject to no responsibility, except that imposed by the ordinary laws of libel and slander. It is not

liable in law for propagating falsehood or suppressing truth. Thus it militates against the old maxim that power and responsibility go together. The press enjoys considerable power for good and evil, but those who are responsible for the views expressed in it are accountable for them only to their own conscience.

The difficulty involved in this work of reporters and correspondents is shown by the following incident. An experiment was made with a group of presumably trained observers at a Congress of Psychology at Göttingen.

> Not far from the hall in which the Congress was sitting there was a public fête with a masked ball. Suddenly the door of the hall was thrown open and a clown rushed in madly pursued by a negro, revolver in hand. They stopped in the middle of the room fighting; the clown fell, the negro leapt upon him, fired, and then both rushed out of the hall. The whole incident hardly lasted twenty seconds. The President asked those present to write immediately a report since there was sure to be a judicial inquiry. Forty reports were sent in. Only one had less than 20 per cent of mistakes in regard to the principal facts; fourteen had 20 per cent to 40 per cent of mistakes; twelve from 40 per cent to 50 per cent; thirteen more than 50 per cent. Moreover, in twenty-four accounts 10 per cent of the details were pure invention and this proportion was exceeded in ten accounts and diminished in six. Briefly a quarter of the accounts were false. It goes without saying that the whole of the scene had been arranged and even photographed in advance. The ten false reports may then be relegated to the category of tales and legends; twenty-four accounts are half-legendary, and six have a value approximating to exact evidence.[10]

If such a large margin of inaccuracy could creep into the accounts written immediately after the incident by trained psychologists, what can we expect from the ordinary reporter of average intelligence and training and in most cases without any knowledge of an Indian language? In addition to needing an excellent memory the reporter, if he is to be reliable, must also be careful and competent. His estimate of the sources available to him must be correct. He must prefer first-hand observation to mere hearsay. He must know what questions to ask, what things to observe, which persons to contact, which items to report and which places to visit. The facts that he provides to his paper or news agency are vital to those hundreds of thousands of readers who will base their opinion on them. If he continues to feed them on false or distorted or half-true facts, people who accept his statements—and especially those who read only his dispatches—will continue to develop their opinion on the wrong track. It is good for the average newspaper reader to

inquire sometimes how he got the facts on which he has been building his opinion, which is a part of public opinion. Who actually observed, heard and felt the things about which he has now an opinion? How much did the reporter see for himself, and how much was he told by others? When he said that Indian leaders thought this and this, what did he mean by 'Indian' leaders? How many leaders did he meet personally? Did he see leaders of all parties and groups? What questions did he put to them? How could he be sure that these spokesmen made up the consensus of Indian opinion? Did he read all important Indian newspapers? Did he visit all provinces? Or, did he presume that what he knew of one part of the country was also true of others? To ask these questions is not to answer them. Some of them cannot be answered at all. Others can be answered only in presumptions and guesses. But to ask them is a healthy reminder that it is dangerous and unwise to accept all that newspapers publish. They remind us of the 'distance which often separates your public opinion from the events with which it deals. And the reminder itself is a protection.'[11]

When the reporter's dispatch has been received by the newspaper there still remains the problem of the technique of its presentation. The old Northcliffe technique was to sugar the news by the addition of some external and often irrelevant, but always attractive, detail. He assumed that most news items were dull in themselves and therefore unpalatable to the reader, and made a habit of embroidering them with extra details, designed to lure the reader to read on. The modern technique, on the other hand, is based on the belief that 'human interest must be extracted from the news itself without introducing any irrelevant details and, if necessary, at the cost of acquiring a spurious scientific precision by ignoring inconvenient facts and qualifications'.[12] So far as news from India was concerned, there is not much to choose between the two techniques. Both oversimplified the problem, and this over-simplification could be as fatal as direct falsification in the case of a complex subject like India. Irrelevant embroidery and absence of relevant qualifications are equally injurious to the formation of public opinion. The former makes it difficult to distinguish facts from fiction. The latter simplifies so much that the reader thinks that he has no problem to form an opinion about. It is true that neither of these techniques was accepted in principle by the newspapers with which we are con-

cerned in this study, but at times they were employed, particularly by the newspapers of the Left, and to that extent they rendered more difficult the process of opinion formation.

A sub-editor on the Manchester staff of the *Daily Sketch* told the Royal Commission on the Press that in March 1939, as an authentic account of Hitler's entry into Prague could not be received in time for the early editions, he was ordered to 'jump' the news by writing an imaginative account and attributing it to 'our Prague reporter'. When questioned on this practice, Mr Lionel Berry, who was then the general manager of the Manchester office, said, 'I think a thing like that might happen in any newspaper office.'[13] One wonders how many dispatches 'from our correspondent in India' were penned in London's Fleet Street or Manchester's Cross Street, but one hopes they were not many.

But accuracy in reporting is not all that is needed. There must also be an identification of fact as fact, and opinion as opinion. The two must be separated, not only at the source but all the way from the reporter's file, up through the copy and make-up desk and editorial offices to the final, published product. Curiously enough, all the 'quality' newspapers failed to adhere to this precept. It is as if it was considered a merit to give the readers not only news but also some background which inevitably involves the expression of opinion. *The Times* practised it almost to perfection. The *Manchester Guardian* was no less an adept, in spite of C. P. Scott's oft-quoted phrases that a newspaper's 'primary office is the gathering of news. At the peril of its soul it must see that the supply is not tainted. Neither in what it gives, nor in what it does not give, nor in the mode of presentation must the unclouded face of truth suffer wrong. Comment is free, but facts are sacred.'[14] There is nothing inherently wrong in this. In fact, it has the undoubted merit of helping the reader to understand the news by providing him with the necessary background of events and personalities; it has been a joy to read the brilliantly written dispatches of *The Times*' man in a foreign country. But joy turns into perplexity when we try to separate the news from the correspondent's opinions. His dispatch sometimes reads like a cross between pure news and the leader. To say this is not to accuse him of deliberate bias, but to point to the average reader's difficulty in disentangling news from views. It is not easy to do that and therefore to form an opinion on the facts presented. Occasionally the

reader will be able to see through the game and will refuse to form an opinion on facts provided with so much mixture of comment. Inevitably, however, most readers will unwittingly borrow their opinions from the correspondent and adopt them as their own. This sweet deception is welcome to the average reader who finds it difficult to form an independent opinion, for this involves time, thinking and energy. Another danger is that the political bias of the reporter may induce him to omit certain facts or to distort them. In mixing his opinion with his facts he is tempted to ignore the facts that prove inconvenient to his opinions and thus send a report which is 'true' in the sense that it contains no falsehood, but is only half-true in the sense that all facts have not been presented and thus truth has been suppressed. Our criticism of this method may be summed up by saying that a newspaper may express any opinion in the opinion columns, but that a perusal of its news columns should not—at least not blatantly—betray its opinions.

Newspapers are more prone to publish factual reports interlaced with comment in foreign news than in domestic news. And this for two reasons. First, newspapers depend more on their foreign correspondents than on their local reporters. The former enjoy more freedom and greater prestige. They usually are, or are supposed to be, experts on the countries they are working in, and this gives them not only greater credence in the newspaper office, but also some privileges not accorded to other reporters. They can mix facts with opinions on the justifiable plea that their facts, being unfamiliar to the readers, need some background to appear digestible. Secondly, the foreign correspondent is the only source of news. If he is not encouraged, or even pampered at times, the paper would have to depend on the dull and dry stuff supplied by the news agencies. That is where the Northcliffe technique of presentation of news comes in. Local news may be embroidered to attract the reading public. But it is more difficult to decorate foreign news, since the necessary frills are not available. On the contrary, if you can get an 'expert' to embroider foreign news, it is not only easier but safer, for there is less chance of being found out in this sphere. There is hardly anyone there to contradict and, in extreme cases, the contradiction can be dismissed as either a partial and interested intervention or a misinformed intrusion. That explains why, during the last century and a half, many British newspapers have made history

through the exploits of their foreign correspondents. William Howard Russell helped to bring down a government by his reports on the Crimean War in *The Times*. The *Daily Telegraph* interview with the Kaiser in 1908 caused a not inconsiderable storm in every European chancellery. J. D. Bourchier, the Balkan correspondent of *The Times*, was a power to reckon with in Balkan politics and, when he died, some of the Balkan governments issued special memorial stamps in his honour. Sir Valentine Chirol was no less important a figure in Indian affairs. He wrote an occasional leader for *The Times* and was knighted for his services in the consummation of the 1909 reforms. For over twenty years he was the most important source from which educated Englishmen received their knowledge about India.

The above should not be construed to mean that foreign dispatches are necessarily biased or slanted. What is asserted here is that foreign correspondents have, for a variety of reasons, greater opportunity to express their opinions in the process of transmitting facts.

It is more difficult to deal with political bias, that psychological imponderable which Justice Holmes called the 'inarticulate major premise'. To say that a journalist is biased is not always to mean that he is consciously or deliberately biased. Journalists and judges share one common state of mind: unconscious bias. This is no reproach; but it is important that they should know that they have it and should strive to rise above it. The ability to write a truly objective report is unfortunately not common.

To take one example: headlines constitute a useful instrument of expressing bias. Very often the political bias of the newspaper emerges in the headlines given to reports which are themselves free of bias. 'Most of the journalists who appeared before us', wrote the Royal Commission on the Press, 'recognized that headlines ought not to convey a stronger meaning than the report beneath them. If the latter was qualified, the headline should be qualified. This precept is not always observed, with results that may be grossly misleading.'[15]

Such misrepresentations, though not enough to brand the paper as maliciously false, are significant from the point of view of opinion-formation. Readers must have, as far as possible, an accurate picture of the world to be in a position to form an opinion. But such undue

bias prevents the paper from giving this accurate picture. Perhaps an accurate impression may be acquired by collating a number of biased accounts, but this is a difficult and unsatisfactory method and not one to appeal to any except in courts of law. When day after day these biased accounts are fed to people, they have a cumulative effect on the public. Foundations of intelligent judgment on public affairs are weakened. False images are supplied and the public has no means to find access to the correct images. People lack evidence on which conclusions should be based. Continued intake of partisan information may even lead the readers to forget that conclusions should be grounded on evidence.

It is not easy to define the influence of the editor on the politics and views of his newspaper. There have been many great editors in British history: Delane of *The Times*, about whom it was said that *The Times* 'was Mr Delane's report to the public of the news of the day, interpreted by Mr Delane's opinions, and directed throughout by Mr Delane's principles and purposes';[16] C. P. Scott of the *Manchester Guardian*, for whom the editor 'was the personality, controlling, directing, harmonizing, which gave unity of purpose and character to the paper';[17] J. L. Garvin of the *Observer*; Frederick Greenwood of the *Pall Mall Gazette* and *St James's Gazette*; and Sir John Robinson of the *Daily News*. They personified their papers. But editors can be either mere ciphers or creative spirits, depending on their strength of character. In the analysis that follows the editors of journals will be identified whenever it seems likely that their personal influence was responsible for the way in which news of Indian affairs was presented; but where there is no evidence to this effect their names will not be given.

Methods of Analysis

Given time and opportunity this inquiry could be conducted on a wider basis by studying all British newspapers and journals. But a selection had to be made, and this was dictated by four factors. In the first place, only the readers of the 'quality' press were likely to have any direct influence on Government policy. Secondly, the views of the readers of this class of press shaped the views of the others, in so far as they had any. Thirdly, it is doubtful if any other newspaper or periodical had its own correspondent in India, except

perhaps during the last two or three years of British rule; they depended for news on news agencies or other newspapers. Lastly, readers of the popular press were anyway not generally interested in foreign or colonial politics. In general, it may not be far wrong to say that Indian news was neither widely published nor widely read, save in a few special cases when India was making a lot of noise or when an important Indian measure was under discussion in Parliament.

We should also beware of other dangers in relying on the popular press for public opinion. Mass observation studies show that most people only glanced at the political news. Few were really interested in it, except in 'the sort of home news that is partly gossip'. People do not read their papers with any degree of care or judgment, and they seldom think about or criticize what they read. The percentage of readers who could say correctly which government was in power in Yugoslavia in 1947 was as follows:[18]

The Times	87
Daily Telegraph	52
News Chronicle	43
Daily Herald	36
Daily Mail	36
Daily Express	35
Daily Graphic	35
Daily Mirror	16
Observer	71
Sunday Times	69

Taken together the quality press—*The Times*, *Manchester Guardian*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Observer* and *Sunday Times*—reflects the opinion of a fair section of Bryce's first class of opinion-makers, and also that of his second category of opinion-moulders. *The Times*' circulation has a marked emphasis on the older and higher income groups. Most of its readers are Conservative, but about a quarter is Labour and about an eighth Liberal. It commands the attention of the most highly educated and the most intelligent readers. It is not a popular journal, but it certainly has a great influence on the makers of opinion. The *Daily Telegraph* is probably as widely read among the older and higher income groups, but is more openly Conservative. It may say a few things which the dignity of *The Times* does

not permit it to say. The *Manchester Guardian* (now simply the *Guardian*) is the only provincial newspaper with an international reputation. Without attaching itself to any party it gives a good picture of the British Liberal (or liberal) conscience. The *Observer* is read every Sunday by a section of the financially well-off. Its readership extends to all parties, perhaps mostly to the Conservatives, though it has for some time had a wide appeal among Left-wing intellectuals. The *Sunday Times*—no relation to *The Times*—is not much different from the *Observer*, except for its rather strong Right-wing tendency. The *Daily Herald* has also been used to give an idea of what the Labour and Trade Union circles were thinking and saying.

Among the weekly journals, three—the *Economist*, *Spectator* and *New Statesman*—have been selected for treatment, though *Time and Tide* has also been consulted on points. Each of them represents a typical shade of British opinion and all are highly respectable and widely read not in Britain alone. The *Economist* regards itself as liberal, but on Indian affairs it came very near to being the weekly counterpart of *The Times*: both show the same restraint in comment and both strongly affect the making of opinion. The *Spectator*, the oldest of the kind in Britain, may be called right-of-the-Centre in politics. The *New Statesman* is indispensable for knowing the mind of the Left; with a distinguished panel of contributors and editors from Lord Keynes to Mr Kingsley Martin, it supplies the views of leftist intellectuals and 'Bloomsbury' about India. *Time and Tide* is (during this period) an independent weekly, not always original and useful, but at times lively. For the later period some useful material has been found in the *Listener*, the B.B.C. weekly which carries most of the important broadcasts.

Our second source of public opinion is made up of three closely connected elements: viz., Parliamentary debates, White Papers and other official announcements, and official statements and annual conference reports of political parties. Official pronouncements, though strictly more important, are put in the second place partly because we are not concerned so much with the Government's policy and action as with public opinion, and partly because all important official statements were promptly debated in Parliament. In Parliamentary proceedings we shall, of course, give our main attention to what was said in the House of Commons, but we shall not dismiss

the House of Lords as an old useless chamber which wielded no influence on public opinion. On the contrary, there were enough retired viceroys, ex-secretaries of state for India, former governors and civil servants, to give weight to what was said in the House of Lords. At times, of course, arguments were liable to be platitudinous and the debate a little dreary: the Right read what it had been wont to say about India and said it again; the Left recalled what it had been saying about India and faithfully repeated it. Sometimes one of them, remembering the responsibility which went with office, adopted a muted tone, but broadly the House echoed the patent partisan debating points and discussion moved in settled grooves. The remark made by a historian many years ago, that 'British colonial policy may be summed up as an effort to harmonize what ought to be done with what has been said', was still true, at least as the game in the House was played. Conservatives harped on the glories of Empire, first from conviction and later in nostalgia. Socialists branded it imperialism, first in sincerity and later from force of habit.

Attempts to classify our further sources are made difficult by the fact that such classification may be made in many ways, according to the point of view adopted or the standard set. Public opinion was moulded by, and reflected in, the expressed views of a fairly sizeable group of people who commented on Indian political developments with regular attention. How to classify them? The easiest way would be to divide them into two broad categories: those who were sympathetic and friendly to the Muslim cause and those who were hostile to it. But this method has two disadvantages. It is too descriptive and does not lend itself to an analysis of public opinion; it would lead to a catalogue rather than to a serious discussion. Moreover, Muslim politics in India were not static during the ninety years under review; Muslim aspirations shifted and changed in accordance with internal developments and external impact. To adopt this dual categorization would neither encourage the making of a proper assessment nor give the reader any clue to what groups of people, as distinct from individual persons, were thinking or saying. Therefore, the method followed in this analysis is to classify these people into a few recognizable groups and then to concentrate attention on these groups rather than on their individual members. This should not be taken to imply that such groups existed in fact, in the sense that their members were conscious of belonging to one

corporate entity (though in certain cases this characteristic was present) or consulted together at regular intervals before speaking with one voice. There are rebels, eccentrics and nonconformists in every group. But broadly these groups occupied, and sometimes continued to occupy, definite and easily recognizable places in the chart of public opinion, and usually it will not be difficult to account for the views expressed, or the position adopted by them, on a certain issue.

Four such groups at once offer themselves for consideration. There was, first of all, a group—never very large—of members of Parliament who took a keen interest in India and hardly let any occasion pass without making themselves heard. Their chief pulpit was, of course, the House, but it was not unusual for some of them to publish articles in learned journals, to address their constituents, to speak to the divisional party, to write books or at least to write to *The Times*. The views of these persons were naturally coloured by the party they belonged to, but their pronouncements had a common mystic thread, perhaps born of working the democratic machinery together or of speaking as accredited representatives of the people, even when the speaking was done outside Parliament.

A second and even more distinctly recognizable group is that of journalists. The word 'journalist' is a vague appellation and may be applied to anyone who writes in papers with some regularity. But by this test a large number of journalists will be found to be M.P.s, or dons, in professional life. Here, therefore, we will take this group to be constituted by those who were either professional writers to the press and learned journals or, by all external evidence, have no profession which can be categorized under our other classification.

Our third group is by far the most important pressure group on India in Britain. All those who had worked in India officially tended to join together on their return home. It is easy to see the link that bound them. They had spent their lives under similar conditions, they had common memories and impressions, and they thought, with considerable justification though sometimes with too obvious a feeling of self-righteousness, that they were entitled to respectful attention on all Indian questions. Most of them were retired members of the Indian Civil Service—the 'civilians' in common parlance; but it would be deceptively superficial to christen them 'ex-civilians' or

'administrators' for many of them were ex-governors, retired commanders-in-chief, former judges and viceroys. The only collective name suitable for them is the Anglo-Indians, provided that it is remembered that we are using this phrase in a special (and Victorian) sense to mean all those who had served in India in some official capacity for varying periods, and not in the usual (and more recent) sense to mean those born of Indian mothers and English fathers.

The last group in our classification is that of dons who were either experts on India or so deeply interested that they took an active part in some controversy; or, as sometimes happened, men of no knowledge and little interest in India who were somehow constrained to express opinions on the subject. This is not a large group, either in comparison with other groups or by any abstract standard, and the explanation lies in the meagre scope of Indian studies in British universities. Indian history was (and is) not taught except at Oxford, Cambridge and London. Thus only a few, never exceeding half a dozen, persons were professionally interested in India as teachers or scholars; other dons who occasionally strayed into the fold present an uneven performance ranging from Max Muller's dogmatism to Denis Brogan's balanced summing up.

Beyond these four definite groups, which of course overlap, the horizon is not clear. We meet many characters in the course of this journey who refuse to be docketed and labelled at our convenience, not because they are so versatile as to elude classification but because they appear only once or twice and do not fit into our categories. We will find berths for them as we proceed, but where that fails we will just take notice of their existence as individuals whose views mattered for one reason or another. Similarly, we shall find a number of small societies and associations working as tiny pressure groups on India. They include such miscellaneous bodies as the India League, the India Defence League, the British India Committee, the Union of Democratic Control, and other propagandist organizations. Most of them were leftist in opinion, all of them political in complexion. The only body of this sort which made, through Lionel Curtis and Sir Reginald Coupland, a scholarly attempt to study the Indian constitutional question and to prescribe a cure was the Round Table Group.[19] These organizations will also be taken notice of whenever they were active in Britain or produced something which tended to affect public opinion.

Leaders of Opinion and their Myths

About three hundred individuals appear in this study, and only half of them can be said to have effectively made or moulded public opinion.[20] This is a very small number indeed in view of the long period, nearly a century, during which they were active. Whatever the reason for this—concern for domestic affairs, the greater number of foreign problems, ignorance about India, sheer apathy—this small group enjoyed unfettered freedom to lay down what the nation was expected to know and think about India. Its members orated in Parliament, wrote to the newspapers, spoke at public meetings, addressed letters to their Indian friends, published articles in journals of quality, talked in society, and in various other ways formed or influenced public opinion on India. By the training they had received, the political party they subscribed to and their personal experience, they were bound to give only partial pictures of what India was and should be. It must be remembered that the proportion of dons and scholars, who were generally looked to for a fair treatment of a problem, in this group was very small. Politicians and journalists, with or without Indian experience, are not the people to present a balanced view or dwell on all sides. They tend to be demagogues and dogmatists, making political promises, building up a case, writing for entertainment as much as for information, sometimes deliberately creating a sensation, appealing to popular feeling, playing to the gallery. In these circumstances, public opinion was bound to be a curious medley of good sense, distortion, prejudice, enlightenment, flippancy and ignorance. It would have been surprising had it been otherwise. Politicians do not lecture with notes and reference books at their elbows, they make speeches with a certain definite aim before them; and anything that helps them to achieve that end is welcome grist to their mill, no matter whether it comes from a White Paper, a history book, a half-forgotten legend, or a robust imagination. Journalists do not usually write like scholars, or for scholars. They write to make money and to please their readers; and neither is exactly compatible with scholarly balance or meticulous accuracy.

What was the result of all this? Public opinion became, not a 'moralized and codified version of the facts', but a group of stereotypes invented and popularized by those one or two hundred

persons. By repeating certain things about India again and again, and over a number of years, they created a few myths in the public mind round which centred all public discussion and all popular thinking on India. Five such myths may be discovered in this welter of varied opinions.

One myth created and sustained by the Conservatives alone (though at times accepted by others) was that of the 'loyal Musalman'. From Sir Winston Churchill's *Malakand Field Regiment* to Sir Olaf Caroe's *The Pathans* there runs an obvious love of the frontier lore: the bald hills and fortified Afridi villages, the Pathan blend of unfailing hospitality and incredible ferocity, sniping on this side of the Durand Line, the Pathan soldier who applied for leave to go home to murder his wife's paramour and reported back with uncanny punctuality, the pleasures of friendship between British officers and Pathan fighters. It was only on the frontier that the Indian met the English on an equal footing and friendships flowered. All who served in this area came under the spell of the frontier and it was from this, perhaps, that the stereotype of Muslim 'loyalty' took birth. The Muslim, ran the myth, was brave, dependable, nearer to Christianity than any other Indian creed, hospitable, self-respecting. In short, he shared many virtues with the current conception of an English gentleman. He must be supported, encouraged, even humoured. He was the basis of British rule in India, or at least of its continuance. We must never let him down, said the Right, for if once his martial race is alienated the end of our rule in India will be in sight. This myth found its strongest supporters among the Anglo-Indians, and especially those of them who had worked in the Muslim provinces and studied the Muslim mind at close quarters. In India the myth was strengthened by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who declared that the Muslim future in India was closely tied up with the sustenance of British rule and called upon his co-religionists to support the British régime lest they might be devoured by the increasing tempo of Hindu agitation. This myth is still not dead, and even today a letter to *The Times*, or a book of reminiscences, will recall with poignant nostalgia the distant memory of a few days spent happily with the Punjabi Musalman.

The Left had, in the meantime, put up their own myth which traced all the ills of India and British Indian policy to the elemental 'crime' of divide and rule. All differences of opinion in India, they

declared, were due to British official duplicity in dividing Indian from Indian. Hindus and Muslims, Sikhs and Parsis, all were one and belonged to one country, but the Government had split them and was keeping them divided to prolong the tenure of its rule. Were India to unite, which it would the moment the British rulers abandoned this 'hideous' policy, she could presently get her independence. But India was not given a chance to unite by her rulers and this was immoral. The Congress was a national organization, but the Government had inspired the formation of the Muslim League to break the strength of Hindu nationalism. Muslims and non-Muslims were one, but the Anglo-Indians had managed to separate them into communal electorates. In India this myth was nourished by the Hindus, who repeatedly declared that they had no differences with the Muslims and that it was the 'satanic' (the adjective is Gandhi's) British rulers who had come between the two groups. This stereotype, too, lives today, and even now many references to Indian history show the Left-wingers ascribing all communal tension, and even the creation of Pakistan, to the officially adopted and assiduously practised policy of *divide et impera*.

Another myth to which mainly the Left gave currency was that India was entitled to the right of self-determination. The Left always professed to be an implacable enemy of imperialism. Why should we, it said, rule over alien peoples? They are as good as we are. Colonies corrupt the ruler as well as the ruled. They lure the ruler into dishonesty, exploitation and tyranny. They debase the ruled and break their moral fibre. Let us wind up our rule in India and let her people decide their political future. Nationalism and self-determination go together. We have taught both to the East. And now we ignore the one and deny the other. Let us be honest to ourselves and to them. India is a nation and must have the right to determine her status in the world. If she wants independence, give it to her and we shall have a strong and sincere friend in Asia in place of a huge seditious colony.

In answer to this the Right appealed for the protection of minorities in India. Talk about Indian nationalism and self-determination was very good and edifying, they pointed out, but let us first be sure if India is a nation. India is a sub-continent, not a country. It never was a country. It is a medley of races, religions and civilizations, not a homogeneous nation state like England,

France or Germany. It contains large minorities, some of them as large as the total populations of many European states. Are these ready to merge with the caste Hindu majority? Ask the Muslims, they said, and ask the Untouchables, and then re-examine your theory of self-determination. We have ruled India for so long and rescued it from war and anarchy. Why should we now leave it to revert to the state in which it was when we acquired it? Have we no obligation to see that the minorities, who look to us for the protection of their legitimate rights, are not left friendless when we depart? Imperialism may not be so moral a thing, but it entails certain serious duties. We are committed to them and cannot shirk them. We have given our promise to the Muslims, the Sikhs, the Untouchables and the Christians, that we will not leave them against their will at the mercy of a majority which they distrust. An offshoot of this myth, with which we are not concerned here, was that of protecting the native states.

The last myth was the myth of the unity of India. It started on the Left but was gradually adopted by all sides. It was specially welcome to the Left for two reasons. It was the natural corollary of their earlier myth that India was a nation, and it appealed to their economic doctrine of planning. The modern tendency was to federate for the sake of military strength and economic benefit. The age of small states was gone. There were already too many tiny sovereignties, and they caused too many serious frontier squabbles for the peace of the world. India must remain one, for geography, economy and international power politics demanded it. Economic planning, that panacea for all material ills of mankind, was only possible if India retained her unity. Disunity would spell disaster for both portions. Those who asked for division were reactionaries, for they wanted to take India backwards; they must be conservative, for their demand militated against current economic principles. India was entitled to her freedom, but unity went with independence, and all Indians must come together for the sake of this unity. This desire for unity became almost an obsession with all vocal British commentators towards the end of British rule. When the creation of Pakistan was assured the decision was regretted by all: the Right, the Centre and the Left. Myths die hard and for many years to come the Englishman will look to the division of India as signal proof of the failure of his mission in the East.

It is an irony of history that even the Right, which had always been friendly to Muslim aspirations, came to oppose the creation of Pakistan during the last years. Both the Right and the Left ultimately upheld the myth of Indian unity because both felt the psychological need for compensation: the Right to make up for the loss of the 'brightest jewel in the Imperial Crown', the Left to alleviate their guilt for having shared in the benefits of imperialism in India. Both found this compensation in the idea that on their departure they would leave behind them a united and friendly nation, a great new power that would be living testimony to the farsightedness of British rule. And, in doing so, the Right exposed itself to the attack from the Left that it had, in fact, pursued the policy of divide and rule. On the other hand, the Left could be said to have been too idealistic and doctrinaire in opposing the division, for they themselves sanctioned it as an inescapable fact soon after coming into power.

This pattern of stereotypes largely determined what group of facts these people saw and in what light they saw them. Two of these myths, viz., the divide and rule policy and the unity of India, were obviously orientated in favour of the Congress and the Hindus. The one about the right of self-determination could be made to work on both sides, but in fact it was more often slanted against the Muslim demand for 'separatist' self-determination. The other two myths, those of Muslim loyalty and obligation to minorities, were evidently favourable to the Muslims, but the first was modified by later Muslim pronouncements themselves which resented the stigma of 'loyalty' and denied that the Muslim was nothing but a soldier; and the second, however influential and vociferous in the earlier years, did not go so far as to approve the creation of Pakistan. All myths are compounded partly of facts and partly of illusions and are, by their nature, only a symbolic, and therefore necessarily distorted, 'code' by which all facts are interpreted. Therefore they seriously affected British public opinion, or rather we should say that public opinion was but the broad generalization of facts viewed through these myths. It is necessary to keep this in mind if the course of public opinion is to be charted and understood in its proper perspective.

What follows later in this inquiry must be seen against the background of two factors. English patriotism has never been racial or

religious, and English nationalism is perhaps unique in the world. England never had a minority problem nor did she experience the difficulties of bringing about a union of two peoples who are as different from each other as Hindus and Muslims. Nearly every people has its scroll of heroes who are revered as national figures or fathers of the nation. Joan of Arc, Bismarck, Washington, Lenin, Kossuth, Mustafa Kamal, Jinnah, Nasser: all these are honoured names, but there is no Englishman among them. There is no point in history when the English nation can be said to have been formed. No great national uprising marks the English story, no towering personality stands at the fount of the nation. The growth was slow, imperceptible and erratic, but all the same sure, firm and continuous. The English nation emerged gradually, the child of centuries of common living, of countless dangers faced together, sharing the same literature and speaking the same language. It was born of chance, not of design. And this makes the Englishman curiously, but understandably, sceptical of the value of nationalism as a creed. Because he had no national struggle in his own history, he is apt to doubt if such struggles in other countries are worthy of his support.

It was much easier to convince the Englishman of the rightness of Indian nationalism (if there ever was such a thing), for he knew India as a geographical entity and had been ruling it and dealing with it for so long. India was a name well known to English students of history even before the British Government relieved the East India Company of its heavy burden. India was a country and her people were one nation. Between the Englishman and his support of Indian nationalism stood only imperialism, and when this was gone there was nothing to stop him from applauding the 'Indian' struggle for independence. But between the Englishman and his support of Muslim nationalism stood not only imperialism but also his innate, traditional disapproval of recalcitrant minorities. England has long been a closely knit, homogeneous country, and it is difficult for her to appreciate or even acknowledge the existence of a nationalism within a larger nationalism. 'The Indians are a nation' was not difficult to understand. 'The Indians want freedom' was not so monstrous a proposition either. But 'Muslims in India want freedom apart from the freedom of the whole India' was too much for her. No such thing had happened in the Englishman's experience and he refused to consider it as a sensible development. Because he himself

had never considered it wise to voice an assertive nationalism, he never understood the depths to which such a feeling could stir others. Intellectually he found it distasteful, politically it was outside his ken, emotionally—if it is appropriate to use such a term when referring to the English—he might have made some allowance for it. But it was only an allowance, and nationalism does not live on foreign allowance.

Thus, if the following analysis leads one to the conclusion that Muslim nationalism was never supported in England while Indian nationalism was, it should not be thought to imply some implacable hostility to Islam or to Muslim India so much as the natural inability of the English to comprehend and approve such political manifestations. And this inability was aggravated by Muslims themselves. They never learnt how to handle the English. Either the English were angels who had protected them against the Hindus or devils who were denying them Pakistan. Muslims must be loyal and defend British rule, or they must fight openly and spread treason. The Muslim mind worked in straight, simple grooves. It was incapable of skilful manœuvring. No attempt was made to inform the English of the Muslim position. No agents were sent to propagate their case in Britain. No one wrote books expounding their point of view. It was enough to make demands, now respectfully, now in fiery threats. No one cared to understand the English mentality and to modify the approach accordingly. Not once did Muslim India try to appeal to the Englishman's heart or to his intellect. Others did so and reaped the harvest.

Of course, there were reasons for this. Muslims were backward economically and educationally and therefore unable to command large resources for this kind of campaign. Publicity is a costly business and there were few Muslims rich enough to finance it. The little money that was available was needed to keep the national organization living. Lack of education was even a more overpowering handicap. No money meant no education; no newspapers, no journalists; no propaganda, no success. While Muslim leaders were appealing for money and beseeching their followers to send their children to school, Hindus were publishing newspapers, sending their agents to London and New York, contacting M.P.s, cultivating British visitors to India and thus making the British conscious of their existence and familiar with their political aims. In comparison,

the Muslim League was perfectly idle and the London Muslim League followed in its footsteps. If British public opinion was and still is hostile to the Muslim cause, Muslims themselves must bear a good portion of the blame for it. They could not reasonably expect to succeed when they never tried.

2: *The Origin of Nationalism: 1857–1905*

EIGHTEEN FIFTY-SEVEN is a landmark both in the history of India and in the history of the British Empire. After the unsuccessful attempt at a mutiny in this year, the dominion of the East India Company was transferred to the control of the British Crown. Now the British Government ruled over the vast spaces of India and was responsible to Parliament for the manner of doing so. The British sat up and began to take notice of what they possessed in the inscrutable East. For nearly a hundred years this part of the Empire was destined to be the most glittering gem of the Crown and to have considerable effect on British foreign policy. On the other side, Indians read their own lesson in this change of masters. They witnessed the departure of the East India Company through the haze of their frustration at losing the 'war of independence', and their sullenness was only aggravated by the thought that the British had now come to stay. The little hope that they once had of dislodging the Company now gave way to the feeling that they formed an integral part of the British Empire. In future the British must be handled differently. Mutinies would not help. There was before them a long and slow uphill road leading to constitutional changes and ultimately to self-government. But for the moment they acquiesced in the British rule and a new chapter was opened in the history of India.

Post-Mutiny Cross-Currents of Opinion

The myth of the loyal Musalman did not appear till the second half of this period. In the 1850s, most British writers believed that the Mutiny was the result of a Muslim conspiracy; and consequently Muslims fell out of favour with the British. This created an anti-

Muslim bias which did not disappear till this reading of history was later proved erroneous by British historians themselves. A second reason for the generally unfavourable opinion of Muslims was that, as Islam was a world religion competing with Christianity for the loyalty of mankind, many British commentators came to adopt a characteristic religious intolerance in face of this clash of creeds. To this must be added the fact that many Englishmen of this time derived their impression of Islam from the example of the contemporary Ottoman Empire, with the unavoidable result of confusing religious and political issues. These three factors need some elaboration.

It was widely believed in Britain that Muslims had taken a leading part in the rising and that British rule had been saved mainly by the anti-Muslim feeling of the Hindu races.[1] The British were repeatedly reminded that it was the Muslims who had organized the great rebellion. A member of Parliament could say, as late as 1886, that the Muslims were one element of permanent disaffection among the Indian population.[2] In some quarters this idea lingered on into the next century; in 1910 Sir Harry Johnstone still believed that the Mutiny was a real attempt on the part of the Muslims to found once again a Muslim Empire, at the expense of the Englishman and the Hindu.[3]

The rivalry between Islam and Christianity was an equally potent cause of bad feeling. We are told that Herbert Edwardes had come to believe that the Mutiny was a 'divine chastisement for the sin that we had committed as a nation by accepting a compromise with false religions' in India.[4] The British should 'open the Bible wide' and teach the subject people the Christian view of life.[5] Sir Alfred Lyall was obviously referring to such expressions of opinion when he remarked that Christians in India were yet not free from the old spirit 'which included crusading among the solemn duties of a faithful ruler'.[6]

The status and future of the Ottoman Empire have played a prominent part in British foreign and imperial policy. In the earlier period of what came to be known as the Eastern Question British sympathy and support were generously given to Turkey. For this there were two reasons. First, the presence of Russia in Asia and the possibility of a Russian initiative in the East became a British phobia. It is said that in 1899 Tsar Nicholas II told his sister, in a

letter, that to paralyse British policy in the Near East, the Far East and even in South Africa, he had only to order by telegraph the mobilization of forces in Russian Turkestan.[7] This was an exaggeration, but there is no doubt that Britain considered any Russian move towards or in Asia as a grave threat to her Empire. There was also the problem of retaining India; this was a second element in Palmerston's anti-Russian and pro-Turkish policy. The Indian Empire was a British interest, and to maintain this interest Palmerston had twice risked war and had once actually waged it (in the Crimea). Basically, Palmerston and Disraeli both agreed on the destiny of the Ottoman Empire. Disraeli wanted to improve the conditions of the Turkish inhabitants, not out of the sentimentality and philanthropy which possessed Gladstonian Liberals, but because it was in the British imperial interest that the Ottoman Empire should be strong and healthy. Indeed, at one time, during the Berlin negotiations, his Foreign Secretary, Salisbury, thought of imposing a Resident, on the Indian native states' pattern, on the Sultan.

But later British public opinion moved sharply away from Turkey. Palmerston and Disraeli were succeeded by Gladstone whose emotionally charged pamphlet, *The Bulgarian Horror and the Question of the East*, sold two hundred thousand copies within three weeks of publication. Though Disraeli dismissed the agitation with the quip that Gladstone was worse than any Bulgarian horror,[8] the British people were now passionately interested in the future of the Armenians and the conduct of the Ottoman Empire. This popular outcry, coalescing with the post-Mutiny anti-Muslim feeling, roused some fiery tempers in Britain. It crystallized the old Christian-Islamic clash, recalled to mind the alleged Muslim initiative in India, revived the crusading spirit and raised hopes of new imperial gains. British learned journals of the period are replete with articles and comments written to show the impossibility of a Muslim power in Europe, the inherent incapacity of Islam to exist as a political system and the dire necessity of bringing the Ottoman Empire to an end.[9]

The Turkish question was intimately connected with the Indian problem. The Sultan was looked upon by most of the Indian Muslims as their religious leader, the Khalifa. It is true that he was accepted as such by the Sunnis only; but in practice the whole movement soon became more political than religious, for the Khalifa

was not only the religious leader but also the ruler of the only existing Muslim Empire.[10] Naturally the European plans for the dismemberment of his territories were a cause of acute anxiety to Muslim India. But the existence of any such feeling in India was denied by all those who were victims to the current anti-Muslim prejudice. It was said to be but 'a figment of political agitators'.[11] Wilfrid Blunt was convinced that the Indian Muslims wholly sympathized with Arabi. As the Khilafat had in any case to go, Britain should control the Khalifa and thus become the head of the Islamic world.[12] To the Rev. Malcolm MacColl, Canon of Ripon, it was insufferable that Indian Muslims should 'dictate to us how we are to conduct ourselves towards foreign countries or sovereigns'.[13]

The collective result of these three currents of feeling—Muslim responsibility for the Mutiny, religious ambition to advance Christianity in the East, and revulsion at the Ottoman conduct in Armenia and other places—was a spate of anti-Islamic utterances. Professor Monier Williams regarded Islam as 'an illegitimate child of Judaism' and plainly 'a corruption of Judaism and Christianity'.[14] To Sir William Muir, the biographer of the Prophet, 'the sword of Muhammad and the Quran are the most stubborn enemies of civilization, liberty and truth which the world has yet known'.[15] Foremost among these hostile commentators was Malcolm MacColl, who asserted that Islam could be proved to be essentially and historically incompatible with civilization and that the people who adopted it passed under a blight which arrested their development and made them incapable of progress. This 'perpetual sterility and barbarism' of Islam were due to four 'vices': polygamy, slavery, prohibition of free thought and an 'impassable chasm' between Muslims and the rest of mankind.[16]

It would be unfair, however, to deduce from the preceding paragraphs that British opinion was entirely hostile to the Muslims. There were some, though not many, who held different views. Sir Alfred Lyall bore testimony that Muslims in India had always been tolerant of other religions, especially of Hinduism.[17] Sir William Baker brought out the close affinity between Islam and Christianity.[18] Henry Crossfield wrote an exceedingly sympathetic account of Islamic religion, history, culture and achievements.[19]

From the Mutiny till 1870 it is hard to find anyone in Britain who did not blame the Muslims for the insurrection. With the passage of

time, however, and by the efforts of some Indian Muslims, this impression gradually changed. The last major attempt to revive the bogy of Muslim disloyalty was made in 1871 by Sir William Hunter in his book, *The Indian Musalmans: Are they bound in Conscience to rebel against the Queen?* He tried to exhibit the spirit of unrest among the Indian Muslims by narrating the events leading to the formation of the 'Rebel Colony' and recounting the 'chronic disasters' in which it had involved the British power. He pictured the Muslim masses as 'eagerly drinking in the poisoned teachings of the Apostles of Insurrection'. He concluded by inquiring into the grievances of the Muslims under British rule and pointing out their 'real wrongs' and the means of remedying them.[20] Hunter's allegations were rebutted in both India and Britain. In India, Sayyid Ahmad Khan questioned both his sources and his interpretation.[21] In Britain, Sir Alfred Lyall, a fellow member of the Anglo-Indian group, contested his observation that most Indian Muslims were restive and were not being justly treated by the Government. He pointed out that Hunter had drawn his facts from the province of Lower Bengal and applied his inferences to all India, a process 'somewhat defective in logical fairness'. It was much nearer the truth to say that uneducated masses of Muslims were against the British than that, as Hunter had put it, 'the best men are not on our side'.[22]

By about 1875 British public opinion had generally come to believe in Muslim loyalty. Sir Richard Temple could write in 1880 that 'within the most recent years' Indian Muslims had become comparatively well-affected.[23] *The Times* was surprised at the spectacle of the stronger race (the Muslims) most heartily acquiescing in British rule, and agitation and sedition being the monopoly of races (the Hindus) which owed it absolutely to the British Government that they were not now the helpless and spiritless victims of successive conquerors (11 October 1886); now 'we must look to our Muslim subjects for the most sensible and moderate estimate of our policy' (28 December 1886). At the same time W. H. Gregory was stoutly arguing for cultivating friendly relations with Muslim India;[24] and Sir John Strachey thought it a mistake to suppose that the better classes of Muslims were as a rule disloyal.[25] The myth of Muslim loyalty was taking shape.

The making of this myth was facilitated by Muslim India herself, when Sayyid Ahmad Khan began to write and speak in favour of the

proposition that Muslims had not initiated the Mutiny, that they should welcome the British rule, and that Islam should assimilate the good points of Western civilization. Thinking on these lines was certainly an act of defence against the British retribution that fell upon the Muslims immediately after the Mutiny, but Sayyid's role in helping the Muslims recover their political and intellectual influence cannot be overestimated. He opposed the demands of the Indian National Congress for an increase in representative government in India and a wider recruitment of Indians to government service by open competition. He did so on the ground that the peoples of India were not a nation and that therefore any move towards the rule of the majority was bound to result in Hindu domination over the Muslims.[26]

Sayyid's point of view was supported in some eminent quarters in Britain. *The Times* agreed that under a system of recruitment by open competition the Muslims would find themselves practically deprived of the share of government to which their position and influence entitled them and that they would find their condition intolerable (16 January 1888). Theodore Beck, a former Principal of the Aligarh College, calculated that such a system would give the majority of the posts to the Hindu Bengalis and the remainder chiefly to Brahmans of Bombay and Madras. He pointed out the dilemma in which the reforms of 1892 had put the Muslims. If they did not make a turmoil the House of Commons would not believe that they disliked the proposed scheme of competitive tests, and would thus see their interests suffer grievously. If they agitated 'they may hurry the people towards the British bayonets'.[27]

The Aligarh College founded by Sayyid also received some support in Britain. A 'Sayyid Memorial Fund' was opened to collect money for Aligarh, and it was quite a success.[28] Strachey asked all those who were anxious to assist the work of Indian progress to send their help to the College, for 'they could find no more certain way of doing good'.[29] Two friends of Sayyid wrote articles making a strong plea for turning the Aligarh College into a Muslim university.[30]

In Britain Sayyid's name was not well known. Only two contemporary references to him can be found among the vast periodical literature on India.[31] Most of those British writers who were at this time giving their moral support to the Congress naturally

looked askance at Sayyid's injunction to Muslims to keep aloof from it. Blunt, for example, did not like him when they met in India in 1884.[32] The opinion was hazarded that Sayyid was not antagonistic to the principles of the Congress but only differed from the Congress leadership 'in such details as manner and time' and that the Congress 'represented the educated opinion of all portions of the Empire'.[33] Motives of personal advancement were imputed to him; he was said to have changed his policy of favouring the Congress to one of hostility to it because he was made a K.C.S.I.[34] He had 'an acute sense of political opportunism'.[35] In view of later developments, it is curious to find a recent historian asserting that Sayyid had maintained that India was a nation.[36]

Muslims and the Congress

Sayyid had asked his people to have nothing to do with the Congress, and by and large his advice was accepted. Current Indian news reflected the Hindu character of the Congress and the Muslim aloofness from it.[37] The following table[38] shows the strength of Muslim delegates in annual Congress sessions between 1885 and 1894:

Year	*Hindus*	*Muslims*	*Total*
1885	58	2	72
1886	387	33	436
1887	492	81	607
1888	965	221	1248
1889	1502	254	1889
1892	520	87	625
1893	732	63	867
1894	1118	20	1163

It is generally believed that the Anglo-Indians were the most fierce critics of the Congress movement in Britain. It is time to destroy this myth. The Congress was founded by an Anglo-Indian, it was presided over by at least three Anglo-Indians, and most of its publicity in Britain was provided by this group. With this was allied another powerful section of public opinion: the radical M.P.s. Two years before the establishment of the Congress John Bright had approved of the formation of an informal Indian Committee, having for its object the securing of combined Parliamentary action. The names of nearly fifty M.P.s were obtained, but the Committee fell

into abeyance and was not revived till 1889. In 1888 the Congress was successful in enlisting for its cause the famous Charles Bradlaugh. At the same time a paid agency was established, under William Digby, to represent the Congress in London. This 'Indian Political Agency' carried on a vigorous campaign in Britain. In 1889 it spent £2,500 on its propaganda work. The defunct Indian Committee was now revived, on 27 July 1889, as the British Committee of the Indian National Congress.[39] In 1890 the Committee established the journal *India* to place before the British public 'the Indian view of Indian affairs'.[40]

Not unnaturally, these people defended the Congress against all criticism. William Digby declared that it represented all 'nations and classes' not excepting 'even the Muslims—a section of whom only follow the aged and (hitherto) universally respected Sir Sayyid Ahmad'.[41] Wedderburn ascribed the Muslim hostility to it to the machinations of the 'excitable and high-handed functionaries' of the Government.[42] Hunter 'consistently championed' the Congress claims and his biographer says that it owed 'whatever result it has achieved to Hunter's influence with the British public'.[43] Hume, the founder of the Congress, dealt severely with all who opposed it and claimed that Muslim opposition was stimulated from the outside by a few ill-advised officials.[44] The myth of divide and rule was taking shape.

To receive such powerful backing in Britain within a few years of its birth was a great success for the Congress. But it had worked hard to get it. What did the Muslims do in this direction? Practically nothing. A couple of Sayyid's friends in Britain wrote a few articles in support of his ideas. But this was no more than a drop in an ocean. The only Muslim of note who made an attempt to put the Muslim case before Britain was Ameer Ali. On the other hand, the Congress was sending its agents to speak to the British public on its behalf; it had influential friends in Britain; and it issued a journal which publicized its point of view. Apart from these exertions, there were certain other reasons for the Congress working so successfully on British public opinion. First, in spite of its usual loyal declarations, the Congress was a protest against imperialism, and so found a ready welcome in those British radical circles which were 'enemies of imperialism'. Secondly, the Congress was generally credited with being the spokesman of Indian nationalism, and was

therefore favoured by most British liberals who, irrespective of their opinion on imperialism, were disinclined to reject out of hand a manifestation of colonial nationalism. Thirdly, the myth of divide and rule prejudiced a large section of the public opinion against the Sayyid school. The Muslims who opposed the Congress were thought to do so not sincerely but as a result of official and 'imperial' instigation. And, lastly, even if it were conceded that Muslim separatism was a fact, the Congress still deserved greater support because it represented a large majority of Indians. The old post-Mutiny anti-Muslim bias may also have played a part in keeping certain Englishmen from supporting the Muslims.

The last decade of the nineteenth century was a critical period in the projection of India in Britain. Indian political awakening had just begun, and it was a question of which party succeeded in winning over the sympathies of British opinion. The Muslims had no proper organization in India itself (the Muslim League was not established till 1906) and they never bothered to cultivate the British public. This was a grievous error and it ultimately proved highly detrimental to their cause.

In view of the total absence of any Muslim propaganda it is interesting to find some British writers defending the Muslims and sharing their feeling towards the Congress. Sir Leslie Griffin called it a sham; only a few 'obscure and notoriety-seeking' Muslims joined it.[45] Colonel Ward likened it to the assembly of Irish carpet-baggers.[46] To William Lilly it was 'the most impudent of impostures',[47] and Sir Auckland Colvin attacked it with all the gusto of an Anglo-Indian in office.[48]

All these people were members of the Indian Civil Service; they belonged to the same Anglo-Indian group, a large section of which had established and nourished the Congress in Britain. But there was also a miscellaneous group of journalists and others who were bitterly opposed to the Congress.[49]

The Insistence on Indian Diversity

An overwhelming majority of the Anglo-Indians realized the wide heterogeneity of Indian conditions and denied that India was, or could be for many years, a nation. This insistence on Indian diversity was in fact a reaction to two opposing myths, those of Indian

unity and divide and rule. When one side, mostly consisting of radical M.P.s and members of the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, charged the Right and its friends with keeping Hindus and Muslims separate from each other and asserted that India was a nation, or on its way to becoming one, their opponents concentrated on recounting the diversities of India. Professor Seeley threw his weight on the side of disunity and told his students at Oxford that the name India ought not to be classified with such names as England and France, which were nationalities, but with such as Europe, which marked a group of nationalities. He warned that from the moment the feeling of a common nationality began to exist in India, even if only feebly, the British Empire would cease to exist.[50] Later Lord Bryce was to join forces with Seeley and to underline the vital role of religion in the East, where it replaced national feeling.[51]

The Anglo-Indians followed these academic opinions almost unanimously. Henry Keene dismissed the idea of home rule for India as being as absurd as that of home rule for Europe.[52] Sir John Strachey prophesied that, no matter how long the duration of British dominion, how powerful the centralizing attraction of Government or how potent the influence of common interests, India as a whole could never become united.[53] Beck viewed the probability of the Indians becoming one nation as so wild and remote as to be no basis for practical politics.[54]

But to emphasize the human diversity of India was not enough. The main point in the statements of the pro-Congress group was that Hindus and Muslims were united and that there was no such schism between them as Sayyid in India, and others in Britain, had painted. Consequently, the opposing Anglo-Indian group proceeded to show that not only were all Indian racial and religious groups separate from one another, but that there was a chronic antagonism between Hindus and Muslims. The references varied in emphasis and in interpretation, but none omitted to note and register the fact of communal apathy.[55] The Hindu-Muslim problem did exist; and, unfortunately for the radical pro-Congress group, facts lay on the side of the Anglo-Indians. From describing this communal rivalry they now proceeded to discover its causes.

Sir Henry James traced the sequence of Hindu-Muslim friction to the aggressiveness and recently revived religious activity of the

Hindus.[56] Beck also found the Hindu of the new school aggressive and revengeful and 'vigilant and pitiless' in his efforts to ruin the Muslim.[57] Ward attributed the antagonism to four causes: past rule of the Muslims, 'arrogance and pride of place' of the Hindus, establishment of the Congress, and the home rule institutions introduced by Lord Ripon.[58] Sir Theodore Morison summed up the argument of this school by saying that Muslims, though not a nation in the European sense of the word, were beginning to look upon themselves as composing one nation distinct from other Indians.[59]

Only one Anglo-Indian publicly stated that the existence of these hostile creeds side by side was beneficial to the British. It was one of the strong points in 'our political position', said Sir John Strachey, that the better class of Muslims constituted an energetic minority whose political interests were identical with those of the British and who could not be conceived to prefer Hindu rule to British dominion.[60] There could be no more effective ammunition for the radical group, which was on the look-out for such confessions of the divide-and-rule policy.

A glance at the record of Hindu-Muslim rioting between 1870 and 1893 would have convinced anyone of the seriousness of the situation. One cause of this trouble might have been that during the first four years of this period the Hindu and Muslim religious festivals coincided; but it was not a mere coincidence that the Congress was founded in 1885.[61] But the British Committee of the Indian National Congress continued to echo cheerfully the Congress declaration that everything was all right in India so far as communal relations were concerned. When the Hindu leader, Keshub Chandra Sen, died Sir Henry Cotton reported that all Indians, irrespective of their religion, united in expressing their sorrow at the loss of one in whom they took pride 'as a member of one common nation'. He also found that the name of Surendranath Banerjea excited as much enthusiasm 'among the rising generation of Mooltan as in Dacca'.[62] The Hindus, who had never been antagonistic to Muslim aspirations and Muslim interests, 'find no more ardent advocates than in the columns of the Hindu press'.[63]

Sir Henry was at perfect liberty to say what he pleased, but we must remember that when he made Sen a national hero and Banerjea a common leader, Hindus and Muslims were tearing each other up in Lahore and Karnal; and when he made the Hindu press an ardent

advocate of Muslim aspirations, the Hindus were killing, burning and looting in anger against the partition of Bengal because it had resulted in the creation of a Muslim-majority province. When the art of under-estimation assumes such proportions it should be called by a different name.

Conclusion

Thus a number of significant cross-currents appear in the formation of British opinion on India. The period under review began with a general distrust of the Muslim, born of the feeling that he was responsible for the Mutiny. Gradually this anti-Muslim sentiment faded away and was replaced by two opposing views. One, mostly held by the Right, was that the Muslim community was loyal and dependable and its existence as such was of advantage to British rule in India. The other, more popular among the Left, was that the talk of Hindu-Muslim rift was an exaggeration and that all Indians were united and were, consciously or unconsciously, behind the Indian National Congress.

Another significant development during the latter half of this period was the appearance of a definite and recognizable group of M.P.s, journalists and Anglo-Indians, who blessed the establishment of the Congress, supported its cause in Britain and admired it as the legitimate manifestation of an Indian nationalism. A majority of this group belonged to the radical wing of politics, but it also contained some well-known Anglo-Indians. They may be called the radical group, but it would be more strictly true to give them the name 'Congress group' in British public life. We will meet this group often in our narrative; and though its personnel changed from time to time, its policy towards India remained fairly consistent throughout.

This period also witnessed the birth of the myths referred to in the last chapter. The Right, mainly with the help of the Anglo-Indians, took the lead in forming the myth of Muslim loyalty. The Congress group, on the other hand, charged the Right with deliberately splitting the Indian 'nation' to facilitate the prolongation of British hold on India. This myth of divide and rule was coterminous with another myth, that India was a nation. These two myths now became the stock-in-trade of the Left and were to be used often in coming years.

3: *The Partition of Bengal: I*

WRITING to Lord George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, in April 1902, on the subject of Berar being put under the administration of the Central Provinces, Curzon had, in passing, mentioned his intention of examining in general the question of provincial boundaries. On Bengal he was definite that it was 'unquestionably too large a charge for any single man'.[1]

No sooner had his intention to change the boundaries of Bengal been made public than there was an immediate outcry against it. Undeterred by this opposition, which he considered ill-founded and not disinterested, he decided to visit the scene of the trouble itself. Informing his wife of his plan to leave for Chittagong on 13 February 1904, he wrote, 'The row about the dismemberment of Eastern Bengal continues in every accent of agony and denunciation. But so far no argument.'[2] His trip to Chittagong, Mymensingh and Dacca convinced him of the case for a change. His chief argument was that Bengal was too unwieldy to be administered properly and conscientiously by one lieutenant-governor. Many among those who bitterly opposed his plan agreed with him in the diagnosis, but prescribed a different remedy. They wanted a governor with an executive council to replace the lieutenant-governor. To one who had for long urged the reduction of Madras and Bombay to the status of other provinces, such a scheme of adding to the number of presidencies was obviously unacceptable.

The scheme Curzon had produced earlier, in December 1903, had proposed the reduction of the population of Bengal from 78,500,000 to 60,000,000. The amended scheme, which he sent to the India Office in February 1905, further reduced the population of Bengal to 54,000,000, of whom 9,000,000 would be Muslims and 42,000,000 Hindus. It handed over to Assam a population which would bring the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam up to 31,000,000, of whom 18,000,000 would be Muslims and 12,000,000

Hindus.[3] Bengal would consist of 141,580 square miles and Assam of 106,540 square miles.[4] This scheme was sanctioned by St John Brodrick, the Secretary of State for India, in June 1905. The proclamation of the formation of the new province was made in September, and the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam came formally into being on 16 October 1905.

Later events were to show that the Viceroy had misread the temper of the people in his tour of Bengal. He had returned with a firm faith in the righteousness of his resolve and a sincere hope that the reform would be welcome to the people. What actually happened was the exact reverse. He had claimed that his speeches had silenced his critics and his plan had captivated the imagination of the people. In effect, his project started a passionate and sweeping agitation against the partition that was to prove a headache to the British Government, a subject of party politics for the British Parliament, an excellent weapon for the detractors of Curzon, a milestone in the history of modern India and, above all, the beginning of Muslim separatism in Indian politics.

How far was Curzon responsible for these results? He was contemptuously indifferent to the agitation aroused by his scheme. But this attitude cannot be explained by the autocratic character of the Viceroy or by the supreme confidence he had in his administrative genius. In spite of his domineering air he was by no means indifferent to Indian public opinion. On many occasions, when the interests of Great Britain were in conflict with those of India, he had unhesitatingly championed the latter and unmistakably emphasized the importance of the growth of Indian public opinion and the folly of ignoring it. In fact, so consistently and outspokenly did he adopt this attitude that it evoked a respectful protest from Sir Arthur Godley, who could not understand 'why what is called public opinion in India should have any more overwhelming weight with Your Excellency's Government or with the Secretary of State than it had ten or fifteen years ago'.[5]

Why did a man with such a deep and honest respect for Indian public opinion persist in the execution of his project after he had seen how distasteful it was to the people? His official biographer has one explanation. Curzon was convinced in his mind that his scheme was in the interest of India. He felt that the masses were suffering untold hardships by the existence and retention of old

boundaries, mostly drawn as a result of accidents of history, results of battles and whims of kings, and never for reasons of administrative expediency. By doing away with such harmful anachronisms he was, he thought, bringing justice to India. An agitation based on sentiment was not to be permitted to stand in the way of such a noble act. 'The fact of the matter is that Lord Curzon reserved to himself the right to decide when public opinion was an expression of views based on sober reasoning and supported by obvious justice and when it was a mere frothy ebullition of irrational sentiment.'[6]

A more practical explanation is that Curzon was right when he had found his audience not hostile during his fact-finding visit to East Bengal. Muslims formed a majority of the population of that area, and they naturally welcomed the project of a new province in which they would be the ruling nationality. Thus he was neither factually incorrect nor foolishly optimistic in reporting to Lady Curzon in glowing terms. This is corroborated by later events: the agitation was centred in Calcutta, not in Dacca, and it was more dangerous and widespread in West Bengal than in the new province.

Curzon was the most brilliant proconsul England ever sent out in her long career of empire making. He did many good things in India, and such vital spheres of public policy as education, agriculture, land policy, irrigation, railway administration and ancient monuments, still bear the stamp of his ability and foresight. Such ruthless pursuit of administrative perfection has its own penalties. Men, particularly men ruled by an alien race, forget the benefits bestowed upon them with a generous hand, and remember the tiny slips, the small defects and the passing hardships. Curzon had displeased the Hindus by refusing to recognize the Indian National Congress officially. He had also annoyed the Bengali Hindus by his reforms in the administration of the Calcutta university. When he modified the boundaries of Bengal, his erstwhile enemies were provided with a clear-cut issue on which they could attack the Viceroy. The so-called partition of Bengal was thus made a pretext for giving vent to all the bitterness and hatred the Hindus had been nourishing for so long.

The Agitation

The partition was immediately made an occasion for unprecedented agitation by the Hindus, mostly those of West Bengal. Curzon, in

having the boundaries modified, was charged with ulterior motives: to favour the Muslims by giving them a new province; to 'vivisect' the Bengali homeland and strike a deadly blow at Bengali 'nationality'; and to injure and weaken the 'nationalist' and 'patriotic' movement and spirit of the people of India, which had its strongest centre in Bengal.*

The partition was defended, and the agitation against it condemned, by the Conservatives and several Anglo-Indians. The ablest of them all, Curzon, explained his views in a debate in the House of Lords. Dismissing the insinuation made by the agitators and their friends in the British Congress group as 'a calumny so preposterous that it scarcely seems worthy of notice', he characterized his plan as 'merely the readjustment of the administrative boundaries' of Bengal 'effected by a duplication of the machinery of Government'. He concluded by uttering a grave warning:

> For my own part I can only say that any revocation or modification of the partition of Bengal—a measure accepted by two Secretaries of State, two Governments, two India Councils, of undoubted administrative advantage, inflicting injury upon no class or community, made a test case between the extremist party in India and the Government—would place a premium upon disloyal agitation in India in future, and render the Government of India well-nigh impossible; and future Secretaries of State would rue the day and would not forgive the man by whom that concession had been made.[7]

To Sir Charles Elliott, a former lieutenant-governor of Bengal, it was an 'undisputed axiom' that Bengal was too big to be administered as one unit. As a cause of disaffection the partition was incommensurate with the result. It was a 'symptom of pre-existing disaffection rather than a cause'.[8] Other commentators shared the view that the partition was in no sense the original cause of the revolutionary agitation. It might have given the agitation a strong impetus, added to it many recruits and forced it into daylight; but still it was only a pretext.[9] *The Times* strongly condemned the agitation which it called 'absolutely contemptible' (14 April 1906). The *Spectator* agreed, but regretted that the newspapers should give so much prominence to the agitation (5 September 1906).

It was towards the end of 1903 that Curzon had expressed his intention of changing the boundaries. There is no evidence in the

* This unrest and its implications are studied in detail in the next chapter.

newspapers or written records of the period 1903–5 of the Muslims having objected to the scheme. But from October 1905 onwards there is irrefutable evidence of the Muslim attitude to the partition.[10] They supported it almost to a man.

However, the agitators of the anti-partition movement took pains to show that the Muslims were with them. This propaganda had fruitful results in Britain, where a considerable section of public opinion came round to the view that sedition was universally supported by all classes and creeds. The Congress group was naturally the easiest to be converted. Already it believed that there were no serious political differences between Hindus and Muslims and that both were united under the Congress flag. It would have been a betrayal of this belief if it now conceded that the agitation was purely Hindu. Therefore, the whole group, strengthened by the arrival of a few powerful and popular figures like Keir Hardie, consistently maintained that the partition was resented by all and denied that Muslims were against the current unrest.

Keir Hardie called the partition an 'ill-advised' scheme and a 'great blunder' which was forced upon the province 'in the teeth of opposition of practically the entire population'. Later, when he came to know that Muslims were not opposed to it, he changed the point of his attack and complained, 'The Government of India is not surely reduced to the necessity of offending the Hindu population in all parts of India in order to give the Muslims a semblance of power in a portion of one province.'[11] Sir Henry Cotton was not prepared to concede even that much. He insisted that all classes of Indians were represented in the protest. He was told in India that Muslims had not joined the agitation, but he refused to believe it.[12] Henry Nevinson, currently the *Manchester Guardian*'s Indian correspondent, employed another trick while describing an Indian scene.

> The anniversary of that national wrong has become the Ash Wednesday of India. On that day thousands and thousands of Indians rub dust or ashes on their foreheads; at dawn they bathe in silence as at a sacred feast; no meals are eaten; the shops in cities and the village bazaars are shut; women refuse to cook; they lay aside their ornaments; men bind each other's wrists with a yellow string as a sign that they will never forget the shame; and the whole day is passed in resentment, mourning, and the hunger of humiliation.[13]

Some of this might have been true if the words 'India' and 'Indians'

were replaced with the words 'Hindu India' and 'Hindus'. All the semi-religious rites he shows Indians going through are Hindu ritual, and no Muslim would ever practise them whatever his opinion on the partition. The whole controversy here, and later, related to the question whether all Indians shared the same political views or not. To report a Hindu opinion as an 'Indian' feeling was not, strictly speaking, incorrect, since all Hindus were Indians; but in the circumstances it was grossly misleading, for it carried the impression that Hindus and Muslims had no difference of opinion.

In contrast to these statements of the Congress group were the utterances of a large number and variety of commentators, who cannot easily be grouped since they contained Anglo-Indians, journalists and some persons whose identity or personal details are not available.[14] The partition was resented by the caste Hindu only, for it threatened his superiority in all walks of life. Even the Hindus were not all on the side of agitation.

The most important Muslim leader in Bengal was then the Nawab of Dacca. It was alleged by Nevinson that when the partition was first suggested the Nawab was greatly opposed to it and even called it 'beastly'. But later Curzon's influence, combined with 'certain privileges granted to Muslims', made him change his views. Much was made of a loan of £100,000 given to the Nawab by the Government at a low rate of interest. This 'benevolent action' encouraged him and his co-religionists to view the partition with favour. Three points are involved in this statement. First, there is no evidence of the Nawab having objected to the partition, except that of Nevinson himself; and he does not mention his source or authority. Secondly, there was no privilege granted to Muslims as such; every Muslim could see the advantages accruing to him in the creation of a province where he would be in a majority, and it needed no persuasion by the Viceroy to open his eyes to this. Thirdly, the loan advanced to the Nawab was neither an innovation nor a bribe, as Nevinson implies, given to the Muslim leader to buy his support for the official action; such loans were frequently given by the Government of India to big landholders and petty princes to develop their estates or clear their immediate liabilities and to save them from the professional money-lenders.

Hindu-Muslim Riots

Modern Indian history has been marked by a recurring pattern of communal riots: Congress would declare a *hartal* (suspension of business) and its militant volunteers would force Muslim shopkeepers to shut up their business against their will, thus resulting in the shedding of blood. This familiar feature was prevalent also in the years 1905–11. As to the merits of the partition itself, here too British opinion bifurcated into two discernible groups. One, consisting of some Labour M.P.s and Liberal journalists, blamed the Muslims and held them responsible for all communal riots. The other, containing most of the Anglo-Indians, argued the other way round and defended the Muslims, whom they considered to be innocent victims of provocative Hindu violence.

On his return from India, Nevinson stated that all the riots in Bengal were started by Muslims, who generally kept themselves busy by looting shops, abducting Hindu widows, outraging Hindu women, desecrating temples and creating panic. This 'terror' existed because 'almost invariably' the English officials were on the side of the Muslims. When some Bengali merchants who dealt in Manchester goods and had been boycotted told him that Muslims insisted on having English goods, he refused to believe them.[15]

Nevinson shakes our faith in his impartiality by identifying himself so closely with the Hindus. If the Government was in fact supporting the Muslims out and out against the Hindus, and a reign of terror and anarchy was let loose, why did no Hindu complain against it? Contemporary and later Hindu writings repeat the usual charge that the Governments of India and Britain were always partial to the Muslims, but none of them says anything about the period on which Nevinson waxes so eloquent. It is impossible to believe that any Hindu writer would have omitted to refer to this state of general anarchy, if it had existed. Moreover, we find no reference to these alleged happenings in contemporary newspapers and reports. Further, Nevinson was grossly unfair, even by his own logic, when, on the one hand, he stated that the partition was opposed by all the Hindus and Muslims together and, on the other hand, insinuated that the two communities were busy breaking each other's heads.

Keir Hardie tells the same tale and embellishes it with a magnificent testimonial to the Hindu, who was 'by nature loyal, patient,

and long-suffering; but there are limits even to Hindu endurance, and these limits have probably been reached in the eastern districts of Bengal'.[16] When Hardie was writing this the anti-partition Hindu agitation was getting so desperately out of control that the Liberal Secretary of State for India had reluctantly to sanction special powers to deal with its campaign of crime and murder. Moreover, news agency reports from India during this period did not bear out Nevinson and Hardie.[17]

The Anglo-Indian group adopted an attitude that was diametrically opposed to that of Nevinson and company. Its views coincided more closely with the news agency dispatches and with the *Quarterly Review*, which attributed the growth of communal violence to the Government's inability to deal with the agitation promptly.[18] Sir Bampfylde Fuller remarked that Muslims were bitterly attacked by the Hindus and, having no other remedy, met force by force. Rioting ensued and the Government 'was placed in the awkward position of punishing a large number of loyal Muslims because they resented the oppression of Hindu schoolboys'.[19] The militant and revolutionary side of the agitation was being run by a special body of Hindu young men called the National Volunteers. Nevinson, in one of his usual dispatches from India, had warmly praised the work of these Volunteers who, according to him, acted as guards of women 'against the lower classes of Muslims' and were always ready 'for any sudden onslaught by the Muslims on Hindu houses and temples'.[20] But Sir John Rees tells a different tale. According to him, the Volunteers tried to force the Muslims to join in the anti-partition demonstrations, and this led to riots in Jamalpore and other places.[21]

In view of these conflicting reports about the same matter the wonder and despair of the ordinary reader can well be imagined. Whom was he to believe? The venerable and popular Keir Hardie or the distinguished Sir John Rees? A well-known journalist like Nevinson or a former governor like Fuller? And the different reports were not different interpretations or different readings of the same situation, but diametrically opposed descriptions of the same occurrence by highly educated and intelligent eye-witnesses. If reporting of facts could be such poles apart, how much more could the two sides disagree on views and opinions?

Morley and the Partition

Parliament debated the partition in February 1906, and Morley, Secretary of State for India, at once declared that it was 'now a settled fact'. He observed that at that moment there was a great subsidence of the feeling against partition,[22] but he made it clear that whether partition was a wise thing or not, 'nothing was ever worse done so far as disregard of the feeling and opinion of the people is concerned'.[23] In passing it must be noticed that Morley makes the mistake of identifying Hindu feeling with the 'feeling and opinion of the people', made by all Liberal and Labour politicians and writers on India.

If there is a discrepancy between Morley's declaration that partition is a settled fact and his opinion that it was an unwise action, his later statement resolves the inconsistency. When his Liberal administration came into office it found the partition a *fait accompli*. Then it was a question of 'political expediency' whether that transaction was to be reversed or upheld. The 'disadvantages' of setting aside all the operations following the first order were, by the test of political expediency, seen to be greater than the 'errors' of the original change. Hence Morley and his Government decided to uphold the decision of Curzon and Brodrick and Hamilton.[24] In 1908 Morley again declared that the partition would stand, while questioning why it was considered too sacrosanct to be modified.[25] Two years later, however, he appears to have come down squarely on the side of partition; he wrote to Sir John Clark, the Governor of Bombay, on 28 April 1910, that its reversal was 'now out of the question'. He had come to that conclusion at a very early stage and, he adds in his characteristic style, 'if I go to heaven one reason will be that, in spite of much pressure here, long and loudly continued, I stood firm by the Settled Fact . . .'.[26]

But such forthright support for partition did not fall from Morley's lips in Parliament. In the House he was always wavering: criticizing the methods and wisdom of the act and upholding its enforcement in the same breath. Probably he wanted neither to displease his own party nor to encourage the pro-agitation commentators in Britain. But it was not easy to strike such a precarious balance; and parliamentarians and politicians of the Liberal and Labour schools took heart at seeing the Secretary of State speaking

half-heartedly on the matter, and naturally persisted, with greater hope, in their clamour for undoing the partition. It has been said that on the question of partition Morley was largely guided by the advice of Minto and Sir Arthur Godley.[27] But there is nothing in Minto's letters to have encouraged Morley to hold the views he appears to have held. On the whole, Morley upheld his predecessor's decision on the ground of political expediency, but condemned it on the basis of his personal conviction. Not to uphold it would have been both to undo the former Government's major decision with an undue haste and to place the Government of India in an awkward situation. But not to criticize it was against his personal opinion and contrary to his sense of intellectual honesty. What perhaps he failed to see was that, in the first place, he was supplying a convenient vantage point for his political adversaries in Britain and that, in the second place, he was keeping the Muslims in India in a state of uncertainty. It was not without significance that on all possible occasions Muslims reminded the Secretary of State of his earlier statement that the partition was a 'settled fact'. They were continually afraid that Morley might succumb to the pressure from the other side, which was supported in Britain by some vocal members of his own party; though, in the event, it was his successor who was to make the Muslim fears come true.

Opinion in favour of Partition

As Morley rarely argued for the partition, or tried to make a case for it, this task was left to others, inside and outside Parliament. The strongest supporters of the change were to be found in the Anglo-Indian group and in the editorial chairs of *The Times* and the *Spectator*.

The Anglo-Indians, confident in their superior knowledge of India, tried to refute *seriatim* the points raised by the anti-partition group. Rees disagreed with Morley's objection that partition had been enforced against the 'feeling and opinion of the people concerned'.[28] Sir George Birdwood called 'utter nonsense' the suggestion that the partition had divided the Bengali 'nation' in two.[29]

As usual, the Anglo-Indian group was fully supported by the pundits of Printing House Square. *The Times* supported partition, failed to see in it anything that did violence to Bengali sentiments

and slated its detractors (8 September 1905). The case for partition was nowhere argued more cogently and in greater detail than in the dispatches sent by its special correspondent in India.[30] Before partition had been enforced, and when as yet only its scheme had been made public, the *Spectator* saw no reason against a change which 'will undoubtedly improve administration' (2 August 1905). Later, the dispatches published in *The Times* fully convinced the journal that Curzon was wholly justified in the decision he had taken and that Morley was showing courage and statesmanship in refusing to reverse it (21 April 1906). In the opinion of the *Quarterly Review*, the agitation would have died of inanition long ago had it not been for the incitement of a number of M.P.s and Bengali agitators.[31]

But the greatest victory of the pro-partition group was won in Manchester. This city was then, and later, the chief centre of Congress propaganda and of its British supporters. Therefore it was with some hope of success that, in September 1905, the Marwari Chamber of Commerce of Calcutta sent a pre-paid telegram to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, warning the latter that the sale of Manchester goods had stopped due to agitation against partition and asking them to intercede with the Secretary of State to annul partition. The appeal, however, did not succeed, and on 4 September the Manchester Chamber decided to send the following reply to the Calcutta telegram: 'Agitation is unwise, Bengali leaders must abandon the boycott in the best interests of the people'.[32]

Opinion against the Partition

Those who were opposed to the partition were no less vocal than those whose views we have studied above. This sector of opinion may be considered under four heads. The first and largest group was made up of Liberal M.P.s. Most of them also belonged to the British Congress group, and therefore generally borrowed their arguments from the Congress leaders and the Bengali agitators: partition had divided the Bengali 'nation', it was an attempt to suffocate 'Indian nationalism', it was administratively undesirable, it divided the Hindus from the Muslims, it was enforced against the wishes of the 'Indian people', it was a part of the deliberate official policy of repression, and so on.[33] Again and again, in 1905, 1907 and 1908, Herbert Roberts, Rutherford, Hart-Davis and Lord MacDonnell

urged the Government to 'modify' the partition, to remedy this 'grave injustice' and to send 'a message of peace to India'.[34]

The second group, much smaller than the first, consisted of a few Labour M.P.s who made common cause with the Liberal group in attacking the partition. Sir James O'Grady and Ramsay MacDonald were its spokesmen.[35] The third group contained three journalists, one Liberal, one Fabian Socialist and one Labour. Nevinson raised the objection that the people of Eastern Bengal took exception to being bound up with those of Assam, whom they regarded as semi-barbarous.[36] Ratcliffe, the Fabian, had taken the lead in opposing partition when he was editing the Calcutta *Statesman*; later he called it a 'blunder'.[37] Brailsford, the Labour journalist and M.P., thought it an 'autocratic act' and a 'clumsy one'.[38]

It will be noticed that this group contained a fair number of Anglo-Indians: Cotton, O'Donnell, MacDonnell and Hart-Davis, among the Liberal M.P.s, and Ratcliffe among the journalists. But, apart from this radical group, only one other Anglo-Indian is on record as having expressed himself against partition. He was Lord Kitchener, the former Commander-in-Chief of India, whose conflict with Curzon had led to the Viceroy's resignation. Short of actual reversal, he was in favour of doing anything to bring the people of the two severed portions of Bengal into some kind of unity.[39] This might have been due to his personal conviction or to his old enmity with Curzon; Morley does not mention his arguments.

Among the quality press, the anti-partition group found scanty support. Only the *Manchester Guardian* extended its help, and even that was grudging and with qualifications. It admitted that the Bengali grievance was 'wholly sentimental', but still suggested making Bengal a presidency (22 December 1908), a demand which had been made by the Hindu agitators from the start.

The Fuller Episode

An important incident in this period was the forced resignation of Sir Bampfylde Fuller, the Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam. He was a firm man who was not prepared to stand any nonsense from the agitators and politicians. Students of certain schools were involved in the anti-partition agitation, and Fuller

ordered the disaffiliation of these schools by the University of Calcutta. The Viceroy, Lord Minto, did not agree with him and asked him to rescind his order. In reply Fuller offered his resignation which, to his surprise, was immediately accepted.[40] By itself, this episode is not significant, but the conditions in which it happened and the political climate of the time made it something of a *cause célèbre*.

On his return to England, Fuller saw Morley and explained his point of view, but the Secretary of State remained convinced of the rightness of the Viceroy's, and his own, decision to accept the resignation. Fuller's stand was that 'I was on the spot; I understood the conditions; I knew India; what did Lord Minto and Mr Morley, then fresh to power, know or understand?'[41] Morley justified his action on the ground that Fuller was an unreliable administrator. Minto was quite alive to the objection against changing a governor in face of agitation, but 'it became every day more evident that the administration was unreliable and might lead to difficulties. If we persuaded him to remain we should run the risk of having to support him against ill criticism. So the resignation was accepted.'[42] Thus Fuller was asked to go for two reasons. First, he was incompetent and the provincial administration was deteriorating. Secondly, he was being criticized by the people, that is by the Hindus who did not like partition, did not like the new province created as a result of the partition, and did not like the Governor who suppressed the violent and anarchic unrest in his jurisdiction. The second point was elaborated in another letter by Morley to the Viceroy. The way to fight the agitation was 'clearly by trying to give the "agitators" as little to cry about as possible; to blow off gas in talk and articles; and never to meddle without clear and established prospects of breach of the peace'. Instead of this, Fuller's circulars and orders were only technically legal, 'without any attempt to pass the hard words to his subordinates to keep cool, and to bring either force or law into operation only when absolutely necessary'.[43] This makes an excellent case for accepting the resignation, but this official solicitude for handling the agitation is rather surprising in view of the stringent measures later sanctioned by Morley himself and of the violent and murderous proclivities of the agitation attested to by eye-witnesses like Sir Valentine Chirol.[44]

Fuller himself believed that he had been made the victim of a

foolishly lenient government, and that later events vindicated his stand. He claimed, with some truth, that the measures which he had taken were maintained and strengthened after his departure. The Government, he said, took too serious a view of his unpopularity with the Bengali press.[45]

The incident involved two important points. One was that Fuller, along with many others, felt that he had been sacrificed to please and placate the Hindu agitators. The other was that the Muslims of Eastern Bengal and Assam had come to look to Fuller as their protector against the agitation, which they disliked and disowned, and as their friend, for he had issued orders that Muslims were to be given their proportion of Government posts in keeping with their population in the province.[46] Taken together, these two considerations provided effective ammunition to the supporters as well as to the detractors of the Lieutenant-Governor. He was defended by all those who stood for a firm hand in dealing with the unrest, and was attacked by those who charged him with being pro-Muslim and anti-Hindu.

Not unnaturally, the Anglo-Indian group came to the defence of Fuller. Sir Frederick Lely, a Liberal himself, criticized the Government for forcing Fuller's departure. 'The disaffected schoolmaster is abroad, and the highest in the land go down before him. There is not a man in India who stands for law and order whose position today is not the weaker for this unhappy interference. A bad thing for the man, but far worse for India.'[47] An agitation which should have been liquidated much earlier would now continue.[48] For the first time in the history of British India 'agitation triumphed over the Government'.[49] It 'took the heart out of' all British officers serving in India.[50]

These strictures on the Government were strongly supported by the *Spectator* which called it a capital mistake; 'we should never throw a man to the wolves merely because the wolves howl loudly and show their teeth' (13 June 1908). It has been a long tradition of *The Times* to support all official action in principle, but to add its own riders in detail. Here, too, it seems it had its heart with the Anglo-Indians but did not wish to be critical of the government of the day. So it justified the acceptance of the resignation in Morley's terms but feared that this precedent of a viceroy's refusal to uphold a provincial head in exceptionally difficult circumstances 'will be

borne in mind by the mischief-makers the next time they see their opportunity' (14 November 1906).

Morley's decision to accept the resignation certainly encouraged British pro-agitation publicists. They saw in it a confession that the agitation was not entirely illegitimate and a hope that the end at which the agitation aimed might be nearer. Two instances will bear this out. Sir Henry Cotton called it 'the vindication of the popular will' and a 'popular victory'.[51] G. A. Hardy, a Labour M.P., attacked Fuller from the other side and blamed him for being pro-Muslim, derisively quoting Fuller's alleged remarks that 'he had two wives, and that as his Hindu wife was sulky, he was determined to pay attention to his Muslim spouse'.[52]

It is relevant that, on his visit to India in 1911, Fuller was advised by the authorities not to visit Dacca. He explained this order by his popularity with the Muslims of Eastern Bengal.[53]

Conclusion

Five questions were involved in the controversy over the partition of Bengal. First, was the partition of Curzon a wise act? A majority of the Anglo-Indians said that it was, and were supported in this by *The Times* and the *Spectator*; while a majority of those Liberals and Labourites who were vocal on India called it a blunder. Secondly, was this change brought about against the wishes of the people concerned? The Anglo-Indians again answered in the negative; while the anti-partition group denied that popular wishes were ascertained at any stage. Thirdly, did all the communities agitate against the partition? The Anglo-Indians and the Right as a whole never tired of affirming that the unrest was entirely a Hindu protest; while the radical camp was equally emphatic that it was an agitation common to all communities. Related to this was the problem of the consequent Hindu-Muslim antipathy; and on this, too, the dichotomy of views follows the set pattern of the period. The Right protested that the rioting was the result of the Hindus urging against the partition and the Muslims insisting on its merits and retention; and the radical set ascribed it to the deliberate official policy of encouraging and supporting the Muslims. Fourthly, should Fuller's resignation have been accepted? The Anglo-Indians were cut to the quick and angrily declared that it discouraged

British officials in India, encouraged the agitation and disheartened the Muslims; but the anti-partition group tended to see in it a victory of their cause and regretted that such action had not been taken earlier. Finally, should partition be upheld or reconsidered? Morley was wavering, while the pro-partition commentators stoutly favoured its retention and the anti-partition wing clamoured for its reversal.

Thus on all points of controversy public opinion tended to harden into two fairly distinct groups: the Right on the side of the Muslims, and the radical on the side of the Hindus; or, more strictly, the Anglo-Indian-cum-Right pro-partition group and the British Congress-cum-radical anti-partition group. The attitude adopted by the quality press helped to throw this transfiguration into relief. *The Times* threw its weight on the side of the pro-partition group and swept the *Spectator* along with it. The *Manchester Guardian*, on the other hand, was sympathetic to the anti-partition group and backed it up with editorial comments as well as reporters' dispatches. The interesting thing here is that the way in which British opinion divided itself during this period was gradually to become the set pattern. In years to come the Liberals and the Left, with the *Manchester Guardian* and, later, the *New Statesman*, were to support the Congress stand in Britain, while the Anglo-Indians and the Right, with *The Times* and the *Spectator*, were to be friendly to the Muslims.

The student of public opinion of this period is brought to a state of near despair by finding diametrically opposed reports and versions. Three radicals visited India during this crisis and recorded their personal experiences. But it is perplexing to find that the reports made by Hardie, Nevinson and MacDonald were flatly contradicted by the contemporary news coming from India, and by the resolutions and speeches of the Indians themselves. All three insisted that all Muslims were opposed to the partition; but we read of the Muslim meetings, resolutions and memorials asking for the suppression of agitation and praying for the retention of the partition. Cotton and Hardie were sure that all Indians, irrespective of religious affiliations, opposed the division; Rees was also sure that not only the Muslims, but the Christian and the Hindu communities as well, protested, not against the partition, but against the anti-partition agitation.[54] Nevinson thought that the partition was

opposed tooth and nail by all the civil servants of Bengal as well as by the Lieutenant-Governor; Rees again said just the opposite.[55] Nevinson, Rutherford and O'Connell asserted that the Indians were not consulted before the partition was ordered; Sir Charles Elliott believed that unprecedented pains were taken in Bengal to satisfy and conciliate objections.[56] Still more perplexing for the contemporary newspaper reader must have been the contradictory news and dispatches published in *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*. The former was a fervent supporter of the partition, and some of the finest defence of Curzon's act is to be found in its columns. The latter was opposed to partition and frequently published strongly pro-agitation dispatches and articles.

In addition to the reasons we examined in the first chapter—lack of Muslim propaganda in Britain, inability of the British to accept the idea of a Muslim nationalism within an Indian nationalism, etc.—three others may explain this general sympathy of British radicals for Hindu political aspirations. One was that the Government of India then stood for 'imperialism', and the British radicals were against it and therefore sided with its enemies, that is, the Hindus. The result was that a Hindu group came together with an English group—or more probably several different groups—to harass the Government of India and the Secretary of State for India. Secondly, the Conservative Party and the Liberal 'imperialists' were tactically open to assault in this period, and India was one weapon among others. This motive may have been mixed with personal ambitions, but it is reproduced in later British politics in the Middle East, Kenya and Nyasaland. Finally, Congress was open to Indians of all creeds, claimed to represent all Indians, and had been founded by an Englishman for this object. The Muslim League, on the other hand, was a 'sectarian' and a sectional organization, which it was difficult for an Englishman to support openly.

4: *The Partition of Bengal: II*

The Agitation

When news of the anti-partition agitation in Bengal and the general unrest in the country began to reach Britain, organs of public opinion and commentators on Indian affairs were not slow in expressing their reaction. The anti-agitation publicists were the same people who had been, a little earlier, pro-partition. They found no reasonable cause for the unrest and attributed it to mere anti-British feeling which was said to be a natural and normal response to any foreign rule anywhere. At first they tried to play down the serious nature of the agitation and later they ascribed it to other causes than the partition of Bengal. *The Times*, in reply to those who charged the Government with repression, agreed that there was much in the early history of British rule that could only be defended, if at all, by a moral standard strictly relevant to the circumstances of the time, but now it could honestly be claimed that the Government of India was 'enlightened, beneficent and humane'; it was not ideal, but then no government was (20 March 1906). Other supporters of the official policy were more outspoken. The *National Review*, for example, saw in the agitation a deliberate policy of assassination by a revolutionary party, and this 'growing cult of murder', this 'political *thugi*', was roundly condemned.[1] *The Times* hardened its tone in proportion to the gravity of Indian news, condemned the unrest unqualifiedly and gave full support to the Government in dealing with it (11 and 14 May 1907). In welcoming back the retiring Viceroy, Lord Minto, whose term of office had coincided with the worst spell of unrest, the journal praised his work in general terms, but mixed the encomium with a bitter paragraph:

> Some of his official acts have been called weak, and were weak. It was not strong statesmanship which flung Sir Bampfylde Fuller to the wolves, and gave an impetus to the agitation in Eastern Bengal which it took years to overcome. It was not strong statesmanship which deported known agitators with swift severity, and released them with apologetic excuses. It is not

> strength, but weakness, when an Administration arms itself with special powers for special purposes and takes pride in refraining from using them although need is there [17 October 1910].

Persons and periodicals who were opposed to the partition were also opposed to the suppression of agitation and held a different view of the unrest. Sir Henry Cotton denied that there was any desire amongst the Indians to eject England from India and declared that they were, in fact, grateful for the benefits they had received from English rule.[2] Later the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent, writing from Calcutta on 30 May 1907, complained that the British press had been exaggerating the Indian situation and asserted that, in fact, the European and Indian communities had been brought nearer together than they had been since 1905.[3] About three weeks later, however, a dispatch from the Press Association correspondent appeared in the same newspaper,[4] which regretted that the serious nature of the agitation was not being realized by the people at home, gave details of lawlessness and spoke of all Europeans going about with revolvers on account of the growing number of assaults upon them. The news was published under the title, 'Alarmist View of the Situation'.

Men Behind the Unrest

Throughout the agitation, news from India showed that the Muslims were assuring the Government of their loyal assistance in the suppression of this 'horrible, anarchic propaganda', expressing disgust at the growing sedition and heartily congratulating Minto on the passing of the Explosives and Press Offences Act.[5] On the other hand, the Congress had, by 1906, grown into a militant body demanding self-government as an inalienable right. It aligned itself with the anti-partition agitation, but some of its more moderate leaders, like Gokhale, resented the rise of extremism in a body which had so far been conspicuous for its constitutional approach. This conflict between the moderates and the extremists came to a head in the 1907 session at Surat, when a brave bid to capture the organization was made by the violent section led by the Mahratta Brahman, B. G. Tilak. His Hindu orthodoxy and his efforts to make the nationalist movement a religious revival were, more than anything else, responsible for alienating even that small group of Mus-

lims who, despite Sayyid Ahmad's admonition, had associated themselves with the Congress. From this juncture onwards, the Congress and the seditious agitation were identified in theory and in fact.

The contrast between the attitudes of the two leading British newspapers to Congress at this time is not only interesting in itself but also symbolic of the dichotomy running all through British opinion on this question. Just before the Surat split, *The Times* had castigated the Congress for being 'an abiding mockery of its own aspirations' and 'a complete and constant refutation of its own programme' (14 December 1907). This was strong language, but stronger was to come when the news of Tilak's essay at mastery arrived. The journal lashed out at the scotched moderate leaders who had wrought their own undoing by wanting to make the British believe that the Congress represented the 'Indian nation', though they knew that it did not. And now 'the whole fabric of its pretensions was shattered in a moment when a single Mahratta shoe came hurtling through the air' (30 December 1907). The *Manchester Guardian* was, on the contrary, very indulgent to Congress, always calling it a 'party of reform' and encouraging it to believe that its demands would be considered sympathetically by the British 'party of progress' which was then in power (29 December 1906). After the Surat split, a different line of approach was adopted. It bemoaned that the greatest enemy of the Congress had been the indifference of English public opinion. It was a body born and bred on the Liberal creed; and it would be a bad day for Liberalism when loyalty to its principles in India failed to awaken an answering sense of duty amongst the English Liberals (28 December 1907).

British opinion at once divided into two sections, one following the tone of *The Times*, the other adopting the point of view of the *Manchester Guardian*. Among the former were many Anglo-Indians who called Congress 'an assemblage of English-speaking Hindus'[6] and argued for bringing it under regulation since it was spreading sedition and corrupting the 'vast loyal masses'.[7] Among the latter were the British Congress group and some radical M.P.s who had completely identified themselves with the Congress. Dr Rutherford went to India to attend the Congress session of 1907;[8] Ramsay MacDonald was invited to preside over its 1911 session but was unable to do so on account of his wife's death.[9] Wedderburn presided over the 1904 session;[10] and Herbert Roberts complimented

it for its 'distinguished services' to the State and asked Morley to strengthen this 'constitutional party of progress in India'.[11]

Keir Hardie's Visit to India

In the latter half of 1907 Keir Hardie was in India, seeing things for himself. His visit became a controversial matter: some called it a foolish indiscretion on his part, many agreed that it was a scandal of the day. He was received by the Viceroy, after some hesitation it seems, and Morley wrote to Minto, 'I am glad you saw him . . . he is an observant, hard-headed, honest fellow, but rather vain and crammed full of vehement preconceptions, especially on all the most delicate and dubious parts of politics.'[12] During his Indian stay he was certainly hard-headed but, unfortunately, he observed only one side of the picture. His preconceptions did not allow him to take an impartial view of the Indian situation. Throughout the tour he was accompanied by J. Chaudhri, a prominent Hindu agitator and the son-in-law of Surendranath Banerjea.[13] Arrangements for his visit to Bombay were made by a member of the Congress who received him at the station and shepherded him round.[14] Hindu newspapers welcomed him as a messiah for the Hindu community and the *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, the best known paper on the agitation side, expressed their attitude in a eulogistic leader, saying that 'the people are delirious with joy' at his advent and that God had sent him 'to demolish the gigantic conspiracy against the Hindus'.[15] Keir Hardie responded magnificently to this royal welcome. In Bengal he heard little of the Muslim view of the situation as he was surrounded throughout by agitators. On his return from Eastern Bengal to Calcutta he told his interviewers that both Hindus and Muslims were very bitter against the partition. When Duchesne, the editor of the *Englishman*, pressed him for the names of leading Muslims who had told him that partition was undesirable, he could only say that their communications were 'strictly private'. But he said that he had spent half an hour interrogating Muslim villagers and, when asked who was his interpreter, refused to indicate his name or nationality, remarking, 'You must rely on my and his good faith.'[16] At Serajgunj, on his request, a procession of Boats sang the 'Bande Mataram'. At Barisal, he stated that Hindus and Muslims were united and that both were justified in shouting this song.[17] But while

Hardie was shouting 'Bande Mataram', asking his audience to sing it and asserting that both Hindus and Muslims were justified in chanting it, Muslims were vehemently protesting against it.[18]

Hardie's utterances and activities clearly reflect the influence of his chaperons. At Mymensingh he said that he was convinced that the partition was the root cause of all mischief and that official repression had increased the unrest. At Dacca he stated that the cause of the agitation was official opposition to the *swadeshi* and official patronage of Muslims.[19] When told by Hindus that Muslims had carried off their widows, he proclaimed that it was like the atrocities in Armenia.[20] On his return to Britain he told his countrymen that there was no sedition in India and the wonder was that there was none.[21] Such remarks were not meant to please the Muslims, and they only helped to widen the gulf between them and the Hindus. For once, at least, those who charged the Government with the policy of divide and rule were themselves its practical upholders.

This performance in India was condemned in Australia, where Hardie was to go after his Indian tour. The *Sydney Telegraph* found it difficult to estimate the damage he had done by stirring up discontent, and the Australian Labour Party was not pleased at the prospect of his impending visit, for it feared that a similar display of blatant ignorance by this 'self-styled' comrade would discredit its cause in Australia.[22] At home, *The Times* rebuked him (2 October 1907). Others joined in the censure and called him a 'fool', a 'ridiculous buffoon', a 'talker of nonsense' and a 'crank'.[23]

There is no reason to doubt Keir Hardie's sincerity and honesty. He had gone to India with prefabricated notions. There he had depended entirely on Congress leaders for his views and observations. If his impressions betray lack of knowledge this was because he did not care to acquaint himself with all aspects of the situation. He must be held responsible for giving his British friends, hearers and readers a one-sided, partial picture of Indian politics; but a graver responsibility must lie upon those of his friends who quoted him with approval in high places.

Wilfrid Scawen Blunt

Wilfrid Scawen Blunt was, in most respects, the exact opposite of Keir Hardie. A man of wealth and connections, a minor poet, a

horse-breeder, a passionate Orientalist, a bitter anti-imperialist, he had access to circles closed to Keir Hardie. In imperial affairs in Egypt he was as pro-Arab as Hardie was pro-Congress in India. But on India the two figures agreed to a remarkable extent.

A distinguished Anglo-Indian, Sir Curzon Wyllie, was murdered in London in 1909 by a Hindu youth, Madan Lal Dhingra. The murderer was tried for the crime and sentenced to death. In his dying speech he said that 'this war will continue so long as the Hindu and English races last'.[24] Blunt defended this young man, whom he called a Mazzini. He admired his courage and sighed for five hundred equally fearless men who could achieve freedom for India. He was grateful to the authorities for having chosen his own (Blunt's) birthday (17 August) for Dhingra's execution, thus making it an anniversary of what would be regarded in India as a martyrdom for generations. After the hanging, he was full of praise for the murderer's 'greatest fortitude', assaulted the British public for its 'besotted' refusal to acknowledge his (Dhingra's) greatness and warned that the day of reckoning was not far off. England apologized only when her face was well slapped, not before.[25]

On India, generally, he was equally forthright. After a discussion with Gokhale, the Congress leader, he found that the latter was no leader of revolution, for he was neither enthusiastic nor bitter.[26] He suspected that a good deal of bomb-throwing in India was arranged by the police so as to give the Government an excuse for violent measures.[27] His visit to India in 1879 convinced him that the 'natives' were capable of governing themselves 'far better than we can do', and 'at about the tenth part of the expense'.[28]

While in Egypt in 1881, Blunt had been tempted more than once to embrace Islam, but 'somehow the incredulity of my reason has always at the last moment proved too strong, and I have been unable to pronounce publicly words to which my intellect could not wholly subscribe'. It was in one of these 'moods of religious attraction' that he visited India in 1883–4.[29] His interest in India lay in great measure in the position of Indian Muslims and in the possibility of a liberal Muslim reformation in that country. We have already seen,[30] however, that in India he disagreed with the policy of Sayyid Ahmad and looked with disfavour at the signs of Muslim separatism. It is difficult to reconcile his interest in Indian Islam with his distrust of contemporary Muslim politics, and his desire

for a liberal reformation in Islam with his mistrust of Sayyid who was then the leader of such a reformation.

By any standards he was a remarkable man: a sworn enemy of imperialism; a Conservative and, later, a Liberal in national politics; autocratic in his domestic life, even a slave-owner (he had bought a little black boy, Pompey, as a slave in the Cape Verde Islands in 1867).[31] When Blunt died the *Manchester Guardian* praised his mission against the British Empire, and wrote, 'At most periods of our history there have been Englishmen who have been ready to defend unpopular causes. Blunt belonged to that noble line, and he added honour to its fine records' (12 September 1922).

Conclusion

To some, the coincidence of the beginning of Indian unrest with the advent of the Liberals to power was not a mere accident. They pointed out that it was a viceroy sent out by a Liberal cabinet who had encouraged the formation of the Congress; and that it could not have been altogether by chance that the worst outbreak of sedition synchronized, almost exactly, with the return of the Liberals to power in 1906.[32] Morley himself has informed us that in 1906 there was an Indian Committee, with about a hundred and fifty members, in the House of Commons, all of them radicals and Liberals; but Dilke, who was on it, assured him that, on account of its heterogeneous composition, it did not agree about anything and had no leading mind.[33] In the opinion of a modern historian, the arrival of the radicals at Whitehall gave fresh hope to the 'nationalists' in India and the Hindus launched a campaign of violence and assassination in which many innocent victims paid with their lives for the 'weak benevolence' of the new régime.[34]

It is difficult to say what difference it would have made to the Liberal point of view if Morley had not been at the India Office. It is less difficult to assess the impact of his policy on Indian problems. He had his own characteristic theory of the relationship that ought to exist between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, and he tried to live up to it. Minto was ordered to furnish minor details, not permitted to take any vital decisions, told to contact the India Office more often, and so on. All this comes out very clearly in their voluminous correspondence. On his part, it is true, Morley

kept the Viceroy faithfully and precisely informed of the latest developments at his end. But the initiative was gone from Calcutta. India was ruled directly from London. This did not produce chaos, as it might well have done, because Minto was an able administrator. But it led to a cramping of the Government of India at a time when it faced exceptional difficulties. Morley made Minto, perhaps quite unintentionally, as weak a viceroy as Curzon had made himself masterful. The agitators saw their opportunity and reaped a golden harvest. Morley himself was weak at times, or perhaps a little helpless before the constraining influence of a section of his party. He sanctioned special powers to the Viceroy to deal with violent sedition and accompanied them with instructions to use them sparingly. He spoke of stern measures and of standing no nonsense from the agitators,[35] yet virtually dismissed the lieutenant-governor who put his instructions into practice. It took him a long time to formulate the reforms associated with his name but, even then, he was uncertain what to put in and what to take out.* He promised separate representation to the Muslims, then modified the plan to their detriment, and finally gave way to public pressure. He made himself unpopular among the Hindus for his refusal to reverse the partition, which he called a 'settled fact'; he antagonized the Muslims, partly by his wavering attitude to the question of separate electorates and partly by his failure to deal firmly and successfully with the agitation.

Morley had a first-rate mind and stood head and shoulders above his colleagues and contemporaries in sheer intellectual power. He had the best of intentions. But he was not one of the outstanding Secretaries of State for India. In spite of the association of his name with the first major instalment of self-government to India, his record as a Minister is not as high as his ability promised. Of course, he was faced with extraordinary difficulties. He had to take notice of all shades of opinion in his party without seeking to override them, for he was not the leader of the party. The invisible but heavy pressure of his own party, so natural in a parliamentary system, cribbed and confined him. In India he was faced with a virulent unrest which had no precedent in history. Perhaps he had no option but to combine repression with concession, and thus evolve a compromise which is the essence of politics: we must not

* See next chapter.

forget that he was the author of a philosophical tract entitled 'Compromise'! Further, the newspapers of his party were no less troublesome than some extremists in its ranks. The chief of them all, the *Manchester Guardian*, looked kindly on the agitation and was benign to Cotton, Nevinson and Hardie. This alone could be enough to cause anxiety to a Liberal Secretary of State. But the smaller fry could be nagging, too, and one day he was forced to call in two Liberal editors and dress them down in good shape before they departed 'wiser and sadder men'.[36]

Perhaps Morley was not meant for politics; his intellectual gifts and literary grace would certainly have brought him greater eminence in the sphere of letters than he could ever have achieved in party politics and imperial administration. Or perhaps he was divided, in his mind, on the right policy to be adopted, and went, now this way, now that, as his lights led him, caring not a jot for that consistency which Emerson calls the hobgoblin of little minds.

5: *The Founding of the Muslim League and the Reforms*

The Founding of the Muslim League

In the first decade of the twentieth century Muslim aloofness from the Congress was common knowledge in Britain, and was interpreted by different commentators in different ways. Ramsay MacDonald, himself closely connected with the Congress movement, explained Muslim estrangement by the Hindu character of Indian nationalism; he found that some of the strongest nationalist Hindus accepted the Muslims as fellow citizens with a grudge, and sighed that the 'hope of a united India, an India conscious of a unity of purpose and destiny, seems to be the vainest of the vain dreams'.[1] Dicey found the sense of patriotism and of nationality utterly lacking in the East; religion was the one binding link, and nowhere was this 'so firmly realized and so loyally observed as among Muslims'.[2] Hindus and Muslims were 'only kept together by the bayonets of the Pax Britannica'.[3]

During the years 1902–5 Muslim leaders began to realize that Congress was incapable of representing Muslims or of dealing adequately or justly with their needs and aspirations. The Aga Khan did his best to prevent the breach being widened by remonstrating with his old friend, Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, and begging him to use his influence and make Congress realize how important it was to gain Muslim confidence. But to no avail. The Congress persisted in ignoring the realities of the situation. By 1906, the Aga Khan, Mohsin-ul-Mulk and other leaders had come to the conclusion that they should have an independent organization to secure 'independent political recognition from the British Government as a nation within a nation'.[4] Thereafter things moved quickly. Most of the Muslim leaders met in Dacca in December 1906, the Nawab of Dacca moved a resolution for establishing a Muslim organization, and Viqar-ul-Mulk delivered the presidential address. The new

body was christened the All India Muslim League,[5] and it met in its first annual session at Karachi in December 1907 under the presidency of Peerbhoy.

Several British writers on Indian history and politics have continued to give incorrect dates for the establishment of the League. The years 1907, 1908 and even 1910 have been mentioned.[6] There has also been an unnecessary confusion about the identity of its founder and the first president. One historian calls Ali Imam the founder;[7] another scholar, who earned a doctorate for his study of Indian Islam, makes the Aga Khan its first president;[8] while Lord John Hope makes Sayyid Ahmad Khan speak at the League's meeting in 1906, though the gentleman had then been dead for eight years.[9]

Broadly speaking, the establishment of the Muslim League, which one day was to split India and create the world's largest Muslim State, went unnoticed in Britain. *The Times*, always sensitive to Indian developments, welcomed the change, not so much as a mark of Muslim progress or unity, but as an inevitable outcome of the Congress movement and an exposure of the hollowness of the pretensions of Congress to speak for India. Using the occasion as a stick to beat the agitation with, it reminded the more cautious agitators that agitation was a game that provoked counter-agitation and that the counter-agitation might be conducted by the most warlike races of the peninsula. Despite the pacific language of its founders, the journal doubted if the League's establishment would make for peace (2 January 1907). The *Spectator* followed suit. The objects of the League were excellent, but 'we confess that we do not like this feeling among Muslims that they must organize in a camp by themselves. That is the real danger of the National Congress, as we have already pointed out—that in agitating for union it makes for racial disunion' (5 January 1907). The only other notice of the League's birth was an enthusiastic article in the *Contemporary Review*, which accorded a warm welcome to it, analysed its aims and objects and contrasted its constitutional and loyal approach with the Congress policy of violence. The founding of the League was ascribed to the Muslim conviction, after the agitators' successful attempt at the removal of Sir Bampfylde Fuller, that only by agitation could the Government be reached. 'The Rubicon has been crossed,' it declared, 'the Muslims of India have

forsaken the shades of retirement for the political arena; henceforth a new factor in Indian politics has to be reckoned with.'[10]

Different motives have been ascribed to the Muslims for their creation of a separate organization. The usual Hindu argument, unsupported by any evidence or corroboration, has been that the British Government and the Viceroy inspired the establishment of the League with an eye to using it to break the Congress and delay Indian independence. In short, it was an imperialist design, a subtle move to keep India under the British yoke. Because of its jibe at imperialism and British duplicity, this interpretation won much support in the United States, Soviet Russia and British leftist circles. In the United States it was a useful argument for criticizing British 'imperialism' and contrasting it with American 'republicanism' and 'freedom'. In Soviet Russia it was accepted as another proof of the standard Communist thesis that the British were exploiting India for their own ends. The British Labour Party and its friends also believed it readily, for it buttressed their own anti-Government and pro-Congress attitude.

But there were some students of Indian affairs who had different views. The *Quarterly Review* took note that it was the incubation of the Morley-Minto reforms which had led the Muslims to organize themselves in self-defence.[11] Lord Ronaldshay believed that the birth of the League was the result of a simple but vital problem: how was a system of government which predicated homogeneity of population to be adjusted to meet the case of a population whose outstanding characteristic was its heterogeneity?[12] In the opinion of a modern historian, the League was founded 'in response to the Hindu agitation for [*sic*] the partition of Bengal' and that since then 'the vitality of the Muslim separatism was in direct proportion to the militancy of Hinduism'.[13]

In contrast to the Congress, which not only had an effective propaganda machine in Britain but also had the inestimable advantage of a British India Committee in the House of Commons, the League's attempts at publicity were confined to occasional breakfast[14] meetings where Ameer Ali, the president of the London All India Muslim League, played the host.

The Simla Deputation

The gulf between the Hindus and Muslims now manifested itself in the constitutional sphere. The principle of representation and election had been established in the provincial field by the Indian Councils Act of 1892. Now, it was said, the elective principle was to be extended. To safeguard themselves the Muslims drew up a scheme of separate electorates and presented it to the Viceroy, Lord Minto, at Simla on 1 October 1906. On this 'very eventful day'[15] the large and representative Muslim delegation, led by the Aga Khan, impressed upon Minto two points of policy. First, in all elections, local and provincial, Muslims must be separately represented and their representatives separately elected by purely Muslim electors. Secondly, the extent of Muslim representation must be 'commensurate not merely with their numerical strength, but also with their political importance and the value of the contribution they make to the defence of the Empire'. The Viceroy, in a carefully prepared address, accepted both the demands contained in the memorial.[16]

On the day on which the Viceroy saw the deputation an unnamed contributor to *The Times* welcomed the Muslim demands and gave three arguments in favour of their acceptance. First, it was the duty of the Government to protect the rights of minorities. Secondly, representation by communities was necessary for the success of representative institutions. Thirdly, it was not inconsistent with the demands of the Hindu majority if, as was asserted, the Congress did represent Indian opinion. The Hindu politicians had made no attempt to adapt British institutions to Indian needs and proclivities; Morley himself had characterized the idea of transplanting British institutions as fantastic and ludicrous. The Muslims had now made the first practical suggestion ever thrown out by any Indian party.[17] The journal congratulated the Muslims for making no attempt to influence religious prejudice or political passion against British rule, unlike the Hindu agitators of Bengal. There was no doubt that the principle of representation by numerical majorities was not workable in India; where this principle was applied minorities went to the wall (2 October 1906).

A detailed background of Muslim politics was sketched by the *Economist* to show that the deputation was the outcome of two

causes: the pending increase of the elective element and the Hindu agitation against the partition of Bengal (27 February 1909). The *Spectator* also welcomed the deputation and supported its demands; the real thing, however, was to give Indians more and better paid jobs but to keep ultimate executive control in British hands. 'The eastern ideal of government is monarchy absolute as Deity, but just and benevolent. We should give them that, and not reforms and popular government' (16 October 1906).

On the day the Mintos were receiving and entertaining the Muslim deputation, Lady Minto received a letter from an official, whom she does not name, to whom the reception of the delegation was 'nothing less than the pulling back of 62 millions of people from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition'.[18] Minto's biographer also thinks that his reply to the deputation prevented the ranks of sedition from being swollen by Muslim recruits, 'an inestimable advantage in the day of trouble which was dawning'.[19] All Hindu and several British historians have characterized Minto's acceptance of the principle of separate electorates as Machiavellian and have insinuated that the deputation was inspired and prepared by the British. But it is unnecessary to impute base motives to the Viceroy, as his real motive was clear, precise and, from his point of view, praiseworthy: to help in the continuance of British rule in India. There is not a shred of evidence to show that he conspired with the Muslims to lead a delegation to him or that he readily accepted their demands because this would cause divisions between Hindus and Muslims. Minto may have suffered from many failings but not from double-dealing.

Morley-Minto Reforms

During the last months of 1906 Morley had been developing his ideas about Indian reforms and keeping Minto informed of his thoughts. At the other end, Minto was doing the solid work by appointing a committee to thrash out the contemplated changes. This body finished its labours in early 1907 and a stately dispatch on reforms was sent to Whitehall on 19 March 1907. It contained a recommendation for enacting into law the Muslim demand of separate representation. Discussion, and consequent amendment of the dispatch, continued for the next year and a half and can be studied

in the Morley-Minto correspondence. But towards the end of 1908 Morley changed his mind on the question of Muslim representation and replaced the earlier provision of separate electorates with a new proposal for an electoral college by which Muslims and non-Muslims would together elect a number of Muslims and these in turn would elect the representatives. There was an immediate and hostile reaction to this in Muslim India.[20] Soon the dispute assumed such proportions as to cause public debate in Britain. *The Times* opened the campaign on behalf of the Muslims on 29 December 1908. It agreed with the Muslim fears that under Morley's scheme their distinct representation would be illusory (29 December 1908).

To impress upon Morley the resentment felt at his proposal, the Muslim League decided to send a deputation to see him. Morley consented, and wrote to Minto flippantly, 'I have agreed to receive the sons of the Crescent next week. I wish the Prophet himself were coming!! There are not many historic figures whom I would be better pleased to summon up from Paradise.'[21] The nine-member deputation saw the Secretary of State on 27 January 1909,[22] but failed to convince him of the injustice of his scheme. Morley refused to budge because he did not want to annoy the Hindus. He wrote to Minto,

> ... the honest Muslims went away decidedly disappointed. I never expected it would be otherwise. How could I satisfy them by a straight declaration off my bat? We have to take care that in picking up the Mussalman, we don't drop our Hindu parcels, and this makes it impossible to blurt out the full length to which we are or may be ready to go in the Muslim direction.[23]

The Times was not satisfied with the expressions used by Morley and did not find them reconcilable with the considered reply of the Viceroy to the Simla deputation of 1906 (28 January 1909). No reforms which left the Muslims with a just sense of grievance could possibly work for the good of India as a whole (9 February 1909). But all Muslim protests, and their advocacy by *The Times*, were unheeded and Morley stuck to his electoral college scheme.

The mystery now deepens. No reason was given by Morley for justifying the change he had made in the reforms dispatch of 19 March 1907. The Simla deputation had made it clear that it wanted Muslims to be elected separately by exclusively Muslim electors; Minto, in his reply, had accepted this unreservedly and had

included this provision in his first dispatch. But Morley changed it to an electoral college scheme and, when this aroused fierce opposition among Muslims and in Britain, refused to go back. Speaking in the House of Lords on 23 February 1909, he gave a pledge that all Muslim demands would be met. This was odd in view of his stand; but three months later a strange thing happened. On 2 May 1909, Minto sent a telegram to Morley which made a farce of his Simla promise.

> I do not understand any Muslim here to claim concessions suggested by Hobhouse, namely, that wherever elections are found possible they should be conducted on the basis of separate representation of the Muslim community. If interpreted literally that would involve separate Muslim electorates within the various electorates proposed, such as presidency, corporation, district boards and municipalities, universities, landholders and the commercial community. This is manifestly impracticable and has never been suggested.[24]

However, precisely this *was* suggested by the Muslims at Simla and it was accepted by Minto himself. On what grounds did he now find these suggestions impracticable? It may be that in 1906, when the Hindu agitation was at its highest, he welcomed the Simla deputation as a godsend and as an opportunity of making friends with the Muslims. Later, Morley seems to have felt that too much had been promised to them; the agitation emergency was slowly passing away; Hindus were not to be annoyed. And perhaps the Viceroy also repented of his rash promises and agreed with his chief in changing the electorate provision to the detriment of Muslims. No other explanation of the *volte face* is feasible in the light of four documents: Minto's reply to the deputation of October 1906, the Government of India's reforms dispatch of March 1907, the Morley-Minto correspondence of the period, and Minto's telegram of May 1909.

In June *The Times* reverted to its attack on Morley's shifting policy, reminded him of the 'perfectly clear and definite' pledges given to the Muslims and warned him that, so far, no satisfactory attempt had been made to reconcile the pledges and the project described in Minto's telegram (26 June 1909). Ronaldshay fired a spirited broadside in the House of Commons. Unless the Government were able to clear up the mess created by the telegram, he thundered, two beliefs of very serious import would grow up in

India: first, that the only way to obtain the ear of, or satisfaction from, the Government was to adopt the method of agitation; secondly, that the word of the British Government was no longer a bond which was incapable of violation.[25]

These references to pledges stung the Secretary of State, and now he tried to wriggle out by explaining away the nature of the pledge he had given.

> I incline to rebel against the word 'pledge' in our case [he wrote to Minto]. We declared our view and our intention at a certain stage. But we did this independently, and not in return for any 'consideration' to be given to us by the Muslims, as the price of our intentions. This is assuredly not a 'pledge' in the ordinary sense, where a Minister induces electors to vote for him, or members of Parliament to support his measures in the House of Commons, by promising that if they will, he will do so and so. We shall have done the best we can according to the circumstances and conditions with which we have to deal, and by which we may be limited. That strikes me as the common sense of the thing. Pray don't scold me for being a pure Sophist.[26]

It is a little hard to accept this disclaimer. In the ordinary sense the word 'pledge' means a 'leader's public promise (not) to adopt some course' (*The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, fourth edition), and such a promise had certainly been given publicly by the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. Six days later Morley repeated that any departure from his stand would now provoke 'reproach and dissatisfaction' among the Hindus.[27] On 25 August 1909, the reforms Regulations were passed by the Secretary of State's Council, but only with the help of Morley's casting vote; five members had voted for them and five against. Morley was pleased that he did not have to overrule his Council. The same day he was told that a Muslim leader was coming to see him on the electorate issue. 'Whatever happens', he commented, 'I am quite sure that it was high time to put our foot definitely down, and to let them know that the process of haggling has gone on long enough, come what may. I am only sorry that we could not do it earlier.'[28]

These Rules and Regulations were published in November,[29] and they contained a scheme for separate Muslim representation in the shape in which it had been requested by the Simla deputation. Between August and November Morley seems to have changed his mind once more, and he finally abandoned his electoral college scheme. This was welcomed by *The Times* which had fought the Muslim battle so heroically and persistently and perchance

influenced Morley to change his decision (16 November 1909). More surprising still, now Morley realized that 'if we had not satisfied the Muhammadans we should have had opinion here—which is now with us—dead against us', but consoled himself by the thought that 'nothing had been sacrificed for their sake that is of real importance'.[30] In his last letter on the controversy he put the whole blame on Minto and reminded him that 'it was *your* early speech about their extra claims that first started the Muslim hare'.[31]

The Debate on the Reforms

Besides the controversy centring round Morley's electoral college scheme, the idea of separate Muslim representation itself started a debate in Britain which was to recur, with monotonous regularity and with the same arguments on both sides, till the enactment of the last law relating to Imperial India in 1935. Generally a large number of people supported the Muslim demand; most of the opponents belonged to the British Congress group and the Liberal and Labour parties. The difference between these two groups may be underlined by saying that while the former took the Muslims to be in some way a distinct nationality, the latter refused to distinguish between Indians and Indians. In short, the first group realized that Britain had some obligation to see that the minorities were given just treatment and the second was in favour of the majority ruling over the minority regardless of the feelings of the minority concerned.

The views of the first group were put succinctly by Sir Thomas Holderness: Indian Muslims were 'for many purposes a nation'.[32] The device of separate representation must be accepted in India as an illustration of Herbert Spencer's law that 'the integration of the organism necessarily begins with the formation of small groups and advances by compounding and recompounding them'.[33] Lord Percy went further and opined that for all time to come the attempt to govern by majorities in India was in the nature of things doomed to failure.[34] Sir Valentine Chirol put it simply by saying that 'the more we delegate our authority to the natives of India on the principles which we associate with self-government, the more we must necessarily in practice delegate it to the Hindus'.[35] This the Muslims knew and feared.

Later historians have not missed the relation between the introduction of a Muslim electorate and the creation of Pakistan.[36] Of course it is easy to see in separate representation the seeds of the separation which later blossomed into a Muslim State, but not difficult to argue that even in its absence an ultimate united India was only a shadow of a dream. Muslims demanded separate representation because they considered themselves to be separate from the Hindus. Irrespective of whether this demand was conceded or not, their feeling of separateness remained and therefore the creation of Pakistan was inevitable. There is no direct connection or causal relationship between the two. Though it must also be remembered that in this argument the exponents as well as the critics have the immense advantage of hindsight.

Supporters of the Muslim electorate did not, however, have the entire field to themselves. The critics belonged to as many different groups as the defenders. First came Sir Henry Cotton, who felt that it was an imperialist device to weaken the growth of that 'national or patriotic movement' which was working towards unification, fusion and amalgamation of all differences.[37] Then came the Liberals who generally claimed that their motive in opposing the system was to harmonize the different religions and exclude religious differences from the political arena; and they therefore called the Muslim demand a reactionary one. They also thought that the interests of Hindus and Muslims were the same and that special creed legislation was at variance with the British system and therefore unpermissible.[38] The *Manchester Guardian*, choosing to side with this extreme Liberal group rather than with Morley and the bulk of the party, thought it a pity that Morley did not insist on his first plan 'which would have met the just demands of the Muslims without offending the Hindus' (30 December 1910).

The Labourites were also stout opponents of the system. During the second reading of the India Councils Bill, in April 1909, Keir Hardie objected to the provision of a Muslim electorate.[39] Ramsay MacDonald vaguely hinted that the Simla deputation and the acceptance of its demands were inspired by Anglo-Indian officials; in any case whether this was true or not, it had undermined the influence of the Congress and thrown the 'constitutional Nationalist camp' into consternation.[40]

Membership of Viceroy's Council

One of the revolutionary changes embodied in the Morley-Minto reforms was the appointment of an Indian to the viceroy's executive council.[41] The innovation was opposed by *The Times* on the plea that it was fraught with possibilities of great evil. Not only would it be impossible to find anyone who could speak for more than one of the great divisions of the people, but his introduction into the highest executive body would be full of peril for the security of the State (18 December 1908). The latter fear is not difficult to understand in the light of contemporary agitation in Bengal, the capital being in Calcutta. The former argument was one that Muslims, too, were urging. They insisted upon the appointment of two Indians, one Hindu and one Muslim; and the committee of the London Muslim League resolved that the introduction of a member from one community alone would be regarded by the other as a grave prejudice to its interests.[42] When the appointment of Sinha, a Hindu, was announced, *The Times* argued for the appointment of a Muslim and commented, 'Without that further change, from which Lord Morley shrinks, the change which he has made cannot but awaken their [Muslims'] jealousies and stimulate their suspicions' (24 March 1909). The *Spectator* had echoed the Muslim demand a little earlier (27 February 1909); and it feared that Sinha's appointment would 'prove, not a healer of discontent, but an apple of discord' (27 March 1909). The Secretary of State, however, ignored this advice; but next year, on Sinha's resignation, a Muslim was appointed in his place.

Only a perverse sense of humour must have dictated this choice, for Morley knew very well that his Muslim appointee, Sayyid Ali Imam, was the only Muslim of any importance who had forsaken his community and supported Morley's electoral college scheme, for which he had been ostracized by his people.[43] If, therefore, this appointment was aimed at satisfying Muslim sentiment, it misfired; but it may be that Morley wanted more to reward Ali Imam for supporting his pet scheme than to conciliate Muslims.

The conservative *Quarterly Review* adopted an oddly illogical attitude on this controversy. First it suggested that the appointment of an Indian member of the council should not be held in succession by two members of the same community; but when Imam's ap-

pointment in succession to Sinha was announced, it severely criticized this bestowal of office 'in regular see-saw between the two races'.[44]

Morley and the Reforms

A study of British rule in India exhibits a disturbing connection between agitation and reform. The fierce Bengal agitation resulted in the reforms of 1909; the Khilafat agitation coincided with the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919; the Congress non-co-operation campaign heralded the reforms of 1935; Congress refusal to support the war effort sent Sir Stafford Cripps post-haste to India for negotiations. This may well be a superficial reading of history, but it cannot be discredited without strong evidence to the contrary, which has yet to be produced.

When, in August 1906, Minto appointed a committee to consider reform proposals, he sent a note to his council saying, '. . . to me it would appear all important that the initiative should emanate from us; that the Government of India should not be put in the position of appearing to have its hands forced by agitation in this country, or by pressure from home'.[45] But that was exactly the impression the reforms created in some circles in India as well as in Britain. Blunt thought that these reforms might have effected a reconciliation if they had come three years earlier, but now they were too late.[46] This may have been personal bias, for he had a pretty low opinion of Morley.[47] The *Labour Leader* was more outspoken, and justified the Congress for naturally regarding the reforms as a triumph for agitation, but saw no particular reason why it should have been so lavish in its eulogies of British statesmanship (1 January 1909).

During this period the British Government was under pressure from both Hindus and Muslims. Hindus wanted repeal of the partition of Bengal, which Morley refused, and a fresh instalment of self-government, which was conceded. Muslims insisted on retaining the partition of Bengal, to which Morley agreed, and on separate representation, which was conceded after much argument. The British gave way to pressure, and it was the first pressure and the first yielding in Indian politics. The pressure was from both Hindus

and Muslims, and both were yielded to. Obviously the result was an expedient, not a policy. And this expedient was to lead by stages to that of 1947.

Before Morley announced his scheme of reforms Gokhale, a Hindu moderate leader, had sent him his own proposals, and it appears that Morley adopted most of his points. When the reforms were made public, Gokhale wrote to Sir Herbert Risley, of the Home Department of Government of India, requesting that the note on reforms which he had sent to Morley on 1 September 1908, should be included in any papers which the Government of India might issue on the constitutional proposals. By an accident, so common in press leakages, this letter and his note were at once published in an Indian paper, the *Friend of India*, on 21 January 1909. The only notable difference between Gokhale's note and Morley's reforms was that Gokhale had suggested the appointment of two Indians to the viceroy's council, foreseeing that one must be a Muslim and one a Hindu. To some the publication of this note confirmed the impression that the reforms were not due to Minto's initiative or to Morley's suggestion, as they had been given out to be, but had been wrung from the Secretary of State by the 'leaders of the agitating classes'.[48] Some corroborative evidence is available to show that Morley was considerably influenced by Gokhale in the formulation of his reform proposals. In his note Gokhale had recommended the creation of *panchayats* (village councils), partly elected and partly nominated with certain powers and functions in all villages with a population of five hundred and above. Within less than three months, Morley directed the Government of India 'to consider the best way of carrying out a policy that would make the village a starting-point in public life'.[49] Further, when Morley's reform proposals were published and were being criticized by the Muslims, two Hindu leaders, Motilal Nehru and Pherozeshah Mehta, sent telegrams to Morley acknowledging the 'noble statesmanship' inspiring the proposed reforms.[50] When Muslims came to know that Morley had accepted Gokhale's version of a separate electorate despite earlier promises made by himself and the Viceroy, they were indignant and wired to Ameer Ali to protest in London.[51] Speaking in the House of Lords on 11 March 1909, Morley admitted that he had asked Gokhale to write a note on reforms and had received it in September 1908; and that at the same time he had also received

a note from a Muslim leader,[52] but he was silent about the publication of the latter.[53]

There was nothing wrong in Morley's asking for Gokhale's suggestions, as the latter was the foremost leader of the Hindus in his day and could speak for them. But where he displeased the Muslims was in accepting Gokhale's views on the issue of Muslim representation and persisting with them in face of Muslim opposition, and in spite of his earlier pledges. In public he never gave any argument to justify his stand, but in private he confessed to Minto that accepting the Muslim plea would annoy the Hindus. Perhaps he was conscious of the bad impression he had left on the Muslim mind, for, when the Aga Khan came to see him in February 1909, he begged him to disabuse his mind of the idea that he was, like all English radicals, an enemy of Islam.

> What other Liberals thought about Islam, I did not know; but for myself, if I were to have a label, I should be called a Positivist, and in the Positivist Calendar, framed by Comte after the manner of the Catholics, Mahomet is one of the great leading saints, and has the high honour of giving his name to a week! This will soon be expanded into a paragraph in the *Daily Mail* that the Indian S.S. has turned Mahometan. That, at any rate, would tend to soften Mahometan alienation from our plans.[54]

6: *The Delhi Durbar and After: 1911–1927*

MUSLIM India entered a new phase of politics in 1911 when the partition of Bengal was revoked. Many have argued, as we shall presently see, that the annulment came at a wrong moment. It was an ill-timed move which pleased neither the Hindus who had been clamouring for it, since they considered it too delayed to evoke any sense of gratitude, nor the Muslims who had been repeatedly assured of the continuance of division.

Contemporary reports from India in the years before 1911 speak of a marked diminution in the intensity of the anti-partition agitation. As early as 1907 the *Economist* felt that the Hindu-Muslim conflict appeared to be dying down in Bengal and the agitation declining, despite the efforts of the 'volunteers' to promote it (25 May 1907). It was clearly pointed out that Muslims would bitterly resent any suggestion of the repeal of partition. Partition was justified in the eyes of all men, 'save only a few malcontent members of Parliament who know nothing of present conditions in Bengal'. Even in Calcutta the outcry had long ago died away.[1] By 1910, the Government of India had become so confident of its suppression of agitation and the agitation had decreased to such an extent that the Government said they would not prohibit the demonstrations of protest organized for the partition anniversary; though all loyal people were urged to abstain from taking part in them as they might add to race feeling.[2] In the meantime, the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was making sound progress. In May 1910 the *Spectator* could claim that the agitation against partition was 'evidently collapsing' (21 May 1910). In October 1911 the *Round Table* wrote, 'Also it is in the least degree unlikely that an administrative measure like the partition of Bengal, which has been justifying itself more and more each year, will be capriciously upset.'[3] This was

published in the December issue of the journal; on the twelfth day of that month partition was revoked.

The Delhi Durbar

As far as is known, the *Englishman* of Calcutta was the first to suggest that the King should visit India and there be crowned Emperor. It was hoped that this visit would appeal to the Indians, who regarded the sovereign as a deity, and that it would destroy the seeds of discontent.[4] Gradually this suggestion matured, and then the question of boons that His Majesty should declare in India arose. Various suggestions were made. Some thought that it would be a good gesture to admit Indian officers to commissions in British regiments; others prescribed emptying debtors' prisons.[5] The Viceroy proposed two separate major boons: the reversal of Curzon's partition of Bengal and the transference of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi.[6] This was enthusiastically commended by Keir Hardie.[7]

Lord Hardinge, who had succeeded Minto as Viceroy in November 1910, discovered that the partition was severely criticized on all sides yet, in the beginning, he held out no hope of its reversal, though even then Bengalis repeatedly expressed the hope that the King would repeal the measure.[8] In January 1911, however, he received a proposal from Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State, suggesting the possibility of a modification of the partition. Crewe's idea was to create a governorship instead of a lieutenant-governorship, with the capital at Dacca or elsewhere; to form an enclave of Calcutta directly under the Viceroy; and to appoint Commissioners in various divisions of the province. The King was to announce these changes at the Durbar as he was 'strongly in favour of it in principle'. Hardinge consulted his officials and advisers, but all strongly objected to the scheme; and thereupon Crewe let the plan drop. During later months, however, Hardinge became convinced that if partition were allowed to stand very serious trouble would follow. His views became a definite policy after he had received a memorandum from the Home Member of his council, Sir John Jenkins, on 17 June 1911, which urgently argued for the transfer of the capital to Delhi and the reversal of partition, both changes to be announced by the King. Hardinge quickly agreed and drew up a very secret

memorandum which was then submitted to his council. No vital objections were raised by the council, and on 19 July the Viceroy wrote a long letter to Crewe containing full details of this policy and a strong plea for its acceptance. Crewe wired back on 7 August giving his full support, and authority to proceed, and urged absolute secrecy till the Durbar. The King was told of this scheme by Crewe himself in the presence of Sir A. J. Bigge.[9] His Majesty accepted it with great keenness. He was very anxious to make the announcement in person and insisted on the need for complete secrecy. Morley and Asquith were told later, and both were deeply impressed with the idea.[10]

In his letter to the Secretary of State, Hardinge expressed his conviction that partition was causing deep resentment among the Bengalis, though he confessed that Eastern Bengal had benefited greatly by the partition and that its Muslims were loyal and contented. One of the arguments he gave in favour of his proposal was that a reversal would bring Hindus and Muslims closer together.[11] Crewe, in his reply, hoped that Muslims would regard with satisfaction the re-erection of Delhi as capital of India, yet emphasized the need to balance the different communities in the new set-up. In his boundless enthusiasm for the new plan he wrote, 'I cannot recall in history, nor can I picture in any portion of the civilized world as it now exists, a series of administrative changes of so wide scope culminating in the transfer of the main seat of Government, carried out, as I believe the future will prove, with so little detriment to any class of the community, while satisfying the historical sense of millions.'[12]

The Coronation Durbar was duly held on 12 December amid brilliant pageantry. The King announced the proposed changes, and said at the end, 'It is Our earnest desire that these changes may conduce to the better administration of India and the greater prosperity and happiness of Our beloved People.'[13] Muslim reaction to the reversal of partition was instantaneous, bitter and furious. It confirmed their belief that the Government listened only to clamour and agitation, and a bitter jest, 'no bombs, no boons', was passed round among them at Delhi.[14] Practically the entire Anglo-Indian group allied itself with the Muslim protests. Curzon attacked it with vigour and trenchancy, bringing out all the arguments from his Indian experience; Lansdowne shared Curzon's objections;[15] and

Minto took exactly the same view.[16] The three former viceroys were followed by a host of ex-Indian officials.[17]

Among the Anglo-Indians, 'Asiaticus', a regular contributor on India to various leading periodicals, adopted an attitude which revealed the inner conflict in British minds. In April 1912, he declared that the Durbar decisions had caused growing dissatisfaction among Muslims, but in August of the same year he made a plea not to criticize Hardinge for the reversal of partition, for such criticism would weaken British rule and make his task less easy. In March 1916, he praised Hardinge for standing up to Whitehall in the Indians' interest and exclaimed that no other viceroy had ever taken his stand upon issues which appealed more strongly to India; next month he called deplorable the decision that handed back the control of the vast neglected areas of Eastern Bengal to distant Calcutta, and said that it was an unwise abandonment of beneficent work progressing smoothly in the Muslim province.[18]

Generally the Anglo-Indian group received full support from *The Times* and other organs of the Right; but on this occasion no such encouragement was forthcoming. Only the conservative *Quarterly Review* assailed the Delhi decisions in strong terms: never before was the policy of 'kick the friend and gratify the enemy' expressed with more Machiavellian directness than in the reversal of partition.[19] *The Times* was too stately to condemn an announcement made at a coronation and too loyal to criticize the King. Whilst previously the agitation had been a 'pretext' and an 'excuse' and 'mere sentiment', now it was 'impolitic to ignore considerations of popular sentiment, especially if they are backed by a genuine sense of grievance, when there can no longer be the slightest suspicion that the concessions made by them have been wrung from Government by mere clamour'. The revocation was a measure of constructive statesmanship, worthy to be promulgated from the lips of the Sovereign himself (13 December 1911). *The Times* also objected to the use of the word 'reversal' of partition, since there could be no reversal that did not revive the *status quo ante* (14 December 1911). The *Spectator* endorsed these remarks (16 December 1911). The *Economist* was optimistic enough to think that 'generous confessions of error, backed by actions, constitute the highest wisdom in politics', and naïve enough to believe that Muslim

sentiment was appeased by the removal of the capital to Delhi (16 December 1911).

The British Congress group, which had been agitating in Britain for an annulment of partition since 1905, naturally applauded the change. Sir Henry Cotton was delighted beyond measure; Sir William Wedderburn called it an admirable act of statesmanship; Ramsay MacDonald was pleased but felt apprehensive lest, Delhi being essentially a Muslim city, the Hindus might take this change as 'yet another favour to the Muslims'.[20] All the radical and leftist journals identified themselves with these views. The *Manchester Guardian* welcomed the re-unification of Bengal, but even it warned that the Muslims in Eastern Bengal would need very careful handling (13 December 1911). On the connection between the concession and the agitation it confessed that the Congress leaders would be more than human if they did not interpret the change as a striking vindication of their method of action (26 December 1911). To the *New Statesman* the reversal was a 'victory for constitutional agitation' and the most effective reply to the extremists (29 April 1916). The *Labour Leader*, however, reminded the 'Indian reformers' that they could obtain self-government only when they forced it from the hands of Britain (15 December 1911).

The compliments showered upon Hardinge for his work in India can be explained. By 're-adjusting' Bengali boundaries he had endeared himself to the Hindu population, and their good opinion of him was reflected in that of many British commentators. It was difficult, if not impossible, for a British paper or individual to criticize a viceroy who was popular among the majority in India; nor could the news of numerous meetings held in India urging the extension of his term of office be ignored.[21] From the British national point of view Hardinge was certainly entitled to an encomium simply because he had, by his policy of appeasement and restoration, saved India for the Empire in the early stages of the war.[22]

But this does not mean that Hardinge's policy was not disapproved of by Muslim India. There was no doubt that the reunification of Bengal was intensely distasteful to them, and they mistrusted a viceroy who, in their view, leaned dangerously towards the Hindus. In his Indian memoirs Hardinge claimed that his action was met by a chorus of approval except from the Cal-

cutta British community, and that the Bengalis of the two Bengals were enthusiastic over the reunion of their province. Towards the end of January 1912 he visited Eastern Bengal and met with a more enthusiastic reception there than anywhere else, which he took as a remarkable testimony of the satisfaction of the people at the reunion of the provinces.[23] But these statements are hard to reconcile with the current reports of Muslim resentment, the resolutions of protest passed by the Muslim League and the speeches of Muslim leaders. It is true that Muslims did not make a nuisance of themselves when the announcement was made; that was due partly to their tradition of loyalty and partly to the injunctions of their leaders. Nevertheless, all available evidence points to their growing uneasiness and throws doubt on Hardinge's self-congratulatory reminiscences.

Much criticism has been directed to the unconstitutional, or at least extremely unorthodox, and secret methods employed in reaching this decision. When the proposals were put before the Cabinet they accepted them with reluctance. On the one hand, they doubted if such boons would in fact arouse the desired enthusiasm; on the other, they were not at all certain that it was wise to identify the King personally with changes of such import and controversy.[24] Moreover, the measure was driven through the Viceroy's and the Secretary of State's councils by the force of authority. Neither of them was, properly speaking, consulted. The Secretary of State's council, for instance, were summoned, the dispatch was read to them, and they were informed that the King and the Cabinet had already approved it. Significantly enough, the only serious protest came from a Bengali member, a Hindu.[25] It was undoubtedly startling to have such important changes irrevocably announced on the strength of a secret letter from the Viceroy and a dispatch from the Secretary of State accepting the proposal contained in that letter. It was, in addition, a departure from normal practice to have ministers advising the announcement of such changes by the King in person before they had been discussed in Parliament.[26] It looked as though the King had been keen to announce an astounding boon, and his advisers, intent on pleasing His Majesty, had speedily pushed through the proposal without giving a thought to the arguments it would arouse. Crewe had proposed such a change in 1910, but Hardinge had called it impracticable. Then Jenkins took it up,

persuaded the Viceroy to father it, and the machinery of decision-making came into operation. Hardinge was anxious to pacify the agitation. Crewe welcomed the plan as a revival of his earlier suggestion. The King, already in search of an effective boon, was happy to be presented with a ready-made solution. The Councils were hustled into a decision, the Cabinet was probably influenced by the King's interest in the question, and Parliament was completely ignored.

The association of His Majesty's person with the change had one visible effect. Criticism was choked off or at least greatly smothered. It was a good bait to the loyalty of Muslim India; the Aga Khan, Viqar-ul-Mulk and Ameer Ali advised their followers to desist from any protest against the decision. Later this caused the Muslim League to swing over to the radical side under new leaders, and such 'loyalists' as the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali were forced to leave the organization. *The Times* carefully noticed the King's association with the announcement and, using it as an obvious threat, reminded the critics that the word of the King had been spoken and that that was irrevocable[27] (13 December 1911). The warning seemed to have proved salutary and the trickling stream of criticism was prevented from swelling into a torrent of condemnation, which could have been expected had the decision been taken by the Cabinet in the usual course of its duties. Perhaps, as Sir John Rees remarked, the Government would not have dared to reverse the partition except under cover of the Sovereign's presence and prerogative.[28] This may or may not be true, but it cannot be denied that the official decision was suspect when there was no public discussion on the plan in India or Britain, when Parliament was kept in the dark and a rigid secrecy was maintained. It might be true to say that the royal prerogative was put to an unjustifiable use which was, in the end, unfair even to the King himself. His name was drawn into party politics in Britain and, which was far worse, into party politics and religious rivalry in India. If, as is contended here, this course of action was politically unwise and constitutionally untenable, blame rests on the King's advisers, in particular on the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for India, who should have told the King that Muslims would look at his boons with disgust. Besides, the King should not have been associated with a decision which was in glaring contradiction to the repeated pledges of a former Govern-

ment to a vast and distinct element of Indian population. The danger was that the incensed Muslims might, for the first time, include the Sovereign in their condemnation of the Government which had betrayed them. The constitutional convention of keeping the monarch out of partisan politics was thrown to the wind in, of all places, India.

It must be noticed in passing that those Liberal and Labour M.P.s who had opposed Curzon's partition in 1905, on the plea that it had been decided upon without previous discussion in public or Parliament, never recalled this criticism now. By any standard, the decision of 1905 was more widely debated and more publicly discussed than that of 1911. Moreover, the Labour Party, which was on the look-out for any breach of constitutional convention, did not protest against the King's association with the change.

As to the larger question why such a decision was made at all, only speculation is possible. Five possible explanations come to mind. First, that the Government of India was powerless to suppress the agitation and gave in to the demands of the agitators out of sheer weakness; but this is dismissed by the fact that all current reports from India agree on the decrease and virtual disappearance of the unrest. Secondly, that the Government of India had resolved to give up Calcutta as the capital and, since such an action would have encouraged the agitation to flare up again, by annoying the Bengalis of Calcutta, these potential malcontents were gratified in anticipation by the re-unification of Bengal.[29] This, however, gets no support from the Viceroy's letter to the Secretary of State proposing the reversal of partition: the transfer of the capital was a by-product, and an extremely important by-product, but the real change was in the boundaries of the province; and the Viceroy said so clearly. Thirdly, that it was just a move in the imperial game of divide and rule. The partition had angered the Hindus; the provision of separate electorates in the 1909 reforms had pleased the Muslims; now the reversal of partition would gratify the Hindus. This see-saw of expediency is, however, too crude to be true; the imperial moves were, to do them justice, more subtle. Fourthly, that the King demanded a spectacular boon to announce at Delhi, and the best that the Cabinet and the Viceroy could think of was to repeal Curzon's partition: a rather far-fetched idea in spite of its simple attractiveness. Finally, that it was only a gesture of goodwill

towards the self-governing ideals of the Indian people, and was meant to satisfy the desires of a majority of Indians, irrespective of their creed or politics. This would have been the most feasible explanation had Crewe not, in July 1912, expressly repudiated the popular Indian reading of a passage in the Government of India's dispatch foreshadowing self-government on colonial lines. To him the existence of an Indian Empire, on the lines of Australia and New Zealand, was 'as imaginary as any Atlantis that was ever thought of by the ingenious brain of any imaginative writer'.[30] Perhaps the real motive behind the 1911 announcement was a mixture of all these considerations. A definite answer waits the release of the relevant archives.

It is, in passing, tempting to compare the Morley-Minto team with the Crewe-Hardinge one. Crewe was certainly not as fortunate as Morley, in having Hardinge to deal with in India. Though, or perhaps because, he was a diplomat, Hardinge lacked Minto's enterprise. In imagination and intellect he was less gifted than his predecessor, a judgment supported by a perusal of his dispatches and later writings. He was, in the final analysis, a mediocre viceroy: a man of only second-rate ability, whose career had been architected by the charm and energy of his wife. Crewe's biographer justly remarks that the bulky correspondence between Crewe and Hardinge lacks the glint of Morley's with Minto.[31] At the other end, Crewe himself was not an outstanding figure by any standard, and succession to Morley had completely eclipsed the little ability he had. A pedestrian politician, he depended more and more on the viceroy and other advisers; just as Hardinge, in his turn, tended to lean more and more on the initiative of his council, as is shown by Jenkins's initiative in the reversal of partition.

The Shift in Muslim Politics

A marked change came over Muslim politics after 1911. Factors contributing to this uneasiness were the reversal of partition, loyalty rewarded with betrayal in Muslim eyes; the beginning of the war in Tripoli, involving Muslims; and the Western powers' bid to control Persia. A feeling grew among them that they could no longer depend upon the British Government for the protection of their legitimate rights. Their trust in official promises had received a rude

shock, and a shift in their traditional attitude of 'sturdy loyalty' was now evident. This change in feeling appeared in definite terms in the resolution of the Muslim League at its session of December 1912 to January 1913, according to which the aim of the organization was changed from loyalty to a 'form of self-government suitable to India'. The word 'suitable' is the operative word, for the League still refused to identify itself with the Congress demand of unqualified self-government; it retained the right to modify self-rule in accordance with Muslim rights and aspirations.

A natural result of this change was the coming together of the Muslim League and the Congress. Now it was possible for the two to co-operate against the British since both were dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions, though for different reasons. In 1916 the two organizations held a joint session in Lucknow and formulated common reform proposals to be demanded from the Government: this was the famous Lucknow Pact. In its next session in Calcutta, on 31 December 1917, the League endorsed the Congress resolution urging the need for a parliamentary statute to introduce complete responsible government. Thus, by 1918 the two bodies had practically united, and soon they were to present a formidable front in the Khilafat agitation.

From this point onwards there was a marked change in British opinion. Those who had so far, directly or implicitly, supported the Muslims were now critical, for the Muslims were no longer living up to their reputation of loyalty. The growing anti-British feeling in Muslim India and the consequent Hindu-Muslim *entente* made a farce of the myth of Muslim loyalty which had been engendered and sustained so far by the Anglo-Indians and their Conservative allies. At the same time, the British Congress group and their radical supporters welcomed the new developments, partly to justify their theory about the fundamental unity of India and partly to show how wrong the other side had been.

The Times was displeased and considered it a misfortune that Muslim energy was diverted from the 'solid work of self-improvement' to 'cheaper and more specious ends' (16 March 1912). Directly after the declaration of the new policy by the Muslim League, an anonymous contributor to the *National Review*, who claimed to be one who had christened the League at its birth and helped to draft the Muslim address to Minto in 1906, bitterly bemoaned this change

in Muslim attitude which, he said, 'might well make Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Mohsin-ul-Mulk turn in their graves'.[32] To the radicals, however, advancing hopes of a Hindu-Muslim *rapprochement* were good news. In a letter to an Indian written on 28 July 1913, Blunt rejoiced at the Congress-League cordiality and claimed that his communication was instrumental in causing the Aga Khan's resignation from the League in November of the same year.[33] Sir Henry Cotton, who could not in view of his previous policy admit that Muslim uneasiness was caused by the 1911 changes, ascribed it to education and to the unity of ideas born of uniformity of training.[34] The *Manchester Guardian*'s conclusion was that the assumption on which British rule in India was built, viz., that Indian population was divided into two great religions, was no longer valid. It was no longer possible to dispose of the national future of India with the epigram that it is not a country but a continent (10 August 1917). The *New Statesman* reacted quite differently. On it now dawned the realization that in the crisis of the War the peace in India depended upon Muslim friendliness, and 'our supreme interest in the East at the moment is to keep on our side the incalculable sentiment of Islam' (26 December 1914 and 2 January 1915).

The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms

The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 had not satisfied most of the Indians, and almost from the moment of their enactment there had been a persistent demand for a further instalment of self-rule. The Hindu-Muslim co-operation now made it possible for India to present a united scheme to the British Government. One was the well-known Congress-League Scheme evolved after Hindu-Muslim negotiations towards the end of 1916. Another, known as the Memorandum of the Nineteen, because it was signed by nineteen members of the Viceroy's Legislative Council, was made public towards the end of 1916.[35] It was generally believed in India that some at least of its proposals had Hardinge's approval and were submitted by him to the British Government.[36] *The Times* refused to look at the Memorandum, calling it an unrepresentative document drawn up in haste and without careful consideration. Its demands were 'sweeping', 'nonsensical' and 'foolish' (22 Decem-

ber 1916). Montagu, the new Secretary of State for India, was also critical of a scheme which did not attempt to realize responsible government but left an irremovable executive at the mercy of a legislature that could paralyse it but not direct it.[37]

Shortly after Montagu's assumption of office, he made a memorable announcement on 20 August 1917, regarding the Government's policy in India. The declaration contained this oft-repeated passage: 'The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.' Simultaneously he announced his intention of visiting India personally for discussions with the Viceroy and political leaders. He was in India from November 1917 to April 1918, and his Indian diary[38] faithfully records his day-to-day activities and general impressions.

These joint negotiations of the Viceroy and Montagu with political leaders led to the reform proposals, popularly known as the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, which were published on 8 July 1918.[39] The first part consisted of a lucid statement of the situation and the second set out the proposals. In November 1918 the Franchise and Functions Committees, which were to elaborate in detail the principles propounded in the Report, began work under Lord Southborough. They toured India and concluded their labours in March 1919. In the summer the Government of India Bill, incorporating the proposals of the Report, was carefully considered by a Joint Committee of Lords and Commons under the chairmanship of Lord Selborne. The Committee made various recommendations designed to amplify and simplify the proposed reforms. So modified, the Bill passed through both Houses of Parliament in December 1919 and received the Royal assent on 23 December.

The publication of the Report and the enactment of the Act[40] led to a repeat performance of the debate on communal electorates which had previously been held in 1908–9 when the Morley-Minto reforms were on the anvil. The discussion inside and outside Parliament was monotonously repetitive, the same persons and parties taking the same sides. The Report argued strongly and persuasively against separate representation; but the Muslims regarded this as a

settled fact and any attempt to go back on it would rouse a storm of bitter protest; besides, a pledge had been given to them and it must be honoured until 'we are released from it'. Therefore, regrettable though it be, it must be maintained for the Muslims until conditions altered, 'even at the price of slower progress towards the realization of common citizenship'.[41] It must be recalled here that the Hindus, who had bitterly opposed the idea of separate Muslim representation in 1909, had now, by the Lucknow Pact of 1916, agreed to it and it had prominently figured in the Congress-League scheme. But the Report did not concede this Muslim demand because of the Lucknow agreement; it refused to regard the Pact as conclusive.

> To our minds [it declared], so long as the two communities entertain anything like their present views as to the separateness of their interests, we are bound to regard religious hostilities as still a very serious possibility. The Hindus and Muslims of India have certainly not yet achieved unity of purpose, or community of interest. They have yet a long road to pursue before that end is reached.

The debate on separate electorates visibly reproduced the party lines in British politics; the Right speaking in their favour and the Left, with one major exception, against them. Among the supporters of the system were three Anglo-Indians, three M.P.s and a distinguished journalist.[42] Ramsay MacDonald, the exception on the Left, had so far been opposed to the system, but now he recognized that, far from stereotyping racial and religious animosities, it would elevate minorities to a position of dignity and promote unity.[43] Among its critics the most detailed and bitterest attack came from Josiah Wedgwood, who called it by such names as 'trickery' and '*divide et impera*'.[44] Sir Henry Cotton shared these views.[45] Another influential critic was Lionel Curtis, who called it the 'greatest blunder ever committed by the British Government in India', and prophesied that so long as it remained India would never attain nationhood.[46]

The Period of Riots

At the time of Congress-League union some students of Indian affairs had refused to be beguiled into complacency by this show of unity and had predicted a short life for it. History proved them

right. Even while the Hindu-Muslim compact was still quite fresh riots broke out simultaneously over a great part of the Patna district, which were only suppressed after an area of some forty square miles had passed into the hands of Hindu mobs. According to the Government resolution, it was necessary to go back to the days of the Mutiny for a comparable turmoil and disorder.[47] In 1921 came the monstrous Mopla rising in Malabar, where fanatic Muslim tribes, inflamed by Khilafat propaganda, Gandhi's non-co-operation movement and reports of Hindus spying over them on behalf of the Government, fell upon their Hindu neighbours; and peace had to be restored with the help of strong military action and a prolonged period of martial law. From 1920 onwards the number of such riots rose steeply. There were eleven in 1923, eighteen in 1924, sixteen in 1925, thirty-five in 1926 and thirty-one up to November 1927.[48] Conditions were so bad that in 1926 the Under Secretary for India confessed a steady and increasing intensity of riots, and ascribed it to struggle for power, privilege and self-preservation as official control was slackened.[49]

What explains this orgy of religious bloodshed and racial strife? Such outbreaks have occurred throughout history when populations of different religions or cultures have been mixed and there has been no resolute authority to maintain confidence in public order. Jews and Greeks behaved thus in Palestine in the time of Christ. As the *Economist* pointed out, similar conditions produced the same results in Eastern Europe in the 1920s (10 April 1926). Other commentators, belonging to various groups and parties, supported this analysis of the situation. Chirol was convinced that Hindus and Muslims had never been of one heart and that the imminence of self-rule had merely deepened the wide gulf.[50] The difficulty lay in the fact that any government in a free India was bound to be a Hindu government: a nightmare to the Muslims. A *rapprochement* between Hindus and Muslims was among the few things in this world to which the word 'impossible' could be applied.[51] To the Muslim there were only two alternatives in an independent India: the submergence of his nationality in Hinduism or his political domination, at least in certain regions of India, secured by a struggle which might involve use of physical force.[52] The weekly press, of all complexions, reached broadly the same conclusions. To the *New Statesman* the fundamental origin of the tension was simply that

one party was Hindu and the other Muslim, and the latter was convinced that *swaraj* would mean Hindu ascendancy (2 April 1927). *Time and Tide* found that the events forbade any optimistic forecast of a tranquil India when *swaraj* was established (16 June 1922). St Loe Strachey, writing in the *Spectator*, learnt another lesson from current reports: the British military forces must stay in India 'to prevent internal disorder, and the possibility of a religious war between the Muslims and the adherents of the various forms of the Brahmanical faith' (18 July 1925).

But different views were current among the Socialists. Garratt attributed the trouble to communal electorates and criticized Gandhi for having agreed to them in 1916.[53] Lord Olivier, a former Labour Secretary of State for India, did not attach much importance to such news from India and pulled up the British press for harping on communal riots and thus prejudicing public opinion against any understanding of 'Indian nationalist demands'.[54] Col. Wedgwood regarded Indian bloodshed as mere 'cutting of the wisdom teeth' and complimented the Hindus on their attempt to strengthen themselves to face the virile Muslims.[55] In this controversy the *Manchester Guardian* supported the Socialists. Conceding that India would never be a nation in the sense in which France was a nation, it still believed that she had an underlying unity as remarkable as the superficial diversity (2 February 1925). It saw much force in the Hindu—which it called 'Indian'—thesis that the presence of a foreign power and the absence of responsible government had encouraged communal rivalry (27 March 1926); denied that religious rivalry was a product of the prospect of self-government (6 April 1926); and hinted that British bureaucracy in India was fomenting communal dissension (1 May 1926). It favoured the Hindu suggestion of abolishing communal representation, but feared that this would be unpalatable to the Muslims. If the Muslim community persisted in its attitude towards the Hindus, it would be impossible to think of *swaraj* except as a beautiful dream—or as a nightmare (17 July 1926).

The Nehru Report

In a speech in the House of Lords, asking the House to agree to the submission to the King of the names of the proposed members of

the Simon Commission, Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, explained why no Indians had been appointed to the Commission and entered into some details of the divisions of opinion and of interest in India. No unanimous report could be expected from an Indian body, he said, as it was bound to present a Hindu report, or a Muslim report and three or four other dissenting reports from various sections. The Congress leaders in India took deep umbrage at these words and accepted them as a challenge to India to produce a constitution. An All Parties Conference, which had lately been formed to bring all boycotters of the Simon Commission together, undertook to prepare a constitution to confound official pessimism. Inevitably, its work at once resolved itself into a discussion of the Hindu-Muslim problem. Debates dragged on for weeks with growing friction until the Conference had to turn to that 'last infirmity of conferences', the reference of difficult questions to sub-committees. When these failed, too, another sub-committee was asked to draw up a constitution. Even within this small body of eight members there were sharp differences of opinion, and it was with great difficulty that a report was finally published in August 1928.

The drafting committee consisted of Motilal Nehru, Sayyid Ali Imam, Tej Bahadur Sapru, Mangal Singh, S. C. Bose, E. R. Pradhan and Shoaib Qureshi. Motilal Nehru was the chairman, hence the report's popular name. Though termed an 'All Parties Conference', the organization was not representative. Muslims who took part in its deliberations belonged to that small minority which had been repudiated long ago by the great majority of the Muslims. The Sikh member of the Committee was driven out of the Secretaryship of the Sikh League within a week of the publication of the document. The Christians, too, repudiated the principles adopted by the Report in reference to the protection of minorities.

The main recommendations of the Report may be summarized thus: (*a*) India to have the same constitutional status in the British Empire as the self-governing Dominions and be styled the Commonwealth of India. (*b*) Legislative powers to be vested in a parliament of two houses, a senate of 200 members elected by provincial councils on a popular basis and a house of representatives of 500 elected directly by universal adult franchise. (*c*) Executive power to be vested in a governor-general acting on the advice of a council of ministers responsible to the legislature. (*d*) Joint mixed electorates

for all elections and immediate abolition of separate Muslim representation.[56]

The Congress hastened to accept these recommendations and cordially congratulated the Committee 'on their labours, their patriotism and their farsightedness'.[57] Next month it passed a resolution declaring that if the British Government did not accept this Report in its entirety by the end of 1929, the Congress would start a non-co-operation movement.[58]

Muslim reaction to the Report was a swift, unmistakable and unqualified rejection. From this moment onwards Congress became an almost completely Hindu body and assumed in the eyes of Muslims the character of chief opponent to their claims and aspirations.

The Report received a hostile reception in Britain everywhere, except in certain Socialist circles. On the Right, Lord Sydenham called it an 'amazing effusion' postulating government by the narrowest caste oligarchy the world had ever known.[59] The *Empire Review* found it almost cruel to criticize a utopia which reflected little credit upon its sponsors.[60] *The Times* agreed with those who described it as a scheme for the establishment of a Hindu *raj* (8 September 1928). Comments by the liberal *Manchester Guardian* were equally unflattering. The Report was so impossible that it created the suspicion that it was meant partly to impress innocent foreigners and partly to be the opening in an 'Oriental bargain where the vendor is expected to ask more than his camels can conveniently carry' (17 August 1928). On the Left, the *New Statesman* was severe: the Report was an artificial plan, an abstract and mechanical structure, neither Indian nor workable, a doctrinaire invention unrelated to the established facts of Indian life or government, an ill-considered and hasty device, a paper scheme already disowned by every minority; it was precisely a scrap of paper and nothing more (15 June and 3 August 1929).

This time, however, the *New Statesman* was not expressing the Labour point of view. This was done by the *Daily Herald* which, alone among the British press, characterized the Report as a 'demand to which first-rate importance must be attached, and from which there should come a new effort to meet Indian views' (16 August 1928). Lansbury was shocked to read the *Manchester Guardian*'s uncomplimentary leaders, and wrote a stinging letter to

the newspaper, saying that its comments read like the Tory jokes and sneers against Irish home-rulers in the days when Gladstone had first tried his hand at Home Rule for Ireland.[61]

The Socialist Policy

When the first Labour Government in British history took office in 1924, there was rejoicing among the Hindus and Surendranath Banerjea sent a telegram to Ramsay MacDonald congratulating him on his appointment and hoping that under his guidance the attainment of full self-government would be expedited. MacDonald's message to India of 26 January, probably a public reply to Banerjea's telegram, was anything but encouraging to the Congress. He warned that no party in Britain 'will be cowed by threats of force or by policies designed to bring government to a standstill'.[62] The *New Leader* was quick to notice the contrast in tone between this message and MacDonald's friendly letters to Poincaré (31 October 1924). Evelyn Wrench, writing in the *Spectator*, welcomed MacDonald's message (2 February 1924) and correctly forecast that Labour's policy would be 'cautious, but at the same time sympathetic with India's aspirations for a further instalment of self-government' (16 February 1924). The Congress was also disillusioned by the inclusion of Chelmsford in the new Labour Cabinet and the exclusion of Wedgwood.[63] On the whole, the left wing in the party was dissatisfied with the Government's Indian policy, and its organ called it 'the one great failure of the Labour Government'.[64]

The other major Socialist body, the Independent Labour Party, was generally outspoken in its support of the Hindus. A minor incident illustrates this. In 1927 Katherine Mayo, an American visitor to India, had published her *Mother India*, which contained some startling but generally correct statements about the Hindu religion. When the *New Statesman* favourably reviewed the book on 16 July, Fred Hughes, secretary of the I.L.P., wrote a letter to the journal, saying that *he had no first-hand experience of India and had not read the book*, but had found the review 'an uncritical and worthless piece of work'.[65]

7: *The Khilafat Movement*

As was said in the last chapter, previous to 1912 Muslims of India were, as a rule, supporters of the British Government and insistent that political reforms demanded by the Congress must be consistent with the maintenance of British control. This policy was forsaken in 1913, for two reasons. The first, as we have seen, was the Delhi Durbar changes which led them to think that Muslim interests had been sacrificed to the appeasement of a Hindu agitation. The second was the influence of Pan-Islamism and the Khilafat question, to which we now turn.

Turkey and the Khilafat Question

Much of the Ottoman Empire in Asia Minor had been partitioned by secret agreements during the War: Mesopotamia to Britain, Syria and Cilicia to France, under the Sykes-Picot agreement of 16 May 1916; a large area extending inland from the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts, including Adalia and Smyrna, to Italy under the Treaty of London of 26 April 1915, and the St Jean de Maurienne agreement of 17 April 1917. Possession of the Straits and Constantinople had been promised to Russia in the Constantinople agreement of 18 March 1915, but the Soviet Government denounced it. After the armistice of Mudros of 30 October 1918 with Turkey, Allied forces took control of Constantinople. At a meeting in London in February 1920, Lloyd George and Clemenceau agreed to leave the Sultan in Constantinople, partly as a result of French urging and partly because of pressure from the India Office.

But by 1920 the Sultan of Turkey had been replaced by a National Government at Angora, and Mustafa Kamal began liberating his country. He attacked the French forces in Cilicia and Italian forces in Konia. Italy withdrew her forces and gave up her claims to any part of Asia Minor. In June the Turkish forces threatened British

troops stationed on the Asiatic side of the Straits; in reply the Allies called upon Greece to launch a major offensive against Kamal. With Lloyd George's encouragement the Greeks had occupied Smyrna in May 1919, though it had previously been allotted to Italy; now Greek forces advanced into Anatolia and another Greek army landed in Eastern Thrace and occupied Adrianople.

The Allies signed the Treaty of Sèvres with the Sultan on 10 August 1920, by which Eastern Thrace, Gallipoli and the Aegean islands were ceded to Greece; Smyrna was to be administered by Greece for five years and then to decide its future by a plebiscite; the Straits and the Dardanelles were to be demilitarized and placed under international supervision. But things soon changed. At the end of 1920 Venizelos, the Greek statesman, fell from office and King Constantine returned to the throne. Britain had little enthusiasm for the former pro-German monarch and France, suspicious of British policy in the Near East, was ready for a change. Only Lloyd George stuck resolutely to his pro-Greek policy, and therefore, in 1921, when the Greeks could have extricated themselves from Asia Minor, they did not do so, trusting to Lloyd George's support. In summer they began a new offensive aimed at Ankara. In October France and Turkey signed a treaty at Ankara, ending the war between the two and providing for French evacuation of Cilicia and surrender of territory in northern Syria.

Events moved fast in 1922. In March the Viceroy of India published the memorandum giving sympathetic support to Turkish aspirations. As it ran counter to the British policy at the time Montagu, who had sanctioned its publication, was forced to resign. In August the Turkish forces broke the Greek position in Afium Karahissar. In September the Turks entered Smyrna, and continued to advance towards Chanak, a point on the southern shores of the Dardanelles held by British troops. The British Cabinet met on 15 September, and Lloyd George, Churchill, Balfour, Chamberlain and Birkenhead decided on resolute action. A warning was sent to Kamal to respect the zone of the Straits; telegrams were sent to the Dominions inviting them to aid in the defence of the Straits; and on 16 September a communiqué clearly foreshadowing war was issued from Downing Street.[1] The Dominion leaders read the communiqué before receiving the Cabinet's telegrams and felt that they were being imperiously asked to help Britain in a cause in

which they had not been consulted. Canada firmly refused and New Zealand alone expressed moderate enthusiasm. Poincaré ordered French troops at Chanak to withdraw, Curzon at once went to Paris and persuaded him to let the French general at Constantinople support the British Commander-in-Chief in arranging a meeting at Mudania with Kamal to limit the line of Turkish advance. This meeting took place on 3 October, and on 11 October a convention was signed by which the Turks agreed to respect the neutral zone; the Greeks were to evacuate Eastern Thrace, but the Turks were not to occupy it, pending the final peace settlement.

This necessitated a new treaty with Turkey, and it was signed at Lausanne in July 1923. Turkey retained Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople; demilitarized zones were established on both sides of the Dardanelles, including Gallipoli and the Chanak area, and on both sides of the Bosphorus; navigation of the Straits was opened to the ships of commerce of all nations in time of peace and of neutrals in time of war involving Turkey, and to warships of all nations in time of peace or Turkish neutrality.[2]

After this hurried and necessarily brief survey of main events in the theatres of war and their aftermath, we can now proceed to deal in greater detail with the Khilafat question and its political effects in India and Britain.

Pan-Islamism was a doctrine first preached by Shaikh Jamal-ud-Din Afghani to the effect that Muslims all over the world were brothers and should unite in defence against the influences working against Islam. This idea was developed by Sultan Abdul Hamid of Turkey and, after him, by the Committee of Union and Progress, into an appeal to the faithful to rally round the Ottoman Khalifa. Under its influence, the Muslim League passed a resolution of protest against the policy of Britain in leaving Turkey to her fate after the Balkan wars (this was in 1913), and in 1916 denounced the Arabs who, under the Sherif of Mecca, rebelled against Turkish rule.

As Chirol pointed out,[3] it was England herself who magnified Turkey in the eyes of Muslim India. During the nineteenth century it was British policy to bolster up the Ottoman Empire against Russia, partly because Russian expansion in Central Asia threatened the safety of the Indian north-west frontier. In 1878, when the Russian armies were at the gates of Constantinople, Indian troops were sent to Malta and Disraeli was ready to risk another war with

Russia to save Turkey. At the same time, it was being impressed upon Indian Muslims that a great community of interest existed between them and Turkey, and there was a great deal of talk about the British Empire as the greatest Muslim Empire in the world. This pro-Turkish policy was reversed by Lord Salisbury after the Treaty of Berlin which ended the Russo-Turkish war. In 1897, Turkish forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the Greeks in Thessaly and this sent a thrill of pride through the whole Muslim world. The Sultan's prestige grew everywhere, particularly in India where his name had come to be used in the Friday congregational prayers. This was in addition to the inevitable religious solidarity of Islam.

This concern for Turkey coincided with the general trend of European policy towards Muslim countries. All the Muslim States of North Africa passed under British or French control. England and Russia were conspiring to sweep away the last remnants of Persian independence. Italy occupied Tripoli with characteristic highhandedness. Then came the Balkan wars which reduced Turkey in Europe to Eastern Thrace, Constantinople and the Straits. It was not difficult for Muslim India to believe that the European powers were engaged in a deliberate policy of destroying Islam.

When, on top of all this, came the Great War, with Turkey ranged against the British and Indian Muslims fighting for the British against their co-religionists, it was a heavy strain indeed on Muslim loyalty. But, secure in their confidence in British fairness, Muslim India generously responded to the call for arms and her armies fought gallantly in Mesopotamia and other 'Muslim' theatres of war. It was after the War, when Britain was signing a peace treaty with Turkey, that the storm burst.

A feeling had been growing among the Muslims during the last twenty years that the maintenance of Turkish power and independence was of great Muslim interest. If Turkey was to disappear, they would become like unto the Jews: a mere religious sect whose kingdom had gone. Their resentment was all the greater because they had always believed that there was a certain community of religious thought between Islam and Christianity which could not exist between either of them and Hinduism. They had no intention of adopting Hindu methods of agitation but, should their expectations be disappointed, they might well seek at least the moral support of Muslims beyond the frontiers of India.[4] This was long

before the Delhi Durbar and its re-partition policy. Later the waters were more troubled. All British observers detected among Indian Muslims a growing sense of dissatisfaction not only with their position in India but with the position of Islam in the world.[5]

Lord Reading's Attitude

The viceroyalty of the Earl of Reading, from April 1921 to April 1926, presents the only period of British rule in India when the viceroy's inclinations and overt pronouncements on a subject of interest to Muslim India were in clear conflict with the policy of the prime minister. Despite his opinion recorded in May 1921 that, to a considerable section of Muslims, Khilafat was only an excuse for promoting discontent against the Government,[6] he always looked at Muslim aspirations with a sympathetic eye and was tireless in drawing Whitehall's attention to them, though it cost him a congenial secretary of state.

In doing so, he went much farther than his predecessor, Lord Chelmsford, who, in a carefully worded message to Muslim India, on 14 May 1920, when provisions of the proposed treaty with Turkey were published, had tried his best to allay Muslim fears,

> . . . they include terms which I fear must be painful to all Muslims . . . in your hour of trial I desire to send you a message of encouragement and sympathy which I trust will uphold you . . . I am confident that with the conclusion of this new Treaty that friendship will quickly take life again, and that a Turkey, regenerate and full of hope and strength, will stand forth, in the future as in the past, a pillar of Islamic faith. This thought will, I trust, strengthen you to accept the peace terms with resignation, courage and fortitude, and keep your loyalty to the Crown bright and untarnished as it has been for many generations.[7]

In spite of a careful and an almost over-zealous use of terms of consolation, it read like the hangman's address to the condemned prisoner.

These words of verbal sympathy were no compensation for Lloyd George's policy, and Muslim India refused to reconcile herself to the acceptance of such a peace treaty. By the end of 1921 extreme pressure was being brought to bear on Reading, even by moderate and 'friendly' Muslims, to urge the British Government to make concessions in favour of the Turks. He supported the central Muslim demand for the restoration of Thrace and Smyrna to Turkey,

believing that, if it were granted, he and his Government would 'have the end of our active troubles in sight'. Montagu agreed with him but confessed that, in persuading his colleagues, he had to contend with a good deal of 'dilatoriness and indifference'. The Viceroy's anxieties increased greatly with the catastrophic development of Greco-Turkish relations in 1922, and he was so seriously alarmed that he sent a dispatch to Montagu on 28 February 1922, on the eve of the Greco-Turkish Conference. It contained a formal request of the Government of India for a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres based on the intense interest of the Indian Muslims in the Turkish peace treaty, and on the services of the Indian Muslim troops during the War. He urged, in particular, subject to the safeguarding of the neutrality of the Straits and of the security of the non-Muslim population, three points, viz., the evacuation of Constantinople, suzerainty of the Sultan over the Holy Places, and restoration of Ottoman Thrace (including Adrianople) and Smyrna. Calling these Muslim India's 'just and equitable' aspirations, he made the fulfilment of these points of the greatest importance to India.[8] In asking for permission to publish this dispatch, Reading spoke in forcible terms of his duty to warn Britain of the immense danger of failing to placate reasonable and friendly Muslim opinion, stating that the governors and ministers of every province in India agreed with his views.[9] For giving the Viceroy the permission to publish this dispatch, Montagu was to lose his seat in the Cabinet.

In August 1922, Reading privately told Earl Winterton, the Under Secretary of State for India, as he had already told Peel, Montagu's successor in the India Office, that if Britain went to war against Turkey, India would be ungovernable as she would lose the only firm support she had—that of the Muslims.[10] On 29 September, when Winterton and Reading were in the middle of a picnic in Simla, the Viceroy received a telegram with the alarming news that there was a grave risk of war with Turkey over the Chanak incident. He turned to Winterton and told him plainly that if this happened India would not be governable.[11]

As soon as Peel took over from Montagu, he wrote to Reading telling him how opinion in England was becoming inflamed against the Turks owing to reports of barbarities committed by them on the Greek population. But then in June, the bombardment of Samsun in the Black Sea by the Greek fleet convinced the Muslims

that the Allies had committed a breach of neutrality in allowing the Greeks to use Constantinople as a base and to pass through the Straits and the Bosphorus. They came to believe that, though the Government of India was favourable to Turkish claims, the British Government was the protagonist of the anti-Turkish campaign. Reading told Peel that the Muslims no longer suspected the Indian Government but firmly believed that all its efforts were nullified by the Home Government. In Muslim eyes, the publication of Reading's famous dispatch had given him a clean bill. In the explosive situation created by the Chanak incident, he again urged the Home Government that the British should 'not again be placed in the unfortunate position of appearing to be the only ally who is withstanding the legitimate aspirations of the Turk as they appear to the Muslims in India'. He repeated this warning in a series of telegrams and letters. To his good luck and great satisfaction, Lloyd George was replaced by Bonar Law, and the latter was free from any anti-Turkish prejudice. Reading's son and biographer remarks, with some justification, that he 'played as important a part in shaping British policy towards Turkey as if he had been sitting at the actual conference table'.[12]

Montagu's Policy and Resignation

Montagu declared his cordial sympathy with the cause of Muslim India and assured the Muslims that throughout all the Peace discussions in Paris there had never been one word, authorized or unauthorized, to indicate that anybody was foolish enough to want to interfere with the Khilafat question.[13] A few months later he told Aubrey Herbert that the Greek occupation of Smyrna had certainly led to grave apprehension lest the Entente contemplated a division or partition of Turkish territory: a policy which, he made plain, had always been opposed by himself, by the Government of India and by all Indians.[14] On 5 May 1921, he wrote a letter to the Indian Khilafat deputation, summing up the new position in regard to Turkey, and concluded,

> No participant in the War can claim that any peace is wholly satisfactory. A good peace must be a compromise. I trust that you, and those whom you represent, will recognize this whatever may befall, and that in the final settlement you will be able to see that, even if all your requests have not been granted, your religious sentiments have been respected, and that the

undoubted claims of India to special consideration in helping to determine the peace with Turkey have been abundantly recognized in the provisions of the peace.[15]

But all Montagu's pleadings could not soften the blow of the Treaty of Sèvres for the Muslims. Nor did his remonstrances with Lloyd George bear any fruit in the shape of a change in the Government's Turkish policy. Montagu must have found himself in an awkward position, disagreeing with his Chief on a cardinal issue and not very happy with at least one of his colleagues. It is difficult to say how long this fragile garment of an uneasy alliance would have lasted without bursting at the seams, but matters came to a head next year, when Montagu received a vital dispatch from Reading urging the Government to concede basic Muslim demands. The Secretary of State sanctioned the publication of this telegram without consulting Lloyd George or the Cabinet. For this alleged constitutional solecism he was asked to resign by the Prime Minister, which he did early in March 1922.

His virtual dismissal was said to have been necessary to satisfy the requirements of the doctrine of collective responsibility of the Cabinet. This was, however, denied by Montagu in a speech to his constituents at the Cambridge Liberal Club on 11 March. He thought that the Muslims of India were entitled to know of the effort being made on their behalf by the Government; the public were entitled to know what the Government of India thought of this important question. He had been on the verge of resignation on this question again and again and hesitated because he did not wish to say to the Muslims of India that solemn pledges made to them were irretrievably lost. The publication of the telegram was not the real reason for his resignation; the real reason was that he had been pleading, arguing, cajoling, urging against Lloyd George's policy in the East ever since the Peace Conference, and had never understood from what motive his pro-Greek policy was dictated. He was convinced that the Prime Minister's policy was calamitous to the British Empire.[16] Not unnaturally it was widely believed in India that Montagu's resignation was engineered by the Cabinet out of dislike for his pro-Muslim policy.[17]

Montagu's resignation was supported by *The Times*, but a significant rider was attached to the leader, 'If means can be found to persuade Indian opinion that the resignation of Mr Montagu does

not, and will not, imply any weakening of the efforts of the Imperial Government to secure the fullest and most favourable treatment of Muslim aspirations during the forthcoming negotiations with our allies, they should be found and employed forthwith' (10 March 1922).

Perhaps Lloyd George had had enough of a secretary of state who was utterly opposed to his opinions on the peace treaty. Perhaps he was a constitutional martinet and insisted on the resignation of a colleague who flouted the conventions of a cabinet system. Perhaps it was some sort of invisible Conservative pressure that influenced his decision to get rid of Montagu. All this must be conjecture, but we know that Montagu was not popular with the Conservative Party in Britain and was mistrusted by the diehards. So was Reading; and a diehard was once heard saying in private that India was being lost because two Jews, one in Whitehall and one in Delhi, were afraid to grapple with the extremists.[18]

The welfare of India was Montagu's ruling passion. He joined the Cabinet in July 1917, we are told, only on condition that he would be given the India Office. And when he resigned office he seemed to lose the greater part of his interest in life. He was never the same man again.[19]

Lloyd George and the Coalition Policy

At the beginning of the War, Lloyd George had promised that Turkey would not be subjected to any excessive penalties at the cessation of hostilities. Interpreting this pledge as an undertaking that Turkish integrity would be respected, Muslim India had responded magnificently to the British call for soldiers and war effort. At the close of the War, however, this pledge was shelved and the Muslims felt cheated. There were angry protests, and a deputation of the Khilafat Committee, under Muhammad Ali, was sent to England to acquaint the Coalition Government with the sentiments and views of Muslim India. Apparently Lloyd George was not pleased to receive this body and gave it a cool reception.

> I do not understand Mr Muhammad Ali to claim indulgence for Turkey [he replied to the deputation]. He claims justice, and justice she will get. Austria has had justice, Germany has had justice—pretty terrible justice. Why should Turkey escape? . . . The Muslims of India stood by the

> Throne and the Empire. We gratefully acknowledge it. They helped us in the struggle. We willingly and gladly recognize that. We recognize that they have a right to be heard in a matter which affects especially Islam. We have heard them. Not merely have we heard them, but we have largely deferred to their wishes in the matter. The settlement was very largely affected by the opinion of India and especially the Muslims of India. But we cannot apply different principles in the settlement of a Muslim country to those which we sternly applied in our settlement with the Christian communities with whom we were also at war.[20]

The Prime Minister did not, however, elaborate in what way and to what extent the settlement with Turkey was affected by Muslim opinion in India. If solid concessions had been given to Turkey, as he claimed that they were, why then was there so much clamour against the harsh terms of the treaty?

He repeated his conception of a 'just peace' in 1922 when, on the eve of the treaty negotiations, he told the House of Commons that he hoped for a satisfactory peace with Turkey. 'But it will be a just peace,' he asserted. 'There is nothing to be gained by unjust concessions to fear . . .'[21]

Such opinions expressed with vigour and clarity helped to make the official policy unmistakable and even consistent; but they created hopeless confusion in India where every such pronouncement was met with an angry howl. One explanation of this stand has been suggested. The Coalition Government had to minimize the strength of the Indian feeling; the Turks were aware of the value of Muslim Indian agitation as a lever with which to extract concessions from Britain; and the Government was naturally anxious to deprive their opponents of this effective weapon. Hence the official playing down of the genuine Muslim uneasiness in the cause of political and diplomatic expediency.[22] But this is not enough to explain the Prime Minister's extreme hostility to the Turk. His pro-Greek policy could only have been a result of his 'romantic admiration' for ancient Greece and of his opinion of Venizelos as 'the greatest statesman Greece has thrown up since the days of Pericles'.[23]

The British press was in no way indulgent to Lloyd George in his policy in the East. The *Manchester Guardian* welcomed the fall of the Coalition with the bitter remark that the greatest service it had rendered to the country was in disappearing from the scene (23 October 1922). It was, however, the *New Statesman* that maintained a fierce attack on Lloyd George's policy from September

1922 until the end of his term. He and his followers had a violent prejudice against the Turks, and this prejudice had three sides: a humanitarian side which denounced the atrocities committed by the Turks, a religious side which cried for the protection of the Christians against Muslims, and a political side which insisted on the incapacity of Turkish rule over other races. He forgot that the Greeks were also guilty of atrocities, that there were Muslims who needed protection against Christians, and that the Treaty of Sèvres had deprived the Turks of the right to govern themselves. Principles of nationalism and self-determination, taught by the Europeans to other races, demanded that the Greeks must evacuate Turkish territory. 'What put them there was not justice, but the ignorance, short-sightedness and vain ambitions of the cynics of the Peace Conference, what keeps them there is the false sentiment of British idealists.' A prime minister who knew nothing about the East was matched by a foreign secretary who knew everything about it, except how to deal with it, and the result—military and political miscalculations, indifference to Muslim feeling, wanton irritation of the Turks, intrigues, squabbles with Allies, damage to British prestige and trade, and the shipwreck of Greece. The British people had never had any taste for such a policy in the Near East and they wanted a new one at once. This should begin by meeting the three Turkish demands regarding Constantinople, Dardanelles and Thrace. Then followed a personal attack on the Prime Minister the like of which is hard to find in the annals of British quality press.

> Never, since Englishmen first sailed for the East, has British prestige stood so low as it stands today in all the lands that lie between Constantinople and Calcutta, Tehran and Cairo. And this is not partly, but wholly, the fault of one man—Mr Lloyd George . . . he does not understand, and obviously has never understood, the principles on which the fabric of British authority in Asia has been reared and maintained. He is as accomplished a political trickster as these islands have ever produced, and when trickery fails he has command of a certain rather petulant and blustering violence which not infrequently achieves its end. But these weapons have never been the weapons of Englishmen in the East, nor if they had been would there have been a British Empire . . . What is clear is that he has betrayed the fundamental interests of Great Britain in a manner for which the history of modern British statesmanship offers no parallel . . . If the Muslim world distrusts and despises Great Britain, it is because it distrusts and despises Mr Lloyd George . . . British Christians may admire Mr Lloyd George, but at bottom they trust him no more than do Asiatic Muslims . . . Mr Lloyd George is the first Prime Minister of this country whom

> even Fleet Street, let alone the nation, will not follow into war. This is the decisive comment upon his career. It should be his epitaph.

He had let his country down as no prime minister before him had ever done. Any honest fool would have served better the fundamental interests of the country and of the Empire.[24]

The real reason for this untidy state of things was that the Lloyd George administration had made conflicting promises and reached contradictory understandings with a number of parties. For example, six documents competed for the solution of the Syrian problem: (1) the correspondence between McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca, (2) the secret Sykes-Picot agreement, which never mentioned the Sherif at all, (3) the 'declaration to the seven' of 1917, which consisted of a statement, made to a Syrian Arab committee, issued in Cairo and instigated by T. E. Lawrence, to the effect that the pre-war Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and any other Arab areas freed by the military action of their own inhabitants during the war, should become entirely independent, (4) Lloyd George's statement of January 1918, (5) the Anglo-French declaration, issued four days before the November armistice, promising the complete and final liberation of the peoples whom Turkey had oppressed, and (6) the firm statement of the Covenant of the League of Nations that the same right of self-determination should apply to the defeated Ottoman Empire as to the vanquished empires of Europe.[25] The McMahon pledges to the Sherif, of 25 October 1915, were given without consulting the Government of India. Moreover, the French Government was not a party to these pledges, and therefore it was found necessary to reconcile them with British obligations to the French. This was done by the Sykes-Picot agreement of April 1916. 'No casuistry can wholly adjust the pledges given secretly to the Arabs in October with the pledges given secretly to the French in the following April.'[26] To all appearances someone had made a complete mess of things.

The Times *and the Turkish Question*

It may not be an exaggeration to say that the attitude of *The Times* changed in accordance with the British military and political situation *vis-à-vis* Turkey. When in 1913 the Muslim League had at first enunciated its stand on the Turkish question, the journal had

rebuked those ardent Muslims who had lost all sense of proportion and tried, in words of foolish menace, to dominate the foreign policy of the British Empire (15 July 1913). The later Hindu-Muslim fraternization was found to be only a repetition of the Mutiny, when the organizers of the rising had been Hindu and the dupes who did their bidding chiefly Muslims (19 April 1919); this 'supposed unity' was unreal and transitory (26 April 1919). A few days later, it was acknowledged that one of the mistakes of the Peace Conference was that, in disposing of the Near East, it had forgotten Islam (8 May 1919).

The journal was angry when the Khilafat deputation succeeded in seeing the Prime Minister, but was pacified when it was given a cold reception. It lauded Lloyd George's firmness and precision and criticized Fisher's welcome to the members of the deputation when they had arrived in Britain. But Fisher had done so at Montagu's instance, and Montagu was not spared. Stooping to a personal attack on the Muslim deputation, the journal hoped that when in future the Indian Muslims wanted to speak to the Imperial Government, they would 'choose representatives of unquestionable standing and with irreproachable credentials' (22 March 1920).

The Treaty of Sèvres was recognized to be obsolete in November 1921, when Mustafa Kamal's forces had decisively beaten the Greeks. The general impression abroad, that the British Government sympathized with the Greek claims and favoured their attack upon the Turks, was false and should be resolutely dispelled by prevailing upon the Greeks to abandon their impossible claims and to evacuate Asia Minor (2 November 1921). The British Government was firmly asked not to help Greece in her designs against Turkey, and French recognition of Kamalist Turkey without consulting Britain was regretted (5 November 1921). The Home Government was blamed for the continuance of the Khilafat agitation, as an equitable peace with Turkey would have assuaged Muslim excitement. Simultaneously, the Ali brothers were called 'foolish and unbalanced men with no real capacity for leadership' (6 November 1921). Lloyd George had made the quarrel between Turkey and Greece his own concern and had favoured a policy which had kept them at war and impeded the pacification of the Near and Middle East (22 February 1922). By next month it had reached a position from where it could urge a determined and sustained effort to reconcile Turkish claims

and Indian Muslim aspirations with the security of the non-Muslim populations of Turkey (9 March 1922).

When the Greeks had been finally beaten by Turkey, the journal put all the responsibility on the Allies: 'this shameful exhibition of Allied disunion in the sensitive East has wrought untold harm' (5 September 1922). Finally, with the abolition of the Khilafat itself and the end of the agitation came this jubilant note, '. . . . the chief of Pan-Islamic firebrands have vanished with almost comic suddenness through the collapsing floor of their flimsy platform' (3 April 1926).

Public Opinion on the Khilafat Agitation

British official policy during this period, or the tone of *The Times*, was by no means typical of national feeling. The Muslim cause received support, sympathy and sustenance from many quarters. But it is hard to classify them, since the 'identifications' of this period differ greatly from those of the pre-1914 period. Some landmarks survive, but not many. It is not easy to find a way of recognizing and 'ordering' all the people with their tangled motives. Some disliked the general policy of the Coalition and related the Muslim case to their own stance. Others were in genuine agreement with Muslim aspirations and looked askance at Greek imperialist ambitions. Still others had seriously studied Islam and could appreciate the Muslim uneasiness at any possible danger to the Khalifa or the Holy Places. Again, some of them were Anglo-Indians and some were destined to go to India later. Others were party politicians, and still others just authors of books or free-lance journalists. Party affiliations overlapped and group frontiers cut across each other. Only the semblance of an order can be created in this welter of figures, motives and movements.

Sir John Rees deemed it a serious matter that Britain was alienating her 'best friends in India' by thoughtless speeches implying that whoever gained by Balkan dissensions it was not to be the Turk. He deplored the 'perfect' boycott of the Turks and Muslims in favour of the Greeks and Armenians in England; it was not possible to get a hearing for the Muslim side or to get a place in the press. 'There will never be peace in India,' he said, 'until we drop our fatal patronage of the extremely expensive Armenian, until we have the Greeks out of Smyrna, and until what we have taken from Turkey is

restored.'[27] Similar unqualified support came from Sir Theodore Morison. In case the Turkish Empire had to go, he suggested two alternatives to Muslim delegates to be pressed upon the Peace Conference: either a large confederation of Syria, Mesopotamia, Arabia and Asia Minor, or an Arab Kingdom comprising Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia.[28]

W. T. Stead had recognized in 1908 that the British Empire had given too many hostages to Islam to be able to ignore the opinions of the Khalifa. In her relations with Turkey, Britain could do either of two things: destroy the Khalifa utterly and put up another of her own choice under her own tutelage, or recognize the Khalifa and make the best of him. There was some justification for pursuing the former possibility since Britain was the greatest 'Muslim power', but there was a much greater risk. The latter course should be adopted, and Britain should accredit a special ambassador to the Khalifa as Roman Catholic countries sent envoys to the Vatican.[29] Now the position of the Khalifa in Islam was compared to that of the Pope in Roman Catholicism by Cromer, who thought that a possible substitution of some Khalifa other than the Sultan of Turkey might be effected without very great shock to Muslim opinion and sentiment. He proposed that the British Government, in conjunction with their Muslim advisers, should issue a manifesto reassuring the Muslim world of the importance which Britain attached to the political independence of the Khalifa, whoever he may be.[30]

Lord Lloyd, who was the Governor of Bombay at the time of this crisis, was in favour of Turkish suzerainty over the Holy Places and the Khalifa's administrative sovereignty. His views made him so popular with the Muslims that in 1920 they asked him to represent Muslim India on the Khilafat deputation that was going to Britain in the autumn of that year. It is not recorded whether he agreed to do so or not, but we are told that Delhi and Whitehall refused to spare him at that critical period.[31]

The most hard-hitting denunciation of European and British attitudes to the Muslims is to be found in the work of Alexander Powell, who aimed at exposing and attacking the 'selfish, insincere and dangerous policies which are being pursued by certain European Governments in the Near East and the intrigue, corruption, deceit and bad faith which have characterized these policies'.[32]

It is comparatively easy to classify the anti-Turk opinion, for its creators generally gave reasons for their attitude. Eight such reasons may be discovered, with a small sector of opinion grouped around each.

In the first place, there was a group of critics who denounced the British policy of leniency to Turkey in deference to the pressure of Muslim India. It was, they said, an example of 'feebleness' which ought not to have been given. The agitation was anti-British and dangerous. Anyway, such irrelevances could not be permitted to obtrude into British diplomatic decision-making.[33] In the second place the Indian Khilafat agitation and the accompanying Pan-Islamic ideas were considered to be a mere 'stunt' and not worth considering seriously. The agitation was artificial. Pan-Islamism was a bluff. There was no nationalism behind it. Anyway, the British should not drift 'into a breach with Hinduism'.[34] In the third place, there was a distinctly anti-Islamic group, to whom Islam as a religion was distasteful and therefore all its manifestations reactionary. Pan-Islamism meant religious animosity. Islam was narrow dogmatism and fanaticism. It was a conquering creed essentially hostile to European culture.[35] In the fourth place, there were at least two persons who opposed the Khilafat movement for what may be called its 'imperialistic' proclivities. In India, Charles Freer Andrews, who devoted his life to the service of Gandhi and the Congress, refused to join the agitation on the ground that to agree to it was to agree to an Ottoman Empire, and to agree to any kind of Empire was to 'cut the ground under the Indian demand for independence'.[36] In Britain, Captain Ormsby-Gore made a distinction between Turkey and the Ottoman Empire and between Turkey and Islam. Turkey had never been a good friend to Islam, Britain ought to stand up for Arab nationalism, for Arab autonomy and for Arab freedom from the Turk.[37]

A fifth argument was that British fortunes in the Near East were indissolubly bound up with a strong and friendly Greece. Greece was the progressive and Turkey the decadent country, and not to make Greece strong and friendly was to barter away 'our security in the East'.[38] Sixthly, some observers were annoyed by the association of Muhammad Ali and certain other Muslim leaders with the Khilafat agitation. Serious objections were raised in the House of Commons against the personnel of the Khilafat deputation that

came to see the Prime Minister in 1920.[39] Chirol marvelled at the Viceroy's acknowledgment of Muhammad Ali as the spokesman of Muslim India and at his permission to him to address the British Government as the head of a deputation.[40] Seventhly, there were some who looked at the whole question from the point of view of British world interests. The *Manchester Guardian* well expressed this attitude.[41] Finally, much was made of the play of German and later Bolshevik propaganda in India. A modern author has neatly defined the Khilafat movement as a movement created by a 'number of more extreme Indian Muslims' at the instigation of Germans for fomenting disaffection among the Muslims of India.[42] Such grossly misleading over-simplification takes no notice of the real problem behind the movement or of its later ramifications. In the same vein *The Times* ascribed later Turkish victories to her alliances with 'the destructive and subversive Bolshevist force in the East' (25 September 1922). Russian propaganda is also stressed by a contemporary work on Bolshevism, in which it is claimed, without much sound evidence, that Bolshevik influence was apparent in the Muslim and Pan-Turkish movements and in the part played by the Muslims in the Punjab riots of April 1919.[43] The source of this information is stated to be Chirol; but Chirol connected the Indian revolutionary movement with Bolshevist propaganda and had not a word to say on any link between the latter and the Khilafat movement.[44]

Further, on the Balkan questions, there was in Britain a strong group of anti-Turk or pro-Balkan intellectuals, which boasted such distinguished figures as Bryce, Toynbee, Gooch, Seton-Watson and Temperley. Bryce, in an interview with the *Daily Herald* in February 1920, declared that Constantinople was neither a Muslim city nor a sacred city and that if it were taken away from the Turks no danger would arise in India. 'Turkish rule, in any form, or under any pretext, must absolutely vanish from the lands it has ruined.'[45] Toynbee did not think that the Khilafat demands were made by all Muslims, since the Shias did not support the Osmanli title; nor was he in favour of deliberately helping Muslims in the Turkish settlement 'in violation of our principles'. The real reason behind Muslim clamour was their fear of the loss of the only great Muslim power, and the remedy lay in filling the void left in Islam by the collapse of Turkey with the progress of self-government in India, Egypt, Mesopotamia and Persia.[46] Many years later, when the Khilafat and

the agitation for it had disappeared from view, but there remained a potential danger that such incidents might occur again when Britain had to determine her policy towards a Muslim country, Toynbee suggested some kind of permanent liaison between the Imperial Government in London and representative Muslim opinion in India and other parts of the Commonwealth. Thus the British Government would know beforehand how this or that course would be regarded by 'British Muslims' and the latter would feel that they were not left unconsulted in matters in which they were vitally interested.[47] Chirol supported this idea, but stipulated an impossible condition, viz., that first a representative Indian Muslim body should disown its old Khilafat leaders.[48] Another don of this class was G. P. Gooch, who repeatedly declared that he had no enthusiasm for Islam as a religion or for the civilization it had created; rejoiced at the eviction of the Turk from Albania, Macedonia and Western Thrace; sympathized with Armenia and was a member of the Armenian Committee; and was jubilant over the victory of Greece over Turkey in the Balkan wars.[49]

Among the leading journals, *The Times*, as we have seen, led the charge against the Khilafat movement. In this it was closely followed by the *Spectator* which even surpassed the 'thunderer' in its severity of language. The only solution of the Turkish problem was to expel the Turkish Government 'bag and baggage' from Europe. Constantinople should be placed under international control. The Turk's proper place was in Asia. Europe must be rid of him, not as a Muslim, but as 'an incorrigible barbarian whom we can endure no longer' (12 July 1919). People should not forget that the Crimean War, fought in Turkey's interest, was immediately followed by 'the Muslim Mutiny' in India (10 January 1920).[50]

The Labour Party and the Khilafat Movement

The attitude of the Labour Party was rather confused. The party's official statements were vague and non-committal; its daily press organ supported Turkish demands, and so did the *New Statesman*; but certain individual Socialists shared the opinion of the Right as embodied in the foregoing quotations from the *Spectator*.

In early 1920 the Khilafat leaders approached the Party in connection with their demands. In its reply the Party stated that the

Khilafat was a religious question which ought to be settled by Muslims themselves and that non-Muslim governments ought not to intervene in it. It found the question of Smyrna difficult. It doubted whether the Ottoman Empire had performed or could perform the function expected of it by non-Ottoman Muslims, and suggested that the destiny of Turkey was of less importance to Islam than the destinies of the much larger populations that had come under some form or other of European domination. It stood for the full and rapid establishment of national self-government, not only in India, but in Egypt and Mesopotamia, and for its restoration in Persia.[51] In other and more plain words, the party politely but firmly refused to support the Khilafat demands and talked irrelevantly, as Toynbee had done previously, of the need for self-government in Persia and other places.

India was discussed by the Labour Party Conference of June 1922, when the following resolution was passed on the Turkish question: 'The Conference also urges the Parliamentary Labour Party to press the Government to help forward a settlement with Turkey with the object of giving that country control of her own territories, with a guarantee that Turkey will deal fairly and justly with people of other nationalities who are resident within the sphere of her authority and Government.' Speaking on moving this resolution, Tom Shaw declared that Muslim opinion was perfectly justified in resenting the handing over of any part of their co-religionists to another country, as had happened in Asia Minor. The Government was asked to drop its pro-Greek policy and apply the doctrine of self-determination.[52] This was the closest any Labour expression came to the Muslim demands.

Henry Brailsford, a well-known Socialist journalist, used more positive terms in declaring that Constantinople was not a sacred city to the Muslims, that the Khalifa was not a Pope and that the Turks must be confined to Asia Minor.[53] Another Labour supporter tried to explain the lack of Labour support to Armenia by saying that British interests in the Balkans and Turkey were 'imperial' and that therefore the Labour Party wanted to have no truck with any imperial move. But he appealed to the party to support the Armenians against the Turks more firmly.[54]

On 21 February 1920, the *Daily Herald* published a full-page manifesto appealing to all, and especially to trade unionists and

workers, to influence the Government to support Armenia and drive out the Turk from Europe. With the banner headline 'A MENACE TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD: TRADE UNIONISTS ORGANIZE NOW', it went on to paint the Turk in the darkest hues and concluded with this:

> Now is the time for you to act.
> *Women of Britain*, stop the atrocities being committed against women and children.
> *Comrades of the Great War*, and all ex-servicemen, did your comrades suffer and die at grim Gallipoli in order to keep the Turk at Constantinople?
> *Christians*, act for your faith.
> *Trade Unionists*, protest against diplomacy 'behind the closed doors' and the burden of militarism.
> *All you who have a stake in the British Empire stop the menace to trade and prosperity.*

The manifesto was unsigned by any person or organization.

The *Daily Herald* itself was generally sympathetic to the Turkish claims. It was in favour of leaving the Sultan in Constantinople as the spiritual head of Islam. It insisted on making peace with the Bolsheviks and declared that the key to the Turkish problem lay in Moscow (8 January and 21 February 1920). The strongest support to the Muslim cause came from the *New Statesman*. It was idle to pretend, it wrote, that the loyalty of Muslim India was so unvarying and unshakable that Britain could count on it without reference to the conduct of her officials or the events of the theatres of war (3 July 1915). In making the Treaty of Sèvres, the Supreme Council had 'executed a grim and Jehovah-like vengeance upon the Turks', and given to Islam a pretty exhibition of Western imperialism (14 August 1920).

8: *The Coming of Federation*

FOR the next ten years, Indian history was written in London. From the appointment of the Simon Commission to the implementation of the 1935 reforms Indian affairs were constantly in the headlines in Britain. Never before or since has India made such an impact on British public opinion. Newspapers flashed Indian news every day, learned journals carried frequent articles on the latest Indian developments, Parliament was busy in evolving the most detailed constitution that was ever devised for India, and scores of books were published on Indian politics. It is the purpose of this chapter to study and analyse British public opinion during the busy years between 1927 and 1937.

Simon Commission

The 1919 constitution had stipulated that after ten years the British Government would again go into the question of Indian constitutional progress. But long before this period had expired, in fact almost immediately after the passage of the 1919 Act, Indian leaders had begun to ask for such an inquiry on the grounds that a ten-year period of probation was too long and that India was fit for the next instalment of self-government. By 1927 this demand had become so insistent that Section 84A of the Government of India Act, 1919, which stipulated an inquiry after ten years, was amended, and the words 'at the expiration of' (ten years) were replaced by the word 'within'.[1] Accordingly, on 26 November 1927, the British Government announced the appointment of a Statutory Commission, which consisted of the Rt Hon. Sir John Simon (Chairman), the Rt Hon. Viscount Burnham, the Rt Hon. Baron Strathcona and Mount Royal, the Hon. Edward Cadogan, the Rt Hon. Stephen Walsh, the Rt Hon. Richard Lane-Fox, and Major Clement Attlee.

Within a month Stephen Walsh resigned for reasons of ill health and was replaced by the Rt Hon. Vernon Hartshorn.

The Commission, commonly designated the Simon Commission, paid two visits to India; the first lasting from 3 February to 31 March 1928, and the second from 11 October 1928 to 13 April 1929. Their Report was published in May 1930.

The personnel of the Commission came in for criticism both in India and in Britain, but for different reasons. In India objection was raised to its exclusively British composition. In Britain, on the other hand, the weak membership of the body was strongly criticized. *The Times* at once noticed that, with the exception of the chairman, none of the members was in the front rank of political leaders; but they were all 'men of industry, common sense and good temper, sufficiently varied in their political views to be representative of Parliament and sufficiently free from egotism to work in harmony' (9 November 1927). Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of *The Times*, was shocked at the weakness of the team behind Simon. In his opinion it was really a one-man show.[2] But neither he nor his paper said anything about the absence of any Indian on its panel.[3] Others referred to this 'omission' but justified it on many grounds. The *New Statesman* pointed out that it had to produce a scheme which was not only workable but also acceptable to Parliament. Appointment of an Indian or Indians to it would have created more problems than it would have solved. Would a report prepared with Indian co-operation be a unanimous one, and would it be acceptable to all Indians? (12 November 1927). As the *Spectator* put it, since India was not a nation an adequate Indian representation would have run into 'a membership of hundreds' (21 April 1928). Irwin, who was then viceroy, tells us that one of the dangers that the Secretary of State foresaw from a mixed commission was that an unreal alliance might be created between the Indian and the British Labour representatives, the former repeating pet political slogans and the latter subscribing to them unreflectingly, so that the result might be a set of patently ill-judged proposals presented to a not-too-well-informed public as the considered recommendations of a clear majority on the Commission. His own advisers in India were also unanimous in thinking that a British Commission was the most appropriate plan.[4]

But these arguments carried little conviction to the Indians. The

Congress stood for unqualified boycott of the Commission; but the Liberals, the Scheduled Castes, the Indian Christians, the Parsis and other small minorities were in favour of co-operation. Muslims were split, one section led by Sir Muhammad Shafi consented to co-operate while the other led by Jinnah sided with the Congress.

The *Spectator* strongly reproved the parties who were contemplating a boycott (18 February 1928). The *Manchester Guardian* was almost stern. India had wasted the last four years in communal quarrels and she must suffer for her follies (2 January 1928). To the *New Statesman*, Indians were foolish to complain of their exclusion from the panel and would be still more foolish if they tried to carry out their threat of a boycott (12 November 1927).

The British Government and the Simon Commission made a successful attempt to make the best use of the disunity among Indian parties. The Secretary of State for India wrote to the Viceroy that he had always relied on the non-boycotting Muslims, the Untouchables, the business community and others to break down the boycott. 'You and Simon must be judges whether or not it is expedient in these directions to try and make a break in the wall of antagonism.' He advised Simon to see important people who were not boycotting, particularly the Muslims and Untouchables, and to advertise widely all his interviews with representative Muslims. 'The whole policy now is obvious. It is to terrify the immense Hindu population by the apprehension that the Commission is being got hold of by the Muslims and may present a report altogether destructive of the Hindu position, thereby securing Muslim support, and leaving Jinnah high and dry.'[5] The Viceroy's 'most trusted advisers' concurred. They were sure that the Muslims would never boycott the Commission and, communal tension being so sharp, the Hindus would hardly dare to do so in their anxiety lest the decision might go against those who did not make their case before the inquiring body.[6]

The appointment of the Simon Commission exposed a division of opinion in the Labour Party. In October 1927 the Party Conference asked for the Commission to be so constituted and to work in such a way as to 'enjoy the confidence and co-operation of the Indian people'.[7] On 9 November the Parliamentary Labour Party regretted that in some respects the procedure announced by the Government for the Commission fell short of providing for the

fullest opportunity to India to express her views, intimated its decision to try to get it amended during Parliamentary discussions, and asked India to await the result of these debates before finally deciding her attitude to the Commission.[8] On 24 November, the Parliamentary Labour Party issued another declaration asking the Commission to consult on equal terms with a commission appointed by the Indian legislature, suggesting joint meetings of the two commissions for hearing the evidence, advising further consultations between them after the inquiry had been made, and demanding the presentation of reports by both commissions before Parliament. It concluded by hoping confidently that its representatives on the Commission would act in the spirit of this declaration. The Parliamentary correspondent of *The Times* pointed out that the general interpretation placed on the last sentence was that the party expected Walsh and Attlee to come to the party for instructions if they found that the spirit of this declaration was not being realized; in other words, they were being asked 'to embark upon the examination of a great constitutional issue with their hands tied behind their backs'.[9] This interpretation seems to have been a correct one because the political correspondent of the *Daily Herald* also understood that this declaration was 'in the nature of an instruction to the Labour representatives on the British Commission'.[10]

On the same day, however, the *Daily Herald* carried an article by George Lansbury, Chairman of the Labour Party, in which he advised all Indians not to boycott the Commission.[11] But a few days later, Josiah Wedgwood, a Labour M.P., wrote to Lala Lajpat Rai, a prominent Hindu leader, describing official policy as 'so deadly and stupid', hoping that the Commission would be boycotted and expressing pleasure at this prospect. 'This Commission does not require your help,' he said. 'There is no need to stand in a witness box and be cross-examined by persons of no great importance who have not before shown any interest in your views or feelings.'[12] In the next annual conference of the party, many speakers denounced the Commission and charged that the party had betrayed India by nominating members to it; but MacDonald and Snell denied that the party had flouted its previous promises to or on India.[13] In the same year the Labour Publishing Company published a tract on *India and the Labour Party* by V. H. Rutherford, in which the Commission was strongly condemned.

Simultaneously, Ramsay MacDonald was asking Indian Nationalists to co-operate with the Commission, but was hampered by the recalcitrance of that small minority of his own party which was bent upon encouraging Indians to boycott the Commission. Perhaps his words were addressed as much to India as to that section of his party.[14] In February 1928 he again sent a telegram to India stating that it was a complete illusion to suppose that if the work of the Commission was successfully obstructed, a future Labour Government would appoint a new Commission on another basis, and making it clear that the Commission and its procedure had 'the full confidence of the Labour Party and no change in the Commission would be made'. This step was commended by the *New Statesman* on 18 February. Next day MacDonald informed Hartshorn by cable that no new Commission would be appointed and that the present one had the full support of the Labour Party.[15]

The Simon Report

The long-awaited report of the Statutory Commission was finally published in May 1930. The first volume (Cmd. 3568) of this historic work was a survey of Indian political, communal, constitutional, administrative, financial and educational systems and an examination of the problems facing the country. The second (Cmd. 3569), published a fortnight later, set forth the proposals for constitutional reform.

Except for the *Daily Herald*, the entire British press welcomed the Report, often with glowing tributes. For *The Times* the first volume was the refutation of the claim advanced by the Hindus that India was a 'nation' in the sense in which Germany or Sweden were nations; that was why the Hindus had received it with hostility (19 June 1930). The second volume embodied a scheme which marked 'the most hopeful advance of our generation towards the solution of the problem' (24 June 1930). The *Daily Telegraph* was more complimentary. The first volume earned such adjectives as impressive, lucid, sincere and authoritative (10 June 1930). The second was 'as great an enterprise of State-planning as was ever trusted to ability and experience in public affairs' (24 June 1930). The *Spectator* found in it no trace of 'preconception or prejudice' (14 June 1930). To the independent *Time and Tide* it was a sound

and safe body of recommendations, inspired by a strong sense of realism (28 June 1930). The Liberal *Manchester Guardian* was equally pleased with this workable and flexible plan which was suited to India's needs and aspirations; it showed the way to a great goal—'a self-governing federation unparalleled in the world's history' (24 June 1930). In the opinion of the *New Statesman* it showed breadth of view and a 'bold sweep of constructive imagination' and was destined to rank as 'a State document of historic importance' (28 June 1930).

The *New Statesman* apparently did not reflect the majority opinion of the Labour Party which had not been satisfied by the Report. The *Daily Herald* felt that, far from preparing the way to a rapid transformation, it tended rather to the 'indefinite stabilizing, on essential points, of the final authority and power in the present system'. This was no self-government, nor even the provision of means by which it could be reached (24 June 1930). Simultaneously, the Parliamentary Labour Committee on India regretted that the Report did not include proposals for establishing India as a self-governing unit in the Commonwealth on a permanent basis.[16] In Laski's view the Report was 'brilliantly written, clear, logical, concise, but lacking in generosity, cold, even in places, callous'.[17]

In short, the Report created an excellent impression on all, except, as we will see, the extreme Right, which was opposed to any concessions to India and was soon to stage an interesting but unsuccessful battle on the issue; and the extreme Left, which believed that the recommendations did not go far enough.

The Round Table Conference—1

The next stage was the convening of an all-party Indo-British Round Table Conference to discuss and determine the exact shape of the future constitution on the basis of the Simon recommendations. The first session of this Conference was opened by the King himself in London on 10 November 1930. The Congress was not represented because it had refused to accept the Simon Report, had insisted that the Conference was useless unless Britain first conceded the principle of 'complete independence' and, in the absence of any such stipulation, had started a non-co-operation movement on 12 March 1930. All other parties attended. Muslims were represented, among others,

by the Aga Khan, who was elected the head of the total Indian delegation, Muhammad Iqbal, Jinnah and Mr Zafarullah Khan. Most of the work in the first session was done through the Federal Structure Sub-Committee under Lord Sankey, and slowly the proposed federal plan took shape.

The cardinal question at the Conference, and the one on which it was virtually wrecked, was that of Hindu-Muslim antagonism. It was a minority problem, but 'there never was a minority problem like this in the history of the world'. Among the suggestions then made from outside to solve this problem was one of arbitration. Edward Thompson revived the idea of the problem being put to arbitration before a panel of three: one Indian nominated by the Hindus, one by the Muslims and one Englishman. He also stated that the younger Muslims were not as 'communal minded' as the old ones. When this suggestion and this remark were resented by some Muslim spokesmen in a letter to *The Times* on 22 June, Thompson replied that it was a suggestion he was 'asked to make; and it can be carried farther if this is desired. That is all.'[18] He did not, however, indicate the nationality or party of the quarter which had suggested this. Was it the Hindu leaders or one of the British parties? In any case, arbitration outside the British Government was not acceptable to Muslims.[19]

The Delhi Pact

The Congress boycott of the first session had given something of an air of unreality to the discussions of the Conference since the largest party in India was absent. This was realized by the British Government, and early in January Wedgwood Benn, the Secretary of State, wrote to the Viceroy, wondering whether the latter could create a 'bilateral situation' which would lead to an amnesty on the Government's side and the abandonment of the civil disobedience campaign on the Congress side. The Viceroy sounded the Provincial Governments, but 'almost all' of them stoutly disapproved of such an action which would be interpreted as a climb-down and a defeat for the Government. Emerson and Crerar, the Viceroy's two top advisers, strongly argued against Benn's suggestion.[20] But Irwin ignored this advice and decided to act upon his Chief's plan.

The first signs of weakening in the attitude of the Government of

India, which had so far firmly dealt with the non-co-operation campaign, appeared in the Viceroy's speech before the Indian legislature on 17 January. Then things moved rapidly. On 26 January Gandhi was released unconditionally. But on 27 January he repeated his old claims to complete independence in a statement to the *Times of India*. On 15 February he wrote to Irwin asking for a meeting to seek information on matters discussed in the previous week with the Conference delegates. This interview took place on February 17 (four hours), 18 (three hours), 19 (half an hour) and 27 (three hours). An agreement was reached and published on 5 March. This Delhi or Irwin-Gandhi Pact stipulated the following: (*a*) Civil disobedience would be effectively discontinued; (*b*) steps would be taken for the participation of Congress in the Conference; (*c*) Congress would be allowed peaceful picketing on behalf of Indian-made goods; (*d*) the Government would withdraw all Ordinances except the one concerned with terrorist activities; (*e*) the Government would withdraw all notifications declaring certain associations unlawful; (*f*) the Government would withdraw all prosecutions relating to offences not involving violence; (*g*) persons undergoing sentences of imprisonment for their activities during the disturbances would be released; (*h*) other concessions were made by the Government in respect of fines imposed, movable goods seized and the location of punitive police during the unrest.[21]

Barring the right wing of Conservative opinion, the pact was generally hailed as a victory and a reconciliation. *The Times* was pleased and denied that it was a surrender to Gandhi (5 and 6 March 1931). The *Spectator* deemed it worthy to be ranked with the grant of responsible government to the peoples of South Africa by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Government in 1906; it was a victory for the spirit of the Round Table Conference (14 March 1931). When Gandhi had declared his boycott campaign in March 1930, and throughout the progress of the disturbances, the *Manchester Guardian* had condemned the whole affair, blessed the Viceroy's firm measures and reprimanded the Hindu Nationalists for obstructing the work of the Conference (12 March, 14 and 22 April, 6 May, 2 June, and 3 July 1930). But now it changed its views and likened the pact to the Anglo-Italian Naval Agreement signed by Henderson with Mussolini, admitted that Gandhi had met the Viceroy on equal terms and called it a triumph for 'Indian nationalism' (4 March 1931).

It was emphatic that the prestige of the Government of India would not suffer by this (6 March 1931), and that there was no capitulation on either side but only an 'understanding' and a 'sense of common purpose' (18 April 1931). The *Daily Herald* hailed it as a 'great victory' and bitterly denounced the diehards who called it a 'surrender' (5 March 1931). The *New Statesman* expressed identical views (7 March 1931).

The King was full of admiration for the patience and forbearance that Irwin had shown in dealing with Gandhi and felt that the Viceroy deserved 'the very greatest credit' for bringing about the pact.[22]

Those who attacked the pact in Britain did so mainly on the ground that it weakened British rule in India and amounted to a surrender to an agitation. This point of view was crystallized in two leaders in the *Daily Telegraph* (5 and 6 March 1931), and it was supported by two other organs of rightist opinion: the *Empire Review* and the *National Review*.[23] Outside the press, the attack was led by Churchill, who lashed out at Irwin in a tone reminiscent of Curzon's onslaught on the 1911 decision of repealing the partition of Bengal. The Viceroy, he said, had surrendered to a man who stood for the expulsion of the British from India and its substitution by Brahmin domination. It was 'a most profoundly injurious blow struck at British authority, not only in India, but throughout the globe'.[24] Lord Peel objected to the method of Gandhi-Irwin negotiations, which gave the impression of two potentates deciding the future of India.[25]

The real issue was not whether the Viceroy or Gandhi had the advantage of the terms, but whether the Viceroy was justified in negotiating on equal terms with the leader of one party, thus implying recognition that the Congress represented India. That this implication was evident is attested by a recent Hindu historian.

> The settlement [he says] was framed in the form of a treaty to end a state of war, and was replete with phrases—'it has been arranged that', 'it is agreed that'—which seemed to accept that Gandhi was dealing with the Government on almost an equal footing . . . the most important feature of the settlement was the tacit recognition of the Congress as the intermediary between the people and the Government.[26]

On 16 June, Irwin's successor (Willingdon) confessed to Benn that 'there can be no doubt that one effect of the settlement has been to

increase the prestige of the Congress and to lower that of the Government'.[27] The Government of India's official reports for this period also admit that the pact increased the influence of the Congress and was taken to mean a victory for the cause of the disobedience movement. Throughout the country Congressmen proclaimed the pact as a 'victory for the Congress' or frankly described it as a 'truce'; and this attitude was not confined to the irresponsible rank and file of the party.[28]

The pact must finally be judged in the context of an answer to two questions. How far was Congress representative of all India and particularly of Muslims? Was the possibility that this gesture might estrange the Muslims considered by Irwin, who disregarded his expert advisers on this point, or by the British Government on whose instance the pact was made, or by those in Britain who applauded it?

As for the representative character of Congress, Irwin himself knew and recorded that it was a Hindu body.[29] This view is supported by all contemporary literature on India.[30] As for the Muslim fears of a British-Hindu *entente*, *The Times'* correspondent wrote from New Delhi, when Gandhi was meeting Irwin in long interviews, 'Most significant of all is the hostile attitude of the Muslims, which had grown more and more marked as the week went on and has been definitely increased by the suspicion that the Hindu leader is being given an unduly exalted position in settling the affairs of India' (27 February 1931). The Aga Khan was critical of Irwin's policy of appeasement.[31] The Indian Government's official report itself recorded that the increased importance which the Congress seemed to be acquiring as a result of these negotiations caused the Muslims 'serious apprehensions'.[32]

What actually happened in India after the signing of the pact proved the failure of Irwin's policy of reconciliation. The prognostications of the *Daily Telegraph*, that such appeasement would certainly lead to open violence, were fulfilled; but the sufferers were not the Government of India but the Muslims of Cawnpore. Twenty-three days after the signing of the pact Gandhi, in addressing the Congress session at Karachi, paid a warm tribute to the three criminals executed for the Lahore conspiracy case and to Bhagat Singh who had thrown a live bomb into the Indian legislature. He advised his hearers to 'copy their capacity for sacrifice and reckless

courage', and at his behest the Congress passed a resolution admiring the bravery and sacrifice of Bhagat Singh and his accomplices and describing their execution as 'an act of wanton vengeance'.[33] The result was that 'a definite class of Indians came to look at Irwin's policy as synonymous with British weakness, and when a student was asked what the British Government could offer to India he replied unhesitatingly, 'Irwinism'.[34]

The most serious result of the pact was the unprecedented increase in communal warfare. During the disobedience campaign, for months, the daily life of Muslims had been disorganized by Congress obstruction. Congress volunteers forced Muslim merchants to close their shops in honour of individuals or occasions for which the latter had little sympathy.[35] A day came when this irritation blew up in a major disaster. The Congress called for a complete *hartal* on 24 March in mourning for Bhagat Singh. The Muslims of Cawnpore, who neither sympathized with Bhagat Singh nor supported the Congress,[36] refused to close their shops. When they were forced to do so by the Congress volunteers, Hindu-Muslim riots broke out on a huge scale. For at least two days, says the official report, the situation was altogether out of control and the loss of life and destruction were 'appalling'.[37] An official commission of inquiry was appointed, which published its findings on 8 June and put the responsibility squarely on the Congress. The findings were accepted and concurred in by the Governor in Council of the United Provinces, in a resolution which brought out the connection between the killings and the Delhi Pact. The Report was clear on the point that the Congress disobedience movement had aimed at paralysing the Government, yet the Government of India had not only opened negotiations and made a pact with its leaders, but had released a multitude of its agents from gaol. The Muslims read in this a recognition of the strength of the movement, and their conviction deepened that the Hindu majority was being permitted to impose its will on the Muslim minority.[38]

News of this catastrophe stunned many British observers, and the Congress as well as the official policy of 'reconciliation' was roundly condemned. The *Daily Telegraph* ascribed these horrors to the fanatical political agitation led by Gandhi and his henchmen (26 March 1931). The *Manchester Guardian* was horrified and slated Gandhi for extolling Bhagat Singh (26 March 1931).

The Round Table Conference—2

The second session of the Conference was the most important of the three, partly because the Congress was represented and partly because a serious, though unsuccessful, effort was made to reach a communal settlement. The Aga Khan, who was unofficially acting as spokesman or all minorities, was often seeing Gandhi to discuss and determine the communal issue. British newspapers urged Gandhi to show some generosity for, as the *Manchester Guardian* said, the minorities had every right to insist upon their demands and the majorities had to make concessions (1 October 1931). But Gandhi insisted on Muslim acceptance of the Nehru Report, which had been rejected by all Muslim bodies much earlier. When at last a serious deadlock ensued all the minorities except the Sikhs issued a joint statement of demands.[39] *The Times* realized the significance of this document and called it 'an outline of a Bill of Minority Rights which represents the claims jointly and severally put forward by the representatives of over a third of the population of British India' (13 November 1931). But Gandhi refused to look at this document and the communal problem remained unsolved.

What was the impression left by Indian statesmen on Britain after the Conference? It is interesting to find that Jinnah and Gandhi, both of whom were soon to become symbols of Indian nationalisms, were considered fiascos. Jinnah was, in Dawson's phrase, the 'outstanding failure',[40] and, in Sir Samuel Hoare's opinion, 'volatile' and difficult to work with.[41]

But universal condemnation was reserved for Gandhi. He seems to have convinced all that he was in London not to negotiate but to dictate his terms. *The Times* declared that he had made no practical contribution and was hardly a constructive statesman (5 January 1932). The *Round Table* thought that he might have played a greater part if he had been less destructive, and more inclined to understand the minorities' point of view.[42] He made three claims—that Congress alone represented India, that the Untouchables could not be separated from the body of Hinduism, and that Hindus and Muslims could and should live together in a united India without either separate representation or special safeguards—each one of which was contested by a majority of other delegates; and as soon as he realized that many of his own countrymen were opposed to his

conception of united India, he lost all interest in the proceedings and more than once 'looked like walking out of the Conference'. He showed no aptitude for compromise or even for negotiation, and continued to repeat his claim for complete independence from British 'terrorism, slavery and tyranny'. He desired peace only on his own terms, avoided taking his Indian colleagues into his confidence, challenged their *locus standi* and considered himself as the only Indian fit to speak for India and negotiate on equal terms with Britain. His failure was more than political, it was spiritual; 'we had expected John the Baptist; we saw a *bania* in close alliance with other *banias*'. He was unwilling or unable to make any practical suggestion for bringing about a settlement. His consciousness of power and authority in India made him a poor negotiator, he treated the smaller groups with a condescension bordering on disdain, and the practical details of government were beyond his understanding. His mind worked through an 'inner light' which was completely impervious to reason and was at bottom an 'incredible egoism'.[43]

Why did Gandhi behave like this? The explanation lies partly in the traditional Congress policy of non-co-operation and reluctance to work with Britain, and partly in the Delhi Pact. By releasing Gandhi unconditionally and making an agreement with him, the impression was created in India that there were only two parties in the country, the British Government and the Congress, and that the former was afraid of the latter. Already all Congress leaders were obsessed by the idea that they represented all India; this agreement confirmed the obsession. Not unnaturally, therefore, in the Conference Gandhi, the sole delegate of the Congress, ignored all other parties, tried to dictate his own terms and dismissed all other delegates as unrepresentative reactionaries.

Despite this later reputation, Gandhi was received in Britain as a hero and a saint. People turned out to see him when he passed along the way. He became a public sensation and a feature of English life. One day when Laski was coming away from the Conference he saw a workman craning his neck to have a glimpse of Gandhi. When asked what Gandhi stood for, he replied, 'I don't know, guv'nor.' 'Then why do you come to see him?' asked Laski. And the ready rejoinder came, 'I always come to look at the sights. Flood-lighting yesterday, Gandhi today, it's like a blooming festival.'[44] The workman's answer provides an insight into the average Englishman's

attitude. Gandhi was the centre of attraction because he was a novelty. They had never seen before a 'mahatma' clad in a loincloth; in contrast, the Muslim delegates were more orthodoxly dressed, perfectly at home in Britain. Similarly, the Congress was always a nuisance, with non-co-operation today and a boycott tomorrow. It kept itself in the news and Britain was more interested in her 'enemies' than in the Muslims who were generally quiet, orderly and respectful. Only the unruly attract attention. We take notice only when something goes wrong or somebody behaves erratically or rudely. Ordinary civilized behaviour calls for no comment.

An insight into the mind of the Left is provided by Laski's letters written to Justice Holmes during the second session. The significance of these letters lies not only in the fact that Laski was then the foremost intellectual in the Labour Party, but also in the fact that he played an important, almost official, part behind the scenes in the Conference by writing memoranda for Ramsay MacDonald and by trying to bring about an agreement between Hindus and Muslims. Giving his 'solemn estimate' of the Conference he put all the blame on Muslims, 'who would cheerfully cut my throat in the name of Allah', who were a 'poor lot' in the things of the mind and whose religious fanaticism was 'terrible'. When Sankey, the Lord Chancellor, asked him to 'try to bring the Muslims to reason' he found himself talking to a wall, ascribed it to their religion and felt himself 'being taken back into the Reformation times'. When the Conference broke down he cursed religion as a social disease and blamed MacDonald's weakness, vanity and indecisiveness for not compelling agreement.[45]

The Communal Award

The second session ended without any communal settlement in sight and the Prime Minister was left with the onerous task of arbitration. This was done in the Communal Award published on 10 August 1932. The terms of the Award were roughly as follows. In those provinces where Hindus formed a majority of the population and would have a clear majority of seats in the provincial legislatures (that is, in all provinces except the Punjab, Bengal, and the North-West Frontier Province), the Muslims received, as in the past, seats in excess of their population ratio. In Bengal, where

Muslims formed fifty-five per cent and Hindus forty-three per cent of the total population, Muslims received about forty-eight per cent and Hindus thirty-nine per cent, of the total number of seats in the provincial assembly. The Europeans of Bengal were given excessive representation, viz., ten per cent of the total seats. In the Punjab, where the Muslims formed fifty-seven per cent, Hindus twenty-seven per cent and the Sikhs thirteen per cent of the population, Muslims received forty-nine per cent, Hindus twenty-seven per cent and Sikhs eighteen per cent, of the total provincial seats.[46] It was hoped, however, that the Muslim minority in the two provinces would be turned into a majority (fifty-one per cent) through some university, labour, landlords and other special seats.

The British press on the whole welcomed the Award as a piece of difficult work well done. *The Times* commended the provision giving Muslims only '51 per cent majority' in the Punjab and Bengal as a good arrangement whereby they would not be able to dispense with the practical necessity and the political duty of obtaining the goodwill and support of other elements (17 August 1932). The *Daily Telegraph* gave a general welcome to the decision (17 August 1932). To the *Spectator*, the figures of the Prime Minister seemed to achieve 'the greatest possible measure of justice possible' (20 August 1932). The Award was certain to disappoint both Hindus and Muslims, said the *Manchester Guardian*, but on the whole the Government had dealt 'with a most awkward situation in the fairest possible manner' (17 August 1932). The *New Statesman* welcomed it as an honest attempt to solve the apparently insoluble (20 August 1932). Only the *Daily Herald* complained that there had been some weighting in favour of the Muslims (17 August 1932).

The question of communal representation had been thoroughly debated twice before, once in 1908–9 and again in 1918–19. A third discussion now opened in Parliament and outside, with the same arguments and counter-arguments. In this the line of demarcation clearly lay between the Right and the Left. Among the Conservatives who supported separate electorates were Lord Hailsham, Mr Hugh Molson and W. A. Lee.[47] The only prominent figure on the Right to oppose them was the Marquess of Salisbury.[48] To the Labourites the system was not only the demand of a mere handful of Muslims but an essentially bad measure. Josiah Wedgwood called it 'absurd and antiquated';[49] Attlee believed that it was granted to

please the Muslims and regretted the decision, and Lansbury shared this view;[50] Lord Strabolgi conjured up the shape of an anti-British Muslim *bloc* extending from Delhi to Cairo;[51] other leftists propagated these views outside Parliament.[52]

The Emergence of Reforms

The last session of the Conference, lasting from 17 November to 24 December 1932, was brief and unimportant. The Congress and the Labour Party both were absent; the first because of Gandhi's dissatisfaction with the second session and consequent reopening of the disobedience campaign and his arrest. The Labour Party was reprimanded for its abstention by *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian* (3 November 1932). Lansbury attributed the failure of the Conference to the change in Government, and Wedgwood Benn accused MacDonald of turning out 'peacemakers like us' and deliberately closing the negotiations. In February 1933 Lansbury sent a message to India on behalf of the Labour Party declaring that the Party had taken no part in the Conference because the latter could neither speak nor act as representative of all India.[53] But this could be said also of the first session, which had been attended and supported by the Labour Party, though against the wishes of its extreme wing.

The recommendations of the Round Table Conference were published as a White Paper in March 1933 (Cmd. 4268) and debated in Parliament on 17 March. The Government won a three-to-one victory, but Churchill's savage opposition was an 'unmistakable warning of the diehard determination to continue the fighting to the bitter end'.[54] *The Times* first gave it a qualified and rather unenthusiastic approval (18 March 1933), but later accorded it a more heartening welcome, mainly because, as it admitted, none of the opponents could produce a workable alternative and because the defence was remarkably able (22 November 1933). But to the *Spectator* it looked as if the Cabinet were more concerned to convince 'the Churchills and Page Crofts' of the reality of the safeguards than to convince India of the reality of the self-government offered to it (24 March 1933). The *Manchester Guardian* expressed pleasure at the creation of a strong Centre,[55] which it called the demand of the 'nationalists', a collective noun adopted by it for the

Hindus only (18 March 1933). The only available unfavourable British comment was that of Laski, who thought that the scheme was cluttered up with all sorts of checks and balances which seemed to 'reproduce the worst features of the worst modern constitutions'.[56]

The next stage was the consideration of the White Paper by a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament. The Committee[57] sat under the Marquess of Linlithgow, from April 1933 to November 1934, holding in all 159 meetings and examining 120 witnesses. It finally reported to Parliament on 22 November 1934.[58] The Report had a mixed reception in the British press. *The Times* was impressed by it, the *Scotsman* was gratified and the *Daily Telegraph* applauded it as 'one of the great State papers of all time' (22 November 1934). But the *Spectator* was disappointed to see the derogations from full self-government set out without disguise and perhaps deliberately emphasized to placate the right-wing critics in Britain (23 November 1934). The *Daily Express* warned that no Indian would look at it and the *Daily Mail* feared profound disappointment in India. The *Daily Herald* was the most outspoken and found the proposals 'shot through with timidity and distrust' (22 November 1934): its opinion was actually reflected in the headline under which the news was published: 'Indian Report gives in to Diehards'.

The Report itself had been carried by nineteen members to nine, the minority being made up of four Labourites who wanted to go farther towards self-government and five diehards who opposed any concession. The Labour Party continued to oppose the Report outside the Committee chamber. Lord Snell, a Labour member of the Committee, condemned it as unacceptable.[59] Lansbury refused, on behalf of the Party, to accept any responsibility and mentioned the two main defects of the Report: it contained too many safeguards and it failed to postulate Dominion status. He wanted the Government to meet Indians in the same friendly spirit shown by Irwin in 1931.[60] In Attlee's opinion, the chief defect was its 'failure to give effect to Indian sentiment', and he too declared that the Labour Party was entirely unbound by anything that might be done by the Committee and was entirely uncommitted to any Government proposals whatever.[61] From the Conservative side, the Report was defended by L. S. Amery.[62]

The House of Commons debated the Report on 10, 11 and 12 December 1934, and gave the Government a four-to-one majority. On 18 December the House of Lords also approved the Report by 239 votes to 62, the largest voting since December 1927 when the Prayer Book measure was approved by 241 to 88 votes. The second reading of the Bill took place in the Commons on 7, 8 and 11 February 1935, with a voting of 404 for and 133 against. After the final reading and the Royal Assent, the Bill reached the Statute Book on 24 July 1935. Parliamentary debates on the measure were of impressive length. A total of 1,951 speeches were made containing fifteen and a half million words and occupying 4,000 pages of *Hansard*.[63]

Parliament had certainly worked hard at the Bill and deserved the congratulations from Printing House Square: it was 'an achievement as great as any in its long and glorious history' (6 January 1935). The *Observer* called it 'perhaps the greatest political experiment the world has seen' (27 September 1936). But, as things turned out later, the Government of India Act 1935, on which so much care and industry had been lavished, was a sad failure. It pleased none of those for whom it was fashioned. The Hindus objected to it because they believed it to be so hedged in with safeguards that anything like Hindu supremacy seemed impossible.[64] The Muslims disliked it because a strong Centre implied an accession of Hindu strength.

The Conservative 'Revolt'

Throughout these protracted considerations of the reforms Mr Churchill, with the help of some Conservative friends, waged a relentless war against the reforms outside and inside Parliament. This split in the Conservative Party gave Baldwin many difficult hours, enabled the Indians and particularly the Hindus to lampoon Churchill as a 'blind imperialist' and an 'enemy of freedom', and kept him out of office for many years.[65] Churchill's anti-reform attitude has generally been misunderstood and misinterpreted. He was convinced in his mind that it was against the interests of both Britain and India to revise the constitution in the direction of an advance, and in this he carried a fair number of his party with him.

He opened the diehard campaign against the reforms in a powerful speech before the India-Empire Society on 11 December 1930, in which he made four points: (*a*) it was the weak-minded and defeatist tendency of present British politics which was responsible for the change in Indian opinion; (*b*) the danger was that the Government would commit itself to concessions which would weaken British hands in the future without appeasing Indian sedition; (*c*) Gandhism and all that it stood for would, sooner or later, have to be finally crushed; (*d*) the British nation had no intention of relinquishing its mission in India.[66] In early 1931 he resigned from the Conservative Business Committee to begin a 'save India' campaign in the country, and now the *Manchester Guardian* was shocked to find that a certain amount of Conservative opinion was with him rather than with Baldwin (26 February and 19 March 1931). His most brilliant performance in this campaign was his speech in the Albert Hall on 18 March 1931, in which he made the point that the Simon Commission was not bound to recommend advances and that the proposals of the Simon Report were an absolute maximum. The next forward step in the development of Indian responsibility should be in the provincial sphere. On 19 March polling took place in the St George's by-election, where the official Conservative candidate, Duff Cooper, was being opposed by an Independent Conservative, Ernest W. Petter, backed by the anti-reform Lord Rothermere. The latter was beaten and Duff Cooper was elected with a majority of 5,710. Undaunted by this, Churchill launched another attack in the House of Commons on 9 July. Again, in a broadcast in early 1935, he assailed the Government of India Bill in picturesque phraseology: it is 'a gigantic quilt of jumbled crochet work. There is no theme; there is no pattern; there is no agreement; there is no conviction; there is no simplicity; there is no courage. It is a monstrous monument of shame built by the pygmies.'[67]

The Conservative case against 'abdication' was put succinctly by Sir Henry Page Croft in a pamphlet of the same title. His point was that when the National Government was formed by MacDonald no mention was made for any grave constitutional reform in India; the Government was formed only to meet the national crisis. In the ensuing elections, from start to finish, India was absent from the manifestos of any of the leaders and was hardly mentioned in a single

speech. Democracy was to be forced on Indians, but the champions of this policy dared not submit the issue to the free democratic verdict either of Parliament or of the Conservative Party 'which provides the overwhelming majority of Parliament'. What India needed was, above all things, peace, development and economic progress, and only Britain could bestow these gifts upon her.[68] In answer to this, five Conservative M.P.s—Sir Adrian Baillie, Captain Victor Cazalet, the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava, A. W. H. James and Mark Patrick—issued a pamphlet,[69] exposing the folly of many of the catchwords and analogies employed in the diehard platform campaigns.

By 1932 the diehards were undoubtedly well organized and vocal. It was felt that an effective body of Liberal opinion was required to bring pressure on the Government. Irwin, who had recently retired as viceroy, was scheduled to head some sort of association advocating the acceptance of 'reasonable nationalist' demands, but he had joined the Government, and then Lord Derby was being seconded, with Sir Stanley Reed to brief him in the background.[70] In March 1933 some Conservative M.P.s formed a new Parliamentary group, called the India Defence Committee. The convener's letter of invitation said that it would consist of those members 'who are opposed to the abdication of central government of India and who are prepared to take any measure necessary to resist this proposal, for which there is no mandate either in Great Britain or India'. Sixty M.P.s attended the meeting.[71] In June another similar body was formed under the title of India Defence League, which had a broader basis of membership and was meant to appeal to the general public.[72] As a counter-offensive to the first of these bodies, a Union of Britain and India was established in May to support the reforms and combat the 'campaign of ill-informed propaganda' on India.[73]

Among Churchill's most loyal supporters was Lord Lloyd, a former Governor of Bombay, who was against the Conference and the acceptance of the threats of Hindu non-co-operation, and wrote, in March 1930, a series of five articles in the *Daily Telegraph* describing the policy that he thought the Government should adopt. The procedure of negotiating with Indian parties at the Conference he held to be unwise for three reasons: it committed Parliament in advance of discussions, it misled Indian public opinion, and it ignored the welfare of the Indian masses.[74]

An official reply to all these arguments of the recusant diehard group was given by Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for India, in a broadcast at the end of 1934.[75] Baldwin's argument in favour of the reforms was that they had the support of every post-war viceroy and of every provincial governor at that time. He believed that the reforms were necessary for the sake of preserving the Empire. Speaking to the Conservative Party on 4 December 1934, at Queen's Hall, he said, 'It is my considered judgment in all the changes and chances of this wide world today that you have a good chance of keeping the whole of that sub-continent of India in the Empire for ever.'[76] On the other hand, the two chief arguments of the Churchill group, as put in the Commons debate on the White Paper in March 1933, were: (*a*) self-government should first be tried in the provinces before it was introduced in the centre; and (*b*) Britain should not hand over control of the police to Indian legislatures. The second was only a detail, though had this point been accepted Muslims would not have suffered under Congress rule in 1937–9. By a curious accident of history, the federal part of the 1935 Act was never put into operation, thus fulfilling the diehard demand.

Churchill and his supporters have often been condemned for their ill-natured and ill-timed opposition, and abused as imperialists and reactionaries. Sir Samuel Hoare, who was in the thick of the battle, thought that the long delay in the passing of the Act encouraged disillusionment in Britain as well as in India, thus weakening the initial drive behind federation. Had there been a longer interval between the passing of the Act and the outbreak of war, the federation might well have been started. Thus the Conservative 'revolt' is held responsible for the 'disastrous' results.[77] Though today a criticism of this point of view may lose weight because of the inestimable advantage of hindsight,* yet it can be argued that Hoare's reading of history was wrong. Later events in India occurred as they did, not because the federal scheme was not introduced in time but because the entire Act was rejected by all major parties. The Hindu-Muslim conflict being what it later turned out to be, the operation of the federation would not have mattered at all. Moreover, the postponement of the operation of the federation was not only due to the outbreak of war but also to the refusal of the required number of States to enter it. It is difficult to see how the

* Templewood also enjoyed the advantage of hindsight: he wrote in 1954.

diehard movement can reasonably be held accountable for increasing Muslim distrust of the Hindu, and the Princes' mistrust of Congress.

The Attitude of the Left

The attitude of the British Left during these ten years was plainly pro-Congress. The Muslim problem was usually ignored, and when it was mentioned it was done so briefly, unsympathetically and indifferently. The Labour Party throughout supported Gandhi's civil disobedience movement. At the start of the campaign it sent him greetings, welcoming the 'development of a mass movement' and strongly condemning the 'severe repression with which this movement was being met'.[78] This was later echoed by Professor Cole, the historian of the Labour Party, when he wrote that the 'Indians' (the use of the collective noun without any qualification is significant) launched their campaign in view of 'continued repression'.[79] In July 1930 two Labour M.P.s, Fenner Brockway and John Beckett, were suspended in the House of Commons, the one for persisting in questions against the Speaker's ruling and the other for the 'rape of the mace'; they had been infuriated at the Government of India's 'harsh' handling of the Congress disobedience movement.[80] The *Daily Herald* covered the campaign in detail, publishing the dispatches of its correspondent in India, George Slocombe, fully and prominently. Slocombe played an important part in trying to bring together the Viceroy and Gandhi through the intermediaries of Jayakar and Sapru.[81] Towards the end of 1930 the paper suggested that after Irwin a Labour viceroy should be sent to India and put forward the name of Lord Gorell (24 November 1930). It had no comments on Cawnpore, but wrote a long leader on the Karachi session of the Congress (28 March 1931). Sometimes the paper betrayed bias in the display of news. On 2 January 1931, for example, it published a special dispatch on the Round Table Conference from its correspondent, captioned 'Olive Branch to Muslims by Hindu Leaders'. The only relevant sentence in the report contradicted the headline: 'Only the somewhat intransigent attitude of Dr Moonje and some of his ultra-sectarian colleagues of the Hindu Mahasabha seems now to stand in the way of a complete settlement.'

The India League, a left-wing body with Krishna Menon as its

secretary for twenty years, sent a delegation to India in 1932 to survey the conditions there and report back. This report was published in 1934, with a preface by Bertrand Russell, who was then the chairman of the League. Few men in Britain realized, he wrote, that misdeeds as serious as those of the Nazis in Germany were being perpetrated by the British in India.[82] The report greatly exaggerated the numerical strength and influence of the 'Nationalist Muslims'—those who were with Congress—and deplored that nothing about them was known in Britain. It dismissed all other Muslims in a few paragraphs containing superficial remarks and incorrect names of leaders.[83] This was not surprising, for the delegation had been carefully shepherded by Congress guides throughout the tour.[84] It was reported that the entire show was stage-managed by Congress, and official circles stated that Congress not only paid the fares of the party and arranged its itineraries but made a substantial cash donation to the funds of the India League.[85] Reviewing the Report, *The Times* did not find it objective (10 March 1934), and even the *Manchester Guardian*, itself quite friendly to the Congress, did not spare it (17 April 1934).

Conclusion

An immense amount of work had gone into the making of the new constitution which was to operate (in part) from 1 April 1937. Later events were to reduce it to a glorious but futile monument to British industry and perseverance. It operated partially in India for just as long as it took to evolve it. It remains a tragedy of the first magnitude that the constitution on which Britain spent so much time and acumen finally proved useless while earlier attempts, made more easily and smoothly, gave good service. But there is one consolation: the Government of India Act of 1935 still enjoys the reputation of being the most finely drafted piece of constitution-making in the world and, what is more important, it was drawn upon heavily by the makers of the post-1947 constitutions of Pakistan and India. This was a tribute which perhaps compensated for the disappointment caused by the failure of the Act in the years following its passage.

9: *The Movement for Pakistan*

THE first elections under the 1935 Constitution were held in early 1937. The Congress won majorities in eight provinces, but refused to form ministries unless the 'safeguards' clauses in the Act were suspended and the Governors undertook not to interfere with the provincial administrations. This the Government refused to concede, for it would require an amendment of the constitution by Parliament; and the Muslims and other minorities would never have accepted this change. A deadlock ensued, which was broken only in June by a conciliatory statement of the Viceroy, assuring the Congress that the Governors would not use their special powers unnecessarily. This assurance was accepted and Congress took office in eight out of eleven provinces in July 1937.

The Congress Rule

The immediate effect of the Congress advent to power was a sharp increase in communal hatred and Hindu-Muslim antagonism. In October the *Statesman* of Calcutta was constrained to remark, 'Every lover of India must feel disturbed at the fierce communal controversy which *has broken out since the advent of provincial autonomy*.'[1] A former assistant editor of the *Times of India* declared that the Muslim suspicion of the motives of the majority had greatly deepened and that the majority had done nothing to dispel it.[2] The Under Secretary of State for India toured India unofficially in early 1939 and found a sharply increasing Hindu-Muslim antagonism which, he said, went far outside the bounds of mere religious feeling and in fact represented an antagonism between modes of life.[3]

Why did the installation of Congress Governments produce this result? During its tenure of office the Congress adopted two practices which, in the long run, created a great deal of resentment not only among the Muslims and other minorities but also among some of

the Congress friends in Britain. The first of these was its official policy whereby all the provincial Congress ministries took orders from, and were under the strict control of, the All India Congress Committee and were not responsible to the provincial legislatures or their electorates. Several Congressmen objected to these 'totalitarian methods' and all liberal thinkers unhesitatingly denounced this procedure as the negation of democracy. In Britain, a number of people, some of them not unsympathetic to Congress policy in general, noted and deplored this constitutional abnormality.[4]

The second major mistake that the Congress committed was to underestimate the strength of Muslim nationalism. The past history of Hindu-Muslim relations might well have indicated that a compromise with the Muslims would be a prudent policy; and the Muslim League manifesto of 1937 was a clear offer of co-operation, but Congress spurned the hand of friendship. It could not abandon its claim to represent all India and to insist that Congress Muslims were the only authentic representatives of their community.[5] When the Muslim League asked for coalitions, the Congress laid down such insulting terms as would have led to the complete disappearance of the League as a party and its absorption in the Congress machine.[6]

Then there were other things. Proceedings in the assemblies were opened with the singing of the Hindu song, 'Bande Mataram'. The Congress tricolour was flown over local administrative buildings. Congress committees issued orders. In some districts Congress police stations were opened and the Congress police investigated crime. The Congress opened a 'Military department' to raise and train a 'national army'. The rank and file of Congressmen 'behaved as if they were a ruling caste, as if they owned the country'. The minority parties did not count, they were not consulted and their opposition was firmly voted down. 'It was impossible, in fact, to evade the truth that the idea of a "Congress raj" had materialized.'[7] In Government schools, in the United Provinces, Hindi replaced Urdu as the medium of instruction. Muslim boys were ordered to salute Gandhi's portrait. Government posts were monopolized by Congressmen. In short, 'there was every sign that the new constitution signified a Hindu raj, pure and simple'.[8]

Muslims had never had any confidence in the Hindus; now, as a result of this oppression, they lost all confidence in the British

Government too. They felt that Britain had sold them to the Hindus, for they had expected the British Government to interfere to protect their interests in Congress-ruled provinces. In their view, the Government, in its anxiety to prove the genuineness of the reforms, had given Congress a free hand to pursue its policy of establishing Hindu rule.[9]

Many British observers, who were interested in India and did not theorize on insufficient or one-sided information, agreed that by the time the Congress ministries resigned Muslim patience had reached the end of its tether and that anything might have happened after that. The country was 'in a state of suppressed civil war' and an explosion was only prevented by the police and the British military system.[10] Francis Yeats-Brown, the author of the best-seller *Bengal Lancer*, recorded that during the first two years of Congress rule in the United Provinces, riots had doubled in number, armed robbery had increased by seventy per cent and murder had gone up by thirty-three per cent.[11] Even such a sober investigator as Coupland forecast dire things: 'By the end of 1939 it was widely believed that, if the Congress Governments had lasted much longer, communal fighting would have broken out on an unprecedented scale. The idea of a "civil war" had been an almost inconceivable idea so long as British rule was still unquestioned, but now many Indians were saying that it was coming.'[12]

As against this widespread criticism of the Congress rule we find only two 'parties' who were impressed with the new provincial governments and their actions. One was the Viceroy who declared, in a White Paper, that the Congress ministries had conducted their affairs with 'great success'.[13] In Britain the Left was even more generous in its praises of Congress. A Liberal M.P. felt that in their work the ministries had broken down the clear-cut demarcation between Hindus and Muslims.[14] A Labour M.P. declared that the ministries had administered the laws of India with 'striking success' and that 'Muslims, Hindus and other communities have borne testimony to the fair and just way in which Indian administrations have developed government in the provincial areas'.[15] Among others on the Left who paid the Congress ministries the doubtful homage of uncritical adulation were Brailsford, Henry Polak and Horace Alexander.[16] As usual, on Indian affairs, the *Manchester Guardian* adopted the Labour line: the Hindu-Muslim controversy was only

the result of Nehru's campaign for strengthening Congress membership among the Muslim masses; it feared increasing communalism but made no mention of Muslim apprehensions (30 November 1937).

When Britain declared war in September 1939 the Congress immediately protested against the involvement of India in war without consulting her people. It rejected the argument that under the Constitution foreign policy was not a subject under Indian control, insisted on an unequivocal official statement explaining the war aims of the British Government, and threatened that if this were not done to its satisfaction it would withdraw from all provincial governments and start a non-co-operation anti-war campaign.[17]

This demand was attacked by the Right in clear and strong terms;[18] but the entire Left rallied to the support of the Congress.[19]

For a few years the Congress had been voicing a new demand for a constituent assembly elected by India to decide the future constitution. By 1939 this demand had become firm and vocal. But such a suggestion was obviously unacceptable to the Muslims, who realized that any such body elected on an all-India basis would have to be predominantly Hindu in composition and therefore unable to satisfy their wishes or safeguard their interests. In this opposition to the idea of an Assembly the Muslims were supported in Britain by the press on the Right. *The Times* saw the impracticability and the dangerous implications of the proposal and warned against an irretrievable split in the country (15 December 1939). The *Observer* agreed with this (29 October and 25 November 1939). The *Economist* saw in this demand the ultimate danger of a Palestine in north India (16 December 1939).

In fact, the idea of a constituent assembly had been sketched by Attlee, Cripps and Nehru before the war,[20] and that partly explains why the Congress demand was widely supported on the British left. In an oddly reasoned leader the *Manchester Guardian* argued in favour of the Assembly plan (20 December 1939). The *New Statesman* could not see how the majority of the people of India could be asked to submit to a negative veto by the Muslims (28 October 1939). Laski asked for a fixed date—about three years after the end of the war—for giving India Dominion status and declared that Indians should work out their constitution within that period, and he was sure that 'Jinnah and his friends' would come to terms

with the Congress.[21] Wedgwood Benn added his support to the Congress plan and denied that the Congress had ever sought to underrate the minorities problem.[22]

Who Represents the Muslims?

The entire Muslim problem in India and the controversy over it came to be centred round the question: who represents the Muslims? The Congress, as always, claimed that it represented a vast majority, if not all, of the Muslims, since it pretended to speak for all India. Consequently, all those in Britain who supported the Congress politics or sympathized with its aspirations also believed in this. What were the facts?

The results of the 1937 elections showed that out of a total of 1,771 seats in all provincial legislatures, the Congress won only 762; that is, less than half of the total. This in itself made nonsense of its claim to speak for the whole of India. There were, moreover, 211 Hindu seats which were captured by persons who did not agree with the Congress policy; in other words, the Congress did not even represent all the Hindus. Out of the 482 Muslim seats, 173 were won by Muslim Independents, 113 by the Muslim League, 62 by other Muslims and 8 by the Muslim United Party of Bihar. An overwhelming number of the Muslim seats in the Punjab were won by the Unionist Party of Sir Fazl-i-Husain. How far did the Congress represent the Muslims on the electoral showing? It contested only 58 out of 482 Muslim constituencies, and won only 26. In other words, the Congress represented a little over five per cent of Indian Muslims on its electoral performance.[23] In the light of these statistics, it passes understanding how the Congress could claim to speak for Muslim India and how its British friends could have echoed this pretension.

But such facts and figures failed to discourage the British radicals in their optimism and in their implicit faith in the Congress. A Labour M.P. could still say in the House of Commons that a large number of Muslims were not only supporting the Congress directly or indirectly, but in many of the provinces were working in 'hearty co-operation' with it.[24] The *New Statesman* was cautious enough not to underrate the power of 'Mr Jinnah's ultra-conservative Muslim League', but flatly refused to accept it as representing Indian

TABLE I[1]

Province	Congress	Non-Congress Hindus	Muslim Independents	Muslim United	Muslim League	Other Muslims	Other Parties	European & Anglo-Indians	No Party	Total
Bengal L.A.[a]	54	42	43	—	40	38	—	31	2[c]	250
Bengal L.C.[b]	3	7	13	—	4	—	—	3	—	30
Bihar L.A.	91	4	16	6	—	3	—	—	32	152
Bihar L.C.	—	9	1	2	—	—	—	1	1	14
Assam L.A.	32	9	30	—	4	—	—	—	33	108
Assam L.C.	—	10	6	—	—	—	—	2	—	18
Bombay L.A.	87[d]	27	12	—	18	—	4[e]	8	19	175
Bombay L.C.	16	4	3	—	2	—	—	1	—	26
Madras L.A.	159	—	—	—	9	2	21[f]	9	15	215
Madras L.C.	26	—	—	—	3	—	5[f]	1	11	46
U.P. L.A.	134	9	24	—	26	—	29[g]	6	—	228
U.P. L.C.	8	19	14	—	—	—	10[g]	1	—	52
Punjab L.A.	18	36[h]	—	—	2	4	88[i]	—	27	175
N.W.F.P. L.A.	19	1	2	—	—	—	7[j]	—	21	50
Orissa L.A.	36	—	—	—	—	—	24	—	—	60
Sind L.A.	8	14	9	—	—	7	18[k]	—	4	60
C.P. L.A.	71	10	—	—	5	8	—	2	16	112
Total	762	201	173	8	113	62	206	65	181	1,771

[a] L.A. = Legislative Assembly.
[b] L.C. = Legislative Council.
[c] Muslims; party not known.
[d] Including Communist and Nationalist.
[e] Labour.
[f] Justice Party.
[g] National Agricultural.
[h] Including Sikhs.
[i] Unionists.
[j] Hindu-Sikh Nationalists.
[k] Sind United Party.

[1] Taken from H.C. 321 5s. Cols. 809–810.

Muslims as a whole (4 November 1939). Edward Thompson doubted if the League spoke for even a quarter of the Muslims and accepted the Congress claim that it had a larger Muslim membership than the League's.[25]

The Movement for Pakistan

It has been said by many, both British and Indian, that the Congress refusal to share power with the Muslims in 1937 was the event that was chiefly responsible for bringing Pakistan into existence. There is some truth in this, in the sense that the Congress refusal and later oppression awakened Muslims to their real peril and facilitated the task for their leaders of organizing them into a strong and united party. Perhaps the Muslims might not have despaired of possible co-operation with the Hindus had their experience of the Congress ministries been a different one. But the idea of a Muslim state of some sort goes much beyond this. The Congress rule only helped to crystallize this notion into a definite scheme.

It was Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the poet, who, in his presidential address to the Muslim League at Allahabad on 29 December 1930, spoke in favour of a Muslim state in India. But it is vital to remember that his scheme was for a Muslim India within a larger Indian federation, and in no sense can he be said to have envisaged a sovereign and independent Pakistan.[26]

It was alleged by Edward Thompson in 1940 that Iqbal had supported the Pakistan plan only because he was President of the Muslim League, and that in fact he thought it to be disastrous to the British Government, to the Hindus and to the Muslims. He is said to have been told this by Iqbal himself.[27] But it is difficult to accept this version, for there is no corroborative evidence, nor does Thompson quote any letter or announcement of Iqbal substantiating this change of heart. On the other hand, Iqbal's letters to Jinnah, written between 1930 and 1938, prove the opposite. Moreover, Pakistan was not claimed till 1940, and Iqbal was never President of the League after that; in fact, he died in 1938, two years before the Lahore Resolution and two years before Thompson made this charge.

In 1933 the Pakistan idea was being elaborated by a set of Indian students in Cambridge, led by Chaudhri Rahmat Ali. He founded

the Pakistan National Movement and worked for it perseveringly till his death in 1948. His conception, however, differed radically from Iqbal's, in that he demanded the creation of three sovereign Muslim States in India: Pakistan, consisting of the Punjab, Kashmir, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan; Bangistan, comprising Bengal and Assam; and Osmanistan, containing Hyderabad, Deccan and Berar. In 1947 when Jinnah accepted the present Pakistan, Rahmat Ali resented this 'betrayal of the Pak Nation' and called for a continuance of the campaign to regain all the Muslim areas lost to the Hindus.[28]

It was only in 1940, however, that Muslim India took the decisive step and resolved to work for partition. With the nightmare of Congress rule fresh in their memory, the Muslim League met in Lahore in its annual session, and there passed the epoch-making Pakistan or Lahore Resolution on 23 March 1940, making the demand that all areas in India in the north-west and north-east where Muslims were in a majority should be constituted into '"Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign'.[29] This marks the definite beginning of Muslim separatism in India, which ultimately resulted in the partition of the continent and the creation of Pakistan.

Lord Eustace Percy recently made a curious statement to the effect that Pakistan was never mentioned in the deliberations of the Joint Select Committee (1933–4), but that privately the Indian delegates discussed it as 'the rather disreputable dream of a single agitator, called Jinnah'.[30] There is something seriously wrong here. Perhaps Jinnah is a misprint for Rahmat Ali, for Jinnah had never agitated for Pakistan at the time Lord Percy was writing about. Pakistan was hardly mentioned in Indian politics then, or for as long as six years after it. It is surprising how, and on what grounds, Lord Percy made Jinnah the dreamer of Pakistan in 1933–4.

British Reaction to the Pakistan Demand

British reaction to the Pakistan demand may be studied under three heads. There was, first, a group of people who tried to understand the real problem without taking sides and exercised their minds to suggest some alternatives. Secondly, there were those who supported the Pakistan idea and were in favour of giving it a trial.

Finally, there was a huge section of public opinion which was not prepared even to consider this solution.

The first group may again be divided into two categories. In the first were those who attributed the Muslim move towards separatism to the intransigence of the Hindu when the latter was in power, and the consequent genuine Muslim fear of a Hindu raj. In support of this they mentioned the fact that backing for Pakistan had been strongest in the Hindu provinces.[31] The second category comprised those who suggested their own alternatives for Pakistan aimed at reconciling Muslim demands with the preservation of Indian political unity. One of them, following G. T. Garratt's suggestion made nine years earlier, advised the rearranging of provincial boundaries involving a division of the Punjab and Bengal.[32] Amery, the then Secretary of State for India, suggested a further increase in the powers of the provinces, a re-grouping of provincial areas, the minimum of central control and the possibility of an American type of executive.[33] Sir Arthur Page suggested that India be divided into predominantly Hindu or Muslim districts and that these should be given Dominion status.[34] Professor Coatman's solution was an interesting departure from the usual remedies: re-draw provincial boundaries, form a federation of autonomous provinces, and appoint a special Muslim official in the Federal Government to look after the Muslim interests (something like the Secretary of State for Scotland in the British Government).[35] The Liberal leader, Clement Davies, thought of something on the lines of the United States, with sovereign provinces transferring to the centre such rights as they deemed satisfactory, with full right to contract out subject to some sort of plebiscite.[36]

During the period when the idea of Pakistan was sinking into the British minds, there were some who stood out in clear support for the proposal and saw nothing disastrous in its realization. They can be studied in detail under three heads. First came three Anglo-Indians, Francis Yeats-Brown, Sir George Schuster and V. F. Gray. Yeats-Brown realized that India could never be one country but must remain an area of diversified cultures and that all attempts to force her into one mould would meet with disaster.[37] Sir George Schuster warned against ignoring the Pakistan demand and called for a realistic approach to the practical difficulties offered.[38] Gray, who had spent thirty years in India and six as a member of a

provincial assembly, made a plea for considering partition more sympathetically, and posed the question: is it not asking for trouble to hand the north-west of India, with its Muslim background, over to Hindu rule against its wish?[39] Then came two university dons, Sir Reginald Coupland and Sir Robert Ensor. Considering the communal background of the Pakistan scheme, Coupland said that the notion of persecution of Muslims in a Hindu province being countered by persecution of Hindus in a Muslim province might be a crude idea and a negation of civilized government; yet it was just common sense to recognize the utility of retaliation as a deterrent. 'It promises to repay barbarism in its coin, it does not provoke it.'[40] The Congress policy that Muslims should be placed unreservedly within Hindu power was found by Ensor to be impossible, while the Muslim policy of Pakistan could hardly be said to be impossible; in the absence of a reconciliation the alternative which was not impossible shall prevail.[41] Next came four journalists and authors, all of them, except one, well known in Britain for their writings, though these were not necessarily on India. The most powerful defence of Pakistan was written by Beverley Nichols in his *Verdict on India* (1944). This book, which was reprinted in quick succession many times, was the first British publication to introduce Jinnah and the Muslim case properly to the British reading public. It stated unequivocally that the only course for the British was to 'divide and quit': to recognize Indian independence but make sure that Pakistan was established first.[42] Another journalist to be greatly impressed with the idea was Sir Evelyn Wrench, for long the editor of the *Spectator*. Knowing of the complete lack of unity in India, he was in favour of granting Dominion status to north-west India and to any other territory 'with a definite Muslim majority'. A great Muslim free state in the north-west was inevitable and would play a great part in bringing stability to southern Asia.[43] St John Philby, an Anglo-Indian, a famous Arabian explorer and the author of many books on Islamic countries, denied that Pakistan was 'a cause of despair' and asserted that if no all-India solution was possible, the Muslims had an indisputable right to form their own Dominion.[44] Patrick Lacey, who was later to write *Fascist India*, one of the strongest denunciations of the Hindus and a powerful plea for Pakistan, in a letter castigating the *Manchester Guardian*'s anti-Pakistan attitude, pointed out that Muslims did not seek supremacy,

but only wanted to be sure that, if co-operation with the Hindus finally proved impossible, they would not be denied the next best thing in constitutional advance.[45]

By 1945 the trend of opinion was undoubtedly towards the Muslim solution. The *Economist*, which had at first hinted at accepting the Muslim plan in some shape (14 May 1944), now realized that unity could not be imposed by a constitution if it (unity) did not exist and conceded that the Pakistan solution was more workable (7 April 1945). Even some circles on the Left had now come to admit the inevitability of some sort of Pakistan. Mr Woodrow Wyatt, the Labour M.P. and a close friend of Cripps, was inclined to offer the Muslims geographically contiguous areas in which they were a majority 'and no more', and if this were refused they would have to take their place in an independent, unpartitioned India; and the only party, he declared, who could do this was the Labour Party.[46] The *New Statesman* found only one way out of the impending impasse: that Hindu and Muslim provinces should group themselves in two federations and the two federations should be linked into a loose Indian Union (31 March 1945).

Though most of the figures quoted above were influential in Britain, and some of them might well have succeeded in converting their fellow citizens to the Pakistan plan, yet opposition to the Muslim demand was widespread and came from all shades of opinion. The Conservatives and the Socialists joined with the Liberals and the Communists in opposing the scheme on various grounds.

On the Right, the Marquess of Zetland, who was then Secretary of State for India, appreciated the ground on which the proposal was based but looked at it as 'something not far short of a counsel of despair'. Its acceptance would be an admission of the failure of all efforts of Englishmen and Indians based on the assumption that Indian political unity was possible.[47] The chief condemnation from the Liberals came from Lord Samuel. The Pakistan scheme was favoured neither by history nor by geography; nor was it sanctioned by political foresight. There were already too many sovereign states in the world for international peace. It was indeed 'a most deplorable proposition' and would sow 'the seeds of civil war'.[48] The Left was entirely and completely opposed to the Pakistan idea.[49] Lord Snell thought that it would perpetuate divisions and lead to

continued internal strife. To Lord Faringdon it was impracticable as well as a retrograde step.[50] In the House of Commons, Mr Morgan Price and Mr W. G. Cove repeated Faringdon's opinions.[51] This campaign was continued outside Parliament by journalists and writers, one of whom went so far as to say that Indian unity was a thing worth fighting for and called for a resistance to Pakistan no less determined 'than was the attempt to divide the Southern from the Northern states from America in 1861–65'.[52] Brailsford, perhaps the best-known journalist on the Left of that period, called Pakistan 'wicked' and a 'crime against civilization'.[53]

The Attitude of the Press

The news of the Lahore Resolution was not given any prominence in the British press. *The Times*, the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Daily Herald* published the news in a short summary, the *Daily Telegraph* completely omitted it. Only two leading papers made any comment. *The Times* held the Congress policy responsible for the emergence of Muslims as a separate nation, but disfavoured the Pakistan proposal as 'it would mean an end to Indian unity' (27 March 1940); the scheme was 'manifestly unacceptable' (18 April 1940). For the *Manchester Guardian* Jinnah, by getting the Resolution passed, had 're-established the reign of chaos in Indian politics'; the plan struck at the heart of 'Indian nationalism' (2 April 1940). Next morning the paper again attacked the Muslim League, but gave no argument. The *New Statesman*'s reaction was an assertion that Indians did not divide on the lines of creed but on economic lines and that communal division had been recognized and exaggerated by the white rulers for their own ends (30 March 1940).

On the other hand, there were three press reactions which did not exhibit the usual violent hostility. The *Economist* contented itself with saying that it was foolish to suppose, as the Congress did, that divisions of race and culture, which had created fundamental political cleavages all over the world, could in India be slurred over by denying their existence (30 March 1940). The *Observer* appreciated that a new phase of the Indian problem had opened and read in it the implied warning that the Congress must revise its policy of 'a crude democratic constitution' for all India if it wanted other Indian communities to co-operate with it (31 March 1940). Surpris-

ingly, the most favourable comment appeared in *Nature*, the highly respectable scientific weekly.

> Apart from the fact that the voice of a minority of some eighty million or more, sectional differences, for once, forgotten, cannot be ignored, it is based upon a very real difference in a cultural tradition, as every student of Indian civilization is aware; for the Muslim tradition fosters democratic outlook, while fearing and resenting Hindu domination in an independent India, which would from its immemorial tradition of caste be essentially oligarchic in practice. However impracticable the Muslim demand may be, no solution will secure the future of India in world affairs or internally which attempts to ignore or override these fundamental differences of culture and tradition [6 April 1940].

Apart from its reaction to the Lahore Resolution, the press was generally not sympathetic to the Pakistan solution. *The Times* feared that Pakistan would positively invite foreign intervention in Indian affairs (24 December 1940). It amounted to the setting up of small sovereignties such as had lately shown themselves in Europe so lamentably ill-fitted to survive in the prevailing ruthless international climate (19 September 1941). The Liberal *Manchester Guardian* was not far behind in opposing the idea of partition. It was glad that the Government had never accepted the 'disunity of India that is implied in the Pakhistan [*sic*] policy'* (6 January 1942). However, by 1945 the paper had to concede that the right of secession had to be granted to the Muslims 'if we want to get on', but still hoped that a unified and federated India would emerge in the end (19 April 1945). The leftist *New Statesman* doubted if the main body of Muslims really wanted Pakistan and believed that if real political power were given to India the Muslims would adjust themselves to the inevitable (28 February 1942). It was sure that not a single province claimed for Pakistan would, by a vote of its legislature, endorse the scheme[54] (14 March 1942). As late as in July 1945, its correspondent reported from Simla with full confidence that Pakistan was not really the important element in the Muslim League policy (14 July 1945).

A similar anti-Pakistan attitude was adopted by the *Round Table*, which found ample evidence that the project was inconsistent with British policy, which was to maintain and consolidate the unity of India, and assured the Congress that British failure to condemn the

* This wrong spelling may not have been an accident for it was repeated twice in the leader.

proposal implied no acquiescence in it. In its next issue it proceeded to do what the Congress wanted the British press to do, and listed a number of arguments against Pakistan: it would revive internal strife and devastation, weaken Indian defence and wreck industrial progress. A year later, it repeated the objection that Pakistan militated against that self-sufficiency in the sphere of economics and defence without which no nation could preserve its integrity in the post-war world.[55]

10: *The Years of Negotiation*

The Cripps Mission

TOWARDS the end of 1941 the fortunes of war were changing fast in favour of the Axis powers. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour on 7 December. By the middle of February 1942 Singapore, the major Allied bastion in the Far East, had surrendered, by March Burma had fallen and, on the other side, Rommel was poised in the Libyan desert ready to strike for the Nile. The war status of India was thus changed overnight, and from being a remote ally of Britain she came at once into the front line of the Japanese advance. At the same time, Japan was proclaiming its friendliness to India, asserting her cultural ties with the sub-continent and declaring that she was coming to deliver India from British imperialism.

On the other side, it seems that there was heavy pressure from the United States on Britain to do something substantial in the way of appeasing the nationalist movement. The British Cabinet met in the morning of March 3 to discuss the Indian Declaration for Dominion status after the war. President Roosevelt had urged Mr Churchill to give India a promise of Dominion status right away, as he thought that this gesture would unite all Indians to work for the war effort. Churchill explained to the President that India was a continent of the size of Europe and that it was very difficult to reconcile the differences between Hindus and Muslims, and that the latter numbered a hundred million and provided most of the Indian troops.[1]

It was under these conditions that Mr Churchill announced in the House of Commons, on 11 March 1942, that Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the Commons, was to go to India immediately to negotiate with her leaders on the draft declaration he was taking with him. Reaching Delhi on 22 March, Cripps made the draft public on 29 March. According to this document (Cmd. 6350), the aim was to create a new Indian Union 'which shall

constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any respect of its domestic or external affairs'. An Indian body would draft the new constitution after the conclusion of hostilities. There was a provision for any province to remain out of the proposed Union with the right of forming its own independent Government; this 'non-accession clause' was obviously aimed at satisfying the Muslim demand for Pakistan. Britain and the Indian constitution-making body would negotiate a treaty respecting the protection of religious and racial minorities. No major alteration in India's constitutional position was foreshadowed during the war, but every effort was to be made to associate her people in the counsels of their country and in the war effort.

On 10 April Congress rejected the offer, demanding that a free national government should be set up at once with full powers. Cripps hastened to meet this demand by agreeing to establish a new executive council, exclusively Indian in personnel except for the viceroy and the commander-in-chief, which would control practically all the day-to-day details and administration of the government. On 11 April, however, the Congress turned down the whole scheme on two main grounds: first, it did not give immediate independence; secondly, it struck a blow to Indian unity by its non-accession provision. The Muslim League followed suit, saying that the terms of provincial non-accession were too indefinite and vague to result in Pakistan. The offer of the British War Cabinet thus ended in nothing. What was the explanation?

For the Muslims the choice of Cripps was an unhappy one. He belonged to the Labour Party which had always been unsympathetic to the Muslim cause. He was an old friend of several Hindu leaders, especially Nehru. This prejudiced the Muslims against him.[2] And the Congress was not slow in detecting in the choice of Cripps an envoy whose political past might incline him to favour their views.[3] He was pressed by Hindu leaders to use what weight he possessed with the British Government to bring into being the independence of India.[4]

Muslims also found the non-accession clause not far-reaching enough: they denied that it was sufficient to produce Pakistan. On the other hand, the British Government claimed to have inserted

this clause in the draft declaration precisely because any constitution based on the coercion of the Muslims could not have lasted.[5] When made public, the clause had a mixed reception in Britain. Sir Stanley Reed alone believed that the Union of autonomous states envisaged in the offer was the only principle which could meet the distinctive religious, racial and economic needs of India.[6] Lord Hailey was opposed to it.[7] The *Manchester Guardian* regretted 'such a breach in Indian unity' (30 March 1942) and the *New Statesman* was convinced that none of the Muslim provinces would vote to opt out of the Union (4 April 1942); anyway the Muslim minority stood in no need of protection as, among other things, 'a Muslim theologian presides over the Congress' (18 April 1942).

The Hindu rejection of the offer, and especially Gandhi's action in spurning the declaration and in forcing the Congress Working Committee to reverse its original acceptance,[8] was (except for the extreme wing of the Labour Party) universally criticized in Britain; and particular exception was taken to the ground on which the rejection was professedly based, viz., that the scheme did not give immediate independence. Five peers, representative of all parties, called it an amazing proposition in the middle of a dangerous war.[9] It did not escape the attention of other observers in Britain, as it had not eluded the Hindu mind, that the time of the offer coincided with the lowest ebb of Allied fortunes of war.[10] The press of the Right was no less critical. The *Daily Telegraph*, which had welcomed the offer (30 March 1942) and commended its acceptance (31 March and 4 April 1942), now rebuked the Congress for its intransigence and its attitude of 'the most complete intolerance' towards the Muslims (13 April 1942). This was showing a lack of realism, added the *Spectator* (17 April 1942).

The Labour Party had no united or definite views on the Cripps mission. On 30 March, Mr Arthur Greenwood, deputy leader of the party, issued a statement, welcoming the offer and asking India to accept it.[11] The Labour Party's presence in the War Cabinet implied that it had blessed Cripps's journey to India. But when the party's annual conference met a few months later, some delegates chose to attack the offer rather than those who had turned it down. Mr Reginald Sorenson led this band of critics and added that Nehru should be invited at once to form a National Government in accordance with the established principle of majority rule. Finally, the

Conference unanimously passed a resolution calling upon the Government and 'the peoples of India' to 'make a further effort to reach a rapid and satisfactory settlement'. Greenwood, however, reminded the party of its long-established policy of consideration for minority rights and dissuaded it from insisting that the Government should force a solution on India in face of the views of the minority.[12] Similarly, in the T.U.C. annual conference of 1942, Sir Walter Citrine, the General Secretary, pulled up those who saw greater unity in India than facts warranted, and expressed his conviction that if self-government were given to India at once it would result in such internal strife as would facilitate Japanese occupation.[13] The *Daily Herald* was ill-disposed towards the offer from the very beginning. On the non-accession clause its remark was pithy and expressive, 'Every Punjabi, Hindu or Sikh or Muslim, is proud to be an Indian. He will not sell that birthright for the name of "Pakistan" ' (30 March 1942). On 1 April, the paper published an India's *Who's Who* by W. M. Ewer, presumably meant as a guide to its readers who were following the Indian negotiations with interest. Four leaders were thumb-sketched—Jinnah, Nehru, Azad and Rajagopalacharia—but uncomplimentary remarks were reserved for Jinnah, who was called 'talkative' and 'quarrelsome'; 'nobody has yet quite made out what he really stands for'.

The Congress Rebellion

During the Cripps negotiations the Congress had made a bid for the control of entire India; when this failed it became more and more bitter and uncompromising. It wanted independence—'immediate; unconditional, and regardless of consequences, whether invasion, civil war or general anarchy'.[14] Gandhi was now convinced that Japan was going to win, and he appealed for the withdrawal of all British forces from India. In his opinion, the departure of the British would not only stop Japan from invading India but also 'solve' the Hindu-Muslim problem. 'Leave India in God's hands', he called, 'or, in modern parlance, to anarchy. Then all parties will fight one another like dogs or will, when real responsibility faces them, come to reason and agreement.'[15] In April 1942, immediately after rejecting the Cripps offer, he prepared a resolution to be put before the Congress Working Committee, in which he stated that if India were

freed her first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan, assured Japan that India bore no enmity towards her, called on the people to offer complete non-violent non-co-operation to the Japanese forces if they attacked India and to make no assistance to the British, declared that Britain was incapable of defending India and reiterated that Japan's quarrel was not with India but with the British Empire.[16] This resolution was accepted by the Working Committee on 14 July. The All India Congress Committee, the High Command, however, insisted on substituting armed resistance to Japanese invaders for non-co-operation, and finally passed the amended resolution on 8 August. It warned that if independence was not forthcoming immediately, there would be a *violent* mass revolt against Britain.[17]

The scheme in the mind of the Congress president was that, as soon as the Japanese army reached Bengal and the British army withdrew towards Bihar, 'Congress should step in and take over the control of the country', and most of his time in May and June 1942 was spent in developing this plan. But Gandhi did not agree with him. He believed that the Japanese army would come into India not as India's enemy but as the enemy of the British and that if the British left immediately Japan would not attack India. Moreover, he thought that the British would allow him to develop his movement of resistance. Nehru had coined the phrase 'open non-violent rebellion' before Gandhi had started talking of 'non-violent revolution'.[18]

This revolt was, however, forestalled by the prompt action of the Government of India who arrested all Congress leaders on 9 August. Serious and widespread disturbances broke out in Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar, the Central Provinces and Madras. Telegraph wires were cut, airfield installations destroyed, railway stations burnt, railway tracks torn up and post offices looted and burnt down. Hundreds of people were killed before the campaign had spent its strength in September. Two significant things about this rebellion[19] must be noticed. First, these disturbances took place only in the Hindu provinces; and secondly, all other parties, including the Hindu Mahasabha, kept themselves aloof from the rising.

Unreserved condemnation was the immediate and universal British reaction to the rebellion, again with the sole exception of some groups on the Left. *The Times* was angry (12 August 1942).

The *Daily Telegraph* was scandalized: it was 'irresponsible folly' (16 July 1942), the 'imbecility of Wardha' (23 July 1942), 'infatuation with the lust of power' (6 August 1942), and a scheme for 'not the withdrawal of the British but the entry of the Japanese' (10 August 1942). The *Observer* had no respect for this bid at 'dictatorship' (19 July 1942). The *Sunday Times* called the Congress 'a *herrenvolk* without qualifications' (2 and 9 August 1942). The *Spectator* was equally severe in tone (14 and 21 July, 7 and 14 August 1942), while the *Economist* called it 'one of the most dramatic acts of political blackmail in world history' (25 July 1942). J. C. French, who regularly commented on Indian affairs in the *National Review*, called the revolt an attempt at a *coup d'état*, 'seizure of power by an autocratic minority'.[20] He was followed by a sizeable group of Congress critics.[21]

However, the Congress was not without some supporters among the Left. Some politicians and newspapers had already been suggesting that, in view of the Japanese danger, a policy of appeasement of the Congress should be adopted. Foremost among these was the *Manchester Guardian* which wrote, when the disorders had started, that 'there is no reason to doubt that Mr Gandhi and the Congress leaders intend only non-violence' (10 August 1942), and characterized as ridiculous the idea that Congress could be ignored in future negotiations (13 August 1942). The *New Statesman* regretted that Muslims were exempted from the collective fines imposed on Indian villages participating in the revolt (5 December 1942). Lord Huntingdon's solution was that Britain should quit India at once and hand over power to the Congress.[22] Laski suggested an immediate meeting between Gandhi and the Viceroy.[23] Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence called the rebellion a 'spiritual revolt' and left it at that.[24] A Labour M.P. called for the release of all political prisoners and the formation of an interim national government.[25]

The National Executive Committee of the Labour Party passed a resolution on 22 July, viewing with grave apprehension the possibility of a 'civil disobedience movement' and describing it as political irresponsibility that might imperil the fate of all freedom-loving peoples.[26] On 12 August the Committee, in co-operation with the Central Council of Trades Union Congress, issued a declaration on the recommendation of the Joint Committee on India (consisting of the Indian Committee of the Parliamentary

Labour Party and the International Sub-Committee of the National Executive Committee), which considered the Government of India's action of detaining the Congress leaders 'an unavoidable precaution', but at the same time urged the Government to resume free and friendly discussions on the abandonment of 'civil disobedience'.[27] The latter clause of the declaration was disputed by J. R. Shanley of the Upholsterers' Union, who likened it to an employer saying to the striking workers that he would negotiate with them when they resume work. No delegate to the T.U.C., he said, would support the idea that the Congress attached to their desire for negotiation the threat of 'civil disobedience', and he concluded by asserting that the campaign was never called.[28]

Gandhi decided in February 1943, while still in detention, to undergo a fast of twenty-one days unless the Government and the Viceroy exonerated him from any responsibility for the rebellion and acts of sabotage. He said that the revolt was the responsibility of the Government of India. This decision reopened the debate for and against the Congress in Britain. But this need not detain us, as the temper and tone of the participants were but a replica of what has been described above.

It has recently been revealed that in 1943 the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, proposed to release Gandhi and Nehru and to invite them to join his Executive Council, but that this suggestion 'received no support at all from London and made King George very angry'.[29] In view of the March White Paper,[30] and other signs of the Government of India's firm policy, it is a remote possibility that this suggestion was made in early 1943; unfortunately the King's biographer does not mention the exact date or month.

Jinnah-Gandhi Conversations

The next important incident of this period belongs to the autumn of 1944 when Jinnah and Gandhi (who had by now secured his release) met to discuss the Indian stalemate. The way to their conversations had been cleared by C. Rajagopalacharia, a front-rank Congress leader and the only one among the Hindus who was prepared to concede the Pakistan demand. He prepared a statement in July 1944, making specific provisions for a *rapprochement* between the Congress and the League. Gandhi was persuaded to meet Jinnah

to discuss the future of India on the basis of this formula, commonly known as the C.R. formula after the initials of Rajagopalacharia. These talks took place in Bombay in September 1944, but failed to end in any agreement. The main point on which the breakdown occurred was that, while Gandhi agreed to a partition *after* the British withdrawal, Jinnah insisted on a division *before* independence because he had serious doubts whether Congress would keep its pledge once the British departed.

The British reaction to these talks and their failure again reflected the marked dichotomy between the Right and the Left. The former was firm with Gandhi, while the latter blamed Jinnah for being obstinate and praised Gandhi for his realism and generosity. Before the negotiations *The Times* had remarked that their success would entail a larger comprehension of the Muslim point of view than Gandhi had hitherto displayed (15 July 1944); but it noted that while on one side Gandhi was offering terms to the Muslims, on the other he was vindicating his 1942 action which had frightened the minorities into hardening their stand (9 August 1944). To the *Economist* it was necessary to make quite certain that Gandhi did not attach to words a meaning of his own which only emerged after the event (15 July 1944).

On the other hand, the opinion of the Left, as embodied in the *New Statesman*, complimented Gandhi on his 'generous offer' to the Muslims and his 'realistic and accommodating outlook' (15 July 1944). Jinnah was condemned for the 'shocking' speech with which he had received 'the Mahatma's olive-branch'; it was suspicious and ill-natured, and it was felt that Gandhi would have to supply all the 'charity and grace' (15 August 1944). Moreover, it was doubtful if even a purely Muslim electorate would yield a majority for separation (19 August 1944).

The Simla Conference

In March 1945 Lord Wavell came to London to discuss with the Cabinet the Indian political deadlock. After his return to India, on 14 June, he presented a new offer, in which he made it clear that the Cripps offer still remained open. He declared his readiness to reform his Council immediately so that it should be exclusively Indian, except for the Commander-in-Chief; the Council would be selected

from among the Indian parties 'in proportion which would give a balanced representation of the main communities, including equal proportion of Muslims and caste Hindus'.[31] With a view to discussing the formation of such a council, he called a conference of all Indian political groups at Simla. The main parties were asked to submit a list of nominees from which he could select his councillors. Jinnah rejected this procedure on two grounds. First he demanded, in logical consistency with his claim to represent Muslim India, that all Muslims appointed to the Council should be from among the Muslim League; while the Congress insisted on nominating two Muslims of its own to the list on the ground that some of its members were Muslims. Secondly, he contended that the principle of Pakistan should be recognized, for, if the League accepted the Wavell plan, 'the Pakistan issue will be shelved and put in cold storage indefinitely'. Faced with these irreconcilable demands from both sides the Viceroy was forced, in the middle of July 1945, to declare the breakdown of the Conference.

In Britain Muslims were generally blamed for causing this failure, but there was a visible difference of tone between the criticism of the Right and the condemnation of the Left. *The Times* found Jinnah's claim to appoint all Muslim members an 'extreme proposition', but reluctantly conceded his second point that the party which secured effective representation now would be advantageously placed in relation to the settlement of the future permanent constitution with which the problem of Pakistan was connected (10 July 1945). The *Observer* put the more obvious blame on Jinnah, but reminded the Congress leaders, who were now 'pluming themselves on their co-operative attitude', that their past treatment of the Muslims was responsible for his intransigence (15 July 1945). Dealing with Gandhi's argument that the Congress would not agree to religious parity because that would stiffen the religious divisions and endanger Indian unity, the *Economist* remarked that this reasoning would be more effective if there were any likelihood of Congress nominating persons not under the orders of the Working Committee 'which, where it is concerned with the issues of the religious communities, is primarily dominated by Hindu interests' (23 June 1945).

The press of the Left, however, expressed unqualified disapproval of the Muslim stand. The *Manchester Guardian* condemned Jinnah for using his 'familiar' veto and declared that 'we shall sooner

or later have to tackle that veto' (14 July 1945). For the *New Statesman* the Conference had failed only because of the intransigence of Jinnah and the Muslim League (1 September 1945).

Muslim India and the Muslim League

During the Simla Conference, Jinnah had been condemned for his claim to nominate all Muslim members by the entire British press, presumably on the ground that he did not represent *all* the Muslims of India. This presumption was true in the sense that the Muslim League did not speak for every single Indian Muslim, but it was false in the sense that the Muslim League did not represent most of the Muslims. Even before the 1945 elections, which took place soon after the Conference and in which the League captured almost all Muslim seats, most open-minded observers had accepted the League as representing Muslim India. As early as 1943 Coupland had recorded that the League held 'at least an equivalent position among Indian Muslims to that which the Congress holds among the Hindus'.[32] It was a commonplace among British political circles to point to the small number of seats won by the League in the 1937 elections, without referring either to the mere five per cent Muslim seats then captured by the Congress or to the by-elections the League had regularly won since then.[33] By 1945 the Congress did not speak for more than one or two per cent of the Muslims; and even a Socialist politician conceded that by early 1945 the League was a living organization having the 'support of the vast majority of Muslims whatever the Congress said about it'.[34] The Congress leaders themselves privately admitted in 1945 that their party membership was 'more than ninety-five per cent Hindu'.[35] Even this confession was an understatement.

But the debate on the representative character of the Muslim League still went on unabated. The Right of all shades defended the League's claim to speak for Muslim India. The *Round Table* had regarded it, even in 1940, as the most representative Muslim organization and had found no alternative body capable of supplanting it and of eliminating Jinnah from its leadership.[36] The supporters of this view included Sir Harry Haig, Sir Verney Lovett, Earl Winterton, Sir Stanley Reed, Sir Frederick Sykes, L. S. Amery and Mr Godfrey Nicholson.[37]

The detractors all belonged to the Left. Edward Thompson thought that the League had still a long way to go before it could represent Muslim India;[38] Henry Polak contemptuously referred to it as 'Mr Jinnah's group';[39] the Union of Democratic Control knew that it did not speak for all Muslims.[40] In the Parliament Lord Faringdon and Mr Sorenson repeated these 'facts'.[41] The Labourites were furious at Mr Churchill's speech of 10 September 1942, in which he had quoted figures to the effect that 235,000,000 out of a total of 390,000,000 Indians were opposed to the Congress.[42] Rhys Davies called it 'nonsense' and Bevan 'shameful'. The *New Statesman* argued that this statement was 'oddly irresponsible in view of the fact that the President of the Congress is a Muslim' (19 September and 30 October 1942).

British Opinion and Muslim Politics

A fundamental principle involved in the Indian problem was this: does the democratic law by which the decree of a minority must give way to the will of a majority apply to the population of every conceivable area? The Congress contended that it applied everywhere and demanded that it should be applied to India in which the Hindus were in a great majority. The Muslims contended that it did not apply to an area where the population was not homogeneous, and demanded that, as they were alien in tradition and sentiment from the Hindus, they should be allowed to form their own State(s).[43] The Congress blamed the British Government for having created the minority problem, as if Britain had put the Muslims in India. The Muslims charged Britain with being indifferent to their legitimate aspirations. The British difficulty lay in the fact that if power were transferred to the majority, that is, the Hindus, it would lead to a disastrous civil war. And if power were not transferred to the majority, the British Government would be charged with arming the Muslims with a veto. The British predicament was obvious and must be appreciated. To borrow Lord Hailey's words, 'We seem to arrive at the paradox that we are being charged with a refusal to extend national liberties, because a large section of the population believes that by doing so in the present circumstances we might endanger its individual liberties.'[44] After 1940, two ways were open to Britain: either to give India independence and transfer

power to the majority of the people and face (or rather let India face) the civil war which was inevitable; or to accept the Muslim idea of Pakistan, to partition India and withdraw. Ultimately the latter alternative was followed, but the idea of a divided India was so revolting to the average British mind that it needed a long time before its inevitability forced Britain to face it. There were, however, precedents in the Dominions where independence was given to certain parts of an area and others were permitted the choice between coming in or staying out. The Canadian Federation, for example, was originally formed by four provinces; others joined later. The South African Union was another case of making special conditions for entering or staying out altogether.

A second factor in the situation after 1940 was the attitude of Indian parties to the war. The Congress had clearly and unhesitatingly declared itself against the war, withdrawn its ministries in the provinces, staged a long civil disobedience movement and finally tried an unsuccessful rebellion. The Muslim League, on the other hand, acquiesced in its members continuing to hold office in provincial governments fully engaged in the war effort and in their co-operating as individuals in many other ways. The League, therefore, not unnaturally expected that British public opinion would take notice of this, appreciate the friendly Muslim gesture and desist from bracketing it with the Congress. What it found, instead, was a section of opinion prepared to concede the Congress demand in full, a large section doubting the League's representative credentials, and almost the entire corpus arguing against any kind of Pakistan.

Of course there were some in Britain, generally on the Right, who took note of the anti-war and anti-British Congress attitude and commented unfavourably on it.[45] Even the *Manchester Guardian* was constrained to state that the Congress leaders had shown little faith in Britain or her allies and little interest in the Allied cause (28 July 1944). This, however, brought a stinging letter from Rajagopalacharia, on 29 August, saying that the paper had betrayed its true liberal creed, and that India could no longer expect any fair dealing from the British Liberals. The journal never again criticized the Congress.

However, these opinions were not widespread and did not reflect the feelings of more than a small circle vocal on India. Neither the current anti-war Congress politics nor the repeated Muslim declara-

tions that the Congress spoke for the Hindus only were enough to deter the Labour Party and the T.U.C. from continually demanding the release of all prisoners, the opening of negotiations and the grant of immediate Dominion status to India on the principle of majority rule.[46] The cue was taken by the Labour representatives in Parliament and passionate but one-sided speeches were made by Messrs Sorenson, Gordon MacDonald and Cove in the Commons[47] and by Lords Snell, Strabolgi and Faringdon in the Lords.[48] Outside Parliament, too, the leftist propaganda in favour of the Congress continued. When Cripps was leaving for India in 1940 and Zetland had asked him what would happen if the Muslims refused his offer, he had shrugged his shoulders and said that he hoped they would play; and Zetland told him that 'my admiration for his optimism was greater than my confidence in his judgment'.[49] This attitude of indifference to the Muslims was generally characteristic of the entire Left,[50] and may be illustrated by a chronological study of the views of Edward Thompson, the Oxford don, who was one of the strongest critics of the Muslims in this period. In 1940 he had asked if the Muslim League, which had not won a single seat in 1937 in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind and won only one seat in the Punjab, was to be given a permanent veto.[51] In 1943 he argued that the British had won the sovereignty of India from the Marathas, not the Muslims, implying that therefore sovereignty should revert to the Hindus when the British withdrew.[52] In 1944 he contended that Pakistan should not be conceded even if Gandhi and Jinnah agreed to it; they had no right to decide this question since neither was a Punjabi or a Bengali, and the Punjab was being governed by a Hindu-Muslim-Sikh coalition and in Bengal, though there was a slight Muslim majority, the 'wealth and tradition and culture of the Bengali nation are overwhelmingly Hindu'. Then, referring to the 1905 partition of Bengal, he made the curious statement that the division of Curzon was opposed so much by 'all Hindus and Muslims' that it had to be undone.[53] Apparently he had forgotten what he had written fourteen years earlier on the Bengal partition. 'The anti-partition agitation', he had declared in his *Reconstruction of India* (1930), 'was a Hindu nationalist movement . . . the Hindu rage to have the partition annulled was part of the general Hindu excitement all over India. The Muhammadan reply was to found the Muslim League in 1907 [*sic*].' In 1945 he stated

that if Britain had been occupied by a conqueror who offered self-government on the condition that first Catholics and Protestants should be in agreement, 'we should never have won freedom'.[54]

Among the press, the *Manchester Guardian* and the *New Statesman* were the centres of this pro-Congress publicity. When the Congress announced its intention of starting an anti-war individual civil disobedience movement, instead of criticizing this decision, the *Manchester Guardian* suggested that the Secretary of State should be sent on a special mission to India (15 October 1940). Its New Delhi correspondent incorrectly reported that both the Congress and the League were withholding co-operation in the war effort (17 September 1940). The *New Statesman* was almost insulting to the Muslims. The Hindus, it said, offered every imaginable guarantee of Muslim rights and the Muslim pose of being an oppressed minority was merely ridiculous (14 December 1940). The Congress should offer some more ministerial posts to the Muslims and, if Jinnah still opposed, he would find himself isolated (29 June 1940).

Obviously and naturally the Congress took heart from such steady support. In fact, it was, and knew that it was, on very strong ground in Britain. Three things had helped it in securing this superiority in relation to the Muslims. First, it had got itself identified with the Socialist and non-Socialist (not Communist) Left, including the Liberals, at a time when these forces were gaining ground. Secondly, Muslims had become identified with the Conservatives, and therefore aroused hostility in non-Conservative circles. Finally, behind all the controversy was the 'administration's' feeling that Britain had given India unity and should now defend it against any scheme of partition. The upshot of this third factor was that the Congress tended to win favour even on the Right, as most of the Anglo-Indians were Conservatives. These cross-currents added up to the fact that an overwhelming majority of the British thinking public of all political shades came, directly or indirectly, to support the Congress idea of a united India as the 'practical' solution. This was the weakest spot in the Muslim armour, and, ironically enough, one for which they could not be convicted of indifference or lack of propaganda. It just happened to be thus, and played havoc with their cause in Britain.

11: *The Transfer of Power*

A Labour Government took office in London in July 1945, and in September the Viceroy announced the Government's new proposals for India; elections to all provincial and central legislatures were to be held in the coming winter; after the elections the Viceroy would hold discussions with the representatives of the new provincial assemblies to decide the method of forming a constituent assembly and determining its powers and procedure; and he would take steps to form an interim government with the support of the main parties.

The Congress Committee met in the same month and rejected the new proposals as a mere repetition of the Cripps offer, reaffirmed the August 1942 resolution and declared that its policy was negotiation if possible and 'non-violent' direct action if necessary. In the election manifesto references were made to the 1942 resolution and it was laid down: 'By its demand and challenge the Congress stands today. It is on the basis of this resolution and with its battle-cry that the Congress faces the election.'[1] The Muslim League concentrated on the Pakistan issue, claiming that this should be settled before constitution-making began. The results of the elections held in the winter of 1945–6 conclusively proved that there were only two main parties in the field. The League captured 425 out of the available 441 Muslim seats in the provinces and won every single Muslim seat in the Centre. The Congress had a similar success in the non-Muslim constituencies. The cleavage between the two parties was deeper than ever. One had fought the elections on the basis of a united India, the other on the basis of a partitioned India. Each had received an emphatic endorsement from its electorate and swept the smaller cross-current groups into limbo.

Faced with this picture of 'irreconcilables' the British Government announced, on 19 February 1946, its decision to send a Cabinet Mission of three to India to seek an agreement with the Indian

leaders on the constitutional issue. This body, consisting of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr A. V. (later Lord) Alexander, reached India on 24 March and, finding its conversations with the Indians unfruitful, published its own recommendations on 16 May. The Cabinet Mission plan, as it came to be known, ruled out Pakistan as a practical possibility and suggested a Union of India controlling foreign affairs, defence, communications, and the finance required for these subjects. All other powers would belong to the provinces, who would be free to form groups with group executives and legislatures, and each group could determine which provincial subjects should be taken in common. Any motion in the Union legislature which raised an important communal issue would require the consent of a majority of the representatives from each of the two major communities. The constitutions of the Union and the groups were to be subject at ten-year intervals to reconsideration if demanded by any province. The three groups of provinces were: (*a*) Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, the Central Provinces and Orissa; (*b*) the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Sind; (*c*) Bengal and Assam. A constituent assembly, consisting of 292 members from the provinces and 93 from the States, was proposed. Following the convening of the constituent assembly, the representatives of each of the three groups were to meet separately to decide the nature of their group constitutions. After this action the group representatives were to reassemble in a single body for the drafting of the Union constitution.[2]

On 6 June the Muslim League accepted the plan, in the hope that it would ultimately result in the establishment of Pakistan, while reserving the right to revise its attitude at any time during the progress of constitution-making. On 25 June the Congress accepted the long-term plan with reservations on certain vital points, but refused to accept the short-term plan of entering the interim government. On 16 June the Viceroy had announced that, if the major parties, or either of them, refused to come into the government, he would proceed with its formation in co-operation with the party or groups that were prepared to join it. But when the Congress rejected the short-term plan on 25 June, the Viceroy, instead of forming a government with the help of the League and other parties which had accepted the whole plan, postponed the formation of the

interim government. The League took this as a breach of promise and an unnecessary concession to the Congress. At the same time, the Congress leaders were making intemperate speeches defining the position of the Congress in the plans for the transfer of authority in India. Mr Nehru declared that what his party would do in the constituent assembly depended entirely on its own free will. 'We have committed ourselves to no single matter to anybody,' he said. The Congress president supported him by announcing that the constituent assembly would have 'the unfettered right to make a constitution; it would be sovereign; and would legislate for a united, not a divided, India'.[3] These utterances reduced the Congress acceptance of the long-term plan to nonsense. Simultaneously, the Viceroy had, according to Jinnah, failed to keep his word about the formation of the Council. Muslims felt that their worst fears were being realized and on 27 July the Muslim League reversed its acceptance of the plan and announced that the time had come to resort to 'direct action' to achieve Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the Congress changed its mind and accepted the short-term plan. The Viceroy, therefore, invited it to form the interim government and this administration took office in September. The day this government was installed was marked as a day of protest and mourning by the Muslims and black flags were flown to demonstrate their feeling of resentment. It was not till 15 October that the League revised its decision and entered the interim government.

The first meeting of the constituent assembly was scheduled for 9 December, but the League asked for its postponement so that discussion could be held on the vexed question of the grouping clause. The Congress interpreted this provision to mean that each province had the right to decide both as to its grouping and as to its own constitution. To overcome this impasse the British Government invited the Viceroy, Jinnah, Liaqat Ali, Nehru and Baldev Singh to come to London to discuss the controversy. When these conversations of December 1946 failed to produce an agreement, the British Government reaffirmed that the League's interpretation was the right one, viz., that the decision of the assembly's sections on provincial constitutions and grouping should be taken by a simple majority vote of each section. But the Congress refused to accept this version, and demanded that the League should either

enter the constituent assembly on the Congress interpretation of the grouping clause or resign from the interim government. The League refused to quit the government and boycotted the assembly on the ground that it was the Congress that had refused the official interpretation of the grouping clause.

Faced with such an acute difference of opinion the British Government announced, on 20 February 1947, its intention to withdraw from India by June 1948. Simultaneously Wavell was replaced by Mountbatten. When the new Viceroy reached India on 22 March, he found the country in a state of virtual civil war and he decided to expedite the transfer of power. After conferring with the political leaders he returned to London in May to inform Whitehall that the Cabinet Mission plan was not enough to meet the emergency and to seek new instructions. Back in India on 2 June he announced the final plan,[4] by which the Muslim provinces not represented in the constituent assembly would vote to determine whether their constitution was to be formed by the existing constituent assembly or by a new one. On 3 June both the parties accepted the plan, and on 4 July the Indian Independence Bill was introduced in Parliament and became law on 15 July. Power was formally transferred to the two new Dominions on 15 August 1947.

This briefly is the story of the last days of British rule in India. How did Britain react to it during these hectic days?

The Cabinet Mission Plan

The Mission plan was on the whole received well in Britain. The general feeling was summed up in the comment of *The Times* that the plan indicated the kind of natural accommodation which presented the only alternative to civil war (17 May 1946). The *Observer* remarked that the Congress could well afford to welcome a plan which came down on its side by ruling out the Muslim claim (19 May 1946). In the opinion of the *Daily Telegraph*, the reasons that the Mission gave for the rejection of Pakistan were sound enough, yet 'the idea of a Muslim State has taken so firm a hold of the imagination of the Muslim people, that it has become a religious faith, ignoring alike questions of economics and of the place that India might hold in the world as a united nation' (17 May 1946). When the Muslim League accepted the plan in June, it congratulated Jinnah for showing true

statesmanship (7 June 1946), but the *Manchester Guardian* warned him that it was 'clearly his last chance of getting so much' (7 June 1946).

Mr Arthur Moore alone pointed out that neither from the Cabinet Mission nor from the Congress had come one word of congratulations or any recognition of what it had cost the League to abandon, even temporarily, its platform of Pakistan. The only response was a derisive outburst in the Hindu press, accompanied by insulting cartoons, proclaiming the defeat and surrender of the League and determination to follow up this victory and force the Mission to yield in all points to the Congress.[5]

The Interim Government

When, towards the end of July, the League withdrew its acceptance of the plan in view of the Viceroy's refusal to form a government without the Congress and declared its policy of 'direct action', a section of the British press appreciated the Muslim difficulty and conceded that the League had good ground for alarm in Congress's overwhelming majority in the constituent assembly and in Mr Nehru's repeated statements that the assembly would be a sovereign body whose majority vote would be implicitly final; and that provincial groupings could not and would not survive. The *Observer* saw in the formation of a purely Congress government a catastrophe that would lead to 'calamities, recognized by all, though few have dared to name them publicly' (4 August and 1 September 1946). The *Economist* believed that the League had good reason for feeling that it had been let down (3 August 1946). *The Times* reprimanded the League for its declaration of 'direct action'; this was nothing but 'sacrificing patriotism to pique' (30 July 1946). It appealed to Jinnah to forsake unconstitutional ways (28 August 1946) and to join the government (13 September 1946). The *Daily Telegraph* and the *Spectator* also deplored the League's policy, though in less strong terms.

The Viceroy's initial refusal to form a government with the League alone in June and later readiness, almost anxiety, to form one with the Congress alone were severely criticized inside and outside Parliament. In the House of Commons Mr Churchill led the attack by connecting the installation of Congress rule with the

ensuing 'series of massacres' unparalleled 'since the Indian Mutiny of 1857'.[6] In the Lords, Templewood had warned against any attempt at forming a government with the co-operation of one community alone and had, on 18 July, directly asked the Government if they intended to do so. There was *no* reply.[7] Outside Parliament, too, the official policy came under fire not only from the organs of the Right but also from 'independent' journals. The *National Review* bitterly regretted the handing over of power to an organization which was caste Hindu by composition, quisling by its war record and Fascist by policy.[8] The *Round Table* asserted that the neutral view was that, on the wording of the Viceroy's statement of 16 June, the balance of logic lay with Jinnah.[9] To the *Economist* the current British policy seemed to be that 'when Congress refuses to play, the Muslims get nothing, but when Muslims also refuse to play, Congress gets power' (7 August 1946); and it asked for the grounds on which the decision was taken to give power to Nehru at the moment of maximum conflict between Hindus and Muslims (24 August 1946).

It is now known that the installation of a Congress government was purely Attlee's decision. Wavell was in favour of postponement till the Muslims could be persuaded to come in. But Attlee overruled him.[10] Naturally, therefore, the radical and leftist circles acclaimed this action of a Labour Government. One Labour M.P. complimented Wavell on his skill in showing the 'intransigent Muslim leaders' that the British Government meant business this time.[11] The *Manchester Guardian* hailed the decision and congratulated the British 'nation' on giving India her freedom (26 August 1946).

The Congress press in India, and certain Congress leaders, had started calling the interim government a Cabinet and Nehru the Prime Minister of India; but, on the League's serious protests against this misrepresentation of facts, the Viceroy issued a clarification to the effect that the government was merely the Viceroy's Executive Council with Nehru as vice-chairman. But the *New Statesman* continued to call it a 'Cabinet bound by collective responsibility, with Nehru as Premier'[12] (7 September 1946). And later, when the Muslim League joined the Council, it regarded this development as 'an unhappy preparation for independence' (19 October 1946).

The Constituent Assembly

In the period between the League's acceptance of the plan in June and the formation of the interim government in September and even after that, the Congress leaders had been proclaiming that they were not bound by anything once the constituent assembly met. When the League announced a boycott of the assembly, the Congress leaders delivered speeches at Meerut aiming at creating the impression that they cared little for the Muslim point of view and would use their overwhelming majority in the assembly to draft a constitution for a united India of their own liking. Some of Mr Nehru's statements on this topic were characterized by the *Daily Telegraph* as 'imitating the language of Hitler' (26 November 1946). *The Times* found it difficult to deny the force of Jinnah's contention that his entry into the assembly was futile unless the Congress changed its policy, but still asked him to come into the assembly and see how the Congress behaved (6 December 1946).

This issue of the constituent assembly was discussed two or three times in Parliament. When the assembly was meeting in Delhi in February 1947 without its Muslim members, Lord Simon expressed his doubt whether the body could be called a constituent assembly; he compared it to an industrial conference to which both employers and workmen were invited, but only one party accepted the invitation.[13] But Mr A. V. Alexander said that the 'voluntary abstraction' of one body of representatives did not make any difference. He was repeatedly asked to state what the Government's attitude would be if the assembly made decisions without Muslim participation, but he and other Ministers refused to answer what they called 'this hypothetical question'. Mr William Gallacher, the Communist M.P., called upon the Government to recognize the assembly 'as it is constituted at the moment';[14] and Cripps was of the opinion that the assembly was, despite Muslim absence, capable of giving 'ample protection' to the minorities.[15] Lord Samuel, the Liberal leader, condemned the Muslims for abstaining from the assembly.[16]

The *Manchester Guardian*, which had originally welcomed the Mission plan, now reversed its opinion and called it a 'clumsy, wasteful, and inefficient' system; encouraged Nehru not to keep 'the constituent assembly tied to the Cabinet Mission scheme'; and asked its readers not to be surprised if the decision of the assembly did not

closely follow the Mission plan (14 February 1947). The *New Statesman* was in favour of asking the League to leave the government if it persisted in boycotting the assembly and warned that the British would not support it if it tried to obstruct the assembly's deliberations (7 December 1946). And when the League Working Committee declared the assembly illegal and invalid on the ground that it was no longer working under the Mission plan, the journal took it as 'of course a concerted move to destroy the whole plan for the realization of India's independence', and asked the Government to fix a date for withdrawal from India and leave the responsibility for reaching or refusing settlement to Indians (8 February 1947).

The 'Grouping' Clause

In a sense the entire Mission plan foundered on the rock of the 'grouping' provision, by which the vote in the sections was to be by majority vote. While accepting the plan, the Congress had read its own interpretation into this provision, viz., that the provinces had the right to decide both as to grouping and as to their own constitution and that therefore the decisions in the sections could not be by simple majority vote. The League questioned this version and finally rejected the plan as this clause was the only concession to its demand for Pakistan. To settle this dispute the British Government invited representative Indian leaders to London in December 1946, and when negotiations failed, produced its own final interpretation, which was the same as the League's. According to Mr Attlee, the Government had legal advice which confirmed that the statement of 16 May meant what the Mission had always said was their intention, viz., that voting in the sections was to be by majority vote. And he realized that from the Muslim point of view the 'grouping' clause was the essential element in the plan, because if the agreement of all the provinces within the section was required to the framing of a constitution (and this was the Congress contention), it was probable that the opposition of some of the smaller provinces would prevent group constitutions being formed.[17] But to this statement the Secretary of State for India added the significant announcement that if the constituent assembly wished to refer this point to the Federal Court of India they could do so. This was strange. Why

was a reference to the Federal Court allowed when the British Government, who were the authors of the Mission plan, had decided that the clause had such and such a meaning and that this meaning must be accepted by all parties? Explaining his stand, the Secretary of State confessed that the Government had mentioned 'this matter of the Federal Court because that was the view expressed by the Congress party'. Lord Simon objected to this procedure on the technical and legal ground that the Federal Court could only be asked to consider a question of law and that only on the request of the Governor-General; the Congress did not have any right to submit this question to the Court and it was not a question of law. Pethick-Lawrence agreed that it was not a question of law and added that the Government would by no means depart from its own interpretation *even if the Federal Court decided otherwise*, but still persisted in allowing the Congress to appeal to the Court if it desired.[18] This did not satisfy Simon, who again expressed his surprise at this concession to the Congress. When the Government had declared what the proposal meant, it was 'next door to idiotic to say: "we will now go to a bench of Judges in order that they may tell us what the Government means" '. It was not a question of construing a contract, or a treaty, or a statute, or a will; it was purely a question of what the Government had said. If it was not stated in clear language, the Government had made it clear now, and the matter ended there. Templewood, who had piloted the 1935 Act through the Parliament and knew it so well, could not conceive how a question of this kind could possibly come within the scope of a court with the powers and privileges of the Federal Court of India.[19] In the House of Commons, Mr R. A. Butler found it an extraordinary procedure under which the Government made a statement itself and then went to a Federal Court to interpret it. It was exactly as if the Government came to the Commons with the King's Speech and then decided to send it to the High Court to find out what they meant by what they had originally said.[20]

Apart from the technical and legal points involved there was the political question of what effect this concession to the Hindus would have on the Muslim climate of opinion in India. Muslims were already alarmed at the Congress views on the status and functions of the constituent assembly. Lord Simon had referred to this aspect of the question in his speech in the Lords, but there was no comment

from the Government. Besides, and as *The Times* pointed out, there was no sustained assertion by the Government that persistence in the Congress interpretation would destroy the whole basis of the scheme and would render the party's acceptance of the plan meaningless from the Muslim point of view (7 December 1946).

During their stay in London the Indian leaders were entertained at a luncheon at Buckingham Palace. The King sat between Nehru and Jinnah, but found the former 'very uncommunicative on any subject'. Jinnah told him 'a great deal'.[21] On 10 December, after the breakdown of the talks, His Majesty saw Mr Attlee and told him that he was greatly worried and 'could see no alternative to Civil War between Hindus and Muslims for which we should be held responsible as we have not enough troops with which to keep order'. The Prime Minister agreed and added that 'Nehru's present policy seemed to be to secure complete domination by Congress throughout the Government of India. The Muslims would never stand for it and would probably fight for Pakistan which the Hindus dislike so much.'[22]

Fixing the Deadline

In the last letter that Wavell wrote to the King as viceroy he had expounded his policy on British withdrawal. In the event of the Cabinet Mission plan breaking down he suggested that four courses were open to the Government: (*a*) to re-establish British power and prestige in India and to rule it for the next fifteen years or so; but Attlee made it clear that this policy was totally unacceptable; (*b*) to make another attempt to bring the parties together; but this involved the recognition of Pakistan and he was not ready for this; (*c*) to support the majority party (the Congress) in establishing its control over all India. This was neither just nor honourable; (*d*) to recognize that the British had failed to arrange a compromise and to withdraw from India.

> This was the policy which I advocated and I recommended the withdrawal of British control by stages, beginning with the south of India, as the safest method of proceeding. (I had put this proposal to a civil and military committee in India in the previous autumn, and they had been unable to recommend to me any better plan.) The date I recommended for final transfer of power was March 31st, 1948. I failed, after many hours of conference, to get any definite policy from Your Majesty's Government. Their

chief difficulty was reluctance to face Parliament with any proposal which would make it clear that we were withdrawing our control very shortly.

The King's official biographer adds, 'His Majesty's Government, however, refused to accept the Viceroy's plan, which they regarded as altogether too precipitate a retreat, but authorized him to prepare secret plans for withdrawal, varying in accordance with the several contingencies in which a breakdown might occur.'[23]

The exact date of this letter is not mentioned, but it must have been early in 1947. Very soon after this, however, the Prime Minister seems to have come round to Wavell's last suggestion[24] and, on 20 February 1947, he announced in the Commons the intention of His Majesty's Government to transfer power 'by a date not later than June 1948'; Wavell had suggested 31 March 1948. The Mission plan had hoped that a fully representative constituent assembly would be able to produce an agreed constitution, said Mr Attlee, but if this was not possible before June 1948, the Government 'will have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government in India should be handed over, on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of central Government for British India or in some areas to the existing Provincial Governments, or in such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people'.[25]

This announcement, said the Secretary of State for India in the Lords, was made as a result of advice received from 'responsible authorities' in India, and was designed to impress on the Indian parties the sincerity of the Government in their promise to transfer power and the urgency of finding a solution of their difficulties. He did not name these 'responsible authorities', but we know that one of them was the Viceroy (whose advice was in fact completely rejected) and the other G. D. Birla, the Hindu millionaire financier of the Congress, who had written to Cripps, on 12 December 1946, that no agreement was possible until the Government made a declaration fixing 'the final date when under all circumstances power will finally be transferred to Indian hands'.[26] In his memoirs and reminiscences, however, Attlee speaks of no such 'advice'. He explains his decision on two grounds. First, the Indian leaders were 'not really keen on responsibility' and therefore he tried to 'bring them right up against it and make them see they'd got to face the situation themselves'. Secondly, the Indian administrative machine

was running down and 'couldn't go on much longer'.[27] But he does not mention another important factor. When offering the viceroyalty to Mountbatten, Attlee had told him that power would be transferred in two years' time. Mountbatten thought this too long a period for him to be away from the Navy and asked Attlee if the job could be done in twelve months. This 'was the maximum time he felt he could spare'. Attlee replied that 'eighteen months would be long enough', and then agreed to arrange further 'compromise' on the time required. It was on this specific understanding that Mountbatten accepted the viceroyalty.[28]

The 'time-limit' speech was not well received by the British press of the Right. *The Times* feared that a rigid time-limit might be no more than 'a self-defeating complication of policy'; it operated regardless of the human factor (21 February 1947). It might seriously affect Indian welfare by obliging Britain to hand over power to an unsettled authority or authorities (6 March 1947). The *Daily Telegraph* described it as a 'reckless folly'. 'Never has such a decision fraught with such terrible possibilities been taken with such apparent disregard of consequences' (21 February 1947). For the *Spectator* the question was whether the gamble was justified, and the Government had not demonstrated that it was (7 March 1947). The *Manchester Guardian* regretted that the position in which the Muslims might be left, 'largely through the fault of their leader', was a 'strain on our profound wish to be impartial to the end' (21 February 1947).

Five days after this announcement was made, the House of Lords debated a motion of Templewood that the decision to withdraw by June 1948 'under conditions which appear to be in conflict with previous declarations of the Government on this subject, and without any provisions for the protection of minorities, or the discharge of their other obligations, is likely to imperil the peace and prosperity of India'. General feeling was that the fixing of so early a date would result in confusion and chaos. On the suggestion of Halifax and the Primate, however, the motion was not put to a division. But spokesmen from the Opposition predicted appalling human misery and civil war, slaughter and bloodshed, chaos and anarchy, 'thanks to soft heads and feeble hands in high places'.[29] Speeches from the Government benches were unrealistic and at times incredibly idealistic. Lord Darwen, for example, mentioned the 'great forces

working for unity in India' which were little known in Britain and referred to the 'very good work' being done in the constituent assembly.[30] The significant thing about this debate was that the speakers on the Treasury benches did not answer the questions raised by the Opposition, sounded dangerously vague about the future, and either had no plans to cope with what might happen—and a great deal happened in fact—or did not want to make them public.

The second announcement made by the Prime Minister on 20 February related to the recall of Wavell. It must be remembered here that Wavell, who was initially popular with the Congress for having refused the League the chance to form the government and for having given it to the Congress, had lately been criticized by the Congress for his refusal to overrule the Muslim ministry in Bengal, when rioting occurred there, irrespective of the constitutional rights of the provincial government. Later, when the League refused to enter the constituent assembly and the Congress insisted on turning the League out of the interim government, Wavell refused to endorse the Congress proposal. This earned him Hindu resentment.[31] Since then the Congress had set its heart on getting rid of him; and in early 1947 Gandhi, who had already privately conveyed to the British Government his opinion that the situation had gone beyond Wavell's control,[32] now cabled Attlee that his removal could not be delayed.[33] Mr Nehru was pleased at Wavell's recall.[34] Attlee has said that he recalled Wavell because of his 'defeatist' mentality. The Viceroy's evacuation plan had revolted him and convinced him that 'Wavell had shot his bolt and that I must find somebody else'.[35]

Two Governors-General or One

During these last days arose the so-called controversy about the governor-generalship of the new Dominions. On 10 July 1947, Mr Attlee declared in the Commons that it had been intimated to the Government that it would be convenient to all concerned to have one governor-general for both the Dominions in the initial stages. For some time the Government had proceeded on this assumption, but now the League had expressed its desire to have a separate governor-general for Pakistan; he regretted this 'change'

and thought that great benefits to the whole continent would have followed from Mountbatten's appointment as head of both the countries.[36] This regret was shared by *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*.

Two points are involved here. First, was there any ground for the British Government to assume that India and Pakistan would have one governor-general? Among the evidence made available so far there is nothing to show that this idea was ever properly discussed. Everyone assumed that it would be so.[37] It might have been in Mountbatten's mind and also conveyed to the Cabinet, but it was not made public. Besides, there was no precedent for a joint governor-generalship in the history of the Commonwealth. It is difficult to read the motive of the Labour Government in suggesting this innovation, and Pakistanis were quick to suspect that this was but an indirect attempt at keeping some sort of unity between the two new Dominions.

Secondly, did the Labour Government seriously expect the Muslims to accept as governor-general a person who had, in their opinion, shown dangerously pro-Hindu predilections? Mountbatten's appointment was greatly welcomed by the Congress and his relations with Nehru were already good.[38] British official circles were well aware of this and Lord Ismay felt that there was a danger of an issue being made of Mountbatten's selection as a pro-Hindu and anti-Muslim appointment.[39] In fact, the new Viceroy's actions substantiated Muslim suspicions. It was to Nehru alone that he showed his plan on 10 May. Nehru was furious and insisted on a substantial modification. Then V. P. Menon was asked to draft a new plan immediately with the Congress objections in view. Such a plan was ready in exactly four hours—two to six p.m. on 21 May 1947. Both Lord Ismay and Sir George Abell opposed the new scheme, but Mountbatten put all his weight behind it and threatened to resign if it was not accepted by the Cabinet.[40] He had his way, and the India-Burma Committee of the Cabinet approved it 'without the alteration of a comma'.[41] Attlee and his Cabinet sanctioned it in a Cabinet meeting which lasted exactly five minutes.[42]

Other instances can be quoted to show that Mountbatten tended to lean towards the Congress rather than the League. On their first meeting on 25 March Mountbatten asked Nehru to give him his own estimate of Jinnah.[43] Jinnah was not asked to give his im-

pression of other leaders. The only Indian who was during this period in the Viceroy's 'complete confidence' was Mr V. P. Menon, a Hindu with pro-Congress views;[44] and he drafted the final plan of transfer of power after Nehru had rejected the Viceroy's scheme. When Jinnah opposed the division of the Punjab and Bengal, Mountbatten told him that 'the feeling invoked in his heart by the prospect of the partition of these Provinces was the feeling invoked *in my heart and the heart of Congress* against the partition of India itself'.[45] In Muslim eyes this was enough to convince them that the Viceroy had completely identified himself with the Hindus. Pakistani feeling about him has been so strong that when his proposal to visit Pakistan in February 1956 as First Sea Lord was announced, there was such an outburst of indignation and anger in Pakistan that the Admiralty had to cancel his programme.[46]

Mountbatten certainly possessed some vital qualifications to be the last viceroy of India. He was from the Royal family, he was an Admiral, and he was reckoned 'leftish'. He was a handsome figure, in line with the British tradition of personable colonial governors. Some foreign observers feel that it was a grave tactical error for Pakistan not to agree to Mountbatten's joint governor-generalship, since anyone else likely to be available would be a 'lower card'. This might be true, but it was impossible in the prevailing temper of opinion in Muslim India in July–August 1947. Jinnah cannot be blamed for having refused the appointment of a person whom he and his people knew to be unsympathetic to their feelings.[47]

The Labour Government and the Muslims

When in July 1945 a Labour Government took office its past history and its leaders' warm friendship with Congress leaders[48] naturally encouraged the Congress,[49] and the *New Statesman* put new heart into such hopes by declaring that if Indians now realized that it was the Labour Government's firm will to reach a settlement, the minorities would understand that nothing further could be gained by obstructive tactics (22 September 1945). The *Round Table* felt apprehensive lest the Government be tempted to go too far in yielding to the claims of the Congress, 'representing chiefly the Hindu middle class', and thus precipitate a conflict with the Muslims.[50] *The Times*' India correspondent also foresaw that the Congress was

going to exert heavy pressure on the Government to decide the communal issue in their favour.[51] It is relevant to recapitulate here the policies and decisions of the Labour Government and to see how far these fears materialized.

In his first pronouncement on India as Prime Minister, Mr Attlee made it clear that 'we cannot allow a minority to place a veto on the advance of the majority'.[52] Hindu India was especially pleased with this point; it had in fact been angling for such an assurance since the Simla Conference, and some Congress newspapers inferred that Britain had made up its mind to by-pass the Muslims if no other means were left to India for an immediate political advance.[53] We have already seen that the Cabinet Mission plan was highly critical of the Pakistan scheme, and even the *Manchester Guardian*'s correspondent conceded that the plan was nearer the Congress point of view than the League's (20 May 1946). The most serious step taken by the Government was the installation of the Congress Government in India in September 1946; in doing so Attlee had overruled the Viceroy. Later, when Mr Nehru made some provocative speeches about the sovereignty of the constituent assembly, which went far in making the League adamant on its Pakistan plan, the Secretary of State for India took no notice of their grave implications but dismissed them as a political rejoinder to some 'very provocative' speeches made earlier in the House of Commons.[54] The Government also showed its partiality to the Congress in the 'grouping clause' controversy, and, in face of stiff opposition in Parliament, insisted on allowing the Congress to approach the Federal Court for a decision on the interpretation of the clause.

The Instrument of Instructions issued to the new Viceroy, and partly drafted by himself, contained two points which cut at the root of the Muslim demand. The first instruction made it clear that the 'definite objective of the British Government is to obtain a unitary government for British India and the Indian States', and the fifth laid down that the Indian leaders had to be told to avoid a break in the continuity of the Indian Army and the transfer of power was to be in accordance with defence requirements.[55]

One other thing must be noticed here. All the major official inquiries into India had been constituted of all political parties in Britain. The Simon Commission was an all-parties investigation, so was the Round Table Conference and so was the Joint Select Com-

mittee. But the Cabinet Mission was the first such inquiring body whose personnel was confined to the party in power. Thus while in 1927, 1930 and 1934 India was negotiating with Britain as a whole, in 1946—which turned out to be the most momentous occasion—India was discussing with the Labour Government alone.

British Opinion in the Final Phase

Before 1945 the usual argument of those who disagreed with the Muslim case was that the Muslim League was unrepresentative and that a majority of Muslims did not want Pakistan. No such reasoning was possible after the elections of 1945–6 in which the League swept the board. And one would have assumed with considerable plausibility that in 1946–7 a larger section of opinion would support the Muslim case for freedom. What we find, instead, is a no less widespread criticism of the Pakistan idea coupled with equally strong support for the Congress slogan of a united India.

All shades of political opinion, from the extreme Right to the extreme Left, contributed their share of strictures against the Muslim cause.

To take the Right first, the *Daily Telegraph* regretted the British decision to divide India (4 June 1947). As late as 31 May 1947, *The Times* made a plea for a united India and, in case partition did take place, for a united army and some sort of 'political integration'. The *Round Table* insisted that the British Government could not in any case adopt the Pakistan plan as a practical policy.[56] In the Commons, Mr Godfrey Nicholson and Sir John Anderson (later Viscount Waverley) spoke against the Pakistan solution.[57] Others characterized the June 3 plan as lamentable and destructive.[58]

Among the Liberals, the *Manchester Guardian* realized that the idea of partition was obnoxious to most British people (20 February 1946). They asked for immediate transfer of power to Nehru and hoped that the Congress would not abuse the power (24 February 1947). In May, when Pakistan looked inevitable, it declared that any decision whether to divide India or not rested neither with the Viceroy nor with the Cabinet but with Nehru, and that if Nehru agreed with it, 'we must accept his judgment and give him all the support we can' (3 May 1947). But three weeks later it again called for a transfer of power to 'Nehru's Government' leaving it 'to

Nehru to settle with the Muslim League the question of partition or no partition' (21 May 1947).

The Left was more dogmatic. The *New Statesman* referred to Jinnah as one 'who wishes to make himself leader of all Indian Muslims' (29 June 1946) and alleged that he wanted to delay any settlement in the hope of Mr Churchill's return to power (11 January 1947). Brailsford favoured the handing over of all power to the Congress, who would then win the support of the Muslims by offering the presidency of the constituent assembly to the 'ageing and ambitious' Jinnah. The creation of Pakistan he took to be a reactionary step implying a reversion to some medieval conception of theocracy.[59] Mr Sorenson characterized the two-nation theory as a conception leading to 'theocratic totalitarianism'.[60] To Mr Cove the Muslim League was a project of British imperialism designed for the purpose of stirring up communal differences.[61] Mr Wyatt argued for an immediate withdrawal and the transfer of all power to Nehru on the ground that if favour were shown to the Muslims the Hindus would be ranged bitterly against Britain for all time.[62]

The Communists made common cause with Labour. Mr Gallacher asked for a transfer of power to the Congress, and when Earl Winterton intervened to ask, 'What about the Muslims?', answered, 'There was a majority at the General Elections, and the Labour Party set up a Government. What about the Tories?'[63]

To get at the bottom of this anti-Pakistan, or rather pro-united India, sentiment we must try to study the British mind and its peculiarities. To the British perhaps the issue appeared not as between Hindus and Muslims but as between one British sentiment and another. As a nation they knew nothing about India or about Muslims. But decisions on India got caught up in British decisions, and Hindus understood better than Muslims how to follow and manipulate British decisions and policies. And we must remember the *images* in which the British public thinks: was it not a good thing to unite Quebec and Ontario? Was it not a bad thing to get involved in the partition of Ireland? This certainly does not mean that the British would dream of uniting themselves with, say, the Germans, but in principle they seem to like the idea of 'rising above' nationality, even if the pursuit of this principle sometimes exposes them to the righteous wrath of ardent foreign nationalists.

That is why there was, in opposition to the prevailing anti-

Pakistan sentiment, no corresponding section of opinion that supported the Muslim cause or sought to justify the Muslim stand.

Regrets at the Emergence of Pakistan

Perhaps nothing shows so well the British failure to understand the Muslim sentiment as the universal feeling of regret expressed at the emergence of Pakistan and the frequently voiced hope of its future merger with the Indian Union.

Before studying these expressions in detail, it is pertinent to remember that they were identical with what the Hindus and the Congress were then saying. The All India Congress Committee's resolution of 14 July 1947, which accepted the partition plan, hoped that when the current passions had subsided India would again be united and one.[64] On Independence Day Gandhi declared that the time would come when the partition would be undone.[65] Menon, the creator of the final partition plan, himself thought that partition was certainly not intended to stand for all time.[66]

Directly or indirectly, this general Hindu feeling was echoed in Britain by most of those who took an interest in Indian affairs. *The Times* welcomed Pakistan as a leading State of the Muslim world, but dropped a thinly disguised hint that some sort of unity with India would be looked forward to (15 August 1947). The *Manchester Guardian* hoped that partition would result in so many 'inconveniences and dislocations' that experience of them would lead to reunion, and that the Pathans would certainly prefer to federate with Hindustan because she had more money to relieve their poverty (5 June 1947).

Halifax looked forward with nostalgia to hope of a united Bengal and a united Punjab by the Muslims leading to an ultimate reunion of India.[67] Sir Alfred Watson trusted that partition would not endure and cherished the hope of one day seeing New Delhi as the throbbing heart of a united India.[68] Lord Ismay had similar thoughts on Indian Independence Day.[69] There was a full debate on India during the second reading of the Indian Independence Bill on 10 July 1947, in which a general undercurrent of regret and sorrow was visible. Mr Attlee hoped that this severance would not endure and the two Dominions would come together again. Mr Macmillan associated himself with these sentiments, and Mr Richardson and Mr Sorenson

followed suit. Cripps was sad because the Government had not been able to present a bill setting up a united India; Mr Butler consoled him by holding out the hope that as history developed the conception of a greater whole would arise; and Mr Attlee, Mr Hugh Molson, Lord John Hope and Sir Stanley Reed shared Cripps's regret and Butler's optimism.[70] In the Lords, the Secretary of State for India, Lord Listowel, hoped that when the disadvantages of separation had become apparent, the two Dominions would 'decide to reunite in a single Indian Dominion'; Templewood prayed that his hopes of a united India were not irrevocably repudiated but only deferred to a future date; and Lords Samuel, Pethick-Lawrence and Salisbury prayed with him.[71]

It is perhaps important to remember that at the time when these sentiments were being voiced the British leaders were also asking and hoping that Pakistan would stay within the Commonwealth. It is also important to remember that these sentiments implied the desire to see the Muslims always living under a permanent Hindu majority in a united India.

12: *Britain and Muslim India*

It was the spirit of Hindu revivalism in the Congress, more than anything else, that persuaded the Muslims to travel in the direction of separatism. They wanted a separate state of their own in which their culture could flourish, their ideals could be realized and their traditions could be upheld. Before they came to formulate the policy of separation so markedly, they still felt themselves to be distinct from other Indian peoples and therefore made demands not usually associated with ordinary minorities. Gradually the cleavage, which might have begun as mere religious antagonism, developed into such a rift as to constitute within the body politic of India two distinct nationalities. Geography and race did not neatly define them, but the moral and spiritual attributes and the historical antecedents of the two groups were so diverse as to create an impassable barrier between their members. In the Orient religion sinks deep into the hearts of men, because it puts before them not only a *summum bonum* but also a philosophy of life and a standard of conduct which mould their thought and action to an extent which is often not realized by a Western mind.

Still the Western mind, or rather more specifically the British mind, made an effort to study the religious politics of India. In doing so it was well placed as compared to other European minds, because it had been trained in Empire building, in contact with the proverbially inscrutable East, in the knowledge that a failure to understand Asia might lead to loss of world-wide supremacy, and in the classical studies which teach curiosity as much as perseverance (it was not a coincidence that many British politicians and most Anglo-Indians took degrees in classics at Oxford and Cambridge). Armed with these formidable weapons and a national flair for adventure the Englishman set forth to discover India and to understand 'what made it tick'. But serious snags appeared. Religion had lost its hold in the West by the time India came into prominence

in British politics. The British knew the Muslim well. His forefathers had fought him in the Crusades. A part of Europe had been under Muslim sway for centuries. Muslim culture and learning were held in respect and admiration in British academic circles. But the Hindu was a new factor. He was confined to India, and some Englishmen found Hinduism less attractive than Islam. But the Hindu was important. He formed a majority in India and one day, no matter how distant, Britain would have to hand over her great Indian Empire to him. The British and the Muslims shared many characteristics, but the Muslim was only a minority and minorities could be a nuisance. There was still another cross-current. Islam was potentially a world power and therefore a future rival of British world supremacy. It might be tactful to keep on good terms with it, but at the same time it should not be encouraged too much. Pan-Islamism has always been a fearful bogy in the West.

Party politics played a very significant part in the British approach to India. If we study British feeling about Muslim India, we find that sympathy progressively decreases as we travel from the Right to the Left in politics. To illustrate this we must briefly recapitulate here the attitudes of the three main groups in British politics, with a short reference to the Communists. But instead of dealing with them in the orthodox way, that is, under the heads of Conservatives, Liberals and Labour, the three broad sections of opinion will be called the Right, the Centre and the Left. It is true that these divisions in British politics are divisions on domestic policy, particularly economic policy, and do not necessarily correspond to the divisions on colonial and foreign affairs. Nevertheless, there was a fair measure of agreement among the supporters of the Right on Indian questions, and also among supporters of the Left. Among supporters of the Centre, that is, Liberals and radicals, there was a good deal of disagreement due, in the earlier period, to the different opinions within the group, and in the later period to the irresponsibility which comes with the knowledge that the party would never be called upon to rule the country. The great advantage of this method is that it will enable us to bring under each head the opinions of not only the political party proper but also of other individuals and groups who do not carry the same party label but share the same views.

The Right

The British Right had always had a soft spot for minorities, a firm reluctance to let the Empire go and a strong belief in the British mission in the East. These ingredients obviously contributed to a character which is averse to violence in the colonies, yet ready to use a strong hand against sedition. That is one reason why the Right was generally friendly to the Muslims. They never took part in violence, sedition or unrest (except during the short Khilafat period); their policy since the days of Sayyid Ahmad was to be loyal and dependable so that they should be protected against the Hindu majority. On the whole this policy paid dividends. It was a comfort to know that the powerful rulers smiled at their co-operation. The myth of Muslim loyalty was as dear to the Right as to the Indian Muslim. It made the Right more sympathetic to Muslim aspirations than any other British group, with the result that it supported the partition of Bengal, demanded a firm hand to put down the Hindu unrest, condemned the repeal of partition and argued in favour of separate electorates. For doing so it was accused by other groups as well as by the Hindus of being reactionary, retrograde and 'imperialistic'.

Five factors seemed to have helped to form this 'pro-Muslim' policy of the Right. First, most of the publicists of the Right seemed to find more in common between themselves and Islam as a religion than between themselves and Hinduism. They pointed to the similarities in Christian and Islamic teachings, to the facts that Islam had taught reverence to Christ and sanctioned marriage with Christians, to the ease with which Muslims mixed with Europeans, to the absence of a caste system in Islam and to the debt which Western culture and civilization owed to Muslim learning. Secondly, they realized that Muslims were spread throughout the world, that Britain, as a leading world power, should not offend a part of them found in India and that a policy of friendship with all Islamic lands would be ultimately better for Britain than one of strained relations. This could be called imperialism, but it was also good diplomacy, and it furthered British interests. This policy was pursued for long, and involved a war with Russia to save Turkey and opposition to the Ottoman Empire to protect the Arabs. A third reason was the imperialism common to the British and the Muslims. Islam had

come to India as a conquering power and had carved a glorious empire out of this Hindu land. Britain had succeeded it as the imperial overlord. The two peoples could meet on an equal footing; both were rulers, though one had replaced the other. The Hindu had no place at this table; he had only changed his masters. And if the Muslim had lost his hold on India, he could still point to his past glories and to the then existing Ottoman Empire. Imperialism is a strong bond, so long as there is no rivalry; and there was no rivalry in this case. In the fourth place, there was the myth of the loyal Musalman, the dependable warrior, the martial race, whom Britain could not afford to alienate if the hilly borders of India were to be effectively garrisoned. No other part of India has appealed more to the romantic side of British imagination than the North-West Frontier. It was peopled by Muslims. Further, they were in a majority throughout the north-west of the sub-continent. The most vulnerable frontiers, which had been stormed by waves of invaders in history, lay in this area and had to be manned with the natural fighters of the place. And thus it was the Musalmans who came to be the Wardens of the Marches.

The final, and perhaps the most important, reason for the attitude of the Right was their better knowledge of India. They were better informed about India than any other group because they included a huge majority of the Anglo-Indians, people who had spent their working life in the service of India. They had known India at first hand and claimed to base their views on personal knowledge and intimate contact rather than on books of reference and short Indian tours. Palmerston used to say that when he wanted to be misinformed about a country he called in somebody who had spent thirty years there. And the Left usually capped the phrase 'he knew India well' by the phrase 'he knew India only as an administrator'. But this is unfair. The Indian civilian rarely reached the governorship and, even when he did, he had first spent between twenty and thirty years in the district. Here he lived in close communion with the peasant and the farmer. He observed his way of life, tackled his problems, heard his grievances and maintained law and order. To his district he was the *mai bap*, the mother and the father of the people. When such a man returned to Britain to claim that he knew India better than those who had never been there or, what is worse, had taken a few weeks' tour of it, he had ample justification for his

claim. And generally he was right in his facts. To take an example, the existence or otherwise of serious Hindu-Muslim trouble in India was a perennial point of controversy in Britain. The Centre and the Left generally insisted that there was no serious trouble and that reports were grossly exaggerated. Keir Hardie, Henry Nevinson, Dr Rutherford, Lord Samuel—all went to India on short tours and all brought the news that communal trouble was either a figment of imperialist imagination or much less serious than was popularly thought. But the Anglo-Indians were always complaining of increasingly bitter communalism and recounting incidents of grave import. Facts supported the Anglo-Indians here, and they could prove it by Indian newspapers and official reports. It may be that at times they exaggerated their own importance, but strong evidence to the contrary is needed, and is not available, to prove that they distorted facts or betrayed ignorance.

The fact that towards the end of the British rule the Right were, in spite of their traditional sympathy, opposed to the creation of Pakistan is also explained by the preponderance of Anglo-Indians in it. The administrators of India did not like India to be disrupted and divided. Governors had ruled provinces as units, engineers had constructed dams and railways which cut across provincial boundaries, and generals had commanded mixed army units. It hurt their administrative 'conscience' to see that all this was now to be put asunder. Provinces were to be divided, railways to be partitioned, river waters to be distributed, regiments to be cut up on communal basis. This was too much for those who had seen India as one, helped it to become one and administered it as one whole. Hence their strong opposition to the Pakistan scheme and hence the fact that the Right joined with the Centre and the Left in regretting the emergence of Pakistan in 1947.

The Centre

Early Whigs, like Lord John Russell and the third Earl Grey, were imperialists and in this stood well to the Right of their Liberal supporters. They considered the maintenance of colonial connections a bounden duty aimed at reclaiming the backward peoples from barbarism. Though the Whigs joined with other Liberals in opposing Disraeli's plan to make Queen Victoria Empress of India, yet

there was no substance in the controversy. It was not until later that a serious divergence developed between Liberal and Conservative attitudes to India.

The attitude of the Centre was a middle way between those of the Right and the Left. It upheld the partition of Bengal in face of severe criticism from its own radical wing, and it conceded separate electorates to Muslims though against Morley's personal inclination. But it was also a Liberal administration which annulled the partition of Bengal in 1911 and again a Liberal Prime Minister who forced Montagu's resignation in 1922. Herbert (later Lord) Samuel, an important Liberal leader, visited India in the winter of 1937–8, met Hindu leaders and attended the annual Congress session, and on his return broadcast a talk on India on the B.B.C. and wrote three articles for the *Spectator*, without mentioning anything about the Muslim problem.[1] Liberals as a whole were opposed to the Pakistan scheme and Lord Samuel, speaking as their leader in the Lords in 1946, declared that his party wholeheartedly agreed with the Indian policy of the Labour Government.[2]

As was said earlier, the Centre was probably more divided on its Indian policy than the other two groups. This internal difference of opinion can be illustrated by comparing Sir Henry Cotton with Sir John Rees. Both were Anglo-Indians; both had reached the highest place within the reach of an Indian civilian; both had spent more than thirty years in India; and both were elected to Parliament on the Liberal ticket. But on India their opinions were poles apart. Cotton condemned the partition of Bengal, Rees stoutly defended it; one admired the Hindu agitation against it and favoured concessions, the other hated violent sedition and argued for strong measures; one pleaded with Morley not to concede separate representation to Muslims, the other repeatedly spoke in defence of the Muslim claim; one rejoiced at the repeal of partition, the other castigated the decision. Cotton was not merely sympathetic to the Congress, but actually presided over one of its annual sessions; Rees was a bitter critic of Congress and dismissed it as a rowdy, unrepresentative clique. Similar opposing attitudes within the party can be discovered in later periods. Cotton was succeeded by men like Lloyd George and Lord Samuel, Rees by men like Lord Meston and Professor Coatman.

For many years now the Liberal Party has been ineffective as a

political power and therefore less vocal on India; but a good idea of Liberal, or liberal (in one word Centre), views on India can be gained by looking at the policy of the *Manchester Guardian* in this period. But it must be remembered that this paper reflected not so much the opinion of the main group as that of its radical wing. In fact, most of its pronouncements on India would have met with the approval of the Left.

The paper was firm in opposing the partition of Bengal, supporting the agitation against it, refusing to believe that Muslims were against the agitation, denying separate electorates to Muslims, and welcoming the revocation of the partition. It echoed the Hindu opinion that Hindu-Muslim riots were due to the presence of a foreign power in India and agreed with it on the necessity of abolishing separate electorates. Though highly critical of Lloyd George's Turkish policy, it never came out openly in support of the demands of the Khilafatists. At the death of Ameer Ali in 1928, it wrote an obituary notice in which sarcastic references were made to his membership of the Reform Club and to his 'un-progressive' views 'except in those matters in which his community happened to be intimately concerned'; he was condemned for what the paper chose to call his 'sectional' outlook (6 August 1928). It repeatedly welcomed Nehru's programme of mass contact among Muslims and prayed for its success (23 September 1937) and supported the Congress demand for a constituent assembly.[3] In 1942 it strongly opposed the Pakistan scheme and condemned that part of the Cripps offer which permitted provinces to opt out of the proposed Indian Union. In 1944 it put all the blame for the failure of Gandhi-Jinnah talks on Jinnah, and from that date till 1947 called again and again for British withdrawal from India leaving the Congress in power. Welcoming the formation of the Congress interim government in September 1946, it advocated immediate withdrawal with rejection of the Pakistan scheme even if 'we shall be accused of having abandoned the Muslims to the mercy of Hindu majority' (24 February 1947).

Besides its editorials, the journal also showed bias in the selection and placing of Indian news. In 1922 its correspondent reported, confessedly relying on Hindu information, that Muslims would co-operate with the Hindus in a 'national' struggle whether the Turkish question was settled or not (10 June 1922). In February 1946

Calcutta witnessed disorders over an 'Indian National Army' official who had been sent to prison for seven years. It published Reuter's dispatch on page five, in which there was not a word as to which party had instigated the disturbances; but on the next page it published its own correspondent's report with the double-column headline: 'The Disorders in Calcutta: Muslim League Responsibility', in which after saying that the League had initiated the organization of demonstrations he reported that the demonstrators had included both League and Congress participants (14 February 1946). Later when the Congress and the League were examining the Cabinet Mission plan and neither had as yet given an answer, it published a dispatch from its correspondent on the back page with the headline: 'Mr Jinnah's Dilatoriness', and the report opened with the sentence, 'There is some impatience in the Congress circles at the indulgence shown to Mr Jinnah's dilatory tactics' (24 May 1946). Then the paper also sometimes published hearsay or rumours as news. For example, during the 1945–6 elections, in which the League won every single seat in the centre and an overwhelming majority in the provinces, its Delhi correspondent wrote that the League candidates were meeting with stiff opposition in certain constituencies (27 November 1945); again during the Cabinet Mission's negotiations it repeatedly referred to internal disunity in the League and the opposition of some unnamed top leaders to Jinnah's opinions (e.g. 15 May 1946). Moreover the paper's own knowledge of Muslim India was faulty. When the Viceroy invited fourteen leaders to form a government in 1946, it published Liaqat Ali Khan's name as 'Liaqat Hayat Khan' (17 June 1946); the latter was a different person and was not invited. The mistake was never corrected, perhaps never discovered. Sometimes the paper invented headlines which had no relation to the matter printed under them. For instance, on 17 August 1946, it carried a dispatch under the title, 'Mr Jinnah Stirs up the Muslims', but the report contained nothing about Jinnah saying anything. A recent example of its ignorance is an article on Pakistan by Taya Zinkin, published in the issue of 7 January 1955, in which the author, who was then working as a correspondent in Pakistan, made the startling statement: 'At first everybody even Mr Jinnah was in the Congress . . . In 1939 the Muslim League split off and began to agitate for Pakistan.'

The Left

It has been said that the British Left had much sympathy with India's demand for freedom, but 'considerably less understanding of the more complex and debatable question of Muslim nationalism'.[4] It has also been realized that the left-wing writers usually favoured the Congress.[5] How far was this true?

If we make a chronological study of the attitude of the Left towards Muslim India we find that it was generally unfriendly to her demands and aspirations. In all cases of Hindu-Muslim differences the Left has been critical of the Muslim position. It opposed the partition of Bengal, encouraged the Hindu agitation against it, persisted in its declaration that Muslims were also against the partition, hinted that the League was established at British official instigation, condemned the Muslim demand for separate representation, alleged that the Simla deputation had been officially engineered, and welcomed the repeal of the partition of Bengal. In 1921 a Hindu publisher of Madras issued H. M. Hyndman's *The Truth About India*, which omitted all reference to the Muslim issue and to the Khilafat question. Next year the Labour Publishing Company of London published Wilfred Wellock's *India's Awakening: Its National Significance*, which again was silent about Muslim India. Lord Olivier, once the Labour Secretary of State for India, was opposed to a Muslim electorate and was of the opinion that British officials in India encouraged riots and aided the Muslims. During the period of bloody riots of 1922–7, Josiah Wedgwood dismissed the whole affair as mere 'cutting of the wisdom teeth' and Ramsay MacDonald believed that Hindu-Muslim differences were 'steadily being bridged'.[6] In 1926 the Pethick-Lawrences visited India, met Tagore ('it was a great privilege') and saw Gandhi ('it was inspiring'); there is no mention of any meeting with a Muslim leader, but the visit 'led to a much better understanding of the political aspirations of the Indian people'.[7] In 1927 Fenner Brockway went to India as an I.L.P. fraternal delegate to the Congress and the Indian T.U.C. He saw Jinnah and found that 'the main motive of his nationalism was pride' and felt that 'in any social crisis Jinnah would stand with the ruling class rather than with the Indian masses, and would use the Muslim issue to divide the masses'. Jinnah was only an 'opportunist', while Ajmal Khan, Zakir Husain and Azad were the 'cream

of the Muslim intelligentsia'.[8] In 1932 was published the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, carrying the article on 'Indian Question' by H. N. Brailsford, in which he not only gave a partisan picture of the situation but also stated, incorrectly, that Morley had undone the partition of Bengal.[9] Till 1945 the Left stubbornly refused to admit that Jinnah represented a majority of Muslims; and even when the League won a brilliant victory in the elections of that year, one of its foremost publicists accused the League of having succeeded 'by violence, bribery and intimidation' and declared that election results were no index to Muslim wishes on Pakistan.[10] At the creation of Pakistan the Left was the foremost among those who regretted the event and hoped for re-unification.

In October 1947, faced with unprecedented strife and killing, the Pakistan Government appealed for aid and advice to Britain and the Dominions. It asked the Governments to consider ways and means of ensuring the safety of millions of refugees who were leaving or entering Pakistan. The reply of the British Cabinet was so coldly phrased that it sounded like a snub.[11] In January 1959, in a television interview, Lord Attlee did not conceal his intense dislike for Jinnah, whom he called a hanger-on of the Congress, a proud dandy and far from a good Muslim.[12] There was no doubt that after 1947 the Labour Party continued to praise India and ignore or damn Pakistan.[13] First Mountbatten tried to become Governor-General of Pakistan, and when this attempt failed he was allowed by the Cabinet to stay on as Governor-General of India. In the eyes of the Pakistanis he was closely associated with the Hyderabad 'police action' and the Kashmir war. While he was accepting Kashmir's accession to India and thus enabling Indian soldiers to land in Kashmir, he was also serving as the 'neutral' Chairman of the Indo-Pakistan Joint Defence Council. Pakistan felt the same when Sir Claude Auchinleck was forced to resign as Supreme Commander and leave India before military assets could be equitably divided. The policy of the Labour Government was responsible for the alienation of Pakistan from Britain during its early years,[14] and no confidence was restored between the two countries till the advent of a Conservative administration in 1951.

American Pressure on British Opinion

There was one thing common in the leftist policy on Muslim India and the American attitude to Muslim nationalism: both were indifferent to, and ill informed about, the Muslim position. In 1942 Muslims were perturbed by the amount of pressure being put upon Britain by the United States to concede Hindu demands; it was feared that this might result in a British attempt to impose a settlement which would take less account of Muslim interests than of the expediency of appeasing the Congress in the presumed interest of the Allied war effort. Churchill was being pressed by Roosevelt, but he felt that the Americans were not sufficiently familiar with the Muslim problem involved in giving India freedom.[15]

Innumerable examples can be given to show American ignorance and indifference in this field.[16] Repeated American references to the Indian problem and the accompanying pressure on Britain did not, of course, please the British. At times this sort of advice was distinctly unpleasant and some in Britain were cut to the quick. When, for example, in 1931, Gandhi asked the Viceroy for an independent inquiry into the alleged police 'excesses', an American suggested that this inquiry be made by a commission consisting of foreign members. *The Times* angrily commented, 'The ingenious inventor of the scheme does not state what American opinion would say if a British journalist, visiting the U.S., proposed an international inquiry into the lynching in South Carolina' (24 February 1931).[17] Stung by American reaction in general and Walter Lippmann's remarks in particular, the *Manchester Guardian* wrote a long strong-worded leader, comparing British 'imperialism' with American 'overlordship' of the Philippines, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Britain, it said, was not quite sure about the 'morality of recent manifestations of American interest in some other territories'. The tradition of white supremacy so widely maintained in America was not so fine a humanitarian expression as the trusteeship of dependent peoples and their preparation for self-government. The word 'liquidation', so much advocated by the Americans, was a horrid word with a totalitarian smack; Lippmann should rest assured that the British Empire was not any less liberal than the United States (16 March 1946).

What is interesting in this Anglo-American debate is that the

British Centre and Left rallied to the defence of British 'imperialism'. The Liberal answer was given by the *Manchester Guardian*. The Socialist retort came from two of its best-known journalists. Henry Polak, who had so far devoted himself to criticizing the Government for its 'repressive' Indian policy, now regretted that Americans learnt much of what they knew of the Indian nationalist movement and of Indo-British relations from sources unfriendly to Britain. Perhaps unconscious of the fact that he was condemning his own Congress friends, he alleged that Indians who had moulded American public opinion had been as a rule, 'the victims of events and emotions', had lost their balance of judgment and had given the Americans a distorted picture.[18] The most withering attack on American ignorance came from Edward Thompson who, in a series of five articles in *The Times*, took as text some well-known American books on India and exposed the mis-statements and falsehoods contained in them.[19] All his points were probably correct and he was justified in making them, but he omitted to mention two things. First, he did not say that he himself was as much opposed to official policy as his American victims and equally prepared to concede most Congress demands. Secondly, he was unaware of the contradiction in his stand. His own opinions on India were, as far as Muslim nationalism was concerned, as distorted and partisan as those of the Americans. Both suffered from the same defects—incorrect information, indifference to Muslim problems, misreading of the history of Indian nationalism, insufficient knowledge of Muslim India, and a reluctance to recognize the existence of any Hindu-Muslim problem in India.[20]

Reflections on the Leftist Attitude

It may not be possible to explain fully the attitude adopted by the Left, and in particular by the Labour Party to the Muslim problem. But we can contemplate and examine some theories.

It has been suggested that the unsympathetic policy of the Left arose out of its dislike of mixing religion with politics: that Liberals and Socialists do not want to see political moves based on religious considerations or nationalism sustained by faith. But this is hardly convincing. Of course, Laski's outbursts during the Round Table Conference can be explained by his abhorrence of the influence of

religion on any human activity. He did not believe in the value of faith; he extolled Proudhon because he was 'clear-headed, far-sighted, anti-religious'; he did not believe in intuition or metaphysics and the idea of reaching truth through intuition was to him not merely nonsense but dangerous nonsense. He liked Upton Sinclair's *The Profits of Religion* and enjoyed its strictures on 'the great mission of Christianity and the nonsense of that kind'; he considered religion to be more harmful to civilization than any other single factor in history. He was incapable of seeing that the poetic exposition of experience was *per se* more valid than anything factual and he refused to believe that he could learn more from Wordsworth's *Prelude*, which he could not read, than from *Tom Jones*.[21] Obviously such a mind cannot find anything appealing or captivating in personal faith; for religion and poetry meet at the summit: both are manifestations of the eternal human urge towards truth. Still, this theory would not do, and that for two reasons. Laski's approach to religion, and deductively to the Muslims of India, was not typical of his party; no other leftist of any importance is on record as having rejected religion in such clear and final terms. On the other hand, the Labour Party has been on the whole crypto-religious; that is why theosophy was one of the many religious ingredients of leftism at the end of the last century, and that was partly why it took to Gandhi. What is still more important, the Congress, which was generally supported by the entire Left, was itself a deeply religious movement. Annie Besant had asserted that the foundation of Indian nationality was indestructibly laid on the records of Ram Chandra, the Hindu hero-king of the *Ramayana*, and other ancient sages and warriors, and had congratulated Chirol on having accurately seen the truth that the national revival was born of the Hindu revival.[22] If the Left objected to the Muslim ideals because they were grounded on Islam, it could with equal logic and fairness have condemned the Congress as founded on Hinduism. But it did not, and therefore this theory will not do.

The Left has always supported the majority against the minority in colonial politics. In India it supported the Hindus, in Ireland the Roman Catholics and in Cyprus the Greeks. This solicitude for the majority may be defended by the party itself on a purely democratic principle, but it is difficult to see the validity of its indiscriminate application to all cases. Lord Attlee himself once wrote that between

Hindus and Muslims racial and religious distinctions were 'so deep and far reaching that one may say that two separate peoples are inhabiting the same country'.[23] But his party did not believe this, nor did he himself; and both continued to insist right up to the end that Indian disunity was only an artificial thing. Or the party's support to the majority may be defended on the principle of sheer political expediency. It is better to be on the winning side, and the majority has always a better chance of winning. It is good politics. Whether it is justice or not is another question.

Another reason for the Left's support of the Congress and the Hindus may lie in the impression that the latter were socially and professionally closer to the British working classes than were the Muslims. There were more industrial workers, small traders and petty civil servants among the Hindus than among the Muslims; the latter predominated in the army and the civil services—the foreigner, at any rate, always considered the Muslims a martial race and hardly anything else. So far the argument is at least plausible. But it breaks down when it is recalled that nearly ninety per cent of all Indians worked on the land, and that to discriminate between Hindu city-dwellers and Muslim city-dwellers was not only artificial but absurd. Almost all Indians were peasants, and the Labour Party or any other leftist organization in Britain was not an agrarian group, nor could it understand the problems of the Indian agricultural workers. It is true that a number of Indian trade union officials attended the Labour Party annual conferences, but they represented hardly more than five per cent of India; to support them might have been a gesture of international Socialist solidarity, but it certainly did not mean supporting India.

A more feasible theory could be that the Left exaggerated the influence in the Congress of its Socialist-minded leaders and therefore considered it a duty to give it aid and comfort. The *Labour Leader* once wildly claimed that 'before Britain went to India the land and its products were communally owned '(15 December 1911); a statement which has no historical basis. Fenner Brockway once admitted that his party did not identify the Congress with the Indian Labour movement, but pointed out that Nehru was leader of the Congress as well as chairman of the Indian T.U.C. and that the 'mass feeling of the industrial workers is almost passionately supporting the Congress'.[24] He omitted to mention that Joshi and

Shiva Rao, both accredited representatives of the trade unions, were coming to the Round Table Conference, while the Congress had boycotted it. When later it was feared that the Congress might have nothing to do with the Act of 1935, the *New Statesman* assured its readers that as such a decision would mean that new India would be controlled entirely by the Right, the Congress would not allow this and would therefore co-operate (1 June 1935). At the time of the 1942 rebellion, one Labour M.P. openly stated that the Committee of Congress were Socialists, 'some of them are extreme Socialists'.[25] But the fact is that the Congress was not a Socialist body and did not adopt Socialism as its official policy till after 1947. Nehru was a Socialist, and for some time had even Communist views, but his personal opinions could not make the Congress an Indian counterpart of the British Labour Party. On the other hand, in 1937, the *New Statesman* correspondent reported that the Congress was predominantly right-wing in tendency, that India was by no means ripe for Socialism and that some of her leaders disliked what seemed to them a Western infiltration (23 October 1937). This makes nonsense of the idea that the Congress was a Socialist party and therefore entitled to the British Left's sympathy. If there was any element in Indian population which was poor, downtrodden and deserving of support, it was the Muslims. What actually happened, however, was the amusing paradox of the richest Indian element being backed by the workers' party of Britain[26] and the poorest segment getting all the support they could muster from the rich Tory group.

Party rivalry may also have contributed something to the Left's outspoken defence of the Hindus. The Right were believed to be pro-Muslim, therefore the Socialists had no option but to support the other party. It is a neat theory but, like all neat theories, does not fit the facts. In the first place, the Right's support to the Muslims was not a fraction of what the Left was doing for the Hindus. Not a single politician of the Right is on record as having ever attended a Muslim League meeting, not to speak of presiding over it, or having been on friendly terms with any Muslim leaders, or having sent encouraging messages to Muslim India, or having invited Muslim representatives to its annual conferences. Secondly, the leftist support to the Hindus preceded the rightist support to the Muslims. Extreme radicals and would-be Socialists had started supporting the Congress

towards the last quarter of the nineteenth century, nearly thirty years before the Tories were to defend the Muslims. It would, therefore, be nearer the truth to say that the Right was pro-Muslim because the Left was pro-Hindu than to say that the Left supported the Hindus because it found the Right supporting the Muslims. It follows logically that the usual leftist claim that Tories divided and ruled is historically incorrect. It was the Left which began the unfortunate and tragic sequence of dividing the Indians into two religious-cum-political groups and sympathizing with one of them.

There is no doubt that the Congress had a formidable propaganda machinery in Britain almost since its inception. Bright and Bradlaugh blessed it; Wedderburn and Hume presided over it; Digby and Yule represented it in Britain; Hardie and MacDonald defended it against all criticism. Within four years of its origin the Congress had its own agency in London, looked after by a panel of influential politicians of the Left. It issued its own journal, *India*, which was successively edited by a series of able men like Sir Gordon Hewart, Sir Henry Cotton, S. K. Ratcliffe and Henry Polak. Its circulation, though never large, was influential and 'many a question in Parliament on line of attack of India's friends was suggested by it'.[27] Distinguished leftists visited Congressmen, attended Congress sessions and cultivated Congress leaders.[28] Ramsay MacDonald was offered the Congress presidency in 1911. Before him Nevinson and Keir Hardie had made friends with the Congress leaders. Josiah Wedgwood was intimately known to Lala Lajpat Rai. Lansbury and Hyndman often sent messages to India. Lord Olivier openly favoured the Congress in a letter to a Hindu politician. Lord Pethick-Lawrence and Cripps were close friends of Nehru and Gandhi. For many years *India* claimed to inform the British public of what 'Indians' were saying or thinking, meaning thereby what the Hindu Congress was saying or thinking. Whenever a leftist wrote or spoke on India he never failed to mention the Congress demands, always calling them 'Indian demands'. There was nothing wrong in this if the group chose to do so. But it was incorrect to say that Congress was India and its demands were Indian demands, and it unduly influenced public opinion.[29]

If we remember the Indian myths created by the Left we can largely explain this unsympathetic attitude. The whole policy of the Muslims went against the convictions of the Left. Muslim India

stood for the disunity of India, while the Left believed in the fundamental unity of the sub-continent. Muslim India emphasized the Hindu-Muslim differences, while the Left insisted on the 'brotherhood of man'. Muslim India pointed to the force of religious nationalism, while the Left had its faith in modern secularism. Muslim India demanded partition, while the Left believed in India as an economic unit. These were differences too deep to be bridged. The Left had a strong element of idealism in its philosophy. It believed in the brotherhood of man and thought that men will naturally live in peace and amity unless selfish and fanatical leaders lead them astray. It was an accident of history that the Congress leaders seemed to share these ideals while the Muslim leaders denied them. Muslim India's belief in the inevitability of communal hatred, though vindicated by history, was repellent to most leftists. Therefore some of them thought the Muslim leaders were sincere and called them 'fanatical', and some thought them insincere and therefore 'wicked', but all disagreed with their point of view. The real basis of the Muslim demand was that Muslims of India were a separate nationality; once this was denied by the Left, its hostility to the creation of Pakistan was explained. If Muslims were not a nationality it followed that their insistence on separatism was nothing but 'selfishness', 'reaction' and 'fanaticism'.

The Communist Point of View

So far practically nothing has been said about the policy of the British Communists on India mainly because it has not been possible to get hold of relevant documents and papers. But a good idea of its attitude can be gained from books on India written by Mr Rajane Palme Dutt, himself half-Indian by parentage and the foremost Communist publicist on Indian developments. In 1942 he published his *A Guide to the Problem of India* which, he claimed, had been prepared to assist in the development of an 'informed opinion' about India, and presented the 'essential facts' about the Indian situation and the background of the Indian question.[30] In his opinion, the communal issue was grossly misrepresented in the official press; the Muslim League was the 'organization of a tiny minority of reactionary upper-class Muslims under the ex-Congress politician, Mr Jinnah'; it was founded under 'governmental inspiration' and always

'favoured and encouraged' by the government; and its 'reactionary' leaders always played a 'disruptive role' to block any democratic advance. Then he proceeded to explain and justify the resolution on India passed by the National Conference of the Communist Party of Great Britain on 25 May 1942, which asked for immediate recognition of Indian independence and opening of negotiations with Congress leaders for the establishment of a 'National Government with full powers, subject only to such restrictions as the Indian people are willing to accept in the interests of India and of the common struggle against the Axis Powers'.[31]

Thus the Communist approach did not differ from the usual leftist view. Both played down the Hindu-Muslim problem, accused the League and its leaders of being reactionary and disruptive, and were in favour of conceding the Congress demand for independence without any reference to the Muslim issue.

Britain and Muslim India

In Britain generally the field of exposition of the Indian case was occupied almost entirely by the Left who sedulously preached the gospel according to Gandhi and Nehru. In Parliament exponents of the same gospel got a hearing out of proportion to their numbers or their weight, though their practical experience of India was negligible. How did this affect the situation? One result was that by reiterating again and again that Congress represented all India, these British friends of the Congress helped to make it what an Indian Christian leader called the 'Indian counterpart of the Nazi party in Germany'.[32] If Congress claimed to be the exclusive embodiment of Indian nationalism and therefore rejected all compromise and ignored all other groups, partial blame for this must rest on those English groups which encouraged it in this delusion. A second result was that it convinced the Muslims that there was a feeling against them in Britain and particularly in the House of Commons. The House could be frightened about Palestine by putting the Jewish case or alarmed about India by putting the Hindu case, but the Muslims got no hearing. They wondered why the Socialists invariably took the side of the Hindus and, finding no adequate explanation, made some 'rude suggestions' as to the connection between the Labour Party and the Hindus.[33]

As was said earlier, the support that was given to the Muslims came mainly from the Anglo-Indian group. One representative of this group, a remarkable figure in many ways, deserves some notice. Francis Yeats-Brown was once in the Indian army and later developed into a popular author of the Bengal Lancer books. He loved the North-West Frontier and the Punjab, learned to speak Pushto and Urdu and served in an entirely Muslim regiment. As he had spent many years in northern India he had naturally a ready understanding of Muslim aspirations. During his last visit to India in the war he met Jinnah, Rajagopalacharia and Ambedkar, and was convinced that there could be no solution which ignored the wishes of the vast majority of Muslims. Like Beverley Nichols he was attracted to the Pakistan project. He knew that there was no such thing as 'India', he knew that Hindus preferred the British to Muslims, that Muslims preferred the British to Hindus and that neither wished to co-operate with the other.[34]

With the single exception of Sir Reginald Coupland, who was a specialist on India, nobody in Britain seems to have *understood* the problem of Muslim nationalism better than Professor Denis Brogan. He recognized that India was more like Europe than France or England or even pre-Bismarckian Germany. Because there was no Muslim national feeling a generation ago, or ten years ago, there was no guarantee that 'there is no such nationality well on the way to mature to life now' (he was writing in 1943). Referring to those who opposed the Pakistan demand by appealing to the unity of India, he said that they meant the political unit constituted by English rule; as far as they assumed that there was something inevitable in that unity, 'they are assuming something that requires a great deal of proof'. Modern European history did not suggest that unity over so great an area as India would be easy to attain or maintain after British withdrawal, or that, 'once the idea of an Indian nation had taken roots in the minds of the majority, they can prevent the idea of Indian nations taking root in the minds of the minorities'. If that time came, the Muslim leaders in the Congress might come to seem 'as unnatural as the Ulster Protestant founders of the United Irishmen seem in modern Belfast'. The more Indian nationalism became national and created a national myth, the more natural it was for the Muslims to begin to think of their own traditions which 'are in fact traditions of conquest in India and of

the world community of Islam outside India'. Britain could create national unity in India in one way only—by being sufficiently oppressive and sufficiently indifferent to the feelings and sentiments of its subjects. Amritsar and Malabar united Hindu and Muslim for the time being, and 'more rigours of this sort' might have unified India, but British India was not rigorous enough for that. It must be admitted that Britain had 'failed to unify India in the deep national sense'.[35]

One significant feature of British opinion was that it was most active, lively and vocal on the making of the 1935 reforms, while the momentous events of 1947 passed comparatively unnoticed. The following table shows the number of articles published in leading journals on India on the four main occasions when the Indian constitutional question was being decided:

Periodicals	*1909*	*1919*	*1935*	*1947*
Asiatic Review	2	2	24	14
Contemporary Review	2	6	18	3
Empire Review	6	6	26	5
Fortnightly Review	3	2	20	2
National Review	3	1	22	10
Nineteenth Century	5	6	30	4
*Political Quarterly**	—	—	4	4
Quarterly Review	2	1	1	2
Round Table	—	5	28	6
Total: 275	23	29	173	50

Three things may account for this lack of interest in India in 1946–7. First, the British were at this time absorbed in national affairs. The nation was devoting all its attention to fighting the after-effects of war and building up a new economy. Secondly, there was no party clash as there had been in 1930–5. Nothing like the Conservative split occurred, nor were the opponents of the decision as firm, as vocal and as well led as the diehards were in 1930–3. Public attention fastens more easily on sensational events, but there were no Churchillian outbursts in 1947. Finally, in 1947, the general climate of opinion seems to have reached a stage when the passing away of a large chunk of the Empire did not rouse popular anger or popular

* It is surprising that this Socialist journal gave so little attention or space to India in spite of the Left's keen interest in the problem. On an average it published one article every two years.

acclaim. It speaks volumes for the change in British 'imperial mentality' that while in 1935 the mere talk of making a new constitution for India (*not* of giving it independence) had created a big political row, in 1947 the actual decision of a complete withdrawal did not create more than a ripple on the surface of public thought and speech. People as well as the press took the decision calmly, many of the former not even taking notice of it. It must be the first time in history that an empire of this size passed away unwept and unsung. It was indeed an amazing phenomenon.

If on the whole British public opinion was not well informed on Muslim India, Muslims themselves were partly responsible. Muslim pronouncements failed to be presented in the British press. The Muslim case was never put clearly before the British public. If Muslims wished their side to be heard they should have taken more trouble in making it known in Britain. There might have been sympathy with Muslim feeling and an earnest desire to see the Muslims finding satisfaction in a free India, but the idea of splitting up a country was difficult for the Englishman to understand, and we must make allowance for his bias for unity. We know after how great reluctance the British had agreed to the partition of Ireland and Palestine. A further reason for the Muslim case going by default was that the Muslims had practically no press in India. British-owned newspapers and international news agencies had to recruit from a journalistic pool where Hindus predominated. Consequently, the outside world reading Indian news and dispatches came to believe that there was no such thing as the Muslim issue.

Compared to this the Hindus had a magnificent propaganda machinery not only in India but also in Britain. Representing a rich community and backed by industrial and commercial magnates the Hindu press commanded attention in India. In Britain its task was greatly facilitated by the voluntary efforts of aid by a large section of opinion and press. It could, moreover, afford to send special full-time agents to publicize its stand in foreign countries. Some Hindu leaders were successful authors and their books sold well in the English-speaking world. Nehru's books alone must have won many converts, though in fact they contained many distorted and incorrect statements about Muslims.

Such facilities were denied to the Muslims, partly because of poverty and partly because of lack of education. It should also be

remembered that their task was infinitely more difficult than that of the Hindus; they had to fight on two fronts, convincing the Hindus that they must treat them well and at the same time negotiating with the British for more concessions and safeguards. In India they had no press worthy of the name; in Britain they found a large section of opinion ranged against them from the start. They had neither the money to compete with the Hindu newspapers nor a large enough educated class to draw upon for voluntary publicity work. In fact, when we look back it seems no less than a miracle that with all these crippling drawbacks Jinnah was able to organize the League, to meet the Hindu challenge with equal astuteness, to formulate a clear-cut programme, to negotiate with usually reluctant and sometimes unsympathetic British Governments and to achieve his goal—all this within seven years.

One of the principal arguments of all those who opposed British rule in India was that British policy in India was one of divide and rule. Thousands of words have been spoken and written to prove or disprove this pet theory. Of course, instances can be quoted on both sides; and that proves nothing. But it is dishonesty to attribute the Hindu-Muslim conflict to British rule. Britain might have profited by this discord, but that is not the point. Hindus and Muslims themselves were responsible for this mutual antagonism. As Muhammad Ali put it picturesquely, 'It is the old maxim of "divide and rule", but there is a division of labour here. *We* divide and *you* rule.'[36] Sometimes it has been said that Hindu-Muslim rivalry began when the British rule betrayed signs of weakening and the two claimants saw that power was coming to them. But the story goes back much further than that. When India was ruled by Muslims, Hindus hated Muslim power. As soon as Muslim power weakened, Hindu nationalism rose through the Mahratha formula of *Hindu pad padshahi*, imperial status of the Hindus. By the end of the eighteenth century Muslim power was gone and this posed a problem for the Hindus: whom could they hate now? The arrival of the British solved this problem for them, and at once the hatred formerly felt for the Muslims was transferred to the British. Hinduism was saved from a severe spiritual crisis. After the departure of the British the Hindu hatred has once again fastened itself on the Muslims and Pakistan.[37] This analysis of the Hindu mind by a Hindu himself shows that the Hindu-Muslim problem was imbedded

in the historical logic of India. Britain only witnessed it, she did not create or aggravate it.

In conclusion it must be said that on the whole the basic Muslim problem in India was not given as much attention in Britain as it deserved. We have tried to give some reasons for this, to which another should be added here. There was a general tendency of the British to make concessions to Congress, and this resulted in concentrating public opinion on Congress rather than the Muslims. This tendency to make concessions was rooted in the British belief that 'politics is the art of compromise'. The British do not believe that the pursuit of abstract justice is a sensible aim; they believe in the policy of 'live and let live', of trying to minimize disagreement, of making concessions when necessary. Obviously, if there is a big group and a small group, both discontented, the ruler will tend to make more concessions to the big group.

But that does not mean that the Muslim problem was completely ignored. Barring the opinion on the Left most British commentators noticed the deepening Hindu-Muslim cleavage and realized its significance and even its implications, though none was mentally prepared to countenance its final and logical development. It was difficult for the British to appreciate the force of religious feelings in India. If we categorize British authors on India, not according to their domestic politics or their profession, but according to the extent of their knowledge of India, we get three groups. First, men who really knew India, who realized the force of communal conflict and were always warning the British public about it. Thereby they gave comfort to the Muslims, but this does not mean that they 'supported' them. Secondly, men who had only a passing acquaintance with India and took sides according to personal disposition. They subdivided into two classes. Men of action, like soldiers and civilians posted to the frontier, tended to prefer Muslims because Muslims seemed to them to value honour, courage and loyalty. But this probably did not reflect any deep understanding of Muslim ideals. Liberal intellectuals tended to prefer Hindus because they did *not* have the military virtues, and seemed to them to value peace, humility and pacifism. That is why many liberal intellectuals admired Gandhi on the mistaken assumption that he had the same fundamental ideals that they had. This point of view also did not reflect any real understanding of Hindu ideals. Finally, the great

majority of men who had no knowledge of India, did not understand the depth of communal conflict, and consequently saw no reason why the country should not live in unity. This made them prefer Congress politics to League politics, but not because they supported the Hindus as such.

One surprising thing emerges from this study. Amid this prolonged and at times acrid debate on India no serious alternative to Pakistan was ever suggested. The only attempt came from Sir Reginald Coupland who, in a way, stood outside this partisan controversy and surveyed the problem from an Olympian height unattained by party politicians, fiery journalists and peripatetic M.P.s, who were often in the fray to prove a point. Apart from the Cabinet Mission plan, which seemed too complicated to work in practice, no constructive scheme emerged from these long discussions, nor was any suggestion put forward by the India League, the Empire Society, the Indian Conciliation Group, the Indian Committee, the Union of Democratic Control and such other bodies ostensibly devoted to an appraisal of the Indian problem. There were polemics galore, but of any helpful attempt to find a way out of the communal impasse there was none. Some saw no problem in the whole affair and were confident that their reading was unmistakable; others were uneasily aware of the existence of a thorny issue but had enough optimism to look forward to some sort of final compromise. The clash between these two approaches sounded loud and clear but, in the event, produced nothing.

APPENDIX I

Leaders of Opinion

Alexander of Hillsborough, Earl; Albert Victor (b. 1885). M.P. Co-operative, 1922–31, 1935–50. First Lord of Admiralty, 1929–31, 1940–5, 1945–6. Minister of Defence, 1947–50. Leader of Labour peers since 1955. For many years Baptist lay-preacher.

Amery, Leopold Stennatt (1873–1955). On the editorial staff of *The Times*, 1899–1909. M.P. Unionist, 1911–45. First Lord of Admiralty, 1922–3. Secretary of State for Colonies, 1924–9. Secretary of State for India, 1940–5. Author of *The Empire and Prosperity*, *A Plan of Action*, *The Forward View*, *India and Freedom* and *My Political Life* (4 vols.).

Andrews, Rev. Charles Freer (1871–1940). Head of Pembroke College Mission, 1896. Joined Cambridge Brotherhood at Delhi, 1904. Joined Tagore's Institution at Santiniketan, 1913. Correspondent of *Manchester Guardian*, *Natal Advertiser*, *Toronto Star*, *Modern Review* (Calcutta) and *The Hindu* (Madras). Author of *Renaissance in India*, *Zakaullah of Delhi*, *The Indian Problem*, *Mahatma Gandhi* and *India and Britain.*

Arundel, Sir Arundel Tagg (1843–1929). Indian Civil Service, 1864–1907. Member Viceroy's Council, 1901–6.

Attlee, Earl; Clement Richard (b. 1883). Lecturer in Social Science, London School of Economics, 1913–23. M.P. Labour, 1922–55. Member Indian Statutory Commission, 1927–30. Leader of the Opposition, 1935–40. Lord Privy Seal, 1940–2. Deputy Prime Minister, 1942–5. Prime Minister, 1945–51. Leader of the Opposition, 1951–5. Author of *The Social Worker*, *The Labour Party in Perspective* and *Purpose and Policy* (speeches).

Barclay, Sir Thomas (1853–1941). International law practitioner. M.P. Liberal, 1910. Author of *International Law and Practice*, *Turco-Italian War and Its Problems* and *Law and Usage of War.*

Bevan, Edwyn Robert (1870–1943). Lecturer in Hellenistic History and Literature, King's College, London, 1922–33. Author of *Stoics and Sceptics*, *Holy Images*, *Thoughts on Indian Discontent* and *Christianity.*

Birdwood, Sir George Christopher Molesworth (1832–1917). Professor of Anatomy, Grant Medical College, Bombay. Sheriff of Bombay, 1864. Served in Revenue and Statistics Department of India Office, 1871–1902. Author of *The Industrial Arts of India*, *Report on the Old Records in the India Office* and *First Letter Book of East India Company.*

Birkenhead, Earl of; Frederick Edwin Smith (*1872–1930*). Fellow and Lecturer, Merton College, Oxford, 1896. Lecturer, Oriel College, 1897. Solicitor-General, 1915. Attorney-General, 1915–19. Lord High Chancellor, 1919–22. Secretary of State for India, 1924–8. Author of *Points of View*, *Famous Trials of History*, *Law*, *Life and Letters* and *Last Essays*.

Blunt, Wilfrid Scawen (*1840–1922*). Diplomatic service, 1858–69. Travelled in Muslim countries, 1877–81, and in India, 1883–4. Author of *Future of Islam*, *Ideas About India*, *India Under Ripon* and *My Diaries*.

Brockway, Archibald Fenner (*b. 1888*). Editor, *Labour Leader*, 1912–17. Editor, *India*, 1919. General Secretary, I.L.P., 1928, 1933–9. Editor, *New Leader*, 1926–9, 1931–46. M.P. Labour, 1929–31. Chairman, I.L.P., 1931–3. Rejoined Labour Party, 1946. Author of *Non-Co-operation*, *The Government of India*, *A Week in India* and *The Indian Crisis*.

Brodrick, St John (*1856–1942*). M.P. Conservative, 1880–1906. Secretary of State for War, 1900–3, and for India, 1903–5. Created Earl Midleton, 1920.

Brogan, Denis William (*b. 1900*). Professor of Political Science in the University of Cambridge, and Fellow of Peterhouse. Hon. Fellow, Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Author of many books.

Bruce, Sir Charles (*1836–1920*). Governor of Windward Islands, 1893–7, and of Mauritius, 1897–1904. Author of *The Broad Stone of Empire*, *The True Temper of Empire* and *Milestones of My Long Journey*.

Bryce, Viscount; James (*1838–1922*). Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, 1870–93. M.P. 1880. Cabinet Minister, 1892. President of Board of Trade, 1894. Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1905–7. M.P. Liberal, 1885–97. Ambassador to U.S.A., 1907–13. Author of many books.

Butler, Richard Austen (*b. 1902*). M.P. Conservative since 1929. Under Secretary of State for India, 1932–7, and for Foreign Affairs, 1938–41. Member, Indian Franchise Committee, 1932. Cabinet office, 1951–5, since 1957.

Butler, Sir Spencer Harcourt (*1869–1938*). Indian Civil Service. Governor of U.P., 1921–3, and of Burma, 1923–7. Chairman, Indian States Commission, 1928.

Cadogan, Hon. Sir Edward Cecil George (*b. 1880*). M.P. Conservative, 1922–3, 1924–35, Unionist, 1940–5. Member, Indian Statutory Commission, 1927–30. Member, Joint Select Committee on India, 1933–4. Author of *Makers of Modern History*, *Life of Cavour*, *The India We Saw* and *The Roots of Evil*.

Candy, Sir Edward Townshend (*1845–1913*). Indian Civil Service, 1865–1903. Judicial Commissioner, Sind, 1886–7. Vice-Chancellor, Bombay University, 1897–1902.

Catlin, George Edward Gordon (*b. 1896*). Professor of Political Science, Cornell, 1924–35, McGill, 1956–60. Contested (Labour) Brentford and Chiswick, 1931, and Sunderland, 1935. Author of many books on political science.

Chamberlain, Sir Austen (*1863–1937*). Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1903–5, 1919–21. Secretary of State for India, 1915–17. In War Cabinet, 1918. Leader of the House of Commons, 1921–2. Foreign Secretary, 1924–9.

Chelmsford, Viscount; Frederick John Napier Thesiger (*1868–1933*). Fellow of All Souls, 1892–9. Governor of Queensland, 1905–9, of New South Wales, 1909–13. Viceroy of India, 1916–21. Warden of All Souls, 1932–3.

Chirol, Sir Valentine (*1852–1929*). Clerk in the Foreign Office, 1872–6. Director of the Foreign Department of *The Times*, 1896–1912. Member, Royal Commission on Indian Public Services, 1912. Author of *Indian Unrest*, *India: Old and New*, *The Occident and the Orient* and *India*.

Churchill, Rt Hon. Sir Winston Leonard Spencer (*b. 1874*). Served on the north-west frontier of India, 1897. *Morning Post* Correspondent in South Africa, 1899–1900. M.P. Conservative, 1900–6, Liberal 1906–8, Constitutional 1908–22 and since 1924. Cabinet office, 1910–15, 1919–21, 1924–9. Prime Minister, 1940–5, 1951–5. Leader of the Opposition, 1945–51. Nobel Prize for Literature, 1953. Author of many books.

Coatman, John (*b. 1889*). Indian Police Service, 1910–26. Director of Public Information, Government of India, 1926–30. Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1926–30. Secretary to Liberal delegation to the Round Table Conference, 1930–2. Professor of Imperial Economic Relations, London, 1930–4. Chief News Editor, B.B.C., 1934–7. Director of Research, St Andrews, 1949–54. Author of *The Indian Riddle*, *Years of Destiny* and *India: The Road to Self-Government*.

Cole, George Douglas Howard (*1889–1959*). Reader in Economics, Oxford, 1925–44. Chichele Professor of Political and Social Theory, Oxford, 1944–57. Research Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford, 1957–9. Fellow of All Souls, 1944–57. President of Fabian Society, 1952–9. Author of many books.

Colvin, Sir Elliott Graham (*1861–1940*). Indian Civil Service, 1882–1918.

Coupland, Sir Reginald (*1884–1952*). Lecturer at Oxford, 1907–18. Editor, *Round Table*, 1917–19, 1939–41. Fellow of All Souls, 1920–48, and of Nuffield College, 1939–50. Member, Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India, 1923. Beit Professor of History of British Empire at Oxford, 1920–48. Author of many books on imperial history and politics.

Craddock, Sir Reginald Henry (*1864–1937*). Indian Civil Service, 1884–1923. Member, Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India, 1923. M.P. Unionist, 1931–7. Fellow of Keble College, Oxford, 1931–7.

Craik, Sir Henry, Bart. (*1846–1927*). Served in Education Department, Whitehall, 1870–1904. M.P. Conservative, 1906–27. Principal, Queen's College, Harley Street, 1911–14. Author of *Life of Swift*, *A Century of Scottish History*.

Crewe, Marquess of; Robert Offley Ashburton Crewe-Milnes (*1858–1945*). Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, 1892–5. Lord President of the Council,

1905–8. Secretary of State for India, 1910–15. Ambassador in Paris, 1922–8.

Cripps, Sir Richard Stafford (*1889–1952*). M.P. Labour, 1931–50. Solicitor-General, 1930–1. Ambassador to Russia, 1940–2. Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1947–50. President, Fabian Society, 1951. Author of *Why This Socialism?*, *Towards Christian Democracy*, *Democracy Alive* and *God in Our Work*.

Croft, Baron; Henry Page (*1881–1947*). M.P. Conservative, 1910–40. Under-Secretary for War, 1940–5. Chancellor of Primrose League, 1928–9.

Cromer, Earl of; Evelyn Baring (*1841–1917*). British Army, 1858–72. Private Secretary to Viceroy of India, 1872–6. Served in Egypt, 1877–9. Member, Viceroy's Council, 1880. Consul-General in Egypt, 1888–97. Author of *Modern Egypt*, *Ancient and Modern Imperialism* and *Abbas II*.

Curtis, Lionel (*1872–1955*). Town Clerk of Johannesburg. One of Milners' 'Kindergarten' in South Africa. Fellow of All Souls. Author of *Civitas Dei*.

Curzon of Kedleston, Marquess; George Nathaniel (*1859–1925*). Under-Secretary of State for India, 1891–2. Viceroy of India, 1899–1905. Lord Privy Seal, 1915–16. Lord President of the Council, 1916–19. Fellow of All Souls, 1883–1925. Chancellor of Oxford University, 1907. M.P. Conservative, 1886–98.

Darwen, Baron; John Percival Davies (*1885–1950*). Contested (Labour) Blackburn, 1922, 1923 and Skipton, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1935 and 1945. Created Baron, 1946.

Dawson, Geoffrey (*1874–1944*). Colonial Office, 1898–1901. Private Secretary to Milner, 1901–5. Editor, *Johannesburg Star*, 1905–10. Editor, *The Times*, 1912–19, 1923–41. Editor, *Round Table*, 1919–22, 1942–4.

Dicey, Edward (*1832–1911*). Leader-writer for *Daily Telegraph*, 1861–70. Editor, *Observer*, 1870–89. Author of *Cavour*, *England and Egypt* and *The Egypt of the Future*.

Digby, William (*1849–1904*). Editor, *Madras Times*, 1877–9. Founder and Director of Indian Political Agency, 1887–92. Editor of *India*, 1890–2.

Dunsterville, Lionel Charles (*1865–1946*). Indian Army, 1894–1900. He was Rudyard Kipling's 'Stalky'. Author of *Stalky's Reminiscences*.

Dutt, Rajane Palme (*b. 1896*). Editor, *Daily Worker*, 1936–8, and *Labour Monthly*, since 1921. Vice-President, British Communist Party.

Elliott, Sir Charles Alfred (*1835–1911*). Indian Civil Service, 1856–95. Chief Commissioner of Assam, 1881–5. Member, Viceroy's Council, 1887–90. Lt.-Governor of Bengal, 1890–5.

Elwin, Verrier (*b. 1902*). Lived among aboriginal tribesmen in Central India, 1932–46, 1949–53. Author of *Songs of the Forest* and *Leaves of the Jungle*.

Ensor, Sir Robert Charles Kirkwood (*1877–1959*). Leader-writer, *Manchester Guardian*, 1902–4, *Daily News*, 1909–11. Chief Leader-writer, *Daily Chronicle*, 1912–30. Deputy for the Gladstone Professor of

Political Theory and Institutions, Oxford, 1933, 1940–4. Research Fellow, Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 1937–46. Research Lecturer, All Souls, 1937–46. Faculty Fellow, Nuffield College, 1938–40. Author of many books on modern British history.

Fuller, Sir Joseph Bampfylde (*1854–1935*). Indian Civil Service till 1906. Chief Commissioner of Assam, 1902–5. Lt.-Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1905–6.

Gallacher, William (*b. 1881*). Chairman, Clyde Workers Committee, 1914–18. Leading Communist since 1920. Author of *Revolt on the Clyde*, *The Rolling of the Thunder* and *The Case for Communism*.

Garratt, Geoffrey Theodore (*1888–1942*). Indian Civil Service, 1913–23. Journalist on the staff of the *Westminster Gazette* and *Manchester Guardian*. Contested as Labour candidate, 1925, 1931, 1935.

Gibb, Sir Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen (*b. 1895*). Professor of Arabic, London, 1930. Laudian Professor of Arabic, Oxford, 1937. Professor of Arabic, Harvard, since 1955.

Gooch, George Peabody (*b. 1873*). M.P. Liberal, 1906–10. Contested Bath, 1910, and Reading, 1913. President, Historical Association, 1922–5. President, National Peace Council, 1933–6. Editor, *Contemporary Review*. Historian.

Graham, Sir Lancelot (*b. 1880*). Indian Civil Service, 1904–41. Governor of Sind, 1936–41.

Hailey, Baron; William Malcolm (*b. 1872*). Indian Civil Service, 1895–1934. Member, Viceroy's Executive Council, 1919–24. Governor of the Punjab, 1924–8, and of United Provinces, 1928–30, 1931–4. Director, African Research Survey, 1935–8. Author of *An African Survey* and other books on colonial history.

Hailsham, Viscount; Douglas McGarel Hogg (*1872–1950*). M.P. Conservative, 1922–8. Attorney-General, 1922–4, 1924–8. Lord Chancellor, 1928–9, 1935–8. Secretary of State for War, 1931–5. Editor of the Hailsham edition of Halsbury's *Laws of England*.

Halifax, Earl of; Edward Frederick Lindley Wood (*1881–1959*). M.P. Unionist, 1910–25. Viceroy of India, 1926–31. Lord Privy Seal, 1936–7. Leader of the House of Lords, 1935–8. Foreign Secretary, 1938–40. Ambassador in Washington, 1941–6.

Hamilton, Lord George Francis (*1845–1927*). M.P. Conservative, 1868–1906. First Lord of the Admiralty, 1885–92. Secretary of State for India, 1895–1903. Chairman, Royal Commission on Poor Law, 1905–9.

Hardie, James Keir (*1856–1915*). Editor, *Cumnock News*, 1882–6. M.P. Labour, 1892–5, 1900–15. Chairman, Independent Labour Party. Founder of *Labour Leader*.

Hardinge of Penshurst, Baron; Charles (*1858–1944*). Diplomatic Service, 1880–1903. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1906–10. Viceroy of India, 1910–16. Ambassador in Paris, 1920–3.

Hardy, George Alexander (*1851–1920*). Merchant and manufacturer. M.P. Labour, 1906–10.

Harlech, Baron; William George Arthur Ormsby-Gore (*b. 1885*). M.P. Unionist, 1910–38. Ministerial offices, 1922–4, 1924–9, 1931–6.

Secretary of State for Colonies, 1936–8. Member, British Delegation to the Peace Conference, Middle Eastern Section, 1919.

Hart-Davis, Thomas (*d. 1920*). Indian Civil Service, 1869–97. M.P. Liberal, 1906–10.

Hill, Archibald Vivian (*b. 1886*). Brackenbury Professor of Physiology, Manchester, 1920–3. Nobel Prize for Physiology and Medicine, 1922. Jodrell Professor of Physiology, London, 1923–5. M.P. Independent Conservative, 1940–5. Scientific Adviser to Government of India, 1943–4.

Holderness, Sir Thomas William (*1849–1924*). Indian Civil Service, 1872–1912. Under-Secretary of State at India Office, 1912–19.

Hope, Lord John (*Adrian*) (*b. 1912*). M.P. Conservative, 1945–50. Younger twin son of second Marquess of Linlithgow.

Hunter, Sir William Wilson (*1840–1900*). Bengal Civil Service. Statistician to the Government of India. President, Indian Education Commission, 1882. Member, Viceroy's Council, 1881–7. Author of *The Imperial Gazetteer of India* and other books on Indian history.

Huntingdon, Earl of; Francis John Clarence Westenra Plantagenet Hastings (*b. 1901*). Joint Parliamentary Secretary of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1945–50.

James, Sir Henry Evan Murchison (*1846–1923*). Indian Civil Service, 1865–1900. Member, Viceroy's Council, 1895–7.

Keene, Henry George (*1825–1915*). Indian Civil Service, 1847–82.

Kitchener of Khartoum, Earl; Horatio Herbert (*1850–1916*). In Egyptian army, 1888–92. Commander-in-Chief, South Africa, 1900–2, and India, 1902–9. Consul-General in Egypt, 1911–14. Secretary of State for War, 1914.

Knox, Sir Alfred William Fortescue (*b. 1870*). Indian Army, 1898–1903. M.P. Conservative, 1924–45.

Lansbury, George (*1859–1940*). M.P. Labour, 1910–12, 1922–40. First Commissioner of Works, 1929–31. Leader of the Labour Party, 1931–5. Sometime editor of the *Daily Herald.*

Laski, Harold Joseph (*1893–1950*). Lecturer in Political Science, Cambridge, 1922–5. Professor of Political Science, London, 1926–50. Member, Fabian Society Executive, 1922, 1936. Member, 1936–49, and Chairman, 1945–6, of the Labour Party Executive Committee. Author of many books.

Lely, Sir Frederick Styles Philipin (*1846–1934*). Indian Civil Service, 1869–1905. Member, Viceroy's Council, 1903. Contested as Liberal, 1910.

Lilly, William Samuel (*1840–1919*). Under-Secretary, Government of Madras, 1869. Secretary, Catholic Union of Great Britain, 1874–1919.

Listowel, Earl of; William Francis Hare (*b. 1906*). Labour Whip in the Lords, 1941–4. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India, 1944–5. Postmaster-General, 1945–7. Secretary of State for India, 1947.

Lloyd, Baron; George Ambrose (*1882–1941*). M.P. Unionist, 1910–18, 1924–5. Governor of Bombay, 1918–23. High Commissioner for

Egypt, 1925–9. Secretary of State for Colonies, 1940–1. Author of *Egypt Since Cromer*.

Lloyd George of Dwyfor, Earl; David (*1863–1945*). M.P. Liberal, 1890–1931, Independent Liberal, 1931–45. Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1908–15. Prime Minister, 1916–22.

Lothian, Sir Arthur Cunningham (*1887–1962*). Indian Civil Service, 1911–46. Prime Minister, Alwar State, 1933. Specialist on the relations between Indian States and the Government of India.

Lovett, Sir Harrington Verney (*1864–1945*). Indian Civil Service, 1884–1919. Reader in Indian History, Oxford, 1920–32.

Lyall, Sir Alfred Comyn (*1835–1911*). Bengal Civil Service. Lt.-Governor of North-Western Provinces, 1882–7. Member, Council of the Secretary of State for India, 1888–1902. Ford Lecturer in English History, Oxford, 1907.

MacColl, Rev. Malcolm (*d. 1907*). Canon of Ripon, 1884–1907.

MacDonald, James Ramsay (*1866–1937*). Secretary, Labour Representation Committee, 1900–12, and Treasurer, 1912–24. Chairman, I.L.P., 1906–9. Leader of the Labour Party, 1911–14. Member, Royal Commission on Indian Public Services, 1912–14. Sometime editor, *Socialist Review*. M.P. Labour, 1906–18, 1922–37. Leader of the Opposition, 1922. Prime Minister, 1924, 1929–35. Lord President of the Council, 1935–7.

MacDonnell, Lord; Antony Patrick (*1844–1925*). Indian Civil Service, 1865–95. Member, Council of India, 1902. Under-Secretary of State in Ireland, 1902–8. Member, Irish Convention, 1917–18.

MacMunn, James Robert (*1866–1945*). Army doctor. Served in India, 1895–1901.

Meston, Lord; James Scorgie (*1865–1943*). Indian Civil Service, 1885–1919. Rede Lecturer at Cambridge, 1920. President, Liberal Party Organization, 1936–43.

Minto, Earl of; Gilbert John Murray Kynynmond Elliot (*1847–1914*). Military Secretary to the Governor-General of Canada, 1883–5. Governor-General of Canada, 1898–1904. Viceroy of India, 1905–10.

Molson, Arthur Hugh Elsdale (*b. 1903*). Political Secretary, Associated Chamber of Commerce in India, 1926–9. M.P. Unionist, 1931–5, and 1939–61.

Montagu, Edwin Samuel (*1879–1924*). M.P. Liberal, 1906–22. Under-Secretary of State for India, 1910–14. Secretary of State for India, 1917–22.

Moore, William Arthur (*b. 1880*). Secretary, Balkan Committee, 1904–8. *The Times* special correspondent in Turkey, Persia, the Balkan countries, Middle East and India, 1908–22. Managing Editor, *Statesman* (Calcutta), 1933–42.

Morison, Sir Theodore (*1863–1936*). Principal, M.A.O. College, Aligarh, 1899–1905. President, Muhammadan Educational Conference, 1904. Member, Council of India, 1906–16. Member, Royal Commission on Indian Public Services, 1913–15. Principal, Armstrong College, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1919–29.

Morley, Lord; John (*1838–1923*). Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1886,

1892–5. Secretary of State for India, 1905–10. Lord President of the Council, 1910–14. Philosopher. Biographer.

Mountbatten of Burma, Earl, Admiral of the Fleet; Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas (*b. 1900*). Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, 1943–6. Viceroy of India, 1947. Governor-General of Indian Union, 1947–8.

Muir, Sir William (*1819–1905*). Bengal Civil Service. Member, Council for India, 1876–85. Principal and Vice-Chancellor, Edinburgh University, 1885–1905. Author of *Life of Mahomet, The Caliphate* and *Muhammadan Controversy.*

Muller, Friedrich Max (*1823–1900*). Taylorian Professor of Modern Languages, Oxford, 1854. Fellow of All Souls, 1858. Corpus Professor of Comparative Philology (1868). Author of *Ancient Sanskrit Literature.* Editor of the *Rig Veda.*

Munster, Earl of; Geoffrey William Richard Hugh FitzClarence (*b. 1906*). Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War, 1939, and for India, 1943–4.

Nevinson, Henry (*1856–1941*). *Manchester Guardian* Correspondent in India, 1907–8. War journalist, 1909–19. On the staff of the *Nation,* 1907–23. *Manchester Guardian* special correspondent, 1921–9.

Nichols, Beverley. President, Oxford Union. Editor of *Isis* and founder and editor of *Oxford Mail.* Author of many books.

Nisbet, John (*1853–1914*). Indian Forest Service, 1875–1900. Professor of Forestry, West of Scotland Agricultural College, 1908–12.

Noel Buxton, Baron; Noel Edward (*1869–1948*). M.P. Liberal, 1905–6, 1910–18, Labour, 1922–30. Minister of Agriculture, 1924, 1929–30. Author of *Europe and the Turks, With the Bulgarian Staff* and *The War and the Balkans.*

O'Donnell, Charles James (*1850–1934*). Indian Civil Service, 1870–1900. M.P. Liberal, 1906–10.

O'Dwyer, Sir Michael Francis (*1864–1940*). Indian Civil Service, 1885–1919. Governor of the Punjab, 1913–19.

O'Grady, Sir James (*1866–1934*). Secretary, National Federation of General Workers. M.P. Labour, 1906–10, 1918–24. Governor, State of Tasmania, 1924–30. Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Falkland Islands, 1931–5.

Oldham, William Benjamin (*d. 1916*). Indian Civil Service, 1865–1905.

Olivier, Baron; Sydney Haldane (*1859–1943*). Colonial Service, 1882–1920. Secretary, Fabian Society, 1886–9. Secretary of State for India, 1924.

Page, Sir Arthur (*b. 1876*). Judge, Calcutta High Court, 1923. Puisne Judge, 1924–30, and Chief Justice, 1930–6, Burma High Court.

Percy, Lord Eustace (*1887–1958*). M.P. Unionist, 1921–37. President of the Board of Education, 1924–9. Minister without Portfolio, 1935–6.

Pethick-Lawrence, Baron; Frederick William (*1871–1961*). Editor of the *Echo,* 1902–5, of *Labour Record and Review,* 1905–7, and Joint Editor of *Votes for Women,* 1907–14. M.P. Labour, 1923–31, 1935–45. Secretary of State for India, 1945–7.

Philby, Harry St John Bridger (*1885–1960*). Indian Civil Service, 1907–15. Served in Mesopotamia, 1915–21. Chief British Representative in Transjordan, 1921–4. Author of many books on Islamic countries.

Price, Morgan Philips (*b. 1885*). Journalist. M.P. Labour, 1929–31, and since 1935.

Rathbone, Eleanor (*1872–1946*). M.P. Independent (combined English Universities), 1929–46. Author of *The Indian Minotaur.*

Reading, Marquess of; Rufus Daniel Isaacs (*1860–1935*). M.P. Liberal, 1904–13. Attorney-General, 1910–13. Lord Chief Justice, 1913–21. Viceroy of India, 1921–6. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1931.

Reed, Sir Stanley (*b. 1872*). On the staff, 1897–1907, and editor of, *The Times of India*, 1907–23. M.P. Unionist, 1938–50.

Rees, Sir John David (*1854–1922*). Indian Civil Service, 1875–1901. M.P. Liberal Independent, 1906–10. M.P. Unionist, 1912.

Roberts, Wilfred (*b. 1900*). M.P. Liberal, 1935–50.

Russell, Earl; Bertrand Arthur William (*b. 1872*). Philosopher. Nobel Prize for Literature, 1950. Sonning Prize, 1960. Author of many books.

Rutherford, Vickerman Henzell (*1860–1934*). M.P. Liberal, 1906–10. Contested as Labour, 1920. Medical doctor by profession. Author of *Modern India.*

Sadler, Sir Michael Ernest (*1861–1943*). Educational administrator, 1885–95. Professor of Education, Manchester, 1903. Vice-Chancellor, Leeds University, 1911–23. President, Calcutta University Commission, 1917–19. Master of University College, Oxford, 1923–34.

Salisbury, Lord; James Edward Hubert Gascoyne-Cecil (*1861–1947*). M.P. Conservative, 1885–92, 1893–1902. Lord Privy Seal, 1903–5, 1924–9. Lord President of the Council, 1922–4. Leader of the House of Lords, 1925–9.

Samuel, Viscount; Herbert Louis (*1870–1963*). M.P. Liberal, 1902–18, 1929–35. Cabinet seats, 1909–10, 1915–16. High Commissioner in Palestine, 1920–5. Chairman, Liberal Party Organization, 1927–9. Leader, Liberal Parliamentary Party, 1931–5. Home Secretary, 1931–2. Liberal leader in the House of Lords, 1944–5.

Sankey, Viscount; John (*1866–1948*). Judge of the King's Bench Division, 1914–28. Lord Justice of Appeal, 1928–9. Lord Chancellor, 1929–35.

Schuster, Sir George Ernest (*b. 1881*). Finance Member, Viceroy's Council, 1928–34. M.P. Liberal National, 1938–45.

Smeaton, Donald Mackenzie (*1846–1910*). Indian Civil Service, 1865–1902. M.P. Liberal, 1906–10.

Snell, Baron; Henry (*1865–1944*). M.P. Labour, 1922–31. Under-Secretary of State for India, 1931. Deputy Leader of the House of Lords, 1940–4.

Spender, John Alfred (*1862–1942*). Editor, *Eastern Morning News*, Hull, 1886–9. Editor, *Westminster Gazette*, 1896–1922.

Stansgate, Viscount; William Wedgwood Benn (*1877–1960*). M.P. Liberal,

1906–27, Labour, 1928–31, 1937–42. Secretary of State for India, 1929–31.

Stead, William Thomas (*1849–1912*). Editor of *Northern Echo*, 1871–80. Assistant editor, 1880–3, and editor, 1883–9, of *Pall Mall Gazette*.

Strachey, John St Loe (*1860–1927*). Editor, *Spectator*, 1898–1925.

Sydenham of Combe, Baron; George Sydenham Clarke (*1848–1933*). Governor of Victoria, 1901–4. Governor of Bombay, 1907–13.

Templewood, Viscount; Samuel John Gurney Hoare (*1880–1959*). M.P. Conservative, 1910–44. Secretary of State for Air, 1922–9, for India, 1931–5, and for Foreign Affairs, 1935. Home Secretary, 1937–9. Lord Privy Seal, 1939–40. Ambassador to Spain, 1940–4.

Thompson, Edward (*d. 1946*). Educational Missionary, Bankura College, Bengal, 1910–22. Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. Author of many books on India.

Titus, Rev. Murray Thurston (*b. 1885*). Lecturer, 1910–13, and Principal, 1941–3, Lucknow Christian College. Professor of Missions, Westminster Theological Seminary, Maryland (U.S.A.), 1951–5.

Toynbee, C.H.; Arnold Joseph (*b. 1889*). Fellow and tutor of Balliol, 1912–15. Koraes Professor of Byzantine and Modern Greek Literature, London, 1919–24. Director, Foreign Research, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939–43. Director of Research, Foreign Office, 1943–6. Research Professor of International History, London, 1925–55. Author of many books on history.

Tweedsmuir, Baron; John Buchan (*1875–1940*). M.P. Scottish Universities, 1927–35. Governor-General of Canada, 1935–40. Chancellor of Edinburgh University, 1937–40.

Ward, Henry Constantin Evelyn (*1837–1907*). Indian army, 1855–60. Minister of Bhopal State, 1885–8. Commissioner of Nerbada Division in C.P., 1892.

Warwick, Earl of; Charles Guy Fulke Greville (*b. 1911*). Mayor of Warwick, 1951.

Watson, Sir Alfred Henry (*b. 1874*). On the staff of the *Westminster Gazette*, 1902–22. Editor, *Weekly Westminster*, 1922–4. Editor, *Statesman* (Calcutta), 1925–33. Director, *Great Britain and the East*, 1941–58.

Wavell, Field Marshal Earl; Archibald Percival (*1883–1950*). Commander-in-Chief, India, 1941–3. Viceroy of India, 1943–7.

Waverley, Viscount; Sir John Anderson (*1882–1957*). Governor of Bengal, 1932–7. M.P. National, 1938–50. Lord Privy Seal, 1938–9. Home Secretary, 1939–40. Lord President of the Council, 1940–3. Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1943–5.

Wedderburn, Sir William (*1838–1918*). Indian Civil Service, 1859–87. President of the Indian National Congress, 1889, 1910. M.P. Liberal, 1893–1900.

Wedgwood, Baron; Josiah Clement (*1872–1943*). M.P. Liberal, then Labour, 1906–42. Vice-Chairman, Labour Party, 1921–4.

Williams, Laurence Frederick Rushbrook (*b. 1890*). Fellow of All Souls, 1914–21. Professor of Modern Indian History, Allahabad, 1914–19. Director of Information, India, 1920–6. Secretary to the Chancellor

of the Chamber of Princes, 1926–30. Foreign Minister, Patiala, 1925–31. Delegate, Round Table Conference, 1932. On the editorial staff of *The Times*, 1944–5.

Winterton, Earl; Edward Turnour (*b. 1883*). M.P. Unionist, 1904–51. Under-Secretary of State for India, 1922–4, 1924–9. Member of Cabinet, 1938–9.

Woodruff, Philip (*Philip Mason*) (*b. 1906*). Indian Civil Service, 1928–47. Director of Studies in Race Relations, Chatham House, 1952–8. Director, Institute of Race Relations since 1958.

Wrench, Sir John Evelyn Leslie (*b. 1882*). Journalist on Northcliffe's staff, 1904–12. Editor, *Spectator*, 1925–32. American Relations Officer to the Government of India, 1942–4.

Wyatt, Woodrow Lyle (*b. 1918*). M.P. Labour, 1945–55. Member, Parliamentary Delegation to India, 1945. Personal assistant to Sir Stafford Cripps on Cabinet Mission to India, 1946.

Yate, Sir Charles Edward, Bart. (*1849–1940*). Indian army, 1867–88. Political Agent in Baluchistan, 1890–2, 1900–4. Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana, 1898–9. M.P. Conservative, 1910–24.

Yeats-Brown, Francis (*1886–1944*). Indian army, 1906–13. Assistant editor, *Spectator*, 1926–8. Author of *Bengal Lancer*, *Lancer at Large* and *Golden Horn*.

Zetland, Marquess of; Lawrence John Lumley Dundas (*1876–1961*). Member, Royal Commission on Indian Public Services, 1912–14. Governor of Bengal, 1917–22. Secretary of State for India, 1935–40. President, Royal India Society, 1923–50, and Royal Asiatic Society, 1928–31.

APPENDIX II

Journals of Opinion

Journal	*Interval of Publication*	*Editors*	
Asiatic Review	Quarterly	Demetrius Boulger	1866–90
		G. W. Leitner	1890–9
		G. R. Badenoch	1899–1912
		Henry Leitner	1912–
Contemporary Review	Monthly	Henry Alford	1866–70
		James Knowles	1870–7
		Percy Bunting	1888*–1918
		J. S. Lidgett } G. P. Gooch }	1918–47
Daily Herald	Daily	George Lansbury	1913–22
		Hamilton Fyfe	1922–6
		William Mellor	1926–31
		W. H. Stevenson	1931–7
		Francis Williams	1937–40
		Percy Cudlipp	1940–53
Economist	Weekly	Edward Johnstone	1883–1907
		Francis Hurst	1907–16
		Hartley Withers	1916–21
		Walter Layton	1922–38
		G. Crowther	1938–47
Empire Review	Monthly	C. Kinlock-Cooke	1901–
Fortnightly Review	Monthly	G. H. Lewis	1865–6
		John Morley	1867–83
		T. H. S. Escott	1883–6
		Frank Harris	1887–94
		W. L. Courtney	1895–1928
Listener	Weekly	—	—
Manchester Guardian	Daily	C. P. Scott	1871–1929
		E. T. Scott	1929–32
		W. P. Crozier	1932–44
		A. P. Wadsworth	1944–7

* This, and subsequent chronological gaps in editorial management of journals listed here, are due to lack of available information.

Journal	*Interval of Publication*	*Editors*	
National Review	Monthly	Alfred Austin	1883–93
		L. J. Maxse	1893–1929
		Viscountess Milner	1929–48
New Statesman	Weekly	C. D. Sharp	1913–31
		K. Martin	1931–47
Nineteenth Century	Monthly	James Knowles	1877–1907
		W. W. Silbeck	
Observer	Weekly	J. L. Garvin	1908–42
		Ivor Brown	1942–7
Political Quarterly	Quarterly	Leonard Woolf	1929–47
		W. A. Robson	
Quarterly Review	Quarterly	William Smith	1867–93
		R. E. Prothero	1893–9
		G. W. Prothero	1899–1922
		Sir John Murray	1922–8
		John Murray	1928–47
Round Table	Quarterly	Philip Kerr	1910–17
		R. Coupland	1917–19
		G. Dawson	1919–20
		John Dove	1920–34
		H. V. Hodson	1934–9
		R. Coupland	1939–41
		G. Crowther	1941
		Henry Brook	1941
		G. Dawson	1942–5
		Dermot Morrah	1945–7
Spectator	Weekly	St Loe Strachey	1897–1925
		J. E. Wrench	1925–32
Sunday Times	Weekly	Leonard Rees	1901–32
		W. W. Hadley	1932–47
The Times	Daily	J. T. Delaney	1841–77
		T. Chesney	1878–84
		G. E. Buckle	1884–1912
		G. Dawson	1912–19
		G. W. Stead	1919–22
		G. Dawson	1922–41
		R. M. Barrington-Ward	1941–7

APPENDIX III

Parliaments

First Meeting	*Dissolution*
13 February 1906	10 January 1910
15 February 1910	28 November 1910
31 January 1911	25 November 1918
4 February 1919	26 October 1922
20 November 1922	16 November 1923
8 January 1924	9 October 1924
2 December 1924	10 May 1929
25 June 1929	24 August 1931
3 November 1931	25 October 1935
26 November 1935	15 June 1945
26 July 1945	3 February 1950

APPENDIX IV

Prime Ministers

Name	*Period of Office*	*Administration*	*Party*
A. J. Balfour	14 July 1902–5 Dec. 1905	Con.	Con.
H. Campbell-Bannerman	5 Dec. 1905–8 April 1908	Lib.	Lib.
H. H. Asquith	8 April 1908–25 May 1915	Lib.	Lib.
H. H. Asquith	25 May 1915–7 Dec. 1916	Coal.	Lib.
D. Lloyd George	7 Dec. 1916–23 Oct. 1922	Coal.	Lib.
A. Bonar Law	23 Oct. 1922–22 May 1923	Con.	Con.
S. Baldwin	22 May 1923–22 Jan. 1924	Con.	Con.
J. R. MacDonald	22 Jan. 1924–4 Nov. 1924	Lab.	Lab.
S. Baldwin	4 Nov. 1924–5 June 1929	Con.	Con.
J. R. MacDonald	5 June 1929–25 Aug. 1931	Lab.	Lab.
J. R. MacDonald	25 Aug. 1931–7 June 1935	Nat.	Lab.
S. Baldwin	7 June 1935–28 May 1937	Nat.	Con.
N. Chamberlain	28 May 1937–10 May 1940	Nat.	Con.
W. S. Churchill	10 May 1940–26 July 1945	Nat.	Con.
C. R. Attlee	26 July 1945–6 March 1950	Lab.	Lab.

APPENDIX V

Secretaries of State for India

Name	*Period of Office*	*Administration*	*Party*
Lord G. F. Hamilton	4 July 1895–9 Oct. 1903	Con.	Con.
St John Brodrick	9 Oct. 1903–11 Dec. 1905	Con.	Con.
J. Morley	11 Dec. 1905–7 Nov. 1910	Lib.	Lib.
Earl of Crewe	7 Nov. 1910–7 March 1911	Lib.	Lib.
Viscount Morley	7 March 1911–25 May 1911	Lib.	Lib.
Earl of Crewe	25 May 1911–27 May 1915	Lib.	Lib.
A. Chamberlain	27 May 1915–20 July 1917	Coal.	Lib.
E. S. Montagu	20 July 1917–21 March 1922	Coal.	Lib.
Viscount Peel	21 March 1922–23 Jan. 1924	Con.	Con.
Baron Olivier	23 Jan. 1924–7 Nov. 1924	Lab.	Lab.
Earl of Birkenhead	7 Nov. 1924–1 Nov. 1928	Con.	Con.
Viscount Peel	1 Nov. 1928–8 June 1929	Con.	Con.
W. Wedgwood Benn	8 June 1929–26 Aug. 1931	Lab.	Lab.
Sir Samuel Hoare	26 Aug. 1931–7 June 1935	Nat.	Con.
Marquess of Zetland	7 June 1935–10 May 1940	Nat.	Con.
L. S. Amery	10 May 1940–26 July 1945	Nat.	Con.
Baron Pethick-Lawrence	5 Aug. 1945–17 April 1947	Lab.	Lab.
Earl of Listowel	17 April 1947–15 Aug. 1947	Lab.	Lab.

APPENDIX VI

Governors-General and Viceroys of India

Name	*Period of Office*
Baron Curzon of Kedleston	6 January 1899–18 November 1905
Earl of Minto	18 November 1905–23 November 1910
Baron Hardinge of Penshurst	23 November 1910–4 April 1916
Viscount Chelmsford	4 April 1916–2 April 1921
Earl of Reading	2 April 1921–3 April 1926
Lord Irwin	3 April 1926–18 April 1931
Viscount Willingdon	18 April 1931–18 April 1936
Marquess of Linlithgow	18 April 1936–20 October 1943
Viscount Wavell	20 October 1943–22 March 1947
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma	22 March 1947–15 August 1947

Notes

Notes to Chapter 1

1. James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (1929 ed.), Vol. 1, p. 173.

2. Wilhelm Bauer, article on 'Public Opinion', *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 12, pp. 669–70.

3. Wilhelm Bauer, quoted in Robert Kann, 'Public Opinion Research: A Contribution to Historical Method', *Political Science Quarterly*, September 1958, p. 374.

4. W. Mackinnon, *On the Rise, Progress and Present State of Public Opinion in Great Britain* (1828), p. 15.

5. Charles A. Elwood, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1917), p. 155.

6. A. L. Lowell, *Public Opinion in War and Peace* (1923), p. 12.

7. In *Dictionary of Sociology*, ed. by H. P. Fairchild (1944), p. 209.

8. See Bryce, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 176–7. It is only to the third category that Sir Robert Peel's cynical reference 'that great compound of folly, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right feeling, obstinacy and newspaper paragraphs which is called public opinion' can be applied; quoted in Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (1941 ed.), p. 197.

9. 'By the common man I mean the man who is so absorbed in the immediate and personal ends of living that he cannot view his destiny with any intellectual detachment. Such a man is capable of receiving doctrines upon authority and accepting them, but he is typically not capable of making hypotheses on his own account.' Harvey Fergusson, quoted in William Albig, *Modern Public Opinion* (1956 ed.), p. vi.

10. A. von Gennep, *La Formation des légendes*, pp. 158–9, quoted in Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (1941 ed.), pp. 82–3.

11. Walter Lippmann, op. cit., p. 45.

12. Political and Economic Planning, *Report on the British Press* (1938), p. 156.

13. Royal Commission on the Press, 1947–9, *Report* (June 1949), Cmd. 7700, p. 129.

14. Quoted in T. S. Matthews, *The Sugar Pill: An Essay on Newspapers* (1957), p. 29.

15. See Cmd. 7700, pp. 118, 305–9.

16. W. D. Bowman, *The Story of 'The Times'*, quoted in P.E.P., *Report on the British Press* (1938), p. 180.

17. J. L. Hammond, *C. P. Scott of the 'Manchester Guardian'* (1938), p. 318.

18. *The Press and its Readers: A Report Prepared by Mass-Observation for The Advertising Service Guild* (1949), p. 23.

19. The Round Table Group—or Milner's 'Kindergarten', for most of its members were trained by Milner in South Africa—originally consisted of Sir Herbert Baker, Hugh Wyndham (later Lord Leconfield), J. F. Perry, Robert (later Lord) Brand, John Dove, Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), Richard (later Mr Justice) Feetham, Lionel Curtis, Lionel Hitchens, Patrick Duncan (later Sir Patrick) and Geoffrey Dawson. These people edited a monthly paper, *The State*, in South Africa, an organ of the Closer Union Societies, which may be taken as the precursor of the *Round Table*. Later this group was joined by F. S. Oliver, Sir Edward Grigg (later Lord Altrincham) and Sir Reginald Coupland. For a good group photograph of the 'Kindergarten' taken in 1906 see J. E. Wrench, *Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times* (London 1955), p. 81.

20. See Appendix I.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. S. Laing, 'The Convention with Turkey', *Fortnightly Review*, August 1878, p. 172.

2. Samuel Smith, 'India Revisited', *Contemporary Review*, July 1886, p. 77.

3. In *Quarterly Review*, January 1910, p. 149.

4. Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India: The Guardians* (1954), p. 36.

5. H. B. Edwardes, *Our Indian Empire: Its Beginning and End* (1861), pp. 25–6.

6. A. C. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies* (1882), p. 243.

7. See A. P. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies* (1959), p. 43.

8. Roy Jenkins, *Sir Charles Dilke* (1958), p. 102.

9. Here is a selection of such articles: *Fortnightly Review:* Adam Gielgud, 'European Turkey and its Subject Races', 1866; Humphrey Sandwith, 'A Heterodox View of the Eastern Question', February 1871; Lepel Griffin, 'The Present State of the Eastern Question', January 1874; Rowland Blennerhassett, 'The Reform of the Ottoman Empire', February 1877; George Campbell, 'The Resettlement of the Turkish Dominions', April 1878; James Bryce, 'Russia and Turkey', June 1878; G. De Hennin, 'A Partition of Turkey', December 1887; John Welsh, 'The Last Days of the Ottoman Empire', October 1889; Karl Blind, 'Young Turkey', December 1896. *Contemporary Review:* Arthur Arnold, 'Turkey', July 1876; Bosworth Smith, 'The Eastern Question', December 1876; Edgar Lenormand, 'Turkey and Greece', April 1881; A. M. Fairbairn, 'The Primitive Policy of Islam', December 1882; Malcolm MacColl, 'The Constantinople Massacre', November 1895; W. M. Ramsay, 'Two Massacres in Asia Minor', September 1896. *Nineteenth Century:* Anthony Salmone, 'Is the Sultan of Turkey the true Khalif of Islam?', January 1896. *Empire Review:* Edward Dicey, 'The Eastern Question', August 1904.

10. For a brief account of Indian Muslim reaction to the fate of the Ottoman Empire see Ameer Ali's additional chapter on 'Muslim Feeling' in Sir Thomas Barclay's *The Turco-Italian War and its Problems* (London 1912), pp. 101–8. Ameer Ali was a Shia Muslim.

11. Monier Williams, *Modern India and the Indians* (1879), p. 201.

12. W. S. Blunt, *India Under Ripon: A Private Diary* (1909), p. 294,

and 'The Future of Islam—V', *Fortnightly Review*, January 1882, pp. 32–48.

13. M. MacColl, 'The Musalmans of India and the Sultan', *Contemporary Review*, February 1897, pp. 292–3.

14. M. Williams, 'Progress of Indian Religious Thought', ibid., December 1878, p. 19, and *Modern India and the Indians* (1879), pp. 162, 165–6, 257.

15. Quoted in S. M. Zwemer, *et al.*, *The Muhammadan World Today* (1906 ed.), p. 12.

16. See his 'Islam and Civilization', *Contemporary Review*, April 1888, 'The Crisis in the East', ibid., October 1897, and 'The Musalmans of India and the Sultan', ibid., February, 1897.

17. A. C. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies* (1882), p. 291.

18. William Baker, 'Reflections in India 1880–1888', *Fortnightly Review*, August 1888, p. 225.

19. See his *England and Islam* (London 1900).

20. For details of how this work came to be written see F. H. Skrine, *The Life of Sir William Wilson Hunter* (1901), pp. 198–200.

21. See his *Review of Dr Hunter's Indian Musalmans* (Benares 1872).

22. A. C. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies* (1882), Ch. IX. During the Mutiny days, however, Lyall had regarded Islam as far more hostile to Britain than Hinduism. He wrote to his father that he was going to Delhi 'to enjoy the pleasure of seeing the imperial city of the Musalmans in ruins'. He was anxious to join in a regular crusade against the Muslims in any country where Christians dwelt. Mortimer Durand, *Life of the Rt Hon. Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall* (1913), pp. 68–86.

23. R. Temple, *India in 1880* (1880), p. 115.

24. W. H. Gregory, 'Loyalty of the Indian Musalmans', *Nineteenth Century*, December 1886, pp. 886–900.

25. J. Strachey, *India* (1894 ed.), p. 240.

26. See his *The Present State of Indian Politics* (1888). For a contemporary detailed and sympathetic account of his ideas see G. F. I. Graham, *The Life and Work of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan* (London), first ed. 1885, rev. ed. 1909.

27. T. Beck, 'The House of Commons and the Indian Civil Service', *National Review*, May 1894, pp. 379–88. Sir John Strachey shared this view; see his *India* (1894 ed.), pp. 391–2.

28. Its Secretary was one J. Parker Smith, M.P. for Lanarkshire. See *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, October 1898, pp. 281–2.

29. J. Strachey, op. cit., p. 209.

30. Theodore Morison, 'A Muhammadan University', *National Review*, October 1898, and J. Kennedy, 'A Muhammadan University for Northern India', *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, October 1898.

31. Theodore Morison, 'A Descendant of the Prophet', *National Review*, June 1898, and J. Kennedy, 'Personal Reminiscences of Sir Sayyid Ahmad', *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, July 1898.

32. W. S. Blunt, *India under Ripon* (1909), pp. 117, 156.

33. F. Pincott, 'The Indian National Congress: The Other Side', *National Review*, June 1889, pp. 530, 535.

34. James Samuelson, *India: Past and Present* (1890), p. 320.

35. H. Cotton, *New India* (1907 ed.), p. 232.

36. H. G. Rawlinson, *The British Achievement in India: A Survey* (1947), p. 147. Perhaps he borrowed his opinion from some Hindu writers who still insist that Sayyid was not a 'separatist'; for example, J. Nehru, *Discovery of India* (1946 ed. London), p. 323.

37. See *The Times*, 19 and 26 December 1887.

38. *Quarterly Review*, October 1895, p. 432. The total is not made up of Hindu and Muslim delegates alone but of all others as well; figures about delegates from other religious groups are not given as we are not concerned with them here.

39. Among its members were Sir William Wedderburn, W. S. Cain, W. S. McLaren, William Digby, John Ellis, George Yule, Sir Charles Schuman, Sir Herbert Roberts, Sir Henry Cotton, Alfred Webb, T. Hart-Davis, C. J. O'Donnell, Dr Rutherford and Philip Morrell. Sir Charles Dilke and Samuel Smith actively co-operated with the Committee but preferred not to join it.

40. W. Wedderburn, *Allan Octavian Hume* (1913), pp. 87–97.

41. Letter to *The Times*, 13 November 1888.

42. W. Wedderburn, op. cit., p. 67.

43. F. H. Skrine, *Life of Sir William Wilson Hunter* (1901), pp. 372, 377.

44. W. Wedderburn, op. cit., pp. 71–3.

45. Speech at Gwalior, reported in *The Times*, 26 December 1887.

46. H. C. E. Ward, 'Difficulties of Indian District Officers', *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, April 1896, p. 279.

47. W. S. Lilly, *India and its Problems* (1902), pp. 242–3.

48. For extracts from his long letter see *The Times*, 12 November 1888.

49. See, for example, Leslie Smith, 'The Congress and Modern India', *National Review*, April 1889; Charles Dilke, 'An Australian View of India', *Fortnightly Review*, December 1892; G. W. Steevens, *In India* (1900), p. 77; and J. Morrison, *New Ideas in India during the Nineteenth Century* (1907), p. 144.

50. J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England* (1883), pp. 221–7. This collection of lectures delivered at Oxford in 1881 continued to sell remarkably well for the next seventy years, not going out of print until 1956.

51. James Bryce, *The Ancient Roman Empire and the British Empire in India* (1914), p. 63.

52. H. G. Keene, 'Home Rule for India', *National Review*, April 1890.

53. J. Strachey, op. cit., pp. 1–2, 7.

54. T. Beck, 'Native India and England', *National Review*, November 1894. See also Sir Richard Temple, *A Bird's-Eye View of Picturesque India* (1898), p. 67.

55. See, for example, T. H. Lewin, *A Fly on the Wheel or How I Helped to Govern India* (1885), pp. 67–8, and Lord Dufferin as quoted in *Montagu-Chelmsford Report* (1928 Indian ed.), p. 91.

56. H. E. M. James, 'Reflections on the Way Home', *National Review*, November 1893, pp. 342, 346.

57. T. Beck, 'The House of Commons and the Indian Civil Service', ibid., May 1894, p. 381.

58. H. C. E. Ward, op. cit., pp. 277–9.

59. See his 'A Muhammadan University', *National Review*, October 1898.

60. J. Strachey, op. cit., p. 241.

61. R. Coupland, *The Indian Problem 1833–1935* (1942), p. 29.

62. H. Cotton, *New India* (1885 ed.), pp. 6, 16.

63. ibid. (1907 ed.), p. 233.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon* (1928), Vol. II, p. 321.

2. ibid., p. 323.

3. Secretary of State for India, *H.C. 151. 4S*, 9 August 1905, Cols. 887–8.

4. *East India* (*Reconstruction of the Provinces of Bengal and Assam*) (1905), Cd. 6258.

5. For Curzon's mild but courageous rebuke see his letter of 27 January 1904 to Godley, quoted in Ronaldshay, op. cit., p. 327.

6. ibid., pp. 327–8.

7. *H.L. 191. 4S*, 30 June 1908, Cols. 510–13.

8. C. A. Elliott, 'The Unrest in India', *Empire Review*, June 1907, p. 383.

9. 'India: The Conspiracy Against the British Rule', *National Review*, July 1908.

10. See Reuter's messages, *Manchester Guardian*, 23 and 27 October 1905; *The Times*, 6 November 1906; All India Muslim League Central Committee's resolution of September 1908, ibid., 7 September 1908; Muslim League's memorial to the Under-Secretary of State for India of 11 November 1908, ibid., 26 December 1908; *Manchester Guardian*, 8 February 1909; Muhammad Ali, *Thoughts on the Present Discontent* (1907).

11. See J. K. Hardie, *India: Impressions and Suggestions* (1909), pp. 10–11, 116–17.

12. *H.C. 152. 4S*, 26 February 1906, Cols. 823–4.

13. H. W. Nevinson, *The New Spirit in India* (1908), pp. 169–70.

14. See *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, April 1907, pp. 293–4; *Quarterly Review*, July 1907, p. 215; J. B. Fuller, 'Foundations of Indian Loyalty', *Nineteenth Century*, August 1909; J. Nisbet, 'India under Crown Government', ibid., November 1908; now even a Hindu historian has come round to this view (K. M. Pannikar, *A Survey of Indian History*, Bombay, 1954 ed., p. 219) though there has been a startling change in his opinion since 1947, when the Hindus themselves demanded and achieved the partition of Bengal!

15. H. W. Nevinson, op. cit., pp. 16–17, 191–3, 202, and his reports from Eastern Bengal in *Manchester Guardian*, 3 and 13 January 1908.

16. J. K. Hardie, op. cit., p. 40. For an identical opinion see Sir James O'Grady, *H.C. 185. 4S*, March 1908, Col. 521.

17. See, for example, *Manchester Guardian*, 11 May 1906 and 15 May 1907.

18. *Quarterly Review*, July 1907, p. 215.

19. J. B. Fuller, 'Vision Splendid of Indian Youth', *Nineteenth Century*, July 1908, p. 20.

20. In *Manchester Guardian*, 3 January 1908.

21. J. D. Rees, *The Real India* (1908), pp. 178, 181. Muslim sources here supported Rees, see S. S. A. Khan, *India of Today* (1908), p. 83.

22. This is supported by two pieces of contemporary evidence. Minto, who was then bearing the brunt of the agitation, wrote to the Prince of Wales in 1906 that if things were left alone the Congress was not to be feared. The chief danger existed in Britain 'where a few members of Parliament, with a very doubtful Indian connection, manage to keep the pot of disaffection boiling, and to disseminate entirely false views upon the position of affairs in India. A Bengali agitation, in India, carries no weight and little meaning. In England there is the danger that British public may assume it to be representative of what people at home take to be the people of India'; Harold Nicolson, *King George V* (1952), p. 87. Morley's declaration that the agitation was subsiding nettled the leaders of the unrest in India, and it was reported that strenuous efforts were made to galvanize it once more into life; *The Times*, 2 April 1906.

23. *H.C. 152. 4S*, 26 February 1906, Cols. 844–5.

24. *H.C. 163. 4S*, 1 November 1906, Col. 1318.

25. *H.C. 191. 4S*, 30 June 1908, Col. 525.

26. Quoted by F. W. Hirst, 'John Morley at the India Office: IV—Reforms', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 February 1929.

27. ibid.

28. *H.C. 8. 5S*, 5 August 1909, Col. 2051.

29. Letter to *The Times*, 17 August 1905. For other refutations see J. D. Rees, *The Real India* (1908), p. 171; E. C. Meysey-Thompson, *India of Today* (1913), pp. 124–38; Al-Carthill (B. C. H. Calcroft-Kennedy), *The Lost Dominion* (1927), p. 199; J. MacMunn, *The Living India* (1934), p. 74; H. Trevaskis, *Indian Babel* (1935), pp. 178–9; and Henry Craik (not an Anglo-Indian), *Impressions of India* (1908), pp. 229–30.

30. See *The Times*, 2 April 1906, and 28 June 1909.

31. *Quarterly Review*, July 1908, p. 233.

32. *The Times*, 5 September 1905.

33. See H. Cotton, *Manchester Guardian*, 12 September 1905, and *H.C. 193. 4S*, 22 July 1908, Col. 209; C. J. O'Donnell, *H.C. 175. 4S*, 6 June 1907, Cols. 947–8, and 'The Unrest in India', *Empire Review*, October 1908; V. H. Rutherford, *H.C. 183. 4S*, 31 January 1908, Col. 381; and T. F. Tsiang, *Labour and Empire* (1923), p. 43.

34. T. F. Tsiang, op. cit., p. 42; *H.C. 175. 4S*, 6 June 1907, Col. 910; *H.C. 191. 4S*, 29 June 1908, Cols. 348–9; *H.C. 193. 4S*, 22 July 1908, Col. 196; and *H.L. 198. 4S*, 17 December 1908, Col. 1999.

35. *H.C. 175. 4S*, 6 June 1907, Col. 921; *H.C. 183. 4S*, 31 January 1908, Cols. 398–9; *H.C. 28. 5S*, 26 July 1911, Cols. 1759–60; and J. R. MacDonald, *The Awakening of India* (1910), pp. 198–9.

36. H. W. Nevinson, *The New Spirit in India* (1908), p. 175.

37. *Contemporary Review*, August 1928, p. 164, and S. K. Ratcliffe, *Sir William Wedderburn and the Indian Reform Movement* (1923), p. 139.

38. H. N. Brailsford, 'Indian Question', *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (1932), Vol. VII, p. 666, and his *Subject India* (1943), p. 21.

39. Morley's letter to Minto of 9 March 1910, Morley, *Recollections* (1917), Vol. II, pp. 330–1.

40. See *East India: Resignation of Sir J. Bampfylde Fuller* (1906), Cd. 3242.

41. Morley's letter to Minto of 17 June 1908, Morley, *Recollections* (1917), Vol. II, pp. 263–4.

42. ibid., p. 184.

43. Morley's letter to Minto of 3 May 1906, ibid., pp. 169–70.

44. See his *Indian Unrest* (1910) which is by far the best and most detailed study of the agitation and its causes.

45. J. B. Fuller, 'The Foundations of Indian Loyalty', *Nineteenth Century*, August 1909, p. 185.

46. See *The Times*, 8, 10, 14, 17 and 24 August 1906, and John Buchan, *Lord Minto* (1924), p. 243.

47. Letter to *The Times*, 14 August 1906.

48. H. C. E. Ward, Letter to *The Times*, 24 August 1906.

49. H. E. M. James, 'Ambition and Sedition in India', *National Review*, June 1907, p. 637.

50. Curzon, *H.L. 191. 4S*, 30 June 1908, Cols. 514–15. See also Asiaticus, 'India: Lord Morley's Viceroyalty', *National Review*, November 1907, p. 525.

51. Letter to *The Times*, 20 August 1906.

52. *H.C. 175. 4S*, 6 June 1907, Col. 908. This 'two-wives' saying has since been repeated *ad nauseam* by all Hindu writers. As far as can be ascertained, the real origin of this remark has never been mentioned anywhere except in the correspondence columns of *The Times*. What happened was that in the course of a private visit, a Bengali of some standing wanted Fuller to use his efforts to reconcile the Hindus with the Government. 'I accordingly explained the situation to him with frankness, and, falling into the parable form with which the East is so familiar, I likened myself to a man with two wives, one Hindu, the other Muslim, with equal claims, but one of whom was doing her best by her behaviour to throw him into the arms of the other. The similitude had the merit of expressing exactly the facts of the position. The conversation was, as I have said, private. But my visitor went from my room to the telegraph office and reported it, a good deal embroidered, to the Bengali newspapers.' J. B. Fuller, letter to *The Times*, 15 July 1909.

53. J. B. Fuller, *Some Personal Experiences* (1930), pp. 182–4.

54. See J. D. Rees, *The Real India* (1908), pp. 204–7.

55. ibid., p. 202.

56. C. A. Elliott, 'Administration and Progress of India', *Empire Review*, June 1911, pp. 310–11.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. 'India: A Grave Outlook', *National Review*, December 1908, p. 690.

2. On this the audience is reported to have laughed, *Manchester Guardian*, 16 February 1905.

3. See ibid., 17 June 1907.
4. ibid., 5 July 1907.
5. See, for instance, Reuter's message in *The Times*, 26 June 1908.
6. H. E. M. James, 'Ambition and Sedition in India', *National Review*, June 1907, p. 635.
7. J. D. Rees, *The Real India* (1908), p. 215.
8. H. W. Nevinson in *Manchester Guardian*, 27 December 1907.
9. B. Sacks, *J. Ramsay MacDonald: In Thought and Action* (1952), p. 410 fn.
10. *Manchester Guardian*, 17 January 1905.
11. *H.C. 183. 4S*, 31 January 1908, Cols. 406–7.
12. Morley's letter to Minto of 23 August 1907, Morley, op. cit., p. 235.
13. Emrys Hughes, *Keir Hardie* (1956), pp. 149–58.
14. Reuter's message, *The Times*, 24 October 1907.
15. Quoted in Reuter's message, ibid., 2 October 1907.
16. *The Times*, 22 October 1907.
17. Viceroy's telegram to India Office of 7 October 1907, quoted in Hughes, op. cit., pp. 156–8.
18. *The Times*, 2 October 1907.
19. E. Hughes, op. cit., pp. 156–8.
20. H. W. Nevinson, 'India as It Is', *Manchester Guardian*, 22 November 1907.
21. Speech at Caxton Hall on 9 April 1908, ibid., 10 April 1908.
22. Sydney correspondent's dispatch, *The Times*, 4 October 1907.
23. See *National Review*, November 1907, p. 493; ibid., August 1909, p. 1040; J. D. Rees, *Modern India* (1910), p. 168; John Buchan, *Lord Minto* (1924), p. 264; and Minto's letter to Sir Arthur Briggs, ibid., p. 264.
24. *Daily News*, 18 August 1909.
25. W. S. Blunt, *My Diaries: Being A Personal Narrative of Events 1888–1914* (1932 ed.), pp. 667, 673, 677, 679, 680, 691–2. Victor Grayson, a Socialist M.P., also supported the murderer in his speech at Huddersfield; quoted in L. A. Cox, 'Effects of British Rule in India', *Nineteenth Century*, September 1909, p. 543.
26. W. S. Blunt, *My Diaries* (1932 ed.), pp. 633–5.
27. ibid., p. 641.
28. Edith Finch, *Wilfrid Scawen Blunt 1840–1922* (1938), p. 113.
29. ibid., p. 181.
30. See Chapter 2 *supra*. These ideas were expressed in his *India under Ripon* (1909), and Blunt confided in a friend that he wanted to add to it some chapters about the India of 1909 but had been unable to get a publisher so much as to look at them; ibid., p. 327.
31. Edith Finch, op. cit., p. 356.
32. J. D. Nisbet, 'India under Crown Government 1858–1908', *Nineteenth Century*, November 1908, p. 801.
33. Morley's letter to Minto of 23 June 1906, Morley, op. cit., p. 175.
34. J. A. R. Marriott, *Modern England 1885–1939* (1941 ed.), p. 490. See also *Quarterly Review*, July 1908, pp. 235, 246, and J. B. Fuller, 'India and the Liberal Politicians', *Nineteenth Century*, January 1910.
35. Cf. Sir Austen Chamberlain's remark: 'Did you read Morley's

account of the repressive measures he sanctioned in India? . . . the whole armour of Irish coercion! Is it not the irony of fate that it should fall to his lot to do all this? I think he is rather proud of his strength in a rather weak man's way.' *Politics from Inside: An Epistolary Chronicle 1906–1914* (1936 ed.), p. 87.

36. Morley's letter to Minto of 18 December 1908, Morley, op. cit., pp. 289–90.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. J. R. MacDonald, *The Awakening of India* (1910), pp. 105, 180–4.

2. Edward Dicey, 'Islam in Fermentation', *Empire Review*, August 1906, pp. 22–3.

3. W. S. Lilly, *India and its Problems* (1902), p. 242.

4. See *The Memoirs of Aga Khan: World Enough and Time* (1954), pp. 75–6.

5. For a brief report of its establishment see *The Times*, 2 January 1907.

6. 1907 is given by a reputable historian (G. T. Garratt, *An Indian Commentary*, 1928, p. 139), a former governor of Bombay (F. Sykes, *From Many Angles: An Autobiography*, 1942, p. 482) and a Cambridge don (David Thomson, *World History from 1914 to 1950*, 1954, pp. 25, 28); 1908 by a historian of British Empire (Eric A. Walker, *The British Empire: Its Structure and Spirit*, 1943, p. 112), by two authors in a book meant for senior school children (H. Plaskett and P. Jordan, *Government of Britain, the Commonwealth countries and the Dependencies*, 1950, p. 287), by a London professor who was in the Indian Civil Service (A. Gledhill, *Pakistan: The Development of its Laws and Constitution*, 1957, p. 27) and a Cambridge don who continues to mention it in every edition (Percival Spear, *India, Pakistan and the West*, 1958 ed., p. 207); and 1910 by another historian (A. F. Dodd, *A Short History of the British Empire*, 1925, p. 207).

7. G. T. Garratt, *An Indian Commentary* (1928), p. 139.

8. Murray T. Titus, *Indian Islam: A Religious History of Islam in India* (1930), p. 251.

9. *H.C. 431. 5S*, 13 December 1946, Cols. 1496–7.

10. E. E. Lang, 'The All India Muslim League', *Contemporary Review*, September 1907.

11. See *Quarterly Review*, July 1924, p. 155.

12. Ronaldshay, *India: A Bird's-Eye View* (1924), p. 239.

13. P. Spear, *India, Pakistan and the West* (1958 ed.), p. 207.

14. For example, one such get-together took place on 16 November 1908, at the Westminster Palace Hotel, when Ameer Ali expounded the policy of the League underlining its loyal spirit. Among the guests were some M.P.s who spoke on the occasion: Sir Raymond West, Sir William Bull, J. M. Robertson and T. H. Idris. See *Manchester Guardian*, 18 November 1908.

15. Countess of Minto, *India: Minto and Morley 1905–1910* (1934), p. 45.

16. For substantial extracts from Minto's reply see ibid., pp. 46–7.

17. 'The Muhammadan Memorial', *The Times*, 1 October 1906.

18. Countess of Minto, op. cit., pp. 47–8.

19. John Buchan, *Lord Minto: A Memoir* (1924), p. 244.

20. See *The Times*, 26 and 29 December 1908, and 4 January 1909, and *Manchester Guardian*, 4 January 1909.

21. Morley's letter to Minto of 21 January 1909, Morley, op. cit., p. 293.

22. For the personnel of the deputation see *The Times*, 28 January 1909, and for the full text of Morley's reply his *Indian Speeches 1907–9* (1909), pp. 98–112.

23. Morley's letter to Minto, op. cit., pp. 293–4.

24. Full text quoted in Ronaldshay's speech, *H.C. 8. 5S*, 5 August 1909, Cols. 2066–8. Extracts from this telegram are also given in *East India (Legislative Councils) Representation of Muhammadans on Legislative Councils* (1909), Cd. 4652.

25. ibid.

26. Morley's letter to Minto of 6 August 1909, op. cit., p. 314.

27. Morley's letter to Minto of 12 August 1909, ibid., p. 315.

28. Morley's letter to Minto of 26 August 1909, ibid., pp. 316–17.

29. *East India (Executive and Legislative Councils) Regulations etc. for giving effect to the Indian Councils Act, 1909* (1909), Cd. 4987.

30. Morley's letter to Minto of 18 November 1909, ibid., p. 323.

31. Morley's letter to Minto of 6 December 1909, ibid., p. 325. Among those who condemned Morley's scheme, and protested against it on behalf of the Muslims, were A. C. Murray (later Viscount Elibank) (letter to *The Times*, 5 January 1909), Sir A. T. Arundel ('The New Reforms in India', *National Review*, February 1909) and Sir Charles Elliott ('Lord Morley's Indian Reforms', *Nineteenth Century*, February 1909).

32. T. W. Holderness, *Peoples and Problems of India* (1911), pp. 127–8.

33. See *Quarterly Review*, April 1909, pp. 706–9.

34. *H.C. 175. 4S*, 6 June 1907, Cols. 890–1; *H.C. 8. 5S*, 5 August 1909, Cols. 2006–8. For other supporters of the Muslim electorate see Sir Charles Bruce, 'Crown and Congress in India', *Empire Review*, February 1907; Sir Andrew Fraser, 'Lord Morley's Indian Reforms', ibid., March 1909; A. E. Duchesne, 'The Indian Muhammadans and the "Reforms" ', ibid., May 1909; J. D. Rees, *Modern India* (1910), pp. 184–5; R. A. L. Moore in *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, January 1911, p. 155.

35. V. Chirol, *Indian Unrest* (1910), p. 128.

36. For example, Sir Percival Griffiths, *British Impact on India* (1952), p. 310, '*Essayez*'—*The Memoirs of Lawrence, Second Marquess of Zetland* (1956), p. 121, and P. Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India: The Guardians* (1954), p. 267.

37. *H.C. 8. 5S*, 5 August 1909, Cols. 2069–70.

38. See Smeaton, *H.C. 175. 4S*, 6 June 1907, Col. 925; Gerald Ritchie in *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, July 1909, pp. 78–9; Lord MacDonnell, letter to *The Times*, 6 February 1909; and Charles O'Donnell, *The Causes of Present Discontent in India* (1908).

39. T. F. Tsiang, *Labour and Empire* (1923), p. 45.

40. J. R. MacDonald, *The Awakening of India* (1910), pp. 283–5, 287–8.

41. Morley himself seems to have been against the appointment of an Indian at all. He 'was not at all inclined to let natives enter the high places

of the service—in particular not disposed to admit them to his Council or to Minto's . . . I was dead against it . . . We could not admit equality. White men could not and ought not to submit to coloured rule, etc., etc. . . . Morley said he pretty much agreed with my conclusions, though not with all my reasons. He knew he would not submit to be governed by a man of colour.' A. Chamberlain, *Politics from Inside: An Epistolary Chronicle 1906–1914* (1936 ed.), entry for 15 March 1907, pp. 59–60.

42. Text of the Resolution published in *The Times*, 4 January 1909.

43. See Lucknow correspondent's dispatch, ibid., 2 October 1909.

44. See *Quarterly Review*, April 1909, p. 699, and January 1911, p. 220.

45. Quoted in John Buchan, *Lord Minto: A Memoir* (1924), p. 241.

46. W. S. Blunt, *My Diaries* (1932 ed.), 18 December 1908, p. 640.

47. Blunt on Morley: 'A weak-backed politician, quite ignorant of India and the East, swayed by the permanent officials and principally anxious for general praise and his social position', ibid., 20 October 1908, p. 632. See also Blunt's letter of 6 December 1908, to C. P. Scott, quoted in Earl of Lytton, *Wilfrid Scawen Blunt: A Memoir by his Grandson* (1961), pp. 177–9.

48. See 'Thirty Years' Service', letter to *The Times*, 8 March 1909.

49. See 'Suum Cuique', letter to ibid., 11 March 1909.

50. ibid., 29 December 1908.

51. ibid., 22 April 1909.

52. Believed to have been Sayyid Hasan Bilgrami, see ibid., 15 March 1909.

53. See ibid., 12 March 1909.

54. Morley's letter to Minto of 18 February 1909, Morley, op. cit., pp. 296–7.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. Special correspondent's dispatch, *The Times*, 8 February 1909.

2. Notification of 4 October 1910, published in ibid., 5 October 1910.

3. *The Round Table*, December 1911, p. 195.

4. Reuter's dispatch from Calcutta, *Manchester Guardian*, 8 November 1910.

5. J. Pope-Hennessy, *Lord Crewe 1858–1945: The Likeness of a Liberal* (1955), p. 93.

6. H. Nicolson, *King George V: His Life and Reign* (1952), p. 169.

7. *H.C. 28. 5S*, 26 July 1911, Col. 1729.

8. Hardinge, *My Indian Years 1910–1916* (1948), p. 11.

9. Later Lord Stamfordham. He was then Private Secretary to the King.

10. Hardinge, op. cit., pp. 36–40.

11. Letter of 25 August 1911. *Announcements by and on behalf of His Majesty the King-Emperor at the Coronation Durbar held at Delhi on the 12th December 1911, with correspondence relating thereto* (1911), Cd. 5979.

12. Letter of 1 November 1911, ibid.

13. Text of announcement, ibid., p. 6.

14. R. Craddock, *The Dilemma in India* (1932), p. 147. For Muslim reaction see also Viqar-ul-Mulk in the *Aligarh Institute Gazette*, 20 December 1911; the Nawab of Dacca in *The Times*, 5 March 1912; ibid., 6 March

1912; and Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I Knew It 1885–1925* (1925), p. 175.

15. A. Chamberlain, *Politics from Inside* (1936 ed.), p. 411.

16. John Buchan, *Lord Minto* (1924), p. 338, and ibid.

17. See A. H. L. Fraser, 'The Changes in India', *Nineteenth Century*, January 1912; J. B. Fuller, 'India Revisited', ibid., September 1912; E. C. Meysey-Thompson, *India of Today* (1913), pp. 124–38; Al-Carthill (B. C. H. Calcroft-Kennedy), *The Lost Dominion* (1927), pp. 225–7; V. Lovett, *Quarterly Review*, July 1928; H. Trevaskis, *Indian Babel* (1935), pp. 178–9.

18. *National Review*, April 1912, pp. 363–72, August 1912, pp. 1061–9, March 1916, p. 147, and April 1916, p. 308.

19. *Quarterly Review*, July 1916, p. 103.

20. For Cotton, *Manchester Guardian*, 13 December 1911, and his 'India: Now and After', *Contemporary Review*, February 1915, p. 201; for Wedderburn, his 'King George and India', ibid., February 1912, and 'The Viceroyalty of Lord Hardinge', ibid., March 1916; for MacDonald, B. Sacks, *J. Ramsay MacDonald in Life and Thought* (1952), p. 410 fn.

21. See *The Times*, 15 April 1915.

22. For this line of argument see *New Statesman*, 29 April 1916, pp. 78–9.

23. Hardinge, *My Indian Years 1910–1916* (1948), pp. 52, 65, 66.

24. H. Nicolson, *King George V: His Life and Reign* (1952), p. 169.

25. A. Chamberlain, *Politics from Inside* (1936 ed.), pp. 411–12.

26. A. H. L. Fraser, 'The Changes in India', *Nineteenth Century*, January 1912, p. 48.

27. For another similar argument see S. F. A.'s letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 19 December 1911.

28. J. D. Rees, 'Coronation Concessions for India', *Fortnightly Review*, February 1912, pp. 312–13.

29. Suggested in *Quarterly Review*, July 1916, pp. 103–4.

30. Quoted in V. Lovett, *India* (1923), p. 167.

31. J. Pope-Hennessy, *Lord Crewe 1858–1945: The Likeness of a Liberal* (1955), pp. 86–7.

32. Asiaticus, 'Indian Muhammadans and the Balkan War', *National Review*, March 1913, pp. 183–8.

33. W. S. Blunt, *My Diaries* (1932 ed.), pp. 834–5.

34. H. Cotton in *Asiatic Review*, July 1914, p. 27; see also report of his address to the Manchester Liberal Federation of 19 March 1915, *Manchester Guardian*, 20 March 1915.

35. Full text in *East India* (*Constitutional Reforms*) *Addresses presented in India to H.E. the Viceroy and the Rt Hon. the Secretary of State for India* (1918), Cd. 9178, pp. 95–7.

36. See *Manchester Guardian*, 21 November 1916.

37. *H.C. 116. 5S*, 5 June 1919, Col. 2309.

38. E. S. Montagu, *An Indian Diary* (1930).

39. Cd. 9109 of 1918.

40. Both were bitterly opposed by the *Spectator*, which called the 1919 Bill 'a species of Constitutional nightmare' (6 December 1919; see also 13, 20, 27 July 1918, 21 September 1918 and 20 December 1919).

41. Cd. 9109, paras. 228–32.

42. E. G. Colvin, 'The Changing Scene in India', *Nineteenth Century*, May 1919; Lord Sydenham, 'The Danger in India', ibid., December 1916; G. A. (later Lord) Lloyd, *H.C. 109. 5S*, 6 August 1918, Col. 1187; Sir Henry Craik, *H.C. 116. 5S*, 5 June 1919, Col. 2324; Sir Henry Page Croft, ibid., Col. 2392; Col. Yate, ibid., Col. 2338; and V. Chirol, 'The Indian Report', *The Times*, 10 July and 14 August 1918. Chirol had written *The Times*' leader of 6 July 1918, on the Montagu-Chelmsford Report; see *The History of 'The Times'* (1953), Vol. IV, Part II, p. 845.

43. B. Sacks, *J. Ramsay MacDonald in Thought and Action* (1952), p. 416.

44. *H.C. 109. 5S*, 6 August 1918, Col. 1210; *H.C. 116. 5S*, 22 May 1919, Col. 669; ibid., 5 June 1919, Cols. 2347–50.

45. *H.C. 109. 5S*, 8 August 1918, Col. 1182.

46. L. Curtis, *Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government* (1918), pp. 121–2.

47. See Chirol, *India: Old and New* (1921), pp. 288–9.

48. R. Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Part I* (1942), p. 75.

49. *H.C. 198. 5S*, 20 July 1926, Cols. 1073–4.

50. V. Chirol, *India* (1926), p. 293.

51. L. C. Dunsterville, 'The Coming Changes in India', *Fortnightly Review*, March 1922, p. 493.

52. Patrick Fagan in *Asiatic Review*, July 1925, p. 373.

53. G. T. Garratt, *An Indian Commentary* (1928), pp. 179–80.

54. Olivier, 'The Indian Political Atmosphere', *Contemporary Review*, August 1927, p. 166.

55. *H.C. 198. 5S*, 20 July 1926, Cols. 1091–4.

56. For a detailed summary see *The Times*, 7 September 1928. Full text in *Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference to determine the principles of the Constitution for India, together with a summary of the Proceedings of the Conference held at Lucknow*, published by the General Secretary, All India Congress Committee, Allahabad, 1928, esp. pp. 27–60.

57. *The Times*, 5 November 1928.

58. ibid., 1 January 1929.

59. Sydenham, 'The Future of India', *Empire Review*, December 1929, p. 414.

60. See ibid., October 1928, p. 222.

61. Letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 22 August 1928.

62. ibid., 26 January 1924.

63. R. W. Lyman, *The First Labour Government* (?1957), pp. 214–15.

64. See *Socialist Review*, November 1924, p. 196.

65. See *New Statesman*, 30 July 1927, p. 506. Italics not in the original.

Notes to Chapter 7

1. This 'manifesto whose warlike tone scared the British public, and still further shook confidence in the Government' was drafted by Churchill and Birkenhead; L. S. Amery, *My Political Life, Vol. II: War and Peace 1914–1929* (1953), p. 234.

2. This account is based on Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase*, Chapters 3, 4 and 9; Winston Churchill, *The Aftermath*, pp. 411–64; and R. B. Mowat, *European Diplomacy*, pp. 202–4, 287–308.

3. V. Chirol, *India* (1926), pp. 217–18.

4. See V. Chirol, 'Pan-Islamism', *National Review*, December 1906.

5. For example, Asiaticus, 'India after the Durbar', ibid., April 1912; Thomas Barclay in *Asiatic Review*, July 1914; H. A. R. Gibb's comment was the most discerning: 'Among all the Muslims of the world, those in India alone insisted on the international aspect of Islam, but in this their motive force was a defensive attitude in the face of Hindu nationalism', *Whither Islam? A Survey of the Modern Movements in the Muslim World* (1932), p. 73. For a diametrically opposed view cf. W. W. Cash, *The Muslim World in Revolution* (1925), pp. 25–9.

6. Quoted in Reading, *Rufus Isaacs: First Marquess of Reading, Vol. II, 1914–1935* (1945), p. 223.

7. *The Times*, 18 May 1920.

8. ibid., 9 March 1922.

9. Reading, op. cit., p. 226.

10. Winterton, *Orders of the Day* (1953), p. 116.

11. See Winterton, *Fifty Tumultuous Years* (1955), p. 55.

12. See Reading, op. cit., pp. 230–2.

13. *H.C. 116. 5S*, 22 May 1919, Col. 637.

14. *H.C. 122. 5S*, 3 December 1919, Col. 373.

15. *The Times*, 6 May 1921.

16. For a full report of the speech, see ibid., 13 March 1922.

17. See Ameer Ali, letter to ibid., 14 March 1922; Aga Khan's statement in ibid., 10 April 1922; and J. D. Rees, letter to ibid., 13 March 1922.

18. Winterton, *Orders of the Day* (1953), p. 112.

19. Venetia Montagu in Montagu, *An Indian Diary* (1930), p. v.

20. *The Times*, 22 March 1920.

21. *H.C. 150. 5S*, 14 February 1922, Col. 958.

22. Reading, op. cit., p. 231.

23. Thomas Jones, *Lloyd George* (1951), p. 197.

24. *New Statesman* (leaders), 2, 16, 23 and 30 September 1922, and 21 and 28 October 1922. This devastating condemnation is only matched by the annihilating criticism of Sir Valentine Chirol, see his letter to *The Times*, 18 September 1922.

25. See A. P. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and its Enemies* (1959), pp. 170–1.

26. C. E. Carrington in *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. III: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870–1919* (1959), p. 638.

27. *H.C. 56. 5S*, 7 August 1913, Col. 1852; *H.C. 116. 5S*, 22 May 1919, Col. 650; ibid., 14 February 1922, Cols. 818–23.

28. T. Morison, 'England and Islam', *Nineteenth Century*, July 1919, and letters to *The Times*, 14 May 1919 and 28 November 1921.

29. W. T. Stead, 'Great Britain and Turkey: A Plea for a Sane Policy', *Fortnightly Review*, March 1908.

30. Letter to *The Times*, 24 April 1915. *The Times* gave its blessings to this idea, provided that this declaration was accompanied by an intimation

that the manifesto was not intended to question the position of the present Khalifa (24 April 1915).

31. C. F. Adam, *Life of Lord Lloyd* (1948), pp. 142–3. Among others who expressed similar views were Lord Edward Gleichen, 'Muslims and the Tangle in the Middle East', *National Review*, December 1919; Stanley Rice, 'The New Era in India', *Fortnightly Review*, January 1921; and H. E. A. Cotton, 'Facts to be Faced in India', *Manchester Guardian*, 16 February 1922.

32. See A. Powell, *The Struggle for Power in Muslim Asia* (1925). A good deal of forthright talking was done in the House of Commons when Lloyd George's Near-Eastern policy was on the carpet, see Yate, Kenworthy, MacLean and Spooner, *H.C. 116. 5S*, Cols. 644–707 and *H.C. 150. 5S*, Col. 932.

33. See Lord Percy, *H.C. 150. 5S*, 14 February 1922, Col. 944; Wedgwood, *H.C. 152. 5S*, 27 March 1922, Cols. 1055–6: O'Conner, ibid., Cols. 1018–19; Sydenham, 'The Indian Musalmans', *Spectator*, 4 November 1922; Chirol, *India* (1926), p. 222; and R. Storrs, *Orientations* (1943 ed.), p. 192.

34. See 'A Non-Official Englishman', 'The Unrest in India', *Manchester Guardian*, 3 November 1920; 'An Anglo-Indian', 'An Indian Point of View', ibid., 23 February 1922; G. F. Bryant, *Gandhi and the Indianization of the Empire* (1924), pp. 1–71; and Claude Brown, *The Ordinary Man's India* (1927), pp. 53–4.

35. See H. A. Wilson, 'The Muslim Menace', *Nineteenth Century*, September 1907; Edward Candy, 'Egypt and India', *Empire Review*, August 1907; and H. H. Johnston, *The Backward Peoples and Our Relations with Them* (1920), pp. 51–4, and in *New Statesman*, 17 April 1920.

36. Letters to Tagore of 22 and 28 September 1920, Chaturvedi and Sykes, *Charles Freer Andrews: A Narrative* (1954), p. 156; letter to Gandhi, 23 September 1920, ibid., p. 155.

37. *H.C. 116. 5S*, 22 May 1919, Cols. 711–13.

38. C. J. O'Conner, *H.C. 152. 5S*, 27 March 1922, Col. 1023.

39. Col. Yate's question, *H.C. 127. 5S*, 24 March 1920, Cols. 386–7; Lt-Col. James's question, ibid., 15 April 1920, Col. 1860; and V. Chirol, in *Quarterly Review*, July 1922, p. 134.

40. V. Chirol, ibid., July 1922, p. 134.

41. See leaders of 16, 18 and 25 September 1922.

42. M. D. Kennedy, *A Short History of Communism in Asia* (1957), p. 58.

43. Paul Milinkov, *Bolshevism: An International Danger* (1920), p. 248.

44. See V. Chirol, *India* (1926), pp. 268–70. There was also a miscellaneous group of persons who were hostile to the movement for reasons either not mentioned or not easily ascertainable: see A. Chamberlain, *Politics from Inside* (1936 ed.), pp. 355–6, and P. E. Richards, *Indian Dust* (1932). Richards was later Principal of the Islamia College, Lahore.

45. *Daily Herald*, 21 February 1920.

46. A. J. Toynbee, 'The Question of the Caliphate', *Contemporary Review*, February 1920.

47. A. J. Toynbee, letter to *The Times*, 22 November 1924.

48. V. Chirol, letter to ibid., 25 November 1924.

49. G. P. Gooch, *Under Six Reigns* (1958), pp. 91, 139, 160, 201–2, 207.
50. See also the leaders of 10 September and 8 October 1921, and 11 and 18 March 1922.
51. *The Times*, 25 February 1920.
52. Labour Party Annual Conference *Report* (1922), pp. 204–5.
53. H. N. Brailsford, 'The Fate of Constantinople', *Daily Herald*, 14 January 1920.
54. See Noel-Buxton, 'Labour and Armenia', ibid., 16 June 1921.

Notes to Chapter 8

1. Government of India (Statutory Commission) Act, 1927.
2. Letter to Viceroy of 1 November 1927, quoted in *History of 'The Times'*, Vol. II, Part II (1953), p. 865.
3. Partly to soften the blow of the entire absence of Indians Sir Michael Sadler suggested a small body of *rapporteurs*, to 'work at, and interpret opinion on, the social and educational aspects of the problem', acting in liaison with Simon, but with the necessary independence of initiative and with 'responsibility for their own findings and report'. He even named such a panel: K. Nataranjan, Akbar Hydari, K. T. Paul, Cornelia Sorabji, J. H. Oldham, A. E. Zimmern, Sir Philip Hartog, E. M. Forster and Graham Wallas. See his letter to *The Times*, 10 November 1927.
4. Halifax, *Fullness of Days* (1957), pp. 115–16.
5. Letter of 19 January 1928, Birkenhead, *Frederick Edwin, The Earl of Birkenhead: The Last Phase* (1935), pp. 254–5.
6. Halifax, op. cit., p. 116.
7. Labour Party Annual Conference *Report* (1927), pp. 255–7.
8. *The Times*, 10 November 1927.
9. ibid., 25 November 1927.
10. *Daily Herald*, 25 November 1927.
11. George Lansbury, 'Labour and India', ibid. Lord Attlee omits all reference to this controversy in his account of the Commission; see his *As It Happened* (1954), pp. 64–7.
12. Extracts from this letter reproduced in *The Times*, 13 December 1927.
13. See Labour Party Annual Conference *Report* (1928), pp. 171–5.
14. See *Manchester Guardian*, 31 December 1927.
15. *The Times*, 16 February 1928.
16. *Manchester Guardian*, 26 June 1930.
17. Letter to Mr Justice Holmes of 28 June 1930, *Holmes-Laski Letters* (1953), Vol. II, p. 1264.
18. Edward Thompson, letters to *The Times*, 17 and 26 June 1931. In fact, this idea of arbitration had been propounded in January by three Hindu leaders—M. R. Jayakar, B. S. Moonje and S. B. Tambe; see their letter to *The Times*, 14 January 1931.
19. See the statement of Sir Muhammad Yakub, the Muslim League Secretary, of 11 October 1931, at Simla, *The Times*, 12 October 1931.
20. B. R. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi* (1958), pp. 301–3.
21. Full text in *The Times*, 6 March 1931; also in *India in 1930–1931* (1932), pp. 655–9.

22. Sir Clive Wigram's letter to Irwin of 27 March 1931, quoted in Harold Nicolson, *King George V* (1952), p. 507.

23. See *Empire Review*, April 1931, p. 344, and June 1931, p. 504; *National Review*, May 1931, p. 591.

24. Speech at the India Empire Society, *The Times*, 19 March 1931, and *H.C. 260. 5S*, 3 December 1931, Col. 1295.

25. In *Asiatic Review*, July 1932, p. 391. Among other critics of the pact were C. F. Adam ('The Drift of Indian Policy', *National Review*, March 1931) and A British India Merchant (F. E. Rosher), (*A Searchlight on Gandhi*, London 1931).

26. S. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin 1926–1931* (1957), pp. 112–13.

27. Government of India's dispatch of 16 June 1931, to the Secretary of State for India, quoted in B. R. Nanda, op. cit., p. 323.

28. See *India in 1930–1931* (1932), p. 105, and *India in 1931–1932* (1933), p. 2.

29. See his essay in Sir John Cumming (ed.), *Political India 1832–1932* (1932), pp. 18–19.

30. G. T. Garratt in *Nineteenth Century*, October 1931, p. 419; Meston, *Nationhood for India* (1931), pp. 24–5, and in *Nineteenth Century*, March 1932, p. 310; M. L. Ferrar in H. A. R. Gibb (ed.), *Whither Islam?* (1932), pp. 229–30; E. G. Colvin in *Fortnightly Review*, February 1932, p. 214; J. Coatman, *Years of Destiny: India 1926–1932* (1932), p. 86; and *India in 1930–1931* (1932), pp. 76–7.

31. H. G. Greenwall, *His Highness the Aga Khan* (1952), p. 128.

32. *India in 1930–1931* (1932), p. 119.

33. F. Sykes, *From Many Angles: An Autobiography* (1942), p. 411.

34. Donald Henderson, 'Dangers of Indian Student Politics', *Empire Review*, April 1933, p. 220.

35. *Round Table*, June 1931, pp. 598–9. See also *Tyranny and Terrorism* published by the Indian European Association in 1931.

36. Robert Bernays, *The Naked Fakir* (1931), p. 229. This is an eye-witness account.

37. *India in 1930–1931* (1932), p. 119. The official report gives no figures at all and other sources mention varying estimates. An eye-witness (E. Hayward, letter to the *Morning Post*, 16 July 1931) saw more than 2,000 persons being killed. The Government estimate was only 300 while some Muslims quoted the figure of 5,000.

38. See *The Times*, 9 June 1931. For details see *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Cawnpore Riots* (1931), Cmd. 3891. And still one commentator claimed that the Congress had tried to make peace in Cawnpore and that all Muslims were with it; V. Elwin, *Truth About India: Can We Get It?* (n.d.), pp. 24, 70, 101.

39. Full text in *The Times*, 13 November 1931; also in *Indian Round Table Conference* (*Second Session*), Cmd. 3997, pp. 68–73.

40. Letter to Irwin of 20 January 1931, *History of 'The Times'*, Vol. IV, Part II (1953), p. 877.

41. Templewood, *Nine Troubled Years* (1954), p. 52. Only these two remarks on Jinnah have been found in contemporary literature. A much

longer treatment of Gandhi is made possible by his crypto-religious appeal to the West and the fact that he was much better known than Jinnah in Britain.

42. *Round Table*, March 1932, pp. 291–2.

43. Sources of these opinions are in this order: Templewood, *Nine Troubled Years* (1954), pp. 60–2; Meston in *Nineteenth Century*, March 1932, pp. 305–6; J. T. Gwynn in *Fortnightly Review*, February 1932, pp. 168–9; E. Thompson, *A Letter from India* (1932), pp. 37–8; R. Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, Part I (1942), pp. 124–5; R. Coupland, *India: A Re-Statement* (1945), p. 140; S. Reed, *The India I Knew 1897–1947* (1952), p. 195; P. Knapland, *Britain, Commonwealth and the Empire 1901–1955* (1956), p. 220; and Laski's letter to Holmes of 17 September 1931, *Holmes-Laski Letters* (1953), Vol. II, p. 1330.

44. Letter to Holmes of 27 September 1931, *Holmes-Laski Letters* (1953), Vol. II, p. 1330.

45. Letters to Holmes of 27 September, 30 October and 14 November 1931, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1332, 1335, 1337–8.

46. Cmd. 4147 of 1932.

47. In this order, *H.L. 95. 5S*, 18 December 1934, Col. 571; in *Asiatic Review*, July 1935, p. 474; and in ibid., pp. 470–1.

48. *H.L. 95. 5S*, 12 December 1934, Col. 269.

49. *H.C. 260. 5S*, 2 December 1931, Cols. 1146–8.

50. *H.C. 262. 5S*, 29 February 1932, Cols. 842–3, 892–902.

51. *H.L. 95. 5S*, 13 December 1934, Cols. 335–6.

52. See Lord Olivier in *Contemporary Review*, May 1928, pp. 567–8; H. N. Brailsford in *Political Quarterly*, October–December 1931, pp. 560–1; H. G. Alexander in *New Statesman*, 14 April 1934, p. 540; and H. C. E. Zacharias, *Renascent India* (1933), p. 283.

53. See Labour Party Annual Conference *Report* (1932), pp. 178–80, and *The Times*, 4 February 1933.

54. Templewood, op. cit., p. 88.

55. It was precisely this part of the proposals that was most resented by the Muslims, who urged that the provinces should be granted maximum fiscal, administrative and legislative autonomy; see resolution of the Muslim Conference Executive Board of 26 March 1933, *The Times*, 27 March 1933.

56. Letter to Holmes of 12 July 1932, *Holmes-Laski Letters* (1953), Vol. II, p. 1396.

57. Personnel: *House of Commons:* C. R. Attlee, R. A. Butler, E. Cadogan, A. Chamberlain, Cocks, R. Craddock, J. C. C. Davidson, Isaac Foot, Samuel Hoare, Morgan Jones, Joseph Wall, Eustace Percy, Miss Pickford, John Simon, John Wardlaw-Milner and Earl Winterton; *House of Lords:* Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Chancellor, and Lords Salisbury, Zetland, Linlithgow, Reading, Lothian, Hardinge, Snell, Halifax, Hutchinson, Derby, Lytton, Peel, Rankeillour and Burnham (later succeeded by Middleton).

58. Issued by H.M.S.O. as a Parliamentary Paper (H.L. 6 [1 Part I] and H.C. 5 [1 Part I] of 1934).

59. See his article in the *Spectator*, 7 December 1934, pp. 870–1.

60. Labour Party Annual Conference *Report* (1934), p. 147, and his broadcast, 'India: Demand for Partnership', *Listener*, 6 February 1935, p. 215.

61. See his 'India Needs More than This', *Daily Herald*, 23 November 1934; *The Times*, 23 November 1934; and his broadcast, 'India: Safety on the Left', *Listener*, 9 January 1935, pp. 56–7.

62. See his article on the India Report, *Spectator*, 30 November 1934, pp. 829–30.

63. Templewood, *Nine Troubled Years* (1954), p. 100.

64. *The Times*, 8 April 1935.

65. His 'definite breach' with Baldwin came on the Indian question. See his *The Gathering Storm* (1949), p. 31.

66. This provoked the *Manchester Guardian* to retort that his programme was even more fantastic than the Nehru Report (12 December 1930). A few days later, it lamented the fact that Gandhi and Churchill were both trying to save India. 'In India Mr Gandhi says "Boo" and in England Mr Churchill says "Bah" and the Round Table delegates are sailing homewards' (21 January 1931).

67. All quotations are from Colin Coote (ed.), *Maxims and Reflections of the Rt Hon. Winston S. Churchill* (1948), except the last one which is from the *Listener*, 6 February 1935, p. 214.

68. H. P. Croft, *India: The Conservative Case Against Abdication* (London n.d.).

69. Adrian Baillie *et al.*, *India From a Back Bench* (London 1934).

70. Thomas Jones, *A Diary with Letters 1931–1950* (1954), entry of 28 July 1932, pp. 48–9.

71. Among its prominent members were Churchill, Sir Henry Page Croft, Sir Reginald Craddock, Sir Walter Smiles and Sir Alfred Knox.

72. Its executive was truly impressive: Churchill, Duke of Westminster, Lords Lloyd, Fitzalan, Home, Carson and Wolmer, Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Sir Alfred Knox.

73. Its founder-members included John Coatman, Sir John Cumming, Sir Philip Hartog, Sir Henry Lawrence, Sir Edward Maclagan, H. G. Rawlinson, Sir Stanley Reed and Sir William Vincent.

74. C. F. Adam, *Life of Lord Lloyd* (1948), pp. 231–2, 242–3.

75. See *Listener*, 2 January 1935, pp. 1–2.

76. O. R. Baldwin, *My Father: The True Story* (1955), pp. 175–6. Sir Robert Ensor pointed to another argument against the diehard stand, viz., the fear that it might bring in a weak Labour Government which would give unco-ordinated concessions to India dictated by fear or by political expediency at home; writing as 'Scrutator' in *Sunday Times*, 10 February 1935.

77. Templewood, *Nine Troubled Years* (1954), pp. 102–3.

78. See Labour Party Annual Conference *Report* (1930), p. 216.

79. G. D. H. Cole, *A History of the Labour Party from 1914* (1948), p. 233.

80. C. L. Mowat, *Britain between the Wars 1918–1940* (1955), p. 378.

For Mr Brockway's own account of the incident see his *Inside the Left* (1947), pp. 205–6.

81. 'Chronicler', *The Crisis and the Truce: A Survey of Indian Politics from the Simon Commission to Irwin-Gandhi Pact* (1931), pp. 37–9.

82. India League, *Condition of India: Being the Report of the Delegation sent to India by the India League in 1932* (?1934), p. xiii.

83. See ibid., pp. 119–23.

84. F. Sykes, *From Many Angles: An Autobiography* (1942), p. 447. He was then Governor of Bombay.

85. *The Times*, 1 December 1932.

Notes to Chapter 9

1. Quoted in M. F. O'Dwyer, 'Indian Congress Claims for Independence', *Nineteenth Century*, March 1938, p. 294. Italics in the original.

2. H. J. Fells, 'Congress Party and Federation', *Empire Review*, November 1938, p. 299.

3. Lt-Col. Muirhead's speech at the East India Association on 16 February 1939, *The Times*, 17 February 1939.

4. T. K. Johnston, letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 9 October 1938; Rushbrook Williams, 'The Indian Constitutional Problem', *Nineteenth Century*, March 1939; Guy Wint, *India and Democracy* (1941), p. 171; Birdwood, *A Continent Experiments* (1945), pp. 18–19; and C. H. Philips, *India* (1948), p. 133.

5. R. Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, Part II (1942), p. 15.

6. For text of the terms see R. Coupland, *India: A Re-Statement* (1945), p. 294.

7. ibid., pp. 174–6.

8. H. G. Rawlinson, *The British Achievement in India: A Survey* (1947), p. 214.

9. Among British observers who shared this feeling with the Muslims were J. Crerar, 'India and Her Future', *Fortnightly Review*, March 1940; L. S. Amery, *Asiatic Review*, January 1941, p. 85; and *My Political Life*, Vol. III (1955), p. 109; Rushbrook Williams in *Nineteenth Century*, March 1941; Sir Verney Lovett in *Quarterly Review*, October 1941; and *The Round Table*, March 1946, p. 154.

10. W. Barton, 'The Viceroy's Council and Indian Politics', *Fortnightly Review*, August 1942, p. 112.

11. F. Yeats-Brown, *The Indian Pageant* (1942), p. 149.

12. R. Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, Part II (1942), p. 157, and *India: A Re-Statement* (1945), p. 187.

13. See Cmd. 6121. For a strong denunciation of the Viceroy's remarks see Jebb in *United Empire*, February 1940, especially p. 51.

14. W. Roberts, *H.C. 352. 5S*, 26 October 1939, Col. 1647.

15. R. Sorenson, ibid., Col. 1686.

16. See H. N. Brailsford, *Subject India* (1943), pp. 44–5; H. Polak, letter to *The Times*, 23 October 1939; and H. G. Alexander, *Congress Rule in India*, Fabian Research Bureau publication (1938).

17. For this controversy see *India and the War: Statement issued by the Governor-General of India on 17 October 1939* (1939), Cmd. 6121.

18. See *The Times* (10 October 1939), *Observer* (19 November 1939) and *Spectator* (22 September 1939).

19. See Lord Snell, *H.L. 114. 5S*, 27 September 1939, Cols. 1163, 1167; Laski, letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 23 October 1939; E. Thompson in ibid., 28 November 1939 and in *Fortnightly Review*, April 1940; H. N. Brailsford, *Democracy for India* (1939), p. 13; C. R. Attlee, *As It Happened* (1954), p. 179; Union of Democratic Control, *India and the War* (1941), p. 21; and of course the *Daily Herald*, 18 and 27 October 1939. Throughout, the *Manchester Guardian* supported the Socialists, see issues of 30 September, 3, 7, 14, 24, 27 and 30 October and 7 and 21 November 1939.

20. C. R. Attlee, *As It Happened* (1954), p. 181.

21. Letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 14 November 1939.

22. W. Benn, 'The War and India's Freedom', *Contemporary Review*, December 1939, p. 655.

23. See Table I.

24. R. Sorenson, *H.C. 352. 5S*, 26 October 1939, Cols. 1683–4.

25. E. Thompson, 'Greatest Freedom for India', *Manchester Guardian*, 29 November 1939. See also H. N. Brailsford, *Democracy for India* (1939), pp. 9–10.

26. For a brief report of Iqbal's address see *The Times*, 30 December 1930.

27. E. Thompson, *Enlist India for Freedom* (1940), p. 58. The author of the present study tried to discover Dr Thompson's heirs so that some more light may be thrown on this point in the shape of some letter from Iqbal to Thompson in the latter's papers. But unfortunately it was not possible to contact anyone who could identify Thompson's son. Any fresh information will be helpful in solving one of the major mysteries facing the historians of this period.

28. See Rahmat Ali, *Pakistan: The Fatherland of the Pak Nation* (1948).

29. Full text of Lahore Resolution in Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai (eds.), *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921–1947* (1957), Vol. II, pp. 443–4.

30. Eustace Percy, *Some Memories* (1955), p. 157.

31. This view is represented by, among others, J. C. French, 'India's War Effort', *National Review*, May 1941; India Correspondent, *The Times*, 25 August 1941; J. Coatman, letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 28 August 1941; C. S. Milford, 'The Communal Problem in India', *The Year Book of World Affairs 1947*; and Eustace Percy, *Some Memories* (1955), p. 157. The most weighty support for this argument came from R. Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, Part III (1943), pp. 74–5.

32. F. E. Holsinger, letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 13 April 1940.

33. In *Asiatic Review*, January 1941, pp. 89–90.

34. ibid., April 1942, p. 160.

35. Letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 25 April 1942.

36. *H.C. 402. 5S*, 28 July 1944, Cols. 1063–4.

37. F. Yeats-Brown, *The Indian Pageant* (1942), pp. 83–4, 170.

38. *H.C. 388. 5S*, 30 March 1943, Col. 121.

39. Letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 9 May 1941.

40. R. Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, Part III (1943), p. 73.

41. In *Sunday Times*, 9 December 1945, writing as 'Scrutator'.

42. Reviewing this work George Orwell admitted that it was a 'thinkable solution' and that it would avert civil war after the British withdrawal; see *Observer*, 29 October 1944.

43. J. E. Wrench, *Immortal Years (1937–1944): As Viewed from Five Continents* (1944), pp. 133, 203–4, and his 'Impressions of India in War Years', *Asiatic Review*, April 1945, pp. 141–2.

44. Letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 10 January 1942.

45. Letter to ibid., 4 April 1940.

46. W. Wyatt, *Into the Dangerous World* (1952), pp. 97–8.

47. *H.L. 116. 5S*, 18 April 1940, Col. 173. He was followed by Lord Hailey, *H.L. 121. 5S*, 3 February 1942, Col. 619; the Earl of Warwick, *H.L. 122. 5S*, 29 April 1942, Col. 778; Godfrey Nicholson, *H.C. 388. 5S*, 30 March 1943, Col. 60; and W. Elliott, *H.C. 402. 5S*, 28 July 1944, Cols. 1025–7.

48. *H.L. 117. 5S*, 14 August 1940, Col. 221; 'Deadlock in India', *Contemporary Review*, October 1940; and other speeches in the Lords in April 1942.

49. In a book published in 1940, Edward Thompson confessed his great astonishment that in the autumn of 1939 'some of our own British Left' were beginning to be persuaded to the idea of Pakistan, which he himself found to be a sure way of plunging India into eternal civil war (*Enlist India for Freedom*, p. 59). It has not been possible to discover individuals who, in his opinion, were supporting the Muslim case in 1939 —when in fact the Muslims had yet not even demanded Pakistan.

50. *H.L. 116. 5S*, 18 April 1940, Col. 180, and *H.L. 121. 5S*, 3 February 1942, Col. 590, and *H.L. 127. 5S*, 6 April 1943, Cols. 20–1.

51. *H.C. 402. 5S*, 28 July 1944, Col. 1039, and *H.C. 411. 5S*, 14 June 1945, Col. 1871.

52. John Maynard, 'India: The Two Voices', *New Statesman*, 4 July 1942, p. 7. This was no less than an open invitation to the Hindus to start a civil war; a strange commentary on the argument of those who said that Pakistan's creation would lead to a civil war.

53. H. N. Brailsford, *Subject India* (1943), p. 92.

54. In fact, the Sind Legislative Assembly passed exactly such a resolution on 3 March 1943; see R. Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, Part III (1943), p. 3.

55. *The Round Table*, March 1941, pp. 319–20, June 1941, pp. 508–9, and June 1942, p. 379.

Notes to Chapter 10

1. Entry of 3 March 1942, in King George VI's diary, J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *King George VI: His Life and Reign* (1958), p. 696. Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck has, however, told the present author that at no

time did the Muslims constitute more than half of the Indian Army.

2. R. Coupland, *India: A Re-Statement* (1945), p. 213. Cf. a Cambridge historian's remark, 'If the choice of a friend of Nehru and the Congress caused some uneasiness among the Muslim leaders, it was slight by comparison with that occasioned by the selection of a former advocate of a Popular Front, of an intellectual Socialist anti-imperialist recently returned from Moscow', Nicholas Mansergh, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Postwar Change 1939–1952* (1958), p. 147.

3. *Manchester Guardian*, 24 and 26 March 1942.

4. Colin Cooke, *The Life of Richard Stafford Cripps* (1957), p. 283.

5. L. S. Amery, *H.C. 402. 5S*, 28 July 1944, Col. 1106.

6. His 'India in Transition', *Geographical Magazine*, August 1942, p. 159.

7. *H.L. 122. 5S*, 29 April 1942, Cols. 771–2.

8. See Cripps, *H.C. 338. 5S*, 11 September 1942, Cols. 614–15. This was later confirmed by Edward Thompson, see Thomas Jones, *A Diary with Letters 1931–1950* (1954), p. 522.

9. Lords Crewe, Salisbury, Samuel, Hailey and Snell, *H.L. 122. 5S*, 29 April 1942, Cols. 759, 769, and *H.L. 127. 5S*, 6 April 1943, Cols. 29–30, 43, 53.

10. See Amery, *H.C. 338. 5S*, 30 March 1943, Cols. 72–3; F. H. Brown in *Empire Review*, June 1943; J. Z. Hodge, *Salute to India* (1944), p. 30; and Colin Cooke, *The Life of Richard Stafford Cripps* (1957), p. 292.

11. *Daily Herald*, 31 March 1942.

12. Labour Party Annual Conference *Report* (1942), pp. 160–2.

13. Trades Union Congress *Annual Report* (1942), p. 301.

14. E. W. R. Lumby, *The Transfer of Power in India 1945–1947* (1954), p. 32.

15. Quoted in R. Coupland, *India: A Re-Statement* (1945), p. 220.

16. Full text in *The Times*, 5 August 1942.

17. Full text in ibid., 7 August 1942.

18. Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative* (1959), pp. 73, 74, 81.

19. The word 'rebellion' or 'revolt' to describe these events would not have been acceptable to the Congress before 1947 (when Gandhi and others denied any departure from the non-violent norm of the party), but since 1947 Indian historians have come to use the word 'uprising' for it. See, for example, Frank Moraes, *Jawaharlal Nehru* (1956), p. 302 (who says that the thought of a Japanese invasion 'thrilled' Nehru, p. 293), *August Rebellion Vindicated*, Calcutta (1945), G. Sahai, *'42 Rebellion: An Authentic Review of the Great Upheaval of 1942*, Delhi (1947), and A. Prasad, *The Indian Revolt of 1942*, Delhi (1958).

20. In *National Review*, December 1942, p. 508.

21. For example, E. Bevan in *Spectator*, 21 August 1942; W. Barton in ibid., 23 October 1942; and H. G. Rawlinson in *Asiatic Review*, July 1943.

22. See his *Common Sense about India* (1942). He was taken to task by Sir Edward Grigg in a review of this book in the *Sunday Times*, 27 December 1942.

23. Letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 13 August 1942.

24. Letter to *The Times*, 15 August 1942.

25. William Dobbie, letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1942.

26. Quoted in full in Labour Party Annual Conference *Report* (1943), p. 40.

27. Text in ibid., p. 40.

28. Trades Union Congress *Annual Report* (1942), p. 300.

29. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *King George VI: His Life and Reign* (1958), p. 703.

30. *Statement published by the Government of India on the Congress Party's Responsibility for the Disturbances in India 1942–1943* (March 1943), Cmd. 6430.

31. *Statement of the Policy of His Majesty's Government* (14 June 1945), Cmd. 6652.

32. R. Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, Part III (1943), p. 9.

33. Between 1937 and 1943 there were sixty-one by-elections to provincial Muslim seats; of these the League won forty-seven, Independent Muslims ten and the Congress four. Between 1934 and 1943, there were fourteen central Muslim by-elections, of which the League won seven, Independent Muslims five and the Congress two. Between 1943 and 1945, there were eleven provincial by-elections, and the League won eight, Independent Muslims three and the Congress none; during the same period all the four central by-elections were won by the League. See R. Coupland, *India: A Re-Statement* (1945), pp. 184, 242.

34. W. Wyatt, *Into the Dangerous World* (1952), p. 97.

35. E. W. R. Lumby, *The Transfer of Power in India 1945–1947* (1954), p. 50.

36. *Round Table*, June 1940, p. 630.

37. See Haig in *Asiatic Review*, July 1940, pp. 428–9; Lovett in *Quarterly Review*, January 1941, p. 27; Winterton, *H.C. 379. 5S*, Cols. 887, 896; Sykes and Amery, *H.C. 383. 5S*, Cols. 576, 605; Nicholson, *H.C. 388. 5S*, Col. 90.

38. Letter to *The Times*, 6 January 1941.

39. In *Asiatic Review*, April 1941, p. 217.

40. Union of Democratic Control, *India and the War* (1941), p. 3.

41. *H.L. 121. 5S*, 3 February 1942, Cols. 589–90; *H.C. 379. 5S*, 28 April 1942, Col. 889; and *H.C. 402. 5S*, 28 July 1944, Col. 1071.

42. *H.C. 383. 5S*, 10 September 1942, Col. 307.

43. It is a little-known but significant fact that the Muslim League demanded *two* independent and sovereign States from 1940 to 1946; it was only in the Legislators' Convention of April 1946 that *one* Pakistan was demanded.

44. Lord Hailey summing up in a conversation on India with Sir William Beveridge on the B.B.C., *Listener*, 15 February 1940, p. 322.

45. A representative selection: J. A. Spender in *Sunday Times*, 11 August 1940; *The Times*, 21 November 1940; the *Observer*, 24 November 1940; E. Rathbone, letter to *The Times*, 31 May 1941; W. Barton in

Spectator, 7 May 1943; Duke of Devonshire, *H.L. 121. 5S*, 3 February 1942, Cols. 629–30; and Hailey, *H.L. 127. 5S*, 6 April 1943, Col. 44.

46. Labour Party Annual Conference *Report* (1943), p. 211 and *Report* (1944), pp. 185–7; and Trades Union Congress *Annual Report* (1943), p. 335, and *Annual Report* (1944), p. 303.

47. *H.C. 364. 5S*, Cols. 903–4; *H.C. 379. 5S*, Cols. 849–50, 868–73; *H.C. 402. 5S*, Col. 1089.

48. *H.L. 116. 5S*, Col. 178; *H.L. 117. 5S*, Cols. 209–10; *H.L. 121. 5S*, Cols. 588–9.

49. *'Essayez': Memoirs of Lawrence, Second Marquess of Zetland* (1956), pp. 274–5.

50. For instance, H. Brailsford in *New Statesman*, 4 May 1940, p. 581, and his entire *Subject India* (1943); G. T. Gwynn, letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 21 August 1940; Carl Heath, letter to *The Times*, 25 November 1941; H. G. Alexander, *India Since Cripps* (1944); and G. Catlin, *In the Path of Mahatma Gandhi* (1948), pp. 267–9.

51. Letter to *The Times*, 12 November 1940. His figures were wrong.

52. Letter to ibid., 8 March 1943; answered by Sir A. Watson on 9 March.

53. Letter to *Spectator*, 1 September 1944.

54. Letter to *The Times*, 20 March 1945.

Notes to Chapter 11

1. *Indian Annual Register, 1945*, Vol. II, p. 110.

2. Cmd. 6821 of 1946.

3. See A. C. Bannerjee and D. R. Bose (eds.), *The Cabinet Mission in India* (1946), pp. 312–15.

4. Cmd. 7136 of 1947.

5. W. A. Moore, 'Wishful Thinking About India', *Nineteenth Century*, January 1947, pp. 12–13.

6. *H.C. 431. 5S*, 12 December 1946, Cols. 1363–9.

7. Lords Scarbrough and Cranborne also spoke. For the whole debate see *H.L. 142. 5S*, 18 July 1946, Cols. 590–617, and *H.L. 145. 5S*, 26 February 1947, Cols. 1050–1.

8. See J. C. French, 'The Cabinet Mission's Legacy', *National Review*, October 1946.

9. *Round Table*, September 1946, pp. 340, 361.

10. Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (1961), p. 48.

11. Mr William Dobbie, letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 23 October 1946.

12. Lord Ismay, Mountbatten's chief of staff, still calls Nehru the 'Deputy Prime Minister' of the interim government; *The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay* (1960), p. 418.

13. *H.L. 145. 5S*, 26 February 1947, Cols. 1000–1.

14. *H.C. 431. 5S*, 13 December 1946, Cols. 1543, 1552–7; ibid., 11 December 1946, Cols. 1179–80.

15. *H.C. 434. 5S*, 5 March 1947, Col. 509.

16. *H.L. 144. 5S*, 16 December 1946, Col. 938.

17. See *H.C. 431. 5S*, 11 December 1946, Col. 1176.

18. Cf. his later opinion that by opposing the official interpretation of this clause Gandhi was 'definitely jeopardizing' the entire Mission plan; in H. S. L. Polak *et al.*, *Mahatma Gandhi* (1949), p. 289.

19. For this debate: *H.L. 144. 5S*, 11 December 1946, Cols. 768–9; ibid., 16 December 1946, Cols. 944–5, 970.

20. *H.C. 431. 5S*, 13 December 1946, Cols. 1531–2.

21. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *King George VI: His Life and Reign* (1958), p. 706.

22. Entry in the King's diary of 10 December 1946, ibid., p. 707.

23. ibid., pp. 708–9.

24. Michael Brecher believes—after having talked to former British officials—that it was this plan which led to Wavell's recall; M. Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (1959), p. 337. And that makes the recall even more incomprehensible.

25. *H.C. 433. 5S*, 20 February 1947, Cols. 1396–7. Full text in Cmd. 7047.

26. G. D. Birla, *In the Shadow of the Mahatma* (1953), p. 321.

27. Francis Williams, *A Prime Minister Remembers: The War and Post-War Memoirs of the Rt Hon. Earl Attlee based on his Private Papers and on a series of Recorded Conversations* (1961), pp. 208–9.

28. Leonard Mosley, op. cit., p. 107.

29. These dire prognostications came true, but a leftist historian still believes that 'the transfer of power over a population of some four hundred million—one-sixth of the world's total population—thus took place smoothly', Henry Pelling, *Modern Britain 1885–1955* (1960), p. 167.

30. *H.L. 145. 5S*, Cols. 962–1036.

31. See *The Times*, 23 and 26 November 1946, and 22 March 1947.

32. Francis Watson, 'Gandhi and the Viceroys', *History Today*, February 1958, p. 96.

33. Leonard Mosley, op. cit., pp. 44–5.

34. M. Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (1959), p. 337.

35. Francis Williams, *A Prime Minister Remembers* (1961), p. 209.

36. *H.C. 439. 5S*, 10 July 1947, Col. 2450.

37. None of those who know the inside story say that Jinnah had at first agreed to having Mountbatten as Governor-General of both Dominions. 'It was assumed' that Jinnah would do so (V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* [1957], p. 394). 'We got the impression' that Jinnah would 'in the end' do so (*The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay* [1960], pp. 428–9). Brecher also used the word 'assumption' in this connection (M. Brecher, op. cit., p. 352). Even the Government of India's records say that 'the India Office appear to be assuming' that Mountbatten would be asked by both parties to become joint governor-general (quoted in L. Mosley, op. cit., p. 150).

38. *Manchester Guardian*, 25 February 1947.

39. A. Campbell Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten* (1951), p. 23.

40. L. Mosley, op. cit., pp. 125–6.

41. *The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay* (1960), p. 421.

42. L. Mosley, op. cit., p. 126.

43. A. Campbell Johnson, op. cit., p. 44.

44. ibid., p. 94.

45. Mountbatten's address to the East India Association on 29 June 1948, *Asiatic Review*, October 1948, p. 349. Italics not in the original.

46. *Manchester Guardian*, 3 March 1956.

47. It may be that Mountbatten's over-anxiety to be joint governor-general, of which he made no secret, created a suspicion in Jinnah's mind. The extent to which Mountbatten had set his heart on this job is clearly brought out by Leonard Mosley, op. cit., pp. 150–6.

48. Guy Wint, *The British in Asia* (1954 ed.), p. 154.

49. *The Times*, 14 August 1945.

50. *Round Table*, September 1945, p. 298.

51. *The Times*, 8 September 1945.

52. *H.C. 420. 5S*, 15 March 1946, Col. 1422.

53. See *The Times*, 18 and 19 March 1946.

54. *H.L. 144. 5S*, 16 December 1946, Col. 943.

55. See A. Campbell Johnson, op. cit., p. 31.

56. *Round Table*, March 1946, pp. 155–6.

57. *H.C. 420. 5S*, 15 March 1946, Cols. 1428–9; *H.C. 431. 5S*, 13 December 1946, Cols. 1487–8.

58. Sir Lancelot Graham in *Asiatic Review*, July 1947, p. 201; Sir Henry Craik in ibid., p. 232; and Earl Munster in ibid., October 1947, p. 294.

59. In *New Statesman*, 9 March 1946, p. 170; 10 August 1946, p. 91; 15 February 1947, pp. 127–8; and 10 May 1947, pp. 329–30.

60. *H.C. 420. 5S*, 15 March 1946, Cols. 1452–4.

61. ibid., Cols. 1458–9, and *H.C. 425. 5S*, 18 July 1946, Cols. 1430–1.

62. *H.C. 431. 5S*, 12 December 1946, Cols. 1425–6 and in *New Statesman*, 15 March 1947, p. 170. This gentleman was considered by Cripps to be a friend of the Muslims, see W. Wyatt, *Into the Dangerous World* (1952), p. 126.

63. *H.C. 422. 5S*, 16 May 1946, Cols. 2129–30.

64. *Manchester Guardian*, 16 June 1947.

65. H. S. Polak *et al.*, *Mahatma Gandhi* (1949), p. 295.

66. V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (1957), p. 442. See also *Hindustan Times*' editorial of 3 June 1947; *Economist*, 17 May 1947; *Sunday Times*, 1 June 1947; *Round Table*, September 1947, p. 370; and *Manchester Guardian*, 25 June 1947 and 15 August 1949.

67. In *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947, p. 114.

68. In *Asiatic Review*, October 1947, pp. 317–18.

69. *The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay* (1960), p. 431. See also C. H. Philips, *India* (1948), p. 154.

70. See *H.C. 439. 5S*, 10 July 1947, Cols. 2445–87, and *H.C. 440. 5S*, Cols. 228–84.

71. *H.L. 150. 5S*, 16 July 1947, Cols. 808–62.

Notes on Chapter 12

1. See his *Memoirs* (1945), pp. 139–52, 256–62; his 'Democracy on Trial in India', *Listener*, 6 April 1938, pp. 719–20; and his 'India Today', *Spectator*, 3, 10 and 17 June 1938.

2. *H.L. 144. 5S*, 16 December 1946, Col. 935.

3. The paper's services in behalf of the Congress earned it this testimonial from C. N. M. Mudaliar, president of the Tamil Nadu Congress Committee, 'Editorial comments in the *Manchester Guardian* during the recent controversy and since the assumption of office by the Congress party in six provinces have been marked by such a friendly approach to the Indian problem . . .', letter to the paper, 13 September 1937.

4. E. W. R. Lumby, *The Transfer of Power in India 1945–1947* (1954), p. 37.

5. C. S. Milford, 'The Communal Problem in India', *The Year Book of World Affairs 1947*, p. 119.

6. *H.C. 186. 5S*, 9 July 1925, Col. 747.

7. Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, *My Part in a Changing World* (1938), pp. 337–8.

8. F. Brockway, *Inside the Left* (1947 ed.), pp. 174–5.

9. *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. VII, pp. 666–74.

10. H. N. Brailsford in *New Statesman*, 2 March 1946, p. 154.

11. See *The Times*, 29 September and 6 October 1947, and R. Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (1950), pp. 168–9.

12. The *Listener*, 22 January 1959, p. 155. It is significant that the more intemperate portions of this statement on Jinnah were omitted when this interview was included in F. Williams, *A Prime Minister Remembers* (1961), p. 211.

13. Winterton, *Orders of the Day* (1953), p. 230.

14. R. Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (1950), pp. 170–3.

15. See W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. IV (1951), p. 186.

16. Some examples may be found in Louis Fischer, *A Week With Gandhi* (1943), A. E. Kane, 'Development of Indian Politics', *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1944, R. Holland, 'India and the American Opinion', *Asiatic Review*, April 1946, Norman Brown in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 91, No. 2, 5 April 1947, pp. 163–80, Curtis in *Yale Review*, Summer 1947, pp. 695–701, and L. K. Rosinger, *Restless India* (1946), pp. 77–8.

17. For similar sentiments see Sir George Schuster, letter to *The Times*, 14 October 1942; Miss Margery Perham, 'America and the Empire', ibid., 20 and 21 November 1942; Sir Edward Grigg, 'Wendell Wilkie on India', *Sunday Times*, 1 November 1942; L. D. Gammans, *H.C. 338. 5S*, 30 March 1943, Col. 101; and Lord Hailey, *H.L. 127. 5S*, 6 April 1943, Col. 49.

18. H. S. Polak in *Manchester Guardian*, 21 June 1943, in *Spectator*, 16 July 1943, and in *Asiatic Review*, July 1943, pp. 268–83.

19. See *The Times*, 21, 22, 23 July, 5 and 6 September 1930. His arguments were favourably analysed in *New Statesman*, 16 August 1930.

20. Gradually a literature of fair size came to be written upon this topic. A selection: S. Brooks, *British Rule in India* (an East India Association pamphlet, May 1909); 'America and India', *Economist*, 13 October 1942; H. S. Holland, 'India and the American Opinion', *Asiatic Review*, April

1946; 'Scrutator', 'Britain and India', *Sunday Times*, 2 March 1947; and E. Harrington, 'American Reaction to Recent Political Events in India', *Asiatic Review*, April 1948.

21. See his letters to Mr Justice Holmes in Mark de Wolfe (ed.), *Holmes-Laski Letters* (1953), Vol. I, pp. 81, 200–1, 209, 247, Vol. II, pp. 1258, 1454.

22. A. Besant, *How India Wrought for Freedom* (1915), pp. ii–iii.

23. In *Daily Herald*, 17 August 1932.

24. Letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 11 October 1930.

25. Wilfred Roberts, *H.C. 383. 5S*, 11 September 1942, Col. 570.

26. And vice versa. In May 1945 the Committee of Indian Congressmen in Britain issued a directive to all its members 'to vote for and support the Labour Party at the forthcoming General Election', *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 26 May 1945.

27. Helena Normanton, *India in England* (1921), p. 22.

28. In November–December 1918 Tilak toured Britain for the Home Rule For India League. He promised financial support to the Labour Party in its election campaign and in exchange secured from the Labour leaders an assurance that they would support the Congress demand both in Parliament and outside. Consequently the Labour Party 'placed the local organization of the party at the disposal of Tilak'. Tilak gave £2,000 to the Labour Party Election Fund, 'resisting a request to make it £5,000'. See S. L. Karandikar, *Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak* (1957), pp. 521–2, Theodore L. Shay, *The Legacy of the Lokamanya* (1956), pp. 136–7, and Bombay Presidency *Police Abstract of Intelligence* for the year 1919, para. 1253, quoted in the Government of Bombay, *Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement in India* (1958), Vol. II, p. 314.

29. In the 1945 election campaign in Britain only six per cent of the candidates of all parties mentioned India in their election addresses. By parties, four per cent Conservatives and eight per cent Labour candidates mentioned India; but only few had 'more than a sentence of a dozen words' to say on the subject. McCallum and Readman, *The British General Election of 1945* (1947), p. 99. But it is not known how many of them mentioned the fact that Indian self-government did not mean giving Congress the chance to rule the country.

30. R. P. Dutt, *A Guide to the Problem of India* (1942), p. 17.

31. ibid., pp. 91–2, 198–9. For similar opinions see his *India Today*.

32. Rev. Pitt Bonarjee, letter to *Manchester Guardian*, 18 August 1942.

33. Earl Winterton, *H.C. 379. 5S*, Col. 884, and *H.C. 411. 5S*, Cols. 1869–70.

34. See J. E. Wrench, *Francis Yeats-Brown 1886–1944: A Portrait* (1948), pp. 20, 265, 268–70.

35. D. W. Brogan, *The English People* (1943), pp. 166–99.

36. *Indian Round Table Conference: First Session (1930–1931)*, p. 102.

37. N. C. Chaudhri, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (1951), pp. 415–16.

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