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Government Policies and the Politics of the Teaching of Urdu in Pakistan

Introduction: Since Urdu had become a symbol of Muslim identity during the period of the Urdu-Hindi controversy in Pre-Partition India, it had an established political significance in the eyes of the Muslim League which began ruling Pakistan in 1947. At the same time, Bengalis constituted more than half (55.6 percent) of the population of Pakistan and the ruling élite—Muslim League politicians, bureaucrats and the military—dominated as it was by a Punjabi-Mohajir coalition, felt threatened by the mere existence of this majority. To neutralize a perceived threat of possible domination by East Bengal, it may have made sense to the ruling élite to fall back on Urdu as a unifying symbol of the state. However, no matter what the underlying political motives of the West Pakistani élite may have been, there is no doubt that most people in West Pakistan, especially the dominant intelligentsia, sincerely felt that it would be in the national interest to integrate the new nation, and that Urdu could do that job better than any other language. With this in mind the teaching of Urdu was promoted as part of the defining political imperative of national integration.

The Beginnings: An inaugural educational conference held in Karachi (27 November–1 December 1947) laid the foundations for a language-teaching policy which is still followed. The cardinal points of this policy were to make Urdu "the lingua franca of Pakistan" and to teach it "as a compulsory language in schools" (ABE 1948: Appendix VI). While the conference did not make it a medium of instruction in schools, the situation was that it was being used as such in the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.), Baluchistan and parts of Kashmir. Among the provinces which make up present-day Pakistan, only in Sindh itself

was Sindhi the medium of instruction for most schools. But even here the cities were changing fast in their demographic composition. The predominantly Urdu-speaking Mohajirs were migrating in large numbers from northern India and settling down in the cities (Census 1951: Statements 2E and 2F). Having more urban, educated people among their numbers than the Sindhis (Census 1951: Tables 9-B), they wanted to have more and more schools—both Urdu- and English-medium—in the cities of Sindh. Thus, when Karachi became a federal area separate from Sindh on 23 July 1948 the number of schools was as follows:

TABLE I

Medium of instruction	Number of Schools	
	1949–50	1950–51
Urdu-medium	69	80
Sindhi-medium	57	59
Gujarati-medium	17	17

Source: ABE 1954: 53

The figures for both Sindhi- and Gujarati-medium schools actually decreased as time went on.

The policy of using Urdu as a means for national integration backfired however, because of resistance to it. According to ethnic nationalists this policy helped the Punjabi and Mohajir élites consolidate their power in all the provinces of Pakistan and was, therefore, part of an overall policy of internal colonialism (for an excellent exposition of their views see Shah 1997). In reality, since it was English, not Urdu, which was used at the highest level in all central services, the rule of English-knowing people was ensured, and Urdu was, if anything, only a minor threat to the domination of this English-using élite. However, the Urdu policy did favor the Mohajirs and Punjabis at the lower levels of power. Moreover it elevated the status of Urdu vis-à-vis the other languages of Pakistan. This enhanced the status of the urban, Urdu-using culture and brought about a corresponding devaluation of indigenous vernacular-using rural cultures. This was the psychological dimension—the valuation of a single symbolic system (language, code of conduct, dress, values and a way of structuring and categorizing of reality) rather than many symbolic systems based on indigenous languages and ways of life. Psychologically speaking, then, the valuation of Urdu vis-à-vis the indigenous languages created a situation which can only be described in terms of cultural imperialism.

An imperialism which, as Paulo Freire points out, is not only acquiesced into but actively supported by those who are subjected to it—the "invaded." Indeed, everyone—"invader" and "invaded"—accept, internalize and act according to the same values (Freire 1989: 151).

As anyone who knows Pakistan will observe, this is true for most middle-class people in the Punjab. They believe that Urdu, and the values which go with urban Mughal culture (the culture of the Urdu-speaking élite), are superior to Punjabi and rural values. However, in the N.W.F.P., Sindh and tribal Baluchistan people are proud of their indigenous cultures. The language movements in various parts of Pakistan—including Hindko, Siraiki, Punjabi, Balochi and other languages—are trying to make urban Urdu-using people take pride in the indigenous languages and cultures (Rahman 1996). In short then, the policy of favoring Urdu explicitly has devalued the other indigenous languages of Pakistan while English, about which more will be said later, has devalued all Pakistani languages.

Urdu Policy in the 1950s: In the 1950s a number of committees were appointed to look at the role of Urdu in Pakistan. These committees kept emphasizing Urdu despite opposition to it in East Bengal. In Dhaka, one year after the first phase of the Bengali language movement in 1948, the Advisory Board of Education set up an Urdu committee under the chairmanship of 'Abdu 'l-Ḥaq, the father of Urdu *(Bābā-e Urdū)*. Among its terms of reference was the possible replacement of English by Urdu as a medium of instruction at the university level. While this was only a future possibility, the committee decided in 1950 that, to begin with, Urdu would become the medium of instruction in most government schools in the Punjab, N.W.F.P., and the centrally-administered areas of Karachi and Baluchistan (ABE 1954: Annexure B, p. 72). From 1952 onward it also became the optional medium of instruction at the intermediate level in the colleges affiliated with the Punjab, Peshawar and Karachi universities (*ibid*., 65).

Indeed, Karachi was converted into an Urdu-using city so quickly that a report of 11 May 1949 tells us that the Municipal Corporation of Karachi passed a resolution recommending the immediate adoption of Urdu in all of its proceedings. All the roads, for instance, would be named in Urdu and other languages would cease to be used. This, however, was "felt to be too precipitate" and the decision-makers contented themselves with making Urdu the official language of the corporation itself (Review 1949).

Included as part of the drive toward creating a Pakistani-Muslim identity was the marginalization of the indigenous languages of Pakistan. As already mentioned, Bengali posed the greatest threat since it was the language of most Pakistanis according to the census of 1951 (Statement 4-B, p. 71). The state marginalized these languages by implementing several language planning policies (LP). We are primarily concerned here with "acquisition planning"—attempts at spreading a language by teaching it and by other means. However, in order to understand acquisition planning better, let us look briefly at other forms of LP.

First, there was Status Planning, which has been discussed above. English had the status of being the official language, and Urdu, it was declared, would be the sole national language. Second, there was Corpus Planning—activities like standardizing a language, creating new terms in it to express modern concepts (neologism), spreading its use through dictionaries and grammar books. Both of these forms of LP were undertaken by the state.

Urdu in East Bengal: Among the corpus planning activities undertaken by the state in East Bengal was the Islamization of Bengali. The East Bengal government set up a language committee on 7 December 1950 and this committee recommended the use of non-Sanskritized Bengali. However, as far back as 1948 East Bengalis had begun to mistrust such changes. Above all they feared that the script of their language, being very close to the Devanagari script of Hindi, would be changed to the Perso-Arabic *Nasta'līq* script of Urdu. Such apprehensions were expressed in the legislative assembly, in the press and by the students of Dhaka University (LAD-B 01 Mar 1951: 61; *Pakistan Observer* 10 April 1949 and Umar 1970: 204). The government, thereupon, took no action, although the apprehensions expressed had not been entirely unwarranted. Even as late as 21 January 1952, exactly a month before the language crisis led to riots in Dhaka, the fourth meeting of the Urdu Committee, with 'Abdu 'l-Ḥaq as chair, recommended that a uniform script be adopted for the national and "regional" languages. Bengali, the majority language of Pakistan at that time, was classified as a "regional" language and the idea that its script should be changed was mooted at various levels (ABE 1954: Annexure D, p. 79).

A small experiment, involving the teaching of Arabic, was, indeed, conducted in this regard. The central government established "twenty adult education centres in different parts of East Pakistan to teach primary Bengali through Arabic script" (Islam 1986: 152; *Pakistan Observer* 4

October 1950). However, since 1940 the medium of instruction in the high schools had been Bengali in the Devanagari-based script (Edn-B 1951: 19) so this experiment failed. Apart from this, in 1950–51 Urdu was "introduced as an additional compulsory subject from class V" (Edn-B 1956: 14). Surprisingly, however, the East Bengal *Report on Public Instruction 1952–53* was silent about the greatest upheaval of its time—the Bengali language movement of 1952. Indeed, the report confined itself to the following laconic, and under the circumstances rather perverse, statement:

> Urdu, then the proposed only state Language of Pakistan was introduced in Middle classes as a compulsory subject. English was, however, abolished upto [*sic*] class V which was now merged into the primary stage. (Edn-B 1958: 17)

The report of 1953–54 also stated without remorse that Urdu had been added "from class IV to upward as a compulsory subject [in some areas] and as an optional subject in [certain other areas]" (Edn-B 1959 a: 12). Thus, Bengali-speaking students had to learn Urdu even after their own language, Bengali, had become the other national language of Pakistan. While official documents declared that Urdu was compulsory for Bengalis just as Bengali was compulsory for "Urdu-speaking pupils" (Edn-B 1959 b: 12), the fact was that state support made Urdu much more ubiquitous in Pakistani cities, especially in the official domains, than any other Pakistani language. Thus, anyone with any social ambition found it necessary to learn Urdu. This meant that pragmatic people, even if they were Bengali language activists, had to learn Urdu, and they felt that their language, and thus their identity, were unjustly marginalized because of an intentionally harmful language-teaching policy.

The Bengali language movement did not lead to any fundamental changes in the centrist policies of the ruling élite. Indeed, the very worst took place instead. The consolidation of the provinces of the western wing into one unit, the province of West Pakistan, in 1955 (WPO 1955), presented a united front to East Pakistan. While confronting Bengali ethnicity in this manner, the policy also provoked the nationalists in West Pakistan—the Sindhi, Pakhtun and Balochi-Brahvi ethno-nationalists—to confront the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated center even more aggressively than before. The rise of ethnicity in Pakistan has, however, been described by a number of scholars and need not concern us here (see Amin 1988; Rahman 1996; Ahmed 1998). What needs to be examined

now is how the state developed its language-teaching policies, especially those concerning Urdu, in light of the increased emphasis on centrism.

Ayub Khan's Language Policy: In 1958 when General Ayub Khan imposed martial law he declared that "a strong central government" was "an absolute MUST" (Gauhar 1993: 163). This was not unexpected considering that in his "appreciation" of 1954 he had written:

> West Pakistan, in order to develop properly and prove a bulwark of defence from the North or South, must be welded into one unit and all artificial provincial boundaries removed, regardless of any prejudices to the contrary, which are more the creation of politicians than real. (Khan 1967: 187)

However, Ayub had deferred to what he called the "prejudices" of the people. Thus he conceded that West Pakistan should "be so sub-divided that each sub-unit embraces a racial group or groups with common economy, communications and potentiality for development, and administration decentralized in them to the maximum possible" (*ibid.*, 187). When applied, of course, this was a contradiction in terms. The disappearance of symbolic names—such as Sindh, Punjab, etc.—and the devaluation of the indigenous languages of different areas were calculated to strengthen the cultural and political domination of the center which, in practice, meant the symbolic domination of Urdu and the urban culture of the Urdu-speaking ashraf.

Ayub Khan's Commission on National Education (appointed 30 December 1958, report submitted on 26 August 1959) made its centrist language policy quite clear. Strengthening the position of "national" languages—which were Bengali and Urdu now—the report said:

> We are firmly convinced that for the sake of our national unity we must do everything to promote the linguistic cohesion of West Pakistan by developing the national language, Urdu, to the fullest extent. In the areas of the former Panjab, Bahawalpur and Baluchistan, Urdu is already the medium of instruction at the primary stage, and this arrangement should continue. Urdu in this way will eventually become the common popular language of all the people in this area. (Edn. Com. 1959: Chapter 21, para 14, p. 292)

Since Urdu was to be introduced in 1963 as the language of instruction in Sindhi-medium schools from class 6 on, the only language which

would really be affected was Sindhi. Pashto was not being used as a medium of instruction after class 5, and it was only being used in a few rural schools anyway, while Sindhi was used in many more schools, especially in rural Sindh. Thus the Sindhis reacted aggressively to the proposed changes and succeeded in having some of them blocked (for details see Rahman 1996: 116).

Ayub Khan's own stance, and that of the officer corps of the army, was modernist and Westernized. It was not that they accepted the liberal humanist values of the West and really believed in democracy, but they did disapprove of certain values, traditions and attitudes of the past. Thus, for them, orthodox and revivalist interpretations of Islam, indigenous culture, and language-based ethnicity were reactionary throwbacks to the past. English, on the other hand, was the language of modernization and progressive values. To combat the mullahs (as the ulema were pejoratively labeled), the army and the bureaucracy supported English-medium instruction. To combat ethnicity, which was stigmatized as "provincialism," the regime had to fall back on Urdu in West Pakistan, and even had to recruit Islam in support of the nationalist cause.

In the 1960s some universities started replacing English as a medium of instruction and examination with Urdu or some other language. Karachi University declared early in 1963 that by 1967–68 all teaching and examination in postgraduate, technical and professional subjects would be in Urdu. It set up an implementation committee to see that this change took place efficiently. Since 1957 a Bureau of Composition, Compilation and Translation had also been functioning at the university, and technical terms were said to exist to facilitate the changeover. However, the university did not suddenly abandon Urdu. Its relevant directive reads: "Statute 28: Medium of Instruction and Examination: The medium of instruction and examination shall be English or Urdu."

The university also decided "to strengthen teaching of English (whenever necessary) to enable Pakistani students to use the language with greater facility." Also, "*knowledge of English Scientific and Technical Terms*, along with their Urdu equivalents, has been *made compulsory for all students*" (emphasis in the original; Karachi University 1963, in 'Abdullāh 1976: 77–8).

But what the Ayub Khan government objected to was the spirit of the change. Karachi University had begun teaching in Urdu in 1963; it intended to introduce it at the highest examining and teaching levels; it proposed using the 400 books that Osmania University, Hyderabad, had produced in pre-1947 India; it wanted to work with other pro-Urdu

organizations such as the Markazī Majlis-e-Taraqqī-e Adab (Lahore) to produce glossaries of technical terms and, most defiantly of all, even teach Urdu to foreign students on the grounds that "every foreign university presupposes adequate knowledge of that country's language" (qtd. 'Abdullāh 1976: 78). Other universities also moved away from English to various degrees. The Punjab University gave the option of answering questions in Urdu and English to B.A. students in 1964, and to M.A. students in 1967. Sindh University allowed not only Urdu but also Sindhi for answering B.A. examination questions, as well as for teaching. Peshawar University retained English but taught and examined students of Arabic, Urdu and Islamic Studies using the medium of Urdu (CSPW 1966: 111).

The *Report of the Commission on Students' Welfare and Problems* (1966) was highly critical of these changes. It charged Karachi University with discrimination and disobedience because Bengali students were denied their right to study in Bengali and because the central government had directed universities not to change the medium of instruction in technical and scientific subjects. The University of Sindh was castigated in terms which weighed heavily on the sensitivities of Sindhi nationalists. The report said: "Sind University has gone to the extent of permitting the use of Sindhi for answering pass and honours examination papers, thus equating a regional language in this respect with the national language" (CSPW 1966: 114).

The report also mentioned that such a change would be unfair to the English-medium students, but this, perhaps the major reason for the highly-critical stance adopted in the report, was camouflaged by the question of the rights of the Bengalis and "a heterogeneous multilingual population" in Karachi (CSPW 1966: 116). In the end all pretense was dropped and the report unabashedly recommended that "no university should be permitted" to change the medium of instruction until a committee of a minister and a secretary—i.e., high, state functionaries—advised such a step (*ibid.*, 117). In short, the Pakistani ruling élite had done what the British did when Sir Syed and the Anjuman-e Panjāb wanted vernacular-medium universities to be established in the nineteenth century—it put its foot firmly down (Rahman 1996: 43–6).

During the sixties Urdu became more and more closely associated with Islam, Pakistani nationalism, and support of the military. The middle-class Urdu press, especially the *Navā'e Vaqt* newspaper, as well as the social studies and Urdu textbooks concentrated on these themes in order to create a strongly nationalistic Pakistani population which would

support militarization with religious fervor. Thus, when, in 1988, the Ministry of Education polled the citizens about educational policies, the majority of respondents, coming mostly from the middle class, supported schooling in the Urdu medium as well as the abolition of élitist English schools. However, along with this they also supported restricting womens' freedom, witch-hunting of freethinkers, compulsory military training, and placing even more emphasis on Islamic and nationalistic matters in the curricula than the state was already providing (Sheikh et al. 1989). Fifty-five schoolteachers, whose opinion was polled by a sampling procedure in 1981–82, agreed that the English curriculum reflected the ideology of Pakistan (Curriculum 1982: 31). These schoolteachers were themselves the products of state-run, Urdu-medium schools. In short, those who supported Urdu were not liberal democrats, while those who supported English and liberal values were mostly from Westernized and élitist backgrounds. In a survey of students in 1999–2000 the present author found that those in Urdu-medium schools were far more right-wing in most of their opinions than those in élitist, English-medium schools (see Appendix 1 for the full questions).

Opinions of Urdu- and English-Medium Students Towards Ideological Issues

Question 13. What should Pakistan's priorities be?

		Urdu-medium schools (N=520)	English-medium schools (N=97)
ALL FIGURES BELOW ARE PERCENTAGES			
(a) Conquer Kashmir?			
	Agree	95.58	62.89
	Disagree	02.12	31.96
	Don't care	02.31	05.15
(b) Develop nuclear weapons?			
	Agree	79.81	64.95
	Disagree	13.65	26.80
	Don't care	06.54	08.25
(c) Reduce army budget?			
	Agree	55.58	69.07
	Disagree	32.50	17.53

Don't care	11.73	13.40
(d) Implement *Sharī'a*?		
Agree	95.58	52.58
Disagree	01.73	23.71
Don't care	02.69	23.71
(e) Make press free?		
Agree	58.65	62.89
Disagree	26.35	19.59
Don't care	15.00	17.52
(f) Make T.V. free?		
Agree	36.92	67.01
Disagree	46.92	18.56
Don't care	16.15	14.43
(g) Establish democracy?		
Agree	75.77	64.95
Disagree	08.46	14.43
Don't care	15.38	20.62
(h) Give equal rights to Ahmedis?		
Agree	44.04	53.61
Disagree	33.85	22.68
Don't care	22.12	23.71

These are some of the responses to ideological questions given in the survey (for comparison of all responses see Appendix 2). These responses indicate clearly that students of Urdu-medium schools favor opinions associated with right-wing ideologies in Pakistan. However, the attitude of these students towards the establishment of democracy is inconsistent with the rest of their views, being more "liberal" than other students. No explanation for this surprising inconsistency comes to the mind.

The Language-Teaching Policy of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP): No significant change in the language-teaching policy occurred during the PPP government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Despite his socialist and liberal rhetoric, Bhutto did not want to alienate the military or the other members of the establishment. Furthermore, he too found Islam and Urdu useful as integrative symbols to counter the threat of ethnic breakup.

The general objectives of the education policy of 1972–80 were:

(i) Ensuring the preservation, promotion and practice of the basic ideology of Pakistan and making it a code of individual and national life.

(ii) Building up national cohesion through education and by promoting social and cultural harmony compatible with our basic ideology (English 1976: 2–3).

Urdu textbooks state emphatically that teachers should ensure that the ideology of Pakistan is never made to appear controversial, and further that: "In the teaching material no differentiation should be made between the religious and the mundane, but the material should be presented from the Islamic point of view" (original in Urdu; Urdu 1974: 12).

Thus, the Bhutto regime, despite the fact that Bhutto himself opposed the ulema both politically and intellectually, also used the same pedagogic political strategies as the previous regimes. In short, the basic policies of the state—in the teaching of languages, especially Urdu—remained the same under Bhutto's socialism as under the martial-law regimes it replaced.

Zia ul Haq's Language-Teaching Policy: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, despite his use of Islam as an integrative symbol and his effort to appease the Islamic lobby, had been opposed by the Pakistan National Alliance which was deeply influenced by the Islamists. When General Zia ul Haq imposed martial law on Pakistan on 5 July 1977, he legitimized himself in the name of Islam. Besides, General Zia did genuinely hold middle-class views and it cannot be denied that a somewhat stringent understanding of Islam is very often part of the middle- and lower-middle-class worldview in Pakistan. Thus, it may not be correct to suggest that Zia ul Haq merely used Islam as a political strategy in the manner of Bhutto. Yet his use of Islam, for whatever reasons, did help him politically. Further, it is also true that Zia ul Haq was a product of the colonial sector—secular schooling, training as an army officer, socialization as an officer of the élitist armored corps—and that nationalism, efficiency and modernization were very much a part of his worldview. This means that there are continuities between Zia ul Haq's policies of Islamizing education and the policies of earlier regimes. The difference, indeed, is one of degree and not of kind. This is evident in the following stated aim of the education policy of 1979:

> To foster in the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan in general and the students in particular a deep and abiding loyalty to Islam and Pakistan and a living consciousness of their spiritual and ideological identity thereby strengthening unity of the outlook of the people of Pakistan on the basis of justice and fairplay. (Edn. Pol. 1979: 1)

In keeping with this overall objective Urdu was to be used as a medium of instruction "to strengthen ideological foundations of the nation and to foster unity of thought, brotherhood and patriotism" (*ibid.*, 2).

While this was merely rhetorical, there was at first a policy departure from previous eras. Starting in "April, 1979 all students admitted to class 1 in all English medium schools will undergo instruction through the medium of Urdu or an approved provincial language" (Edn. Pol. 1979: 72)—and, to top it all, "the nomenclature 'English medium schools' will be abolished" (*ibid*, 70). This was the greatest boost the status of Urdu had ever received. Indeed, the boost came in two ways. First, at the expense of the other indigenous languages of Pakistan in the sense that:

> Urdu became a great repository of Muslim culture and acquired the status of a *lingua franca* most extensively employed as a common link language by people speaking various languages and dialects from Torkhum to Karachi. (Edn. Pol. 1979: 70)

Even while it was conceded that primary education could be in an approved provincial language, it was stated that the "switch over to the National language as medium of instruction is the ultimate aim" (*ibid.*, 71). This was a departure from previous language-teaching policies in that even Ayub Khan had not stated so forthrightly that the "provincial" languages would be supplanted at all levels by Urdu.

Second, the boost also came at the expense of English because the policy of replacing English with Urdu was a major deviation. Nevertheless, at the same time it was agreed that five years would be given to replace books in English with books in Urdu at the intermediate and degree levels, and that during the interval teachers could learn to give instruction in Urdu instead of English. These, however, were mere details. The basic policy seemed to have changed. The state was to retain English "to keep in touch with modern knowledge" (*ibid.*, 71) but it would abolish the dual mediums of instruction. Presumably, then, English would no longer be required for seeking jobs in the state sector in Pakistan and the social and symbolic significance of English would be appreciably reduced.

Such a policy was a deviation from the past and, of course, it was opposed. The opposition to Zia's policies and his abandonment of them are given in detail elsewhere and need not detain us here (see Rahman 1996: 242). Suffice it to say that Zia ul Haq eventually settled for a

language-teaching policy not essentially different from that of his predecessors. His Islamization drive did increase the Islamic content in all courses, including language courses, but this was not a case of a radically new policy but rather of "more of the same."

It is difficult to prove that Zia ul Haq's eleven years made Pakistanis more Islamic or nationalistic. Empirical evidence in this regard is generally inconclusive. However, the articulate sections of the middle class did express right-wing views more forcefully and more often during and after his rule. As mentioned earlier, in 1988 the Ministry of Education elicited the opinions of citizens about proposed changes in educational policies. A large number of people favored more Islamization and more emphasis on loyalty to nation. Others advocated the inclusion of military training. Among the more radical views expressed were:

1. Music should not be taught in schools as a subject.
2. Only Muslim teachers should be appointed, at least up to secondary level.
3. Anti-Islamic teachers should be expelled from colleges.
4. Female teachers should not be allowed to have their hair cut.
5. Islamic studies, Pakistan studies, economics and military training should be compulsory subjects at the college level.
6. The concept of "Jihad" should be given more emphasis in books of Islāmiyāt [Islamic subjects].
7. Teachers should not be allowed to speak against Pakistan's ideology in the classroom (Sheikh et al. 1989).

In short, an articulate section of the middle class, probably brought up on the patriotic courses taught in schools, supported an ideology which used religion to create nationalism and militarism in society. Such opinions had always existed, of course, but they were expressed more openly now, and other people pretended to defer to them for pragmatic reasons.

Language-Teaching After Zia ul Haq: Zia ul Haq died in August 1988; since that time Pakistan has seen two governments headed by Benazir Bhutto, two headed by Nawaz Sharif and a military regime (not counting the caretaker interludes). A number of documents pertaining to education policy have been issued from time to time. On close scrutiny, however, one discovers that these documents are remarkably similar. The Nawaz Sharif education policy of 1998, for instance, reads like a document from Zia ul Haq's time, and Benazir Bhutto's policy could well be mistaken for Nawaz Sharif's.

The 1995 preface to *Teacher Education*, for instance, says that the aim of teacher education is "to inculcate the spirit of Islam and develop the qualities of tolerance, universal brotherhood and justice" (ETE 1995: 1). This was presumably written during Benazir Bhutto's second term in office (1993–96). But the Nawaz Sharif education policy also mentions Islam in similar terms. So, despite an apparent repudiation of the previous governments' policies, the basic language policy remains the same. It is, indeed, a policy so interlinked with the distribution of power in Pakistan that it cannot be changed without first bringing about unprecedented changes in the power structure.

Urdu as an Ideological Language: According to Khalid Ahmed, a respected journalist from Lahore, Urdu lends itself more easily to right-wing views. He points out that Urdu newspapers, especially the *Navā'e Vaqt*, have always favored Islamization, the military, and an extreme form of Pakistani nationalism. The same has been pointed out about Hindi newspapers in India which have consistently been anti-Muslim and aggressive (Ahmed 1998). This contention is true of Urdu only insofar as it relates to the content of newspapers, the pronouncements of religious leaders and the views expressed in a number of popular books on Kashmir, Islam and women. However, it has nothing to do with the inherent structure and linguistic features of Urdu. Some terms—such as *shahīd* (martyr), *lā-dīniyat* (lack of religion and also secularism) and *īmāndār* (one having faith and honesty)—do, however, carry a certain amount of ideological baggage. They evolved in a religious milieu and cannot but reflect their history. This, however, does not suggest that their meaning cannot be changed by being used differently. The point is that Urdu does not necessarily restrict us to one view, excluding all others. It only appears to lend itself to expressing right-wing views because, at the moment, Urdu is used more by people who lean toward the religious right, and because it also gives easier access to texts incorporating the philosophy that is typically associated with a right-wing (religious and nationalistic) point of view.

In this context it should be noted that most Urdu textbooks used with children have a large number of lessons relating in one way or another to Islam, war or the military, and Pakistani nationalism. Indeed, I counted the number of ideological lessons, out of the total number of lessons in Urdu textbooks for classes 1 to 10, and found that 44 percent fell into one of these three major thematic categories. In the context of Urdu it should be mentioned that Muḥammad Iqbāl, considered the

ideological founder of Pakistan, is an important focus of Urdu studies. Lessons about him in school textbooks have been subsumed under Pakistani nationalism, but they may form a category by themselves. S.I. Kamrān has, in fact, analyzed all Urdu textbooks in Pakistan with reference to Iqbāl. His conclusion was that although Iqbāl is part of many lessons, he is not being discussed with a view toward strengthening the ideology of Pakistan (Kamrān 1993). That, however, is a controversial point which will not concern us here. The following chart gives an indication of the percentage of ideological lessons in the textbooks of the four provinces of Pakistan:

Number of Ideological Lessons in School Textbooks Expressed in Percentages

	NWFP	Punjab	Sindh	B'Tan	Percentage according to level
Class 1	20	6	32	28	21.5
Class 2	36	18	41	30	31.3
Class 3	50	31	38	32	37.8
Class 4	50	43	46	47	46.5
Class 5	54	38	49	47	47
Class 6	50	49	49	58	51.5
Class 7	44	52	93	46	88.8
Class 8	50	48	53	48	50
Class 9	33	33	47	25	34.5
Class 10	33	33	47	25	34.5
Total	**42**	**35.1**	**49.5**	**38.6**	**44.3**

[Source: Field work by the present author on the language textbooks used in government schools in Pakistan in 1999]

Since Urdu is read throughout the school years and even beyond, it is the major ideology-carrying language in Pakistan. Moreover, it is used not only in the non-élitist schools but also in the élitist ones.

However, in the élitist English-medium schools, textbooks for classes 1 to 8 are not necessarily those prescribed by the textbook boards. In some places books issued by private publishing houses are used. According to one textbook writer, Pakistani children are not eager to learn Urdu, whereas they show no aversion to English, because Urdu textbooks are not as colorful and interesting as the English textbooks. To remedy this a

very colorful series of textbooks has been produced recently, mostly by the Oxford University Press, Pakistan. There is also a series of storybooks, featuring pillow fights and concerns about animal life, which supplement the main texts. None of these books have Islamic or nationalistic content. However, the *Nardbān-e Urdū* series does contain essays on Islamic historical personages, Pakistani nationalism, and the 1965 war. As this series is used in a number of schools, the students are introduced to the dominant official ideology of Pakistan through language-teaching, though, of course, not to the extent that their government-school counterparts are. Nevertheless, the aim of utilizing Islam to create Pakistani nationalism of the kind that supports increased militarization is not confined to non-élitist institutions alone. Islamic Studies, Pakistan Studies and Urdu are compulsory in all schools in the country and they all contain such content. Perhaps the dose is less intensive in the élitist English-medium institutions because foreign textbooks, English literature, and outside influences dilute it.

Urdu in the Madrasas: Urdu is generally the medium of instruction and examination in Pakistani madrasas. Even if other Pakistani languages such as Pashto, Sindhi and, to a lesser extent, Brahvi and Balochi are used as the real medium of instruction for speakers of these languages, they are not used for examinations which central degree-awarding organizations administer to madrasa students. Urdu, therefore, is generally the language in which madrasa students become most competent.

During Ayub Khan's period suggestions were made by an official committee to modernize the madrasas by changing, among other things, the teaching of Urdu. Urdu was to remain compulsory at the primary level, but at the higher level it would be replaced by English and/or Arabic as the medium of instruction. For example, at the secondary level, classes 9 and 10, Urdu was to be only a preferred option, whereas English or Arabic was to be compulsory (Malik 1996: 126–7). During Zia ul Haq's rule the *Halepota Report*, as the document issued by the National Committee for Dīnī Madāris of 1979 came to be called, also gave suggestions for increasing the state's role and integrating the madrasas in the general system of education. Urdu was proposed as a compulsory subject at the primary level, as well as the medium of instruction (Report Madrassas 1979: Annexures 5 and 7). According to the printed curricula of the madrasas, Urdu is taught by the Deobandis from class 1 to 8 using books published by the textbook boards.

However, despite resistance to reform among the orthodox ulema, some aspects of a contemporary worldview have crept in through modern texts. As we have seen, in those schools where Urdu is taught, government textbooks are in use. This means that certain messages about Pakistani nationalism and the glorification of war and the military, as well as some cognizance of the modern world become part of the students' mind-set. Sometimes Urdu is also taught indirectly through exercises in translation from Arabic and vice versa. In the equivalent of class 12 the *Mu'allimu 'l-Inshā*, written by an Indian *'ālim*, uses Urdu for teaching Arabic. This book, through the topics it includes and the things it emphasizes, reveals itself to be a response, albeit reactionary, to modernity. Being a response, it at least engages in dialogue with modernity and does not exist in a world that simply ignores it. For instance, whereas medieval books never found it necessary to prescribe an Islamic mode of behavior, as it was not in dispute or under threat, this one does. Typical sentences from *Mu'allimu 'l-Inshā*, a three-volume work, include:

1. These girls have been ordered to put on the veil and they have been stopped from going to the bazaar.
2. You women are really ungrateful to your husbands (Nadvī 1951–52, Vol 1: 1) (My translations from Urdu).

There is some emphasis on militarism as well, a feature also absent in medieval texts. The choice of sentences was, according to the author, meant for those who would later be "soldiers of Islam" (Nadvī 1954–55, Vol 2: 11). Some sentences glorify conquest while others are anti-British:

3. Tariq Bin Ziyad conquered Andalusia.
4. The English were always the enemies of Islam (My translations from Urdu).

Egypt is frequently depicted as a corrupt, licentious country where men and women meet freely and wine is imbibed (Nadvī 1954–55, Vol. 2: 126). All these trends are in keeping with the madrasas' assumption of a more active role in the Islamic revivalist movement after the 1950s. Before that time the madrasas were mostly concerned with the preservation of the past. Feeling themselves under attack they clung to the past and viewed change as the greatest source of danger. After the 1950s, especially because of the rise of Islamic revivalist movements in Pakistan, Egypt, Iran and, above all, Afghanistan, the madrasas started incorporating some elements of these movements—e.g., strict adherence to the *sharī'a* and glorification of militaristic jihad—into their curricula.

Thus, although the state has been trying to teach Urdu in order to gain the support of the ulema for its own policies of nationalism and mili-

tarism, what has happened instead is that the ulema have used the teaching of Urdu to disseminate their own worldview which discredits the ruling élite and wants to replace democracy with theocratic rule. This is yet another association of Urdu with the religious and militant right in Pakistan.

Urdu in the University: Up to the intermediate level (12th class) Urdu became compulsory in all schools as part of Zia ul Haq's Islamization policy, including schools that send their students for the British "O" and "A" level examinations. Urdu can also be taken as an option in the CSS examination, and traditional universities offer M.A. and higher research courses in it. Some universities and the National University of Modern Languages (NUML) offer courses in it for foreigners. The state spends a great deal of money on Urdu. The National Language Authority (Muqtadira Qaumī Zabān) publishes books in it so as to make available enough literature to enable Urdu to function as a medium of instruction at the highest level. The Allama Iqbal Open University runs a *Daftarī Urdū* course to enable government officials and others to learn how to correspond and perform official functions in Urdu. Scientific terms have been devised by several institutions, including the Urdu Science Board in Lahore (for details see Rahman 1999: 265–7). Indeed, the budgets allocated to institutions for the promotion of Urdu are quite large.

Institution	**Budget (1999–2000)**
Urdu Science Board (Lahore)	4,535,000
Urdu Dictionary Board (Karachi)	5,900,000
Federal Government Urdu Arts College (Karachi)	27,474,000
F.G. Urdu Science College (Karachi)	25,000,000
Iqbal Academy (Lahore)	3,380,000
Iqbal Foundation (Europe)	473,000

[Source: Expenditure, Vol 1: 1999: 310, 314, 316. Figures given are Rupees]

The state has also set up chairs of Urdu in a number of foreign countries, but social scientists rather than scholars of the language occupy most of these chairs. Urdu is even a school subject for Pakistani children in some foreign countries. However, the Pakistani diaspora keeps Urdu alive more by watching Hindi films and dramas, and by attending functions where major Urdu literary figures are invited to speak, than by actually

investing time and money in teaching Urdu to their children (Jāvēd 1996). In some of the major universities in the United States and Great Britain, Urdu is taught at the university level. The Berkeley Urdu Program, based in Lahore, enables American graduates and researchers to reside in Pakistan and learn Urdu. In Pakistan itself most of the major universities and many colleges offer M.A. degrees in Urdu. At the M.A. level study traditionally focuses more on classical Urdu literature than on the contemporary literary scene. At Karachi University, an M.A. in Urdu linguistics is also offered. This is a one-year M.A. program and it is only available to those already holding an M.A. in literature. Although the program is comprehensive, it is somewhat puritanical in that it glosses over the more erotic aspects or genres of Urdu literature (*vāsōkht, sarāpā, sukhan, rēkhtī*, etc.). Courses on Muḥammad Iqbāl have been added in some Pakistani universities for ideological reasons, and at the Allama Iqbal Open University an M.A. degree is now offered in "*Iqbāliyāt*" (Iqbāl Studies). As mentioned earlier Iqbāl has also become a much-repeated topic in all textbooks of Urdu from class 1 onwards (Kāmrān 1993). However, believing in the ideological significance of Iqbāl as he does, Kāmrān argues that Iqbāl is being neglected at the M.A. level in all but the Open University (*ibid*, 192–3). Individuals less preoccupied with the ideological objectives of teaching Urdu could, however, use Kāmrān's research to argue that Iqbāl has been overrepresented for ideological, rather than literary, reasons.

On the whole, notwithstanding the ideological overtones of Urdu studies, it is by far the most widely-studied language in Pakistani universities. Indeed, students who enroll in colleges and universities are already competent in reading, writing and speaking Urdu. In fact, most educated Pakistanis, except perhaps in parts of Sindh, are more competent in writing Urdu than in writing their own mother tongues. It is the second language among educated Pakistanis and the *lingua franca* in the urban areas. This is largely because Urdu is taught so widely; and it is studied because it empowers students by giving them the skills necessary to find jobs and gain prestige, even though they may resent the hegemony of Urdu for reasons of ethnicity and identity. The M.A. in Urdu is quite popular and is viewed as being easier than an M.A. in English or the social sciences, but it is not considered as easy as an M.A. in languages like Persian, Arabic or the indigenous languages of Pakistan.

The demand for Urdu results mainly from the fact that it is used in the lower domains of power in most areas of Pakistan. It is, next only to English, the language of employment and formal conversation, at least in

the urban areas. It is also the major language of the media, business and education. Hence, people generally support its being taught on the assumption that if they do not know Urdu they will be denied access to power. This is why, in the 1986 survey done by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 68 percent of the people wanted Urdu to be used all day in grades 1 to 3; 30 percent suggested that it should be taught for one period a day and hardly anybody was of the opinion that it should not be taught at all. Even in Sindh, where ethnic antagonism toward Urdu is strong, 43 percent of those surveyed still agreed that it should be taught for one period a day, even for children in classes 1 to 3 (Jones et al. 1986). In my own survey of the opinions of matriculation students the responses regarding Urdu were as follows:

	Madrasas	Sindhi-medium	Urdu-medium	Élitist	English-medium Cadet Colleges	English-medium Ordinary
	(N=131)	(N=132)	(N=520)	(N=97)	(N=86)	(N=119)
Q.2. Desired as medium of instruction?	43.51	9.09	62.50	4.12	23.26	24.37
Q.3(a). Desired as the only language to be taught as a subject?	3.82	6.06	21.54	nil	1.16	9.24
Q.3(b). Desired to be taught in addition to other languages?	67.18	28.05	39.81	55.65	74.42	36.13

[Source: Appendix 2. All figures, except those in parentheses, are percentages. Because of overlaps percentages do not add up to 100. Question 3, given in full in Appendix 2, has been broken into two parts here.]

In other words, despite some ethnic resistance to Urdu (as in Sindh), ordinary people do want to acquire it, and even students from English-medium schools want to study it as a subject. Such responses indicate that, quite apart from the symbolic significance of the language, people acquire it because of its practical value.

Conclusion: Urdu, then, is very much at the center of three highly volatile issues in Pakistani politics: ethnicity, militant Islam and class conflict. The state promotes Urdu in order to counter ethnicity, but this has two contradictory effects: first, it tends to strengthen ethnic resistance because it keeps the grievance about suppressing ethnic languages alive; second, it tends to strengthen the religious right because Urdu is associated with,

and is used by, the religious right in Pakistan. But the religious right not only represents religion, it also represents the class-wise distribution of power (and the resources which are a consequence of that power). Over the years the poor and powerless masses of Pakistan, disillusioned by both the ruling centrist establishment and the splintered left, have supported the forces of ethnic nationalism and religious revivalism. Indeed, in the most populous province of the Punjab as well as in the N.W.F.P., a large number of young militant madrasa students are adopting the politics of the militant religious right because they feel they have been treated unjustly. Individuals in the upper echelons of the liberals and the leftists, who should have favored Urdu and the indigenous languages of the people, have generally favored English. While this keeps the religious lobby at bay for the present, it also generates an atmosphere which could lead to a future struggle for power. The masses, who are deprived of the top-level jobs for which English is required, of the respect which comes from being highly-educated, of their rights and of power, may rise up in revolt to wrest control from the hands of the English-using élite! This is a nightmare the leadership of Pakistan prefers not to contemplate, although much of the indignation over the Westernized lifestyle of the élite, couched in the idiom of religion, is really an expression of the anger of the dispossessed. Since Urdu (vis-à-vis English) is one of the symbols of the dispossessed in most of the urban centers of the country, it is intimately connected with class politics as well as ethnic politics in Pakistan. ❐

Appendix 1
Questionnaire on Language-Teaching and Ideology

Name (Optional)_____ male___ female ___
Age_____ Class (grade in school)_____
Mother tongue_____

1. What is the medium of instruction in your school? _____ Is it your mother tongue? Yes___ No___

2. What should be the medium of instruction in schools? _____

3. Which language or languages out of the following should be taught in schools (you can tick more than one language if you wish):
(a) English_____ (b) Urdu_____ (c) Arabic_____ (d) Persian_____
(e) Pashto_____ (f) Sindhi_____ (g) Baluchi _____ (h) Brahvi_____
(i) Punjabi _____ (j) Any other (name it) _____

4. Should your mother tongue be used as a medium of instruction in schools (if it is not being used)? Yes_____ No_____

5. Do you think higher jobs in Pakistan should be available in English? Yes_____ No_____

6. Do you think jobs should be available in your province in
(a) English_____ (b) Urdu_____ (c) the mother tongue of the majority of the people of your province_____ (d) any other language, please specify _____

7. Should English medium schools be abolished? Yes_____ No_____

8. Have you become aware of Pakistan's strengths and problems because of these types of lessons in textbooks, such as Pakistan Studies, Social Studies, and Islamic Studies, etc.? Yes_____ No_____

9. Have you become more aware of Pakistan's strengths and problems because of these types of lessons in language-teaching textbooks? Yes____ No_____

10. Which language do you READ most at school? _____

11. Which language textbooks have the largest number of ideological lessons (i.e., on nationalism, the military and Islam)?

12. Do you think the lessons you read about Pakistan's wars or history are correct? Yes_____ No_____

13. Please circle the reply with which you agree most: 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=don't care, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree

What should be the most important priorities for Pakistan in your opinion?

a) Conquer Kashmir 1…..2…..3…..4…..5…..

b) Develop nuclear weapons 1…..2…..3…..4…..5…..

c) Develop a strong army 1…..2…..3…..4…..5…..

d) Reduce defense budget and spend on development 1…..2…..3…..4…..5…..

e) Implement the *Sharī'a* (Islamic Law) 1…..2…..3…..4…..5…..

f) Make the press completely free 1…..2…..3…..4…..5…..

g) Make the T.V./Radio completely free 1…..2…..3…..4…..5…..

h) Establish democracy fully 1…..2…..3…..4…..5…..

i) Give equal rights to women 1…..2…..3…..4…..5…..

j) Give Ahmedis (or Mirzais) the same rights (job opportunities, etc.) as others in Pakistan (please note that at the moment they do not have the same rights as others) 1…..2…..3…..4…..5…..

k) Give Hindus and Christians the same rights as others in Pakistan 1…..2…..3…..4…..5…..

l) Establish the equality of provinces/ethnic groups in Pakistan 1…..2…..3…..4…..5…..

Appendix 2
Consolidated Comparison of Opinions of Students in Different Types of Schools Expressed in Percentages

	Madrasas (N=131)	Sindhi-medium (N=132)	Urdu-medium (N=520)	Élitist (N=97)	English-medium Cadet Colleges (N=86)	English-medium Ordinary (N=119)
ALL FIGURES BELOW ARE PERCENTAGES						
Q.2. Medium desired?						
Urdu	43.51	9.09	62.50	4.12	23.26	24.37
English	0.76	33.33	13.65	78.38	67.44	47.06
IMT	0.76 (Ps)	15.15(S)	0.38 (Ps+P)	2.06(P)	Nil	1.68 (P&Ps)
Arabic	25.19	Nil	0.19	Nil	Nil	0.84
Persian	0.76	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Foreign	Nil	Nil	Nil	2.06(F)	Nil	Nil
English+	0.76	3.78	5.58	7.22	4.65	17.65
Urdu+	12.21	0.76	5.96	6.19	4.65	15.97
Arabic+	12.21	0.76	0.58	Nil	Nil	3.36
Persian+	3.05	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
IMT+	Nil	4.55(S)	1.15	1.03(P)	Nil	Nil
NR	16.79	37.88	16.54	5.15	Nil	8.40
Q.3. Languages desired?						
Urdu	3.82	6.06	21.54	Nil	1.16	9.24
English	Nil	33.33	12.31	19.59	17.44	15.13
IMT	1.52(P+Ps)	14.39(S)	0.76(B&P)	3.09(Ps)	Nil	0.84(Ps)
Arabic	18.32	Nil	0.19	2.06	1.16	0.84
Persian	3.82	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Foreign	Nil	Nil	Nil	5.15(F)	1.16(F)	Nil
Urdu+	67.18	28.05	39.81	55.65	74.42	36.13
English+	25.95	41.68	37.69	55.65	75.78	38.66
IMT+	23.66	35.62(S)	21.92	10.30	10.47	16.81
Arabic+	58.02	11.38	33.27	29.81	47.67	29.41
Persian+	22.14	Nil	3.85	8.24	12.79	7.56

Foreign+	Nil	Nil	0.19(F&Sp)	22.67(F)	5.81	1.68(F&G)
NR	3.05	2.27	0.58	Nil	Nil	0.84

Q.4. Desire MT as medium of instruction?

Yes	54.20	79.55	53.65	30.93	20.93	43.70
No	45.04	15.90	45.39	68.04	75.58	54.62
NR	0.76	04.55	0.96	1.03	3.49	1.68

Q.5. Desire higher jobs in English?

Yes	10.69	30.30	27.69	72.16	70.93	45.38
No	89.31	63.64	71.15	27.84	29.07	53.78
NR	Nil	6.06	1.15	Nil	Nil	0.84

Q.6. Desired language for provincial jobs?

Urdu	70.99	8.33	71.54	20.62	32.56	50.42
English	1.53	33.33	10.77	41.24	47.67	21.85
Arabic	8.40	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
IMT	15.28	45.45	16.35	24.74	6.98	Nil
Urdu+ English	0.76	Nil	1.15	5.15	2.33	5.04
Urdu+ IMT	Nil	3.03	Nil	3.09	4.65	3.36
English+ IMT	Nil	3.03	0.19	2.06	2.33	3.36
Mixed/ other	2.29	Nil	Nil	2.06	2.32	Nil
NR	1.53	6.82	Nil	1.03	1.16	1.68

Q.7. Desire abolition of English schools?

Yes	49.62	13.64	20.19	2.06	12.79	5.88
No	49.62	84.09	79.04	97.94	86.05	93.28
NR	00.76	2.27	0.77	Nil	1.16	0.84

Q.8. Have social studies books made you aware of Pakistan's problems?

Yes	47.33	78.79	65.19	49.48	55.81	79.83
No	36.64	15.90	32.69	40.21	40.70	16.81
NR	16.03	5.30	2.12	10.31	3.49	3.36

Q.9. Have language textbooks made you aware of the above?

Yes	41.22	76.51	40.38	41.24	47.68	31.09

No	49.62	16.67	53.65	45.36	51.16	63.87
NR	9.16	6.82	5.96	13.40	1.16	5.04

Q.10. Languages most read at school?

English	1.52	6.06	4.81	97.94	97.68	58.82
Urdu	16.79	Nil	85.77	Nil	1.16	28.57
Arabic	53.44	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
IMT	3.05(Ps)	86.36(S)	6.98(PS+H)	Nil	Nil	8.40((S&Ps)
One+	23.66	6.06	2.12	2.06	1.16	4.20
NR	0.76	1.52	0.38	Nil	Nil	Nil

Q.11. Which language textbooks are most ideological?

English	0.76	3.79	1.35	16.49	11.63	8.40
Urdu	34.35	15.91	88.08	51.55	54.12	68.07
IMT	0.76(Ps)	23.48(S)	0.38(Ps)	Nil	Nil	1.68(S)
Arabic	35.11	0.76	1.35	Nil	Nil	0.84
One+	5.35	6.82	1.72	4.12	3.49	2.52
NR	Nil	49.24	6.54	27.84	19.77	18.49

Q.12. Are History textbooks true?

Yes	69.46	75.76	93.46	74.23	81.40	87.39
No	17.56	15.15	5.38	19.58	18.60	10.92
NR	12.98	9.09	1.15	6.19	Nil	1.68

Q.13. What should be Pakistan's priorities?

(a) Conquer Kashmir?

Agree	99.24	88.64	95.58	62.89	88.37	88.24
Disagree	Nil	4.54	02.12	31.96	06.98	06.72
Don't care	0.76	6.82	02.31	05.15	04.65	05.04

(b) Develop nuclear weapons?

Agree	96.18	49.24	79.81	64.95	79.07	73.11
Disagree	1.53	35.61	13.65	26.80	15.12	18.49
Don't care	2.29	15.15	6.54	08.25	05.81	08.40

(c) Develop a strong army?

Agree	87.79	87.12	95.96	88.66	91.86	94.96
Disagree	02.29	05.30	02.12	08.25	03.49	03.36
Don't care	03.82	07.58	01.92	03.09	04.65	01.68

(d) Reduce Army budget?

Agree	45.04	69.70	55.58	69.07	67.44	62.18
Disagree	42.75	12.88	32.50	17.53	24.42	20.17

Don't care	12.21	17.42	11.73	13.40	08.14	17.65
(e) Implement *Sharī'a*?						
Agree	97.71	81.82	95.58	52.58	79.07	86.55
Disagree	0.76	07.58	01.73	23.71	05.81	01.68
Don't care	01.53	10.60	02.69	23.71	15.12	11.76
(f) Make press free?						
Agree	43.51	62.88	58.65	62.89	73.26	53.78
Disagree	34.35	18.18	26.35	19.59	18.60	30.25
Don't care	22.14	18.94	15.00	17.52	08.14	15.97
(g) Make T.V. free?						
Agree	08.39	46.21	36.92	67.01	48.84	26.89
Disagree	76.34	31.06	46.92	18.56	31.40	63.03
Don't care	15.27	22.73	16.15	14.43	19.74	10.08
(h) Establish democracy?						
Agree	27.48	69.70	75.77	64.95	68.61	74.79
Disagree	48.09	06.06	08.46	14.43	13.95	10.08
Don't care	24.43	24.24	15.38	20.62	17.44	15.13
(i) Give equal rights to women?						
Agree	18.32	84.85	84.81	86.60	88.37	84.87
Disagree	73.28	05.30	09.04	07.22	05.81	08.40
Don't care	08.40	09.85	06.15	06.18	05.81	06.72
(j) Give equal rights to Ahmedis?						
Agree	06.87	58.33	44.04	53.61	33.72	47.90
Disagree	81.68	18.18	33.85	22.68	39.54	28.57
Don't care	11.45	23.48	22.12	23.71	26.74	23.53
(k) Give equal rights to Hindus, etc.?						
Agree	11.45	65.15	56.73	57.73	41.86	51.26
Disagree	71.76	18.18	23.65	20.62	36.05	27.73
Don't care	16.79	16.67	19.62	21.65	22.09	21.01
(l) Give equal rights to provinces?						
Agree	77.10	92.42	91.35	87.63	86.05	91.60
Disagree	10.69	06.82	02.88	05.15	06.98	02.52
Don't care	12.21	0.76	05.77	07.22	06.98	05.88

[Note: In questions 2, 3 and 6 there are overlaps so the percentage totals do not add up to 100. In Q.10 some students seem to have responded as if the question was about the languages they spoke (rather than read) most in school.]

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