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THE PATHAN REVOLT

IN

NORTH WEST INDIA.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

SINCE the return of the Chitral Relief Expedition there had been peace in North-West India, and it seemed probable that the present year was to pass without any disturbances amongst the turbulent tribesmen on our Frontier. The political horizon to the ordinary observer seemed to be without a cloud. There was no Umra Khan with ambitions of sovereignty, prepared to plunge through murder, rapine and the displeasure of the *Sirkar* to gain his ends. True there were pestilential fellows who were known to be preaching discontent to the tribesmen but there was little if any thing to show that these firebrands were sowing with more marked success than usual the seeds of discord and fanaticism. If there was anything which caused concern to Indian observers of political phenomena beyond our far flung frontier battle line it was to be found in certain events which had happened in Afghanistan, and which revived some of the old fears with regard to the Durani Chief who occupies the *gaddi* of that country. Our friend and ally had been devoting himself with much persistency to the religious nature of sovereignty which he wields over the followers of

the Prophet in North-West India and beyond, and the means employed to solidify his supreme headship as the light of religion were such as to be considered antagonistic to the preservation of harmonious relations between the tribesmen and the Indian Government. There was the book, *Twakim-ud-din*, inspired by the Amir himself and written to his command, which impressed upon true Muhammadans the essential and all important character of the *jehad*—that war of religious fanaticism laid down by the Koran as the duty of the follower of Islam to wage against the infidel. The book was certainly a remarkable production and even assuming that the greater part of it was merely a rehearsal and exposition of doctrines laid down in the Muhammadan gospels, it was none the less singular that Abdur Rahman should feel the necessity to propagate afresh its doctrines, and give to them his own imperial impress at such a time. Fanatical Mussalman realise only too completely at present that the *jehad* is, under given circumstances, a part of their creed, and it was with reason argued that to have its meaning newly interpreted in times of peace by a Muhammadan ruler was in itself more or less of an incitement to spread out the green flag of Islam and to smite the infidel wherever found. The other acts of the Amir increased rather than diminished this uneasy feeling, and, to give topical significance to the book, which is not itself of very recent date, he assembled at his Court the religious men of influence from all parts of his country, and in a manner held conference with them as a monarch might with his counsellors. These religious men—*mullahs* as they are known in India—are the levers by which the fanaticism of a frontier tribe is set in motion, as the British Government has over and over again found to its cost. Why did Abdur Rahman hold a conference of these men? If it was to enjoin them to preserve peace on the frontier, where was the necessity? Was not the frontier in peace? These were the pertinent questions asked.

It is foreign to the purpose of this narrative to deal at length with the causes—supposed or real—of the most general tribal conflagration which the annals of Britain in India record, but it is necessary to refer to some of the principal ones in passing. Undoubtedly when the Malakand affair supervened on Tochi, and the other developments followed with a suddenness which was appalling, both press and public in lieu of other adequate explanation pointed to Kabul and its Amir. Had not

his Mullahs incited the people in the Swat, Mohmand, Afridi and Orakzai countries to rise and overthrow with murder and pillage the authority of the British *Raj*? It was a holy war, with Abdur Rahman in the back ground, and it meant the final culmination of a tribal revolt into another armed meeting of the troops of Amir and Queen-Empress beyond the Khyber Pass. The Indian Government shared so far the suspicions of the public mind—suspicions which received confirmation from Shabkadar and later at Bedmani where the Amir's soldiers were known to have fought against us—that a strong remonstrance was sent to his Highness. From Kabul came a denial of responsibility, and a disavowal of the tribesmen and their actions. From this point the Amir was rehabilitated more or less in general British good opinion, and as he gave further proofs of his good will—such as the renouncing of the Afridis when they appealed to him as their religious war lord for support, and the closing of his territory to fugitives from the wrath of the *Sirkar*—it was believed in most quarters that he had not broken his troth plighted in open *Darbar* at Rawalpindi and that he had not been a traitor to the Queen and Empress against whose enemies he had sworn with uplifted sword ever to array himself and his forces.

But hard thinkers and students of our ever present frontier question were not disposed thus to acquit the Durani Chief of complicity, and even yet, whilst some are content to lay all blame for Afghan participation on the unauthorised shoulders of General Ghulam Hyder Khan, the Red Chief of Asmar, others still openly maintain that behind the Commander-in-Chief has always loomed Abdur Rahman himself, who has his own grievances against the Indian Government, and whilst not anxious to draw upon himself the wrath of the *Sirkar*—with more than probable forcible abdication of the *gaddi*—was still not averse to instigating unofficially a policy of vexation and irritation, which it would be difficult to actually bring home to him. The apologists of the Amir are also numerous and they have strong cards as well. There can be no doubt that Abdur Rahman, strong ruler as he admittedly is, oftentimes finds his position as ruler of Afghanistan with its fanatical *cabals* almost untenable. He has to pursue a strangely rugged path, fraught with many dangers, and we are asked to believe that his assumption of religious headship over Indian Mussalmans, and his conferences with the religious headmen of the country, each of

whom is practically a king in his own sphere of influence, is simply the wise conciliatory move of an astute ruler. Besides, what beyond the satisfying of some petty spite was Abdur Rahman to gain by quarrelling with the power whose subsidy he is pleased to accept? However this may be, officially the Amir of Kabul was vindicated by the Viceroy and his Government, and other reasons were put forward to account for the unparalleled convulsion on our North-West Frontier. Let me refer to these incidentally.

First and foremost of course came the charge which attributed everything to Britain's aggressive policy north of the Indus. The hatchets which had been buried after the Chitral Campaign were now disinterred, and loud has been the clang of steel as the exponents of the two frontier policies have fought afresh the old battle. "Is it wise to deprive tribes of the independence which they value above all things and to impose an authority which can only be maintained by a large addition both in men and money; their rugged country is of no strategic value to us, and if we are free on the score of justice is it expedient to advance from India on Central Asia and so increase our responsibilities?" So maintained the "masterly inactivity" party. "What we are doing on the North-West Frontier is necessary" replies those who uphold the existing policy, "anarchy and civilisation cannot march peacefully side by side, we are establishing our civilising influence gradually all along the Afghan border, and both from strategical reasons and to prevent our territory from being raided we are bound to continue in the course now taken." Both parties have fought loudly in the Home press, and in many quarters it has been contentedly accepted that the policy pursued by the Indian Government for so many years past is responsible for the present flare up. "You broke your word in Chitral," shout its opponents, "you retain the country against your pledged word, and you have put the fear of annexation in the heart of every Pathan tribe." Whilst denying that the forward if not aggressive policy has been responsible for the tribal convulsion which spread from Malakand to the Tochi Valley, and regretting that India's almost bankrupt treasury should have to pay crores of rupees on military operations, upholders of the present policy have, nevertheless, welcomed the present disturbances in so-much as they have necessitated "the lifting of the *pardah*" from troublesome countries and by forcing us to smite hip and thigh will compel the indolent mind of the tribesmen to realise

the power and might of the *Sirkar* and disturb no more the peace of the frontier.

But other people, and in India much more than at Home—where the war has been almost wholly one of shibboleths—have looked elsewhere for an explanation of the tribal risings. We are told that the war waged so disastrously to the Christians on the plains of Thessaly has inspired Muhammadans all over India with the idea of a war of extermination on the infidel. What the Turk has done to the Greeks the followers of Islam can repeat with the English in India, and in the excited state of public feeling induced by the Calcutta riots, the murders of Europeans at Lahore, Poona and Peshawar, and the seditious nature of much of the writings in the native press, much popular credence was given to this idea. All theories which suggested a general explanation leaned more or less to Muhammadan fanaticism, and the one to which some high Indian authorities attached themselves was that the successful operations of Afghans against the natives of Kaffiristan had fired the enthusiasm of the Mussalman tribesman, and by flattering his known inordinate vanity, had induced him to listen to the advice of the Mullahs to next attempt the extermination of the king of Infidels—the British *Sirkar*.

It is conceivable that any one of these theories is an explanation, or that these causes, each in turn, have helped to kindle the spirit of revolt. Or it is possible that the true reasons for the great frontier disturbances of 1897 are to be found in purely local causes, and that the subsequent gigantic proportions to which they reached were due entirely to the momentary success over the British *Raj* which flattered the characteristic vanity of the fanatical Mussalman on the frontier and made him believe that the days of the *Sirkar* were numbered, that the flag of Islam was to be unfurled and all infidels from Kabul to Cape Comorin swept into the sea.

It is now generally accepted that the Tochi Valley affair was not part of any general plot, but had its explanation in a miserable tribal story of lying and deceit to attain private ends—a true Pathan procedure. From Tochi to Malakand, from Malakand to Shabkadar, from Shabkadar to the Khyber, from the Khyber to Kohat, the Kurram Valley, and the Samana range of outposts the fiery cross spread with unparalleled swiftness, and almost before we knew the tribes were

discontented lo! we find the entire frontier line ablaze with armed men. Leaving Tochi out of the question as a mere bastard preliminary of the general rising we have the commencement of the revolt at Malakand and Chakdara, and if it can be proved, which is denied, that the natives had deep objections to the policy which had been pursued in the Swat Valley during the past three years, and which they were willing to protest against by force of arms, it is not impossible to believe that the large proportions to which it subsequently attained were due to the lengthy beleaguering of the Malakand and Chakdara garrisons, which was tantamount in the opinion of the rude and uncultured frontier men to the annihilation of the British *Raj*. From the Swat to the Orakzai, Afridi and Mohmand countries, the story of the heavy fighting at Malakand and Chakdara spread from village to village, embellished and magnified in its progress in the accustomed manner of the East till it appeared in the splendid light of a victorious driving of the Infidel out of India, and a general Mussalman call to arms. This is borne out by the fact that tribes with whom we had no possible quarrel, and whom we have treated with the greatest possible deference were among those who joined in the revolt. The Mamunds, who inflicted such great losses on General Jeffreys' brigade, had been left alone by our troops during the Chitral campaign although they did much to merit severe punishment, and they simply joined in the present disturbances from that pure love of a fight which is second nature to the Pathan and becomes additionally attractive when the *feringhee* or infidel foe is the objective.

With astonishing rapidity the conflagration spread until in a short period the whole frontier line from Malakand to Kurram was ablaze and all the tribesmen more or less were under arms.

Troops were pushed to the front with unparalleled despatch and quickly we had an army on our frontier line large enough to deal with any emergency. Never before has Britain's might been exhibited with such prodigality to our enemies in Central Asia; but on no previous occasion has there been a conflagration which extended over so large a part of our frontier line, and brought us into collision with so many fighting tribes. India's north-west frontier has always been a centre of fanatical cyclones, but hitherto we have only had convulsions in more or less restricted areas. Individually we have had quarrels with

most of the tribes, and the Afridis, Orakzais, Yusufzais, Swatis, Maris and Bonerwals have all at different times come into sharp contact with our troops; up to this year the known diversity of interests and the spirit of intertribal *vendetta* animating the various sections has prevented a general resort to arms against us. It has always been considered, however, that when the various races of Pathans could sink their internecine warfare and engage us in unison, even Britain's might would have to be put forward to quell the trouble which would ensue. This is what has largely happened in this year of Diamond Jubilee grace, and for the first time in our frontier history we have seen the most powerful Pathan tribes from Boner to Bolan take the field in unison and flaunt defiance at the *Sirkar*.

In Malakand and the Swat Valley, serious as was the rising, it was speedily dispersed by the rapid despatch of our troops in that direction, and at Shabkadar there was but one outburst of tribal raiding, after which the Mohmands showed little or no opposition. It was when the first signs of serious disaffection among the Afridis and the Orakzais—with the exception of the Waziris, the two most powerful and numerous fighting clans of the frontier—manifested themselves, that the full seriousness of the revolt was clearly seen. The Afridis have long been our friends and have been paid by the Indian Government for services rendered in keeping open the Khyber Pass. A rising on their part meant, if not seizure of actual British territory, then at least the restoring to a state of anarchy of a great highway which the Indian Government had taken upon itself to keep open and safe of ingress and egress. The mere fact that the Afridis and Orakzais had taken to the war path would be quite enough in itself to spread the spirit of revolt to one and all of the smaller tribes, and a general conflagration might confidently be expected. The fighting manhood of our trans-border tribesmen is roughly estimated at 200,000 men, variously armed with rifles, matchlocks and swords. On the frontier where the personal equation looms so largely the first desire of a fighting man is to possess a rifle, and whether he goes to the military lines at Peshawar and robs a sepoy or saves up his *pice* until he has the weight of a weapon in rupees—at which price he can purchase—it is his life's ambition to arm himself in this manner. These tribesmen, it should be remembered, are all Muhammadans and fanatical in their faith and hatred of the infidel. Excepting in Beluchistan our

Government has never succeeded in taming them and to-day they are almost as irreconcilable as when we first mixed in frontier matters.

The trans-frontier tribesmen may conveniently be classed into four divisions from north to south: (1) the clans between the southern limits of the Gilgit Agency and Peshawar; (2) those holding the hills between the Khyber Pass and the Kurram Valley; (3) the Waziri and cognate tribes of the Suliman Range; (4) the Beluchis and those under control of the Governor-General's Agent in Beluchistan. In the first group we get the Kohistanis and Cis-Indus Swatis, the Black Mountain tribes, the Hindustani fanatics, the Bonerwals, the Swatis of Swat, the Mohmands and Bajouris. The second group comprise the most savage and warlike of the frontier tribesmen. Taking the country between the Khyber-Kabul route, the Safed Koh and the Kohat District we get an area of 4,000 square miles. First and foremost among these clans come the Afridis—a powerful tribe with powerful subdivisions—who live in savage independence and have never brooked control from Afghanistan north nor Hindustan south of the Khyber. In the second group also are the Orakzais and Zaimukhts both possessing many and valiant fighting men. In the Kurram Valley the population is largely composed of Turis, who are *Shias* or unorthodox Mussulmans hostilely regarded by the *Sunnis*. They are our good friends and being naturally, like most frontier tribes, of a martial spirit, they readily enlist in the Kurram Frontier Militia and are reliable soldiers. In the third group are the tribes of the Suliman Range, of whom the Waziris alone are of importance and are good specimens of the free, fierce, hardy mountaineers of Afghanistan. It is with the Darwesh section of the Waziris that we had to deal for the Maizar disaster. The fourth or Beluchistan group needs no special reference here, as the tribesmen have in no way associated themselves with the present disturbances.

The explanation or local causes put forward for the rising of the Afridis were three in number, *viz.*, the increase in the salt tax, the fact that their women who ran away to Peshawar were not sent back by our Government, and their objection to our presence as far as the tomb of Akhund in Swat. To these might be added a fourth, the fear that a military road would be built along the Khyber Pass which they themselves would

have to construct. The Hadda Mullah and the Mad Fakir from Swat were the means of rousing disaffection on these points and they also succeeded in bringing the discontent of the Orakzais with regard to the forts on the Samana Range to a head.

With the rising of the Afridis and Orakzais and other cognate tribes in the Peshawar and Kurram Valleys it was clear that it was no border raid with which the Government had to deal and our plans were shaped accordingly. Sir Bindon Blood had been at the first onset sent to Malakand with a Field Force, whilst reserve brigades were also formed to go to the Swat Valley or wherever necessary. When the Shabkadar affair happened it was promptly decided to over-run the Mohmand country. General Elles, with two brigades under General Westmacott and Major-General Macgregor, was ordered to enter the country from Shabkadar in the south, while Sir Bindon Blood having completed the submission of the Swatis, was to enter it from the northern side with two brigades under General Wodehouse and General Jeffreys. A meeting of the two forces was arranged to take place at Nawagai. Whilst Sir Bindon Blood advanced through the Mohmand country to meet General Elles, General Jeffreys was left behind at the foot of the Rambat Pass, and in this neighbourhood he was attacked on the night of September 14th and subsequently, and heavy losses in officers and men inflicted on us by the Mamunds who live on the borders of Kunar and Afghanistan. The juncture between General Sir Bindon Blood and General Elles was made, after which Sir Bindon Blood was compelled to return and complete the quelling of the Mamund opposition, which had been particularly obstinate and deadly to General Jeffreys' brigade.

The rising of the Afridis and the loss of the Khyber Pass, which happened towards the latter half of August, determined Government on the despatch of a large force under Lieutenant General Sir William Lockhart, K. C. B., Commander-in-Chief elect of India, to lift the *purdah* from Tirab, that *terra incognita* to Europeans, whither the Afridi and Orakzai retire in the summer from the overpowering heat of the plains. The punishment of the Afridis, however, was delayed until the other punitive expeditions had been completed and all other discontent along the frontier had been subdued. In quick succession on the Afridi rising came the disturbance in the Kurram Valley and along the Samana Range, where the gallant little garrisons, maintain-

ing our isolated out-posts were attacked and besieged with fiendish pertinacity and determination. General Yeatmann Biggs was in charge of our column at Kohat and he was attacked by a strong Afridi-Orakzai combination when marching along the ridge to the relief of the Samana forts. The siege of the forts on the Samana provides some of the most stirring pages in the history of Indian frontier warfare.

With the successful pacification of the Swat Valley, the peaceful submission of the Mohmands and the final success of Sir Bindon Blood among the stubborn Mamunds the first act in the frontier war drama of 1897 ended, and the curtain was rung down preparatory to the second act, when Sir William Lockhart with the flower of the British and Indian army marches on the plateau of Tirah, and in their own fastnesses proves to the truculent Afridis and Orakzais that though the patience of the *Sirkar* is as enduring as a summer's day yet his arm when put forth against his foes is long as a winter's night.

TROUBLE IN THE TOCHI VALLEY.

CHAPTER II.

BLACK TREACHERY AND DISASTER.



JUST a day before the news of the Maizar affair was known, a letter appeared in the *Civil and Military Gazette* suggesting that, as a means of celebrating the Diamond Jubilee, an expedition might be started against some frontier tribes. This jocular suggestion was somewhat startlingly complied with, the only difference being that instead of an expedition being initiated *a la* Sir Lepel Griffin, to give our troops something to do, the tribesmen themselves rendered punitive measures imperative.

In June Mr. Gee, a Political Officer in the Tochi Valley was being accompanied by a military escort to Sheranna and Maizar, two villages about twelve miles above Datta Khei camp, and on the main Tochi Valley road to Bannu from Ghazni. The Tochi Valley is one of the main highways into

the heart of Afghanistan, and is rich, productive and fairly well cultivated, studded with more or less wealthy villages, and walled and defended by flanking towers. The people who live along this highway are Dawaris, the very name of whom, is, we are told, a byword of reproach. The Dawari is described as eminently vicious and additionally degraded, and an object of supreme contempt to the other warlike tribes on all sides. The business which had carried Mr. Gee into the Madda Khel country above Sheranna was to fix on a site for the most westerly levy post in the valley, and also to meet, by arrangement, the Madda Khel Maliks there and discuss the question of the distribution of a fine which was outstanding against the tribes. It is stated that originally Mr. Gee had fixed his visit for June 9th, but that rain caused its postponement for a day, and that possibly this delay gave the tribesmen the necessary time in which to lay plans for the treacherous attack. Certain it is that not a man on our side apprehended evil.

The escort consisted of 200 rifles, 1st Sikhs, Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Bunny in command, with Lieutenant A. J. M. Higginson; 100 rifles, 1st Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant C. S. S. Seton Browne; two guns No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery under Captain J. F. Browne, R.A., and Lieutenant H. A. Cruikshank, R.A.; and 12 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry, with Surgeon-Captain C. C. Cassidy, 1st Sikhs, as Medical Officer. The escort marched from camp Datta Khel at 5 A.M., and after halting twice on the road, reached Maizar at 9-30, where they were met by the Maliks. Maizar consists of a number of cultivated terraces gradually sloping down to the Shāwal Algaḍ, and the men were halted on the highest terrace at an open space under some trees, not far from a *kot* belonging to the Drepilare section of the Madda Khels. This spot was pointed out by the Maliks themselves as the best place to camp, as there was plenty of room, and water was available near. The guns were placed close to a garden wall in a field clear of the trees. The approach to this camping ground is over a small *kotal* and down a narrow lane through the fields, bounded by low stone walls. The lane runs straight from the *kotal* to the camping ground, which is close to a threshing floor and then curves round to the north to the *koi*. Although nothing had happened to excite suspicion all the usual precautions when camping in a hostile country were taken. The men were ordered to keep their arms with them and not to pile

them, and guards, pickets and sentries placed where considered necessary. As soon as this was settled Mr. Gee and Captain Browne, R. A., taking the sowars, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and accompanied by some of the Maliks, visited Dotoi, which lies a few miles further on in the Tochi, while those left behind made themselves comfortable under the trees.

The Political Officer returned about 12 o'clock; the question of the fine was said by the Maliks to have been settled amicably; food was provided by the leading Maliks for all the Mussalman sepoy, and there was not the slightest suspicion of unfriendliness on the part of the tribesmen. After *tiffin*, about 2 P.M., Colonel Bunny ordered the pipers to play for the villagers to listen to, and they played one tune. Just as they began another, a man was seen waving a drawn sword on a tower in the Drepilare *kot*, and the villagers suddenly cleared off towards the village. A single shot was fired, apparently as a signal, and a fusillade at once commenced, directed at the British officers, who were together under a tree, and the Sikhs. This was taken up on all sides, the sepoy in the meantime falling in at once and taking up positions. Disasters quickly befell our men, and Lieutenant Seton Browne was hit in the leg at the second or third shot, and Colonel Bunny, the commander, was mortally wounded. Almost immediately after our guns opened fire and did great execution among a party of men who attempted to rush them. Bravely our officers stood to their posts, but as they were in an exposed position the two British officers afforded an easy mark for the men in the *bagh*. Captain Browne was hit at about the fifth shot and Lieutenant Cruikshank shot dead almost directly after.

This was all within five minutes of the first shot, and as the enemy's fire did not slacken and the guns had expended their ammunition, a movement was made back towards the *kotal*, the guns limbering up and going first up the lane. As the Infantry retired, the Waziris came out in great numbers from all sides, but a stand was made round the corner of the *bagh* to allow the wounded men to retire. Further disasters befell the little force and the fire of the enemy being directed at the British officers Lieutenant Higginson was shot through the arm and Surgeon-Captain Cassidy in the knee. The Waziris were, however, successfully held in check by a

mixed party of 1st Sikhs and 1st Punjab Infantry, and the latter retired up to the *kotal* when everything was over. Successive positions were taken up on the six ridges which stretch from Maizar to the plain above Sheranna, a distance of about two miles, and though the Waziris followed up in a most determined fashion and occupied all availing positions on the hills around, the retirement was perfect. Lieutenant Higginson was shot in the arm a second time while crossing the hills.

All the British military officers were now wounded, two of them mortally, yet they all continued to carry out their duties and lead their men. The circumstances must be admitted to have been trying in the extreme for the troops, and their staunchness is worthy of the highest praise. Subadars Narain Singh, 1st Sikhs, Sundar Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, and Jemadar Sherzad, 1st Sikhs, behaved with the greatest gallantry. Getting together a party of their men they made a most determined stand by the wall of a garden and from it they covered the first withdrawal, themselves under heavy fire, remaining till the enemy closed with them. Subadar Sundar Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, was now killed, and by far the greater number of the casualties of the day took place here. Under cover of this stand the wounded were carried and helped away, and the guns withdrawn, along a lane, to a low *kotal* about 300 yards distant, where a fresh position was occupied. The survivors of the party at the garden wall then withdrew. The retirement was continued by successive units, very deliberately and with complete regularity, positions being held on the ridges stretching from south to north until the Sheranna plain was reached (about two miles). All this time the enemy was constantly enveloping the flanks. The main road which had been taken in the morning had been abandoned, as it was commanded on both sides, and parties of the enemy were advancing from Sheranna. Lieutenant Higginson was during this part of the retirement, again shot in the arm.

Eventually, about 5-30 P.M., a good position was found, about a mile from the last of the above-mentioned ridges. Reinforcements began to appear in sight, and the enemy was beaten off. The fact that the retreat, over a distance of three miles, occupied $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours, shows how stubbornly the enemy was resisted and what admirable courage and discipline our

brave soldiers displayed. Throughout the tribesmen made the most determined attempts to get to close quarters and annihilate our men, and outside the Drepilari *kot* and at the corner of the garden there was great slaughter, and much individual bravery was displayed. The number of the enemy at the first onset is estimated at 500, but constant reinforcements during the retirement raised their numbers to probably much over 1,000. They are understood to have lost 100 killed and many wounded.

Some *Kotal* sowars had been sent to camp to call for reinforcements, which reached the force in the last-mentioned position about 6-15 P.M. They consisted of two companies, 1st Sikhs, under Lieutenant H. S. Brett, R. A., accompanied by Lieutenant E. N. Stockley, R. E., and brought fresh ammunition, which was terribly needed. They had covered the distance from camp (9 miles) in less than an hour and a half—a magnificent piece of marching and an admirable preliminary to the other feats of endurance shown by our troops on the march throughout the subsequent disturbances. With the ammunition now received the heights around and the village of Sherranna were shelled (the latter at 1,400 yards), with the result that the enemy finally retired, and the village was partially set on fire. The remainder of the admirable withdrawal was unmolested, and the rear-guard reached camp at 12-30 A.M. Some help was given by Khidder Khels, who brought water for the wounded during the retreat; and who, during the following two days, brought in the bodies of all killed.

In frontier warfare no respect is paid by our foes to the dead. The bodies so brought in had been horribly mutilated, irrespective of their religion.

Of the British Officers who so nobly stuck to their posts, Colonel Buppy and Captain Browne, R.A., died of their wounds on the road, and their bodies, with that of Lieutenant Cruikshank, R.A., and all the wounded, were brought in with the retirement. Captain Browne's life would in all probability have been saved had a tourniquet been applied to the severed artery, but medical assistance was not available as Surgeon-Captain Cassidy was *hors de combat*. Both Lieutenant Higginson and Surgeon Captain Cassidy afterwards died, the latter from the effects of his wounds, and the former from enteric fever when convalescent from his injuries on the field.

TOTAL CASUALTIES.

3 British Officers killed.

3 " " wounded.

Native ranks killed—1 Subadar and 7 men of the 1st Punjab Infantry
12 men and a kahar of 1st Sikhs.

1 Havildar and 1 driver No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery.

It is a significant fact that of the above total 17 were Sikhs, though the force was composed of nearly an equal number of Sikhs and Mussalmans.

Wounded—1st Punjab Infantry, 2 men severely, 2 men slightly.

21st Punjab Cavalry, 1 sowar slightly. -

1st Sikhs, 12 men severely.

1 mule driver dangerously.

8 men slightly.

No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery, 2 men severely.

1 man slightly.

1 Kahar slightly.

Several mules and horses were also killed and wounded.

The news reached Lieutenant Colonel W. duGrey, commanding the Tochi Valley troops, Miran Shah, at 11 P.M. on the 10th, and he arrived at Datta Khel, with Surgeon-Captain F.R. Ozzard, at 8 A.M. the next morning.

The first matter for consideration was the recovery of the dead left on the field, and the Government and private property. Lieutenant-Colonel Grey reported that Colonel Bunny and Captain Browne, R.A., continued to carry on their duties after being mortally wounded, and this they continued to do until the near approach of death stopped them, and that Subadar Sundar Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, was killed while fighting in the most gallant and self-sacrificing manner. The behaviour of Lieutenants Seton-Browne and Higginson, in leading their men and, after the death of their seniors, conducting the retreat, though themselves severely wounded, is worthy of high praise. The behaviour of the whole force throughout was splendid.

CHAPTER III.

NOBLE CONDUCT OF OUR SEPOYS.



THE first news of this deplorable disaster, recalling in so many particulars the Wano affair, created a great impression in India and information was anxiously awaited and greedily devoured. It had previously been thought that the laws of hospitality which are treated with so much respect by Pathans, would have absolutely prohibited such black treachery. Surprise was also expressed that so large an escort should have been attacked by a large force without any previous knowledge of such intention. But as was proved at Wano 5,000 or 6,000 tribesmen can assemble so quickly, and their movements are made so secretly, that their presence is first announced by a rush of swordsmen on our pickets. Waziri tactics are based on surprise, and valleys which were empty of men in the morning may swarm with thousands after nightfall.

At first there was much murmuring in some quarters, and in Calcutta it was suggested that the escort had been utterly demoralised and that something like a *saute qui peut* had followed. Never were brave men more shamefully maligned.

As fuller details of the affair were published in the press, it was clearly seen that in the face of ammunition failure and vastly outnumbered on all sides our native troops conducted themselves in a manner worthy the glorious traditions of our Indian army. With bullets raining upon them and with their British commanders all *hors de combat*, the retirement was carried out in the most orderly and admirable fashion. The Muhammedan and Sikh sepoys, literally covered themselves with glory, and by their determination, discipline and bravery alone, saved the entire force from annihilation.

The remarks of Colonel Grey on this matter are worth reproducing here :—

“After the two Royal Artillery officers had fallen, that is almost immediately after the attack began, the gunners continued to fire under the orders of their non-commissioned officers, until their ammunition was expended; in No. 3 Sub-division firing blank by the Havildar's orders when the shells were

expended until the mules were ready. The men serving this gun were—Havildar Nihal Singh, Naick Utam Chand, Gunners Jowala Singh, Chet Singh and Diwan Singh (II). The carriage mule being wounded Havildar Nihal Singh, Naick Utam Chand and Gunner Jowala Singh carried the gun-carriage to the relief line (about 170 yards). Gunner Chet Singh was wounded in the face when limbering up, and was taken away by Gunner Diwan Singh (II). In No. 4 Sub-division, although the gun twice turned over backwards, and two lanyards broke, the men continued to fight their gun. They were—Naick Sharaf Ali, Lance Naick Phulla Khan, Gunner Dulla Khan and Havildar Umar Din (killed). The gun-mule in this Sub-division was wounded just after being limbered up and threw the gun and bolted. The gun was then carried away by Havildar-Major Muhammed Ismail, Gunner Dulla Khan and Gunner Lakhu as far as the relief line. Driver Havildar Rudh Singh gave great help in sending back the wounded, and Salutri Kewal dressed Captain Browne's wound under fire. The drivers all behaved excellently, even loading up the great-coats on the relief line mules until ordered by Captain Browne to desist. Those whose mules were shot or broke away all helped other drivers or took their share in carrying the wounded. The Havildar-Major seems to have conducted the retirement of the section in a cool and able manner. During this first withdrawal Lance-Naick Shah Sowar, 1st Sikhs, behaved with much gallantry, keeping the enemy off with his fire, while he accompanied and helped those carrying Captain Browne, Royal Artillery (who had been wounded)."

It is to be remembered that the guns, while being fought as above described, were at a distance of only 100 yards from a threatening enemy, and were under a converging fire from different sides. The stand made at the garden corner has already been described. This was under the direction of Subadar Sundar Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, and Narain Singh, 1st Sikhs. The latter officer, also, with great presence of mind, removed a large quantity of ammunition from the reserve ammunition boxes of his regiment, and rapidly distributed it. Some was also carried away by Bugler Bela Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry. The value of this ammunition to the force cannot be over-estimated; had it not been rescued, it is difficult to think how the enemy could have been kept off at all. The following men had been sent under heavy fire to fetch away the ammunition boxes by Subadar Narain Singh:—Naick Lachman Singh,

1st Sikhs ; Sepoy Shiv Singh, 1st Sikhs, who went back twice, and was afterwards twice wounded ; Sepoy Isar Singh, 1st Sikhs ; Lance-Naick Atar Singh, 1st Sikhs (killed), and Langri Jhanda Singh, 1st Sikhs.

The conduct of Subadar Sundar Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, at the place where he died, was most heroic. At this place many other men also behaved with great heroism. All those who fell there gave their lives to cover the withdrawal of their comrades. Among the survivors Lance-Naick Ishar Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, fought the enemy hand to hand very gallantly there, killing several with his bayonet, and generally rendering great help ; and Bugler Bela Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, who has been mentioned above, was again conspicuous, fighting bravely and effectively with a rifle he saved from one of the killed, and later in distributing under fire the ammunition which had been saved. During the first withdrawal to the *kotal*, Jemadar Sherzad, 1st Sikhs, carried Lieutenant Higginson, when wounded, away under a very heavy fire. A little later, taking a rifle and ammunition from a dead sepoy, he covered the retreat of a party (consisting of Havildar Muhammad Bakhsh, Naick, Khwaja Muhammad and Sepoy Isar Singh, 1st Sikhs), who were carrying Surgeon-Captain Cassidy, wounded, to the rear. He also carried Surgeon-Captain Cassidy part of the way. Sepoy Allahyar Khan, 1st Punjab Infantry, carried Lieutenant Seton-Browne, wounded, to the *kotal*.

Subadar Nawab Khan, 1st Sikhs, was one of the last to leave the scene of the outrage, and both there and throughout the subsequent retirement, he worked in a very cool and admirable way. During the general retirement from the *kotal* towards the place where the reinforcements were met, the ability and coolness of Subadar Narain Singh, 1st Sikhs, mentioned above, were of the greatest value. Lance-Naick Assa Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, did good work in helping Lieutenant Seton-Browne along when the enemy was pressing the retreat. Sepoy Nurdad, 1st Punjab Infantry, repulsed an attack of a party of the enemy. After shooting down two at a very short distance, he led a successful counter-charge against them, being himself severely wounded. Reference was made in the previous report to the most gallant conduct of the deceased officers—Colonel Bunny, Captain Browne, R. A., and Subadar Sundar Singh. At the time it was written, I was not aware that

Lieutenant Cruikshank, R. A., had also behaved in a most conspicuous manner getting up and continuing to fight his guns, after being once shot down, until he was killed by another bullet. Later on in a special despatch mention was made of the bravery of Lieutenant H. S. DeBrett, No. 6 Mountain Battery.

The sudden and treacherous way in which the attack began, and the fact that at the very first the men saw all their British officers shot down, makes the staunchness and gallantry of the native officers, non-commissioned officers and men even more praiseworthy than they might otherwise have been. The indomitable spirit of No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery is beyond all praise. The conspicuous behaviour of Lieutenants Higginson and Seton-Browne in conducting the retirement, while severely wounded, has been mentioned before. "I trust the General Officer Commanding may see fit to recommend these two British officers and all native officers, non-commissioned officers and men mentioned by name above for a signal reward for their gallantry. And I would also ask permission to submit a list of those killed at the garden wall with a view to the recognition of their splendid conduct being extended to their widows or heirs."

When the previous report was written the casualties were under-stated. They were as follows: Total: killed 26, and 11 horses and mules. Wounded 35, and 5 mules. Also 24 baggage mules missing. Though it was not his business, adds Colonel Grey, to report on civil officers, it would be unjust to omit mentioning that Mr. Gee's exertion and presence of mind were of great value in the help he rendered during the retirement and in sending to call up reinforcements.

CHAPTER IV.

EXPLANATIONS OF THE MAIZAR DISASTER.



IMMEDIATELY all sorts of causes were put forward to account for the treacherous affair, and the one most generally accepted was that it was the work of Mullahs: those frontier fanatics who give so much trouble to our officers. The attack also

took place during the *Muharram*, the great religious festival of the Muhammadans to celebrate the deaths of their martyrs, Hassan and Hussain, and when any act of religious fanaticism or martyrdom is considered specially meritorious. The fact that the Madda Khels are *Sunis*, who do not, as a rule take note of the *Muharram* discounted somewhat this view. Whether the Madda Khel were to any great extent influenced by fanaticism other than that due to the constant preaching of their Mullahs, cannot be said, but there is ample evidence to show that the whole business was carefully planned beforehand, and that the headmen were parties to the treacherous attack on Colonel Bunny's party. The tribesmen doubtless believed that if they could kill the British officers at once the sepoys would be demoralised, and they could be cut off to a man. Success would mean the capture of two mountain guns, 300 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition, not to mention the baggage animals and camp equipage. The prospect of loot of this kind would alone be sufficient to stimulate the ferocity of Pathans; and probably the wires were pulled by men who knew when the Political Officer meant to visit Maizar, what the strength of his escort would be, and the probable time of its arrival at the village. It was the heroism and faithfulness alone of our soldiers which prevented such a dire calamity as the loss of guns and rifles would have been, to say nothing of the wholesale massacre which would have followed.

The report of the Political Officer, Mr. Gee, (who was the only European to escape unhurt) is interesting as showing purely local causes for the outbreak. He says that he purposely took a large escort as he deemed it would have a good effect, especially in view of the fact that an early commencement was to be made on the building of a levy post. The two Maliks, Sadda Khan and Alambe, who, as we now knowt, played the part of traitors, were sent a day in advance to make preparations for the visit of the force and assemble the local headmen to discuss the distribution of the fine that had to be levied. Sadda Khan selected a camping-ground which Colonel Bunny accepted. Mr. Gee adds: "The people in the villages round appeared friendly and talked freely with the Pathan sepoys. Every thing required in the way of grass and wood had been supplied, and about midday the food which had been cooked in one of the Maizar *kots* was brought down for the sepoys and a special point was made of the British

officers partaking of some of it. I then made inquiries as to whether the local *jirga*, which had been sitting under some trees near for some time, were ready to come and see me, and I was told by Ghulam Muhammad, Assistant Political, that they had come to an amicable agræment by themselves, and all that was necessary was that they should come up later to make a formal statement before me. This was what Sadda Khan had led Ghulam Muhammad to believe, but if the evidence available is to be trusted Sadda Khan's statement was a deliberate lie, for at that very time the Maizarwals had refused, as they had the day before, to be bound by his proposals, and must have been preparing for the outbreak. Had Sadda Khan given us the slightest information of this attitude on the part of the Maizarwals—which he, as well as other Madda Khel Maliks, who had been there all day, must have been perfectly well aware of—there would have been plenty of time to prepare for an attack." Further on in the report it is stated that Ghulam Muhammad, who escaped with a small party to the other side of the Tochi river, sent Sadda Khan to Sheranna to keep the people quiet there. The Malik returned in two hours saying he had dispersed the tribal force and the road was clear. Nothing could have been further from the truth, for the Sherana people joined in the fight and the village was shelled. Mr. Gee's narrative made it quite clear that Sadda Khan was cognisant of the whole business.

Although the losses on our side were so heavy they do not nearly compare with the numbers of the Waziris who were killed. The fire of our soldiers must have been wonderfully steady and accurate as no less than one hundred of the enemy, including four Mullahs and one Malik, were killed outright, whilst a great many more were wounded.

The published details of the Maizar affair were followed by a host of criticism. Correspondents wrote as if the Political Officer and the military officers with him at Maizar were imbeciles to have trusted the Madda Khel at all. Yet Colonel Bunny was an officer intimately acquainted with the Pathan character, thoroughly experienced in the manners and customs of frontier tribesmen, and generally cautious in his dealing with the tribesmen: but he must have been deceived by Sadda Khan's hospitality. He neglected none of the precautions usually taken when a

small force is sent to support the authority of the Political Officer. Picquets and sentries were posted, the sepoy were not allowed to pile arms but carried their rifles about with them, and there was no slackness in the general arrangements of the camp. The ground certainly was not well suited for camping upon, but Maizar is on a hillside and its position is such that no commanding position can be taken up near it. If the people had shown signs of sullen resentment at the appearance of the troops it is possible that even greater precautions would have been adopted ; but from the apparently frank submission, coupled with the friendly conduct of the village headmen in offering hospitality, there was nothing to lead to the suspicion that treachery was intended. The Political Officer had not been molested in his ride of four or five miles to Dotoi, though he had only a few sowars with him and he could easily have been waylaid ; the British officers and all Mahomedan sepoy were entertained as guests of the village, and even to Colonel Bunny's experienced eye no signs of an attack were visible.

It was thought that there had been treachery on the part of the Pathan sepoy in the escort, but there was no evidence whatever to justify aspersions of that kind being made. Suspicion always naturally goes to our Pathan soldiers in the event of any untoward event on the Frontier, but in this case it must not be forgotten that, although the majority of the sepoy who fell were Sikhs, several Pathans also were killed, and when their bodies were recovered it was found that the tribesmen had mutilated alike the Sikh and the Pathan.

In some quarters it was suggested that patriotism pure and simple had inspired the tribesmen to attack the escort, but it is difficult to realise the occasion for such hostility. The country has always, although within the sphere of our political influence, been treated with conspicuous leniency.

Under the treaty with the Amir of Kabul, the demarcation of the Indo-Afghan position was a necessity, unless the old unsatisfactory state of things was to remain, under which relations with Abdur Rahman were constantly being strained almost to breaking point. The Waziris particularly had to be shown that they must abandon their predatory habits. Even after the Mahsuds had attacked Wano, Waziristan was not permanently occupied. When Sir William Lockhart's expedition

came to an end, only such posts were established to the north and south of the country as seemed fitted from their position to prevent raids upon the great caravan routes to Ghazni and to ensure some control over the most unruly of the clans. On the side of the Gumal the placing of detachments of troops at points where bands of raiders could be intercepted has been attended with a full measure of success. To the north the outposts in the Tochi Valley were so placed as to command the roads leading into the heart of Waziristan, an alternative route to the chief villages, such as Kaniguram and Makin, being thus kept open. The Mahsuds seem to have recognised that they were in a cleft stick, and they have behaved uncommonly well—for Waziris—during the last two years, though now and again small bands have given trouble along the road from Bannu to Datta Khel. The headmen were content to be left to govern their own villages according to custom, and not even the re-appearance of Mullah Powindah caused unrest in Waziristan.

It remained for a comparatively small section of the Darwesh Khel to break the peace at Maizar and to signalise its defiance of British authority by a piece of treachery unequalled on the frontier, and perfidy in setting at naught the laws of hospitality of a sort revolting even to Afghan sentiment.

CHAPTER V.

A SUMMER CAMPAIGN IN THE TOCHI.



F the forward policy controversy is brought to bear upon the Maizar disaster, it is quite open, of course, to argue that Government should not have taken over the Tochi Valley at all, but have left the Dawaris and Waziris to stew in their own juice, murdering and pillaging along the highway between Afghanistan and India, and being for all time a thorn in the side of the Government of India and the Amir of Kabul alike. The necessities of the situation, however, after the Maizar disaster were plain.

The Government of India naturally resolved immediately upon a punitive expedition into the Tochi country and arrangements to this end went forward rapidly. It was early decided

that the force should be a comparatively large one, as although no opposition was anticipated from either the Mahsuds or the Darwesb Khels, many of whom hold lands in British territory, it was felt that the sending forward of a small force might invite attack and give confidence to any clans who might be hesitating whether they should join the malcontents in the Upper Tochi Valley. Events which have since occurred have shown the wisdom of this decision, as it has at least saved the Government from the reproach which most certainly would have been hurled at its head of having precipitated the subsequent risings and, by taking half-hearted measures, incited other tribes to rebel, caused a general conflagration on our north-west frontier.

In less than a week news was issued from Simla that the following was to compose the force for the Tochi Valley punitive expedition :—

1ST BRIGADE.

- 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
- 1st Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
- 1st Regiment of Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
- 33rd (Punjabi Muhamedan) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
- 1 Squadron, 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry, Punjab Frontier Force
- 6 Guns, No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, Punjab Frontier Force.
- No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- 2 Sections, No. 2 British Field Hospital.
- No. 28 Native Field Hospital.
- 2 Sections, No. 29 Native Field Hospital.

2ND BRIGADE.

- 3rd Battalion, The Rifle Brigade.
- 14th (The Ferozepore Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
- 6th Regiment of Bengal (Light) Infantry.
- 25th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
- 1 Squadron, 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry, Punjab Frontier Force.
- 4 Guns, No. 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.
- 2 Sections, No. 2 British Field Hospital.
- No. 30 Native Field Hospital.
- 2 Sections, No. 29 Native Field Hospital.

C and D Sections, No. 32 Native Field Hospital, were detailed for the line of communications, and Section, No. 1, Field Veterinary Hospital for the base.

COMMANDS AND STAFF.

The following officers were detailed for the staff of the force :

<i>General Officer Commanding the Force</i>	Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B.
<i>Aide-de-Camp</i>	Captain H. M. Twynam, East Lancashire Regiment.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Captain S. W. Scrafe-Dickins, Highland Light Infantry.
<i>Assistant Adjutant-General</i>	Major J. Willcocks, D.S.O., Leinster Regiment.
<i>Assistant Quartermaster-General</i>	Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Nixon, 18th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
<i>Road Commandant</i>	Lieutenant Colonel D. S. Cunningham, 1st Punjab Cavalry.
<i>Base Commandant at Bannu</i>	Colonel W. J. Vousden, V. C.
<i>Station Staff Officer, Bannu</i>	Captain C. P. Scudamore, D. S. O., Royal Scots Fusiliers.
<i>Railway Transport Officer, Kushalgarh</i>	Major H. H. Bunny, Gordon Highlanders.
<i>Commandant British Troops, Bannu</i>	Captain F. D. Annesely, The Buffs.
<i>Commandant Native Troops, Bannu</i>	Lieutenant H. G. Maxwell, 10th Bengal Cavalry.
<i>Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General (Intelligence)</i>	Major G. V. Kembell, R. A.
<i>Field Intelligence Officer</i>	Lieutenant G. K. Cockerill, 28th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
<i>Superintendent, Army Signalling</i>	Captain G. W. Rawlins, 12th Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.
<i>Principal Medical Officer</i>	Surgeon-Colonel R. H. Carew, D.S.O., Army Medical Staff.
<i>Field Engineer</i>	Major T. Digby, R. E. (replaced by Major H. F. Chesney, R. E.)
<i>Assistant Field Engineers</i>	{ Captain A. L. Schreiber, R. E. Lieutenant W. D. Waghorn, R. E. Lieutenant E. N. Stockley, R. E.
<i>Field Paymaster</i>	Captain P. G. Shewell, Military Accounts Department.
<i>Ordnance Officer</i>	Major C. H. L. F. Wilson, R. A.

<i>Chief Commissariat Officer</i>	Major G. Wingate, Assistant Commissary-General.			
<i>Assistant to Chief Commissariat Officer</i>	Lieutenant J. L. Rose, 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment (relieved in September by Lieutenant J. H. Peck, 27th (1st Beluchistan Battalion) Bombay Light Infantry).			
<i>Divisional Transport Officer</i>	Captain H. James, Assistant-Commissary-General.			
<i>Advance Depôt Transport Officer</i>	Lieutenant E. M. J. Molyneux, 12th Bengal Cavalry.			
<i>Assistant to Divisional Transport Officer</i>	Lieutenant E. C. Haag, 18th Hussars.			
<i>Inspecting Veterinary Officer</i>	Veterinary-Major G. T. R. Rayment, Army Veterinary Department (afterwards succeeded by Veterinary Lieutenant C. B. M. Harris, Army Veterinary Department).			
<i>Survey Officer</i>	Lieutenant F. W. Pirrie, Indian Staff Corps.			
<i>Provost Marshal</i>	Captain P. Malcolm, 2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.			
<i>Chaplain</i>	Rev. F. L. Montgomery.			
1ST BRIGADE STAFF.				
<i>Commanding</i>	Colonel C. C. Egerton, C. B., D. S. O., A. D. C., with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General.			
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Captain A. Grant, 2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.			
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General</i>	Captain H. B. B. Watkis, 31st (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.			
<i>Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General</i>	Brevet-Major F. Wintour, Royal West Kent Regiment.			
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i>	Lieutenant E. C. R. Annesley, Deputy Assistant Commissary General.			
<i>Brigade Transport Officer</i>	Captain M. S. Welby, 18th Hussars			
<i>Regimental, Commissariat and Transport Officers</i>	<table border="0" style="border-left: 1px solid black; border-right: 1px solid black;"> <tbody> <tr> <td>Captain J. T. I. Bosanquet, 2nd Battalion, Border Regiment.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Lieutenant T. S. Cox, 11th (Prince of Wales' Own) Regiment of Bengal Lancers.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Lieutenant J. Muscroft, 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Captain J. T. I. Bosanquet, 2nd Battalion, Border Regiment.	Lieutenant T. S. Cox, 11th (Prince of Wales' Own) Regiment of Bengal Lancers.	Lieutenant J. Muscroft, 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
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Lieutenant J. Muscroft, 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.				

<i>Veterinary Officer</i>	Veterinary Lieutenant F. W. Hunt, Army Veterinary Department.
<i>Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling</i>	Lieutenant P. D. McCandlish, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
<i>Provost Marshal</i>	Lieutenant A. H. Maclean, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
2ND BRIGADE STAFF.	
<i>Commanding</i>	Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, C.B. (afterwards replaced by Colonel the Hon. M. Curzon, Rifle Brigade).
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Captain A. G. Dallas, 16th Lancers.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General</i>	Captain J. McN. Walter, Devon- shire Regiment.
<i>Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General</i>	Major H. M. Grover, 2nd Regiment of Punjab Cavalry.
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i> ...	Lieutenant E. A. R. Howell, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
<i>Brigade Transport Officer</i>	Captain P. W. D. Brockman, 5th Regiment of Bengal (Light) Infantry.
<i>Regimental, Commissariat and Transport Officers</i>	{ Lieutenant N. J. H. Powell, 23rd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal In- fantry (Pioneers). Lieutenant P. H. Cunningham, 1st Regiment of Bombay Infantry- (Grenadiers). Lieutenant G. E. Tuson, 16th Lan- cers.
<i>Veterinary Officer</i>	Veterinary Lieutenant C. B. M. Harris, Army Veterinary Depart- ment.
<i>Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling</i>	Lieutenant M. G. E. Bell, 3rd Bat- talion, Rifle Brigade.
<i>Provost Marshal</i>	Lieutenant G. A. Beatty, 9th Bengal Lancers.

As soon as the first excitement of the Maizar outrage wore away and the effective punitive force was under mobilisation, public interest in the Tochi Valley evaporated. There was no general disaffection apparent, later accounts showed that the outrage was committed as the result of a clever intrigue

of Sadda Khan and had little, if any, political significance, whilst it was felt that the field force despatched under General Corrie Bird, beyond having to endure great heat and being worried by snipers at night, would have what is known as a "frontier picnic." In this opinion the public was undoubtedly correct.

Mr. Gee was appointed Chief Political Officer, and Mr. Lorimer and Mr. Kettlewell, as Assistant Politicals, were attached to the two Brigades. Preparations were pushed forward with all speed, and early in July, Bannu and the road from Kushalgarh were crowded with officers, marching troops, field hospitals, commissariat stores, mules, camels, bullock carts, *tongas* and all the paraphernalia of war preparations. There was great jubilation in every quarter, and, despite the intense heat, all seemed to revel in the good fortune which had selected them for the front. If we are to believe the reports, the entire fighting force prayed incessantly that the Mullah Powinda—that frontier firebrand—would be inspired to help the Madda Khels, and so ensure that the troops should have what was termed "some fun" for all the grind and hard work they were putting in. In this respect their hopes were not to be realised and for them was reserved the unexciting role of politically parading on "do tread on the tail of my coat" principles while their comrades in arms on other parts of the turbulent frontier were engaged in sterner work.

The first shot was fired from a village near Boya on July 3rd, and the same day reports came into the camp at Miran Shah of an outrage committed on *sarwans* and camels. A party of sowars under Lieutenant E. N. Stockley, R.E., and rifles under Lieutenant W. H. Climo, moved forward in pursuit, and after an exciting chase fifty-one armed men were captured and brought into camp. Hopes of a big fight were now raised by the intelligence brought into camp that the Madda Khel and Mabsud Waziris had left their homes after sending their families and animals into safety, and were preparing to resist the British advance. It was also added that the Amir had declined to receive the tribesmen into Afghanistan, which increased the chances of a conflict. At night there was the usual "sniping" into camp, that irritating method of frontier warfare which does so much to try the patience of Tommy Atkins and Jack Sepoy. At Datta Khel a man crept within

fifteen yards of the defences and shot a sentry, whilst at Idak the same thing occurred. On the 8th General Corrie Bird left Bannu and entered the Tochi Valley to assume full political control. The same night Datta Khel camp was disturbed by snipers.

A slight spurt of excitement was given to affairs by the little conflict at Saidgi where some sepoy went for a party of Waziri levies with fixed bayonets, killing and wounding about seventeen. These levies are always troublesome, and it has long been the general opinion of every military officer, with the slightest experience, that they are invariably implicated in every robbery and crime that has taken place for years, notably on the occasion of the murder of the four sepoy of the 22nd Punjab Infantry in 1893. The following extract from a private letter received from a man on the spot, throws a side light on these levies which is of interest:—These friendly levies on whom the Politicals rest their faith are our chief enemies. They are the people who “snipe” our camps and attack our convoys, in order to keep up the excitement of the expedition, and to make the Politicals open their bags of rupees in order to bribe them (the levies) into keeping the tribes quiet and communications open. To-day we have heard that one man was shot and that he crawled into the civil camp, about 600 yards from our camp; and it proves what the sepoy have long maintained, namely, that the so-called *friendly levies*, have been the very people who have been doing the shooting: but it is kept very quiet, as the sepoy are terribly exasperated about it.

It is to be hoped that the rough and ready lesson taught them by our sepoy in the Tochi Valley will be appreciated for the future.

There was little of interest from Tochi for some days. We heard with something of disappointment that no advance was expected to be made from Datta Khel until the 20th, which it was thought would enable the Waziris to clear out with all their belongings. The intense heat played havoc with our men on the march, the Argyll and Sutherlands having twenty-five struck down, of which number two died. The Highlanders also had to leave behind a large number of footsore men at Bannū.

On the 14th appeared the Proclamation of the General to the Tribes. It began by reciting the treacherous attack of Madda Khels on the Political Officer's escort after receiving hospitality from them, and proclaimed that Government had ordered him to proceed to Maizar with a force sufficiently strong to hold its own against all comers and to compel obedience to Government orders. General Bird added that he intended to destroy all fortified *kots* in Maizar and Sheranna, whether resistance was shown or not, and that he would remain at Maizar as long as he and Government deemed it desirable. Subsequently he would announce the terms of punishment which Government would inflict on all responsible or who took part in the attack, with whom alone he would deal. All others were warned to live in peace with Government and refrain from obstruction to the force. Further unfriendly acts would be severely dealt with.

The illness of Mr. Gee about this time necessitated his leaving for England, the post of Chief Political Officer being given to Major G. T. Younghusband, Deputy Commissioner of Bannu. An interesting little ceremony took place at Datta Khel when General Corrie Bird paraded the troops and distributed to three native officers of the 1st Sikhs and one non-commissioned officer of the 6th Mountain Battery, the order of merit granted to them for their conspicuous bravery at Maizar. This little public acknowledgment of heroism was enthusiastically received, and the good effect produced was heightened when the General went around and saw each sepoy present at the Maizar attack and congratulated him on his excellent conduct.

Although all this time there had been no fighting our troops had shown indomitable pluck and courage in enduring privations and trials of a very severe character. Few have experienced such campaigning since the Mutiny, the last occasion on which Indian marching had to be done in the height of summer. The excessive heat under canvas after leaving Khusalghar was maddening, the thermometer registering 112° to 116° F. in the tents. At one camp there were 27 cases of heat apoplexy, two dying, one the Regimental Sergeant-Major, and the other a private, named Cameron. The Sergeant-Major only got his warrant rank in May, and his loss was deeply felt in the regiment, where he was a general favourite: they buried him the same evening. The scene at

the hospital tents was deplorable. After these exhausting marches, however, the force reached Tochi, and were now installed about 4,700 feet above sea level, where the weather was pleasant and the nights cool, necessitating covering. Heavy rain every day, accompanied by severe gales, however, made life under canvas disagreeable. The troops were in the middle of a valley, the hills around bare and devoid of vegetation, throwing out a nasty glare which was hurtful to the eyes; smoked glasses having to be worn to protect the sight. All the ranges of hills in Waziristan are dull and uninteresting. Perhaps that was just as well as they afforded no protection to the Waziris, and their movements could be easily made out.

Eventually all was ready for the actual operations to begin. The troops were to advance four miles and burn a village in Sheranna and destroy anything that came into their possession. It was reported that the tribes were gathering together, and intended making a stout resistance. Rumour had it that 12,000 men were in waiting a mile out of Sheranna to oppose all entrance to their village. "If that is the case," says a jubilant correspondent of the *Civil and Military Gazette* "we shall have some fun for our money; the A. and S. Highlanders are the first to attack, and are in hopes of some sharp fighting." The assistant surgeons and medical officers showed themselves of true metal throughout the marching. One poor first class assistant-surgeon, named Traynor, was struck down with heat apoplexy one camp out of Bannu. Another was compelled to remain at Kohat for treatment.

On the 23rd July Maizar was reached, and the scene of the treacherous attack was retraced. A description of the scene as viewed six weeks after the disaster is interesting. The plain extends about a mile north and south, and Drepilari village, from where the first shots were fired, stands on the edge of a cliff above. There is a further strip of alluvial plain on the edge of the river. A collection of *kots* and villages encircle Drepilari from east to south. Colonel Bunny's little force was sitting almost on the edge of the cliff, within 30 yards of the southern boundary of Drepilari, when fire was opened on them. The guns fired back case shot, from where they were, into the crowds trying to rush them from the edge of the cliff some 50 yards off, and drove them back. Traces of cartridge paper were lying about still, showing where the men opened out

rounds. The gallant stand made by Subadars Narain Singh and Sundar Singh, the latter of whom was killed, was at the eastern edge of the village. The party was fired at from Drepilari and the villages to the south and south-east, but not from the *kot* immediately to the east of the village. This *kot* stands high and overlooks the fields, but was apparently occupied by women only, and no shots were fired from it. Avoiding this, for they did not know it was not occupied, the troops retired over a succession of hills and valleys with somewhat steep sides. It is a matter for wonder how the wounded were carried on and the fight kept up. Several instances of pluck and devotion were apparent: for example, they saw the places where the gunner, when the gun mule was killed, picked up and carried the gun bodily to a relief mule; also where the party with Surgeon-Captain Cassidy took turns to carry that gallant officer and to remain behind to fight, Surgeon-Captain Cassidy being a very heavy man. In searching the villages on July 23rd, plates and tumblers belonging to the battery were found in some houses; also a bundle of official papers belonging to Mr. Gee, some fuzes, an ordnance saddle, and an interesting if melancholy relic—Colonel Bunny's riding whip, which was delivered over to the 1st Sikhs.

The fortifications and towers of the village were shelled but the ordinary habitations were left untouched. All this time there was no enemy, and officers and men alike began to be despondent of any real fighting. There was the usual sniping into camp, the telegraph wire was cut, and reports were brought in of small parties of tribesmen who constituted themselves free lances and looted and plundered in the Valley.

This was the position on the 27th August, and all public interest in the Tochi Punitive Expedition had well nigh subsided when suddenly news came that the Malakand had been attacked and that a British force was besieged at Chakdara.

CHAPTER VI.

A MAD FAKIR IN CHITRAL.

IN April 1895 the *pardah* was lifted from the Swat Valley and since that time we have been congratulating ourselves on the remarkably peaceful results which followed the expedition and the new political relations which were established in that far-off country. There had never been any real or determined opposition to our occupation of the valley in the first instance. On only one occasion did the Swatis offer anything like resistance to our advance—and at the Malakand the reverse was of so convincing a character that it enabled the tribesmen to realize clearly that opposition to the British advance was the least wise course to adopt. When the campaign was at an end the willingness, even cordiality, with which the new condition of things was accepted by the people was generally commented upon. With that wonderful adaptability of disposition which is so characteristic of many of the border tribes, the Pathans of the Swat Valley returned to their fields as if no punitive expedition had just traversed their country, and indifferent to the fact that the political influence of the *Sirkar* had been substituted for the anarchical state of things which previously existed.

This peaceful submission and the smiling contentment which so soon ruled all over the valley undoubtedly disarmed suspicion, and it was noticed with satisfaction that the security which British rule gave to the country and the improvements in roads and bridges which were carried out had succeeded in bringing about a rapid development of the trade of Chitral, both internal and external. Relations also between our British officers and soldiers and the Swatis were apparently of a most friendly character, and that there was no resentment ever shown against our military occupation is clearly evidenced by the fact that last year when the annual reliefs were carried out not a single shot was fired throughout the entire valley. It might truly be said that in Lower Swat everything was absolutely peaceful. With regard to the

upper part of the country there was only one cause for unrest. To explain this it is necessary to refer to two of the leading characters in the Chitral Campaign.

The political ambitions of Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandoul, and Muhammad Sharif Khan, the Khan of Dir, were perhaps the two most conspicuous features of the Chitral disturbance. When the star of Umra Khan was in the ascendant it necessitated the hurried departure into exile among the Swatis of Muhammad Sharif Khan. The British expedition put an end for a time at least to the hopes of the Chief of Jandoul, and the Khan of Dir linking his fortunes with ours found himself in the position, at the close of the campaign, of a border chieftain with the added prestige of being directly supported by the British Government. Since 1885 it is alleged that Muhammad Sharif Khan has endeavoured to pursue an aggressive policy beyond Chakdara and among the people in the Talash Valley which has caused a feeling of unrest in Upper Swat. Beyond this there was nothing apparent in the political condition of things which led to the least uneasiness, and nothing which could be brought forward as explanatory of the desperate struggle which broke out around Malakand Camp and Chakdara post towards the end of July.

The only explanation in any way satisfactory which has been brought forward is that which attributes it to *mullahs*, and particularly to one pestilent fellow known as the "mad fakir" who was known to have, with that Peter the Hermit like perseverance and assiduity which is characteristic of the frontier fanatic, liberally spread his doctrines of murder and rapine amongst the tribesmen. According to native report he is a native of Swat who travelled to Central Asia and eventually settled in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Amir's chief cantonment in Afghan Turkistan. He is said to have lived there for ten years and then to have gone to Kabul. This summer, according to the same report, he visited Bajour, the Utman Kbel country, and Buner, preaching the necessity of waging war against all enemies of the Faith. He is supposed to have been in league with Hajab-ud-din, the notorious *mullah* of Hadda, whose fanatical hostility to the British Government is well known. Whatever truth there may be in this story, one point is clear: the "mad fakir" appeared in Upper Swat in

July and the fame of his preaching spread far and wide. He gradually worked his way down the valley, with a rabble of men and boys at his heels, and on July 26th he was at Landakai, within hail of Chakdara. On that day he took the final step which brought about the rising. He claimed to be inspired to work miracles; the Heavenly Hosts were, he said, on his side; and he announced that with or without help from his listeners he would sweep our troops from Chakdara and the Malakand in eight days. His excited appeals to the fanaticism which exists in every Pathan were responded to in a manner little short of marvellous: his progress from Landakai to Thana and thence to Aladand, both villages in view of Chakdara post, must have been a triumphal one; the villagers flew to arms; our levies hastily retired, except such as joined his standard; all the headmen, with one solitary exception, were carried away by the popular enthusiasm, and by nightfall a resolute body of tribesmen were on the move to attack the Malakand, while another party turned their attention to Chakdara. The *mullah* had roused the whole valley, and his standard afterwards became the rallying point for thousands of fighting-men from Upper Swat, Buner, the Utman Khel country, and even more distant parts.

This possible and probable explanation of the rising only added, however, to the difficulties of fully explaining the origin of the unprecedented outbreak. What was the lever which moved the "mad fakir." Was it fanaticism pure and simple? If not who was responsible for the laying of the train and for the preliminaries which ended in the convulsion around the British outposts? These questions still remain unanswered.

But to come to the dramatic story of the onslaught on Malakand and Chakdara, where for a full week the valour of British arms fought against untold odds and emerged victorious from a struggle as obstinate and determined as our frontier annals record.

THE STORY OF MALAKAND SIEGE.

CHAPTER VII.


THE DEADLY NIGHT ATTACK.



INDIAN bazaar rumours are always wonderful and rarely reliable, and on the heights of Malakand very little more credence is paid to the stories which percolate from this source than anywhere else throughout the Peninsula. Several days before the attack the Malakand Bazaar was full of strange rumours in which the "mad fakir" loomed largely. The native mind was impressed by the extraordinary stories, and the more improbable they were the wider was the degree of popularity extended to them. The "mad fakir" was at Landakai, at which place he was popularly believed to have vast armies secreted in the hills, which at the proper moment would be launched forth against the *Sirkar*. Natives talked of nothing else for days in Malakand Bazaar but of the magnificent cavalry, artillery and infantry which were at the holy man's disposal, and no one ventured near the hill neighbourhood where this army lay concealed, strict orders to that effect having, it was stated, been issued by the fakir himself.

Further stories stated that he was in possession of a species of widow's cruse from which he fed all his host. There is little doubt that by some trickery he managed to impose on many of his subsequent followers, for the tale was told and believed that the Malik of one of the villages sent him a gift of Rs. 50, which was returned with Rs. 50 more in addition, and the message that the fakir required no money, as God produced all his requirements. Among a people so credulous such stories were readily believed. Again he made assurances wherever he went that the English bullets would be turned to water, and that by the appearance of the new moon not a single individual of the Malakand garrison would remain. It is quite certain that Lower Swat knew nothing of the game in hand until the very evening of the attack, for the Swatis had been for months coming in to our officers of their own free will and selling their arms.

The little garrison laughed at these idle stories, and, all though in a newly occupied country, amongst the most fanatical of people, not a man believed that they portended evil.



The eventful twenty-sixth of July was polo day with the officers and away went our men merrily for their usual game. On the way down some of the officers were passed by the Assistant Political Officer, Lieutenant A. B. Minchin, who was hurrying down in his *tonga* to get to the bottom of a report which he had just received that a tribal gathering was collecting at Thana or Aladand. Although this might be considered corroboration more or less of the reports current in the bazaar, it aroused no suspicion amongst the enthusiastic young officers, and the game of polo was played with as much zest and energy as if it was being witnessed by admiring crowds at Lahore or Poona. There was absolutely nothing unusual in the demeanour of the villagers that afternoon; the usual groups of Khar folk watched the game and the players rode up in pairs without noticing a single disturbing fact. Their suspicions were aroused only when returning to camp. It transpired afterwards that the polo *chowkidar* was told to hurry the ponies back from Khar, as there was to be an attack on Malakand that night. As the players crossed over the road to North Malakand, they passed Lieutenant F. A. Wynter, R. A., of the Mountain Battery, who told them that Lieutenant Minchin had sent in from Chakdara to say there was no doubt about some of the tribes being up, and that a body of about 600 or 700 had passed through Aladand at 7-30 P.M., marching towards Malakand. Major H. A. Deane, Political Agent, in the afternoon informed Colonel W. H. Meiklejohn of the seriousness of the impending troubles, and advised the Brigade moving at once on Amandara Pass to prevent the fakir seizing it. At 7 P.M. orders were issued for the Moveable Column to march as follows to the Amandara Pass under Lieutenant-Colonel H. N. McRae (45th Sikhs):—Four guns No. 8 Bombay Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, and 45th Sikhs, to move at 12 midnight, 24th Punjab Infantry to follow in support at 4 A.M.

The garrison of Malakand consisted of one squadron of the 11th (Prince of Wales' Own) Bengal Lancers, No. 8 Mountain Battery, No. 5 Company Madras Sappers, the 24th and 31st Punjab Infantry, and the 45th (Rattray's) Sikhs, or something under 3,000 men. The troops at Chakdara were two strong companies of the 45th Sikhs under Lieutenant H. B. Rattray and Second Lieutenant J. L. Wheatley, and one squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers under Captain H. Wright, or a total strength of about 300. Two other British officers were also

there, Captain D. Baker, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers, Transport Officer, and Lieutenant A. B. Minchin, 25th Punjab Infantry, Assistant Political Officer. Captain Baker, however, was at Malakand when the attack occurred.

The idea was to anticipate the attack, which, it was presumed, would be delivered just before dawn, generally the chosen time with our frontier enemies; but subsequent events showed how entirely novel their tactics were to be. All were now busy preparing for the move out, and by the time orders had been issued it was nine o'clock; dinner followed in due course, and just as all were getting up from it the "assembly" was heard sounding from the 45th Sikhs' camp, and simultaneously firing commenced at Abbott's Road Picket and No. 10 Picket. It appears that a levy sowar riding up the road had seen large bodies collecting on the hills east of the camp, and galloped in to report. It was not a moment too soon; a party of the 45th Sikhs, under Major W. W. Taylor, with Lieutenant R. M. Barff hurried forward to the defile on the Buddhist Road, just in time to meet a mass of several hundred Pathans creeping silently up the road. In another few minutes they would have been in the camp. The fighting here was very heavy; poor Taylor being mortally wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel McRae with thirty men followed quickly after Major Taylor, and together they met the hundreds of the enemy in the gorge where the road reaches the top of the pass. Rocks were rolled down on the little band and a heavy fire kept up, but our men held to their posts nobly, and eventually when the remainder of the regiment came up, they only retired about fifty yards, where they remained defying the enemy all night. The 45th had a hard night of it, and lost several killed and wounded. The enemy, however, must have suffered heavily here. Meanwhile matters were getting most serious in the centre of the camp; Abbott's Road and No. 10 Pickets were reinforced by a company of the 24th Punjab Infantry, but were overpowered by rapidly increasing numbers and forced to retire; the *serai* and bazar being very soon overrun with swordsmen. There is no doubt that the gallant resistance shown by this small party in the narrow gorge against vastly superior numbers saved the camp from being rushed on that side.

Another company of the 24th Punjab Infantry cleared the football ground up to the bazar wall, bayoneting several of the

enemy, and firing into masses of them inside the bazar from the cover of this wall; but this company very soon had to leave its position, for another company manned the hospital enclosure, 100 yards behind the bazar wall, while the Sappers manned the north wall of this camp, thus making the presence of this company useless where they were; they accordingly were brought into the Sappers' and Miners' enclosure. Outside this were Colonel Meiklejohn, Major Herbert, Lieutenants F. W. Watling and E. N. Manley, R. E., Colonel J. Lamb, Captain H. F. Holland, Lieutenants S. H. Climo, A. K. Rawlins, and S. Morton, 24th Punjab Infantry. Firing was heavy and incessant all round the enclosure, and it transpired that numbers of the enemy had crept up the graded road to Damodur Das's shop, and thence attacked the south side and Quarter Guard, Sappers and Miners, and overran the Commissariat godown. Lieutenant L. Manley, of the Commissariat Department, must have been killed at the very outset; Sergeant Harrington, of the Ordnance Department, had a most miraculous escape in the hut where Lieutenant Manley was cut up. He reported that some 30 or 40 crowded into the hut, Lieutenant Manley opening fire on them, the lamp being knocked over, and poor Manley settled with at once. In the darkness they overlooked Sergeant Harrington, although for several hours they were moving about the hut; eventually, when the Quarter Guard of the Sappers and Miners was retaken he heard friendly voices and made his escape.

To return to the bazar corner of the Sappers' and Miners' enclosure. The firing very soon gave the enemy's sharpshooters, posted on the graded road, the range, whence from the cover of the parapet walls they maintained a steady and well-aimed fire on our men; in the first ten minutes Major Herbert was wounded in the calf, the bullet first passing through Colonel Meiklejohn's gaiter; the company of 24th Punjab Infantry holding the corner close to the bazar were kept busy repelling the attempt of the enemy to break through the defences. Under cover of the shopkeepers' tents they collected from time to time in numbers, charging up most determinedly; their losses here must have been very heavy, for 30 of their bodies were found in the morning, and it is probable that during the hour before dawn, when the attack slackened off, they were occupied in carrying off their dead and wounded. A collecting station for wounded was formed near this corner in a spot fairly well safe from the enemy's fire. It was here, while Colonel Lamb

was asking after Major Herbert, that he received a very dangerous wound in the thigh, the bullet entering the bone; and almost at once Lieutenant Watling was carried in with a bad sword cut wound severing the tendon just above the ankle; he, however, succeeded in returning his assailant measure for measure, running his sword through and leaving it in his body.

Lieutenant Watling reported that the enemy in large numbers had overcome the Quarter Guard and had even penetrated some way within the camp, thus threatening the rear; and even more serious still that they were carrying off the Company's reserve ammunition.

Colonel Meiklejohn at once ordered a party of the 24th Punjab Infantry to accompany him to this quarter: few men could be spared from their posts, and the first lot to hand reached the cook-house about 50 yards from the Quarter Guard. Their party consisted of Colonel Meiklejohn, Captain Holland, Lieutenant Climo, Lieutenant Manley, Colonel Meiklejohn's orderly, a sepoy of the 45th Sikhs, two or three Sappers of No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners, and two or three non-commissioned officers and sepoy of the 24th Punjab Infantry. At the cook-house we were met by a number of the enemy, who were hidden inside, and behind the trees, and in the tents; in this first sally Colonel Meiklejohn's orderly was shot dead, one of the Sappers wounded, and a lance-havildar, of the 24th Punjab Infantry, wounded in two places: the enemy had absolutely charged up to the point of the officers' revolvers, and most of the pistol shots must have told. Colonel Meiklejohn had again here a narrow escape; a sword cut was aimed at his neck, but fortunately it was not delivered true, and the officer commanding escaped with a bruise. Our men were forced back from here owing to their revolvers being empty and the decrease of their numbers: ten yards further a stand was made but here they were flanked by a large tree on the left, and unfortunately the doorway of an E.-P. tent on the right; Lieutenant Manley was sent off for reinforcements, and while away Captain Holland was shot through the back from the doorway of the tent, and another Sapper wounded; this reduced the party to about half its original number, there being not more than seven or eight left. Captain Holland had an escape indeed, he was shot sideways, the bullet entering and coming out on one side of the spine, and then doing likewise on the

other side, making four holes in its course; he was taken back to the collecting station by Lieutenant Climo, who returned with 10 or 12 Dogras of the 24th Punjab Infantry, and at the third attempt they were successful in reaching the Quarter Guard. Here they found all the ammunition had been carried off; a bad business as ammunition was becoming a serious question. They now occupied themselves in clearing the Commissariat lines and putting up defences to the south entrance of the enclosure, and destroyed the cook-houses which were close against the hedge on this side.

At 1-30 A.M. Colonel Lamb sent Lieutenant Rawlins to Colonel Meiklejohn to propose the advisability of obtaining reinforcements from the fort; on his way over the ground to the Quarter Guard, Lieutenant Rawlins had a very narrow escape; a *Ghazi* crawling along on his stomach jumped up almost under his feet, and struck at him. Fortunately he was somewhat out of practice and caught Lieutenant Rawlins with the back of the sword on the wrist, two revolver bullets promptly despatching him to the eternal glory that presumably all our enemies of the evening had gone in quest of. Lieutenant Rawlins reached the fort safely, a perilous journey, as the road lay by way of the Commissariat godown and Sappers' Mess. Waiting for these reinforcements was weary and anxious work, for it seemed probable that the enemy would make a great effort before dawn; in this surmise they were wrong, for quite contrary to their custom they drew off about 3-30 A.M., evidently for the purpose of clearing off their dead and wounded, while it was still dark: their firing, however, was not relaxed until 4-15 A.M., when their sharpshooters retired to the heights, about 800 yards from the centre of the camp.

CHAPTER VIII.

FOLLOWING UP THE ENEMY.



AS soon as there was sufficient light to pick our way with comfort, Colonel Meiklejohn ordered two companies, 24th Punjab Infantry, to clear the bazar; this was done without casualty, the whole place being found clear with the exception of one or two *Ghazis*, who had not made good their retreat.

The bazar was a woful scene of havoc, everything of value and easy of removal having been carried off, and several of the shopkeepers cut up. The Bazar *Chowdri* himself had quite a miraculous escape, as on hearing friendly voices he stepped out of a tent unharmed: he had remained in hiding in the back part of this tent all night and had escaped the garrison's heavy fire, which was for hours directed on the bazar, as well as the cold steel of the enemy's swordsmen. His experiences must indeed have been terrible.

During this memorable night two conspicuous instances of valour occurred in and near the Sappers' lines. During the sortie to the Sappers and Miners Quarter Guard, when Colonel Meiklejohn's orderly was shot dead, in falling back to the next stand, the body was left behind. Lance-Naick Sewan Singh, of the 24th Punjab Infantry, rushed forward alone and carried the body back. At the time our men, of course, could not tell whether the man was killed or only wounded. The act was done under the most perilous conditions; practically surrounded as they were with swordsmen, assisted by men armed with breech-loading rifles. The second instance occurred in the rescue of a wounded havildar of the 24th Punjab Infantry. This man was wounded at the outset with the company which first manned the bazar wall; but in the dark his absence was not noticed. At about 1 P.M., during a lull in the firing, the company in the hospital enclosure heard his cries for help; Lieutenant E. W. Costello, 24th Punjab Infantry, taking two sepoy with him advanced to the middle of the football ground and carried in their wounded comrade; this deed was indeed a gallant one, carried out as it was when the football ground was overrun with the enemy's swordsmen, and also raked by our own fire. The enemy had left this havildar for dead, having cut him in two or three places in addition to his original wound a severe bullet wound in the shoulder.

Colonel Meiklejohn determined the first thing in the morning to follow up the enemy. Orders were accordingly issued for the 31st Punjab Infantry with 4 guns, No. 8 Bombay Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, supported by the 24th Punjab Infantry, to reconnoitre towards Chakdara and get through if possible; a weak squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers, under Captain H. Wright accompanied this force, and got through to Chakdara safely; the infantry and guns, however, could not

get further than Bedford's Hill, opposite Khar, and were therefore recalled. The enemy on the right of the road occupied the heights all the way along, and amused themselves by sniping at the force at about 800 yards range, doing no damage however. From the junction of the North Malakand and graded roads, the 24th Punjab Infantry covered the movement of the rest of the force to North Malakand; on the completion of which the Officer Commanding Brigade sent orders for the 24th Punjab Infantry to return to Malakand by the graded road. The command of this regiment, owing to Colonel Lamb and Captain Holland being both wounded, had now devolved on Lieutenant Climo. The regiment moving with a flank guard on the Buddhist road was fired on by the enemy crowning the heights above, and some of their standards came down to within 300 yards of the flank guard, which was at once turned to the enemy, and became an attacking line, reinforced by further companies. A turning movement by one company ascending to the highest point on the right, caught the enemy, and they retired leaving several dead, one standard being captured. Orders were now issued for the evacuation of North Malakand, and all available transport was engaged in removing stores from there to the fort for the remainder of the day. This was very wise, as by nightfall the enemy had concentrated in greater numbers than ever, and in addition the hills on the west were crowded with Utman Khels, &c., thus providing us with a much more extended line to defend.

The movement of the North Malakand troops, 6 guns No. 8 Bombay Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, Guides Cavalry, and 31st Punjab Infantry (one squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers got through to Chakdara where it remained throughout the siege), was completed by 6 P.M. The Guides Cavalry, despite the intense heat, made a splendid march from Mardan, being in camp at Malakand in eight hours from receipt of Colonel Meiklejohn's telegram calling them to the relief. They accompanied the remainder of the garrison to the *kotal*. The force now in the *kotal* was as follows: 24th Punjab Infantry, 6 Companies 45th Sikhs, Guides Cavalry, No. 5 Company Queen's Own Sappers and Miners, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery. The enemy, who had been collecting on the western hills all day, came down at 5 P.M., and harassed the flank guard of the 31st Punjab Infantry, killing one of their number; at the same time overpowering No. 2 picket, 24th

Punjab Infantry, who were forced to retire. Two guns, No. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery had just arrived to the support of the west of the camp, and, ably assisted by them, two companies of the 24th Punjab Infantry retook the hill at the point of the bayonet, killing nine of the enemy and capturing a standard. The hill was then occupied by the 24th Punjab Infantry during the night. The enemy in their flight down the hill were badly knocked about, some of them running from their hiding places at such close quarters that the officers were enabled to use their revolvers with great effect.

From the right the following were the positions of the troops on the night of the 27th July:—From Gretna Green along the Buddhist Road up to No. 8 picket, the 45th Sikhs, supported by portions of the 24th Punjab Infantry from Fort Malakand; Sappers' and Miners' lines were manned by No. 5 Company Sappers and Miners, and the 31st Punjab Infantry, the latter regiment holding the *serai* with a detachment of 1 non-commissioned officer and 25 men; the Guides Cavalry held the Field Hospital enclosure and Commissariat lines; the 24th Punjab Infantry held Gibraltar Rock, the hill west of that again, and the water *nullah*. The fort was garrisoned by the remainder of the 24th Punjab Infantry, who also had a company at Maxim point. The enemy began their attentions early in the evening, emboldened no doubt by the evacuation of North Malakand; the sortie by the 24th Punjab Infantry, however, kept them off till dark, when they returned in largely increased numbers from east, north and west.

CHAPTER IX.

ANOTHER FIGHT IN THE DARK.



It was a curious sight before dark to see the enemy streaming in batches of 50 and 100 along the Chak-dara road with numbers of different coloured banners. But picturesque undoubtedly as the sight was it boded ill for the gallant defenders. Such large numbers meant an attack along the whole line, and this

as the previous night's business had shown, was deadly work. So far these hordes of the enemy were dressed chiefly in white, showing that the news had not yet reached Buner. In the same manner the hill tracks from the Utman Khel country could be discerned crowded with new comers. The preparations of the garrison were complete, and the disposition of troops, as the event proved, was admirable. The attack was renewed with increased vigour from east to west at 8-30 P.M., and another exciting night ensued. The heaviest fighting was, as on the previous night, in the Sappers' quarter, and our casualties were heavy.

A most determined onslaught on the fortified *serai* (about 100 yards in front of the north-east corners of the central enclosure) resulted in 10 of the 31st Punjab Infantry being killed and 11 wounded, but not before they had inflicted a heavy punishment on their assailants, who were forced to draw off, thus allowing the removal of the killed and wounded. This corner was the only entrance to the *serai*, and the 25 men of the 31st Punjab Infantry blocked it up most effectively, holding their position till 3 o'clock in the morning against most determined attacks, those who were left only retiring by means of a ladder when the enemy had set fire to the *serai* and the flames were enveloping them. Well might Colonel Meiklejohn eulogise their gallantry and dauntless courage, and the pity is that the darkness and noise of firing prevented the position of the brave little party being appreciated and help sent to them. Only four of the defenders escaped being killed or wounded.

The 45th Sikhs had a still more difficult task this night in keeping the enemy off, and on several occasions the tribesmen penetrated into their trenches, only to be driven back with heavy losses on each occasion. On the west the enemy pressed the 24th Punjab Infantry hard all night; Lieutenant Costello receiving his first wound, a long flesh wound penetrating the back and coming out through the right arm. This occurred about 7-30 P.M. in a sortie up the water *nullah*, in which the enemy were driven off, leaving several dead and a standard behind them. The Martini sharpshooters from the peak on the west were most annoying, getting the range of the guns with the 24th Punjab Infantry, and sniping at them all night, wounding two gunners. At 5-30 A.M. a reconnaissance went out from this regiment to North Malakand, and cleared the

enemy off the rocks, killing 5; in the meanwhile the gathering on Gallows Tree hill, about 700 yards from the west of the position, had moved down to a high spur about 400 yards from the 24th Punjab Infantry. On the return of the reconnoitring company from North Malakand, Lieutenant Climo, commanding the 24th Punjab Infantry, decided on driving them off. In the first instance a company under Lieutenant Rawlins moved out to reconnoitre their rear, but the enemy very soon displayed their superiority in numbers, and when they could no longer fire, rolled stones down on the company from their lofty position.

Lieutenant Climo at once went to their assistance with half of the remaining force at his disposal, leaving the guns and remainder of the half battalion, 24th Punjab Infantry, to cover his advance. The guns were worked most ably by Subadar Sher Singh of No. 8 Bombay Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, and without their assistance it is doubtful if the counter-attack on Gallows Tree hill could have been carried through. The swordsmen of the enemy quickly gave way, but their sharpshooters, armed with Martinis, stuck to their ground until our men reached 50 yards of their *sangars*, when they retired to the next peak and re-opened fire. Just as Gallows Tree was reached, a message came from the Officer Commanding the Brigade to say that a party of the 24th Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant H. A. Gib, was advancing from the fort *viâ* Guides Hill to their assistance. Lieutenant Rawlins was accordingly ordered to proceed to the south along the crest of the hill to join hands with this party, which he eventually did, returning to camp with $1\frac{1}{2}$ companies *viâ* Fort Malakand. The enemy had chosen the west as their line of retreat, and they were accordingly followed up by one company under Lieutenant Climo; the enemy's riflemen still covered the retreat, not moving themselves till our men were within 100 yards and then always under cover. Eventually, descending the gorge leading up to the pass over the Utman Khel hills, large bodies of the enemy were come upon returning towards Deri to the north, and the Utman Khel country to the west. At a range of 400 yards heavy losses were inflicted on them, many being killed outright, whilst numbers hobbled away wounded. Their dead in this counter-attack was estimated at about 40, with 60 to 100 wounded. At the start at least 1,000 men were crowning the height from Gallows Tree hill downwards.

As a large portion of the retreating enemy had fled into the village of Jalalkot, the guns were called up, and the village shelled, eight out of ten shells dropping right into the middle. The casualties to the 100 men of 24th Punjab Infantry in this admirable action were only 1 Subadar, bullet wound, and one sepoy shot through the hand. The result of this counter-attack, which Colonel Meiklejohn well described as executed with soldierly ability and dash was that the enemy evacuated these hills invariably before dawn, and seldom returned again till 6 P.M. The casualties were as follows on the night of the 27th July:—

	Killed	Wounded.
45th Sikhs	2	14
Sappers and Miners	1
31st Punjab Infantry	10	11
24th Punjab Infantry	2 officers (1 British, 1 Native) and 2 sepoys.
No. 8 Mountain Battery	1
	<hr/> 12	<hr/> 29

The day of the 28th very soon showed the fact that they were practically besieged; the enemy occupying all the heights and sniping all day long at most of the objects of interest in the camp. Our men now spent their time in improving defences and making cover for extra pickets: three lines of barbed wire were run right round the Commissariat, Sappers and Miners, and hospital enclosures; the abattis on the east and south was strengthened; the wall dividing the Commissariat godown from the Sappers' enclosure was also demolished. The Brigade mule-drivers were utilised in most of this work, so that all the combatant ranks were able to avail themselves of the time for rest. Extra *sangars* were built all along the west aspect of the camp, and as the Guides Infantry were expected at any time, it was hoped that this quarter of the camp would be considerably reinforced before night.

By 8-30 P.M. the fight was recommenced; before dark the Chakdara road revealed a fresh sight; the white track being absolutely black with the sombre-clad Bonerwals—the enemy whose appearance was confidently expected. The tribesmen displayed their usual energy on the centre. The 31st Punjab Infantry were here occupying the east and north faces of the

Sappers' and Miners' lines, and at the bazar corner, where they had all along shown so much vigour. On the 26th July the enemy made the most determined attempts to effect an entrance, and it was only the great stubbornness displayed here that prevented them succeeding in their object. The casualties in the 31st Punjab Infantry were very heavy, 2 killed and 21 wounded, including Lieutenant H. B. Ford and Lieutenant Swinley, the former very severely. In fact it was entirely due to Surgeon-Lieutenant T. H. Hugo's perseverance that Ford's life was saved; with the greatest difficulty the bleeding was stopped, Hugo holding on to the arteries with his fingers for some hours. The 45th were kept busy throughout the night, losing 2 killed and no further casualties. The Guides Infantry, after a magnificent march from Mardan, arrived at 7 P.M. this evening. They had started at 1. A.M. on the 27th, and notwithstanding the great heat arrived fit and ready to go on duty at once. Owing to the urgent need for reinforcements, it was found necessary to send the regiment straight to picket duty, part going to Maxim point and part on the east side next the 45th Sikhs.

The gallant perseverance of the Guides in this quarter saved the camp time after time; unfortunately their casualties were considerable, 2 sepoy being killed, and 1 native officer and 9 sepoy being wounded. Their performance here speaks volumes for them, as they came on to this arduous duty without rest or food. The Guides Cavalry, as on the previous night, were posted in the Hospital enclosure and Sappers' and Miners' lines; here Lieutenant H. L. S. Maclean (who was afterwards killed at Landakai) was wounded, having a most miraculous escape, the bullet entering his mouth and coming out of the cheek without damaging the bone. Two ponies were also wounded this night belonging to the Guides Cavalry. On the west the enemy had collected in great numbers and were most persistent until 3-30 A.M.; they many times came charging down the hillside, but the guns were not to their liking. The casualties here were fortunately slight, 2 gunners and 1 sepoy, 24th Punjab Infantry, only being wounded.

The enemy during the morning of the 29th were fairly quiet. About 1 P.M., however, they began to trouble the force on all sides. Two or three times the "alarm" called us to reinforce our pickets. Matters quieted down again by 3 P.M., the cause of

the trouble probably being the more eager of our fanatical enemies anticipating their big night, for that day was *Jumarat* and also the appearance of the new moon, and the enemy evidently meant to fulfil their promise of making their biggest effort on that night.

The enemy renewed their attentions all along the line at 5-30 P.M., the number of Martinis firing being largely increased. A sortie was again made from the 24th Punjab Infantry this evening. The enemy had crept up the hill and posted themselves behind rocks within 200 yards of the picket line; Lieutenants Climo and Morton, when walking round the picket line, were shot at three or four times, Lieutenant Morton's orderly being wounded. Half a company, under Lieutenant Rawlins, was at once sent on to a high spur on the left to work down behind these parties of the enemy, the other half company with Lieutenant Climo covering the advance. Two bodies of the enemy, numbering about 40 each, were turned off the rocks with a loss of 2 killed and several wounded. The sniping from the west now ceased until after dark. During the day the *serai* was pulled down, obstacles placed where required, the bazar was demolished, and large bonfires built in prominent places. These were found most useful, and assisted the garrison in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. The enemy, probably on this night, were in larger numbers than on any previous night; and every precaution had been taken to repel their attacks. It was curious, however, that on reckoning casualties in the morning, the right and centre had had comparatively few casualties. The enemy had been no less vigorous in their assaults; on the left, however, the heaviest fighting took place.

Time after time from 8 30 P.M. to 1-30 A.M. the enemy rushed up to the *sangars* in different parts of the position, only to be repulsed with loss on each occasion; at 1-30 P.M. the picket guarding the water *nullah* and rear of 24th Punjab Infantry camp was rushed in the most determined way, the enemy, regardless of anything, leaping into the *sangars*. They were, however, repulsed after a short hand-to-hand conflict, but not until Lieutenant Costello had been wounded for the second time, a severe wound, the left arm being shattered; one *havildar* was severely wounded (he has since died of the wound), one *sepoy* had a severe sword cut, and several

had lesser sword cut wounds. About 2 A.M. the enemy in front of the Afridi company of the 24th Punjab Infantry, attempted a parley, asking the Afridis to come over and give up their rifles, and telling them that there was no possible reason for doubt that Malakand would be taken sooner or later. Finding the replies unsatisfactory, they now endeavoured to ascertain our resources, their curiosity about the supply of ammunition being very keen. Our men told them that his most necessary article of warfare was just about finished.

At this pleasing piece of information, to them, they earnestly begged the Afridis to reconsider their decision, and not be so foolish as to throw this last chance of safety away, proposing that they should come into the *sangars*, divide up the rifles and ammunition, and then proceed to finish up Malakand. This was agreed to with the greatest alacrity. Out came a score or more of the enemy from behind rocks about 50 yards away and began to advance. They had not come far before every Afridi had covered his man and for five seconds the crack of the rifles showed these gentry what their real intentions were. As usual the enemy, with the exception of their sharpshooters, cleared off about 3 A.M. In the morning matters appeared fairly quiet.

The casualties during the night were as follows :—Guides Cavalry, 1 horse wounded ; Guides Infantry, nil ; 45th Sikhs, 2 sepoy wounded ; 24th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant Costello and 10 men wounded ; 31st Punjab Infantry, nil ; Sappers and Miners, nil ; No. 8 Bombay Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, 2 men wounded.

On the 29th the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras and details of the Guides under Colonel A. J. F. Reid arrived at Dargai. The fearful heat had caused the deaths from heat apoplexy of 21 men of the 35th Sikhs on the way up.

CHAPTER X.

FIGHTING TO THE RESCUE OF CHAKDARA.



T was reported that the "mad fakir" had personally led this attack, but that he had been wounded and had fled to Landakai: also that his second-in-command and companion had been killed. There is not the slightest doubt that the enemy's losses during the night were very heavy.

The day of the 30th was the quietest the garrison had had so far: no alarms of any sort. Officers now commenced to arrive from India; Colonel H. A. Sawyer, 45th Sikhs, and Major J. G. Ramsay, 24th Punjab Infantry, arriving in the morning among others. The day was as usual occupied in repairing damages and strengthening the position, there being wire entanglements, whilst the barbed wire placed round enclosures was generally cut in many places, showing how close the enemy were in the habit of coming up. This night again found the enemy in earnest on the right, the 45th and Guides, who were there, doing grand work; the former lost 1 sepoy killed and 6 wounded, the Guides 2 wounded.

The enemy attacked in great force all night, and time after time charged right up to the *sangars*. They must have lost severely, as the Guides picked up four standards and many bodies close under one of their breastworks. The Guides Cavalry again had one horse wounded; the Gunners, 31st Punjab Infantry, Sappers, and 24th Punjab Infantry, has no casualties.

Early on the morning of the 31st was ascertained the probable reason of the enemy giving the left and centre an easy time and occupying the attention of our right. Hearing of the near approach of the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras, they detached part of their forces to attempt to cut them off; this, however, did not succeed, as with the exception of a slight skirmish, both regiments arrived safely. For the first time since the night of the 26th, British Officers were now able to visit North Malakand; this was done to ascertain the feasibility of using the water-supply there. The rocks were accordingly cleared, in doing which four of the enemy were killed, two *jezails*, one sword and one spear being captured. A portion of the Guides

Cavalry, under Captain G. M. Baldwin, D. S. O., reconnoitred up to the limits of the original camp, and then returned by the road, followed by the half company of the 24th Punjab Infantry which had been utilised to clear the spurs. There was a good deal of firing at this party, but with the exception of one horse being wounded no casualties occurred. On the night of the 31st the attack was once more heaviest on the right, the bonfires and extra defences in the centre apparently being too much for the enemy's feelings; the left of the position was also less vigorously assaulted. The casualties during the day and night were as follows:—Guides, four wounded; 45th Sikhs, one killed, 6 wounded; 31st Punjab Infantry, Sappers, Royal Artillery, Guides Cavalry, 11th Bengal Lancers and 24th Punjab Infantry, no casualties.

During the day of 1st August orders were issued for a relief column to move out to Chakdara; the Cavalry, 11th Bengal Lancers and Guides, accordingly moved down by the North Malakand road about 3 P.M. under Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams of the Guides. On reaching the valley, the enemy swarmed down from the heights: it was truly wonderful to see the reckless manner in which these men rushed to certain death. The cavalry pursuit was a grand display, and the losses to the enemy must have been very heavy, at least 100 bodies being left on the field. Our losses in this brilliant affair were, 11th Bengal Lancers, 3 sowars wounded, one horse killed, 4 wounded; Guides, one sowar killed; Lieutenant Baldwin severely, and Lieutenant C. V. Keyes of the Guides, slightly wounded, one Native Officer, one duffadar and 9 sowars wounded. Colonel Adams' horse was killed under him, three other horses were killed and 18 horses wounded. The broken nature of the ground cramped somewhat the action of the cavalry, and as the enemy were gradually working round their left flank to cut them off from their only line of retreat, Colonel Meiklejohn sent Major E. Hobday, R.A., Staff Officer, to Colonel Reid to order Lieutenant-Colonel Adams to withdraw. As the cavalry wended their way up the road the enemy attempted to attack them, but Major J. G. Ramsay, commanding 24th Punjab Infantry, prevented this by a well-timed counter-attack, in which about 250 of the enemy were turned out of the rocks just below the roadway. In this last little affair the losses to the enemy were estimated at 20 killed and many wounded, whilst two standards, three rifles, and two

swords were captured in this sortie. By this time the day had grown too old to attempt the move to Chakdara.

The same day Sir Bindon Blood arrived and took over the command from Colonel Meiklejohn and orders were issued by him for the following force to bivouac on Gretna Green during the night, ready for the daybreak march to the relief of Chakdara :—

- 400 Rifles, 24th Punjab Infantry, under Major Ramsay.
- 400 Rifles, 45th Sikhs, under Colonel H. A. Sawyer.
- 200 Rifles, Guides Infantry, under Lieutenant P. C. Elliott Lockhart.
- 2 Squadrons, Guides Cavalry, under Lieutenant G. D. Smith, 2nd Central India Horse.
- 2 Squadrons, 11th Bengal Lancers, under Major S. B. Beatson.
- 4 Guns, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, under Captain A. H. C. Birch, R. A.
- 50 Sappers, No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant A. R. Winsloe, R. E.
- 2 Sections Native Field Hospital under Surgeon Captain H. F. Whitchurch, V. C., L. M. S.

} The whole under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams.

Colonel Meiklejohn was in sole command of the relieving column.

To this date from July 26th to August 1st the casualties were as follows :—

	Killed.	Wounded.
Officers	1	19
Non-commissioned officers and men	22	131

All were settled in their places at 9 P.M. and a good night's rest ensured compared with the previous six nights. An alarm occurred about 1-30 A.M. and it was a good sight to see the cool and collected way with which the men stood to their arms without moving ; it was not long before all were at rest again. Sir Bindon Blood as soon as it was light enough gave the order to Brigadier-General Meiklejohn to move off, passed an order to Colonel T. H. Goldney to advance, and went quickly himself to the top of Castle Rock Hill to superintend the operations generally. Colonel Goldney's force was taken from the Castle Rock pickets, and consisted of about 250 rifles, 35th Sikhs under Lieutenant-Colonel L. J. E. Bradshaw, and 50 rifles,



38th Dogras, under Captain L. C. H. Stainforth. His attack was supported by the remainder of the pickets holding Castle Rock, and by 2 guns, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, in position near the pickets and under the command of Jemadar Nawab of that Battery. Colonel Goldney and his men, on receipt of the order, advanced silently to within about one hundred yards of the enemy's position without being perceived. Then the enemy, becoming suddenly aware of what was going on, opened an irregular and ineffective fire, and as our men came to close quarters ran away in all directions, leaving seven of their number dead and one prisoner in our hands. There was no casualty of any sort on our side. The last portion of the column to relieve Chakdara moved off at 5-15 A.M. We had evidently taken the enemy unawares. They made, however, a grand stand at the foot of the graded road; from there onwards to the heights on our right they collected in thousands, and for about half an hour their resistance was of the stubbornest. The 35th Sikhs crowned the heights on the right, the Guides those just below, and the 45th the small hill on the left of the road which was crowded with the enemy.

The position was taken at the point of the bayonet, the enemy suffering very heavy losses. The enemy now retired absolutely by thousands along the heights on our right, flying disheartened and panic stricken in all directions into the plains, where they were pursued by the cavalry and still further discomfited. One might say that the defence of Malakand ceased at 6-30 A.M. on the 2nd August. It was expected to find Dogra's hill occupied, but the enemy evidently had more urgent affairs at their villages. At Betkeli and Amandarra another resistance was made by the enemy, but they were driven from the village and the Amandarra heights with great loss. In the village of Amandarra Lieutenant Watling's sword was recovered. From this point on, the road lies through rice fields, and our men were paid no further attention by the enemy, who up to Amandarra sniped at the rear guard but fortunately without doing much damage. The last two miles of the road was very tedious work; though every effort was being made to hurry on to Chakdara, where the firing was very heavy. The enemy had broken down all the bridges, and it was no easy matter moving doolies laden with wounded and ammunition mules through the water-logged hill fields. Eventually Chakdara was reached at 6-30 A.M., the bridge



Rough Sketch of Chakdara and adjacent Country

PLAIN



Rice fields

To THANNA

Rice fields

To ALADAND

From Malakand

Route to Kanby
Camps through

About 2 miles

Civil Hospital

Fort
Guns
HORN WORK

Water Logged

Rice fields

Change

Stream

Chakdara
Village

PLAIN
Cavalry

700 yards
Chitral Road

Enemies
Camps
Sungars

River Swat

Rice fields

Rice fields

River Swat

Rice fields

To ALADAND

From Malakand

Route to Kanby
Camps through

About 2 miles

Civil Hospital

Fort
Guns
HORN WORK

Water Logged

Rice fields

Change

Stream

Chakdara
Village

PLAIN
Cavalry

700 yards
Chitral Road

Enemies
Camps
Sungars

River Swat

Rice fields

Rice fields

River Swat

Rice fields

To ALADAND

From Malakand

being found in perfect order. The relieving force now heard how close a thing it had been for them, and there was little room for doubt that they arrived just in the nick of time.

The casualties of the relieving column were as follows :

45th Sikhs, 7 wounded,

No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners, 1 wounded ;

Guides Cavalry, 1 sowar and 3 horses wounded ;

Guides Cavalry, 2 sepoy killed, 1 native officer and 6 sepoy wounded ;

35th Sikhs, 2 sepoy killed, 3 wounded ;

24th Punjab Infantry, 4 sepoy wounded ;

No. 8 Bombay Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, 3 gunners wounded, 1 mule killed, 1 pony and 5 mules wounded.

HOW CHAKDARA WAS DEFENDED.

CHAPTER XI.

A BELEAGERED GARRISON.



AMONGST those British Officers who took part in the eventful game of polo on July 26th, was one from Chakdara, who at the conclusion of the game found himself compelled to ride another race, and this time for his life. This was Lieutenant H. B. Rattray, of the 45th Sikhs ("Rattray's Sikhs") whose experience was an exciting but unenviable one. Just when he had finished his game of polo and was on the point of departure for Chakdara Fort, he was met by two sowars of the 11th Bengal Lancers. These men had ridden in with a letter of warning from Rattray's brother officer at Chakdara, and in it Lieutenant Wheatley had briefly stated that large numbers of Pathans with standards were advancing towards Malakand on the left bank of the Swat from the east, and on Chakdara on the right bank, from the north and north-east. Lieutenant Rattray, made his way back right through the hostile enemy as fast as possible, and after an exciting ride, found, on his arrival at the fort, that Lieutenant Wheatley's report was only too true. He at once reported the serious aspect of affairs to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Malakand, by telegram ; and it was partly owing to the receipt of this wire and a previous wire from

Lieutenant Minchin, Assistant Political Officer, that the troops at Malakand were prepared for the attack.

It is curious to note how particular the tribes were during the day of the 26th not to commit themselves to any preliminary acts of violence. At Chakdara, Havildar Gurdit Singh was out sketching a few miles from the fort in the afternoon: he was surrounded by an advanced party of the enemy, who took away a compass, a pair of binoculars, and some rupees, but permitted him to go back without harm. This havildar reached the fort almost simultaneously with Lieutenant Rattray, his story corroborating all other reports. Preparations were now made for any eventuality; and arrangements were made with a havildar of the Dir Levies to give the garrison warning of the near approach of the enemy, the signal being the lighting of a fire on the hill to the north of the fort. At 10-15 P.M. the signal fire was seen. The garrison at once fell in at their posts as the alarm sounded; and it was not long before the enemy opened fire, the attack coming from the west; but finding the fire too hot for them gave up their attempt in this direction.

In a short time the attack was resumed from the north-east, strenuous efforts being made to escalate the walls by means of ladders taken from the Civil Hospital. Here again they were repulsed, and they made their final attempt for that night on the east side, which was occupied by the 11th Bengal Lancers. This attempt was, however, not sustained, for long before daylight they had all drawn off, occupying the hills to the north and north-west, whence they sniped all day but without inflicting any casualties on the garrison. Their fire was, however, well enough aimed to render moving about an unpleasant operation. Surgeon-Captain V. Hugg, of the 31st Punjab Infantry, who was in medical charge at Chakdara in addition to being Civil Surgeon with the Government Hospital built for the use of the tribes, had rescued all the medical instruments from the hospital at 7 P. M. on the 26th July. At this time several Maliks from Upper Swat had promised him that, whatever the result of this rising of the tribes, the hospital should remain intact. It was apparent how little was the influence the Maliks had over the fanatical enemy, for, as will be described later, the hospital was occupied and all medical stores ruthlessly destroyed before the siege was raised. At 8 A. M. on the 27th July, Captain Wright, accompanied by Captain D. Baker,

Transport Officer, Malakand Brigade, with 40 sabres, 11th Bengal Lancers, arrived from North Malakand.

And let me here describe the exciting ride Captain Wright with his squadron experienced on the morning of the 27th, the route of which is shown in the sketch map. No sooner did they debouch on to the main road from the low hills surrounding North Malakand, than the enemy opened fire on them, but fortunately their aim was far from accurate. The cavalry turned off on to the Khar plain, going by way of the polo road; on the plain were dotted groups of the enemy, who, however, showed the greatest activity in bolting on to the hills whenever the cavalry quickened their pace. The ground traversed here was exactly the same piece of country over which the Guides Cavalry made their famous charge during the expedition in 1895. Badkala was reached safely, but just beyond rise the Amandara heights through which the road passes. This was held very strongly by the enemy, and it was deemed impossible, except with great loss of life, to attempt getting through by the road: this squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers happened to have just come up from Nowshera in relief, and, therefore, knew little of the country. A pathway was discovered leading under the hill close to the river; this appeared a promising road, and it was decided to pass through. Like most of these hill tracks, it ended abruptly in an almost impassable rock, and it is a miracle how the cavalry managed to get through or over. The enemy, noting their intentions, came down the hill and opened fire, and at one time got in so close that Captain Wright and Captain Baker were able to use their revolvers. These were an exciting few moments, but the rocks were eventually left behind. On the Chakdara side the road was now found occupied, so, under a heavy fire, the squadron had to take to the river, and managed to cross two large streams of water. The advance was then continued until the top of the island was reached, and here the river was re-crossed without casualty. In crossing the rice fields to reach the road, two sowars were wounded and Captain Wright's horse was hit in the thigh, notwithstanding which it gamely managed to carry its rider into Chakdara. The enemy kept up their fire and pursuit until the Maxim gun on the Chakdara Bridge head compelled them to stop. During the last mile or so of the road, the enemy investing the fort on the right bank also opened fire; but fortunately the squadron reached its goal.

without further casualty, and joined the beleagured garrison of which on his arrival Captain Wright took command, and conducted the defence of the long and trying siege.

At 11-30 A.M. the tribesmen again commenced to attack most determinedly; it was extraordinary to see the fanatical bravery of some of the enemy. Time after time standard-bearers, backed up by swordsmen, would charge straight up to the walls of the fort, only to fall riddled with bullets. Their losses during this morning attack were very heavy, the dead lying about unremoved all day. After this no further desire was shown by the enemy to tempt Providence by daylight; retiring to the hills sniping continued until evening. During the day the signallers in the Signal Tower on the west were reinforced by six men, sufficient supplies for several days, and as much water as possible were also sent up. This was carried out under cover of both Maxims and that portion of the troops manning the west wall. It was found impossible to further communicate with Malakand, the telegraph wires having been cut during the night, and the enemy absolutely prevented signalling. The attack was resumed at 11 P.M., the enemy surrounding the fort on all sides, coming up close under the walls. Lieutenant Wheatley had, during daylight, trained the 9-pounder gun and Maxims on those points from which attacks might be expected: the result was satisfactory, for on opening fire with these guns the enemy cleared off for some hours. They returned about 1-30 A.M., this time attacking the north-east corner, and once more brought up ladders for escalading purposes: foiled in their attempts they drew off before daylight to the cover of the hills. From the outset every possible effort was made to give cover to the garrison. Captain Baker superintended this work, and it is doubtless owing to the excellent arrangement made by him, that many of the garrison were saved again and again.

The enemy returned to the attack earlier than heretofore on the evening of the 28th, at 5-30 P.M. They formed a large semi-circle of not less than 2,000 armed men, and interspersed among them were about 200 standard-bearers, the whole forming a very fine spectacle. The advance was made by their usual rushes and accompanied with their well-known maniacal shouts. Their standard-bearers, leading parties from cover to cover, worked their way up under the walls, where

the steady fire of our Sikhs repelled all attacks. As darkness closed in a body of them crossed the barbed wire, and scaling a corner of the rock discharged their rifles almost in the faces of our men. The night was a repetition of previous ones.

The morning of the 29th July was spent in making cover from reverse fire, especially along the pathway up to the guns, which was open to the fire of the enemy, now sangered on the hill west of the fort. At 3 P.M. on this day large reinforcements arrived at Chakdara village. They were evidently keen on getting to business at once, and must have had a master-mind among them, for their chief efforts were directed against the Signal Tower. In spite of a very heavy fire, both from the tower and fort, they succeeded in reaching the doorway itself, and here attempted to fire it. Having set fire to the combustibles arranged for the purpose, they ranged themselves under cover round the fort and on the hills north of the Lower, giving vent to their feelings with shouts of delight. It was not long, however, before they relapsed into silence when it was found that no damage had been done. At sunset the foresight of the Fort Maxim was shot away: this was a very serious occurrence, as the enemy had become imbued with a very profound respect for this weapon. It was with a great sense of relief the garrison found that the Military Works armourer was able to remedy this for us: he very quickly rigged up a temporary sight, which answered as well as the original. The enemy continued their attacks on the tower till 8 P.M., after which they appeared to have had more than enough, for they made no attack during the night, merely contenting themselves with keeping up a continuous fire from the hills.

The day of the 30th July was comparatively quiet, and it was found possible to give the whole garrison a few hours' rest in relief, a much-needed rest indeed, considering that the garrison was well-nigh worn out with want of sleep and fatigue. No determined attack was made this night, in fact the elements were against it; a heavy rain and cold wind being almost more unpleasant than the enemy. So far they had been able each day to send up supplies and water to their comrades in the Signalling Tower. On the 31st July, at 6 A.M., the usual excursion with water, &c., was made, and this proved to be the last received by them until after the relief about 10 A.M. on the 2nd August.

CHAPTER XII.

CHAKDARA'S URGENT APPEAL: "HELP US."



P to date the difficulty of keeping up signalling communication with Malakand had been well nigh impossible, and it undoubtedly would have been so had it not been for the bravery and devotion of the gallant signallers of the 45th Sikhs. One of these men, especially Sepoy Prem Singh, displayed the most surprising gallantry; he used daily to go out through a port hole in the tower with the helio apparatus, and at the risk of his life under fire from all sides, managed to get urgent messages through to Malakand; the fact of thus keeping up communication with the outer world did no little to cheer all ranks.

Another determined attack was made at 4-30 P.M. on the 31st July, but the Maxims and 9-pounder did such execution that the enemy cleared off to Chakdara village almost quicker than they came.

Sunday, the 1st August, was the commencement of 30 very anxious hours. The enemy very considerably increased in numbers and furnished with many more rifles, invested the fort on all sides. During the night they occupied the Civil Hospital, the walls of which they loopholed; the east end of Signal Tower Hill was also occupied by them permanently, thus cutting off communication with the gallant little party holding the tower and rendering it impossible to replenish the all important water-supply. During the day it was found almost impossible to move about within the fort, the north and east faces being commanded by the marksmen on Signal Tower Hill, and the west face also being commanded by the conical hill north of the fort: the enemy had every portion marked, in fact it seemed as if men had been specially told off for every yard of open space. Such a methodical and determined siege portended increased danger. All day long the enemy continued to increase, and matters grew so serious that it was decided to send an urgent appeal for help.

Owing to the danger and difficulty of signalling, a long message was out of the question; so it was made as short as

possible and the gallant Sikh signaller again risked his life to helio the two words "Help us."

These words were read at Malakand and it was this which determined Colonel Meiklejohn to take steps at all hazards to relieve the little band of defenders. The message was wired from Malakand to India and from there it was cabled to England. Everywhere it was known that the garrison was in dire distress and it was with feelings of great relief that the news was known of the prompt answer and effective help which was sent out from the Malakand?

Regarding the helio message it may be said that as a matter of fact a long message was made out explaining the situation as far as ammunition, rations, and casualties were concerned; but, as the signal tower was surrounded, such a lengthy message was impossible, and these two words were flashed only through the pluck of Sepoy Prem Singh, 45th Sikhs, who ran out of the tower, down the khud, put up his helio, flashed the two words, and bolted in again, under a heavy fire. This tower was garrisoned by 16 men of the 45th Sikhs, and the way they fought may be realised from the fact that 60 bodies were counted round the tower after one of the attacks on it, besides those the enemy were able to carry away.

In a worse plight than the garrison in the fort was the little force in the tower. During the whole day of the 1st August pressing requests came from them for water, but this could not be supplied; any attempt at a sortie could only have resulted disastrously, for by this time the fort was invested by close on 10,000 tribesmen. We may be sure the fort garrison felt for their unfortunate comrades in the tower, and that if it had been possible they would have relieved them. All hopes were now centred on Malakand's reply to the urgent signal.

During the night of the 1st August nothing particular occurred, but at daybreak on the 2nd August began the most determined assault that had been experienced so far. The enemy appeared bent on taking the fort at any cost; ladders were placed against the walls, and bundles of grass brought up to cover the barbed wire. All this was carried out under a murderous fire from our men. Kishen Singh, commanding the 9-pounder gun detachment, was killed and two sepoy severely wounded on the north face. Notwithstanding these

vigorous assaults they held their own for four or five hours ; even then it seemed that their overwhelming numbers might be too much for our small force.

The defence could not much longer hold out. At this critical moment the cavalry of the relieving column appeared through the Amandara Pass. As they approached the bridge the enemy began to draw off. Now the tables were turned and well did the Sikhs make use of their opportunity. At this time Lieutenant Rattray was himself standing by the west gate. Seeing the enemy commencing to go, he moved out at once with some six sepoy, daringly ran across the road into the hospital and drove the remainder of the enemy out. These men fled by the river bed, but were soon overtaken by our Sikhs, who with mad rush and Khalsa yell leaped on the foe and wreaked the vengeance they had so long and so patiently huffed to themselves. It was a scene such as only frontier warfare can provide. Not a soul of the rebel party by the river bed escaped, some 30 or 40 dead bodies being left on the ground. This party was soon joined by Captain Baker, and Lieutenant Wheatley with a reinforcement from the detachment.

As they returned they found the cavalry checked by a heavy fire from the *sangars* on the Signal Tower Hill. Lieutenant Rattray now attacked the *sangars*, driving the enemy off with heavy loss on to the plain before, where the cavalry was ready for them, Captain Wright with his squadron inflicting great damage over the plain, and Major Beatson accounting for large numbers in the charge through the rice fields. The last of the enemy to leave the furthest *sangar* wounded Lieutenant Rattray in the neck ; fortunately a slight wound, which in no way prevented him from being able to meet the General Officer Commanding the relieving column, and receiving the congratulations which he so richly deserved for the admirable manner in which he had helped to conduct the defence. The total losses to the garrison were three killed and nine wounded : numbers which speak volumes for the excellence of the defences, and the forethought shown by the officers in preparing cover. The enemy lost in killed alone outside Chakdara 2,000 alone. One discharge of the smooth bore gun, fired at the enemy as they came away from praying at the mosque, alone killed eighty.

One last word for the little band of Sikhs in the Signal Tower to whom in many ways is due the fact that there was a garrison at all left to relieve. They got their well deserved drink about 10 A. M., and we may well imagine that no nectar ever tasted more refreshing, sweeter, or cooler to them than the plain Swat river water for which they had thirsted for so many weary hours.

The succouring force from Malakand arrived in the morning and relieved the gallant Chakdara garrison of a great load of anxiety. The Malakand contingent also was not sorry once more to be able to stretch its legs in the Swat Valley instead of being besieged in the fort at Malakand. Throughout the idea of the tribesmen undoubtedly was to harass and wear out the garrison at Chakdara, and if possible cause them to exhaust the ammunition. The fort, which is armed with Maxim guns, is practically impregnable to capture from tribesmen so long as any cartridges remain with the defending troops, and even should ammunition run out, the scarped rocky eminence of great strength on which the fort is built would enable storming parties to be beaten back at the point of the bayonet.

It must have been a matter of surprise to many why the tribesmen never attempted to destroy the Chakdara Bridge. The reason is said to be that they were so confident of complete victory that they thought it would be well to keep the bridge in good repair for subsequent use. Their overweening confidence in the "mad fakir" is amply testified by the undaunted way in which they rallied to the attack time and again, spite of the terrible losses inflicted on them by the old smoothbore and the Maxims. Prayer was held in a mosque in the village of Chakdara, and until the fort was relieved the tribesmen, with scaling-ladders ready to hand, came straight from the mosque to the walls, certain each time that at last victory was to be theirs. The only result was the greatest slaughter ever inflicted on the frontier. During the last Afghan war, the only occasion when over a thousand men were slain, was at Ahmed Khel, where the Afghan loss was estimated at 1,200 killed.

PUNITIVE EXPEDITION IN THE SWAT VALLEY.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE.



THROUGHOUT the week the greatest excitement prevailed in India, and news from the beleaguered garrison was eagerly and anxiously awaited. There was distinct relief felt everywhere when it was known that the 11th Bengal Lancers with 12,000 rounds of ammunition had reached Malakand, which was increased when it was seen that troops were making forced marches up the Swat Valley. Officers were rushing back to their regiments from leave and the hill stations, and favorite hot weather resorts of India were rapidly being denuded of the military men. On the Saturday following the outbreak seven hundred infantry reached Colonel Meiklejohn, bringing with them 200,000 rounds of ammunition in addition to their own regimental supply, whilst another convey, similarly supplied, arrived shortly afterwards. Still energy was kept up almost at straining point and efforts were made to quickly reinforce the artillery at the Malakand, two batteries being hastily pushed forward to aid the solitary No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery which was at the fort. The weather was of the most trying character imaginable, and the great heat told largely amongst the men, the 35th Sikhs losing twenty-five men from apoplexy and sunstroke between Mardan and Dargai alone.

Still the men were in the best of spirits, eager to push forward to join in the hot work which they knew and hoped was waiting for them on the heights of Malakand. The tales of gallant heroism had fired all ranks, and overcoming every difficulty the relief force pursued its forced marching right into Malakand.

Government lost no time in sanctioning the despatch of the Malakand Field Force, and on July 30th the following particulars were published :—

The Governor-General in Council sanctions the despatch of a force, as detailed below, to be styled the Malakand Field Force, for the purpose of holding the Malakand and adjacent posts and operating against the neighbouring tribes as may be required :

1. *Formation of Force.*—The force will be composed as follows :—

1ST BRIGADE.

1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment.
 24th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 31st (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 45th (Rattray's Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 Sections A and B of No. 1 British Field Hospital.
 No. 38 Native Field Hospital.
 Sections A and B of No. 50 Native Field Hospital.

2ND BRIGADE.

1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment.
 35th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 38th (Dogra) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 Guides Infantry.
 Sections C and D of No. 1 British Field Hospital.
 No. 37 Native Field Hospital.
 Sections C and D of No. 50 Native Field Hospital.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS.

4 Squadrons, 11th Regiment of Bengal Lancers ("Prince of Wales' Own").

1 Squadron, 10th Regiment of Bengal Lancers ("Duke of Cambridge's Own").

Guides Cavalry.

22nd Punjab Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

2 Companies 21st Punjab Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

10th Field Battery.

6 Guns No. 1 British Mountain Battery.

6 Guns No. 7 British Mountain Battery.

6 Guns No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.

No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.
 No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
 Section B of No. 13, British Field Hospital.
 Sections A and B of No. 35 Native Field Hospital.

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.

No. 34 Native Field Hospital.
 Section B of No. 1 Field Veterinary Hospital.

3. COMMAND AND STAFF—

<i>General Officer Commanding the Force</i> (with the local rank of Major-General)			Brigadier-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B.
<i>Aide-de-Camp</i>	Captain A. B. Dunsterville, East Surrey Regiment.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Captain A. R. Dick Personal Assistant to the Military Member of the Viceroy's Council.
<i>Assistant Adjutant-General</i>		...	Major H. H. Burney, 1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders.
<i>Assistant Quartermaster-General</i>		...	Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, Central India Horse.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, Malakand</i>			Captain A. B. H. Drew (<i>vice</i> Major Herbert, wounded in action).
<i>Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General (Intelligence)</i>			Captain H. E. Stanton, D.S.O., R.A.
<i>Field Intelligence Officer</i>	Captain H. F. Walters, 24th (Baluchistan) Regiment, Bombay Infantry.
<i>Superintendent, Army Signalling</i>	Captain E. W. M. Norie, 2nd Battalion, Middlesex Regiment.
<i>Principal Medical Officer</i>	Surgeon-Colonel G. Thomson, C.B., I.M.S.
<i>Commanding Royal Engineers</i>	Colonel J. E. Broadbent, R.E. (replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Peacock).
<i>Commanding Royal Artillery</i>	Lieutenant-Colonel W. Aitken, C.B., R.A.
<i>Adjutant, Royal Artillery</i>	Captain H. D. Grier, R.A. (replaced by Captain H. Rouse, R. A.)
<i>Adjutant, Royal Engineers</i>	Captain H. J. Sherwood, R.E.
<i>Field Engineer</i>	Major E. Blunt, R.E.

<i>Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling</i>				Captain J. C. Sutherland, 17th Bengal Cavalry (afterwards replaced by Lieutenant H. E. Cotterill, Royal West Surrey and Lieutenant E. Christian, Royal Scots Fusiliers).
<i>Assistant Field Engineer</i>	Lieutenant C. M. F. Watkins, R.E.
<i>Assistant Field Engineer</i>	Lieutenant H. O. Lathbury, R. E.
<i>Field Treasure Chest Officer</i>	Lieutenant F. D. Grant, Military Accounts Department.
<i>Ordnance Officer</i>	Captain W. W. Cookson, R.A.
<i>Chief Commissariat Officer</i>	Major H. Wharry, Assistant Commissary-General.
<i>Assistant to Chief Commissariat Officer</i>				Lieutenant A. S. Cobbe, 32nd Pioneers (afterwards replaced by Captain R. C. Lye, 23rd Pioneers).
<i>Divisional Transport Officer</i>	Captain C. G. R. Thackwell, Assistant Commissary-General.
<i>Assistant to Divisional Transport Officer</i>				Captain F. H. Hancock, 26th Punjab Infantry (afterwards replaced by Captain A. W. V. Plunkett, 2nd Battalion, Manchester Regiment).
<i>Senior Veterinary Officer and Veterinary Inspector</i>				Veterinary Captain H. T. W. Mann.
<i>Survey Officer</i>	Captain C. L. Robertson, R.E.
<i>Provost Marshal</i>	Captain C. G. F. Edwards, 5th Punjab Cavalry.
<i>Chaplain</i>	Rev. L. Kluch.
1ST BRIGADE STAFF.				
<i>Commanding</i>	Colonel W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Lieutenant C. R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon Guards.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General</i>				Major E. A. P. Hobday, R.A.
<i>Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.</i>				Captain G. F. H. Dillon, 40th Pathans.
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i>	Captain C. H. Beville, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
<i>Brigade Transport Officer</i>	Captain J. M. Camilleri, 13th Bengal Infantry.
<i>Regimental, Commissariat and Transport Officer</i>				Lieutenant R. Harman, 4th Sikhs (afterwards replaced by Lieutenant J. Duncan, Royal Scots Fusiliers).

<i>Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling</i>				Captain E. V. O. Hewitt, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent.
<i>Provost Marshal</i>	Second Lieutenant S. Morton, 24th Punjab Infantry.
<i>Veterinary Officer</i>	Veterinary Captain W. R. Walker.
2ND BRIGADE STAFF.				
<i>Commanding</i>	Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Lieutenant J. Byron, Royal Artillery.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General</i>				Major E. O. F. Hamilton, 1st Battalion, The Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment.
<i>Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General</i>				Major C. H. Powell, 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkhas.
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i>	...			Captain G. A. Hawkins, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
<i>Brigade Transport Officer</i>		Captain D. Baker, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers.
<i>Regimental, Commissariat and Transport Officer</i>			and	Lieutenant G. C. Brooke, 2nd Battalion, The Border Regiment.
<i>Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling</i>				Lieutenant W. H. Trevor, 1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment.
<i>Provost Marshal</i>	Captain F. Duncan, 23rd Punjab Infantry.
<i>Veterinary Officer</i>	Veterinary Lieutenant J. W. Rudd (afterwards replaced by Veterinary Lieutenant G. M. Williams).

FOR BASE AND LINE OF COMMUNICATION.

<i>Base Commandant (with the temporary rank of Colonel and pay and status of Colonel on the Staff)</i>				Lieutenant-Colonel V. A. Schalch, 11th Bengal Infantry.
<i>Staff Officer at the Base</i>	
<i>Section Commandant</i>	Captain O. B. S. F. Shore, 18th Bengal Lancers (replaced by Captain Belli Bivar, Belooch Horse).
<i>Nowshera Depôt Commandant, British Troops.</i>				Captain H. D'E. Vallancey, 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
<i>Nowshera Depôt Commandant, Native Troops.</i>				Captain R. R. Renton, 18th Bengal Infantry.

<i>Bannu Depôt Commandant</i>	...	Captain J. E. L. Gibbs, Bedfordshire Regiment.
<i>Base Commissariat Officer</i>	Captain S. W. Lincoln, Assistant Commissary-General.
<i>Assistant to Base Commissariat Officer.</i>		Lieutenant E. G. Vaughan, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
<i>Transport Officers</i>	{ Lieutenant R. S. Weston, 2nd Battalion, The Manchester Regiment. Lieutenant E. F. Macnaghten, 16th Lancers. Lieutenant C. G. Lewes, Essex Regiment.

General Sir Bindon Blood's appointment to the general command was received with universal satisfaction. There had been absolutely no time lost. General Blood, after inspecting the defences and seeing to the troops at Malakand, made a report to head-quarters which was in every way eulogistic of the admirable generalship which the defence force had shown during the trying week and of the gallantry and determination shown by all arms. He found all the arrangements made by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn admirable in every way, and the position absolutely secure. He described the spirit of the troops as excellent, all showing eagerness to be led against the enemy. He warmly praised their soldierly bearing and keenness after the almost continuous fighting of the week, with little rest at night and exposure to sun during the day.

The enemy suffered severely in the attempts to take Malakand and Chakdara. It is understood that the Malakand was held by about 2,500 troops, and that the Chakdara Fort had but a small garrison of 300 men. The difference between the two posts is that Malakand is exposed and the troops have necessarily to scatter themselves over an extended area for camping purposes and possesses no forts, whereas at Chakdara the small garrison, retired within its forts, was able to hold its own and to inflict nearly three times as much loss on the enemy as the force at Malakand with over eight times its strength could inflict. If the reported losses of the enemy at Malakand be correctly estimated, or even approximately so, the advantages of a strongly fortified post for exposed military outposts on the frontier become very evident. That only 700 of the enemy were slain during these long nights of almost hand-to-hand fighting, compares very unfavourably with the

2,000 or so who fell in trying to take the small post at Chakdara.

A testimony to the value in defence of posts of the Maxim gun, if indeed one be now needed, is given by the record slaughter at Chakdara, where the weapon appears to have swept down the enemy in its hundreds, and to have preserved our bridge over the Swat river most effectively. That the supply of small-arm ammunition and artillery shell should have threatened to run out is not so very wonderful, when consideration is given to the tremendous fire kept up all the time during the best part of a week; but although reserve was even in excess what is ordinarily required to be kept in hand under like circumstances, the fact that there was actually a pinch to refill the arsenals in time, is a hint for the future guidance of our authorities in all similar cases. Further illustrations should not be necessary to prove that garrisons beyond the border should have ample ammunition at hand to enable them to hold out for much longer than they could be possibly called upon to do before help reaches them from India, and the possession of practically impregnable works which the troops can occupy would help out matters by rendering a well controlled fire always possible, which would not be the case at night where the enemy has practically no obstacle to his closing on the defences in the darkness.

CHAPTER XIV.

A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE: RESERVE BRIGADE FORMED.

NOTHING was more remarkable about the outbreak in the Swat Valley than the extraordinarily sudden manner in which the tribesmen collected. Instead of the thousand or two which was first considered to be a fair estimate of the numbers in revolt, it was found that there were at least ten or twelve thousand under

arms on the hills to the north, the north-east and the south-west, as well as in the Swat Valley itself. This great gathering caused much anxiety, and in order to set aside the possibility of a reverse to our troops the Viceroy and his Council decided, early in August, on the immediate formation of a reserve Brigade, to be held in readiness to support the Field Force under General Sir Bindon Blood should necessity arise. Much importance was attached to the rising of the Bunerwals, four sections of which there was good reason to believe were in the field against us. It was felt that every day's delay in putting forth our strength meant more adherents for the Mad Mullah, and a general rising of the Utman Kheis, Bunerwals, Kohistanis as well as Swatis might be a tough job even for a large force.

The Bunerwals belong to the Yusaf section of the Yusafzai tribe, and comprise the Iliazai and the Malizai sub-divisions, and, as their name implies, they inhabit the Buner Valley. They first came into collision with the British Government during the Umbeyla campaign in 1863, when they offered considerable resistance; but eventually undertook to disband their armed force, to destroy Malka and to drive the disaffected Hindustanis out of their country. Those engagements they carried out. In 1868, in 1877 and in 1884 they broke the peace again, raiding border villages, and on each occasion the only punishment inflicted was to make them rebuild what they had destroyed and the payment of fines. On the last occasion it seemed very probable that a military force would have had to be sent against the Bunerwals, but they submitted without military measures being necessary. The other sub-divisions of the Yusaf section of Yusafzais are the Ranizai, Isazai and Akazai, all of whom have given much trouble in years gone by and with whom our account will yet have to be settled without a doubt.

The Swatis are not a pure Pathan tribe, but are believed to be of Indian origin. They originally occupied the territory between the Hydaspes and Jallalabad; but were gradually driven out by Afghan tribes, and the Yusafzais deprived them of Swat and Buner; they accordingly crossed the Indus and settled at Alahi, Nandihar, Tikri, &c., during the sixteenth century. The Swatis of Alahi are a clan known as Thor, and their country is a mountainous region adjoining Kohistan and

touching Kaghan. In years gone by they have given a good deal of trouble to the British Government.

The following was the composition of the Reserve Brigade:—

- 2nd Battalion, The Highland Light Infantry.
- 1st Battalion, The Gordon Highlanders.
- 21st (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
- 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
- 6 Guns, 10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery.
- No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
- No. 14 British Field Hospital.
- No. 45 Native Field Hospital.
- No. 1 Field Medical Depôt.

COMMANDS AND STAFF.

<i>Commanding ...</i>	Brigadier-General J. H. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G., Royal Artillery.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Captain R. J. G. Elkington, Royal Artillery.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General</i>				Captain A. H. G. Kembal, 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
<i>Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.</i>				Captain H. R. B. Donne, 1st Battalion, The Norfolk Regiment.
<i>Field Intelligence Officer (attached to Divisional Head-Quarters).</i>				Captain J. K. Tod, 7th Bengal Cavalry.
<i>Veterinary Officer.</i>				Veterinary Lieutenant T. W. Rudd.
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i>	...			Captain A. Mullaly, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.
<i>Brigade Transport Officer</i>		Captain E. deV. Wintle, 15th Bengal Lancers.
<i>Regimental Commissariat Transport Officer.</i>				Lieutenant H. I. Nicholl, 1st Battalion, The Bedfordshire Regiment.

Despite the heavy fighting which had been going on and the state of unrest and revolt which prevailed along the Swat Valley generally, the mails were now again regularly carried from Nowshera to Malakand, accompanied by a guard from Malakand to Chakdara. A *tonga* started from Nowshera immediately on the arrival of the mail train, and was timed to reach Malakand about 4 P.M. It left Malakand again at 5 and

the mails were delivered the same evening at Khar, Amandara and Chakdara. Again the mail *tonga* left Chakdara at 8 A.M., arrived Malakand at 10-30, and Nowshera at 5 P.M., in time to catch both the up and down trains.

Such harmonious working under difficulties so real is a fine tribute to the efficiency of the arrangements.

Since the outbreak at the Malakand the rush of traffic along the road between Nowshera and Malakand had been overwhelming, and nothing but indomitable determination and completeness of arrangements ensured every thing being carried out with punctuality and without serious hitch.

On the 10th August the troops had finished their trying march and were encamped in the cooler climes of Amandara, where they found the hill breezes and occasional showers a delightful change after the exhausting rigour of the plains' hot weather. Amandara lies on the left of the road and runs down nearly to the river. On the other side of the road there is a belt of trees half a mile long, where it is shady and cool during the heat of the day. Horses and mules looked very well after their hard march. The 10th Field Battery suffered the most—nearly all their casualties occurring in the seven miles up from Dargai, and as they marched that day from Jalala to Khar, a distance of 25 miles, it was not to be wondered at; but the animals were quickly recovering their condition, with the help of plenty of loot from the neighbouring villages.

At Amandara was the 1st Brigade, including the Guides Cavalry, the 11th Bengal Lancers, the 10th Field, and the 1st and 7th Mountain Batteries, whilst the 2nd Brigade with the 8th Native Mountain Battery was at Khar.

About this time there was a fear of foot and mouth disease breaking out among the bullocks, but stringent measures stamped this out fortunately. On the 10th the Aladand *jirga* came in to Major Deane. They were very submissive and returned pledged to bring in any Government property in their possession. This was thought to be the end of the Malakand disturbances. It was reported that the Ranazai had sent in a peace deputation to the Political Officer at the Malakand. The tribes about Panjkora were reported quiet and the local excitement appeared not to have extended. On August 5th, the Khan of Dir came in and

saw the Political Officer, who reported that the interview was satisfactory, and that the Khan promised the punishment of his subjects who took part in the attack. Many standards and guns captured on the 2nd were being brought in to camp. Plenty of grain and fodder also was obtained in the deserted villages.

On the 7th, at 5 A.M., General Jeffreys reconnoitred several villages west of Jolagram and west of Khar with the 35th Sikhs and Guides Infantry, four guns No. 1 British Mountain Battery, and a small body of cavalry. The inhabitants had all fled, except one man who was wounded with a broken leg and arm, and who was brought into Malakand Hospital. Much Government and other property looted from the North Camp was found. The Political Officer reported that the Mad Mullah tried to raise Shanazai villages north-east of Chakdara on the night of the 5th, but failed.

By the 11th all spare transport and supplies had been shifted from Malakand hence to Khar, and the Malakand was receiving a thorough cleaning. The field post offices had commenced working. The general health of the troops was excellent.

All was quiet again on the 12th; Colonel Lamb had his leg amputated the previous day: the Rontgen Rays having failed, owing to some injury having occurred to the apparatus on its way up. The thigh bone was found to have been completely shattered. Later came the news that he died on Sunday night. He is the tenth officer we had lost since the first shot was fired at Maizar on the 10th June; in addition we had had eighteen wounded. The late Major John Lamb, temporary Lieutenant-Colonel in command of the 24th Punjab Infantry, saw active service in Afghanistan in 1879-80 and in the Zhob Valley expedition in 1890, and on both occasions was mentioned in despatches.

Reliable information was received that after a *jirga* at Takht-a-band, the Bunerwals, with the Hindustani fanatics, together with men from Chamla and the Khuddu Khel and Jadun, started for Swat on the 9th. Two sections, however, of the Bunerwals had refused to join, so it was thought improbable that many Bunerwals would come down Chamla, as the valley leading to Umbeyla Pass is called.

On the 13th the Upper Swatis, on the right bank on the river, sent in representative *jirgas* to obtain terms. The Lower Swatis surrendered unconditionally, and were allowed to return to their villages. All this pointed to a quiet settlement taking place.

Accordingly there was much delight on the part of our troops when on the 13th it was known that orders had been received for a forward move into Upper Swat. As the news spread from regiment to regiment, it was received with ringing cheers. On every hand there was rejoicing at the prospect of a speedy move forward, and Amandara Camp was quite merry with the bustle of getting carriage, drawing rations, getting rid of extra baggage and other odds and ends, which so mysteriously collect during a period of inaction. As the country in which the force was to operate was only suitable for mule carriage, all impedimenta was reduced to the lowest possible limits; the amount of mule transport with the force being very limited. The force was to consist of about 3,500 rifles and sabres, whilst every endeavour was to be made to carry 12 days' rations, which gave the General Officer Commanding a pretty free hand.

On the 14th General Blood himself joined the special force, the Divisional troops attached to it coming under his direct command from the fifteenth. While General Blood was away, General Jeffreys commanded the force left behind.

Even the weather seemed to favour the advance, for the rain, which had fallen nearly every day, and which delayed the advance at least one day, curiously enough had left the valley, narrow as it is, severely alone, and bivouacking was thus not unpleasant.

On August 16th the 1st Brigade left at 5-30 A.M. for Thana, full tents and baggage being taken as far as that place. The force consisted of the whole of the troops, at Amandara, *viz.* :—

- The West Kent Regiment.
- 34th Punjab Infantry.
- 31st Punjab Infantry.
- 45th Sikhs.

With the following Divisional troops :—

10th Field Battery.

No. 7 British Mountain Battery.

No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.

5th Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.

6 Squadrons from the Guides Cavalry.

11th Bengal Infantry.

The whole valley of Swat was beautifully green, although it had not had much of the previous rain. The river was in full flood and split up as it is into many channels running between emerald strips of land, it looked highly picturesque.

Simultaneously with the advance of the 1st Brigade to Thana, a small force from Mardan was directed to proceed to Rustum, one march towards the Bunerwals. This was a gentle hint to them to remain quiet during our visit to Upper Swat Valley, into which many passes exist from the Buner country. This force was in command of Brigadier-General J. H. Wodehouse and consisted of one squadron 10th Bengal Lancers (under command of Captain W. L. Maxwell), the Highland Light Infantry, No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners, and two sections No. 14 British Field Hospital.

CHAPTER XV.

A BRILLIANT ACTION: THE BATTLE OF LANDAKAI.



IN the morning our troops were going to knock at the "gate of Swat" as Landakai has been termed: indeed it is a very strong position. The camp at Thana was in the middle of an open plain, well away from the hills and about four miles from Landakai, where the enemy was expected to show fight. The road from the camp to Landakai runs around the northern edge of the village of

Thana and thence close to hills on the right until the village of Jalala is reached, where the road passes between that village and the end of a spur covered with Buddhist ruins and running up to a peak which dominates the whole Landakai position. Between the Jalala spur and Landakai is first an open valley about 900 yards wide at the lower end, then another spur, then a deep ravine and finally the main Landakai spur ending in cliffs overhanging the Swat River; the road, being carried round these cliffs for nearly a mile on a stone causeway, which, as General Blood was correctly informed, the enemy had damaged and obstructed in various ways. Beyond the Landakai spur, as General Blood knew from a reconnaissance made by Major S. B. Bentson, 11th Bengal Lancers, the valley is open, and the rice cultivation lies in such a way that the enemy, in occupying the lower end of the Landakai spur, would find himself formed to the left flank of his line of retreat. During the reconnaissance on the evening of the 11th, some hundreds of the enemy with flags were seen occupying *sangars*, spread over a mile or so of the end of Landakai spur, and holding an old Buddhist Fort on a peak, where they evidently fancied themselves very securely posted. From their general appearance, their shouting, and their expenditure of ammunition, General Blood judged that larger numbers were behind what he saw, and he accordingly returned to camp, making as little show of force as possible, and issued orders for the next day.

On the morning of August 17th General Bindon Blood with his force cleared out at daybreak from Thana, bent upon attacking the enemy. They had scarcely cleared the village of Thana before the heights above Jalala and Landakai were seen to be crowned by masses of the enemy distributed along the ridges, as on the preceding evening. The force moved steadily up to the foot of the long spur which runs down towards the Swat River from the range on the right, and fight soon commenced. There was general jubilation when it was seen that the enemy really intended to offer some resistance, and that the expectations of the Political Officers that the people would offer no opposition were being falsified.

Punctually at 6-30 A.M. the cavalry of the advanced guard moved off and pushing on to Jalala, found a few of the enemy

established in the Buddhist ruins on the adjacent spur. These they held in check with the assistance of the infantry of the advanced guard, which consisted of two companies, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, under Captain W. R. Marshall, 2nd Derbyshire Regiment, attached 1st Royal West Kent Regiment, until the arrival of the remainder of the battalion which headed the main body. Then the battalion, under Major C. W. H. Evans, extended and crowned the Jalala spur, clearing the enemy out of the Buddhist ruins before mentioned.

The position occupied by the enemy, who numbered 5,000 men with 150 standards, was a grassy ridge from above the causeway to near Jalala to the east of Nalbunda, and their greatest force was seen to be above the causeway. The West Kent had the honor of commencing the attack and to them was allotted the task of driving back skirmishers from the small spur in front. Shortly came along Major M. F. Fegan, R.A., with No. 7 (British) Mountain Battery, reinforcing the West Kents in the most effective manner. This battery immediately made the position of the enemy an exceedingly warm one, the accuracy of the practice and the effect being remarkable. In his admirable gun work Major Fegan received much assistance from No. 10 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, which was down on the plain below, having come up to their position over ground which was very difficult for wheeled artillery.

The withering effect of the guns seemed to paralyse the enemy. For a space they held to their position in a bewildered sort of fashion, but realising, after two or three rounds of effectively placed shells, that they possessed every disadvantage and little that was of value to themselves by staying where they were, they diplomatically moved away behind *sangars* discreetly erected slightly behind the west of the ridge. From here the standards were still to be seen flaunting defiance, and this they were able to do without much result for a while, as the shells, if they did not catch the top of the *sangars*, fell harmlessly over. Once the enemy took to the *sangars* it is doubtful whether our guns did very much havoc, although in several cases some admirable practice was made.

Meanwhile the main attack under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn was developed on the right, the 24th Punjab Infantry

supported by the 31st Punjab Infantry under Major J. G. Ramsay and Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. O'Bryen respectively with the 45th Sikhs under Colonel H. A. Sawyer in reserve, worked their way up the hill to within 500 yards of the crest line, where they opened a heavy fire on the position. By this time No. 8 Bombay Mountain Battery commanded by Captain A. H. C. Beach, R. A., had joined the firing line and came into action at a range of about 500 yards.

Now the place was being made altogether too hot for the *moolkies*, and the stubborn resistance which our troops were so anxious to meet with was not offered to the advance up the hill. The "moral" if not the actual effect of the guns, coupled with the determined advance of our troops had taken all the fighting out of the tribesmen, and as our gallant men surmounted the summit of the ridge, they were seen in full retreat. Wheeling to the left Colonel Meiklejohn's forces swept the west of the hill for a little distance, and were shortly joined by the West Kents. All was energy and determination. A small stone tower or fort at a range of 600 yards was played upon by No. 8 Mountain Battery and ten minutes of this sufficed to give the West Kents the opportunity they desired, to rush the position. The flags which the enemy had shown there a few minutes before gave the Men of Kent the hope of active work in the *sangar*, but the enemy had decamped before they got there. It was seen that there was no fight in the enemy, and although as a kind of recompense for their more or less fruitless rush on the *sangar*, the West Kents got a few stragglers, the main body of the tribesmen could be seen streaming across the plain in the direction of Butkhela, their hasty retreat being accelerated by the guns of No. 8 Mountain Battery at long range. We were now in possession of the ridge, and so far not a man on our side had been killed—five wounded sepoy indeed comprising the total casualty list. The work of the infantry had been more or less finished, and here, if never before, was the opportunity for cavalry.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE RIDE OF THE GUIDES : HOW BRITISH OFFICERS DIE.



ALL this time the Guides had remained inactive, waiting anxiously for the opportunity which they knew must come, and for which the General had kept them together under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams. Up to now a narrow causeway commanded by the enemy's fire had been an obstacle to their passing around the edge of the ridge into the plain beyond, but when the tribesmen had been forced by the battery to evacuate this position, the 5th Company, Queen's Own Sappers and Miners, under Captain E. P. Johnson, R.E., and under the direction of Major Blunt, R.E., the Senior Royal Engineer Officer present, soon made the causeway fit for the cavalry advance. But valuable time had been lost in this necessary delay.

Now from the hills above the famous guerrilla corps was seen rapidly advancing after the fugitives, who were fast reaching the shelter where they would be safe. The retreating tribesmen had reached a point about a mile beyond the village of Kotah, and were already close under the hills. Towards this village the Guides advanced, and they were seen to be moving rapidly over the ground. When through the village the Guides broke into a gallop. Their attempts to intercept the fugitives, however, was bound to be unsuccessful. Heavy rice fields had to be ridden through and these told on the horses—never of the best in the Guides.

It was shortly that occurred an incident which sent a thrill through the length and breadth of India when it became known—the deaths of Lieutenants R. T. Greaves and H. L. S. MacLean. Accounts differ somewhat as to what actually occurred. The most probable story, however, is that in the excitement of the stern and unavailing chase a few, better mounted than the rest, singled themselves out from their comrades, and when galloping between the village of Kawa Kila and the Hills they fell into an ambush. Captain H. T. E. Palmer commanded the leading squadron and it pushed right on into the fields of high Indian corn at the end of the causeway. Without

warning they came out right under the fire of five hundred of the enemy, who were on the side of the hills and within one hundred yards range. The fire was deadly and in the first onset Captain Palmer's horse was shot. It is admitted that Lieutenant Greaves and Captain Palmer were at the head of the pursuing party, and at this point it is stated that Greaves' horse ran away with him right among the enemy, by whom he was shot.

The tribesmen ran out and cut down Greaves, whilst previous to this Palmer had been slashed across the wrist by a standard-bearer whom he managed in turn to cut down.

The position for our brave officers was a desperate one. The enemy were crowding around. They had seen the British Officer fall and it revived their pluck. But Colonel Adams and Lord Fincastle were close behind, and they galloped right into the midst of the crowd of *Ghazis* who were collected around the bodies of Greaves and Palmer. Both Colonel Adams and Lord Fincastle had seen Palmer and Greaves attacked, but before they could get up Greaves had already had one hand cut off and received other sword cuts.

This was the work of a few seconds, and as the two officers came dashing into the enemy they were greeted with a volley of rifle shots. Lord Fincastle had his horse shot when close up and the scabbard of his sword was also carried away by a bullet. He fell close by the body of poor Greaves. He was not wounded, however, and with Colonel Adams made a desperate effort to lift Greaves on to the Colonel's horse and get him away. Poor Greaves, however, was again shot through the body whilst Lord Fincastle was trying to lift him up and died almost immediately.

The two British were now facing a determined enemy at close quarters, and unless help came quickly their fate was assured. Twenty yards away were any number of rifles and the chances of escape were nil. Then it was that gallant MacLean rode up with his few *sowars*, and threw himself and his men right into the thick of the fray. The struggle was short and bloody. Around the bodies of their comrades these British Officers and Indian *sowars* fought grimly with the host of fanatical *Ghazis*. Desperate as the struggle was, it seemed at first as if it was going to be successful. The gallant band recovered the lifeless

body of poor Greaves and successfully removed it away, whilst Colonel Adams placed it on one of the *sowar's* horses.

Then they dashed in again at the foe and gallant MacLean was shot through both thighs. He fell into the midst of the bloody arena, and bled to death almost immediately. Colonel Adams had his horse shot, but gathering his little party together once more they nobly dashed in, and after a hard struggle brought away the bodies of their brother officers. In this last rush, Colonel Adams was slightly wounded. Meanwhile more of the Guides had come up and their fire helped to keep the enemy in check. Having rescued their dead the cavalry now retired into a neighbouring tope of trees which they defended until relieved by some infantry and No. 8 Mountain Battery. The appearance of the guns forced a hasty retreat, and shortly after the operations of the day closed.

Those watching from the heights speak of the ride of the Guides as magnificent, whilst the conduct of officers and men when they fell into ambush was worthy of the high reputation of the famous veterans of the Punjab Frontier Force.

Lieutenant R. T. Greaves belonged to the Lancashire Fusiliers, which is now at Quetta, and received his commission in May 1891. His keenness for service had led him to go to the front on leave from his regiment, and whilst up there he acted as war correspondent to several Indian papers. He was a promising young officer, devoted to his profession, and his death was a great blow to all his comrades.

There is something peculiarly sad in the deaths of Lieutenants Greaves and MacLean, and nothing throughout the present operations on the frontier caused more general and widespread sorrow.

MacLean, of the Guides, was a well known figure. He was one of the best and most dashing officers of the Guides, popular with all good soldiers, and at the time he met with his death he was acting adjutant of the regiment. Only a little while before he had been at Malakand, fighting gallantly with the defending force against the same foe, by whom he was shot through the cheek, and it was only his keenness for

the battle field which carried him into the second affair almost direct from hospital. The Guides keenly feel his loss. Poor MacLean's body was carried to Mardan and was buried where most, if not all, of the gallant dead of the Guides repose. Greaves' remains were escorted into Malakand and were buried with full military honours in the Malakand cemetery, all officers of the garrison attending.

The death of these officers was the melancholy feature of an otherwise cheaply won victory, although undoubtedly death as it met them both, on the field of battle, was undoubtedly that which they would themselves have desired. Still even the British army, with its proud records of unselfish devotion and bravery, can ill afford to lose such noble sons. The general feeling of grief was well expressed in the following lines by a friend of MacLean's, which appeared in the *Civil and Military Gazette*, "In memoriam" :—

Hold fast your tears : this is no time to weep.
 Tears are the meed of death, that incomplete
 Cuts down the flower, ere yet the hue doth peep
 From out the velvet bud's sheath. Tears are meet
 For ship-wrecked lives and deaths that bring an end
 To barren hopes, to want, disease, to shame.
 So hold your tears. For he, MacLean, your friend,
 Died not as frost-nipp'd bud, an empty name.
 Nor yet in hopes unfruitful. Want, disease
 Or shame had never sullied the fair page
 Of that brave vigorous life. From weeping cease.
 Lo! the wild foe to wonder turn'd from rage.
 As self-forgetful on to death he hurl'd,—
 True to his Corps, a Guide to all the world.

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The bravery of the Colonel of the Guides and of Lord Fincastle will, it is to be hoped, receive some special mark of recognition. If ever the man was played under trying circumstances it was around the bodies of the three British Officers who were cut down by *Ghazis* at Landakai. With bullets hailing around them and with a malignant enemy stubbornly contesting a hand to hand battle, the fight was continued

until the object was attained and the unmutilated bodies of the British Officers were borne away.

. It was a graceful thoughtfulness and fully in accord with public sentiment which moved Sir Bindon Blood to attach Lord Fincastle to the Guides Cavalry as a mark of recognition of his gallant behaviour, and it is even more pleasing to know that Sir Bindon Blood has forwarded a communication to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief giving full details, for his special consideration, of a truly gallant feat at arms.

In the morning fighting the enemy's loss was estimated at one hundred killed, of whom the West Kents claimed at least a third. On our side there were few casualties other than those already mentioned. The Guides had three sepoy's slightly wounded (besides losing many horses killed and wounded) the 24th Punjab Infantry, the 45th Sikhs and the 31st Punjab Infantry had each one sepoy wounded. Altogether only eleven of our side were killed and wounded of whom four were officers.

The Brigade encamped at Kotah that night. At 11 A.M. just as the enemy had been cleared of the Jallala ridge, news came from Thana that 1,000 men with several flags were near the Morah pass and appeared to threaten the camp. These may have been the people left on General Meiklejohn's right, and as they had been untouched by him were particularly pleased with themselves and were beating drums and dancing about: but they very soon moved off when Major F. G. Delamain opened fire on them with two dismounted squadrons of the XIth Bengal Lancers and accounted for twenty killed. In every way the day had been a bad one for the tribesmen, and their faith in the mad Fakir's omnipotence must have received a rude shock.

The resistance which was shown at Landakai gave promise of yet further collisions with the evasive enemy, and as the weather was favourable to camping out and appeared likely to continue so, our men were in good spirits.

CHAPTER XVII.

A "POLITICAL WALK OVER" IN SWAT VALLEY.



THE march of the Field Force up the Swat Valley was one of great interest to all who took part in it. The greater part of the country travelled over was previously quite unknown to Europeans except from the reports of natives, and the map compiled from various sources by the Intelligence Branch, although in the main correct as to names and intermediate distances, proved to be considerably out as regards the general direction of the valley, which keeps a more easterly bearing than had been estimated. From Chakdara the valley runs straight, general direction E.-N.-E., as far as Barikot, a distance of some 12 miles, when it turns sharply almost due north for a short way, and then again resumes its easterly bearing running about N.-E. for some 20 miles. Numerous side streams join the Swat at various points, and the whole valley is of wonderful fertility—at this time of year green with luxuriant crops of growing rice and Indian corn. Villages are thickly scattered along each side of the main stream, and around them are the invariable graveyards, shaded by groves of trees, which form such a characteristic feature in the scenery of this part of the world. Numerous remains of Buddhist *stupas*, monasteries and other buildings are passed which would afford an interesting field for investigation to the archaeologist. Most of these remains are of great antiquity, as is proved by the writings of the Chinese traveller Hinen-Tsiang, who ascended this valley some 1,400 years ago.

Further up the valley the scenery becomes wilder and more mountainous. The hills, which rise to heights of 3,000 or 4,000 feet above the river bed, become more rugged and bolder in outline, while the snows of the Kohistan are seen towering in the far distance. These rise to altitudes of 16,000 or 17,000 feet and form a fine background to the vista of the river winding sluggishly along through its green level valley bounded on either side by bare rocky hills on which the pines begin to show themselves at elevations of 4,000 to 5,000 feet.

The furthest point reached by our cavalry reconnaissance on the 21st August from Mingaora (the present capital) was

Gutibagh, about 12 miles higher up, where a halt was made on the summit of a small eminence opposite to the junction of the Arnawai river with the Swat. From here the view extended some 5 or 6 miles further, beyond which point the river appears to trend in a more northerly direction towards the Kohistan or hill-country proper—the valley itself still fertile and thickly populated. Between Mingaora and this point the village of Manglaor was passed: this was the former capital and is surrounded by numerous Buddhist remains. Here, and for a few miles higher up, the valley widens, instead of narrowing as was expected, and broad stretches of cultivation are found on both sides of the Swat.

The reconnaissance to the Karakar pass on the 25th August lifted the *pardah* of another hitherto unexplored country. This pass leads from Barikot in the Swat Valley into the Salarzai portion of Buner and is one which is much used for the export of grain, &c., from Upper Swat southwards to Rustum and other Indian marts. The pass is an easy one some 4,500 feet in height above the sea level, and from its summit a fine view is obtained of this portion of Buner. The general character of the country appears to be similar to Swat, that is to say, a mountainous country with wide level river beds which are fertile and highly cultivated. Immediately below the pass is an open valley at this time green with growing crops, drained by a stream which makes its way through a break in the hills into a larger valley beyond. Mountains rise in the background beyond which lies the Indus, and on the hither side a river of considerable size (the Barandu) is seen winding its way south and east through a broad fertile valley. This country was scanned with interest by our officers as they saw in it possibly the scene of future frontier operations unless the Bunerwal improves his ways.

All the new country was of a highly interesting character. The Swat Valley maintains the same astonishing fertility throughout, and the yearly output of grain must be something enormous: indeed the value of the export trade over the Malakand alone amounts to some 30 or 40 lakhs of rupees annually, while large quantities also are known to be carried over the Karkar and other passes. The principal crops are Indian corn, wheat, barley and rice.

THE RISING OF THE MOHMANDS.

CHAPTER XVIII.

INVASION OF BRITISH TERRITORY.



WHEN interest in the punitive measures against the tribesmen in the Tochi Valley was fast dying away the siege of the garrisons at Malakand and Chakdar acted as a refresher. In like case when the reliefs of the beleaguered garrisons having been successfully carried out, Sir Bindon Blood's brigade occupied itself with marching along the Swat Valley in pursuit of an elusory adversary and eyes were once more being turned from our north-west frontier, there came the startling news that the recalcitrant tribesmen had broken out in a fresh place and had invaded British territory near Peshawar. Never before in the annals of the British in India has such a daring move been made by the tribesmen. The public mind which had been deeply concerned over the disturbances in the Tochi and Swat Valleys, became distinctly apprehensive when the disorder spread to Peshawar. The first information received by the general public was the newspaper intimation that, at about four o'clock in the afternoon of Saturday, August 7th, some four or five thousand Mohmands had attacked the fort of Shabkadar and that the Border Police who garrisoned it had been successful in repulsing them with great loss to the enemy. Previous to attacking the Fort, however, it appeared that the raiders, who were under the leadership of the notorious Mullah of Hadda, or Hadda Mullah, as he is familiarly known, had first of all descended upon the Hindu village of Shankargarh, which is the bazar of Shabkadar, on murder and plunder bent.

Fortunately for the villagers the advance of this formidable horde had been heralded, and before the wild Mohmands arrived the villagers had hurried pell mell into Shabkadar Fort, where they were sheltered by the garrison. Only two or three men, apparently disbelieving any hostile intentions on the part of the Mohmands, remained in Shankargarh, and these

paid the penalty of their lack of credulity with their lives. Had private warning not reached the village in time to enable the inhabitants to fly, it is almost certain that the tribesmen who had taken to the war path, would first have whetted their appetites on the defenceless Hindus and Sikhs of Shankargarh. Baulked of its prey the marauding gang set fire to the village and then made an attack on the Fort in which they are believed to have lost fifty killed.

Shabkadar Fort itself was built by the Sikhs. It stands on a mound and has walls fifty feet high, so is practically impregnable to any force without artillery. Shankargarh was an old Sikh Cantonment bazar and it is inhabited chiefly by rich Hindu money-lenders, who have had very profitable dealings with the tribesmen on both sides of the border, distant only three miles away. Shabkadar was held by forty or fifty men of the Border Police.

Immediately on the news becoming known there was much indignation expressed that such a formidable gathering could assemble on our Borders and actually invade our territory and outrage a people under British protection without any previous cognisance of hostile intention on the part of our political officers. Information from Peshawar showed beyond a doubt that for two or three days before the raid was actually made, it was known that an ominous collection of tribesmen was going on in the neighbourhood of Fort Shabkadar. This is only eighteen miles from Peshawar, and it was undoubtedly the general feeling of press and public alike that our civil authorities, with the influence and espionage they exert, should have satisfied themselves regarding the truth or otherwise of these rumours. It was known, days before the raid occurred, that the Hadda Mullah was busily stirring up the Mohmands; the Hindu *bunniah*s at Shankargarh had information at least a week beforehand of the impending trouble, and several of them took the precaution of moving in to Peshawar itself. Even before the Mohmands appeared, rumours that they were abroad were not lost on everybody, and it was suggested to the Civil authorities that troops might be moved out as a precaution towards the border. Had this simple step been taken the Mohmands would not have been able to boast of having burnt a bazar within eighteen miles of Peshawar and have gained the influence and prestige which accrues from such a daring

act. All this, as the Indian press unanimously at the time pointed out, goes to show that there is urgent need for more forethought and better organised intelligence among the officers who are supposed to make it their business to be *en rapport* with what is happening on the borderland. It is idle to say that no one can foresee these things. If the Hindu *bunniahs* can get accurate information, the political and civil officers should be able to obtain it too, or should retire to posts more suited to their capacities and make way for others more adroit.

Before dealing with what followed the Mohmand raid, it will be interesting to cast a glance at the wild and uncultured people who set at naught the authority of the British *Raj* and flouted defiance into the face of the *Sirkar*. The great Mohmand tribes hold the hills north-west of Peshawar right down to the Khyber pass, and owe a loose allegiance to the Amir of Kabul, though also politically connected with us. The country of the Mohmands is divided naturally into two parts, the rich alluvial lands along the bank of the Kabul River from Jellalabad to Lalpura, and the country to the east of Lalpura consisting of a net work of hills and valleys. The principal of the latter are the valleys of Shilman, Gandao and Pandiali. They are, as a rule, dry and arid water-courses, raging torrents in heavy rain, but usually presenting a stony and shingly bed, from which slopes of barren ground lead to the rocky spurs and ranges that flank them. As the Durand boundary runs from Landi Kotal eastwards of Lalpura and then along the watershed separating the basins of the Kunar and Panjkora Rivers, the most considerable portions of the country are within the British zone. We pay some of their sections small subsidies for keeping an alternative to the Khyber route open, that latter route being sometimes closed when the tribes safeguarding it are fighting amongst themselves. The independent Mohmands—for some sections are British subjects settled in the Pesháwar district—are a strong turbulent people, with a fighting strength of about 16,000. The Baizai account for one-half of these. They hold the eastern part of the county adjacent to Bajour and the Utman Khel border. The Mohmands have never been accounted an enemy of much importance in the various conflicts with our troops, and in 1880 they made but a poor resistance when some 5,000 of them, who had crossed the Kabul River near Dakka, were attacked by a column 850 strong under Colonel Boisragon.

On a previous occasion, in 1879, a small detachment of 170 men of the Mhairwarrah Battalion, under Captain O'Moore Creagh, successfully held a position near Kane Dakka against several thousand Mohmands who attacked for six hours. This was one of the most brilliant little actions on the Khyber side during the whole Afghan War. They were until lately marauders and robbers by inclination and circumstance, and peaceful only when afraid or bought over. Their nearest sections were punished by us in 1851, in 1852, and again in 1854, but none of those forays or expeditions led to any result. They continued their raiding and kidnapping outrages as before, their object being to force us into restoring to their leaders certain *jagirs* or revenue-free land assignments in British territory, which had been confiscated because of their misconduct. In 1857 their tardy preparations for a holy war against us were cut short by the fall of Delhi, and the consequent certainty that the infidel English would continue to rule India. In 1863 the ferment amongst the tribes, caused by our difficulties at Ambela and the despatch of the "fiery cross" far and wide, emboldened the Mohmands to venture down into the plain nearly 6,000 strong, when they were charged again and again by 450 of our native cavalry and easily scattered. In 1879-80, during our war with the Afghans, a force of 12,000 Mohmands and Bajouris attempted to close the Khyber Pass against us, but were so roughly handled by the few troops available to oppose them that each gathering was dispersed with the greatest ease. The Mohmands were in 1893 divided between the Amir and the Government of India. Those westward of the watershed between the Kunar and Panjkora Rivers have been definitely recognised as inside Afghanistan, those eastwards of that as yet undemarcated line being within the political frontier of India. The delineation, says Mr. Thorburn in his "Asiatic Neighbours," is geographically good but ethnically bad.

Like the tribesmen of Tochi and the Swat Valleys the Mohmand is notorious for cowardice, as the Kamdakka affair of 1879 clearly showed. The Mohmands have been branded as treacherous and cowardly, the Tarakzai procuring women (Chitralis?) for the Adam Khel Afridis, and are assisted in this slave trade, *which does exist*, by the foreign clans—Bajauris, Swatis, Bunerwals and Utman Khel tribes. Probably we are misinformed in making the first part of the accusation against them, at any rate we said the same till lately of the men of

Swat, and now know that we lied. But of the truth of the second portion of the charge there is no doubt, and sedition-mongers in Hindustan would do well to note, that the Afridis, who *demand* the rendition of all Afridi women resident in Hindustan, with a view to inflicting a cruel death penalty on them, would, did they have the power, establish women-slave-markets in Indian towns, or preferably carry off the women wholesale, slaughtering the males after the manner of the Moghul Sultan's best traditions.

But to return to the raid and its consequences. Shabkadar as has been mentioned, is only seventeen miles from Pesháwar, and news of the incursion soon reached the authorities there, and at once General Elles ordered a moveable column out, which marched to Shabkadar the same evening. The moveable column was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Woon, 20th Punjab Infantry, and it was composed as follows:—

4 guns of No. 61, Field Battery (under Captain S. W. W. Blacker, R.A.).

2 squadrons, 13th Bengal Lancers (under Major F. G. Atkinson).

2 companies, Somersetshire (Prince Albert's) Light Infantry (under Major A. Lumb).

20th Punjab Infantry.

From Peshawar could be clearly seen the glare in the sky produced by the burning village of Shankargarh. It was felt that urgency was absolutely necessary and the cavalry riding forward arrived at Shabkadar early on Sunday morning. The infantry also marched well, despite the fact that the Somersets had only just arrived at Peshawar when they were ordered to advance to Shabkadar. There was no difficulty over the Kabul River for the first two branches, as it was bridged, but on arrival at the third, the 13th Bengal Lancers set their horses at the ford and swam across. The infantry when they arrived at the third branch suffered considerable delay as they had to be ferried over, a tedious proceeding.

When Major Atkinson and the first squadron of his cavalry arrived near Shabkadar, they saw the village of Shankargarh in flames. He reconnoitred Shabkadar, and it was

found that the report which had been received regarding the retirement of the raiders was true only in part. After burning the village and unsuccessfully attempting to storm the Fort, they retired to the low hills which run from the main ranges to within a mile and a half of the Fort, which is three miles from the border line. Here they remained out of gun shot range and their numbers were fast increasing, contingents being attracted, by the tales of success, from almost all the Mohmand clans. Lieutenant A. G. B. Turner reached the fort at 8 A.M. and then acted as a compact squadron until Major Atkinson brought up the other squadron of the 13th Bengal Lancers, the infantry arriving somewhat later.

The preliminary brush with the enemy now took place. The cavalry skirting the cultivated ground between the fort and the plateau upon which the enemy was in position, pushed them backwards and forced the Mohmands into the low hills which skirt the border, with considerable loss to horses and men. The cavalry followed as the enemy retired until they were stopped by the nature of the ground. Unable to advance further a retreat was carried out, when the tribesmen followed them up till they reached open ground, firing into them, but without inflicting much damage. The force passed the night in the Fort and was not attacked. Reinforcements of $3\frac{1}{2}$ companies of the 30th Punjab Infantry and 1 Field Troop, 13th Bengal Lancers, were sent from Peshawar on Sunday night.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE SHABKADAR FIGHT: A MAGNIFICENT CAVALRY CHARGE.



THE next morning the enemy was seen to be still in possession of the lower ranges of the hills, but he did not appear in great force, so Colonel Woon, about 6 in the morning, moved out his troops to the attack. Taking his course *via* Shabkadar village, he gained the plateau which the enemy had held on the preceding day.

Colonel Woon had at his disposal between 1,100 and 1,200 men. On the plateau our infantry were halted for a space to enable the artillery who had been in difficulties over the rough and uncultivated ground, to come up; with the artillery being the Bengal Lancers as an escort. Brigadier-General Elles had been at Shabkadar on the Sunday, but he had returned to Peshawar, to arrange the disposition of the weakened garrison and to telegraph information to those at head-quarters of the state of affairs on the frontier.

The enemy's line was found to be about two miles in length, and there were from 6,000 to 7,000 tribesmen assembled, a much larger number than was expected. Colonel Woon began his attack with the infantry and he found the enemy full of fight. The infantry being in such small numbers, only about 700, the enemy conceived the bold idea of completely enveloping them and cutting off their retreat to the fort. The large numbers of the enemy enabled them to show a strong front, at the same time to detach a force to operate on Colonel Woon's left flank, and also a further strong detachment to work as the cutting off party. The flanking party came down under cover of the Gandab *nullah*, while the third party, completely concealed by the low hills, so far achieved that object that the small force of Somersets and 20th Punjab Infantry were forced to fall back. The enemy were greatly assisted by ravines and the broken nature of the country.

This has always been the battle ground of the Mohmands, and their past histories point to this method of attack.

To guard against his infantry being enveloped by the enemy who were streaming out into the plain on either hand, Colonel Woon began to withdraw towards the fort. The infantry retired in two sections, the one supporting the other. But the tribesmen, as usual, interpreted an orderly retirement to be a defeat, and pressed on with great determination, at times being within a hundred yards of the Shabkadar force. The position was critical.

At this point General Elles who had hurried back from Peshawar appeared on the battle field and took command. While the infantry were thus retiring by alternate bodies on the fort, the artillery were able to come into action, and this freed the cavalry. The retirement to prevent being outflanked was

absolutely necessary. The tribesmen—some of them got up within 300 yards of the guns and Captain Blacker had a nasty wound in the knee—were triumphant and in their mad fanaticism recognised no personal dangers but literally threw themselves on to our soldiers. The Fort was still a good way off, and the retirement of our men promised to be very much harassed, even if successful. A field troop of cavalry, sent out the night before with a detachment of the 30th Punjab Infantry, now arrived and took over the escort of the guns. Major Atkinson and his two squadrons of Lancers were therefore free.

When General Elles left Peshawar early on Monday morning, he brought back with him two companies of the 30th Punjab Infantry. It was at the ferry over the Kabul River that he heard the sound of heavy firing in the direction of Shabkadar, and leaving his infantry to follow on, he galloped forward to the scene of action. When he arrived operations had been in progress for more than two hours, and our troops were undoubtedly being very hardly pressed by the fanatical tribesmen, who had swarmed from their fastnesses in the low-lying hills, and were engaging our infantry in the open.

On at least two previous occasions when we have fought with the wild Mohmands, cavalry has won for us the day. General Elles must have thought of this when he ordered the 13th Bengal Lancers to make their magnificent charge. Everything was favourable to the use of mounted soldiers. The enemy were on a plateau, and although the ground was rough it yet would enable the Lancers to charge with deadly effect. The main body of the tribesmen was fast completing its strategical attempt to envelop our little infantry force, and it was cavalry preceded by battery fire which alone could save the situation.

This the General saw clearly, and concentrating the fire of his four guns upon the enemy's left, he gave the order to the 13th Bengal Lancers to charge. From right to left along the whole line of the tribesmen was the command. It was a magnificent spectacle. Making their way up one of the ravines, the 13th were able to manœuvre outwards so as to join the enemy's flank unperceived, and forming in a *nullah* they made one of the most brilliant charges which even Indian Cavalry has recorded.

The ground was a mass of stones, boulders and ups and downs, over the folds of the ground. It only shows what cavalry can do when necessary, and that, as far as Asiatic warfare is concerned, their sun has not yet set. Coming round upon the flank of the Mohmands the two squadrons literally swept them from end to end, leaving killed and wounded strewn behind to testify to the effect of their superb effort. The brilliant charge was commanded by Major Atkinson, and both he and Lieutenant A. Y. Cheyne had their horses shot under them. The effect of the charge on the enemy was absolutely indescribable. Where had been the buoyancy of victory and the enthusiasm of complete success, now followed almost instantaneously a demoralisation so complete that it culminated in blank despair and utter rout. By this time the cavalry had relieved all pressure on the infantry and guns, and their glorious part in the day's work was for the time being at an end.

Before the enemy could recover from the effects of the cavalry charge,—and they certainly did not show much disposition to reform and resume the fight—the infantry attack was ordered. The two companies of the 30th Punjab Infantry which General Elles had left behind at the Kabul river ferry now came up, and joining the Somersets and the other troops they pursued the fast retreating enemy to the foot of the low-lying hills where further chase was impracticable and he obtained the much desired refuge.

The day was still early, it being only 10-30 A. M., but the fight was over. The General, realizing that his men were more or less fatigued after their four or more hours of trying work in the field, decided to close the operations for the day. With the small infantry force he had at his disposal, he would hardly have felt justified in pushing forward into the hills, and perhaps engaging the enemy where his cavalry would not have been able to render the admirable service they had done on the plateau of Shabkadar. On the brave sepoy of the 20th Punjab Infantry fell the brunt of the *Ghazi* attack, and seven of the twelve killed and nearly half the wounded belonged to this regiment, the Pathans and Sikhs offering the most stubborn resistance to the attempts of the enemy to surround the infantry.

Thus already on two occasions in these present frontier disturbances has the vital importance of cavalry assert-

itself. At Chakdara the 11th Bengal Lancers and the Guides Cavalry completely outstripped the relieving infantry and, after crushing the courage of the foe and taking full advantage of his flight, had succeeded in leaving a hundred dead and dying tribesmen on the field. There is nothing the warlike tribesman fears so much as a charge of cavalry, and it is rarely he gives the opportunity to our brilliant mounted soldiers to prove the value of the premier arm of the service. When he does he receives a lesson of a terrible character, and as has been over and over again exemplified, two or three squadrons can with perfect safety and confidence be sent charging against thousands of tribesmen. More or less on the actual plateau where the 13th Bengal Lancers made their proud charge, the 7th Hussars similarly achieved renown in January of 1864, when a single squadron of the British Cavalry Regiment made three successive charges on a body of five thousand Mohmands, and by effectively breaking the tribesmen's line enabled Colonel Macdonnel, of the Rifle Brigade and his infantry to charge decisively and victoriously.

It is a singular commentary on the fear and horror which the tribesman has of cavalry that even a *ghazi*, desperate and determined, to whom life has no object and death no fear, who indeed seeks death as the key to paradise and immortality, will not face the horse soldier. The breastwork he will charge right up to, and he leaps forward to a body of infantry with yells of delight, but when cavalry soldiers appear, fear enters his fanatical spirit and he flies anywhere for safety, and if caught up he will die without that savage exultancy that is characteristic of him under other circumstances.

The Mohmands, completely demoralized, did not rest even when they reached the safe haven of the low-lying hills which, with overweening confidence, they had rashly left in the early morning to annihilate our infantry. Not even the power of the Hadda Mullah, who was present at the fight, could restore cohesion to the bodies of flying tribesmen, and hurrying away helter skelter, they shortly disappeared altogether, and Colonel Woon believed later on that there were none of the enemy to be seen anywhere.

Estimates as to the loss suffered by the enemy in this battle differ a good deal, but probably a thousand killed and

wounded is quite within the mark. Included in the dead of the enemy were thirty-two of the leading men of the Mohmands. Although severe, our losses in dead and wounded were not very great, considering the overwhelming superiority in numbers of the enemy and the close quarters at which at one time the affair was conducted. There was, however, the usual dastardly mutilation of our dead discovered when the bodies were brought in. The casualty list was as follows :—

Killed.—Somersetshire Light Infantry, four privates; 20th Punjab Infantry, seven sepoy; 13th Bengal Lancers, one sowar.

Wounded severely.—Major Lamb, Somersetshire Light Infantry (bullet wound in neck); Captain Blacker, 51st Field Battery (bullet wound in the leg); Somersetshire Light Infantry, eight non-commissioned officers and men; 20th Punjab Infantry, thirty-four sepoy; Bengal Lancers, eight sowars.

Wounded slightly.—Lieutenant Cheyne, 13th Bengal Lancers; Second Lieutenant E. G. Drummond, Somersetshire Light Infantry; one private, Somersetshire Light Infantry; one sepoy, 20th Punjab Infantry; six sowars, Bengal Lancers; two non-commissioned officers, 61st Field Battery.

It only remains to be noted that the wounds inflicted on our men were made by almost every class of bullet, Lee-Metford, Martini-Henry, shrapnel bullets and rugged lumps of lead and other metal. It is also quite evident that the bullets used were mostly of very decided "stopping" power. A man hit was stopped. An exception was Lieutenant E. G. Drummond of the Somersets, who was hit by a Lee-Metford, but was able to go on. It is not an unfair presumption, therefore, that men on the enemy's side hit by our Lee-Metford bullets (which at this time were not of the new Dum-Dum pattern) were not immediately placed *hors de combat*. The 61st Field Battery did splendid service. Since the Afghan War this was the first time a field battery has been in a frontier action, whilst it was also the first time that the new artillery twelve-pounder has ever been fired in earnest. In the fight on the 9th instant, our soldiers say they saw regular regiments with colours, dressed uniformly and using bugles. An officer says: I myself saw many men in a kind of *khaki*, many also nearly naked.

These latter were swordsmen, and were employed chiefly at a distance. The riflemen were employed closer, and in the flank attack on our left the ground favoured this. Their fire was generally high or our casualties would have been greater. They resorted to the old dodge of planting a banner on a ridge and then went somewhere else and fired from cover, of which there was plenty available on our left. It was more open in front of the artillery, who were much disgusted when the dodge referred to was discovered. In the cavalry charge a woman, unarmed, bearing a standard and encouraging the men, was also seen.

CHAPTER XX.

WATCHING THE FRONTIER.



MINOUS rumours now became general of tribal convulsions in the Khyber District, the Afridi country, the Kohat Border and the Kurram Valley. Government wisely decided that all contingencies must be guarded against, and accordingly in the middle of August orders were given for the formation of two reserve brigades, to be concentrated at Rawalpindi as the most convenient place from which to operate in any direction. In the *Government Gazette* these brigades were put down under the head of "Disturbances" and were styled the 2nd and 3rd Reserve Brigades and were composed as follows:—

SECOND RESERVE BRIGADE.

- 2nd Battalion, The Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
- 2nd Battalion, The Royal Irish Regiment.
- 1st Battalion, 3rd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
- 12th (The Khelat-i-Ghilzai) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
- No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
- 18th Regiment of Bengal Lancers.

No. 4 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.

No. 23 British Field Hospital.

No. 62 Native Field Hospital.

Sections A and B of No. 31 Native Field Hospital.

THIRD RESERVE BRIGADE.

1st Battalion, The Northamptonshire Regiment.

1st Battalion, The Dorsetshire Regiment.

9th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

1st Battalion, 2nd (Prince of Wales' Own) Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.

3rd Field Battery, Royal Artillery.

3rd Regiment of Bengal Cavalry.

No. 4 Company, "Queen's Own" Madras Sappers and Miners.

No. 24 British Field Hospital.

No. 63 Native Field Hospital.

Sections C and D of No. 31 Native Field Hospital.

COMMANDS AND STAFF.

The following appointments were made to the staff of the brigades:—

SECOND RESERVE BRIGADE.

<i>Commanding</i>	Brigadier-General R. Westmacott, C.B., D.S.O.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Lieutenant R. C. Wellesley, Royal Horse Artillery.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General</i>	Captain W. P. Blood, Royal Irish Fusiliers.
<i>Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-Gen- eral</i>	Captain F. J. M. Edwards, 3rd Bom- bay Light Cavalry.
<i>Field Intelligence Officer</i>	Captain F. A. Hoghton, 1st Bombay Infantry (Grenadiers).
<i>Principal Medical Officer</i>	Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Thomsett, Army Medical Staff.
<i>Veterinary Officer</i>	Veterinary-Lieutenant F. U. Carr, Army Veterinary Department.
<i>Brigade Ordnance Officer</i>	Major T. E. Rowan, Royal Artillery.
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i>	Captain E. Y. Watson, Deputy As- sistant Commissary-General.

<i>Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Officer (Regimental Officer)</i>	...	Lieutenant N. G. Fraser, 4th Bombay Cavalry.
<i>Brigade Transport Officer</i>	...	Captain W. H. Armstrong, 1st Battalion, East Yorkshire Regiment.

THIRD RESERVE BRIGADE.

<i>Commanding</i>	Brigadier-General A. G. Yeatman Biggs, C.B.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Captain E. St. A. Wake, 10th Bengal Lancers.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General</i>				Major E. F. H. McSwiney, D.S.O., 1st Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent.
<i>Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General</i>	Captain C. P. Scudamore, D.S.O., Royal Scots Fusiliers.
<i>Field Intelligence Officer</i>		Major R. C. A. B. Bewicke-Copley, King's Royal Rifle Corps.
<i>Principal Medical Officer</i>		Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Murphy, D.S.O., Indian Medical Service.
<i>Veterinary Officer</i>	Veterinary-Lieutenant F. W. Wilson, Army Veterinary Department.
<i>Brigade Ordnance Officer</i>		Captain M. W. S. Pasley, Royal Artillery.
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i>	...			Captain C. F. T. Murray, Assistant Commissary-General.
<i>Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Officer (Regimental Officer)</i>	...			Captain P. H. Rogers, 2nd Battalion, Yorkshire Light Infantry.
<i>Brigade Transport Officer</i>	...			Captain H. W. C. Colquhoun, 24th Madras Infantry.

Having withdrawn the troops to the neighbourhood of the Fort, General Elles returned to Peshawar, and immediately ordered up to Shabkadar the remainder of the Somersetshire Light Infantry, and 250 of the 37th Dogras, so as to be ready to assume the offensive if the Mohmands re-appeared. As it was impossible to say how far the excitement extended along the border, General Elles called up three companies of the 8th Bengal Infantry from Nowshera, and at the same time asked for one battery of artillery, a regiment of native cavalry and one of native infantry, it being important to have a strong garrison at Peshawar. The Gordon Highlanders, under orders

from Army Headquarters had been despatched from Rawalpindi by train at midnight on Sunday, and reached Peshawar on Monday afternoon, the 2nd Queen's from Jullundur replacing them at Rawalpindi as part of the Reserve Brigade of the Malakand Division.

The troops now watching the Mohmand Frontier were the 51st Field Battery (four guns), two squadrons, 13th Bengal Lancers, the Somersetshire Light Infantry (740 strong), the 20th Punjab Infantry (600 strong), the 30th Punjab Infantry (300), the 37th Dogras (250), or a handy force of about 2,200 men.

From the 9th, until it was determined to send an army into the Mohmand country, the force was a corps of observation, and the duty was exceptionally severe, as with an enemy audacious enough to attack the very fort of Shabkadar—to attempt to axe open the door and to burn the environs—there was no saying what they might not attempt. The cavalry patrolled day and night, and one squadron of the 13th Bengal Lancers under Major J. H. Balfour, reconnoitred all three main routes into the Mohmand country which are due north-south of the Alikandi route through Pindiali's villages (north Mohmand), the Gundab *nullah*, the direct route, the southern boundary of which was the scene of Colonel Woon's fight and which leads to the centre of the country, and lately the Shinoil route which leads into the southern portion of the valley by Afghanistan *vid* Lalpura. It was not possible in any case to reconnoitre beyond a five mile radius from camp, because the enemy's pickets invariably fired on any attempt being made. All the main *kotals* were held in strength, at times to as many as a hundred to two hundred rifles.

On the 12th, the daily cavalry patrol reported heavy firing at 7 A.M. at the mouth of the Karappa defile in Gundab *nullah*. Major Balfour moved out and supported the patrol and found that a party of tribesmen, about 300 strong, presumably Halamzais, had come down into the Tarakzai hills, and had planted three standards on the side of the left boundary of the defile which is clearly visible from Shabkadar. They saluted the act with a fusilade of not less than fifty rounds. On arrival of the cavalry the tribesmen uprooted their standards and disappeared into the defile, and the cavalry had orders not to follow them further.

The reinforcement of the Peshawar garrison was carried out with the utmost despatch and eventually General Elles had the following wing troops in Peshawar itself, having sent the remainder of the 13th Bengal Lancers to Shabkadar, augmenting the strength of the force there to about 2,500 men :—

- One Section, 51st Field Battery.
- No. 57 Field Battery.
- No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers.
- 9th Bengal Lancers.
- The Devonshire Regiment.
- The Gordon Highlanders.
- The 2nd Battalion of the 1st Gurkhas.
- Five Companies, 30th Punjab Infantry.
- Six Companies, 37th Dogras.
- Three Companies, 8th Bengal Infantry.

After the action on the 9th August nothing more was seen of the Mohmands at Shabkadar for many days. On the morning of the 13th, the 13th Bengal Lancers "walked over" the scene of the recent fight and saw no one. On the 14th the whole force moved out and played the game of "Do tread on the tail of my coat," but without the least result. The gorge of the Gandab Valley route was thoroughly reconnoitred, and an officer's patrol pushed up the valley as far as they could safely go. The valley, on going forward, closes in, and about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles up, the patrol came upon small parties of scouts on the tops of adjoining hills, but no gathering of any number could be detected. These scouts made no attempt to fire on the patrol, which could, however, not advance any further. It was tolerably certain, then, that the Mohmand raiders were not in a hurry to come out of the hills and try conclusions with the force.

The cavalry reconnoitred the Alikandi route into the Mohmand country on the 19th, and they found that the passes were occupied by the enemy. This showed the intention of the Mohmands not to allow any force to approach their mountain homes unopposed, and it was felt that any entry into the hills would require to be in sufficient strength to overcome all opposition.

It is well known that between frontier tribesmen and Sikhs exists a deadly feud dating back to the times when the

Sikhs, as rulers of the Punjab, were engaged in frontier punitive missions. Religious differences have also accentuated this hatred and the most grim records of our frontier troubles will be found where Sikh and Mussalman tribesman have been the foemen. Soon after the Shabkadar fight an incident occurred which embittered more than ever this race and religious spirit of vendetta in the sons of the *Khalsa*. It was found, after the Mohmand raid and the battle of Shabkadar, that the tribesmen had looted the sacred temple or *Durbar Sahib* at Shabkadar, and that a number of copies of the holy scriptures or *Granth Sahib* had been burnt. No act could be more calculated to incense the frontier Sikh soldiers, and when to this is added the other atrocities perpetrated on the Sikhs, it will be seen that they had indeed sufficient cause to nourish anew old animosities and to cherish the sweet prospect of revenge.

THE LOSS OF THE KHYBER PASS.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE AFRIDIS ON THE WARPETH.



ANOTHER shake of the kaleidoscope is now to be remarked, and we see the further developments in what by this time had generally come to be considered a pre-arranged and carefully mapped out plan of revolt. As though Tochi, followed by Malakand and Chakdara, with Shabkadar and the Mohmand rising supervening, was not a sufficiently acute form of frontier upheaval, strange reports now began to receive corroboration which showed clearly and unmistakably that practically the entire north-west frontier of India was ablaze with rebellion and that from the Malakand to the Kurram the "fiery cross" had roused all to arms. The green flag of Islam had been unfurled and to it flocked the fanatical frontiersmen.

The outlook was black, and now was to be tested the value and strength of our occupation of the Kurram Valley, that

dominating forward frontier position of which seventeen years ago we possessed ourselves, and of the amount of faith to be placed on the Afridis with whom we had a covenant to protect and keep open the Khyber Pass.

The first signs of the further spreading of the revolt was the disquieting news from Peshawar, that a simultaneous rising had been arranged between the Orakzais and the Afridis. The details of this alleged concert of two of the most powerful and warlike of our frontier neighbours revealed at last that cohesion and unison which is always to be feared, and from which we have hitherto been saved. Rumours—and the arrant jade has been singularly accurate throughout the present disturbances—had it that the Afridis were to possess themselves of the Khyber Pass, whilst simultaneously the Orakzais would rise and massacre the Sikhs and other troops garrisoning the outposts in the Samana and throughout the Kurram Valley. Fortunately, however, this *bandobast* if ever made—and of this there can be little doubt—fell through, and once again we saw an instance of that extraordinary want of combination which has been so marked in the most powerful frontier upheaval the British in India have ever been concerned with, and which has lessened by a good deal the formidable character of the rebellion which the *Sirkar* has to suppress. Rise eventually both participators to this anti-British agreement did, but the Orakzais delayed the actual commencement of hostilities in the Kurram country until their brother conspirators in the Khyber, fulfilling their part of the bond, had risen, performed what they had set out to do, and dispersed.

Turning first to the Afridi demonstration in the Khyber Pass, some reference is necessary to the warlike and dominating frontiersmen who created our troubles in that historic neighbourhood. The Afridis occupy the country between the Khyber-Kabul route—the upper slopes of the Safed Koh on the west—and the Kohat district, with its recent extension westwards, the Kurram valley. That block makes roughly a square 65 miles each way, and contains over 4,000 square miles. Here dwell in savage independence the Afridis, six of whose eight clans are generally spoken of as the Khyber tribes, *viz.*, the Kuki, Malikdin, Kamar, Kamar and Zakka Khel and the Sipah. The Ak^o Khel are found further to the south, beyond the right

bank of the Bara River; while the Adam Khel hold the hills between the Peshawar and Kohat Districts and are regarded as a separate community, their interests not being identical with those of the clans to the north-west. In the summer months the majority of the Afridis move to Tirah, a high plateau where also go the Orakzais. The Rajgal and Maidan valleys are studded with their mat huts during the hot weather, and their flocks and herds find good pasturage. The Kuki Khel always resort to Rajgal, while Maidan is left for the other clans. In the winter the whole population swarms down into the Bara and Bazar Valleys, and also into the low hills bordering the Jamrud plain. Tirah has never been visited by our troops, and it is regarded as the Afridi stronghold. In the Afghan war of 1878-80 two expeditions were sent into the Bazar Valley, but it was not considered expedient to enter the Rajgal and Maidan Valleys, as this would have involved the employment of at least 10,000 men. The Afridis are collectively the finest and best armed race of dare-devil Afghans on our border, and are believed to have a united fighting strength of not less than from 25,000 to 28,000 men. Neither Moghal Emperor, Sikh Khalsa, Amir of Afghanistan, nor Viceroy of India has ever made any enduring impression upon them. Each clan is supreme within its own narrow limits, sometimes at peace and sometimes at war with a neighbouring clan, but all readily uniting against an external foe. Inside the clan almost every family has its inherited blood-feud. Greed and overweening pride are the strongest characteristics of the Afridis.

The Afridis are men of fine physique and grand fighting qualities, but their general character is of the worst. Ruthless, cowardly robbery, cold-blooded, treacherous murder, are to an Afridi the salt of life. Brought up from his earliest childhood amid scenes of appalling treachery and merciless revenge, nothing can change him; as he has lived, a shameless, cruel savage, so he dies. And it would seem that notwithstanding their long intercourse with the British, and that very large numbers are, or have been, in our service, and must have learned in some poor way what faith and mercy and justice are, yet the Afridi character is no better than it was in the days of his fathers. From such material as this, however, good soldiers have been made of the men enlisted in certain native regiments, and the trained Afridi fights with an élan which is highly appreciated by those who lead him. The blood feuds and quarrels

between the various clans lead to much internal fighting, but it is quite certain that any invasion of their country would see them all united. Unlike most of the other trans-border Afghans, they readily take foreign service. In the height of the Mutiny, said Lord Lawrence, one of the sections of the Afridis furnished us with 1,600 picked men, whom we formed into two battalions: they went down to Oude, and served for more than a year to our satisfaction. Some 4,000 of their young men are now soldiers in our Native army and in those of our Indian feudatories. As they hold both the Khyber route and the direct road between Pesháwar and Kohat, our intercourse with them since the first Afghan war has been continuous. Although our troops have on several occasions—notably in 1855, 1877, 1878, and 1879—penetrated far into their barren hills—thoroughly “lifted their *purdah*,” as the frontier phrase has it—hostilities have never been prolonged beyond a few days. The loss of pass allowances and the privations consequent on a blockade are, as a rule, sufficient to at once coerce malcontent sections into submission to the will of the tribal representatives, who collectively prefer peace and payments to war and want. Physically a magnificent man the Afridi makes a splendid soldier, and in the Chitral campaign the cavalry charge of an Afridi company of the Guides (after Major Battye had been shot down) was one of the finest instances of dash, discipline and bravery recorded. On the offensive he is an enemy to treat with the greatest respect: on the defensive he has not that dareness and stubborn courage which is characteristic of the Sikh and Gurkha, his comrades in many a bloody struggle.

Towards the beginning of August the first rumours of a rising of the Afridis in the Khyber Pass began to be spread about, but as day after day passed and they did not come to a head, it was considered in many well informed quarters that it was purely a scare. Nevertheless the military authorities relaxed no efforts and troops were rapidly moved to the front from all parts of India. It was hoped that this rapid mobilisation would deter the Afridis and Orakzais from making any attack, although it was well understood that it only required some wild act of fanaticism to send them all ablaze.

The disaffection among the Afridis and Orakzais is the work of Aka Khel Mullah, yet another of those pestiferous fanatics whose presence on our frontier is always a menace to

peace and order. First of all he tried to rouse the Orakzais, going there doubtless because the business of kindling the blaze would be easier in that mountainous country where the British guards are few on the scattered outposts. Syad Akbar, another Mullah, loomed largely in frontier affairs at this time. He is supposed to have brought to the tribesmen—the Orakzais particularly—promises of help from Afghanistan.

News came slowly from the Khyber and the country beyond, and on August 22nd the *Pioneer*, in a singularly optimistic article, hinted that our military operations had overawed the malcontents, that further tribal risings on a large scale were now unlikely, and that not much importance need be attached to any rumours from the Kurram Valley. Never was prophecy more wide of the mark. Later on came definite information that on the 21st August the Afridis without a doubt were up, and that the clans of Aka Khel, Malikdin Khel and Zakka Khel, in particular, had started from Tirah to march up the Khyber and take possession of the forts up to Bara and Jamrud. On that day General Elles despatched a flying column of all three arms to Bara to wait for the hostile demonstration, whilst the Jamrud column was kept more on the alert than ever. The 6th Bengal Lancers were ordered to Peshawar which gave General Elles at his disposal no less than eighteen squadrons of cavalry besides infantry, two Batteries Royal Horse Artillery, two Field and one Mountain Batteries—truly a formidable force, consisting in all of between 11,000 and 12,000 men.

On the 23rd the Afridis came rushing up the Khyber Pass in great force, their line extending a mile and a half.

In the plains of India no one ever dreamed that the Khyber Pass could fall into the hands of the tribesmen with such an army close at hand, but by the 23rd the whole Pass from Ali Musjid to Landi Khana was in the possession of the Afridis. Thus almost before we knew the Pass had been menaced, and whilst we were congratulating ourselves on the large proportions of the garrison at Peshawar, which would effectually nip in the bud any fresh development of the spirit of revolt in that direction, we found that the Pass in its entirety was held by the Afridis.

General Elles sent "K" Battery with the Dragoon Guards and four companies of British Infantry to move from the mouth

of the Khyber with the view to rendering assistance to the beleaguered garrison at Fort Maude if this should prove practicable. Apparently this was not at all practicable, for the force fearing the possibility of flank attacks only advanced to within two or three miles of the fort, when it opened fire without doing any damage. It was seen that Fort Maude was in flames, and then our troops retired.

Some slight need of satisfaction was given to us by the knowledge that the little garrison of Khyber Rifles at Fort Maude did not surrender to the tribesmen, but managed, when the guns of "K" Battery scared the tribesmen, to effect an orderly retreat to Jamrud where they were received with much enthusiasm. With the exception of three wounded men and one other who probably went over to the Afridis, the garrison, with the rifles, turned up intact at Jamrud. On the same day came the news that Ali Musjid had been burnt down and that Landi Kotal was being hotly besieged, and later that the *serai* was in flames. Later we heard that Landi Kotal had fallen and that the Afridis had made a clean sweep of the Khyber. For several nights an attack on Jamrud itself was expected and every night the Reserve Brigade at Peshawar bivouacked along the north side of the station ready to move on to Peshawar if necessary. The fall of such impregnable fortresses as Ali Musjid and Landi Kotal, and the securing of the Pass was universally held to be the worst blow our prestige could suffer on the north-west frontier.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE KHYBER PASS AND ITS DEFENDERS.



A DIGRESSION here, in order to refer to the historic Khyber Pass and the levies who guarded it, is necessary.

The Pass itself is a weird, uncanny place. It is a deep slit in the mountains thirty-three miles long and cut by torrents that have rushed towards the Indus. Its widest part is only 450 feet wide, and it narrows down to less than 10 feet in places, while the mountain of slate rocks rises

on either side absolutely perpendicular. The road or bed is fairly good, though in places rough with shingle. In summer time it is perhaps the most frightful death hole in the east. The heat is such as even the plains of India never approximate to and European and even native soldiers would die like flies in the deadly valley. Ali Musjid is $9\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the entrance on the Indian side. It is a very rough, poor old fort, but absolutely impregnable without artillery and it governs the Pass completely. The road by it is only 40 feet wide, and happens to be very slippery on account of projecting rocks. The mountain rises like a wall on each side, and the fort looks straight down from an elevation of 2,433 feet whilst Jamrud at the entrance is 1,670 feet high. To add to the picturesqueness of the scene sentries in pairs, belonging to the Khyber Rifles, are arranged every two or three hundred yards on either side of the mountains for protection against the fierce long-bearded savages of the hills in quest of plunder. Being once well in the Pass, one is struck with the fine workmanship displayed in the narrow winding road, which is in perfect condition. On the left the huge mountains rise almost perpendicularly for thousands of feet, while on the right a depth of a seemingly similar distance yawns beneath, making the corkscrew road a veritable ledge on the side of the huge mountain. The Pass is open for riders only onwards from Ali Musjid to Landi Kotal, its highest point, 3,373 feet, over which the ascent is most difficult. Here guns could be drawn only by men, and even laden animals sometimes find the projecting road too slippery for foothold. In rugged wildness the Khyber surpasses the Via Mala and Glencoe, but the sense of gloom is almost wanting under the burning sun.

The Khyber Pass proper twists for thirty-three miles north-west from the Peshawar plain at Jamrud to the Afghan plain of Jelalabad at Dhaka. By this, the usual route from Peshawar city to Kabul, the distance is 183 miles, in nine or ten marches. In the first Afghan War Colonel Wade, in the heat of July 1839, marched 11,000 British soldiers and Sikhs up the Khyber, under the match-locks of the Afridis, and captured Ali Musjid with a loss of 22 killed and 158 wounded. On that occasion the Afridis butchered 4,000 of the Yusufzai auxiliaries, who had been left to hold an outpost at the northern end, and then shut up Colonel Moseley in Ali Musjid. Being destitute of provisions he had to cut his way back to Jamrud. When

Pollock's army of retribution advanced to Jelalabad and Kabul in 1842, Sir Henry Lawrence played his guns from the heights of the Pass to the admiration of all beholders. On the return of the triumphant army, General M'Caskill's rear guard was cut off, and two guns detained for a day. In Lord Lytton's campaign, two days after his declaration of war, "Sam" Brown's force captured Ali Musjid in a brilliant fashion, although cholera afterwards laid low many a soldier of the garrison. By the treaty of Gandamak in 1879 the British Government retained in their hands the Khyber Pass with the control of the independent tribes inhabiting it. Subsequently when Abdur Rahman Khan became Amir, on the forcible abdication of Yakub Khan, it was arranged with the former, without, however, any formal treaty being concluded, that the Khyber should remain in British possession (1880). The entire Pass as far as Dakka, opposite Lalpura, was now placed under the Punjab Government. Representatives of the various tribes interested in the Khyber Pass were invited to come to Peshawar for a conference with the authorities about the arrangements to be made for the preservation of order in the Pass, and all these representatives attended in 1881. As a result of these deliberations, the Afridis undertook to make themselves responsible for the Pass, while the Ali Sher Khel clan of Shinwarris answered for the portion of the Pass lying between Landi Khana and Lala Beg, the extreme limit of Afridi rights in the Pass. The tribesmen were guaranteed their independence; and in return for their services were granted an annual subsidy of Rs. 87,000, together with another Rs. 87,000 for the maintenance of a corps of *Jezeilchis*. The formal agreement anent the Khyber Pass was entered into in February 1881; and the parties to it were the Zakha Khel, Milikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamrai Khel, Sipah Khel and Kuki Khel Afridis, as well as the Shinwarris of Landi Kotal. Colonel Hastings was the first Political Officer who was entrusted with the supervision of the execution of these arrangements; and after him the difficult task fell on Colonel Warburton, to whom belongs the credit of having successfully carried out by means of these wild, untamed agents, the measures initiated by his predecessor. The Khyber Pass became a safe thoroughfare, and the primitive *Jezeilchis* developed into the Khyber Rifles.

CHAPTER XXIII.

DEFENDING THE KHYBER: BROTHER AGAINST BROTHER.



T was many days after the actual fall of the forts and the abandonment of the Khyber Pass before full details were made public. When the news of the attack on Shabkadar reached him, Captain Barton prepared the posts in the Khyber for defence, electing to stay at Landi Kotal as the most important post. He knew the fight was going to be a stubborn one and he made his arrangements to hold the forts against all opposition. Certainly Captain Barton never thought a policy of scuttle would have been pursued. He sent up 50,000 rounds of ammunition, got in 15 days' provisions, and had 15 days' water-supply, while he made arrangements with *ghurras* and *mussucks* for the other posts. At Landi Kotal he increased the garrison by the Mullagori company, making it up to a strength of 350 rifles. The fort, however, was a very big one, with over 1,000 yards of wall to man, requiring as its proper garrison about 1,500 men.

On the 17th August Captain F. J. H. Barton (Guides), Political Officer in the Khyber, got the first reliable news that the Afridis had risen and intended attacking the Khyber posts. He then wrote to the Commissioner of Peshawar, Sir Richard Udney, asking for a reinforcement of four companies and two guns, which would have been ample to repel any tribal attack. Instead of reinforcements, Captain Barton was peremptorily ordered to Jamrud on the morning of the 18th instant and did not return, at that time it was known that the Afridis would not attack the Pass for at least three days. On the 23rd the attack on Ali Musjid began. No one, least of all Captain Barton, could be expected to conjecture that the Government would leave the Khyber Rifles entirely to their fate; and that he expected to return is shown by the fact that he left all his property behind him at Landi Kotal, and which was lost.

Various stories went about the papers regarding the manner in which Landi Kotal was defended by the five native officers and 370 men of the Khyber Rifles. On one hand it was stated emphatically that no resistance worthy the word was offered, and

that, whether by design or through treachery, the gates were opened before much fighting was done and the tribal mob poured in. Some of the garrison, notably the Mullagori and Shilarani sepoys were said to have escaped over the wall with their rifles, while others, including, it is said, the Zakha and Malik-din Khels, fraternised with their clansmen and joined in the fun of looting the post. Naturally it was not to be expected that the garrison would have done anything else, as the foemen were their own brothers, but still the news was unpleasant. It was therefore a delightful surprise when, a few days after these disappointing stories had been circulated and generally accepted, they received an emphatic contradiction from Captain Barton, the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles. I append part of the statement he wrote to the papers. It had been said that the garrison only held out for two hours or less. Captain Barton replied: "As a matter of fact, they resisted steady attack for over twenty-four hours. The enemy lost over one hundred killed and the garrison had one native officer killed and one severely wounded. The latter, who was shot through the middle of the shoulder-blade in the early morning of the 25th, continued fighting and encouraging his men until the fort was taken about midday. The Subadar, who was killed just before the enemy effected an entrance and who conducted the defence, had two sons in the attacking force, and one son with him in the Khyber Rifles. The losses amongst the defenders cannot be ascertained as yet, but they were not less than ten killed. The Subadar commanding the Mullagori company, when the enemy through treachery effected an entrance into the fort, collected his company and fought his way through, losing several men in doing so. He then took his company through the Shilman country and is on his way back to Jamrud without the loss of a rifle."

The loss which the Khyber Rifles suffered throughout the raid was stated to have been ten only in killed and wounded.

On September 3rd the Mullagori Subadar (to whom Captain Barton makes reference), and 40 men of No. 6 Company, Khyber Rifles, who were all Mullagoris, and who fought their way out of the *serai* at Landi Kotal, returned to Jamrud with their rifles amid a scene of great enthusiasm, the garrison turning out to a man and cheering them heartily. They had lost four men killed and three severely wounded. These men had applied

for leave after fighting their way back to their own country, in order that they might bury their dead and reassure their friends.

The following is the terse and reproachful story of the siege and fall of Landi Kotal from the lips of one of the defenders:—"When the *lashkar* came our Subadar had conversation with them and asked them to postpone the attack until he was reinforced. The Afridis then drew away and attacked. We fought stubbornly. Afridi and Khyberis alike expected reinforcements and relief. For two nights and two days we fought, Afridi brother against Afridi brother, but no succour came from the *Sirkar*, and the Subadar, seeing that we could not hold out much longer, and that times were against us, told us to disperse in the night—and we came in here!" This is the true Mussalman way of looking at such a *contretemps*. Times were against them. It was *Kismet*.

In the middle of September there was another scene of enthusiasm at Landi Kotal when, amidst great cheering and with their own band playing them in, Subadar Jawas Khan and 95 non-commissioned officers and men, Shinwaris of Nos. 1 and 2 companies, Khyber Rifles, marched in from Landi Kotal, all bringing in their rifles. The Subadar, who had been severely wounded at the defence of Landi Kotal, still had his arm and shoulder bound up, but had pluckily marched in the whole way with his men. He behaved with the greatest gallantry during the defence of the fort, cheering on his men for several hours after he had been wounded, up to the time that the fort was taken by the *Ghazis*. He and his tribe, the Shinwaris of Loargi, had been threatened that, for returning to Jamrud with their rifles, their villages would be burnt and their crops destroyed. Their return had been delayed partly by those threats, but chiefly because they did not like to come in without bringing their wounded Subadar with them. As they were drawn up on the square in front of their barracks, they looked an exceedingly fine-looking body of men—soldiers to a man.

These incidents made the general public believe that the Khyber Rifles were more to be pitied than blamed, and the political authorities at Peshawar were felt to have committed an irretrievable blunder in abandoning the levies to their fate. All told there were only 452 men defending the *mas*, which

is twenty miles long. At the time the Pass was attacked (and it was known for days before hand that an attack was imminent), there were 9,500 British and native troops at Peshawar, Fort Bara and Jamrud, and not a man was moved to help the Khyber Rifles, who were waiting for assistance from the *Sirkar* whose salt they had eaten and in whose good faith they had implicit trust.

It is stated on good authority that when the first batch of the loyal levies returned to Jamrud with their rifles and found an army watching their unnecessary immolation, they openly jeered at our troops: and small wonder if this was so. In defence of the masterly inactivity which left the Khyber Rifles to fight or scuttle, it was urged that there was not a force sufficiently well equipped and provisioned to move out from Peshawar. All the military authorities could do in the time was to hurry troops to Peshawar and Kohat and General Elles could not move a column into the Khyber hills because he had the Mohmand border at Shabkadar to watch and guard. But even these apologists felt obliged to confess that the loss of the Khyber was not only an incalculable blow to our prestige but also the most serious of all incitements to a general conflagration along the whole of the north-west border. As the *Pioneer* remarked, if ever there was a case for urgent action it was now.

But there were other disasters in store.

GRIM FIGHTING ON THE SAMANA.


CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ORAKZAIS JOIN THE REVOLT.



WHILE the Afridis were making hay in the Khyber Pass their Orakzai brethren had not yet moved in the Kurram Valley and Samana country. In this respect at least they were true to their traditions of faithlessness and lack of unified action amongst themselves. There was no doubt that a rising was impending and troops were being pushed forward





Rough Map of Samana Range

Showing hill Paths

Scale 1 inch to 3 1/4 mile

with all speed to Kohat to guard against it. Each day that the Orakzais delayed their offensive demonstrations rendered less difficult the task before us, and when at last the tribesmen burst with full force on the Samana outposts, the damage they did was small in comparison to what would have resulted had we been completely taken unawares. The Samana country branches off to the north from Hangu, which is situated half-way between Kohat and the fort of Thal, the entrance to the Kurram Valley.

The Kurram Valley stretches in a north-westerly direction for about 60 miles in a straight line from Thal. The valley is broadest at its head, where it is about 15 miles across. From Thal to Sadda the border is only a few miles from the left bank of the Kurram, and runs along the base of the Ziamukht and Orakzai hills, which every here and there reach down to the river banks itself. On the right bank our territory extends through low hills for about 25 miles to the Khost border. Beyond Sadda the valley opens out into what appears to be a big plain. As a matter of fact there is very little level ground, except near the banks of the river. What seems a plain is really a long regular slope, much cut up by *nullas*, which rises at a considerable gradient from the left bank of the river to the base of the Safed Koh, the crest of which is the Afghan boundary.

The arrangements for keeping open the Kohát Pass well illustrate the susceptibilities of the Afridis. For nearly half a century now we have from fear of hurting the feelings of the Pass villagers, refrained from insisting on their making the route practicable for wheeled traffic. The attraction of an increased subsidy and large profits from road-making contracts fails to tempt the Afridi sections concerned to permit a rough track being converted into a high road, because such conversion would, they say, be a visible sign of their loss of independence. The Khyber Pass, on the other hand, is traversed by a splendid road, made originally more than fifty years ago during the first Afghan war, up which the traveller drives as if he were on an Indian high road. Notwithstanding that fact, the Kohat Pass is still in the same state of nature as it was when first forced by us forty years ago, in 1853. We have twice had opportunity for insisting on having a proper road made through it—once in 1853, when a series of raids and outrages compelled

our long-suffering Government to punish the Adam Khel section of the Afridis ; and once again in 1877-78, when the hills of the Jowaki section were occupied by an army for the two severest winter months, and that clan reduced from prosperity to misery. The reason why we have never made a road through the Pass is, that Government in its dealings, as well with its Indian feudatories and subjects, as with the most barbarous of the trans-border clans, is always scrupulously faithful to its promises and engagements, and our original agreement with those Kohat Pass clans was that they should give us a right of way only and no more.

Besides the Afridis two other Afghan tribes—the Orakzais and Zaimukhts—occupy the southern end of the block of mountains with which we are now dealing. The former are a powerful collection of clans, capable of bringing over 6,000 armed highlanders into the field; the latter are a small, strong tribe, whose fighting strength is about 4,000 men only, but they are all fine stalwart highlanders. Both inhabit the mountains immediately to the north-west of the Kohat District, and have, owing to the natural strength of their fastnesses, and their marauding instincts, caused our frontier villages from first to last a good deal of loss. Expeditions of the old style were launched against the Orakzais in 1855 and 1868, but it was not until 1891 that the tribe realised what punishment should mean. Our troops entered their hills in mid-winter, quartered their whole country, blew up their towers, burnt the woodwork of their villages, destroyed their grain-stores, and did not finally withdraw until dominating positions on the Samana range had been occupied and garrisoned. A treacherous rising soon after occurred, on which the former operations were repeated, but more drastically, and resulted in exemplary punishment being inflicted on the tribe. Had the work ended with the heavy losses in life and property suffered by the Orakzais in those two expeditions, the lesson would have been an enduring one, and have left no open wound. It was, however, decided at the end of the first phase to fortify and garrison several strong commanding positions just inside the enemy's territory.

In the opinion of the "masterly inactivity" party as opposed to that of "masterly activity" it is these forts that are the cause of all the trouble amongst these tribesmen. The Orakzais

are one of the most numerous, powerful, fanatical, and, in some respects, inaccessible of our immediate Border tribes, or rather group of tribes: for though usually referred to as one, it must be understood in an ethnographical and not a political sense. Their six main divisions are split up into many parties, are variously *Gâr* and *Sâmil* in politics; and their inter-tribal warfare, which has often furiously raged between the Tirah Saynds and Sunnis, formed the subject of a special report to Government by Cavagnari. Some sections in a great measure are dependent on British territory; others but slightly so; and reprisals are not easy. One, the Daulatzai, has committed many acts of hostility; and against the Bizoti and Rubia Khel clans special expeditions have been undertaken, while some of the most numerous have so far never given any serious trouble. Any relations with them as a body would hardly be possible and probably nothing, unless it were lust of plunder or hatred of the infidel, would unite together the different elements that go to make up a fighting strength estimated at over 25,000 men. As a body, though not such fine men as the Afridis, they are robust, wiry-looking mountaineers; and though opinions differ as to their martial qualities, they admittedly shoot very straight. It is more than doubtful if by descent they are Pathans; but if not better, they are probably not much worse than their neighbours in the Pathan qualities of deceit, avarice, and cruelty. MacGregor says "there is no doubt that, like other Pathans, they would not shrink from any falsehood, however atrocious, to gain an end. Money could buy their services for the foulest deed; cruelty of the most revolting kind would mark their actions to a wounded or helpless foe, as much as cowardice would stamp them against determined resistance." On the other hand it must not be forgotten that they have been embittered by centuries of bitter religious feuds and the influence of fanatical teachers; they have never had a Government of any decent sort, its place being supplied by superstition; and they do not understand our theory of tolerance or non-interference. They are certainly not worse than the Afridi—to whom these crimes are second nature, but who, under a tight hand, is transformed into a soldier ranking with the best in our native army.

It must be remembered that the little forts along the Samana range are all of *kutch*a construction. They are only garrisoned by a few sepoys and are not intended or expected

to resist a long siege. The great difficulty which has to be contended with by the garrison is generally that of getting a water-supply, and when a siege is on, this can only be done by a raid, as the tanks hold only a small supply.

When the first rumours of impending trouble in the valley became known, the forces at Parachinar, near the site of the old Kurram Fort, were as follows :—

2 Small guns of Derajat Mountain Battery.

Half Squadron of 3rd Punjab Cavalry.

Wing of 1st Battalion, 5th Gurkhas.

2 Companies of 36th Sikhs.

300 of the Kurram Militia armed with sniders.

It was on the 15th that the first intimation was received at Kohat of the intention to attack the Samana outposts, and the following column was held in readiness to move at a moment's notice :—

5th Punjab Infantry (under Captain R. F. Jameson).

4 Guns of Derajat Mountain Battery (under Captain J. L. Parker).

1 Squadron of 3rd Punjab Cavalry.

It was reported that the Musazai section of the Orakzais had risen and was descending in force on the Kurram-Thal road, the nearest point of which is the post of Sadda, held by a native officer and thirty men of the 36th Sikhs. At this time General Yeatman-Biggs left Rawalpindi with his staff to assume command of the troops between Kohat and Kurram. Several defiant acts of the Musazai were reported, and probably they would have done a great deal more had not our officials organized and armed the Turi tribesmen in the villages most likely to be attacked. The Musazai are very old offenders, and it was on all hands hoped that Government would march through the country and "lift the *purdah*" thoroughly.

CHAPTER XXV.

CAPTURE OF THE UBLAN PASS.



N the 25th August news was brought in from Mahomedzai, the fort which is situated near the foot of the Ublan Pass, that some sniping had been going on at night, and that the enemy had occupied the *sangars* which had been the scene of the defeat of our troops 29 years ago. The same day Major Bewicke Copley, Intelligence Officer, and Captain E. H. A. Wake, Orderly Officer to General Yeatman-Biggs, rode out from Kohat and reconnoitred the ground. The next night the levy post was ruhsed by some Bizotis and Utman Khels, one man was killed, one ehavildar and one man wounded, and the remaining levies fled for refuge to Mahomedzai. At dusk on the 26th Mahomedzai was reinforced by one company of the 2nd P. I. under Captain L. E. Cooper. At 4 A.M. on the 27th a force consisting of 1 Squadron 3rd Punjab Cavalry, 6 Guns No. 9 Field Battery, 2 Companies Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the 2nd Punjab Infantry moved out from Kohat to attack the Pass. General Yeatman-Biggs arrived on the scene at daybreak, and the guns took up a position near a tank on the plain at the foot of the Pass and opened fire at 2,200 yards. After some very pretty shooting Major A. S. Wedderburn succeeded in almost completely silencing the enemy's frontal fire and also that on the crags to our left, but the latter afterwards broke out again during the advance. Dispositions were then made for the attack, the 2nd Punjab Infantry leading and the Royal Scots Fusiliers in reserve, with the squadron of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry as escort to the guns. The main attack advanced up the centre of the Pass, and when about half way up there found themselves exposed to a galling and very accurate fire, coming chiefly from the left flank, where there were a number of sharpshooters concealed amongst some steep crags overlooking the Pass. These crags were a thorn in the side during the whole process of the engagement—they are perpendicular and quite inaccessible, and it is impossible either to scale or to outflank them. Here a number of the enemy remained concealed, keeping up a galling fire, and

although volleys were continually fired at them, it was found impossible to dislodge them. About 8 A.M. the *kotal* was gained, Lieutenant A. M. S. Elsmie, Adjutant of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, who had led his company most gallantly from first to last, being the first to arrive at the summit. The enemy did not wait to try conclusions at close quarters, but were seen rapidly retreating in a fairly compact body down the other side of the Pass, where they crossed the Bara River and entered the village beyond. Volleys were fired after them, both from the main attack and also from the men of the 2nd Punjab Infantry on the right.

Meanwhile the right attack had been having some sharp work: after fighting their way from ridge they gained the crest and swept the enemy before them, the two companies being well led by Captain C. M. Eales and Subadar Bhuta Ram respectively. The troops had to fight their way up a rocky and almost precipitous hill with little or no available cover, under a burning sun, and exposed to a heavy fire. The heat indeed was terrific, and the European troops suffered a good deal, one man dying of heat apoplexy. No water was procurable, and the ground was too bad to allow of pack mules being brought up.

The casualties during the advance were 1 sepoy, 2nd Punjab Infantry killed, and Subadar Akhbar Khan, 2nd Punjab Infantry and 2 sepoy wounded.

The retirement was begun about 10-30 A.M. and was carried out in echelon, the main body moving off first down the centre of the Pass, followed in turn by the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the two companies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry who had originally advanced on the right. The enemy promptly followed up, and it was now that most of the casualties occurred. During all this time the snipers concealed among the crags on the left had kept up a galling fire, and they now kept moving down and harassing our rear-guard. About half way down Captain Baird Smith and Lieutenant L. A. North, both of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, were severely wounded, the former in the ankle and the latter in the stomach, the bullet by a fortunate chance running round under the ribs and coming out without having penetrated very deeply. Surgeon-Captain W. G. Beyts and Surgeon-Lieutenant H. P. K. Bamfield, A. M. S., rendered prompt and efficient aid to the wounded; the former with the aid of a sepoy

carrying a wounded officer for some distance down the hill under a heavy fire when the ground was too bad for doolies to be used. The retirement was well and steadily carried out, but the troops on reaching the foot of the Pass were almost completely exhausted, 16 men of the Royal Scots Fusiliers having been knocked over by the sun. However *tongas* had been sent out from Kohat for these and the wounded, and after a short rest the remainder marched back to cantonments going well and strong, and arriving cheering and singing.

The total casualties were: 1 Private, Royal Scots Fusiliers, and 1 sepoy, 2nd Punjab Infantry killed; 2 Officers, Royal Scots Fusiliers, 2 W. O., 2nd Punjab Infantry and 8 sepoy wounded, of whom two have since died. It is said that several of the enemy were dressed in *khaki* and appeared to be old sepoy both from the steadiness and accuracy of their fire, and from the manner in which they at once distinguished the officers. They were armed chiefly with sniders. Since this engagement the Ublan Pass has been quiet, no sniping or other sign of hostility having been observed.

The reports received from Thal, on the 30th, were alarming. A sowar carrying telegrams on beyond Thal (the wire being unworkable) rode out eight miles and then returned, finding the police post, where he expected a relief, deserted. Letters and telegrams received told of fighting on the Samanas and the burning of several of our posts by the Orakzais. News of the fighting in the Khyber, and that the tribes between Peshawar and Kohat were up, had by now reached our borders. The tribes, already worked on by the Mullahs, determined to rise in earnest. Sadda post, which up till now had been held by 36 men only, was reinforced by 25 rifles. During the night there was some firing near Sadda, but nothing serious.

On the night of August 30th the first attack in force took place. Late in the afternoon, the signallers in Sadda post saw with a telescope a large gathering headed by Mullahs with standards advancing across the border in the direction of Bhalish Khel post. The latter is merely a tower with a small courtyard on one side of it, in which are the huts in which the garrison live. The post is held by 20 men of the Kurram Militia. Just before dusk the enemy closed in round the tower and began a fusillade, which lasted till past mid-night. The attacking force

was reported to be 1,500 strong; there were probably 2,000 men out altogether, some of whom did not partake in the attack.

No doubt they trusted in their overwhelming numbers to overpower the small garrison. But the latter fought splendidly, yet another testimony to the faithfulness of our levies under the most trying of circumstances. The havildar in command, an Afridi, when his attacking fellow-tribesmen called to him by name again and again to come over with his rifles, replied with volleys.

About midnight the defenders had only 20 rounds each left, and the fire slackened somewhat as the ammunition had to be husbanded. The Afridis noticing this, pressed and hewed the gate down with axes. But the garrison, when the gate went down, retreated into the tower after killing two of the enemy as they entered the gateway. The brave little garrison was at the mercy of its enraged foe. Blood had been spilt and it is not in the Pathan nature to pardon such a deed—even from a brother. Fortunately at this moment help arrived from Sadda. Fifty of the levies there, belonging to the Malik Khels, who are famous for their fighting qualities, turned up in the nick of time, and the enemy exaggerating their numbers made off to the hills. It is a pity they did not wait a little longer, as fifty more of the Kurram Militia were close up, having been sent by Captain E. W. S. K. Maconchy from Hassan Ali, five miles off, as soon as he realised that the post was being very hard pressed.

The very gallant way the garrison behaved, speaks volumes for the pluck and determination of the Militia. Their soldierly qualities could scarcely have been subjected to a severer test. The Malik Khels certainly deserve their reputation for reckless daring.

The loss on the other side, besides the two men killed in the gateway, is not known, but it must have been considerable.

CHAPTER XXVI.

FIRST SIEGE AND RELIEF OF THE SAMANA.

NEWs from the solitary outposts on Samana was anxiously looked for, and when it came it was found that the attack which had been feared had actually been made. The Samana Range runs east and west; to the north of it lies the Khanki Valley, and to the south the Miranzai Valley.

News was received at Fort Lockhart on August 26th, that a large force of Orakzais, including Mamozai, Ali Sherzai and Ah Khel would attack the Sheowri border police post below Gulistan. Heavy firing was heard all night from Gulistan, which was held by 130 men of the 36th Sikhs under Major C. H. DesVœux, 36th Sikhs. At dawn of the 27th, the big hills above Gulistan were seen to be held by the enemy. Major DesVœux, with Lieutenant A. K. Blair and 60 men, made a reconnaissance, but finding the enemy in great strength were obliged to retire, which was steadily executed under fire. At 7-30 A.M. news of the above was received by Colonel J. Haughton at Fort Lockhart, who started at once with 150 rifles and arrived at Gulistan at 9-30. Seeing the enemy in great strength in a very strong position, extending over two miles, it was determined to wire for reinforcements from Hangu. At 12 Lieutenants R. G. Munn and Blair and half a company started out to cut off parties of the enemy moving down to water. After firing a few volleys on the enemy the pickets retired hastily, but not before Lieutenant Blair had been severely wounded.

On the 29th the Kahi police post was raided and burnt. The intention of the tribesmen to make an attack on Sadda had been averted by the timely and unexpected arrival of reinforcements which was a complete surprise for the Afridis, who at once dispersed.

Fort Gulistan, distant $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Fort Lockhart, had been practically invested by the tribesmen since the 27th

August. The *lashkar*, numbering some 6,000 men, for some days and nights contented itself with long range sniping cutting an unhappy *bhisti's* throat, carrying off his mules and such like exploits; but on the 3rd at 2 P.M. they made a determined attack on the horn work, first occupying Picket Hill, distant 350 yards, where Lieutenant Blair was shot through the lung, and afterwards advancing to within 10 yards of the hedge under cover of a heavy fire at ranges from 150 to 300 yards. They were able by the terraced formation of the ground to approach securely so close that they at last fired the hedge, a stout obstacle well pegged and weighted with stones.

Now occurred the gallant incident which called forth high encomiums from the Commander-in-Chief. On Major DesVœux calling for volunteer sepoy, Sunder Singh and Harma Singh sprang out and under a heavy fire tore down the burning portion. They succeeded in their task, and returned safely. Again the fire broke out on the opposite side, and the same two men assisted by four others again performed their task, one being shot through the leg. The names of these two gallant fellows were sent to head-quarters.

The attack continued with slight intermission till noon next day. During the night attack volunteers were called for to light a bonfire 100 yards from the post; again the call was promptly answered, and two more sepoy proved their devotion to their salt by performing their task under a very heavy fire and practically in the midst of the enemy.

Orders were now issued to General Yeatman-Biggs to send out a convoy of supplies to Fort Lockhart, whilst at the same time the Samana Range would be cleared of the foe. Accordingly on the 7th September the force left Hangu. It consisted of the 1-2nd Gurkhas, in advance, followed by two companies of the Royal Irish, the 2nd Punjab Infantry, half company No. 4 Sappers and Miners, No. 9 Field Battery, escorted by one squadron of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, and one squadron of the 3rd Bengal Cavalry. Two companies of the Royal Irish under Colonel C. G. Mansell, 3rd Punjab Cavalry. The 1-3rd Gurkhas also joined at Pat Darband marching from Doaba. Little happened to the force and the convoy, which consisted of 30 days supplies for the half battalion, 36th Sikhs, garrisoning the Samana.

The position up to the 10th of September was this. After the fall of the Khyber the Orakzais gathered their *lashkar* and made their first effort at the Ublan Pass, while small raiding parties moved towards Kurram. They were not very successful in their efforts, but they saw that isolated posts held by the Border Militia or Police lay open to attack, east and west of the Samana, and they raided Shenowrie, Lakha and Saifulderr, and even threatened Hangu and Thal. The two columns from Kohat forced them back into the Khanki Valley, and they had then to consider whether they should renew their raids. The Orakzai would, probably, have rested content with what they had achieved in the burning of a few posts, but this did not fit in at all with the aims of the Mullahs who were bent on making further mischief. The Afridis were therefore worked upon by Saiad Akbar to gather again and to make a demonstration in a new direction. It was resolved to leave the Peshawar border untouched, owing no doubt to the strength of our forces in that direction, and to make a big demonstration against the Samana. Accordingly a contingent, said to number 10,000 at least, marched into the Khanki Valley, where the Orakzai were already assembled, and the Daulatzai clan were directed to collect behind the Ublan Pass. It was obviously intended to carry our forts on the Samana and to raid Hangu, Ibrahimzai and even Kohat itself, if any marked success was gained. This resolve was carried out and for days fierce fighting took place in the Samana country.

Now we come to one of the saddest yet most glorious pages in the history of the risings—the siege and fall of the Saragarhi Fort with its noble little garrison of Sikhs.

THE DEFENCE AND FALL OF SARAGARHI.

CHAPTER XXVII.

IMMOLATION OF TWENTY-ONE SIKHS.

FROM the map it will be seen that the little post at Saragarhi is about one and-a-half miles distant from Fort Lockhart, and is situated in the midst of the Samana hills at an altitude of about six thousand feet.

It was built on the same pattern as all the other so-called forts, in the form of a square, with bastions at each corner and with a wooden door, heavily studded with iron, flush with the ground. Inside this *serai* were the quarters of the little band of Sikh sepoy who formed its garrison on Sunday, the 12th of September. These forts are not built to resist a siege, and in the case of assault by tribesmen in large bodies they are certain death-traps for the garrisons. They are built for occupation by levies as a general rule, and the principle seems to be that in case of assault the men ordinarily occupying them can manage to arrange terms with their assailants and so escape slaughter. It seems a haphazard sort of arrangement and is particularly deadly when war rumours necessitate its fortification by regular troops, who are not in such fortunate case as to be able to surrender and escape with their lives. Particularly was this so with the slender garrison that occupied it on the 12th September. They were twenty-one in number only and they belonged to the 36th Sikhs, a regiment which had never been under fire.

A word or two regarding this new regiment which fleshed its virgin arms to such purpose on the heights of Samana, is necessary. The regiment was raised ten years ago by Colonel "Jim" Cooke and Captain H. R. Holmes, the latter the biggest man of his time in the Indian army. It had originally been raised in 1852, but was disbanded in 1882. The story goes that Captain Holmes when out recruiting in the Ludhiana District used to challenge all the young men of a village to wrestle with him on the understanding that all competitors should enlist in the new regiment. The Sikhs are

great wrestlers, but they found the burly Englishman one too many for them, with the result that within a few months of the orders for raising it being received the new regiment appeared before the Commander-in-Chief at Meerut. A finer body of men than the 36th Sikhs is not to be found in the Indian Army. It left Delhi for the front 777 strong, every man being 5 feet 8 inches and over in height with the minimum of a 36-inch chest. They were in 1891 sent to join the Manipur Field Force, but never had the luck to go to the front. Thus till this year they had never had their baptism of fire.

Notwithstanding this latter fact, however, they were Sikhs, and the traditions of the Khalsa nation have taught us what to expect from her sons. They have always gone fearlessly and dauntlessly into danger and surrender is not of their creed. The frontier of north-west India is an old battle field for the descendants of Ranjit Singh, and glorious fights were fought in its hills and valleys in years gone by. It is full of reminiscences of bygone glory, and what is more, the personal animosities which those times of Sikh punishment of frontier aggression engendered still hold remorseless sway in Sikh and Pathan alike. When these two meet there is no quarter asked and none given. The sepoy smites for the glory of his race against his traditional foe, and the Pathan kills that he may mutilate the body of the infidel and rob him of paradise.

We are told that it was absolutely necessary to maintain Fort Saragarhi as a transmitting signalling station between Gulistan and Fort Lockhart, and that there was ample ammunition, water and food, also that the fort was impregnable except to artillery. This is not the place to criticise the military necessities which, in order to maintain an essential position, leave its little force so weak that its immolation is inevitable.

The very meagre account of the defence and fall of Saragarhi is supplied by a signaller at Saragarhi who kept in communication to the last, and by the on-lookers at Fort Lockhart and Gulistan who, powerless to render assistance, witnessed the grim tragedy to its sad *finale*.

An overwhelming force of Afridis, put down by the observers as many thousands, was the attacking force, and from

the commencement the siege was of a most determined character. Time after time the enemy assaulted in force, but the gallant little band who held the walls repulsed the attack with terrible slaughter. The enemy now took shelter under the rocks close to the fort and kept a hot fire on the defenders from a few yards' distance. The Sikhs on the fort walls held their posts for hour after hour, but again and again the enemy returned to the siege regardless of their heavy losses in dead and wounded.

Desperate as was the position of the garrison at Fort Lockhart, the heroic struggle of their Sikh comrade-in-arms was more than they could gaze tamely upon. The enemy were to be counted in thousands, all well armed, and had the entire garrison at Fort Lockhart—and even it was miserably weak—turned out to the rescue of the beleaguered few, such an act must of necessity have meant annihilation, without in any way accomplishing the object intended. Nevertheless an attempt was made, and one hundred rifles of the Fort Lockhart garrison marched out of the little fort. The intention was to divert, if possible, the enemy's attention.

What was almost certain to occur in such case now resulted. The tribesmen, realising the small numbers of the little band in the open, jubilantly rushed forward and opened out with the intention of outflanking them. The danger was too great, it would have been but a glorious and unavailing sacrifice to have waited such an overpowering on-rush, and reluctantly the rifles were ordered back into the fort.

Now the fate of the gallant Sikhs at Saragarhi was certain. It was only a matter of time. The door was attacked, and the little garrison slowly but surely was reduced by the enemy's marksmen. For six and-a-half hours these heroes fought their great fight, and held their own until it became impossible with the few unwounded men left to arm both the walls and guard the entrance door.

The end must come sooner or later, but until such time the Martiris of the Sikhs cracked out defiance and death to the enemy. There is nothing even in romance, unless it is the siege of Torquilstone in "Ivanhoe," which approaches in grandeur this defence by our Sikh sepoys against the rushes of fanatical hordes of *Ghazis*. From Fort Gulistan two men were

noticed under the bastion in the north-west corner of Saragarhi making a hole in the wall. They were covered both from the view and fire of the defenders by a fatal defect in the construction of the fort. The heavy door was attacked with axes, but for long it resisted all attempts to break it in. Now the attack on the wall was successful, and at the dead angle of the flanking tower the enemy crowding over their dead and wounded entered the breach and fought their way into the enclosure. But even yet all was not over.

Stubbornly the noble few who were left retreated into the *serai*, and hard indeed did each defender die. Large numbers of the enemy had now gained entrance to the *serai* by ladders with which they had escaladed the walls. Surrounded on all hands, the garrison was mercilessly cut down.

One solitary Sikh only was now left and he defended the guard-room. Magnificent was the resistance which he offered, and alone at his post he accounted for twenty of the enemy—one for each of his poor dead comrades. It is consoling to think that even at the end it was not to the weapons of his overwhelming foes that this hero fell. During this last glorious stand, when the Afridis were being hewn down by the solitary sepoy, the enemy, despairing of conquering the last of the Sikhs, set fire to the guard-room, and, fighting with his face to the foe, the last Khalsa soldier finally perished in the flames.

Thus the enemy were robbed of their last and most terrible foeman, whose body was saved by the flames from the horrible mutilation to which his comrades-in-arms—dead and dying alike—were subjected by the fiends whom they resisted so long.

At half-past four, after nearly seven hours of onslaught and slaughter, Fort Saragarhi fell into the hands of the tribesmen. How dearly our Sikh sepoys sold their lives may be gathered from the fact that the enemy admitted that close upon two hundred of themselves had been killed outright, whilst the numbers of wounded must have greatly exceeded this total.

Let me here step aside a little and detail the scene at Saragarhi a few days later when General Yeatman-Biggs' relief force reached the dismantled fort. It was a piteous sight. The little post was levelled almost to the ground and

amid the ruins of the fort they had so gallantly defended lay the stripped and horribly mutilated bodies of the little garrison.

Our troops looked lingeringly at the grim spectacle, and the hardened expressions on faces of Sikh and Gurkha alike (for these latter also had seen their dead) boded ill for the ruthless murderers. It is impossible to describe the nature of the mutilation which these wild Pathans inflict on their helpless enemies—it is revolting in the extreme. As corpse after corpse, maimed and disfigured, was drawn forth the comrades of the dead men looked on in terrible silence.

An examination of the position revealed more details of the grim Sunday fight and showed clearly that the breach in the dead angle of the flanking tower had been caused by the removal of a corner stone after which mass after mass of masonry fell and hundreds of the infuriated devils swarmed like ants through the breach and over the walls. Tales also came from the enemy corroborating the battle in the guard-room—grimmer and more deadly even than Alan Breck's defence of the Roundhouse of which Stevenson told us—and how one wounded Sikh who lay on his charpoy when the Afridis surged into the *serai* shot down four men before his death-blow came.

Thus died a band of heroes faithful unto death to the *Sirkar* whose salt they had eaten. Such valorous deeds need no eulogy. Well may the Khalsa nation be proud of her sons, and England of the brave men who fight and die in her quarrels in far distant lands.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE GALLANT DEFENCE OF GULISTAN.



WHEN the sacking of Fort Saraghari was complete the tribesmen on Monday, the 13th, turned their attention to Fort Cavagnari, which they attacked with great determination, their *lashkars* covering all the hills about it, many thousands of men being present. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon information

reached Hangu from Fort Lockhart that Gulistan was closely beset and that several casualties had occurred among the garrison. The Officer Commanding Fort Cavagnari had made a sortie and captured three standards, but thereafter he had to act on the defensive. He adopted the ruse of parleying with the enemy under the pretence of surrendering, and in this way got a messenger through to Fort Lockhart describing his position, which was becoming critical, owing to the enormous numbers attacking. When General Yeatman-Biggs at Hangu learned what had taken place he sent a native signaller of the 3rd Bengal Cavalry down the road to Doaba to get a message through to the garrison. The sowar galloped twelve miles along the road and succeeded in heliographing before sunset that help would arrive next morning.

The fortifications of Forts Lockhart and Cavagnari are very strong, though they are not capable of holding many troops, while the scarcity of water prevents a Brigade remaining on the Samana for more than two days at a time.

At 8-20 A. M. on the 12th, the enemy were seen in large numbers coming up the valley north of Gulistan. Lieutenant Pratt and 20 rifles of the 36th Sikhs were at once sent to cut them off. The enemy, however, turned off to Saragarhi Fort, so Lieutenant Pratt was recalled. The enemy now appeared in large numbers on the Saragarhi hills, and at the same time other large bodies surrounded Fort Cavagnari, which is two and a half miles distant, and prevented the small garrison of that place giving any assistance to Saragarhi. About 10 A. M. the enemy rushed upon Saragarhi in great force, estimated at the time at about six thousand men.

In the meantime large bodies of the enemy had been keeping up a hot and continuous fire on Fort Cavagnari and several casualties had occurred. Fort Cavagnari is of the same design and construction as Fort Saragarhi, and what the enemy had done at one place they could easily do at the other. Seeing this, Major DesVœux ordered the lower rooms in the bastions to be cleared, and barricades constructed of flour bags to guard the holes should the enemy succeed in making them. All the water that was possible had been filled up in the morning. The garrison were now cut off from water. The same state of affairs continued all night; thousands

of the enemy with 15 standards being close under the walls. The firing was so heavy that it was impossible to move about.

The whole garrison stood to their posts all night. On the morning of the 13th things were very serious. The enemy, estimated at fifteen thousand, were all round, but still closer. Water was getting low, the men being on short allowance. There was no water at all for the mules and horses.

A havildar volunteered to capture one of the standards which was within 20 yards of the south walls, and started with 16 men, and charged the enemy with fixed bayonets. The enemy were, however, found in great strength with three standards not previously seen. The little party, nothing daunted, simply laid down at a distance of six yards and fired into the enemy. The enemy replied with great effect, many of the gallant Sikhs being wounded. Seeing that, another havildar with 11 more men jumped over the wall to help their comrades and get them back. Well they know what leaving wounded or dead bodies with their frontier foes means. They rushed again on the enemy, and driving them back captured all three standards, which were carried into the fort amidst ringing cheers. Fourteen men were wounded in the sortie; but the moral effect was great.

Well might Sir George White, our Commander-in-Chief gloat over such splendid courage, which revels in a grim old-fashioned love of the fight.

The Sikhs, who had now been 20 hours on duty, returned to their posts in great spirits. This was the turning point in the defence. And it is thus even satisfactory to find that such a deed of daring was done for an useful purpose, which it achieved. The captured standards represented three sections of the Mamozais: they were said to be greatly discouraged and moved further off, having lost many killed and wounded, they being left on the ground. The main body of the enemy, however, with 12 standards kept close to the walls, keeping up a continuous fire on the fort and outworks at close range, and many more casualties occurred. During the day the enemy got the range of all the doors and passages exactly. All parts of the hornwork and most of the fort is commanded by the hills to the west, and *sangars* had been built all round and were lined with the enemy's rifles. The garrison had been much weakened by their losses, but all the men who could do so,

returned to their posts as soon as their wounds had been bandaged.

As it was not known when relief might arrive; it was found necessary to husband the ammunition carefully. That this was done with good effect is shown by the fact, that at the end of three days' fighting it was found that one of the enemy had been killed or wounded for every 35 rounds fired. This includes the ammunition expended sharply to cover the sortie parties and other parties moving about the fort. On the evening of the 13th a helio was received from General Yeatman-Biggs saying that reinforcements would arrive on the 14th, and the sound of field guns firing was heard in the Miranzai Valley.

The whole of the night of the 13th was spent on duty on the walls, and in the morning the enemy, who had been firing all night, were found to occupy the same position. The hospital now was crowded with wounded, and Surgeon-Captain C. B. Prall was overwhelmed with work. The Saragarhi hills were seen to be crowded with the enemy, who also occupied Samana Suka and the whole of the hills west of Gulistan. The trials of the gallant garrison however were nearly at an end: relief was close at hand. The shells of the relieving force were seen bursting over Saragarhi.

At 12 noon on the 14th the Saragarhi heights had been taken by General Yeatman-Biggs and by 1. P. M. a great retreat of the enemy began; their retreat soon turning into a rout. It being no longer necessary to be careful of ammunition, fire was opened from all parts of the fort and its outworks on the retreating enemy, many of whom fell. At 2 P. M. the advanced guard of the relieving force marched into Fort Cavagnari and the garrison were relieved. The officers and men had now been under arms for 52 hours, and had actually been on their posts for 50 hours without a rest. The enemy who attacked Saragarhi and Fort Cavagnari were the Mamuzais, Ali Khels and Ali Sherzais, together with the Afridi *lashkar*. The enemy lost 500 killed and wounded; but this does not include the slightly wounded who were able to walk away, the number of whom it is impossible to ascertain.

The total losses of the detachment of the 35th Sikhs at Fort Cavagnari on the 12th, 13th and 14th were 44 killed and wounded, besides two followers killed. This

does not include the 21 killed at Saragarhi. General Yeatman-Biggs afterwards inspected the fort and the detachment of the 36th Sikhs. Addressing the men, he complimented them on the splendid work they had done, and told them he would forward to the Commander-in-Chief the names of those who had particularly distinguished themselves by their valour. He also visited the hospital and spoke a few words to each of the wounded.

CHAPTER XXIX.

CLEARING THE SAMANA.



AFTER the first relief of Samana the enemy evacuated the ridge, and on the afternoon of the 10th September the Intelligence Officer with General Yeatman-Biggs saw a large force of Afridis crossing the Samphaga Pass into the Khanki Valley. This force was augmented by large numbers of Orakzais and it was reported that an advance on Hangu and Samana was meditated. The enemy camped that night at Kharappa and large numbers were plainly seen at Fort Lockhart. At 10 A. M. on the 10th instant, the 3rd Gurkhas were sent down to reconnoitre down some spurs to the north of Fort Lockhart. Small bodies of the enemy were seen, and long range volleys were fired by the 3rd Gurkhas. Three men were seen to fall. The troops returned to Fort Lockhart by 5 P. M. At 6 o'clock the next evening the following troops under General Yeatman-Biggs moved from Fort Lockhart towards Lakha to intercept the enemy crossing the Tawana to attack Hangu :—

Two Companies 18th Royal Irish.

2nd Punjab Infantry.

1-2nd Gurkhas.

1-3rd Gurkhas.

The rear-guard was composed of the 3rd Gurkhas under Captain V. A. Ormsby, and was later joined by three companies of the 2nd Gurkhas under Captain J. G. Robinson, the whole being commanded by Colonel Pulley, 3rd Gurkhas.

Hardly had the head of the column reached its bivouac than firing began. The Orakzais, hitherto kept in check by our possession of Gogra, now swarmed down on the rear and began a determined attack on the convoy. Any one acquainted with the way of the useful but unwieldy *untk* can picture for himself the confusion produced at night on a steep, narrow hill road by 51 loose camels without nose strings and maddened by fear and wounds. Both the 2nd and 3rd Gurkhas behaved with great steadiness, fending off attacks which at times almost assumed the proportion of a rush, with section volleys, and doing all they could to bring the convoy in. To the main body on the hill beyond, the sight, but for the necessary anxiety, was most picturesque. In the bright moonlight every flash could be seen, and the yells of the enemy and the sound of their war drums came clearly to their ears. As the bivouac was neared, the road wound down in a very nasty wooded ravine. Two companies, however, of the 2nd Punjab Infantry took up a position to cover the retirement, and doing their work very smartly the whole arrived in camp by 2 A.M. Here they endeavoured to sleep, though desultory firing went on all night. At daybreak an attempt was made to recover some of the lost camels, but it was found the Orakzais had been before and looted nearly all the food. Our casualties were one officer, Captain Robinson, 1-2nd Gurkhas, slightly wounded, and 12 Gurkhas killed and wounded, and about 40 camels stolen or strayed.

Another account of this rear-guard action says :—About 9 P. M. the rear-guard was fired on by the enemy, who, instead of proceeding to Hangu, had halted on a spur on the north side of Samana. The force of the enemy was estimated at from 3,000 to 4,000. It is not known how many actually made the attack on the rear guard, but the rear guard was hotly engaged from 9 P. M. till 2 A. M., the enemy many times surrounding the rear guard, and they got up to within 20 paces more than once, but never really charged home. In one place one company of the 2nd Gurkhas under Captain Robinson was surrounded and almost cut off till ten men of the 3rd Gurkhas came back and routed the enemy by continuous and steady volleys ; and the behaviour of both the 2nd and 3rd Gurkhas

was excellent under most trying conditions, the fire discipline being very good indeed. The 3rd Gurkhas rushed two positions strongly held by the enemy, who would not wait for the bayonet: casualties, 2nd Gurkhas, rank and file killed 3, wounded 5, and Captain Robinson was hit in the arm by a spent bullet. Besides these 5 men had their clothes cut by bullets. The 3rd Gurkhas lost 1 rifleman killed and 3 wounded; the 2nd P. I. two killed. The casualties were wonderfully small, but the attack was made at night and the firing of the enemy was very erratic and they never really charged home. Jemadar Harkbir Gurung, 2nd Gurkhas, with about 8 men, succeeded, in most difficult ground, in bringing in a wounded man, and the rifle and accoutrements of one who was killed, and that in the face of 30 or 40 men of the enemy, who were about 15 yards off firing all the time. The 2nd Gurkhas made a most splendid effort to bring in their dead, but were rushed by overwhelming bodies of the enemy. The force was to move to Hangu that day. The losses of the enemy could not be estimated, but they must have been very heavy. Yar Muhammad, the leading Sheikhan Malik, 5 Malla Khel Maliks, and many smaller men were killed.

Later news however was received that on the departure of the column to Hangu, the enemy attacked the forts on the Samana in great force, and captured Saragari, held by 21 men of the 36th Sikhs, killing all the Sikhs, who gallantly died at their posts, attempting to defend the fort against overwhelming numbers. This altered the plans and necessitated a return to the Samana.

Early the next morning, says one of the officers, we started for Lakha, an old Police Post recently abandoned by us and burnt by the enemy. Here we were promised a sufficiency of good water, but on arrival found nothing but one miserable mud hole. Luckily for us humans, the animals refused to touch it so the men washed out their mouths and their officers partook of milk with a little tea in it. I forgot to mention that the party sent after the stores had found the bodies of 3 Gurkhas badly mutilated, and the corpses of nearly 40 tribesmen. Six of their Maliks we know were carried off and probably others, so their loss was presumably heavy. For the remainder of the day we halted, the whole force fairly worn out from want of water. At 3-30 p.m., just as we had started on our return to Hangu, we received news by helio that the greater part of the *lashkar* we had been hunting

had doubled on its tracks, and was at that moment investing the posts we had left the day before, Saragarhi and Gulistan being hard pressed. There was not a drop to drink nearer than Hangu, and to fight our way back in the dark without it was, in view of the condition of men and animals, a physical impossibility. Very reluctantly the General, not daring to leave Hangu unprotected, followed the convoy, and we toiled painfully down the path, much broken in parts by the tribesmen, and at 6-30 P.M. arrived in camp dead beat.

All next day we rested as well as we could after the news of the fall of Saragarhi which reached us that evening, haunted by the fear that we should be too late to relieve Gulistan which, be it remembered, contained Englishwomen and children. As a diversion five squadrons and four field guns were sent off under Major H. J. J. Middleton, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, to get as near as possible under Gulistan and do what they could. As it turned out, this was a good deal, for though their fire at that range could not be very effective, their appearance not only greatly cheered the beleaguered garrison, but convinced the enemy that our advance would be made by Doaba. This they showed by breaking up the roads and planting *sangars* against us. At midnight the relieving force started from Hangu carrying only great-coats, waterproof-sheets, blankets, and one day's provisions, with every *pakhal* we could muster. The whole was concentrated at Lakha by 4-30 A.M., and at daybreak we advanced to Gogra Hill.

As we anticipated, the enemy, though taken by surprise, soon took possession of an ideal position on the hill with advanced post at Tsalai with 11 standards and about 4,000 men. They opened a hot and fairly accurate fire on our advance, but the guns brought up quickly into the front line soon produced an effect, and the 3rd Gurkhas, supported by the 2nd Gurkhas, stormed the hill. The enemy's retreat was pounded by the guns and long range fire of the Royal Irish, and Colonel Haughton, on the west, hurrying down from Fort Lockhart with all of the 36th Sikhs and signallers and sick of the Royal Irish that could be spared, materially quickened their pace. Our force rapidly pushed on for Fort Lockhart, passing on its way the little post of Sangar, besieged for the last 24 hours; its garrison of 41 men, 36th Sikhs, were drawn up, as we passed, proudly displaying a standard they had

captured in a smart little sortie, the night before. On we pushed to Fort Lockhart, and the General mounting the Fort tower could see Saragarhi Hill on which the captured post stood, covered with the standard and masses of the enemy. At last we believed in the oft reported thousands of the *lashkar*, for there must have been at the lowest computation 8,000 in battle array. Still no news of Fort Gulistan, so the General ordering up the guns, soon had the hill so swept by shrapnel that on the advance of the infantry not a soul was found.

It was a thousand pities, for had we but known it, Gulistan was safe for some hours yet, and had we but had the time we might have inflicted heavy loss on an enemy whose line of retreat would have been open to our fire. However, so far as we knew, no time was to be lost, so limbering up, we pushed on another two miles, and there on the opposite hill stood the fort still bravely holding out. The slopes above and beyond were literally packed with swarms of the enemy now warned by the sound of our guns that the time for departure was at hand.

At the sight of our skirmishers on the sky-line every man of the beleaguered garrison who could stand, wounded or whole, sprang to the parapets and opened a heavy fire on the now wavering foe. Our guns hurried up and unlimbering poured in their shrapnel, while the infantry, racing down the steep hillside did their best with long range volleys to persuade some at least of the tribesmen to stay behind.

The guns under Captain Parker made beautiful practice at even extreme ranges, across the wide valley, searching out and dispersing every group we could see and putting shell after shell into a village where they had imagined themselves at least secure.

But Gulistan was safe, and with lightened hearts some of the force pushed on. By 2 P.M. they were within its walls. Blackened with gunpowder, worn out with 33 hours of continuous toil and stress, many bandaged and bloodstained, the garrison still presented a brave front. Drawn up at the gate were the survivors of the sortie—that gallant feat at arms—with the three standards they had captured. Out of the original garrison of 165 rifles, 2 had been killed, 8 dangerously and some mortally wounded; 8 severely and 24 slightly wounded. Of these latter, 9 did not report

themselves till relief had come. Major C. H. DesVœux, who had his anxieties doubly intensified by the presence of his family, had been the life and soul of the defence, guarding against every danger and showing an example of cheerfulness and steadfastness to all. Lieutenant H. R. E. Pratt, an officer of a year's standing, had ably seconded him, though suffering from dysentery; Surgeon-Captain Prall had untiringly tended the wounded under heavy fire, helped by Miss Theresa McGrath, Mrs. DesVœux's maid, who amid the flying bullets could be seen here bathing a wounded sepoy's head and there tying up another's arm till the doctor could see him. Last, not least, every sepoy of this gallant band did his duty, and at times almost more than his duty, in a way worthy of the proud name of Sikh.

The state of the fort had better be imagined than described. Bearing in mind the number of dead and wounded in that small space, and the impossibility of any, but the most primitive conservancy arrangements, it is due only to the wonderful purity of this mountain air that it was in any way endurable.

Leaving the fort with two mountain guns, and the 2nd Punjab Infantry to guard it, the main column returned to Fort Lockhart and there bivouacked, having marched since midnight 24 miles without food and come into action three times. From friendly Rabia Khels, they afterwards learnt that the losses of the enemy, all told during these several operations, were over 400, including some 180 killed in the taking of Saragarhi.

The next day the 15th, the General Officer Commanding visited Gulistan and issued a stirring Force Order extolling the heroic defence of these two posts, and promising to forward the names of the most distinguished for valour. Major Des Vœux then presented to him his officers and last not least Miss McGrath, worthy, if any, of her Gracious Majesty's notice. He then visited the wounded, many of whom wore ghastly signs of what they had gone through, and gave orders for the remedying of the most obvious defects of the post.

Next day a reconnaissance was carried out to within one mile of Kharappa in the Khanki Valley. All villages were found empty, and in the distances could be seen men, women, and children driving their herds hastily towards Tirah. All tended to confirm the reports that the hostile *laskars*, both Afriidi and Orakzai, had for the time at least utterly dispersed.

But there could be no doubt of two things, namely, firstly, that the march to Lakha saved a serious irruption, *viz.*, Hangu into the Miranzai Valley; and secondly, that but for the timely return Forts Gulistan, Sangar and Dhar could not have held out another 24 hours.

On the 15th instant, Mrs. DesVœux, her four children and a nurse, and all sick and wounded were taken from Gulistan to Fort Lockhart.

A search party sent out from Fort Cavagnari discovered on the Shinwari road, about one mile from the fort, the dead bodies of followers reported missing on the 12th instant. The unfortunate men were Sikh cooks, and had gone to collect wood for cooking. They were quite unarmed. Their hands and legs were found tied together and their clothes and bodies were burnt. It is believed that they were tied hand and foot and burnt to death.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE SADDA CAMP ATTACK.



LL through the early part of September fears had been entertained for the safety of Sadda, and day after day the tribal *jirgahs* were reported to be advancing to attack the camp. On the night of the 16th, however, the oft delayed movement was made. The vacillation of the tribesmen, however, again allowed relief to be sent. On the 15th two field guns were sent from Parachinar, and orders were received at Parachinar that the two guns there of No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery, and the wing of the 1-5th Gurkha Rifles were to proceed to Sadda, reaching camp by 6 P.M. on the 16th at latest. A wing of the 5th Punjab Infantry had been sent away from Sadda on the morning of the 16th, in order to hold Alizai and Thall on the line of

communications to Kohat, and it was necessary for the Gurkhas to arrive by the evening to take their place, and hold that portion of the camp which had been occupied by them.

Near Sadda our border runs along the base of low rocky hills that extend for several miles parallel to the left bank of the Kurram river, at a distance of about three miles from the edge of the stream. At Sadda itself, the Kurmana Dara joins the main stream almost at right angles. This Kurmana Dara drains the country of the Mussazais and Chamkannis, and a large part of country occupied by Afridis, and the gorge by which it leaves the low hills is the entry into the enemy's country through which our forces have to advance on Yirah. The defile is at least 11 miles long, and only 60 yards broad in many places, and flanked on both sides by difficult ground; the tribesmen, if determined, should be able to offer a stout resistance to our advance, provided they collect in sufficient numbers. From the foot of the low hills the ground slopes gradually to the Kurram river. For about two miles from the hills this slope is much cut up by deep *nullahs*; so much so, that what at first sight appears to be a long continuous slope, is really a succession of broad nearly flat-topped spurs with deep *nullahs* between them. It is on one of these spurs that the camp is pitched, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the border, on the right bank of the Kurmana Dara. From the bed of the stream to the flat top of the spur is a rise of between two and three hundred feet, parts of which are extremely steep. The flat top of the spur is about 300 yards across at the top and about 450 yards across at the bottom of the camp. Then comes one of the *nullahs* mentioned above, about 200 yards broad and, perhaps, 200 feet deep, with very steep banks. The south-east edge of camp corresponded with the edge of the bank of the Kurmana Dara; on the north-west, the boundary of the upper half of the camp corresponded with the edge of the *nullahs*, it then receded, leaving a flat open space about 150 yards broad between it and the point where the steep bank begins. The north-east side of camp faced open nearly flat ground, and the south-west side the same. The whole ground on the flat top of the spur is more or less covered with dwarf palm and loose stones, both large and small. Out of these a low wall, about two feet high, had been built up on the north-east side, facing the open, and on the south-east side along the edge of the bank of the Kurmana Dara. There were strong pickets out on the south-west in the open, and on the north-west on the edge of the big *nullahs*;

these pickets had been strongly fortified with thick stone walls.

There were five small pickets out on the bank of the Kurmana; and small patrols went out continually round the camp, to prevent a surprise. One of the latter happened to be out at the very time the attack began. But the darkness so handicapped them, that although the enemy had collected within about 150 yards of them, they could not see them, and the first intimation they got about the attack was hearing shots fired by our pickets as the enemy tried to rush them. The patrol then withdrew into camp, the enemy at the time being much nearer the camp than they were themselves. On the previous night two pickets had been posted out in the open ground above camp; but on the night of attack they had been withdrawn. This change somewhat disconcerted the enemy, who carefully stalked the low walls that had been built for the pickets.

No doubt they thought they had caught the defenders asleep, and must have been sadly disappointed to find no one there, where they rushed in over the wall. This was all carried out in perfect silence, and the advance was continued quietly, until our first pickets on the bank of the Kurmana was reached. Here the sentry was the tribesmen—and only just in time; a warning volley was fired, and the pickets retired, the enemy close on their heels, yelling and beating their drums, and keeping up a hot fire. The next pickets, about 100 yards from the first one, was also closely pressed, but reached the camp wall in safety. Just as they settled down in their places behind the wall, the havildar in command was shot dead as he was pointing out their places to his men. The first shot fired was apparently a signal for attack, for firing began almost immediately from a distance of about 200 yards on the north-east face, from the open. The tribesmen, under cover of the darkness, had built up rapidly small *murchas* of loose stones from behind which they could fire in comparative safety. Another party advanced down the big *nullah* on the north-west of camp; but they were at once seen, and retired almost immediately as soon as volleys were opened on them from the north-west pickets and two companies of the 5th Gurkhas, who were lining the edge of the *nullah*.

For the first few minutes it was hard to realise the nature of the attack; from the noise of the drums and yells of the enemy, they seemed to be nearer than they, perhaps, really were; perhaps the promptness with which our men turned out prevented them from rushing straight on into camp. As soon as the first slight confusion was over, the steadiness of the volley firing must have shown the enemy clearly enough that our men were quite ready for them. For some time they contented themselves with firing steadily into camp from behind their shelters, then came a pause; they were creeping in nearer and heaping up the loose stones into fresh shelters, from which to re-commence their fire. These tactics were repeated from time to time, till about midnight they had closed in as near as they dared. Round the east corner of camp, held by the 5th Punjab Infantry, they got up in individual cases to within 30 yards; and there some of them died.

By now large numbers of men had collected in a small *nullah* that joins the Kurmana just opposite the east corner of the camp. The yells and drumming increased, and they seemed about to make a rush; the din going on just beyond the wall was a strange contrast to the dead silence on our side of it, broken only by the sharp words of command of the non-commissioned officers, and the crack of section volleys. About 1 A. M. the firing slackened. The leaders had been unable to get their men to attempt a rush. A great deal of choice abuse was exchanged among the enemy before they decided to retire, and a great deal more was hurled at the camp. But bad words do not break any bones. Very few shots were fired after 1 A. M., and soon all was still; patrols were sent out, and found that the enemy had all departed.


They had, however, fired steadily into camp for over two hours; and had done a lot of damage. The 5th Punjab Infantry had one havildar killed; a sepoy of the 15th Sikhs had been wounded; two sowars of the 18th Bengal Lancers were wounded; two men of the 5th Gurkhas were wounded; one follower was killed and several wounded; about 20 animals (chargers and transport animals) were killed or wounded. Colonel Richardson had a narrow escape, his head being grazed by the fragments of a ricochet. It is surprising that the casualties were not greater, as the majority of the

enemy's bullets fell inside the camp. They were mostly round matchlock bullets, but there were a certain number of Martinis and Sniders being used. The strength of the enemy was estimated at 2,000. It is scarcely likely that a less number would have attacked the camp. Seven or eight of them were certainly killed or wounded outside the wall held by the 5th Punjab Infantry and blood stained litters which had been used to carry away the wounded were found on the field. There was a report in the village that 15 were killed and 41 wounded and that the Chief Malik of the Mussazais was among the killed. It was easy for the enemy to hit men and animals in camp, but very hard for the defenders to hit them crouching behind stones and ledges of rock.


IN THE MOHMAND COUNTRY.

CHAPTER XXXI.

REVIEW OF THE SITUATION.

HE quickly changing area of distance necessitated considerable alterations in the disposition of the British Field Forces. In Malakand the two Brigades were under Colonel Meiklejohn and General Jeffreys respectively, the Reserve Brigade under General J. Wodehouse, R.A., and the whole force commanded by Major-General Sir Bindon Blood. It was decided not to allow the tribes any breathing time, and quickly the first Brigade was located at Amandara and the second at Khar, whilst arrangements were made for the flying columns to operate. When the Shabkadar affair happened, a part of the force intended for the Reserve Brigade, which was then forming at Mardan, was sent on instead to Peshawar. In the Swat Valley General Blood had first of all to wait a little while to allow freedom of action to the Political Officers to receive *jirgahs*, &c., after which a decision would be come to whether to move up the valley or not. Then came the formation of





Theatre of operations
of the
Mohmand Field Force
and
Malakand Field Force

two more Reserve Brigades at Rawalpindi under General Westmacott and General Yeatman-Biggs—afterwards known as the Second and Third Reserve Brigades. On the 16th of August we heard that General Blood had started his march along the left bank of the Swat River into Upper Swat. At Mardan General Wodehouse's force had been raised to full strength by the addition of the Highland Light Infantry and the 2nd Queen's from Rawalpindi, and it was moved out to Rustam to watch the southern border of the Buner country. Then came the battle of Landakai, after which we found the centre of interest move to the Peshawar Valley and Kohat. In view of the rumoured risings of the Afridis and Orakzais General Yeatman-Biggs was sent to Kohat to assume command, General Elles being in command in the Peshawar District. The field of operations now stretched from Upper Swat to Waziristan, and the greatest military activity prevailed, troops being rapidly moved forward to the front and to fill up gaps caused by the formation of the two Reserve Brigades at Rawalpindi. In Upper Swat General Blood had a peaceful time. The affair at Landakai had had a very demoralising effect upon the enemy, and from Rustam General Wodehouse reported that many of the Bunerwals had been seen carrying their dead and wounded over the passes leading from the Swat Valley—the melancholy tokens of a bloody fight. On the 20th, the concentration of the troops told off to Kohat was almost complete and General Yeatman-Biggs was now in the position to be able to despatch a column to Thall in order to, in a manner, overawe the Orakzai and show them the futility of attempting the capture of Parachinar Fort and securing possession of the Kurram Valley. It was decided that the political walk through the Swat Valley should stop at Mangloor, where the presence of Sir Bindon Blood and the troops would be sufficient to demonstrate clearly to the tribes the power of the *Sirkar*.

Reports from the Khyber now gathered in volume and seriousness, and quickly we heard and realised that the whole of the famous highway between India and Afghanistan was in the hands of the Afridis, who had sacked the forts and killed some of the garrison. At this time General Elles was at Peshawar with a hastily collected force of 11,000 or 12,000 men of all arms. From that time until the present the Khyber has been closed to traffic and a state of anarchy has prevailed where, but a little while before, all was order and discipline. Great energy was

displayed on the Kohat side and every effort was made to avert the storm which all omens presaged. A flying column was sent out from Kohat to Thall under Colonel G. L. R. Richardson, 18th Bengal Lancers, which halted at Hangu for orders. General Yeatman-Biggs had a powerful force at Kohat at his disposal, including four Native Mountain Battery guns, a Garrison Battery in Kohat Fort, six Squadrons of Native Cavalry, one and a half Battalion British Infantry, and one Company of Sappers, to which was added later the 3rd Bengal Cavalry and the 6th Madras Infantry. On the 25th came the first outbreak of hostilities in this direction, an attack being made on the Mahmudzai post, which is just below the Ublan Pass—a regular trade route. The position was defended by the Kurram Militia who, when they were attacked, retired and joined the detachment of Native Infantry close by. The next day General Yeatman-Biggs moved out from Kohat, and the Ublan Kotal, where the enemy was in force, was shelled and a good deal of damage done. The enemy showed no fight and our troops retired without loss, only one or two men being slightly wounded. Orders were now issued for the employment of the Malakand Field Force—which had had a peaceful progress along the valley—to be used in operations against the Talash tribesmen beyond Chakdara, and the Utman Khels to the south-west of Malakand. Colonel Reid was ordered to take a small column to Uch, and General Jeffreys, after having his brigade strengthened by a Mountain Battery and a detachment of Cavalry, went to Tota Khan beyond Khar, and to march westwards from there reconnoitring the Inzari Pass about twelve miles away. If practicable he was to cross the Pass and turn south over the Agra Pass and so drop into the Totai Valley where he was expected to find at home some of the Utman Khels whose submission was necessary. That this expectation was shrewd was shown by later developments. Colonel Reid's column in the meantime was meant to be securing the submission of the tribes lying between Dir and the right bank of the Swat River. The brigade under General Wodehouse was still at Mardan where it was reconstituted and stood in readiness to move wherever necessary. Then General Jeffreys' previous orders were countermanded, and he was instructed to stay at Khar, where, if necessary, he could move forward to Uch.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE MOHMAND FIELD FORCE.



THE Governor-General in Council sanctioned the despatch of a force as detailed below, to be styled the Mohmand Field Force, to move into the Mohmand country from Shabkadar and co-operate with a force under the command of Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B. The force was composed as follows :—

1ST BRIGADE.

1st Battalion (The Prince Alberts') Somersetshire Light Infantry.
 20th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment.
 Sections A and B, No. 5 British Field Hospital.
 No. 31 Native Field Hospital.

2ND BRIGADE.

2nd Battalion, The Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
 9th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
 37th (Dogra) Regiment of Bengal Infantry (6 companies).
 Sections C and D, No. 5 British Field Hospital.
 No. 44 Native Field Hospital.

DIVISIONAL TROOPS.

13th (The Duke of Connaught's) Regiment of Bengal Lancers.
 No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
 No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.
 28th Regiment of Bombay Infantry.
 No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
 1st Patiala Infantry (Imperial Service Troops).
 Detachment, 16th Lancers, with a maxim gun.
 Detachment, 1st Battalion, The Devonshire Regiment, with 2 maxim guns.
 Sections C and D, No. 63 and Section A, No. 45 Native Field Hospitals.

4. COMMANDS AND STAFF.

<i>General Officer Commanding the Force</i> (with the local rank of <i>Major-General</i>).			Brigadier-General E. R. Elles, C.B.
<i>Aide-de-Camp</i>	Lieutenant M. R. Elles, R.E.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Captain K. MacLaren, 13th Hussars.
<i>Extra Orderly Officer</i>	Captain R. E. Grimston, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
<i>Assistant Adjutant-General</i>	Major C. L. Woolcombe, 2nd Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers.
<i>Assistant Quartermaster-General</i>	Major G. H. W. O'Sullivan, R.E.
<i>Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General (Intelligence)</i> .			Captain F. A. Hoghton, 1st Bombay Grenadiers.
<i>Field Intelligence Officer</i>	Lieutenant C. E. Macquoid, 1st Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent.
<i>Commanding Royal Artillery</i>	Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Duthy, R. A.
<i>Adjutant, Royal Artillery</i>	Captain W. MacLeod, R.A.
<i>Field Engineer</i>	Captain F. H. Kelly, R.E.
<i>Assistant Field Engineer</i>	Lieutenant W. A. Stokes, R.E.
<i>Assistant Field Engineer</i>	Lieutenant C. B. L. Greenstreet, R.E.
<i>Principal Medical Officer</i>	Surgeon-Colonel E. Townsend, A.M.S.
<i>Superintendent, Army Signalling</i>			Captain G. C. Rigby, 1st Battalion, Wiltshire Regiment.
<i>Provost Marshal</i>	Major P. Massy, 19th Bengal Lancers.
<i>Field Treasure Chest-Officer</i>	Lieutenant W. M. Grimley, 20th Punjab Infantry.
<i>Senior Veterinary Officer and Veterinary Inspector.</i>			Veterinary Captain F. W. Forsdyke, A.V.D.
<i>Chief Commissariat Officer</i>	Captain G. Westropp, Assistant Commissary-General, 2nd Class.
<i>Assistant to Chief Commissariat Officer.</i>			Captain G. R. C. Stuart, 1st Battalion, East Lancashire Regiment.
<i>Divisional Transport Officer</i>	Captain F. A. Rideout, Assistant Commissary-General.
<i>Assistant to Divisional Transport Officer.</i>			Lieutenant W. M. C. Vandeleur, 2nd Battalion, Essex Regiment.
<i>Ordnance Officer</i>	Major T. E. Rowan, R.A.
<i>Survey Officer</i>	Brevet-Major W. J. Bythell, R. E.
<i>Section Commandant</i>	Captain W. C. Knight, 4th Bengal Cavalry.

1ST BRIGADE.

<i>Commanding</i>	Brigadier-General R. Westmacott, C.B., D.S.O.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	Lieutenant R. C. Wellesley, R. H.A.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General</i>	Captain W. P. Blood, Royal Irish Fusiliers.
<i>Deputy Asst. Quartermaster-General</i>	Captain F. J. M. Edwards, 3rd Bom- bay Cavalry.
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i> ...	Captain E. Y. Watson, D.A.C.G.
<i>Brigade Transport Officer</i>	Captain D. H. Armstrong, 1st Batta- lion, East Yorkshire Regiment.
<i>Regiment, Commissariat and Trans- port Officer.</i>	Lieutenant N. G. Fraser, 4th Bom- bay Cavalry.
<i>Asst. Superintendent, Army Signalling</i>	Lieutenant H. W. Field, the Devon- shire Regiment.
<i>Veterinary Officer</i>	Veterinary Lieutenant F. U. Carr, A.V.D.

2ND BRIGADE.

<i>Commanding</i>	Colonel (with temporary rank of Brigadier-General) C. R. Mac- gregor, D.S.O.
<i>Orderly Officer</i>	2nd Lieutenant E. W. C. Ridgeway, 29th Punjab Infantry.
<i>Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General</i> ..	Captain G. M. Gloster, Devonshire Regiment.
<i>Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- General.</i>	Captain H. Hudson, 19th Bengal Lancers.
<i>Brigade Commissariat Officer</i> ...	Lieutenant D. H. Drake-Brockman, D.A.C.G.
<i>Brigade Transport Officer</i>	Lieutenant R. G. N. Tytler, Gordon Highlanders.
<i>Regimental Commissariat and Transport Officer.</i>	Lieutenant F. W. Birch, 29th Punjab Infantry.
<i>Veterinary Officer</i>	Veterinary Lieutenant W. J. Tatam, A.V.D.

The force ordered to proceed into the Mohmand country consisted of General Westmacott's brigade and another commanded by Colonel MacGregor, whilst General Elles was in command of the whole, taking the rank of Major-General. There was great and general satisfaction felt all over India when it was known that the Mohmand country was to be


traversed by our troops. It was felt that the admirable arrangements by which forces would swoop down upon the Mohmand country from opposite directions at one and the same time would also ensure the business being speedily and successfully concluded. Major-General Blood, with two brigades of the Malakand Field Force under Brigadier-General Jeffreys and Brigadier-General Wodehouse was to act from the east while the first Brigade under Colonel Meiklejohn, held their line of communications and Major-General Elles with the brigades under Brigadier-General Westmacott and Colonel MacGregor was to move direct into the Mohmand country from the Shabkadar side.

It is now important that attention should be given to what was going on with the Malakand Field Force, in order to understand what followed whilst the campaign in the Mohmand country was in progress.

On September 8th the first movement of the column from the Malakand Field Force was made from the Pankjora Valley. General Woodhouse's brigade arrived at Sadda on the 5th where the bridge was found all right having been guarded by the Dir levies.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE IMAGINARY BATTLE OF PANJKORA.

URING the passage of the Panjkora River on September 4th, the seizing of the bridge-head was not accomplished without an engagement, imaginary it is true, but still sufficiently real to those in whose imagination it existed, to give them some very genuine excitement for a short time.

The road for the latter half of the day's march had been almost impassable for wheeled traffic, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that the ambulance carts had been got along at all. As it was, the bullocks had to be unyoked and the carts dragged along by hand, and it was only owing to the opportune presence of a certain number of sick men in them that they were got forward. Under the able direction of the medical officers, however, the energies of the sick were equal to the task, and the carts surmounted the obstacles of the road right bravely. When about a mile from the bridge a halt was called for the administration of medical comforts, and the medical officer in charge of the carts went forward to explore the remaining portion of the road, which he found to his dismay, presented difficulties of an even more formidable nature than those already accounted for. Under these circumstances, fearing that the sick might become overtired and, perhaps, even seriously unwell if they had to drag the carts much longer, he asked for instructions as to advancing any further. He received orders for the carts to come forward if possible, and was on the way back to resume command of his fatigue party of invalids, when he noticed on the crest of the hills, on the far side of the river, a contingent of the Dir levies engaged in building *sanjars* for the use of our pickets. These he very naturally mistook for the foe, and word went back that the hills were swarming with enemies, and that the ambulance carts were to proceed if possible. From this to a general engagement, with urgent orders for the carts to advance at all hazards to carry off the dead and wounded, was but a short step.

The effect of the news on the previously dispirited sick was electrical. The lame men rushed between the shafts of the ambulance carts, the maimed shoved the wheels round with feverish activity, and the pneumonia patients encouraged both with their shouts. Suddenly, however, a sufferer from ophthalmia, who happened to be on ahead, detected the 38th Dogras fraternising with the supposed enemy, and sent a man with heat apoplexy back with the news. Sadly and sorrowfully the sick men abandoned their dreams of bloodshed, and returned to the more prosaic, if less heroic, task of getting the wheeled transport through, a feat which was achieved by 8 P.M. without further interruption.

The 2nd Brigade having marched into camp at Serai on the 6th, General Blood with his staff proceeded there the following day. Orders were now out for the two Brigades of the Malakand Field Force to advance beyond the Panjkora and effect a junction in the Mohmand country with a force under General Elles moving in from Shabkadar, the general line of advance being towards Nawagai and then south into the Mohmand country. The 2nd Brigade on the 8th crossed Panjkora, and on the 9th the 3rd Brigade followed with the camels. The 1st Brigade on reaching Panjkora later took over the tents of the 3rd Brigade and held the lines of communication back to Chakdara. On the 9th the 2nd Brigade arrived at Camp Gosham. On the evening of the 11th Sir Bindon Blood, accompanied by the Divisional Staff, proceeded to Chakrata and joined the 3rd Brigade there. The Khan of Nawagai visited the camp and tendered his best services. On the 12th the Divisional Head-quarters Staff and 3rd Brigade left Chakrata for camp at Sham Shak where they were joined by the 8th Bengal Mountain Battery and two Battalions of Infantry from the 2nd Brigade. On the 14th the march to Nawagai had been completed and General Blood and his Head-quarter Staff were in camp there.

The 2nd Brigade of General Blood's division under General Jeffreys reached Sado after having completed effectually the work it set out to do among the tribes beyond the Uch River. At Sado General Blood assumed command of the division, which now consisted of about 5,000 men, whilst at this time, the force of General Elles with which it was co-operating was of similar strength. No proclamation was made to the Mohmand tribes, but news of the expedition spread far and wide, and our political officers made known to all that the armed visit to their country of the forces of the *Sirkar* was not to menace the independence of any tribe but to take such steps as would ensure the border against being attacked in the future. General Blood with the two brigades advanced due west by the Ushira Valley to Mandia, the road it will be remembered which was followed by Sir Robert Low in the Chitral Campaign. From Mandia the road leads south-west by the Khaluzi Valley to the high range which separates Bajour proper from the Mohmand country.

When at Nawagai our troops were in the rear of the Mohmands and could choose any point on which to march. The

Gandab Valley or defile along which General Elles was to advance is thirty miles from Nawagai, and about fifty from Shabkadar, and along this route he advanced after a slight delay of a couple of days caused by the desire of Major Deane to secure the complete submission of the Utman Khels before returning to Swat.

General Wodehouse when he reached Nawagai spent a couple of days in surveying the Mittai Valley, after which the Brigade swung round on the 16th, and marched due south *viâ* Lokarai and Songab upon Takhdand, where it was to join hands with General Jeffreys' Brigade, which had entered the Mohmand country by the road east of Nawagai which led it direct upon Takhdand.

Meanwhile the 3rd Brigade, with Sir Bindon Blood, were occupying a position of great strategic importance. A glance at the map will show that on the morning of the 15th the situation was extremely difficult, and might at any moment have become critical. General Elles was still at Shabkadar. The Hadda Mullah with a large gathering occupied a strong position in the Bedmani Pass. The Mamund Valley—Salarzai and Bajour—were either in a blaze or at the combustion point. Between these two powerful revolts lay Nawagai. The Khan, a man of great influence in these parts, might by throwing his influence against the British have raised such a storm as would have given occupation to every soldier in the mobilised forces. The Pass of Nawagai would have been closed. General Elles arriving with his Brigade from Shabkadar would have had to defend himself, perhaps indeed to fall back without attacking the Mohmands at all. It is easy to realise how serious the effect of such a disaster would have been.

It was necessary to be bold. Sir Bindon Blood decided to remain at Nawagai to keep the Khan loyal and the Pass clear at all costs. This action cut the tribesmen into two sections. It paralysed the Khan. It maintained the communications. But it was not unattended with danger and difficulty. Sir Bindon Blood considered himself strong enough to hold his position in spite of any attack that might be made. He judged rightly. On the 18th a skirmish took place. The Hadda Mullah was feeling his way. On the 19th a sharp attack was delivered on the entrenched camp, and on the night of the 20th

a grand assault was made by 4,000 tribesmen. This attack is considered by many of those long practised in frontier warfare to have been the best conceived and most vigorously executed attack which the tribesmen have hitherto delivered. It was repulsed with crushing losses. To us the cost was two officers (including another Brigadier), 35 men, and 120 animals killed and wounded.

This important action must be referred to in detail.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

NIGHT ATTACK ON GENERAL SIR BINDON BLOOD.



ON September 20th, a reconnaissance in force was sent out by Major-General Sir Bindon Blood in the direction of the Badmanai Pass, where gatherings of the enemy with standards had been several times observed, and where cavalry reconnaissances had been twice fired on. This reconnaissance in force started about 3 P.M. from the Nawagai camp, under the command of Brigadier-General Wodehouse, but was unable to come to close quarters with the enemy owing to the necessity of getting back to camp before dark. On the appearance of our force, the enemy in large numbers swarmed out of a big village in the mouth of the Mitai Valley; they had many standards, and were estimated by our advanced cavalry as about 1,500 strong, about one-third being thrown out as skirmishers, with the remainder in a compact mass as reserve. Our force advanced to the edge of a large *nullah* about 6,000 yards distant from the enemy, and as it was then growing late, General Blood ordered a retirement, first, however, firing six rounds from the guns in the direction of the enemy, without apparently producing any effect at the very long range.

Brigadier-General Wodehouse then retired the force in *echelon*, the enemy following at a respectful distance, being

about two or three miles behind when our men arrived in camp about dark. Before the light failed they could be distinguished moving down into a big *nullah* to the south of the camp, and nine standards could be counted in one place. In anticipation of an attack, bonfires were placed in readiness on the threatened faces of the camp, viz. to the south and west. The Khan of Nawagai, who had been supplying a picket on the west of the camp, reported that an attack in force was to be expected, and that his picket would not be able to hold its own: so he was instructed to order his men to raise an alarm on the enemy's presence becoming known, and then to retire at once. The alarm, however, came from the south face of the camp, where the Queen's and the Garwhal Rifles were stationed and was occasioned by the lighting of the bonfires at about 8-45 P.M., their lighting being the signal for the first volley.

Up to this time not a sound had been heard, the enemy having evidently crept quietly up the bed of the big *nullah* leading up to the south and west faces of the camp. It is supposed that it was their intention to attempt to carry the camp by a rush, but that the unexpected lighting of the bonfires made them think their presence was discovered, or perhaps, the men employed in lighting them offered a too tempting mark to some of the younger bloods. Be this as it may, the lighting of the fires probably saved our men the unpleasant experience of a sword attack in the darkness, and throughout the night the actual attacking was all done with firearms, though several times the enemy attempted to come to close quarters, covering the advance by a heavy fire: but the fire of the defenders was too steady and effective to allow of an actual charge. The camp was in the form of an oblong, the shorter sides facing north and south. The south face was manned by the Queen's, who also had part of the west face, and the Garwhal Rifles, who also had part of the east. The Bombay Sappers and Miners were on the east face, on the left of the Garwhals, and the 11th Bengal Lancers on their left again. The north-east corner was held by the 22nd Punjab Infantry, who also had the north face and part of the west face, in the centre of the latter face was No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, on whose left were the Queen's.

The brunt of the attack fell on the south and west faces, and thus the right of the Garwhal Rifles, the Queen's, the guns and the left of the 22nd Punjab Infantry were the units most

occupied. The Queen's had the chief advantage of the light from the bonfires, and the effect of several of their volleys was very marked, as the enemy advanced at first with the utmost boldness, approaching within 15 yards of the outer line of the camp. This was also the case on the west face, but the steady firing of the 22nd Punjab Infantry and a few rounds of case from the guns soon drove the enemy back into the shelter of the *nullahs* and terraces near. The camp was so placed as to prevent much firing into it from above, though some of the enemy's marksmen took advantage of the trees on the west side to keep up a galling fire upon any mark they could find. The tents of the Divisional and Brigade Staff and of the hospital drew the fire especially, and these, with the exception of those of the hospital tents which it was actually necessary to keep standing, were dropped.

A man with a Lee-Metford specially turned his attention to General Blood's tent, but the horses of the Brigade Staff, which were directly behind in the line of fire, were the chief sufferers from his efforts, no less than five out of ten horses belonging to the Staff being hit. The number of breech-loading rifles in use by the enemy was quite remarkable; there seemed to be many Martinis and Sniders, and about half-a-dozen Lee-Metford's. The bombardment of the camp was kept up till about 2-15 A. M., and during the whole of the five-and-a-half hours it lasted the rain of bullets into and over the camp was incessant. The small shelter trenches round the perimeter of the camp protected those actually in them from the greater part of the enemy's fire, which was mostly delivered from the *nullahs* and terraces round the camp, and this accounts for the small number of casualties, one man (of the Queen's) being killed, and 28 wounded, one of whom, a follower, died the next day.

The casualties among the animals were officially reported as 44 killed and 89 wounded.

The reserves had to lie out in the open in the centre of the camp without any protection, and to any one lying there, as every minute a bullet could be heard to find its billet in a kit, tent or horse, it seemed little short of a miracle that the men got off so lightly. Veterinary-Captain Mann was slightly wounded, in this part of the camp, but it was a lucky escape that he had, as the bullet that struck him hit his pistol, and he escaped with a bad bruise.

About 11 o'clock, when the firing was at its height, Brigadier-General Wodehouse went across to the Divisional Staff camp to speak to General Blood, and it was on his return that a ricochet bullet caught him in the calf of the left leg, inflicting a severe wound, but luckily missing both bone and artery. He was taken to the hospital tents, which were, however, anything but a haven of refuge, as, some of the enemy's marksmen paid particular attention to them, offering as they did an excellent target especially when a light had to be lit for the examination of a wounded man. One of these tents had 13 bullet-holes through it, while that of Colonel Collins, Commanding the Queen's, was a good second with 11; indeed, hardly any one could boast an uninjured kit in the morning.

The firing began to slacken as the moon rose, and at about 2-15 A.M., when she appeared above the hills to the north-east, the enemy drew off. They left five dead men close to the camp, including one whom the 22nd fetched out of a tree opposite their lines in the early morning, a party having gone out of the camp with the express intention of bagging him; and upwards of 20 were found later, hastily buried round the camp.

The total losses were at first put at over 100, but later information makes them out to have been much heavier, trustworthy evidence putting them at between 300 and 350 in killed alone. It was stated locally that the entire gathering of the Hadda Mullah, numbering about 1,500, and of the Sufi Mullah, numbering about 2,000, with some Shinwaris and a contingent from Afghan territory took part in the attack, and that all lost heavily, the latter having 20 killed. It was further asserted that the enemy were so confident of capturing the camp that they had provided a quantity of baggage animals to carry off the loot. A tom-tom appears to have accompanied the guard over this baggage, for it could be heard being vigorously beaten in the *nullah* some way away from camp; while a voice could also be occasionally distinguished exhorting the attackers to "shout altogether and charge," though without effect, as the enemy obviously found the Dum-Dum and Martini bullets difficult to face at close quarters. The effect of the repulse of the attack was the rapid dismemberment of the entire gathering, which was reported to have dispersed entirely by the 22nd; and the subsequent lack of opposition on the Badmanai Pass was directly traceable to the same cause.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE CAPTURE OF BADMANAI PASS.



HE advance from Shabkadar commenced on the 15th. The 1st Brigade led the way at 5-30 A.M. with only their obligatory mules carrying ammunition, water, &c., and were shortly followed by a portion of the 2nd Brigade escorting about 1,300 camels loaded with kits and stores. Owing, however, to the Hadda Mullah being reported to be in force about eight miles from Shabkadar, the hills on either side of the path had to be crowned by the flankers of the 20th Punjab Infantry, who were acting as advance guard, and the advance was necessarily very slow. After proceeding about 7 miles to a village called Dand, the road was found to lead up a precipitous defile hardly passable for mules and quite impracticable for camels. This path was simply a track across slippery sheet rock, over which the mules mounted to the top by a series of jumps and acrobatic feats. This defile was the place where the Hadda Mullah was expected to offer resistance, and numerous *sangars* had been built commanding bends in the road. Whether, however, his heart failed him or whether the news of General Blood's advance from the north had induced him to retire, is not obvious, but there is no doubt that if he had held the defile as he evidently first intended to do, he would not have been ejected without considerable loss on both sides.

The Pioneers and Sappers and Miners worked at the first defile and succeeded in improving it almost into a bicycle track. At Gandab there is a plentiful supply of water from the bed of the river, but shortly above the village the stream quite fails and water is only procurable from wells. Immediately along the banks of the stream there is a narrow strip of cultivation, chiefly *cheri*, but evidently in the spring the greater part of the country is under crops, and considerable stores of barley, wheat and *bhoosa* were found in all the villages. Fowls and onions were also more or less plentiful.

The first phase of the operations included reconnoissances being pushed forward in all directions to the Kapak and over

the Nahaki Passes, the latter by General Westmacott's column. Beyond this latter again, up to Kung, towards Nawagai, and towards Danish Kol; and entrenched camps along the line of communication were arranged. The next great stride forward was made when General Elles moved up to Nahaki and what may be called the second phase of the operations was entered upon. Brigadier-General MacGregor remained at Nahaki to defeat any possible turning movement of the enemy, while Generals Elles and Westmacott pushed on to unite with Sir Bindon Blood's force, and to get in contact with the enemy.

Meanwhile the Oxfordshire had joined the 1st Brigade. The Somersetshire, who had rather gone to pieces during the course of the campaign, returned later to Peshawar and Cherat. Information was received that the Hadda Mullah with a large following was encamped at Kuz Chinarai, some 15 miles beyond Nahaki, and was waiting to be attacked.

General Elles and the two Brigades encamped at the foot of the Badmanai Pass, where on the night of the 24th all was ready for the attack on the Badmanai Pass the following morning. The troops were in good spirits at the prospect of at last having a real set to with the Hadda Mullah and his fanatical followers and it was evident that the enemy meant business, for 'lights out' had barely sounded, when a dozen bonfires showed out on the surrounding hill sides and "sniping" began. Colonel Graves' Brigade turned out as some of the enemy came daringly close to their lines; but General Westmacott's made no return and at about 12-30 firing subsided.

The two Brigades fell in in the morning at 7 to advance to the taking of the Pass which was reported to be held in strength. At the entrance of it stands a village and a low conical hill, the position from which the cavalry reconnaissance was fired on. Behind this village is the first *kotal* which commands the mouth of the Pass. General Westmacott was entrusted with the turning of this left position and the brunt of the day fell upon his force.

The two Brigades advanced simultaneously and the three Batteries were massed in the centre under Lieutenant-Colonel Duthy. The 20th Punjab Infantry furnished General Westmacott's advanced guard, the 1st Gurkhas in support followed by the Bombay Pioneers, the Somersets being told off as an escort

to the guns, except one company which was detached to occupy a spur on the right surmounted by a tower. The 20th slanted up the incline fields to the village, which they found unoccupied. The actual ascent of the *kotal* then commenced. The whole of the hillside was covered with small holly bushes and it was not until the advanced skirmishers of the 20th were half way up the hill, that it was certain that the position was occupied by the enemy. Then at 10 o'clock a shot was fired and a brisk fire broke out from the summit of the hill. The 20th dodging from bush to bush, boulder to boulder, steadily advanced, barely firing a shot and the enemy seeing the glint of cold steel, fell back to a corresponding spur behind—a few edging to the left, but the fire of Lieutenant Logan's Maxim quickly dislodged these and they joined the main body on the surmounting spur. By 8-20 the top of the first *kotal* was won, and it is interesting to note that the 20th turned the position without the aid of artillery fire.

A brief halt on the summit allowed the supporting regiment to come up and Colonel Cunningham's Mountain Battery. The 20th then advanced to clear the second spur, the Gurkha coming into action behind them, as the enemy took up a position on the high crest of a hill which commanded the whole line of advance. The Battery came into action here and a few rounds were sufficient to expel them.

The action then became general as the enemy split up into small parties, covered each succeeding spur, and contested the advance of each skirmishing party until they were up almost to within rushing range. They had several picked marksmen amongst them, and at one period they had singled out Generals Westmacott and Staff, who were always present in the fighting line. The main attack pressed in up to 2,000 feet above the valley, while a detachment of the Afridi Company of the 20th with the Maxims worked along the spurs on the right and had a close quarter engagement with a party of tribesmen *sangered* in a *ziarat*.

But as the Pathans (our soldiers) made their final rush the enemy forsook their stronghold, and were hurled down into the valley close to Badmanai village, the Maxim playing over them as they made their way down the ravines leading to the far side of the valley. In the meantime the Gurkhas and remainder

of the 20th had worked up to the highest ridges and had driven all the enemy before them.

The advanced guard of the other Brigade then began to work up the right of the valley and Lieutenant Logan seeing a collection in a village on their front turned his Maxim upon them, and they dispersed before the 22nd Punjab Infantry came within range. Thus by twelve minutes to one the left approach of the Pass was turned and the road to Badmanai clear, the total casualties being two killed and three wounded in the 20th and Gurkhas. The brunt of the fighting fell upon the 20th and the Maxims, who with the Gurkhas did excellent work.

General Elles helioed his congratulations up to General Westmacott at the close of the action, saying that the 20th and Maxims behaved beautifully and could not have done better.

That night the Brigade encamped at Badmanai village. From Badmanai the force moved down to Torakhwa and on the following morning marched out of the fort there to the punishment of the Jarobi Valley, the key of most of the trouble which had taken place in this quarter of the frontier. General Westmacott marched his column out with the Somerset Light Infantry as the advanced guard, the Gurkhas following, then the two mountain batteries with the Bombay Pioneers as escort, while the 20th Punjab Infantry furnished the rear guard, General Elles and Staff, including the Maharaja of Patiala—accompanying the advanced guard. A short pass had to be crossed before the opening to the Jarobi plain was reached; but it brought no difficulties. There followed a march of five miles over as desolate and arid a country as one could ever imagine. Tier upon tier of dusty waste-stretches, the force winding its weary way along the shingled and bouldered *nullahs* and waterways which serve this casual people for roadways. It seemed that Jarobi, the valley of the Mohmands, which overflows with milk and honey, was but a myth, for it appeared that the barren waste between it and Torakhwa ended in a solid range of hills. But the Patiala Cavalry, which were furnishing the advanced scouts, came back and reported a gorge, and this was the promised land. A reconnaissance up this gorge made by Captain Houghten and Lieutenant Maclarea was fired on by the enemy on the heights on either side to the number of two or three hundred, and on the return parties could be seen by the advanced guard. Two guns of No. 3 Battery were called up to disperse these, and a couple of ringed shell

with a volley from the company of the Somersets was sufficient to do this. But it was at once apparent that the valley was a most difficult one to approach from a military point of view.

It was narrow and winding and surmounted with precipitous hills, which were so high that it would have been heavy work turning them if they had been occupied. But though the tribesmen could be seen collecting on the summits they made no attempt to arrest the advance of the troops up the valley. Captain Kelly at once set to work, and flames showed on either side that Shabkadar was being avenged. At the first gorge General Westmacott left the Somersets with No. 5 Mountain Battery, and a half battalion of the Gurkhas was sent up a spur which commanded the left approach up the valley while a company of the 20th were detached to take a similar position on the right. The force then advanced, and a square tower standing prominently in the centre of the waterway showed where the valley opened out to the right into the Jarobi Valley proper.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

A MOHMAND PARADISE: THE HOME OF HADDA MULLAH.

THE main advance toiled up the bouldered way, and then, when the tower was reached at last, the beautiful valley which no European had gazed upon before broke upon the view. After the country traversed through for the previous ten days it certainly was a picturesque spot. The valley opened out and the far side was lost in a lofty range. On the right the hills were lower and gracefully wooded with walnut and pine, while as stepping-stones to the centre of the valley the green fields of Indian corn rose in succeeding tiers, and there on a knoll with a deep grove at its foot stood Jarobi proper,—the home of the Mad Mullah—nestling against the wooded spurs which rose away from behind it melting away into the bleak barrenness of the separating range. It was a veritable rat-trap and photographs

or sketches made of it, and its approaches would be most interesting mementos. Of course the different heights of the approach were crowned. One incident shows the amount of fanaticism in some of these tribesmen. Five swordsmen who remained behind in a *masjid* either intentionally to do a *ghaza*, or had stayed there too long when their comrades cleared on, rushed on the 20th Punjab Infantry and died, undoubtedly in their own way, as a sacrifice.

As the first white men shaded their eyes to the scene, the elements joined, and as if in disapprobation of the sacriligious advance, dense storm clouds rolled over the peaks and vivid lighting played above the sacred spot, while the artillery of heaven reverberated across the peaceful valley; an ominous forecast of the rude awakening which was about to come. And even as the force halted in the entrance the flames of destruction began to lick upwards in the posts which held the gorge, and the commanding tower stood a moment and then melted away in a cloud of dust and smoke as the destroying cartridge took effect.

After a temporary halt two companies of the 20th and the Sappers were sent forward to burn Jarobi. As they came abreast of the village the heavy clouds brought up rain and hail, and a bitter wind chilled all to the bone as they plodded up the Pass. Colonel Woon was in command of his two companies, and beyond the knoll he found the road which was said to lead to the Mullah's retreat narrowed into a narrow defile with almost sheer cliffs on either side. The Sappers had applied the fatal torch to Jarobi, and Colonel Woon was still pressing up the defile, and yet there was no hostile demonstration. Then suddenly, when the roadway became still narrower, a blaze of fire was poured in from either side, and it was evident that the defile was held by the enemy in force.

There was no cover for the 20th and Sappers, and as they stood they returned the fire and then pushed on to the final goal. The fire was heavy, and four or five men dropped in as many seconds. In the meantime, the firing having declared the position to General Westmacott in the rear, No. 3 Mountain Battery was ordered up, and it made beautiful practice on the hills crowning the left of the 20th, while the remaining half battalion was pushed up to the defile in support. A few minutes after the guns came into action the whole of the valley was in

flames, and the main object of the expedition had been attained. As a retirement in the dark would not have been desirable, at 3-30 the "retire" was sounded, and the two companies of the 20th passed through the Gurkhas on the way down to the camp, and in turn the Gurkhas passed through the Pioneers. Parties of the enemy, seeing that the force was retiring, gathered on the hillsides, and as the Bombay Pioneers covered the withdrawal from the valley by half battalion volleys they came under a harassing fire from the most daring of the cragsmen who held on to their rear. General Westmacott personally conducted the covering of the retiring column, and most of the casualties occurred within a few feet of him; so it is probable that the tribes' marksmen had singled out his flag.

By 5 the dangerous part of a most treacherous valley had been cleared and by 5-30 the whole of the troops engaged were in camp. It will be seen that the tribesmen again practised their usual tactics. They showed no hostility until the advance guard was well into what might well have been a *cul de sac*, and then when darkness compelled the General to withdraw his troops rushed to the attack in strength, hoping to delay the force until it should become entangled in the ravines and cuttings of the Pass.

On the 20th the Brigade moved a little further down the valley scouring all the villages within reach. On the 27th an attack was made on Khuda Khel, a village whose *jirgahs* would not listen to the surrender of their breech-loaders. At first they occupied their village, when shelled out of that they took to the hills. It might be described as a very pretty field day against a skeleton enemy. The 28th Pioneers in the centre, the Gurkhas on the right, the Oxfordshire Light Infantry on the left. As our force advanced the enemy retired and it was a game of long bowls, shells, and long distance volleys. The enemy fired excellent volleys, got under cover the moment they saw the smoke of the guns, and jumped up and fired again directly the shell had burst. They must have had pits or something of the sort. One cannot help admiring these men a small force about one to ten defying our troops and willing to take any punishment we may be able to administer rather than surrender their breech-loaders. It is difficult to see how this last could be enforced unless we were prepared to stay in the country some months.

With the capture of Badmanai Pass, the assault on Jarobi and on Khuda Khel, the fighting stage of the operations may be said to have been brought to a close on the 28th September.

There only remained what may be called the phase of "Political walk-round." Compared with the latter days of the fighting stage had been the infliction of punishment. The Musa Khels took theirs, and the Baizais theirs, and the villagers of the Kung Khwaizai's theirs. The "show" might have been called over, and the Somersets and Patiala Cavalry were returned to Peshawar. The brigades of the other force under Officiating Brigadier-General Graves quietly worked their way down. But the whole movement was so leisurely that it hardly attracted any attention. Generals Elles and MacGregor took a column out to Yakdand, and Danish Kot, and hurried up tribes who still owed money, arms, grain and forage. They took prisoners as hostages from any whose payments were not quite complete, reconnoitred new passes and routes, and started off—Lieutenant-Colonel Woodhouse with a column down the Pandiali Ali Kandi route. On the 2nd October the final details for return of the various units of the force to Peshawar were issued, and on the 7th October the curtain was finally rung down.

There is a good story told that, during the attack on the Badmanai Pass, the Hadda Mullah was seen personally riding among the flying foe, but his pony fell in an awkward place, and they put him into a litter and carried him off. There were women close by, refugees from the villages, who cursed him in their choicest tongue for the troubles he had brought upon them.

As far as the Baizais are concerned, they never can boast that their *purdah* has not been lifted, that a *Sirkar's* force has not swept through their country, and in accordance with the nature of things, it may be fairly presumed that they will keep clear of raids in our territory for many a long day. At the same time, in the matter of surrender of their breech-loaders the tribesmen were adamant, and would not throw up the sponge. Their *jirgahs* were willing to accept any terms except that, and they stood their ground. The Mohmand Field Force had not the good fortune to come in contact with large masses of them. They had shown a front and then retired, and retired till our force could go no further.

GENERAL JEFFREYS AND THE MAMUNDS.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

HOT FIGHTING : HEAVY BRITISH LOSSES.



On return to the Malakand Brigades we find that much has occurred to alter the original plans by which Generals Blood and Elles were to fall simultaneously on the enemy and overwhelm him. On the night before the Shabkadar advance, General Jeffreys' was fired into for six hours by the Mamunds, and heavy losses resulted to our officers and men. On the 13th General Jeffreys and the 3rd Brigade moved up beyond Khar. On the 13th, the Political Officer with two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers moved up the Mamund Valley, and with the assistance of the Khan of Jhar an attempt was made to get the *jirgah* to come in, but this proving unsuccessful, an advance was made up the valley, and some sheds were burnt in a village known to be implicated in the attack on Chakdara, and in which there was a horse that had been stolen from the cavalry. On the 14th, a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers reconnoitred the Salarzai Valley, and one of the passes north. An armed picket was posted on the hill, and in some places armed men were seen about, but generally the people seemed quiet. They expressed a fear that at any time some tribes might come down and attack our camp and so implicate them. That day the 2nd Brigade camp had been moved some miles nearer the Rambat Pass; the Buffs and Sappers had been moved up to hold the Pass; and preparations had been made to cross in the morning.

There was no suspicion of any contemplated attack on the camp. About 8 P.M., however, some shots were fired into camp, and everyone was on the alert at once. The Guides occupied the east face of camp, the Sikhs the south, and the Dogras with the cavalry and guns the north face. The first attack was made against the Guides and continued for about two-and-a-half hours, the leaders every now and then making every effort to bring their men on to the charge. About 100 yards from

the east face there was a deep *nullah*, and the ground on the far side commanded the camp. The enemy, it is believed, had carefully reconnoitred the camp by daylight, and located the head-quarter camp, as all night a steady fire was kept up on this from the points of vantage east of the *nullah*, and had the officers whose tents were in that locality not been employed elsewhere they would have fared badly. Several shots were put into some grain bags which were put up to shelter the General.

After about two-and-a-half hours firing from the east face, the enemy moved off, evidently to hold a council of war. They then came on against the Dogras, their leaders again trying to bring them on to the charge and imploring them to shoot lower. A bugler also tried to sound, but only succeeded in making weird noises. There was a large percentage of rifles used against our men, and the shooting was very close as will be seen from the number of animals killed and wounded, about 35 being killed and sixty wounded. The 38th Dogras had exceedingly bad luck, losing three officers. Permission had been granted to Lieutenant W. E. Tomkins to make a sortie, and orders had been passed down the line to cease firing when suddenly the order for the sortie was countermanded, and Lieutenant Tomkins was going down the line passing the order to commence firing again, when he was shot in the mouth and fell. He must have offered a clear mark in the moonlight. Lieutenant A. W. Bailey had just brought up an order to his Commanding Officer from the General Officer Commanding and was shot in the side close to Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Vivian, and died in a few minutes. Lieutenant C. D. M. Harrington was lying in the trench with his men with his head against the parapet when a shot came from over the other side of the camp and hit him on the back of the head. Great sympathy was felt for the 28th Dogras for their extreme ill-luck on this occasion. About 2 A.M. the enemy suddenly stopped firing and began to clear off. At 6 A.M., Captain Cole was ordered to move off with a half squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, and see if he could find any traces of the people who had attacked the camp.

Outside the camp a crowd of people was seen who said that they were the followers of the Khan of Khar and had come to to help the *Sirkar*. One of these gentlemen who had said that he had come to help the *Sirkar* was then asked who had attacked

the camp, and where they had come from. Of this he declared absolute ignorance, until a little persuasion was brought to bear on him by a few sowars, when this ignorant gentleman crawled on to his pony and led the party straight off after the enemy. After going some six miles the right flank patrol reported men going away to the right front; the direction was at once changed, and after a gallop of two miles the tail end of a party of tribesmen was overtaken and a number speared. They were followed into a gorge where the cavalry dismounted and opened fire. The enemy now having reached ground where they knew themselves to be safe, turned and opened fire, and those on the hills also began firing. The position being a most disadvantageous one for cavalry to act in, it was considered advisable to return at once. Directly the enemy saw the movement they came swarming down the hill, but the retirement was carried out with the loss of one horse killed and one wounded only, and the enemy followed to within four miles of camp keeping at a respectful distance and with one eye on a *nullah*. Three miles from camp the cavalry were supported by the Guides Infantry, and four guns, but it was then too late to take the offensive.

On the 16th, three columns moved out to the north to punish the enemy who had attacked our camp. The right column under Colonel Vivian, with the 38th Dogras, a section of Sappers and two guns, the centre one under Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. Goldney, one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, four guns, 35th Sikhs, and Buffs, the left column to operate near camp under Major F. Campbell with the Guides. The cavalry with the centre column soon came up with the enemy who had collected on a knoll at the foot of the hills 300 strong. On the appearance of the 35th Sikhs they moved off north, keeping close to the foot of the hills, and the 11th Bengal Lancers followed them, dismounting and firing volleys as opportunity occurred. The 35th then came up again keeping close to the foot of the hills for about an hour-and-a-half, but the enemy had disappeared among the rocks and hills. The 35th then moved half-right against the village of Shahi Tangi. The tribesmen were sniping at them, but there was no resistance. The village of Shahi Tangi was reached and burnt, and then it was deemed advisable to retire. Directly the retirement was commenced, the enemy appeared from all sides, rocks and *nullahs*, and came on very boldly—people from the west of the valley coming

over to join in the fight. The Sikhs were pressed very heavily down the hill, the enemy coming up to within 40 yards. When they reached the foot of the hill and got on to open ground the charge was sounded and fixing bayonets, the Sikhs charged their immediate front again, and a company of Buffs coming up covered their subsequent retirement.

The 11th Bengal Lancers had all this time been watching the left flank, and had kept the enemy in check for a certain time until they saw the success of their movement against the 35th, when they at once advanced against the cavalry. They were held by dismounted fire for half an hour, when having turned the left flank of the cavalry obliging them to retire, they immediately closed in on the left flank of the Sikhs, taking advantage of cover afforded by the *nullah*. The cavalry, hearing heavy firing in front moved forward again, and suddenly saw a company of Sikhs surrounded on three sides having a hot fight. The advance scouts of the 11th Bengal Lancers were seen to be very excited and signalling wildly; the squadron came up at a gallop, and charged the right rear of a party of tribesmen closing on the Sikhs. Unfortunately a *nullah* intervened into which the enemy threw themselves, and the cavalry were unable to charge home. However, they came up with such a yell that the moral effect of cavalry was seen, the enemy not only clearing across the *nullah* but out of the village on the far side from which they had driven the cavalry three-quarters of an hour before. The Guides Infantry came up a short time after and swept the enemy away back on the left flank. The General Officer Commanding now came up. The guns were ordered up to a position covering Shahi Tangi, and the 35th and Buffs were ordered to go for the enemy holding that village. One company, 35th, who had been acting as escort to the guns was ordered up the hills on the right (Captain Ryder's Company). The Buffs and Sikhs soon cleared Shahi Tangi and after a halt retired again without much opposition to the position held by the guns.

A halt was now made, and the towers and fortifications were destroyed by Sappers. At about 3-15 a general retirement was ordered, and about this time a message was received from Captain Ryder that he was being pressed, and he was ordered to retire at once, but apparently this message never reached him. A half company of Guides was also sent to support him.

Captain Ryder after some time saw the retirement of the Brigade, and attempted to conform, but was very heavily pressed, and could only do so very slowly. As the Brigade retired, the enemy came on from the west of the valley again and pressed, but as the brigade cleared the place where the enemy had been first found by the 11th Bengal Lancers in the morning the tribesmen seemed to have got news of the company of the 35th on the hill, as they moved rapidly across to the east of the valley to cut off this company. The Guides were now sent to assist the 35th, and the brigade was halted on a small plain. The Guides moved up to the foot of the hills and took up a position to cover the retirement of the Sikhs. The retirement of the Sikhs was made down a long spur ending in a level ridge followed by two small knolls. Lieutenant Hughes was killed. A half-company of Guides reached the Sikhs just at this level spot and as the enemy's swordsmen were running in among them. The men were dead beat, they had had no water and a very heavy climb, and a very hard pressed retirement.

The Guides gallantly carried the wounded Sikhs down the hill, and soon the little party came under the steady covering fire of the Guides at the foot. Still the enemy pressed on. Lieutenant O. G. Gunning was cut over the back twice in the *nullah* at the foot of the hills by a man who got in rear of him, as he was using his revolver at three men facing him. He had already been shot in the face at the commencement of retirement, so he was now in a bad way, but was carried safely into camp. When the Guides had been ordered to the relief of the Sikhs the brigade halted for some time, but as the Sikhs were reported near the bottom of the hill, orders were given to march on. Darkness came on and by some ill-chance the guns, a section of Sappers, with a small escort of Buffs and the General Officer Commanding became separated from the column and found themselves left behind.

The General Officer Commanding, finding himself in this position, made for a small village, but unfortunately the enemy got there at the same time and the escort was not strong enough to turn them out. Lieutenant T. C. Watson, R. E., with five men of the Buffs, made two gallant attempts to go back for reinforcements, but he was shot down, wounded in three places. Several other unsuccessful attempts were made. A position was taken up under the eastern wall of the village and a trench

thrown up to afford some protection, but the enemy were firing at ranges from five to twenty-five yards. The darkness of the night and the dead bodies of the battery mules certainly saved a number of lives, together with the fact that the enemy were afraid to face the guns. As the moon rose Major J. F. Worledge, 35th Sikhs, who with four companies had been also lost in the darkness, and who was on the plain about 800 yards off, sent a sowar of the 11th Bengal Lancers to see if any assistance was required. This man quickly informed him of the critical situation, the four companies were brought up, and at once the enemy bolted. The party was left undisturbed for the rest of the night. The remainder of the brigade had reached camp about 9 P.M.

At daybreak the 11th Bengal Lancers and 38th Dogras went out and brought in everybody.

On the 17th the funerals of Lieutenants V. Hughes, 35th Sikhs, and A. T. Crawford, No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, took place with full military honours. Further particulars showed that in the desperate fighting No. 8 Battery lost 31 mules. The losses were as follows :—

British Soldiers—

The Buffs, killed No. 4219, Private Aughir ; No. 479, Private Dodds : dangerously wounded No. 3088, Private May : severely wounded No. 3189, Private Liver ; No. 4840, Private Stefferman ; No. 4268, Lance-Corporal Smith : slightly wounded No. 3165, Lance-Corporal Judge ; No. 3980, Lance-Corporal Boorman ; No. 3182, Private Nelthorpe ; No. 3997, Private Poiles ; No. 4384 Private Neller.

Native Soldiers—

No. 8 Mountain Battery, killed 6, wounded 22 ; Guides, killed 2, wounded 1 Subadar, 2 Havildars, and 7 men ; 35th Sikhs, killed 22, wounded 44 ; 11th Bengal Lancers wounded 2 ; Sappers and Miners, killed and wounded 15.

Total killed 2 officers and 36 men, wounded 7 officers and 102 men.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT OF GENERAL JEFFREYS' DISASTER.



WRITING in October with reference to the affair on September 16th, of which the published details were inadequate and unsatisfactory the *Pioneer* had the following:—In the Watelai Valley no one seems to have foreseen what a hornet's nest would be stirred up : hornets too whose stings made themselves felt. So far as we can judge, the idea was to let loose nearly the whole brigade in the valley, to punish every village of importance in a single day, and then march back again to Inayat Killa. The brigade was due in the Mohmand country to co-operate with General Elles' division; its commander and the troops composing it had the further prospect of Tirah before them; and there was every inducement to "polish off" the Mamunds who had been bold enough to fire into the camp below the Rambat Pass.

To each Commandant was allotted a village or group of villages, and he was directed to deal with it independently. So the Buffs, the 35th Sikhs, the 38th Dogras and the Guides Infantry, each six companies strong, moved off to accomplish their task: a detachment of the 11th Bengal Lancers, the mountain guns and the Sappers being held ready for emergencies in case of any particularly strong opposition. The 35th Dogras on the right found the village of Damodalai far too strong to attack without artillery, and Colonel Vivian very sensibly returned to camp instead of knocking the heads of his men against mud walls. On the left the Guides were successful in sweeping through some small hamlets, but had they pushed on to Agrah and Gat they would probably have had to withdraw as the 38th had done, for we know how sharp was the fighting in this direction days afterwards when the whole brigade was in action. Further up the valley the Buffs had disposed of one village also. It was in the centre that matters went wrong. The 35th Sikhs pushed well into the hills at the far end of the valley, and as the further mistake was made of splitting the six companies into three parties, the

Mamunds saw their chance and got to close quarters. Three companies which had begun to burn the village of Shahi Tangi were forced back, and they had to abandon the body of Lieutenant Hughes, who had been killed. Word was sent back for the Buffs and Guides to come up with all speed, and the 11th Bengal Lancers made a charge which, though it could not be driven home owing to broken ground, prevented the Sikhs from being surrounded. When the reinforcements arrived the Mamunds were driven back, and Lieutenant Hughes' body was recovered. Then came a long halt of some three hours, which enabled the enemy to collect in full strength; and when the retirement was eventually ordered, the tribesmen pursued their usual tactics with considerable success. We do not even know now how it came about that the two companies of Sikhs holding a hill over 2,000 feet high were left to fight there way down alone: an order, it is said, was sent to them to retire, but it never reached Captain Ryder. There was some desperate fighting, and the Guides Infantry had to double back to save the Sikhs who were attacked by overwhelming numbers. It was here that the heavy losses occurred.

The retirement down the Watelai Valley was weary work for the troops, for a thunderstorm came on, and as the enemy closed in it became pitch dark. The guns with a half-company of Sappers and 15 men of the Buffs got separated from their escort of four companies of the Sikhs, and General Jeffreys found himself belated with this small party. The valley is intersected with ravines and marching at night was no easy matter, as the Guides, who formed the rear guard, discovered. The General eventually decided to take up a position under the walls of a village, and here for four or five hours the handful of British soldiers, gunners and Sappers had to defend themselves against the enemy at very close quarters indeed. There were no means of sending off to camp for assistance, and it was not until the moon rose that the party were extricated about an hour after midnight. Such details as we have received of the fight under the village walls go to show that officers and men behaved with the finest courage. Lieutenant Wynter fought his guns after he was wounded until through faintness from loss of blood he could no longer give orders. Then a sepoy took him in his arms, and sat for hours shielding him with his own body against the enemy's fire. It was an heroic action, and the sepoy was severely wounded while thus protecting

his officer. Another man coolly beat out with his coat the bundles of burning straw which the Mamunds threw from the house-tops to light up the ground and enable them to aim. The work was perilous in the extreme, but the sepoy went about it calmly and repeatedly extinguished the flaming straw.

A Sapper was sent out into the open to watch a door in the walls from which it was feared the enemy might rush; his figure was outlined clearly with every flash of lightning and he was repeatedly shot at, but he stuck to his post, calling out from time to time to show that all was well. Again Major Worledge with the relief party from the camp, finding that he could not reach the spot whence the noise of firing came, sent out a sowar to open communication with General Jeffreys. This man passed safely through the tribesmen who were on the move across the valley, reached the village only to get a volley from his own friends, delivered his message and carried back another to Major Worledge. Other instances of devotion and gallantry could be given, but enough has been said to show that, as at Maizar, the Malakand, Chakdara, and the Samana, our troops acquit themselves in splendid fashion.

There was much criticism of the manner in which the operations were conducted and the issue of the official despatches was awaited with interest.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PUNISHING THE MAMUNDS.



HIS determined attack on General Jeffreys' Brigade made it necessary that he should countermarch and punish the Mamunds and Salarzais. The Mamunds are numerically unimportant, the total number of fighting men on the most liberal estimate being only 1,500. Yet in the Chitral Campaign they were a constant source of uneasiness and trouble and were up in arms the

whole time, the sniping into camp in the Jhandoul Valley being laid at their door. Sir Robert Low and Brigadier-General Waterfield almost implored to be allowed to punish them, but this step was forbidden. If this had been sanctioned it would have doubtless saved the present heavy loss in General Jeffreys' forces, and it could easily have been done, as our troops were only a day's march from the valley where the clan lives. This half-hearted policy was justly criticised at the time and its evils are now clearly seen. These few tribesmen, brave undoubtedly, with that inordinate vanity which is the prevailing characteristic of the Pathan have in all probability believed that our troops were afraid to approach them in their fastnesses and that the arm of the *Sirkar* could not be extended against them. These Mamunds live partly in Bajour and partly in Afghan territory, cultivating lands on either side of the frontier. They have been troublesome to Afghanistan as well as to India, and ever since Asuar was occupied some years ago the Amir has had endless trouble with them. These were the people by whom General Jeffreys had been attached to whom he was now going to thoroughly subdue.

The news of the fighting with General Jeffreys, the Mamunds and its heavy losses to our arms roused the greatest interest. It was expected that General Blood would have sent reinforcements to General Jeffreys. He did not do so because after the Thursday night when the tribesmen inflicted such heavy losses the operations in the valley were entirely successful. The villages were burnt and so thorough was the punishment that the villagers sued for mercy. At first fears had been entertained of a general rising of the Bajouris, but the success of General Jeffreys' punitive measures dispelled these.

But all was not over with the Mamunds and they persistently refused to surrender the twenty odd rifles they captured on the 6th. Accordingly General Jeffreys continued his punitive measures and the fortified villages of the tribesmen were in turn burnt down. Still the enemy were most determined in their resistance, and on the 21st when General Jeffreys visited Umra Khan's village, Zagai, there were again casualties on our side. The enemy in large numbers were on the surrounding hills, but their fire was kept under by the guns and volleys from the Buffs, who were in the most exposed position and consequently suffered most. The casualties were : British wounded, Second-

Lieutenant G. N. S. Keene, Unattached List, and Lieutenant R. E. Power, of the Buffs; rank and file nine; native rank and file two.

On September 22nd the 3rd Brigade marched from Nawagai to Kuz Chinarai, thus leaving the Malakand Field Force, and passing to General Elles's Command. Sir Bindon Blood with the Head-quarters Staff and two squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers, marched the same morning to Inayat Kila. The village of Das, west of Agrat, was attacked in the morning. The tribesmen as usual followed the returning troops, and the following casualties occurred: Guides Infantry, killed one, dangerously wounded one, 35th Sikhs, slightly wounded one. A squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers again protected the flank and the Guides Infantry executed the retirement with their customary skill and steadiness. Long experience on the frontier has made this corps specialists in hill fighting, and in the severe actions of this week their value was felt by all in the force to have been inestimable.

On the morning of September 23rd, General Jeffreys' Brigade marched to visit the fortified village of Tangi, the inhabitants of which were concerned in the recent fighting. The enemy appeared at first in small numbers, and the guns came into action at 8 o'clock. Firing continued until 11-45; the village was taken, the Guides first seizing the hills to the left. The 38th Dogras were in the centre, the 35th Sikhs on the right, and the Buffs in reserve. Casualties: the Buffs, Major R. S. H. Moody, slightly wounded; 38th Dogras, severely wounded, one. Lieutenant F. S. Reeves, of the Buffs, had a curious escape, the bullet striking his revolver and glancing thence through his case.

The Buffs were to march for Nowshera on the 25th to join the Tirah Field Force and their departure was much regretted, as in the recent fighting they had shown themselves worthy of the finest traditions of British Infantry. The Royal West Kent from Panjkora replaced them. Up to date the Buffs' casualties had been: officers 3; soldiers 22; this out of greatly reduced strength. In the 2nd Brigade alone the losses of the week amounted to 14 British officers and 153 men, besides nearly 150 transport animals, cavalry horses, officers' ponies, &c.

A great deal of ammunition had also been expended. On the 16th, the 35th Sikhs alone used 18,000 rounds. No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery was now unable to put more than four guns in the field, having lost a third of the mules, half the officers and a quarter of the men.

CHAPTER XL.

GENERAL JEFFREYS AGAIN HOTLY ENGAGED.



THE terms with which the obdurate Mamunds were asked to comply were the handing in of fifty breech-loaders and the sixteen Martinis captured on the 16th. This they point blank refused to do, saying that the Martinis had been carried over the Afghan border and were irrecoverable. The Mamunds admitted taking part in the Chakdara attack and the naïve excuse they put forward for their unprovoked interference was that all the world was doing *ghaza* and they simply joined in. They admitted also having attacked General Jeffreys' camp at Mirkinai on the 14th, and in reparation for their misdeeds their *jirgahs* offered a sum of money and a few old useless breech-loaders! The consequence was a re-opening of hostilities. General Jeffreys had now a full Brigade at his disposal, composed at follows: —

Royal West Kent.

No. 7 Mountain Battery.

Two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry.

No. 4 Company, Sappers and Miners.

31st Punjab Infantry.

38th Dogras.

Guides Infantry.

In addition there was the column at Panjkora.

On the 30th, the force advanced against Agrah and Gat, where serious fighting took place, and our losses were again large. When advancing against the village of Agrah the Guides Cavalry reconnoitred the ground, and reported that the village was occupied and that the adjacent heights were strongly held. The enemy appeared in considerable numbers both on the hills, where they displayed standards, and among the scrub in broken ground to the left. The action was opened by the cavalry who at 8-2 A. M. were fired on from the scrub and hills. Dismounted fire was at once ordered by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and desultory skirmishing ensued. Meanwhile the infantry were advancing and at 9-15 A. M. the battery came into action shelling the enemy on the heights.

The Guides Infantry then advanced to clear the hills to the left. The enemy who occupied *mortures* and *sangars* maintained a sharp fire, but on Major Campbell ordering the Guides to charge the hills these were carried. The Royal West Kent had now advanced in the centre and the 31st Punjab Infantry on the right, and very severe fighting ensued. The British Infantry cleared the village and attacked the tribesmen in the *sangars* behind it. Second-Lieutenant W. C. Browne Clayton was killed by a volley at close range, and the enemy at once charged causing a temporary check; but Major W. G. B. Western advanced with Lieutenant F. A. Jackson and one-and-a-half companies of the Royal West Kent and drove back the enemy and captured the *sangars* at the point of the bayonet.

The losses had already been severe, and the 31st Punjab Infantry on the right were also hotly engaged. All the positions were, however, held until the Sappers had completely destroyed the whole of the village. The return to camp was then ordered. The 38th Dogras under Lieutenant-Colonel Vivian now advanced to support the 31st Punjab Infantry on the right. The enemy did not, however, press the retirement as vigorously as usual, and the display of the cavalry prevented any advance into the open ground, but much firing was maintained from the hills with some effect. No. 7 British Mountain Battery fired shrapnel at close range and kept the nearest spurs clear. All firing ceased at 2-10 P. M., and the homeward march was not molested. The enemy's loss could not be exactly estimated. It was however, thought to be heavy, as they did not follow the retiring.

An additional battalion of infantry would have been very welcome. The tribesmen displayed remarkable courage, tactical skill and marksmanship; but, though their complete punishment would entail loss, everyone with the force was anxious that it might be proceeded with. The officers displayed great gallantry, most of the Royal West Kent having bullet holes in their clothes and helmets and nearly all having strange escapes.

The following is the complete list of casualties:—British officers, killed, Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. O'Bryen, 30th Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant Browne Clayton, Royal West Kent; British officers wounded, Royal West Kent Regiment, severely Lieutenant H. Isacke, slightly Major Western, Captains R. C. Style and N. H. S. Lowe and Second-Lieutenant F. A. Jackson; 31st Punjab Infantry: severely Lieutenant E. B. Peacock; total officers eight. British soldiers, Royal West Kent, killed: 3357 Private Berry, 3998 Private Jones, 3393, Private Thitson; wounded dangerously, 4202 Private Sullivans, 3350 Private Buckland, 3554 Private Edwards; severely 2635 Private Bright, 1341 Sergeant Warner, 2952 Private Meagher, 4090 Private Jipps; slightly 4140 Private Lalter, 3471 Private Gad, 2613 Private Gregory, 3454 Private Hewan, 2777 Private Scudder, 1320 Private Mills, 4303 Private Garns, 4179 Private Brooker, 4004 Private Everwett, 3114 Private Crampton, 4720 Private King, 3346 Private Evans, 3541 Private Morgan; total 23. Native ranks killed; 31st Punjab Infantry fifteen, 38th Dogras four; total casualties all ranks 58.

In the Agrat action No. 7 Battery, Royal Artillery, fired 140 shrapnel shells, and when it was apparent that the Royal West Kent and 31st Punjab Infantry were severely engaged, Major Fagan advanced his guns within 800 yards of the enemy and by constant fire kept many spurs clean. Though the guns came under sharp fire only one mule was killed. The want of more troops was severely felt: three additional battalions could have been fully employed; and only the great skill with which the Guides Cavalry on the left were handled checked the enemy's advance from that direction. The 31st Punjab Infantry also suffered from having no battalion on their right flank. The difficulty and danger of attacking these fortified villages in broken ground and high crops is great, and it should be remembered that after an adequate camp-guard and the details have been deducted the brigade could only parade for fighting some

1,300 strong. In this small number the loss in a fortnight of 245 was very severe.

On the 3rd October, the 2nd Brigade with two batteries of artillery, under Brigadier-General Jeffreys, at 6 o'clock as usual, attacked the village of Badilai. Very little opposition was encountered. The guns came into action at 9 o'clock, shelling the village which was captured and completely destroyed. Up to this time few casualties had occurred, but as soon as the withdrawal of the troops began the enemy appeared in great numbers, as many as three thousand being estimated to be present. Firing now became brisk and all the corps were involved, but the 31st Punjab Infantry were most severely pressed. The cavalry covered the retirement with great skill, but though the enemy showed much boldness they did not advance into ground which rendered charging possible, and took refuge in *nullahs* whenever threatened. Firing ceased at 2-30, P.M., and the force reached camp safely. The whole affair was extremely successful, but the loss was considerable. The casualties were as follows:—Royal West Kent, dangerously wounded, one; 31st Punjab Infantry, killed one, wounded five; Guides, Infantry wounded three; Guides Cavalry, wounded two; 39th Dogras, one killed, three wounded; total: killed two, wounded fourteen.

CHAPTER XLI.

COERCING THE MAMUNDS.



HE stubborn character of the opposition with which General Jeffreys was meeting determined General Bindon Blood to go to his assistance and assume command of the brigade, and on October 2nd he wired that he was leaving with every man and gun for Inayat Killa in order to finish off the Mamund business at once. As the brigade was now strengthened by four field guns in addition to the same number of mountain guns,

together with the Highland Light Infantry, and 4 companies of the 34th Punjab Infantry, further operations were not expected to be attended with heavy loss.

On the 4th October, General Blood decided to give all the troops at Inayat Killa a rest before beginning the tedious work of finally coercing the Mamunds. There was much to be done in restoring the mobility of the force after its hard experiences, and the field hospitals were strained greatly to satisfactorily deal with the large numbers of wounded. The final work of reducing the Mamunds to submission was not expected to be accomplished without fighting, but the result was never in the slightest doubt, and it was hoped that a week or so spent in reducing the villages to ruins and inflicting the other punishments which our punitive ideas permit of would complete the task and leave General Blood ready to operate elsewhere. The situation was a good deal complicated by the proximity of the scene of operations to the Afghan frontier, and apart from the openly made assertion that General Jeffreys had all along been fighting against Afghans as well as Mamunds, fears were entertained that with tribesmen holding land on both sides of the border-line it would be difficult to reduce them to submission unless they were followed into Afghan territory.

In the Mamund Valley the negotiations which Major Deane had been conducting with the Mamunds had made some little progress. The tribal leaders were informed that they must, as a preliminary measure, order back across the frontier all the men who joined them from Afghan territory. These men had nothing to lose, as they knew our troops could not cross the border line and harry their villages. They were well armed, had abundant ammunition, and their line of retreat was always secure. They thus fought on advantageous terms.

On October 6th, news was brought in to the camp at Inayat Killa that a thousand men from across the border intended attacking the camp. The Mamunds, however, were said to be unwilling to join. Every precaution was taken, but the night passed quietly away without anything unusual occurring. The camp was now well protected by wire entanglements, a mud wall and ditch all round with several traverses inside, and every endeavour had been made with mud walls and saddles to afford protection to the transport animals picketed within the camp, so that any attempt at an attack would be

severely punished. The Khans of Dir and Jhar were negotiating with the tribesmen for peace. It was evidence of the desire of the Mamunds to come to terms, that they should have refused to join in the proposed attack on this camp, and have dissuaded the *badmashes* from Kunar from themselves attacking our force.

On the evening of the 7th three or four shots were fired at a guard of Guides Cavalry out with their grasscutters, who were occupied within a mile of camp. The snipers did no damage, and on being chased fled up the *nullahs* towards the hills. During the night three men were seen creeping up towards the 24th Punjab Infantry lines, and on being fired at bolted.

On the following night not a single shot was fired—a pleasant change. In addition to the Khan of Jhar's men some Mamunds themselves were doing pickets on duty for us. The Khan of Jhar came in on the 8th from his visit to the Mamunds, and brought in with him ten rifles, nine of which were of those lost by the 35th Sikhs in the action of the 16th September. Four more were said to be in the hands of Rahim Shah, the Political Agent, who, together with the Khans of Nawagai and Khar was still out with the Mamunds. Information showed that the Mamunds had lost about 350 killed, and the wounded lying in their villages amongst the hills were numerous. Reports from the valley showed that the Mamunds had had a surfeit of fighting and were anxious to submit.

A few days later came the end. On the 11th arrangements were ready for the *darbar*, and at about 1 o'clock in the afternoon a large and representative *jirgah* of Mamunds, accompanied by the Khans of Nawagai, Jhar and Khar, arrived and put up at the village of Nawah Killa, awaiting the fixing of the time and place for the *darbar*. About 3-15 P.M. Sir Bindon Blood, accompanied by Major Deane, Chief Political Officer, Colonel Masters, A. Q. M. G., his A. D. C., and orderly officers, Mr. Davis, Assistant Political Officer, and a few other officers, with an escort of the Guides Cavalry, started for the *darbar*, which was held near Nawah Killa, about 600 yards away from the camp. On the arrival of Sir Bindon Blood the Khans were presented, and some hand-shaking occurred. The General sat down with Major Deane on his left and the other officers arranged on either side. The *jirgah* with the friendly Khans formed up on three sides of a square, of which the General and his staff formed one. On the side to the left of the General were seated the friendly

Khans with their retinue, and the representative *jirgahs* occupied the front and right hand sides. The *jirgah* was understood to express its regrets at what had occurred, and promised its complete submission and obedience in future. Its opposition had been made under the impression that we intended annexing the country. It was admitted that they had suffered heavy losses and great danger. The *darbar* lasted fifteen minutes, during which photographs and sketches were taken of the scene. At the close of the *darbar* the whole *jirgah* with hands upraised took an oath to adhere to the terms dictated to them. The *jirgah* was then dismissed.

The Mamund *jirgah* having come in and submitted, there was no necessity for a further occupation of the valley, and on the 12th the force moved back marching the first day to the camp near Jhar. There it stayed a day or two before moving on into the Jhandol Valley. Every military precaution was taken during the march. The 1st Brigade provided the advance and baggage guards, and the 2nd Brigade, with the 10th Field Battery, acted as the rear guard. Future movements of the force were still veiled in mystery, but a prolonged stay in the Swat Valley was feared. Among the terms of peace settled at the *darbar* was the following:—That Umra Khan's men should be turned out of the valley. The *jirgah* also gave security for the return of the two rifles which had not yet been surrendered. It was considered that the damage done in the valley during our lengthened stay in it amply settled all other outstanding accounts with the tribe.

General Sir Bindon Blood with a small escort paid a visit to the Salarzai Valley. It was found to be very similar in its general features to the Mamund Valley. The camp later on was moved five miles up the Salarzai Valley. The stay there depended on the political arrangements to be made. The Mamund Valley was evacuated without a single shot being fired, a sure sign of the complete submission of the tribe.

On the 13th the force was at Camp Matashah, one of the principal villages in the Salarzai Valley, which appeared somewhat more thickly populated than the Mamund Valley was. The villagers brought in firewood, and *bhoosa* was very plentiful in large stacks round each village or fort. The arable land in the valley had already been ploughed and sown, and the young crop was well up. The Salarzais were given up to that

evening to collect their *jirgah* and declare their intention. It would not appear at first as if they were prepared for war. The people being still about their villages with their cattle; but, as with the Mamunds, so here, the hill villagers were not so anxious for peace as the dwellers in the plain villages. The camp at night was surrounded by friendly picquets to warn off any possible snipers.

On the night of the 14th snipers were again about, and several shots were put into camp without any damage being done. The head-quarters camp was apparently the mark aimed at. After this had gone on for some time, the friendly picquets realised that the time had come to show their zeal, and with much shouting and a shot or two they drove off the snipers. As is usual on such occasions, several narrow shaves were related. Orders were out for a reconnoissance in force the following morning to the Ghakki Pass, and another up the valley towards Pashat. General Meiklejohn commanded the former, and Colonel Aitken the latter, with which General Blood went, and the field battery. A large convoy of warm clothing arrived this day, and this was distributed at once, and was hoped to be of aid in fending off fever, which was rather prevalent in spite of quinine parade. The general health of the troops, however, remained good. The *jirgah* was still reported unsettled and unable to come to an unanimous decision, and it was thought probable that after all their decision would be in favour of fighting. The following morning two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry and 400 of the Guides Infantry started about 10 A.M. to reconnoitre the valley about Pashat. One squadron, with the Infantry, advanced to examine the Chakki Pass through the hills between the camp and Pashat, whilst a second squadron went round the foot of those hills. The valley was found to be fairly broad, well wooded and apparently fertile, with a river running down the middle of it. The reconnoissance went to within two miles of Pashat, which was a large village, its principal feature being a strong fort, situated in the middle of the valley. In all the villages the inhabitants were busy at their usual daily occupations and seemed in no way disturbed by our appearance in their midst. A young crop of barley and wheat was springing up in all the fields. An English-speaking inhabitant greeted our soldiers near Pashat with a good morning. It was found that he had served ten years as a coolie on a sugar plantation in Demarara. An old

pensioner of the 27th Punjab Infantry was also found wearing the Frontier medal with four clasps. Some supposed Buddhist remains were found in the Pass, notably a cave.

The next night was a quiet one, only one suiper having appeared, and he very quickly moved off when a few of the Highland Light Infantry went out to *shikar* him. On the morning of the 16th at half-past eight, all troops except one company of each regiment and half a battalion of the 38th Dogras went out for a reconnoissance towards Pashat. This was pushed some little way beyond Pashat itself towards the head of the valley. It was found that the field guns could go easily as far as was reconnoitred, and that there would be no difficulty in bringing them into action against any of the villages lying on the hill sides. The troops did not return until the middle of the afternoon. No opposition was encountered, and agricultural pursuits were being peaceably followed. The women and children were about, whilst fair sized herds were seen grazing at the foot of the hills. It would thus appear that the Salarzais did not intend fighting, but the *jirgahs* had not yet come in, and a very strong impression prevailed that they would declare for war. It was said that the delay is due to disputes between the *jirgahs* of the Upper and Lower Salarzais as to the proportion of the fines to fall on each. To further complicate matters, Ustad Muhammad, one of Umra Khan's chief men, was said to have come into the valley to try and create trouble, as he did so successfully in the Mamund country.

News from the Salarzai Valley on the 17th predicted the submission of the Salarzais. On that day a portion of the Lower Salarzai *jirgah* came in camp, and the *jirgah* of the Upper Salarzais came in the following day. A move forward was then made to impose terms of peace on some other of the many tribes which took part in the attack on the Malakand and Chakdara after which the force returned to Chakdara.

CHAPTER XLII.

CONCLUSION.



ALTHOUGH the campaign in the Mohmand country was not very exciting, it accomplished its work most effectively, and there can be little doubt that the inhabitants of that land must now regret having listened to the blandishments of the Hadda Mullah. The *purdah* was lifted in the most thorough fashion, and not even Jarobi and the delectable valley flowing with milk and honey of which so much had been heard was omitted in the retributory march of the soldiers of the *Sirkar*. And apart from the moral effect of the over-running of the country General Elles inflicted very material punishment on the Mohmands. He collected altogether from the Mohmands 12 breech-loaders, 60 Enfields, 1,070 guns, 850 swords, and Rs. 17,500 in fines, while the value of the forts and towers destroyed is estimated at Rs. 60,000. The expedition was reckoned to have cost the Mohmands a lakh and a half of rupees.

The following was the final Mohmand Field Force order issued by Major-General Elles, C. B. :—"In relinquishing command of the Mohmand Field Force, the Major-General Commanding wishes to thank all ranks for their hearty co-operation to ensure the successful issue of the expedition. It was not in the fortune of the Force to see much fighting, but on several occasions parts of the Division have been engaged with the enemy, and though the resistance was small heavy work has been entailed on the troops. General Elles would wish specially to notice the excellent work of the 20th Punjab Infantry. This fine regiment behaved most gallantly at Shabkadar before the expedition, losing 10 per cent. in action, and in the attack of the Bedmani Pass, well supported by the Maxims, 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkhas, and No. 3 Mountain Battery, crowned heights of 4,000 feet in the face of the enemy in a way which could not be excelled. The General Officer Commanding would also acknowledge the good work done by the 13th Bengal Lancers, commencing with the fine charge by two squadrons in the action at

Shabkadar. His best thanks are also due to the 28th Bombay Pioneers, and No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, whose services have been invaluable and greatly tended to the rapid completion of the expedition. It has been a great satisfaction to General Elles to have under his command the 1st Patiala Regiment, and the Nabha Infantry of the Imperial Service Troops; the former regiment has taken its place in the fighting line with the regular troops, and both regiments have done good service. In bidding goodbye to the Force, General Elles wishes all success to those officers and corps who are fortunate enough to form part of the Tirah Field Force, and trusts that the experience gained in the short Mohmand Expedition will prove of value to them."

All had for sometime been quiet in the Khyber Pass, but during the second week in September it was found that the Afridis had again put in an appearance at the Jamrud end and had been more than usually daring in their attacks, even venturing to fire on patrols and reconnoitring parties at short ranges. It was, however, exceedingly difficult to get on equal terms with them, as they were wonderfully quick in moving from hill to hill. It seemed probable at first that their boldness was occasioned by their having a large force behind them, but it is doubtful if their numbers ever exceeded two hundred; or if they were the advance party of a large force, that force had thought discretion the better part of valour and had gone back into the Afridi country. On Saturday, the 9th instant, a patrol of the 4th Dragoon Guards under Captain D. P. Sellar was reconnoitring towards the Khyber Pass. Some of the enemy were seen in the Pass and were watched for some time by the patrol. But as their numbers were few, and it was doubtful whether they were the enemy or friendlies, the order was given to return to the fort at Jamrud. As the troop was moving off, the enemy fired at it, and one of the shots hit Private Mears, and he fell from his horse on to the road just in front of Captain Sellar, who at once ordered half his troop to dismount and line the crest of the nearest hill, whilst he and three of his men raised the wounded man up and placed him on a horse, when he was sent back to Jamrud; the enemy, who had been reinforced, keeping up a heavy fire the whole time and advancing to within 500 yards, although several of them were seen to fall under the fire which was kept up by the Dragoons. Eventually Captain Sellar mounted his men and took them back to the fort without

any further casualty, thanks to the bad marksmanship of the enemy and the excellent cover afforded by the hill.

The next morning the usual patrol was sent out to the Samghakki Pass, which is about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the fort. This Pass is a short one, fairly broad at one end, but very narrow for about twenty yards at the other, and leads through a spur which juts for a considerable distance into the plain; on the other side of it is the open plain leading to Bara; this plain, however, being intersected by a number of *nullahs* and ditches. As Captain T. F. N. Jones with his patrol approached the Pass he left it at the mouth under command of Sergeant-Major Clarke, whilst he, Corporal Walton, Private Dance and a native sowar rode into the Pass itself. Just as they got to where the Pass becomes narrow, armed natives, to the number of about sixty, sprang up from behind the rocks and fired point blank at them. Captain Jones and Corporal Walton both fell dead, the officer with two wounds in his body and the corporal with five; the corporal's horse and the sowar's were also killed, and Private Dance's horse slipped and fell, throwing its rider. The Sergeant-Major, hearing the firing, at once brought up half the patrol, leaving the remainder at the mouth of the Pass to prevent their being cut off, and so prompt was he that the patrol, which then only consisted of 10 men, got up to the spot before the enemy had time to mutilate the bodies, and managed to get them on to two horses and to bring them and the two dismounted men safely out of the Pass without further loss. A message was at once sent to the fort and a force was sent at once to the Pass, but without seeing any sign of the enemy, who had evidently gone off through the hills to Fort Maude, where about 200 of them could be seen through the glasses. Captain Jones of Ballina, Co. Mayo, was the son of Major Jones, who himself served through the Crimea in the same regiment. He was only 31 years of age and joined the service in 1839.

In the Tochi Valley little of interest had happened during August and September. On the 5th August letters were sent to the leaders of the Madda Khel asking them to come into camp and hear from the General what the terms of the *Sirkar* were. At first they doubted our guarantee of safe conduct, but on the 17th General Corrie Bird held a *darbar* at which some Khazba Khel and Tori Khel Maliks were present. It was announced that Government demanded the return, in good con-

dition, of the property which had been lost at Maizar, the surrender of eighteen headmen, the payment of a fine still outstanding for the murder of a Hindu writer and a further fine of Rs. 10,000 for the Maizar outrage. Ten days were allowed for consideration of the terms. About this time a Native Officer was murdered. This officer was Subadar Gurmukh Singh, Bahadur, the brave Sikh who with the small band of the 14th Sikhs defended Chitral Fort, and received the order of merit for his conspicuous gallantry. There was a good deal of sickness in the Tochi Force, the Rifle Brigade suffering greatly, losing early in September from enteric fever Major Frank S. W. Raikes, second in command of the 3rd battalion, and one of the most popular army men in India. His loss was much felt. Another British Officer also died. This was Lieutenant A. J. M. Higginson, who was several times wounded at Maizar, but died from enteric fever contracted when convalescent from his field injuries. The news of the fighting at Malakand and elsewhere was known amongst the Waziris, but there were no signs of the spread of fanaticism amongst them, and our columns marched along the country unmolested. On the 14th September a party of 300 Highlanders, 200 Sikhs (14th) and 300 of the 1st Punjab Infantry moved up the Tartoi stream with the view of surprising the village of Dadum which belonged to Sadda Khan, the leader of that section of the Madda Khels with which the force had to deal. The surprise was complete and the party, which was fired at, brought away 200 cattle and sheep and a large quantity of arms and returned to camp after a fatiguing march of twenty-six miles or more.


The Madda Khels had shown no signs of submitting to the terms laid down, and columns were sent out to visit the various villages, but little of interest happened. There was very great sickness amongst the British and native troops and letters from the front criticized severely the mild methods employed by the Political Officer and which were such as to render a punitive expedition a thing to be desired greatly by tribesmen. Another young officer second Lieutenant Kane of the Rifle Brigade dying of enteric fever. All connected with the force were undoubtedly dead sick of a campaign which, whilst being deadly in a marked degree, had none of the glory of the warlike operations on other parts of the frontier. The force however was serving a valuable purpose in occupying the valley and they

effectually kept in check the Waziris and prevented any spread of the conflagration to their end of the frontier.

All eyes were now centred on General Sir William Lockhart and the Tirah Field Force, and the chances of opposition from the Afridis. Already there had been some preliminary skirmishing, and with the march of our large army into the unknown land of Tirah the last and most powerful of the *Sirkar's* troublesome neighbours was being dealt with and made to pay toll for his share in the disturbances.


Perhaps this little volume of narrative cannot be better closed than by the following extract from the private letter of an officer with Sir Bindon Blood, which clearly outlines the leading features during twenty-four hours with a field force on the frontier: "Reveill , is usually sounded about half-past five o'clock, but if we happen on a fine moonlight night it will be perhaps earlier. The instant it is sounded the peaceful quiet of the night is disturbed by sounds of hammering tent pegs, or the iron picketting pegs of animals, whilst the 'umming bird' as Kipling calls the camel, begins his usual morning's grumble. An hour is usually allowed from reveill  till the 'fall in' is sounded for parade and then the march commences. In this hour officers get their *chota buzri* (and in some regiments the Tommies get tea). Afterwards kits are packed, tents dropped and the whole loaded on either mules or camels. Then all the regiments collect at a fixed place, leaving a baggage guard and a rear guard. When the order is given to march an advance guard is sent forward and the regiments in fours follow. Behind them comes the ammunition and hospitals and then the baggage and rear guard. There are generally one or two halts during the march. On arrival the Staff fix on the place for camping with due regard to water and defence, and then lines are laid out. It is generally some time before the baggage appears.


"Meantime Tommy piles arms during which time one hears such remarks as 'Them Simla———are playing a game of chess with we' and the affairs are generally discussed. On arrival of the baggage, tents are pitched, and the cooks get to work. Guards are detailed, fodder-cutting, wood-cutting, water pickets, &c., &c. After the men have had a rest they will be set out to put up a shelter trench all round the camp.



INDIA'S NORTH WEST FRONTIER









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