



Muhammad Shah viewing a garden from palanquin.  
*Courtesy : Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.*

*frontispiece*

# The Reign of Muhammad Shah

1719–1748

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*To*  
*the sacred memory of*  
MY FATHER AND MOTHER

# PREFACE

THIS study is largely based on my thesis approved for the Ph.D. degree by the Aligarh Muslim University in 1960. I have been engaged in the long intervening period in utilizing the extensive source-material that has come to light since then. The thesis has been subjected to considerable revision, for not only the original chapters were thoroughly recast so as to furnish a more detailed treatment but altogether new chapters have been added to incorporate new information.

As the decline of the Mughal Empire reached its last phase during the reign of Muhammad Shah, the history of the period has claimed the attention of the most diverse writers; naturally, therefore, the emphasis given to various factors responsible for decay has differed widely. Regional political studies have centred on the currents of political separation which the imperial policies in the late seventeenth century set off in several parts of the country. A number of popular writers have sought to find the explanation for this process in the character of the reigning Emperor and the alleged moral degeneration of the Mughal aristocracy. Some distinguished historians have ascribed the decline of the Empire to the breakdown of the imperial military system while others have stressed the agrarian crisis as the primary cause of the catastrophe. The subject has received renewed attention, and of late, a series of learned articles bearing on the controversy have been contributed by historians in and outside India. However, these studies are confined mainly to the last decades of Aurangzeb's reign when ominous fissures had developed in the mansabdari and jagirdari systems; these generally overlook the history of the period which actually witnessed their complete breakdown and rapid collapse of the central authority.

The present work attempts a detailed study of the political, economic and social forces which caused, hastened or simply accompanied the process of imperial disintegration during the reign of Muhammad Shah. It attempts to examine the causes of failure on the part of the imperial government to retain command over the fissiparous tendencies and control the process of decline. The discussion is focused on changes in the functioning of the administrative institutions and agencies, the form and character of factional politics at the royal court, response of different sections of the ruling class to the challenges confronting the Empire, and the impact of factionalism on the formulation and implementation of imperial policies and programmes. The political and military events and

the central-provincial relations are analyzed from the point of view of their effects on the Mughal court. In addition, the broad patterns of Mughal culture and aspects of Muslim religious revivalism are sought to be explained within the framework of socio-economic environments of the period. But the land-revenue system, agrarian economy and relationship, and the state of trade and industry existing in different regions of the Empire constitute such a vast and important field of study that they need separate and exhaustive treatment. These could not be dealt with except in a perfunctory manner in the volume of this size. It is accordingly proposed to discuss these themes and problems exhaustively in the volume that I am now busy with.

The position of Muhammad Shah has long been misjudged by historians and popular writers alike, who have painted him as a debauch, indolent and careless king, thus holding him exclusively responsible for the decay and ruin of the Empire. But I hope the facts adduced in this book would show that this assessment is much too one-sided. A critical examination of evidence demonstrates that the Emperor was certainly not as bad as he has been painted; and that it was a fatal combination of circumstances, rather than the weaknesses of the man at the helm, which was responsible for the ultimate collapse of the Empire.

In the preparation and publication of this work I have received generous assistance from my teachers and colleagues, for which I am deeply beholden to them. I acknowledge my debt of gratitude to my revered teacher and supervisor, Professor Shaikh Abdur Rashid, formerly the Head of the History Department, without whose constant guidance and stimulating assistance the thesis would never have been finished and submitted. His departure from Aligarh deprived me of the benefit of his guidance which would have facilitated the early publication of the work. I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor S. Nurul Hasan, my distinguished teacher and formerly the Head of History Department, who very kindly went through certain chapters of the work and made valuable suggestions for improvement; he always encouraged and provided me with whatever facilities I needed for the completion of the work. I express my deep and sincere thanks to Professor K.A. Nizami, my esteemed teacher and formerly the Head of History Department, for his constant encouragement and help in the pursuit of my research work. It was he who had originally suggested that I should undertake the study of this period and helped me to overcome the initial difficulties I experienced in starting the project.

I am profoundly grateful to Professor Irfan Habib, my distinguished colleague and the present Head of History Department, for his scholarly assistance and keen personal interest in the publication of the book. He could very kindly spare his valuable time to make a careful reading of

the chapter on Administration and give some constructive suggestions from his own wide knowledge of the subject. The two maps contained in the book were prepared under his direction. My debt of gratitude to Professor A. W. Kureishy, my esteemed teacher, deserves particular recognition. He thoroughly read the original draft of the first five chapters of the book, removed many errors of language and improved the presentation. The zeal and care with which he worked for months together have left a deep impression on me, and I will ever remember the affection and generosity he showed throughout this period. My special thanks are due to Professor Aslub Ahmad Ansari, the Head of English Department, who, in spite of his preoccupations, took the trouble of reading the chapter on Cultural Scene and suggesting some changes. My grateful thanks are due to Prof. Satish Chandra who enlightened me on several controversial points and offered important suggestions in course of the discussions I had with him.

For the collection of source-material, not available in Aligarh, I had to work for a considerable time in the libraries of Patna, Sitamau and Poona, and I recognize with gratitude the immense help and hospitality extended to me by Professor S. Hasan Askari, Dr. Kunwar Raghubir Singh and Dr. G. Khare, during my stay at these places.

I am grateful to Dr. S. P. Verma, my colleague in the Department of History, for his assistance in the selection of photos and supply of information that enabled me to write the section on painting. I am also thankful to Mrs. Madhu Tirvedi who helped me in understanding the technical aspects of music which had developed to a great height during the period under study. My obligation to Mr. Tariq Ahmad, my colleague, is very great; he cheerfully performed the arduous tasks of proof-reading and preparing the index. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Iqbal Hasan, my colleague in the Department, who has been most helpful in several ways. I am beholden to Mr. Farrukh Jalali for his labour of love in preparing the index of few chapters and pointing out variant spellings in the book.

I must record my obligation to the staff of the office of the Department of History, particularly Mr. Anwar Ali Zaidi, Superintendent of the office and Mr. Zahur Ahmad who typed the manuscript. My thanks are due to Mr. S. Saeedul Hasan who so excellently made the photographic reproductions for illustrations in the book. I am thankful to Mr. Zahur Ali Khan, the Calligraphist in the Department, for the care and attention with which he had drawn the maps. Equally I am beholden to Mr. M. Anees Alavi who has not only designed the dust-cover, but also reproduced and enlarged the miniature depicting the Holi scene.

I am thankful to the authorities and staff of Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, Asafia Library and State Archives of Hyderabad,

British Museum (Oriental Section) and India Office Library, London, for allowing me to use their collections of Persian manuscripts and documents. I am also indebted to the staff of the Research Seminar Library of the Department of History for their cooperation and help.

My thanks are due to the Editorial Department of Asia Publishing House for the friendly help and cooperation which they extended to me in the publication of the book.

In a special manner I now wish to express my grateful thanks to my brother Professor Dr. Waheed-uddin Malik, the Vice-Chancellor of Bundelkhand University, who took keen interest in my early education and by his own example inspired me to carry on my studies at Agra and Aligarh. I also appreciate the affection and kind sympathy of my brothers, members of the family and friends who have long waited to see the fruit of my labour.

Although I received help and guidance from a number of distinguished scholars, I alone am responsible for any errors and shortcomings that may exist in this volume; and for these I crave the indulgence of the reader.

*May, 1977*

ZAHIR UDDIN MALIK



# CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>		vii
<i>List of Tables, Plates and Maps</i>		xiii
ONE	INTRODUCTION	1
	Political Scene at the Accession of Muhammad Shah, 1: A. Wars of Succession and Administrative Problems, 3; B. Financial Problems, 13; C. Rival Factions at the Court, 22: The Irani Nobles, 23; The Turani Nobles, 25; Saiyids of Barha, 31; D. Challenge to the Empire, 38; Marathas, 39; Rajputs, 45; Sikhs, 50; Jats 53	
TWO	NOBILITY AND ITS STRUGGLE FOR POWER	56
	Accession of Muhammad Shah, 56; Fall of the Saiyid Brothers, 57; Ascendancy of the Mughals, 74; Wizarat of <u>Nizam-ul Mulk</u> , 78; <u>Qamr-u'd-din Khan</u> , the new Wazir, 91; Fall of Koki Jiu's Clique, 95; Rivalry between <u>Khan-i Dauran</u> and <u>Qamr-u'd-din Khan</u> , 96; Nobility and the Maratha Problem, 100; Gujarat, 101; Malwa, 103; Deccan, 106	
THREE	THE MARATHA EXPANSION	116
	Gujarat, 117; Malwa, 124; Bundelkhand, 137; Maratha Incursions into the Eastern Provinces, 142	
FOUR	FOREIGN INVASIONS	155
	Rise of Nadir Shah, 155; Nadir Shah's Diplomatic Relations with the Mughal Court, 157; Defence of North-western Border, 160; Invasion, 163; Battle of Karnal, 166; Nadir Shah in Delhi, 175; Court Politics after the Invasion of Nadir Shah, 182; The First Invasion of Ahmad Shah Durrani, 189; The Death of Nadir Shah and Rise of Ahmad Shah, 189; The Invasion, 192	
FIVE	CENTRE-PROVINCE RELATIONS 1725-1748	198
	Gujarat, 211; Deccan Provinces, 223; The Eastern Provinces, 233; Punjab, 249; Rajputana, 257; Balaji Baji Rao's Relations with the Mughal Court, 265; 'Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla, 273	
SIX	ADMINISTRATION UNDER MUHAMMAD SHAH	283
	The Monarch, 283; Power and Functions of the Wazir, 287; Mir Bakshi, 296; Second Bakshi, 298; Third Bakshi, 298; Fourth Bakshi, 299; Special Royal Troops, 300; Mir Atash, 301; Sadr-us Sadur, 302; Mir Saman, 309; Mansabdars, 311; Jagirdars, 319; Faujdar, 330	

SEVEN	CULTURAL SCENE OF THE PERIOD	342
	Hindu-Muslim Relations, 345; Social Life in Delhi, 359; Religious Reforms, 374; Shah Wali-ullah, 375; Mazhar Jan-i Janan, 383; Khwaja Mir Dard, 386; Revival of Chishti Order, 390; Growth of Urdu Literature, 393; Music, 402; Painting, 403	
EIGHT	MUHAMMAD SHAH AND DECLINE OF THE EMPIRE	406
	<i>Appendix A</i>	418
	Mansabdars who supported Nizam-ul Mulk	
	<i>Appendix B</i>	420
	Nobles who opposed the Saiyid Brothers	
	<i>Appendix C</i>	423
	Ranks and Positions of the Saiyids of Barha and their partisans in 1719	
	<i>Appendix D</i>	427
	Selected Bibliography:	
	<i>A. Political Chronicles, 427</i>	
	<i>B. Administrative Manuals, 447</i>	
	<i>C. Administrative Records, 449</i>	
	<i>D. Epistolary Collections, 450</i>	
	<i>E. Religious and Mystic Literature, 452</i>	
	<i>F. Works on Social Life, 452</i>	
	<i>G. Tazkirahs, 453</i>	
	<i>H. Modern Works (English), 453</i>	
	<i>I. Urdu Works, 457</i>	
	<i>J. Marathi and Hindi Sources, 458</i>	
	<i>K. Journals, 458</i>	
	<i>Index</i>	461

## LIST OF TABLES, PLATES AND MAPS

### LIST OF TABLES

		<i>Page</i>
TABLE A	List of Mansabdars holding ranks of 5,000 and above during the Reign of Farrukh Siyar	17
TABLE B	Ranks and Positions held by members of the Turani group	31
TABLE C	Distribution of the top posts at the Centre	70
TABLE I	Appointments in the central government in 1720	80
TABLE II	Governors appointed or confirmed	82
TABLE III	Nobles who received Mansabs in 1720	83
TABLE IV	Officers appointed during the years 1724-1730	94
TABLE V	List of the Mughal nobles in the group of Qamr-u'd-din Khan	98
TABLE VI	Officers appointed during the first public durbar of Muhammad Shah in 1739	184
TABLE VII	List of important Appointments made to various Posts	228
TABLE VIII	List of Mansabdars holding the Zat rank of 5,000 and above	318
TABLE IX	Jagir mahals held by Nizam-ul Mulk during 1715-1718	322
TABLE X	Faujdaras of some important places	340

### LIST OF PLATES

<i>Frontispiece</i>	Muhammad Shah viewing a garden from palanquin.
PLATE I <i>facing p. 48</i>	Muhammad Shah with four ministers, namely Nawab Sa'adat Khan Burhan-ul Mulk, Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan, Nawab Roshan-u'd Daulah Bahadur and Nawab Hafiz-u'd-din Khan Bahadur.
PLATE II <i>facing p. 64</i>	Three ministers of Muhammad Shah—Khan-i Dauran Khan, Qamr-u'd-din Khan and Muzaffar Khan.
PLATE III <i>facing p. 352</i>	Muhammad Shah entertained by musicians and dancers.
PLATE IV <i>facing p. 368</i>	Muhammad Shah taking part in Holi, late in his reign.

### MAPS

1. <i>facing p. 8</i>	The Mughal Empire, 1719
2. <i>facing p. 182</i>	India in 1748

The Reign of  
Muhammad Shah  
1719—1748

## INTRODUCTION

### POLITICAL SCENE AT THE ACCESSION OF MUHAMMAD SHAH

The Mughal Empire at the time of Muhammad Shah's accession in 1719 was at the zenith of its territorial expansion. Some of the political problems, left unresolved by Aurangzeb, had been partly settled in the preceding decade. The Rajputs were reconciled; their leaders Raja Jai Singh Sawai and Raja Ajit Singh, were to continue their sway over a vast area stretching from Amber to the port of Surat. The Jats and the Sikhs, however, were suppressed and made to feel the increasing influence of the imperial power. The onward thrust of the Maratha expansion across the Narmada was halted by the successful campaigns of the imperial generals. The system of alliances, though devised by the Saiyid brothers to isolate Farrukh Siyar, indirectly contributed to the making of the Mughal authority paramount throughout the realm. Moreover, their alliance with the Marathas offered much needed respite to the government officials and relief from oppression to the populace in the Deccan. With a young and intelligent Emperor on the throne and the continued stewardship of the Saiyid brothers, the prospects of a strong and stable Mughal rule seemed hopefully bright.

Nevertheless, the past decade had witnessed revolutionary changes in Mughal politics and government. In theory, the monarch was still the centre of all power, but he had ceased to exercise any decisive influence in the making of policy, the filling of high offices and the spending of money. The administrative machinery worked in a fashion that made it unresponsive to the universal need for security and peace. The long cherished belief that the government of the Empire had been designed to ensure domestic tranquility and peace was dispelled by its incapacity to discharge these fundamental responsibilities. No effort was made by the ministers and statesmen of the Empire to remedy the ills and remove the anomalies which encumbered the governing processes at all levels. Their interest and ambition were to cling jealously to power with scant regard for the welfare of the

people. The mansabdari system failed to cope with the complex problems arising out of the agrarian crisis. The central treasury sank into deep penury. The tragic manner in which Farrukh Siyar was first deposed, then done to death was fraught with momentous consequences for the Mughal dynasty. It irretrievably damaged the prestige of the monarch and ruined the image of monarchy as the embodiment of law and authority. It set one group of nobles against another in an endless struggle for power which the sovereign had wielded. Rapid succession of kings and accompanying changes in administration exposed the common man to ever new hazards and produced an attitude of indifference and apathy towards the future of the state. The Empire was still vast and integrated; but its institutions were rapidly losing their vigour and efficiency.

The basic problem before Muhammad Shah was to choose between two alternative courses of action. He could maintain the *status quo* provided he was content merely to reign under the superintendence of the Saiyid brothers or he could exert himself to gain firm control of the imperial administration by bringing a different faction of nobles to power. The next question linked up with the first was: Would he adhere to the political settlements which the king-makers had made with the Marathas, Raja Ajit Singh and Churaman Jat, or would he formulate a new policy towards the regional forces? By what methods and through what agencies were the desired results to be achieved? Further, uppermost in his mind were the questions of administrative reforms: How to meet the agrarian crisis? How to improve the quality and probity of officers of the state? How to organize the *mansabdari* system and how to strengthen the military potential? The age of conquest and expansion had ended; that of corrupt politics and internal strife followed. The vision and dynamism which in the past marked the actions of men in power were replaced by passivity and smugness. The nobles, on whom the burden of leadership now devolved, were unwilling to exert themselves in an effort to regenerate and revitalize the decaying institutions of the Empire to control the forces—political and economic—that challenged them. Under such circumstances the crucial question was whether the Emperor possessed the talent, will and imagination necessary for a complete reconstruction of the Empire and its institutions? Would he find new adjustments for securing the stability of the Empire or be swept aside by the march of events and become a helpless spectator?

The present chapter attempts to examine in detail the nature of these problems which originated or developed during the years 1708-1719. An analysis of these problems will help in the assessment of the difficulties of Muhammad Shah in their historical perspective. In the following chapters an attempt is made to analyze the nature of the solution that he sought for these problems and the measure of success or failure he met with.

## A. WARS OF SUCCESSION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

Aurangzeb's death on 3 March 1707<sup>1</sup> at Ahmadnagar in the Deccan signalled the outbreak of a fratricidal war among his three surviving sons,<sup>2</sup> Shah 'Alam,<sup>3</sup> A'zam Shah<sup>4</sup> and Kam Bakhsh<sup>5</sup>. Each of the three Princes proclaimed himself Emperor and started preparations to establish his title by raising troops, collecting money and enlisting the support of the nobles. Shah 'Alam received the news of his father's death at Jamrud, twelve miles west of Peshawar<sup>6</sup>, and hurried back to Peshawar, from where accompani-

<sup>1</sup> Bhim Sen, *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, f, 161a.

<sup>2</sup> Aurangzeb had five sons: Muhammad Sultan, Muhammad Mu'azzam, A'zam Shan, Akbar and Kam Bakhsh. Muhammad Sultan and Akbar died in the lifetime of their father. Muhammad Sultan was born on 30 December 1639 and died on 16 December 1676. Musta'id Khan, *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, 159-60. Akbar was born on 21 September 1657, and died at Mashhed on 31 March, 1706. Mirza Muhammad, *Tarikh-i Muhammad*, 18.

<sup>3</sup> Muhammad Mu'azzam was born on 14 October 1643. His mother's name was Nawab Bai, daughter of Raja Raju. After the death of Amir Khan, he was appointed governor of Kabul. He was given the title of Shah 'Alam Bahadur. In the 49th regnal year, he received the governorship of Lahore, and on his recommendation Mun'im Khan was appointed deputy in this province. Shah 'Alam held the charge of these two provinces till the death of Aurangzeb. For details, vide *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, 153; Sarkar, J.N., "The Early Life of Bahadur Shah", *Journal of Indian History*, 1922-23, 4-9.

<sup>4</sup> Muhammad A'zam was born of Dilras Banu Begam on 9 July 1653. Shortly before his death, Aurangzeb had appointed him governor of Malwa. The Prince was reluctant to leave the imperial headquarters at Ahmadnagar, but the Emperor had sent him to Malwa to improve the fast-deteriorating situation in the province. He left Ahmadnagar on 22 February 1707, and had hardly gone 40 miles when news of his father's death was conveyed to him. He forthwith returned to the imperial camp. After funeral ceremonies were over, A'zam Shah ascended the throne on 16 March 1707 and immediately marched north to capture the cities of Agra and Delhi. For details of A'zam Shah's activities and preparations, see *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, ff. 162-163; Kamraj bin Nain Singh, *A'zam-ul Harb*, 65, 107, 109; Jonathan Scott, *History of Deccan*, II, Part XII, 10-12.

<sup>5</sup> Muhammad Kam Bakhsh, the youngest and favourite son of Aurangzeb, was born on 7 March 1677. He was appointed governor of Bijapur in February 1707, and a few days before his father's death, he proceeded to the province, in the company of Muhammad Amin Khan, the commander of Mughal troops and with great difficulty occupied the fort of Bijapur. When Aurangzeb died, Kam Bakhsh assumed the royal title of *din panah*, and caused the *khutbah* to be read and coins to be struck in his name. He appointed Ahsan Khan alias Mir Malang his *mir bakhshi* and Hakim Muhsin as his *wazir*. Kamraj, author of *A'zam-ul Harb*, 45-47, writes that A'zam Shah sent a *farman* to Kam Bakhsh confirming his rule over Bijapur and adding the province of Hyderabad to his possessions. For details, see *Tarikh-i Muhammad*, 25; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, 589-90.

<sup>6</sup> Jag Jiwan Das, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, f. 40a,

ed by his two sons, Khujista Akhtar and Rafi'-ul Qadar,<sup>1</sup> he set out for Lahore. Mun'im Khan,<sup>2</sup> deputy-governor of the province, greeted the Prince on his arrival at Pul-i Shah Daulah, 12 kos north of Lahore.<sup>3</sup> He mustered force of 5,000 horsemen in front of the Prince's camp and presented him a voucher for Rs. 40 lakhs.<sup>4</sup> This timely help in men and money highly impressed Shah 'Alam who promised him the *wizarat* in case of success<sup>5</sup>. Mun'im Khan used his influence to bring local chiefs, officers and notables under the banner of his patron. Muhammad Mu'iz with his son A'z-u'd-din joined his father at Lahore.<sup>6</sup> On 4 May 1707, Shah 'Alam formally proclaimed himself the Emperor of India with the title of Bahadur Shah. He had the *khutbah* read and coins struck in his name. The *mansab* of Mun'im Khan was increased to 4,000/2,000 and the title of *Khan-i Zaman* was bestowed upon him.

<sup>1</sup> Shah 'Alam's four surviving sons were: Muhammad Mu'iz, born on 9 April 1660, Muhammad 'Azim, born on 16 December 1664, Rafi'-ul Qadar, born in December 1670, and Khujista Akhtar, born on 4 October 1671. Muhammad Mu'iz was the governor of Thatta and Muhammad 'Azim held the government of Bihar under his charge. The two younger sons Khujista Akhtar and Rafi'-ul Qadar lived with their father at Kabul. When Shah 'Alam started from Peshawar he wrote to Mu'iz urging him to come to Lahore. For details, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, 574; Irvine, William, *Later Mughals*, I, 143-146.

<sup>2</sup> Mun'im Khan, son of Sultan Beg of the Barlas tribe, was born in 1651. He started his career as keeper of the seal under Ruhullah Khan, the *mir bakhshi* of Aurangzeb. Later he was appointed *diwan* of Shah 'Alam to manage his *jagirs*. On the recommendations of the Prince, Mun'im Khan was promoted to the *diwani* of Kabul and subsequently to the *naib-subedari* of Lahore. The *faujdari* of Jammu was also assigned to him. He held the *mansab* of 1,500/1,000 horses. "By his judicious dealings and bravery, he subdued the seditious and turbulent men of the province." He administered the *jagir mahals* of Shah 'Alam with devotion and ardour. As expenditure outran the revenues from the *jagirs*, the *diwan* reduced the size of the Prince's army and dismissed unworthy favourites who surrounded him. In anticipation of a civil war, he made secret preparations to strengthen the cause of Shah 'Alam. He raised a strong force and collected necessary equipment like artillery, beasts of burden and boats. Mirza Muhammad, *Tarikh-i Muhammadī*, 28; Shah Nawaz Khan, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, Text, III, 667-677, English Translation, II, 293-94; *History of Deccan*, 40-42.

<sup>3</sup> Jag Jivan Das, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, f. 41b; Na'imat Khan 'Ali, *Jang Namah*, 10.

<sup>4</sup> Khafi Khan, *Muatakhhab-ul Lubab*, 574. No other historian records the sum of Rs. 40 lakhs which Mun'im Khan had arranged for Shah 'Alam. Bhim Sen states that Mun'im Khan spent the entire money accumulated in the treasury of Lahore in recruiting troopers and collecting war material. *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, f. 164a.

<sup>5</sup> Khafi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, 574.

<sup>6</sup> *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, f. 164a.

<sup>7</sup> Bahadur Shah also conferred high ranks on his four sons on this occasion. Muhammad Mu'iz was made *mansabdar* of 25,000/15,000, his son A'z-u'd-din of 8,000/3,000, Muhammad 'Azim of 18,000/15,000, Rafi'-ul Qadar of 16,000/15,000, and Khujista



Decisive victory attended the arms of Bahadur Shah in the battle of Jaju fought against the forces of A'zam Shah on 18 June 1708.<sup>1</sup> On the following day Bahadur Shah held his first public darbar in which he increased the *mansab* of Mun'im Khan to 7,000/7,000 *du aspah*, *sih aspah* and regularized his appointment to the office of *wizarat*.<sup>2</sup> The gracious Emperor even accommodated Asad Khan<sup>3</sup> and his son Zulfiqar Khan,<sup>4</sup> though they had supported A'zam Shah, by appointing them *wakil-i mutlaq*<sup>5</sup> and *mir bakhshi* respectively.<sup>6</sup> In the second battle of succession, waged on 13 January 1709 near Hyderabad, Kam Bakhsh was defeated and mortally wounded.<sup>7</sup>

Akhtar of 14,000/9,000. A'zam Shah had been no less lavish in granting high ranks to his sons. His three sons Bidar Bakht, Muhammad Wala Jah and Muhammad 'Ali Tabar had received *mansabs* of 20,000/20,000, 12,000/9,000 and 10,000/7,000 respectively. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, 575; *A'zam-ul Harb* 89-92; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 294.

<sup>1</sup> For details, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 576-578; Kamraj, *A'zam-ul Harb*, 227-230, 375; Na'mat Khan 'Ali, *Jang Namah*, 20-24.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 598; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, 296.

<sup>3</sup> Asad Khan, the illustrious *wazir* of Aurangzeb had served the Empire with exceptional devotion in important offices for three decades. His noble lineage, great family connections, rich administrative experience and elegant tastes built up a vast prestige and renown for him. In rank and influence, he towered high above his contemporaries. Wise, dignified and an active administrator, Asad Khan united industry and honesty. Against these qualities was set his failure to espouse the cause of the victor in the recent civil war. A'zam Shah had appointed him *wazir* and left him in charge of the treasury and the harem at Gwalior. For details of his biographical account, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, 310-320, *Later Mughals*, I, 9, 10.

<sup>4</sup> His original name was Muhammad Isma'il and he was born in 1675. His mother's name was Mihar-un Nisa Begam, daughter of Asaf Khan Yamin-u'd Daulah. He married the daughter of Shayista Khan Amiral Umara. First he was appointed to the rank of 300 in the 11th year of Aurangzeb's reign. By dint of sheer merit, he gradually rose to eminence. He took part in several campaigns in the Deccan and gave proof of his courage and loyalty. In October 1689, he captured the strong fort of Raigadh and made the family of Sambhaji captive. Aurangzeb, being highly pleased with his military exertions, bestowed on him the title of Zulfiqar Khan and a *mansab* of 3,000/2,000. After the death of Bahrahmand Khan, he was appointed to the post of *mir bakhshi*. In 1704, his rank was 6,000/6,000. For details, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 93-106.

<sup>5</sup> As a matter of political expediency the office of *wakil-i mutlaq* was revived for Asad Khan. The post of *wakalat* was last held by Asaf Khan, father-in-law of Shah Jahan. He held the *mansab* of 9,000/9,000, *du aspah*, *sih aspah*, and enjoyed great privileges. When he transacted business in *diwan-i'am*, the *diwan* and *bakhshi* placed the papers pertaining to their respective departments before the *wakil* for his signatures. For a detailed discussion of the powers and functions of *wakil-i mutlaq* in the reigns of Shah Jahan and Bahadur Shah, *vide* Ibn-i Hasan, *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, 136-187; Shakir Khan, *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, ff. 51-57; *Later Mughals*, I, 38.

<sup>6</sup> *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, f. 164b; *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, f. 307b.

<sup>7</sup> *Later Mughals*, I, 58-64.

It was during the reign of Bahadur Shah that the *wazir* became the most powerful minister and the most important man in the state. Mun'im Khan who held that office was the chief influence over the royal mind and his counsels had more weight with him than that of other ministers. His powers and functions extended beyond the jurisdiction of the revenue department; he took active part in all the campaigns fought in this period. He overshadowed the *wakil-i mutlaq* and drove him into the background. The *wakil* retained his former pomp and splendour but real authority rested with the *wazir*.<sup>1</sup> Though Bahadur Shah gave the impression of being a weak and feeble king, he kept the nobles under restraint and did not allow the reins of government to slip from his grasp. With courage and foresight he successfully resisted the plans of Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan to concentrate all executive powers in their own family.<sup>2</sup> With the *wazir* and the *mir bakshi* pitted against each other,<sup>3</sup> unsupported by any strong faction of their own, and with the Princes set to watch over them carefully, they were hardly in a position to challenge royal

<sup>1</sup> When the *wakil-i mutlaq* held his office, Mun'im Khan, the *wazir* had to wait upon him to get the papers signed. Mun'im Khan felt that to serve Asad Khan like other ministers was below his dignity. Proud of his unique record of services to the Emperor, he wished to enjoy absolute power and independent position. The Emperor, who could not disregard the feelings of his favourite, resolved the difficulty by relieving Asad Khan of the administrative burdens due to his declining age. He was asked to retire and spend the remaining part of his life in peace at Delhi. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 602.

<sup>2</sup> When Mun'im Khan died at the age of sixty on 28 February, Zulfiqar Khan represented to the Emperor that his father, Asad Khan, should be made the *wazir* on the basis of merit and noble descent. Bahadur Shah declined to recognize the claims of Asad Khan, but instead, offered the *wizarat* to Zulfiqar Khan provided he resigned from the *subedari* of the Deccan. Zulfiqar Khan refused to accept this arrangement. He would neither consent to become the *wazir* in the lifetime of his father, nor was he prepared to surrender his rights over the Deccan. The Emperor plainly told the *mir bakshi* that two highest offices of the Empire could not be placed in the hands of the father and son, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 677-78.

<sup>3</sup> A deep rift had developed between the *wazir* and the *mir bakshi* who found themselves at variance on major issues of high policy as well as minor administrative affairs. Zulfiqar Khan opposed Mun'im Khan in all his measures and obstructed his plans on every occasion. For instance, Mun'im Khan, having separated the *subas* of Burhanpur and half of Berar from the six provinces of the Deccan and included them in the divisions of the Delhi province, wanted to put the new territorial unit, known as Berar Payin Ghat, under the charge of his son Mahabat Khan, the second *bakshi*. Zulfiqar Khan strongly objected to the scheme which in his opinion was an unwarranted interference by the *wazir* in the local administration of his province. The case of Murad Khan, *subedar* of Bijapur, was another example of their mutual conflict. Their rivalry prevented the settlement of the Maratha problem. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 626-628, 649-650.

authority and dictate to the monarch. Bahadur Shah, by utilizing the services of the Princes, maintained the dignity and strength of the monarchy and shielded it from encroachment by ambitious ministers. Under him the monarchy faced no crisis; it commanded respect and inspired awe as in the past. With his death, however, began the long and bitter struggle for the *wizarat* which became the keynote of Mughal history in subsequent years. During this period, the post of *wizarat* was the most coveted goal of a noble's life. It lured and tempted noble after noble to plunge headlong in one war of succession after another. It was the conflict and competition for this prize which widened the rift between different sections of the governing class and ultimately destroyed the power, prestige and position of the Emperor.<sup>1</sup> But the careless and profuse grants of *mansabs* and lands made by Bahadur Shah caused a marked decline in the standards of administrative efficiency and made the enforcement of procedural rules a difficult task for the officers concerned. The old tradition, for example, that the same title would not be conferred on two persons simultaneously was not adhered to in the indiscriminate bestowal of titles and gifts. Consequently, the ranks, rewards and honours conferred by the Emperor on the *mansabdars* lost their value and significance. The burden of his prodigious liberality fell heavily on the government treasury and produced considerable strain on the resources of the state. Ikhlas Khan, the *'arz-i-mukarrar*, emphasized the necessity of reform in matters of recruitment and promotion of officers and grants of land. He suggested that a proper investigation into the background, character and merit of the candidate should be made before his application was forwarded by the *wazir* for the royal sanction. His successor, Musta'id Khan, also attempted to introduce reforms in the pattern of appointment and assignment of land to the *mansabdars*. He insisted on the strict adherence to rules and regulations in such important matters. But all these proposals for reform proved highly unpopular with the job-seekers and met with stiff opposition from the ladies of the Emperor's harem.<sup>2</sup> Mun'im Khan remained contented in public business according to the wishes of the Emperor, unconcerned with the abuses which threatened to erode the authority of the imperial government. The Emperor frankly admitted that he was unable to refuse the grant of jobs or reward to any one who petitioned for it; the officers were, however, free to either issue the *sanad*, or reject the applications after scrutiny.

Bahadur Shah died on 27 February 1712 at Lahore. His death was

<sup>1</sup> Iradat Khan, *Tarikh-i Iradat Khan*, f. 78b.

<sup>2</sup> For details, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 629-30. The two queens, Mihr Parwar and Ammat-ul Habib, used to get the applications of favoured candidates signed by the Emperor without waiting for investigation and approval by the *'arz-i mukarrar*.

immediately followed by a new war of succession among the Princes even before his body was buried.<sup>1</sup> From this war Jahandar Shah emerged victorious and ascended the throne on 29 March 1712 at the age of fifty-two. His titles were Abul Fath, Muhammad Mu'iz-u'd-din, Jahandar Shah. The Emperor appointed Zulfiqar Khan, to whose zealous efforts he owed his crown, as the *wazir*, and retained his father, Asad Khan, in the office of *wakil-i mutlaq*.<sup>2</sup> Jahandar Shah greatly valued the opinions of the *wazir* on questions of political importance, and, by and large, acted on his advice regarding appointments, transfers and grants of *jagir*. What strengthened the *wazir's* grip over the administration was the Emperor's own lack of interest in its affairs because of his excessive indulgence in sensual pleasures.<sup>3</sup> Zulfiqar Khan, however, found himself faced with a strong opponent in Kokaltash Khan,<sup>4</sup> the *mir bakshi* and foster brother of the Emperor. He opposed the *wazir* in every matter and instigated the Emperor against him.<sup>5</sup> Another rival with whom the *wazir* had to deal was Lal Kunwar, the favourite mistress of the Emperor.<sup>6</sup> Her hold over the

<sup>1</sup> Bahadur Shah died at the age of seventy years, five months and twenty days. He ruled for a period of five years, one month and twenty-two days. When the war of succession was over, his dead body was brought to Delhi and buried in the courtyard of the 'Alamgiri mosque near the tomb of Khwajah Qutb-u'd-din Kaki. *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 29; *Later Mughals*, I, 135.

The four surviving sons of Bahadur Shah who fought for the throne were: (1) Jahandar Shah, (2) 'Azim-ush Shan, (3) Jahan Shah and (4) Rafi'-ush Shan. For details, *Later Mughals*, I, 158-160.

For details of this famous war of succession, *Tarikh-i Iradat Khan*, 85a; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 685-88; Kamraj, 'Ibrat Namah, ff. 45-46; *Jahandar Namah*, ff. 21-34; *Farrukh Namah*, ff. 40-60.

<sup>2</sup> The *mansabs* of Zulfiqar Khan and Asad Khan were increased to 10,000/10,000 and 12,000/12,000 respectively. Zulfiqar Khan retained the governorship of the Deccan and Asad Khan was appointed the governor of Gujarat. *Farrukh Namah*, f. 74a; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 446; *Jahandar Namah*, f. 34b; *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, f. 118b; *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 395.

<sup>3</sup> *Jahandar Namah*, f. 35; *Farrukh Namah*, f. 74a; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 446.

<sup>4</sup> His real name was 'Ali Murad. He was appointed *mir bakshi* with a *mansab* of 7,000/7,000 and the titles of Khan Jahan, Bahadur, Zafar Jang and Kokaltash Khan. Khwajah Hasan, his relative, became the second *bakshi* with the title of Khan-i Dauran. His rank was 5,000/5,000; and he was made *ataliq* of Prince A'z-u'd-din, the son of Jahandar Shah. *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, f. 118b; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 446; *Jahandar Namah*, f. 34a.

<sup>5</sup> Kamraj, 'Ibrat Namah, f. 46b; *History of the Deccan*, II, Part IV, 84.

<sup>6</sup> Lal Kunwar was a dancing girl who became Jahandar Shah's concubine before his accession to the throne. She was the daughter of Khasusiyat Khan, a descendant of Mian Tansen. Murtaza Husain, *Hadiqat-ul Aqalim*, 131. She was honoured with the title of Imtiyaz Mahal, and riches were bestowed on her. Some of her relations were promoted to *mansabs* of 4,000 and 5,000; elephants, drums, costly

## INTRODUCTION

Emperor's mind was strong enough to enable her to exercise great influence behind the scene. Though she was not allowed to interfere directly in any branch of the government or high matters of policy, yet the internal dissensions between the *wazir*, the *mir bakshi* and Lal Kunwar caused numerous splits among the nobles in the royal court.<sup>1</sup>

During his eleven months' rule, Jahandar Shah showed complete indifference to the affairs of the state and administrative business.<sup>2</sup> The general supervision and control over the administration was exercised by the *wazir* and the *mir bakshi*. In the words of a contemporary writer: "The Emperor's prestige was undermined and awe for him vanished from the hearts of the people."<sup>3</sup> The impression created on the minds of the people was that the king reigned but did not rule and that real power rested with the ministers.<sup>4</sup>

Jahandar Shah was rudely disturbed in his pursuit of pleasure by the revolt of Farrukh Siyar,<sup>5</sup> the son of 'Azim-ush Shan. Having enlisted the aid of the Saiyid brothers and backed by the resources of Chhabela Ram Nagar,<sup>6</sup> 'Ali Asghar Khan<sup>7</sup> and Muhammad Khan Bangash, Farrukh

*khil'ats* and jewels were awarded to them. *Farrukh Namah*, f. 74; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 446; *Jahandar Namah*, f. 37a. The appointment of her brother, Na'mat Khan, to the governorship of Multan was cancelled by the Emperor when Zulfiqar Khan objected to the appointment.

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 450.

<sup>2</sup> *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, f. 119a; Kamraj, 'Ibrat Namah, f. 46b; *Farrukh Namah*, f. 74a.

<sup>3</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, f. 365b; Nur-u'd-din, *Jahandar Namah*, f. 39a.

<sup>4</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 685; Shaf'i Warid, *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 44 Aligarh MS., 449, 457.

<sup>5</sup> Farrukh Siyar was at Patna when he heard the report of his father's death at Lahore in the war of succession. He soon proclaimed himself Emperor and immediately busied himself in hectic preparations for the success of his enterprise. Born on 11 September 1683 he was now in his thirtieth lunar year. For details of his early life and activities in Patna, see *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 707-708; Ahsan Ijad, *Farrukh Namah*, ff. 40a, 67-69, 73; Qasim Lahori, *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, ff. 45-50; Mirza Muhammad, 'Ibrat Namah, ff. 14-15; *Jahandar Namah*, ff. 40-42.

<sup>6</sup> Raja Chhabela Ram Nagar, son of Mehta (Bhagwati Prasad), belonged to a respectable family of Nagar Brahmans. He was born at Agra. His brother, Raja Daya Ram was a protégé of 'Azim-ush Shan who had given him a rank in the army and was killed in the battle of Lahore, fighting for the Prince. When Farrukh Siyar declared himself Emperor at Patna, Chhabela Ram was *faujdar* of Karra Manikpur. The Raja had rejected overtures made to him by Jahandar Shah and joined the standard of Farrukh Siyar who had sent him a *farman* to that effect. In the battle of Agra he played a conspicuous part, and after the victory he was raised to a great position by the Emperor. *Farrukh Siyar Namah*, ff. 71-72; 'Ajaib-ul Afaq, 14, 28, 33.

<sup>7</sup> 'Ali Asghar Khan was the *faujdar* of Etawah. He deserted the army of Prince A'z-u'd-din and threw in his lot with Farrukh Siyar. He paid Rs. 5 lakhs and received the title of Khan-i Zaman. *Farrukh Siyar Namah*, f. 71a.

Siyar marched on Delhi from Patna to fight for the Mughal throne.<sup>1</sup> In a battle that ensued on 10 January 1713, near Agra, Jahandar Shah was defeated and his army scattered.<sup>2</sup> The crestfallen king returned to Delhi to consult Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan on the future course of action; but they imprisoned their former overlord and delivered him up to the agents of the victor.<sup>3</sup> However, this base ingratitude did not mollify Farrukh Siyar who held Zulfiqar Khan primarily responsible for the fall of his father 'Azim-ush Shan and the murder of his brother, Muhammad Karim. On 11 February 1713, both Jahandar Shah and Zulfiqar Khan were put to death with great cruelty.<sup>4</sup> Next day Farrukh Siyar made his entry into Delhi and took possession of the royal palace.

In recognition of their assistance the Saiyid brothers were exalted to high positions and important executive powers were placed in their hands. Farrukh Siyar appointed Husain 'Ali Khan, the *mir bakshi*, with the rank of 7,000/7,000 and the governorship of Bihar; and he made 'Abdullah Khan, the *wazir*, with the rank of 7,000/7,000 and the *subedari* of Multan.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the Saiyid brothers attained to the fullness of power to which their right was derived from the major role they had played in the war of succession. Farrukh Siyar's revolt against the reigning monarch, without the requisite resources was a rash enterprise; his success had been due entirely to the resourcefulness and daring of the Saiyid brothers. This fact more than any other accounted for the arrogance in their attitude towards

<sup>1</sup> Muhammad Khan Bangash was a soldier of fortune who had established his power in the district of Farrukhabad. His family belonged to the Kaghazai Kartai clan of the Bangash country in eastern Afghanistan. Born at Qaimganj, Muhammad Khan started his career as a mercenary soldier; he soon rose to prominence and attracted the attention of Farrukh Siyar who was in search of allies. After the battle of Agra, the leader of the Bangash Afghans became the governor of Allahabad. For details of his biographical account, vide "Bangash Nawabs of Farukhabad," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1878-79; Mir Wali-ullah, *Tarikh-i Farrukhabad*; Faiz Bakhsh, *Tarikh-i Farah Bakhsh*.

<sup>2</sup> The best detailed description of Farrukh Siyar's march from Patna to Allahabad and from there to Agra is given by Ahsan Ijad in *Farrukh Namah*, ff. 69-90. For details of the battle, see *Farrukh Namah*, ff. 92-102; *Jahandar Namah*, ff. 49-59.

<sup>3</sup> Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Namah*, ff. 17-19.

<sup>4</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, 732-735; *Jahandar Namah*, ff. 60-61.

<sup>5</sup> The titles of Husain 'Ali Khan were: Amir-ul Umara, Bahadur and Firoz Jang; while those of 'Abdullah Khan were: Qutbul-Mulk, Yar Waf'adar and Zafar Jang. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 728. According to Yahya Khan, the Emperor did not want to make 'Abdullah Khan the *wazir*. This post he had reserved for Ahmed Beg, a *Khanazad* noble. He offered 'Abdullah Khan the post of *wakil-i mutlag* which he refused to accept on the ground that the office had long ceased to function. *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, 119b, 122a.

the Emperor. They began to act independently and regardless of the Emperor's authority. In fact, they considered him as their creature. Abdullah Khan felt himself entitled to assign important jobs to his own men and override the choice of the Emperor. He appointed Amjad Khan the *sadr-us-sadur* and Lutfullah Khan Sadiq the *diwan-i khalisa* while the Emperor had given these posts to Afzal Khan and Chhabela Ram Nagar respectively. A difficult situation arose which was surmounted by a compromise between the supporters of the rival appointees. Lutfullah Khan became the *diwan* and Afzal Khan took charge of the *sadarat*. Chhabela Ram Nagar had to content himself with the *subedari* of Agra which did not satisfy his ambition.<sup>1</sup>

This bold assertion by the *wazir* of what he considered to be his right was an attack on the royal privilege and an affront to the authority of the king. Farrukh Siyar took alarm at the defiant attitude which, in his opinion, boded ill for the prestige of the monarchy. He resolved to make his authority decisive and reduce the *wazir* to the position of an instrument of the royal will. He was encouraged in this policy by those among his personal devotees and the *Khanazad* nobles who resented their own exclusion from positions of power and privilege. Instead of open and direct action to achieve his aims, the Emperor employed the method of under-cover proceedings against the overpowerful ministers. As the bent of his character lay in the direction of intrigue, he followed this method throughout his reign. This predilection for intrigue and obsessive fear of an armed clash ultimately discredited his whole policy and led him to disaster.

On 28 February 1719, Farrukh Siyar was arrested by Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan. He was cruelly blinded and thrown into a cell of the Tripoliya in the fort.<sup>2</sup> The Saiyid brothers now reached the apogee of their power. They now had complete control of affairs and began to exercise authority in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Rafi'-u'd Darajat, whom they seated on the throne, was only a shadowy figure, confined within the four walls of the palace. He was seldom, if ever, allowed to come out and meet the people; even his meals were served with the permission of his tutor, Himmat Khan, a Barha Saiyid. The fort and royal apartments were occupied by soldiers and officers whom the Saiyids could fully trust. Consumptive and addicted to opium, Rafi'-u'd Darajat rapidly declined in health. Realizing that his end was near, he expressed the wish to abdicate if his elder brother Rafi'-u'd Daulah, was raised to the throne. This was done and Rafi'-u'd Daulah was placed on the throne on 6 June 1719.

<sup>1</sup> *Farrukh Siyar Namah*, ff. 125a, 131a; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 729-30.

<sup>2</sup> For details of the harrowing events in connection with his deposition, see *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, ff. 74-78; Mirza Muhammad, *'Ibrat Namah*, Patna MS., ff. 116-118; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 534-540; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 800-810.

Rafi'-u'd Daulah also was a puppet in the hands of the Saiyids. "His comings and goings, his appearance in the audience hall, what he ate and what he wore, his every act was under the control of Himmat Khan Barha. He was not allowed to attend the public prayers on Friday, to go for hunting, or to converse with any of the nobles, unless one of the two Saiyids or his guardian was present."<sup>1</sup> Like his predecessor, Rafi'-u'd Daulah suffered from consumption, and was addicted to opium. He could not survive an attack of diarrhoea and died after a brief reign of four months and sixteen days on 18 September 1719.

These successive crises caused by the civil wars gradually weakened the central government while the recurrent strife of rival factions of nobles tore the ruling class apart. Under the strain of war, the strict rules and regulations in the government departments broke down; appointments to posts of responsibility were made, not in recognition of merit or efficiency, but for narrow and immediate factional considerations. The Saiyid brothers lacked vision and their administrative talents were not of a high order. They had neither the capacity nor the desire to set right the machinery of government and get rid of its many abuses. The habitual sloth and easy going dilatory methods of 'Abdullah Khan caused laxity in the functions of the Revenue Department which was run by Ratan Chand, his *diwan*.<sup>2</sup> Ratan Chand made a large fortune through illegal means; he appointed incompetent persons to high posts; and he interfered in the work of officers employed in other departments.<sup>3</sup> The practice of plurality, i.e. one person holding several appointments simultaneously, came into vogue. Assignments made in this slipshod manner and out of factional considerations soon threw the whole administrative machinery out of gear. Rapid promotions, sudden transfers and dismissals of public servants became the order of the day. The phenomenal rise of Murad Kashmiri from a *mansab* of 2,500 to 7,000/7,000 and from the post of third *mir tuzak* to the governorship of Muradabad is a typical example of such appointments. This man held the posts of second *mir tuzak*, *daroghah* of mace-bearers, head officer of *khawasan* (pages) in addition to the *subedari* of Muradabad.<sup>4</sup> 'Inayatullah Khan Kashmiri worked at the centre as *diwan-i khalisa-wa tan*, besides holding the *subedari* of Kashmir.<sup>5</sup> Mir Jumla<sup>6</sup> and Nusrat Khan<sup>7</sup> were each assigned more than two posts. In his second regnal year, Farrukh

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 816, 829, 830.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 773, 775.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 739.

<sup>4</sup> Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Namah*, ff. 80-85.

<sup>5</sup> Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Namah*, f. 71a.

<sup>6</sup> Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Namah*, ff. 35, 51.

<sup>7</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, 342b.



Siyar appointed Shahamat Khan governor of Gujarat, but within a fortnight he was replaced by Daud Khan.<sup>1</sup> During his reign of seven years at least seven successive appointments were made to the post of *mir atash* or commander of artillery alone.<sup>2</sup>

## B. FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

The Mughal government faced major financial problems during the decade following the death of Aurangzeb. The four wars of succession waged during these years proved a serious drain on the financial resources of the government. Every war entailed a great diversion of resources to military uses, putting a severe strain upon the already depleted treasury. The disasters of battle and plunder told heavily on all classes. Problems of post-war adjustment deepened the economic crisis which had for long gripped the Empire. Aurangzeb's successors made no real attempt to repair the ravages of successive wars. Nothing was done either to extend the areas of the *khalisa* lands or restore the efficiency of the *jagirdari* system. With a large and rising court expenditure whatever money flowed into the treasury was squandered on personal comforts and the luxuries of the court. Owing to disturbed conditions, provincial treasuries were overburdened by administration costs leaving hardly any balance to be remitted to the royal exchequer.

Aurangzeb's prolonged warfare with the Marathas had necessitated a great increase in the number of *mansabdars* who acquired *jagirs* in lieu of pay. This new influx which included a large number of nobles of the Deccan into the government and economy changed the economic situation in the last quarter of the seventeenth century by greatly increasing the pressure on the land. As the number of assignees multiplied, it became hard to find the land for allotment. Aurangzeb is reported to have remarked that while areas available for assignment were few, the claimants formed a crowd.<sup>3</sup> This difficult situation was aggravated by the prodigality of Bahadur Shah who recklessly bestowed *mansabs* without any regard to the land available. In the words of a contemporary, "Too large a number of Hindus and Muslims obtained jobs. The generous king rejected no application for the grant of new *mansabs* and increased the ranks of existing incumbents three

<sup>1</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, 341a.

<sup>2</sup> The following persons held this post: Ghazi-u'd-din Khan Ghalib Jang, Samsam-u'd Daulah Khan-i Dauran, Ibrahim-u'd-din Khan, Salabat Khan, Afrasiyab Khan, Ghulam 'Ali Khan and Sayid Khan Jahan. *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, ff. 347b, 350b, 352, 348b, 360b.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 602.

or four fold."<sup>1</sup> But these new *mansabs* existed only on paper; there were no *jagirs* to go with them. This resulted in great distress to the holders who received no pay. Small *mansabdars*, in particular, lived in utter poverty.<sup>2</sup> Even as early as the reign of Bahadur Shah when the full effects of these new factors had not taken effect and the financial resources of the government were still relatively large, difficulty was experienced by his government in meeting its expenditure.

During his march from Kabul to Agra, Bahadur Shah had taken possession of the money available in the provincial treasuries and spent it for mobilization and military operations. During his reign of about five years, according to Khafi Khan, he spent no less than Rs. 83 crores.<sup>3</sup> In addition to this, his government was still realizing revenues due to the crown from different parts of the Empire. Salim-ullah, the author of *Tarikh-i Bangala*, states that Ja'afar Khan, *diwan* of Bengal, was remitting the revenues to the central government regularly every year.<sup>4</sup> From one entry in *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i* we may infer that 'Abdul Hamid Khan, *diwan* of Gujarat, was also regular in sending the money to the court.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, all these revenues did not suffice to meet the expenditure of the Emperor. He could not pay the salaries of the soldiers and had to depend on 'Azim-ush Shan's treasury for day-to-day expenses of the court.<sup>6</sup>

The measures of reform in the system of assignment undertaken by Islam Khan and Musta'id Khan were resisted by the *mansabdars* as well as the *wazir* and the king who did not attach any importance to the need of such reform.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, these were merely designed to curb the uncontrolled influx of new job-seekers, they did not envisage any reduction in the privileges of big *mansabdars* who had already grabbed extensive and lucrative *jagirs*. There existed a disparity between big and small *mansab*-holders which threatened the balance and efficiency of the whole system at a time of acute *paibaqi* scarcity. No attempt was made to tackle the basic

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 601, 627.

<sup>2</sup> Kamraj, *Ibrat Namah*, f. 41a.

<sup>3</sup> Bahadur Shah took out Rs. 40 lakhs from the treasury of Lahore, Rs. 28 lakhs from Sirhind and Rs. 30 lakhs from Delhi. In the fort of Agra, he found Rs. 9 crores out of which Rs. 4 crores were distributed among generals and Princes to clear the arrears of pay of the soldiers and as advance of pay to new recruits. His son 'Azim-ush Shan is reported to have brought for him from Bengal Rs. 9 crores, part of which was also used to meet the expenses of the army. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 574, 576, 577, 578.

<sup>4</sup> Salim Ullah, *Tarikh-i Bangala*, Aligarh MS., 61-62.

<sup>5</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, f. 319a; *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, 385-394.

<sup>6</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 684.

<sup>7</sup> For details of these reforms and causes of their failure, see *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 629-630.

problem of disparity in holdings or to enlarge the *khalisa* areas as any reform in this direction would have involved fundamental adjustments in the social order. The result was the perpetuation of the financial problem of the state and the continuance of widespread distress among the rank and file of the *mansabdars*.

During the eleven months of Jahandar Shah's reign, financial conditions deteriorated further.<sup>1</sup> This is evidenced by the emergency measures adopted by him to raise troops and supplies for war. He hastily collected an army of 1,00,000 to stave off the attack on the capital by Farrukh Siyar. He had not only to meet the claims of the fresh levies but also to pay off the long-standing arrears of salary to the old soldiers. Whatever cash was available in the central treasury was used up first, then gold vessels and other precious articles, stores of rich cloth and carpets were distributed among the soldiers to be sold in the market. Even ceilings plated with gold were broken up and store houses within the fort were cleared of their contents to furnish troops with money and arms.<sup>2</sup> This vandalism marked the last stages of bankruptcy and was symptomatic of the desperate financial situation. Nevertheless, his lavish expenditure on frivolous amusements and largesse to favourites continued and completed the financial ruin of the government.<sup>3</sup>

Soon after his accession Farrukh Siyar issued orders to governors and officers to send the revenues they had collected since the death of Aurangzeb.<sup>4</sup> The substantial money thus acquired enabled him to make his way from insolvency to comparative affluence. He utilized his new resources to finance military expeditions against rebels and reward his supporters liberally. He was also able to raise the prestige of the crown by maintaining appropriate dignity and splendour in public appearances in the court. In the beginning of 1714, for instance, the Emperor directed Hussain 'Ali Khan to quell the revolt of Ajit Singh, and gave him Rs. 3 crores to cover the expenses. The *mir bakshi* regularly received *hundies* from the court during the course of operations.<sup>5</sup> The imperial forces were simultaneously engaged in a costly war with the Sikhs and In'am Khan Bahadur with 7,000 Mughal horse, was despatched to reinforce 'Abdul Samad Khan, the governor of the Punjab against them. The salary of his troops was ordered to be paid from the treasury of Sirhind.<sup>6</sup> In the same year, Raja Jai Singh, governor of Malwa, was sent to put down Churaman

<sup>1</sup> *Jahandar Namah*, ff. 21-34.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 474.

<sup>3</sup> *History of Deccan*, II, Part IV, 81; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 472.

<sup>4</sup> Qasim Aurangabadi, *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, B.M. MS., f. 60b.

<sup>5</sup> *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, ff. 62-64.

<sup>6</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, ff. 62-64.

Jat who was in revolt and a large amount of money was placed at his disposal. The fighting continued for twenty months and the Emperor not only sent money to the general regularly but also paid Rs. 50 thousand per month to Sanjar Khan, and Shamsher Khan, wardens of the imperial highway, during the course of the operation.<sup>1</sup>

Adequate and regular provision of money ensured the success of the imperial forces in these three important campaigns of the reign.<sup>2</sup> Raja Ajit Singh sued for peace and surrendered; the Sikhs proved no match for the king's superior cavalry and artillery and suffered defeat.<sup>3</sup> The Jats were forced to submit to the dictates of the government<sup>4</sup> and Churaman Jat had to deposit Rs. 50 lakhs in the royal exchequer and give Rs. 30 lakhs as a present to the Emperor. The authority of the crown was re-established and the monarch grew in stature.<sup>5</sup>

There is, however, another aspect of Farrukh Siyar's policy which tended to aggravate the financial problem of the state. The inordinate grant of *mansabs* to a very large number of people continued unabated, resulting in the alienation of *khalisa* lands with concomitant decline in the state revenues. According to Mirza Muhammad, even the clerks in the offices of *diwan*, *bakshi* and *khansaman* were granted ranks and *jagirs*.<sup>6</sup> Another contemporary writer complains that undeserving persons from towns and villages secured jobs in the government.<sup>7</sup> The numerous others, who had accompanied Farrukh Siyar from Bengal, Bihar and Awadh, were absorbed in the administration.<sup>8</sup> Similar was the rise of Kashmiris to lucrative posts which hurt the pride of the older nobility.<sup>9</sup> The large increase in the number of *mansabdars* may be inferred from the following list.<sup>10</sup> We find from it that in Farrukh Siyar's reign the number of *mansabdars* holding the rank of 7,000, 6,000 and 5,000 was twenty, twenty-

<sup>1</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 14b; *Akhbarat*, dated 18 September 1715, 20 March and 31 August 1716.

<sup>2</sup> For details of this campaign, *vide* Mirza Muhammad, '*Ibrat Namah*', Patna MS., ff. 59-60.

<sup>3</sup> For details of fighting with the Sikhs, *vide* Irvine, W., *Later Mughals*, I, 307-317.

<sup>4</sup> For details of Raja Jai Singh's expedition against Churaman Jat, *vide* *Akhbarat*, Sitamau Collection, Vol. 12, dated 4, 12, January 1717, April 17, May 20, 1717, and Jai Singh's letter to 'Abdullah Khan, the *vazir*, dated March 1718.

<sup>5</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 14a.

<sup>6</sup> '*Ibrat Namah*', f. 70b.

<sup>7</sup> Kamraj, '*Ibrat Namah*', f. 54b.

<sup>8</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 3.

<sup>9</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 771, 793.

<sup>10</sup> List of *Mansabdars* of Farrukh Siyar holding the ranks of 5,000 and above, 1713-1719.

TABLE A

LIST OF *MANSABDARS* HOLDING RANKS OF 5,000 AND ABOVE DURING THE REIGN OF FARRUKH SIYAR

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Rank</i>
1.	S. Husain 'Ali Khan	7,000	1.	Sa'adat Khan	6,000	1.	Mir Muhammad Mehdi	5,000
2.	S. 'Abadullah Khan	7,000	2.	Mir Muhammad Amin	6,000	2.	Muh. Ja'afar Shirazi	5,000
3.	Khan-i Dauran	7,000	3.	Raja Chhatrasal Bundela	6,000	3.	Ghalib Khan	5,000
4.	Taqqarub Khan	7,000	4.	Raja Mukham Singh	6,000	4.	Muh. Kazim	5,000
5.	Daud Khan Panni	7,000	5.	Zafar Khan	6,000	5.	Sanjar Khan	5,000
6.	Abdur Ra'uf Khan	7,000	6.	'Aziz Khan Bahadur	6,000	6.	Afrasiyab Khan	5,000
7.	Hidayatullah	7,000	7.	Muhammad Khan Bangash	6,000	7.	M. Yar Khan	5,000
8.	Ghazi-u'd-din Ghalib Jang	7,000	8.	Mahmud Khan	6,000	8.	Qamr-u'd-din Khan	5,000
9.	Murad Kashmiri	7,000				9.	Khan Zaman Bahadur	5,000
10.	Nasir Khan	7,000				10.	Budh Singh	5,000
11.	Raja Ajit Singh	7,000				11.	Churaman Jat	5,000
12.	Mir Jumla	7,000				12.	Islam Khan	5,000
13.	Raja Jai Singh	7,000				13.	Hafiz M. Afzal	5,000
14.	Rana Sangram Singh	7,000				14.	Abhay Singh	5,000
15.	Murshid Quli Khan	7,000				15.	S. Khan Jahan	5,000
16.	'Abdul Samad Khan	7,000				16.	Farzand Khan	5,000
17.	Sarbuland Khan	7,000				17.	Maharana Bhim Singh	5,000
18.	Nizam-ul Mulk	7,000				18.	Asadullah Khan	5,000
19.	Raja Chhabela Ram	7,000				19.	Maharana Budh Singh	5,000
20.	Zafar Khan Rustam Jang	7,000				20.	Amin-u'd-din Khan Bahadur	5,000
						21.	Raja Girdhar Bahadur	5,000
						22.	Raja Ratan Chand	5,000

eight, twenty-two respectively. It was in sharp contrast to the number of *mansabdars* holding the same ranks in the first twenty years of the reign of Aurangzeb, when only six *mansabdars* held the rank of 7,000 *zat*, twelve of 6,000 *zat*, and thirty-three of 5,000 *zat*.<sup>1</sup>

By the beginning of the fifth regnal year, not only the *khalisa* but most of the *paibaqi* lands appear to have been engrossed by big nobles and influential courtiers, and Farrukh Siyar found himself faced with serious financial difficulties. In that year, he was unable to assign *jagirs* even to his *wala shahi* troops and on the suggestion of Lutfullah Khan Sadiq, *diwan-i khalisa-wa tan*, decided instead to give salaries in cash to the *mansabdars* of 40 to 900 *zat* and to his 7,000 to 8,000 *wala shahi* troops at the rate of Rs. 50 per month provided they got their horses branded at the muster. These *mansabdars* and soldiers continued to serve the government in the hope of *jagirs* and salaries. But after a year they had to be summarily dismissed with their salaries still unpaid. It appears that not only had the income from the *khalisa* declined but the payment of revenues from provinces was also made only in part.<sup>2</sup>

With the evidence available at present, it is difficult to ascertain precisely the amount of money from the *khalisa* that was remitted by the governors to the imperial treasury. However, the information about Bengal revenues seems to be ample and authentic. Murshid Quli Khan, the governor of Bengal, augmented *khalisa* income by undertaking major reforms in the land revenue assessment and collection. He deprived the defaulting *zamindars* of their holdings and engaged experienced and trustworthy Bengali *amils* on contract in each *mahal* and *chakla* to collect the revenue. Both the cultivated and fallow lands were measured village by village, plot by plot, and *ra'iyat* by *ra'iyat* with the help of *shiqdars*, *amins*, *karkuns* and *jaribdars*. These officers prepared a comprehensive statement of the past and present revenues and a draft schedule of probable income from each revenue unit. He made sustained efforts to encourage cultivation and the collection of the revenues was made with great vigour.<sup>3</sup> By these ingenious methods, the income of the *khalisa* was increased to Rs. 1 crore and 50 lakhs per annum.<sup>4</sup> He was now able to remit the money acquired from the *khalisa* to the royal exchequer regularly. The details of annual remittances from Bengal are recorded in a Persian document on which James Grant has based his analysis of revenue collection in the province. It states that the amount of Rs. 16,51,00,306-10-6 was sent to the centre from Bengal for

<sup>1</sup> Athar Ali, *Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb*, Appendix, 175-179.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 769.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Bangala*, 31, 36. For details of his reforms vide, *The History of Bengal*, Dacca, 1848, Vol. II, 409-413; 'Abdul Karim, *Murshid Quli Khan and His Times*, Dacca, 1963, 77-87.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Bangala*, 36, 43, 50.

fifteen years nine months and five days, comprising the period from the first regnal year of Farrukh Siyar to the ninth year of Muhammad Shah's reign. Computed, the yearly payment comes approximately to Rs. 10,471,174-15-5.<sup>1</sup> The incident in which Mir Jumla seized Rs. 1,80,00,000 being remitted by Murshid Quli Khan to Delhi shows that at least the same amount as given in the relevant document was annually remitted to the central treasury.<sup>2</sup> Shaf'ī Warid clearly states that one crore of rupees was the annual remittance from the treasury of Bengal.<sup>3</sup> The punctual remittance of the royal dues won the admiration of the Mughal Emperor and as a consequence strengthened the governor's hold over the province.<sup>4</sup>

As regards other provinces, the source-material is too scanty to throw any light on the subject. Perhaps in no other part of the Empire were land reforms of the kind made in Bengal planned or carried out during this period. Frequent transfers of the governors, their deep involvement in court intrigues, lack of interest in revenue administration and venality of local officers were mainly responsible for their failure to develop the real taxable capacity of the areas under their control. Matters were made worse by additional burdens arbitrarily imposed by the centre on the provincial treasuries. This situation was clearly reflected in the prevailing state of affairs in Gujarat and the Deccan where the first symptoms of financial instability were unmistakably discernible. For instance, Farrukh Siyar in his first regnal year appointed Shahamat Khan governor of Gujarat but soon replaced him by Daud Khan Panni who in his turn governed the province only for two years, 1713-1715. During his brief term of office, Shahamat Khan appropriated to himself as much of the state revenues as he could and even withheld the payment of salaries to the soldiers. Daud Khan was a simple soldier and he showed no interest in the details of routine financial business. In 1715, he was replaced by Ajit Singh with

<sup>1</sup> *Persian Revenue Records of Bengal*, B.M. MS. 6586, Aligarh Rotograph, f. 47. The figures of the *Persian Revenue Records* exactly correspond with those given by James Grant in his, "Analysis of the Finances of Bengal", *The Fifth Report*, Calcutta, 1917, II, 213.

<sup>2</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 5a; Mirza Muhammad writes that Mir Jumla distributed Rs. 30 lakhs out of the Bengal treasure among his soldiers. The reports of this high-handed act angered Farrukh Siyar who immediately dismissed Mir Jumla and appointed Murshid Quli Khan to the post of governor. This happened in 1715. 'Ibrat Nama, f. 46a.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 467.

<sup>4</sup> Besides the regular payment of *khalisa* income Murshid Quli Khan despatched large amounts of money as presents to Farrukh Siyar. On the occasion of the Emperor's marriage he offered Rs. 4 lakhs; when Prince Jahan Murad Shah was born the court received Rs. 10 lakhs and one thousand, and five hundred *ashrafis* from him. According to another entry Rs. 16 lakhs sent by the governor was deposited in the government treasury, *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghata'i*, ff. 350, 356,

Haider Quli Khan as *diwan* of the province.<sup>1</sup> Ajit Singh, instead of trying to improve the financial situation which was steadily deteriorating, extorted money by force and his subordinates made illegal exactions and oppressed the people. Numerous complaints against his misrule were made to the Emperor who replaced him by Khan-i Dauran on 2 May 1717.<sup>2</sup> It was during this period that the province was visited by a severe famine.<sup>3</sup> Throughout the reign of Farrukh Siyar, the treasury of Ahmadabad was burdened with the responsibility of discharging administrative costs<sup>4</sup> as well as making cash grants for charitable purposes.<sup>5</sup> The result was that the governors could remit only very small amounts of money, after deducting civil and military expenditure, to the central government.

The financial situation in the Deccan was equally unsatisfactory. The Marathas had quickly recovered from the blows inflicted by Aurangzeb and they soon extended their control over large parts of the imperial territories in the Deccan. The governors appointed after Aurangzeb's death made only feeble attempts to resist the Maratha demands of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*. Daud Khan Panni, deputy to Zulfiqar Khan, arrived at a compromise arrangement with the Maratha authorities in the Deccan according to which the Marathas would not claim the *chauth* from the *jagirs* of Daud Khan and the Princes. As regards other *jagirs*, the deputy viceroy undertook the responsibility of collecting the *chauth* and paying it directly to Raja Shahu. This arrangement worked well but it brought no relief to small *mansabdars* who paid *chauth* and the cultivators who paid

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 399-401. Former governors like Ghazi-u'd-din Khan and Shahamat Khan had also assumed the administration of *khalisa* and *paibaqi* lands, which was the exclusive function of the *diwan*, and rendered no accounts to the central exchequer for the revenues which they derived from these lands. Imperial orders had to be issued that administration of *khalisa* and *paibaqi* was the exclusive preserve of the *diwan* and the governor should not be allowed to exercise his control over these areas. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 409.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 412-413.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 10, 11, 12.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 18, 19.

<sup>5</sup> 'Abdul Hamid Khan, deputy to Daud Khan, sought the royal permission to take Rs. 1,00,000 from the treasury of Ahmadabad to pay off the outstanding arrears of soldiers. Shariat Khan, *diwan* of the province, received instructions from the court to advance Rs. 50,000 as cash assistance to the brother of Darak Das on the security of Muhkam Singh, provided he joined Husain 'Ali Khan then engaged in fighting with Ajit Singh. Moreover, an additional amount of Rs. 40,000 was to be given to Muhkam Singh, *diwan* of Husain 'Ali Khan. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 404.

The Sharif of Mecca was paid Rs. 1,00,000 from the treasury of Surat; while Rs. 5,00,000 were given to the needy in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina from the treasury of Ahmadabad. The learned and the pious like Maulana Nur-u'd-din and the descendants of Shaikh Wajih-u'd-din also obtained grants of varying amounts. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 19.



*sardeshmukhi* to the Maratha agents directly. The next governor, Nizam-ul Mulk, appointed by Farrukh Siyar in 1713, stood for a vigorous policy towards the Marathas and repudiated the settlement made by his predecessors. He ordered *faujdar*s and *zildar*s to oust the agents of Raja Shahu from Aurangabad and other places. But these measures led to a clash with the Marathas and Nizam-ul Mulk failed to check the menace and the Marathas continued to extort *chauth* from every *mahal* in the areas which they had come to control.<sup>1</sup>

However, Nizam-ul Mulk is credited with having abolished a number of cesses like *zila'dari*, *rahadari*, and *faujdari*, though the officers in their own selfish interest did not desist from exacting them illegally.<sup>2</sup> It appears, however, that he did succeed in collecting tributes from the *zamindar*s, for on his return to the capital on 13 June 1715, he was able to deposit Rs. 11,00,000 in the royal treasury.<sup>3</sup> The *diwan* of Karnatak, Sa'adat-ullah Khan also on one occasion sent Rs. 11,40,000 and on another Rs. 25,00,000 to the central exchequer.<sup>4</sup>

These facts would show that while civil and military expenditure in the provinces swelled due to political disorders, mismanagement and confusion in revenue collection led to a sharp decline in the receipts of the central exchequer. Moreover, at the centre, corruption was rampant in the revenue department. The *wazir*, his henchmen as well as his staff, felt no scruples in amassing private fortunes through bribery and misappropriation.<sup>5</sup> Above all, the system of farming out of *khalisa mahals* further decreased the imperial revenues and adversely affected the interest of hereditary middlemen in the *parganas*.<sup>6</sup> On one hand the conflict between the Emperor and his ministers defeated all attempts to solve fiscal problems of the government through reform, on the other, the condition of the people steadily deteriorated throughout the period due to steep rise in the prices of food grains and other commodities.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 742, 743, 744, 745.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 748.

<sup>3</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghata'i*, f. 349a.

<sup>4</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghata'i*, ff. 343, 344.

<sup>5</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 775, 776.

<sup>6</sup> *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, f. 123b.

<sup>7</sup> In the first year of Farrukh Siyar's reign, the prices of wheat, rice and pulses were extraordinarily high. For one rupee only three *seers* of these grains could be purchased. *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, f. 122a. According to Qasim Aurangabadi, famine conditions prevailed everywhere in the Deccan and only four *seers* of wheat could be had for one rupee. The gold and silver coins could be seen only in the royal treasury and in the shops of goldsmiths. This crisis continued for three years. *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 62. In 1718 due to drought a severe famine afflicted the province of Gujarat. Even *bajra* was sold four *seers* for a rupee, and even that was not available in the market, causing great misery to the people. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 18.

## C. RIVAL FACTIONS AT THE COURT

The Mughal nobles formed a permanent body of administrators who were trained to conduct the affairs of government both civil and military at different levels. As a class, they professed no common social or political ideals. Their interests were confined to the administrative machinery of which they were the important parts and their sole aim was self-aggrandisement. Their role was purely that of instruments for the execution of imperial policy. Nevertheless, big nobles influenced the mind of the Emperor and had their say in shaping the state policies. This influence became dominant when weak Emperors sat on the throne. The nobles exerted a considerable cultural influence on the manners and mode of life of the people and played their part in the easing of various kinds of local tensions in the areas under their jurisdiction. It was to this class that society owed the remarkable development of art and literature which was the glory of the Mughal age. The nobility provided the monarchy with a strong base and furnished society with leadership in politics and culture.

The Mughal nobility was a heterogenous mass, composed of diverse nationalities and religions. The component elements represented several distinct modes of life and thought. Its structure was the result of organic growth through the process of reciprocal assimilation between its diverse components. The prospect of material advancement and generous patronage especially for efficient and capable men attracted a very large number of foreigners. Streams of emigrants flowed from Persia, regions of Trans-Oxiana, Arabia and North Africa, poured into Mughal India. Those who distinguished themselves in the services of the Mughal court acquired status and large fortunes. The constant influx kept continually changing the complexion of the nobility, but at the same time, the fresh elements went on adapting their manners and traditions to the new environment.

The people who migrated from Central Asia belonged to the Turko-Mongol race, spoke the Turkish language and generally professed the Sunni creed. They were known as Turanis. The immigrants from Persia, called Iranis, spoke the Persian language and generally belonged to the Shi'a sect. However, the term 'Mughal' in common parlance, was applied collectively to both the Turanis and Iranis; for they closely resembled in appearance, possessed similar traits of social behaviour and similar cultural attitudes, and manifested common prejudices towards other ethnic groups. The Mughals held the preeminent position in the bureaucratic machinery and showed remarkable political capacity. The Afghans stood on a different level in the racial stratifications of the nobility. For centuries before the advent of the Mughals, the Afghan tribes had crossed the Indus and spread over large parts of the northern and eastern plains of India where they established colonies, founded dynasties and enjoyed supreme

power. Their political predominance, however, ended with the advent of the Mughals. For nearly a century after the consolidation of the Mughal rule, the Afghans were barred from services and privileges and their fortunes sank low. They smarted under the yoke of their superior adversary. With the passage of time, suspicion and hatred began to disappear and the Afghans gradually regained their former influence in the reign of Aurangzeb who appointed them to important positions especially in the army. Under the later Mughals, the Afghans served as soldiers, petty officers and *fauj-dars*; but no Afghan noble rose to the rank of a minister in the central government, and only few held the *mansabs* of 5,000 *zat*. Another element in the composition of the nobility was that of the Indian Muslims who were either the descendants of local converts or those whose ancestors had come from outside but had for long settled in India. This group constituted a numerical minority in the superior cadres of official employments. By the first half of the eighteenth century, the Indian Muslims had gained ascendancy; the Saiyid brothers who belonged to this category held two supreme offices of the Empire and exercised immense power. A fourth element was that of Rajput and other Hindu nobles who were given high ranks during this period. At the centre, Hindus served as ministers in the civil departments, or secretaries to ministers, and *wakils* of governors, while they had almost a monopoly of a very large number of clerical jobs. Murshid Quli Khan appointed a large number of Hindus to many lucrative posts, both civil and military, in Bengal.

The great Mughal Emperors endeavoured to weld these heterogenous elements into a unified whole. By opening new and large horizons for their talents and energies, they made the nobles loyal to the crown and forged a bond of unity among them. The life-styles, behaviour and manners of the nobles were shaped into a common mould. Strong traditions of mutual goodwill and tolerance thus developed in the imperial services, cut across all ethnic differences and prevented sharp cleavages in its ranks along either racial or religious lines. In the troubled period that followed the death of Aurangzeb, serious cracks began to appear in the system. Behind this facade of cultural homogeneity, the ethnic substratum remained unchanged. With the weakening of the central authority, the nobility lost its cohesion and was rent asunder by the differences of race and language and split up into rival groups, each pitted against the other in the struggle for supremacy. The later Mughals failed to curb the particularist tendencies within its ranks, or to inspire or rally the nobles to the defence of the Empire against the dangers which threatened it.

### *The Irani Nobles*

At the turn of the eighteenth century, the Irani nobles held positions of influence and power and some of the top echelons in the imperial

hierarchy belonged to this ethnic group. The Irani nobles enjoyed esteem in the intellectual circles and their own contribution to the growth of art and literature was considerable. In the reign of Aurangzeb, the two supreme offices of the Empire, *wizarat* and *mir bakhshi*, were occupied by two prominent Irani nobles, Asad Khan and his son Zulfiqar Khan. A'zam Shah, who proclaimed himself Emperor on 14 March 1707, retained both father and son in these offices and maintained the numerical strength of the Irani *mansabdars* in the army.<sup>1</sup>

As already stated, the career of Zulfiqar Khan followed an opportunist and self-centred course during the years 1707-1713. The appointment of Mun'im Khan to the post of *wizarat* struck a severe blow to the power and prestige of this Irani family. Although Asad Khan was exalted to the office of *wakil-i mutlaq* and Zulfiqar Khan allowed to continue as *mir bakhshi*, they were gnawed by a sense of frustration and constantly strove to regain their hold on the levers of power. The second civil war provided Zulfiqar Khan with the opportunity he was seeking of retrieving his fortunes and he threw himself frantically into the struggle. The war ended in his favour and the fruit of his adroitness and courage was the office of *wizarat* which restored his family to its former ascendancy. But he was governed purely by personal ambition and no policy issues or the general interests of the Irani community were involved in the struggle for supremacy. 'Azim-ush Shan, who was defeated, had received support from all sections of the nobility—the Iranis, Turanis, Afghans and Rajputs.<sup>2</sup>

The group of Zulfiqar Khan did not represent the aspirations of the Irani nobles as a whole; it was, in all essentials, a family group, held together by ties of blood and committed solely to the selfish interests of their own family. In building up their position they mustered support from wherever it was available. They had in their service men like Raja Dalpat Rao, Ram Singh Hara, Baz Khan and Daud Khan Panni, and later 'Abdul Samad Khan, a Turani, and Sarbuland Khan, an Irani noble, supported them as they were under obligation to Zulfiqar Khan.<sup>3</sup> The group operated with a fair degree of cohesion which gave it effectiveness. After the fall of this

<sup>1</sup> *A'zam-ul Harb*, 92-94; Kamraj, *Ibrat Namah*, ff. 10-24.

<sup>2</sup> *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 270; III, 156, 158; *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 43; *Farrukh Namah*, ff. 16a, 17b, 20a.

<sup>3</sup> Raja Dalpat Rao Bundela of Datiya-Orchha, 3,000/3,000, Raja Ram Singh Hara, 2,500/2,000 of Bundi, Baz Khan Afghan and Daud Khan Panni 6,000/6,000 were Zulfiqar Khan's close associates and fought under his command in the battle of Jaju against Bahadur Shah. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 317, 323-24; *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 23, 33. 'Abdul Samad Khan espoused the cause of Jahandar Shah and fought against 'Azim-ush Shan in the battle of Lahore. Though Sarbuland Khan took no part in the battle of Lahore, he was appointed deputy governor of Gujarat by Zulfiqar Khan. For details, vide *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 801-806.

powerful Irani family in 1712, no other Irani noble rose to such high rank till the end of Muhammad Shah's reign in 1748.<sup>1</sup>

The most prominent among other Irani nobles who distinguished themselves during this period were Sarbuland Khan,<sup>2</sup> Mir Muhammad Amin,<sup>3</sup> Muhammad Yar Khan<sup>3</sup> and Taqarrub Khan.<sup>4</sup> But they did not constitute an ethnic faction espousing a common policy for the benefit of their group as a whole. They shifted sides with the changing current of events, as their personal interests dictated.

### *The Turani Nobles*

The Turani nobles formed one of the principal elements of the imperial bureaucracy. Although during the reign of Aurangzeb the number and influence of the Iranis had increased, the power and position of the Turanis in the imperial affairs remained intact. The great representatives of this section rendered invaluable services to the Mughal government.

<sup>1</sup> He was the foremost Irani noble of the day. He started his career as *faujdar* of Kara, and gradually rose to the high office of governor, first of Awadh and then of Patna. His name was Mir Muhammad Rafi', and he was the son of Mir Afzal. He came from Iran in the reign of Aurangzeb. For details, vide *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 801-806.

<sup>2</sup> Mir Muhammad Amin, son of Mir Muhammad Nascir, belonged to a Saiyid family of Nishapur. He first entered the service of Sarbuland Khan as *mir-i manzil* or camp superintendent. When Farrukh Siyar ascended the throne, he was admitted in the *wala shahi* corp, through the favour of Taqarrub Khan with a *mansab* of 1,000 *zat*. After the accession of Muhammad Shah he attached himself to the Saiyids who, on 6 October 1719, appointed him *faujdar* of Hindaun and Bayana. He, however, joined the conspiracy organized by Muhammad Amin Khan against his patrons. After the murder of Husain 'Ali Khan, he was promoted to the rank of 5,000/3,000 with the title of Sa'adat Khan, Bahadur. For details of his early life and career, vide *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 463; Srivastava, A. L., *First Two Nawabs of Awadh*, 2-14.

<sup>3</sup> Muhammad Yar Khan, son of Bahman Yar I'tiqad Khan, held various offices in the reign of Aurangzeb as the *mir tuzuk* and *darogha-i ghusal khana*. In 1666, he was appointed governor of Delhi and *faujdar* of Muradabad with a *mansab* of 3,500/3,000. He gave his loyalty to whomsoever occupied the throne of Delhi after the death of Aurangzeb. Throughout this critical period he led a dignified and peaceful life, never indulging in power-politics or taking sides with any faction. His rank was 5,000/5,000. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 706-713.

<sup>4</sup> Taqarrub Khan was the title bestowed on Muhammad Ja'afar Shirazi by Farrukh Siyar. The Emperor appointed him *Khan-i Saman* and granted him the rank of 5,000 *zat*. Muhammad Ja'afar had rendered a great service to the Emperor by persuading under false pretences Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan, who had opposed Farrukh Siyar, to come to the court. He died in 1715, and held the rank of 5,000 *zat*. *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 34; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 728, Kamraj, *Ibrat Namah*, 53b.

They had displayed talent of a high order in both politics and war. At the same time, they were culturally highly advanced. Since they belonged to the same ethnic group as the ruling dynasty, the Turanis considered it just and natural that all power should rest in their hands. This sense of ethnic pride and the consciousness of their position in the government influenced their political behaviour and their relations with other factions.


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The famous Turani group which rose to prominence at the end of the seventeenth century and continued to hold power in varying degrees till the middle of the eighteenth century was headed by Ghazi-u'd-din Khan Firoz Jang.<sup>1</sup> Like the group of Asad Khan mentioned earlier this was also a family group, knit together by ties of kinship and marriage and by common allegiance to the Mughal crown. But it was larger, stronger, more exclusive and consequently more cohesive; it showed greater alertness, sense of opportunity and capacity to unite whenever a chance to enhance their power offered itself. Other members of this family were: Chin Qulich Khan,<sup>2</sup> Muhammad Amin Khan,<sup>3</sup> Hamid Khan,<sup>4</sup> Abdul Samad Khan,<sup>5</sup> 'Iwaz Khan,<sup>6</sup> Qamr-u'd-din Khan,<sup>7</sup> Zakriya Khan<sup>8</sup> and Ri'ayat Khan.<sup>9</sup> They were a bulwark of strength for their family and worked in unison for promoting their common interests.

None of these nobles, with the exception of Hamid Khan who fought in

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<sup>1</sup> For details of his biography, vide *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 872-879.



<sup>2</sup> *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 837-848.

<sup>3</sup> *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 346-350.

<sup>4</sup> *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 765-769.

<sup>5</sup> *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 69-74. He was the brother-in-law of Muhammad Amin Khan.

<sup>6</sup> *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 71.

<sup>7</sup> Son of Muhammad Amin Khan, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 358-361.

<sup>8</sup> Son of Abdul Samad Khan, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 106-107.

<sup>9</sup> Brother of Muhammad Amin Khan, *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 53.

the van of A'zam Shah's army, took part in the battle of Jaju.<sup>1</sup> Ghazi-u'd-din Khan was considered unfit to render any useful service in battle, while Chin Qulich Khan and Muhammad Amin Khan deserted the Prince's army and stayed behind in the Deccan.<sup>2</sup> However, Bahadur Shah, after his victory over A'zam Shah, appointed Ghazi-u'd-din Khan, governor of Gujarat,<sup>3</sup> Chin Qulich Khan, governor of Awadh,<sup>4</sup> Muhammad Amin Khan, *faujdar* of Muradabad<sup>5</sup> and Hamid Khan, the *subedar* of Bijapur.

The Turani nobles, although promoted to high ranks, were not satisfied as they considered these offices inadequate. They not only resented the elevation of Mun'im Khan and Zulfiqar Khan to key posts but they fretted at their own removal from the court where they could better serve the interests of their family. Far from the centre of the political power, the group soon lost its position as an effective element in politics, and it took more than a decade for its revival as a dominant political force in the Empire. Chin Qulich Khan, in particular, hated to serve in a far-off area and resigned in a huff from the post of governorship and retired.<sup>6</sup> Muhammad Amin Khan, however, managed to pull on with the central government and even participated in the campaign against the Sikhs.<sup>7</sup>

After the death of Bahadur Shah, Chin Qulich Khan return to active politics and decided to try his luck in the impending war of succession. The future of the nobles had by this time come to depend on the outcome of such wars. He threw in his lot with 'Azim-ush Shan, and having raised a force of 3,000 to 4,000 horse, set out to assist the Prince. He had hardly marched out from Delhi when he heard reports of 'Azim's defeat and death. Sorely disappointed at the failure of his plan, Qulich Khan disbanded his troops and began to live in isolation.<sup>8</sup> 'Abdul Samad Khan on the contrary, had taken up arms in support of Jahandar Shah and demonstrated his worth in battles. His consummate ability as a commander won him the favour of the king and the admiration of Zulfiqar Khan.<sup>9</sup> He was,

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 420.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 572.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 383.

<sup>4</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 616.

<sup>5</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghata'i*, ff. 308b, 316a, 325a, 321b.

<sup>6</sup> Chin Qulich Khan had resigned first in 1708 but had been persuaded by the Emperor to continue. He resigned again in February 1711 and after reporting at the court and disbanding his army retired into the background. According to Rustam 'Ali Khan, he had found the land in Awadh barren and unproductive, but the reason was his chagrin at his removal from the court. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 665, 681; *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 426.

<sup>7</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 669.

<sup>8</sup> Mirza Muhammad, *'Ibrat Namah*, i 99b.

<sup>9</sup> *Jahandar Namah*, ff. 21, 22.

therefore, in a position to plead the cause of Chin Qulich Khan who would otherwise have shared the fate of those nobles who had opposed Jahandar Shah.<sup>1</sup> Chin Qulich Khan was not only pardoned but directed to fight under the command of Prince A'z-u'd-din, son of Jahandar Shah, who had been vested with the conduct of operations against Farrukh Siyar.<sup>2</sup> Chin Qulich Khan proceeded to Agra to join the Prince but held back from the contest in which the Prince's defeat seemed to him obvious.<sup>3</sup> This civil war had raised hopes among the Turani nobles who took concerted measures for their own advancement. They were able, through the intermediacy of Mir Jumla, to get into touch secretly with Farrukh Siyar who made attractive offers as the price of their defection. They decided to support the cause of the rebel at a critical juncture when the issue still hung in the balance and at the height of the battle Chin Qulich Khan and Muhammad Amin Khan deserted the ranks of Jahandar Shah's army and went over to the side of Farrukh Siyar.<sup>4</sup>

After his accession to the throne, Farrukh Siyar granted to the Turani nobles lucrative rewards as the price of their perfidy. He conferred on Chin Qulich Khan the title of Nizam-ul Mulk, and appointed him governor of the South with 'Iwaz Khan as his deputy in Berar. Muhammad Amin Khan became the second *bakhshi* with the title of 'Itimad-u'd Daulah Nusrat Jang. 'Abdul Samad Khan received the *subedari* of Lahore; and Qamr-u'd-din Khan was given the post of the *bakhshi* of *ahadis*.<sup>5</sup> These nobles, after many years of struggle for power, had at last come into their own and were now satisfied with their offices.

Chin Qulich Khan, now holding the title of Nizam-ul Mulk, was hard working and devoted to his work. He took in hand with great energy the task of improving the administration and restoring peace in the Deccan; he had neither the time nor the inclination to concern himself with court politics. His uncle Muhammad Amin Khan also scrupulously avoided entanglement in the endless intrigues and conflicts between Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyid brothers. No connection existed between this family group and the court faction organized by the Emperor which included two Turani grandees—Ahmad Beg and Mir Jumla—besides Khan-i Dauran, the Indian Muslim and Taqarrub Khan, an Irani noble. On the contrary the two groups were so divided in their attitudes and outlook that they were always

<sup>1</sup> For instance, Rustam Dil Khan and Mukhlis Khan were put to death. Mahabat Khan, Hamid-u'd-din Khan, Sarfraz Khan, Amin-u'd-din Khan Sambhali and others were made prisoners and their properties were confiscated. *Jahandar Namah*, f. 36b.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 698; *Jahandar Namah*, f. 45b.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 698.

<sup>4</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khwaqin*, f. 56a; *Farrukh Siyar Namah*, ff. 86a, 99.

<sup>5</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, f. 341b; Mirza Muhammad, *'Ibrat Namah*, f. 100b; *Farrukh Siyar Namah*, f. 105a; *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, f. 137b. Appendix I.



at cross purposes.

When the faction formed by the Emperor against the Saiyid brothers failed to humble them and the cleavage between the Emperor and his *wazir* 'Abdullah Khan grew sharper, Muhammad Amin Khan counselled that 'Abdullah Khan should be deprived of the *wizarat* and replaced by some other faithful and competent noble. He promised support with his army in case 'Abdullah Khan chose to resist.<sup>1</sup> The motive behind this suggestion was selfish. There is no evidence to show that at this early stage a feeling of group rivalry played any part in the attitude of Amin Khan towards the Saiyid brothers. Nor does it appear that the suggestion was made out of a desire to support the cause of the king's favourites. The Turani leader entertained the ambition of securing the office of *wizarat* and was playing for himself. Ahmad Beg and Mir Jumla regarded the proposal with misgivings. They were alarmed at the prospect of Muhammad Amin Khan reaching the pinnacle of power if he triumphed over the Saiyids in an armed clash. The plan came to nothing when Farrukh Siyar made it known that he had set his heart on Murad Kashmiri. After this, Muhammad Amin Khan lost all interest and withdrew from the struggle between the Emperor's faction and the Saiyid brothers.<sup>2</sup> In 1716, however, his relations with the Emperor and his faction became strained due to a series of incidents which led to the reduction of his *mansab* and to his dismissal from the *faujdar*i of Muradabad.<sup>3</sup>

By the end of 1718, the struggle between the Emperor and the Saiyids had come to a head as a result of new frictions. Husain 'Ali Khan in the Deccan announced his intention to march on Delhi with a strong army in support of a new claimant to the throne. As the army would have to pass through Malwa, the Emperor, to forestall the *mir bakhshi's* plan, appointed Muhammad Amin Khan the governor of Malwa and directed him to take charge of the office without delay. But he declined to undertake a responsibility which would involve him in the risk of confrontation with the minister. He was, however, forced to do so and set out from the capital on 29 November 1717.<sup>4</sup> But his heart was not in the enterprise and the resources at his command were too limited for him to take up the gauntlet on behalf of the Emperor. According to Khafi Khan, he left Malwa without royal permission and hastened back to Delhi where he arrived in January 1718.<sup>5</sup> Provoked by this effrontery, the Emperor refused him entry into the

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 71a.

<sup>2</sup> Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Namah*, ff. 32, 33.

<sup>3</sup> Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Namah*, ff. 50, 53, 54.

<sup>4</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 787; Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Namah*, ff. 79, 106.

<sup>5</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 802; Mirza Muhammad, on the other hand, states that Muhammad Amin Khan received an imperial *farman* to present himself at the court. *Ibrat Namah*, ff. 111, 112.

capital, dismissed him from his *mansab* and resumed his *jagirs*. The office of *bakhshi* of the *ahadis* was taken away from his son, Qamr-u'd-din Khan, and given to Zafar Khan.<sup>1</sup>

'Abdullah Khan, ever on the watch to wean away a grumbling noble, secured the permission for Amin's entry into the capital and treated him with utmost deference and won his gratitude.<sup>2</sup> The Turani veteran had become so estranged from Farrukh Siyar that he declared himself on the side of the Saiyids and pledged unqualified support in their conflict with the Emperor.<sup>3</sup> He advised Husain 'Aii Khan to depose the Emperor and assured him of his allegiance if the Saiyid chose to ascend the throne.<sup>4</sup> In almost the same way the Emperor humiliated Nizam-ul Mulk by ordering his transfer from the Deccan and appointing him the *faujdar* of Muradabad. Nizam-ul Mulk fiercely resented being thus deprived of one of the major positions of power in the Empire. His feelings against the Emperor were further aggravated when Farrukh Siyar turned to him for help against the Saiyids and gave him the false impression that he would be appointed *wazir* in return for the assistance. Nizam-ul Mulk soon discovered that the Emperor had no such intention and the post was reserved for the Emperor's favourite, Murad Kashmiri. Consequently, he refused to play a role which did not promise a return to power. Foresighted and cautious, he maintained a dignified aloofness in the faction feuds that raged in the capital.<sup>5</sup>

From the foregoing analysis it is clear that this family group did not constitute, at this stage, the centre of resistance to the supremacy of the Saiyids. Farrukh Siyar put no trust in the group; he on the other hand, entertained the morbid fear that the Turani chiefs, like the Saiyids, might try to weaken him and dominate over him. Throughout his rule he leaned for support on his servile and cringing favourites who, by reason of their imbecility, were outmanoeuvred by the resourceful Saiyids. The Turanis did not identify themselves with the court clique; nor did they actively oppose or support the faction of the Saiyids. Had they done so, there is little doubt that the Saiyids would have found it more difficult to bring about the deposition of Farrukh Siyar. The Turani group at this time was not in a position to act as a sufficiently powerful pressure group or to bargain from a position of strength. The Turanis were an opportunist

<sup>1</sup> Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Namah*, ff. 112b, 114a.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 802.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 456.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 538; *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, ff. 75, 76; Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Namah*, f. 115b.

<sup>5</sup> *Tozkiirat-us Salatin-i Chaghata'i*, f. 349a; *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 89b; *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 18b; Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Namah*, f. 115; *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 144b; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 771.

## INTRODUCTION

group not committed to any party or faction; they tried to maintain their position rather by compromise. It was only after the death of Farrukh Siyar when other factors came into play and realignment of forces took place that the Turanis emerged as a rival group to the Saiyids and even the tensions and conflicts which divided them were political and not sectarian.

TABLE B  
RANKS AND POSITIONS HELD BY MEMBERS OF THE TURANI GROUP

From 1707-1719

Name	Rank	Position
1. Ghazi-u'd-din Khan Firoz Jang	7,000/7,000	governor of Gujarat
2. Muhammad Amin Khan	6,000/6,000	<i>faujdar</i> of Muradabad, second <i>bakshi</i>
3. Nizam-ul Mulk	7,000/7,000	governor of Deccan, and <i>faujdar</i> of Muradabad
4. 'Abdul Samad Khan	7,000/7,000	governor of Lahore
5. Hamid Khan Bahadur	2,500/1,500	<i>subedar</i> of Bijapur
6. R'iyat Khan Bahadur	6,000	—
7. 'Iwaz Khan	5,000	<i>subedar</i> of Berar
8. Muhammad Anwar Khan	—	<i>subedar</i> of Khandesh
9. Qamr-u'd-din Khan	5,000	<i>bakshi</i> of <i>ahadis</i>
10. Zikriya Khan	5,000	<i>faujdar</i> of Jammu.

### Saiyids of Barha

As already mentioned, the history of the Mughal court is a confused and dreary record of internal feuds between Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyids of Barha. The real significance of this strife and its bearing on the development of political events has also been reviewed. Here, it is worthwhile to enquire into the basis of the power which the Saiyid faction exercised continuously for the seven years from 1712-1719 and the causes of its opposition after that period. The Saiyids of Barha,<sup>1</sup> like the Irani and Turani factions,

<sup>1</sup> The two Saiyid brothers—Saiyid Hasan 'Ali Khan and Saiyid Husain 'Ali Khan—were the sons of Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan Barha alias Saiyid Miyan who in the 33rd regnal year of Aurangzeb held the *faujdar* of Nandair in the Deccan. The Saiyids of Barha claimed their descent from Saiyid Abul Farha who had migrated from Medina to Wasit in Iraq. Some time afterwards Abul Farha left Wasit and moved to Ghazmin. According to one tradition, he, along with his sons, came to India in the army of Shahab-u'd-din G'horī. First they settled at different places in the Punjab and later they migrated to Muzaffarnagar where they had acquired lands in *jagir*. "They call twelve *bara* in Hindi. As in the Duab there are twelve

formed a powerful family group, the members of which were linked together by ties of blood and marriage, and bound by common interest. They were solidly united around their leaders, 'Abdullah Khan and Husain 'Ali, who wielded enormous power in the Empire and enjoyed a reputation on account of their great qualities of leadership, force of will and generosity.<sup>1</sup> A feature which distinguished this group from its rivals and gave it greater strength and cohesion was that the bulk of the troops maintained by its leaders was mainly composed of the members of the Saiyid family who were splendid fighting men.<sup>2</sup> This displayed when the murder of Husain 'Ali Khan aroused their wrath,<sup>3</sup> and they were able to marshal a very large army under the banner of 'Abdullah Khan to meet the challenge of the imperialists.<sup>4</sup>

The Saiyids of Barha enjoyed the unique privilege of leading the imperial vanguard, and this advantage over other elements in the Mughal army served to exalt their sense of social pride.<sup>5</sup> Jahangir admired their martial prowess and reckless valour.<sup>6</sup> Aurangzeb, while he acknowledged their great qualities and noble lineage, was disinclined to give them rapid promotion to high ranks which, he believed, would make them proud and vain.<sup>7</sup> Able and experienced officers among them were generally appointed as *faujdar*s and *nazims* in areas where the habit of turbulence was deep-rooted. Before Farrukh Siyar's succession to the throne, the family occupied a subordinate position, as compared with either the Irani or Turani groups in the imperial bureaucracy. It was for the first time in 1712 that this family emerged

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villages near each other which are the native country of these Saiyids, they have become known as Saiyids of Barha." *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, 366. Jahangir promoted members of this family to position of influence and authority in recognition of the support they had rendered at the time of his accession. Under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, the Saiyids of Barha continued to serve the Mughal government with distinction and enjoy reputation for loyalty and bravery. During the reign of Aurangzeb, the elder brother, Hasan 'Ali Khan, was the *faujdar* of Nandurbar and Sultanpur, while the younger, Husain 'Ali Khan, held the charge first of Ranthambor and then of Hindaun-Bayana. In the battle of Jaju, the two brothers fought on the side of Bahadur Shah I who conferred the rank of 4,000 *zat* on each. On the recommendation of 'Azim-ush-Shan, the Emperor appointed Hasan 'Ali Khan governor of Allahabad and Husain 'Ali Khan deputy-governor of Bihar. For details, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 321-338 ; II, 489-491 ; III, 130-140. *Later Mughals*, 201-208; Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, 86-90.

<sup>1</sup> *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 321.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 793.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 544.

<sup>4</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 918; *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, f. 375a.

<sup>5</sup> H. Blochmann, *A'in-i Akbari*, 425-429; Manucci, *Storia Do Mogor*, II, 454.

<sup>6</sup> *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, 366.

<sup>7</sup> *Ahkam-i Alamgiri*, 8, 32.

as a powerful group and rose to a dominant position in the state. Besides the posts of *wizarat* and *mir bakhshi*, 'Abdullah Khan and Husain 'Ali Khan held the *subedaris* of Multan and Bihar respectively. As heads of these departments, they insisted on having a deciding voice in matters of appointments, promotions and transfers of officers and *mansabdars*. They resented any interference in the affairs of their own departments.

It was their growing power and arrogance which had aroused the jealousy and opposition of the king and his favourites and had led to continuous intrigues and faction feuds. Throughout his reign, this Emperor ceaselessly intrigued against the Saiyids but all his attempts to dislodge them from power failed. The reason for this lay largely in Farrukh Siyar's fickleness, diplomatic ineptitude and the foolish counsels of his favourites. The nobles who upheld his cause lost faith in him and went over to the side of his ministers. The Saiyid faction drew much of its strength from the alliances they were able to form with the former rebels like Ajit Singh, Churaman Jat and the Marathas, with their diplomatic skill. The friendship of these regional leaders gave prestige and weight to the Saiyid group and made its cause more acceptable in areas where they held power. Farrukh Siyar became isolated and the position of his supporters was greatly weakened. In contrast, Husain 'Ali Khan showed great firmness in keeping the commitments he had made to Raja Ajit Singh, Churaman Jat and Raja Shahu, who, in return, resolutely helped the Saiyids in their conflict with the Emperor.<sup>1</sup>

It is interesting to note that Farrukh Siyar had been the first to make secret overtures for aid to these powerful chiefs whom the Saiyids later succeeded in turning against him. When the Emperor dispatched Husain 'Ali Khan against Ajit Singh, he had also sent a dispatch to Ajit Singh to fight against and kill Husain 'Ali Khan.<sup>2</sup> Again, he had tried unsuccessfully to induce the Marathas to help Daud Khan Panni in his campaign against Husain 'Ali who was governor of the Deccan.<sup>3</sup> In the case of Ajit Singh, the Emperor vainly tried to the last to win him over.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately for him, the image which Farrukh Siyar projected on the popular mind was that of a mendacious, fickle and ungrateful person who could be trusted only at one's own peril. It is, however, to be added that in view of Farrukh Siyar's disposition, the course adopted by Husain 'Ali was dictated by the motives of self-defence. His reaction to the situation, beset with danger to his own security and the position of his group, can hardly be ascribed to any liberal purpose or enlightened policy. "They (the Saiyids) tried their

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 794,795,801,802,846.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 509.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 780.

<sup>4</sup> Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Namah*, ff. 96,97,109.

best to put down the Marathas; and Husain 'Ali, during his first two years in the Deccan, made strenuous efforts to prevent Maratha inroads in Baglan and Khandesh. But when ultimately they found that they stood in great danger to their life and position from their master, they were compelled to reverse their policy and seek Maratha friendship.<sup>1</sup> The financial difficulties of the Emperor, referred to earlier, further accentuated his weakness. He could not bear the expenditure of his *wala-shahi* troops while the *wazir* maintained a strong army of 20,000 horse, well equipped and regularly paid, that formed the core of the Saiyids' power.<sup>2</sup> Thus, in the end the Saiyids were able to seize control of the fort and the palace without encountering armed resistance.<sup>3</sup>

The Saiyid brothers, although they had done nothing to destroy or supplant the institution of the monarchy and had been at pains to preserve the integrity and power of the Empire, had nevertheless pushed the monarch into oblivion. Under their political hegemony, Farrukh Siyar's successors would continue to wear the crown, but would be stripped completely of the sovereign powers. The Saiyids succeeded in their objective of reducing the sovereign himself to a nullity but were unable to destroy the ties of loyalty that bound all sections of the people to the house of Timur. The nobles and the people had been used to the exercise of authority by the sovereign and no deep-rooted tradition of allegiance bound them to a government in which all authority proceeded from a family group. It was the monarch alone who could evoke the affection and loyalty of the people. He alone could maintain the balance of power among various sections of the upper classes by the judicious distribution of royal patronage.

The Saiyid brothers had made Farrukh Siyar's life a torture before they put it to a ghastly end on 28 April 1719. The grim deed provoked a strong and spontaneous reaction all over the capital and its repercussions were soon evident in Agra and other places.<sup>4</sup> Hatred of the Saiyids grew in

<sup>1</sup> G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, II, 37.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 795.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 187, 188.

<sup>4</sup> Hadi Khan Kamwar states that at least 15,000 to 20,000 people followed the bier of Farrukh Siyar. They wept and wailed; they tore their garments and threw dust on their heads. The women shrieked and threw stones on the servants of the Saiyids. *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, f. 364b. But Khafi Khan and Ghulam Husain write that only two or three thousand beggars formed the funeral procession. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 820; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhlkhirin*, II, 421. The main reason of Farrukh Siyar's popularity among the beggars and the poor was his extraordinary generosity. Rustum 'Ali Khan records one instance to prove this particular virtue possessed by the Emperor. One day Farrukh Siyar came to the great mosque and saw a large number of persons in a most wretched condition. With eyes full of tears he asked 'Abdullah Khan, the *wazir*, to give alms to them. The *wazir* immediately distributed a few lakhs of rupees among these poor persons.

volume and was directed equally powerfully against their partisans who had outraged public opinion by their conduct. For instance, Ajit Singh was generally condemned for his betrayal of Farrukh Siyar and came to be called the killer of his son-in-law. Wherever he went curses and abuses were heaped upon him.<sup>1</sup> The citizens of Delhi violently demonstrated their anger against the Marathas.<sup>2</sup> They viewed the policy of friendship with Churaman Jat, a former rebel and enemy of the public peace, as highly reprehensible. Ratan Chand, who exercised a powerful influence at the court through his control of the departments headed by the Saiyids, was despised not only by the officers and clerks whom he treated abominably, but also by the nobles who felt their dignity compromised by being obliged to present themselves at his residence where he used to hold office.<sup>3</sup>

The first serious expression of this resentment and revulsion of feeling was the revolt of Shayista Khan, maternal uncle of Farrukh Siyar, who gathered a force in Delhi to avenge the fate of his nephew. But his mansion was stormed and he was made prisoner.<sup>4</sup> Other nobles like Ruhullah Khan III, Tahawwur Khan Turani and Salabat Khan, unable to fight with the Saiyids, left Delhi and joined Jai Singh who became the spearhead of opposition.<sup>5</sup> At Agra, Mitra Sen,<sup>6</sup> a physician by profession, set up Neku Siyar, a son of Prince Akbar, living as prisoner in the Agra fort, as Emperor on 18 May 1719. Samandar Khan, the new commandant, was refused entry in the fort and the garrison prepared for defence. Mitra Sen tried to seek the help of the hostile nobles and local zamindars. There was talk of making a common front at Agra by Raja Jai Singh, Chhabela Ram Nagar and Nizam-u'l Mulk; such an overwhelming combination was expected to bring about the fall of the Saiyids.<sup>7</sup> It was an ominous portent for the future of the Saiyid

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*Tarikh-i Hindi*, 448. The cruel treatment meted out to Farrukh Siyar in the prison stirred the minds of the people and proved the starting point of reaction against the Saiyids. This demonstration of anger by a section of public in Delhi was the first overt sign of opposition to their authority. The chroniclers who had previously justified the stand of the Saiyids now began to sympathise with the luckless Emperor. Even Mir Qasim, author of *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, wavers in his devotion to the Saiyids. Khafi Khan again and again condemns the Saiyids on this score. *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 540; *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 31b; *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 82b; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 901,902,905.

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 83.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, R.811.

<sup>3</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 34a; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 843; *Tarikh-Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 42a,43a.

<sup>4</sup> Kamraj, *Ibrat Namah*, f. 69a.

<sup>5</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 832.

<sup>6</sup> For details of his life, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 825-826.

<sup>7</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 827-829; Shiv Das includes the name of 'Abdul Samad Khan, governor of Lahore, in the list of Neku Siyar's supporters. *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 30a.

oligarchy. Husain 'Ali Khan marched from Delhi on 23 June 1719 and after his arrival at Agra operations were launched vigorously against the insurgents. The nobles to whom Neku Siyar had appealed for aid could not come for one reason or another to join his forces. Chhabela Ram was engaged in quelling local disturbances; while Nizam-u'l Mulk thought it too adventurous to go to the aid of a destitute like Neku Siyar. Only Raja Jai Singh moved up to Toda Tank, a place 80 kos from Agra; beyond which he was not prepared to risk an advance.<sup>1</sup> Without support from these nobles, Neku Siyar had neither strength nor resolution to resist for long and on 12 August 1719 the garrison surrendered. Neku Siyar was made prisoner and sent to Delhi; Mitra Sen, the arch-conspirator, committed suicide. Husain 'Ali Khan took possession of the treasures and valuables found in the vaults of Agra fort, which, according to Khafi Khan's estimate, were worth two or three crores of rupees.<sup>2</sup>

Suppression of Jai Singh was the next immediate task which drew the attention of the Saiyids. But the risks involved in an attack on his stronghold forbade a major military action. Husain 'Ali Khan sent Ajit Singh to pacify Jai Singh and persuade him to lay down arms.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, the Saiyids announced that a punitive expedition against the refractory Raja would be launched when the Emperor visited the Shrine of Khwaja Mu'in-u'd-din Chishti at Ajmer. The announcement was obviously designed to bring pressure on the Raja and terrify him into submission.<sup>4</sup> Their tactics proved successful. Besides, Jai Singh's resolve to keep up armed opposition was shaken by lack of support from any quarter. In the circumstances, compromise appeared to be a wise and prudent step. He retired from Toda Tank and reached Amber.<sup>5</sup> He received a sum of Rs.20,00,000 and the *faujdari* of Sorath in Gujarat. The Mughal nobles who had sought refuge with him were allowed to stay in Amber. This, however, did not improve their relations, and Jai Singh remained in the opposite camp.<sup>6</sup>

Peace was hardly restored with Raja Jai Singh when rumblings of a new menace rose ominously in the east. The storm-centre was Allahabad where a haughty, resolute governor, Chhabela Ram, raised the standard of insurrection. Apart from the desire to avenge old grudges, the necessity of

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 827, 828; Kamraj, *Ibrat Namah*, f. 69a, 70a; *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f., 29a.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 90a.

<sup>3</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 32a.

<sup>4</sup> *Balmukand Namah-i* letter to Ajit Singh, 3-4. 'Abdullah Khan wrote that Raja Jai Singh, having gathered *zamindars* and other Rajputs of his native country, was bent upon creating disorders. If he continued his aggressive policy, he would suffer disaster. Also, letter No. 5, p.9.

*Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 835,838.

*Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 93a.



self-preservation had made the Raja to take up arms. The government, on the other hand, looked upon him as a supporter of Farruk Siyar, still faithful to the memory of that king and sympathetic to the cause of the rebels at Agra and as such a source of potential danger. Chhabela Ram was replaced by Shah 'Ali Khan Barha who was dispatched with an army of 10,000 to take possession of Allahabad fort.<sup>1</sup>

The Saiyid brothers at the same time sought to conciliate Chhabela Ram by the use of diplomacy, offering him the *subedari* of Awadh in return. To dispel his fears, 'Abdullah Khan wrote conciliatory letters to Chhabela Ram in which he appealed to him to attend the court, and if he was unable to do so he could send his nephew, Girdhar Bahadur, whose *mansab* had been increased by 500 *zat*.<sup>2</sup> To be on the safe side however and to back up the moves for conciliation, two imperial generals, 'Abd-un-nabi Khan and Daud Khan were simultaneously ordered to proceed to Allahabad at the head of 9,000 horse. But neither conciliatory letters nor concentration of forces moved the rebel. Entrusting the defence of the fort to Girdhar Bahadur, he came out and marshalled his forces to meet the imperial army; he had a severe attack of paralysis and died of it shortly afterwards.<sup>3</sup> His death did not materially affect the situation as Girdhar Bahadur kept up the resistance bravely, and restored the confidence of the soldiers shaken by Chhabela Ram's death.<sup>4</sup> The *wazir* renewed the terms of peace which he had offered to Chhabela Ram. As no favourable response to overtures of peace was forthcoming, reinforcements under the command of Haider Quli Khan were dispatched.<sup>5</sup> The insurrection continued for nine months without precipitating any serious fighting<sup>6</sup> and once again negotiations were set on foot through the medium of Ratan Chand in whom Girdhar Bahadur reposed his trust.<sup>7</sup> A settlement was reached by which he gave up his

<sup>1</sup> 'Abdullah Khan, in one of his letters to Chhabela Ram, explains why this was being done. The *wazir* assured the Raja that the government had no plans to ruin him; their only anxiety was the safety of the highway, as the *faujdar*s in that area had no strong force for its protection and Saiyid Shah 'Ali had been ordered to bring the Bengal treasure from Benaras to Allahabad. *Balmukand Namah*, letter No. 3, p. 7, *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, p. 188; *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, f. 128a.

<sup>2</sup> *Balmukand Namah*, letter No. I, p.7.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, p. 843.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, p. 189.

<sup>5</sup> For details of the movement of armies, vide, *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 32b.

<sup>6</sup> *Balmukand Namah*, letters No. 9,10,11, pp. 13-15. These letters are addressed to Haider Quli Khan and Shah 'Ali Khan. The substance of these letters is that Girdhar Bahadur should be forced, either by means of military operations or some amicable settlement, to surrender the fort. The *wazir* informs the imperial generals that he is ready to march in that direction to reinforce them.

<sup>7</sup> Girdhar Bahadur erected additional fortifications, increased his army from local

claims over the possession of Allahabad and accepted the *subedari* of Awadh with the *faujdar* of Gorakhpur. The Saiyids conferred on him the rank of 5,000 and the title of Raja. He also received 30,00,000 of rupees as a gift.<sup>1</sup>

All political symptoms pointed a favourable direction and augered well for the consolidation of the Saiyid oligarchy. Perils of great magnitude which had threatened the power and position of the Saiyids had been warded off by their political wisdom and diplomatic skill. Their rivals were defeated and humbled.

#### D. CHALLENGE TO THE EMPIRE

Aurangzeb had met the challenge of centrifugal forces in the Empire by boldly facing up to them. He had kept up a persistent and determined struggle against heavy odds. His ceaseless efforts and inflexible will enabled him to maintain the dignity, authority and the territorial integrity of the Empire. The last decade of his reign had witnessed a series of military successes against the Marathas. In these years all the important Maratha forts were captured and in pitched battles the Mughal forces had triumphed. But the Emperor had failed in his ultimate purpose. He could not consolidate his scattered territorial gains and military triumphs alone could not solve a problem which was both political and economic. In the course of incessant operations he lost sight of the necessity of making political adjustments which would have ensured the stability of the Empire and at the same time satisfied the demands of the Marathas. Consequently, the situation in the Deccan at the time of his death looked almost as gloomy and menacing as it had been twenty years before when Aurangzeb launched his prolonged operations against the Marathas

The grand project of liquidating the Maratha power collapsed with the death of its architect. Aurangzeb's successors lacked the character and capacity to carry on with it. The provincial government of the Deccan was unable to resist the progress of the Maratha arms; its officers were either helpless spectators or in some cases even partners in their depredations; and as already observed they were compelled to come to a settlement

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recruits and gathered ammunitions and food grains sufficient for several years; he also seized the treasure of Bengal. The author of *Tarikh-i Muzaffari* says that the Saiyid brothers wanted to settle the issue quickly, for delay would cause revolt and discontent to spread to the adjoining areas, p.190. Shiu Das holds the same opinion. He attributes their anxiety for an early settlement to the fear of a general conflagration. *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, ff. 34,35.

<sup>1</sup> *Balmukand Namah*, letter No. 4, p. 8; *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 35b.

with them on terms that were unfavourable to the Mughal government. In other parts of the Empire also the regional chieftains rose against Aurangzeb's successors in an attempt to acquire higher ranks in the central government. The later Mughals however showed greater flexibility and tolerance in dealing with them and through tact or by a judicious application of force brought them to submission. Churaman Jat was promoted to the *Mannsab* of 5,000; Raja Ajit Singh of Mewar and Jai Singh of Amber were made governors of Gujarat and Malwa respectively. These potentates, once exalted to high positions, never wavered in their allegiance to the crown. Thus, at the time of Muhammad Shah's accession, the Mughal Empire enjoyed general peace and tranquillity.

The following section is devoted to a critical study of the policy the later Mughals adopted towards the Marathas, Rajputs, Sikhs and Jats during the years 1707-1719.

### *Marathas*

In Aurangzeb's reign Sambhaji, eldest son of Shivaji, had been arrested along with his secretary Kavi Kalash in February 1689;<sup>1</sup> both had been cruelly put to death by the Emperor's orders on 11 March 1689. The family of Sambhaji, including his wife Yesu Bai and son Shahu, a lad of seven years, were made captives<sup>2</sup>. Raja Ram, younger son of Shivaji ascended the throne on 8 February 1689.<sup>3</sup> He established his headquarters first at Raigadh but later slipped out of this stronghold and entered Jinji where he set up his government<sup>4</sup>. With the arrival of Raja Ram at Jinji the Maratha activities were renewed on a large scale. The Maratha chiefs from the west and local *zamindars* of Karnatak acknowledged his supremacy and rallied round him. Specially, the Raja of Tanjore, Shahji II, his first cousin, assisted him with money and material.<sup>5</sup> Aurangzeb felt concerned at this dangerous development. He dispatched an army under the

<sup>1</sup> Sambhaji ruled the Maratha kingdom for a period of nearly nine years, 20 July 1680 to 1 February 1689. Muqarrab Khan *alias* Shaikh Nizam Hyderabadî set out from his base at Kolhapur to chase the Maratha king. At Sangameshwar the Mughal general surrounded Sambhaji's forces and captured him. For details, *vide Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, I, pp. 383-89.

<sup>2</sup> Saqi Musta'id Khan, *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, 331; *New History of the Marathas*, I, 331.

<sup>3</sup> Raja Ram was under confinement when news of Sambhaji's arrest reached Raigadh. He was released and proclaimed new Chhatrapati. Yesu Bai, wife of Sambhaji, did not press the claims of her son, Shahu and acknowledged Raja Ram the new leader of the Marathas. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, I, p. 400.

<sup>4</sup> *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, I, 331.

<sup>5</sup> J.N. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, Calcutta 1955, 233.

command of Zulfiqar Khan to invest the fort of Jinji and overthrow Raja Ram. But the operations against Raja Ram which were begun early in September 1690 dragged on with varying fortunes till February 1698 when the fort of Jinji surrendered and Raja Ram escaped to Satara where he established his rule. This robbed Aurangzeb of complete victory over the Marathas<sup>1</sup>. In October 1698 Raja Ram invaded and plundered Berar and Gondwana. But his plans to invade Surat were wrecked by Bidar Bakht who routed the Maratha forces in a severe battle which took place four miles beyond the fort of Parendā<sup>2</sup>.

Raja Ram died on 2 March 1700 at the age of thirty years. His son Karana who succeeded him died a few days later and another son from his wife Tara Bai was crowned under the title of Shivaji II<sup>3</sup>. On 21 April 1700, the garrison of Satara capitulated to the imperial forces<sup>4</sup>. During the years 1689 to 1699 when Raja Ram was being pressed hard at Jinji rigorous operations were simultaneously being conducted against other Maratha chiefs with great success. Aurangzeb resolved on the systematic reduction of all the Maratha strongholds. By 1704 with the use of arms as well as money he was the master of nearly all the important Maratha hill forts<sup>5</sup>.

The long-drawn struggle with the Marathas resulted in a frightful waste of imperial resources, both in men and money.<sup>6</sup> In the Deccan the ravages of war were aggravated by famine and plague which scourged the land.<sup>7</sup> Whole villages were desolated and lay in ruins, and over large areas peasants gave up cultivation and *Jagirdars* lost hold over their possessions. The Maratha roving bands infested highways and plundered helpless travellers with impunity.<sup>8</sup> The difficulties of terrain in the South and the guerilla tactics of the Marathas which it favoured prevented the Mughals from establishing their rule firmly over the conquered areas. The heavy artillery of the Mughals could not be effectively used in the Maratha lands. Want of provision and forage, incessant rains and flooded rivers seriously reduced the mobility of the Mughal army. The Mughals had to fight the enemy on all sides : the well-equipped and firmly entrenched garrisons they were maintaining, and the elusive Maratha horsemen, who operated behind

<sup>1</sup> For details of events of these 8 years, *vide*, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, I, pp. 415-418; *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, pp. 352, 353, 357-58; *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, ff. 106-112, 124; Francois Martin's Memoirs given in *House of Shivaji*, 234-249.

<sup>2</sup> *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, f. 129; *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, 411, 412.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, I, 469.

<sup>4</sup> *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, 413.

<sup>5</sup> For details of events which led to the capture of these forts, *vide*, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, I, 464, 470, 471, 490, 492-94, 509, 513-14; *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, 410-11, 413, 420, 429-30, 435, 438, 495.

<sup>6</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, I, 517.

<sup>7</sup> *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, 477.

<sup>8</sup> *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, ff. 145-149.

their lines and intercepted supplies by closely encircling the imperial troops from all sides<sup>1</sup>. Moreover, though the Emperor had succeeded in reducing the centre of Maratha power he could not prevail against the numerous Maratha captains who rose in its place everywhere in the areas. They confronted Aurangzeb with a far greater danger by preventing him from gaining a permanent foot-hold in their homelands<sup>2</sup>.

Aurangzeb was staunch and relentless in the prosecution of war, but less adept in the art of making statesmanly arrangements with the vanquished. The death of Raja Ram had afforded a golden opportunity to come to terms with the Maratha state which, due to dynastic disputes and mutual rivalries among the chiefs was then faced with a great internal crisis. He could at that time have accepted the terms of Tara Bai<sup>3</sup> or raised Shahu to the Maratha throne<sup>4</sup>. Such an arrangement, based on generous concessions, would have secured the loyalty and submission of the head of the Maratha state without the trouble of dealing with the numerous Maratha *sardars* separately. His insistence on the surrender of all the forts was inexpedient. But the demand of *sardeshmukhi* at the rate of 9 per cent meant a heavy loss to the revenues of the state and Aurangzeb could not but regard it as a mischievous attempt at blackmail. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how without a change of approach he could find a way out of the impasse merely by waging endless war. The failure of the parties to come to terms further embittered their relations and made the problem more complicated. Tara Bai assumed the control of the Maratha government and showed remarkable courage and capacity in its conduct. The Maratha troops ravaged the country as far as the confines of Ahmadabad and the districts of Sironj and Mandesor in Malwa. Tara Bai divided the Mughal dominions into districts, and following the imperial practice she appointed *subedars*, revenue collectors and toll-collectors.

<sup>1</sup> *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, 426, 431, 463, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, 474-75, 507-9.

For details of the enterprises and guerilla tactics of Santa Ghorpade, Dhana Jadav and Pidiya Nayak, *vide*, *Aurangzeb*, V, 78-9, 116-117, 120-21; *House of Shivaji*, 250-70; *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, 141, 153; *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, 342-449, 491-92; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, 420-21, 428, 434.

<sup>2</sup> Some new figures like Dhana Singh Jadav, Santaji Ghorpade, Krishna Malhar, Nima Sindhia, Dado Malhar, Rambha Nimbalkar and several others appeared in the Maratha ranks and dominated the war front in the Deccan. *New History of the Marathas* I, 342; *Aurangzeb*, 197-199.

<sup>3</sup> Tara Bai, wife of Raja Ram and mother of Shivaji II (b-1696) pressed the claims of her son for recognition by the Emperor and presented the following terms to him. She asked for the right of collecting *sardeshmukhi* in the Deccan, a *mansab* of 7,000 for her son, and exemption from attending the court. She was ready to cede 7 forts and maintain a contingent of 5,000 troops for the service of the Mughal government. She did not demand *chauth* and chose the status of a vassal of the Emperor. *Aurangzeb*, V, p. 136.

<sup>4</sup> Shahu, son of Sambhaji, had grown to manhood in Captivity. He was treated with

Though Aurangzeb was unshakable in his resolve to completely crush the Marathas, his officers showed growing war-weariness and longed for peace. But prospects of complete victory or early termination of hostilities looked by no means bright. Zulfiqar Khan, who had of late developed deep personal interest in the region, was most eager for a settlement of the question in dispute. He had a plan to establish his own hold in the Deccan which could only succeed with the active support of the Marathas, and he considered Shahu to be his natural ally for the achievement of this purpose. The death of Aurangzeb was to provide Zulfiqar Khan with the opportunity to put his scheme into effect, because the ensuing civil war would necessitate the withdrawal of the imperial army from the Deccan and the termination of operations against the Marathas. He persuaded A'zam Shah to set Shahu free and allow him to proceed to his kingdom. Though this had been done as a part of Zulfiqar's unfolding plan, it was nonetheless a major change in imperial policy. Had the change come earlier it might have ensured Shahu's loyalty and served the interests of the Empire. The new policy, so important in its bearings upon the future developments in the south, was adopted without a deliberate, coherent plan to settle the issues on which the war had been fought. Khafi Khan and other contemporary writers do not mention any specific terms having been formally agreed upon by the parties.<sup>1</sup>

Shahu escaped from the camp of A'zam Shah on 8 May 1707 and on reaching Satara he was placed on Shivaji's throne on 12 January 1708. He soon found himself implicated in succession disputes with Tara Bai and Rajas Bai.<sup>2</sup> Shahu handled the situation diplomatically. He divided the Maratha kingdom into two parts. He gave one half of the territory, south of River Krishna, to Sambhaji, keeping the other half, lying north of that river, for himself.<sup>3</sup> This partition saved the Maratha state from a protracted

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tender kindness by the Emperor; a *mansab* of 7,000 was conferred on him; and adequate allowance for his maintenance was provided. Aurangzeb wanted to make Shahu the king of the Marathas. He was prepared to grant *mansabs* to at least 70 Maratha *sardars* provided they acknowledged Shahu as their master. The Maratha chiefs, including Dhana Jadav, were required to come to the royal court; they would first meet Shahu and then pay homage to Kam Bakhsh. Accompanied by Shahu and Kam Bakhsh they would present themselves before the Emperor. But before terms could be settled finally and the ceremony held Aurangzeb became apprehensive of the Maratha intentions and changed his mind. For full account of this development, *vide*, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, p. 520.

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, I, 516-520.

<sup>2</sup> For details of these events, *vide*, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 581; James Grant Duff, *A History of the Marathas*, Calcutta, 1912, I 304; *New History of the Marathas*, II, 349-53; Sardesai, *Marathi Riyasat*, I, 2,5,6,11,40,41.

<sup>3</sup> Sardesai, *Main Currents of Maratha History*, 90.

civil war. Sambhaji established the seat of his government at Kolhapur. Shahu at Satara was fortunate in gaining the timely support of Balaji Vishwanath whom he appointed Peshwa on 16 November 1713. Balaji's support combined with Shahu's lovable personal qualities and shrewdness brought into his fold some of the most powerful Maratha *sardars*.<sup>1</sup> Like Raja Ram he granted *jagirs* and assigned revenues of different parts of land in Malwa and Gujarat to them. They in turn served him with loyalty and enthusiasm in extending the influence and territory of this small Maratha state at the expense of the Mughals, the opportunity for which was afforded by the civil wars.<sup>2</sup>

The wars of succession, financial crises and faction-feuds had thrown the Mughal government into confusion. When Shahu was busy in consolidating his position, Shah 'Alam came to the Deccan to fight against his younger brother Kam Bakhsh. Shahu sent an army under Namaji Sindhia to the help of Shah 'Alam. In the ensuing battle fought on 13 January 1709 Kam Bakhsh was defeated and mortally wounded. Shahu opened negotiations with Shah 'Alam for the grant of *Chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the six *subas* of the Deccan and was supported in the matter by Zulfiqar Khan. Tara Bai on the other hand, was encouraged by Mun'im Khan to put forward the claims to this grant for her own son, Shivaji II. After much deliberation the Emperor held that the claimants should decide the issue among themselves and the right of collecting these taxes from the imperial provinces would devolve according to the settlement. This was a virtual recognition on the part of Bahadur Shah of the claims of the Marathas to the collection of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* from the Deccan, but his reluctance to give to it explicit legal form made him avoid taking a decision in the dispute between the two rival claimants. He feared that doing so would oblige him to take the next logical step and he hoped that the parties themselves would never be able to settle the issue peacefully. Thus another opportunity to settle the Maratha problem on a permanent basis, by no means unfavourable to the imperial interests, was lost. After this the Emperor did not stay long in the Deccan as more urgent matters in the north demanded attention, and, therefore, the Maratha problem remained unsolved.<sup>3</sup>

As hoped by Bahadur Shah the Marathas failed to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the dispute. But, instead of forcing the issue against each

<sup>1</sup> These were Daubade, Sindhia, Udaiji Pawar, Kanhoji, Raghuji Bhosle, Malhar Rao Holkar, Nero Shankar and others. With the help of these leaders Shahu was able to restore order and unity in his state. H.N. Sinha, *Rise of the Peshwas*, 28-29, 40-41.

<sup>2</sup> *Rise of the Peshwas*, 80-81; *The Main Currents of the Maratha History*, 93.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, 11, 626-627.

other, the Maratha chiefs, including Raja Shahu, asserted their claims by launching an offensive to win lands in the Empire.<sup>1</sup> It was in this situation that Daud Khan, unable to prevent the Maratha inroads, had made the compromise with Shahu as referred to above. In 1713 Nizam-u'l-Mulk replaced Daud Khan as governor of the Deccan. He refused to pay the money demanded by the Marathas and strove to put down the rising power of Shahu. He skilfully won over Sambhaji of Kohlapur to his side by holding out the promise of support in his rivalry with Shahu; Rao Rambha Neimbalkar, Chandra Sen Jadav and Sarji Rao Ghatge also joined the new governor.<sup>2</sup> But he could neither completely suppress the Marathas nor was he able to strengthen the position of Sambhaji.<sup>3</sup> The tide of Maratha victory that flowed unchecked in the Deccan was rolled back in Malwa by the imperialists. Jai Singh, with the help of Chhatrasal Bundela and Budh Singh Hada inflicted a crushing defeat on the Marathas on 10 May 1715 and successfully stopped their expansion northward.<sup>4</sup>

In 1715 Nizam-u'l-Mulk was summoned to the court and replaced by Husain 'Ali Khan in the Deccan. On account of court intrigues Husain 'Ali failed to devote himself singlemindedly to the task of administering the province. Considerations of his own security and self-interest made him seek the help of Shahu whose pretensions he was supposed to curb. He started peace negotiations through Shankaraji Malhar, the agent of Shahu. The Maratha King, in the hope of obtaining imperial recognition to his claim of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* agreed to help the Saiyid in his hour of need.

The terms settled between the parties included the grant of *Swarajya*, *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* as demanded by Shahu in the time of Bahadur Shah. In return for the *chauth* the Marathas were to serve the Mughal Emperor with a contingent of 15,000 troops; and in return for *sardeshmukhi* they were to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the regions from where they collected these taxes. Shahu would pay annually in cash 13,00,000 of rupees by way of tribute. It was also agreed that Shahu's mother Yesu Bai along with his wife, his brother Madan Singh and all his followers, hitherto kept under detention at the court would be immediately released.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For details of Maratha activities, vide, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, 11, 626, 627, 666; *New History of the Marathas*, 11, 21.

<sup>2</sup> *Rise of the Peshwas*, 54.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 743-747.

<sup>4</sup> *Akhbarat*, dated, May 25, June 6, 1715; Chhatrasal Bundela's letter to Jai Singh, May, 1715. For details of Maratha activities in Malwa during this period vide, *Sardesai Commemoration Volume*, 59-72.

<sup>5</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, Part II, 783, 784, for the discussion of *Swarajya* and other terms of the treaty, *New History of the Marathas*, II, 39-43; Satish Chandra,



The success or failure of the alliance depended on the strength of the imperial authority to enforce its terms and the sincerity of the Marathas to faithfully abide by them. The grant of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* was a small price to pay for the restoration of peace in the war-torn south and also for safeguarding the interests of the Empire. The general economic effects of the agreement were far-reaching. It resulted in considerable loss to the revenues of the state as the work of collecting *chauth* from the *khalisa* and the *mahals* of *jagirdars* was entrusted to the agents of Raja Shahu.<sup>1</sup>

Husain 'Ali Khan marched to the North, accompanied by Balaji Vishwanath and at the head of a strong Maratha army of 16,000 horse furnished as agreed by Shahu and reached Delhi on 16 February 1719. Though the family of Shahu was released on 23 February 1719, the treaty as a whole was not ratified by Farrukh Siyar. The Marathas stayed on in the capital for more than a month to receive the grant of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* during which time Farrukh Siyar was deposed. They left Delhi on 30 March 1719 after receiving three documents, one for *chauth*, the second for *sardeshmukhi* and the third for *Swaraj* or the grant of independent rule over hereditary lands of Shivaji.<sup>2</sup>

### Rajputs

Towards the close of Aurangzeb's reign Ajit Singh,<sup>3</sup> worn down by an obstinate and sanguinary struggle, sued for peace which the Emperor promptly accepted. He was given Mertha as *jagir* for his maintenance in

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*Parties and Politics at Mughal Court*, 131-132; also, *Indian History Record Commission Proceedings*, 1940, 204-12. For the origin and working of the system of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*, vide Surender Nath Sen, *Military System of the Marathas*, Calcutta, 1928, pp. 28-51; *New History of the Marathas*, Vol. II, pp. 49-54.

<sup>1</sup> In every *mahal* two Maratha officers, one *Kamaishdar*, responsible for *chauth*, and another *gumastha*, for *sardeshmukhi* were appointed. Besides the authorised cases under the agreement they charged additional taxes like *faujdari*, *shikdari* and *rahdari*. In this way, holds Khafi Khan, nearly half of the revenue of *jama* were assigned to them. Three officers of Raja Shahu, each equipped with an armed force, were placed in the revenue department and at the police posts and important points on the highways. Although Husain 'Ali Khan had not allowed them to extort the impost of *rahdari*, the Maratha agents imposed 8 annas per bullock cart and one rupee per merchant. As a result the *ra'iyat* and the people in general were subjected to a series of oppressions and hardships. *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*, II, 785-786.

<sup>2</sup> *Later Mughals*, I, 407.

Ajit Singh, the posthumous son of Maharaja Jaswant Singh, 7,000/7,000, the *zamindar* of Mewar, was born at Lahore in February 1679. Aurangzeb had his own doubts about the legitimacy of Ajit Singh. He refused to recognise him as the

1704.<sup>1</sup> In November 1705 Durgadas also submitted and his former rank of 3,000 horse and the *faujdar* of Patan was restored to him.<sup>2</sup> Ajit Singh, however, never abandoned his claims over Jodhpur. Sullen and resentful he waited for an opportunity to recover his principality. The moment to strike came when Aurangzeb died in 1707. Forthwith the Rathor chief marched on Jodhpur, drove out Ja'afar Quli, the deputy *faujdar*, and took possession of the city. He tried to bring the entire estate under his control.<sup>3</sup> He was too busy to take any part in the war of succession; nor had he cared to send customary felicitations and presents to Bahadur Shah on his accession. Worse still, he was reported to have demolished the mosques in Jodhpur and banned the offering of prayers. It was also alleged that he insulted the Mughal officers.<sup>4</sup>

His example inspired Rana Amar Singh of Udaipur and Jai Singh of Amber<sup>5</sup> to throw off the shackles of vassalage. They rallied to Ajit Singh's aid and fomented revolts in their lands.<sup>6</sup> Bahadur Shah appointed Mihrab Khan the *faujdar* of Jodhpur to suppress the disturbances, and by the end of 1708 the Emperor himself arrived at Amber to take charge of the offensive against the refractory chiefs.<sup>7</sup> Internal dissensions, due to the rivalry between Jai Singh and Vijay Singh over the *gaddi* prevented the Rajputs of Amber from offering resistance to the Mughal arms. As suzerain Bahadur

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rightful heir and appointed Mughal officers to occupy Mewar. When Jaswant Singh's family reached Delhi the Emperor ordered that the child should be looked after in the palace. "He promised to give him a rank in the Mughal peerage and investiture as Raja when he would come of age." The proposal provoked the fury of the Rathors who took possession of the child and brought him to Jodhpur. A widespread uprising followed in Rajputana in which Durgadas played a prominent role. The war dragged on for twenty-five years till the death of Aurangzeb. For details, *vide Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 755-60, 599-604; *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, p. 178; *Aurangzeb*, III, 351-52.

<sup>1</sup> *Aurangzeb*, III, 286.

<sup>2</sup> *Aurangzeb*, V, 286-291.

<sup>3</sup> *Aurangzeb*, V, 292.

<sup>4</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 605.

<sup>5</sup> The name of Jai Singh's father was Bishan Singh, the great grandson of the illustrious Mirza Raja Jai Singh. In the 44th year of his reign Aurangzeb granted him the title of Raja Jai Singh with the rank of 1,500/1,000. Like other nobles he fought in the Deccan campaigns. He displayed great valour in the capture of Khelna, 1701, and was promoted to 2,000/2,000. After Aurangzeb's death he supported A'zam Shah in the war of succession, but on the day of battle he deserted him and joined Bahadur Shah. His defection, however, did not secure the victor's favour. His brother Vijai Singh, on the other hand had fought on the side of Bahadur Shah and was given the rank of 3,000/- and made the chieftain of the kingdom, to the chagrin of Jai Singh. For details, *vide, Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 81-83.

<sup>6</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 605.

<sup>7</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 606. Mirza Muhammad, *'Ibrat Namah*, f. 55b.

Shah exercised his discretion in favour of Vijay Singh, his old and loyal ally who became the chief of Amber.<sup>1</sup> Rana Amar Singh, finding his kingdom in imminent danger of being overrun promptly submitted and sent his brother Bakhat Singh to attend the court and pay homage to the Emperor. Bahadur Shah received him graciously and tried to assuage the fears of Amar Singh, but the Rana fled into the hills.<sup>2</sup>

✓ In the meantime Mihrab Khan had defeated Ajit Singh who formally surrendered on 24 February 1704. He presented himself before the Emperor who received him with every mark of favour and respect; his rank of 3,500/3,000 and the title of Maharaja were restored to him, his two sons, Abhay Singh and Bakht Singh were given the ranks of 1,500/300 and 700/200 respectively. But he was not allowed to retain control over Jodhpur which was to be governed by the imperial officers; and once again Jodhpur proved the rock on which the settlement was to founder. Though after the conclusion of this treaty, Raja Ajit Singh and Jai Singh accompanied Bahadur Shah to the Deccan neither could forget or forgive the loss of his principality.<sup>3</sup>

On 30 April 1708 Ajit Singh and Jai Singh suddenly left the Emperor's camp at Mahabaleshwar on the Narmada and rode straight to Udaipur.<sup>4</sup> The Rana of Udaipur whose niece was the wife of Ajit Singh, readily agreed to take up their cause, and they entered into an alliance for the recovery of their lost principalities, Jodhpur and Amber. The alliance was cemented by the marriage of the Rana's daughter to Jai Singh.<sup>5</sup> The old embers of hostility to the Mughal rule were stirred and a wave of insurgency swept across

<sup>1</sup> Bahadur Shah on the plea that there existed a dispute between the two brothers ordered Amber to be brought under the control of the Mughal government. Saiyid Ahmad Sa'id Khan Barha was appointed *faujdar* and all the property of Jai Singh was confiscated though it was returned to him later. But this did not console and pacify Jai Singh who continued to nurse his resentment and raised the banner of revolt soon afterwards. Na'mat Khan 'Ali, *Bahadur Shah Namah*, 62-64; *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, II, 904.

<sup>2</sup> The presents offered by the Rana on this occasion included one hundred gold coins, one thousand rupees, one elephant, nine swords and two horses with gold trappings. *Nuskha-i Dil Kusha*, 169-170; *Bahadur Shah Namah*, 44.

<sup>3</sup> *Bahadur Shah Namah*, 92-95; Kamraj, 'Ibrat Namah, f. 36b; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 606.

<sup>4</sup> Mirza Muhammad, 'Ibrat Namah, f. 56b. Khafi Khan writes that the Rajput chiefs effected their escape at the border of Ujjain. They left the camp on the pretext of hunting. They took away their baggage, and burnt down what they could not remove. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 616.

✓ <sup>5</sup> The terms of the triple alliance were these: The Ranas of Udaipur were acknowledged to be of pure blood, and the issue from any daughter of their family would be given precedence in matters of succession if she became the wife of a Rajput Raja. II. No Rajput chief would marry his daughter to a Mughal king. III. The

the land of the Rajputs. With a force of 30,000 the confederates invaded Jodhpur and captured it after ousting the *faujdar*, while Jai Singh took possession of Amber. Their greatly superior forces met and defeated Husain Khan Barha, *faujdar* of Mewat who was killed in the battle; his two brothers, Ahmad Saïd Khān and Ghairat Khan and some fifty followers also perished in the fighting. The aims of the alliance were thus accomplished.<sup>1</sup>

These events caused grave concern to the Emperor. He ordered Asad Khan to take up a position at Agra and make preparations for the invasion of Rajputana. The Rajas were to be punished for their military occupation of the imperial cities and the prestige of the government was to be maintained. But Asad Khan could not execute the commands.<sup>2</sup> Thereupon Bahadur Shah himself crossed the Narmada on 25 December 1709 and reached Dandwa Sarai, 30 kos from Ajmer on 15 May 1710, but he was simultaneously confronted by serious Sikh rebellion, and found it difficult to devote himself fully to the suppression of the Rajputs. Realizing the urgent need for peaceful adjustment with the two chiefs he recognised the mastery of Ajit Singh and Jai Singh over their homelands. The Rajas in their turn made their submission to the Mughal Emperor and personally paid homage while he was on his march towards the Punjab. The accommodating monarch gave them presents and allowed them to return to their states.<sup>3</sup> The peace-treaty concluded with the Rajas marked a departure from the Mughal policy towards the Rajputs during the last three decades. The vexed problem of Jodhpur and Amber had been solved; and for some time Raja Ajit Singh and Jai Singh remained loyal to the crown and seemed to be satisfied with their status in the Empire; while the central government was too busy with its own problems to interfere in their affairs. But their ambition soared in proportion to the decline in the fortunes of the imperial government. From the death of Bahadur Shah to the accession of Farrukh Siyar the Empire was rocked by three successive civil wars which produced changes in the attitude of the Rajput chieftains towards the central authority. At the accession of Farrukh Siyar, Ajit Singh and Jai Singh, though still professing loyalty, declined to attend the court. Their demand now was for a substantial enhancement in their rank and position in the Empire. Not satisfied with the arrangements made by

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three signatories decided to act in concert in all matters of importance. *Vir Vinod*, II, 769-70, 772-74, 775-78; *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, I, 415; *Malwa in Transition*, 116.

*Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 651; *Mirat-i Waridat*, 279; *Tarikh-i Iradat Khan*, f. 76b.

<sup>2</sup> Mirza Muhammad, '*Ibrat Namah*', f. 57b.

<sup>3</sup> For details, *vide*, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 662; '*Ibrat Namah*', 59a; *Tarikh-i Iradat Khan*, f. 76b.



[ PLATE I

Muhammad Shah with four ministers, namely Nawab Sa'adat Khan Burhan-ul Mulk, Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan, Nawab Roshan-u'd Daulah Bahadur and Nawab Hafiz-u'd-din Khan Bahadur. (The original is a brush drawing on skin, probably a tracing.)

*Courtesy : Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.*

Farrukh Siyar to meet his demands Ajit Singh rose in revolt in 1714.<sup>1</sup> Husain 'Ali Khan, the *mir bakhshi*, who led an expedition against him compelled the rebel to flee and take refuge in the hills. Unable to carry on the war, Ajit Singh surrendered and accepted all the terms offered by the imperial general. He agreed to marry his daughter to the Emperor and accepted the governorship of Thatta which he had previously refused. But a separate treaty was also negotiated privately to which the king was not a party. It was settled between Husain 'Ali and Ajit Singh that once he was on the way to Thatta a royal *farman* appointing him the governor for Gujarat would immediately be issued. Ajit Singh acted accordingly and achieved his ambition of becoming the governor of Gujarat, a province adjacent to his own homeland.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, Raja Jai Singh, who had accepted the arrangements, acquired great influence and position at the court. Farrukh Siyar trusted him and had regard for his capabilities. On 15 September 1716 he assigned him the difficult task of crushing the revolt of Churaman-Jat.<sup>3</sup> The province of Ajmer was given to Ajit Singh on 5 November 1719.<sup>4</sup> The chiefs of Jodhpur and Amber emerged manifestly more powerful and influential and once again became important factors in imperial politics. Rajputana was further pacified when a permanent source of discord between the Mughal government and the people was eliminated by the abolition of jaziyah in 1713.<sup>5</sup> Though reimposed at the suggestion of 'Inayatullah in 1717<sup>6</sup> it was again abolished by Raf'i-ud-Darajat at the

<sup>1</sup> Mirza Muhammad, author of '*Ibrat Namah*' states that Raja Ajit Singh and Jai Singh were summoned to attend the court soon after Farrukh Siyar's accession. The chieftains sent letters of congratulations to the new Emperor; but they declined to go to the court. In reply they requested that *mansabs* of 7,000/7,000 and governorships of Malwa and Gujarat should be bestowed on them. Once their demands were met and apprehensions removed they would present themselves before the Emperor. Farrukh Siyar, in order to assuage their fears, appointed Jai Singh to the *subedari* of Malwa and Ajit Singh to that of Thatta, giving each of them the rank asked for. Ajit Singh was not satisfied with this arrangement and revolted to press his demand. '*Ibrat Namah*, f. 59.

<sup>2</sup> Mirza Muhammad, '*Ibrat Namah*, f. 60. For details of the campaign and terms of agreement, *vide*, *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 509-510; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 738; *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 4; *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 62b, 63a. Qasim Aurangabadi, author of *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 70, writes that Ajit Singh forbade the call for prayer from the 'Alamgiri mosque and ousted the Mughal officers from Jodhpur and took possession of Ajmer.

<sup>3</sup> *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 81-82.

<sup>4</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, f. 349a; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 838; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 759.

<sup>5</sup> *Akhbarat*, dated April 12, 1713.

<sup>6</sup> *Vide*, Farrukh Siyar's letter to Jai Singh giving reasons for the reimposition of the tax. *Akhbarat*, May 15, 1717.

specific request of the Rajput chiefs.<sup>1</sup>

### Sikhs

Guru Gobind Singh<sup>2</sup>, son of Tegh Bahadur, had organized the Sikhs into a strong militant order and transformed the religious sect into a political body. He roused the drooping spirit of the Sikhs and inspired them to action with the ideal of establishing a state of their own. He insisted on military training and emphasized the necessity of unity and discipline. Every interest of the individual was to be subordinated to the service of the Guru; no sacrifice was too great in the cause for which the *khalisa* stood. Nanak's ideal of a heavenly kingdom was set aside and was replaced by the aims of power and glory in this world. Gobind Singh cast away the garb of the saint and lived in princely state, surrounded by armed followers.<sup>3</sup> People of low castes, despised by Hindus and Muslims alike, joined the Sikh fraternity in large number in the hope of attaining social dignity. To bear arms and use them to challenge and destroy the existing order was religiously a meritorious activity and the spoils of war provided an attractive material incentive. Unity and strict discipline, a strong faith in divine assistance combined with martial qualities of a high order made the Sikhs militarily the most fearless and formidable community. On the field of battle the trained and zealous Sikh swordsmen exhibited extraordinary feats of valour, defeating the Mughal regulars in a number of engagements.<sup>4</sup>

In the last decades of Aurangzeb's reign, Gobind Singh, taking advantage of the unsettled conditions in the north, made his bid for the conquest of the hilly country of the Punjab. He carried out raids against the chiefs of this area and had several skirmishes with the Mughal generals. He built several forts in the Himalayan foothills.<sup>5</sup> Gobind Singh, however, could not prevail against the government and was unable to establish a permanent hold over any territory. The imperial officers wreaked terrible vengeance on the rebels. The murder of Gobind Singh's sons left a rancour which continued to poison the relations between the Sikhs and

<sup>1</sup> On the representation of Maharaja Ajit Singh, Raja Bhim Singh and Raja Ratan Chand the *Jaziyah* was again abolished. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 817.

<sup>2</sup> Cunningham, J.D., *A History of the Sikhs*, Delhi, 1955, 59-66; *Evolution of Khalsa*, 64-70; Latif, Syed Muhammad, *History of the Punjab*, Calcutta, 1891, 38-45; *Later Mughals*, I, 80, 81, 84.

<sup>3</sup> *Aurangzeb*, III, 303, 314-317.

<sup>4</sup> *Asrar-i Samadi*, 6.

<sup>5</sup> *History of the Sikhs*, 68-70. These forts were: Paomta, Anandgarh, Lohgarh, Keshgarh and Fatehgarh.

the Mughal government.<sup>1</sup> After the death of Aurangzeb, Guru Gobind Singh paid a visit to Bahadur Shah at Agra with an intention to prevail upon the new Emperor for taking action against Wazir Khan, the *faujdar* of Sirhind. The Emperor welcomed the Guru and gave him a jewelled scarf and presents worth of Rs. 60,000; but the protests and remonstrances the Guru made against the Mughal officer proved of no avail. However, Gobind Singh accompanied the Emperor to the Deccan where he arrived in Nanded, a small town on the bank of the Godawari, in September 1707. There he died on 7 October 1708.<sup>2</sup>

With the death of Gobind Singh the line of hereditary succession to the spiritual leadership came to an end. The political leadership now passed to Banda Bahadur<sup>3</sup> (1670-1716) whom the late Guru had charged with the duty to organize the Sikh community and punish the men responsible for the persecution of the Sikhs and the murder of his sons. Gobind Singh had given Banda his banner, battle-drum and five arrows, and issued commands to his followers in the north to join him. Banda accordingly proceeded to the Punjab and declared himself the true successor of his master. By sheer dint of his abilities as organizer and preacher Banda overcame all the difficulties and the Sikhs acknowledged him their new leader. "Banda opened the flood-gates to a sea of pent-up hatred, and all he could do was to ride on the crest of the wave of violence that he had let loose."<sup>4</sup> He renewed the war against the Mughal government and its officers with greater zeal and vigour.<sup>5</sup>

Banda first turned his numerically superior forces against Wazir Khan, the *faujdar* of Sirhind and the killer of Gobind Singh's sons, and on 22 May 1710 in a hotly contested fight defeated and killed him. For several days the prosperous town of Sirhind was thoroughly sacked and then burnt. Other *parganas* of Sirhind *sarkar* were subjected to the same kind

<sup>1</sup> *Later Mughals*, I, 88.

<sup>2</sup> Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, I, 94, 95. Giving the circumstances of Guru Gobind Singh the author writes, "One evening two young Pathans entered his tent and, finding the Guru alone, stabbed him in the abdomen. The motive for the murderous assault was never known, since the assassins were slain immediately. The Guru's wounds were stitched and it was hoped that he would recover. But the stitches burst a few days later and he died on October 7, 1708," p. 95.

<sup>3</sup> He was an ascetic who had set up an establishment of his own at Nanded. His real name was Lachman Das and he was born in 1670 at Rajauri of Rajput parents. He had joined the sect of *bairagi* and gone to the South where he spent more than fifteen years in a hermitage on the banks of the river, Godawari. It was there that Guru Gobind Singh met him and chose him to carry on his mission in the Punjab. *A History of the Sikhs*, I, 101.

<sup>4</sup> *A History of the Sikhs*, I, 103.

<sup>5</sup> *A History of the Sikhs*, 77; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 652; *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 28.



of plunder and devastation. The Sikh armies then pushed their expedition vigorously across the Jumna. Their invasion of Saharanpur, abandoned by its faujdar 'Ali Hamid Khan, spread such terror throughout the sarkar that its inhabitants fled before the Sikhs leaving behind all their property to be looted. The triumphant Sikhs, laden with spoils, moved on to Jalalabad and laid siege to the fort. But the garrison sallied out and a fierce charge drove back the invaders. They next attacked Sultanpur and the parganas of Jullandhar Doab, but there also Shams Khan, the faujdar defeated them after severe fighting. Within a period of nine months Banda's army had penetrated deep into the country between Lahore and Delhi, laying waste numerous towns and villages.<sup>1</sup>

(The Sikh invasions greatly alarmed Bahadur Shah who set out for the north, crossing the Narmada on 25 December 1709, Hurriedly making peace with the Rajputs on his way and without halting at Delhi he entered the Punjab; he dispatched advance forces, one under the command of Firoz Khan Mewati and the other under Saiyid Wajih-u'd-din Barha against the Sikhs. These imperial commanders inflicted a sharp defeat on Banda's troops who, faced with the well-armed and disciplined soldiers, saw fit to withdraw into the hills. The main imperial army reached Sadhaura on 13 November 1710, and in the beginning of December launched their major drive against Banda by storming Lohgarh where he had taken refuge. The Sikhs fought desperately but the fortress was reduced; Banda effected his escape under cover of night into the upper Himalayas and the Sikh soldiery dispersed in confusion. Bahadur Shah, disappointed at the escape of Banda, repaired to Lahore while the Mughal generals like Muhammad Amin Khan, Rustum Dil Khan, Khan Zaman Bahadur and Saif Khan continued the struggle with the enemy and tried their utmost to capture Banda. This fighting was desultory and indecisive as the Sikhs avoided facing the Mughal army in the open and resorted to guerilla tactics.<sup>2</sup>

In the confusion that prevailed after Bahadur Shah's death in the Punjab, Banda recovered Sadhaura and Lohgarh in 1712. He built a large fort near Lohgarh to which the name of Gurdaspur was given. Farrukh Siyar ordered 'Abdul Samad Khan, the governor of Lahore, to suppress the insurgents. The fort was invested in 1713, and the rebels were driven out and forced to retreat to Lohgarh which in its turn could not be held against the Mughals. The Guru and his followers left the fortress and again

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 657-660. *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, ff. 30-32. For details of these events, vide, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 653-660; *Tarikh-i Iradat Khan*, f. 78b; *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, ff. 29-32.

<sup>2</sup> For details of this campaign, vide, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab* II, 670-674; *Tazkrat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, ff. 325,326; *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, ff. 33-34.

carried fire and sword into the neighbouring areas. The Emperor, much enraged at this failure, dispatched reinforcement under Qamr-u'd-din Khan, Afrasiyab Khan, Raja Gopal Singh, Raja Udait Singh and Muzaffar Khan. The reinforced imperial troops chased the Guru from place to place, compelling him to fall back on Gurdaspur. This time the siege of the fort was so carefully laid and pressed so vigorously that Banda was soon forced to surrender unconditionally with the whole garrison. The prisoners were sent to Delhi, and with the execution of most of them including Banda on 19 June 1716 the Sikh insurrection which had assumed such threatening proportions was finally quelled. It was not to be renewed on any large scale till after the invasion of Nadir Shah in 1739<sup>1</sup>.

### Jats

In its character and consequences the Jat revolt against Aurangzeb was not less important than other regional uprisings in his reign which have so far been analysed. As the Jat lands were close to the two imperial cities of Agra and Delhi<sup>2</sup> and because the *jagirs* of numerous *amirs* and *mansabdars* lay in them, the maintenance of law and order in that area had always constituted a major administrative problem. The sturdy and warlike Jat peasantry hated the imposition of discipline and authority over them, disobedience to it seemed ingrained in their nature and sporadic outbreaks of agrarian unrest were endemic among them. The Mughal government on its part was consequently too prone to tackle the problem by force and never tried to reform the existing economic system which had given rise to these uprisings. The economic discontent, exacerbated by military and bureaucratic repression, developed into organized resistance to established authority. But the movement of resistance, which gradually spread over vast tracts of Jat lands, does not seem to have had a religious or political character. It was limited to withholding payment of revenue to the state, forcible occupation of the *jagirs* and *khalisa* lands, raiding the highways and resistance to government officers.

Prosperous and resourceful, the Jat *zamindars* built small forts, surrounded by thick jungles, and stored them with fire-arms and food grains. They collected the impoverished but brave and sturdy peasants under their banner and organized them for a general revolt. | Prospects of rich pillage,

<sup>1</sup> For details, vide, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 766-767; *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, ff. 65-68; *Asrar-i Samadi*, 12-15; Kamraj bin Nain Singh, *Ibrat Namah*, ff. 61,62.

<sup>2</sup> For the origin of the Jats and their early activities, vide, *Storia do Mogar*, tr. W. Irvine, London, 1907-8, Vol. I, 132-134; Saiyid Ghulam Ali, Khan, *Imad-us Sa'adat*, 50; Shah Waliullah, *Siyasi Maktubat*, edited, K.A. Nizami Aligarh, 1951, 48,50; Qanungo, *History of the Jats*, 37-50; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, Text I, 540-548; Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*, 1963, 341.

which peaceful cultivation could not secure, aroused their predatory spirit. Encouraged by the long absence of Aurangzeb from the north and the growing laxity in the central administration armed bands of the Jats began to pillage the countryside and rendered the highways unsafe by their frequent outrages<sup>1</sup>. Under their leaders, Raja Ram and Bhajja, they created serious trouble for the Mughals in two successive rebellions during the last two decades of the seventeenth century. It took strenuous and persistent military operations on the part of Aurangzeb's lieutenants to quell the Jat disturbances and reduce their fortresses like Sinsani and Sogar<sup>2</sup>. By the close of Aurangzeb's reign all Jat resistance seemed to have collapsed and the region relapsed into sullen but uneasy quiescence.

Churaman, the son of Bhajja, emerged as the new leader of the Jats, after the death of Aurangzeb, and organized them once again to renew their former activities. He was present with his armed bands at the battle of Jaju where he plundered the camp of 'Azam Shah and acquired rich booty. But before any punitive action could be taken against him, Churaman submitted to Bahadur Shah at Agra and received the rank of 1,500/500. He later joined the Emperor at Ajmer and accompanied him towards the Punjab where, under the command of Muhammad Amin Khan, he fought against the Sikhs<sup>3</sup>. After the death of Bahadur Shah he returned to his native haunts to stir up fresh troubles which the weak government of Jahandar Shah could not put down. He took part in the battle between Jahandar Shah and Farrukh Siyar near Agra on 10 January 1713, and this time plundered the baggage of both the armies<sup>4</sup>. To punish these acts of Jat brigandage Farrukh Siyar decided to overrun their country and finally crush their power. But Chhabela Ram and later Samsam-ud Daulah, successive governors of Agra, appointed to carry out the task failed in their purpose, though Samsam-ud Daulah succeeded in persuading Churaman to submit. On 5 October 1713, Churaman reached Delhi and was conducted to the Diwan-i Khas by Samsam-ud-Daulah. He received the wardenship of one of the main roads running from Barapula upto the bank of the Chambal. But his high handed dealing with the fief-holders and other officers of

<sup>1</sup> *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, 93,94; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, English trans. I, 436; *Aurangzeb*, V, 295.

<sup>2</sup> For details of the campaigns launched by Bidar Bakht (1688), Bishan Singh (1690-1691), Mukhtar Khan and Riza Khan, vide, *Ma'asir-i 'Alamgiri*, 274, 298, 311, 334, 340, 398; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, I, 316.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 668-669; *Later Mughals*, I, 322. Churaman's father was the zamindar of all villages and the assessed income from the land amounted to Rs. 8,000. *Imad-us Sa'adat*, 55.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 503.

the government, provoked the Emperor to retaliate<sup>1</sup>.

Farrukh Siyar summoned Raja Jai Singh from Malwa to lead a strong army against Churaman. The Raja besieged Thun the stronghold of the Jats in November 1716. After prolonged and stubborn resistance Churaman was forced to give way; but before he could be brought to complete submission he succeeded in getting in touch with 'Abdullah Khan over the head of Raja Jai Singh and concluding terms of peace with the government through the good offices of the former. He agreed to pay a tribute of Rs. 50,00,000 and on 19 April 1718 he was received by the Emperor who conferred on him the customary robe of honour<sup>2</sup>. For this kindness of the *wazir*, Churaman Jat became grateful to the Saiyid brothers and staunchly supported them in their conflict with Farrukh Siyar in the course of which he was promoted to the *mansab* of 5,000 *zat*<sup>3</sup>.

Like Churaman Jat, Chhatrasala<sup>4</sup>, the Bundela chief, remained loyal to the crown, and the latter even assisted the imperial government in suppressing the Sikhs and the Marathas. He served in the army of Bahadur Shah and took part in the assault on Lohgarh, the Sikh stronghold. In the time of Farrukh Siyar he distinguished himself by defeating the Marathas on 10 May 1713. For this military service he was raised to the *mansab* of 6,000/4,000 early in 1714.<sup>5</sup> Chhatrasala, while serving as warden of the marches on the bank of Narmada, wrote to Jai Singh, governor of Malwa, early in May 1714—"The Marathas wanted to encamp on this side of the Narmada, but they crossed it and stayed on the other, on account of our presence: They had intentions of aggression after the rains. When we three, with armies, block their way they will not dare cross the river. They will be beaten by the good luck of the Emperor. I am watchful and request you to be equally alert as the Marathas are cunning and fraudulent"<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 65; Shiv Das writes that Churaman extended the area of his *zamindari* by force. He exercised great sway over the land between Hodal and Palwal. The local petty *zamindars*, peasants and other inhabitants supported him. Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan, Samsam-ud Daulah and other nobles possessed *Jagirs* in this area. The Jats plundered the caravans and closed the highway to traffic and caused terror in the villages. *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, ff. 11,12,14; *Siyar-ul Muta'akkhherin*, 31; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 521.

<sup>2</sup> For details of the fight, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 776-777; *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, ff. 13,14, copies of a letter and *farman* to Khan Jahan and Raja Jai Singh, f. 15; *Akhbarat*, Sarkar collection, II, dated March 1718, 29. Letter of Jai Singh to Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan on his victory over the Jats, 105. A detailed account is given by Mirza Muhammad in his *'Ibrat Namah*, ff. 84-94.

<sup>3</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 30a; Kamraj, *'Ibrat Namah*, f. 68a.

<sup>4</sup> For details of his early career, *History of Aurangzeb*, V, 391-399; Bhagwan Das Gupta, *Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela*, Agra, 1958, pp. 32-74.

<sup>5</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 670; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 510; *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta' i*, f. 344b.

<sup>6</sup> *Akhbarat*, dated May 1714, Misc. Vol. II, 271-74.

# NOBILITY AND ITS STRUGGLE FOR POWER

## ACCESSION OF MUHAMMAD SHAH

Muhammad Shah ascended the throne on 28 September 1719 and ruled over the Mughal Empire till his death on 15 April 1748. His real name was Roshan Akhtar; and he was the son of Jahan Shah, the grandson of Aurangzeb. Born at Ghazni on 16 August 1702, he was then in his eighteenth lunar year<sup>1</sup>. As Prince he held the rank of 8,000 *zat* and 2,000 *sawar*, and frequently received *khil'ats* at the court of Bahadur Shah, his grandfather<sup>2</sup>. His father Jahan Shah had been killed in the battle of succession against Jahandar Shah at Lahore on 27 March 1712, and since then until his accession Roshan Akhtar had stayed with his mother Qudsia Fakhr-un-nisa Begum in the royal palace at Delhi<sup>3</sup>. During this period of seven years the Prince was entrusted neither with military commands nor civil responsibilities. These formative years which the Prince could have utilized in learning the art of rulership were irretrievably wasted in semi-confinement.

In his early life, however, he had been given training in archery, riding and music and had received the conventional education usually imparted to princes. He felt no difficulty in expressing himself in Turkish while he could compose beautiful lyrics in Hindi. With these cultural attainments were combined amiable qualities of character which no historian has denied to him. He was a brave and handsome youth of affable temperament and

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<sup>1</sup> Munshi Danishwar Khan, *Miftah-ut Tawarikh*, 305; Shah Nawaz Khan, *Mir'at-i Aftab Numa*, 488.

<sup>2</sup> Mirza Hadi Kamwar Khan, *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, Aligarh, MS. ff. 308a, 315a.

<sup>3</sup> Jahan Shah, whose original name was Khujista Akhtar, had two sons: Farkhanda Akhtar and Roshan Akhtar. Farkhanda Akhtar was killed in the battle of Lahore and Roshan Akhtar arrested by officers of Jahandar Shah. Qasim Aurangabadi, *Ahwal-ul Khwaqin*, f. 42b; Khafi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 689.

serene disposition. His manners were gentle and graceful; clemency and sagacity characterized his actions. He was averse to cruelty and prone to forgiveness<sup>1</sup>.

His predecessor, Raf'i-ud-Daulah, a sickly weakling of twenty-one years had reigned hardly for a month and twenty-two days when serious illness afflicted him<sup>2</sup>. The powerful Saiyid brothers, having lost all hopes of his recovery, planned to put some other prince on the throne. From Bidyapur, near Fatchpur Sikri, where they were then encamped, the king-makers sent a party of horsemen under their cousin, Ghulam 'Ali Khan, son of Saiyid Khan Jahan, to Delhi to offer the crown to Prince Roshan Akhtar and escort him to their camp.<sup>3</sup> Qudsia Begum welcomed the proposal of the Saiyids and with marks of great joy she allowed her son to depart. Before the prince could reach the Saiyids' camp, Raf'i-ud-Daulah had already died on 18 September 1719<sup>4</sup>.

Prince Roshan Akhtar reached Bidyapur<sup>5</sup> on 24 September 1719, and at a simple coronation ceremony four days later, the two ministers paid homage and offered presents to the king who assumed the titles of 'Abul Fath Nasir-ud-din; Muhammad Shah, Badshah, Ghazi<sup>6</sup>. Coins were struck and *khutba* was read in the name of the new Emperor<sup>7</sup>. It was directed that the commencement of the new regime should be fixed from the time of Farruk Siyar's deposition seven months earlier, i.e. 28 February 1719<sup>8</sup>.

### Fall of the Saiyid Brothers

In the previous chapter it has been observed that the forces which had challenged the imperial authority were either subdued or reconciled in the

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 840.

<sup>2</sup> Raf'i-ud-Daulah was the son of Raf'i-ush-shan and the grandson of Bahadur Shah I. He was enthroned on 6 June 1719 at the suggestion of his brother, Raf'i-ud-Darajat when the latter became physically incapacitated to perform his normal functions. Raf'i-ud-Darajat had succeeded Farrukh Siyar at the age of twenty years on 28 February 1719, and reigned only for three months and nine days. He died on 11 June 1719. Qasim Lahori, *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 86a.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 839; Yahya Khan, *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, f. 128a; 'Ali Muhammad Khan Bahadur, *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 28.

<sup>4</sup> Muhammad Ali Khan Ansari, *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, Aligarh, MS. 186-187.

<sup>5</sup> Irvine is of the opinion that Tajpur, four miles west of Bidayapur, was the actual site of the ceremony. *Later Mughals*, II, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 186; *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, f. 128a.

<sup>7</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 840-841; *Miftah-ul Tawarikh*, 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 31; *Mir'at-i Aftab Numa*, 489.

decade that followed the death of Aurangzeb. For some time political alliances ensured the maintenance of internal peace and to a degree centripetal stability was achieved. But, at the same time, vast concessions, that Aurangzeb refused even to consider, encouraged the Marathas and others in their plans of conquest and expansion. During these years of civil discord the armed forces of the Empire lost their efficiency while the regional opponents of the Empire had through long experience perfected their individual methods of fighting against the imperial armies. The imperial generals had failed to evolve new tactics demanded by the situation. Bankruptcy threatened the government and utter confusion prevailed in the central administration at all levels. The *coup d'etat* of 1719 had to a noticeable degree impaired the image of the monarch and weakened its power and prestige.

To re-establish peace and order, to repair the shattered finances and restore monarchy to its former power and dignity were the most pressing tasks confronting Muhammad Shah. Those supreme needs of the realm could be met only if the Emperor was able to wield the power necessary for it. But in fact he was a mere puppet and did not enjoy even the semblance of authority. That the coins were issued and the *khutba* was read in his name, and all orders and edicts bore his seal was a mere show, an evidence of the fact that he reigned, but not that he ruled. "His world was like an iron cage to which access by others was as difficult as his own exit from it"<sup>1</sup>. All real power was wielded by the two brothers. It was they who appointed and dismissed all public officials and it was by them that decisions about state policy were made<sup>2</sup>.

The Court politics was beset with problems which had arisen in the wake of Farrukh Siyar's deposition and murder. There was serious discontent not only against the complete domination of the Saiyid oligarchy over the imperial government but the position of complete helplessness and impotence to which they had reduced the Mughal monarch. Muhammad Shah who was a cautious young man proceeded warily. Though he fully realized the possibilities of exploiting to his own advantage the prevailing atmosphere of sympathy for the House of Timur and hatred for the domineering Saiyids, he decided to hide his time till the arrival of his mother, Qudsia Begum.

It was with the arrival of the Emperor's mother at the royal camp near Fatehpur Sikri on 14 October 1719 that matters began to assume a different complexion. The pent-up feeling of dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs began to express itself in secret consultations and conspiracies

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 38,41.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 842.

among the nobles who were opposed to the Saiyids. The elements of opposition centred round Qudsia Begum, a sagacious lady, who also possessed a talent of no mean order for undercover intrigue. Anxious to emancipate her son she quickly discovered the instruments she could employ for the purpose. She set to work with Muhammad Amin Khan, the influential leader of the Turani faction and an adept in the art of intrigue and dissimulation, to prepare schemes for the overthrow of the Saiyids.

Muhammad Amin Khan's hatred for the Saiyids was fierce and strong. He longed for an opportunity to destroy their power. He had sided with Husain 'Ali Khan against Farrukh Siyar, but had gained nothing from the alliance, which had only added to the power and riches of the Saiyids. He himself enjoyed neither influence nor confidence in the councils of the Saiyid brothers. Aggressive, ambitious and unscrupulous he became alienated from them. But he could conceal his scorn for them and his desire for revenge behind the smile of a courtier. It was Muhammad Amin Khan's firm belief that ability to rule was a hereditary talent, possessed only by the Mughals who had once formed the core and the flower of the nobility. But the Mughal nobles and *mansabdars* had been banished from power and were living now in obscurity and distress. He was convinced that their exclusion from the central executive had undermined the interests of the Mughal dynasty<sup>1</sup>. "Pride, courage and honour spurred this lion-hearted noble to make an end to this state of things and take revenge"<sup>2</sup>.

Muhammad Amin Khan quickly acquired great influence with Qudsia Begum and became her sole guide and friend. Whenever he got the opportunity in the court he talked with Muhammad Shah in Turkish which both knew well but other courtiers did not understand. Shah 'Abdul Ghafur, a shady character and necromancer of sorts, was disguised as a milkwoman and carried letters and messages from the royal tent to Muhammad Amin Khan. The Mughal leader persuaded Muhammad Shah and his mother to take Nizam-ul Mulk also into confidence and enlist his support. Accordingly, the Emperor and Muhammad Amin Khan opened a correspondence with Nizam-ul Mulk and explained to him in a series of letters the purpose of their plans against the Saiyids and informed him of the scheme being prepared by the Saiyids for the complete ruin of the Turani group.

In one of the letters Nizam-ul Mulk was urged to emancipate Muhammad Shah from the bondage of the Saiyid brothers. He was also assured that the Emperor and his mother had full confidence in him and regarded him as the staunchest shield and defender of the royal house. He was told that the

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 905; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 38.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 906.



Saiyids intended to destroy him (Nizam-ul Mulk) after they had settled the scores with Girdhar Bahadur. In the letter, the Emperor expressed the hope that Nizam-ul Mulk would follow the tradition of his ancestors and would not fail in accomplishing the urgent task of liquidating the hegemony of the Saiyids. Nizam-ul Mulk, who had crossed the Narmada on his way to the north under the Saiyids orders, received another letter in which he was advised to stay in the south as his return to the north would be disastrous to him.<sup>1</sup> He was further informed that the Saiyids had instigated Husain Afghan of Qasur to cross swords with Abdul Samad Khan,<sup>2</sup> the governor of Lahore and that Husain Afghan had been promised the *subedari* of Lahore if he defeated and killed this veteran Turani noble, and all this was a part of their clever scheme which encompassed the ruin of Nizam-ul Mulk, Muhammad Amin Khan and other Turani nobles<sup>3</sup>.

No contemporary writer has recorded the text of the letters of Nizam-ul Mulk wrote in reply to the Emperor's letters. In the absence of definite evidence it is difficult to ascertain the aims and objectives which goaded this Turani leader to plunge headlong into an armed clash with the Saiyid faction. Qasim Aurangabadi holds that, besides the question of his personal safety, Nizam-ul Mulk wanted to restore Muhammad Shah to sovereign authority and set up a new political order in which the Mughals could occupy the forefront of the stage<sup>4</sup>.

The significance of the struggle which ended with the overthrow of the Saiyids brothers has been reduced by some contemporary historians to a mere clash between two vigorous, daring and ambitious personalities, namely Nizam-ul Mulk and Hussain 'Ali Khan. Interpreted in this way the conflict would appear to possess no deeper significance than what could be attached to an accidental and passing occurrence. But in reality the struggle was momentous in its consequences and the forces which produced it were complex and lay deep in the political tensions created by the interplay of power politics. Nizam-ul Mulk and Hussain 'Ali Khan represented two opposing factions, striving furiously against one another for the control of the state. The

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 850, 851, 852; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 116. The information contained in the letter was confirmed by the reports sent by the Nizam's *wakil*, Diyanat Khan.

<sup>2</sup> For details of his life, *Ma'astr-ul Umara*.

<sup>3</sup> *Majmu'a-i-insha Walajahi*, 55, 58.

<sup>4</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 194a.

و چون غیر از استقلال پادشاهی امری دیگر نیست  
*Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 855; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*.

مستحکم شاه بندی دین پناه  
 که در قید چون خسوف است ماه  
 ضرور است بر جمله مومنان  
 که بخشند او درهائی... ازل

issue was nothing less than the absolute control of the throne by their own faction. The basis of division between the Mughals and Saiyid factions, although it had no religious undertones, was ethnic in the sense that the support of the former came chiefly from families who were either of more recent foreign origin or which had preserved their ethnic identity, while the latter was made up almost entirely of family groups of Indian origin or those long settled in the country. Such, for example, is the position taken up by Khafi Khan and Muhammad Bakhsh Ashub who assert that the final showdown between the factions was precipitated by the Saiyid brothers' policy that none except the Saiyids of Barha should hold supreme power at the centre. Their hatred for the Turani Mughals was such that they deliberately planned to destroy the prestige and ruin the fortunes of all the Turani and Irani families.<sup>1</sup>

It has been noticed that the Mughals, even before the rise of the Saiyids, had been losing ground in the imperial services. Throughout the years 1707-1719 their fortune had steadily declined. What is more, during this whole decade the Mughals displayed no unity of purpose or policy. Even Nizam-ul Mulk, whose revolt in 1720 started the chain of events leading to the fall of the Saiyids, had followed a policy of non-involvement in the court politics during the period. But this is not to say that the more capable and enterprising among the Turani Mughals lacked ambition. Both Nizam-ul Mulk and his uncle Muhammad Amin Khan entertained the ambition to attain the *wizarat* in the reign of Farrukh Siyar. That monarch, smarting under the yoke of the Saiyid brothers, had come to have quite other ideas about the type of person who, in the interests of the monarchy, should be appointed to that all important posts. He had made it plain that he had no intention of conferring the post on any of the domineering and masterful personalities among the nobles. It was this attitude of the monarch which, by withdrawing the most coveted prize a noble faction could aim at, had prevented the Mughals from becoming organized on his side, against the Saiyid brothers. Muhammad Amin Khan and Nizam-ul Mulk had both virtually withdrawn from organized or purposeful political activity at the court. What brought them into a determined though surreptitious opposition of the Saiyid brothers was the encouragement given to them by Muhammad Shah. Added to this was the powerful incentive afforded by

<sup>1</sup> Khafi Khan writes :

هر دو بزرگ بر خرابی و بی آبروی همه خاندان  
ایران و توران کمر بسته اند -

*Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 860.

Muhammad Bakhsh Ashub, *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 38; Mir Muhammad Ali Burhanpuri, *Mir'at-ul Safa*, f. 40b.

the dangerous trend of the Saiyids' policy towards the Mughal throne and the interest of the Mughal group in the Empire. Muhammad Shah's policy towards the Mughals and the Saiyid brothers becomes evident from the secret correspondence that passed between him and Nizam-ul Mulk. It was this twofold incentive which brought an organized Mughal faction into existence and led to the overthrow of the Saiyid brothers. Both Khafi Khan and Qasim Aurangabadi held the view that at this stage of the proceedings, the main motivations behind the struggle of the Mughals against the Saiyid brothers were the preservation of the dignity and prestige of the Mughal nobles and restoration of the freedom of action of the sovereign. V2 'L484

Nizam-ul Mulk had accepted the governorship of Malwa on the specific condition that he would not be transferred to another province very soon,<sup>1</sup> because a quick transfer always implied the ruin of an officer. When he had left Delhi on 15 March 1719 he had taken his whole family and army consisting mainly of the Mughals with him.<sup>2</sup> He had found Malwa in a state of confusion and unrest. Widespread lawlessness and menace of Maratha invasions threatened internal security and weakened the provincial administration. The *zamindars* and *faujdars* became refractory and turbulent; they misappropriated the state revenues and oppressed the peasantry. The Kota-Bundi struggle was still continuing and the disorders caused by it were spreading far and wide. Most serious of all, on the border of Malwa, was the concentration of the best-equipped cavalry, furnished with Rajput horse, under Dilawar 'Ali Khan, *bakhshi* of Husain 'Ali Khan.<sup>3</sup> For the maintenance of law and order, his own safety and the security of provincial frontiers Nizam-ul Mulk raised fresh troops and equipped them with artillery. He thus developed a military power out of all proportions to his normal requirement as governor which according to Khafi Khan comprised 8,000 horse.<sup>4</sup> L7

The reports of Nizam-ul Mulk's measures to strengthen his armed forces alarmed Husain 'Ali Khan. Oblivious of the internal troubles faced by the governor the Saiyid brothers misconstrued his motives. They assumed that every step taken by the Nizam to improve his position was animated by the sole motive of revolt against them<sup>5</sup>. To add fuel to the fire,

148354

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 847.

<sup>2</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 152b.

<sup>3</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, Nizam's letter to Husain 'Ali Khan, f. 36a; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 117.

<sup>4</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 848.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 192-94.

Qasim Aurangabadi writes that the persons who were not promoted or favoured by Nizam-ul Mulk sent such fantastic reports to the court to poison the mind of Husain 'Ali Khan. *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 152b.

Nizam-ul Mulk kept in his service Marhamat Khan<sup>1</sup> whom the *Mir Bakhshi* had dismissed from the *faujdar* of Mandu. Marhamat Khan was a competent and spirited officer who had rendered valuable service to Nizam-ul Mulk in the restoration of peace in the province. Impressed by his efficiency and loyalty, Nizam-ul Mulk recommended the restoration of Marhamat Khan to his old rank and office<sup>2</sup>. Pleading the case of a disrespectful servant was taken as proof of the Nizam's haughty and disdainful attitude. It gave umbrage to Husain 'Ali Khan and created suspicions in his mind about the loyalty of Nizam-ul Mulk. Under the pretext that to successfully check the Maratha inroads it would be necessary for him to govern Malwa personally, Husain 'Ali Khan asked Nizam-ul Mulk to relinquish Malwa and in its place accept the *subedari* of any of the provinces given in a list which included Agra, Allahabad, Multan and Burhanpur<sup>3</sup>. Nizam-ul Mulk was perplexed at the unexpected and precipitate action of Husain 'Ali. Plainly it meant that he must either submit or fight. He decided to ignore the orders. It was harvest time in the province and his only hope of being able to meet the expenses of his enlarged army lay in staying on in the province and collecting the revenues<sup>4</sup>. Husain 'Ali Khan, provoked by this defiance, sent *farmans* commanding him to quit Malwa forthwith and present himself at the court. Dilawar 'Ali Khan was asked to move south and cross the Chambal to threaten the headquarters of the governor; 'Alam 'Ali Khan, Husain 'Ali's nephew and his deputy in the Deccan, was ordered to move north to the bank of the Narmada with his forces<sup>5</sup>. Thus Nizam-ul Mulk found himself caught between two fires. He held a council to consult his relations and followers on the steps to be taken to meet this mounting threat. They felt that there was no other course but to stay in Malwa and fight at once as their very existence was in peril. This would have been tantamount to rebellion and Nizam was hesitant to renounce allegiance to his overlord. His loyalty to the crown, his aversion to civil war and his doubts about the result made him reluctant to take an irrevocable step. It was at this stage that he received the letters referred to above from Muhammad Shah which helped him to reach a decision. He

<sup>1</sup> His original name was Mir Ibrahim, son of Amir Khan, Mir Miran, a prominent Irani noble in the reign of 'Alamgir. Marhamat Khan obtained the *faujdar* of Mandu in the time of Farrukh Siyar. He did not pay his respects to Husain 'Ali Khan when he passed through Malwa on his way to Delhi, who took it as a direct insult. For this he was dismissed and Husain 'Ali Khan replaced him by Khwajah Kuli, a Turani Mughal. For details, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 713-15.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 859.

<sup>3</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 36b; *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 96.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 194.

<sup>5</sup> *Hadiqat-al 'Alam*, 96.

resolved to set out for the Deccan.

Husain 'Ali Khan's suggestion that he wanted to keep Malwa under his own charge so that it could be better defended against the Marathas was a mere pretext for the transfer of Nizam-ul Mulk from there. The relations between the Saiyid brothers and Raja Shahu, the Maratha king, were extremely friendly and cordial.<sup>1</sup> Far from doubting their sincerity or fearing their penetration into Malwa, 'Abdullah Khan had full faith in the support and co-operation of the Maratha king against Nizam-ul Mulk. This is clear from letters the *wazir* wrote to Shahu and his Peshwa, Balaji Vishwanath. In fact, 'Abdullah Khan had appealed to Raja Shahu to help 'Alam 'Ali Khan in the campaign against Nizam-ul Mulk.<sup>2</sup> A similar appeal was made in a letter to the Peshwa in which the *wazir* had stated, "it was solely on the strength of the Peshwa's goodwill and in the hope of assistance from him that his brother Husain 'Ali Khan had left 'Alam 'Ali Khan unaided in the Deccan." The *wazir* also expressed the hope that the Peshwa would render all military assistance to the deputy governor in the forthcoming war.<sup>3</sup> Further in a letter to 'Alam 'Ali Khan the *wazir* urged him to increase the strength of his army through the co-operation of local *faujdar*s, *subedar*s and *zamindar*s and that he should seek the advice of Shankaraji Malhar in his preparation for war.<sup>4</sup>

Nizam-ul Mulk having taken the decision to move to the Deccan crossed the Narmada at the ford of Akbarpur on 8 May 1720 with an army comprising 14,000 horse and foot.<sup>5</sup> He first captured Asirgarh by bribing the garrison because he could not afford a long siege, and proceeded next to capture the city of Burhanpur where the officers of the province submitted to him on 20 May 1720. The occupation of Asirgarh and Burhanpur greatly strengthened the position of Nizam-ul Mulk.<sup>6</sup> Several *jagirdar*s and *zamindar*s of the Deccan now joined his colours with their contingents. While his already considerable resources were thus increased, his noble treatment of the family of Saiyid Saifuddin

<sup>1</sup> *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 115.

بجانب بستنه بد عهد از چاهلی

چو سا هو بسادات از یکدل

<sup>2</sup> *Balmukand Namah*, letter No. 15; 22-32.

<sup>3</sup> *Balmukand Namah*, letter No. 16; 24.

گرامی بردار سلمه الله تعالی محض باعتماد معاونت  
امارت بنده مزبور و دوستی و رفاقت آن بسالت  
نشان خان بوخوردار در آن ملک تلمها گذاشته اند -

<sup>4</sup> *Balmukand Namah*, letter No. 26; 35.

<sup>5</sup> Mansa Ram, *Ma'asir-i Nizami*, State Library Hyderabad MS. 47; *Savaneh Deccan*, f. 92.

<sup>6</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 157b; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 117.



Three ministers of Muhammad Shah—Khan-i Dauran Khan, Qamru'd-din Khan and Muzaffar Khan. (The original is a drawing, partly coloured. Names are inscribed in Persian and Nagari characters.)

*Courtesy : Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.*

'Ali Khan won him the admiration of friend and foe alike<sup>1</sup>.

While Nizam-ul Mulk was busy settling the affairs of Burhanpur, Dilawar 'Ali Khan at the head of 40,000 horse and supported by notable chiefs like Raja Bhim Singh Hara, Gaj Singh and Dost Muhammad Rohilla moved southward from Malwa, crossing the Narmada on 6 June 1720.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile 'Alam 'Ali Khan, having enlisted new troops by making liberal grants to the *fauj-dars* and *zamindars* set out at the head of an army, nearly 30,000 strong, from Aurangabad with the intention of joining Dilawar 'Ali Khan. But Dilawar 'Ali Khan, contemptuous of his antagonist, overestimated his own strength and resolved to strike without waiting for 'Alam 'Ali Khan to come up. On 19 June 1720 the armies of Dilawar 'Ali Khan and Nizam-ul Mulk came face to face near Pandhar, a hilly country, 32 miles from Burhanpur.<sup>3</sup> A fierce battle ensued in which Dilawar 'Ali Khan, leading the attack in person, was shot dead and Rao Bhim Singh and Raja Gaj Singh also perished. It was a complete rout and the losses inflicted on Dilawar's army were fearful and enormous spoils fell into the hands of the victor.<sup>4</sup>

This overwhelming defeat alarmed and dismayed the Saiyid brothers. The flower of their army had perished; a great warrior had been killed and their family honour besmirched. Their self-confidence was shaken and their counsels became confounded and distracted. To ensure the safety of his family, which was in the Deccan, Husain 'Ali Khan tried to cajole Nizam-ul Mulk by sending a *farman* conferring on him the *subedari* of the Deccan which was intended only to gain time by deluding him.<sup>5</sup> He simultaneously requested Nizam-ul Mulk "to furnish his family with an escort and see that they were not molested on the way."<sup>6</sup> But Nizam-ul Mulk in a shrewd move took full advantage of it by giving to the *farman* immediate and wide publicity throughout the Deccan. This greatly

<sup>1</sup> The mother of Saiyid Saifuddin 'Ali Khan, brother of Husain 'Ali Khan was in Burhanpur when the city fell into the possession of Nizam-ul Mulk. Perturbed by this sudden development the lady sought protection of the Nizam; she offered her jewellery and money as the price for her safety. Nizam-ul Mulk not only refused to accept the amount but conferred robes of honour on the messenger, Muhammad 'Ali and sent baskets of fruit for the children. He ordered one of his officers to escort the family upto the river Narmada with a force of 200 horse. *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 203.

<sup>2</sup> *Swaneh-i Deccan*, f. 93a; *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 97a.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 874.

<sup>4</sup> For details of the battle, vide, *Mirat-i Waridat*, 545; *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, ff. 90, 100.

<sup>5</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, copy of the *farman*, f. 38.

<sup>6</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, copy of Husain 'Ali Khan's letter to Nizam-ul Mulk, f. 39b.

strengthened his position as the lawful governor. Nizam-ul Mulk sent to 'Alam 'Ali Khan a copy of the *farman*, duly attested by the *qazi* of Burhanpur, along with a letter asking him, in the capacity of governor, to disband his troops and proceed northward with his family. To this 'Alam 'Ali Khan made no response and continued with his advance.

'Alam 'Ali Khan was still engaged in pushing his heavy artillery across the Fardapur pass on his way to join Dilawar 'Ali Khan when the news of the defeat at Pandhar reached him.<sup>1</sup> Shankaranji Malhar and other close associates of the Saiyids advised him to proceed no further and wait till the arrival of Husain 'Ali Khan. But the young general was not only impetuous but had great confidence in his personal valour and in the strength of his Afghan and Maratha soldiers. He consequently marched forward and met the forces of Nizam-ul Mulk at Balapur. A major battle took place on 9 August 1720 in which Nizam-ul Mulk rapidly thrust both his left and right wings to envelop 'Alam 'Ali Khan's army. The manoeuvre was completely successful. Saiyid Wali, Saiyid 'Alam Barha and many other captains of renown fell on the field, the rest of the army gave way before the fierce and repeated onslaughts. 'Alam 'Ali Khan, though tired out and seriously wounded, persisted in fighting with heroic courage till he was surrounded and killed. The shattered ranks of his army fled in panic, leaving behind their baggage to be plundered by the Nizam's army<sup>2</sup>.

These successive military defeats in the Deccan struck a shattering blow at the power and prestige of the Saiyid brothers. A spirit of gloom, deepened by the invincibility of Nizam-ul Mulk's army, spread in their camp. At this juncture Muhammad Amin Khan suggested that the best course for them would be to come to an understanding with the redoubtable Nizam-ul Mulk; and by frankly accepting the realities of the situation in the Deccan they should recognise him as the governor of that province. If that was done he offered to send his son Qamr-u'd-din Khan to the south to fetch Husain 'Ali Khan's family from Daulatabad. The Saiyid brothers rejected the proposal; they declared their resolve to fight out the issue and punish Nizam-ul Mulk for his audacity. In fact, ever since Nizam-ul Mulk's flight from Malwa, Husain 'Ali Khan had been busy in completing plans for a campaign against him. The ever prudent 'Abdullah Khan had urged caution and delay in the hope that Dilawar 'Ali Khan and 'Alam 'Ali Khan might defeat the enemy. But now that the affairs had turned out differently, Husain 'Ali Khan was determined to lead an immediate campaign to the Deccan and a huge force of 50,000 troops

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 886.

<sup>2</sup> For details of the battle, *Mirat-i Waridat* 547; *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, ff. 165, 169; *Tarikh-i Saltanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, ff. 103, 104.



mainly composed of the Saiyids of Barha and the Afghans was quickly raised for the campaign.<sup>1</sup>

The Saiyids had all the time suspected Muhammad Amin Khan of having secretly instigated Nizam-ul Mulk and they considered him as the root cause of all the troubles, the real centre of the intrigue and as a traitor in the camp. Twice they attempted to vent their wrath on him but the fear of a general revolt by the Mughals dissuaded them from executing their designs.<sup>2</sup> They were on the horns of a dilemma. What were they to do with Amin Khan? If he was left behind in Delhi he would rebel, but if he accompanied the army to the south he would certainly desert and join their enemy.<sup>3</sup> Husain 'Ali Khan ultimately decided to keep him in the camp where his activities could be closely watched. In order not to arouse his suspicion Husain 'Ali Khan humoured the Mughal leader and kept up the appearance of good relations with him. Liberal payments of salaries were made to Muhammad Amin Khan's soldiers.<sup>4</sup> Haider Quli Khan, another Mughal leader of note, was appointed to the post of *mir-atash* held by Gulam 'Ali Khan, a Barha Saiyid. Husain 'Ali Khan's relations protested against this policy of appeasement but he justified the measure by arguing that he wanted to disarm the hostility of the Mughals and to promote unity in the army.<sup>5</sup>

Muhammad Amin Khan was however too shrewd to be taken in by all this and although he too kept up an appearance of friendship, in his heart of hearts he was convinced that a blow must be struck against Husain 'Ali Khan by whatever means possible, and he was equally convinced that he was not going to be spared, whenever it suited Husain 'Ali Khan's designs.<sup>6</sup> He tried to dispel suspicion by repudiating the charge of having instigated Nizam-ul Mulk. But it appears that Muhammad Amin

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 214.

<sup>2</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 45a.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 105a.

و نواب صاحب (حسین علی خان) را هم همین دو خطر و لکوب برداشتن و گذاشتن او هر دو بیلا است -

<sup>4</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 45b.

<sup>5</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta' akhkhlerin*, II, 433.

<sup>6</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 175a.

اعتماد الدوله محمد امین خان بحسب ظاهر متابعت میکرد - اما خواهش باطن همین بود که بهر قسم که "ابو یزید" بر سر امیر الامرا دست دراز باید کرد..... و اعتماد الدوله نیز می دانست که از دست امیر الامرا جان بر شدنی نیستم -

Khan was himself in a quandary: What disturbed him was that he could not afford to view with equanimity the victory of either Husain 'Ali Khan or his nephew Nizam-ul Mulk in the forthcoming contest. Husain 'Ali Khan's victory would spell the immediate and complete ruin of the Turani faction of which he was the leader, while the victory of Nizam-ul Mulk was likely to thwart the realization of a long cherished personal ambition of becoming *wazir* of the Empire. If his nephew emerged successful in the contest; Muhammad Shah would hail him as his saviour and would feel so beholden to him that he would appoint him to the most coveted and prized post in the Empire. But as things stood at the moment the first possibility seemed more likely as in the forthcoming contest Nizam-ul Mulk was heavily outmatched.<sup>1</sup> The Saiyids possessed a substantial superiority in man-power. Besides the force of 50,000 soldiers and a sizable part of artillery they could call for powerful armed support from the different provinces of the Empire. They had at their disposal vast financial resources and could keep their soldierly liberally paid.<sup>2</sup> The trump card which they held in their hands, however, was the presence of the Emperor in the army they commanded. They could use him with powerful effect to cause defections among Nizam-ul Mulk's soldiers and wean nobles and *mansabdars* away from his camp to their side. Here was the key by which the doors of success for the Saiyids could be opened. Such were the fears that assailed Muhammad Amin Khan.

These sombre prospects however, instead of demoralizing Muhammad Amin Khan, suggested to him possibilities in a new direction. If Husain 'Ali could be done away with the whole problem would be solved at a stroke. He set about secretly to hatch a plot against the life of Husain 'Ali. It had been arranged between the Saiyid brothers that while Husain 'Ali would lead the campaign in the south, 'Abdullah Khan would proceed to Delhi and stay there to watch over affairs at the capital. The projected separation of the two brothers would afford the opportunity for which Amin Khan was looking. Once Husain 'Ali Khan was eliminated 'Abdullah Khan could be easily subdued and the Saiyid faction would be liquidated. Muhammad Amin Khan contrived to bring into the plot some more Mughal nobles of influence like Sa'adat Khan and Haider Quli Khan who were motivated by personal as well as group interests. The conspirators secured the services of Haider Beg Kashghari to do the deed. Mir Haider was promised rich rewards if he survived and financial support to his family if he got killed in the attempt.<sup>3</sup> "All these three were agreed

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 433.

<sup>2</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*; f. 45b.

<sup>3</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 46b.

on the plan of assassination and bound themselves together to effect their purpose and keep their designs to themselves."<sup>1</sup> The Emperor's mother was kept well posted with the details of the plot. The atmosphere in the camp grew tense and became charged with suspicion. There were vague rumours that some conspiracy was afoot and Husain 'Ali Khan's life was in peril but Husain 'Ali Khan in his overweening pride recked nothing of the danger.<sup>2</sup>

In September 1720 Husain 'Ali Khan and the Emperor set out for the Deccan and proceeded by way of Ajmer because Husain 'Ali Khan wanted to meet Raja Ajit Singh and discuss with him the details of the campaign. At Karoli, a village 10 miles from Agra, Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan left for Delhi with his staff and officers.<sup>3</sup> On 8 October the imperial camp reached a place between Jiund and Biund about two *kos* to the east of Toda Bhim, 75 miles northwest of Agra and 60 miles east of Jaipur. By this time the conspiracy had matured. On the fateful day of 8 October, when Husain 'Ali Khan was returning in his palanquin from the imperial enclosure he was approached by Mir Haider Beg who presented to him a written petition of complaints against Muhammad Amin Khan. The moment Husain 'Ali Khan became engrossed in reading it Haider Beg drew a dagger, plunged it into his body and instantly cut off his head. He was himself immediately killed by Nurullah, the nephew of Husain 'Ali Khan; but Nurullah was soon put to the sword by some Mughal soldiers who had by now come up to the spot. Husain 'Ali Khan's head was brought to the tent of Haider Quli Khan where Muhammad Amin Khan was also present. Husain 'Ali was fifty-two years of age when he was killed.<sup>4</sup>

As soon as the news of this outrage spread in the camp the Saiyids of Barha driven frantic with rage in a body attacked the Mughals guarding the imperial tent in a desperate bid to take possession of the person of the Emperor. Bitter fighting ensued and so great was the tumult round the royal enclosure that Muhammad Shah and his mother became terrified and the Emperor could not summon the courage to come out and take command of the situation. His want of resolution at this critical moment increased the confusion. The Saiyids of Barha fought courageously but were ultimately overcome by the Mughals. Throwing formalities to the winds, Sa'adat Khan, with his face covered, entered the *harem*, brought out the Emperor and forcibly mounted him on Qamr-u'd-din Khan's elephant. Muhammad Amin took his seat behind him in the

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 903; *Mir'at-ul Safa*, f. 47a.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 105b.

دریں عرصہ کیست کہ دست بر من خواهد انداخت

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-ul Safa*, f. 47a.

For details, vide, *Later Mughals*, 56-60.

*hauda*. They took up a position at the entrance of a public market in the camp where thousands saw the severed head of Husain 'Ali Khan stuck up on a huge pole.<sup>1</sup>

The success of the *coup d'etat* by the Mughal faction brought about a radical change in the basic structure of power at the Mughal court. Muhammad Amin Khan's first concern was to win new adherents to his side and to consolidate his position. The task was not an easy one. The imperial army consisted mostly of the Barha Saiyids, Rajputs and Afghans, while the *coup* had been the work of the Mughal which formed a comparatively small element in the army. It appears that the hope or promise of benefits under the new dispensation, rallied to the throne only a small section of the higher nobility among them. In the formal *darbar* held by Muhammad Shah on the day following the coup, only 21 nobles including Raja Gopal Singh Bhadauriya paid homage, but the Emperor made a number of new appointments in the *darbar* which radically transformed the political set-up. The distribution of the top posts at the centre was as follows.<sup>2</sup>

<i>Name</i>	<i>Post</i>	<i>Mansab</i>
1. Muhammad Amin Khan	<i>Wazir</i>	8000/8000
2. Samsam-ud Daulah Khan-i Dauran	<i>Mir Bakhshi</i>	8000/8000
3. Haider Quli Khan	<i>Mir Atash</i>	6000/3000
4. Sa'adat Khan		5000/3000
5. Qamr-u'd-din Khan (Son of Mohd. Amin Khan)	<i>Second bakhshi</i> <i>and</i> <i>Daroga Ghushkhana</i>	5000/-

The fall of the Saiyids was not yet complete. This became dangerously evident when 'Abdullah Khan having raised Prince Ibrahim to the throne and collected a large army and marched from Delhi to settle the score on the field of battle.<sup>3</sup> In the face of this dangerous crisis Muhammad Shah turned to the loyal elements in the Empire for military assistance. The Emperor issued *farmans* to Nizam-ul-Mulk, Girdhar Bahadur, 'Abdul

<sup>1</sup> For details of this combat between the two groups, *vide*, *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, ff. 109-111; *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 41; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 905.

<sup>2</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 176.

<sup>3</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, f. 374b; *Sahifa-i Iqbal*, ff. 8, 9; *Hadiqat-ul 'Alam*, 110.

Samad Khan and Raja Jai Singh in which he recounted the perfidy of the Saiyid brothers and the developments leading to the murder of Husain 'Ali, and directed them to rally round his throne against 'Abdullah Khan.<sup>1</sup> The replies of the governors to Muhammad Shah's summons all contain professions of loyalty but it appears that they were still uncertain about the outcome of this conflict and kept away on one pretext or the other. Only Raja Jai Singh sent a force of 3,000 to 4,000 horse under his *diwan*, Jag Ram.<sup>2</sup> In contrast the army of Saiyid 'Abdullah was being strengthened by the enthusiastic response of the Saiyids of Barha who flocked in large numbers to his standard at Delhi. On 11 October 1720 the Emperor marched with his army towards Delhi. On the way several chiefs, such as Saiyid Nusrat Yar Khan Bahadur, Sabit Khan, Muhammad Khan Bangash and others joined him. After nearly one month's journey the royal army reached the bank of the Jamuna and encamped on 12 November 1720 at a place called Hasanpur in the Patwal *pargana*.<sup>3</sup>

Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan after completing his preparations set out from Delhi on 28 October 1720, leaving Nijabat 'Ali Khan and Ghulam 'Ali Khan, in charge of the city. The army under his command was estimated to be more than one lakh but in his pride he refused to take any artillery along with him. He soon reached Hasanpur, and on 13 November 1720 the rival armies arrayed themselves against each other.<sup>4</sup> Haider Quli Khan made

<sup>1</sup> Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan was at Sarai Chat, on his way from Karoli to Delhi, when on the night of 9 October 1720, a camel driver sent by Ratan Chand gave him a letter containing information of Husain 'Ali Khan's murder. He had to choose between two alternatives—one was to negotiate and make a compromise with the Emperor who had written to him for such a settlement or recover the lost position by having recourse to arms. Pride as well as fear of foul play stood in the way of submission. 'Abdullah Khan decided to fight with the Mughals and started frantic preparations for the struggle. Prince Ibrahim was the eldest son of Raf'i-ush-shan, third son of Bahadur Shah and was crowned on 15 October 1720 by 'Abdullah Khan. The Khutba was read in his name and coins were issued. According to Khafi Khan 90 thousand horsemen were enlisted by 'Abdullah Khan and one crore of rupees was disbursed. No rules and regulations were observed in recruiting the soldiers and no distinction was made between bazar loungers, cotton-carders and old veterans, with the result that resentment grew apace among the *khanazad mansabdars* and *wala shahi* troops. For details of these events, *Later Mughals*, II, 66, 73, 74, 78, 79; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 915; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 556.

<sup>2</sup> The copies of these *farmans* have been included by Shiu Das in the *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*. All these *farmans* contain the same version of the incident. He has also recorded the replies received from these governors. *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, ff. 49, 50, 53; also, *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Allahabad, 1967, 187-188.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, f. 115.

<sup>4</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 915, 916, 919.

full use of the imperial artillery and took heavy toll of the enemy forces, and the Barha hordes dashed in vain against the imperialists. But despite the confusion that prevailed in 'Abdullah Khan's army deserters from which thronged the road to Delhi, the battle was still undecided by the evening. On the second day of the battle 'Abdullah Khan found his army reduced to few hundreds of his relations and close comrades and was soon surrounded on all sides by the Mughals. He refused to give up, however, and as was the custom of the Barha Saiyids, dismounted to fight on foot. He continued to fight till he was captured along with Saiyid Najmuddin 'Ali Khan. Prince Ibrahim and Saifuddin 'Ali Khan had already made good their escape. Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan was taken to Delhi where he was imprisoned.<sup>1</sup> He died of poison administered to him by the order of Muhammad Shah under pressure from the Mughal nobles at the age of fifty-seven on 11 October 1722.

Khafi Khan blamed the Saiyids for the accumulating misfortunes of the Empire and held them responsible for the ruin of the Mughal dynasty. He asserted that their policy towards the nobles and the repressive measures adopted by them towards all categories of *mansabdars* and specially the Turani and Irani families, had alienated all and sundry from the Saiyids<sup>2</sup>. Even old servants and close associates of the Saiyids gradually became disgusted with their high-handedness and cursed their rule. They longed for the restoration of the Royal house to its former strength and splendour.<sup>3</sup> In their pride and arrogance the Saiyids failed to recognise the importance of the Mughals. Khafi Khan emphasized the error of this attitude of the Saiyids and criticized the exclusion of the Mughals from positions of power and influence in the Empire.<sup>4</sup> Muhammad Ashub supported the views of Khafi Khan in this matter.<sup>5</sup> Through the story told by Khafi Khan<sup>6</sup> and Qasim Aurangabadi there runs the assumption that sectional interests combined with a desire

<sup>1</sup> For details of the battle of Hasanpur, vide, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 921-34; *Tarikh-i Fathiya*, f. 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 902.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 905.

<sup>4</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 900.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 38a, 43b.

و چون خود ها میر بخششی و وزیر بودند اول بر طرفی دوئسا و بی منصبی بدادی  
ها و تغییر جاگیرات خورد و کلاں کمر بستہ یک پارہ نان این انوس از خوان  
نعمت الوان بند کردند و ابواب ننگدستی و افلاس و اضطراب بر روی احوال  
شان کشاندند و از تودانی با ایرانی هم این بلا سرایت کرده -

<sup>6</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 902, 903.

to free Muhammad Shah from the thralldom of the Saiyids, drew the Irani and Turani nobles closer. Muhammad Amin Khan's appeal for Mughal solidarity was responded to ardently by Sa'adat Khan and Haider Quli Khan although both were Iranis. These Irani nobles never flinched from the deliberate stand they had taken and the energy and devotion they displayed at the battlefield of Hasanpur amply proved that their support for Muhammad Amin Khan and the cause he championed was whole-hearted and sincere.

During the period under review political parties of the modern type with their definite political programmes, the base of operations and peculiar mode of functioning did not exist. However, families of big nobles formed the basis of organized political factions determined to exercise power through their control of the government. What gave strength and cohesion to these groups was the family bond while ethnic identity added to the common interests of the group as symbolized by a recognised leader. What held the members of each group together were the traditional emotional attachment to certain cultural and political institutions. Differences in ways of life, pride of race and diverse economic interests often set one group apart from another and brought them in conflict with each other. The spirit of keen mutual rivalry is clearly discernible in the conflict between the Mughals and the Saiyids which raged in the Deccan and ended at Hasanpur. It must be remembered that these considerations underlying group formation and rivalry applied only to the core of the group and its leadership. In actual action, like the *coup d'etat* of 1719 by the Saiyids or the palace revolution of 1720 carried out by the Mughals, the forces that came into play on either side were not homogeneous. In each case the elements which supported the rival groups were very diverse, like the Afghans, Rajputs, Marathas and Indian Muslims, each of whom represented a separate ethnic tradition and followed its own leader, but were found operating on either side. From family groups the Saiyids and Mughals had transformed themselves into two rival heterogeneous coalitions loosely strung together, whose leaders strove for the attainment of their aims through court intrigue, political manoeuvring and if it came to that through wars of succession.

The coalition formed by the Saiyids included a larger proportion of the Afghans, Rajputs and the Marathas,<sup>1</sup> while the Mughals, Shaikhs and Deccani Saiyids predominated in the rival coalition of Nizam-ul Mulk; the

<sup>1</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawagin*, f. 175.

<sup>2</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 877, 878, 889, 893.

proportion of the Afghans and the Marathas was very much smaller in his army.<sup>2</sup> No Rajput *zamindar* or *mansabdar* of note seems to have joined the Mughal leader though it is likely that he enlisted some Rajput soldiers during his stay in Malwa.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, in the battle of Hasanpur the Afghans, Rajputs and other Indians fought by the side of the Mughals for Muhammad Shah.<sup>2</sup> However, except for Nusrat Yar Khan, who was hostile to 'Abdullah Khan, no other Saiyid of Barha fought on the side of Muhammad Shah<sup>3</sup> or served in the army of Nizam-ul Mulk, nor were the Mughals employed by the Saiyid brothers in any of their battles.<sup>4</sup>

Some idea of what the Mughals stood for may be gauged from policies followed by Muhammad Amin Khan and Nizam-ul Mulk during their respective terms of *wizarat*. The Mughal group had a sentimental attachment to the monarch as a person, whom the Saiyids had reduced to a mere figurehead. The Mughals favoured the dominance of the *Khanazad* and hereditary nobles; the Saiyids supported the cause of new elements in the nobility. The Saiyid party had made concessions, in its own interest to the Marathas, Jats and Raja Ajit Singh against whom the Mughal leaders advocated a forward and vigorous policy. By and large all contemporary writers are agreed that the Saiyids were inefficient and corrupt, an accusation which though exaggerated is not unwarranted. The Mughal *wazirs* stood for strong and clean administration which they tried to achieve by setting an example of firmness and uprightness. Muhammad Amin Khan infused a spirit of duty and discipline among the officials. Nizam-ul Mulk made proposals for the eradication of such patent abuses as bribery, reckless alienation of *khalisa* lands and *ijarah*. It was when real power lay with the Mughals that Muhammad Shah abolished the *jaziya* which was a measure in keeping with the temper of an age marked by moderation and enlightenment.

#### *Ascendancy of the Mughals*

After the battle of Hasanpur Muhammad Shah left for Delhi and reached its suburbs on 16 November 1720. He visited the shrines of

و جمعی دیگر از بهادران نامور نبرد آزما ایران و توران و افغانان جلالت  
نشان و راجپوتان تہو رو پیشہ ہمرایہ قول و فوج یلتمس قرار گرفتند -

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix, A.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix, B.

<sup>3</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 52.

<sup>4</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 771.

و مدام قطب الملک متوہم بود - نگاہ داشت سپاہ می نمود - و سوائے سادات  
ونتوتان بارہہ دیگران را کمتر نگاہ می داشت -



Khwajah Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki and Khwajah Nizamuddin Auliya and gave Rs. 5,000 to the guardians of each shrine. On 22 November the Emperor rode in triumph through the streets of the capital, making a brief halt at the *wazir's* house near Ajmeri Gate. Muhammad Amin Khan received the Emperor in a grand fashion and offered as *nazrana* two trays full of jewels, five horses and other valuable presents. He, then, entered the fort, already vacated by the Saiyids.<sup>1</sup>

His victory over 'Abdullah Khan had freed him from the tutelage of the Saiyid brothers who had completely dominated the administration, the crown and the court. The centre of gravity now shifted from a group formed by the two top-ranking ministers to the monarch himself who became once again the pivot of all administrative, military and fiscal authority. He could once again exercise the right to frame policy and choose his own servants and officials. The restitution of monarchical authority brought stability in political life and relief to the masses from the confusion and tension of civil strife. It engendered the hope that the state machinery which had suffered most by the civil commotion, would now begin to function smoothly. It was believed that prices would come down, revenues would flow into the royal treasury and arrears paid to the servants, and all this would usher in an era of peace and plenty.

The first weeks, however, were given to festivities. The buildings inside the palace were decorated and *darbars* were held in which large number of officers paid homage and received, in return, costly rewards and high titles. The rejoicings were not only not allowed to be marred by persecution or bloodshed but a declaration of amnesty to all those who had opposed the Emperor inspired confidence among all sections of the subjects.<sup>2</sup> *farmans* were issued to all the governors, *zamindars* and top-ranking *mansabdars* many of whom came from far and near to attend the court.<sup>3</sup> They were confirmed in their offices and given promotion in their ranks; grants of land, robes of honour and gifts were bestowed on them. Numerous hereditary nobles, court superintendants, *wala shahi mansabdars* and personal relations of the king were favoured and patronized on the occasion.<sup>4</sup> Another grand *darbar* was held on 25

<sup>1</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i-Chaghta'i*, f. 376a; *Sahifa-i Iqbal*, f. 221; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 251.

<sup>2</sup> *Sahifa-i Iqbal*, ff. 23, 28.

<sup>3</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam* contains copies of *farmans* sent to Murshid Quli Khan, Raja Girdhar Bahadur, Nizam-ul Mulk and Sarbuland Khan; ff. 63, 64; Girdhari Lal, *Zafnamah-i Deccan*, Asafiyah MS. 69. The governors were informed of the victory of the imperialists at Hasanpur, and directed to announce the happy news with due ceremony.

<sup>4</sup> Some of the nobles favoured by Muhammad Shah in Delhi were : Kifayatullah,

November 1720 in the *diwan-i-khash*, now restored to its former beauty and splendour. Raja Jai Singh, Raja Girdhar Bahadur, 'Abdul Samad Khan and several other grandees offered fealty and presents. It was in this *darbar* that on the representation of the two above named Rajas Muhammad Shah ordered the abolition of *Jaziya*.<sup>1</sup>

On 14 August 1721 another *darbar* was held in the beautifully decorated and illuminated *diwan-i-'am*. Muhammad Shah on entering the hall first offered thanksgiving prayers and taking his seat on the Peacock Throne, ordered pearls and precious stones to be showered on the audience. After the nobles had made their obeisance and greeted the Emperor, dancing girls standing in rows on either side of the throne entertained the audience. Shiu Das says that thereafter the Emperor, accompanied by these singers, came to the hall twice every day in morning and afternoon and transacted state business. This radically transformed the atmosphere at the court. The royal court, no longer the battleground of factions, presented a scene of amity and accord between different groups of officials. Soft and sweet music, played twice every day by beautiful girls, transported the ministers and high officials into a different world altogether. The atmosphere of tension and distrust was replaced by an air of relaxed and cultured gaiety at the court which was sustained by the gentle and urbane personality of the monarch himself.<sup>2</sup> Yet this kind of atmosphere bred complacency rather than a sense of serious urgency needed to meet the enormous problems of the day. A great opportunity to reorganize the government, strengthen the Empire and set the ruling class to new horizons was lost.

The Mughals emerged as the most dominant group and power and wealth passed to its leaders. The top personnel in government was supplanted by the leaders of the coup and men of the king's choice. The process of excluding the Saiyids of Barha from all jobs and positions was carried forward with ruthlessness. This warrior class, famed for matchless gallantry, was lost for ever to the imperial army in which they had held prominent place. The list of officials for the year 1720, given on page 82, does not contain a single noble, except Saiyid Nusrat Yar Khan, who belonged to the *Sadat-i Barha*. But it must be noted that the exclusion of the Saiyids did not signify that the Mughals had now acquired authority of the kind claimed and exercised by the erstwhile Saiyids. Nor was the dominant

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Ziaul-lah, Hidayatul-lah, Mirza Khan, Wafa Khan, Ma'ali Khan, Yaqut Khan, Mazhir-ud-din Khan, Islam Khan, Safi Khan, Saiyid Mahmud Khan and Faizul-lah Khan, companions of 'Abdul Samad Khan. *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, f. 376.

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 934-35.

<sup>2</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, ff. 68, 69, 70; *Sahifa-i Iqbal*, ff. 23-30.

group exclusively Mughal; other diverse elements now made up a much higher percentage of the total membership of the ruling class than in the days of Saiyid dominance. Such were the Rajputs, Afghans, Shaikhs and *Khanazad* nobles who often represented attitudes and opinions which differed greatly from those of the Mughals. The structure of the ruling class in its diversity and heterogeneity now corresponded more closely to the former imperial bureaucracy.<sup>1</sup> Khan-i Dauran, Muhammad Khan Bangash, Raja Jai Singh, Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan, Raja Girdhar Bahadur, Sher Afgan Khan and Khwajah 'Abdullah were neither Mughals nor did they belong to that party; but their influence was as pronounced as that of Muhammad Amin Khan and Sa'adat Khan. The Mughal group was itself rent by personal rivalries and divisions. Nizam-ul Mulk resented that his claims for *wizarat* were ignored in favour of his uncle, Muhammad Amin Khan. However, all these elements at the court had their share of power and found it possible to work together in relative harmony under the throne. Muhammad Shah leaned visibly towards the Mughals but managed to keep the others reasonably contented. The Mughal leader Muhammad Amin Khan unlike the Saiyids of Barha made no attempt to consolidate the exclusive interests of his own group and did not insist on assigning important and well paid jobs only to his party members.

The Emperor leaned heavily on his *wazir* for advice and the execution of his commands. But Muhammad Amin Khan unlike his predecessor 'Abdullah Khan never tried to override the royal will; major decisions were taken by him only with the formal and prior consent of the king. Muhammad Amin Khan was a hard task master for his secretaries and other officials, but for the general public he was mild and lenient. For carrying out office work he did not depend very much on clerks and officers. Every applicant was permitted to put his papers directly before him and the *wazir* took pains to examine them and issue orders himself; he issued the *sanad* to the man concerned either on the same or the following day. To the Mughals he always showed marked favour but he was honest and just to others.<sup>2</sup>

Muhammad Amin Khan died on 27 January 1721 after only three months in office, and was buried within the premises of a school he had founded near Ajmeri Gate.<sup>3</sup> Death had cut short his political career just when it reached its height. Though ruthless as a politician he proved himself a vigorous administrator of great organizational capacity and devotion to duty. With the removal of this firm and sagacious leader dissensions arose

<sup>1</sup> See Tables I, II, III.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 567-68; *Tarikh-i Fathiya*, f. 132a.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 939.

among the Mughals. Neither Nizam-ul Mulk nor Qamr-u'd-din Khan proved capable of meeting the problem of keeping the Mughal group organized and united. With the death of this great leader the newly established ascendancy of the Mughal group came to an end and their party gradually disintegrated.

### Wizarat of Nizam-ul Mulk

After Muhammad Amin Khan's death Muhammad Shah was confronted with the difficult problem of appointing a new *wazir*. The office being a coveted one almost all leading nobles were eager to secure it. Mir Muhammad 'Ali, author of *Mir'at-ul Safa*, records that Haider Quli Khan, Sa'adat Khan, Burhan-ul Mulk, Khan-i Dauran and Sarbuland Khan pushed their respective claims for the vacant office.<sup>1</sup> Shiu Das, in his *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, states that one group of nobles wanted Qamr-u'd-din Khan to succeed to the office of his deceased father; while other courtiers pressed for the appointment of Khan-i Dauran.<sup>2</sup> According to Yahya Khan, Muhammad Shah himself was inclined to make Khan-i Dauran the chief minister<sup>3</sup> but the claims of Qamr-u'd-din Khan could not be easily ignored. Qamr-u'd-din Khan asserted that his father, Muhammad Amin Khan, had been rewarded with the greatest honour in the Empire in recognition of the services he had rendered in restoring Muhammad Shah to his sovereign authority, and by the right of inheritance the post should devolve upon him. If he was considered too young to hold the post, there was Nizam-ul Mulk upon whom the high office could be conferred. [The Emperor agreed to the latter proposal and a *farman* was sent to Nizam-ul Mulk calling upon him to return from the Deccan and assume the responsibilities of *wizarat*.<sup>4</sup>

Yusuf Muhammad Khan, author of *Tarikh-i Fathiya*, writes that Muhammad Shah had given a pledge in the letters he wrote to Nizam-ul Mulk before the overthrow of the Saiyids that if the latter was successful against the Saiyids he would be appointed *Wazir*. The *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*<sup>5</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-ul Safa*, f. 52a.

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written by Qasim Aurangabadi, conveys the same impression. A critical examination of the actual letters and *farmans*, issued by Muhammad Shah, however, would make it clear that the Emperor never made a definite promise to confer the *wizarat* on Nizam-ul Mulk.<sup>1</sup> Even now the Emperor had made the appointment reluctantly and in taking the decision he had been influenced more by the pressure of the Mughal faction than by the claims of the hereditary rights preferred by Qamr-u'd-din Khan. Shaf'i Warid records that Qamr-u'd-din threatened bloodshed if the prize post went to a non-Mughal.<sup>2</sup> The author of *Tarikh-i Muzaffari* corroborates this statement by remarking that Muhammad Shah dreaded the Mughal group so much that he had to suspend all important business of the state till the arrival of Nizam-ul Mulk<sup>3</sup> and as a temporary measure appointed 'Inayatullah Khan deputy *wazir* to look after the routine work of the department.<sup>4</sup>

Nizam-ul Mulk set out for Delhi after entrusting the administration of the Deccan to 'Iwaz Khan and Fida'i Khan and reached the capital on 28 January 1722.<sup>5</sup> His popularity as a successful general and administrator was already very great in the capital, and on the day of his arrival, crowds of people came out to greet him and thronged the road all the way from Humayun's tomb to the Red Fort. Thousands stood on the roofs of houses and shops on either side of the road to catch a glimpse of the new *wazir*.<sup>6</sup> His appointment had indeed raised great hopes among the people, hopes that now at last under the new dispensation, things would improve. The Emperor held a grand *darbar* in his honour a few days after his arrival and formally conferred on him the office of *wizarat* with "usual gifts of robes, jewels, a ring, a jewelled pen-case, and a large sum of money."<sup>7</sup>

Upon taking charge of his office Nizam-ul Mulk found the state of the treasury alarming and the *jagirdari* system in disorder. People suffered from the effects of rise in prices, and unemployment, particularly among

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me and he had already issued a *farman* to this effect in his own handwriting. This pledge notwithstanding, Muhammad Shah had gone back on his words and appointed Muhammad Amin Khan *wazir* instead." *Nizam-ul Mulk*, Asaf Jah, I, 138.

<sup>1</sup> The copies of these letters and *farmans* are included in *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, ff. 53, 63, 64; *Zafrah-i Deccan*, 69, 70, 71 and *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 177b; also, *Journal of Indian History Congress*, Allahabad, 1967, 183-190.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 611.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 268.

<sup>4</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 66a.

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TABLE I

## APPOINTMENTS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN 1720

S. No.	Names and Titles	Mansabs	Office	Group	References
1.	Muhammad 'Amin Khan A'itmad-ud Daulah	8,000/8,000	wazir	Mughal	Kamwar, f. 373b
2.	Khwajah 'Asim, Samsam-ud Daulah, Khan-i Dauran	7,000/7,000	mir bakhshi	Shaikh (Indian)	„ „
3.	Qamr-u'd-din Khan	7,000/7,000	Second bakhshi, daroghah diwan-i-khas	Mughal	„ „
4.	Zafar Khan Bahadur, Roshan- ud Daulah, Rustam Jang	7,000/7,000	Third bakhshi, mir bakhshi of ahadis	Indian (Muslim)	„ „
5.	Saifullah Khan, 'Aqidat Khan	6,000/5,000	Fourth bakhshi	—	„ „
6.	Iradatmand Khan, Sharf-ud Daulah.	5,000/3,000	diwan-khalisah wa tan	—	„ „
7.	Haider Quli Khan, Mu'iz-ud Daulah, Nasir Jang.	6,000/6,000	mir atash	Mughal	„ „
8.	Iradatmand Khan, Sharf-ud Daulah	5,000/6,000	diwan khalisah wa tan	Khanazad	„ „
9.	Mir Jumla	7,000/7,000	sad-rus sadur	Mughal	„ 374a
10.	'Inayatullah Kashmiri	6,000/5,000	khan-i-saman	Kashmiri	„ 377b
11.	Dil Dler Khan	6,000/6,000	Head of Escheat	Ansari (Indian)	T.M. 95. Kamwar, 376b
12.	Jaswant Rai	—	Peshkar in khalisah Department	Kayasth —	Kamwar, 374a



13.	Kirpa Ram	—	Peshkar in the <i>Tan</i> Department.	Kayasth	Kamwar,	—
14.	Khawajah Hamid Khan	—	<i>Qazi-ul Quzzat</i>	Shaikh	„	378b
15.	'Ata 'Ali Khan	—	Keeper of the arsenal	Kashmiri	T.M. 93	—
16.	Hidayat-ullah Khan	—	Superintendent of menial servants	Kashmiri	Kamwar,	f. 376b
17.	Muzaffar Khan, brother of Khan-i Dauran	5,000/3,000	Superintendent of Retinue	Shaikh (Indian)	„	376b
18.	Sa'adat Khan, Burhan-ul Mulk	6,000/5,000	Superintendent of <i>Khawas</i>	Mughal	Kamwar,	f. 376b
19.	Raja Gujjarmal	—	Head of Scouts	Kayasth	Kamwar,	f. 376b
20.	Kifayatullah Khan	—	Librarian	Indian	„	„
21.	'Ati-ullah Khan	—	<i>Daroghah- i Dak</i>	Indian	„	„
22.	Fazil 'Ali Khan	—	Head of Elephant Stable	—	„	f. 377b
23.	Lachhmi Ram	2,000/500	<i>Peshkar in the Nizarat</i>	Kayasth	„	f. 376b

**TABLE II**  
**GOVERNORS APPOINTED OR CONFIRMED IN 1720**

S. No.	Names	Name of the Province	Group	References
1.	Sarbuland Khan	Kabul	Irani	Kamwar, f. 376b.
2.	'Abdul Samad Khan	Lahore	Turani	„ f. 376a.
3.	Sher Afgan Khan	Multan	Indian	Shiu Das 68b.
4.	Zakarya Khan	Kashmir	Turani	Kamwar, f. 376b.
5.	Mahabat Khan	Thatta	Indian	„ f. 376b.
6.	Haider Quli Khan	Gujarat	Irani	„ f. 376b.
7.	Sa'adat Khan	Agra	Irani	— f. 378b.
8.	Raja Ajit Singh	Ajmer	Rajput	„ f. 376b.
9.	Raja Jai Singh	Malwa	Rajput	„ f. 378b.
10.	Raja Girdhar Bahadur	Awadh	Brahman	„ f. 376b.
11.	Muhd. Khan Bangash	Allahabad	Afghan	„ f. 376b.
12.	Nusrat Yar Khan	Bihar	Saiyid of Barha	„ f. 378b.
13.	Murshid Quli Khan	Bengal	Indian	— —
14.	Nizam-ul Mulk	Deccan	Turani	— —
15.	Mubariz Khan	Hyderabad	—	<i>Ausaf-ul-Asaf</i> , f. 51
16.	'Iwaz Khan	Aurangabad	Turani	„ „ —
17.	'Abdur Rahim Khan	Burhanpur	Turani	„ „ —
<i>Faujdars</i>				
1.	Bhupat Ram	Panipat		Kamwar 376b.
2.	Khair Andesh Khan	Bareilly		„ 376b.
3.	'Ali Asghar Khan	Sikandarabad		„ 376b.
4.	Fakhiruddin	Delhi		„ 376b.
5.	Ruhullah Khan	Doraha (Malwa)		„ 377b.
6.	Qaim Khan	Saharanpur		„ 377b.
7.	Bayazid Khan	Mewat		„ 377b.
8.	Hamid Khan	Sikandarabad		„ 377b.

TABLE III

## NOBLES WHO RECEIVED MANSABS IN 1720

S. No.	Names	Mansab	References
1.	Khawajah 'Abadullah (father-in-law of M. Shah)	8,000/6,000	Kamwar 376a
2.	Jahan Khan	7,000/5,000	" "
3.	Muhammad Khan	7,000/7,000	" 374b
4.	Khawaja Monis Khan	6,000/1,000	" 377b
5.	Khawaja 'Abdul 'Aziz	7,000/5,000	" 374a
6.	Mir Hasan Khan, Koka	6,000/2,000	" 374a
7.	Sadr-u'd-din Muhammad Koka	4,000/4,000	" 374a
8.	Yar Muhammad Koka	4,000/3,000	" 374a
9.	Rahim Khan	4,000/2,000	" 374a
10.	Shafi-u'd-din Khan	4,000/2,000	" 374a
11.	Gursa khan	4,000/2,000	" 374a
12.	'Izzat 'Ali Khan	4,000/2,000	" 374a
13.	Jan Nisar Khan	4,000/2,000	" 374a
14.	Sipahdar Khan	4,000/2,000	" 374a
15.	Khoja Zamrud Khan	2,000/2,000	" 374a
16.	Ashraf Khan	5,000/3,000	" 374a
17.	Shah Nawaz Khan	4,000/2,000	" 376b

the *khanazad* nobles, had reduced them to impoverishment.<sup>1</sup> Reckless alienation of *khalisa* lands had brought about a perceptible fall in the revenues of the state, making the regular payment of salaries difficult.<sup>2</sup> The Emperor, faced with imminent bankruptcy,<sup>3</sup> resorted to the sale of state offices to the highest bidder. Most of the newly elevated *mansabdars* were by and large men of low calibre, incapable either of executing government orders or managing their *jagirs*. Those who failed to receive *jagirs* against

<sup>1</sup> Qasim Aurangabadi writes that in spite of good rains and cultivation of vast areas only seven seers of grain could be bought for one rupee. *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 181a. Shafi Warid attributes this rise in prices to the system of revenue farming. *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 570.

<sup>2</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 85b.

<sup>3</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 182a. For instance, 'Aqidatmand Khan, son of Amir Khan was appointed governor of Bihar after he paid Rs. 5 lakhs as *peshkash*. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 938.

their pay lived in poverty and distress.<sup>1</sup> Some of the *jagirdars* sold grain in the imperial market; the market officers, having been bribed, did not check them. Oppressed by official malpractices and highhandedness of *jagirdars*<sup>2</sup> the peasantry defied revenue collectors and withheld payment. Not far from the capital the *Mewatis* had taken to plunder and thrown the whole region into disorder, operating with increasing boldness as their depredations went unpunished.<sup>3</sup> The natural calamities in the form of earthquakes, floods and epidemics affected large areas of the land and further aggravated the distress of the people.<sup>4</sup>

To set the finances in order and to effect improvement in the *jagirdari* system Nizam-ul Mulk put a number of proposals before the Emperor. One was that all further assignments of *jagirs* should be stopped and more lands brought under the *khalisa*. Farming of *khalisa* revenues so ruinous to the exchequer should be put to an end. The existing deficit was to be met by rigorous thrift in the court and personal expenditure of the monarch and by reducing the size of the royal bounty. He also suggested that the king should give up the unwise practice of selling state offices to augment his resources as it lowered the royal dignity. He insisted on enforcing discipline and raising the standard of administration by appointing competent persons to offices of trust and responsibility. He held that the reimposition of *jaziya* would lessen the financial burden. Apart from financial and administrative proposals he urged that the Mughal government should send a military expedition to the help of Sultan Shah Husain Safavi who had been defeated and deposed by Mahmud Khan Afghan.<sup>5</sup>

Nizam-ul Mulk's proposals appear to have gained the king's consent and he was permitted to implement them. His plans for drastic changes in the administrative set-up represented a popular demand and met with the general approval of the public. The privileged nobles and the courtiers, however, felt alarmed at the challenge which the proposals posed to their growing supremacy. All these elements came together and prepared themselves to resist the threat. They were headed by Koki Jiu,<sup>6</sup> the foster-sister of Muhammad Shah, and as was to be expected this new coalition against the *wazir* cut across old party lines. It was made up not only of such courtiers as Shah 'Abdul Ghaffoor, Zafar Khan, Roshan-ud Daulah and Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan, but also included those Mughal nobles like Haider Quli

<sup>1</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 181a.

<sup>2</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 182.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 257.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 207.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, f. 16a; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II.

همشیره رضاعی پادشاه که در اصطلاح اهل هند کو کی

گویند، زن سکر آفرین پرتوس صاحب جوهر بود

<sup>6</sup> *Mir'at-ul Safa*, f. 52a.

and affection of the people whom he strove to protect from the prevailing lawlessness. On 20 June 1725 Muhammad Shah accepted the bitter reality and pardoned Nizam-ul Mulk conferring upon him the governorship of the Deccan and the title of Asaf Jah. His *jagirs* were restored to him; but he was relieved of the charge of the other two provinces of Malwa and Gujarat.<sup>1</sup>

*Qamr-u'd-din Khan, the New Wazir*

The office of *wizarat*, after being held, for a brief interval, by Ghazi-u'd-din Khan,<sup>2</sup> was conferred on Qamr-u'd-din Khan<sup>3</sup> on 22 July 1724 who had no rival claimant in the field to oppose his elevation to that high post.<sup>4</sup> For once an appointment to this high post had been made smoothly and without the usual tensions. In selecting Qamr-u'd-din Khan as the new *wazir*, Muhammad Shah had given little consideration to merit and outstanding ability, and had made loyalty to the throne and submissiveness of temperament the criteria for appointment. The Emperor liked young men of equable temper and pleasant disposition; the company of ambitious, assertive persons of stubborn will was odious to him.<sup>5</sup> Qamr-u'd-din Khan, who was 38 years old at the time of his appointment, had always been a pleasant man to have around in the court. With his noble lineage and loyalty to the Emperor combined with his modesty and cultured ways he had been able to infuse a good deal of warmth in his personal relations with Muhammad Shah. His clean and fair administration and his humane approach to its problems won him the respect of the public. He was also popular on account of his generosity and patronage of art and literature. Being satisfied with the existing machinery of government, the new *wazir* concentrated on making it work well; introducing reforms by uprooting the older institutions was beyond the range of his vision. The love of

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 962; *Nizam-ul Mulk Asaf Jah*, I, 176-178.

<sup>2</sup> His real name was Mir Muhammad Pannah. He was the eldest son of Nizam-ul Mulk and son-in-law of Qamr-u'd-din Khan. Muhammad Shah made him deputy *wazir* on January 6, 1724 when Nizam-ul Mulk left Delhi for the Deccan. He chose to stay on in the capital even after he was replaced by his father-in-law in the office of *wizarat*. For details of his career, vide, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 361-62.

<sup>3</sup> Mir Muhammad Fazil, son of Muhammad Amin Khan, received the title of Qamr-u'd-din Khan in the reign of Aurangzeb. Farrukh Siyar appointed him the *bakhshi* of the *ahadi* troops and granted him the rank of 5000/-. When his father became *wazir*, he was made second *bakhshi* and his rank was increased to 6,000/-. After Muhammad Amin Khan died, he received the title of I'timad-u'd-daulah. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 358-361.

<sup>4</sup> Muhammad bin Faiz 'Ata Khan, *Akbar-i Muhobbat*, f. 439.

<sup>5</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, II, 458.

pleasure limited his ambitions to acquiring predominance in public affairs.<sup>1</sup> Court politics and intrigue held no attraction for him. He did not involve himself in the conflict between the Emperor and Nizam-ul Mulk and gave no support to Hamid Khan when he defied central authority and fomented strife in Gujarat soon after his appointment though both were his close relatives. He was able to get on pleasantly with men of the king's intimate circle which included nobles of such diverse characters as Zafar Khan and Shah 'Abdul Ghafoor. He was completely free from lust for power and never tried to subordinate the imperial interests to his own selfish purposes. So far from ever defying the royal will he considered it his highest duty to strictly comply with his master's orders in all circumstances.<sup>2</sup> These traits of personality enabled Qamr-u'd-din Khan to continue in the office of *wizarat* for 24 years till the end of his life and to enjoy the complete confidence of the Emperor throughout the period.

The Emperor increased the rank of Qamr-u'd-din Khan to 8,000/8,000 and assigned him *jagirs* in proportion to his salary.<sup>3</sup> In contrast with former *wazirs* he was not given the *subedari* of any province. His authority and influence were further limited by the dominance enjoyed at the court by Koki Jiu and her group. The Emperor hardly ever took a decision on any issue without consulting Zafar Khan and Koki Jiu.<sup>4</sup> Zafar Khan and other advisers of the king wielded far more power in matters of appointments, grant of *mansabs*, promotions and dismissals than the *wazir* and other officers.<sup>5</sup> The system of *peshkash* had placed at the disposal of this group the means for extending and perpetuating their own power as the Emperor, always in desperate need of money, depended on Koki Jiu and her associates for arranging the contributions from job-seekers. The people looked to them for recommendation and assistance in securing ranks and *jagirs*. The *wazir* who was not a link in this chain of arrangements quickly slid into the background and owing to the constant interference by the king's favourites his control over the department was far from effective.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Fathiya*, f. 132b; *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shah*, f. 67a.

اگرچه غفلت شعار و همیشه مست بادہ خوشگوار می بود - اما نہایت کم آزار و رفیقی پرور بود - خلق شاہجہاں آباد شکرگزار او و زندگی او را مستقیم می شمردند -

Harnam Singh Nami, *Sa'adat-i Javed*, 301.

عادل و مستکی و فیاض و باصروقت و تمکین و عیش دوست و شراب نوش...

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 67a.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 280.

<sup>4</sup> *S.P.D.* XXX, No. 14, dated 17-8-1728.

<sup>5</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akkherin*, II, 458.

<sup>6</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 67a.

It was on the suggestion of Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan, an important member of the group, that Sarbuland Khan was appointed governor of Gujarat in September 1724,<sup>1</sup> though his record of service in Kabul was most unsatisfactory. What was more a sum of one crore of rupees was given to him out of which he paid the arrears of his soldiers and built up a strong force to fight Hamid Khan, the uncle of Nizam-ul Mulk.<sup>2</sup> His request for the release of Saiyid Najm-u'd-din 'Ali Khan was also granted. The Emperor appointed Najm-u'd-din the governor of Ajmer and even allowed him to recruit the Saiyids of Barha in his provincial army. Muhkam Singh, the trusted secretary of Husain 'Ali Khan, was restored to his old rank and a *jagir* worth two crores of *dams* was assigned to him.<sup>3</sup> Haidar Quli Khan, another antagonist of Nizam-ul Mulk, was restored to favour and reinstated on 30 December 1724 in the office of Mir Atash; Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan Turani, a supporter of Nizam-ul Mulk, was dismissed from this post.<sup>4</sup> Zafar Khan another member of the Koki clique recommended Nasir Khan for the governorship of Kabul.<sup>5</sup> Similarly through the efforts of Koki Jiu and Zafar Khan, Muhammad Khan Bangash secured the *subedari* of Malwa on 19 September 1730.<sup>6</sup>

Obviously, the *wazir* played no part in these administrative appointments. Apart from the fact that these appointments led to the rapid decline in the influence and power of the *wazir* in the government, they marked a definite shift in the policy of the Emperor towards the Turani nobles. Hardly five years after their fall, the Saiyids of Barha were being brought back to power as a counterpoise to the Turanis. This trend becomes clear from a perusal of Table IV, given on p. 94, containing the list of officers pertaining to years 1724-1730. It contains only a few Turanis; except for the office of *wizarat*, now rendered ineffective, all other key posts were held by the non-Turani favourites of the king. The percentage of the Indian element in the central departments was growing relatively larger. So was the proportion of eunuchs whose origins have not been recorded but who figure quite prominently on the list.

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, II, 460. Ghulam Husain states that Sarbuland Khan was secretly promised the post of *wizarat*, in case he succeeded in driving Hamid Khan from Gujarat. This statement is not corroborated by other contemporary writers.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 95a; *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 79.

<sup>3</sup> Some of the important Barha Saiyids who joined the standard of Najm-u'd-din 'Ali Khan were: Saif-u'd-din 'Ali Khan, Shuja'at-ullah Khan, Muhammad Khan, Shah 'Ali Khan and Nijabat 'Ali Khan. *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 281; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 508-510.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, II, 459.

<sup>5</sup> *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 23-24; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 833-35.

<sup>6</sup> *J.A.S.B.*, 305-306.

TABLE IV  
OFFICERS APPOINTED DURING THE YEARS 1724-1730.<sup>1</sup>

<i>Names</i>	<i>Mansab</i>	<i>Post</i>	<i>Group</i>
1. Qamr-u'd-din Khan	8,000/-	<i>Wazir</i>	Mughal (Turani)
2. Muzaffar 'Ali Khan	7,000/-	<i>Mir Atash</i>	Indian
3. Sher Afghan Khan	7,000/-	Darogha of <i>risa- la-i sultani</i>	Indian
4. Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan	6,000/-	<i>Nazir and daro- gha sarf Khas</i>	Indian
5. Amin-u'd-daulah	—	<i>Mir Tuzak I</i>	Indian
6. Dawar-dad Khan	—	<i>Mir Tuzak II</i>	—
7. Mir Hasan Khan	6,000/-	<i>Darogha khas Jilu</i>	(Koka of the Emperor)
8. 'Ali Ahmad Khan	5,000/-	<i>'Araz Mukarrar</i>	(brother of Koki Jiu) Indian
9. 'Ali Asghar Khan	5,000/-	<i>Faujdar of Doab (Punjab)</i>	(brother of Koki Jiu) Indian
10. 'Ali Hamid Khan	5,000/-	<i>Darogha of Faiz Canal</i>	(brother of Koki Jiu) Indian
11. S. Najm-u'd-din 'Ali	—	Governor of Ajmer	(Saiyid of Barha) Indian
12. Bu 'Ali Khan	—	<i>Darogha-i-farrash khana</i>	—
13. Munawwar Khan	5,000/-	<i>Qur Baigi</i>	Indian
14. 'Inayat Khan Rasikh	4,000/-	<i>Bakhshi of shagird paisha</i>	Indian
15. Allahwardi Khan	4,000/-	<i>Qarawul Baigi</i>	Mughal
16. Javid Khan	—	<i>Darogha of privy purse</i>	ethnic origin not known
17. Jawahar Khan	—	<i>Darogha of jewel house.</i>	Eunuch
18. Bakhtawar Khan	—	<i>Darogha of Kitchen.</i>	„
19. Waje'eh Khan	—	<i>Darogha of coffec department</i>	„
20. Qaim Khan	—	<i>Darogha of post office</i>	„
21. Mas'um 'Ali Khan	—	<i>Darogha of intelli- gence office</i>	„

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, II, 457-58; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 46, 47, 48, 54, 55.



*Fall of Koki Jiu's Clique*

The list of appointments of officers, in Table IV, made at a time when Koki's clique stood at the height of its power, shows that *mansabdars* and courtiers of Indian origin were generally favoured for promotion to high posts in the government. But the trend was permanent and continued even after the fall of Koki's clique from power in 1734. Their power and social importance rested solely on the successful exploitation of the system of *peskash* on behalf of the king with whose connivance they were able to elbow out the ministers from exercising their departmental patronage. But plainly the basic defects of the system had plainly contributed to their fall which was both sudden and complete. The sale of offices was hardly possible when available jobs were exhausted. The few who did succeed in securing one found it increasingly difficult to take possession of *jagirs* even after payment of bribes. Those who succeeded found that the produce from *jagir* lands fell far short of the amounts they had to pay for them as *peshkash*. This state of affairs detracted from the prestige of the government and alienated the affections of a large and important sections of the public.<sup>1</sup> The members of the clique had made immense fortunes by embezzlement and peculation while the Emperor was in financial straits. He became suspicious about the transactions and these were confirmed by the report of auditors which showed an outstanding balance of Rs. 3 crores against Zafar Khan and the same amount against 'Abdul Ghafoor.<sup>2</sup>

Koki Jiu, who was at the head of the clique, went too far when she quarrelled with the queen. Muhammad Shah was so astounded and angry that he decided to take immediate action against the whole bunch of his former henchmen. Koki Jiu recognized the writing on the wall, and surrendering her hoards of riches silently quitted the palace. Zafar Khan, though he paid back part of the money he had embezzled, fell into disgrace. Shah 'Abdul Ghafoor, relying on the influence he had come to exercise as a *dervesh* at court chose to disobey and even slighted the Emperor in open court. It was in vain that Qamr-u'd-din Khan tried to persuade the Shah to submit and save his position. 'Abdul Ghafoor was arrested and imprisoned and cash amounting to two crores of rupees was seized from him; all his immovable property was confiscated. By the end of 1734 the ascendancy of this clique had come to an end.<sup>3</sup> Their weakness lay in the fact that they operated as a clique, which because of the nature of its activities had to depend on people drawn from different social strata. They were neither organized like the other factions at the court nor could

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, I, 47a.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, II, 47b., 66b; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 605, 623-638.

<sup>3</sup> For details, vide, *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, 602-605, 622-638; *Tarikh-i Hind*,

they hope to get their support. Without the support of a party they were unable to withstand the opposition of strong sections of nobles whose ill-will and jealousy they had aroused. The most noteworthy feature of their fall is that it illustrates once again that Muhammad Shah was no figure-head; he was not the man to be permanently dominated by considerations of personal intimacy and relationship. He had used the clique for his own purposes and the moment they betrayed his trust he discarded them without remorse. That he had chosen to rely on such people as the members of this rickety coalition merely shows that he lacked both training and vision and had neither the will nor the capacity to face up to the immense problems confronting the government and was content to work to death the existing system. Zafar Khan and 'Abdul Ghafoor, wanting in talent and resource, had no other measures except *peshkash* to suggest for replenishing the treasury. No long range measures for solving the financial stringency or augmenting the productive capacity of the state were either suggested or adopted.

#### *Rivalry between Khan-i Dauran and Qamr-u'd-din Khan*

The void opened by the exit of Koki Jiu from the political stage, was now partly filled by Khan-i Dauran, the *mir bakhshi*, who had worked for it. He had won the favour and confidence of the Emperor and started wielding considerable influence in the management of affairs. Qamr-u'd-din Khan failed to seize this chance to recover the lost influence and power of the *wizarat*. Khan-i Dauran had started his career as a *mansabdār* of 150, and had risen to the high position of the *mir bakhshi* in 1719 at the age of 47. He was well-equipped by training and temperament for the place he occupied in the king's council. He was not only cultured, thoughtful and generous, but was wholly Indian, in his speech, dress and manners.<sup>1</sup> He possessed the wisdom to change sides and make adjustments according to the change in circumstances. Experience of court life had taught him the importance of loyalty, service and flattery to the king; in these qualities he outshone other courtiers. Throughout his public life he managed to retain the confidence of the Emperor and to keep his rivals at bay. Consequently he was able to serve the government uninterruptedly, until death on the battle-field of Karnal gloriously ended

517-18. Rustum 'Ali Khan has summed up the character of Shah 'Abdul Ghafoor in the following couplet:

در طریق باطنی بدتر ز کُرگ	در لباس ظاهری شیخ بزرگ
ما نند در دعوی بعید از مدعا	از زبان صد زکر و در دل صد دعا

<sup>1</sup> Akbar Muhabbat, 437.

his career on 16 February 1739.

The battle of Karnal was the last and the only battle in which he had fought gallantly for the Emperor. Previously he had never displayed dash or courage in any of the campaigns he had to undertake against the imperial foes. Peaceful settlement with the Marathas was his ideal and aim. He was opposed to the military solution of the regional problems. He pleaded for the adoption of a conciliatory attitude towards the refractory *zamindars*. He argued that the Rajas and the *zamindars*, big and small, were basically obedient and loyal servants of the crown. For instance he advocated that the traditional ties which bound the Rajputs with government should be further strengthened in order to combat the Maratha menace and also to secure local support for military operations and maintenance of tranquillity in Rajputana. He generally protected the interests of the Rajput chiefs and treated their *vakils* at the court kindly.<sup>1</sup>

The Emperor consulted Khan-i Dauran in matters relating to appointments and transfers of big officials and his counsels generally prevailed.<sup>2</sup> He appointed Muzaffar 'Ali Khan, brother of Khan-i Dauran, the governor of Ajmer, and *mir atash* after the death of Haider Quli Khan in 1725 and raised him to the *mansab* of 7,000/7,000.<sup>3</sup> His appointment strengthened the position of his brother as he was not only given a free hand in the appointments and promotions of officers and artillery-men like *minkbashi* and *hazariyan*<sup>4</sup> in his department but being responsible for the security of His Majesty and the palace gates he came to wield immense influence with Muhammad Shah.<sup>5</sup> Khan-i Dauran himself apart from the post of *mir bakhshi* held the charge of distributing the subsidies to the hillmen of Kabul, an important function formerly performed by Zafar Khan.<sup>6</sup>

On the suggestion of the *mir bakhshi*, Sarbuland Khan, governor of Gujarat, was replaced by Abhai Singh in October 1730. This appointment served a double purpose. On the one hand, Abhai Singh thus honoured left the *wazir's* group and befriended Khan-i Dauran; on the other hand, the Raja made spirited efforts to wage an offensive against the Marathas in Gujarat.<sup>7</sup> In pursuance of the same policy, Raja Jai Singh, in spite of

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 78-79.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 78b.

ہیچ حکمے و ہیچ مرے بے تجویز و بے مشورہ او بجائے نمی آردند

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 283.

<sup>4</sup> For an explanation of these terms, *vide*, W. Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, Delhi, 1962, 157-158.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 82a.

<sup>6</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 479.

<sup>7</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 118.

his past failure as a general, was appointed once again the governor of Malwa in October 1732, in place of Muhammad Khan Bangash who was accused of having formed a league with Nizam-ul Mulk to dethrone the Emperor.<sup>1</sup> Khan-i Dauran also fully exploited the conflict between the Emperor and Nizam-ul Mulk to his own advantage. He imputed treasonable motives to any noble friendly to the Nizam and pursued him relentlessly till his career or standing with the Emperor was ruined. This became a favourite device which he used successfully against all his rivals and opponents. He soon built up a faction of his own which consisted of Muzaffar 'Ali, Raja Abhai Singh, Raja Jai Singh and other Rajput and Afghan nobles. By systematically giving jobs to persons of non-Mughal extraction he assumed the leadership of the Indian elements at the court against the *wazir*.

Qamr-u'd-din Khan, in spite of his intimate relationship with the Emperor and his peaceable, easygoing nature could not afford to plough a lonely furrow and remain isolated in this fast developing situation which spelled danger for the Mughals. Though he had no great gifts for practical politics, circumstances forced him to safeguard his position and willy-nilly he had to come forward to take an active part in the new party strife. He was obliged to rally the support of the Mughals whose interests had to be defended against further encroachment. Members of his own family joined hands with other Mughal nobles to form a group behind the *wazir* to enable him to vie with the faction of Khan-i Dauran. The following table gives their names and ranks.<sup>2</sup>

Apart from the Mughal element Qamr-u'd-din Khan brought into the

TABLE V

LIST OF THE MUGHAL NOBLES IN THE GROUP OF QAMR-U'D-DIN KHAN

<i>Names</i>	<i>Mansabs</i>
1. 'Azimullah Khan (cousin brother of the <i>wazir</i> )	5,000/-
2. Khan Firoz Jang (son-in-law of the <i>wazir</i> )	5,000/-
3. Jan Nisar Khan (brother of Begum Sholapuri, wife of the <i>wazir</i> )	4,000/-
4. Mir Haider Khan	7,000/-
5. Shahamat Khan	7,000/-
6. Iradatmand Khan	7,000/-
7. Artat Khan	7,000/-
8. Taqtamash Khan	7,000/-
9. Muhammad Khan Bahadur	6,000/-
10. Gurrah Khan Bahadur	6,000/-
11. Najeeb 'Ali Khan	5,000/5,000
12. Musi Yar Khan	5,000/-

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 516.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 83.

alliance, Muhammad Khan Bangash, the Afghan chief, and also established cordial relations with Sa'adat Khan, the powerful Irani noble. Muhammad Khan and Sa'adat Khan had on their part taken fright at the overweening influence of Khan-i Dauran and felt the need of forming a union with the *wazir*. This accession of powerful adherents gave strength and vitality to the Mughal group which would otherwise have cracked beneath the weight of the increasingly strained relations between the Emperor and the leading Mughal noble, Nizam-ul Mulk. This combination acted as a counterpoise in preserving the balance of power at the court. The friendly contacts between Muhammad Khan Bangash and Qamr-u'd-din Khan are manifest from their correspondence in which they expressed sentiments of sincerity and devotion towards each other. Muhammad Khan kept the *wazir* informed of all events and developments in Bundelkhand and Malwa, and sought his assistance in obtaining money and *jagirs* for himself and his officers. The *wazir* in return never failed to show him all kinds of courtesies and wrote letters encouraging him to hold his own in the midst of difficulties.<sup>1</sup>

When Qamr-u'd-din Khan went to Agra in September 1732 Muhammad Khan welcomed him most cordially. The *wazir* visited his friend's house and asked him to join in the campaign against Bhagwant Singh, *zamindar* of Adaura, in Ghazipur district,<sup>2</sup> who had murdered Jan Nisar Khan, the *faujdar* of Karra. Muhammad Khan took part in the military operations and helped the *wazir* to defeat the rebel. Qamr-u'd-din Khan intended to crush other warlike elements in this area, but urgent calls from the Emperor obliged him to return to Delhi.<sup>3</sup> Later, the *wazir* requested Sa'adat Khan to punish Bhagwant Singh in a manner warranted by his guilt. Sa'adat Khan, while passing through Allahabad on his way to Delhi, September 1736, invaded the stronghold of the *zamindar* who was killed in the fighting.<sup>4</sup> Qamr-u'd-din Khan also took help from 'Ali Muhammad Khan, the Rohilla chief, in the suppression of Saiyid Saifuddin 'Ali Khan.<sup>5</sup>

In 1723 a private feud between Sa'adat Khan and Muzaffar 'Ali Khan, arising from a petty issue, almost led to an armed clash. Muzaffar 'Ali Khan, provoked at being insulted by Sa'adat Khan in the presence of the Emperor, swore vengeance and instantly started mobilizing troops with the help of his brother, Khan-i Dauran. Qamr-u'd-din Khan placed his own force, made up largely of the Mughals, under the service of Sa'adat Khan who had not brought his army from Awadh. The Mughals

<sup>1</sup> Bhagwan Das, *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, Aligarh MS. ff. 22, 24.

<sup>2</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, f. 37.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 106, 107.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, 467-68.

<sup>5</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, 478.

made this into an occasion for a demonstration of their solidarity. Qamr-u'd-din Khan exhorted the Mughals, both Iranis and Turaniš, to make common cause against Muzaffar 'Ali Khan and his brother as the honour of all the Mughals was at stake and their interests were, therefore, one and the same. An armed clash was however averted by the timely and forceful assertion of his authority by the Emperor. He ordered both the contending leaders to leave the capital forthwith and repair to their respective provincial headquarters. Both Sa'adat Khan and Muzaffar 'Ali Khan complied and with this the episode came to an end.<sup>1</sup> Zafar Khan and Sher Afghan Khan, who had employed a large number of Afghans and Hindustanis in their armies, formed their own group which did not identify either with Qamr-u'd-din Khan or Khan-i Dauran. Zafar Khan, though related to Nizam-ul Mulk, did not join hands with Qamr-u'd-din Khan in his conflict with Khan-i Dauran.<sup>2</sup>

### *Nobility and the Maratha Problem*

The central issue facing the nobility was the threat posed by the Marathas to the territorial integrity of the Mughal Empire. When faced with the rapidly expanding Maratha power, the weakness of the Mughal nobility—political, administrative and military—became starkly revealed. It was largely due to this weakness that the Maratha troops were able to overrun the fertile and extensive territories of Gujarat and Malwa and in the towns and villages of these provinces replace Mughal officers by their own men as revenue collectors. The rout of the imperial army at Amjhera in 1728 dealt a severe blow to the royal authority and destroyed the whole fabric of the local administration in Malwa. Determined to regain control of the above two provinces, Muhammad Shah dispatched several well-equipped expeditions under the command of his nobles who as generals were given full authority in the conduct of operations. But the successive commanders almost without exception proved themselves slothful and inefficient in planning and supervising the campaigns. In sharp contrast with the earlier phase of the Mughal-Maratha struggle, the contemporary accounts of these campaigns present a very uncomplimentary picture not only of the Mughal strategy and military organization but also of the quality of leadership. No deeds of chivalry or acts of heroism illumine the tale. For the Mughals it was a succession of one

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 81, 82.

شرم مغلیت واحد است و ایرانی و تورانی یکی است

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 60a. The daughter of Zafar Khan had been married to Nasir Jang Nizam-ud Daulah, son of Nizam-ul Mulk, f. 55a.

subject surrender after another. The imperial generals fought not a single major contest doggedly and unitedly; they displayed no enthusiasm and spirit of self-sacrifice for their cause so conspicuous among their foes. The Marathas had abandoned their former tactics and were now operating over vast areas, fighting with large armies in the open. This should have made the problem of dealing with them simple for the imperialists had it not been for their incapacity to raise and equip large armies due to lack of resources. When they did have the armies, the commanders proved incapable of moving as swiftly as their foe. Non-payment of salaries chilled the ardour of the soldiers and their rank and file became thoroughly disaffected. The people in general either because of official tyranny or because of the failure of the government to protect them in time did not rally to the defence of the province when danger threatened and in course of time started collaborating with the Marathas.

### Gujarat

The first governor to defy imperial orders of transfer was Hamid Khan who refused to handover charge to his successor, Sarbuland Khan. He was also the first Mughal governor to invite the Marathas to help him against the imperialists. He thus plunged the province into civil war and anarchy. He assigned *chauth* of all the *parganas* north of the Mahi river to Kanthaji Kadam Bande, and south of that river as far as Surat to Pilaji Gaikwad.<sup>1</sup> He replaced local officers, in charge of various *mahals*, by his own men, appropriated the crown lands, seized the money in the royal treasury and levied taxes, unknown before, on traders and merchants.<sup>2</sup> The Emperor, shocked to hear all this ordered Sarbuland Khan to march post-haste to Gujarat and curb the disorders prevailing there. A sum of Rs. 1 crore was placed at his disposal, out of which Rs. 50 lakhs were given to him immediately and the balance was promised to be paid in instalments later.<sup>3</sup> Sarbuland Khan, however, showed no anxiety or keenness to proceed on his mission; unnecessary delay and sloth marked the preparations for the journey. He set out from Delhi only on 13 April 1725, and took a full year and eight months to reach Ahmadabad in December 1726.

Hamid Khan, whose defiance of the Emperor had been instigated by Nizam-ul Mulk, now decided also at his suggestion to leave the province without offering resistance and retire to the Deccan.<sup>4</sup> Sarbuland Khan

<sup>1</sup> For details, vide, *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 58, 59, 63, 64; *S.P.D.*, XXX, 312.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 64, 67.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 79.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 86-87.

throughout his stay in Gujarat (1726-1730) took no effective measures to beat off the Maratha attacks, although during these years he received Rs. 9 lakhs from the centre, and had collected a huge amount of money through illegal fines and imposts.<sup>1</sup> "He sat idle in the city, while the enemy devastated the province and he dared not come out to face them; but, being overpowered, he paid *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*."<sup>2</sup> His arrangement with Baji Rao was altogether repugnant to the king who considered it an act of disloyalty as well as of weakness. His influence at the court suffered final eclipse when serious complaints against his usurpation of *jagirs* and other misdeeds poured in. He was dismissed from the governorship of Gujarat, and Raja Abhay Singh was appointed to that post in 1730.<sup>3</sup> The Raja received Rs. 18 lakhs in cash and 50 cannons of different sizes by way of military assistance from the government. He had to encounter the resistance from Sarbuland Khan who, following the way of Hamid Khan, resorted to fighting in order to retain his hold over the province. He was, however, defeated in an engagement, and was forced to leave the city. On 28 October 1730 Raja Abhay Singh entered Ahmadabad.<sup>4</sup>

Raja Abhay Singh who was energetic and resourceful, worked relentlessly to hold back the Marathas and revive the vanishing authority of the Mughals. But he found himself foiled at every step by the numerous Maratha divisions and was unable, owing to lack of resources, to maintain the requisite forces at the various centres of action. Consequently, he decided to come to terms with Baji Rao. He made an agreement by which he promised to pay *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* on the condition—that no other Maratha leader would invade the province and lay it under contribution.<sup>5</sup> The Emperor disapproved of the agreement and deeply resented the breach of his trust on the part of the governor. He considered the treaty ruinous to the imperial interests and a source of grave danger to the Mughal rule.<sup>6</sup> Baji Rao failed to stop the annual predatory incursions led by Umabai, Pilaji and Damaji. Abhay Singh became gradually convinced that he was unequal to the task of checking the Maratha incursions.<sup>7</sup> He lost hope of securing any help from the Emperor whose displeasure he had already incurred. Having entrusted the administration to his deputy, Ratan Singh Bhandari, Abhay Singh left

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 88, 99, 102, 103.

<sup>2</sup> B.N. Rau, *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, 150; *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 95.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 118.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 118, 119, 129, 130.

<sup>5</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 133, 134, 135; *S.P.D.*, XV, 82.

<sup>6</sup> *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, 160.

<sup>7</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 142, 143, 157, 158, 164, 167, 168.



Ahmadabad in 1733 and repaired to Jodhpur.<sup>1</sup> When complaints of cruelty, directed against the deputy-governor, multiplied, the Emperor dismissed the Raja and appointed Momin Khan as the governor of Gujarat, in May 1737.<sup>2</sup> Momin Khan faced the same difficulty in taking charge of his office which his predecessors had experienced. Ratan Singh disobeyed the royal orders and took recourse to arms, for which he had prepared himself. Momin Khan enlisted the support of Damaji by promising to assign to him half of the revenues of Gujarat. Ratan Singh Bhandari was forced to capitulate and left Ahmadabad on 26 May 1737.<sup>3</sup>

### Malwa

The military situation in Malwa had deteriorated rapidly after the defeat and death of Girdhar Bahadur in the disastrous battle of Amjhera fought on 29 November 1728.<sup>1</sup> The Mughal armed forces, crippled by lack of equipment and men, became, demoralised and despondent. The Marathas collected *chauth* from Nobai, Dhar, Ratlam and Badnawar while they plundered and devastated Sarangpur.<sup>5</sup> Bhawani Ram who succeeded his father Girdhar Bahadur as governor found the task of raising military contingents very difficult, as the small amount of Rs. 2 lakhs, received from the court, proved insufficient to meet the rising cost of defence. Added to his financial distress was the complication created by the hostile attitude of Saiyid Najm-u'd-din 'Ali Khan whom the Emperor had deputed to assist Bhawani Ram. The Saiyid circulated false news of his appointment to the governorship of Malwa, although no such change had been made by the government. The affairs of the province fell into confusion and the imperial authority declined.<sup>6</sup> Bhawani Ram, in the end was replaced by Raja Jai Singh on 29 November 1728. The Emperor gave him Rs. 13 lakhs and instructed him to open negotiations with Raja Shahu for a peaceful settlement.<sup>7</sup>

Raja Jai Singh showed no inclination to undertake a major offensive against the Marathas who consequently continued their persistent depredations with impunity. He had long been in touch with the Poona court

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 163.

<sup>2</sup> *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 205; *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, 195, 196, 197, 205, 208.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, 219, 231; *S.P.D.* XII, 88, 96, 98.

<sup>4</sup> *S.P.D.* XIII, 16, 17, 25, 28.

<sup>5</sup> *Malwa in Transition*, 167-169.

<sup>6</sup> *'Ajaib-ul Afaq*, ff. 79, 85. Bhawani Ram's letter to Nizam-ul Mulk, informing him of the defection of Saiyid Najm-u'd-din 'Ali Khan and the complications caused by it.

<sup>7</sup> *'Ajaib-ul Afaq*, ff. 83, 84; *S.P.D.* X, 66.

and wanted to use the friendship with Baji Rao to bring Malwa and Agra under his sway. He had supported neither Girdhar Bahadur nor Bhawani Ram during their tenure as governors in the hope of ultimately securing the *subedari* of Malwa for himself. He further desired to carve out an independent principality, with the help of the Marathas, stretching from the river Jumna to the bank of the Narmada.<sup>1</sup> In court politics the Raja was in agreement with Khan-i-Dauran who regarded war against the Marathas futile and hopeless. Khan-i-Dauran had openly criticised Aurangzeb for his failure to crush the power of the Marathas in the Deccan. "Alamgir waged war with the Marathas for 25 years; he won only pyrrhic victories which brought more misfortunes than benefits. Whatever had been achieved during two hundred years was undone and set at naught. All rules and regulations, established during this period were upset and thrown to the winds."<sup>2</sup> The spectre of war haunted Khan-i Dauran; he was keen to avert a repetition of the calamity which had befallen the Empire in the past. He pleaded that the Mughal government should extend the hand of peace towards Marathas and establish better relations with them. He suggested that Raja Jai Singh, being the strongest among the Rajput chiefs, should be placed in charge of Malwa as he could exert his influence over the court of Shahu to effect a settlement with the Marathas. The Emperor was in agreement with the views of Khan-i Dauran and gave whatever the Raja asked for in the discharge of his mission.<sup>3</sup>

The Raja, however, failed to achieve any thing either on the field of battle or in the realm of diplomacy. Lack of success in the campaign had compelled him to start negotiations with the Marathas through Dip Singh, but the terms of peace offered by them staggered the Emperor, and the negotiations fell through. The exasperated *mansabdars* and *jagirdars*, to whom the revenues of Malwa were assigned, demanded the recovery of their *jagirs* from the hands of the Marathas. It was their pressure which compelled the Emperor to resume military action against the Marathas in Malwa. It is significant to note that Khan-i Dauran who was opposed to the policy of military coercion and stood for amity with the Marathas, had no *jagirs* in the provinces threatened by them. The resumption of the offensive led to the dismissal of Raja Jai Singh and the appointment of Muhammad Khan Bangash as the *subedar* of Malwa on 19 September 1730.<sup>4</sup> The new governor was an ally of the *wazir* and an advocate of an aggressive policy against the Marathas and as such was opposed by

<sup>1</sup> *Malwa in Transition*, 164, 195; *New History of the Marathas*, II, 112-115.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 78b.

<sup>3</sup> *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 168-170.

<sup>4</sup> Mir Wali-ullah has given copy of the *farman* of Muhammad Khan's appointment in *Tarikh-i Farrukhabad*, Aligarh, MS. 39.

Khan-i Dauran at every step. All his efforts to expel the Marathas were thwarted by the discord among the nobles at the court, referring to which Muhammad Khan Bangash wrote, "The idea of suppressing these elements never engaged the attention of any noble. If any one thought and planned to destroy the foes, other nobles resolved to encourage and help them."<sup>1</sup> He never received the military and financial help which the government had promised at the time of his appointment.<sup>2</sup> With his meagre resources Muhammad Khan strove ceaselessly from 1730 to 1732 to arrest the progress of the Maratha arms and maintain order in the distracted province; in the words of Rustum 'Ali Khan, "He spent his time (1730-1732) in the midst of conflict and contention."<sup>3</sup> The Maratha chiefs had gathered a formidable array; the number of their fighting forces ranged from 20 to 50 thousand horsemen which they stationed in sizable concentrations at different places but not far from each other while Muhammad Khan was hardly in a position to pay for two thousand troopers for the protection of the villages from attack.<sup>4</sup>

Muhammad Khan Bangash wrote: "If the problem was not properly tackled, the Marathas would invade Agra and Allahabad with a large army and their expansion would engulf the cities of the eastern provinces, bringing in its wake outrage and plunder."<sup>5</sup> He warned that if the northward thrust of the Marathas was not repelled the North and South would be completely sundered.<sup>6</sup> He suggested to the king that the charge of Agra and Ajmer should be entrusted respectively to Sarbuland Khan and Burhan-ul Mulk both of whom, because of their devotion to the imperial cause, would strengthen the northern defences; their bold initiative and combined efforts might even be able to throw the Marathas back across the Narmada.<sup>7</sup> His frantic appeals, however, produced no results. In desperation Muhammad Khan turned to Nizam-ul Mulk for help and on the latter's invitation, he went to meet him in the hope of making plans for joint operations against the Marathas. The meeting gave to Khan-i Dauran the opportunity to discredit the two nobles in the eyes of the Emperor. By subtle insinuations he convinced the Emperor that Nizam-ul Mulk and Muhammad Khan Bangash were in reality concerting measures to overthrow him and set up another Prince on the throne. Muhammad Khan Bangash was consequently replaced by Raja Jai Singh as the governor of Malwa. Muhammad Khan Bangash left Malwa and reached Agra on

<sup>1</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, Letter to Nizam-ul Mulk, f. 36.

<sup>2</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, ff, 24, 40, 41, 47.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 516.

<sup>4</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, f. 41, 42, 48.

<sup>5</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, f. 47.

<sup>6</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, f. 47.

<sup>7</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, f. 9.

6 December 1732. Khan-i Dauran had thus effectively weakened the strongest ally of his opponent while his own friend had acquired a new accession of strength.<sup>1</sup>

The Emperor, acting on the advice of Khan-i Dauran, gave Rs. 20 lakhs to Raja Jai Singh to enlist troops in Malwa. The Raja once again showed no real interest in the defence of his province and the single campaign in which he tried to take back Mandu failed miserably. The result was that during his third and last governorship (1732-1737) the Maratha power reached its height in Malwa. The Raja, despite the fact that he possessed arms and treasure, sufficient to put up stout and prolonged defence, retired to his capital Jaipur, abandoning Malwa to the tender mercies of the Marathas. "Why should he (Raja Jai Singh)," explained Nizam-ul Mulk, "give up all his pleasures for the hardships and difficulties of military operations? He shields the Marathas in order to save his own territories from the horrors of their incursions."<sup>2</sup> People in Delhi and Agra watched these events with alarm and dismay; they imputed all disasters to the policy of appeasement so persistently followed by the Raja. They felt that if the Emperor had only listened to the appeals of leaders like Bhawani Ram and Muhammad Khan Bangash, instead of supporting Raja Jai Singh, the situation might yet have been saved. Shaf'i Warid, expressing these sentiments, writes:

Raja Jai Singh was at the height of his power. He was governor of Agra for 12 years and of Malwa for 5 or 6 years. He possessed a large army, artillery and great wealth. His sway extended from Delhi to the banks of the Narmada. But even so he hopelessly failed to do any thing against the invaders, choosing instead to live peacefully at his home. Half of the money, received from the court, he gave to the Marathas and half he took for himself. The Emperor, for the sake of Khan-i Dauran, did not remove him from office and appoint a new governor.<sup>3</sup>

### Deccan

Nizam-ul Mulk, who had as *wazir* opposed the policy of appeasement of the Marathas, was forced by the threat of an armed conflict with Mubariz Khan to come to an understanding with Peshwa Baji Rao I. Such an attitude did not rest merely on reasons of expediency but was grounded on

<sup>1</sup> For details, *Mir'at-ul Safa*, f. 60b; *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, ff. 34, 36; *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 200.

<sup>2</sup> *Munsha'at-i Mausavi Khan*, ff. 150, 151.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 680; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 139.

a genuine desire for establishing friendly relations with the Marathas without which he could not keep the Deccan under his control. He met Baji Rao at Malcha on 18 May 1724 and recognised the imperial grants of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*,<sup>1</sup> thus committing himself to a course favourable to the Maratha ambitions of aggrandisement in other parts of the Empire. Baji Rao, in return for these concessions, assured military help against Mubariz Khan.<sup>2</sup> After this victory at Sakharkhedla, Nizam-ul Mulk conferred on Baji Rao a *mansab* of 7,000/7,000. He similarly rewarded Rao Nimbalkhar and Chandersen Jadhava who had done good service to him in the course of his struggle with this rival.<sup>3</sup> Having established his rule in the Deccan, Nizam-ul Mulk turned his attention to the affairs of Gujarat where troubles, due to changes in the local administration, were brewing up. He apprehended an invasion of his dominions by Shuja'at Khan, deputy governor of Gujarat, whom the Emperor had commanded to raise an army of 20 thousand horse for this purpose. According to one version, Sarbuland Khan was promised *wizarat* if he succeeded in destroying the power of the Nizam.<sup>4</sup> Besides this military threat, he feared that his *jagirs* in Gujarat would be seized by his opponents. To meet the situation Nizam-ul Mulk encouraged Hamid Khan to prolong his resistance to wear down the foe. The Nizam sent Kantaji Kadam Bande, an officer of Shahu, to his aid at the head of a strong force to Ahmadabad. This was designed as a counter-stroke to the hostile moves of the Emperor.<sup>5</sup>

Nizam-ul Mulk's reconciliation with the Marathas greatly contributed to the relaxation of tension and establishment of order in the imperial *subas* of the Deccan which followed his military victory. The country needed peace to recover from the effects of civil war and anarchy. Nizam-ul Mulk, now free from external invasion, set himself to restore the towns and villages in the province, which were ruined, to normal conditions. Raja Shahu, seriously involved in domestic feuds, was only too eager to live in amity with the Mughal *subedar*. But, soon frictions arose between the two neighbours, and the patch-work of compromises fell to pieces. Nizam-ul Mulk was revolted by the excesses of the Maratha agents posted in his dominions to collect the dues. The Maratha revenue collectors harassed the *jagirdars* and molested the helpless peasantry. The dual system was

<sup>1</sup> For the first time, on 4 January 1721 the Nizam had his personal meeting with Baji Rao and accepted the Maratha claims of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in the Deccan but resisted the stationing of Maratha agents in the neighbourhood of his capital. *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, 192.

<sup>2</sup> *Peshwa Baji Rao and the Maratha Expansion*, 13.

<sup>3</sup> James Grant Duff, *A History of the Marathas*, Calcutta, 1912, II, 406.

<sup>4</sup> To meet the cost of this army Shuja'at Khan was given an amount of Rs. 3 lakhs from the treasury of Surat. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 56.

<sup>5</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 58, 59; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 581.

not only a constant source of irritation but had proved onerous to the tillers and profitable only to the Marathas; it undermined the governor's authority and resulted in administrative confusion. The two expeditions launched by Baji Rao during the years 1725-1726 in the Karnatak, where the Marathas not only collected *chauth* but made arrangements for its regular collection in the future, glaringly revealed that Baji Rao had embarked on a new policy of expansion. The Nizam sent 'Iwaz Khan, his able and trusted officer, to drive them out of the villages. In the skirmishes that followed, the Marathas suffered heavy losses and fled.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless it was becoming clear that Nizam-ul Mulk did not possess either the military strength or the resources to deal with this perpetual threat to the existence of his nascent kingdom. A fresh struggle for leadership in Maharashtra, however, raised his hopes of meeting the situation by diplomatic means. There was a dispute between Raja Shahu and his cousin Sambhaji of Kolahapur for succession while Baji Rao and Senapati Dabhade were engaged in a severe contest for supremacy. In the course of the struggle the forces of opposition to the regime of Shahu gathered strength. Several Maratha chiefs, out of jealousy of the powerful Peshwa, left the service of their master and joined the Nizam.<sup>2</sup> These Maratha defectors induced Nizam-ul Mulk to champion the cause of Sambhaji and install him on the throne of Shivaji.<sup>3</sup> The renegades had constituted an independent group which stood for restraint and moderation, very different from the expansionist policy of Baji Rao. Nizam-ul Mulk also regarded Baji Rao as inordinately arrogant, ambitious and the most untrustworthy leader in Maharashtra.<sup>4</sup>

Nizam-ul Mulk resolved to utilise the prevalent rift among the Marathas for maintaining the territorial integrity of his kingdom and consolidating his rule in the Deccan. He made friendly overtures to Sambhaji and also planned to actively support the Senapati against the Peshwa. His real objective was to get rid of the Maratha revenue collectors who had made life in the villages miserable. Since he could not openly repudiate the commitment in regard to *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* with the Maratha authorities he wanted to achieve his aim through an alliance with the adversaries of Shahu and Baji Rao. The motive of his policy was to maintain reasonably good relations with his Maratha neighbours, but not to allow them to grow so powerful as to endanger his position in the Deccan.

<sup>1</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 199; *Hadiqat-ul 'Alam*, 139; 'Asaf Jah, 184.

<sup>2</sup> Chander Sen Jadhava and Rao Neinbalkar were already in the Nizam's camp, now Udaji Chuhan, Kambaji Bhonsle, and Sar-Lashkar Suttanji also fled to his court.

<sup>3</sup> For details, *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 215a; *S.P.D.*, XI, 28; X, 61, 66, 67.

<sup>4</sup> *S.P.D.*, X, 66.

He concerted measures with his allies for an invasion of Poona and overthrow of the regime of Raja Shahu. The opportunity to strike came in November 1727, when the bulk of troops, under the command of Baji Rao, were away from the capital on an expedition in the Karnatak. At the head of a strong army, and accompanied by Sambhaji and his followers, Nizam-ul Mulk advanced towards Poona. The allies entered Poona, without encountering any resistance, and Sambhaji was installed as the Chhatrapati of the Marathas.<sup>1</sup> Baji Rao, having heard of these events marched towards the south and began to ravage Burhanpur and Aurangabad. This sudden swoop of the Peshwa on his territories baffled the Nizam and compelled him to evacuate Poona hurriedly. While falling back from Poona he was overtaken by the superior forces of Baji Rao at Palkhed, 20 miles west of Aurangabad. On February 25 a sharp but indecisive contest was fought in which the Nizam's army was worsted. Baji Rao cut off all the Nizam's supplies of grain and water, and the scarcity of provisions became so acute that Nizam-ul Mulk had to sign a humiliating treaty at Mungi Shevgaon on 6 March 1728. By the terms of this settlement Nizam-ul Mulk agreed to withdraw his protection from Sambhaji and allow the Maratha officers to continue to collect the *chauth* in the Deccan.<sup>2</sup>

Grief at this blow to his power and prestige utterly prostrated Nizam-ul Mulk. Qasim Aurangabadi writes that for some days he gave up taking meals.<sup>3</sup> The appalling failure of his plan did not deter the Nizam from continuing his efforts to oust the Peshwa from the position of authority at the court of Raja Shahu. He kept up his alliance with Senapati Dabhade<sup>4</sup> and sent a contingent under Momin Yar Khan to help him against the Peshwa.<sup>5</sup> At the same time he invited Muhammad Khan Bangash, governor of Malwa, to join him in a coalition against the Marathas. Before this combination could take shape, however, Baji Rao, defeated and killed Dabhade in a stiff battle fought at Dabhai on 1 April 1731.<sup>6</sup> Sambhaji also failed to achieve his ambition as he suffered defeat in 1730 and accepted the position of a vassal under Shahu by the treaty of Warna ratified on 13 April 1731. The country to the south of Warna and stretching to the bank of Tungabhadra was given to Sambhaji.<sup>7</sup> Baji Rao, thus, broke the ring of foes encircling him over whom his victory was decisive.

<sup>1</sup> *Hadiqat-ul 'Alam*, 139; *S.P.D.*, X, 50.

<sup>2</sup> For details, *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 199. *Hadiqat-ul 'Alam*, 140; *Mir'at-ul Safa*, ff. 50-60; *S.P.D.*, X, 51, 52, 53, 54, 960-63; *S.P.D.*, XV, 90-91.

<sup>3</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 199.

<sup>4</sup> *S.P.D.*, X, 67, 72.

<sup>5</sup> *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, 158-159.

<sup>6</sup> *S.P.D.*, XII, 35, 39, 46.

<sup>7</sup> *New History of the Marathas*, II, 122-125.

The defeat of his allies—Sambhaji and Dabhade—and the subsequent disaster that overtook Muhammad Khan Bangash obliged Nizam-ul Mulk to abandon the offensive and adopt a conciliatory policy towards Baji Rao. He had for 8 years (1724-1732) been occupied in hostilities with the Marathas without any help from the imperial government. His plan to exploit the conflict among the Marathas for consolidating his hold over the Deccan had failed. Baji Rao remained a formidable figure and the sword-arm of the Maratha expansionist movement. Confronted by the hostile activities of the Marathas, cut off from the imperial centre and distrusted by the Emperor, the governor with his scanty resources in men and money could not alone cope with the all powerful Peshwa. He recognised the existing realities and bowed to the unquestioned supremacy attained in the south as well as in Malwa by Baji Rao. On the invitation of the Nizam, Baji Rao came to meet him and discuss terms of settlement. The two chiefs met on 27 December 1732 at a place, called Roh-Rameshwar. The Nizam presented seven robes, costly pearls, two horses and one elephant to the Peshwa.<sup>1</sup> Nothing definite is known about the exact terms of this momentous meeting, but its outcome was an entirely new relationship between the Nizam and the Marathas.

Hyderabad no longer acted as a bulwark and a barrier against the northward drive of the Marathas; the Nizam, now virtually independent, devoted his energies to the well-being of the people. For about 6 years Hyderabad enjoyed peace and prosperity till the Nizam was called to the court in 1738. Justifying his new policy of friendship with the Marathas, Nizam-ul Mulk is reported to have said :

God knows that I can destroy the race of these wretched people root and branch and wipe out all signs of their existence in one year, only if I can be sure of the Emperor's attitude. But what can be done if the earth be hard and the sky far off? When the Emperor himself is not serious what can his subordinates accomplish?<sup>2</sup>

Comparing his position with that of the central ministers, the Nizam remarked:

The central ministers like Khan-i Dauran, Qamr-u'd-din Khan and Sa'adat Khan possess *jagirs* worth one crore of rupees; each of them has crores of rupees in cash. Their *jagirs* are in no danger of being seized by the marauders. They are secure at the court and enjoy the confidence of the king. He, on the other hand, lives in a state

<sup>1</sup> S.P.D., XV, 94; XXX, No. 91; *A History of the Marathas*, I, 416; *New History of the Marathas*, II, 143-144.

*Ahwal-ul Khawaain*, p. 199.



of constant danger; he has suffered hardship and privations in warfare; his lands are trodden under the heels of the Maratha horsemen; but still his loyalty to the monarch is doubted.<sup>1</sup>

Nizam-ul Mulk expressed the same view of his situation in several letters addressed to the Emperor and court nobles in which he confessed his inability to check the Maratha onslaught which imperilled the very existence of the Empire. His own condition was such that a major clash with the Marathas, whose superiority in arms and tactics was beyond doubt, would be disastrous without sufficient military strength and adequate reinforcements:

For the resources of the Marathas have doubled since the death of Aurangzeb; the affairs of the Empire, on the contrary, have fallen into disorder; signs of decline have become manifest every where. Many forts and posts, once under the Mughal control, have passed into the hands of the Marathas. Raja Shahu receives large collection of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* from the imperial Deccan. According to the terms of the settlement they take one half but from those who are unable to put up a resistance they take (almost) the entire revenue from their villages, leaving only one-tenth to the *jagirdars*. Besides money, they obtain large quantities of grain and fodder.<sup>2</sup>

The Nizam's estimate of the true state of affairs in the Deccan and elsewhere is in agreement with the statement of Qasim Aurangabadi which runs as follows:

With the flow of money has come the accumulation of stores of armaments and food grains, enabling the Maratha generals to be ever on the march. They can mobilise large armies of 70 to 80 thousand men, sometimes of one lakh, and dispatch large columns in all directions. They have established their strongholds in Gujarat, Malwa and Rajputana. The sycophants at the court ascribe the Maratha success to the encouragement of Nizam-ul Mulk. But the court nobles do not understand the real facts of the situation; nor have they any strength of character to face this crisis.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Munsha'at-i Mausavi Khan*, f. 152.

<sup>2</sup> *Munsha'at-i Mausavi Khan*, f. 148.

<sup>3</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, ff. 200b, 20a.

و بادشاه و امرا بمعنی زن خصالتان بیانگ یلاند گفتند  
که این فساد برپا کرده نظام الملک است... سم نظام  
الملک بدنام نموده اند -

Finance was the rock on which all the successive plans of defence foundered. Successive defeats in battle led to loss of the income from the provinces and breakdown of the revenue administration in those areas. The imperial loss was the gain of the Marathas. A typical example of what happened after the Maratha takeover is afforded by Gujarat. Raja Abhay Singh, its governor, informed the Emperor on 10 November 1730:

That Surat including 28 districts was under the sway of Pilaji Gaikawad, and remittance of income from these places depended only on his will. Baroda, Dabhoi and Jambusar, yielding a revenue of Rs. 30 lakhs have also passed under the control of other Maratha chiefs like Chimnaji and Kanthaji. The Marathas levied taxes, besides *chauth* and *sardesh-mukhi*, like *peshkashi*, *darobast*, etc.<sup>1</sup>

Abhay Singh wrote to Bhandari Amar Singh, his agent at the court, giving more details of the unsettled conditions in Gujarat:

Nothing is left out of the *kharif* crop. Nawab Sarbuland Khan has squeezed every pie of the income, whether it was given willingly or under pressure. The district *jagirdars* have also likewise collected the rent. This is the real condition of the *kharif* crop. As regards the income from customs it can only be realised when trade flourishes and can only be collected when people rehabilitate their homes. . . . There is no source of income left under this head (land revenue) as the whole of *khalisa* and *jagir* lands have been resumed.<sup>2</sup>

Equally acute were the financial difficulties which Muhammad Khan Bangash, due to Maratha raids, faced in Malwa. He did not have enough money to pay even for two thousand horse. As a result of the non-payment disaffection, violently expressed, spread in the army. He wrote:

The *zamindars* and *faujders* forcibly seized the *jagirs* while the invaders pillaged the towns and villages. Cultivation was not to be seen any where; there was only dry grass. Consequently, revenue receipts fell sharply. From Mandsur only Rs. 5,000 and from Sironj and Bhilsa Rs. 4,000 were collected. In view of this small amount collected by government officers the condition of *jagirdars* could be very well imagined.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, 136, 150.

<sup>2</sup> *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, 152.

<sup>3</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, f. 42.

The Marathas were eager to exploit to the full their military success to their material advantage. Baji Rao repeatedly instructed Chimnaji to make heavy exactions both from villages and towns and send the amount by bills of exchange (*hundees*). "Go roaming about wherever you like but bring money somehow or other."<sup>1</sup>

Thus all sources of income from these three provinces dried up and the imperial government was faced with utter bankruptcy. Whatever sums of money the Emperor was able to spare for the generals was wasted by them in ill-planned campaigns or in purchasing peace. The policy of the central government in regard to giving subsidy to governors was clear and firm. The government helped a governor financially so long as he was engaged in operations against the Marathas. The moment he surrendered and entered into friendly pacts with the Marathas the government stopped supply of money to him.

The foregoing discussion in regard to the role of the Mughal nobles in the Mughal-Maratha struggle shows that their factional quarrels and lack of statesmanship had ruined every chance of imperial success. Apart from rivalry over control of public affairs, the Mughal nobles were sharply divided on the question of policy to be adopted by the government to check the Maratha expansion in Malwa and Gujarat. Khan-i Dauran and his group, as explained above, advocated the policy of compromise and liberal concessions towards the Marathas, while the faction of Qamr-u'd-din Khan insisted on making all possible military effort to restore imperial authority in these provinces. Each group, in the pursuit of its distinct objectives, put pressure on the court and interfered in the appointment and removal of governors of provinces convulsed by the Maratha raids. For the realisation of the goal in view the Emperor employed the alternate methods of war and peace as proposed by different factions, but his efforts made in each direction yielded no satisfactory results and the problem remained insoluble till after the invasion of Nadir Shah.

To add to this irreconcilable conflict of policy was the indiscreet conduct of the governors which further aggravated the situation in the provinces and contributed to the increase in the power and prestige of the Marathas. The governors of Gujarat, for example, hired Maratha aid in their mutual disputes and, in return for it, granted them the right to collect *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in the province without seeking the permission of the central government. Nizam-ul Mulk, in dealing with the Marathas pursued his own independent course, though he always professed devotion to the imperial cause. The Emperor distrusted his professions and therefore disregarded his appeals for financial assistance. His opponents at the court blamed him for having betrayed the interests of the Empire

<sup>1</sup> S.P.D., XII, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 30.

by his close understanding with Baji Rao and held him responsible for the danger and emergency which the government faced in Malwa.

The pattern of relationship between the Mughal governors and the Maratha chiefs which emerged in Malwa was different from that prevailing either in Gujarat or the Deccan. Some governors of Malwa, like Girdhar Bahadur and Muhammad Khan Bangash, put up a stout resistance to the Marathas while Raja Jai Singh preferred peaceful settlement to warfare as the only practicable policy under the existing circumstances. In tackling the Maratha problem as well as administering the affairs of the province the governor was generally guided by the policies and interests of his patron at the court. His success or failure in all such undertakings depended on the success or failure of his powerful patron against the hostile faction at the court. For instance, Muhammad Khan Bangash was thwarted in his efforts of defence by Khan-i Dauran, an antagonist of his supporter Qamr-u'd-din Khan and upholder of the conciliatory policy. With the removal of Muhammad Khan Bangash in 1732 the character of the struggle changed as the new governor Raja Jai Singh Sawai attempted no defence of the province against the Maratha attacks though he possessed strong capabilities for it. The Raja, subscribing to the views of Khan-i-Dauran, his friend and ally, considered ceaseless and costly campaigns against the Marathas as disastrous for the interests of the Empire. He requested the Emperor to adopt a more tolerant attitude towards the Marathas and seek a peaceful solution of the complex problem. As early as 1729 the Raja had written to the Emperor that settlement with the Marathas "will give peace to the land and save us from the expense of campaigns every year."<sup>1</sup> This broad principle of policy apart, the Raja had been motivated by a desire to strengthen his position by enlarging his domain in Rajputana and gain the status of an independent ruler. Like Nizam-ul Mulk, the Raja found no other way to achieve his objective than by entering into friendly understanding with Baji Rao, the recognized leader of the Marathas. The difference between the attitudes of Nizam-ul Mulk and Raja Jai Singh lay in the fact that whereas the former wanted to live in peace with the Maratha neighbours in the Deccan but favoured a well-planned offensive against them in other parts of the Empire, the latter pressed the urgency of peaceful adjustment to resolve conflict not only in Malwa but wherever the problem existed.

Thus factionalism at the court bore direct relationship to the issues involved in the Mughal-Maratha struggle and it influenced the course of events connected with armed conflicts between the two belligerents. The Emperor struggled hard to maintain the security of the Empire and

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<sup>1</sup> *Jaipur Records* (Add., Persian, II, No. 188).

implacably resist its disintegration. But all his strenuous efforts, due to court politics, proved unavailing and in the end the Empire broke up like a ship on the rock. His helplessness was further accentuated by the terrible effects of Nadir Shah's invasion which crippled the Mughal government militarily and financially. Having assessed the role of the Mughal nobility in the struggle, we shall discuss in the following chapter the details of the Maratha expansion and examine other facets of the problem.

## CHAPTER THREE

# THE MARATHA EXPANSION

The formal grant of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*, obtained by Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath Bhatt in 1719, marked a decisive advance in the rise of the Maratha power. It raised the status of Raja Shahu and established his supremacy in Maharashtra. The Peshwa, by his tact and devotion, surmounted innumerable difficulties which had beset the early career of Raja Shahu and succeeded in placing the Maratha kingdom on a firm foundation. He won over the powerful Maratha chiefs to the side of his master and pacified those who threatened defection. With the help of the bankers he borrowed vast sums of money which enabled the Raja to organize a strong army and enlarge the boundaries of his dominion. The *jagirdari* system, inaugurated in the days of Raja Ram, was extended further during this period as it had proved useful in keeping the warlike and ambitious Maratha leaders satisfied and obedient. The Raja apportioned the various districts of the Deccan, excluding the Swarajya, to numerous feudatories who were obliged to furnish contingents for the state service and after defraying their expenses out of the *chauth* they collected, to pay the balance to the state treasury. After Balaji's death, 2 April 1720, his eldest son Baji Rao was appointed to the office of Peshwa on 17 April 1720. His unflagging zeal for Maratha power and expansion stirred the whole Maharashtra to new aspirations of glory and conquest. The political upheavals at the Mughal court and the friendly attitude of the Rajput chieftains encouraged and helped the young Peshwa in the execution of his carefully laid plans of territorial expansion. He had elaborate plans to lead his hordes into the rich provinces of Gujarat and Malwa to levy contributions on them by force. The control of these two important provinces would enable him to erect the Maratha kingdom on the ruins of Mughal power. Raja Shahu, in pursuance of it, divided the provinces into spheres of influence among his principal officers, assigning the revenues of Malwa to the Peshwa and Gujarat to Senapati Debhade. Within less than a decade the Maratha troops had established their dominion in these areas and extinguished all vestiges of Mughal rule from there.

## Gujarat

The Maratha general who took the foremost part in the conquest of Gujarat and carried the Maratha banner further afield was Khanderao Dabhade, the veteran and daring Senapati of Raja Shahu. Long before the accession of Muhammad Shah, Dabhade had led raids into south Gujarat and had firmly established himself there by overpowering the Mughal generals sent against him. He commanded the passes and trade-routes between Burhanpur and Surat and operating from a chain of forts he had built he extorted tribute from traders and travellers. He acquired considerable wealth and increased the strength of his armed forces. His able lieutenant, Damaji Gaikwad, rendered him valuable service in these exploits, and, in return, received the title of Shamsheer Bahadur. On 27 September 1729 Khanderao Dabhade died, and on June 8 of the following year his son Trimbak Rao Dabhade assumed charge as the Senapati. He inherited Gujarat as his sphere of influence and assigned the task of collecting revenues to Pilaji Gaikwad who had succeeded to the office of *Mutaliq* after the death of his uncle, Damaji Gaikwad. The new deputy to the Senapati distinguished himself by extending the Maratha dominions further south to the environs of Surat. From his advanced base at Sonagadh, Pilaji raided the adjacent territory, and helped by the turbulent tribes of Bhils and Kolis, defeated and drove out the Mughal officers. By a series of operations he penetrated into the villages of the remote interior which his troops harried and ravaged without restraint.<sup>1</sup> In the armed conflict between Hamid 'Ali Khan and Rustum 'Ali Khan, Pilaji Gaikwad supported the latter while Kanthaji Kadam Bande fought on the side of the former though later Pilaji changed sides and joined the ranks of Hamid 'Ali Khan.<sup>2</sup>

For his desertion Pilaji was rewarded with *chauth* of all the *parganas* south of the Mahi river as Kanthaji had already been appeased by the surrender of one fourth of the revenues from the *parganas* north of this river.<sup>3</sup> The fall of the Mughal power was thus hastened by the internal dissensions among its leading officers. Rustam 'Ali Khan, friendless and exhausted, encountered the Maratha troops at Vaso, 10 February 1725, and rushing into their ranks met his tragic end.<sup>4</sup> When the battle ended in victory for Hamid 'Ali Khan, the different groups of the Marathas, led by Kanthaji and Pilaji, fearlessly spread over the land devastating with fire and sword the suburbs of Ahmadabad and extorting

<sup>1</sup> S.P.D., XXX, 349, 371.

<sup>2</sup> For details, *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 52-79.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 77.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 76.

*chauth* and *khandani*, or ransom money, from the people. Both Kanthaji and Pilaji appointed their own agents to collect the dues in areas assigned to them by Hamid 'Ali Khan<sup>1</sup> The Marathas marched under the standards of these two generals on Cambay, the centre of commerce and trade, in April 1725 and plundered with impunity the adjacent territory. They demanded at the point of sword Rs. 5 lakhs from the inhabitants of Cambay, but matters were settled on payment of Rs. 1,10,000. Even the English factors were forced to pay Rs. 5,000 and the Marathas left Cambay on 15 April 1725.<sup>2</sup>

Finding Gujarat an easier prey than Malwa the Peshwa's forces under Antaji and Bhaskar also invaded it in the beginning of 1726. They laid siege to Vadnagar, one of the most prosperous towns where rich bankers and traders resided. The city had no army to ward off the attack; the inhabitants purchased immunity for themselves on payment of Rs. 4 lakhs as tribute. This invasion introduced a new element into the disturbed politics of the province, adding to the confusion that already prevailed there. Soon after, another band of marauders, headed by Kanthaji, advanced upon the defenceless town and besieged it. The helpless citizens of Vadnagar, unable to protect themselves, either by arms or money, sought safety in flight; some of them ran away to distant places like Mathura and Benares. The Marathas entered the town and sacked it thoroughly. They dug up its buried treasures and set fire to its stately buildings. Sarbuland Khan the newly appointed Mughal governor of Gujarat had a large army sufficiently provided with equipment and finances to fight and chastise the Marathas, but he lacked both capacity and determination.<sup>3</sup> Overcome by some craven fear, the governor entered into peace talks with Kanthaji on his approach to Ahmadabad, October 1726, and agreed to pay the *chauth* of all the *parganas* to the North of the Mahi river previously granted by Hamid 'Ali Khan. Formal documents, containing these terms were signed by the parties. The governor ordered *faujدارs* and *'amils*, posted in the area, to admit Kanthaji's agents for the collection of their dues<sup>4</sup>.

The treaty, however, gave Sarbuland Khan no relief from the marauding expeditions of the new adventurers. The defenceless condition of the land and its fabulous wealth continuously excited the cupidity of Baji Rao. He sent an army under the command of Udaji Pawar to invade Gujarat, which he promptly did in 1726. He encountered no opposition and occupied

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 78.

<sup>2</sup> For details of the siege of Cambay, Gense and Banaji, *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, I, 4-5. The report of Daniel Innes to John Courtney refers to an armed dispute between Kanthaji and Pilaji. 'Ali Muhammad Khan, whose account of this event is brief, has confused this conflict with that between Baji Rao and Trimbak Rao fought on April 1, 1731. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 79.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 90-91; *S.P.D.*, XXX, 349.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 93.



Dabhai, killing its *faujdar*, Abul Nabi Beg. This intrusion into their sphere aroused the hostility of Kanthaji and Pilaji who joined hands to maintain their rights in the province. Their combined forces laid siege to Dabhai and compelled Udaiji Pawar to abandon the town. Undaunted by this reverse, the Peshwa organized another expedition and placed Chimnaji Appa, his brother, in command of it. In 1727 Chimnaji Appa made a raid on Dholka and pitched his tents in the neighbourhood of Ahmadabad. He opened negotiations with Sarbuland Khan about the grant of *chauth* to the Peshwa. The governor refused to countenance his claims, in the expectation that the latter would be driven out by Pilaji and Kanthaji. At this Chimnaji, stepped up military pressure to intimidate the governor and oblige him to yield to his demands. The Peshwa's brother laid waste Dholka and adjacent villages compelling the inhabitants to pay a huge ransom.<sup>1</sup> At the end of 1729, he returned in greater strength and started operations on a wider scale. He wrested Pavagadh from the control of Kanthaji and penetrated as far as Petlad and Cambay from where he exacted tribute of Rs. 2 lakhs. He then repeated the attack on Dholka and plundered it thoroughly<sup>2</sup>.

Lack of financial resources had led to a considerable diminution in the size of the Mughal armies. Their morale had suffered due to loss of faith in their commanders and under these circumstances they completely failed to check the triumphal and devastating progress of Chimnaji. Alive to the gravity of his situation, Sarbuland Khan made a compromise with the Peshwa hoping that, as the supreme leader of the Marathas, he would put an end to the annual predatory incursions of Kanthaji and Pilaji. The settlement between Sarbuland Khan and Baji Rao was concluded on 23 March 1730. According to its terms<sup>3</sup> the Mughal governor ceded the *sardeshmukhi* of the whole province including the customs duties to Baji Rao. He also granted *chauth* on land and customs of the province of Gujarat, in addition to 5 per cent of the revenues of Ahmadabad. In return for these concessions the Peshwa undertook to maintain a contingent of 2,500 horse for the governor to help him in enforcing law and order. The Peshwa further agreed not to appoint more than two or three Maratha officers in each district for collecting the dues. The agreement stipulated that no extra money, in any form, would be demanded from the *ra'iyat* by the Marathas. The Peshwa also undertook to stop the inroads of other Maratha chiefs in the province and promised not to extend any support to local disruptive elements.

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 101-102.

<sup>2</sup> For details, *The Gaikwad of Baroda*, I, 10.

<sup>3</sup> *S.P.D.*, XV, 82, 84, 86; *Baji Rao I and the Maratha Expansion*, 32-33; Grant Duff, *A History of the Marathas*, I, 347.

The agreement between Sarbuland Khan and Baji Rao was damaging to the prestige and authority of Trimbak Rao to whom the revenues of Gujarat had been assigned by Raja Shahu. The Senapati was determined to uphold his right to the collection of *chauth* in the province which he held by right of conquest. Baji Rao, now at the zenith of his power was equally resolved to preserve the area for himself. He won the support of Raja Abhay Singh, the new governor, who signed a convention, February 1731, confirming the treaty between Chimnaji and Sarbuland Khan made in the previous year. All endeavours of Raja Shahu to effect a settlement having failed, the rival parties prepared themselves to decide the issue in the field of battle. In a brief but sharp encounter on 1 April 1731 Trimbak Rao was defeated and killed. The victorious Baji Rao immediately returned to Poona laden with the plunder of Gujarat. Subsequently, however, he appears to have relented under the taunts of friend and foe alike for the unseemly struggle and bloodshed. He gave up his claims and took no further interest in the affairs of Gujarat, leaving the field clear for Yeshwant Rao Dabhade, the son and successor of Trimbak Rao.<sup>1</sup> Thus the agreement with Sarbuland Khan had been repudiated before it was put into effect and Pilaji Gaikwad continued to be the deputy of the Senapati, exercising on his behalf all his former rights in Gujarat. The range and boldness of his depredations proved the despair of Abhay Singh who struggled in vain to stem the power of Pilaji. Over-powered in fighting, the governor took recourse to a stratagem by which Pilaji was assassinated in the last week of March 1732 at Dahar to the consternation of the Marathas who fled in panic. The Raja forthwith marched on Baroda and captured it though he failed to seize the important fortress of Dabhai because he had run out of his supply of grain and fodder.<sup>2</sup>

The capture of Baroda was a serious territorial loss which the Dabhade family and its officers' in Gujarat could ill afford. To recover this important town and avenge the murder of Pilaji, Umabai, the widow of Khanderao Dabhade set out at the head of an army, 30,000 strong, in 1733 and advanced unchecked upto the walls of Ahmadabad where Damaji Gaikwad II and Kanthaji joined her. They laid siege to the capital and succeeded in blocking completely all supplies to the city. The city was, however, stoutly and obstinately defended. Abhay Singh mustered all his available forces, strengthened the walls of the city and placed his artillery along the ramparts of the citadel. In the face of the firm resistance the Marathas diverted some of their forces to plunder the districts that bordered the capital. The suburbs of Rasulabad

<sup>1</sup> For details, *S.P.D.*, XII, 42-46; *Peshwa Baji Rao I and Maratha Expansion*, 35-39; *New History of the Marathas*, II, 123-131; *The Gaikwads of Baroda*, I, 11; *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 134-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 142-143; *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, 172-176.

were harried and pillaged, their inhabitants slain or driven away and beautiful buildings were burnt. At the same time siege operations continued relentlessly; and in one skirmish with a detachment of the besiegers Jivraj Bhandari, the brave but rash Mughal general, was killed. When the crisis reached its climax, Abhay Singh concluded peace with the invaders and Umabai raised the siege and retired on being promised the ransom of Rs. 80,000, besides *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*.<sup>1</sup>

In the following year, 1734, the Marathas under Mahadaji Gaikawad again massed at the gates of Baroda. The local *zamindars* and tribes rallied to the support of the invaders. The fort was poorly furnished with provisions and arms; and the garrison, demoralised by the absence of its commandant, capitulated after a feeble defence. The fort and town of Baroda thus fell into the possession of the invading army.<sup>2</sup> The marauding expedition, led by Rangoji, deputy of Damaji II in 1736 was attended with greater success. Rangoji invaded the ancient town of Viramgam and occupied it with the help of its *desai* who had secretly invited him. Ratan Singh Bhandari, the deputy of Abhay Singh, invaded Viramgam to wrest it from the hands of the enemy, but he raised the siege on hearing of the Maratha invasion of Ahmadabad. For the second time in 1736 Kanthaji, accompanied by Malhar Rao Holkar, entered the province and advanced upto Danta. They sacked the town completely and extorted Rs. 10 lakhs from its inhabitants. The reduction of Danta was followed by the capture of Kapadvanj and Petlad.<sup>3</sup>

In May, the same year Raja Abhay Singh was replaced, because of charges of oppression and extortion against his deputy, by Momin Khan as governor of Gujarat. Ratan Singh, Abhay's deputy, strongly resented the change and took up a defiant attitude, refusing to admit the new governor into the capital. To secure the expulsion of the dismissed official Momin Khan summoned Rangoji to his aid. In return for military assistance Momin Khan agreed to cede to Rangoji half of the revenues of Gujarat, excluding those from Ahmadabad and the town and port of Cambay. The allied forces invested the capital at the end of August 1736; mines were laid to breach the high walls and all supplies to the garrison were cut off.<sup>4</sup> While the siege operations were in progress, Damaji II himself appeared with a large army to reinforce his deputy, Rangoji. He took his post at Isanpur, 5 miles from the city, where Momin Khan, followed by his principal officers, visited him on 20 December 1736 and the two exchanged presents and turbans with each other as a token of

<sup>1</sup>For details, *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 157-161; *S.P.D.*, XIV, 1.

<sup>2</sup>*Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 167-168.

<sup>3</sup>*Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 187-193.

<sup>4</sup>*Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 198-202.

brotherly affection and friendship. Ratan Singh immediately set about attempting to wean Damaji away from Momin Khan by offering him half the total revenues of Gujarat including Ahmadabad and Cambay. Damaji II informed Momin Khan of the attractive offer made by Ratan Singh, and enquired whether he was ready to grant him the same concessions. Momin Khan, dreading the consequences of refusal complied, with the modification 'that he ceded Viramgam in exchange for half of the revenues of Cambay.<sup>1</sup> "The ambition of Momin Khan to be *subedar* and his alliance with the Marathas on such disastrous terms to secure his objective gave the final death-blow to the expiring Mughal power in Gujarat."<sup>2</sup> After holding out for 9 months, Ratan Singh was induced by Momin Khan to leave Ahmadabad on 25 May 1737. He received Rs. one lakh in cash to cover expenses of his journey to Marwar.<sup>3</sup>

Momin Khan, accompanied by Fida-u'd-din Khan, Jawan Mard Khan and other officers, entered the city amidst general relief on 2 June 1737. As it was a Friday, the Mughal governor went straight to *Masjid-i Jam'a* where he prayed and heard the *khutba* recited in the name of the reigning Emperor. The prominent citizens waited upon him with usual offerings in token of submission. A public announcement to maintain law and order was made. Rangoji, escorted by Fida-u'd-din Khan, also came into the city and took up his residence at Rustam 'Ali Khan's mansion near the Jamalpur gate.<sup>4</sup> He posted his armed men at all the *thanas* in the southern half of the city, including its six gates which the treaty authorised him to hold and administer. The Maratha civil officers were also placed in all the wards and markets of the city to supervise the work of tax collection and secure their half share according to the terms of settlement. The Marathas not content with their position as co-sharers in revenues of Ahmadabad made themselves obnoxious by imposing intolerable burdens on the people in the areas of the city controlled by them. They took possession of whatever houses they fancied by forcibly ejecting their rightful owners. Provoked by this rapacity the residents of the area rose in arms and for three days riots raged in the city in which the combatants used swords and guns, resulting in casualties on both sides. It was through the conciliatory efforts of Momin Khan that the disturbances subsided. The Mughal *subedar* exhorted his partners to avoid excesses in dealing with the inhabitants who, being mostly soldiers by profession, would not tamely submit to high handed measures. The Marathas pledged not to violate the rights and

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 220.

<sup>2</sup> M.S. Commissariat, *A History of Gujarat*, II, 463.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 234-35.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 236-237.

peace of the people in future; they withdrew from the riot-torn areas of the city to the gates of Khan Jahan and Jamalpur.<sup>1</sup>

When the disturbances subsided, people who had fled and whose livelihood depended on the trade and industry of the city, returned. The merchants and artisans, however, continued to be subjected to vexatious exactions by the local officers, both Maratha and Mughal. In 1738 Momin Khan levied new duties on the citizens and secured one lakh of rupees from them. Rangoji did not receive his half share in the money to which he was entitled by the previous treaty. The Maratha chief at once set himself to realize his share by demanding money from the people and showed great ruthlessness in its collection. This double imposition outraged all classes, already taxed almost to the limit of their endurance and riots again broke out. For twenty days there were clashes between the citizens and the Maratha soldiery all over the town which paralysed the administration.<sup>2</sup> The seriousness of the situation forced Momin Khan and Rangoji to make fresh arrangements to settle existing disputes and avert conflicts in future. They signed a new pact which embodied the following terms:<sup>3</sup>

1. An absolutely equal division was to be made of all revenues received from the city and the suburbs.
2. The Marathas would have the same right to enter and leave the city and be subject to the same restrictions as the Muslims. The governor's guards were not to be posted at the Jamalpur and Khan Jahan gates.
3. The merchants and artisans would be allowed free access, as was usual, to the Maratha sector of the city and no restriction would be put by the Nazim's officers.
4. An equal number of men of the two governments would sit in the *Pandit Khana* (court of justice) and all surety and bail deeds were to be executed in their presence.
5. Officers of both sides would sit jointly in the criminal and fiscal courts, and if any person was to be summoned, both sides would send a police officer to call him.
6. Should the need arise for it the bulk of Maratha troops would be withdrawn for a *mulkgiri* expedition, the Mughals would not take advantage of their absence to entertain ambitious designs; and in case a dispute arose in the districts, it was not to be made the ground for a quarrel with the Maratha agent in Ahmadabad.

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<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 237-239.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 250.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 251; *A History of Gujarat*, II, 470.

The pact was made on the eve of Nadir Shah's invasion which so weakened and prostrated Muhammad Shah that he saw no other alternative but to accept the accomplished fact. This settlement was the first ever made by a provincial governor to be accepted by the central government. By a *farman*, dated 4 June 1742, the Emperor conferred on Momin Khan the *mansab* of 6,000/6,000 and the titles of Nizam-u'd-daulah and Dilawar Jang.<sup>1</sup> The Marathas thus gained legal recognition of their new position as equal partners in the administration of the capital and the income from the entire province. Momin Khan was absolutely dependent on their goodwill and cooperation to keep himself in the seat of power. He maintained cordial relations with them and resolved peacefully all disputes which frequently arose during this period. The Marathas, too, ardently desired the new arrangements to succeed as joint rule had raised their political status and social esteem in the eyes of the public. The local *zamindars* and chiefs acknowledged their supremacy and received them with every demonstration of respect. Their authority now extended to Surat and Cambay apart from their firm hold over Baroda, Viramgam and Petlad. Besides, Damaji secured the division of the revenues from the *parganas* round Surat and received a 3/5th share in the land revenues and customs of Broach, the emporium of overseas trade.<sup>2</sup> Thomas Hedges wrote to James Hope from Cambay on 16 February 1744, a year after the death of Momin Khan, "The power of the Ganims being at present much greater than that of the Mughals, not only in Ahmadabad and this place but throughout Gujarat makes Rangoji look upon himself in the light of the Nawab and expect the same respect from all merchants wherever he goes; and therefore, as it is always usual for us to give the Nawab of Ahmadabad a present when he comes hither . . . I waited upon him (Rangoji) the day before yesterday and made a present to the amount of 119 rupees which he received in a very courteous manner." Rangoji promised "to do whatever might tend to promote a flourishing trade as the power of Gujarat was now chiefly in his hands."<sup>3</sup> The arrangements lasted till 1753 when, with the capture of Ahmadabad, the entire province was annexed outright by the Marathas.

### Malwa

The province, being very rich in agriculture and industry, was a valuable Mughal possession; its conquest would open a channel through which northern wealth could flow into the south. Its strategic importance as the

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 264, 273-74.

<sup>2</sup> *Gaikwads of Baroda*, I, 16-18; *History of Gujarat*, II, 475-76.

<sup>3</sup> *Gaikwads of Baroda*, I, 48-49.

vital link between the north and the south was very great; it could be used as a base of operations from where it was possible to strike at Agra in the north and at cities which lay in very heart of the Empire. Its conquest would cut the southern and western provinces off from the centre. It was, therefore, in Malwa that decisive conflicts between the Mughals and Marathas were staged. The severe and prolonged struggle ended in the final victory of the Marathas who were able to establish their domination over Malwa.

After the early incursions to obstruct the free passage of the Mughal armies, treasure and provisions through the province, organized by Tara Bai as early as 1700, the Marathas had made no significant advance in Malwa.<sup>1</sup> With the appointment of Baji Rao as Peshwa, the political situation in Malwa underwent a great change. He had the revenues of this province assigned to himself by Raja Shahu and posted his loyal lieutenants in various districts for its collection.<sup>2</sup> The Peshwa's generals, Udaiji Pawar, Gojaji Devakata, Krishnaji Hari, Trimbak Gangadhar, Kesho Mahadev and Janoji Bhonsle, to whom places like Jhabu, Dhar and Indore, were given, launched campaigns during the years 1724-26 and gathered large spoils from there. In 1727 when the attacks were repeated the Maratha chiefs found themselves stubbornly opposed, by Girdhar Bahadur, the faithful and energetic Mughal governor. Raja Shahu asked the governor not to interfere with their activities and to allow them to collect *chauth* freely in Malwa. Yielding neither to persuasion nor to show of force, Girdhar Bahadur upheld the imperial authority and maintained his own prestige as governor.<sup>3</sup>

The bold resistance of Girdhar Bahadur provoked Baji Rao to make preparations for a fresh and bigger assault on Malwa. The decision was prompted by two other factors. The first was his victory over Nizam-ul Mulk at Palkhed in February 1728, and second was Raja Jai Singh's suggestions conveyed to him through Dado Bhimsen, to invade the province, and his assurance of neutrality in the Mughal-Maratha conflict.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, a formidable expedition was organized, early in October 1728, under the command of Chimnaji who was joined by Udaiji Pawar and Malhar Rao Holkar. The Maratha army crossed the Narmada on 25 November 1728 and passing through Mandu Ghat reached Nalchha on November 27.<sup>5</sup> Girdhar Bahadur, who lay encamped near Amjhera,

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab ul-Lubab*, 516-18; *Aurangzeb*, V, 382.

<sup>2</sup> *S.P.D.*, XXX, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *S.P.D.*, XX, 272, 273, 275; *S.P.D.*, XXX, 6-9.

<sup>4</sup> *S.P.D.*, XXX, 10.

<sup>5</sup> *S.P.D.*, XXX, 55, 226, 283, 284.

anticipating the movement of the Marathas across the Mandu hills, set out for Dhar. But, before he could reach the place he was suddenly attacked by the Maratha army. Taken completely by surprise he was forced to accept battle without being able to take up a proper defensive position. Nonetheless, Girdhar Bahadur and his cousin Daya Bahadur put up a heroic fight in which they lost their lives.<sup>1</sup> In the prolonged struggle with the Marathas no other Mughal general had shown such heroic zeal and readiness to face death for the imperial cause as those two officers. The imperialists fled pell-mell, leaving their whole baggage to be pillaged by the victors. "The moral effect of this defeat was disastrous and the local princes, *zamindars* and others felt the utter weakness of Mughal rule."<sup>2</sup>

Chimnaji, then, besieged Ujjain and endeavoured to take it by storm. Bhawani Ram, son of the late governor, defended the city by raising new forces and gathering provisions. After one month and five days Chimnaji returned disappointed and empty-handed to Kaiyadah. He received instructions from Baji Rao to collect money from different districts and confiscate all *jagirs* of Girdhar Bahadur.<sup>3</sup> In the following year Chimnaji collected dues from the surrounding areas of Nolai, Dhar, Ratlam, Badnwar and Sarangpur.<sup>4</sup> The passage had been cleared for the tide of Maratha conquest northwards, and all resistance to it had collapsed in the province. The administration broke down and imperial authority seriously declined. Bhawani Ram with his meagre resources and scanty supplies could not maintain his position against these heavy odds. The local Rajas and *zamindars*, in constant danger of losing their estates, acknowledged the invader as their master on November 1729. Muhammad Shah dismissed Bhawani Ram, on charges of inefficiency, and appointed Jai Singh the new governor of Malwa.<sup>5</sup> The Raja, on his arrival in Malwa, took the field against the Marathas who had captured Mandu; but stopped fighting when Mandu was restored to him.<sup>6</sup> Jai Singh came back to his capital and opened negotiations through Deep Singh, his envoy, for a lasting peace with Raja Shahu. Deep Singh promised a subsidy of Rs. 11 lakhs a year in lieu of *chauth* for Malwa, if Raja Shahu agreed to abstain from aggression on the Mughal province. Before any arrangement could be finally arrived at Raja Jai Singh was replaced by Muhammad Khan Bangash, September 29, 1730.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *S.P.D.*, XXX, 17, 23, 25, 27; also *Malwa in Transition*, Appendix 2, 199-207.

<sup>2</sup> *Malwa in Transition*, 165.

<sup>3</sup> *S.P.D.*, XII, 30, 51; XIII, 14, 15; 'Ajaib-ul Afaq, ff. 69-71.

<sup>4</sup> *S.P.D.*, XXX, 284-5.

<sup>5</sup> 'Ajaib-ul Afaq, f. 77a.

<sup>6</sup> *S.P.D.*, XXXI, 31.

<sup>7</sup> *S.P.D.*, XXX. 300-1; X, 66.



Muhammad Khan was just the kind of governor the distracted province needed. He possessed the military experience and political foresight that would be necessary for the task of expelling the Marathas and reducing to obedience the disorderly elements. As soon as the governor arrived in Gwalior, he was directed by the court to march forthwith against the Marathas who were operating in the neighbourhood of Sarangpur, 52 miles north east of Ujjain. When he reached the trouble spot on 15 January 1731 the numerous Maratha forces suddenly fell upon the Mughal army. The Afghan chief hurriedly drew up his troops and repulsed the attack with such vigour that the Marathas took to flight and crossed the Narmada.<sup>1</sup> This success did not stop the Marathas from striking back which they soon did raiding as far as Sarangpur and Shahjahanpur. Though they were routed again their leader Malhar Rao Holkar, incited by Yar Muhammad Khan of Bhopal, advanced towards Ujjain and endeavoured to force his entry into the city. Ujjain was strongly garrisoned and well-furnished with supplies. Muqem Khan, the *faujdar*, came out and forced the besiegers to retreat in disorder.<sup>2</sup> On 14 February 1731 Muhammad Khan proceeded to Dhar where he fought a battle against Malhar Rao and sharply defeated him. The Marathas, leaving most of their camp equipage in Mughal hands, fled precipitately.<sup>3</sup> The governor occupied two forts, Kakali and Chikalda, held by Udaiji Pawar on the right bank of the Narmada, on 10 April 1731.<sup>4</sup> He then proceeded to inflict a defeat on Malhar Rao Holkar also in the vicinity of Rampura and Mandeshwar, forcing him to retreat hastily in the direction of Jaipur. At the same time Antaji Mankeshwar with his army broke into Kayeth, 17 miles east of Ujjain, but withdrew on the approach of Muhammad Khan on 3 June 1731. Next day reports were received that Holkar had again attacked Sarangpur; its *faujdar*, Daud Khan asked for reinforcement. A strong relieving contingent, including some of the local chiefs, was equipped and dispatched. The combined troops of Holkar, Antaji and other Maratha *sardars* were defeated and dispersed. Their camp equipage and baggage were plundered.<sup>5</sup>

Muhammad Khan, in his account of these operations, claimed that with only 20 thousand horse and 20 thousand foot he had struggled ceaselessly against the Marathas and had obliged them to relinquish their conquests and evacuate their outposts at Dhar and Dipalpur; they had been forced also to give up their designs on Ujjain and Mandeshwar by his efforts. At no time had he yielded or given money to them unlike other governors of

<sup>1</sup> *J.A.S.B.*, XLVII, Part I, 309-310.

<sup>2</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, ff. 33-34.

<sup>3</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, ff. 40-41.

<sup>4</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, f. 8.

<sup>5</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, ff. 8-9.

Gujarat, like Hamid Khan and Sarbuland Khan, who had granted *chauth* of vast areas to the invaders.<sup>1</sup> For a while it appeared that the advance of the Marathas had been halted. But the appearance was deceptive. The success gained in the recent desultory campaigns had not brought about the collapse of the Maratha power in Malwa. Since his potential for offensive action was limited, Muhammad Khan waged only defensive wars.

Baji Rao, as soon as he was free from his engagements in Gujarat, turned his attention to the restoration of his waning influence in Malwa. He sent a huge army of nearly 80 thousand horse under the command of Anand Rao Pawar, Fateh Singh, Chimmaji and Holkar who swept into the province from several directions. The local Rajas on the way only preserved their territories on payment of tribute and so did the people to save their lives and honour. The report of this organized attack distressed and dismayed Muhammad Khan. Faced with the immense numerical superiority of the Marathas he realised the extreme peril of his position. He desperately asked for reinforcements from the centre but waited in vain for them to arrive. In this desperate plight the only course left open to him was to conclude a truce on such terms as he could get from the Marathas. He, however, refused to commit himself in writing till he had obtained royal approval of these terms. The Maratha chiefs returned home victorious and exultant. Muhammad Khan fell into disfavour and the Emperor, on the advice of Khan-i Dauran, recalled him and put Malwa under the supreme charge of Raja Jai Singh on 28 September 1732.<sup>2</sup>

Raja Jai Singh set out from Jaipur on 20 October 1732 and reached Ujjain in December. In February 1733 when he was still at Mandsaur, the Maratha troops led by Holkar and Sindhia surrounded him and intercepted all supplies of food and fodder. Having neither the will nor the strength to fight, the Raja sued for peace and offered Rs. 6 lakhs as a condition for his safe retreat. Holkar declined to accept the terms of peace and resumed the offensive against the Mughal governor.<sup>3</sup> In the fighting that ensued both sides suffered heavy losses. In the end, Jai Singh agreed to pay Rs. 6 lakhs in cash and cede 28 *parganas* in lieu of *chauth*. Since then, the Raja, unmindful of his obligations, played no part in the defence of the province and became an idle spectator of events.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'Aziz-ul Qulub, f. 47.

<sup>2</sup> 'Aziz-ul Qulub, ff. 47, 48. There were three distinct causes of his disgrace. First, "The complaints of *jagirdars* in Malwa, who were influential persons in the palace; secondly, the attack on Chhatra Singh of Narwar who was the *protege* of the eunuch Khidmatgar Khan and others; and thirdly, the friendship which had sprung up between the governor and Nizam-ul Mulk." *Later Mughals*, II, 255; *J.A.S.B.*, 324.

<sup>3</sup> *S.P.D.*, XXX, 307-9; XIV, 1-3.

<sup>4</sup> *S.P.D.*, XXX, 310-1; XV, 6.

The Marathas, having subjugated southern Malwa, now pushed their frontiers towards the north to territories adjacent to Agra and Delhi. The area south of Agra became exposed to their conquest, as waves of marauding armies swept over northern Malwa. In face of the growing menace, Muhammad Shah directed the *wazir* to march in person against the Marathas and suppress their depredations which covered the land between Sironj and Narnol. Accompanied by Zahir-u'd Daulah and Khan Firoz Jang, Qamr-u'd-din Khan set out from Delhi on 5 April 1733, and moved to Agra where he was joined by Muhammad Khan Bangash. From there the imperial army advanced beyond Narwar to Ladah-Danger, south of Karlars, where it was learnt that the enemy forces had already retired and recrossed the Narmada; whereupon the Mughal troops returned. In the autumn of the same year the Marathas reappeared and this time the Emperor asked Khan-i Dauran to proceed against the invaders. He shrank from the enterprise and preferred the comforts of court life to the toils and perils of the campaign but persuaded his brother, Muzaffar Khan, to assume command of the royal army on his behalf. Muzaffar Khan left Delhi on 20 March 1734 and hurried towards Sironj, the point of the enemy's attack. But, finding that the Marathas, after ravaging the land, had gone away, Muzaffar Khan did not stay there and on 11 June 1734, started back for Delhi.<sup>1</sup>

In October 1734, next year, the Marathas under Pilaji Jadhev, again crossed the Narmada and moving north and traversing Malwa swept into Bundelkhand. The Mughal government organized two simultaneous expeditions one to be led by the *wazir* and the other by the *mir bakhshi*, to meet the threat of the invasion. The two generals set out on 10 November 1734, and marched at the head of their respective armies towards Malwa. Qamr-u'd-din Khan moved by way of Agra and entered Malwa where after gaining some success in the first few contests he suffered a reverse near Narwar since his heavy cavalry of 25,000 was not trained to face the light Maratha horse. His army rapidly became demoralised and lost cohesion. Unable to risk a major engagement in this situation, the *wazir* purchased peace on payment of Rs. 5 lakhs as tribute. Pilaji received the money and withdrew to allow the safe retreat of the Mughal minister.<sup>2</sup> Khan-i Dauran, too, failed to prosecute his campaign successfully. His army, which was joined by Raja Jai Singh, Raja Abhay Singh and Durjan Sal Kotah, was a disorderly crowd of 200,000. Early in February 1735 his army arrived near Rampura only to be encircled by Holkar and Sindhia who cut off its supplies. On the suggestion of Raja Jai Singh, Khan-i Dauran, who was in no position to fight, also came to terms

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, f. 265; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 85; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 686.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, f. 267; *S.P.D.*, XIV, 21-23.

with the Maratha chiefs. The *mir-bakhshi* promised to secure an imperial grant of Rs. 22 lakhs in lieu of *chauth* from Malwa to the Marathas. At the end of April 1735 Khan-i Dauran reached Delhi where his pusillanimity and cowardly haste in submitting to the Marathas had aroused a storm of indignation at the court.<sup>1</sup>

The failure of these campaigns deeply disappointed Muhammad Shah and convinced him that Malwa could not now be reconquered from the Marathas by his generals. The Emperor, therefore, decided to start negotiations with Baji Rao and sent Nijabat 'Ali Khan on a peace mission to Jaipur which the Peshwa was at the time visiting on the invitation of Raja Jai Singh. Under the changed conditions no imperial campaign was organized in Malwa in the year 1735-36.<sup>2</sup> Raja Jai Singh had sent his minister Raja Ayamal "to invite Baji Rao to his domain and promised to take him to Delhi and to arrange a lasting peace between the Marathas and the Empire."<sup>3</sup> When Jai Singh met the Peshwa at Bhambholao, near Kishangarh on 15 February 1736 he proposed a grant of 20 lakhs in cash and a *jagir* of 40 lakhs in Malwa, the latter to be assessed on the revenues of the principality of Yar Muhammad Khan.<sup>4</sup> The Peshwa on his side put forward the following terms:

1. The grants of the *subedari* of Malwa and that of its entire territories, excluding the parts held directly by the Emperor, the lands of *jagirs* and grants of rent-free lands and daily allowances.
2. A cash payment of Rs. 13 lakhs for his expenses of war to be paid in three instalments—Rs. 4 lakhs when Pilaji arrived at the court to settle the peace treaty; Rs. 5 lakhs after the autumn harvest and Rs. 4 lakhs after the spring harvest.
3. The *nazar* of Rs. 6 lakhs to the Emperor in return for the grant of *sardeshpandai* rights in the 6 *subas* of the Deccan, to be paid only after the country is brought under control."

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, ff. 266-7; *S.P.D.*, XIV, 21, 23, 27, 29, 57; *Malwa in Transition*, 231, 232, 234.

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed discussion, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, Appendix A, 240-241.

<sup>3</sup> Baji Rao reached Udaipur in the first week of February 1736 and there he received the *diwan* and agents of Raja Jai Singh. Baji Rao also sent his agents like Mahadev Bhatt Hingane to Jaipur for preliminary talks. "Jai Singh agreed to present the Peshwa with 5 lakhs in all, two lakhs in cash and the rest in jewellery, costly robes, five horses and one elephant." The Raja played a leading role in these negotiations. For settlement between the warring parties, *Malwa in Transition*, 240-241.

<sup>4</sup> *S.P.D.*, XIV, 50-52, XXX, 160; *Malwa in Transition*, 241-242.

These terms were presented by Nijabat 'Ali Khan and Yadgar Kashmiri before the Emperor, who accepted them and appointed Baji Rao the deputy governor of Malwa in May 1736. Shortly afterwards on 29 September 1736, Muhammad Shah issued a *farman* by which Baji Rao was exalted to the *mansab* of 7,000 and his brother, Chimnaji, to 5,000; the Peshwa received robes of honour, a *jagir*, the *mahals* of his *watan* and the right to perquisites.<sup>1</sup>

The policy of compromise adopted by Muhammad Shah served only to increase the ambition of Baji Rao to establish Maratha hegemony over the whole of Malwa. His appetite whetted by success and the discovery that the Mughal nobility was utterly degenerate, Baji Rao soon severed the alliance and sent a new set of demands which placed the Delhi court in a quandary. He claimed the following concessions:<sup>2</sup>

1. That the governorship of the province of Malwa, with all the States connected with it, be given as *jagir* to the Peshwa.
2. Expulsion of Yar Muhammad Khan and 'Izzat Khan from their States with the aid of the imperial forces and the grant of their principalities to Baji Rao.
3. A *jagir* of 50 lakhs a year in the six Deccan *subas* be granted to the Peshwa. The *subas* to be transferred in the name of the Emperor's son and Baji Rao to be asked to act for the absentee governor. Half of the dues collected by Baji Rao in the Deccan, for the Emperor, to be granted to Baji Rao.
4. The kingdom of Tanjore be given to Raja Shahu.
5. Grant of forts of Mandu, Dhar and Raisin in Malwa to Peshwa for keeping his family in.
6. All the territories south of the Chambal to be given to the Peshwa in *jagir* on the explicit term that the rulers of the various states within that area would not be harassed, if they submitted and paid their tribute.
7. A sum of 15 lakhs to be paid immediately from the Bengal treasury to help the Peshwa to pay off some of his huge debts.
8. The holy places of Prayag, Benares, Gaya and Mathura to be given in *jagir* to the Peshwa.
9. All arrangements in the Deccan to be made through the Peshwa.
10. Baji Rao agreed to go to Agra, where he should be conducted by Jai Singh and Amir Khan and presented to the Emperor during a ride. Soon after he should be given leave to return home.

<sup>1</sup> S.P.D., XV, 86, 88, 89; XIV, 62.

<sup>2</sup> S.P.D., XV, 93, 95, 96; *Malwa in Transition*, 246-47.

Thus, "starting with a request for the grant of the *chauth* of Malwa and some cash to recover his expenses, the Peshwa went on increasing his demands till at last he asked for virtual control over Malwa, Bundelkhand, Bengal and the Deccan."<sup>1</sup>

The Emperor rejected these extraordinary demands and decided to make fresh efforts to resist the Maratha inroads in his dominions. Raja Jai Singh, ever friendly towards the Poona court, suggested to Baji Rao that only a full scale attack mounted on Northern India could overawe the Emperor and compel him to accept his conditions. The Peshwa was himself aware of the fact that the Mughal army was inferior, both in power and spirit, to the Marathas, and accordingly planned such an offensive. At the head of 50 thousand horse and accompanied by a number of his renowned generals the Peshwa left Poona on 12 November 1736, crossed the Narmada and passing swiftly through Malwa descended on Bhopal where he received Rs. 5 lakhs from Yar Muhammad Khan.<sup>2</sup> Thence he boldly marched into Bundelkhand and reduced the *zamindars* of that region. On receipt of this information, the Emperor ordered the *wazir* and the *mir bakhshi* to stem the enemy's advance. Raja Jai Singh and Raja Abhay Singh in response to royal commands, also set out from their headquarters while Sa'adat Khan hastened towards Agra to join the imperial army.<sup>3</sup> Unruffled by this concentration, Baji Rao sent a part of his army under veterans like Holkar, Jadhav, Baji Bhivrao and Ruprai, to plunder and lay waste the populous and prosperous tract beyond the Jumna. This was calculated to divert the Mughal troops from the main theatre of the campaign and prevent them from effecting a junction. The Marathas swooped down on Shikohabad and ravaged Firozabad and 'Itimadpur. While they were carrying fire and sword into the countryside of Jalesar, Sa'adat Khan confronted them on March 12, 1737 and in an encounter forced the Marathas under Holkar to retire and closely pursued them. In the course of retreat the Marathas lost their way and suffered heavy losses. Sa'adat Khan, though he gave a greatly exaggerated account of his victory to Muhammad Shah, was congratulated and rewarded by the Emperor. The victorious noble resumed his march westward and met Khan-i Dauran, now encamped at Mathura with a large army, artillery and numerous elephants.<sup>4</sup>

Baji Rao, stung by Holkar's reverse, resolved to invade Delhi itself to

<sup>1</sup> *Peshwa Baji Rao and Maratha Expansion*, 129.

<sup>2</sup> *S.P.D.*, XXII, 339, 341; X, 27.

<sup>3</sup> *S.P.D.*, XV, 18.

<sup>4</sup> According to Ashub one thousand and five hundred Marathas were made captive by the soldiers of Sa'adat Khan. *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 114-115; *S.P.D.*, XV, 17, 22, 27-28, 47; XXX, 198, 365-6; *Later Mughals*, II, 287.

revive the morale of his army and demonstrate its power but above all to "teach the Emperor a wholesome lesson." "Two ways", he wrote, "were open to me, to attack Sa'adat Khan and destroy him, or fall upon Delhi itself and burn its outlying parts. But Sa'adat Khan would not venture out from Agra, so I took the latter course." Sending his heavy baggage into Bundelkhand and avoiding the Delhi-Agra road, at that time under the effective control of the Mughal forces, Baji Rao made a detour through the land of the *Jats* and the *Mewatis*. He moved swiftly covering ten days journey in two days and nights and on 29 March 1737 made a sudden dash on Kalka, six miles south of Delhi, where he attacked and plundered the Hindus busy in celebrating the festival of Ram Naumi. The imperial troops under Mir Hasan Koka came out of Delhi to meet the invaders and took up positions against them. The Marathas feigned retreat to lure the Delhi army out of its positions. The Mughals completely deceived by this ruse abandoned their positions only to be quickly surrounded by Holkar and routed badly. Koka Khan and Shiv Singh fell in the fighting; while Mir Hasan Khan Koka and several other captains were wounded. The disaster gravely menaced the security of the imperial capital. From this perilous situation the citizens of the capital were saved only by the timely arrival of Qamr-u'd-din Khan from the direction of Agra. The Peshwa on hearing of the approach of the *wazir* with his army hastily departed under cover of darkness on the night of 31 March 1737. At Bandshahpur, 20 miles from Delhi, the Maratha leader was overtaken by the *wazir's* army which had reached there. Zahir-u'd Daulah and Ghazi-u'd-din Khan, who commanded the vanguard, were determined to wipe out the ignominy suffered by the Mughals in Delhi and not to allow the Marathas to return safely. In a battle that followed Baji Rao was defeated and immediately left the field in the night when darkness hampered the pursuit. The Mughal generals entered the city in the midst of general relief and rejoicings.<sup>1</sup>

Baji Rao's attack on Delhi, though a most daring act, failed to coerce the Emperor to accept his extreme demands which had already been rejected a year before. It, on the contrary, provoked a serious reaction in the Mughal court, giving chance to the anti-Maratha elements to once again assert the need for regaining the possession of Malwa by force. The Emperor, disgusted with the behaviour of Baji Rao, and influenced by the prevailing mood in the court, decided to make one more serious effort to recapture the province. He consulted his ministers on the measures to be adopted for the success of the new offensive against the Marathas. The nobles, big and small, advised the Emperor to summon Nizam-ul Mulk from the Deccan and entrust him with the supreme direction of imperial affairs, as he was, in their opinion, the only *amir* capable of standing up to

<sup>1</sup> For details, *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 115-123; *New History of the Marathas*, II, 153-154; *Tarikh-i Hindi*, f. 273.

the enemy.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, the Emperor sent urgent letters to Nizam-ul Mulk to come to the court and join the imperial service as *wakil-i-mutlaq*. The Nizam's agent at the court informed him that he would also obtain the governorship of Malwa provided he took upon himself the responsibility of wresting the province from the control of the Marathas. Nizam-ul Mulk received the royal *farman* with due respect and ceremony on 3 February 1737 near Burhanpur where he had reached on 20 December 1736.<sup>2</sup>

During these years of Mughal-Maratha struggle Nizam-ul Mulk had always urged the central government to give him substantial assistance in men and money for ousting the Marathas from the conquered areas. In his letters to the central ministers he had emphasised the necessity of holding mutual consultations and planning joint campaigns to face the Maratha problem. He wrote to Khan-i Dauran, "After meeting and mutual consultation plans to chastise the Marathas and destroy their bases can be put into operation."<sup>3</sup> His desire to defeat the Marathas with the help of the imperial resources had stemmed from motives of self-interest. He feared that if Maratha military pressures continued to increase in this way, the Emperor might reach some settlement with Baji Rao at his expense, the effects of which would be disastrous to the very existence of his dominions. For one of the demands put forward by Baji Rao was the "grant of a *jagir* worth Rs. 50 lakhs in the six Deccan *subas* to the Peshwa. The *subas* to be transferred in the name of the Emperor's son, and Baji Rao to be asked to act for the absentee governor."<sup>4</sup> This was a threat of gigantic proportions which, if not curbed promptly, would lead to his complete downfall. To forestall such a settlement he must become the spearhead of a counter-attack against the enemy and save his territories. Ashub adds a second important consideration which weighed with the Nizam to proceed to Delhi and serve under the king. He holds that Nizam-ul Mulk was on the look-out for some opportunity to join the central government for his rule, due to his disloyalty to the Emperor, had

<sup>1</sup> *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 285.

نشستند شاه و ایران بهم	-	پی چاره کار با صد الم
چه تدبیر باید نمود این زمان	-	که از شر او ملک باید امان
پس از فکر بسیار اصرای دین	-	بشاه جهان عرض کرد این چغین
که از عهدش کس نیاید بدر	-	بجز آصف عهدش و الا نظر
رقم کن بی عزر آن کارها	-	که سرزد این پیشتر از قضا
یکی نامه خاص از دست کوش	-	سوی آن وفا مظهر صدق کیش

<sup>2</sup> *Akhbar-i Muhabbat*, f. 231, S.P.D., XIV, 45; XV, 93; X, 27.

<sup>3</sup> *Munshat-i Mausavi Khan*, ff. 140, 141, 157, 158.

<sup>4</sup> S.P.D., XV, 95-6.



not been fully acknowledged in the Deccan.<sup>1</sup> Nizam-ul Mulk is reported to have declared, on the eve of his departure, that he had no other purpose but to serve under the king and save the Empire from disintegration. His close companions had requested him not to proceed to Delhi, arguing that he possessed six *subas* as vast in area as *Hindustan*, and that the Mughal court was a hotbed of group politics and a wise person like him should not plunge in that vortex of intrigues and factions. Nizam-ul Mulk replied that he was the obedient servant of the Emperor and at the time his only aim was to seek the goodwill of the Emperor by obeying his orders.<sup>2</sup>

Having placed the government of the Deccan under the charge of his son Nasir Jang, he left Burhanpur on 7 April 1737 and reached Delhi in the first week of July. The Emperor conferred on him the *mansab* of 9,000/9,000 robes of honour and other valuable gifts and appointed him *wakil-i-mutlaq*. Expectations ran high in the capital that Nizam-ul Mulk would wage war with vigour and success and would revitalize and reform the administration.<sup>3</sup> On 3 August 1737 Muhammad Shah, in accordance with the agreement previously made, appointed Ghazi-u'd-din Khan governor of Malwa and Agra, dismissing Raja Jai Singh from the governorship of these two provinces and Baji Rao from deputy-governorship of Malwa. The Emperor directed Nizam-ul Mulk to proceed to Malwa and deliver it from the yoke of the Marathas. Except this arrangement no other changes were introduced in the central or provincial administration; the rise of Nizam-ul Mulk to this new power strengthened the position of his family group, but did not disturb the balance of power at the

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 166a.

مگر بہانہ طلب ہوں کہ لطیفہ روی دہد کہ این حرکت بخوارش و طلب حضور واقع شدہ مقدمہ قتل مبارزخان و بعضی امور دیگر کہ نامرضی بادشاہ ازو بظہور آمدہ موجب شہر یزش بہ لغی و طغیان و ستمرد و سرکشی از احکام پادشاہی شدہ و در دکہن نقش عملش خاطرخواہ صورت نمی گیرد.....

Qasim Aurangabadi contradicts this statement of Ashub by saying that all persons, big and small, had submitted to his authority and come into his fold. *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 199b.

<sup>2</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 246a.

کہ ما بلدہ پادشاہی ایم - در ہر صورت رفتن حضور بہتر از جمیع و خود است - بالفعل مارا غیر از رضا جوے پادشاہ مقصد و مطالبی بر تو نیست -

<sup>3</sup> For details, *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 130-131. Fazil Khan, *darogha-i-feel Khana*, an Irani noble and a *mansabdar* of 4,000 composed the following couplet in praise of the Nizam who gave him two thousand rupees, one horse and other precious things. *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, 305.

صد شکر کہ ذات دین پناہی آمد  
رونق دہ ملک پادشاہی آمد  
تاریخ رسیدنش بگفتم ہاتف  
گفت این رحمت الہی آمد

court.<sup>1</sup> The Indian group remained firmly entrenched in power and its leader, Khan-i-Dauran, held sway in the king's council. The office of *wakil-i-mutlaq* seemed only to be decorative, with no powers attached to it. Apart from attending the court and paying respect to His Majesty Nizam-ul Mulk had no other routine work to perform. Even his popularity, raised to a high degree, began to abate after the setback at Bhopal.

Nizam-ul Mulk, accompanied by his son Ghazi-u'd-din Khan, set out from Delhi with thirty thousand horse and a fine park of artillery for an advance in Malwa. Crossing the Jumna below Agra he marched through Bundelkhand where Hirda Shah and other sons of Chhatrasal joined him. The Rajas of Datiya and Orchha also joined the imperial army. After rapidly advancing by the Sironj route Nizam-ul Mulk reached Bhopal on 13 December 1737.<sup>2</sup> Baji Rao, on hearing of the Nizam's march on Malwa, started from Poona with a huge army of eighty thousand horse and was joined enroute by Ranoji Sindhia and Holkar. Soon after entering Malwa the Marathas organized their army in battle array and moved up to the position of the imperial army near Bhopal fort. Instead of making a frontal assault on the enemy, Nizam-ul Mulk chose to wage a defensive campaign. His feebleness to launch an immediate offensive foredoomed his cause and ensured an easy victory for Baji Rao. The Marathas, finding the Mughal commander unwilling to give battle, began harassing the imperial army by constantly hovering around their positions. The Nizam at length, sent out a division against the enemy which on 14 December 1737 fought a fierce engagement in which the Rajputs in the imperial army suffered heavy casualties losing 500 men. The Nizam recalled his troops from the field and suspended the hostilities.<sup>3</sup> He did not venture out again to attack the

<sup>1</sup> Nizam-ul Mulk and his family members held the following key posts in the government :

<i>Names</i>	<i>Manasabs</i>	<i>Posts</i>
1. Nizam-ul Mulk	9,000/9,000	Governor of the Deccan and <i>wakil-i-mutlaq</i> .
2. Qamr-u'd-din Khan	8,000/8,000	<i>wazir</i>
3. Nasir Jang	6,000/6,000	Deputy-governor of the Deccan.
4. Ghazi-u'd-din Khan, son of the Nizam and son-in-law of Qamr u'd-din Khan.	6,000/6,000	Governor of Malwa and Agra.

<sup>2</sup> *S.P.D.*, XV, 56, 57, 58; XII, 356; XXX, 207.

<sup>3</sup> *S.P.D.*, XV, 5; XXX, 207; *Later Mughals*, 303.

Marathas and remained entrenched in his strong position. His immobility encouraged the Maratha forces to surround him and cut off all supplies. To gain time for reinforcement to arrive from Delhi, Nizam-ul Mulk opened negotiations with Baji Rao through Anand Rao.<sup>1</sup> During the course of the negotiations, the Nizam under cover of his artillery managed to enter the fort of Bhopal, where he was closely besieged. Soon famine conditions began to prevail in the fort as provisions and forage became exceedingly scarce.<sup>2</sup> No help came from any quarter and Nizam-ul Mulk grew weary and exhausted. Unable to hold out any longer, he sent Ayamal of Jaipur, Sa'eed Lashkar Khan and Anwar-ullah Khan to the Maratha camp to settle terms of peace which he ultimately accepted on 6 January 1738. He agreed to cede the whole of Malwa to the Peshwa and recognised his sway over territories between the Narmada and the Chambal. He further promised not only to secure imperial sanction for the treaty but the grant of a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs also for Baji Rao.<sup>3</sup> "The victory of Bhopal marks the zenith of the Peshwa's career. He accomplished the conquest of Malwa . . . and announced the birth of the new imperial power."<sup>4</sup> Baji Rao now devoted himself to consolidating his hold over Malwa and augmenting his financial resources. He tightened his grip over such Rajas and *zamindars* as were still hesitant to recognise him as their overlord.<sup>5</sup>

### Bundelkhand

Chhatrasal, the Bundela chief, taking advantage of the prevailing imperial distractions, had increased his power and kept up only an outward pretence of subservience to the Mughal crown. He constantly defied imperial officers, particularly those appointed by Muhammad Khan Bangash to hold and control *jagirs* assigned to him by Farrukh Siyar in 1713.<sup>6</sup> The Bundela chief raised disturbances and prevented collection of revenue from areas under his influence. His partisans defeated and killed Peer Khan Bangash, *amil* of Kalpi and the uncle of Muhammad Khan's wife. Other *'amils*, like Diler Khan of Seondah and Ahmad Khan of Irichh, met stiff

<sup>1</sup> S.P.D., XXII, 368-369.

<sup>2</sup> S.P.D., XXII, 369.

<sup>3</sup> *Malwa in Transition*, 261-62. *Later Mughals*, II, 304.

<sup>4</sup> *Baji Rao I and Maratha Expansion*, 149.

<sup>5</sup> S.P.D., XV, 68.

<sup>6</sup> Muhammad Khan acquired the following eight *parganas* as his *jagirs* which all lay in Bundelkhand, R.A.S.B., 274-275:

1. Irichh, 42 miles north of Jhansi; 2. Bhnader, in the district of Jhansi; 3. Kalpi, in the district of Jhansi; 4. Kunch, in the district of Jalaun; 5. Seondah, in the district of Banda; 6. Maudah, in the district of Hamirpur; 7. Sipri, 55 miles west of Jhansi; 8. Jalaun, a *pargana* in the district of Jalaun.

opposition in establishing *thanas* and realizing dues.<sup>1</sup> Muhammad Khan Bangash, however, was determined to take effective control of his *mahals* worth Rs. 50 to 60 lakhs per year. On 25 December 1720 Muhammad Shah, in recognition of valuable services rendered in the battle of Hasanpur, had appointed the Afghan noble governor of Allahabad and confirmed him in the possession of his *jagirs*.<sup>2</sup> Thus for personal as well as official reasons it was the responsibility of Muhammad Khan Bangash to enforce royal authority and order in this turbulent region. The Bundelas, on the other hand, regarded his performance of duty as an encroachment on their hereditary rights, to safeguard which they frequently resorted to armed resistance. This clash of interest had made a conflict between the two inevitable, and it ended only with the armed intervention of the Marathas on the side of the Bundela chief which resulted in the final defeat of Muhammad Khan and territorial loss to the Empire.

In the year 1719-20 the Bundelas invaded Kalpi with a force of 12 thousand horse and 7 thousand foot. They plundered the town, demolished its buildings and imprisoned the families of the Saiyids and the Shaikhs treating women and children with great severity. Muhammad Khan received orders from the Emperor to march in person and crush the Bundela uprising; Muhammad Khan instead sent an army under Diler Khan who defeated the rebels and drove them out from the *thanas* in Kalpi and Jalalpur. But, Chhatrasal and his local allies again organized an army of thirty thousand horse and resumed the fight against Diler Khan. Though his force was inadequate for such a contest, Diler Khan unwisely accepted the challenge. A bloody battle was fought on 13 May 1721 in which Diler Khan perished along with 500 of his comrades; though in another area Qaim Khan, the eldest son of Muhammad Khan, won success and occupied the Bundela fort of Tarahwan.<sup>3</sup> In 1723 when Muhammad Khan was absent on a campaign against Raja Ajit Singh, Chhatrasal, whose audacity was increasing, seized large portions of the imperial territories, while Hirday Narayan and his other sons overran the rest of Bundelkhand to the frontiers of Bihar. The Emperor, perturbed at the news, directed Muhammad Khan, about the end of 1726, to proceed to Allahabad and chastise the rebels. He granted to the governor a sum of Rs 2 lakhs later commuted into the revenues of *chakla* Kora to raise contingents for the purpose. Shortly afterwards, Muhammad Khan came to Allahabad and collected a large army and appointed his second son Akbar to lead its vanguard on 3 February 1727. This army crossed the Jumna

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Farrukhabad*, 26; *Tarikh-i Lauh*, f. 11a.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Farrukhabad*, 33.

<sup>3</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, ff. 30-31; *Tarikh-i Lauh*, f. 52b; *Tarikh-i Farrukhabad*, ff. 26-28; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 257.

and military operations on an extensive scale were started against the Bundelas.<sup>1</sup>

The Bundelas also collected an army of 20,000 horse and more than 100,000 foot to fight the imperial forces. The fighting continued relentlessly for nearly two years in which both the antagonists, matched equally in strength and spirit, displayed great valour and resourcefulness. Muhammad Khan succeeded in conquering the hill forts of Luke, Chankhandi (both in Riwa district), Kakarali (in Panna state), Mau, Ramnagar and Kalyanpur, and reduced the *parganas* of Bhid, Maudah, Pailani and Agwasi. He managed to defeat the Bundelas in all major engagements and compelled their leader to flee from one fort to another for refuge.<sup>2</sup> At length in November 1728 after much fighting and bloodshed the famous fort of Tarahwan fell to the imperialists and Chhatrasal now took shelter in Jaitpur, his last stronghold, which was vigorously besieged by Muhammad Khan. The investment dragged on till December, with heavy losses on both sides in killed and wounded, when Chhatrasal's position became so untenable that he surrendered unconditionally. Muhammad Khan detained Chhatrasal in his camp for about four months during which the Bundela leader was reduced to such straits that he was prepared to relinquish all his claims over the lands held by him and was ready to give an undertaking that he in future would not resist or impede the imperial officers in

<sup>1</sup> *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, f. 15; *Later Mughals*, II, 231, 232.

<sup>2</sup> The Bundela forts, built usually on hill tops and defended as they were surrounded by ditches and dense jungle which covered most of these hills, were difficult to conquer. The plains where battles were fought were cut across by ravines and fast flowing rivulets. For instance, the fort of Tarahwan, head quarters of Bahar Singh, had three mud fortresses, with four masonry citadels; the fort of Jaitpur situated on a hill, was surrounded on one side by a lake of great depth, one kos wide and several kos long. From the top of those hills the Bundelas fired down on the advancing columns of the enemy. The capture of these forts was the most outstanding feat of the Afghan soldiers under Muhammad Khan. Besides, the governor had to encounter the hostility of local *zamindars* who, bound by ties of caste as well as common economic interests, gathered under the banner of Chhatrasal. The Bundela chief's capacity for military leadership was of no mean order and his followers fought bravely and stubbornly in the defence of their forts and lands. Muhammad Khan had to rely on his own resources and appears to have received no help, in men or money, from the government; nor did any consolation come from the Emperor. His only strength lay in the valiant service performed by his sons, his loyal companions-in-arms and his soldiery chiefly Afghan. Moreover, his hardships were increased by want of funds. In despair, he wrote to the Emperor, "His Majesty could not have reflected where the money was to come from. Did he think Qa'im Khan knew alchemy or could unearth hidden treasure? Had any one else raised an army at such a critical juncture, he would have been bountifully rewarded." The Mughal commanders, he added, received lakhs of rupees for waging war with Ajit Singh. *'Aziz-ul Qulub*, 3, 4, 7, 12, 15, 17, 19, 20; *J.A.S.B.*, 303.

establishing their *thanas* any where in the country. Muhammad Khan waited for instructions from the court about the terms of the settlement to be made with Chhatrasal, but he received none.<sup>1</sup>

The military achievements of Muhammad Khan Bangash had excited the jealousy and envy of his rivals at the court. They feared that recognition of his services might lead to his accession to power. They maliciously circulated the rumour that the Afghan chief, following the example of his ancestors, had designs to supplant the Mughal dynasty. Probably influenced by this false imputation of treasonable motives, the Emperor inordinately delayed taking any decision about the fate of Chhatrasal, now spending his time in an agony of suspense and uncertainty.<sup>2</sup> Somehow Chhatrasal managed to send urgent and piteous appeals for help through his confidential emissaries to Baji Rao. The Peshwa received his letters at Garha in February 1729 and promptly accepted the request. At this time most of the Afghan soldiers had returned to their homes on holiday, as there was no possibility of further fighting breaking out and only a contingent of four thousand horse had stayed behind in the imperial camp. Chhatrasal, under the pretext of celebrating the Holi festival, obtained leave from Muhammad Khan and escaped. Soon information was brought by spies that a strong army of the Marathas was coming to the rescue of Chhatrasal; but, Muhammad Khan neglected the warning and made no preparations for his defence. When he awoke to a sense of his danger, the Maratha troops had already reached 12 miles from his camp.<sup>3</sup>

It was Baji Rao who had appeared with an army of 25,000 accompanied by Pilaji Jadhav, Nero Shankar, Tukaji Pawar and other renowned Maratha captains. He had set out from Poona and adopting an unfamiliar route reached Mahoba on 12 March 1729, where Chhatrasal and his sons had welcomed him. The gloom which had settled upon the Bundelas was now dispelled and the hope of survival had revived their drooping spirits. The local Bundela *zamindars* and autonomous chiefs joined the Maratha standards and with an estimated strength of nearly one lakh of soldiers, they advanced towards Jaitpur where Muhammad Khan lay encamped. The Maratha-Bundela army drew closer and closer to the camp of the Afghans and suddenly surrounded it. The Marathas spread over the entire neighbourhood closing all roads and cutting off all supplies of food and fodder. Qa'im Khan who was operating in the north-eastern part of Bundelkhand, hastily put together a small force and advanced towards Jaitpur as soon as he heard of his father's plight. But at Supa,

<sup>1</sup> For details of these campaigns; '*Aziz-ul Qulub*, ff. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 26; *Tarikh-i Farrukhabad*, 37; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 586; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 464.

<sup>2</sup> '*Aziz-ul Qulub*, f. 15b; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 587.

<sup>3</sup> *S.P.D.*, XIII, 10, 22, 23, 30.

12 miles north-east of Jaitpur, he was repulsed by the Marathas and all his baggage and supplies fell into their hands. Availing himself of this diversion, Muhammad Khan retreated into the fort of Jaitpur which was soon besieged by the enemy. Baji Rao, who was short of heavy artillery, first attempted to take the fort by assault, but failed. He then decided to further tighten the blockade to starve out the garrison. It was under these trying circumstances that Muhammad Khan wrote to the Emperor for reinforcement. Muhammad Shah ordered Khan-i Dauran to march to the assistance of the beleaguered general. "But Khan-i Dauran, full of intrigue, and deceit and excuses, every evening put off his start to the morning, and every morning put it off until the evening."<sup>1</sup> Fortunately for Muhammad Khan an epidemic broke out in the Maratha camp which compelled Baji Rao to leave Jaitpur with his army on 23 May 1729. The siege by the Bundelas, however, continued, for another three months. Khan-i Dauran never started from Delhi and Muhammad Khan, without help and reduced to extremities, capitulated and promised never to invade the Bundela villages and towns in future.<sup>2</sup>

It was thus that the imperial cause in Bundelkhand was lost and the Marathas gained a footing in this strategic area. "From Bundelkhand it was easy to exercise a check upon the Rajputs in the west, to descend in a moment into the Doab and Awadh to the north, or advance to Benares, Patna and even Bengal to the east."<sup>3</sup> For the disastrous consequences the main responsibility was that of the derelict nobles at the court, but a great share of the blame rests with the Emperor also. No contemporary historian has recorded his reactions to the serious dereliction of duty on the part of Khan-i Dauran, but it is a fact that he was never taken to task by Muhammad Shah. On the other hand, Chhatrasal felt deeply beholden to Baji Rao for timely assistance in his hour of need. He expressed his gratitude by giving Baji Rao a *jagir* worth Rs. two lakhs and twenty five thousand, and a fort in Jhansi. He adopted him as his son in an open *darbar* and entrusted his own sons to the care of the Peshwa. When the Bundela chief died two years later on December 14, 1731, Baji Rao was the master of one third of his territories.<sup>4</sup> One year after Chhatrasal's death, the Peshwa sent his brother Chimnaji to collect tribute from the chiefs of Orcha, Datiya, Narwar and Bhadawar with the object of consolidating the Maratha power in Bundelkhand. In October 1732 Chimnaji reached Bundelkhand and obtained the money equivalent to the revenues of the *jagir*

<sup>1</sup> *Later Mughals*, II, 239.

<sup>2</sup> For details, *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 588-589; *Tarikh-i Farrukhabad*, 38; *Siyar-ul Muta'akkherin*, II, 464, 465; *S.P.D.*, XXX, 288, 289.

<sup>3</sup> *New History of the Marathas*, II, 229.

<sup>4</sup> *A History of the Marathas*, II, 421.

bestowed by the deceased Raja whose sons, Jagat Raj and Hirdey Shah submitted to the Maratha general, delivered up the fort of Rajgadh, and promised to give their full support to the Marathas against the imperial forces.<sup>1</sup>

### *Maratha Incursions into the Eastern Provinces*

During this period of anarchy and turmoil in the western and central parts of the Empire, the eastern provinces of Bihar, Orissa and Bengal had enjoyed settled rule and efficient administration. Under the able governorship of Murshid Quli Khan and his successor, Shuja'ud-din Khan, the people enjoyed increasing material prosperity as trade and commerce developed and agriculture flourished. Though the governors ruled with the scope of their authority virtually unlimited, they never wavered in their allegiance to the crown. The annual tribute of Rs. one crore, which they regularly remitted to the central treasury, constituted the mainstay of the Emperor's income.<sup>2</sup> However, the internal condition of the province deteriorated in the years that followed the death of Shuja'ud-din on 13 March 1739. Disorders and intrigues became rife and caused general disruption of normal activities. Sarfraz Khan, who assumed the reins of government, failed to resolve factional differences or to control the ambitions of the more self-seeking among his courtiers and officials. In fact his very incapacity encouraged the ambitions of the nobles and each tried to aggrandise himself at the expense of the weak and simple-minded governor. Prominent among them were 'Aliwardi Khan,<sup>3</sup> deputy-governor of Bihar,

<sup>1</sup> *S.P.D.*, XIV, 7, 8, 9.

<sup>2</sup> Ghulam Hussain Salim, *Riyaz-us Salatin*, Calcutta, 1890, 290, 291; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, II, 516.

<sup>3</sup> His original name was Mirza Muhammad 'Ali. His grandfather was one of Aurangzeb's foster-brothers. His father, Mirza Muhammad, served under 'Azam Shah as superintendent of the *feelkhana* (elephant-stables). The mother of Mirza Muhammad was related to Shuja'ud-din Muhammad Khan, son-in-law of Murshid Quli Khan and deputy-governor of Orissa. After the death of 'Azam Shah in the battle of Jaju, the family went to Cuttack where Shuja'ud-din Khan received them with honour and affection. He employed Mirza Muhammad 'Ali and his brother Haji Ahmad in his government; the salary of the former was Rs. 150 per month. Mirza Muhammad 'Ali impressed his master by rendering loyal service; he soon became the supervisor of the *faujdar*s of Orissa. It was mainly through the efforts of these two brothers, gifted with tact and prudence, that Shuja'ud-din Khan obtained the *subedari* of Bengal, much against the will of Murshid Quli Khan. Sarfraz Khan, son of Shuja'ud-din Khan, was the designated heir of Murshid Quli Khan, and he ascended the *masnad* of Bengal after the latter's demise on 30 June, 1727. Shuja'ud-din Khan, in a bid to seize the government, marched at the head of a strong force on



his brother Haji Ahmad, the chief *diwan*, and Ray Rayan Alam Chand,<sup>1</sup> *diwan* of *Khalisa*, all of them men of ability, enterprise and great cunning. These three persons obtained ascendancy over the mind of Sarfraz Khan and strengthened their hold over the administrative machinery. On the other hand, old servants, like Lutuf 'Ali Khan, Mir Murtaza and Mardan 'Ali, felt keenly disappointed in their hopes of promotion and advancement.<sup>2</sup> This gave rise to group politics and sectional rivalries which soon eroded political stability and seriously endangered the position of Sarfraz Khan.

The aim of 'Aliwardi Khan and Haji Ahmad was nothing less than the establishment of their supreme power in Bengal. They stood a good chance of success in case of a struggle for the governorship. For the realisation of this objective 'Aliwardi Khan began to increase his military strength in Bihar by recruiting numerous soldiers whom Sarfraz Khan had disbanded for reasons of economy. His armed forces included a large number of Afghans and Rohillas.<sup>3</sup> He consolidated his financial position by collecting huge sums of money from areas under his control and was also given substantial amounts by his brother and other relations for the support of the army. Apart from all this the two brothers had influential allies at the court and in the city of Murshidabad. They formed a plot with Ray Rayan 'Alam Chand and Fateh Chand Jagat Seth, a famous banker, to overthrow the

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Murshidabad and compelled his son, Sarfraz Khan, to abdicate in his favour. As a result of it, Shuja'ud-din proclaimed himself governor of Bengal in July, 1727 and bestowed rewards and honours on his supporters. Mirza Muhammad 'Ali received the title of 'Aliwardi Khan and the *faujdar* of Rajmahal, 1728, while his brother Haji Ahmad became the chief *diwan* of the province. The sons and several members of Haji Ahmad's family were elevated to posts of influence and authority. His one son, Sa'eed Ahmad, became the *faujdar* of Rangpur; and the second, Muhammad Raza, was appointed the *bakhshi* of the governor's troops. 'Aliwardi Khan and Haji Ahmad enjoyed confidence and favour of the governor who generally consulted them on matters of policy and in the transaction of business. In 1732, when Bihar was made the subdivision of Bengal, Shuja'ud-din Khan in his capacity as *subedor*, appointed 'Aliwardi Khan, its deputy-governor. 'Aliwardi Khan proved himself an able and vigorous administrator. For details, *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 83, 85, 88, 95, 96, 97; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 469, 470, 471, 472; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 290, 293, 294.

<sup>1</sup> Alam Chand started his career as an ordinary clerk in revenue department of the Bengal government. He was a hard working and capable *mutasaddi*. Shuja'ud-din promoted him to the post of *diwan-khalisa*. The *mansab* of 1,000 with the title of Ray Rayan was conferred on him. He was the chief adviser of the governor and exercised great authority in the civil and revenue department. *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 293.

<sup>2</sup> *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 307.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 113; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 309.

governor.<sup>1</sup> The close associates of the governor warned him of the impending danger to his person and office, and urged him to act without delay. Sarfraz Khan at first gave no credence to the reports, and in his simplicity he refused to believe that the two brothers could have any cause of complaint against him. He acted only when clear evidence of the conspiracy was laid before him. He dismissed Haji Ahmad and appointed Mir Murtaza as chief *diwan*; Sa'eed Ahmad Khan and Zain-u'd-din, the two sons of Haji Ahmad, were put under confinement.<sup>2</sup> But action had come too late and was too ineffective. Only immediate military action to knock out 'Aliwardi Khan, the king-pin of the plot, could have availed, as he was already on his way to Murshidabad.

Having completed all the details of his planned coup, 'Aliwardi Khan set out from Patna with an overwhelming force for Murshidabad. His march was not opposed till he had reached Giria only 22 miles south east of Murshidabad, where he was met by Sarfaraz Khan with his Bengal army of thirty thousand. A fierce battle, fought on 10 April 1740, ended in the death of the governor and complete rout of his army.<sup>3</sup> Haji Ahmad was sent into the city to announce the victory of his brother and confiscate treasures of the vanquished, and 'Aliwardi Khan made his triumphal entry two days later. He installed himself as *subedar* of Bengal in the midst of great rejoicings. The big officers and dignitaries flocked around him doing homage and offering their services. By a liberal and beneficent policy he succeeded in extinguishing the smouldering embers of discontent. He confirmed the old employees in their posts and the *zamindars* in their lands. A lavish distribution of wealth pacified the populace who had abominated him for his treachery. He treated members of the fallen dynasty with respect and clemency; he provided them with allowances and jobs.<sup>4</sup> Subsequently, 'Aliwardi Khan also obtained legal recognition of his position from Muhammad Shah to whom he paid a handsome *peshkash* and presents, besides the fixed tribute.<sup>5</sup> But liberality however great would not

<sup>1</sup> Haji Ahmad advanced Rs. 9 lakhs, Muhammad Raza Khan Rs. 5 lakhs, Sa'eed Ahmad Rs 7 lakhs and Husain 'Ali Khan Rs. 3 lakhs. *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 114.

<sup>2</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 488, 489; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 99, 100, 112, 113; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 310.

<sup>3</sup> For details, *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 493; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 117-127; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 310-323.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 127, 128, 129; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 324.

<sup>5</sup> 'Aliwardi Khan sent Rs. 40 lakhs in cash, costly presents worth Rs. 70 lakhs, as *peshkash* and Rs. one crore as tribute to the Emperor. He gave Rs. 3 lakhs to Qamr-u'd-din Khan, the *wazir*, and Rs. one lakh to Asaf Jah, the *mir bakhshi*. He retained Jugal Kishore as his *yakil* at the court. *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 494, 495, 496; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 128; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 325.

conciliate the relatives of Sarfraz Khan or make them submit to his usurpation; one of them, Rustum Jang, the son-in-law of Shuja'ud-din Khan and deputy-governor of Orissa, with the help of the local *zamindars* revolted and brought the whole province under his control.<sup>1</sup>

As soon as 'Aliwardi Khan learnt of the insurrection, he collected his troops, hastened to Cuttack and inflicted a severe defeat on the rebel at Phulwari, 3 March 1741. Rustum Jang escaped into the Deccan where along with his relatives he sought asylum with some local chiefs and even Asaf Jah became an ardent champion of his cause.<sup>2</sup> The new deputy-governor, Saulat Jang, a nephew of 'Aliwardi, could not manage the affairs of the *subah* efficiently, and a new insurrection broke out. The nobles and officers, provoked by the *subedar's* capricious policy invited Mirza Baqar, son-in-law of Rustam Jang from the Deccan to invade Orissa. Mirza Baqar, joined by a band of the Marathas, entered Orissa without encountering opposition and captured Cuttack in August 1741. Saulat Jang was captured and was put under confinement along with his family. 'Aliwardi Khan, however, soon avenged the outrage. He entered the province, swooped down upon the rebels and scattered them. He restored his authority and established order in the province; he entrusted the administration of Orissa to Shaikh Ma'sum, a brave warrior from Panipat and appointed Daulat Ram, son of Janki Ram, his *peshkar*.<sup>3</sup> Having thus reduced Orissa to obedience and cleared it of his enemies, 'Aliwardi Khan returned to Murshidabad. But his triumph was short-lived as he soon found himself faced with the threat of a Maratha invasion. Baqar Khan who had returned to the Deccan with some other relatives of Sarfraz Khan approached Raghujai Bhonsle and prevailed upon him to attack Bengal. As the proposal held the prospect of rich booty, the Maratha chief readily agreed and sent his chief minister Bhaskar Ram with a strong cavalry of 20 thousand commanded by 25 generals. Raghujai thus unleashed the hurricane of Maratha invasion on Bengal and Orissa.<sup>4</sup>

Bhaskar Ram swept into Orissa unchecked; at Cuttack he defeated Shaikh Ma'sum and imprisoned Daulat Ram. He then descended upon Burdwan where 'Aliwardi Khan had also reached on hearing of the invasion on 15 April, 1742, and had established his camp on the bank of Rani lake outside the town. The Marathas surrounded the camp and, avoiding hand to hand fighting, cut off supplies using their main army for the purpose while detachments were employed to devastate the adjacent territories.

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 496.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 130-134; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 496, 497.

<sup>3</sup> For details, *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 500-505; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 135-140; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 329-334.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 505; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 141-142; *Riyaz-us Salatin* 335-337.

When 'Aliwardi Khan made an attempt to break out, the Marathas fell upon him and plundered his baggage. Enfeebled by incessant attacks and want of provisions, the governor lost heart and sued for peace. But, finding the price of their withdrawal too exorbitant, he decided to fight his way out and move to a place of safety.<sup>1</sup> After a tough struggle he eventually succeeded in breaking out of the ring and reaching Katwah, 35 miles to the north-east of Burdwan closely pursued and constantly harassed all the way by the Marathas. He left Katwah and at last at Nikul Sarai, 14 miles from it, he turned to face his pursuers, and in the ensuing action both sides suffered heavy losses.<sup>2</sup> It was in this battle that Mir Habib,<sup>3</sup> one of 'Aliwardi's generals, was made captive by the Marathas. Mir Habib an extremely capable and self-made man, transferred his allegiance to his captors; he soon gained an important command in their army and subsequently became their principal adviser as he was able to supply information regarding topography of Bengal and economic resources of its towns. At this stage Bhaskar Ram wished to retire, but he was induced by Mir Habib to raid the capital of Bengal which offered very rich booty.<sup>4</sup>

The Maratha incursions into Bengal now assumed the dimensions of a tidal wave. A squadron of seven hundred horse was placed under the command of Mir Habib who burst into the defenceless capital in May 1742. The efforts of Haji Ahmad to save the town failed and Mir Habib sacked several localities; he seized Rs. 6 lakhs from the house of Jagat Seth and captured such eminent citizens as Murad 'Ali and Raja Daulat Rao. The Marathas quickly evacuated Murshidabad as 'Aliwardi Khan came with a large force to its relief but they turned on Hugli.<sup>5</sup> Mir Habib, by inveigling Muhammad Raza, the *faujdar* of Hugli, to an interview, seized him and secured possession of the fort through the help of 'Abul Hasan, a rich and influential merchant of the place. For his services

<sup>1</sup> The Maratha chief demanded Rs. 10 lakhs as ransom which 'Aliwardi Khan refused to pay. The governor had only a small force of 3,000 to 4,000 cavalry and 4,000 to 5,000 musketeers with him at this time. *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 143; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 508, 510.

<sup>2</sup> *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 340-41; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 144; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 511-512.

<sup>3</sup> Mir Habib hailed from Shiraz in Persia. He lived at Hughli and earned his livelihood by hawking from house to house the goods imported from his home country. Though illiterate, he was gifted with shrewd understanding, wit and cultivated manners which enabled him to secure a small job in the government of Bengal. He rose from there, by sheer dint of merit, to the post of the deputy to Rustum Jang. He rendered valuable services to the *naib-subedar* and won his absolute confidence. *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 101-103; *Riyaz-us-Salatin*, 299-303.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 513; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 145-146.

<sup>5</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin* II, 513; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 343. "On hearing of the

to the cause of the Marathas, 'Abul Hasan was appointed *faujdar* of Hugli, and Shesh Rao became the *Nazim*. However, Shesh Rao followed a policy of moderation and was kind and courteous in his dealings with the old officers. The local *zamindars* rendered homage to the Maratha *Nazim* and paid tribute to his agents. Making Katwah a base of operations the Marathas extended their depredations far and wide; they wantonly ravaged places like Burdwan, Midnapur and Balesar.<sup>1</sup> The atrocities and devastations perpetrated by the Marathas have been described by contemporary writers as most frightful. Utter terror raged in these towns and villages; slaughter, rapine and outrage marked the course of their invasions. "They cut off the ears, noses and hands of hundreds of people, or killed them with many kinds of torture and suffering. Tying sacks of dirt to the mouths of others, they mangled and burnt them. They violated the modesty of a large number of women."<sup>2</sup>

'Aliwardi Khan seriously busied himself in strengthening his army and making plans for an offensive against the Marathas. He sent for Zain-u'd-din, deputy-governor of Bihar and Saif Khan, governor of Purneah to join the expedition with their respective troops. He also applied to the Emperor for military succor. Zain-u'd-din, responded to his uncle by bringing 5,000 cavalry and 6,000 to 7,000 infantry, while Saif Khan contributed 5,000 trained soldiers.<sup>3</sup> At the head of this considerable army the governor set out from Murshidabad and crossing the river Ajay made a daring surprise raid on the enemy's base at Katwah, on 27 September 1742. Overwhelmed by the blow, the unwary Marathas took to their heels, leaving the baggage in the hands of their antagonists. Having plundered the camp, the Bengal army started in relentless pursuit of the Marathas till Katwah was cleared.<sup>4</sup> Bhaskar proceeded to Pachet and then turned for a descent on the Midnapur district which he thoroughly ravaged. A Maratha force slipped into Orissa and killed Shaikh Ma'sum in a sharp battle. 'Aliwardi Khan who was following hard upon the heels of Bhaskar caught him near Midnapur. The Maratha general was defeated and with no further chance of

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movements of the Marathas, 'Aliwardi started at once from Katwah, and marching day and night with all possible speed, in the midst of rain and thunder, reached the city of Murshidabad towards the morning of the 7th May." K. Dutta, *'Aliwardi and His Times*, 68.

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 514; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 148; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 344.

<sup>2</sup> *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 345. For a graphic eye-witness account of Ganga Ram, which is far more shocking than that given by Persian writers, vide J.N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Calcutta, 1949, Vol. I, 49-50; *'Aliwardi and His Times*, 72, 73.

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 515, 516; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 149-150; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 346.

<sup>4</sup> For details, *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 517-18; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 347.

success in sight returned discomfited to Nagpur in December 1742.<sup>1</sup> His retreat was a signal for Shesh Rao and the Maratha agents he had posted to collect *chauth* at Burdwan, Hijili and other places, to abandon their posts and leave hastily. The former *'amils* and *fauj-dars* returned and resumed charge of offices from which they had been ousted. The Nawab rapidly restored the whole province of Orissa to order and after appointing 'Abdul Nabi Khan, uncle of Mustafa Khan, as his deputy in Orissa returned to Murshidabad on 10 February 1743.<sup>2</sup>

Reports of this disaster deeply disquieted Muhammad Shah and caused anxiety in imperial circles. In his alarm, he ordered Safdar Jang, the governor of Awadh, to help 'Aliwardi Khan against the Marathas.<sup>3</sup> Safdar Jang set out with a large army and a powerful artillery from Faizabad and reached Patna on 7 December 1742. He took possession of the Patna fort and began to behave as if he was the *de facto* governor of the province. The people of Patna were struck with consternation when his unruly soldiers indulged in plunder and vandalism. Available evidence makes it appear that Safdar Jang was seeking to detach Bihar from Bengal and add it to his dominion in Awadh. It also appears that he expected that the Emperor, at the time under the influence of his partisans at the court, would give recognition to his acquisition.<sup>4</sup> 'Aliwardi Khan was shocked to hear of Safdar Jang's attempts at usurpation and the unseemliness of his conduct. He represented to the Emperor that as the Marathas had already been defeated and driven out, he was in no need of help from such a grasping person. The Emperor thereupon sent orders to Safdar Jang not to proceed any further and return to his own headquarters which Safdar Jang did on 15 January 1743.<sup>5</sup>

Muhammad Shah had simultaneously asked Peshwa Balaji Rao to march to Bengal against Raghuji Bhonsle who had advanced with a large army into the province, and had set up his camp once again at Katwah in March 1743 after occupying Burdwan. The Emperor had appointed Balaji Rao in July 1741 the deputy-governor of Malwa and he now directed him to undertake the responsibility of protecting the imperial territories from the invasion of Raghuji. Moreover, sharp differences had arisen between Balaji and Raghuji over the *chauth* of Bengal which had been assigned to the latter by Raja Shahu but were claimed by the former. Raghuji stubbornly resisted the claims of Balaji in Bengal which he had considered his special sphere of influence. This provoked the resentment of the Peshwa and he readily concerted measures with the Mughal Emperor to

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkherin*, II, 519; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 348.

<sup>2</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkherin*, II, 519-520; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 151.

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkherin*, II, 516.

<sup>4</sup> For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Chapter V.

<sup>5</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkherin*, II, 517; *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 33, 34.

attack Raghujī in Bengal. He brought into Bihar forces estimated at nearly 40 to 50 thousand horse and passing through Sahesram, Gaya, Daudnagar and Monghyr he appeared in the neighbourhood of Murshidabad in March 1743.<sup>1</sup> All along the route Balaji had ravaged and plundered. Whoever paid ransom softened the wrath of the Marathas; whoever stood against them was either put to death or led into captivity. The Peshwa, however, spared Patna which was on his way and where anxiety had prevailed.<sup>2</sup> 'Aliwardi Khan, who was caught between two fires, sought refuge in peaceful settlement with the Peshwa. The governor met the Peshwa at Plassey on 31 March 1748 and agreed to pay *chauth* for the province of Bengal to Raja Shahu and Rs. 20 lakhs in cash to the Peshwa. Balaji Rao, in return, promised to chastise Raghujī and expel him from Orissa.<sup>3</sup> Having agreed upon joint military operations, 'Aliwardi Khan and Balaji Rao set out with their forces against Raghujī and inflicted severe defeats on him compelling him to abandon his enterprise, and leave Orissa.<sup>4</sup> Balaji had broken the power of his opponent but had established his own influence in this area. He wrote to Shahu, "By the grace of God I had a successful expedition in Bengal. Raghujī was routed and my authority established. The Nawab was convinced of my power and I have received ample return in money both from him and the Emperor. Raghujī invaded Bengal and having established his cantonment in the province, had asserted his strength. The Emperor desired that I should oppose and expel him."<sup>5</sup> Having accomplished all this, the Peshwa returned to Poona at the end of May 1743.

This was by no means the end of the Maratha incursions into north eastern country on which further disasters were to fall in the coming months. Raja Shahu had viewed with concern the conflict between his two principal officers and had resolved it by defining their respective spheres of activity. "An agreement was signed by both (Raghujī and Balaji) on August 31, 1743 at Satara by which all the territory from Berar to the east right up to Cuttack, Bengal and Lucknow, was assigned to Raghujī, with which the Peshwa bound himself not to interfere; and the territory west of this line including Ajmer, Agra, Prayag and Lucknow were to be the exclusive sphere of the Peshwa."<sup>6</sup> Thus freed from all fear of interference Raghujī sent his trusted general, Bhaskar, at the head of 20,000 horse in January, 1744 to invade Bengal and levy tribute from it. This flagrant violation

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 522; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 353; 'Aliwardi and His Times, 83, 84.

<sup>2</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 522, 523, 524; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 353.

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 524; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 156.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 525.

<sup>5</sup> *New History of the Marathas*, II, 217.

<sup>6</sup> *New History of the Marathas*, II, 219.

of a treaty so recently contracted greatly disconcerted 'Aliwardi Khan. His financial difficulties and lack of morale among his army officers precluded the possibility of a full scale offensive by him. He was forced to take recourse to a stratagem which would destroy the enemy without fighting. With the cooperation of Janki Ram, his *diwan* and Mustafa Khan,<sup>1</sup> the trusted Afghan general, he cleverly lured the Maratha leaders for an interview at Mankara on 31 March 1744.<sup>2</sup> Bhaskar, as he approached 'Aliwardi Khan's tent along with his 21 generals, was suddenly set upon and murdered by the Afghans of Mustafa Khan. Raghuji Gaikwad was the only survivor who escaped with his troops and baggage. The whole region was cleared of the raiders and for about a year Bengal enjoyed peace.<sup>3</sup> But Mustafa Khan through whose instrumentality the deed had been successfully accomplished did not receive adequate recompense from 'Aliwardi Khan. He had been promised the deputy-governorship of Bihar, but the Nawab evaded the fulfilment of his promise. Disgusted at the breach of faith, Mustafa Khan resigned his post and set off to Patna where he raised the banner of revolt against his former master in March 1745.<sup>4</sup> The Afghan warrior was an ambitious man of high ability, with a military record second only to 'Aliwardi Khan. In every crisis his sword had saved the cause of the Nawab, and after every victory he had emerged more powerful and indispensable. This made him very arrogant and he began to affect airs of superiority. His insurrection caused extensive desertions by Afghan soldiers, who formed the main fighting strength in Bengal, from 'Aliwardi Khan's army.

In his struggle against 'Aliwardi Khan, Mustafa Khan did not scruple even to enlist the aid of the Marathas by inviting Raghuji to attack Bengal.

<sup>1</sup> Mustafa Khan was a distinguished Afghan general in the army of 'Aliwardi Khan. The Emperor had bestowed on him honours and rewards on the recommendations of the governor. He received a *mansab* of 5,000 and the title of Babar Jang. In the army of Bengal he was the commander of 7 thousand horse and he was given Rs. 12 lakhs as reward by the governor. His uncle, 'Abdul Nabi Khan, held the *subedari* of Orissa and the command of 5,000 horse and a royal *mansab* of 4,000. After the death of 'Abdul Nabi Khan, his son 'Abdur Rasul became the *subedar* of Orissa. *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 528.

<sup>2</sup> Both Mustafa Khan and Janki Ram went to see Bhaskar and impressed upon him the necessity of meeting with the Nawab for a lasting settlement. They tried to dispel the suspicions of the Maratha leader by taking solemn oaths "according to the forms of their respective religions—Janki Ram by touching the sacred water of the Ganges and Tulsī leaves, and Mustafa Khan by holding a copy of the Koran in his hands." *'Aliwardi and His Times*, 89, 90.

<sup>3</sup> For details, *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 528, 529, 530, 531; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 152, 154; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 350-352.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 532; *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 354, 355; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 156-157.



Raghuji eagerly seized the opportunity, and in March 1745, penetrated into Orissa for the third time with a cavalry force of 14,000 and captured Cuttack whose defence had been sadly neglected by Durlabram, son of Janki Ram and deputy-governor of Orissa. Durlabram, in the hope of making a settlement, visited the Maratha leader but was imprisoned and later sent to Nagpur. At this time 'Aliwardi Khan was in no position to withstand the attack as his hands were tied by the Afghan rising in Bihar. To avoid confrontation and gain time he opened negotiations with the Maratha chief which dragged on for two and a half months. He skillfully procrastinated till one of his generals had defeated and killed Mustafa Khan in June 1745. Relieved from the Afghan trouble, 'Aliwardi Khan prepared to try conclusions with the raiders.<sup>1</sup> The breakdown of negotiations and the preparations of the governor for an offensive, however, failed to intimidate Raghuji who entered the district of Burdwan and marched on Birbhum. He formed an alliance with Murtaza Khan, the son of Mustafa Khan, now beleaguered in Magror, and in response to his request for help, he advanced into Bihar. The Maratha chief relieved his new allies, and, accompanied by them, proceeded towards Bhojpur plundering and ravaging places on his way to it. 'Aliwardi Khan, with a picked force of 12,000, hurried to Patna and from there rushed to block the passage of the Marathas.

At Rani's tank near Muhib 'Alipur the two opposing armies came to grips. The Marathas suffered defeat; Raghuji was seriously wounded and his two generals, Mahimaji and Shankraji were killed.<sup>2</sup> Not discouraged by the set-back, Raghuji resolved to direct the attack from Bihar to 'Aliwardi Khan's capital at Murshidabad and passing through the hills and jungles of the Santhal region the Maratha chief massed his troops near it on 21 December 1745. Coming quickly upon his track, 'Aliwardi Khan also arrived there the next day and not only frustrated the enemy's attempts to plunder the city but chased him from the field and closely pursued him upto Katwa. The Bengal army overtook the fleeing Marathas at Ravideghi, near Katwa, and inflicted a crushing defeat on them forcing Raghuji to beat a hasty retreat to Nagpur. But these defeats did not rid Orissa

<sup>1</sup> *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 355; *Tarikh-i Bangalah*, 159. 'Aliwardi Khan is reported to have written the following letter to Raghuji: "An agreement brought about by dint of money, is the effect of either impotence, or some great hope. As to the first, I inform you that by God's blessing, my warriors are more covetous than ever of another engagement with you, and more desirous of fighting than hunters are of getting at their prey. And as to the second article, I must tell you, that they can not expect any benefit from entering into a treaty with so unfortunate a commander as yourself. Matters standing thus, the agreement you expect, can not be brought about but by a battle." *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkerin*, 542, 543, 544, 545; *Aliwardi and His Times*, 95.

<sup>2</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkerin*, II, 547, 548, 549; *S.P.D.*, XXVI, 7, 11.

of the Maratha presence. Their roving bands, under the leadership of Mir Habib continued to ravage districts like Bankura, Midnapur, Hijili and Balesar.<sup>1</sup>

At the beginning of 1746 Muhammad Shah thought it necessary to conclude a settlement with Raja Shahu by granting him the *chauth* of Bengal. He consented to pay Rs. 25 lakhs as the *chauth* of Bengal and Rs. 10 lakhs as that of Bihar to Raja Shahu without consulting 'Aliwardi Khan who was playing a key role in the defence of the imperial territories in the east. 'Aliwardi Khan found the arrangement highly prejudicial to the strength and interests of his government.<sup>2</sup> He became suspicious of the Emperor's intentions and he refused point-blank to comply with the royal orders for the payment of *chauth*. On the basis of past experience 'Aliwardi Khan believed that this kind of intervention by the centre in the affairs of Bengal, made for the third time, would only complicate the situation and create new problems for him. In his petition, he argued that the three provinces constituted one administrative unit and no arrangement should have been made separately for any of the parts. He added that when settlement had been reached with Rajah Shahu, why did Raghuji Bhonsle march on Bengal and why did not the Peshwa prevent him. Payment of *chauth* was no guarantee of protection from future raids. Stress of unceasing warfare pressed severely upon his resources and he had no money to meet the demands of Rajah Shahu and the Peshwa. The Nawab plainly told Raghunath Jay Ram, the Maratha agent at Murshidabad, "Patna is mine, Bengal too is mine, I ought to act treating both provinces as one."<sup>3</sup> He thus repudiated the treaty made by the Emperor and took a stern stand on the issue concerning *chauth*. He decided to defend the province against Raghuji on his own, instead of depending on the uncertain support of the Peshwa. His first step was to send an expedition under Mir Ja'afar, *bakhshi* of the Bengal army, to fight against the Marathas and Afghans in Orissa. Mir Ja'afar defeated Saiyid Nur, the lieutenant of Mir Habib, near Midnapur on 12 December 1746.<sup>4</sup> In the beginning of the following year Ranoji, son of Raghuji came to the assistance of Mir Habib. This time Mir Ja'afar put up no resistance as he had already shifted his ambition to Bengal itself and was busy plotting with 'Ata-ullah Khan,<sup>5</sup> son-in-law of Haji Ahmad, to capture power there. The Nawab, informed of the plot, immediately dismissed both of

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 550, 551.

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed discussion of circumstances, under which the compromise was formed, see Chapter V.

<sup>3</sup> *Fall of Mughal Empire*, I, 72-74.

<sup>4</sup> For details, 'Aliwardi and His Times, 100.

<sup>5</sup> 'Ata-ullah Khan was the son-in-law of Haji Ahmad Khan. He held the *faujdari* of Rajmahal and Bhagalpur. He had the *mansab* of 3,000/- and the title of Sabit Jang.

them from their posts and marched in person against the enemy, routing him utterly near Burdwan in March 1747. He frustrated another attempt of Janoji to invade and plunder Murshidabad in his absence. For the time being tranquillity returned to the war-ravaged towns and villages of the north-eastern country.<sup>1</sup> The prolonged struggle had strained 'Aliwardi Khan's finances and the Maratha raids had inflicted severe damage on both agriculture and trade. Moreover, as war dragged on the forces of opposition to the Nawab's authority gathered momentum. His close companions and relations, exploiting each and every difficulty and weakness, hatched plot after plot to seize the reins of power. Progressively 'Aliwardi Khan's difficulties multiplied and he was threatened from within and from without. His nephew, Zain-u'd-din Haibat Jang organized a rebellion against him in Patna by employing the Afghans who were once his bitter foes. But Zain-u'd-din got entangled in the toils of his own plot and the Afghans killed both him and his father, Haji Ahmad, and took possession of Patna on 13 January 1748.<sup>2</sup> Again, his impatient grandson and heir, Siraj-u'd-Daulah, made a plot to end his life in June 1750.<sup>3</sup> Yet, 'Aliwardi Khan stood up to these perils bravely and by his valour, perseverance and perspicacity tided over every crisis. He had spent most of his time, since his rise to power, in the saddle ceaselessly moving the armies from place to place and despite his 73 years had lost none of his doggedness and physical endurance. A strategist of no mean capacity, he himself planned and organized the raising of armies and supervision of the details of operations. His victory in the battle of Rani Sarai against the Afghan rebels, the killers of his brother and nephew, fought on 16 April 1748, was as remarkable as his campaign against the Marathas, launched in the following year.<sup>4</sup> This was in sharp contrast with the conduct of campaigns in Gujarat or Malwa by his contemporaries. Even so, a successful termination of struggle in Orissa was not in sight and the Maratha hold over it was as tight as before. But though all the stupendous exertions had proved futile in Orissa the efforts of Raghuji to push beyond it and establish a foothold in Bengal were equally ineffectual. His fearful expeditions brought him no monetary gains which could have relieved him from financial distress. Completely exhausted and worn-out, the two belligerents at long last had to choose the wiser course of coming to terms. After making the preliminary settlement they signed a definitive treaty in May 1751, containing the following terms<sup>5</sup> :

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkherin*, II, 555-557.

<sup>2</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkherin*, II, 557-563.

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkherin*, II, 583-585.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkherin*, II, 576-578.

<sup>5</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkherin*, II, 591.

1. Mir Habib was appointed deputy-governor of Orissa. He was to pay the surplus revenue of the province by way of salary to the Maratha army, stationed there.
2. 'Aliwardi Khan promised to pay Rs. 12 lakhs as *chauth* of Bengal.
3. Raghuji agreed not to invade or ravage the territories of Orissa, and promised further never to cross the Bengal frontier now fixed near Jalesor.

## CHAPTER FOUR

# FOREIGN INVASIONS

## NADIR SHAH'S INVASION

### *Rise of Nadir Shah*

The beginning of the 18th century saw the Safavid kingdom of Persia in a state of disintegration, and its ultimate overthrow by the Afghans synchronized with the decline of the Mughal power in India. The factors that contributed to the fall of these two ruling dynasties, famed far and wide in the 17th century for their wealth, extent of territory and power, were generally similar. Shah Sultan Husain (1644-1722), unwarlike and incompetent, was defeated almost in every battle by the armies of Mahmud Afghan who captured Isfahan and established his authority over Persia. The Shah gave legal recognition to this transfer of power by conferring on the Afghan conqueror the crown of Persia on 22 October 1722. However, Mahmud's accession to the throne could secure for him neither complete dominion in Persia nor the loyalty of its people. Tahmasp Mirza, the third son of Shah Sultan, was not willing to recognize Mahmud's sovereignty. He set up a rival camp at Gazvin, proclaimed himself Shah and rallied under his banner the scattered forces of his father. Though defeated and driven out from Gazvin, the Prince continued his revolutionary struggle against the hated aliens. The common people, daily victims of pillage and outrage, wanted the collapse of the new regime. The internal conflicts among the Afghan leaders further weakened the authority of Mahmud. Amid these stresses he could not withstand the mounting pressure of the Turks and the Russians on Northern Persia. Gradually his authority began to wane and he lost his hold over the army. Ashraf, the son of 'Abdul 'Aziz and Mahmud's nephew rose against him and after assassinating him occupied the throne on 22 April 1725. While the civil discord weakened the Afghan government the situation of Tahmasp Mirza greatly improved. At the town of Sari the Safavi Prince was joined by Fateh 'Ali Khan Qajar, a warrior from Astrabad, with a well-trained force of 2,000. He also won over to his

side Nadir Quli Beg,<sup>1</sup> whose fame as a general had spread far and wide. He had a strong contingent of 2,000 *kurds* and *afshars* when he met the Safavi Prince at Khabushan early in 1726. The *afshar* chief was a clever and resolute leader of men; his ability and successful leadership soon elevated him to the supreme command of the Prince's army. Having gained a controlling influence over the Prince, Nadir intrigued to bring about the downfall of Fateh 'Ali Khan Qajar whom he believed to be his rival and a dangerous obstacle in the realization of his ambition which was boundless. He poisoned the mind of Tahmasp against Fateh 'Ali Khan who was beheaded on a false charge of treason by the Prince's order on 11 October 1726. The Prince appointed Nadir the Qurchi Bashi and bestowed on him the title of Tahmasp Quli.

Nadir gained direct control over the military machine which he organized strenuously to wage a war of extermination against the foreign enemies. He defeated Malik Mahmud Sistani, the independent ruler of Mashhad, in a decisive battle on 11 November 1726. The next few years were devoted to reducing petty Afghan states to submission before embarking upon the final trial of strength with Ashraf. He took possession of Bihdadin and Sangan, the Afghan strongholds, and forced Allahyar Khan, the Abdali chief of Herat, to acknowledge his sovereign power in May, 1729. The time now seemed ripe to strike down the Afghan monarch and liberate Persia from his yoke. With a strong army Nadir marched on Mihmandost and inflicted heavy losses on Ashraf's army. Ashraf sustained another crushing defeat at Nadir's hands near Isfahan which the Persians seized on 13 November 1729. The Afghan troops were no match for the trained army of Nadir and every battle exhibited their inferiority. Tahmasp Mirza came from Tehran and amid an enthusiastic display of popular rejoicing ascended the throne of his father, Shah Sultan Husain, whom Ashraf had already cruelly put to death in 1726. In the last week of December, 1729, Shiraz, too fell into the hands of Nadir. Ashraf met his end when he was captured and executed by the men of Husain Sultan, the chief of Qandhar and brother of Mahmud.<sup>2</sup> Thus collapsed the Afghan kingdom after a short period

<sup>1</sup> For details of his early life, *vide*, 'Abdul Karim ibn Aqibat Mahmud Kashmiri, *Bayan-i Waqa'i*, also known as the *Nadir Namah* or *Tarikh-i Nadiri*, Aligarh MS.; James Fraser, *The History of Nadir Shah*, London, 1742; Har Charan Das, son of Udai Rai, *Chahar Gulzar Shuja'i*. B. M. MS.; Sir John Malcolm, *The History of Persia from the most early period to the present time*, London, 1815, Vol. 2; Shaikh Muhammad 'Ali Hazin, *Tazkirat-ul Ahwal*, Persian text, edited by F. C. Belfour, London, entitled *The Life of Shaikh Muhammad Ali Hazin*, London, 1830; Mirza Muhammad Mahdi Kaukabi Astrabadi, *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, also known as *Tarikh-i Nadri*, Bombay, 1875; L. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, London, 1838; San'at-i Zadah Kirmani, *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, 1956.

<sup>2</sup> Lockhart, L., *Nadir Shah*, 33, 45.

of seven years, and the Persians regained their freedom.

Nadir also waged strenuous campaigns against the Turks and wrested from their control vast provinces like Azerbaijan and Iraq. Successful wars made him powerful and popular. He was the real authority in the state while Shah Tahmasp was reduced to that of a figure-head. To raise his stature and build up his image in the public eyes the Shah decided to lead the armies in person. But the very first campaign which also proved to be his last fought on 1 January 1732 at Khurijan near Hamdan ended in humiliation and he was forced to conclude peace by which he was made to give up all that Nadir had fought so hard to win. When Nadir learnt of this disaster he angrily denounced the ignominious conduct of the king. He immediately abrogated the terms of the treaty and declared his master unfit for the kingly office. On 7 September 1732 he coerced the Shah, now utterly stupefied and helpless, into abdicating in favour of his infant son, Abbas III. He assumed the powers of the regent and in that capacity he held in his hands the supreme direction of military and political affairs of the kingdom. His campaigns against Turkey and Russia during the years 1732-1736 scored more triumphs; every year saw new battles won and new provinces added to the Empire. In the course of a few years Nadir was able to make Persia a formidable power in central Asia. His countrymen found in him a hero and leader to adore, and his enemies stood in awe of his prowess. He now decided to throw off the mask of subordination to the king, already a puppet in his hands, and to wear the crown himself. He assembled a council of the prominent nobles, generals and *ulema* who, unanimously invested him with kingship. His coronation took place on 8 March, 1736, in which he assumed the title of Shah. A short time after this formal ceremony Nadir Shah set out from Ispahan at the head of 80,000 horse to conquer Qandhar, the last stronghold of the Afghans and a potential focus of trouble. Husain Sultan, its independent ruler, made a gallant stand and surrendered the fort on 25 March 1738 only after a relentless resistance of nearly a year.

### *Nadir Shah's Diplomatic Relations with the Mughal Court*

The possession of Qandhar, the gateway to Kabul, put Nadir Shah on the road to India and he was now in a position to invade it and acquire the riches necessary to replenish his treasury depleted by incessant warfare. Since his rise to power Nadir had watched with close attention the development of events in India. The cracking edifice of the Empire, the chaotic state of imperial politics, the lack of capable and determined leadership at Delhi and the discords in the ranks of nobility all seemed to favour his

schemè of the invasion of the country. Like Timur, whose conscious follower he was in his political and military plans, he first set about preparing a case for his projected invasion. He based it on the large number of Afghan political refugees who had sought shelter in India. He demanded the Mughal government that it should expel the refugees from and seal the border against them. When the overburdened authorities in Delhi failed to satisfy his requests, Nadir, under the pretext of expelling the Afghans, launched a massive attack on Kabul and Peshawar. "This is highly probable, however," says Lockhart, "that his express desire to punish the Afghans was only a pretext and that he had for sometime harboured the design of conquering India."<sup>1</sup> The authenticity of the statement by the author of *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi* that Muhammad Shah was not inclined to drive out the Afghans, his immediate neighbours, is extremely dubious.<sup>2</sup> For there is no proof to show that secretly or openly the Mughal government encouraged Sultan Husain in his resistance against the Persians or that any official support was extended to the Afghan influx into Indian territory. The Mughal Emperor was too much occupied with domestic problems to be able to take partisan attitude in events happening beyond his frontiers. He received Persian embassies with every mark of respect and dignity, provided them with princely comforts, gave lakhs of rupees in gifts and promised to take necessary action against the fleeing Afghans. But a full and thorough chastisement of the Afghans needed a military expedition which the Mughal government was unable, due to long-drawn struggle with the Marathas, to dispatch in the hilly areas of the north-western provinces. Moreover, the Afghans, uprooted from their hearth and home, were no longer a source of danger to Nadir Shah's mighty power. His own army contained a large proportion of Afghans and Turkomans. After the conquest of Qandhar he employed several thousand young *ghalzais* in his army while other Afghan tribes were sent to Khurasan; and the Abdali tribes of Nishapur and Khurasan were settled in Qandhar.<sup>3</sup> In view of this benign policy the extirpation of the *ghalzais* Afghans does not seem to have been his serious motive for an aggressive military action against the Mughal government.

Early in 1730 Nadir Shah sent 'Ali Mardan Shamuli as his ambassador to Dehli to request the Mughal Emperor to prevent the Afghans from crossing Indian territory. The embassy, comprising of fourteen members, was

<sup>1</sup> *Nadir Shah*, 123.

<sup>2</sup> *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, 333-334. 'He also writes that the ambassadors of Nadir Shah were imprisoned in the old fort of Delhi. But this is a baseless accusation against the Indian monarch, 336.

<sup>3</sup> *Nadir Shah*, 120.



received with all due ceremony in Delhi by the Mughal officers, and were introduced to the court by Sa'adat Khan in the audience hall.<sup>1</sup> In reply 'Ali Mardan Shamuli after paying customary eulogy of Muhammad Shah recounted the exploits and great deeds accomplished by Nadir Shah and praised his gallantry, untiring energy and ability. He informed the Emperor that Isphan had been conquered and Tahmasp Mirza (1729-1732) had ascended the Persian throne. The defeated Afghans, expelled from Persia, had fled away in all directions for refuge. The emperor of Persia had resolved to invade Qandhar and destroy this last seat of the Afghan power. He had, therefore, requested the Mughal Emperor to seal the Indian border to Afghan refugees when the siege of Qandhar was in progress. If any fleeing *ghalzais* still found their way into the Mughal territory they were to be immediately expelled.<sup>2</sup> He then presented Tahmasp's letter to Muhammad Shah who passed it on to the *wazir* for its contents to be discussed in the private chamber and a suitable reply to be drafted. The ambassador received in gifts a robe of honour, a jewelled dagger, a horse and an elephant with golden trappings and one lakh of rupees. After the ceremony at the court, Sa'adat Khan took 'Ali Mardan and his party to his house in the city and entertained them. For their maintenance the embassy received three lakhs of rupees from the government and the same amount from Sa'adat Khan.<sup>3</sup> In reply the Mughal Emperor wrote to Shah Tahmasp promising to issue orders to his officers to guard the passes and prevent the Afghans from entering his dominions.<sup>4</sup> Shortly after the deposition of Tahmasp Mirza and the enthronement of his infant son under the title of Abbas III (7 September 1732) he again conveyed the news officially to Muhammad Shah through his envoy Muhammad 'Ali Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars, who was received by Roshan-u'd-daulah Zafar Khan, third *bakhshi* of the Empire, and lavishly entertained. The envoy repeated the previous request about the Afghan fugitives who were trying to find asylum into India. The envoy also reported that Nadir had captured Herat and other strongholds of the Afghans and informed that his resolve to conquer Qandhar was firm. Muhammad Shah in his reply wrote that his officers had done their best to guard the frontier and prevent the infiltration of Afghan refugees into the hills of Northern Afghanistan but had not completely succeeded in the task as the imperial army was currently engaged in war with the Marathas and the

<sup>1</sup> For details of reception, vide, *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 135-139; *A Mughal Statesman of the Eighteenth Century*, 75, 76.

<sup>2</sup> *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, 329-330.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 139-140.

<sup>4</sup> For copies of letters exchanged between the two courts, vide *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 141-147.

army officers could not pay their full attention to this problem.<sup>1</sup> On 11 May 1737 Nadir Shah dispatched his third embassy led by Muhammad Turkoman to announce in Delhi the news of his coronation and apprise the Mughal Emperor about the military operations being conducted in Qandhar. He repeated his previous appeal of preventing the Afghan survivors from entering into Kabul and Peshawar. The ambassador had strict instructions to return from Delhi within forty days, but stayed in the city for more than a year. Contemporary historians have stated diverse reasons for his overstay; of these the one given by Ashub appears to be correct. Firstly, the government authorities could not make necessary arrangements for his ceremonial departure; secondly, he fell so much in love with the corrupt life in the capital that he wasted all this time in the company of the dancing women, although he had received the reply to Nadir's letter within a short time.<sup>2</sup> The latter part of Ashub's statement is corroborated by other writers except those who were Persians or prejudiced towards the Mughal government.<sup>3</sup>

The foregoing analysis will make it clear that the Mughal government had tried to maintain diplomatic relations with Nadir Shah and meet his strident demand with regard to the expulsion of the Afghan refugees. No attempt—military or political—was made by the government to prevent his hegemony in areas contiguous to imperial territory, although it posed a direct threat to the security of the Empire. The internal evidence furnished by his letters supports the view that the demand had been cleverly designed as a tactical move to execute his military plans for the invasion of India. Thus, the Afghan problem bore little relationship to the issues which resulted in the deterioration of relations between the two governments. In fact, the decadence of the Mughal Empire constituted the main motive force for the unprovoked aggression by Nadir Shah. The Empire, as previously explained, was deep in the grip of financial crisis and in the throes of incessant warfare with the Marathas. The governing class was in complete disarray as its strength was hopelessly dissipated in factional quarrels. Nadir Shah surveyed the whole situation and carefully prepared his blow to strike at a time when the Empire was breaking up under pressures of Maratha attacks.

#### *Defence of North-western Border*

The North-western border of India occupied a position of fundamental

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 155-156. For a copy of Muhammad Shah's letter, ff. 148-154.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 155-156. For a copy of Muhammad Shah's letter, ff. 157-160.

<sup>3</sup> *Bayan-i Waqat'i*, f. 10b; *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 233; *Tazkirah-ul Ahwal*, 223-226.

strategic importance during the medieval period. The Mughal Emperors had built up military bases in this vulnerable part of their Empire to ensure the security of the country against aggression beyond the Indus. The entire border was inhabited by warlike clans and tribes who were poor and divided, and whose normal condition both by tradition and circumstances was one of independence and defiance of the established authority. They carried predatory raids into the rich and vast plains periodically to relieve themselves from economic hardship. After the loss of Qandhar in 1649 the Mughal interest in the western frontier diminished, as new problems appeared to engage the attention of the imperial government. Nevertheless, Aurangzeb had the foresight to keep a vigilant eye on the border and crush the tribal risings of the *afridis* and *yusufzais* by the method of "breaking two bones by knocking them together"<sup>1</sup> The troops in Afghanistan and hillmen of the western border received salaries and pensions for performing the important duties of protecting the passes and checking subversion in that region. His last two governors, Amir Khan (1667-1697) and Shah 'Alam (1699-1707) maintained law and order in the provinces by their tact and military strength. As a result of this vigorous policy the central government did not experience for a long time either foreign invasion or revolt by the hillmen. Even after the death of Aurangzeb cash payments were continued to be made to the governor of Kabul for disbursement among the hillmen and garrison of the fort. In the reign of Muhammad Shah a sum of Rs. 12 lakhs was sent annually to Kabul to meet these specific requirements. But Roshan-u'd-daulah, in charge of this financial transaction, began to misappropriate the money, resulting in the irregular and diminished remittances to the government of Kabul. On charges of embezzlement he was removed from this particular job which was later given to Khan-i Dauran, in addition to his functions as *mir bakhshi*. But Khan-i Dauran, too failed to discharge his function properly and faithfully. The reason for this dereliction of duty was his political rivalry with Nasir Khan, the governor of Kabul and a Mughal Iranian noble whom he wanted to discredit by placing difficulties in his way. He convinced the Emperor that the money would be utilized by the governor in increasing his strength and there was every likelihood that in collusion with Nadir Shah he himself might attempt to unseat him. Thus, for a long time no money was sent to clear the dues of the garrison at Kabul or to pay the political pension of the hillmen<sup>2</sup>.

When pressed hard by the starving soldiery, Nasir Khan wrote to the central government :

That he himself was but a rose bush withered by blast of autumn, while

<sup>1</sup> *Aurangzeb*, III, 279.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, 99.

his army was no more than a faded pageant, ill-provided and without spirit.<sup>1</sup>

He requested that out of the five years salary due to him, at least one year's salary should be paid to him so that he could satisfy his creditors and have a little left over at his disposal. Khan-i Dauran replied to his *wakil*<sup>2</sup> :

Do you think that I am a simpleton that I would be impressed by such tales which are in fact designed to extort large sums of money? Our houses are built on the plains, and we do not fear any thing except what we can see with our own eyes. Your house stands on the Bhochla hill<sup>3</sup> and you have probably sighted Mongol and Gizalbash armies from the roofs of your house. Write to your master that the royal orders have been issued to the governor of Bengal for money, and when the Bengal treasure arrives after the rainy season, the money will be quickly sent to Kabul.

Ashub writes that whenever Nasir Khan wrote on the subject and his *wakil* approached Khan-i Dauran the latter always replied in the following terms:<sup>4</sup>

Mira Saheb, what is the matter? Today for what cause a new stir has been created? Your master has sent the gun of luck in motion and forgotten the favours of two hundred years, and the services of two generations in the cause of the Empire. On every pretext he wants money. He writes something on one occasion and the other on the next. But the friends are ignorant. How long would I continue to present the demand for money before the Emperor? Tahmasp Quli Khan is not relieved of his war against the enemies. How can he invade Qandhar and Herat?

Khan-i Dauran held the opinion that such communications were meant only to frighten the government into giving him large sums of money to

<sup>1</sup> *Tazkirah*, f. 118b.

<sup>2</sup> *Tazkirah*, f. 119a.

<sup>3</sup> Bhochla hill was in the environs of Matia Mahal in Delhi. *Asār-ul Sanadīd*, Navalkishor Press, 13.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, 275,

هر گاه وکیل ناصر خان خریدار شد عرض داشت مروکل خود باو می نمود از دور دیده و خریدار را بدست گرفته به تمشخر و استهزا احوال می میداد و بهمان تکیه کلام که میرا صاحب خیر باشد امروز کدام بوجه طوفان تازه ساخته و بردارخته آورده آید - مروکل شمارا توپ طالعه بصحرکت آمده و چشم حق شناسی و نمک خوردگی دو صدساله و خانزادی دو سه پشت پوشیده بهر بهانه می خواهد مبلغی بدست آرد -

enable him to have a free hand in local affairs and that the governor had magnified the dangers of the situation as Nadir Shah was still busy in the suppression of Afghans in Persia far away from the border of Afghanistan. The letters sent from Kabul were not placed before the Emperor and even when read in the darbar no serious thought was given to their contents, and on one such occasion Janish Khan, the agent of Nasir Khan, was taunted in public and told that he had recently purchased the house of Wizarat Khan for one lakh of rupees on the bank of the Jumna. "From the high walls of its veranda the new owner might see armies coming from the direction of China; standing on the roof of his house he could watch what was going on in Kabul and Qandhar." With such witty and flippant remarks he set aside the matter and prevailed upon the Emperor to withhold payment of money to the governor. His vision being coloured by political considerations, Khan-i Dauran could not bring himself to appreciate Nasir Khan's financial needs, nor could he grasp the urgency of the defence problem and consequently failed to give proper lead and direction to the government in the hour of extreme peril. He has been accused by contemporary writers of failure to create effective deterrents against the enemy and render effective assistance—military and financial—to the governor who was primarily responsible for the defence of the threatened frontiers. It should have been possible to organize and range the virile mountain tribesmen solidly against the invader whose march on Peshawar could yet have been barred.<sup>1</sup> "If at this time," writes Mukhlis, "a well appointed army, under an experienced leader, had been sent to the support of these hillmen, it was more than probable that Hindustan would have been saved."<sup>2</sup> Nasir Khan, having lost all hopes of aid from the court, returned to Peshawar, and the soldiers and mountaineers, reduced to dire straits, abandoned their posts and resorted to highway robbery instead. The defence of the border was thus completely abandoned and the strategic province was left exposed to the rapacity of the tribal chiefs and the ambition of the foreign invader<sup>3</sup>.

### *Invasion*

Qandhar fell to Nadir Shah on 12 March 1738 and on 21 May he set out at the head of 80,000 horse on his momentous campaign in India from Nadirabad, a city constructed by him two miles south-east of Qandhar.<sup>4</sup> He crossed the Indian frontier at Mukur and reached Qarabagh, 36 miles

<sup>1</sup> Malleson, *History of Afghanistan*, 269.

<sup>2</sup> *Bada'i Waqa'i*, f. 5a.

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 11, 479.

<sup>4</sup> *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, 361.

south-west of Ghazni. Baqi Khan, the Mughal *faujdar*, fled to Kabul, leaving the prominent citizens of Ghazni no alternative but to offer submission to the invader<sup>1</sup>. Nadir Shah treated the vanquished kindly. From Ghazni he wrote to the *kotwal* of Kabul that he had no desire to conquer the land; his main purpose was to punish the 'wretched' Afghans. "Be not anxious for your safety but discharge the obligations of hospitality."<sup>2</sup> He then marched on Kabul where the notables submissively acknowledged his authority. He bestowed on them gifts and robes of honour. However, Sherza Khan, commandant of the fort, was not prepared to surrender; he strengthened his defences and roused the garrison to resistance. The citadel was invested and after a siege of one week Kabul fell to Nadir Shah on 19 June 1738. The Persians seized the treasury, horses, elephants and stores<sup>3</sup>. On 14 July the Persian monarch sent an envoy, accompanied by some eminent persons of Kabul, to Delhi to explain the circumstances under which Kabul had been captured. In his letter he deplored the position Muhammad Shah had adopted on the Afghan issue, accused him of breaking his word, and of treating the Persian ambassadors with gross discourtesy. At the same time Nadir Shah assured him of his own goodwill and disavowed any aggressive intention against Indian territory<sup>4</sup>. When the envoy and his party arrived at Jalalabad, largely inhabited by Rohilla Afghans, the Mughal *faujdar* barred their passage. A local chieftain murdered the envoy and the baggage of the party was plundered. The news aroused Nadir Shah to savage fury. He sent a detachment of his army to storm Jalalabad and inflict severe punishment on those responsible for the murder of his ambassador. At the approach of the Persian force the local officers fled away in terror and the people tamely delivered up the place. The garrison was put to the sword and a general massacre followed<sup>5</sup>.

In the meantime reports were received by Nadir Shah that Nasir Khan the former governor of Kabul had placed a force of 20,000, composed chiefly of the Afghans and the Kashmiris in the Khaibar pass to block the advance of the Persians<sup>6</sup>. On 17 November 1738 Nadir Shah proceeded from Jalalabad and, following a little used route,<sup>7</sup> made a surprise attack

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 329.

<sup>2</sup> *Tazkirah-ul Ahwal*, 268.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 332.

<sup>4</sup> *Bayan-i Waqa 'i*, f. 10.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 206b; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 325; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 481.

<sup>6</sup> *Bayan-i Waqa 'i*, f. 10.

<sup>7</sup> For a detailed discussion of the route adopted by Nadir Shah, vide *Nadir Shah*, 127-128.

on the Indian army. The imperial forces were taken completely by surprise and were thrown into such disorder that they were quite unable to meet the sudden and fierce attack of the enemy. They soon gave way, leaving in Nadir's hand immense booty and very large number of prisoners including Nasir Khan. The people of Peshawar, terror-stricken by the fate of their governor, threw the gates of the city open to the conqueror.<sup>1</sup> The Persian army spread devastation and terror as far as Attock, then constructed a bridge to cross the river. Nadir Shah left Peshawar on 6 January 1739 and after crossing Attock turned towards Wazirabad, ravaging towns and villages all along the lines of his march.<sup>2</sup> From Yaminabad he marched to Degh Nala probably by crossing the bridge of Shah Daula where he learnt that Zakariya Khan, governor of Lahore, was fortifying the bank of the Ravi to the north of the city against attack. 'Abdul Baqi Khan, the Persian *wazir* sent a letter to Zakariya Khan asking him to withdraw his forces and come under the protection of the Persian Emperor. The governor, however, was not to be cajoled by promises or dismayed by threats and continued resolutely with his defence preparations. He sent the letter of 'Abdul Baqi Khan to Delhi and urged the government officials to dispatch immediate reinforcements<sup>3</sup>. On January 10, 1739 Nadir Shah advanced from the bridge of Shah Daula and, avoiding the direct road to Lahore, turned eastward to avoid the defences at Ravi and outflank the Lahore army. He drove back the *zamindar* of Adinanagar who was hurrying to the aid of the governor<sup>4</sup> and soon came in sight of the Lahore army. In the fighting which began on January 21 Zakariya Khan suffered a reverse and his son, Yahya Khan escaped to the camp of the Emperor to report the result of the combat. Zakariya Khan resumed hostilities but the battle turned against him<sup>5</sup> and realizing the folly of prolonging a losing fight he opened negotiations with the Persian king through Molvi Kifayat-ullah Khan Kashmiri. Nadir Shah instructed 'Abdul Baqi Khan, his *wazir*, to meet the governor and settle terms of peace with the Mughal governor. On January 14, Zakariya Khan visited the Persian camp, paid Rs. 20 lakhs and gave presents to the invader. Nadir Shah received him graciously, greeting him as his son and permitted him to retain his office as governor of Lahore. He was given a *chapkan* of gold brocade, a

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 342-343.

<sup>2</sup> *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, 363; *Bada'i Waqa' i*, f. 8. "Wazirabad, Eminabad and Gujarat, towns which, for population, might almost be called cities, were levelled with the earth. Nothing was respected, no sort of violence remained unpractised."

<sup>3</sup> *Tazkirah-ul Ahwal*, 275; *Bada'i Waqa' i* f. 7; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 190.

<sup>4</sup> *Bada'i Waqa' i*, f. 8.

<sup>5</sup> *Bayan-i Waqa' i*, f. 10; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 295; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 326; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin* 482.

jewelled dagger and an Arab horse with a gold embroidered saddle and costly trapping. His son, Hayatullah Khan Bahadur, was granted a *mansab* of 500 in the Persian army<sup>1</sup>. Thus, Lahore was saved from the horrors of massacre and spoliation. Fakhr-u'd-daulah,<sup>2</sup> the ex-governor of Kashmir who had been living in Lahore since his expulsion from Kashmir was reinstated in his office and a detachment of troops was put at his disposal to enforce his authority in the province. Nasir Khan was also pardoned and restored to his post of the *subedari* of Kabul and Peshawar.<sup>3</sup> Nadir Shah had gold coins struck at Lahore which bore on the obverse the inscription "Nadir the Sultan",<sup>4</sup> and on the reverse "struck at the capital of Lahore, 1151 A. H, may God preserve his reign."<sup>4</sup> He stayed in Lahore for 20 days, conducting its affairs like a virtual sovereign. The whole country from Kabul to Lahore had passed under his sway, increasing his resources and enhancing his prestige.<sup>5</sup> As was his wont Nadir Shah first addressed a letter from Lahore to the Mughal Emperor again accusing him of breach of faith and simultaneously asserting his friendship and goodwill towards him. Nadir Shah then left Lahore on 26 January 1739 and reached Sirhind on 5 February where he learnt that the Mughal army had already established its camp at Karnal, 82 miles from him. He sent a force of 6,000 cavalry to reconnoiter the country up to the imperial camp and report on the enemy's strength and disposition. From there he marched to Ambala via Rajpura and passing through Shahabad and Thanesar arrived at Sarai 'Azimabad, 12 miles north of Karnal, on 11 February to face the Indian army.<sup>6</sup>

### *Battle of Karnal*

The grim prospect of foreign invasion had stared the Mughal court in the face ever since Nadir Shah's squadrons had poured across the Attock. The magnitude and perplexity of the problems arising out of this external danger were being anxiously debated by Muhammad Shah and his nobles. The atmosphere which appears to have prevailed in the councils was one of confusion and helplessness in the face of the approaching danger. At this

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 191-196; *Bada'i-Waga'i*, f 8b.

<sup>2</sup> He was the brother of Roshan-u'd-daulah Zafar Khan and a *mansabdar* of 6,000/6,000. In 1737 Muhammad Shah appointed him governor of Kashmir but a year later removed him and appointed in his place 'Atiullah Khan. *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 293.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 344.

<sup>4</sup> Syed Muhammad Latif, *History of the Punjab*, Delhi, 1964, 202.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 345-46.

<sup>6</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 197; *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 346.



grave crisis the Mughal nobility, split up into a number of cliques, failed to unite itself with bonds of common aim to drive back the aggressor. Acute jealousies and bickerings confused their deliberations and undermined all attempts of the Emperor to organize and plan the campaign against the Persians. The Emperor tried to bring about a relaxation of the strain in the relations between Khan-i Dauran and Nizam-ul-Mulk. Both the nobles held discussions for several days regarding military preparations and defence plans, creating the impression that a close understanding had been reached between them. But under an appearance of formal courtesies the two nobles entertained the deepest distrust against each other and their old rivalries persisted.<sup>1</sup> Whatever plan was put forward by Khan-i Dauran in the king's council was opposed by Nizam-ul Mulk, and whatever was suggested by the latter was openly contradicted by the former.<sup>2</sup> The military abilities of Khan-i Dauran were not very great and he had underestimated the strength and resources of Nadir Shah. To conceal news of reverses was considered politic and to defer the solution of problems that could be easily tackled in the beginning the highest wisdom.<sup>3</sup> Khan-i Dauran was disposed to shift the blame for his own neglect of affairs on to his opponents. He kept harping on the old charge that Nizam-ul Mulk maintained treasonable intercourse with the foreign invader. Nizam-ul Mulk, on the other hand, resented that the Emperor sought advice from Khan-i Dauran in preference to him. Then there was the old standing and deep rooted antipathy between Khan-i Dauran and Sa'adat Khan which was no secret at the court. The perennial feuds of these three nobles had reached the soldiers and affected their discipline and morale. In Delhi the two big nobles—Nizam-ul Mulk and Khan-i Dauran—now contended furiously for the control over the army. In the face of the advancing invader this fatal feud led to the loss of precious time over the issue of the supreme command of the imperial forces. The Emperor, under these circumstances, saw no alternative but to assume the supreme command and lead the campaign in person. It was after this foolish waste of nine whole months (May to November) of valuable time in futile personal squabbles and only when Nadir Shah had entered Peshawar (November 1738) that the drums of war began to beat in the Mughal capital.

The Emperor started belated and feverish preparations for the struggle. He issued orders and royal *farmans* to the governors, officers, chiefs, Rajas, small and big, and *zamindars* of near and far places to immediately reach the capital with their respective contingents. The royal troops were given six months salary in advance and it was promised that the balance would

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 169.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 560.

<sup>3</sup> *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, 335, 367, 377.

be paid every month, and their banker's dues cleared off after the termination of hostilities. The *mansabdars* and *jagirdars*, living in poverty and neglect, owing to the non-realization of revenues, too, were summoned on promise of cash payment of their monthly salaries. Besides, new recruits were enrolled on terms of Rs. 50 for a horseman and Rs. 5 to 7 for a footman.<sup>1</sup> The Emperor put Rs. one crore at the disposal of officers in command; a train of field artillery and other necessary munitions of war were also provided to them in abundance.<sup>2</sup> Khan-i Dauran wrote letters to Sawai Jai Singh and other Rajput chieftains to help the government at this juncture; but the Rajas, entangled in their own affairs, failed to respond to the appeal.<sup>3</sup> The Emperor called even Baji Rao to his aid. Qamr-u'd-din Khan, the *wazir*, collected his 5 thousand Mughal troops; Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan, the *mir atash*, mustered 3 thousand cavalry and 20 thousand matchlockmen; and Khan-i Dauran had two thousand horsemen, all of them *mansabdars* receiving salaries both in cash and *jagir*, besides two thousand of his own Indian troops. Twenty big *amirs* riding on elephants, each with his respective force, followed Khan-i Dauran. The number of combatants the government was thus able to gather together totalled approximately two lakhs. The imperial army, equipped with cannons and provisions, set out from the city and encamped first in the Shalimar garden just outside Delhi. There all the nobles waited to welcome the Emperor who arrived at the place accompanied by Prince Ahmad and nobles like Ishaq Khan, Amir Khan, Sarbuland Khan, Aghar Khan, and 'Abdul Ma'abud Khan. The Emperor remained there for about one month (December), spending most of his time in hunting presumably to put himself and his retinue in shape. When tidings came that Attock had been crossed by the enemy the Mughal army started marching towards Panipat where it reached on February 7, 1739 followed by the Emperor.<sup>4</sup>

After careful survey the Mughal commanders selected Karnal, 20 miles north of Panipat, as the ground of battle for its northern side was protected by a thick jungle while its eastern side was covered by the 'Ali Mardan canal which could supply water; and its extensive and open fields were suitable for cavalry manoeuvres. A mud wall was constructed around the imperial camp on which the guns were mounted. A deep ditch was also dug around the wall which was filled with water and covered with trees to make it impassable. Within these fortifications the nobles erected their

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 170b.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. 41b.

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, II, 482.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 171, 175, 176, 186, 187; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 326; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 296; *Bada'i Waqa'i*, f. 9.

tents and arranged their troops. The royal camp was further fortified by guns which were fastened together with iron chains and at every point five artillery men were stationed. Khan-i Dauran with his brother Muzaffar Khan took his post on the western side of the city wall; on the eastern side of the canal stood Qamr-u'd-din Khan while Nizam-ul Mulk occupied the northern centre of the field. The camp emerged as a sizable city covering an area of 12 miles, containing lakhs of people, combatants and non-combatants, and supplied with all sorts of provisions which would have sufficed, in the opinion of Ashub, to conquer a whole kingdom.<sup>1</sup> The strength of the Persian army was also not less than one lakh of fighting men. Nadir Shah's strategy was to avoid an attack on the Indian fortifications and force the Emperor to fight in the open by making a wide detour round its eastern side. By this he hoped to outflank the Mughal troops, cut their communications with Delhi, and, if the Emperor still remained cooped up within his entrenchment, to march on Panipat and thence to Delhi. On Monday morning, February 23, Nadir Shah who was in Sarai 'Azimabad moved out and marching nine miles beyond 'Ali Mardan Khan canal encamped at a place, six miles north-east of Karnal and a mile and a half west of the Jumna, with the village of Kunjpura in the north. The first thing he did was to ride up with his bodyguard close to the Indian camp, and after making a reconnaissance of the ground and of the disposition of the Mughal army, he returned to his camp.<sup>2</sup>

On the evening of February 24 his scouts brought the information that Sa'adat Khan was coming up from Panipat with 30,000 cavalry to join the imperial army and Nadir Shah dispatched a strong column to obstruct his march. Sa'adat Khan himself managed to enter the imperial camp late in the night, but his baggage was plundered by the Persians and 500 loaded camels were carried away by them.<sup>3</sup> He was received by Khan-i Dauran and it was only the next morning when he went to offer his homage to the Emperor, and was busy discussing the plan of operations with other commanders that news of the disaster to his force was conveyed to him.<sup>4</sup> The news distressed and agitated him so much that he began to insist on immediate action against Nadir Shah, despite the efforts of Nizam-ul Mulk and Khan-i Dauran to make him desist.<sup>5</sup> Paying no heed to their warning and throwing all caution to the winds he took a hurried leave of the Emperor, and with one thousand horse and a few hundred foot in imme-

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 188, 189; Fraser, *History of Nadir Shah*, London, 1792, 153; *Bada'i Waqa' i*, f. 9b.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 348; *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, 370, 371; *Nadir Shah*, 133, 134.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 200; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 327.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkerin*, II, 482.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 210, 211; *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja' i*, f. 82; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 301.

diate attendance on him he came out of the imperial tents, mounted an elephant, ordered his drums to be beaten and without any artillery advanced against the Persian camp. Another 4,000 horse and 10,000 foot joined him later, and his two nephews, Mirza Muhsin and Nasir Muhammad Khan Sher Jang stood close to him. On hearing this, the Persian army came out to meet him, but, in order to decoy him, feigned flight and let themselves be chased by the Indian soldiers. But, in the pursuit Sa'adat Khan went two miles out from his position. The ruse succeeded and the impatient warrior, on whose bravery the Mughals set so much store, was surrounded by the enemy.<sup>1</sup> In response to his urgent appeals, the Emperor asked Nizam-ul Mulk to go to his aid, but the latter replied that, as Khan-i Dauran was in command of the right wing he should advance to the assistance of the embattled general. The Emperor then ordered Khan-i Dauran who immediately set out from his camp at the head of 8,000 to 9,000 cavalry but without artillery and haphazardly plunged into the fighting.<sup>2</sup> Nadir Shah, who was waiting for just such a situation to develop, "donned a coat of mail and helmet," placed 3,000 men in ambush, set out two bodies of gunners, each 500 strong, and putting himself at the head of 1,000 picked *afshar* horsemen rode out to fight the Mughals. The battle started at 1 P.M. and by 5 P.M. the two separate forces fighting under Sa'adat Khan and Khan-i Dauran had been completely routed, while the main Indian army remained behind the prepared positions and never came to action at all. Sa'adat Khan, despite heavy odds, kept on fighting bravely till he was surrounded by numerous *afshar* horsemen under the command of Nadir Shah. His elephant was wounded and it got out of control and bore Sa'adat Khan into the Persian ranks where he was made prisoner.<sup>3</sup> "The Indian centre, under Khan-i Dauran, fought on bravely, but they like Sa'adat Khan's men, were mown down by the rapid and accurate fire of the *jazayirchis*, as well as by that from the *zanburaks*."<sup>4</sup> When reports of Khan-i Dauran's desperate condition reached the royal camp, Muhammad Shah sent a message to Nizam-ul Mulk urging him to hasten to the rescue of the *mir-bakhshi*. However, Nizam-ul Mulk refused to obey the orders saying that "for the assistance of 40 thousand soldiers there should be an army of one lakh, and moreover, the two imperial commanders did not listen to his advice, and the stupid fellows went to launch campaign without order and discipline." He then asked for a cup of coffee and burst

<sup>1</sup> *Bayan-i Waqa'i*, f. 11; *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja'i*, f. 83a; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 306.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 213, 214; *Bada'i Waqa'i*, f. 10.

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 311.

<sup>4</sup> *Nadir Shah*, 138.

into laughter.<sup>1</sup> Consequently no reinforcement was dispatched to Khan-i Dauran who in the end was mortally shot and brought back by his followers to the camp. The soldiers fell back into a panic-stricken stampede. Several men of distinction, fighting shoulder to shoulder with Khan-i Dauran, perished on the field. The carnage was unparalleled and the destruction of war equipage, stores and baggage inestimable. About nine thousand Indian soldiers and at least two to three thousand Persians were slain on that day. The terrible disaster suffered by the Indians brought tears in the eyes of Muhammad Shah. On the following day Khan-i Dauran breathed his last at the age of 68 years.<sup>2</sup> A gloomy silence fell on the scene of action where lay a heap of ten thousand corpses to be soon covered with the darkness of night.<sup>3</sup>

According to Ashub the vanity and rashness of Sa'adat Khan and the Emperor's weakness caused the ruin of the Indian army at Karnal. The Mughal generals, without any well-defined plan of action and without proper reconnaissance of the enemy's position, rashly attempted to measure strength with troops that were immensely superior in organization and equipment and led by a military genius. The impetuosity of the foolishly head-strong Sa'adat Khan suddenly and completely upset whatever strategy the Mughal generals had thought out in their divided and discordant deliberations. When Khan-i Dauran hurriedly advanced in a random fashion to the rescue of Sa'adat Khan a Persian battalion quickly engaged and held him in check before he was any where near Sa'adat Khan. Thus there was a wide gap between the forces of the two generals and this prevented them from concerting their movements and each had to face the enemy's onslaughts singlehanded. Even at this stage, adds Ashub, a vigorous counter-offensive by Nizam-ul Mulk and other Turnai leaders with the rest of the army would have saved the day. But the whole artillery and corps of match-lockmen under Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan and the strong troops under Qamr-u'd-din Khan did not go into action at all.<sup>4</sup> The Nizam not only disobeyed the Emperor's orders for going to

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, 107.

<sup>2</sup> *Bayan-i Waqa'i*, f. 12; *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja 'i*, 168, 169; *The History of Nadir Shah*, 157, 158; *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 566. Some of the companions of Khan-i Dauran who were killed in fighting were : Muzaffar Khan, his brother and his elder son, 'Ali Hamid Khan, besides, Yadgar Khan, Mirza 'Aqil Beg, Mir Kaloo, son of Mir Musbaraff, Ratan Chand, son of Khushal Chand, Aman-ullah Kashmiri. *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 102-104.

<sup>3</sup> For details, vide *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 215-218; *Bayan-i Waqa'i*, f. 12a; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 329; *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja 'i*, f. 85; *Nadir Shah*, 135-136, *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, 381-384. The author of this work writes that only 2,500 Persian soldiers were killed, *Bada 'i Waqa 'i*, ff. 10, 11, 12.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 210, 217, 218.

the relief of Khan-i Dauran, who had imprudently and rashly joined the battle, but even derided them on the ground that his tiny force could not possibly change the situation at this crucial stage of fighting. Ashub says that his decision to stay out of the armed conflict was not based on sober military considerations of the moment but sprang from a deep seated desire to avenge himself against rivals who had always intrigued against him at the court. He had already sent back the major part of his army, artillery and treasures from Bhopal to the Deccan, although they were sorely needed in the forthcoming war with Nadir Shah. In choosing this moment to avenge his personal wrongs he must have known fully well that he was not only throwing the Empire into jeopardy but that he would himself suffer ignominy and ruin.<sup>1</sup> The Indian soldiers performed prodigies of strength and valour, admits the author of *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, but they could not stand before the rapid and accurate fire of the *jazayirchis* and *zamburaks*.<sup>2</sup> "An arrow," writes 'Abdul Karim, "can not answer a bullet."<sup>3</sup> The Indians who had placed too much reliance on elephants found them of no use at all. Hanway states that "Nadir, in order to frighten the elephants of the Indians, ordered stagings to be carried by pairs of camels; on these stagings he had naphtha and other combustible materials placed, which were to be set on fire during the battle."<sup>4</sup> The Indian fire-arms, according to J.N. Sarkar, "were heavy and cumbrous and of a more antiquated type than those of Persia and Turkey, and therefore the fire delivered by them was usually slow and inaccurate enough to be neglected." Moreover, "the Indian soldiers were trained to stake every thing on the shock charge of heavy cavalry and hand to hand grapple. They had little mobility. Not so the *qizilbashes*<sup>5</sup> in the Persian service. Like their fellow Turanians in Trans-Oxiana or in the armies of the Usmali Sultans of Constantinople, they formed the best cavalry in Asia—hardy

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 168.

لیکن چون از یاران حضور مدت العمل واقفان در دل داشت و تخم انتقام در سینه پر کینه می کاشت خرابی و تباهی خود هم گوارا کرده بضمون آنکه باعلی این حجاز غرق شود من هم بجهنم عمل کرده بهر قسم خواست که ذلت و اهانمت و خفت بمخالفان پر نفاق برسد اگرچه خودش هم برباد رود -

<sup>2</sup> *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, 383.

<sup>3</sup> *Bayan-i Waqa'i*, f. 12.

<sup>4</sup> *Nadir Shah*, 138.

<sup>5</sup> The bulk of Nadir Shah's army included soldiers of Turkish origin as he himself belonged to a tribe of Turks who had settled in Persia for centuries past. These soldiers were called *qizilbashes* for they all wore caps made of red *sqarlat* (scarlet). *Tazkirah*, f. 125n.

and fast horsemen, mounted on fleetest and strongest breed of horses, and trained to the saddle from their childhood.”<sup>1</sup>

After the disastrous battle had ended, Muhammad Shah and his generals, apprehending of fresh attacks, prepared themselves for defensive action. The Turani commanders and other nobles assembled in the royal camp to discuss the situation and to devise means for meeting the impending danger. Nizam-ul Mulk with his troops, fully mobilized and armed, moved forward and stood in battle array outside the prepared positions. The Emperor, followed by Qamr-u'd-din Khan and the royal bodyguard, also took up new positions on the front. But in the darkness of night, though the enemy's artillery still thundered, they could not see the movement ominously of the enemy. They spent a few hours in this state of uncertainty and tension, but when no attack came they marched back to their original lines. To revive the courage of the soldiery Nizam-ul Mulk ordered the drums of victory to be beaten and announced that Sa'adat Khan, triumphant and safe, had returned from the front. It was further declared that military operations against the enemy would be launched the next morning. At day-break the soldiers prepared themselves for fighting a desperate combat against the powerful adversary, but to their surprise, Nadir Shah did not attempt a fresh attack.<sup>2</sup>

Shrewd tactician and diplomat as he was, Nadir Shah had no intention of taking any further action as it was not necessary. Skilful diplomacy would clinch the military action which he had won. His objective was booty and not the military subjugation of the country. As soon as that object was accomplished he would return to his country. He summoned Sa'adat Khan into his presence and inquired about the resources and aims of the Mughal Emperor. Sa'adat Khan replied, “The Emperor's resources are vast. Only one of his nobles came out to fight today and has gone back on being accidentally wounded by a shot. But there are many other Amirs and brave Rajas with countless hosts still left.” Upon this Nadir Shah said, “You are my fellow countryman and fellow believer, advise me as to how I can get a ransom from your Emperor so that my troops may go home and I may defeat the Sultan of Turkey.”<sup>3</sup> Sa'adat Khan replied that he should open negotiations with Nizam-ul Mulk, the most senior and the wisest noble in the Empire. Accordingly, Nizam-ul Mulk was called by the Shah to pay a visit to him and Muhammad Shah reluctantly allowed him to go. On reaching Nadir's camp, Nizam-ul Mulk was befittingly received by Persian officers and negotiations for a settlement started. It was agreed that Nadir Shah would return to

<sup>1</sup> J. N. Sarkar, *Nadir Shah in India*, Calcutta, 1973, 54, 55.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 220-224.

<sup>3</sup> *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja 'i*, f. 87; *Nadir Shah in India*, 56.

Persia without marching on Delhi on payment by the Mughal Emperor of Rs. 50 lakhs as war indemnity, out of which Rs. 20 lakhs were to be paid there and then, Rs. 10 lakhs when Nadir Shah reached Lahore, another Rs. 10 lakhs at Attock and the remaining Rs. 10 lakhs at Kabul. Nadir Shah expressed a desire to have a friendly interview with the Mughal Emperor to get the agreement ratified by him and invited the Emperor and his party to lunch at his camp for this purpose. On the following day, 26 February 1739 Muhammad Shah, accompanied by Nizam-ul Mulk, Qamr-u'd-din Khan, the *wazir*, and Ishaq Khan, went to the Persian camp and was warmly received by Nasrullah Mirza, the son of Nadir Shah, and conducted to his father. Both the kings sat down side by side and dined and talked in a friendly atmosphere for several hours after which Muhammad Shah and his party returned.<sup>1</sup>

Nizam-ul Mulk now suggested to the Emperor to bestow the office of the *mir bakhshi* which had fallen vacant after the death of Khan-i Dauran on his son Firoz Jang as a reward of his diplomatic achievement. Before the Emperor could make up his mind in this matter, 'Azim-ullah Khan, a nephew of Qamr-u'd-din Khan, asserted his claim for the appointment to the coveted post. The Emperor, in order to resolve the dispute between the two ambitious claimants, conferred the post of the *mir bakhshi* on Nizam-ul Mulk, the eldest and experienced noble of the Turani family.<sup>2</sup> The appointment of Nizam-ul Mulk to the post of the *mir bakhshi* cut Sa'adat Khan to the quick. He lost faith in the Emperor and resolved to humiliate and ruin both his rival the Nizam who had scored against him and the Emperor who had in his view acted ungratefully towards him. In pursuance of this short-sighted policy he craftily suggested to Nadir Shah to proceed to Delhi and take possession of all the riches and wealth, amounting approximately to Rs. 50 crores, which the imperial treasury and the houses of nobles contained. His cupidity being excited, Nadir Shah broke the agreement he had made and again called Nizam-ul Mulk, 5 March 1739, to his camp for fresh talks.<sup>3</sup> In the interview Nadir Shah set an indemnity of Rs. 20 crores and 20,000 soldiers to fight in his army as the new condition for his peaceful return to Persia. The frightened

<sup>1</sup> *Bayan-i Waqa'ī*, f. 14; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 336; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 345-47; *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, 390-392; *Bada'i Waqa'ī*, 13. *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 230-250.

<sup>2</sup> It is said that 'Azim-ullah Khan in his desperation threatened to ally himself with the foreign invader, and he actually began to march towards the Persian camp when both the senior leaders of his family—Nizam-ul Mulk and Qamr-u'd-din Khan—hastened to hold him back and prevent him from committing a foolish act. *Nadir Shah in Delhi*, 59.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 253-254; *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja't*, f. 88.



and perturbed Nizam-ul Mulk implored the conqueror to moderate his demands, he tried to persuade Nadir Shah by arguing that "since the foundation of the *chaghta'i* dynasty upto now twenty crores of rupees had never been amassed in the imperial treasury. Shah Jahan, with all his efforts, had accumulated only sixteen crores, but the whole of it had been spent by Aurangzeb in his long wars in the Deccan, at present even fifty lakhs were not left in the treasury."<sup>1</sup> But this made no impression on the unrelenting and greedy Nadir Shah who insisted on the immediate fulfilment of his demands. He further insisted that Nizam should call his master so that matters could be discussed and settled personally between them.<sup>2</sup> Under this strong pressure Nizam-ul Mulk wrote to the Emperor what Nadir Shah demanded.<sup>3</sup> On receiving the letter Muhammad Shah demurred for a while but at length submitted to the dictates of the victor, for refusal meant further disgrace and disaster. Nadir Shah gave to the Mughal Emperor as warm and cordial welcome as before but put him and his retinue immediately under arrest in tents which were fixed close to the Nadir Shah's own, where his harem was also brought later. Qamr-u'd-din Khan also followed with the imperial artillery and joined the Emperor.<sup>4</sup> In the Mughal camp, put under heavy blockade by the Persians, famine conditions already prevailed and after the departure of the Emperor tension and chaos held it in their grip. The soldiers who had no commanders to lead or protect them against triumphant and revengeful foreigners were filled with consternation. It was officially announced in the camp with prior concurrence of Nadir Shah that soldiers and civilians were free to stay at Karnal or proceed to their homes. All of them took the opportunity to leave the camp and set off for their homes, but on the way robbers and roving bands of Persian horsemen harassed them. "The Mughal monarchy appeared to all to be at an end."<sup>5</sup>

### *Nadir Shah in Delhi*

The seizure of royal treasures and thorough spoliation of the wealth of the Mughal capital required the military occupation of Delhi. Nadir Shah, therefore, sent Sa'adat Khan as his *wakil-i mutlag* and Tahmasp Khan Jalayir as his plenipotentiary with an escort of 4,000 horse

<sup>1</sup> *Nadir Shah in India*, 61.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 569.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 336; *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja'i*, f. 89; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, II, 480.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 258.

<sup>5</sup> *Bada'i Waqa'i*, f. 15; *An Eyewitness Account*, I. H. C. Bombay Session, 1947, 359-60.

to capture the Mughal capital.<sup>1</sup> Lutfullah Khan, the governor of the city, was asked both by Nadir Shah in his edict (*raqam*) and Muhammad Shah in a *farman*, addressed to him, to hand over the keys of the fort to these officers. He was further urged by the two kings to maintain peace and order in the city, console the people and guard the royal prisoners.<sup>2</sup> In compliance with the royal commands Lutfullah Khan opened the gates of the city and handed over the keys of the fort and those of the treasures to Tahmasp Khan Jalayir. Nadir Shah, followed by Muhammad Shah, started from Karnal on 12 March, and travelling via Panipat, Sonapat and Narela, they reached the Shalimar gardens, outside Delhi, on 18 March 1739. It was here that Sa'adat Khan and Lutfullah Khan now came to offer homage to Nadir Shah who, satisfied with their arrangements, bestowed on them gifts and honours.<sup>3</sup> Muhammad Shah took leave from Nadir Shah to repair to the royal palace so that he could make preparations for the Shah's reception. "The fallen descendant of Babar and Akbar rode into his capital on a portable throne (*takht-i rawan*); no band played and no banners were carried before him."<sup>4</sup> Next day, 20 March 1739, Nadir Shah entered the city in great state; his procession was headed by 100 elephants on each of which several *jazayirchis* were mounted; and he was received by the Mughal Emperor with great pomp and ceremony. He occupied Shah Jahan's palace-chamber near the *diwan-i khas*, while Muhammad Shah took up residence in the buildings near Asad Burj.<sup>5</sup> Muhammad Shah then offered all the royal treasures and jewels to Nadir Shah which he accepted with feigned reluctance.<sup>6</sup> The *khutba* was read in the name of Nadir Shah from all the pulpits in the mosques of Delhi on Saturday, 21 March, the festival day of *Id-ul Zuha*. In Delhi, as in other mints of the Empire, coins were struck in the name of the Persian monarch.<sup>7</sup> The same day Nadir Shah held the

<sup>1</sup> Ashub mentions two more nobles—Sher Jang and 'Azim-ullah Khan—who accompanied Sa'adat Khan to Delhi. *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja'i*, f. 89. *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 338.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 337. The work contains copies of Nadir Shah's letter and the *farman* of Muhammad Shah. *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. 44.

<sup>3</sup> *Bada'i Waqa'i*, f. 16a; *Bayan-i Waqa'i*, f. 14; *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja'i*, f. 89.

<sup>4</sup> *Nadir Shah in Delhi*, 68.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 355; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 338.

<sup>6</sup> *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 355; *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, 398-400.

<sup>7</sup> The coin bore the following inscription :

"The Sultan over the Sultans of the Earth is Nadir the King of Kings, Lord of the fortunate conjunction".

On the reverse of the coin was inscribed;

"May God prolong his reign, struck at Shah Jahanbad, the capital". For the coins struck in Ahmadabad, vide, *A History of Gujarat*, II, 471-472.

*Nau Ruz darbar* and in the evening went to the apartments of Muhammad Shah to pay a visit to him.<sup>1</sup> On that night it was reported that Sa'adat Khan, who was suffering from cancer in the foot, died.<sup>2</sup>

All these events which were tantamount to a change in a monarchy precipitated a great administrative crisis and caused utter confusion in Delhi. Tahmâsp Khan Jalayir, in charge of the city administration, placed the Persian mounted police (*nasqichis*) to restore tranquillity and maintain law and order in the localities where disturbed conditions prevailed. The grain-merchants, taking advantage of this chaotic situation, increased the price of grain, subjecting the populace to great hardship and suffering. Tahmasp Khan, under the instructions of Nadir Shah, fixed the price of wheat at ten *seers* a rupee and sent a party of *nasqichis* to the Paharganj grain market to impose the decree. The merchants and traders refused to comply with these orders and unitedly rose against the authorities. They called to their

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 385; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 260-261, 262.

<sup>2</sup> Rustum 'Ali, author of *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, holds that Sa'adat Khan committed suicide by taking poison. He writes: "Nadir Shah treated Sa'adat Khan and Nizam-ul Mulk in a rude and contemptuous fashion and even threatened with corporal punishment in the open *darbar*. Nizam-ul Mulk told Sa'adat Khan that as they had not only been insulted but also threatened with public disgrace and possible execution, suicide was preferable to this fate. After this exchange of views the two nobles went back to their homes. Nizam-ul Mulk drank a glass of water mixed with sugar and fell asleep while Sa'adat Khan, true to his word, drank a cup of poison and died." This statement is incorrect for the following reasons: In the first place, the writer puts this event after the general massacre, although Sa'adat Khan died on 21 March 1739. He does not mention any reason for the sudden change of Nadir Shah's attitude towards the nobles. All accounts agree that Sa'adat Khan performed the duties assigned to him by Nadir Shah faithfully and he stood high in his favour. Secondly, a suicide pact between two opponents who distrusted each other intensely seems to be extremely improbable. Thirdly, his is not an eyewitness account; it is based on hearsay as the author was not present in Delhi at the time and recorded the event without proper investigation. Moreover, he has painted the Nizam in the blackest colours as if he possessed not even one grain of good in him. Adverse comments on the Nizam are expressed in the worst possible terms and the false charges he has made against him at several places clearly show that he is prejudiced in his judgement and dishonest in the description of events. Ashub, an eyewitness of all those events has only this to say, "It is said that Sa'adat took poison." Though unsparing in his criticism of Nizam-ul Mulk's conduct at Karnal, Ashub does not mention his name in this connection. Other contemporary authorities have ascribed his death to the chronic pain in his leg due to a tumour which was probably cancerous. *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 574. *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 262b; *Bayan-i Waqa'i*, f. 14; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 388.

assistance the people of the locality to oust the Persian soldiers from that area. A crowd collected and mob violence broke out which soon spread in other localities already agitated by hostile feeling against the foreigners. The Persians, wandering about unawares in the streets and narrow lanes, were assaulted and killed mercilessly. In the midst of all this the riff raff of the city underworld suddenly, excited by the rumours of Nadir Shah's murder by one of the *qalmaq* women guards in the royal palace, rose armed with whatever weapons came to hand and joined the disturbances and freely indulged in acts of plunder and massacre. Saiyid Niayaz Khan, son-in-law of Qamr-u'd-din Khan, became the leader of the rioters; his warlike Turani followers from Mughalpura flocked to his banner and slew the Persian horsemen. No one stopped to verify the rumours while no one had the courage to control the disorders; on the other hand, all seemed to be gratified at the annihilation of the invaders whom their armies at Karnal had failed to defeat. According to 'Abul Karim, 3,000 Persians were killed in the riots which raged till late in the night of 21 March 1739.<sup>1</sup>

Nadir Shah first declined to believe reports that slaughter of his soldiers was in progress in the city; but when two persons sent by him to verify the reports were killed he became furious and ordered a general massacre of the people of Delhi. On the morning of 22 March 1739 Nadir Shah dressed himself in armour, mounted his horse and rode out from the fort, accompanied by his captains and soldiers. He took his seat in the Golden Mosque of Zafar Khan Roshan-u'd Daulah near Kotwali Chabutra in the middle of Chandni Chowk and then unsheathed his sword as a signal for the reprisal killing of the citizens of Delhi in the areas where Persians had been slain. The dreadful carnage commenced at 9 A.M. on 22 March and was stopped at about 2 P.M.<sup>2</sup> Twenty thousand men, women and children were butchered without mercy; hundreds of women were ravished and led into captivity; while hundreds of others committed suicide by jumping into wells. Beautiful villas and mansions of the nobles were set on fire and razed to the ground, and thousands of shops were looted. All the roads and lanes in Chandni Chowk, Lahorigate, Fatehpuri, Faiz Bazar, Kabuli Darwaza, Idgah, Ajmerigate, Hauz Kazi and Johri Bazar—all densely populated by Hindus and Muslims—were littered with ghastly heaps of corpses.<sup>3</sup> Hundreds of *Saiyids*, savants, *Hafizs*, poets, pious men, writers,

<sup>1</sup> For details of these events, vide, *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 263-266; *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 356-357; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 340; Hanway, 11, 375.

<sup>2</sup> *Bayan-i Waqa 'i*, f. 14; *An Eye Witness Account*, 360; Fraser, *History of Nadir Shah*, London, 1792, 185; *Bada 'i Waqa 'i*, ff. 16, 17, 18.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 268-270; *Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, 410.

doctors and sages were put to sword.<sup>1</sup> The Muslims performed the ceremony of *jaihar*, killing their women and children with their own hands.<sup>2</sup> When this slaughter and destruction was at its height Nizam-ul Mulk and the *wazir*, as urged by the Emperor, went to the mosque of Roshan-u'd Daulah, where Nadir Shah was sitting with his sword unsheathed. They begged for mercy and the tyrant, not completely devoid of all humanity, relented; he gave orders to stop the bloodshed and return to the fort.<sup>3</sup> "For a long time the streets remained strewn with corpses, as the walks of a garden with dead flowers and leaves. The town was reduced to ashes, and had the appearance of a plain consumed with fire."<sup>4</sup>

Though his thirst for revenge had been quenched by the general massacre, Nadir Shah's greed had yet to be satisfied and a new kind of terror was unleashed on the doomed capital. Nadir Shah now began the ruthless spoliation of its citizens. He imposed an enormous fine of Rs. two crores on the townsfolk and took severe measures for its collection. "Accountants were appointed to levy the indemnity from the inhabitants under the supervision of Tahmasp Khan Jaliyar. But in order to save the people from utter ruin, officers of both the governments were directed to supervise assessment of ransom in law courts in the presence of public. Footmen (*piadas*) of the Kotwal and *nasaqichis* were sent to take a census of the houses and prepare lists of property. Unoffending people, high and low, rich and poor, were compelled day after day to attend the law courts where they were kept from dawn to sun-set and often till night. The total contribution from the capital amounted to Rs. two crores. Nadir Shah then appointed the Nizam, the *wazir*, 'Azimullah Khan, Sarbuland Khan and Murtaza Khan to collect the money. The entire city was divided into five sections and lists of the inhabitants, residing in these localities, with their names and the amount to be levied from each, were prepared and given to these five nobles<sup>5</sup>. In the collection of money no barbarities were spared. The whole city was put in a state of siege, no one was allowed to leave the capital or send away his family; and the mounting scarcity of foodgrains compelled the people to comply with all orders of Nadir Shah's officers.<sup>6</sup> "Not only was their money taken, but whole families were otherwise ruined. Many swallowed poison and others ended their woes with

<sup>1</sup> *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 380-382.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, f. 54; for list of those prominent persons who killed themselves or were killed by the Persians, vide, *Tarikh-i Muhammedi*, 110-111.

<sup>3</sup> *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 386. *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja 'i*, f. 90; Hanway, Vol. II, 375; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 372-373; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 340; *Bayan-i Waqa 'i*, f. 14; *An Eye Witness Account*, 360; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 34.

<sup>4</sup> *Bada 'i Waqa 'i*, f. 18.

<sup>5</sup> *Bada 'i Waqa 'i*, f. 19.

<sup>6</sup> Hanway, II, 382.

the stab of knife."<sup>1</sup> Large contributions were also levied from the nobles and the governors were forced to pay the money without delay.<sup>2</sup>

Apart from this Nadir Shah seized from the palace all the crown jewels including the *Koh-i Nur* and the peacock throne, plates of gold to the value of one crore, other precious articles, including furniture made of gold and silver as also gold coins and whatever else attracted his fancy.<sup>3</sup> "In short, the accumulated wealth of 348 years changed masters in a moment."<sup>4</sup>

On 6 April 1739 Nadir Shah celebrated the marriage of his son Nasrullah Khan to a Mughal princess.<sup>5</sup> "In honour of the occasion, Nadir ordered illuminations, display of fireworks and lavish entertainments while the

<sup>1</sup> *Bada 'i Waqa 'i*, f. 20. Allahwardi Khan, the *Qarawal Begi*, and a *mansabdar* of 7,000/- had no money to pay because he received no revenues from his *jagirs*. To escape from insult and torture he took poison. Ghairat Khan, son-in-law of Sher Afghan Khan, stabbed himself. Majlis Rai, *diwan* of Qamr-u'd-din Khan, also committed suicide. *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 290, 291.

<sup>2</sup> Following is the list of nobles and officers who paid money :

Name	Amount of money
1. Nizam-ul Mulk	Rs. 50 lakhs
2. Qamr-u'd-din Khan	Rs. 30 lakhs
3. Raja Jugal Kishore, <i>wakil</i> of the governor of Bengal.	Rs. 7 lakhs 3,000 gold coins & 7 elephants with gold trappings.
4. Khushal Chand, <i>peshkar</i> of <i>mir bakhshi</i>	Rs. 257,000
5. Shaikh Sa'adullah, <i>Diwan-i Tan</i>	Rs. 250,000
6. Nagar Mal, <i>Diwan-i Khalisa</i> .	Rs. 250,000
7. Sita Ram, the Imperial Treasurer	Rs. 300,000
8. Rai Tonda, <i>peshkar</i> of <i>diwan-i tan</i> .	Rs. 250,000
9. Subhan Rai, <i>wakil</i> of Dost Muhammad Khan Afghan, Bhopal.	Rs. 150,000
10. Total amount paid by small officers and clerks.	Rs. 250,000
11. Muhammad Khan Bangash	Rs. 700,000
12. Safdar Jang, governor of Awadh.	Rs. one crore.
13. Anand Ram Mukhlis.	Rs. 5,00,000

Besides, Nadir Shah seized the properties of Sa'adat Khan in Delhi, Khan-i Dauran, Muzaffar Khan and all such nobles as were killed at Karnal. *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 291-294.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 294-295.

<sup>4</sup> *Bada 'i Waqa 'i*, f. 18b.

درلٔ از دوخته سید و چهل و هشت سال را دریں آن واحد از تکوئل  
یکی گرفته تکوئل دیگری گرد -

<sup>5</sup> According to Ashub she was the daughter of Mirza Yazdan, grandson of Sultan Murad Bakhsh, son of Shah Jahan. *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 295b.

people of Delhi were still mourning their dead<sup>1</sup> and lamenting on the loss of their valuable properties. Nearly a week later, Nadir Shah held a grand *darbar* in which he put the crown of Hindustan back on the head of Muhammad Shah and gave to his nobles robes of honour and gifts; the name of the Mughal Emperor was substituted for that of the Persian monarch in the *khutba* as well as on the coinage. "In return for this liberality, surpassing indeed the kindness of a father to his son, or of brother to brother," Muhammad Shah formally ceded the Trans-Indus provinces and Afghanistan to Nadir Shah and requested him to accept all the treasures which the latter had already acquired.<sup>2</sup> An agreement was signed, "surrendering all the countries about Sind, westward of the rivers Attock and Sind, and of the Sanjar stream, which flows from the latter, namely, Peshawar, Bangash, the country of Kabul, Ghaznin, and the Kohistan, Hazara, the fortress of Bhakkar . . . and the province of Thatta." The agreement stipulated further that "henceforth the officers of the powerful State (Persia) shall collect the revenue and exercise all authority in the aforesaid countries, and the people, great and small, dwellers in towns and in plains, tillers of the soil, men of every degree, shall be subject to their laws and the ministers of this eternal government (Mughal government) shall no longer have sway over them."<sup>3</sup>

Nadir Shah then invited the Mughal Emperor and his nobles to a dinner party and gave valuable presents to his guests. He then started making preparations for his departure and after completing all arrangements he issued a proclamation that the "victorious banners of the King of Kings and Lord of benefice would move towards Persia." A huge baggage train consisting of mules and camels was arranged for carrying the immense load of treasures, stores and other precious articles. Nadir Shah and his army left the city after a stay of 57 days, on May 16, staying for a day at Shalimar gardens.<sup>4</sup> He sent Hayatullah Khan, eldest son of Zakariyah Khan, and 'Abdul Baqi Khan ahead of his army to Lahore to ask the governor

<sup>1</sup> *Nadir Shah*, 151.

<sup>2</sup> The total collection of indemnity made at Delhi was nearly 15 crores of rupees in cash, besides a vast amount in jewels, clothing, furniture and other valuable articles from the imperial store-houses. *Tarikh-i Jahan Kusha-i Nadri*, 361. The contemporary writers differ in their estimates of the amount of entire wealth Nadir Shah had secured from the royal palace as well as from the imperial city of Delhi. For instance, the author of *Tarikh-i Muzaffari* gives the figure of 40 crores of rupees (341); while according to Anand Ram and 'Abdul Karim the treasures acquired amounted to 50 and 80 crores of rupees respectively. *Bayan-i Waqa 'i*, f. 16. In addition to this wealth in cash and jewels, 300 elephants, 10,000 horses and the same number of camels were taken away. *Nadir Shah in Delhi*, 78.

<sup>3</sup> *Bada 'i Waqa 'i*, ff. 28b, 29, 30.

<sup>4</sup> *Bada 'i Waqa 'i*, ff. 30, 31.

to collect one crore of rupees and make preparations for his reception. Nadir Shah proceeded to Sirhind and marching via Sialkot reached Lahore where Zakariya Khan received him and presented the required amount of money. Impressed by his loyalty and efficiency, Nadir Shah appointed the Mughal *subedar* as his deputy to govern the areas ceded by Muhammad Shah and send an annual tribute of Rs. 20 lakhs to the Persian government. He reached Nadirabad on 4 May 1740.<sup>1</sup>

### *Court Politics after the Invasion of Nadir Shah*

During the invasion of Nadir Shah the bitter factionalism and personal discords which had for long kept the Mughal nobility divided and distracted at last proved disastrous to the security and integrity of the Empire. In the hour of crisis the Mughal nobles failed to forge a united front to repel the foreign aggression. As previously mentioned, Khan-i Dauran took no adequate steps to defend a zone which lay open to direct attack. At the battle of Karnal Sa'adat Khan hurried into action against the explicit desire of the Emperor and without due caution or preparation; his precipitate action consequently threw the Mughal camp into disorder and upset all devices of offensive operations. Khan-i Dauran, who went with his hastily improvised forces to fight, was soon exhausted by the counter-attacks of the enemy and heavy casualties in his ranks. Seriously perturbed by the irretrievable damage to the army, the Emperor directed Nizam-ul Mulk to move out immediately and prevent the Persians from achieving further success in the battle, but the later refused to comply with the royal orders and stuck to his own position. The other Turani leaders, like Qamr-u'd-din Khan, Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan and their relations also shrank from taking part in this fateful engagement, though they had sufficiently large and well-ordered forces under their commands. They saw thousands of the

<sup>1</sup> Having crossed the Chenab river Nadir Shah marched via Rawalpindi to Hasan Abdal from where he proceeded towards the Indus, and after crossing it he went to Peshawar and thence through the Khaibar Pass and Jalalabad to Kabul where he arrived on 2 December 1739. Instead of marching towards the north as to reach Nadirabad early, Nadir Shah set out on a long southward journey in order to punish Khudayar Khan, the powerful chief of Sind, whom he had summoned to Kabul for paying homage to him. Nadir reached Larkana on 12 February 1740 and compelled Khudayar Khan to submit and hand over all his gold, jewels and pearls amounting to one crore of rupees. He left Larkana for Nadirabad on 10 April. "The route taken was via Gandava and Sibi, then over the 54 miles Bolan Pass, the dreaded Dasht-i Bi Daulat, Shal (Quetta) and Fushanj (Pishin). Nadir and his army arrived at Nadirabad on the 7th Safar (4th May) just over two (lunar) years from the time when he had set out from there for the conquest of India." For details, vide *Nadir Shah*, 157-162. For details concerning the life and career of Khudayar Khan, *Ma'astr-ul Umara*, ii, 825-829.



Mughal soldiers perishing before their eyes but remained aloof and callously indifferent. Khan-i Dauran, defeated and severely wounded, returned to his camp and expired the next day, 16 February 1739. His death left the Turani group master of the situation, and Nizam-ul Mulk, its leader, attempted to seek narrow private benefit from it. He secured the vacant post of the *mir bakhshi* and became the central figure in the councils of the defeated monarch. His appointment was resented by Sa'adat Khan, now a prisoner of Nadir Shah, who had for long nourished the ambition of attaining this key office of the central government. In the midst of disaster and defeat when the fate of the Empire hung in the balance Sa'adat Khan could think only of his frustrated ambition and determined to teach a lesson to Nizam-ul Mulk. It was he who persuaded the Persian conqueror to demand Rs. 20 crores instead of Rs 50 lakhs and march to Delhi to secure the amount if the Mughal authorities refused to pay it at Karnal. Thus their perennial personal rivalries instead of burying with the army at Karnal were yet alive to bring calamities even more dire to the Empire and its people.

The irresponsible and disloyal conduct of the Turani nobles shocked Muhammad Shah and made him doubtful of their basic integrity. The opinion at the court and outside had also turned seriously against these nobles and their motives had become suspect. What was more this opinion had become vocal. It held Sa'adat Khan and Nizam-ul Mulk directly responsible for the ignoble defeat and squarely accused them of having invited Nadir Shah and being all along in league with him. Such indignant feelings were particularly strong among the remnants of Khan-i Dauran's army and his other adherents in the city. They ascribed the defeat of their chief to the treachery of Sa'adat Khan and non-cooperation of the Turani leaders. The bitterness of their criticism found expression in the two principal contemporary works—*Jauhar-i Samsam* and *Risalah-i Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i Dauran*—whose authors were the protégés of Khan-i Dauran. The contemporary writers, patronized by Khan-i Dauran, have blamed Nizam-ul Mulk and Sa'adat Khan for all the misfortune suffered by the army and the citizens of Delhi; while historians and poets serving under Nizam-ul Mulk or those who flourished at the court of Awadh have sought to defend their patrons. The allegation of treason was absolutely groundless and false rumours of the two nobles conspiring with Nadir Shah were deliberately circulated by the followers of Khan-i Dauran to discredit the Irani and Turani groups. There is no positive evidence, direct or circumstantial, to show that these two nobles had invited Nadir Shah; or the rash and premature attack made by Sa'adat Khan at Karnal and the subsequent attitude of Nizam-ul Mulk formed part of a pre-determined plan to ensure the victory of the foreign invader.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a full discussion of this controversy, vide, *A Mughal Statesman of the Eighteenth Century*, 85-99.

After Nadir Shah's departure on 16 May 1739 the scars left by the invasion and the massacre began gradually to disappear and life at the court returned to normal. The order that had completely collapsed in the wake of war was restored to an appreciable degree. "Life which had ceased to throb in the veins of the people returned again as the flood having receded, water began to flow again in the rivers."<sup>1</sup> Timely rains produced a bumper crop and brought down the soaring prices of food grains and it appeared that nature had taken pity on the famine-stricken populace.<sup>2</sup> When calm had at last descended on the capital the Empêror held his first public *darbar* and made the following appointments:<sup>3</sup>

TABLE VI  
OFFICERS APPOINTED DURING THE FIRST PUBLIC DARBAR OF  
MUHAMMAD SHAH IN 1739

Name and Title	Post	Mansab	Group
1. Amir Khan, Umdat-ul Mulk	III <i>Bakhshi</i> & governor of Allahabad	6,000/-	Irani
2. Ishaq Khan, Mu'taman-u'd Daulah	<i>Diwan-i</i> <i>Khalisah</i>	6,000/-	Irani
3. 'Azim-ullah Khan	<i>Sadar</i>	6,000/-	Turani
4. Murtaza Khan	<i>Mir Tuzak</i>	—	Irani
5. N'imat-ullah Khan	<i>Qarawal beg</i>	—	Indian
6. Hadi 'Ali Khan	<i>Darogha-i</i> <i>feelkhana</i>	—	Irani
7. Salabat Khan	<i>Bakhshi of</i> <i>ahadis</i>	—	Irani
8. Tarbiyat Khan	<i>Darogha-i</i> <i>torkhana</i>	—	Khanazad
9. Hakim Ma'asum 'Ali Khan	Superintendent of Post & Intelligence	—	Irani
10. Safdar Jang	Governor of Awadh	—	Irani
11. Mir Muhammad Baqar	<i>Darogha-i</i> ' <i>Erab Khana</i>	—	Irani
12. Asad Yar Khan	<i>Darogha-i</i> <i>harkaras</i>	5,000/-	Irani

<sup>1</sup> *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 420.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, f. 48a.

<sup>3</sup> At this time Nizam-ul Mulk, always keen to tender advice, is reported to have told the Emperor to reassert the authority of the state and reorganize the administration, both having been paralyzed by the upheaval; and apart from building up a strong army, the Emperor should emerge from Delhi and establish contacts with cities and provinces of the Empire. Nizam-ul Mulk with his characteristic thoroughness is also reported to have further advised the Emperor to hold audience every day in the *diwan-i-khas* and take keen interest in the transaction of state business, personally looking into the minutes of all records pertaining to privy purses, *khalisa*, *jagirs* and other sources of income. *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 421.

Table VI shows the overwhelming predominance of the Irani group of nobles who had secured nine of the most important posts in the imperial administration. Its chief rival, the Turani group, had lost the confidence of the Emperor due to the role it had played at Karnal while the Indian group had disintegrated after the death of their leader, Khan-i Dauran. The Irani nobles grouped themselves round Amir Khan 'Umdat-ul Mulk<sup>1</sup> and formulated a plan of building up their influence and promoting their interests. The new party derived its strength and owed its supremacy in the state not from the ability and talents of its members but to the misfortunes of its rivals. There was hardly a man of outstanding civil or military ability in its ranks. Amir Khan, the head of the Irani group was neither a soldier nor an administrator whose talents lay in the realm of the fine arts. Handsome in person, suave in manners, eloquent of speech and possessed of poetic qualities he was altogether too charming for the king and courtiers to resist. He soon ingratiated himself with both. The other members of the faction occupying higher posts in the government had similar inclinations and tastes, but nearly all heartily detested the exercise of arms and shunned the onerous responsibilities of high office.<sup>2</sup> Amir Khan to strengthen his coterie further brought to the court other protégés, like Muhammad Ishaq Khan Shustari<sup>3</sup> and Asad Yar Khan,<sup>4</sup> who depended entirely on his support. Having acquired influence over the Emperor, Amir Khan in concert with his cohorts made a bid for supremacy in the state by attempting to force Qamr-u'd-din Khan, the *wazir*, out of office. This attempt provoked the hostility of deeply rooted interests, and, consequently, factionalism and intrigues again became rife at the court.

Amir Khan induced Muhammad Shah to instal him in the office of *wizarat* in place of Qamr-u'd-din Khan. The Emperor agreed to this mischievous plan but suggested that he should wait till Asaf Jah had left Delhi for the Deccan, and till then the plan was to be kept a secret. A few days later Asaf Jah, appointing his son Ghazi-u'd-din Khan as his deputy in the office of *mir bakhshi* left and encamped outside the capital on his way to the Deccan where urgent business awaited him.<sup>5</sup> In the meantime Amir Khan

<sup>1</sup> Amir Khan, was the eldest son of Mir Khan, *Mir-i Miran*, governor of Kabul in the reign of Aurangzeb. After his father's death he got the title of *Mir Khan* and the rank of 1,000/600 and married the daughter of Baharamand Khan, the *mir bakhshi*. In the reign of Bahadur Shah he served as deputy of Asaf-u'd Daulah Asad Khan to the government of Lahore. Later, he held subordinate posts in the government. For details, *vide*, Saiyid Ghulam 'Ali Naqavi, *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 24; Mir Wali-ullah, *Tarikh-i Farrukhabad*, ff. 103-106; *Tarikh-i Muza'fari*, 240.

<sup>2</sup> *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 426, 427.

<sup>3</sup> For details of his early life, *vide* *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 774-776; *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 35.

<sup>4</sup> *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja 'i*, 65-66.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 313-314.

getting impatient and incapable of concealing his elation at the success of the plan, assumed a haughty and impolitic attitude towards the *wazir* and even let fall derogatory remarks against him in private gatherings. The *wazir's* suspicions were roused and he became alarmed at the impending danger to his safety. He immediately got into touch with Asaf Jah who was still near at hand making preparations for his journey. Asaf Jah at once wrote back suggesting that he should take leave of the Emperor to join his camp and accompany him to the Deccan "as opposition to the king and conflict with him would be neither prudent nor in his interest."<sup>1</sup> Acting on this suggestion, Qamar-u'd-din Khan went over to the camp of Asaf Jah and from there sent a letter of resignation to the Emperor in which he stated, "I have committed no mistake, but the Emperor has become ill-disposed towards me by the wrong reports of selfish persons. I had no intention to be disloyal nor do I at present think in these terms but, unable to put up with these rebuffs, I am going with Asaf Jah to the Deccan"<sup>2</sup>

These developments placed Muhammad Shah in a state of dilemma as he feared that the Turani nobles could create difficulties for him and even endanger his throne if he pressed farther along his chosen path. Asaf Jah was, notwithstanding his role at Karnal, a veteran noble whose influence in the Empire and importance as a leader of the Turani faction could not be ignored. The Emperor turned to Ishaq Khan who, though a member of the Irani group, was considered by him more trustworthy than Amir Khan. Ishaq Khan after great hesitation, managed to rise above factional considerations and tendered the sober advice that Qamar-u'd-din Khan and Asaf Jah should not be removed from their offices because they were old nobles and commanded great respect among the people while Amir Khan and his friends were new-comers and lacked the prestige for such position.<sup>3</sup> Whatever differences there might have been with the Emperor in the past, the *wazir* still professed respect and loyalty to him. The Emperor should adopt safe and easy course of effecting compromise with the disgruntled nobles, for trial of strength with them would take a bloody form. The advice went home and the Emperor withdrew his original scheme. He called Amir Khan and told him, "It is not wise to antagonize the Turani nobles who are too powerful. The best policy is to conciliate them. Out of loyalty and regard for me you should therefore refrain from doing any thing that might rouse their anger or hostility."<sup>4</sup> Amir Khan was humiliated further when he was made to pre-

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 487.

<sup>2</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 487.

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 487.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 487.

sent himself with his two wrists tied like a culprit before Asaf Jah, the latter being authorised to mete out to him any punishment he desired. Asaf Jah, not considering Amir Khan to be his equal, forgave him but at the same time asked him to quit the court saying, "now that differences have arisen between you and the *wazir*, it is best that you should go away from the court to your province of Allahabad for sometime." Accordingly, after four months of this episode Amir Khan left for Allahabad and Nizam-ul Mulk then proceeded to the Deccan on 27 July 1740.<sup>1</sup>

With the removal of Amir Khan from the court and the death of Ishaq Khan, which occurred on 18 April 1740, the influence of the Irani nobles waned and Qamr-u'd-din Khan was now able to improve his image and win the goodwill of the Emperor. Amir Khan, however, continued actively but surreptitiously to intrigue against his foremost rival, the *wazir*, to retrieve his position and advance the interests of the Irani nobles in the government.<sup>2</sup> While living at Allahabad, he developed friendly contacts with Safdar Jang, the governor of Awadh, and drew him to his own group against the Turanis.<sup>3</sup> Safdar Jang was a capable general and administrator who had by his tireless energy and great liberality got together a large, trained and well-equipped army.<sup>4</sup> At this time the Marathas were invading the eastern provinces of Bihar and Bengal and 'Aliwardi Khan, the governor, was bearing the brunt of their aggression. Since 'Aliwardi Khan did not enjoy the confidence of the Emperor, Amir Khan saw his opportunity in the situation developing in the east and at once wrote to the Emperor, "Now that 'Aliwardi Khan, the slayer of his master, is entangled with the Marathas and has no force to spare, if you order Safdar Jang he will conquer Bihar for you; Safdar Jang is a loyal servant and he will pay the tribute of the province every year."<sup>5</sup> Amir Khan hoped that the success of this project would enable him to repair his fortunes at the centre and regain former influence in the court. Muhammad Shah, tempted by the prospect of procurement of revenues from the eastern provinces, accepted the proposal of Amir Khan and issued a *farman* to Safdar Jang directing him to establish royal authority in Bihar and granting him the districts of Chunar and Rohtas. Accordingly, Safdar Jang, at the head of a strong force, marched into the province, where, instead of carrying out the royal commission, his troops took to plundering the populace and then without achieving anything he returned to his headquarters. As a reward for this

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 314b; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 487; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 257.

<sup>2</sup> *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 32.

<sup>3</sup> *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 32; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 315a; *First Two Nawabs of Oudh*, 89-98.

<sup>4</sup> *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 34.

<sup>5</sup> *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 33.

fruitless undertaking, the post of *mir atash*, held by Hafiz-u'd-din, son of Sa'ad-u'd-din Turani, was conferred on Safdar Jang, 16 March 1744. He was also appointed *subedar* of Kashmir, while Amir Khan secured the *faujdari* of Karnal.<sup>1</sup> Amir Khan returned to the court and regained his position and influence over the Emperor, while Qamr-u'd-din Khan completely unnerved by the resurgence of the Irani faction, retired into the background.

Amir Khan now interfered in all matters of state and made suggestions on every issue and treated the king as if he was only a puppet in his hands. Once he even pressed for the dismissal of Roz Afzun Khan, the *nazir* and devoted eunuch of the Emperor, and when the Emperor refused to yield, Amir Khan threatened him with the gravest consequences and it was after this that he visited the prison-cell of the Royal Princes. The Emperor's suspicions were roused by this conduct, and the nobles, tired and disgusted with him, were quick to exploit this folly by poisoning the mind of the Emperor against him. The Emperor, already exasperated at his imperious behaviour, now flew into rage and got Amir Khan murdered through one of the servants of Roz Afzun Khan in *diwan-i-khas* on 25 December 1746.<sup>2</sup> Amir Khan was beyond doubt a man of dignity and commanding literary gifts, impelled by high ambition to seek power through intrigue that was in conformity with the current standards of political behaviour. His cruel murder and the death of Asad Yar Khan, a year before, 15 April 1745, did not destroy the core of the Irani faction. Safdar Jang now became the head of this faction, giving to it a more confident and vigorous leadership. The Emperor appointed Mirza Muhammad Najm-u'd-daulah, the elder son of Ishaq Khan, *diwan-i khalisa*, on 12 July 1747 and conferred titles and *mansabs* on his other sons.<sup>3</sup> Thus ultimate influence at the court continued to rest in the Irani group which still dominated public affairs. The court politics, during the remaining part of Muhammad Shah's reign, was marked by the intense mutual rivalry of Qamr-u'd-din Khan and Safdar Jang, former the leader of a group of nobles mainly Turani and the latter of the other which was predominantly Irani.<sup>4</sup> These feuds and

<sup>1</sup> Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan died on 20 June 1743. For details of these events, *Akhabar-i Muhabbat*, f. 246a; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari* 257; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkerin*, 521-522; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 346.

<sup>2</sup> *Akhabar-i Muhabbat*, f. 245.

<sup>3</sup> Ishaq Khan had three sons and one daughter : Mirza Muhammad, *Najm-u'd-daulah*, 6,000/-; Mirza 'Ali, *Istekhar-u'd-daulah*, 5,000/-; Mirza Muhammad 'Ali, *Salar Jang*, 5,000/-; Bahu Begam had married (1745) Safdar Jang's son, Shuj'a-u'd-daulah. She was the mother of Nawab Asaf-u'd-daulah, Nawab of Awadh. Najm-u'd-daulah was as close and faithful a companion of Muhammad Shah as his father Ishaq Khan had been. *Chahar Gulshan-i Shuja 'i*, 208; *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 24.

*Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 316, 319.

The governors were chosen from the most illustrious of the nobles; unwavering loyalty to the throne, conspicuous ability and long experience in civil and military affairs were the qualifications which merited the appointment of a noble to this high and responsible post. Royal princes were also put in charge of the provincial government; the experience and training they received during the tenure of office proved substantially valuable for an efficient conduct of the imperial administration after their accession to the throne.<sup>1</sup> The governors held *mansabs* that ranged from 4,000/- to 7,000/- and their tenure of office was at the Emperor's pleasure.<sup>2</sup> At the time of his appointment it was usual to confer on him special gifts and honours.<sup>3</sup> The *farman* issued to a governor on this occasion had a set pattern and contained instructions underlying principles of imperial administrative policy.<sup>4</sup> By way of emoluments he was assigned *jagirs*, the proceeds of which covered, besides personal pay, expenses of *tabinan*.<sup>5</sup> "The *nazim* of Gujarat, besides his personal *mansab* and 1,500 horsemen serving as *tabinan* under him, received 2 crores 1 lakh 85 thousand and 9 hundred *dams*—18 lakhs *dams* as *in'am* and the rest as *jagir* apart from getting tribute from the *zamindars*. Former *nazims* used to obtain

<sup>1</sup> *Risala-i Zira'at*, f. 2.

<sup>2</sup> For instance, Maharaja Jaswant Singh, governor of Gujarat, 1670-1672, held the *mansab* of 7,000/7,000; five thousands were *du-aspah, seh-aspah*. Mukhtar Khan, governor of the same province, 1682-1685, on the other hand, was the *mansabdar* of 4,000/4,000 *du-aspah, seh-aspah*. The tenure of their offices ranged, in the case of this province, from 2 to 16 years. Mahabat Khan, 1662-1668; Bahadur Khan, 1668-1670; Muhammad Amin Khan, 1672-1682; Mukhtar Khan, 1682-1684; Shuja'at Khan alias Kartalab Khan, 1685-1701. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 244, 303, 313.

<sup>3</sup> Mahabat Khan was honoured with a special robe, an Arab horse with gold accoutrements, a big elephant with silver trappings and gold covering. Two thousand horsemen from among his contingent were made *du-aspah, seh-aspah*. Mukhtar Khan at the time of his appointment was given a robe of honour, an elephant and a horse. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 253-303.

<sup>4</sup> For copies of these *farmans*, issued to Ibrahim Khan in 1707 by Aurangzeb and in 1708 by Bahadur Shah, and in 1713 by Farrukh Siyar to Shuja'at Khan, *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 375, 381, 399-400.

<sup>5</sup> The Mughal *mansabdars* were kept either at the royal court for service or on active duty somewhere in a province. The *mansabdars* included in the second category, were called *tabinan* (or contingent serving under some noble or governor). W. Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, Delhi, 1962, 10. Hidayatullah says that a governor-designate should enlist one-fourth *tabinan* before setting out for his *subah* and another one-fourth on his way to the *subah*. He should send half of the *tabinan* so recruited to reach the provincial headquarters before his own arrival there. These soldiers should be brave and experienced men from good families, *Hidayat-ul Qawa'id*, f. 14.

Rs. 2,40,000 as their salary. In the reign of Aurangzeb, there were 900 *mansabdars* and a contingent of 26,030 horse, about a third of whom were reserved for active service in the field in accordance with the rules of enlistment. Similarly, the *mansabdars*, *faujdar*s, and *thanedar*s, leaving half of their forces on local duty joined the *nazim* with the other half.<sup>1</sup>

On arrival at the capital city of his province the governor was received by local officers like the *diwan*, chief *qazi*, *sadar*, *bakshi* and *waqa'i-nigar*, and prominent Hindu and Muslim citizens.<sup>2</sup> Having assumed charge of office, the governor was expected to send a *parwana*, under the seal of the chief *qazi*, to *faujdar*s, *mutasaddis*, *zamindars*, *chaudhris*, *qanungoes*, etc. of the province informing them about his appointment and urging them to discharge their duties with zeal and earnestness.<sup>3</sup> He was further required to collect information through his own agents regarding the conduct and activities of various tributary *zamindars* and to formulate his policy in the light of their relations with his predecessors<sup>4</sup>. In the event of a new Emperor ascending the throne the term of the governor had to be confirmed anew by a *farman* giving a brief account of the accession and ordering him to make it known throughout his territories. He was also instructed to get this *khutba* read and coins struck in the name of the new sovereign<sup>5</sup>.

Some basic principles and objectives of Mughal administration in the provinces are embodied in two royal *farmans*: one, issued by Aurangzeb to Ibrahim Khan in 1707, and the other addressed by Farrukh Siyar to Shuja'at Khan in 1713. The *farman* of Aurangzeb lays emphasis on efficient administration, effective protection of the people, development of agriculture and prosperity of the *ra'iyat*. It underlines the obligation of the governor to organize a strong army for maintenance of peace. Ibrahim Khan is further instructed to maintain the traditions of efficiency and

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, Supplement, text, 169, translation, 145.

<sup>2</sup> When Mukhtar Khan reached Ahmadabad in August 1682, he was received by Muhammad Latif, *diwan*, Mir Bahauddin Khan *bakhshi* and *waqa'i-nigar*, Shaikh Muhiyuddin, *sadar*, Khwajah, 'Abdullah, chief *qazi*, *mutasaddis* and other officers. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 303, 314, 346, 369, 383.

<sup>3</sup> *Hidayat-ul Qawa'id*, f. 15. Muhammad 'Azim-us Shan, on his entry into Bihar, sent orders to *zamindars* and *'amils of jagirdars* to come and wait upon him. In response to his summons they came and paid homage to the Prince who gave robes of honour to each of them according to his status. *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 233.

<sup>4</sup> *Hidayat-ul Qawa'id*, f. 15. For instance, the governor of Gujarat, immediately after assumption of authority, undertook an expedition against the turbulent *kolis* and *zamindars*, realised tribute and secured written bonds of good conduct from them. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 303, 314, 376, 381, 396.

<sup>5</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 244-49, 380-81, 399-400; II, 22-23.



integrity which characterised the administrative practices of his predecessors. In case the governor proves himself able and vigorous in the performance of his functions, rewards in the form of promotion in his *mansab* and position are promised. In this *farman* the Emperor, by way of example, extols the good services of some governors of the past. The *farman* says, "Fortunate Princes and Amirs of lofty worth excellently defended provinces against rebels and helped the *ra'iyat* and common creatures of God. Muhammad Amin Khan made remarkable administrative arrangements by his perfect qualities, and Amir-ul Umara Shayista Khan also exerted himself to improve the condition of people." The *farman* exhorts Ibrahim Khan to dispense justice with strict impartiality, put an end to the tyranny of the strong and not allow them to suppress the weak<sup>1</sup>. The *farman* of Farrukh Siyar addressed to Shuja'at Khan indicates the aims of his policy as Emperor. It states that the Emperor's ambition was that the administration of justice should be perfect and that the welfare of the public should be carefully attended to. The pillars of states and religion could thus be strengthened with justice and equity. The *farman* expresses the anxious concern of the Emperor for the progress and prosperity of the masses and the eradication of tyrants. The governor must exert himself with the greatest energy in the establishment of order and improvement of administration. These policies, if properly pursued, would ensure tranquillity and general happiness of all classes.<sup>2</sup>

The Mughal Emperor, in pursuance of these proclaimed objectives, devoted special attention in the provinces to the administration of justice<sup>3</sup> and acts of benevolence.<sup>4</sup> Some of their legal and financial ordinances, issued from time to time, give ample evidence of their deep concern for the effective operation of the established laws and policies. Aurangzeb's code of laws, comprising 33 categories of crimes and penalties, is embodied in a *farman*, dated 12 June 1672 in which he directed the *nazim* and

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 375.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 399-400.

<sup>3</sup> This fact can be well illustrated by the instructions of Aurangzeb to Khawaja Muhammad Hashim directing him to see that the judges should hold their courts for 5 days instead of two; one more day was to be spent in attending to the *subedar's* court. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 275. He also advised his grandson, Prince Bidar Bakht, that in the exercise of judicial duties promptness was better than delay. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 371.

<sup>4</sup> A conspicuous example of Aurangzeb's solicitude for the downtrodden was his order to the *diwan* of Gujarat in 1696-97 to the effect that three thousand rupees should be spent annually in cold weather for distributing 1,500 coats and 1,500 blankets among the poor at their homes after proper investigations. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 340. Many other instances in respect of relief measures during famine; such as remission of taxes and sale of foodgrains at cheap rates, may be cited in support of this statement. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 315, 329.

*diwan* of Gujarat that no person was to be imprisoned without sufficient cause, and the weak and helpless were not to be subjected to oppression.<sup>1</sup> Another *farman* of Aurangzeb dated 20 November 1665, contains about 36 clauses relating to illegal and burdensome taxes which the Emperor abolished.<sup>2</sup> A third *farman* issued by Aurangzeb, on complaints made by the inhabitants of Surath *Sarkar* against Sardar Khan, its *faujdar* reiterates, the state policy of doing justice to all classes of society by safeguarding their respective interests. The Emperor asserted in this *farman* that the main purpose of justice was to provide peace and security to the *ra'iyat* and commonfolk so that they might pray for the stability and continuance of the Mughal rule. "We, in person, dispense justice to the oppressed and afflicted for the reestablishment of the principles of justice and equity, and for the destruction of the very foundations of tyranny and oppression." The *faujdar*, therefore, should spare no efforts in trying and deciding cases in consonance with the established laws, and affording protection to the residents of towns, cities and villages, and the *ra'iyat* of Surath *Sarkar*.<sup>3</sup> These imperial decrees constituted instruments of instruction to the governors as agents for the execution of the basic principles of Mughal state policy within their *subahs*. Shayista Khan, governor of Bengal, 1664-1677, held open court every day where cases were decided, and was prompt in redressing grievances brought to his notice. He considered the discharge of judicial duties as his most important function. Ibrahim Khan, who took charge of the Bengal government in June 1689, personally administered justice and took keen interest in the improvement of agriculture and commerce.<sup>4</sup>

The Mughal governor had no control or authority over the revenue department which was the charge of the *diwan-i-subah* appointed directly by the Emperor and answerable to him alone for all financial transactions of the province. The *diwan*, therefore, functioned independently and in theory the governor could not encroach upon the former's well-defined jurisdiction and powers. The revenues derived from different sources were deposited in the provincial treasury, and all expenses connected with local administration were paid out of it, the balance being remitted to the imperial exchequer. The centre maintained a tight control on provincial finances and all additional expenditure had to be sanctioned by the Emperor without which no money could be spent even by the *diwan*. The governor received his salary, as already mentioned, from *jagirs* assigned to

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 277-283.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 286-288.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 257.

<sup>4</sup> *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 222, 223; *Aurangzeb*, V, 366-67.

him; beyond that under the existing system he had no opportunity to misappropriate public money or lay hands on the *khalisa mahals*.

Aurangzeb assigned the Surath *Sarkar* in *jagir* to Prince 'Azam Shah and ordered Shahwardi, *bakhshi* of Gujarat, to proceed to Surath and enlist a force of three thousand horse for the establishment of order in that area. At the same time the Emperor instructed the provincial *diwan* to send one month's salary of two thousand horsemen from Ahmadabad's treasury in consultation with Mukhtar Khan, the governor. The *diwan* was also asked to submit a report about these payments to the central government for the said amount would be debited to the assignment of the Prince.<sup>1</sup> In the time of Bahadur Shah, Muhammad Beg Khan, *naib nazim*, asked Khwaja 'Abdul Hamid, the *diwan*, to arrange the payment of money for raising troops and purchasing artillery as there was imminent danger of a Maratha attack on towns and villages between Surath and Ahmadabad. The *diwan* replied that he was not authorised to spend a single *dam* without the previous sanction of the Emperor. The deputy governor made a representation to the imperial court and obtained permission for his defence expenditure. A royal *farman* under the seal of Mun'im Khan, the *wazir*, was issued to the *diwan*, directing him to pay the salary of troops the deputy-governor intended to enlist, in consultation with the *bakhshi*.<sup>2</sup> Amanat Khan, *mutasaddi* of Surat and Cambay, informed the Emperor that A'itmad Khan, former *mutasaddi* of Cambay, had embezzled Rs. 345 from the revenues of Port Kohkah. Bahadur Shah instructed the *diwan* to immediately realise the money from A'itmad Khan, deposit it in the treasury and submit the accounts to the court.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, the *diwan* was endowed with all the functions essential to the separate and independent working of the revenue department. Other high-ranking officers of a province were also immune from unnecessary interference of the governor in the exercise of their administrative duties. He possessed no authority over *jagirs* and *madad-i ma'ash* lands; he could not deprive either *mansabdars* or *a'inma* of their assignments. The central government attempted to substitute a prescribed code of procedure for the arbitrary personal rule of the governor as the foundation of his rights and duties. Just how much respect the central government could enforce for the system of checks and balances, so created, depended on its strength. Needless to say, the Emperor was deeply desirous of mutual cooperation between the governor and the *diwan* whose concerted efforts were absolu-

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 306-307.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 382.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 382.

tely necessary for the efficient working of the provincial government.<sup>1</sup> Thus the hold of the Emperor over provincial administration was absolute. He appointed *bakhshi*, *waqa'i nawis*,<sup>2</sup> the chief *qazi*,<sup>3</sup> *sadar*,<sup>4</sup> *sawanehnigar*,<sup>5</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> The *nazim* sometimes became jealous of the *diwan* and endeavoured to undermine his influence. The best-known example of this tension may be illustrated by the open conflict between Murshid Quli Khan and Prince 'Azim-ush Shah. For details, *Aurangzeb*, V, 376. In Gujarat, Prince Bidar Bakht, as a governor tried to poison the mind of his grandfather against the provincial *diwan*, Khwaja 'Abdul Hamid. The governor reported to the Emperor that the *diwan* was in secret correspondence with Durgadas Rathor. Aurangzeb replied that the Khwaja was a man of irreproachable integrity and honesty, a *hafiz* and *haji*; there was no possibility of his being in league with the rebel. The plan of Bidar Bakht to antagonise the Emperor against a trustworthy *diwan* fell through. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 374.

The posts of *bakhshi* and *waqa'i nawis* were entrusted to one and the same person. The appointment letter was issued under the seal of the *mir bakhshi*. As head of military administration in the province his duties consisted of enlistment of soldiers, mustering of horsemen under *mansabdars*, payment of salaries to soldiers, and enforcement of rules connected with branding. In his capacity as *waqa'i nawis* he gathered information through his own agents from all quarters and transmitted it to the royal court. He posted his assistants in the departments of the *nazim*, *diwan*, *faujdar* and *qazi*; they brought reports about the daily proceedings and occurrences to him. The central control over this office is proved by the following example. Mahabat Khan, governor of Gujarat, reported to the Emperor that the number of *mansabdars*, posted in the province, was twenty thousand but when they were called to active service only one thousand out of them responded to summons. Aurangzeb held the *bakhshi* responsible for this laxity in military administration. He dismissed the officer concerned for negligence of duty, and instructed the *darogah* of *dagh-wa tasilha* to enforce the regulations most rigidly. The provincial *diwan*, Haji Shaf'i Khan, was likewise directed to go through the registers containing details of branding and inspect muster-rolls of *tabinan* and *mansabdars*. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 266.

<sup>2</sup> The chief *qazi*, styled *aqzi-ul-quzzat*, for the whole province and a separate *qazi* for the capital city, were appointed by the Emperor, the orders of appointment were issued under the seal and signature of the imperial *sadar-us-sudur*. The *qazi* held a *mansab*. For a critical discussion of the functions and powers of the chief *qazi* vide, P. Saran, *Provincial Government under the Mughals*, 339-345. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, 310, 394, 396.

<sup>4</sup> Provincial *sadar*, or head of religious endowments was also appointed by the court under the seal of *sadar-us-sudur*. For his duties and functions, vide, *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, Supplement, text, 173.

<sup>5</sup> *Sawanehnigar* was a secret reporter mainly responsible for collecting the news and transmitting them to the imperial headquarters. He kept a close watch on the activities of the governor, the *diwan* and other officers. This direct supply of information not only helped the central government in the proper exercise of its controlling authority but also enabled it to restrain the provincial officers from abusing their powers. In addition to the charge of the secret branch of intelligence department he was invested with the duties of Postal Superintendent. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 174, 175; Supplement, 175.

*faujdar*s.<sup>1</sup> By law the governor was forbidden to assume royal prerogatives; any attempt in this matter was bound to bring down the iron rod of the Emperor's wrath upon him.

However, it would not be correct to draw the conclusion that the governor was a mere figure-head, with no discretionary powers or effective control over the provincial administration. The local officers, though appointed and removed by the central government, worked under the supervision of the governor; none of whom could afford to fall foul with him or thwart the execution of his policy. The *diwan* and *bakhshi* were invariably instructed by the centre to work in collaboration with the governor. In the discharge of his special responsibilities with regard to the maintenance of peace, the suppression of internal revolts, collection of tribute and defence of the province the governor could find an ample scope to act independently. Further, a state of emergency offered him an opportunity to exercise his executive authority in any way that seemed to him best suited to the situation. Moreover, in his own executive sphere he was supreme, as *faujdar*s, *thanedar*s and other executive functionaries worked under his direct supervision. He also enjoyed the privilege of local patronage. It was on his recommendations that the Emperor appointed *faujdar*s, increased *mansabs* and conferred titles on officers subordinate to him. For

<sup>1</sup> Some of the names of these provincial officers are noted below. When Mukhtar Khan reached Ahmadabad in August, 1682 he was received by the following officers:

<i>Name</i>	<i>Designation</i>
1 Muhammad Latif	<i>diwan</i>
2 Mir Baha-u'd-din Khan	<i>bakhshi</i> and <i>waga'i nigar</i>
3 Shaikh Muhiy-u'd-din	<i>sadar</i>
4 Khwaja 'Abdullah Khan	<i>qazi-ul-quzzat</i>

At the time of Sarbuland Khan's appointment to the deputy governorship of Gujarat in 1713 the following officers served the provincial government :

<i>Name</i>	<i>Designation</i>
1 Asad Khan	<i>nazim</i>
2 Sarbuland Khan	<i>naib nazim</i>
3 Khwaja 'Abdul Hamid	<i>qazi-ul-quzzat</i>
4 Shar'iat Khan	<i>diwan</i>
5 Mehr 'Ali Khan	<i>bakhshi</i> and <i>waga'i nigar</i>
6 Akram-u'd-din Khan	<i>sadar</i>
7 Nasir-u'd-din Khan	<i>swaneh nawis</i>
8 Azhar Khan	<i>qazi</i> of the city

instance, when Bahadur Khan, *nazim* of Gujarat, proposed the name of Diler Khan to succeed Sardar Khan to the post of *faujdari* of Surath *Sarkar*, Aurangzeb accepted the nomination.<sup>1</sup> When Ghazi-u'd-din Khan Bahadur Firoz Jang sponsored I'timad Khan for filling the vacant *faujdari* of Cambay and *thanedari* of Kajnab, Bahadur Shah I accepted the proposals. Again, it was on the recommendation of Ibrahim Khan that the Emperor granted *mansab* of 200/30 to Muhammad Quli and of 100 *zat* to both Ibrahim Quli and Qasim Quli, sons of Kazim Beg.<sup>2</sup> In 1660 we find Mir Jumla, the governor of Bengal dismissing Mulla Mustafa, the *qazi* of Dacca, on his own authority.<sup>3</sup> The posting and transfer of *faujdar*s and *thanedar*s from one place to another within the province was also the chief concern of the *nazim*.

The foregoing discussion gives a broad picture of the structural and functional relations between Gujarat and the central government during the years 1662-1712. It represents the ideal pattern of relationship that existed between the centre and other provinces when the state machinery operated at the peak of efficiency. The keynote of this relationship was the careful and vigilant control exercised by the centre over the provinces of the Empire. The centre was omnipotent and its power was felt in every branch of the provincial administration.

Nevertheless, Aurangzeb, at the end of his reign, allowed a large degree of latitude to provincial governors. This was owing partly to the confidence he had in their loyalty and ability, and partly to his own preoccupation with the campaigns in the Deccan. The decade following his death saw further relaxation of central control over the provincial authorities as a consequence of a significant administrative practice that came to be adopted during this period. This was the practice of allowing central ministers to concurrently hold governorship of provinces.<sup>4</sup> After

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 274.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 384.

<sup>3</sup> Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, *Life of Mir Jumla*, 211.

<sup>4</sup> The ministers who held governorships in addition to their departmental responsibilities were:

Name	Position at the centre	Province
1 Zulfiqar Khan	<i>mir bakhshi</i>	Deccan
2 Asad Khan	<i>wakil-i mutlaq</i>	Lahore, Delhi & Gujarat
3 Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan	<i>wazir</i>	Multan
4 Saiyid Hussain Khan	<i>mir bakhshi</i>	Deccan
5 'Inayatullah 'Ali Khan Kashmiri	<i>diwan khalisah and tan</i>	Kashmir
6 Nizam-ul Mulk	<i>wazir</i>	Deccan, Gujarat & Malwa

Bahadur Shah the old system of giving gubernatorial assignments to the Royal princes could no longer be continued.<sup>1</sup> The reasons for this are not far to seek. In the first place, most of the Princes were either killed in the battles of succession or blinded and imprisoned; secondly, in the new political situation created by fratricidal strife, court intrigues and coups, the successors of Bahadur Shah were not prepared to run the risk of entrusting whatever Princes were there, including their own sons, with positions of power; especially if they were sent outside the capital to govern a province. The ruling monarch was thus forced to resort to the device of appointing his ministers in more than one capacity for the successful implementation of his policies both at the centre and in the provinces. The introduction of this practice also stemmed from the equally strong desire of important nobles not to move away from the court. But this arrangement was destined to produce grave consequences both for the central government and the affected provinces. For the province it would mean an absentee executive and for the central government it was bound to lead to a laxity of its control and virtual delegation of extensive authority to provincial officers as an inevitable consequence of this conjunction of office in a minister sitting in the capital. Because of his manifold preoccupations at the court the minister could spare little time to devote to his provincial charge, thus leaving his deputies in the province increasingly free to act as they pleased. The evil consequences of this development went much further, as pointed out by the author of *Risala-i Zira'at*, it deprived the Princes in their early careers of the opportunity to acquire the requisite training and experience for dealing competently with the problems of the Empire. When such Princes ascended the throne they had to depend completely on selfish ministers and courtiers into whose hands, slowly but

<sup>1</sup> The system of appointing Royal Princes to governorships continued until the death of Bahadur Shah I who had assigned the charge of four provinces to his four sons. Jahandar Shah, his elder son and successor to the throne, had three sons, A'zz-u'd-din, 'Izz-u'd-din and 'Aziz-u'd-din, but none of them held the governorship of any province, while the sons of his brothers killed in the battle of succession were rotting in prison. After the execution of Jahandar Shah, A'zz-u'd-din was blinded and imprisoned along with his two brothers by the orders of Farrukh Siyar, the new Emperor. Farrukh Siyar had two sons, but both died before they came of age: Jahangir Shah died of small-pox a few months after his birth in May, 1713, and Jahan Murad Shah lived only a year. *Later Mughals*, I. 36, 242, 402. Shoharyar the infant son of Muhammad Shah, is reported to have been appointed the *subedar* of the Deccan but he died a few months later. His second son Ahmad Shah, though appointed governor of one or two provinces, was not sent to take charge of office and administer the province; nor was he ever permitted to lead the Mughal army in the battlefield except in the war against Ahmad Shah Durrani under special circumstances. The Prince remained at the court and, like his father, could not acquire experience in the arts of war and government.

surely, power shifted, and who formed their own factions at the court to retain it.<sup>1</sup>

In the provinces which were unaffected by this administrative practice the governors, living and working at their provincial headquarters, continued to carry on governmental functions efficiently and look up to the central government as the primary source of authority. Apart from the greater efficiency resulting from the immediate presence of the highest official, in the vital matters of war and peace they were guided by the instructions from the centre; and, as in the case of the governors of Gujarat and Bengal, continued to remit the surplus revenue to the imperial treasury. All grants of *mansabs* and titles, and assignment of *jagirs* and *in'am* lands were made, sometimes at the recommendation of a governor by the Emperor, and the orders were issued through the departments concerned. Though the centre, during the decade of 1712-22, was faced with internal crises, the system on which were based centre-province relations worked without mishap. No confrontation between a governor and the central government took place in this decade though marked by confusion and civil strife. What rendered the central authority effectual in the provinces was not so much the personality of Farrukh Siyar as the widely recognized military talents of his ministers like 'Abdullah Khan, Husain 'Ali Khan and Muhammad Amin Khan. The Emperor was too feeble and infirm to secure the execution of his policies in the provinces, but with the help of a *wazir* or *mir bakhshi*, had little difficulty in overcoming any trouble coming from the provincial governments. Deterred by the fear of repressive action, no governor could disregard with impunity the obligations and restraints imposed on him by state laws.

It was for the first time in 1722, after 3 years of Muhammad Shah's accession, that a serious crisis arose in the province of Gujarat whose governor, Haider Quli Khan, formed the ambitious design of establishing himself in an independent position. The Emperor dispatched the *wazir* Nizam-ul Mulk to reduce the rebellious governor to obedience. The *wazir* accomplished the task without delay or difficulty. But when Nizam-ul Mulk challenged the central authority none of the central ministers was found capable of conducting military operations against him. The Emperor instead of taking action from Delhi ordered Mu'bariz Khan, the *nazim* of Hyderabad, to resist and fight him in the Deccan. The *nazim* defeated and killed his adversary in a severe military contest. He seized the reins of power and cut off lines of control which passed from the centre. The Emperor, unable to destroy his power by means of arms, restored the victorious noble to the post of governorship, and he did not again attempt

<sup>1</sup> *Risala-i Zira'at*, f. 2.



to disturb or subvert his authority. The governors of Gujarat realising that the Emperor would neither march in person nor send a central minister at the head of an army, flouted imperial orders and extended the range of their executive powers. The only sword of punishment the Emperor now wielded was the dismissal of a disloyal governor, but the burden of ousting him from office lay with the noble appointed to replace him.

The administration of the provinces, not so far enveloped in the whirlwind of the Maratha invasions, affords a striking contrast to that of Gujarat and Malwa where due to them anarchic conditions prevailed. The governors of Allahabad,<sup>1</sup> Awadh and the Punjab sternly suppressed internal disorders and successfully maintained law and order in their respective provinces. They remained faithful to the crown and lent weight to the central government by their cooperation and military assistance. The provincial administration of Bengal under a succession of able and vigorous governors during this period was run in a manner reminiscent of the halcyon days of the Empire. They steadily strove to maintain the

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<sup>1</sup> Raja Chhabela Ram Nagar was the governor of Allahabad when Muhammad Shah ascended the throne. In November 1719 the Raja died and his nephew Girdhar Bahadur took the charge of office but on 11 May 1720 he was replaced by Shah 'Ali Khan Barha. After the defeat of Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan in the battle of Hasanpur, 14 November 1720, the Emperor appointed Muhammad Khan Bangash as the governor of Allahabad. The new governor applied himself with single-minded devotion to the administration of the province where, due to political changes at the centre, uncertain conditions were prevailing. He divided the whole territory into six units, each of which was put under the charge of his *chela* who performed the functions of both the '*amil* and '*saujdar*. The revenues of Kalpi and Irichh in the Jhansi district were assigned to him in lieu of salary. Though he faced acute financial difficulties and received no help from the centre, the governor was able to preserve the security of the *subah* by suppressing the recalcitrant *zamindars*. His relations with the Emperor were intimate, whose orders whether relating to his own transfer or other administrative affairs of the province he never defied. After the fall of Jaitpur in August 1729 he was recalled to the court and a year later appointed the governor of Malwa, 19 September 1730. During his absence the administration of Allahabad was carried on by his son Akbar Khan, but in 1732 the Emperor appointed Sarbuland Khan the governor of the province. In 1735 Muhammad Khan Bangash secured the royal *sanad* of his appointment but he was opposed by Shah Nawaz Khan, the son of Sarbuland Khan who also acted as deputy of his father. The *subah* of Allahabad, however, remained under the control of Sarbuland Khan till 1739 when Amir Khan was appointed its governor. Amir Khan held the province under his charge for four years and it was after his murder at Delhi in 1743 that Safdar Jung was appointed the governor of Allahabad. For details, J. A. S. B., 330-336; '*Aziz-ul Qulub*, f. 17; '*Imad-us Sa'adat*, 24, 32; '*Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 801-806.

proper relationship between the province and the centre. At the same time they not only endeavoured to augment the resources of the province but remitted the revenues due to the state regularly. The available evidence, however, tends to suggest a change in the direction of a greater measure of executive and financial power coming to rest, in this period, in the hands of these governors. It would appear that, barring large issues and matters of basic policy, they had a freer hand now than in the past. Muhammad Shah, conscious of the growing weakness of the centre, conceded a large degree of discretion to these governors and followed a policy of minimum interference in their internal matters. But shrewd sovereign as he was, he prevented the governors from combining against him by playing off one against the other and exploiting their differences to strengthen his position.

But this description of the centre-province relations does not apply to the *subah* of Kashmir which presents a different story and, therefore, stands in a category by itself. During this period Kashmir remained secure from the Maratha incursions and no foreign invader—Nadir Shah or Ahmad Shah—threatened its indefensible frontiers. It was rarely disturbed by wars of such violence, duration and magnitude as were fought in Gujarat, Malwa and Bengal. Moreover, no governor attempted to precipitate struggle against the centre for independence and no military adventurer rose to carve out a principality, although the agencies of the central government to repress such elements were less powerful here than in other parts of the Empire. And yet, storms of strife and lawlessness lashed its surface and raged unabated, causing havoc and ruin all round. The happy valley, once a pleasure resort for the kings, was shaken by the revolts of turbulent tribes, disaffected peasants and the urban poor. Periodic famines, caused both by floods and drought, added to the woes of the suffering millions. Contributing further to their affliction was the sharp rise in unemployment and prices even during normal times. The lower classes in society indulged in rioting while more elevated groups signed petitions against governors who were mainly responsible for the economic difficulties and social conflicts. Muhammad Shah, whose general policy was based on the appeasement of bureaucracy, dismissed, on more than one occasion, the inefficient and corrupt governors of Kashmir. But the appointments of experienced and resourceful governors were unaccompanied by economic and administrative reforms without which permanent peace or harmony could not be ensured. In consequence, widespread and protracted disturbances, forms of popular protest, continued as a recurring phenomenon. These political developments merely reflected the weakness of the central government which miserably failed to tackle the problems of domestic peace and economy of this small territory. In the short span of forty years Kashmir was governed by twenty governors whereas in

Aurangzeb's reign of half a century only 12 governors had been appointed. Very few governors, under the later Mughals, held office for more than two years; the average tenure of most of them did not exceed a year. Most of the governors administered the province through their deputies who were scarcely distinguished by talents either for military or civil administrations. Their main aim was to enjoy and abuse the advantages of wealth and power. None of them showed the least concern to protect the interests of the Empire or improve the lot of the people. They nevertheless held the Emperor, the fountain-head of political authority, in the deepest regard, and they neither defied the transfer orders nor did they repudiate allegiance to him.<sup>1</sup>

The reasonably harmonious relationship between the provinces and the centre continued upto 1740, after which the bonds that held the two together began to snap. Power of control and administration exercised by the central authority in Bengal, Allahabad, Awadh and the Punjab declined, if it was not completely suspended. The Marathas achieved virtual dominion over Gujarat and Malwa, the Nizam's authority over the Deccan was undisputed and remittance ceased from Bengal while governors in other provinces also became autonomous and professed only nominal allegiance to the throne. The central government was in effect reduced to the position of a rubber-stamp, a mere paper executive, its only function being the confirmation of appointments made by the governors. After the death of Muhammad Shah in 1748, the governors cast away this formality and the phantom of central authority was invoked only at the death of a governor to confirm the succession of his heir as the sanction of the Emperor alone could provide a legal basis for their rule in the territories. Before the battle of Plassey was fought, independent kingdoms in the Deccan, Bengal and Awadh, whose foundations were laid in the last decade of Muhammad Shah's reign, had already been set up.

This chapter is concerned with the detailed study, in the light of the general observations made in the above discussion, of the problems presented by the centre-province relations during the reign of Muhammad Shah. The provinces selected for enquiry are: Gujarat, Bengal, the Deccan and the Punjab. The following pages also include a description of the political relations of the centre with Rajputana, Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao and 'Ali Muhammad Khan, the Rohilla chief.

### *Gujarat*

At the time of Muhammad Shah's accession, Maharaja Ajit Singh held the governorship of Gujarat; Mehar 'Ali Khan acted as his deputy,

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<sup>1</sup> For details, vide, author's article, "The Subah of Kashmir under the Later Mughals", *Medieval India—A Miscellany*, II, 249-262,

while Nahir Khan occupied the office of *diwan*.<sup>1</sup> The Emperor confirmed these officers in their respective offices,<sup>2</sup> and by an *hasb-ul-hukm*, issued to Nahir Khan, all other state employees of Gujarat were allowed to retain their posts; none of them was to undergo the trouble of getting the *sanad* of his appointment renewed. The *diwan* was instructed not to disturb the *jagirdars* and *a'imma* in the possession of rent-free lands granted to them previously by valid *farmans*. The royal order further laid down that the daily allowances given to *rozina-dars*, hitherto a charge on the *jaziya* revenues, would be paid out of the provincial treasury as the tax had been abolished.<sup>3</sup> The Emperor appointed 'Inayatullah as the *qazi* of Ahmadabad in place of Khair-ullah Khan who was transferred. Ruh-ullah Khan, *naib-diwan*, remitted to the central treasury a sum of Rs. 4,08,000 through *hundees* and in the same year the court sent Farrukh Beg Khan, the mace-bearer with a *parwana* pertaining to tribute collected from the *zamindars*, demands of *mansabdars* and dispatch of the treasure.<sup>4</sup>

In April 1720, Anup Singh Bhandari, appointed as the new deputy-governor arrived at the capital; Nahir Khan, the *diwan*, welcomed and brought him to his official residence.<sup>5</sup> The *diwan* submitted a report to His Majesty, giving an account of his administrative activities and important events. In it he stated that he had made strenuous efforts to keep the roads safe from brigands and bandits and obtained written bonds from *zamindars* for the regular payment of tribute. In cooperation with the deputy-governor he had adopted various measures for the proper defence of the city; and together they had done their utmost to effect the good of the general public. About this time the *diwan* was directed to send Rs. 5 lakhs through *hundees* from receipts of *khalisa mahals* to 'Alam 'Ali Khan who was organizing an army against Nizam-ul Mulk in the Deccan.<sup>6</sup> Anup Singh Bhandari submitted a petition to the central government in which he said that most of the war material including cannons and swivels needed repairs. The Emperor sanctioned Rs. 5,000 for this purpose. By another order the *diwan* was urged to march to Surat at the head of 3,000

<sup>1</sup> The copy of a new *khutba*, drafted by learned and pious men, was sent along with the royal order to governors. The following couplet was inscribed on coins at the commencement of Muhammad Shah's reign:

سکہ زد در جہاں ز لطف الہ - بادشاہ زمان محمد شاہ

"Struck coins in the world through divine grace, the king of time, Muhammad Shah." *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 29.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 29.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 30.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 31.

<sup>5</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 31.

<sup>6</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 32.

horse and 3,000 foot and arrange payment of the contingent from the provincial treasury.<sup>1</sup>

The above facts illustrate that down to the year 1720 the central government remained the mainspring of authority and still exercised all embracing powers of superintendence and direction over the provincial government of Gujarat. Even some of the functions, usually reserved for the office of deputy-governor, were passed on by orders of the court to the *diwan* who emerged as the principal officer of the province at least for this short period.

With the overthrow of the Saiyid brothers, Raja Ajit Singh, their staunch supporter, also fell into serious disfavour. Haider Quli Khan who already bore the impressive titles of Mu'iz-u'd Daulah, Bahadur and Zafar Jang was now appointed *mutasaddi* of Surat, and the management of *khalisa mahals* was put under his charge. Bakht Singh, the son of Ajit Singh, was recalled to the court and Haider Quli Khan was made *faujdar* of Kadi and Patta Chanwall, and *thanedar* of several parganas like Rajpur and Bhamuli.<sup>2</sup> Haider Quli Khan continued to stay at the court and governed the province through his deputy, Shuja'at Khan, who was appointed on his recommendation. The function of fiscal supervision, which had been added to his formal executive duties, gave him a position of preponderance and tended not only to diminish the influence of the provincial *diwan*, but enabled him to exercise a general surveillance over the work of his deputy and other provincial officers. Shuja'at Khan proposed that the *jagirs* of Safdar Khan Babi,<sup>3</sup> against whom he bore deep animosity, should be resumed and assigned to him. Safdar Khan, hearing of his enemy's plan, proceeded immediately to Delhi to wait upon His

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 33.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 40, 42; *Siyar-ul Muta'alkhkerin*, II, 452.

<sup>3</sup> The Babi family of Gujarat played an important role in the course of political events which shaped the destiny of the province during this period. The members of this notable family held high positions in government and possessed large *jagirs*. Taking advantage of the confused state of affairs they became independent of imperial authority and carved out small kingdoms like Junagadh, Balasinor and Radhanpur. The head of the family was Safdar Khan, *faujdar* of Gudhra who died in 1725. His two sons Salabat Muhammad Khan and Jawan Mard Khan were *faujders* of Viramgam and Petlad respectively. Muhammad Babi, the son of Salabat Muhammad Khan, received in 1721 the rank of 500/- and the title of Sher Khan; he was made the *thanedar* of Sadra and Virpur. When Salabat Muhammad Khan died of cholera in 1730, Sher Khan was confirmed in his father's *jagirs*. In 1750 he proclaimed his independence and became the first Nawab of Junagadh. His son Sardar Muhammad Khan established a small principality at Balasinor, while Kamaluddin Khan, son of Jawanmard Khan, set up his kingdom at Radhanpur. For details, *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 80, 107, 116; *History of Gujarat*, II, 432.

Majesty and represent against the transfer of his *jagirs*. Haider Quli Khan consoled and pacified him not only by confirming him in the possession of his *jagirs* but also by securing an increase in his *mansab*.<sup>1</sup> The governor sent Raghunath Das as *mutasaddi* of Surat and asked him to audit the accounts of Shaikh-ul Islam whom he was to replace.<sup>2</sup> The new *mutasaddi* did as he was told, discovered a balance of Rs. 7 to 8 lakhs outstanding against his predecessor and forced him to pay back the amount. On the governor's recommendation, the Emperor appointed Muhammad Bahadur, *thanedar* of Sadra and Virpur, and granted him a *mansab* of 500/270.<sup>3</sup>

Haider Quli Khan cherished the ambition of acquiring independent status and his relations with the imperial court began to deteriorate soon after he took the administration of Gujarat into his own hands on 3 July 1722. He was obviously attempting to bring to an end central control over the provincial government; but his ambition exceeded his strength and his scheme failed.<sup>4</sup> Nizam-ul Mulk who replaced him, started in his characteristic manner exercising unprecedented amount of power in the management of the province and though he was careful to obtain the formal consent of the Emperor to all his acts and operations, his arrogation of authority aroused serious misgivings at the court.<sup>5</sup> After a short stay, however, Nizam-ul Mulk returned to Delhi from Gujarat and after his breach with the Emperor and departure from Delhi for the Deccan in 1723<sup>6</sup> he was dismissed from the governorships of the two important provinces of Gujarat and Malwa. The Emperor conferred the governorship of Gujarat on Sarbuland Khan and appointed Shuja'at Khan his deputy. Sarbuland Khan, like his predecessors, preferred to stay at the imperial court and govern the province through his *naib*. At his recommendation the Emperor appointed Rustum 'Ali Khan, brother of Shuja'at Khan, the *mutasaddi* of Surat, and Tale'yar Khan, on the transfer of Qawi-dil Khan, the *bakhshi* and *waga'i nawis* of the *subah*.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 41.

<sup>2</sup> Shaikh-ul Islam had served as deputy to Saiyid Husain 'Ali Khan, and, after the latter's murder, to Qamr-u'd-din Khan. Raghunath Das was the *diwan* of Haider Quli Khan and had the title of Raja. He did not continue for long in this office, as Shakarullah Beg, alias Tahawwur Khan, was appointed *mutasaddi*. After the dismissal of Haider Quli Khan, Momin Khan was appointed the *mutasaddi*. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 27, 41, 49.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 42.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 45, 46.

<sup>5</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 48.

<sup>6</sup> See Chapter II.

<sup>7</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 54.

Shuja'at Khan actively applied himself to the management of the multifarious affairs of the *nizam*. He appointed the city *kotwal*, and patrolling *faujdar*s and *thanedar*s in the suburbs of Ahmadabad.<sup>1</sup> But the chief danger to his position came from the combined forces of Hamid Khan the former *naib-subedar* and the Marathas. Hamid Khan, unwilling to abandon office peacefully, revolted under the instigation of Nizam-ul Mulk against the central government; with the aid of the Marathas he soon defeated and killed Shuja'at Khan in a hard-fought battle<sup>2</sup>. Now supreme in the province Hamid Khan openly flouted imperial authority and destroyed the whole apparatus of central rule in the province. He seized all revenue records under the charge of the provincial *diwan* and took possession of *khalisa* and *paibaqi mahals* as well as *jagirs* assigned to the imperial *mansabdars*. From this time, writes 'Ali Muhammad Khan, these vast areas of land remained under the complete control of the governors and could never be wrested from their hands by the imperial government.<sup>3</sup> The success of Hamid Khan exposed the lack of strength and purpose in the central government which boded ill for the future. He imposed *baiwarah*, an arbitrary tax collected from the citizens on various items such as on trade, the number of family members and houses. The author says that Hamid Khan was the first governor to impose this illegal levy which became permanent under the succeeding *nazims*.<sup>4</sup>

On learning of the rebel's success, the Emperor pressed Saibuland Khan to proceed to Gujarat and personally handle the situation which was becoming increasingly grave. On 1 December 1725 the governor reached Ahmadabad where local officials welcomed him and pledged their support against Hamid Khan.<sup>5</sup> He managed, through successful negotiations, to expel Hamid Khan from the province and then busied himself in the restoration and improvement of its administration.<sup>6</sup> However, he failed to check the advance of the Marathas. The strain of continuous campaigning against them, without any prospects of success, forced the governor to

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 56.

<sup>2</sup> Hamid Khan imprisoned the two sons of Shuja'at Khan, Husain Quli and Ahmed Quli; he treacherously got Ibrahim Quli Khan, younger brother of Shuja'at Khan, murdered when the youth paid a visit to him at his residence. Rustum 'Ali Khan also lost his life and army in a decisive engagement on 10 February, 1725 near Vaso. The fate that overwhelmed this famous Muslim family was the tragic outcome of the strife let loose in Gujarat which ruined many other Muslim noble families of this province. For details, *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 60, 61, 65, 75, 77; *Mir'at-ul Haqiq*, ff. 37, 38.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 64.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 67.

<sup>5</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 80, 81, 87.

<sup>6</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 83-86.

enter into a treaty with Baji Rao on 23 March 1730, without prior reference to the imperial court.<sup>1</sup> The outraged Emperor stopped the promised monthly subsidy of 3 lakhs to him for fighting against the Marathas. Nevertheless, the Maratha incursions continued even after this settlement and so did the expenditure on defence. This was sought to be met by a sharp increase in illegal taxation and unauthorised contributions.<sup>2</sup> The governor seized *jagirs* of all *amirs* and *mansabdars* in the province whether posted at the royal court or in Gujarat. The Emperor sent instructions to the governor through his *wakil* to desist from such a course and to treat the *mansabdars* well. As he did not comply with the royal order, the Emperor, in retaliation, confiscated his unconditional *jagirs* in the Punjab, and distributed them proportionately among the court nobles whom he had deprived of their *jagirs* in Gujarat, though no remedial measure was adopted to compensate the loss suffered by the provincial *mansabdars*, who were reduced to indigence.<sup>3</sup>

The loss of his *jagirs* in the Panjab so exasperated Sarbuland Khan that he lost all restraint and started extorting money from the people of Gujarat on all kinds of pretexts. He imposed a levy on the traders of Ahmadabad two-thirds of which was to be paid by Hindu merchants, and one-third by the Bohras. This harsh and illegal measure provoked serious civil disturbances in the city. The Bohras rose to a man, under their leader Shaikh 'Abdullah, to resist and defy the governor's orders. They were subdued by military force and ruthlessly compelled to pay double the amount.<sup>4</sup> The iron merchants were also subjected to heavy tax and tortured. Ground down beneath these burdens, the merchants abandoned their trade and left the capital to settle in other places.<sup>5</sup> Khushal Chand, the wealthy magnate and *nagar seth*, was not only replaced by Ganga Das and imprisoned but under threats of public disgrace was made to pay a sum of Rs. 60 thousands.<sup>6</sup> Every year since 1725 he had undertaken expeditions for the collection of tribute from local *zamindars*<sup>7</sup> and a very considerable treasure thus accumulated was misappropriated and squander-

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<sup>1</sup> See Chapter III.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 95.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 95.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 113-116.

<sup>5</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 139.

<sup>6</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 92. Khushal Chand, grandson of Shanti Das Jawahari, was the *nagar seth* or chief of trade guilds to whom the *mahajans* gave four annas per Rs. 100 on all goods that were brought in and carried from the city. *Mir'at-ul Haqaiq*, ff. 449-450.

Sarbuland Khan, in 1726 marched on Wadhwan and brought its chieftain Arjun Singh to submission. The Raja was compelled to pay Rs. 3 lakhs as fine for offering resistance in addition to the fixed annual tribute. Other *zamindars*



ed by him, as he is not reported to have remitted any of this to the central treasury. Despite all this he still had no money to pay the arrears of his army which in desperation made demonstrations, and its disaffected officers procured from the governor drafts drawn upon bankers and merchants of the city and then forced the latter to pay up the money.<sup>1</sup> The central government could not prevent the governor from oppressing the merchant class who were reduced to misery. The system of checks and balances that had yielded satisfactory results in former days was gradually falling apart due to the policy of appeasement of the nobility by a weakening centre. It is noteworthy that despite all this, Sarbuland Khan did not formally renounce loyalty to the throne and even during the years of his worst excesses all important vacancies in the government of Gujarat continued to be filled by the central government.<sup>2</sup>

Sarbuland Khan continued to petition to the court requesting the payment of the monthly subsidy withheld by the Emperor after his treaty with the Marathas. When his appeals were completely ignored, he submitted his resignation to the government. The Emperor, already incensed at his past misbehaviour, was greatly shocked by this fresh insolence. He immediately accepted his resignation and appointed Raja Abhay Singh as the new governor of Gujarat.<sup>3</sup> The Raja, accompanied by his brother Bakht Singh, entered the Bhadra citadel on 27th October 1730. His term

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of the adjoining districts, apprehensive of similar action against them, waited upon him with presents and tributes. The Jam of Navanagar gave him Rs. 3 lakhs through Salabat Muhammad Khan Babi, the *Jaujdar* of Viramgam. In 1727, Khimoji, the Jethwa chief of Chhaya near Porbandar submitted and paid 1,25,000 *mahmudis*. Raja Pratap Singh of Halvad, in order to maintain friendly relations with the Mughal authorities, married his daughter to Sarbuland Khan. Lal, a *zamindar* of Mandu, paid him Rs. 2 lakhs. Sarbuland Khan also invaded the villages of the *kolis* near the capital, and extorted money from them. But the expedition, launched in 1729 against the ruler of Cutch, neither yielded him money nor brought glory to his arms. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 88, 93, 94, 95, 99, 107, 110-112.

<sup>1</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 971.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 101, 105.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 118. After his dismissal from the governorship of Gujarat Sarbuland Khan came to Agra and stayed on there as the Emperor had debarred him from attending the royal court. He lived there for one year during which period he tried hard to regain the confidence of the Emperor and ultimately succeeded in securing the *sanad* of the governorship of Allahabad. *Hadiqat-ul 'Aqalim*, 641. Shakir Khan collaborates this statement by saying that Sarbuland Khan due to the displeasure of the Emperor stayed in Agra and suffered great hardship. *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. 9. But according to the author of *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, Sarbuland Khan went to Delhi where he lived till his appointment to the *subedari* of Allahabad. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 801-806. Sarbuland Khan died in January, 1742.

lasted for 7 years, 1730-1737, out of which he remained in the province for only three years; during the remaining four years his deputy Ratan Singh Bhandari conducted the administration on his behalf. The Raja made an earnest attempt to uphold imperial authority not only by vigorous enforcement of law and order but by keeping the court constantly informed about all his administrative activities, the economic conditions of the province and his dealings with the Marathas. The central government reverting to normal practice endorsed his proposals regarding appointments and grant of *jagirs* to his nominees. On his recommendation, Muhammad Pahar, son of Karim Dad Khan, was appointed *faujdar* of Ratanpur. The Emperor appointed Talib 'Ali Khan the *diwan* and Ghulam Muhammad Khan the *waqa'i-nawis* of the *subah*. The Raja was assigned the revenues from the port of Cambay and *pargana* of Chorasi as salary. The governor entrusted the task of collection to Fida-u'd-din Khan who undertook by a bond to pay the money in fixed instalments.<sup>1</sup>

As observed earlier, the governor had no authority to interfere with or exercise control over the revenue administration of the province which was an exclusive responsibility of the *diwan*. This continued till the rebellion of Hamid Khan upset the system in 1723, and was never, therefore, fully restored in Gujarat. Sarbuland Khan also asserted his authority over the revenue department and set aside all rules and regulations which had ensured the independence of the *diwan* in the province. Maharaja Abhay Singh introduced further changes in the organization and working of the revenue department. He assigned some of its functions to executive officers of the provincial government. For instance, the Raja took the management of *sair mahals* from the *diwan* into his own hands and assigned their revenues, which were previously a reserved fiscal item, to the *marwaris* in *ijarah* on payment of Rs 25 per day.<sup>2</sup> He put the bureau of *bait-ul-mal*, hitherto administered by a *darogah* and revenue officers, under the supervision of the city *kotwal*; while in the suburbs its business was entrusted to the patrolling *faujdar*s.<sup>3</sup> The revenues from the *mahals* of the cloth-market in the city had already been appropriated by Hamid Khan and Sarbuland Khan, now Raja Abhay Singh gave these *mahals* in *ijarah* to the *marwari* businessmen who reduced the former clerks and collectors to a nullity.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, he removed royal officers from the mint of Ahmadabad and appointed his own men to supervise its work; under his instructions they debased the gold and silver coins struck at Ahmadabad mint, which had always been without alloy, by an admixture of copper. The result was

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 132, 133, 141, 145.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 141.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 141.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 140.

that Ahmadabad currency soon became unacceptable outside the city.<sup>1</sup> The governor entrusted the work of revenue collection from *madad-i-ma'ash* lands to 'amils and *tahsildars*, an arrangement which led to the pecuniary loss to a larger number of *shaikhs and sayids* who depended on the income from its collection. Their social position suffered such a severe setback that they were compelled to migrate to other towns in search of livelihood.<sup>2</sup>

A noticeable decline in land revenue, due to the Maratha occupation of vast areas in Gujarat, had also necessitated the adoption of various tax measures by the governors. It appears that the main burden of the new taxes fell on the middle classes, more specially on the merchants and traders.<sup>3</sup> The mode of collection adopted was most arbitrary. Seth Ganga Das, the head of the silk merchants, was placed under custody and was released only after he had paid Rs. 9 lakhs as the price of his liberty. This high-handedness and rapacity alienated public opinion and produced serious discontent. The silk merchants closed their factories and thousands of artificers and craftsmen lost their jobs. The deputy-governor, Ratan Singh Bhandari, imposed *baiwarah* on all classes of people and extorted large sums with the utmost cruelty in Ahmadabad. Following his example, the city *kotwal* and *faujdar*s oppressed the common folk in the suburbs by forcibly realising fines and levies under various pretexts. The rage and despair of the business classes, the *ai'mma* and the common people found expression in agitations and petitions to the imperial court against the governor's palpable injustice.<sup>4</sup> In the meantime Momin Khan addressed a letter to the central government which was full of complaints against the deputy-governor and contained details of developments in the province. By his rudeness and tactless behaviour Ratan Singh had antagonised some important local officers like Sher Khan and Jawan Mard Khan. Infuriated by the stream of complaints Muhammad Shah determined to dismiss the deputy-governor, and Khan-i Dauran, the *mir bakhshi*, concurred with the Emperor in the proposed punitive measures. As soon as the public got wind of the impending action, the Gujarati merchants doing business in the royal camp, seized the opportunity, closed their shops in token of a *hartal* and waited in a body at the court to express their resentment against the ruthless and widely hated deputy-governor.<sup>5</sup> Khan-i Dauran offered the

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 141.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 141.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 164, 165, 193.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 192, 193.

<sup>5</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 195-196.

post to Momin Khan<sup>1</sup>, *mutasaddi* of Cambay, who encouraged by his friends, eagerly grasped so fortunate a chance. His acceptance of office implied his willingness to face the anticipated resistance of the displaced governor. Forthwith, an *has-bul hukm* of his appointment, under the seal of the *mir bakhshi*, dated 10 May 1736, was issued to Momin Khan.<sup>2</sup> It stated :

It was repeatedly reported to the Emperor that the *naib nazim* indulged in acts of cruelty, and resorted to many evil practices of extortion, harassment of the people, digging up houses for buried treasure and seizure of hidden wealth owned by the residents. The Emperor asked Abhay Singh to prevail upon his deputy to refrain from oppressing the helpless people. But this salutary advice produced no effect upon him. The Emperor, therefore, was obliged to relieve the Raja of his duties and place Momin Khan at the head of affairs. The new incumbent was to expel Ratan Singh from the city and rescue the people from his tyranny. He would carry on the administration until a permanent appointment was made. The persons, imprisoned by the deputy-governor for extortion of money, were to be set at liberty. He was to show moderation and clemency towards the people and should defend the city and restore stability. He was also to deal with the Marathas, who were at present spread all over the province, in a manner demanded by the exigency of the moment.<sup>3</sup>

Ratan Singh was not made to suffer any other penalty except dismissal for his many misdeeds. He was, however, not in a mood to accept even that. Moreover, the change in the government of Gujarat had deeply offended the feelings of Maharaja Abhay Singh who still then had been on friendly terms with Khan-i Dauran and faithful to the Emperor. The Maharaja now encouraged Ratan Singh to forestall Momin Khan who with the aid of the Marathas was busy making preparations for an offensive action. When the Maharaja heard that Momin Khan was menacingly advancing to Ahmadabad for the forcible expulsion of his deputy he left the imperial court in protest, and this roused the fears at the court that he might be proceeding to raise a revolt against the government and establish his authority in Gujarat.<sup>4</sup> Under instructions from the Emperor Muzaffar Khan rushed to console and pacify the Maharaja, who was now on his way

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<sup>1</sup> His original name was Mirza Muhammad Najam Sani, he was the son-in-law of Abdul Ghani, the *diwan* of Gujarat. Mirza Muhammad received the title of Momin Khan in 1729. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 108, 121, 124.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 196.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 197.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 199-201.

to Jodhpur, with an assurance of his restoration of the office he had held and fresh orders were issued to Momin Khan, urging him to return to Cambay and abandon his plan for capturing Ahmadabad. But Khan-i-Dauran secretly urged Momin Khan to disregard the new orders from the court and make every effort to drive out Ratan Singh. He wrote :

Maharaja Abhay Singh, angry and disgusted, was about to return to Jodhpur. The Emperor asked Muzaffar Khan to assuage his anger and bring him back to the court and he was now satisfied with royal favours. Therefore, if Ratan Singh justified his continuation in office on the ground of this outward reconciliation, you should not be misled by his wrong interpretation of the development; and you must reach Ahmadabad with speed and drive Ratan Singh out of the city. You are directed to assume charge of the *subah* effectively and to establish order and uphold imperial authority.<sup>1</sup>

In the face of the public opposition in Ahmadabad Maharaja Abhay Singh was prevailed upon by the court to transfer Ratan Singh and nominate another deputy to carry on the administration till permanent arrangements could be made. The Raja recommended the name of Abhay Karan Patwat and *hasb-ul hukm*, bearing the seal of the *mir bakshi*, was issued in his favour.<sup>2</sup> In addition the Raja dispatched to Ahmadabad through his messengers, six royal orders which bore the seals of the *wazir* and the *mir bakshi*, three of them were addressed to Momin Khan, and the remaining three to Abhay Karan Patwat. Momin Khan's orders directed him to withdraw to Cambay as the Maharaja was still the lawful governor of the *subah*. The *hasb-ul hukm*, addressed to Abhay Karan stated :<sup>3</sup>

The government of *subah* Gujarat was retained as before with Raja Rajeshwar Maharaja Abhay Singh. Momin Khan would return to Cambay from whatever place he might have reached. Ratan Singh, on account of complaints by the citizens of Ahmadabad, is dismissed and a new *naib* is being appointed in his place. Till the arrival of the new deputy-governor he (Abhay Karan) should continue to manage the affairs of the *nizamat*.

Momin Khan, who had already received secret instructions from Khan-i-Dauran to go ahead with his plans, paid no attention to these orders and following the fresh directive from him now resolved to fight out the

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 203.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 206.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 208-209.

issue to finish. He ordered his forces to besiege Ahmadabad, thus rendering the royal orders inoperative. The war went badly for Ratan Singh and there were no prospects of success as Maharaja Abhay Singh was not prepared to take the field in person to help his deputy. Ostensibly the governor had never been removed from office, it was only his deputy who had been replaced by another. But in reality it was Momin Khan who had been appointed the governor of Gujarat with implicit orders to bring the province under his control. The situation in Gujarat called for firm decision and energetic action against the notoriously corrupt and cruel officers but the central government instead resorted to double-dealing which indicated its want of strength as well as of means to enforce the imperial orders.

Ratan Singh suffered severely in the ensuing conflict ; he was forced to conclude peace and leave the city which he did on 25 May 1737. Momin Khan received approval from both the Emperor and the *mir bakhshi*, Khan-i Dauran. The Emperor increased his *mansab* to 4,000/4,000 and bestowed upon him the title of Bahadur. Zain-ul 'Abdin, the mace-bearer, came from the royal court to deliver gifts which included a standard, a drum, a special robe, a jewelled tiara and an elephant.<sup>1</sup> Momin Khan governed the province for the next 7 years until his death in 1743. Regularly every year he undertook expeditions to assess revenue, collect tribute and obtain written bonds from the refractory *zamindars* and the *kolis*<sup>2</sup>. In accordance with orders from the central government, coins were struck and *khutba* was read in the name of Nadir Shah in Gujarat. When the interregnum ended and Muhammad Shah resumed his sovereignty new coins were struck and *khutba* was again read in the name of the Mughal Emperor<sup>3</sup>. In 1742 Momin Khan's *mansab* was increased and the Emperor conferred upon him the titles of Najm-ud-Daulah and Dilawar Janj and the *mansab* of 6,000/6,000. The *farman* which the governor received at Petlad amid great ceremony was dated 4 June 1742. By another *farman* he was directed to accord a warm welcome to Asaf Jah who intended to visit the province of Gujarat. In the same year the Emperor sent him Persian melons as a gift along with a *farman* that bore the seal of the *wazir*<sup>4</sup>.

Momin Khan<sup>5</sup> died on 21 February 1743 at Ahmadabad and was buried

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 242, 248.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 248, 249, 257, 258, 265.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 253; *A History of Gujarat*, Vol. II, 471-472.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 264, 265.

<sup>5</sup> Momin Khan's son Muftakhir Khan, became Momin Khan II in 1743. He shared the administration of the province for a year with his cousin Fida-u'd-din Khan. But soon civil strife broke out between them, as a result of which Jawan Mard Khan Babi usurped the government and ruled for 10 years from 1743 to 1753. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 136, 277, 279.

there. He was an accomplished and high-spirited officer, possessed of considerable military ability. During his tenure of office he restored some measure of efficiency and stability to the provincial administration. As manifested by his conduct, he cherished benevolent feelings towards the people of Gujarat; he tried to repair the finances of his government and to heal the wounds inflicted on various sections of society by his predecessors. He maintained good relations with the central government and exerted himself to keep up its prestige especially in matters of appointment of officials and grant of *jagirs* in which the final authority rested with the centre. His recommendations for appointment to posts and increase of *mansab* generally met with the royal approval. His death was a signal for the outbreak of civil war in that province. These domestic feuds provided a unique opportunity to the Marathas to consolidate their conquests and expand the area of their influence over the whole of the province. Consequently confusion and disorder continued unabated for a long time as the central government failed to check it.

### *Deccan Provinces*

Muhammad Shah recognised the *fait accompli* of Asaf Jah's supremacy in the Deccan, the result of his military victory in the battle of Shakar Kherda, by appointing him viceroy of its six provinces on 20 June 1725. The appointment was due not to the Emperor's volition but to his weakness. Once his power was legitimized Asaf Jah consolidated it by securing the essentials of political and administrative autonomy and by his example demonstrated to others a method through which independence of central direction could be achieved. Geo-political considerations added to the increasing weakness of the centre since the death of Aurangzeb had tempted many a governor of the Deccan with dreams of independent powers. If the Empire disintegrated it was here, more than anywhere else, that not only power but even an independent dynasty could be established. Zulfiqar Khan Nusrat Jang had preferred, when the choice was offered to him, the *subedari* of the province to *wizarat* in the reign of Bahadur Shah; while it was the Deccan which Husain 'Ali Khan selected for himself when he had to quit the court under the orders of Farrukh Siyar. Daud Khan Panni and Mubariz Khan had both fought against their respective superior officers in the hope of becoming independent viceroys. Asaf Jah followed much the same course, and concentrated his energies on emancipating himself from the paramount authority of the central government.

The governors of Gujarat and Bengal enjoyed varying degrees of power and patronage, but they always sought imperial approval and sanction for

recommendations made by them in regard to the provincial officers and respected the decisions of the central government. Asaf Jah on the other hand, asserted his independence of the centre by making appointments of all officers, high and low, himself conferring on them honours, titles, *mansabs* and *jagirs* after the fashion of a king. Unlike the governors of Bengal and following the practice of those of Gujarat, he did not remit surplus revenues from the *khalisa* to the central treasury. Though the institution of the provincial *diwan* which had provided a mechanism of control over the governor's activities was not dispensed with, it was allowed to retain only the semblance of authority while real power passed to the governor who adopted the existing system of revenue administration to his own needs. The functions hitherto exercised by the *diwan* were not taken over, but his authority over revenue affairs was considerably undermined in the Deccan. The elaborate rules and regulations established by the centre were substantially retained with suitable modifications. While in Gujarat the arbitrary expedient of confiscation of rent-free lands resulted in the destitution of the *a'imma*, in Bengal and the Deccan this privileged class was not subjected to such high-handed action. In these two provinces, the lands and social privileges of the *a'imma* were at least protected, if not promoted, by the local governments. However, in the Deccan, fresh *madad-i ma'ash* grants or renewal of them were made by Asaf Jah himself and not by the Emperor. Despite all this, Asaf Jah scrupulously kept up the outward forms of allegiance to the Mughal crown. The *khutba* continued to be read in the name of the Emperor and his name was also inscribed on coins struck in the mints of the Deccan. His letters to the Emperor contained profuse expressions of loyalty and obedience and were always addressed as to the sovereign.<sup>1</sup>

Immediately on his accession to power, Asaf Jah appointed his close associates to key posts in the provincial government and favoured them with *mansabs* of the first grade without seeking royal permission.<sup>2</sup> This action represented a departure from the administrative policy he had pursued during his second viceroyalty of the Deccan when he had sought royal approval for all appointments and enhancement of *mansabs* for his comrades-in-arms against Dilwar 'Ali Khan and 'Alam 'Ali Khan. After

<sup>1</sup> *Munshat-i Mausvi Khan*, f. 51b.

<sup>2</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 215a.

شخصی را که تیرول یا نصدی امر مختال بود اورا مراقب دو هزارى بخشيد  
و اکثر امرا را هفت هزارى و شش هزارى و صاحب نوبت و طوبخ و علم  
و ماهى و مراتب ساخت و هر يك از جملة آن جماعه خود را ملازم  
پادشاهى خيال نمى كرد و همى گفتند كه بفرده پادشاهى و فدوى نظام  
الملك ايم -



his victory in the battle of Shakar Kherda, "he granted *mansabs* of 2,000/- to a person who hardly deserved one of 500/-; he exalted others to the ranks of 7,000/- and 6,000/- and honoured them with *naubat*, *taugh*, '*alam*, *mahi-o maratib*. None of these officers considered himself the servant of the Emperor and declared that they were the slaves and obedient servants of the kingdom of Nizam-ul Mulk."

The nobles made *mansabdars* of 7,000/7,000 were Nasir-u'd Daulah 'Abdur Rahim Khan,<sup>1</sup> Baji Rao I, Rao Rambha Nimbalkar and Man Singh Hakiya, who at the same time, received special robes, elephants and jewels as gifts from the governor.<sup>2</sup> *Mansabs* of 5,000/5,000 were conferred on seven officers. These were Saiyid Jamal Khan,<sup>3</sup> Muhammad Ghiyas Khan,<sup>4</sup> Mutahawwar Khan Khwashgi,<sup>5</sup> Qadir Dad Khan;<sup>6</sup> 'Iwaz Khan,<sup>7</sup> Khwaja

<sup>1</sup> He was a brother of Khan Firoz Jang's wife and, therefore, the maternal uncle of Asaf Jah. In the reign of Aurangzeb he received the title of 'Abdur Rahim Khan, while Bahadur Shah honoured him with that of Chin Qulich Khan. He was *faujdar* of Jaunpur when the battle of succession between Farrukh Siyar and Jahandar Shah took place. As a reward for his services in that battle, Farrukh Siyar conferred on him the title of Nasir-u'd Daulah Bahadur and the *mansab* of 6,000/-; he was appointed *nazim* of Burhanpur. *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, ff. 94-95.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, ff. 31, 32.

<sup>3</sup> He was the son of 'Iwaz Khan, and became his father's deputy in Berar after the battle of Shakar Kherda. He supported Nasir Jang against Asaf Jah in the battle of Khuldabad, fought on 23 July 1741. He died in 1746. For details, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 310.

<sup>4</sup> His father Ghani Beg had served Khan Firoz Jang with distinction, and by sheer dint of merit he rose to the posts of *darogah* of artillery and *diwan-i tan* in the reign of Farrukh Siyar. He later joined Nizam-ul Mulk and went with him to Muradabad. He played a conspicuous role in the battle of Balapur, 31 July 1720, and, in return for his service, he received the *faujdari* of Sarkar Belgana in *subah* Khandesh. *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, f. 103.

<sup>5</sup> His real name was Rahmat Khan. He took part in the battle against Mubariz Khan and although the Panni Afghans under his command deserted he remained firm in his position and fought with gallantry. He was far-sighted, wise and a polished speaker. "Among thousands of persons very rarely one finds such an accomplished one." *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 776-793.

<sup>6</sup> His real name was Shaikh Nurullah, and he was the son of Qadir Dad Khan, son of Rashid Khan Ansari. Aurangzeb granted him the *mansab* of 400 and made him *qal'adar* of one of the forts in the Deccan. Bahadur Shah increased his rank to 1,000 and appointed him *faujdar* of Janod in the province of Khandesh. He joined the army of Nizam-ul Mulk and fought in the battles against Dilawar 'Ail Khan and 'Alam 'Ali Khan. Muhammad Shah raised his rank, on the recommendations of Nizam-ul Mulk, to 3,000/2,000. In the battle of Shakar Kherda he commanded the vanguard of the Nizam's army; and as a reward received the rank of 5,000/4,000. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 140-141.

<sup>7</sup> His real name was Khwaja Kamal. He came from Turan in the time of

Ahmad, Khwaja Mahmud<sup>1</sup> and Turktaz Khan.<sup>2</sup> There were five officers who obtained the rank of 3,000/3,000, three of whom namely, Harzullah Khan,<sup>3</sup> Talib Muhiy-u'd-din Khan<sup>4</sup> and Hafiz-u'd-din Khan<sup>5</sup> had accompanied him from Delhi to Hyderabad in 1724 and held at the time the rank of 1,000/- only.<sup>6</sup> As for *jagirs* he assigned them to several persons such as Jagpat Rao, a *mansabdar* of 3,000/- in *pargana* Vaktor, to Appa Rao,

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Aurangzeb who, on the recommendation of Khan Firoz Jang, granted him the title of 'Iwaz Khan. After the death of Khan Firoz Jang, Mir Jumla became his patron and got him appointed in Berar as *faujdar*; later he became *nazim* of this province. He supported the cause of Nizam-ul Mulk, and fought against Dilawar 'Ali Khan and 'Alam 'Ali Khan. He received the rank of 5,000/5,000 and the title of 'Azad-u'd Daulah Bahadur Qaswara Jang and was made governor of Berar. When the Nizam went to Delhi to assume the office of *wizarat*, the offices of *diwan* and *bakhshi* were put under him and he was made deputy-governor of the Deccan. He served the Nizam faithfully till his death in 1730-31. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 832-36.

- <sup>1</sup> Khwaja Ahmad Khan and Khwaja Mahmud Khan were the sons of Mubariz Khan 'Imad-ul Mulk. Khwaja Ahmad Khan, son-in-law of Dilawar 'Ali Khan, was granted the *mansab* of 6,000, with a title of Shahamat Khan and a *jagir* in Hyderabad. Khwaja Mahmud received the title of his father, 'Mubariz Khan, and the rank of 5,000/5,000. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 729-746.
- <sup>2</sup> His father came from Turan in the reign of Aurangzeb who gave him a rank in the army. Turktaz Khan was born in the Deccan, and he adopted the customs and manners of the Marathas. After the battle with 'Alam 'Ali Khan he entered the service of Asaf Jah and rose to high position. He died in 1736. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 503-4.
- <sup>3</sup> He was the grand-son of Sa'dullah Khan Shah Jahani. He served as the *faujdar* of *Sarkars* of Mahmud and Nanded. In the time of Asaf Jah he received the title of Bahar Jang. He died in 1167 H. (1753-54). *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, f. 99a.
- <sup>4</sup> He was also the grand-son of Sa'dullah Khan Shah Jahani. In 1724 he resigned the post of *faujdari* of Chinot in the Punjab and entered the service of Nizam-ul Mulk. He accompanied him to the Deccan and fought on his side against Mubariz Khan. The Nizam appointed him *faujdar* of Raichur. He proved an efficient administrator. He improved the condition of Raichur by taking keen interest in the improvement of cultivation and the maintenance of law and order. Later, he was made *faujdar* of Adoni (Imtiazgarh) and *naib nazim* of Bijapur. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 520-524.
- <sup>5</sup> He was the son of Lutfullah Khan, a grand-son of Nawab Sa'dullah Khan. He exerted himself in the battle of Shakar Kherda and Asaf Jah increased his *mansab* and granted him a title. He served in different capacities at various places in the Deccan. He was the *faujdar* of Chicacole and Madak, and governor of Hyderabad. After the death of 'Iwaz Khan, he was made the deputy-governor of Aurangabad. He went to Delhi with Asaf Jah in 1737, and stayed back there. Muhammad Shah bestowed on him the titles of Sa'dullah Khan, Sa'd-u'd Daulah, Hafiz-u'd-din Khan, Bahadur. Dilawar Jang *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, f. 100.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 214; *Hiyat-i Asafi*, 237; *Mir'at-ul Safa*, f. 57.

a big *zamindar*, Telingana in *pargana* Najaras and to Khwaja Ahmad in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad worth of few lakhs as a free gift.<sup>1</sup> Some of his favourite officers who received titles were Faiz-ullah Khan and Agha Mu'in, each of whom received the title of Khan; Iradat Khan<sup>2</sup> obtained that of Bahadur and Khwaja 'Abdullah Khan became Abul Wafa Khan. He appointed Muhtashim Khan<sup>3</sup> *bakhshi* of the *mansabdars*, Anwarullah Khan<sup>4</sup> his own personal *diwan* and Khwaja 'Abdullah Khan,<sup>5</sup> *faujdar*; Sa'dullah Khan<sup>6</sup> was made *nazim* of Arcot and Ahtida Khan<sup>7</sup> the *mutasaddi* of Masaulipatam. Jan Sipar Khan<sup>8</sup> was the *diwan* of Hyderabad.

<sup>1</sup> *Hiyat-i Asafi*, 237-39; *Hadiqat-ul 'Alam*, 139.

<sup>2</sup> His real name was Mir Hidayat-ullah and was the son of Mirza Mubarakullah who held the title of Iradat Khan in the reign of Aurangzeb. Mir Hidayat-ullah acquired the title of his father, Iadrat Khan, in the reign of Farrukh Siyar. Nizam-ul Mulk, during his stay in Delhi in 1722-1724, helped him financially and took him in his service. After the battle of Shakar Kherda he was raised to the *mansab* of 4,000/2,000 and was made *diwan* of the whole of Deccan after the dismissal of Diyanat Khan. *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, f. 102a.

<sup>3</sup> His name was Mir Muhammad Khan and he was the grand-son of Shaikh Mir. Through the recommendation of Zinat-un Nisa Begam he received the *mansab* of 7,000/-. He afterwards attached himself to Nizam-ul Mulk and served him with devotion. In 1724 he was appointed *bakhshi* for the second time and held this important office for 20 years. He received the title of Bahadur and rose to the rank of 5,000/-. "He was a straightforward man, devoid of guile, and was distinguished for his sincerity and frankness." *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 793-796.

<sup>4</sup> He was the maternal uncle of Qutb-u'd-daulah Muhammad Anwar Khan Bahadur, deputy-governor of Burhanpur. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 141-143.

<sup>5</sup> His ancestors belonged to Turan. 'Abdullafi Khan and his brother Khwaja Rahmat-ullah Khan submitted to Nizam-ul Mulk in Hyderabad after the death of Mubariz Khan. The Nizam appointed 'Abdullah Khan *khansaman* in addition to the *faujdari* of Rajmundry and made Rahmat-ullah Khan, *diwan* in his own establishment. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 832-833.

<sup>6</sup> His name was Hidayat Muhiy-u'd-din and he was the son of Mutawassil Khan Bahadur Rustum Jang. He received the title of Khan and the rank of 3,000/2,000. After his father's death he became governor of Bijapur and rose to the rank of 4,000/3,000. As a reward for his services he obtained the title of Sa'd-ullah Khan *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, f.97a.

<sup>7</sup> His name was Mirza Mehdi and his ancestors belonged to Isfahan. First he served as *khansaman* in the establishment of Nizam-ul Mulk during the period of his *wizarat*. After the battle of Shakar Kherda he was appointed *mutasaddi* of Masaulipatam. *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, f. 105b.

<sup>8</sup> He was the son of Rustum Dil Khan and grand-son of Jan Sipar Khan. Rustum Dil Khan was put to death on a false charge of treason by the orders of Prince Kam Bakhsh. His son, who obtained the title of his grand-father, Jan Sipar Khan was held in high esteem by Asaf Jah. Before he was appointed *diwan* of Hyderabad he had served as *khansaman* in the government of Asaf Jah. He

He appointed Raja Gopal Singh Gaur<sup>1</sup> the *qal'adar* of Qandhar in Bidar.

TABLE VII

LIST OF IMPORTANT APPOINTMENTS MADE TO VARIOUS POSTS<sup>2</sup>

<i>Name</i>	<i>Post</i>
1 'Aqil Khan Kambhu	<i>diwan</i> of Burhanpur
2 Yusuf Muhammad Khan	<i>khansaman</i> and <i>darogah</i> of arsenal.
3 Hisamullah Khan	<i>qal'adar</i> of Udgir.
4 Mir Kalan Khan	<i>qal'adar</i> of Bidar.
5 Jan Sipar Khan	<i>diwan</i> of Hyderabad
6 Saif-u'd-daulah	<i>kotwal</i> of Hyderabad
7 Hafiz-u'd-din Khan	<i>faujdar</i> of Chicacole
8 Ahtida Khan	<i>nazim</i> of Masaulipatam
9 Khwaja Rahmatullah Khan	<i>diwan</i> of establishment (Kandpali)
10 Faiz-u-ullah Khan	<i>faujdar</i> of Elore
11 Agha Mu'in	<i>faujdar</i> of Mustafanagar
12 Himmat Yar Khan	<i>qal'adar</i> of Golconda
13 Khair-ullah Khan	<i>nazim</i> of Hyderabad
14 Abdul Nabi Khan	<i>faujdar</i> of Karpa
15 Randaulah Khan	<i>faujdar</i> of Karnul.
16 Sana-ullah Khan	<i>faujdar</i> of Adoni.
17 Sultan 'Ali Khan	<i>qal'adar</i> of Adoni.
18 Sa'dullah Khan	<i>nazim</i> of Arcot
19 Saif Khan	<i>khansaman</i>
20 Talib Muhiyuddin Khan	<i>faujdar</i> of Raichur
21 Mirza 'Ali	<i>faujdar</i> of Bijapur
22 Khwajah 'Abdullah Khan	<i>faujdar</i> of Rajmundry
23 Muhtashim Khan	<i>bakhshi</i> of the <i>mansabdars</i>
24 Nasir-u'd-daulah	<i>nazim</i> of Aurangabad.
25 Nur-ullah Khan	<i>diwan</i> of Burhanpur
26 Anwarullah Khan	personal <i>diwan</i> of Asaf Jah
27 Khwaja 'Abdullah	<i>faujdar</i> of Murtazanagar
28 Raja Gopal	<i>qal'adar</i> of Qandhar in Bidar.

Nothing more clearly demonstrated Asaf Jah's freedom of action in the conduct of provincial administration than the appointment he made of *nazims*, *diwans*, *bakhshis*, *faujders* and *qal'adars* without referring them to the imperial court. His authority, free from imperial direction and control, was now irrevocably established over the Deccan. The centre never

possessed half of the *pargana* of Amarpur in *Sarkar Mahkar* as *jagir*. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 324-328

<sup>1</sup> His ancestors, who were *zamindars* in the province of Allahabad, served under the Raja of Orchha. Gopal Singh took service in the government of Asaf Jah and he showed courage and daring in the battle of Shakar Kherda. He was given a suitable rank and *jagir* by Asaf Jah. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 340-341.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, ff. 31-40, 46; *Hiyat-i Asafi*, 237-239; *Hadiqat-ul 'Alam*, 139,

challenged his position of dominance nor did it ever seek to destroy it by measures which the Emperor later adopted against 'Aliwardi Khan. The political and administrative relations between the centre and the Deccan government became virtually non-existent though the legal fiction of the paramountcy of Delhi was maintained; but the personal relations between Muhammad Shah and Asaf Jah grew close. During the following decades, the Emperor continued to shower favours and honours on him, and Asaf Jah on his part always showed to the Emperor the deference and regard due to him. He received all royal *farmans* with decorum and ceremony and his acknowledgement of them was made in respectful and loyal terms. In reply to the *farman*, regarding his confirmation in the post of governor and restoration of his *jagirs* in the north, he wrote :<sup>1</sup>

The forehead of desire became radiant by the ardour of devotion and servitude when I thought of addressing His Majesty . . . . The servant begs leave to inform His Majesty of the august arrival of the *farman* of elevated dignity, foundation of favour and kindness, conferring the title (*Asaf Jah*) and announcement of increase in *zat sawar* (8,000/-8,000) and *dams* by way of favour. It has also been the royal will and pleasure to restore the *jagirs* in Hindustan and to announce joyful news of further favours.

On many occasions the Emperor sent to Asaf Jah special gifts of fruits and robes of honour and Asaf Jah responded gratefully to these gestures.<sup>2</sup> Once the Emperor sent a *farman* together with three *ghazals* composed by him. Asaf Jah in his reply praised every verse and extolled the high literary merit of the poems<sup>3</sup>. He also sent 'id greetings to the Emperor and wrote letters of congratulation on the anniversary of his enthronement.<sup>4</sup> He kept the Emperor constantly informed about such matters as his dealings with the Marathas, warfare against the local *zamindars*, his financial difficulties and other general conditions prevailing in the province. The revenues collected and raised in the province appear to have been entirely devoted to local expenditure and there is no definite evidence to show that he ever sent tribute to Delhi after 1725; but he always emphasized his loyalty and allegiance to the Emperor as evidenced by a large number of letters in various collections. In one letter, for instance, he wrote, "God is my witness and the people are also aware that I have always carried out royal commands with the same spirit of devotion which my performance of five religious

<sup>1</sup> *Gulshan-i 'Ajaib*, f. 36; *Munshat-i Mausavi Khan*, ff. 131-132; *Nizam-ul Mulk Asaf Jah*, I, 177.

<sup>2</sup> *Munshat-i Mausavi Khan*, ff. 17, 18, 21, 22, 28.

<sup>3</sup> *Munshat-i Mausavi Khan*, ff. 175-176.

<sup>4</sup> *Munshat-i Mausavi Khan*, ff. 41, 43, 62, 63.

acts display."<sup>1</sup> He considered obedience to the king as a necessary prerequisite condition for seeking the blessings of God.<sup>2</sup> He hoped the Emperor would recognize his endeavours and those would win for him grace and that would be rewarding and beneficial to him, both in this world and next world.<sup>3</sup> To effect improvement in the affairs of religion and the state is to do service to the Emperor which is in fact like doing service to God. Whatever he felt was necessary in the interest of the king he had done and would do in future.

In two letters, addressed to the Emperor, Asaf Jah recorded details about the capture of Trichinopoly, the famous stronghold, held by Murari Rao Ghorepada, the deputy to Raghuji Bhonsle, on 29 August 1743. He recounted in it the hardships suffered and perils faced by his armies in the siege operations. He wrote how to divert his attention from the siege, Raja Shahu sent a Maratha force under Babuji Naik to stir up disturbances in Hyderabad but Anwar-u'd-din Khan, its *nazim* defeated and routed it. Raghuji, on hearing of this setback, returned in haste from Bengal without achieving any thing there.<sup>4</sup> Asaf Jah had appointed Anwar-u'd-din Khan *nazim* of Karnatak after the death of Khwaja 'Abdullah Khan<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *Munshat-i Mausavi Khan*, f. 142b.

<sup>2</sup> *Munshat-i Mausavi Khan*, ff. 29, 31, 32.

<sup>3</sup> *Munshat-i Mausavi Khan*, f. 135b.

<sup>4</sup> For details of these events, vide, *Munshat-i Mausavi Khan*, ff. 36,37; Burhan Ibn Hasan, *Tuzuk-i Walajahi*, I, 46-47.

<sup>5</sup> In 1713 Sa'adat-ullah was appointed *nazim* of Karnatak which formed part of the Deccan province. In 1725 he paid homage to Asaf Jah and deposited the revenues in the Hyderabad treasury. His original name was Muhammad Saiyid and he belonged to the Nawayat tribe of Arabs which had settled on the western coast of South India. He died in 1732 and was succeeded by his nephew, Dost 'Ali. The Maratha army, under the command of Raghuji Bhonsle, invaded Karnatak in 1739. Dost 'Ali put up a strong defence but he was killed along with his son Husain 'Ali, and his army was routed. The Marathas made Husain Dost, alias Chanda Saheb, son-in-law of Dost 'Ali, captive and Safdar 'Ali, the eldest son of Dost 'Ali became the *nazim* of Karnatak. But Safdar 'Ali was assassinated by some men in the pay of Murtaza 'Ali, another son-in-law of Dost 'Ali, who had organized a conspiracy to capture power. Murtaza 'Ali was the son of Baqar 'Ali, brother of Dost 'Ali. In November 1742 Murtaza 'Ali, proclaimed himself Nawab and entered Arcot with great pomp. Soon the army of Karnatak, faithful to the memory of their patron, revolted. As Murtaza 'Ali had no courage to fight, he fled away; his departure was followed by the accession of Sa'id Muhammad Khan, the infant son of Safdar 'Ali, who lived with his mother in Madras. Hearing of this troubled state of affairs, Asaf Jah in the beginning of 1743 marched at the head of a large army to establish order and his authority in Karnatak. He drove out

In another letter to the Emperor he gave a detailed account of his pursuit of Bhaskar Pandit and 'Ali Qarawal, the two generals of Raghuji Bhonsle. 'Iwaz Khan Bahadur, governor of Hyderabad, was first dispatched to drive them out of the imperial territories but when he got into difficulties Asaf Jah set out in the midst of the rainy season and took personal command of operations against the enemy. He put such relentless pressure against the Marathas that they became disheartened, and fled away. "In rendering service to His Majesty, I regard danger and peril as pleasure and comfort. I marched from Hyderabad towards Berar and Devgarh. My aim was to create consternation in Raghuji's stronghold in Berar, so that he might not continue his depredations in Bengal."<sup>1</sup>

It is evident that from 1724 onwards Asaf Jah was exercising power in the name of the Emperor but completely independent of his control and authority; he exercised some of the prerogatives of royalty during the period. He no longer obtained royal consent for the appropriation and expenditure of the provincial revenues, nor did he consider it necessary to get his treaties with the Marathas ratified by the Emperor. As already noted he made appointments and transfers of officers and assigned to them *jagirs* on his own initiative. When 'Iwaz Khan, his uncle and *nazim* of Berar died in 1731, Asaf Jah appointed in his place Saiyid Jamal, the son of the deceased.<sup>2</sup> He spent the month of Ramzan, March 1731 camping on the banks of the Narmada from where he issued orders that the daily subsistence allowance granted to persons of Burhanpur in the reign of Aurangzeb should be reduced to two-third and the allowance of such *madad-i ma'ash* holders, granted in the days of Bahadur Shah reduced to one-third.<sup>3</sup> On

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the Marathas from Trichinopoly and appointed Khwaja 'Abdullah as the *nazim* of the province who died soon after assuming charge. Anwar-u'd-din Khan of Gopamau, an experienced officer who had held important positions under Ghazi-u'd-din Khan Firoz Jang and whom Asaf Jah had appointed *faujdar* first of Ellore and then of Rajmundry, was then appointed *nazim*. It was announced that he would administer the *subah* of Karnatak during the minority of Muhammad Sa'id Khan. In April 1744 Anwar-u'd-din Khan reached Arcot and assumed the duties of his office. After the murder of Sa'id Khan, Asaf Jah made Anwar-u'd-din Khan the permanent governor of Karnatak. For details, vide, *Tuzuk-i Walajahi*, 51-54; *Ma'asir-i Nizami*, 150; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, 513-514; *Munshat-i Mausavi Khan*, ff. 94, 120, 121, 129; Robert Orme, *A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan*, I, 38, 41, 47-48, 49-50.

<sup>1</sup> *Munshat-i Mausavi Khan*, ff. 39-41.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, f. 95.

<sup>3</sup> *Ma'asir-i Asafi*, 115.

4 June 1743 Nasir-u'd Daulah, *nazim* of Aurangabad died. His son Mujahid Khan was appointed in his place. As he was only 17 or 18 years old, 'Ali Akbar Khan was made his guardian. Shortly afterwards, friction arose between them; Asaf Jah solved the problem by dismissing Mujahid Khan and appointing 'Ali Akbar Khan as the governor of Aurangabad.<sup>1</sup>

In February 1746 Khwaja Ishaq, *risaldar* received the *mansab* of 400/- and the title of Khan; and Khwaja Shah received the *mansab* of 700/- and the title of Haider Quli Khan. Asaf Jah gave Bahadur Khan, a *qal'adar*, one horse and a robe of 5 pieces as a gift; he allowed Muzaffar Jang Bahadur the privilege of being heralded by the beating of drums when he entered Asaf Jah's camp. Abul Khair, at the time of his appointment as *faujdar* of Gulshanabad, was given a horse, one elephant, a sword and a robe of one piece. At about this time both Rahim-ullah Khan and *wakil* of Babu Naik received *khil'ats* of four and six pieces respectively.<sup>2</sup> "Asaf Jah had laid down that one officer should not be permitted to stay for more than one or two years in his *ta'aluqqa*, so that others might also get their share of its wealth; he explained that an officer could in that time earn enough to suffice him for four years." The system of rapid transfers appears to have been deliberately designed to meet the problem of growing unemployment in the *subah*.<sup>3</sup> Asaf Jah had great regard for old and respectable families whose members found jobs and special favour in his government. Khuda Banda Khan, a descendent of Amir-ul Umara Shaiysta Khan, Muqarrab Khan, son of Amir Khan Deccani, Muhtasham Khan, grandson of Shaikh Mir, Marahmat Khan, son of Amir Khan Miran-i Mir, Saiyid 'Abdur Rahim Khan, a descendent of Mir Saiyid Muhammad Chisti, Abul Khair Bahadur and Sa'adullah Khan, all prominent officers, were some of those who belonged to such families. Most of the Khanazad nobles, residing in the Deccan for one generation or two, were also indebted to Asaf Jah.<sup>4</sup>

A study of documents pertaining to the grant of *jagirs*, subsistence allowance and appointments of such local officers as *faujders*, *qal'adars*, *shiqqadars* and *amins* throws further light on Asaf Jah's relations with the centre. All orders with respect to the assignment of *jagirs* and *madad-i ma'ash* lands were issued by the provincial *diwan* under the seal of Asaf

<sup>1</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 201.

<sup>2</sup> *Akhbarat-i Darbar-i Asafiyah*, Hyderabad State Archives.

<sup>3</sup> *Ma'asir-i Nizami*, 119; *Hadiqat-ul 'Alam*, 173.

موافق ہ بطہ خود کہ زیادہ ہر ہک سال و دو سال ہک شخص را ہر یک  
تفلیقہ بحال نمی داشت تا حصہ دولت بدیگرے رسد -

<sup>4</sup> *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin*, f. 215.



Jah which bore on it the legend, "Nizam-ul Mulk Fateh Jang Bahadur *fidvi* (obedient servant) of Muhammad Shah." One such document dated November 21, 1730 was issued after the death of Mir Muhammad Fazil. It is an order in favour of Zia-u'd-din Husain Khan and others, sons of Qazi Mas'ud Khan, for assignment of *jagir* in *pargana* Sarkano, *Sarkar* Kavil of *subah* Berar, amounting to one lakh and twenty thousand *dams*. The local officers, like *deshmukhs*, *deshpandas*, cultivators and *ra'iyat* of the *pargana* were instructed to allow them to take possession of the *mahal* as *jagirdars*. The revenues from *pargana* Haliyapur in Hyderabad, amounting to 36 thousand *dams*, were assigned to Mir 'Abdul Awwal and Abdur Razzaq jointly after the death of Mir 'Abdul Qayyum Khan. *Deshmukhs* and *deshpandas* of the said *pargana* were enjoined to allow the agents of the 'amil to take charge of the *mahals*. The *sanad* was issued under the seal of Nizam-ul Mulk; it bore the seal of Qazi Karim-u'd-din Khan, and it was signed by 'Iwaz Khan 'Iz-ud-daulah, the *nazim* of Hyderabad. It was issued under the orders of Diyanat Khan, the *diwan* of the Deccan. The document is dated 5 June 1725.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Eastern Provinces*

In contrast with the open defiance of central authority by the *subedars* of Gujarat and its virtual setting aside by Asaf Jah in the Deccan, the governors of Bengal—from Murshid Quli Khan to Sarfraz Khan—based their relations with the imperial court on obedience and loyalty. Whereas Gujarat was distracted by economic oppression and civil strife, the province of Bengal achieved a considerable degree of stability and prosperity under a benign and efficient administration. Public repose in Bengal and its harmonious relations with the centre ended only with the accession to power of 'Aliwardi Khan who, when faced with Maratha aggression evaded payment of tribute into the royal exchequer.

Murshid Quli Khan,<sup>2</sup> appointed governor of Bengal and Orissa in 1715, was confirmed in his office by Muhammad Shah to whom he sent treasure and presents before and after the battle of Hasanpur. Throughout his term of office, which terminated with his death in June 1727, Murshid Quli Khan remained faithful to the crown and unflinchingly obeyed the royal commands. He exercised the patronage vested in his office with the king's sanction. His regular and unflinching payment of annual tribute

<sup>1</sup> *Sajjad 'Ali Collection*, Hyderabad State Archives.

<sup>2</sup> His titles were : Mu'tamin-ul Mulk, 'Ala'u'd Daulah, Ja'afar Khan, Bahadur, Nasiri, Nasir Jang. His *mansab* was 7,000/7,000. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 752.

secured for him an esteemed position at the court while his diligence and ability made his tenure a very successful one. He established law and order in the two provinces, improved agriculture by inaugurating land reforms and tapped new sources of revenue which increased his financial resources.<sup>1</sup>

The Emperor allowed him considerable latitude and initiative in effecting such administrative changes as did not clash with high imperial policy or interests. Freed from central intervention, Murshid Quli Khan gradually but tactfully and unobtrusively concentrated all power in his own hands and then used it in transforming into a family oligarchy. He assigned all important and well-paid jobs to his own relations and adherents. He kept the gaze of the central government averted by regular remittances with which it was mainly concerned so that no attempt was made to interfere with the process. The Emperor not only gave his consent to all these appointments but lavishly bestowed titles and honours on the powerful ruling group being created by the *subedar*. The provincial *diwan*, who generally exercised a check on executive excesses, was his own grandson, Sarfraz Khan.<sup>2</sup> He appointed Shuja'ud-din Muhammad Khan, his son-in-law, the deputy-governor of Orissa, and Muhammad Taqi, another grandson, *faujdar* of Balasore; out of his three deputies in Bengal two belonged to his own family. Muhammad Jan and Saif Khan became the *faujdar*s of Hugli and Purnia respectively.<sup>3</sup> He put the department of *sadar qanungo* under the charge of Darpa Narayan, a competent and trustworthy officer, who also served the governor as his secretary of the treasury.<sup>4</sup> The *faujdar*s of *chakla* Murshidabad, Hugli, Burdwan and Madni were under the *subedar*'s direct charge, while other *faujdar*s and *thanedars* of Tajpur, Purnia, Akbarnagar and Khora Ghat, appointed at his request by the centre, were subordinate to him.<sup>5</sup> He thus became

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkerin*, 444; *Riaz-us Salatin*, 276.

<sup>2</sup> When Saiyid Ibrahim Khan, *diwan* of Bengal, died, Murshid Quli Khan nominated Saiyid Razi Khan, husband of Nafisa Khanam, daughter of Shuja'ud-din Khan, for the vacant post and procured the Emperor's approval. After the death of Saiyid Razi in 1720, the Emperor appointed, at the governor's recommendation, Mirza Asadullah, son of Shuja'ud-din Khan, *diwan* of Bengal, and bestowed on him the title of Sarfraz Khan. *Riaz-us Salatin*, 274; *Tarikh-i Bangala*, 53; Charles Stewart, *The History of Bengal*, London, 1813, 404.

<sup>3</sup> *Riaz-us Salatin*, 247; *Tarikh-i Bangala*, 66.

<sup>4</sup> The post of *sadar qanungo* was first created in the reign of Aurangzeb to reduce the powers of the provincial *diwan* and prevent him from acting illegally. His main function was to countersign all revenue papers issued from *daftar-i-diwani*. Murshid Quli Khan, instead of abolishing the post, sought to gain the cooperation of Darpa Narayan, *sadr qanungo*, by increasing his emoluments. *Tarikh-i Bangala*, 49.

<sup>5</sup> He also established a new *thana* at Kathwa and placed it under the charge of Muhammad Jan. *Persian Revenue Records of Bengal*, B.M.,MS., Add. 6586, f. 5a.

not only the sole executive authority in Bengal, but the influence and ascendancy of his family members was finally established.

Murshid Quli Khan had the prudence to realize that the payment of annual tribute and conspicuous display of allegiance to the sovereign was necessary for the undisturbed enjoyment of his power and the perpetuation of his family's rule over Bengal. He, therefore, took meticulous care to maintain the elaborate procedures and forms required to be observed by a governor in his relations with the sovereign. New coins<sup>1</sup> were struck in the Murshidabad mint on the coronation ceremony of the Emperor every year and sent to Delhi as a token of homage. Besides this, he sent the usual presents or *nazrana* on other public festivals, like two 'ids, marriage of the Emperor or birth of a child in the royal palace. Annually he sent the revenue collected according to rules from *khalisa* and from *khasnavisi*,<sup>2</sup> and also elephants, *seetalpati* and special garments for the king along with the accounts.<sup>3</sup> The average yearly payment works out approximately to Rs. 1,04,74,705.<sup>4</sup> At the ceremonial functions, held at Murshidabad, he strictly observed rules of conduct prescribed for a governor. He never put the royal fleet to personal use and when in the rainy season the royal fleet came out from Jahangirnagar, he received it with ceremony and saluted it as it sailed past; he even distributed gifts among the crew. It is evident that his policy was to set up his own power and that of his family in Bengal with the full concurrence and legal sanction of the Emperor; and it was never his aim to use the power to defy the centre or to destroy its legitimate rights.<sup>5</sup>

For such uniform rectitude of conduct the Emperor rewarded Murshid Quli Khan with special favour and indulgence that continued even after

<sup>1</sup> "The coins mostly used for big transactions were the silver ones called *sicca* rupees, the gold coins having been mere 'fancy' coins used for paying presents to the emperor or higher officers. The *sicca* rupees bore upon them the year of the king's reign and were of the weight of 10 *masha* and of 98/100 fineness. They were not token coins but passed for the same value as the silver they contained, making allowance for 2/100 mixture to cover the cost of coining." *Murshid Quli Khan and His Times*, 93-94; for other details of the system of coinage during this period, vide Harry Verelst, *View of the Rise, Progress and Present State of English government in Bengal*, London, 1772, 93-96; James Stewart, *Principles of Money applied to the present state of the coin in Bengal*, 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Khasnavisi* was a *rusoom* or fee paid by the *zamindars* for the renewal of their annual assignment by the *khalisa* officers. The amount collected under this head did not exceed Rs. 1,91,095. To this was added under the same head Rs. 65,511 more, being the price of gold *mohers*, 4,697-3-8, rated at Rs. 14 each which was sent by the governor to the court every year. *The Fifth Report*, II, 208.

<sup>3</sup> *Persian Revenue Records*, f. 54b.

<sup>4</sup> *Persian Revenue Records*, f. 57; *The Fifth Report*, II, 213; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 467.

<sup>5</sup> *Riaz-us Salatin*, 283.

the latter's death on 30 June 1727. The Emperor did not try to deprive his family of its privileged position in Bengal. Prudence and grace alike dictated this course. The regime was too well-entrenched to be overthrown without disturbing the stable and smooth running of the provincial administration as well as the existing harmony in centre-*subah* relations. The Emperor in consultation with Khan-i Dauran, therefore, appointed Shuja'-u'd-din Muhammad Khan,<sup>1</sup> the governor of Bengal and Orissa who took charge of his office in July 1728.<sup>2</sup> He was an experienced and reputed administrator. His first official act was to release defaulting *zamindars*, put under confinement by his father-in-law, after obtaining from them written bonds for payment of arrears.<sup>3</sup> The measure showed his moderation of temper and restraint in dealing with the offenders. He personally investigated cases of corruption and oppression, and patiently and scrupulously followed the tedious rules and procedures in the discharge of his judicial functions. Like his predecessors he maintained a firm control over the functioning of all departments of government in both the provinces. He allowed Sarfraz Khan, his eldest son, to continue in the office of provincial *diwan* and appointed Muhammad Taqi, his second son, deputy-governor of Orissa; while his son-in-law Mirza Lutfullah, surnamed Murshid Quli II Rustum Jang became deputy-governor in Dacca whence he was transferred in 1734 to Orissa. Another family group which acquired a leading place in government was closely related to the governor. Haji Ahmad, the head of this family, was entrusted with the administration of *sa'ir mahals* in Murshidabad while one of his sons, Sa'eed Ahmad Khan was made *faujdar* of Rangpur. His other two sons, Mirza Muhammad Raza and 'Aliwardi Khan were the *bakshi* and *faujdar* of Akbarnagar respectively. All these proposals for appointment had been sent by the governor to the Emperor who had willingly sanctioned them, making his control over the administration complete.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Shuja'-u'd-din was born in Burhanpur in an *afshar* family which had migrated from Khurasan. He took service under Murshid Quli Khan and accompanied him to Bengal. His first wife Zainab-un Nisa Begam was the daughter of Murshid Quli Khan from whom his son Sarfraz Khan was born but who lived with her father in Murshidabad, as Shuja'-u'd-din had married another lady from whom his son Muhammad Taqi was born. *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkerin*, II, 70

<sup>2</sup> There was a tussle between Shuja'-u'd-din Khan and his son Sarfraz Khan for the post of governorship. Both of them asserted their respective claims and did their best to influence the imperial court [through their *wakils*. For details, *Riaz-us Salatin*, 287-89; *Tarikh-i Bangala*, 84; *The History of Bengal*, 411-412.

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkerin*, II, 471.

<sup>4</sup> For details of these appointments, *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkerin*, 472; *Riaz-us Salatin*, 294; *The History of Bengal*, 417.

He remitted to the royal exchequer Rs. one and a half crores, through Kothi Jagat Seth<sup>1</sup> along with Rs. forty lakhs from the belongings of Murshid Quli Khan. This was followed by the remittance of annual tribute along with usual presents consisting of elephants, horses, garments for the king and other goods manufactured in royal factories. In return for all this he received confirmation of his appointment as governor of Bengal and Orissa. The Emperor also raised his *mansab* to 7,000/7,000 and conferred on him the titles of 'Mota'min-ul Mulk Shuja'u'd-daulah, Shuja'u'd-din Muhammad Khan Bahadur, Asad Jang.<sup>2</sup> The *faujdar*s in the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, were directly appointed by the Emperor; in the exercise of their executive functions they received assistance and cooperation from the governor. The *faujdari* of Murshidabad was under the direct charge of the governor who appointed his own deputy in the area.<sup>3</sup> On the coronation day the governor held a public *darbar* to which all imperial and provincial officers were summoned; in this open court he heard petitions, and after thorough investigation decided the disputes between the parties. *Waqai nawis*, *Waqai nigar* and *harkaras*, appointed by the Emperor, regularly supplied information regarding public matters to the imperial court. On the basis of these reports the central government formulated its policies and issued directions to the provincial *diwan* and the governor.<sup>4</sup>

At about this time a serious situation arose in the *subah* of Bihar which called for immediate intervention of the central government. Fakhr-u'd Daulah, *nazim* of the *subah*, 1727-33, had failed not only to sternly repress disorders and revolts but by the rashness of conduct and hasty measures of administration antagonized local *zamindars* and *amirs* like Shaikh 'Abdullah and Khwaja Mu'atasim.<sup>5</sup> To restore order in the

<sup>1</sup> The great banking house of Jagat Seth was founded at Murshidabad by the ancestors of Fateh Chand. In 1714 Manikchand Saha, son of Hiranand Saha and maternal uncle of Fateh Chand, died. Muhammad Shah, on the recommendation of Murshid Quli Khan, conferred on Fateh Chand the title of Jagat Seth in 1723. Fateh Chand enjoyed the privilege of coining money out of his own bullion on payment of usual charges. For details, *Murshid Quli Khan and His Times*, 98-100; Majumdar, P.C., *The Musnud of Murshidabad*, 153.

<sup>2</sup> *Riyaz-us Salatin*, 291; *Tarikh-i Bangala*, 87,88.

<sup>3</sup> *Persian Revenue Records of Bengal*, f. 63a.

<sup>4</sup> *Persian Revenue Records of Bengal*, f. 64a.

<sup>5</sup> Shortly after his accession Muhammad Shah had appointed Saiyid Nusrat Yar Khan the governor of Bihar with the title of Rukun-u'd Daulah and an increase of 1,000, *duaspa* in his *mansab*. In 1727 he was replaced by Fakhr-u'd Daulah who governed the province for six years. He clashed with Shaikh 'Abdullah, a powerful local *amir*, whose estates he confiscated and whom he tried to imprison. The Shaikh, however, escaped into Awadh where Sa'adat Khan, an old friend and patron of his, gave him protection and a job in the government. To crown all,

province and inspire respect for his authority the Emperor took quick action in dismissing Fakhru'd Daulah and appointing Shuja'u'd-din Khan in his place as governor of Bihar. On the governor's proposal the Emperor appointed 'Aliwardi Khan the *naib nazim* of Bihar and bestowed on him a *mansab* of 5,000/5,000 with the titles of Bahadur and Mahabat Jang.<sup>1</sup> It is probable that considerations of administrative convenience and economy led the Emperor to make this arrangement but it doubtlessly resulted in an immense increase of Shuja'u'd-din's resources and prestige. The Emperor, however, sought to retain his controlling authority over the administration of Bihar by prescribing some rules of procedure for the transaction of business. The Emperor placed the *faujdar* of *sarkar* Mongyer, *sarkar* Shahabad and *sarkar* Turhat in Bihar under the charge of Shuja'u'd-din Khan who sent his own deputies to these places. In the exercise of his powers the deputy-governor of Bihar was subject to the control and direction of the *subedar* who in his turn received orders directly from the central government. All orders concerning Bihar were issued to Shuja'u'd-din Khan who transmitted them to 'Aliwardi Khan with his own directions for their enforcement. When 'Aliwardi Khan wanted to enquire or seek clarification about complicated issues he wrote to Shuja'u'd-din Khan who in his turn communicated the petition to the royal court if he could not use his own discretion in the matter. The central government sent instructions direct to the governor for transmission to the deputy-governor which he was bound to obey. The revenue collectors in *khalisa* and *paibaqi mahals*, attached to *khalisa*, were appointed by the imperial *diwan* in the *subah* of Bihar.<sup>2</sup> After the invasion of Nadir Shah this administrative system, designed to obviate the evils proceeding from the concentration of power in the hands of the governor, collapsed; and, owing to the weakness of the central ministers, the *khalisa* and *paibaqi mahals* passed under the control of the governor of Bengal.<sup>3</sup>

Shuja'u'd-din Khan sent the annual tribute regularly; during a period of 10 years 6 months and 22 days he remitted Rs. 11,31,40,338-14-8, to the

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the governor incurred the displeasure of Khwaja Mu'atasim, brother of Khan-i Dauran who, on this score, poisoned the Emperor's mind against him and eventually secured his dismissal in 1733. *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, 453; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 54, 55; *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. 10a.

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, 469; *Tarikh-i Bangala*, 97. The author of *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, f. 201a, on the other hand, writes that at the suggestion of Khan-i Dauran the Emperor appointed his son Mirza Ahmad the governor of Bihar and Shuja'u'd-din Khan his deputy.

<sup>2</sup> *Persian Revenue Records of Bengal*, f. 70a.

<sup>3</sup> *Persian Revenue Records of Bengal*, f. 71a.

royal treasury.<sup>1</sup> After his death on 13 March 1739, the Emperor willingly nominated his son, Sarfraz Khan to the governorship of the three provinces. The new governor made no change in the policy pursued by his father towards the centre and continued to enjoy the confidence and esteem of the Emperor. During his term of office the invasion of Nadir Shah took place, the deadly effects of which paralyzed the central government. Taking

<sup>1</sup> "In the government of Sujah ud dowlah from the 6th Ziq'ad of the 9th year of Mohammad Shah to the 27th Jamadi-ul-awwal of the same reign, corresponding with 1143 Bangaleh, comprising a period of 10 years 6 months and 22 days."

"Collections, stated as in the preceding account, but detailed in ten sums periodically realised; viz. :

	Rs.	Rs.
Bengal jam 'tumari of the Khalisa Sharifa		9,94,75,831-13-19
Peshkash, & c. variable income		
Nazar-i 'Iiden	8,56,918-8-0	
Wajoohat khasnavasi, & c.	52,05,577-10-0	
Effects of Ja'afar Khan, deceased.	60,93,227-5-4	
Do of Ibrahim 'Ali Khan	1,00,000-0-0	
Do of Nazir Ahmed	1,02,648-4-0	
Kola Pushan, European factories	5,65,000-0-0	
Yaft Khidmat, fees on the grant of zamindari and other offices.	4,50,000-0-0	
Fine imposed on Bid'i uz Zaman, Zamindar of Beerbhoom.	<u>1,06,000-0-0</u>	
Total	<u>1,34,79,371-11-4</u>	1,34,79,371-11-4
Baghelpur or subah of Bihar, in the same time.		1,85,135-5-5

Total : Imperial revenue acknowledged to have been realized in both provinces. 11,31,40,338-14-8

N.B. - The province of Orissa being under the separate government of Mahomed Tuqi Khan, the illegitimate son of Sujah, or Moorshed Kooli Khan his son-in-law.

Remittances to Delhi, in sums equal to the collections of each subah, detailed as follows :

In specie	8,12,27,674-9-3
Bills of exchange	2,99,57,470-15-5
Charges of transportation and hindoyiat	4,90,193-6-0
Payment of money borrowed in the government of Ja'afar Khan from merchants and bankers	<u>14,65,000-0-0</u>

1,40,338-14-8"

advantage of the weakness of the Mughal court, 'Aliwardi Khan invaded Bengal and, in a fiercely contested engagement at Giria he defeated and killed Sarfraz Khan on 10 April 1740. He formally ascended the *masnad* of Bengal in Chihil Satun, the hall of forty pillars; he took possession of all the wealth and properties which belonged to Shuja'ud Daulah and his son Sarfraz Khan.<sup>1</sup>

The development in the eastern provinces were fraught with dire political and economic consequences for the imperial court. Not only was the prestige of the crown, so badly and so recently shaken by foreign invasion, but its last and unfailing source of revenue also in danger. The Emperor began to fear that the exultant usurper might be tempted to repudiate his financial obligations and deftly sever ties of allegiance. Everyone at the court was stunned out of his wits. The future was heavy with forebodings. Two possible courses could be adopted by the Emperor if the imperial interests were to be salvaged. One was, as suggested by Asaf Jah, to dismiss 'Aliwardi Khan and appoint Rustum Jang, son-in-law of the unfortunate victim, as the governor of Bengal.<sup>2</sup> The other was to take away from 'Aliwardi Khan's control the two provinces of Bihar and Orissa and put them under the charge of new governors who could establish the power of the centre in the dominions. As the dislodgement of 'Aliwardi Khan from the two provinces was bound to lead to clash of arms the success of both the plans would depend not only on the ability and zeal of possible candidates to the important posts but on the strength of armed forces that could be placed at their disposal. But the Emperor had neither the resources for full-scale military operations nor able commanders of rank and reputation to undertake them. It is impossible not to be struck by the dearth of gifted and trustworthy persons in the ruling class at this time. But its reasons are not difficult to find. The ablest military officers had perished either in the battle of Karnal or in the holocaust that followed the defeat. Among the remnant the Turani nobles were out of favour with the king; while the Irani and other nobles of influence lacked military experience and qualities of generalship.

The perplexity of this situation compelled Muhammad Shah to recognize the *fait accompli*: bowing before reality he confirmed 'Aliwardi Khan in the post which the latter held by right of conquest. 'Aliwardi Khan, on his part, did his utmost to soften the indignation which his usurpation of power had aroused. He asserted his loyalty and allegiance to the crown and guaranteed regular payment of annual tribute. Jugal Kishore,

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Mut'akkhherin*, 495.

<sup>2</sup> Asaf Jah is reported to have offered his services to lead the expedition to Bengal. But at this moment the relations between the Emperor and Asaf Jah were very strained, *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, f. 185.



his *wakil* at the court, assiduously courted the favour of the Emperor by tact and flattery. As a proof of his obedience, the governor sent Rs. 40 lakhs in cash, costly presents worth Rs. 70 lakhs, Rs. 14 lakhs as *peshkash* and Rs. one crore by way of remittance to the Emperor. He gave Rs. 3 lakhs to Qamr-u'd-din Khan, the *wazir*, and Rs. 1 lakh to Asaf Jah, the *mir bakhshi*.<sup>1</sup> His fears having been thus dispelled, the Emperor raised 'Aliwardi Khan's *mansab* to 7,000/7,000 and granted the various titles and ranks the governor requested for his principal officers.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, Muhammad Shah was far from gratified with the amount remitted to Delhi. He first sent an agent, named Murid Khan, to demand the whole treasure seized from the vaults of Sarfraz Khan's palace and also the arrears of two years.<sup>3</sup> When his arrival was reported to the governor, he asked him to stay at Patna and sent some money for his expenses. After much hesitation he delivered to the king's agent a few lakhs of rupees, jewellery worth Rs. 70 lakhs and a number of elephants and horses. But the issue of arrears was not settled; and Murid Khan, returned to Delhi with his real mission unfulfilled to apprise the Emperor of the attitude of the governor.<sup>4</sup>

The non-payment of the promised money thoroughly alarmed the Emperor; the fond hope that 'Aliwardi Khan, despite his past misdeeds, would remain loyal to the throne in future had proved illusory, thus adding to the Emperor's dislike and distrust of him and necessarily demanding a fresh look at the entire pattern of relationship between the centre and the government of Bengal. The first Maratha incursion in April 1742 afforded the Emperor an opportunity to avenge himself and bring the governor to book. When the governor of Bengal was locked in conflict with Bhaskar Ram, Amir Khan 'Umdat-ul Mulk, *nazim* of Allahabad, wrote to the Emperor suggesting that Safdar Jang, governor of Awadh, be directed to attack Bengal from the side of Bihar and capture it. He assured the Emperor that Safdar Jang would send the full annual revenues to Delhi regularly if the *nizamat* of the eastern provinces was bestowed upon him. He further argued that as Safdar Jang was a general

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin* II, 494; *Tarikh-i Bangala*, 128; *Riaz-us Salatin*, 325.

<sup>2</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 495; *Tarikh-i Bangala*, 129; *Riaz-us Salatin*, 333.

<sup>3</sup> Murid Khan was an imperial agent, sent by the *wazir* to demand the annual remittance from Bengal which had fallen in arrears owing to confusion caused by Nadir Shah's invasion. *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 496. According to Salim he was sent to Bengal not by Muhammad Shah but earlier by the orders of Nadir Shah to extort money from Sarfraz Khan. He was present in Patna when 'Aliwardi Khan invaded Bengal. *Riaz-us Salatin*, 325; *Bayan-i Waqa'i*, f. 59b.

<sup>4</sup> *The History of Bengal*, 448; *Imad-us Sa'adat*, 33; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, f. 248 b.

with not only a creditable record of service but also a strong army, the Emperor did not need to tax his resources by entrusting this responsibility to a central minister.<sup>1</sup> The interests and personal preference of the Emperor inclined him to the choice of Safdar Jang. He consequently issued orders to the governor of Awadh to march on Bihar at the head of his army. For Safdar Jang it held out prospects too tempting to resist and with a large army and powerful artillery he set out from Faizabad and reached Patna on 7 December 1742. He took possession of the Patna fort and began to behave as if he was the *de facto* governor of Bihar. His high-handed conduct provoked strong resentment at Murshidabad and evoked misgivings against the Emperor's policy.<sup>2</sup>

Safdar Jang would have exerted all his military strength to conquer Bihar had 'Aliwardi Khan been defeated in the contest with the Marathas.<sup>3</sup> The Emperor placed under his charge the two impregnable forts of Chunar and Rohtas which he wanted to use for sheltering his family and army.<sup>4</sup> These forts would have been of strategic value only in the event of military operations against the governor of Bengal; but their military utility would be negligible if his real purpose was to help 'Aliwardi Khan to drive out the Marathas from Orissa, the main scene of fighting. But against the expectation of the Emperor and his advisers at the court complete victory attended the arms of the Bengal governor; he emerged with new strength from the ordeal to combat the pressure and preserve his power. He asked Safdar Jang in plain words to keep his hands off Bihar and quit the province without delay.<sup>5</sup> He also requested the Emperor to recall "that aggressive expansionist" for he no longer needed his succour.<sup>6</sup> Safdar Jang explained that as he had defeated the Marathas without his aid he was

<sup>1</sup> 'Imad-us Sa'adat, 33.

صفدر جنگ از علامان اردات کیش است - اگر نظامت آن جا بموجب حکم بندگان اقدس با و تعلق خوابید گرفت سال بسال پیشکمر دلخواه ارسال خواهد نمود -

*Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 517.

<sup>2</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 517.

<sup>3</sup> *The History of Bengal*, 459.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 520.

<sup>5</sup> 'Aliwardi Khan in his letter to Safdar Jang enquired, "Whether the Emperor has bestowed these provinces on him, if it is so, let him reveal the fact so that he should proceed without ado to the court.

اگر داده شهنشاه جم شمیم  
عیاں کن بزرگی که تابی قصور  
ترا این همه ملک را از کرم  
روم تدرین سالک بسوے حضور

*Shah Namah-i Deccan*, f. 208b.

<sup>6</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 520.

ready to return provided he ('Aliwardi Khan) remitted the promised money to Delhi and also paid him a certain amount for his journey.<sup>1</sup> 'Aliwardi Khan, to avoid a showdown, arranged a *modus vivendi*, by pledging to pay the government its dues and sending Safdar Jang a few lakhs of rupees for his journey.<sup>2</sup> The Maratha agent in Delhi reported to Poona that Muhammad Shah had demanded urgent payment of revenues from Bengal and 'Aliwardi Khan had promised to send the treasure in due course.<sup>3</sup> Safdar Jang left Patna on 15 January 1743. The above evidence provides some of the strongest arguments supporting the conclusion that the real object of Safdar Jang's military action in Bihar was to overthrow 'Aliwardi Khan if circumstances favoured his plan.

It is strange that Ghulam Husain Tabatabai, author of *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin* ignores the factors which brought the dispute between 'Aliwardi Khan and Muhammad Shah to a head. He merely states very briefly that the Emperor, in response to appeals for reinforcement from Murshidabad, directed Safdar Jang to proceed to Bihar with his army; and later, at the protest of the governor against his acts of hostility in Patna, urged him to return to Awadh.<sup>4</sup> But this over-simplification fails to furnish a clue to the causes responsible for the widening rift between the Emperor and the governor of Bengal. The crux of the problem was money which Muhammad Shah was persistently demanding and which 'Aliwardi Khan, in spite of repeated assurances, had not paid. To avoid payment of arrears the governor employed devices while the Emperor was determined to overcome the impediments to their recovery in full. As the Emperor could not gain his object by peaceful means he in the end resorted to the desperate method of aggression against the governor through the agency of Safdar Jang. The Emperor's decision to appoint Muhammad Khan Bangash to the *nizamat* of Bengal in 1743 supports this contention. Though Muhammad Khan did not succeed in his bid to obtain a superior post, his

<sup>1</sup> *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, f. 208b.

ولہی در حضور شہ نامور ز تلنگی بود حجت سیم و زر  
پس آن پیمہ کہ سازی خزانہ روان بزوری بغزد یک شاہ چہاں

<sup>2</sup> *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, f. 209a.

خزانہ روان می کدم بزمزید - بزوری بہمراہ خان مرید  
ازیں ماجرا صفدر جنگ شاہ - سوئے صوبہ خود قدم زد برآہ

*Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 520; *Imad-us Sa'adat*, 34. According to the author of *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, f. 250a, 'Aliwardi Khan gave Safdar Jang Rs. 12 lakhs for the expenses of his journey.

<sup>3</sup> *Marathi Itihas Sadhna*, edited by Vishwanath Kashi Nath Rajwade, Vol. II, 94.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 516.

appointment revealed the dangerous mood of the Emperor. Muhammad Khan proposed that his son Qa'im Khan be given the *subedari* of Bihar while he himself would be willing to act on behalf of Prince Ahmed as deputy-governor of the remaining two provinces—Bengal and Orissa. He undertook to deliver up the treasure of Sarfraz Khan, confiscated by 'Aliwardi Khan, and to remit punctually ten or fifteen times more revenue than that deposited by the governors of Bengal; but owing to the opposition of his rivals at the court, Muhammad Khan could not achieve his object.<sup>1</sup>

Muhammad Shah devised a fresh scheme to reduce 'Aliwardi Khan to submission and for its execution his choice fell on Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, deputy-governor of Malwa, whose professions of loyalty he had of late begun to trust. Both the Emperor and the Peshwa wanted to intervene in the affairs of Bengal in their own interests, the former to contain the power of the governor and the latter to prevent Raghuji Bhonsle, his adversary, from gaining a foothold in that area. The Emperor sent the Peshwa to Bengal ostensibly to provide a protective shield for its governor, but, under the guise of protection, he concealed a mischievous plan to put the heaviest possible political and military pressure on him. The circumstantial evidence tends to support this view. In the first place, the way Balaji Baji Rao advanced and struck deep into Bihar, inflicting loss and misery on the territory, was tantamount to aggression against the governor who was soon at his mercy. It was only his tactful and conciliatory attitude which saved the province from a more serious catastrophe. Had the Peshwa brought his troops to repel Raghuji Bhonsle, he would have left the inhabitants of the province and the governor alone; nor the governor would have submitted to the unwarranted demand of *chauth* from Bihar, which he did in his extremity and which was so derogatory to his honour and harmful to his interests. Secondly, 'Aliwardi Khan did not renew his appeal for reinforcements to the court; he was unwilling to have another taste of succour from Delhi only two months after the departure of Safdar Jang. It is true that a fresh assault from Nagpur was expected at any time, but when the Peshwa commenced his journey from Orchha, 8 November 1742, the threat was not so imminent. The Peshwa, on the other hand, had received royal orders, early in November 1742, to proceed to Bengal and, in return for his commitment, obtained the grant of *chauth* from Bihar. He reached Gaya on 8 March 1743, while Raghuji Bhonsle had already entered Orissa in February 1743. Moreover, if Balaji had been commissioned against Raghuji, the success gained by 'Aliwardi Khan over Raghuji and his opposition to any

<sup>1</sup> *The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad*, 329.

outside help, should have made the Emperor revoke his orders to prevent Balaji from launching a military enterprise in Bihar. Thirdly, what made the armed-intervention doubly sinister was the award of *chauth* to Balaji Baji Rao without informing the governor for whose aid this settlement had been made. If the Emperor was intent mainly upon the defence of Bengal, he should have made a settlement with Raghuji Bhonsle rather than with the Peshwa. The grant of *chauth* at this early stage of war, as a condition of peace, even if it had been made to Raghuji, would have been needless because 'Aliwardi Khan was quite well-prepared to fight back the aggression a second time, as the sequel proved. 'Aliwardi Khan concluded that the Emperor had in reality sent Balaji Baji Rao to overthrow him and as such the only alternatives before him were to yield or fight. As he was not ready to fight against two foes at the same time, he found an escape through the peaceful path of settlement by accepting the terms offered by Balaji which he would otherwise have spurned. The Peshwa and the governor met on 31 March 1743 on the west bank of Bhagirathi near Plassey and exchanged presents. He agreed to pay, as already stated, Rs. 22 lakhs to the Peshwa to cover his expenses and pay the annual *chauth* from the revenues of Bihar.

The ultimate consequences of the Peshwa's intervention were far graver than those produced by Raghuji's invasion since they led, by a direct chain of cause and effect, to the grant of *chauth* from Bengal and Bihar to Raja Shahu in May 1751. The agreement, between 'Aliwardi Khan and the Peshwa, though it resulted in the immediate expulsion of Raghuji Bhonsle, introduced a new factor which posed a number of administrative and economic problems for the government of Bengal. Once the Peshwa had succeeded in acquiring *chauth* from Bihar he was never to abandon his claims and he adopted every possible measure to procure his share of the revenues of that province. A few months later he wrote to his agent Ram Chandra Baba, "Raghuji has collected 7 or 8 thousand men and he plans to march towards Patna. This seems to be his avowed object. You must get ready to prevent him from penetrating into the province and to see that Patna does not fall into his possession." It soon became clear that the Peshwa was not interested in the defence of Bengal against the constant menace of Raghuji, nor was he prepared to champion the cause of the Emperor in his tussle with 'Aliwardi Khan. All that he wanted was to tighten his grip over Bihar and then proceed to secure the grant of *chauth* from Bengal. The stir and stress of these developments formed no part of the Emperor's anxiety; his main aim, beyond which he could not project his vision, was to secure the fixed amount of *khalisa* revenues and if this was not paid to damage the resources and position of the governor. The tortuous and underhand course he adopted produced in the end a result which was the opposite of that intended. Under the hammer blows of the Mārathas,

'Aliwardi Khan not only stiffened his resistance to the Emperor's demand for money, but entered into his own arrangements with the Marathas.

There is no definite record of the exact sum of money 'Aliwardi Khan remitted to the central treasury nor any evidence to show how long he kept up the practice if he did pay any portion of the *khalisa* revenues. Charles Stewart suggests that he never sent any to Delhi.<sup>1</sup> James Grant, on the other hand, holds that the Nawab, due to the Maratha incursions, reduced the annual tribute from one crore of rupees to 50 lakhs,<sup>2</sup> the same figure is given in the report of Rai Rayan.<sup>3</sup> The Persian Revenue Records of Bengal do not contain a single document regarding payments to the court under the governorship of 'Aliwardi Khan, though complete accounts of remittances, even to a fraction of rupee, sent by his predecessors, are stated in this important source of information. Salim, Salimullah and Tabatabai are silent on this point; they extol Murshid Quli Khan, Shuja'ud-din Khan and Sarfraz Khan for their regular payment of annual tribute, but in the case of 'Aliwardi Khan they supply no information one way or the other. Ghulam 'Ali, author of *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, however, explicitly states that 'Aliwardi Khan after sending revenue for one year stopped the payment which irritated the Emperor and increased his financial difficulties.<sup>4</sup> The fact that both Safdar Jang and Muhammad Khan Bangash promised to pay more money than what was paid by Sarfraz Khan seems to attest the wilful failure of 'Aliwardi Khan in carrying out his financial commitment. About the year 1743, 'Aliwardi Khan expressed his inability to despatch the treasure on the pretext of Maratha incursions.<sup>5</sup> The Emperor and Hingne in their letters to the Nawab insisted that he should send the whole amount of money collected from *khalisa mahals*.<sup>6</sup> It may be inferred that the governor was sending either half or only a portion of the net collections to the central government. In any case, the clash between Muhammad Shah and 'Aliwardi Khan developed on the issue of payment only after 1743 and continued to strain their relations till the end of his reign in 1748.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The History of Bengal*, 491.

<sup>2</sup> *The Fifth Report*, II, 217.

<sup>3</sup> *Persian Revenue Records of Bengal*, f. 56a.

و از خزانه ارسالی بموجب حکم حضور پادشاه نصف در خرچ نگاه  
داشت سپاه هلاکمه مجبرا گرفتند نصف ارسال می کرد -

<sup>4</sup> *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 33.

<sup>5</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 516.

<sup>6</sup> *S.P.D.*, II, 10, 4. The Emperor wrote to 'Aliwardi Khan, "So, send the full amount quickly." Hingne wrote to him, "You remain watchful at your place and send the imperial revenue in full clearance."

<sup>7</sup> *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 33; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 517.

During these years of conflict and confusion 'Aliwardi Khan maintained a normal and continuous relationship with the centre in other administrative matters. He exercised his initiative in making recommendations for superior appointments to posts under his control, which were generally approved by the central government, and like his predecessors he concentrated all important executive powers in his family members, for whom he secured high *mansabs* and titles from the Emperor.<sup>1</sup> His success against the Marathas in Orissa, December 1742, elicited high praise from the Emperor who conferred on him the title of Husam-u'd-daulah and gifts consisting of a sword, a dagger and necklace. In 1743, the Emperor bestowed, on his recommendation, the deputy-governorship of Orissa on 'Abdul Nabi Khan.<sup>2</sup> Again, after the murder of Bhaskar, 31 March 1744, the Emperor graciously conferred on him the title of Shuja'ul Mulk, and honoured Mustafa Khan, who had played a leading role in that conspiracy with the *mansab* of 5,000 and the title of Babar Jang.<sup>3</sup> This system of administrative relationship remained unaltered presumably till 1745; after that the link, connecting the centre with the Bengal government, was broken.

At the beginning of March 1744 the Maratha army under the command of Bhaskar Ram invaded Orissa, but the Peshwa did not despatch reinforcement which he had promised for the defence of the province a year

<sup>1</sup> The list of posts, *mansabs* and titles, given below illustrates and supports this statement. *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 495, 499, 520.

Name	Mansab	Post	Title	Relationship
1. Nawazish Muhammad Khan	7,000/-	Deputy-governor of Deccan, <i>faujdar</i> of Silhet and Chatgaon	Shahmat Jang Ahtasham-u'd-daulah	Nephew and son-in-law
2. Zain-u'd-din Ahmad Khan.	7,000/-	Deputy-governor of Bihar	Ahtram-u'd-daulah, Bahadur Haibat Jang	Nephew and son-in-law.
3. Saeed Ahmad Khan	7,000/-	Deputy-governor of Orissa	Muhamud-daulah Bahadur, Saulat Jang	Nephew and son-in-law
4. 'Ata-ullah Khan	7,000/-	<i>faujdar</i> of Akbar-nagar and Bhagalpur	'A'z-u'd-daulah, Bahadur Sabit Jang	Son-in-law of Haji Ahmad, brother of 'Aliwardi Khan

<sup>2</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 519,528.

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 516,520,531.

before in return for *chauth*. The Peshwa's reconciliation with Raghuji, effected in the presence of Raja Shahu on 31 August 1743, may account for his non-intervention in the conflict between 'Aliwardi Khan and Bhaskar Ram.<sup>1</sup> Again, in March 1745, Raghuji Bhonsle, invited by Mustafa Khan, launched an attack on Bihar; this time, too, the Peshwa did not draw his sword in the cause of the Nawab. The Emperor felt little concern over the calamity that befell the provinces of his Empire. He did not urge the Peshwa, to whom he had granted *chauth*, to march personally against the invader or send military assistance to the governor. Though self-confidence and indomitable courage helped him to quell the Afghan insurrection and rout the army of Raghuji, the Nawab was disappointed by the apathy which both the Emperor and Balaji showed at this critical moment. He lost faith in the plighted word of the Peshwa and in the policy of compromise the Emperor seemed at the time to be pursuing towards him.

The Peshwa, on the other hand, followed a new strategy designed to obtain royal grant for the *chauth* of Bengal. During the two years, 1744-46, the Peshwa and his agents in the north made every diplomatic effort, through Raja Jai Singh, to persuade the Emperor to issue such a grant. In October 1746, the Peshwa was able to write the following letter, which clearly indicates his well-considered plan, to Ram Chandra Baba:

You must go to Patna after the Bundela war is over. By your visit to the eastern zone you will gain three objects. In the first place you will be able to collect more money from Bihar; secondly, our supremacy will be vindicated; and thirdly the public will begin to acknowledge the strength of our arms. We are separately writing to Mahabat Jang, and this second letter attached herewith is to be handed over to him. It is hoped you will press the Nawab to pay *chauth* in accordance with the treaty of 1743.<sup>2</sup>

Early in November 1746, 'Aliwardi Khan received instructions from the court to remit Rs. 25 lakhs as the *chauth* of Bengal and Rs. 10 lakhs as that of Bihar to the central treasury so that the money could be paid to Raja Shahu's agents in Delhi. Raghu Nath Jay Ram, agent of Sindhia at Murshidabad, sent the following information to Poona on 2 December 1746:<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Aitihāsik Patrayavahar*, Vol. II, Letter No. 35, 24.

<sup>2</sup> *Peshwa Daftar*, Vol. 20, No. 49, 40-41.

<sup>3</sup> *The Bhonslas of Nagpur, 1715-72*, edited by G.S. Desai, Bombay, 1931, No. 49, 40-41, dated 2/xii/1746.



That the *chauth* from Bihar has already been granted by the Emperor to the Peshwa; for the *chauth* of Bengal the Emperor seems well-disposed and inclined to grant to the Peshwa. The *chauth* should be collected from Bihar without any delay. But Nawab 'Aliwardi Khan has raised a new issue in order to evade the payment.

The 'new issue' referred to was explained by the governor in his reply to Raghunath, when the stipulated amount was demanded. 'Aliwardi Khan argued that the three provinces constituted one administrative unit, and no arrangement should have been separately made for any of the parts.<sup>1</sup> He did not question the competence or validity of the Emperor's authority in issuing such a *farman* nor did he criticize the manner in which he chose to exercise it; what he objected to was the utility of the measure adopted to secure solution of the pressing problem of security. While the Emperor mistakenly believed that Balaji was a whole-hearted champion of the Mughal interests in the east, 'Aliwardi Khan apprehended that a grant of *chauth* to him would be the prelude to the disintegration of the territory under his control. It meant that his energies so far expended in hard-fought campaigns were wasted. The Emperor and Hingne, Peshwa's envoy at the imperial court, sought to assuage his fears by asserting that in case of invasion, forces of Sindhia and Holkar, posted in Bundelkhand would rush to his rescue. He should not permit such false rumours to agitate his mind; he must, on the other hand, send annual tribute in full to the Emperor, and *chauth* to the Peshwa.<sup>2</sup> But 'Aliwardi Khan watched the moves of the Emperor with far more apprehension. He thought that the grant of *chauth* was a clever stroke of policy calculated not only to counteract his argument for the non-payment of annual tribute but also to disturb the balance of power in Bengal through the instrumentality of Balaji Baji Rao. He was not swayed by these pressures; he refused to subscribe to a settlement in which his own interests had been disregarded. He wrote to the Emperor, "The districts on the western bank of the Ganges have been devastated and not a *kauri* is being yielded by them. If a sum of Rs. 5 is realised from this side of the river it is spent on the troops. Whence is the money coming and from what source can I send it."

### Panjab

The *subah* of Panjab, under the governorship of 'Abdul Samad Khan<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> S.P.D., XX, No. 29, 21, dated 8/xii/1746.

<sup>2</sup> S.P.D., II, 4, 10. *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, 74.

His original name was 'Abdur Rahim and he was the son of 'Abdul Karim. He

and his worthy son Zakariya Khan,<sup>1</sup> enjoyed such repose and happiness as was unknown to the people of Kashmir and Gujarat. Their rule, which lasted for over a quarter of a century, forms a memorable era in the history of this strategic province of the Empire. The general tenor of their administration was liberal and beneficent; it was devoted to the advancement of public peace and welfare. Possessed of great energy and force of character, both father and son held the helm with strong hands. They quelled disorders by defeating the boldest rebels<sup>2</sup> and administered justice by not showing indulgence to any party on the score of creed, birth or rank.<sup>3</sup> Exceptionally humane and generous, they helped the destitute, protected the victims of lawlessness and distributed alms among the poor.<sup>4</sup> Zakariya Khan was so careful of the interests of his subjects that he tried to acquaint himself personally with their true condition by walking about at night in the streets of Lahore.<sup>5</sup> The upper ranks of civil and military services were open to all classes and sects; many Hindus held posts of dignity carrying high emoluments in his government. Lala Lakhpat Rai and Jaspat Rai served Zakariya Khan as his chief minister and *divan* respectively; they were the keepers of his conscience and effective wheels of the administrative machinery.<sup>6</sup> 'Abdul Samad Khan maintained a brilliant court at Lahore where scholars, *'ulema* and poets, attracted by his unstinted patronage, gathered. In the academic gatherings at his palace literary, philosophical and religious discussions took place, and the governor

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belonged to Samarqand and claimed his descent from Khwaja Nasir-u'd-din 'Ubadillah Ahrar, a famous *naqshbandi* saint (d. 895 H.). Before coming to India 'Abdul Samad Khan had gained reputation as a man of learning and piety. The Sultan of Samarqand appointed him *Shaiikh-ul Islam*, and favoured him with many distinctions. But he left his native country and entered the Mughal service under Aurangzeb. Starting his career as *mansabdar* of 400/- he rose to the rank of 5,000/- in the reign of Farrukh Siyar who conferred on him the *subedari* of Lahore with the title of Diler Jang in 1713. Next year the king promoted him for his victory over the Sikhs to the *mansab* of 7,000/7,000 and bestowed on him the title of Saif-u'd Daulah. For details, vide, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 514-17; *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 21-22.

<sup>1</sup> For details of his early life, vide, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 106-107; *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 23.

<sup>2</sup> For details of the suppression of 'Isa Khan and Husain Khan of Qasur in the years of 1718 and 1719 respectively, vide *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 767-68; *Asrar-i Samadi*, 17-22; Syed M. Latif, *History of the Panjab*, New Delhi, 1964, 192.

<sup>3</sup> *Asrar-i Samadi*, 40,48,53; *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 23.

<sup>4</sup> *Asrar-i Samadi*, 54,55,56; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 329; *History of the Panjab*, 193.

<sup>5</sup> Harnam Singh Nami, *Tarikh-i Sa'adat-i Javed*, B.M., MS., ff. 167-169.

<sup>6</sup> *Bada'i Waqa'i*, f. 52; *Tarikh-i Sa'adat-i Javed*, f. 169.

impressed the savants by his deep knowledge.<sup>1</sup> The attributes of their characters and merits of their policies earned for them the praise and won the hearts of all. Closely related to the family of Qamr-u'd-din Khan, the *wazir*, they formed the core of the Turani group at the imperial court.<sup>2</sup> The cardinal tenet of their political faith, to which they resolutely adhered, was the unswerving loyalty to the monarch, though in internal matters, they were as completely autonomous as any other governor in the Empire.

'Abdul Samad Khan did not take part in the battle of Hasanpur because of scarcity of money and resources.<sup>3</sup> However, he attended the first *darbar* of Muhammad Shah in Delhi, and along with his son offered homage to the Emperor<sup>4</sup>. Following the death of Muhammad Amin Khan they again visited Delhi and attended the royal court. At this time Zakariya was appointed governor of Kashmir,<sup>5</sup> and Sher Afgan Khan<sup>6</sup> the *nazim* of Multan.<sup>7</sup> In the 6th regnal year Sher Afgan Khan, presumably on complaints of maladministration, was dismissed from the governorship of Multan and called back to the court; Lutfullah Khan Sadiq was raised to the *mansab* of 7,000/- and made governor of Multan.<sup>8</sup> It appears that he, too, failed to promote the security of the province and improve the administration. While tranquility, the fruit of the valour and sagacity of its governors, prevailed in Lahore, the *subah* of Multan, due to the turbulence of *zamindars* and weakness of the provincial government, was

<sup>1</sup> *Asrar-i Samadi*, Introduction.

<sup>2</sup> Abdul Samad Khan was married to the sister of Muhammad Amin Khan; while Zakariya Khan married the daughter of his maternal uncle. Yahya Khan, son of Zakariya Khan became the son-in-law of Qamr-u'd-din, the *wazir*. For details of these family connections, *Imad-us Sa'adat*, 21-23.

<sup>3</sup> 'Abdul Samad Khan wrote to the Emperor that he was faced with financial straits; he had no money to pay the salaries of his soldiers which amounted to nearly 4 lakhs of rupees. The *diwan* of the province was not ready to advance this large sum from the provincial treasury. *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 53a.

<sup>4</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, f. 376a; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 251.

<sup>5</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghtai*, 252.

<sup>6</sup> Sher Afgan Khan, son of Khwaja 'Abdur Razzaq Ansari of Panipat, was *faujdar* of Karra. He fought against Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan in the battle of Hasanpur. Muhammad Shah raised him to the *mansab* of 6,000/6,000 and granted him the title of 'Aiz-u'd-daulah. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 177-178; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 230,274; *Tarikh-i Muhammedi*, 78.

<sup>7</sup> Formerly, Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan Qutbul Mulk was the governor of Multan. After his defeat Muhammad Amin Khan was appointed to this post. *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 66b; *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghtai*, f. 376a.

<sup>8</sup> Lutfullah Khan Sadiq, brother of Sher Afgan Khan, held the *mansab* of 6,000/- and the office of *khanşaman* in the central government. At the time of his appointment to the *subedari* of Multan, his *mansab* was increased to 7,000/7,000. *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 272; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 840.

drifting into ruin. The citizens of Multan appealed to the king to send a vigorous administrator capable of establishing peace and royal authority in that distracted *subah*, and the Emperor's choice fell on 'Abdul Samad Khan. The administration of Lahore was committed to the care of Zakariya Khan. These changes in the governorship of Lahore and Multan took place in 1726.<sup>1</sup>

'Abdul Samad Khan died in Lahore on 26, July 1737 and Zakariya Khan succeeded him to the *subedari* of Multan. The Emperor honoured him with the title of 'Azd-u'd Daulah Hizbar Jang.<sup>2</sup> The new governor of the Panjab was a gallant soldier, skilful administrator, upright and just in the conduct of affairs. Maintenance of law and order was the watchword of his policy; he endeavoured to protect the high ways against the depredations of the *jats* and the *gujars* and to rehabilitate villages and towns which had been devastated by the Sikhs.<sup>3</sup> Though a devout Muslim, Zakariya Khan never allowed his political acts to be guided by religious or sectarian considerations. A liberal and considerate treatment of non-Muslims gave his rule stability and made his plans and policy successful. Some orthodox '*ulema*' of Lahore were in the habit of harassing and browbeating Hindus, and their bigotry, on several occasions, provoked religious hate, causing tension in the city. The Nawab adjusted their differences by showing partiality to none and thus preserved communal harmony.<sup>4</sup> When Nadir Shah returned from Delhi, on his way back to Kabul, Zakariya Khan welcomed him warmly at Lahore. The Persian Emperor, pleased with his obedience and honesty, acceded to his request to liberate the Indian prisoners he was carrying to Persia. This benevolent act won him universal praise.<sup>5</sup>

It has already been narrated that Zakariya Khan, having suffered severely in the fierce contest for Lahore, had submitted to Nadir Shah who allowed his defeated adversary to retain the possession of the whole province of the Panjab and appointed his son, Hiyatullah Khan, to the command of 500 in the Persian army with the title of Shah Nawaz Khan. Zakariya Khan remained in Lahore when the famous battle of Karnal was fought between the Mughal and the Persian armies. Before Nadir Shah set out from Delhi, on his way back to Kabul, he sent his minister 'Abdul Baqi Khan and Hiyatullah Khan to the Panjab with orders for the governor to pay a contribution of one crore of rupees. The governor, in obedience to the direction, collected the required amount and delivered it

<sup>1</sup> *Asrar-i Samadi*, 40-48.

<sup>2</sup> *History of the Panjab*, 193.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 329.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh Sa'adat-i Javed*, ff. 168-69.

<sup>5</sup> *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 107.

to the Persian minister. He met Nadir Shah near Lahore and accompanied him as far as the Chenab.<sup>1</sup> Just after arriving at Kabul, Nadir Shah marched southward on 9 December 1739 in order to punish Khudayar Khan,<sup>2</sup> governor of Thatta, who had previously refused to see him and do homage. The Persian monarch reached Larkana on 12 February 1740 where he heard that Khudayar Khan had fled and had shut himself in the fortress of Amarkot. Nadir Shah, consequently, made a deep thrust into the desert and appeared at the gates of the fort. Khudayar Khan surrendered without any resistance to the mighty and relentless invader. Nadir Shah treated him generously, restoring him to the position he occupied and honouring him with the title of Shah Quli.<sup>3</sup> He was made the chief of Thatta and part of Sind which formed approximately one third of his former dominions. Khudayar Khan bound himself to pay an annual tribute of Rs. 10 lakhs and furnish a contingent of 2,000 cavalry under the command of one of his sons. At Larkana Zakariya Khan and his son Hiyatullah Khan, in response to a summons, came to meet the Persian conqueror; they were favoured with *khil'ats* and gifts.<sup>4</sup> The annexed districts of the Panjab—Gujarat, Sialkot, Passur and a portion of Khudayar Khan's territory on the border of Multan, were put under the charge of Zakariya Khan on condition that he would remit annually Rs. 20 lakhs as tribute to the Persian treasury.<sup>5</sup> Nadir Shah recommended in a letter to Muhammad Shah that Zakariya should be promoted to the *mansab* of 8,000/8,000. The Mughal Emperor, accordingly, issued a *farman*, raising his rank and increasing his salary proportionately.<sup>6</sup> The Mughal governor was now of necessity tied with the foreign ruler. But his connection with the outside power did not affect his fidelity to the Indian

<sup>1</sup> *Bada'i Waqa'i*, II, f. 30a.

<sup>2</sup> Shaikh Nur Muhammad, son of Yar Muhammad, had the title of Khudayar Khan which was first conferred on his father by Farrukh Siyar. His ancestors belonged to the 'Abbasi family and were the disciples of Saiyid Muhammad Jaunpuri. One of them secured a plot of land in *madad-i ma'ash* in the region and assembled many followers and dependents. Gradually they acquired *zamindari* rights over the land and enlarged its size by seizing forcibly other adjoining areas. Khudayar Khan made himself master of vast territory. "His pomp and grandeur reached the highest point and he brought most of the *zamindars* under his control." When Nadir Shah resolved to invade India he wrote to Khudayar Khan to allow him a passage through his territory, but the haughty *zamindar*, without foreseeing the consequences, gave a negative reply. It was an affront to Nadir's pride which he determined to avenge at a proper opportunity. For details, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 825-29.

<sup>3</sup> *Bada'i Waqa'i*, II, ff. 33-37; *Jahan Kusha-i Nadiri*, 212.

<sup>4</sup> *Bada'i Waqa'i*, II, ff. 33,34,37.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 343.

<sup>6</sup> *Bada'i Waqa'i* contains copies of Nadir Shah's letters to Zakariya Khan and

sovereign to whom he remained loyal to the last.

The cloud of Persian terror passed over but there ensued a period of anarchy in the province. The Sikhs overran the country between the Ravi and the Beas, and spread devastation far and wide. They carried their depredations almost without opposition to the neighbourhood of Lahore; Emnabad, a town to the north of the city, was attacked and laid under contribution. They defeated and killed Diwan Jaspat Rai, the commander of the Mughal army; but in the following battle suffered severe losses and reverses. Dispirited by the defeat, the Sikh soldiers withdrew from the field and fled headlong for safety. They were ruthlessly chased and hundreds of them were captured and executed for their acts of violence.<sup>1</sup> Having victoriously concluded the Sikh campaign, Zakariya Khan next turned his arms against the local *zamindars* and defeated them in a series of hotly contested engagements. Jang Pannah of the *Bhatti* tribe dominated the tract stretching from Hasan Abdal to the banks of the Ravi. The government troops, led by Kosa Mal, commenced operations against him and defeated and put him to death. Jang Mir Mar, another powerful *zamindar*, pillaged caravans and travellers on the highway between Lahore and the river Sutlej. His ravages caused dismay and anxiety. He was defeated and captured by the Mughal army under the command of Qazaq Beg Khan.<sup>2</sup>

Zakariya Khan died on July 1, 1745, leaving behind him three sons; two of them contested the governorship of the Panjab; the civil war, which their conflict caused, brought the peace of the province to an end and exposed it to the peril of foreign invasion.<sup>3</sup> Yahya Khan, the eldest son was married to the daughter of Qamr-u'd-din Khan, and through this matrimonial connection with the *wazir* he exercised considerable influence

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Muhammad Shah; the copy of the *farman* issued by the Mughal Emperor in favour of the governor is also included in this contemporary work, ff. 32,33,34,35,40.

<sup>1</sup> *History of the Panjab*, 213; Hari Ram Gupta, *History of the Sikhs*, Lahore, 1939, 3-10, 16.

<sup>2</sup> *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 106-107.

<sup>3</sup> How popular Zakariya Khan was with the masses of Lahore is borne out by the demonstrations of grief at his death. "His death was a real calamity to the people of the Panjab; especially for the inhabitants of Lahore the blow appeared to be most grievous. For three nights in succession no lamp was lit in any house. When the bier of that departed chief was brought out from the palace, Mughals wailed loudly tearing their garments and casting dust on their faces. Hundreds of thousands of men of various communities, clad in black, followed the funeral procession, lamenting and beating their chests. From every corner there was such a rain of flowers on the coffin that in the end not a handful of flowers left in the city." *Bada'i Waqa'i*, f. 49b.

in the official circles of Delhi. He was amiable and gentle, but he lacked political experience and tact. His younger brother, Hayatullah Khan, was a man of great courage, impetuosity and resourcefulness. Nadir Shah, impressed by his loyal service had given him the title of Shah Nawaz Khan and had put Multan under his control. He was at the same time, the *faujdar* of Jullundur Doab. Zakariya Khan's third son was Khwaja Baqi Khan, an obscure figure in history. When death came to the governor, his two elder sons were in Delhi in connection with some official business. Immediately on hearing of the serious condition of their father they took leave of the Emperor and left the capital. On the way news of his death was communicated to them. Hayatullah Khan, however, stayed back in Jullundur while Yahya Khan hurried on to Lahore to take charge of the government. Shortly afterwards, Hayatullah Khan also reached Lahore and demanded from his brother an equitable division of the patrimony. Having received his share, consisting of some cash and jewels, he retired, but with the intention to strike a blow for himself as soon as a favourable opportunity presented itself.<sup>1</sup>

In the meantime Qamr-u'd-din Khan urged upon the Emperor the desirability of appointing Yahya Khan and Hayatullah Khan, his nephews, to the two governorships of Lahore and Multan respectively. The Emperor rejected the proposal to avoid these dominions becoming the hereditary possession of one family of nobles.<sup>2</sup> He ordered Muhiy-u'd-din 'Ali Khan Bahadur, *diwan* of the escheat department, to go to Lahore and confiscate properties of the former governor. Anand Ram Mukhlis has criticized the Emperor's decision to deprive them of their father's political heritage as unwise and ungenerous. Had they been rewarded for the memorable services rendered by their father and grandfather to the province the history of the Panjab would have run a different course.<sup>3</sup> Qamr-u'd-din Khan continued to press the claims of his family members and in the end gained his main object.<sup>4</sup> The Emperor made over Multan and Lahore though reluctantly to the *wazir*, who asked Mir Momin Khan,

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 329; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 269; *Bada'i Waqa'i*, f. 50.

<sup>2</sup> Anand Ram writes that a large number of the Mughal *mansabdar*s were in possession of vast *jagirs*, gardens and buildings in the Panjab. The *wazir* feared that if some non-Mughal governor was sent to administer the province he would deprive the Mughals of their lands and urban properties. He left no expedient untried which promised to preserve and promote the interests of the Mughals living in the province. *Bada'i Waqa'i*, f. 50b.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 329; *Bada'i Waqa'i*, f. 51b.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shahi*, f. 3.

an influential Turani officer, to officiate as his deputy, but the remedy proved worse than the disease. The governor never visited Lahore and took no interest in its internal affairs. Mir Momin Khan was too weak to put down the risings of the *sikhs* and the *jats*. Disorders and rebellions broke out everywhere. In the beginning of 1746 Qamr-u'd-din Khan replaced Momin Khan by his own son-in-law, Yahya Khan, while the deputy-governorship of Multan was left in the charge of Khwaja Ishaq.<sup>1</sup>

The adjustment had served only to further embitter the relations between the brothers and had spelled the doom of their once powerful family. Yahya Khan failed to establish his power on a firm basis; his army was in a disorganized state and the civil administration was inefficient and corrupt. Prompted by his brother's weak position, Hayatullah Khan marched on Lahore ostensibly on the pretext of obtaining his share in the paternal estates but in reality with designs on the province itself. As they could not come to an amicable adjustment, hostilities were started to put an end to the dispute. In the battle that ensued on March 17, 1748, Yahya Khan was defeated and taken captive along with his followers. Hayatullah Khan, without having previously secured the sanction of the Emperor, proclaimed himself the governor of Lahore. To demonstrate his power the usurper erased from his seal the words "devoted servant of Muhammad Shah"; he seized the *jagirs* of royal servants and extorted money from the public. He appointed Kauramal his *diwan* and Adina Beg<sup>2</sup> the *faujdar* of Jullunder. In a respectful letter to the *wazir* he promised to release Yahya Khan in return for his appointment to the post of governor of Lahore. His offer was haughtily rejected and the enraged *wazir* wrote sternly demanding the restoration of Lahore to Yahya Khan, failing which he threatened military action against him. After one year Yahya Khan by the contrivance of his aunt, effected his escape and reached Delhi. Fearful of the *wazir's* revenge and feeling the ground slipping from under his feet, Hayatullah Khan opened secret negotiations with Ahmad Shah Abdali to invade Panjab.<sup>3</sup> His role during the invasion of Ahmad Shah has already been examined.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Bada'i Waqa'i*, f. 52; 106a; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 329b; *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 65a.

<sup>2</sup> For details of his early life and career, Hari Ram Gupta, *Studies in Later Mughal History of the Panjab*, 58-72.

<sup>3</sup> For details of these events, vide, *Bada'i Waqa'i*, ff. 106-13; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 270; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 330a; *A History of the Panjab*, 214; *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 65.

<sup>4</sup> See Chapter IV.



## ✓Rajputana

Raja Ajit Singh in the palmy days of the Saiyid brothers had received a considerable accession of strength; he held the rank of 7,000/7,000 and the governorships of Gujarat and Ajmer. His alliance with the Saiyids not only attained for him an important position in the imperial court but made him the dominant power among the Rajput Princes. He could hardly conceal his anger at the fall of his patrons or veil his opposition to the new regime. Without waiting, however, for a final decision of the Mughal government in his case, he, raised the banner of revolt. At the head of 30 thousand Rajput cavalry he set out from Jodhpur and with surprising ease captured Ajmer where he forbade cow slaughter and the call to prayers in mosques; his army, to crown all, annexed Sambhar, Didwana, Toda, Jharod and Amersar. The Emperor immediately divested him of the subedari of Gujarat and Ajmer and appointed on 12 October 1721 Haider Quli Khan and Saiyid Muzaffar 'Ali Khan Daipuri to these two provinces respectively. To the new governor of Ajmer he assigned the task of crushing the insurrection and granted him Rs. 6 lakhs for recruiting an army.<sup>1</sup>

Muzaffar 'Ali Khan received only Rs. 2 lakhs which he spent immediately on organizing a new military force of 20,000 horse. He halted at Manoharpur, 35 miles north of Jaipur, and awaited payment of the remaining instalments. As no money came, the soldiers grew restive, and began to plunder the countryside. Soon all the soldiery deserted and the expedition ended in fiasco.<sup>2</sup> Before Nusrat Yar Khan, the next governor of Ajmer, could strike against the rebels, Abhay Singh, eldest son of Ajit Singh, invaded Narnol and defeated Bayzid Khan, deputy-*faujdar* of the district. Several other places like Alwar, Tijara and Shah-jahanpur fell into the enemy's hands.<sup>3</sup> The Emperor, disconcerted by the tidings, asked his ministers to launch a campaign against the Rathor chief

<sup>1</sup> *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 77. According to Khafi Khan the command of the expedition was assigned first to Sa'adat Khan and then to Khan-i Dauran and Qamr-u'd-din Khan, But each of them refused to undertake the campaign on one pretext or the other. Khan-i Dauran deprecated the line of military action as destructive of the Mughal position and interests in Rajputana. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 937; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 262; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 452-53; James Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Bombay, 1920, II, 1026-27.

<sup>2</sup> *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 77b; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 262, 265.

<sup>3</sup> Nusrat Yar Khan Barha was formerly the *faujdar* of Sambhar. His *mansab* was increased to 7,000/7,000. For details of these events, vide, *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, 266.

but realizing the magnitude of the task, they procrastinated, and consequently no effective check to the activities of Ajit Singh could be administered. Then unexpectedly, however, Ajit Singh withdrew to his capital and assumed a very submissive attitude. The reason for this change was the news of the approach of Nizam-ul Mulk with his army from the Deccan on his way to Delhi through Ajmer. Moreover, a letter from Khan-i Dauran, promising him the Emperor's pardon if he laid down arms, also seemed to have produced the desired effect and Ajit Singh made an appeal for forgiveness.<sup>1</sup>

The Emperor reacted favourably to it and permitted Ajit Singh to retain the province of Ajmer and also promised to restore Gujarat at a later date.<sup>2</sup> But all such concession failed to stamp out the unrest in the province and the situation remained as tense and uncertain as it was before the compromise. The treacherous murder of Nahar Khan, *diwan* of Ajmer and his brother Ruhullah Khan, *faujdar* of Garh Patili, by the Rajputs on 6 January 1723 further aggravated the situation.<sup>3</sup> The Emperor, when apprised of the tragedy, resolved upon a final drastic measure to destroy the power of the Rathor Raja. He assigned the supreme command of the imperial troops to Sharf-u'd Daulah Iradatmand Khan<sup>4</sup> while urgent orders were issued to Raja Jai Singh, Muhammad Khan Bangash, and Raja Girdhar Bahadur to advance with their contingents to the aid of Iradatmand Khan.<sup>5</sup> These impressive preparations deterred Raja Ajit Singh from pressing matters too far. He quitted Ajmer and marched to Sambhar which he left at the approach of Haider Quli Khan, the newly appointed governor of Ajmer, and proceeded to Jodhpur. Haider Quli Khan took possession of Ajmer on 8 June 1723 and sent his deputy Agha Qasim to occupy Sambhar. The fortress of Gar Patili was invested and captured on 20 July 1723.<sup>6</sup>

Through the mediation of Raja Jai Singh Sawai a treaty was entered into by Ajit Singh with the Mughal government. His son Abhay Singh waited upon Haider Quli Khan and offered presents which included money, elephants and other valuables.<sup>7</sup> On 23 June 1724 Ajit Singh was assassinated by his younger son Bakht Singh. (The Emperor recognized the

<sup>1</sup> *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 79a; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 937.

<sup>2</sup> For Ajit Singh's *arzasht* and the Emperor's *farman*, vide, *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, ff. 83a, 84a; *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 937.

<sup>3</sup> *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 79a; *Akhbarat* (Persian) I, 116; dated 10 February 1723.

<sup>4</sup> *Akhbarat*, II, 108.

<sup>5</sup> *Akhbarat*, II, 109; *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 497.

<sup>6</sup> *Akhbarat*, additional, II, 117; *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 497, 498; *Vir Vinod*, III, 842.

<sup>7</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 498; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 516; *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, II, 1028.

succession of Abhay Singh to the throne of Jodhpur<sup>1</sup>, and conferred upon him robes of honour and a *mansab* of 7,000/7,000. Nagor was also given to him as *jagir* which he handed over to his younger brother Bakht Singh. Marwar rose to prominence under the brave and loyal Abhay Singh who enjoyed the emperor's favour. His titles were : Raj Rajeshwar, Saramad Raja-i Hind, and Maharajadhiraj.<sup>2</sup>

Maharaja Abhay Singh was appointed the governor of Gujarat in 1730 and remained in that office upto 1737. The details pertaining to his relationship with the central government during these years have already been described at length in a previous section of this chapter. As mentioned before, the Maharaja left Gujarat in the middle of 1733 and lived in Delhi until 1737. He loyally preferred the cause of the Mughal monarch to that of the Marathas, and linked himself with the faction at court which vehemently opposed the policy of compromise towards them.<sup>3</sup> In July 1734 he participated in the conference of Hurda called by the principal Rajput princes to deliberate on ways and means to stop the progress of Maratha arms in Rajputana. Again, in November 1734 Abhay Singh joined the army of Khan-i Dauran whom the Emperor had ordered to march against the Marathas.<sup>4</sup> Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Sindhia, as a counter-measure, invaded the Rathor territory and in the beginning of April 1736 occupied Merta, and shortly afterwards they compelled Bakhat Singh to pay tribute to them.<sup>5</sup> It does not lie within our purview to examine in any detail the internal relations of Maharaja Abhay Singh with other Rajput states, but briefly, the Marwar chief, in a bid to emulate Raja Jai Singh, endeavoured to enlarge his territory at the expense of his neighbouring states and dominate politics in Rajputana. He repeatedly attempted to capture Bikaner (1741 and 1747) but the armed intervention of Raja Jai Singh and the Rana of Udaipur frustrated his ambitious designs. After the death of Raja Jai Singh in 1743 he took possession of Ajmer.<sup>6</sup> The Mughal court, destitute of means to assert its authority or preserve order

<sup>1</sup> For details of the circumstances in which the murder took place, vide *Later Mughals*, II, 115-17; *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, 119-27; *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, II, 927; *Vir Vinod*, III, 843; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 277-78.

<sup>2</sup> His succession was challenged by two of his brothers, Anand Singh and Rai Singh. Their opposition was, however, thoroughly overcome by Abhay Singh who occupied Jodhpur early in 1725. G.R. Parihar, *Marwar and the Marathas*, 26, 27; *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, XLIII.

<sup>3</sup> S.P.D., XV, 89, 91.

<sup>4</sup> S.P.D., XIV, 23.

<sup>5</sup> S.P.D., XIV, 14.

<sup>6</sup> *Vir Vinod*, III, 1224; *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, XLVI.

in Rajputana, could not regulate the internal relations between different Rajput states or exercise effective control over them. The Rajput chiefs weakened their strength by attempts at individual aggrandisement and in the ensuing domestic feuds they courted the alliance and aid of the Marathas against each other. Maharaja Abhay Singh died at Ajmer on 19 June 1749.

Muhammad Shah encountered no difficulties in his relations with Raja Jai Singh Sawai. The Raja had been constantly and actively in opposition to the Saiyid brothers. He supported the Mughal sovereign militarily when his fate hung in the balance in the battle of Hasanpur. He attended the imperial court in July 1721; the Emperor welcomed him with every mark of respect and bestowed upon him the highest titles and honours.<sup>1</sup> It was on this occasion that his request for the abolition of *jaziya* was accepted.<sup>2</sup> Congratulations poured on him from all sides and the Maharana Sangram Singh II of Mewar (1710-1734) hailed him as the most astute statesman and the biggest *sardar* in Hindustan.<sup>3</sup> He granted religious liberty to Muslims which had been denied to them during the Rajput rebellion. He himself visited mosques in Amber and allowed Muslims to worship without let or hindrance.<sup>4</sup> On 1 September 1722 he was appointed governor of Agra, after the removal of Sa'adat Khan who had failed to crush the uprising of the *jats*.<sup>5</sup> Saiyid Muzaffar 'Ali Khan Daipuri was made deputy-governor of the province. The Raja was directed to establish law and order in the strife-torn area. A large army was placed at his disposal and Rs. 2 lakhs were given to him to meet the expenses of the expedition. Raja Girdhar Bahadur and Maharao Arjun Singh of Orchha were among the principal nobles ordered to serve under his command.<sup>6</sup> The governor besieged the fortress of Thun and with the help of Badan Singh, nephew of Churaman Jat, captured it on 18 November 1722. Muhkam Singh, eldest son of Churaman Jat, fled to Jodhpur and took refuge with Ajit Singh. Badan Singh was proclaimed the new chief of the *jats* by Raja Jai Singh. In recognition of this important victory, the result of which enhanced his reputation and prestige, the Emperor conferred upon him the titles of Raja Rajeshwari Shri Raj Dhiraj Maharaj Jai Singh. His full titles were Saramad Raj Hai Hindustan Raj Rajender

<sup>1</sup> *Akhbarat*, II, Part 5, 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, ff. 64, 65.

<sup>3</sup> *Akhbarat*, III, Part 5, dated December 27, 1720.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkerin*, II, 453.

<sup>5</sup> For details of Sa'adat Khan's fighting with the *jats*, vide, *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 79b; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhkerin*, II, 456.

<sup>6</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 946.

Raja Dhiraj Raja Rajeshwar Sawai Jai Singh. Since then his rise to a position of great strength and affluence was rapid.<sup>1</sup>

His appointment to the governorship of Malwa in 1729 enabled him to strengthen his position both politically and economically. The acquisition of large and fertile *jagirs* as *tankhwa*, *ijarah* and *in'am* materially added to the extent and importance of his dominions. He wrested 50 *parganas* from Zia Khan of Jhunjun, annexed Rampura district from Udaipur, and brought under his sway *khalisa* lands in the neighbourhood of his capital. He secured the *parganas* of Dhandora, *jagirs* in the *Sarkar* of Moinabad and Ajmer, and exercised joint control with Abhay Singh over Sambhar. The areas acquired in *ijarah* became his permanent possessions which he administered through his own officers.<sup>2</sup> Enriched by the accumulation of revenues from these vast resources and strengthened by the political friendship with Khan-i Dauran, Raja Jai Singh Sawai cherished the ambition of carving out an independent kingdom that would stretch from the Jumna to the Narmada. For the protection of his territories he formed an alliance with the Poona court and agreed to pay *chauth* to the Peshwa's agents. At the imperial court he advocated a policy of compromise with the Marathas and suggested peaceful methods to terminate the war with them.<sup>3</sup> But when all serious efforts made by the government in this direction failed to satisfy the exorbitant demands of Peswa Baji Rao the gulf between the Mughals and the Marathas perilously widened and Jai Singh's relations with the centre worsened.<sup>4</sup> The results of his mistaken policy aroused popular resentment which is reflected in the accounts of contemporary writers.<sup>5</sup> Ashub and Warid accused the Raja of betrayal and ignoble submission to aggression without seriously striving to combat it with the immense resources put at his disposal by the government.<sup>6</sup>

In Rajputana Jai Singh sought to assume the leadership of the small principalities which, having severed their connexion with the centre, were unable to safeguard their territorial integrity against encroachments by the outside powers. He interfered in the affairs of Bundi whose Raja Rao Budh Singh had incurred his displeasure on some domestic issue and was

<sup>1</sup> *Akhbarat* (Hindi), dated October 28, 1722, November 28, 1722, 15-16; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, II, 456.

<sup>2</sup> *Akhbarat*, additional, 2, 13, 16, 41; *Akhbarat* (Hindi), II, 27, 157. For details, V.S. Bhatnagar, *Life and Times of Sawai Jai Singh*, 269-75. *Akhbarat* (Hindi collection), Part VIII, 65-68; *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, 143, 144, 145, 147, 150, 151; *Malwa in Transition*, 194; *S.P.D.*, X(V, 50-51.

<sup>4</sup> *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, 147-48, 152-53; *Malwa in Transition*, 209.

<sup>5</sup> *Tazkirat-ul Mulk*, ff. 138, 139; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 245.

<sup>6</sup> *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 680-81; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, 179.

at daggers-drawn with Maharao Durjansal, the Prince of Kotah. He wanted to dethrone Budh Singh and install Dalel Singh on the throne in order to turn Bundi into a vassal state. On May 19, 1730 he crowned Dalel Singh Hada as the Rao Raja of Bundi who acknowledged his overlordship and married his daughter.<sup>1</sup> Budh Singh, addicted to wine and opium, gave up every hope of recovering his dominion and repaired to Udaipur. But his restlessly ambitious queen sought Maratha help against the usurper Dalel Singh. Pratap Singh Hada, eldest son of Salem Singh, joined the ranks of Budh Singh. He was sent to Poona by the queen to settle terms of Maratha military assistance. On condition of payment of Rs. 6 lakhs the Marathas promised to fight for Budh Singh. On April 22, 1734, Malhar Rao Holkar and Ranoji Sindhia attacked Bundi and after a stiff struggle captured the fort. Sangram Singh, father of Dalel Singh, was made captive, and Budh Singh's wife, overjoyed at success, tied the *rakhi* thread round the wrist of Holkar, the goat-herd's son, declaring him publicly as her brother. But soon a strong force from Jaipur restored Dalel Singh to the *gaddi* of Bundi.

The Maratha menace in Rajputana became so acute as to drive home the truth that only by union could the rulers defend their states. Raja Jai Singh called a meeting of Maharana Jagat Singh II of Mewar, Abhay Singh of Jodhpur, Bakhat Singh of Nagor, Zorawar Singh of Bikaner, Durajan Sal of Kotah, Dalel Singh of Bundi, Gopal Pal of Karoli, Rāj Singh of Kishangadh and other big and small Rajas, at Hurda, a village in Mewar, on 17 July 1734 to work out a joint plan of action against the Marathas. It was agreed in the conference that all the participants would help each other in their difficulties; that they would not employ unfaithful persons; and that all of them would assemble at Rampura with their contingents after the rains to launch a campaign to drive the Marathas out of Rajputana; and if any of them could not come in person he would send his heir or a *Sardar* of note.<sup>2</sup> "Though individually enamoured of liberty, the universality of the sentiment prevented its realization, they never would submit to the control required to work it out, and this, the best opportunity, which had ever occurred was lost."<sup>3</sup> After a few years they made yet another attempt to unite themselves for turning the Marathas out of Malwa. It was proposed that after driving them out, Malwa would be partitioned among them. But this treaty, too, did not bear any fruit.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For details, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, 139-140; *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, III, 1497-99.

<sup>2</sup> *Vir Vinod*, II, 1220-21; *Akhbarat* (Hindi collection), III, Part 5, 54; *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, I, 483.

<sup>3</sup> *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, I, 483.

<sup>4</sup> *Vir Vinod*, II, 973.

The Maratha dominance destroyed the foundations of Mughal authority in Rajputana and the old administrative structure crumbled to pieces. The Rajput Princes acknowledged the victors as their new sovereign and overborne by their military superiority, calmly acquiesced in the condition of vassalage. The Maratha chiefs, engaged in the collection of tribute, were not at all interested in enforcing stability and order in states distracted by dynastic quarrels and family feuds. The mutual conflicts that raged throughout Rajputana offered the Marathas the very opportunity they needed to make further inroads into the region and tighten their grip over its states. Thus left entirely to themselves, the Rajputs plunged into ceaseless internecine warfare; and "all the pent-up personal ambitions and inter-state rivalries, now burst forth without fear or check."<sup>1</sup> The triple alliance, formed in 1708 between the states of Udaipur, Jaipur and Jodhpur, had laid down that the son born to the daughter of Maharana Amar Singh II (1698-1710) would succeed to the throne of Jaipur. In December 1728 Chandar Kunwar Bai, wife of Jai Singh, gave birth to a son, named Madho Singh. The event gave Jai Singh many a sleepless night and to forestall certain civil war among his sons, he refused to nominate the new born prince his heir-apparent.<sup>2</sup> He secured the district of Rampura from the Maharana of Mewar to pay compensation to the one year old Madho Singh in 1729. The administration of Rampura was conducted by Jai Singh's officers till September 7, 1743 when at the desire of the Maharana he withdrew them.<sup>3</sup>

It was plain that Madho Singh, now a young boy of 15 would not remain content with a small district and that, backed by the weight of Rana Sangram Singh's influence, he would invoke the treaty of 1708 and assert his claim to the entire kingdom of Jaipur after his father's death. Raja Jai Singh died on September 21, 1743. He was succeeded by his eldest son Ishwari Singh who obtained recognition of his right of succession as indefeasible right from the Mughal Emperor.<sup>4</sup> Madho Singh, supported by the Maharana of Mewar, Rana Jagat Singh II (1734-1751), Ummed Singh of Bundi and Khande Rao advanced at the head of a huge force to contest the throne with his brother. The combined army of the allies was severely defeated at Rajmahal on 1 March 1747 by Hargovind Natani, the commander of Ishwari Singh.<sup>5</sup> Two years later a fierce civil war, caused by the death of Abhay Singh, 21 June 1749, started between Ram Singh and

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<sup>1</sup> *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, 131.

<sup>2</sup> *Vir Vinod*, II, 973.

<sup>3</sup> *Vir Vinod*, II, 1226, 1230; *Malwa in Transition*, 182, 183.

<sup>4</sup> *Akhbarat*, III, Part 5, 74.

<sup>5</sup> *Vir Vinod*, II, 1230, 1236, 1239.

Bakht Singh, the son and brother of the deceased Raja. These civil wars plunged Rajasthan into a state of prolonged violence, chaos and destruction.<sup>1</sup>

Raja Jai Singh in his old age had become partial to the cup and inattentive to the calls of duty. No ambition either of carving out an independent kingdom or creating a united front against the Marathas had been fulfilled in his life-time. The Kachhwaha state in the end suffered the fate of other small principalities which had passed under the Maratha domination. The suicide by Ishwari Singh on 12 December 1750 and the massacre of Marathas by Rajputs in Jaipur city on 10 January 1751 stirred the public feeling to its depths and darkened the political horizon of Rajputana.<sup>2</sup> Raja Jai Singh was gifted with many accomplishments and graces. He was good natured, generous, wise and brave; he gave large sums of money in charity.<sup>3</sup> In the midst of political activities he had the leisure to carry on his favourite pursuit of science and architecture. He founded in 1728 a new city near Amber and named it after himself as Jaipur. At the suggestion of the Emperor he corrected the prevailing calendar, erected observatories at Delhi, Jaipur, Ujjain and Benares, and constructed several caravan, *sarais* and bridges. Under the Raja's direction the astronomical tables "Zeij Muhammad Shahi" was prepared and named after his patron and sovereign Muhammad Shah.<sup>4</sup> Jaipur became the seat of art and culture to which scholars and scientists flocked in large number. Devout, as he was, in religion, his relations with the Muslims were cordial. He visited Muslim shrines and distributed money among the custodians and servants of these holy places. He respected and helped Muslims who belonged to respectable families or had social contacts with him. Many Muslims sought his recommendation for government service; he either employed them in his own state or secured jobs for them in the central administration.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, 131, 134.

<sup>2</sup> For details of these momentous events, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, 165-70.

<sup>3</sup> *Sa'adat-i Javed*, 320.

<sup>4</sup> For technical details of these observatories, G.R. Kaye, *The Astronomical Observatories of Jai Singh: The Jaipur Observatory and its Builder*, 1902. For a brief description of the subject matter and contents of *Zeij Muhammad Shahi*, Add. 14373. The preface to the work written by Jai Singh was translated by W. Hunter. *Asiatic Researches*, 1779, V; *Life and Times of Savai Jai Singh*, 316-30.

<sup>5</sup> *Akhbarat*, Sarkar's Collection, IV, 113, 115, 131; Hindi Collection, I, 139; *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, 3, 1342-43; also Beveridge's note, *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 736, 1354.



*Balaji Baji Rao's Relations with the Mughal Court*

It will be recalled that Asaf Jah had pledged at the convention of Sarai-Doraha, 7 January 1738, to obtain an imperial grant for the *subedari* of Malwa and payment of Rs. 50 lakhs to the Peshwa Baji Rao I. Asaf Jah, on his return to Delhi, explained to the Emperor circumstances attendant upon the conclusion of the settlement which involved the loss of the province and had recommended its ratification. The Emperor, unable to militarily resist the Maratha expansion any longer, accepted the peace proposals put forward by the victorious enemy. Yadgar Khan, who had conducted peace negotiations in previous years with the Peshwa, communicated the royal decision to Chimnaji Appa. He wrote the following letter to him<sup>1</sup> :

Your letter was delivered by Babu Rao Malhar and Dhondo Govind, special envoys of the Peshwa at the Mughal Court. The clarification of whatever issues were in dispute, sought by you in the letter, was given to them. Nawab Saheb (the *wazir*) and Asaf Jah Bahadur, who returned from the side of Malwa, submitted to the Emperor the Peshwa's demand for deputy-governorship of Malwa and assignment of *jagirs* in lieu of his salary. Nawab Saheb and Bakhshiul Mumalik (Khan-i Dauran), who have been from the very beginning in favour of it, used their influence with the Emperor to make him agree to the proposed plan of peace. The Emperor, out of his generosity, has approved the appointment of Baji Rao to the deputy-governorship of Malwa. This is a signal honour ever conferred on a chief of the Deccan. Therefore it is hoped that the Peshwa will abide by the terms of this agreement which he will not break on any pretext.

The letter reveals the keen anxiety of the central ministers, shared by the Emperor, to end the war and accede to the conditions on which the Maratha leader was prepared to make peace. However, Baji Rao's failure to attend the Mughal Court<sup>2</sup> and the turmoil that followed in the wake of

<sup>1</sup> *Itihasik Persian Sahitay*, No. 4, 6.

<sup>2</sup> Khan-i Dauran in a personal letter of November 1737 had assured Baji Rao of a warm reception if he paid a visit to the court to discuss details of the treaty with the Emperor. "It has been decided," he stated, "to send a high and trustworthy *amir* to Ujjain to escort the Peshwa with honour and give Rs. 5 lakhs for daily expenses of his army." But his cordial letter evoked no immediate response, and the Peshwa showed no serious intention to come to Delhi. One more letter was addressed to Baji Rao from the Mughal court after the battle of Karnal, supplying him with information relating to the invasion of Nadir Shah. *Itihasik Persian Sahitay*, No. 10, 13-14.

Nadir Shah's invasion, brought the peace negotiations to an end.

Before these talks could be resumed after the death of Baji Rao on 28 April 1740, the Emperor made a feeble attempt to recover Malwa from the possession of the Marathas. He appointed 'Azim-ullah Khan governor of Malwa and ordered him to start military operations in conjunction with Safdar Jang and Raja Jai Singh Sawai. Ranoji conveyed the warning through Mahadev Bhat to the Maratha court on 13 July 1740. "You intimate the Peshwa that 'Azim-ullah Khan is marching rapidly on Malwa. Please note that we, as servants of the Peshwa, are ready to check the invasion."<sup>1</sup> The Mughal governor, having gathered a force of 15,000, proceeded to Bhadawar where he took Rs. 5 lakhs as a contribution from Raj Singh and raised him to the *gaddi* of that principality. He then marched to Datia and took from its Raja Rs. 7 lakhs in return for the renewal of the *sanad* regarding his *jagirs*. From there 'Azim-ullah Khan went to Urcbha, wasted his time in quarrelling with the chief of the place, and without entering Malwa or encountering the Marathas, came back to Delhi. Both Raja Jai Singh Sawai and Safdar Jang stayed out of the conflict.<sup>2</sup>

Such was the state of affairs in the north when Raja Shahu invested Balaji Baji Rao,<sup>3</sup> son of Baji Rao, with the robes of Peshwaship on 25 June 1740. The first step which the new Peshwa took to forestall the Mughal challenge was to convene a meeting of the Maratha generals and envoys posted in the north. At the conference that took place in Poona it was decided that the Peshwa should undertake an expedition into Malwa to consolidate the fruits of a victory that was won after much painful exertions.<sup>4</sup> Balaji Baji Rao, accordingly, set out from Poona on 23 November 1740 and first paid a visit to Raja Jai Singh Sawai at Dholpur.<sup>5</sup> In December he directed Sindhia, Naroji Shankar and Antaji Mankeshwar to lead their armies against the Mughals. On 5 January 1741 the Maratha forces assailed the fort of Dhar and captured it. The Peshwa, satisfied with the results of his counter offensive, returned to Poona on 7 July 1741. The Emperor became perturbed on hearing of the Maratha success in Malwa.

<sup>1</sup> *Hingne Daftar*, I, Nos. 15, 17, 18, 19.

<sup>2</sup> *Rajwade*, VI, 145.

<sup>3</sup> Balaji Baji Rao, popularly known as Nana Saheb, was only 18 and a half years old when he was appointed the Peshwa. Raja Shahu bestowed upon the young Peshwa a *jagir* of 30 villages and advised him to follow the path of his father in achieving Maratha ascendancy. Balaji Naik Joshi, a competitor of Nana Sahib for the office of Peshwaship, was frustrated in his ambition. *New History of the Marathas*, II, 189.

<sup>4</sup> In response to his summons, Mahadev Bhat Hingne, Ramchandra Baba, Malhar Rao Holkar and Pilaji Rao Jadhav met the Peshwa at Poona.

<sup>5</sup> *New History of the Marathas*, II, 192.

He issued urgent orders to Raja Jai Singh Sawai and other Mughal generals to prevent the Marathas from crossing the Chambal.<sup>1</sup> Mahadaji Ambaji wrote on 17 May 1741<sup>2</sup>:

When the Peshwa suspected that Amir Khan, governor of Allahabad, and Safdar Jang, governor of Awadh, intended to cross the Ganges and march in the direction of Malwa, he ordered Holkar to obstruct them; he, at the same time, instructed other generals to invade Allahabad and keep them engaged in their provinces. In the face of this new danger the two Mughal nobles dared not move out of their places. Jai Singh Sawai stayed on the sidelines protecting his frontiers and avoiding collusion with the Maratha army. He, on the other hand, sent Aya Mal to the Peshwa requesting him to come for a personal interview.

Raja Jai Singh had been from the outset an ardent advocate of peaceful settlement with the Marathas. He believed that the true interests of the Empire demanded a pacific policy towards them. Throughout this period of Mughal-Maratha struggle he maintained this attitude with admirable consistency. While insisting on the policy of conciliation, he upheld the principle of the Mughal sovereignty as the basis of any permanent settlement between the parties. The Emperor was not prepared to abandon this basic principle governing his relations with the Maratha chief for the preservation of peace in the Empire. As both the Emperor and the Peshwa had faith in him, the Raja again began his efforts to effect a compromise between them. With this objective he sought an interview with Balaji Baji Rao with whose father he had been in closest contact in the past. In the meeting that took place they reaffirmed the friendship that existed between them and emphasized the need of working together in complete harmony. The Peshwa expressed doubts about his being appointed to the *subedari* of Malwa but the Raja managed to set these at rest and the Peshwa returned to Poona on 7 July 1741.<sup>3</sup>

In the meantime Asaf Jah became entangled in serious domestic conflicts which obliged him to seek the cooperation of the Marathas and in return to concede their demands. His son, Nasir Jang, had risen in open revolt against him and stood prepared to cross swords with him in the field of battle. Asaf Jah left Delhi in August 1740 and marched rapidly to chastise his rebellious son. He found himself in a situation similar to the one that

<sup>1</sup> *Rajwade*, Vol. 6, 145-49; *S.P.D.*, XIII, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Purendar Daftar*, Vol. I, No. 149, 100.

<sup>3</sup> *Rajwade*, Vol. II, 91, dated 18 May 1741; *S.P.D.*, edited by P.M. Joshi, Vol. I, No. 55, 41, dated 2 April 1741.

confronted him in 1725. Then he had sought the armed assistance of Baji Rao to fight against Mubariz Khan, now he secured the adherence of Nana Saheb in the impending showdown with Nasir Jang. And on both occasions, threatened by aggressive action, he pledged to lend his support to the maintenance of Maratha rights and possessions in the Deccan and Malwa. At this particular juncture he asked for a personal interview with the Peshwa; and Pilaji Jadav brought about a meeting between them at Edlabad on 7 January 1741. They appreciated each other's aims and objectives and committed themselves to a policy of mutual support.<sup>1</sup> It was reported by Nana Saheb to Hingne that they had decided to back Asaf Jah in his fight against Nasir Jang because the former was a man of tact.<sup>2</sup> On 26 February 1741 the Peshwa's letter intimidated Hingne,

I have already informed you of my visit to Nawab Asaf Jah. Sawai Jai Singh has also agreed to obtain royal *sanads* for the *subah* of Malwa together with all the fortified places therein, and acknowledgement of our supremacy over the local chieftain on this side of Chambal. He has also undertaken to obtain a cash payment of Rs. 20 lakhs from the imperial treasury and the remittance of the pilgrimage tax at Prayag.<sup>3</sup>

Thus Asaf Jah drew closer than before towards the Marathas. He is reported to have made the following statement before Babu Rao Malhar who communicated it to the Peshwa:

The Peshwa should go to Delhi and assume charge of imperial affairs in the name of the king. The invasion of Nadir Shah has wrought irreparable damage; and confusion resulting from it reigns supreme everywhere. Contrary to the Emperor's expectations, no Rajput Raja helped the Emperor in the hour of his dire peril. Khan-i Dauran and Sa'adat Khan upset the plans of operations by their rash offensive. If I and the Peshwa maintain friendly relations, every opposition will be overcome and every difficulty will be surmounted.<sup>4</sup>

This significant statement, in which Asaf Jah, the champion of forward policy and a constant opponent of the Marathas, went so far as to suggest that the Peshwa assume control of the imperial administration, was apparently made in the hope that in the prevailing circumstances the Marathas might yet be able to sustain the decaying power of the Mughals.

<sup>1</sup> *Itihasik Patryade*, No. 38, 59, dated 14 January 1741.

<sup>2</sup> *Hingne Daftar*, Vol. I, Letter No. 21.

<sup>3</sup> *Rajwade*, Vol. 6, 152; *Peshwa's Diary*, 21, 22.

<sup>4</sup> *Hingne Daftar*, Vol. II, No. 19, 19-21, dated 26 January 1741.

It is interesting to note that Balaji Baji Rao was keeping the Mughal court informed of these activities in the Deccan. A letter written from the court to the Peshwa provides an illustration:

The letters of the exalted and honoured Peshwa, containing news about his meeting with Asaf Jah, settlement of the issue of Nasir Jang and his march towards the north, were received. The points raised in these letters were explained to his *wakils* posted at the court. The government was favourably inclined to acknowledge the claims made by Baji Rao in the last year of his life. Therefore, the Peshwa, considering the royal favour as a great honour, should pay homage to the court and accept service under the crown. This will promote peace and happiness of the people and enhance his reputation.<sup>1</sup>

But in reality, Nana Sahib's meeting with Asaf Jah and subsequent adjustments arrived at had perturbed the Emperor. He feared that their concert might threaten the security of his throne. He wrote letters to Jai Singh Sawai to ascertain whether any secret pact had been formed between Asaf Jah and the Peshwa. Hingne reported the matter to Nana Saheb in the following words :

Previously Amir Khan and Babu Rao made a compact; afterwards Lashkar Khan, the representative of Asaf Jah, approached you and a compromise was effected. Qamr-u'd-din Khan and Asaf Jah became our allies. This upset the mind of the Emperor and he composed his differences with Asaf Jah. Now the Emperor has made anxious and urgent enquiries from Jai Singh concerning the nature and implications of the alliance between Asaf Jah and the Peshwa. Jai Singh showed these letters to me (Hingne) and asked (me) to explain the true purpose, underlying the agreement. I assured the Raja that no such accord detrimental to the interests of the Emperor, was formed with Asaf Jah, and the Peshwa was well-disposed towards the Emperor. Jai Singh, being softened, asserted that their friendship with the Emperor would prove profitable to them. He advised me and my colleagues not to be influenced by the Turanis in their endeavours to win the Maratha support against the Mughal king. The Raja then wrote to Kirpa Ram to allay the perturbation of the Emperor and arrange the payment of Rs. 15 lakhs from the royal treasury. He has also suggested that the Peshwa should come to Ujjain to receive the amount.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Itihāsik Persian Sahitay*, No. 17.

<sup>2</sup> *Hingne Daftar*, I, No. 13.

Another factor which hastened the conclusion of agreement between the Mughal court and the Marathas was an acute financial stringency which the Peshwa faced at this moment. He had no money to pay either to his creditors or the army.<sup>1</sup> He was so desperately anxious for the payment of Rs. 15 lakhs that he asked Hingne to approach Jai Singh Sawai and press him to advance the stipulated amount from his own treasury. The money given by the Raja, the Peshwa wrote, would be adjusted when Rs. 15 lakh were remitted by the Mughal court.<sup>2</sup> Raja Jai Singh Sawai in his meeting with the Peshwa had promised to secure the grant for Malwa within six months while the latter assured him of his loyalty to the Mughal throne. The Raja went to Delhi where he placed a detailed report of his discussions with the Peshwa before the Emperor. The Raja impressed upon the Emperor the need for making peace with the Marathas and convinced him that Balaji Baji Rao was ready to recognize him as his lawful sovereign and serve under him like other faithful chieftains.<sup>3</sup>

The Emperor, soothed by these assurances, consented to the appointment of Balaji Rao as deputy-governor of Malwa; and procedural formalities followed. The Peshwa was asked to submit a petition to the government professing his loyalty to the Emperor and pledging himself to serve under him. His request was accepted and a royal *farman* was issued on 4 July 1741, appointing Prince Ahmad governor of Malwa and Balaji Baji Rao as his deputy. After two months, 7 September 1741, a grant of the whole of Malwa, including *faujdari* functions, was made to the Peshwa. The *farman* was issued under the seal of the *wazir*. The Peshwa was ordered to maintain law and order in the province, to protect the people against lawlessness and to make the roads safe for travellers.<sup>4</sup>

The Peshwa executed an agreement in which he made the following stipulations:

1. I shall attend the court.
2. I shall occupy the province of Malwa and establish an administration; besides this province I shall not attack or overrun any other part of the Empire.
3. I take the responsibility of preventing other Maratha generals from crossing the Narmada.
4. One capable and distinguished Maratha *sardar* will wait upon the Emperor with 5 hundred horse.

<sup>1</sup> *Rajwade*, Vol. II, 91, 92, dated 7 July 1741.

<sup>2</sup> *Hingne Daftar*, Vol. 1, No. 23, 24.

<sup>3</sup> *Rajwade*, Vol. VI, 151; *Punder Daftar*, I, 149.

<sup>4</sup> *Itihasik Persian Sahitay*, No. 21, 24; *S.P.D.*, XV, 86, 88, 89, 97.

5. The amount of money that I received this year as *in'am* will not be demanded for any reason in the future.
6. Whenever the imperial army moves out on an expedition against an enemy, 4 thousand Maratha horse will join it and fight under the royal banner. The expenses of the contingent, when on active service, will be paid by the Emperor.
7. I will not collect any other dues, except normal tribute, from the *zamindars* of the land beyond the Chambal.
8. That the *jagirs* of *qal'adars*, conditional *jagirs* assigned to *qazis* and *muftis*, the upholders of *shara'* and holders of *madad-ma'ash* lands and daily allowances, granted through *farmans* and confirmed by the Emperor, will not be disturbed, and all of them allowed to retain their possessions.

By another agreement, executed by the Peshwa, the Mughal government paid Rs. 15 lakhs in cash to the Peshwa who was appointed deputy-governor of Malwa with all the *jagirs* and *faujdari* jurisdiction.<sup>1</sup>

Ranoji Sindhia, Malharji Holkar, Yashwant Rao Pavar and Pilaji Jadhav stood surety to the Peshwa for his faithful conduct. They gave in writing that they would leave the service of the Peshwa if he turned disloyal to the Emperor.<sup>2</sup> The Peshwa, by another agreement, assured the Emperor that he would not enter into a secret pact with the Nizam without the Emperor's previous consent.<sup>3</sup>

The appointment of Balaji Baji Rao to the deputy-governorship of Malwa was a formal recognition of the Maratha hegemony which the might of their arms had already established. Malwa passed in legal theory, as it had in fact, under the control of the Marathas. His executive functions embraced maintenance of law and order, and the administration of forts and *jagirs* in the province. "The grant of the *naib-subedari* was merely meant to disguise the completeness of the surrender." The period of uncertainty and confusion was over. The chieftains, who had wavered in their allegiance to the Marathas now finally submitted. Further, the payment of Rs. 15 lakhs from the royal treasury and prospects of regular flow of revenues from areas put under his jurisdiction tended to remove the Peshwa's financial difficulties. The agreement also proved a distinct gain for the Emperor. His Empire was in ruins and decaying; his treasury was empty and his army weakened and demoralized. Under these depressing circumstances the peaceful solution of a long and vexed

<sup>1</sup> *Itihasik Persian Sahitay*, No. 18, 22.

<sup>2</sup> *Itihasik Persian Sahitay*, No. 19, 23.

<sup>3</sup> *Itihasik Persian Sahitay*, No. 20, 23.

problem seemed to him the only alternative. The Peshwa had acknowledged his paramount power and had given a pledge of unreserved support against the enemies of the Empire. He had also assured the Emperor not to enter into any treaty with Asaf Jah without his concurrence. The combined support of the Peshwa and the Raja constituted a sufficient guarantee against disobedient nobles and governors. The Peshwa had disclaimed the intention of extending his sway beyond the Chambal river and had promised to respect the rights and safeguard the interest of the holders of rent-free lands. But the *sanads* contained no direct reference to the position of *mansabdars* small *jagirdars*, revenue officers and other government servants. For survival the latter virtually became dependent upon the goodwill of the Marathas.

Muhammad Shah's appeal to the Peshwa to march to the rescue of 'Aliwardi Khan and grant of *chauth* from Bihar to him was result as well as the manifestation of the sincerity of the alliance between them. After the settlement the Emperor became free from the dangers and risk involved in a war against the Peshwa who, on his part, endeavoured to conform his policy to the maxims of peace and accommodation with the imperial court. In the ensuing years his efforts were mainly directed towards the consolidation of his territorial gains by removing the causes of resistance to Maratha rule in Bundelkhand<sup>1</sup> and strengthening Maratha interests in the regions of Allahabad and Benaras. The Peshwa had turned to a new road, the path of diplomacy, in pursuit of his goal, but it led in the same direction—establishment of Maratha dominion over large areas. The Emperor's friendship or at least neutrality seemed to him necessary for the accomplishment of his objective. The grant of *chauth* from Bengal by the Emperor furnishes a striking illustration of the Peshwa's diplomatic triumph. On 23 June 1745 Mahadev Hingne wrote, "The Emperor has commanded to take to the Peshwa presents consisting of elephants, horses, ornaments, etc. These royal presents I delivered to Nana Saheb in Bundelkhand which he received with due regard and ceremony. The Peshwa felt highly gratified at the rare honour conferred on him by the Emperor."<sup>2</sup> At the same time the Peshwa tried to establish friendly contacts with Safdar Jang, a powerful Irani noble at the court. The Peshwa needed his support for the success of his projects in Bihar and Bengal;<sup>3</sup> while Safdar Jang wanted to prevent the Marathas from carrying on offensive war into Awadh. To promote unity, based on mutual

<sup>1</sup> *New History of the Marathas*, II, 232.

<sup>2</sup> *Rajwade*, 6, 174.

<sup>3</sup> *Peshwa Daftar*, II (Panipat Campaign, 1747-61), Nos. 2,3, 4, 5, dated 23 February 1747.



interests, was indeed the primary purpose which brought them together. Bapuji Mahadev was sent to Safdar Jang to discuss and settle terms with him.<sup>1</sup> The Peshwa felt satisfied that Ram Chandra Baba, his representative in Bundelkhand, was keeping cordial relations with the Mughal governor. He wrote to him, "Safdar Jang is an *amir*; his support should be won by all means; our interests demand that he should not give help to Raghuji Bhonsle to extend his influence in that region."<sup>2</sup> The Emperor who resented an alliance between the Peshwa and Asaf Jah countenanced his growing friendship with Safdar Jang. He asked this noble to contact Balaji Rao and discuss with him the problem of Abdali's impending invasion of India.<sup>3</sup>

#### *'Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla*

During the 17th century the Afghan immigrants from Roh,<sup>4</sup> a hilly tract on the north western border of India, had settled in Kather or the Sambhal-Muradabad division of the Delhi province which in course of time acquired the name of Rohilkhand and the newcomers were called Rohillas. Throughout this period the settlement of the Rohilla Afghans had been encouraged by the Mughal Emperors, particularly Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, in pursuance of a policy of counterpoise against the local turbulent chiefs and *zamindars*.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, thousands of the Afghans

<sup>1</sup> *Hingne Daftar*, I, No. 29, 28, dated 11 January 1745.

<sup>2</sup> *Itihasik Patrayade*, Letter No. 67, 78.

<sup>3</sup> *Peshwa Daftar*, Letters Nos. 2, 4, dated 20 March 1747.

<sup>4</sup> Roh is a Pushto word which means mountain, the ranges of which cover Sawat and Bajawar in the north-west province, the village of Sui in Bhakkar (Sindh), and from Hasan Abdal in the north-west province to Kabul and Qandahar. The inhabitants of this region who migrated to India and settled in Kather were called Rohillas. Mustajab Khan, *Gulistan-i Rahmat*, MS., Aligarh, f.7; Muhammad Raza Khan, *Akhbar Hasan*, MS., Aligarh, 7; James Mills, *History of British India*, London, 1840, II, 226; J.P. Ferrier, *History of the Afghans*, London, 1858, 6.

<sup>5</sup> The *zamindars* and chiefs of Kather generally maintained armed forces to resist the Mughal officers, to make war upon one another; and to plunder the helpless peasants. They had assumed the titles of Rajas, enriched themselves by appropriating state dues and brought under possession the *parganas* which the indolent and weak *jagirdars* had given them in *ijarah*. The conflict between Farrukh 'Siyar and the Saiyid brothers offered an opportunity to these refractory elements to freely indulge in acts of plunder and violence. Throughout this period Kather remained in the grip of disorder and turmoil. For details, *Gulistan-i Rahmat*, f. 6; *Akhbar Hasan*, 10; *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 12.

broke out of their cramped and unproductive homeland into India and spread over the plains of wide extent and uncommon fertility. In Kather they procured for themselves a large field of enterprise and useful occupations, and by indefatigable exertions they gradually improved their material condition and built up for themselves a status in society. The reports of their successes attracted every year swarms of soldiers and workers beyond the border who took up their abode in the promised land, and their migration continued till the 18th century. The majority of the Afghans found jobs in the imperial armies and in the troops maintained by the Rajput chiefs, while others took to farming and craftsmanship. All of them were not uneducated and unworthy of serious contemplation but their physical labour in the field was well-adjusted to their martial spirit and sturdy habits. By means of endogamy they were able to preserve their racial identity and tribal traditions, but clannish rivalries and family feuds prevented the Afghans from organizing themselves into a homogeneous community. Thus, they established their colonies in the districts of Barielly, Anola, Badaun, Moradabad, Amroha, Sambhal and Bijnor which together constitute the modern Rohilkhand in Uttar Pradesh. They would have lived in peace and plenty for a longer period of time had not the changed situation in northern India opened new vistas to transform their scattered settlements into a well-knit, compact and strong principality. When the existing political structure began to crumble, the chieftains, tribal leaders and governors started expanding their territories through conquest and violence. The far-seeing Rohilla *sardars* found in the establishment of their separate kingdom a political necessity and an alternative to the forces of anarchy which were sweeping across the places of their dwelling. Search for security impelled them to forge a bond of unity and a goal for new political order which would hold the newly-constructed community together and firmly. Their struggle for supremacy in northern India obviously brought them into direct conflict not only with the central government but also with the regional powers engaged in the work of expansion through military pressures over neighbours. However, the Afghans responded to direct military challenge and after tiding over many obstacles gained their carefully chosen objective, and by the middle of the 18th century their kingdom had emerged with well-defined contours, supported by military strength and economic resources.

Their first and foremost *sardar* who brought together numerous Afghan clans and laid the foundation of an independent principality was Daud Khan, a slave of Shah 'Alam Khan<sup>1</sup>, one of the influential chiefs in the district of Attock. Ambitious and adventurous, Daud Khan, bade

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<sup>1</sup> Shah 'Alam Khan was the descendant of Shahab-u'd-din Badalzai, a powerful

farewell to his master and native home, and during the reign of Bahadur Shah I arrived in Kather where he, like the majority of his fellow clansmen, began to serve as a mercenary soldier under the local Rajput *zamindars*. The valour and tact of Daud Khan immensely impressed his employers and won for him their esteem and praise. In their domestic conflicts the *zamindars* of Kather appealed to Daud Khan and his superb fighting skill brought victory to the party he supported.<sup>1</sup> The number of his followers multiplied as the fame of his exploits spread in the adjoining areas. The Mughal sovereign rewarded him with some villages, including Bevali in Bareilly, for his gallantry in a campaign against the Marathas.<sup>2</sup> About this time he took up service under Madar Shah who directed him to fight and destroy the rival *zamindars* in the area. In one such campaign the Afghan general captured Bankuli, a town 36 miles north of Bareilly, seized immense booty and made a large number of soldiers captives, including a boy of eight years whom he named 'Ali Muhammad and adopted as his son.<sup>3</sup> Later on, he moved towards north to join the service of Raja Debi Chand of Kumaon on a higher salary and helped him with his 500 soldiers in occupying several villages like Randpur and Kashipur. The Raja's growing turbulence and the prevailing disorders in the region necessitated a punitive expedition by the Mughal government. In 1726, both 'Azmat-ullah deputy-*faujdar* of Moradabad and the *faujdar* of Bareilly, in compliance with the government orders, started military operations against Debi Chand and his comrades. The Raja offered serious resistance to the imperial generals, but in the battle that ensued Daud Khan changed his side and did nothing to avert defeat. This created suspicion in the mind of Debi Chand who wreaked terrible vengeance on Daud Khan by treacherously imprisoning and mercilessly torturing him to death. Towards the close of his life Daud Khan enjoyed the status of a *zamindar*, possessed a strong and well-disciplined military force and exercised considerable influence on minor chiefs in Bareilly and

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*amir* in Roh. Shah 'Alam Khan visited Kather twice to meet Daud Khan and each time was honoured by his grateful slave. When he returned second time he was waylaid and killed by robbers in the neighbourhood of Badaun. Daud Khan, hearing the tragic news, came to the spot and buried the dead body of his master outside Badaun. Hafiz Rahmat Khan built the tomb over the grave of his father. Some writers have alleged that Daud Khan was responsible for the murder of Shah 'Alam because the latter wanted to take him back to his home town. But this is a pure conjecture unsupported by evidence and fabricated only to sully the reputation of Daud Khan. *Akhbar Hasan*, 12; *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 40-41; *Hadiqat-ul Aqalim*, 139.

<sup>1</sup> *Akhbar Hasan*, 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Safar Namah-i Mukhlis*, edited by Dr. S. Azhar 'Ali, Rampur, 1946, 72.

<sup>3</sup> *Akhbar Hasan*, 11.

Muradabad.<sup>1</sup> A leader of great vision and tact, he formed the nucleus of the Afghan power and by linking up all their striking force to it he thus prepared the ground for further expansion under his heir and successor 'Ali Muhammad Khan.

After the death of Daud Khan, his adopted son 'Ali Muhammad Khan<sup>2</sup> was unanimously acknowledged by the principal Rohilla Sardars—Malik Shadi Khan, Najib Khan, Dundey Khan and *bakhshi* Sardar Khan—as their new leader.<sup>3</sup> Only a lad of 15 years, 'Ali Muhammad Khan showed courage and perseverance in meeting all the challenges to his position. He conducted the affairs of *parganas* under control with such diligence and justice that not only his fellow-Afghans but also the villagers accepted him their overlord. He then applied his capacity and resourcefulness to organize a strong and well-trained army to realize his plan of conquest and plunder. He introduced new techniques and weapons in his army to suit the changed methods of warfare. The Rohilla Afghans were supplied with muskets and trained on new lines to use them with accuracy, combination and mobility. He inspired the soldiers with the ideals of unity and discipline and prompted them to fight under his command to conquer new lands and obtain more riches. Geographical conditions of the country chosen for their exploits together with the prevailing political situation facilitated the accomplishment of the objectives the Rohillas had set before themselves. "Their places were surrounded by dense bamboo hedges which no cavalry or artillery could penetrate and through which even infantry could tread its way only where paths had been cut.... Then, again, the skirt of the hills in their immediate north, covered by thick *sal* forests and pestilential swamps called the *tarai*, afforded them a safe refuge after a defeat in the plains, because no enemy could pursue them

<sup>1</sup> *Gulistan-i Rahmat*, ff. 6-10; *Tarikh-i Farha Bakhsh*, ff. 11-13; *Akhbar Hasan*, 13-14.

<sup>2</sup> There is no unanimity of opinion among the contemporary chroniclers with regard to the origin and descent of 'Ali Muhammad Khan. Some writers hold that he was *jat* by origin while according to others he was *rajput* or *ahir*. The author of *Gulistan-i Rahmat* writes that the boy, aged only eight years, was one of the prisoners taken into captivity by Daud Khan, after his victory in the battle of Bankuli. The intelligence and beauty of the boy impressed Daud Khan and he made excellent arrangements for his education and training. When the boy grew up and gave proof of his abilities, Daud Khan declared him as his heir. For details of this controversy, *Gulistan-i Rahmat*, f. 7; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 317b; *Yadgar-i Bahaduri*, 848; *Hadiqat-ul Aqalim*, 139; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 853, 856.

<sup>3</sup> *Gulistan-i Rahmat*, f. 9-10; *Akhbar Hasan*, f. 14; *Bayan-i Waqa'i*, f. 61; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 857-862; *Safar Namah Anand Ram Mukhlis*, 75-76.

across these natural obstacles or survive the climate long".<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the local *zamindars* who could unitedly check the Rohilla expansionist movement were wearing themselves out in mutual warfare while the court nobles whose *jagirs* lay in this region were fully absorbed in the politics of power at the imperial court.

'Ali Muhammad Khan was a shrewd diplomat and a clever military strategist. He sought to avoid confrontation with the Mughal authorities but seized every opportunity to liquidate the weakest elements. His first important diplomatic step was to enter into an alliance with 'Azmat-ullah, deputy-*faujdar* of Moradabad, and with his help to consolidate his own power and procure official recognition to it. It was at the instance of the *faujdar* that 'Ali Muhammad Khan permanently secured the *pargana* Nibia Bowli, set up his headquarters at Bisauli, 14 miles south-east of Chandusi and built a fortress at Bangadh. In return for these concessions the Rohilla chief assisted the *faujdar* and his son Mu'in-u'd-din Khan, also a *faujdar* of Bareilly, in subduing the refractory *zamindars* and collecting revenues from them. But he fell out with Muhammad Saleh, an *ijarahdar* of some *parganas* in Bareilly, and their endless quarrels on financial matters sparked off serious trouble in the district. Muhammad Saleh, disappointed at the partisan attitude of 'Azmat-ullah, wrote complaints to the government, urging it to take prompt action against both of them. When reports from other reliable sources confirmed what Muhammad Saleh had conveyed, the Emperor issued orders for the dismissal of the *faujdar* and the dispatch of a punitive expedition against the Rohilla brigand. In the meantime 'Ali Muhammad Khan made a surprise attack on Muhammad Saleh and in an encounter killed him, and captured Manona, a *pargana* in the *jagir* of Amir Khan. Apprehending a severe chastisement, 'Ali Muhammad Khan lost no time in making friendly overtures to the *wazir* Qamr-u'd-din Khan who, in search of allies, readily responded, and by using his great personal influence rescued him from persecution. The *wazir* gave 'Ali Muhammad Khan a position in the imperial service by assigning to him some *khalisa mahals* on *ijarah*, and a few important courtiers, following his example, also entrusted the management of their *jagirs* to him. The Rohilla chief, now raised to the status of state officer, posted a *wakil* at the court to represent him and protect his interests. In 1737-38 he helped 'Azim-ullah, son of the *wazir*, in the military campaign against Saiyid Saif-u'd-din Khan of Jansath. For his conspicuous role in the campaign he was rewarded with a *mansab* of 5,000, the title of Nawab, and a robe of honour by the Emperor.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, 32.

<sup>2</sup> *Akhbar Hasan*, 17; *Gulistan-i Rahmat*, ff. 17.

Once possessed with an effective war-machine and free from all restraints of law, 'Ali Muhammad Khan commenced a systematic course of predatory warfare with the aim to extend his sway over neighbouring areas. Raja Harnand, the new *faujdar* of Muradabad, opposed him and tried to preserve the solidarity of the imperial territories. But in a pitched battle fought in 1741 the Rohillas inflicted a crushing defeat on the army of the *faujdar* and drove it pell-mell. The *faujdar* and his son lost their lives along with 'Abdul Ghani Khan, 'amil of Bareilly and his brother Diler Khan.<sup>1</sup> To chastise the rebel and recover the land from his possession the Emperor dispatched an expeditionary force under the command of Mu'in-ul Mulk, the son of the *wazir*. 'Ali Muhammad Khan surrendered to the Mughal general, promised to pay an annual tribute to the government and proposed the marriage of his own daughter with one of the *wazir*'s son. The Mughal general accepted his proposals of peace and matrimonial alliance, and agreed to restore all that he intended to take from him. Although the agreement strengthened the political following of the *wazir*, who was at present faced with the opposition of the Irani group, it contributed to the territorial aggrandisement of the rising Rohilla leader.<sup>2</sup> He soon raided and occupied several places like Muradabad, Bareilly, Anola, Badaun, Bangadh, Sambhal and Amroha. These conquests enhanced his power and prestige; consequently, he commanded an army of 40,000 Rohilla Afghans.<sup>3</sup>

The rapidly rising power of the Rohillas in an area just close to the borders of Awadh became a source of great anxiety to Safdar Jang who had joined the central government as *mir atash* in March 1744.<sup>4</sup> His close friend and ally Amir Khan 'Umdat-ul Mulk was already hostile towards 'Ali Muhammad Khan on account of the occupation of his *jagirs* in Muradabad and other *parganas* in Kather. Safdar Jang clearly foresaw that trans-Ganges region was too narrow a field for the Rohilla adventures and rightly feared that his next onslaught might engulf the province of Awadh. A petty event in which some servants of Safdar Jang were killed by the Rohillas aroused his wrath and gave him an opportunity to impress upon the Emperor the need of strong measures against the Rohilla rebel.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, 854.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Faruqhi Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, 318; *Akhbar Hasan*, 20; *Gulistan-i Rahmat*, f. 18b.

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, 855.

<sup>4</sup> *The first two Nawabs of Awadh*, 102, 105; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, I, 365-66.

<sup>5</sup> Early in 1745 there occurred a very petty event which Safdar Jang made a pretext to instigate the Emperor against 'Ali Muhammad Khan. One day some workers under the supervision of *darogha imarat* (superintendent of public works department) sent by Safdar Jang were busy in cutting the wood in the foothills of Kumaon, when some Rohillas came there and tried to stop them from carrying away the timber without the permission of their chief. Their

He proposed a plan of military expedition against the Rohillas and undertook to bear all the expenses of war as the government was unable, due to continuous financial straits, to make payments. Informed of the disorders that raged in Kather the Emperor resolved to restore order in the area, and, yielding to the persuasions of Safdar Jang, agreed to command in person the imperial forces.<sup>1</sup> Safdar Jang sought the cooperation of all the ministers and courtiers including the *wazir*, an ardent partisan of the Rohillas, in the prosecution of the planned campaign.<sup>2</sup> Though the *wazir* was not averse to take part in the operations, he was most anxious to avert fighting to protect his favourite from total destruction. This difference of approach prevented the two powerful ministers from acting whole-heartedly and jointly for the speedy solution of the problem that vexed the government.

At the head of a strong army and accompanied by the principal nobles, the Emperor left Delhi on 25 April, 1745, and after staying for 21 days at the garden of Farhat Afza in *qasba* Loni, he slowly marched in the direction of Kather.<sup>3</sup> On the way near Sambhal the Emperor warmly received Qa'im Khan Bangash who had come from Farrukhabad to join and reinforce the imperial army; and covering a distance of 110 miles in three months the royal party at last reached Bangadh on 14 May.<sup>4</sup> 'Ali Muhammad Khan, acting on the advice of Qa'im Khan, withdrew, took refuge in his stronghold of Bangadh and opened negotiations for compromise.<sup>5</sup> The *wazir* welcomed the overtures, and with the consent of the Emperor began to discuss terms of settlement with other nobles. It was unanimously decided that 'Ali Muhammad Khan should make

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quarrel soon resulted in sword-fighting in which many of the workers were killed. Thinking it a great affront to his honour, Safdar Jang reported the details of the event to the Emperor and induced him to punish the Rohillas severely. For details, *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 260; *Bayan-i Waqa'i*, f. 61; *Tarikh-i Farha Bakhsh*, f. 17.

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 319; *Hadiqat-ul Aqalim*, 140.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Farha Bakhsh*, f. 18.

<sup>3</sup> *Safar Namah*, 1-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'aklikherin*, 855; *Akhbar Hasan*, 22, 'Imad-us Sa'adat, 42.

<sup>5</sup> Qa'im Khan was the eldest son of Muhammad Khan Bangash. After the death of his father, 9 December 1743, Qa'im Khan became the Nawab of Farrukhabad. The Emperor bestowed on Qa'im Khan the title of Farzand Bahadur and showed affection for him. In 1741 Muhammad Khan Bangash had written to Qamr-u'd-din Khan, the *wazir*, to adopt a conciliatory and mild policy towards 'Ali Muhammad Khan as he was loyal to the Emperor. Qa'im Khan following in the footsteps of his father maintained cordial relations with the Rohilla chief and supported his cause. *The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad*, 334-35, 372-73.

unconditional surrender, pay one crore of rupees as war indemnity and restore the imperial territories under his possession.<sup>1</sup> But the Rohilla chief, relying on the strength of his fifty thousand Afghan horse, refused to accept these conditions which he considered unfair and humiliating. The failure of negotiation led to the outbreak of hostilities between the two armies. However, caution and hesitation characterized the attitude of the imperialists who were more interested in keeping their enemy constantly on the defensive than coming to grips with him in a full-scale and decisive battle. Except some minor and isolated skirmishes no coordinated efforts were made to capture the Afghan fortress by launching a vigorous campaign. Conflicting interests of the warring factions in the royal camp thus confused the real issues at stake and obstructed the conduct of operations.<sup>2</sup> At this moment of indecision and uncertainty Nawal Rai, deputy-governor of Awadh, arrived with 20 thousand horse and 40 thousand foot to the aid of Safdar Jang.<sup>3</sup> Further, the local *'ulema* issued *fatwa* pronouncing that fighting with the Emperor was a sin.<sup>4</sup> This declaration caused a general dissatisfaction in the army of 'Ali Muhammad Khan and definitely alienated his non-Afghan adherents. These two factors combined with the Emperor's presence told severely on the morale of 'Ali Muhammad Khan and his determination to resist the royal challenge underwent a reconsideration. On the night of May 20 the Rohillas made a surprise attack on the royal camp but they were quickly repulsed by the Mughal officers. 'Ali Muhammad Khan now became fully conscious of his inability to tide the storm, and consequently he sent a formal message of submission to the Emperor.<sup>5</sup> Both Qamr-u'd-din Khan and Qa'im Khan interceded for him with the Emperor, while Safdar Jang, realizing the futility of his endeavours to crush the Rohillas completely, yielded to the pressures of his opponents and gave in.<sup>6</sup> 'Ali Muhammad Khan, accompanied by his chief officers, three to four thousand troops and his two sons, Faiz-ullah Khan and 'Abd-ullah Khan, came to the royal camp, and after visiting Qa'im Khan and the *wazir* went to pay homage to the Emperor in the afternoon of June 4, 1745. The *wazir* conducted him to the court with his hands tied by a handkerchief. The Emperor pardoned the Rohilla rebel and placed him

<sup>1</sup> *Safar Namah*, 54-55.

<sup>2</sup> For details of these events, *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, 319; *Safar Namah*, 59-63, 64, 65; *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 855; *Hadiqat-ul Aqalim*, 140.

<sup>3</sup> *Safar Namah*, 67; *Tarikh-i Farhabakhsh*, f. 18a.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Farhabakhsh*, f. 19; *Gulistan-i Rahmat*, ff. 22-23.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, f. 260; *Safar Namah*, 75; *Ausaf-ul Asaf*, 43a; *Akhbar Hasan*, 23.

<sup>6</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 320.



under the custody of the *wazir*. His two sons were made hostages. Farid-u'd-din Khan, son of 'Azmat-ullah Khan, was ordered to destroy the fortress of Bangadh and capture the Rohilla artillery. Having completed administrative arrangements the Emperor and his party returned to the capital on 23 June 1745.<sup>1</sup>

The unusual delay of three months in covering a short distance from Delhi to Bangadh and a general hesitation among the imperialists to launch a full-fledged attack on the Rohilla stronghold may be ascribed to the Emperor's disinclination for a relentless suppression of the Rohillas. It appears that the Emperor had anticipated great difficulties and dangers in the destruction of the Rohilla colonies and felt that effects of pursuing such a policy would be ruinous to the general peace in the region. Practical sagacity demanded, on the other hand, a solution which would secure not only the surrender of the Rohilla leader but also peace in the disturbed area. The settlement concluded with 'Ali Muhammad Khan provided a guarantee against the recrudescence of turbulence and of a deterrent to an invasion of Awadh. The Rohilla leader was deprived of his possession, his fortress pulled down, his two sons were made hostages and he himself was carried to Delhi to be kept under the rigorous watch of the government. Though 'Ali Muhammad Khan escaped persecution and his principal *sardars* remained unhurt and the army intact, but with the disappearance of a dynamic leader from the scene the Rohillas were found incapable of renewing their activities. The imperial authority would have been fully established in Rohilkhand if the government had not been in an almost perpetual state of warfare with other regional forces and exposed to the threat of foreign aggression. It was the invasion of Ahmad Shah Durrani and not the settlement concluded with 'Ali Muhammad which enabled him to flee from Sirhind and reconquer lands he had lost. It may be concluded that the settlement was not a piece of blind tactlessness or the result of wilful disregard of the imperial interests.

In Delhi 'Ali Muhammad Khan was put in the Chaharbagh of I'tmad-u'd Daulah in the locality of Jaisinghpura, and the Rohilla generals and soldiers were forbidden to enter the city and meet him. But after a short time, nearly 4,000 Rohillas under the command of Hafiz Rahmat Khan crossed the Jumna in disguise with determined intention to take their *sardar* back by creating disorders in the capital. Though the Rohillas were compelled to leave the city and return, the government felt alarmed at the presence of their leader, and consequently his immediate removal from there was found necessary in the interest of public peace. The Emperor, instead of transferring him to another place as a strictly-guarded

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, 855; *Safar Numah*, 76-81; *Tarikh-i Farhabakhsh*, f. 19; *Akhbar Hasan*, 23.

prisoner or adopting vigorous security measures, appointed him *faujdar* of Sirhind on the suggestion of Qamr-u'd-din Khan who was keen to rescue his favourite from punishment.<sup>1</sup> In Sirhind 'Ali Muhammad Khan carried a number of raids against the refractory *zamindars* and brought them to submission; he restored order in the area and inspired respect for the crown. Hundreds of Afghans of Sirhind and its adjoining area flocked to him for jobs and shelter, while some of his old companions and men-at-arms also arrived from Kather and joined him. The success gained against the local *zamindars* and support received from the Afghans strengthened his position as an imperial *faujdar*<sup>2</sup>, but the invasion of Ahmad Shah changed the situation in the Panjab. Ahmad Shah had written to him to submit, offering the post of *wizarat*, as a reward of desertion, after victory over the Mughal Emperor<sup>3</sup>. But 'Ali Muhammad Khan discarded the offer and decided to leave the place secretly where the two hostile armies were to meet in a combat. He saw in flight from Sirhind a sure chance of gaining his independence and establishing rule in Kather. He, therefore, left Sirhind with his whole army without informing the government or making arrangements for the defence of the place now within the reach of the advancing foreign army. His escape facilitated the easy conquest of Sirhind by the invader, causing great loss of property and prestige to the imperialists. The government was so much entangled in the war preparations against the invader that it could not prevent the entry of the fleeing Rohilla troops into Kather. 'Ali Muhammad Khan safely reached Anola, and he soon started his raids to capture towns and *parganas* he had previously held under possession. Within a short period he brought under control places like Amroha, Muradabad, Sambhal, Bijnor, Bareilly and Shahjahanpur.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Gulistan-i Rahmat*, 28; *'Imad-us Sa'adat*, 43; *Akhbar Hasan*, 25.

<sup>2</sup> *Gulistan-i Rahmat*, ff. 24-26; *Akhbar Hasan*, 25; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 824-25.

<sup>3</sup> *Akhbar Hasan*, 26; *Gulistan-i Rahmat*, ff. 28-29; *Khazana-i Amirah*, 58-60.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 865-68; *Gulistan-i Rahmat*, f. 31a; *Tarikh-i Farhabokbad*, f. 21.

# ADMINISTRATION UNDER MUHAMMAD SHAH

## *The Monarch*

The Mughal state was monarchical in character and highly centralized in form. It was governed by an elaborate machinery which, organized by Akbar, worked successfully for one and a half centuries. Within this period the prestige of the dynasty was so firmly established that no outsider could aspire to the throne; the privilege to reign over the realm ever abided in the house of Babur. The Saiyid brothers played the role of the king-makers and ruled with absolute authority but they did not dare to overthrow the Mughal dynasty and proclaim themselves as sovereigns. The state subjected the bulk of population to uniform laws and made them obedient to the crown, the symbol of political unity. The populace, largely free in the observance of their religious and social beliefs, nearly identified themselves with the power and splendour of monarchy as it was the only bulwark against internal strife and external danger. The governing class included in its ranks men of all creeds, races and regions; it was sought to be firmly tied with the king by bonds of service and loyalty. The ideals of Mughal rule were largely secular and benevolent. The state did not usually interfere in educational, cultural and social activities of the people. The traditional religious policy of the Empire was based on principles of tolerance.<sup>1</sup>

In theory the monarch was the mainspring of the government, the head of the executive and the highest court of justice. He was responsible for his acts to none among his subjects; his commands in all administrative matters—civil and military—could not be questioned. But in practice, the religious and customary laws of the people, split up into various

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<sup>1</sup> Tara Chand, *Society and State in the Mughal Period*, Delhi, 1961, 69; Alexander Dow, *The History of Hindustan*, Introduction, LXXV, LXXXII, XC. A writer, who was contemporary of Muhammad Shah, declared that the "sovereign must abstain from religious bigotry which was the worst trait in the king's character." *Mir'at-ul Mulk*, translated by S. Hasan Aksari, *Indica*, commemoration volume, Bombay, 1953, 36; Philip Francis, *Minutes of the Governor-General in Council*, 30-31.

communities, placed large limitations to his powers. The processes and practices of a highly developed and complex administration further served as a check on the personal will of the king. He was as much bound to follow the established routine of state business as were his subordinates; some-times he could find himself hampered by officers in the execution of his expressly given orders. The stubborn and grasping nobility also put perceptible restraints on the arbitrary exercise of his authority.<sup>1</sup> The later Mughals, wanting in capacity and strength, increasingly depended on the cooperation of the nobles and ministers for the successful performance of their functions.

The Mughal Emperors kept before themselves the ideals of establishing justice, and promoting the well-being of their subjects and the interests of the weak and the helpless.<sup>2</sup> Government officers were repeatedly directed, through *farmans* and *parwanas*, to maintain law and order, develop agriculture, dispense justice, treat the poor and downtrodden kindly and punish those guilty of oppression and extortion. A large number of documents of Muhammad Shah's reign contain these instructions to governors, *diwans*, *qazis*, 'amils and *faujdar*s. In the preamble of a *farman*, addressed to Muhammad Hashim, Aurangzeb had written that "friendliness and benevolence to the high and low is the aim of the illuminated heart"; while in another *farman* to Rasik Das he stated, "that all desires and aims of the Emperor are directed to the increase of cultivation, the welfare of the peasantry and the people at large."<sup>3</sup> Similarly Muhammad Shah, in one of his *farmans*, addressed to Nizam-ul Mulk, emphasized that it was not enough to govern the people, but one must administer the state with the object to improve their lot.<sup>4</sup>

As the monarch occupied a pivotal position in the state machinery, his political dexterity and military skill were obviously matters of the highest importance. Muhammad Shah possessed the qualities neither of a soldier nor of a statesman. Untrained in the art of civil administration and the conduct of military operations, he was raised to the throne, without being given the chance to understand the numerous and complicated problems which beset the Mughal Empire. In the early days of his reign he remained a prisoner of his ministers who kept the main threads of administration in their own hands. Throughout his reign he remained confined within the walls of his fort and never went out to lead campaigns except those against Nadir Shah and 'Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla, which

<sup>1</sup> *Elites in South Asia*, Cambridge University Publication, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Luke Scrafton, *Reflections on the Government of Indostan*, London, 1763, 20.

<sup>3</sup> *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1906, 238-249.

<sup>4</sup> *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*, ff. 79, 81.

only exposed his military incompetence and lack of courage and enterprise.

Nevertheless, he made energetic efforts at consolidating his authority and took every means in his power to protect his court from the effects of domestic violence and foreign invasions. He tried to recover the lost territories and maintain his grip over the state administration. Without some struggle, he never yielded ground. Had the army and civil officers discharged their duties with zeal and dedication, perhaps the results would not have been so dismal. He forced conditions upon Nizam-ul Mulk under which the latter felt compelled to resign from the post of *wizarat*; he easily got rid of the dominant clique of Kokijiu which posed a threat to his authority and disturbed the balance of power at the court. He sacked and punished both Roshan-u'd Daulah, the third *bakhshi*, and his brother, Fakhr-u'd Daulah, the governor of Bihar, for their serious lapses and failings. He dismissed the governors of Kashmir and Gujarat when complaints of maladministration and irregularities were made against them. He wreaked vengeance on 'Umdat-ul Mulk Amir Khan who had insulted him. Popular agitations failed to influence his decisions in matters of public peace and harmony. His role in the shoe-sellers' riot is an illustration of this. Only a few months before his death he supervised war preparations against Ahmad Shah Durrani and kept himself informed of the movements and activities of the imperial army sent under the command of his son.

Some contemporary writers have painted Muhammad Shah as a besotted drunkard and a debauch who cared little about the administration of the state or the dangers that surrounded it. Their aspersions are, however, not based on sound evidence and a critical analysis of events. These writers have held the Emperor responsible for all the misfortunes that befell the Empire in order to gloss over the faults and failures of certain important nobles who patronized them. For instance, the author of *Ahwal-ul Khawaqin* criticises the Emperor for his wrong policies but finds no fault with Nizam-ul Mulk, his patron, who asserted independence and served his relations with the central government. He indeed contends that it was Nizam-ul Mulk and not Muhammad Shah, who strove hard to save the Empire from fragmentation. The authors of *Jauhar-i Samsam* and *Risalah-i Khan-i Dauran*, in their attempts to defend the *mir bakhshi*, to whom they were indebted, have not only condemned the nobles opposed to him but also accused the Emperor of laxity, waywardness and short-sightedness. The writers of *Tarikh-i Hindi* and *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shahi* have also made similar sweeping generalizations without substantiating them with authentic facts. The events of his reign, as analyzed in the previous chapters, amply illustrate the fact that Muhammad Shah was conscientious in the discharge of his responsibilities and perspicacious in understanding and handling state problems.

Muhammad Shah, as head of the state, exercised the power of appointing

and dismissing all those who formed the bureaucratic pyramid of the imperial administration. On matters of policy the king sought the advice of officers whose opinions he valued most; he generally accepted the recommendations of ministers and governors, but the final decision rested with him. Throughout his reign he kept control over policy decisions and administrative arrangements at the centre. The starting point for his reign was his victory in the battle of Hasanpur which restored the governing power to him. Since that time he held the *darbar* regularly and attended to his strenuous duties with care and diligence. His daily routine work was as rigid and exacting as that of the previous Emperors. The function of the state machinery was so much dependent upon his devotion to administrative business that he could not afford to neglect it. Any negligence in the conduct of administration implied disruption of the entire machinery. According to the schedule of work, laid down for the king, Muhammad Shah first offered his morning prayers and then went straight to the *jharokah-i darshan* where he inspected troops, heard complaints of the aggrieved and occasionally witnessed elephant fights. From there he moved to *diwan-i khas* and dealt with the serious problems of government. The officials of various departments presented their reports; the governors and the chiefs paid homage to him and offered presents; they, in return, received robes of honour and other gifts. Here, new appointments, promotions and transfers were made; reports from provinces were submitted; and orders were issued by the Emperor. He next visited the *diwan-i 'adalat* where he received officers of subordinate ranks, dictated necessary instructions, dispensed justice and heard reports sent by *faujdar*s, revenue collectors and *mansabdars*. On Fridays he did not conduct any administrative business, but he went to the mosque to offer his prayers in congregation; the evening he spent in the company of learned scholars and distributed money in charity. Frequently he went for hunting, visiting shrines and gardens, and sight-seeing on the banks of the Jumna. The author of the *Tarikh-i Muzaffari* writes about the Bell of Justice hanging in the Burj-i Mussaman of the Red Fort, the chain of which lay on the ground below the fort-wall. It was proclaimed that any person, seeking redress of some grievance, could come and draw the chain without let or hindrance to inform His Majesty of his plaint.<sup>1</sup>

The administrative procedure adopted at the court was such that no appointment, grant of *mansab* and *jagir*, or increase in the rank or pay of a government servant could be made by any minister, however powerful, if it was not sanctioned by the Emperor. This procedure,<sup>1</sup> initially laid down

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 452; *Akhbarat-i Darbar Mu'lah* (Sarkar Collection); *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*; *Shah Namah Munawwar-ul Kalam*.

in the reign of Akbar, was strictly adhered to by Muhammad Shah till the end of his reign.<sup>2</sup> According to this system, two clerks, called *waqa'i-nawis* were present, day and night, at the royal palace, ready to record the orders of His Majesty pertaining to any public matter. One officer was appointed for each day, whose duty was also to take down the orders of the Emperor, and his record was called *risalah*<sup>3</sup>. Thus the orders of the king regarding policy matters or administrative arrangements were written in the *waqa'i* (diary) of the clerk and the *risalah* of the officer whose turn it was to be in attendance for writing and maintaining records. The diary of the clerk was supervised by the officer present that day in the court; it was placed before the king for his approval by the '*arz-i mukarrar*,<sup>4</sup> the officer-in-charge of revision. After the approval of the king it was handed over to the clerks who made out a separate copy of each order, which was then signed by the *waqa'i-nawis*, the '*arz-i mukarrar* and the noble who mounted guard on that day. The report thus prepared was called *yaddasht* or an endorsed memorandum (court record).<sup>5</sup>

#### *Powers and Functions of the Wazir*

It has already been seen that Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan Qutb-ul Mulk, the first *wazir* of Muhammad Shah, had concentrated enormous power in his hands, having become the arbiter for the political and administrative affairs of the Empire. His successor, Muhammad Amin Khan, assumed a predominant position in all matters concerning the higher branches of the government. But Nizam-ul Mulk, the third *wazir*, who proved equally

<sup>1</sup> For details of this procedure, *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, 93-99.

<sup>2</sup> Numerous documents of Muhammad Shah's reign illustrate this fact. Bashir-u'd-din Ahmad, *Faramin-i Salatin*, Delhi, 1926, 144, 145, 158-160, 251; *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 38.

<sup>3</sup> *Risalah* is a short term of *risalahdar*, a commander of troops.

<sup>4</sup> "He had the duty of revising royal orders and presenting them a second time for the king's sanction". He worked under the king and was directly responsible to him. *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, 293.

<sup>5</sup> Every *yaddasht* contained the signatures of the following persons : (1) The *wazir* (*diwan-i 'ala*) signed it with the remark that the *yaddasht* (court-record) was compared with the *waqa'i* (diary of the clerk) and was placed before the king for his approval. (2) The *darogah-i-'arz-i mukarrar* wrote that on such and such date it was approved by the Emperor. (3) The *waqa'i nawis* noted that the court record was prepared in accordance with the *waqa'i* or the royal orders. Endorsement given on the back of a *farman* which was drafted on the basis of *yaddasht*, also included the names of the *risalah* (the noble in whose presence the Emperor issued orders), *waqa'i-nawis* and '*arz-i mukarrar*.

grasping and independent, was not allowed to hold his sway over the imperial administration for more than two years. His brief tenure was marked by internal tension, and stiff opposition from the powerful vested interests at the court. On 22 July 1724 Qamr-u'd-din Khan became the *wazir*, and he continued to work in the office till the end of his life. He was a plain, simple, and pleasant man; and, unlike his predecessors, he was not very assertive in the conduct of administration. The increasing influence of the *mir bakhshi* set bounds to the powers of the *wazir* and diminished his importance. In matters of policy decisions and administrative changes his voice carried little weight. The *mir bakhshi* and some courtiers, on the other hand, guided the councils of the king and formulated domestic and foreign policies of the government. However, the *wazir* retained his position and prestige in the area of his departmental activities. Qamr-u'd-din Khan, being loyal to the Emperor and subservient to his will, showed no signs of resentment. He apparently reconciled himself to the new situation and accepted the position to which he had been reduced.<sup>1</sup>

The *wazir* played no effective role in the appointment or removal of any governor during this period. The *mir bakhshi*, the third *bakhshi*, and other favourites of the king became instrumental in securing the appointments and dismissals of various governors. For instance, Muhammad Khan Bangash was the appointed governor of Malwa and then dismissed, at the suggestion of Khan-i Dauran. Mention has been made in the previous chapter of the appointment of Sarbuland Khan to the governorship of Gujarat and his dismissal from that office due to the efforts of the *mir bakhshi*. It was he who recommended the name of Raja Abhay Singh to the governorship of Gujarat and after few years succeeded in manipulating his dismissal. The governors of Bengal remitted the revenues to the central treasury through the *mir bakhshi*. He thus had the general charge of the administrative affairs of the province. First Roshan-u'd Daulah and then Khan-i Dauran were entrusted with the task of sending money to the governor of Kabul for payment of salaries to the *mansabdars* and pension-holders in that province. At the centre Qamr-u'd-din Khan exercised no power in matters of appointments and dismissals of officers, nor did he interfere in the affairs of other departments.<sup>2</sup> Whereas copies of *hasb-ul hukms*, issued under the seals of the first three *wazirs*—Abdullah Khan, Muhammad Amin Khan and Nizam-ul Mulk—are found in the *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, there is not a single copy of such a document, issued

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Saltanat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, II, f. 314a.

<sup>2</sup> On the proposal of Shah Abdul Ghafoor, the appointments and transfers of *amins* in *khalisa* area were made. *Gulshan-i Sadiq*, I.O. MS., f. 18b.



under the seal of Qamr-u'd-din Khan, dealing with important policy matters.<sup>1</sup> The only copy of *hasbul hukm*, bearing the seal of Qamr-u'd-din Khan, relates to the appointment of Muhammad Momin Khan as governor of Gujarat, but that was also signed by Khan-i Dauran.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, there are several copies of documents concerning varied aspects of administration which were issued under the seal of the *mir bakhshi*.<sup>3</sup> The author of the *Farhang-i Kardani* holds that the *wazir* (*diwan-i a'la*) was mainly responsible for the entire administration of the Empire.<sup>4</sup> This statement is not applicable at least to the case of *wazir* Qamr-u'd-din Khan. Muhammad Shah was averse to the delegation of large powers to the *wazir*, as he himself wanted to remain a driving force behind the central administration.

In theory the *wazir*, writes Anand Ram, was the first among the central ministers; in official papers he was addressed with the title of Wazir-ul Mumalik. As the head of the revenue department, he was called *diwan-i a'la*, or chief *diwan*; the other two *diwans* in the ministry of revenue, *diwan-i khalisa* and *diwan-i tan* worked under his superintendence. When the *diwan-i a'la* held his office, no one could enter the hall and approach him; the *diwan-i khalisa* and *diwan-i tan* sat on his right and left respectively; they personally went to him to submit reports, show papers and get their files signed by him.<sup>5</sup> The main function of the *diwan-i a'la* or *wazir* was to supervise and control the revenue affairs of the whole Empire. His duty was to take care that the laws concerning the revenue administration were faithfully executed by the agencies set up for that purpose in the Empire. "He had to deal with every officer who drew his salary from the government; he put his finger upon every *dam* that reached the royal treasury and went out of it."<sup>6</sup> Except for financial matters he had no concern with the working of other departments of the central government. Besides the departmental work, Qamr-u'd-din Khan performed other duties assigned to him from time to time by the Emperor. For example, he led a military campaign against the Marathas in Malwa, and fought in the battle of Sirhind. Anand Ram further states that from the time of Aurangzeb it became a rule that the *wazir* should not be dismissed or

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 22, 23, 36.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 197.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 143; 'Ajaib-ul Afaq, No. 189, f. 77a.

<sup>4</sup> *Farhang-i Kardani*, Aligarh MS. 315/85, f. 28b.

<sup>5</sup> *Mir'at-ul Istilah*, Or. 1813, f. 29. For the mode of working by Sa'ad-ullah Khan and Raja Raghunath, *diwans* in the reign of Shah Jahan, *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, MS. 1641, f. 86. Except Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan, other *wazirs* of Muhammad Shah held their offices in the royal court.

<sup>6</sup> *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, 206; *Dastur-al 'Amal 'Alamgiri*, Add, 6599, f. 38a.

transferred.<sup>1</sup> 'Ali Muhammad Khan, author of the *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, supports this statement. He writes :

As the rule and law of this Empire is that the *wazir* is not dismissed, Nizam-ul Mulk was made *wakil-i Mutlaq* and honoured with the title of Asaf Jah. His *mansab* was raised to 9,000/9,000, *do-aspā*, and the *subedari* of the Deccan was restored to him<sup>2</sup>.

Since Asaf Jah ruled in the Deccan, the office of *wakil-i mutlaq* became ornamental and for all practical purposes redundant. But his status was higher than that either of the *wazir* or the *mir bakhshi*.<sup>3</sup> The provincial *diwan* was appointed by the Emperor generally at the recommendation of the *diwan-i a'la* who was mainly responsible for the revenue administration of a province. The provincial *diwan* received the *sanad* of his appointment under the seal of the *wazir*. The other subordinate officers in the revenue department of a provincial government, like the *peishkar*, *darogah* and *mushrif*, were also appointed by the central government; their *sanads* of appointment were issued by the *wazir*.<sup>4</sup>

The signature of *diwan-i a'la* were required on the following important papers :

1. The diary of royal orders.
2. Payment orders addressed to officers of treasury in respect of the payment of salary (*muwajib*) to be disbursed from the royal treasury.
3. Payment orders (*dastakat*) issued to the treasurers for the payment of salary to the armies.
4. Abstract of queries, made by *'amils* and provincial *diwans*, which were reported to the *diwan-i a'la*. The *diwan-i a'la* dictated the answers and signed them according to rules.

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-ul Istilah*, f 29.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 54.

<sup>3</sup> Whenever the *wakil-i mutlaq* held his court the important ministers like the *wazir*, *mir bakhshi*, *khan-i saman* and *mir atash* came to pay homage to him. The *wazir* and the *mir bakhshi*, whose status was greater than that of other ministers, first stood at the *stangah* and greet the *wakil* from there. The *diwan-i tan* and *diwan-i khalisa* bowed before him and took their seats far away from the *wakil's masnad*. The *wazir* and the *mir bakhshi* would personally go to the *wakil* to get their files inspected and signed by him. The *wakil* affixed his signature over that of the *diwan-i a'la*. *Mir'at-ul Istilah*, f. 9. For a detailed discussion of the *wakil's* powers and his conflict with the *wazir* in the reign of Bahadur Shah, *A Mughal Statesman of the Eighteenth Century*, 23, 24.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, Supplement, 173.

5. Matters worthy of the king's notice were forwarded through the *diwan-i a'la*, while the remaining papers were signed by him.
6. The *diwan-i a'la* signed papers of demands for cash salaries of *mansabdars*, match-lockmen and *ahsham*.<sup>1</sup>
7. The salary bills of managers of the government factories and employees, if ordered.
8. *Hasb-ul hukms*.
9. *Parwanas* regarding (a) the *paibaqi*<sup>2</sup>, (b) the remittance of balances in the provincial treasury to the royal exchequer, (c) the payment of salaries and whatever was ordered in respect to the provincial officers and the army, (d) matters arising out of reports received from the *waqa'i-nawis*. On all such documents the *diwan-i a'la* wrote *sanad dahand* (issue the *sanad*), while *diwan-i khalisa* countersigned by writing *mulahaza shud* (seen).
10. Security bonds for personal appearance and sureties for the payment of money due to government and every other undertaking submitted by state employees.
11. Papers received from the office of the *bakhshis*.
12. Demands for payments made by the *fotahdars* and treasurers of provinces and *parganas*.
13. The account reports submitted by auditors attached to different offices.
14. The abstract of a *farman*, given on the reverse side, signed by the *diwan-i a'la*.
15. Report about the dismissal of *'amil*, drafted in the office of *khalisa*.
16. Records dealing with the income which accrued through the revenues or other sources (*abwab-ul mal*); expenditures of the household supported by vouchers (*arbab-ul tahwil*); accounts of the sums of money spent on salaries of the army or the income of the assignments given in lieu thereof (*tawjih*).
17. Registers (*tumar*) of pending balances and demands were signed by the Emperor, and their copies were signed by the (*diwan-i a'la*).
18. Certificates of salaries given in advance.
19. Orders regarding the examination of papers and court diaries.
20. Orders for the recovery of dues from the *mansabdars*.

<sup>1</sup> "They were servants employed in artillery which is permanently attached to the court and were not posted in the forts or provinces outside the court." *Mir'at-ul Istilah*, f. 8.

<sup>2</sup> It is a technical term used for a *jagir* taken away from a *mansabdar* on his transfer and earmarked for re-assignment; it also denoted the revenues from lands so reserved and not yet allotted. Its administration was under the charge of *diwan-i a'la*. *Khulasat-us Siyaq*, f. 26b.

21. Pay-bills issued to the *mansabdars*. On all such papers the *diwan-i a'la* wrote *manzur-darand* (deem accepted), while *diwan-i khalisa* signed them with the remark, *mulahaza shud* (seen).<sup>1</sup>

The register of cash accounts which were sent to the office of *diwan-i a'la* related to the following items:<sup>2</sup>

Purchases, salaries of the *ahadis* (troopers employed directly in Emperor's service), rent-free grants (*in'am*), cash-payments sent for the royal palace, recovery of loans (*'bazyaft musa 'adat*), arrears (*baqay*), payments made to the matchlock-men, fines imposed on *mansabdars'* total expenditure, *khurak-i dawabb*,<sup>3</sup> palace servants (*shagird-pesha*), loans (*musa 'adat*),<sup>4</sup> presents to the king, *pai-mali*,<sup>5</sup> *'al-waz-i jagir*,<sup>6</sup> accounts of numerous store-houses and expenditure

<sup>1</sup> For details, *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, ff. 31, 32, 33 ; *Dastur-al 'Amal*, Bodleian MS., 187, ff. 14, 15 ; *Al'amal-'ilm-i Navisandigi*, f. 151; Haranand, *Siyaq Namah*, *Asafiya*, MS., f. 76b.

<sup>2</sup> *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, Add. 1641, f. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Literally it means fodder for the cattle. It was really an item of deduction from the salary of the *mansabdars* to meet the expenses of the Emperor's elephants and cattle. The practice, introduced by Akbar, continued throughout the 17th century till it was changed in the reign of Bahadur Shah. The *mansabdars* were hard hit by this tax, as income from their *jagirs* was very low ; in some instances the amount did not exceed a half or third of the money required for the expenses of the animals. On non-payment of the tax, the agents of the *mansabdars* at the court were imprisoned and oppressed. (*Insha-i Roshan Kalam*, I.O. 4011, f. 13b.) The *mansabdars* posted in the Deccan were not obliged to pay the amount under this head. (*Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's reign*, 115.) Mun'im Khan, the *wazir* of Bahadur Shah, laid down that when the *mansabdars* secured *jagirs* for their support, the number of *dams* required for the cost of feeding cattle should be deducted first from the total estimated income and the balance should be assigned as the income. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 602; *The Army of the Mughals*, 21. An order issued by the central government to Haider Quli Khan, *diwan* of Gujarat, required him to release 32,06,000 *dams* from the conditional *jagirs* of Ajit Singh, the governor, as the amount of *Khurak-i dawabb*. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Musa'adat* was an official term used for loans or advances of money given to an officer to meet his expenses ; he was liable to pay the money in full. *A'in-i Akbari*, H. Blochmann, I, 275. According to the author of *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, (f. 58b) the officer was to pay in 8 instalments. In the reign of Muhammad Shah advances were made to several nobles, like Sarbuland Khan, Raja Abhay Singh, and Jai Singh ; but there is no evidence to show that these loans were ever recovered (*bazyaft*) from them by the central government.

<sup>5</sup> Deductions for compensation paid for the devastations occasioned by the march of an army.

<sup>6</sup> This technical term was used for such *jagirs* as were assigned afresh to the *mansabdars* after their transfer from one place, either to the court or to another province. *Dastur-ul 'Aamal Agha'i*, Add, 18422, ff. 8, 9.

incurred on animals kept in the royal stable and servants of the palace.

The posting of the following officers was made through<sup>1</sup> the office of the *diwan-i a'la*<sup>1</sup> :

*Subedars, faujdars, diwans, amins and daroghas*<sup>2</sup>, *mushrif*<sup>3</sup>, *tahwildars*<sup>4</sup> of *mahals, fotehdars*<sup>5</sup>, and the *baramud nawisan*<sup>6</sup>, *sazawals*<sup>7</sup>, *amins karoris, tahsildars* and *zamindars*.

As noted above, the *diwan-i a'la*, in the exercise of his functions, was assisted by two *diwans* subordinate to him. One was the *diwan-i khalisa* who carried out the administration of the *mahals* and *parganas* whose income was remitted to the royal exchequer. He countersigned every paper concerning revenue matters signed by the *diwan-i a'la*. He also signed appointment letters issued to the provincial *diwans, faujdars* and *amins*. As he worked under the direction and supervision of the *wazir*, he naturally enjoyed his confidence. But in the absence of any evidence it is a hazardous to assert that the *diwan-i khalisa* or *diwan-i tan* was appointed by Muhammad Shah solely on the suggestion of *wazir Qamr-u'd-din Khan*.

The second *diwan* was called *diwan-i tan*. He dealt with the management of *jagirs* assigned to the Princes and *mansabdars* in lieu of their salaries. This division of work, based on definite principles and rules, facilitated the dispatch of business in the ministry of revenue which was under the charge of the *wazir*. In the reign of Muhammad Shah the posts of *diwan-i khalisa* and *diwan-i tan* were sometimes combined in one person. The first such *diwan*, appointed after the battle of Hasanpur, was

<sup>1</sup> *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, f. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Superintendents of the treasury of the civil courts.

<sup>3</sup> *Mushrif-i Khazana* was an accountant in the treasury who authenticated accounts and documents. He was an accountant in the central government. The duty of *mushrif-i mahals* was to prepare the daily account of revenue-collection and send it every week to the central government. *Farhang-i Kardani*, f. 28a ; *Nigar Namah-i Munshi*, ff. 143a, 155a.

<sup>4</sup> Cash-keeper posted in every *mahal*.

<sup>5</sup> For details of his functions and duties, *Nigar Namah-i Munshi*, f. 138b ; *Dastur-ul 'Amal Bekas*, 28.

<sup>6</sup> His main duty was to audit the accounts of the *'amil* on the basis of the *patwari*'s records and prepare the statement of outstanding balances which were to be realised from the *'amil*. *Nigar Namah-i Munshi*, f. 144a.

<sup>7</sup> Persons deputed by the central government for the execution of orders. *Nigar Namah-i Munshi*, f. 142a ; *Yasin's Glossary*, f. 67b.

Iradatmand Khan. He was succeeded by Raja Gujar Mal Ray Rayan, formerly *diwan* of the estate of Nawab Qudsia Begam, the mother of Muhammad Shah. The Raja was competent and faithful; for his integrity and efficiency he was praised by Nizam-ul-Mulk. When he died in 1724, his son Gajmal became *diwan-i khalisa* and received the titles of his father. The post of *diwan-i tan* was given to Shaikh Sa'ad-ullah.

The following records were submitted in the office of the *khalisa* :<sup>1</sup>

1. Records of the 'amils.
2. Copies of statements from the provincial *diwans* regarding *mal* (land revenue) *sair* (customs) and treasury accounts.
3. Records of revenue demands (*mutalba*).
4. The *amins*, posted in the provinces, were required to send registers of assessment (*siya-i tashkhis*), rent-roll (*tumar jama'*) and collection of revenues.
5. The *karoris* were required to submit total account of receipts and expenditure,<sup>2</sup> copy of rent-roll,<sup>3</sup> daily account of receipts,<sup>4</sup> table of rates, *jama' wasilbaqi*,<sup>5</sup> and *arsatta*,<sup>6</sup> *awarjah*,<sup>7</sup> *daul tankhwah khurak-i duawwab*.<sup>8</sup>

In the office of the *diwan-i khalisa* the following documents were prepared:<sup>9</sup>

- (a) rent-roll for all *khalisa* lands;
- (b) account of income and expenditure at the court as well as in the provinces;

<sup>1</sup> *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, f. 34.

<sup>2</sup> *Mujmil jama' kharch*. The term was applied to receipt and expenditure of a *pargana*. In fact it was *goshwarah* (abstract) and *awarjah* (ledger) made on the basis of village by village (*deh-ba deh*). *Khulasat-us Siyaq*, f. 20.

<sup>3</sup> *Tumar-jama'*, "the sum total of the land revenue according to the *tumar*." *Wilson's Glossary*, 527a.

<sup>4</sup> *Roznamcha-i Tahsil*, it was a kind of paper in which details of every day collection and the balances outstanding were given. *Khulasat-us Siyaq*, f. 17b.

<sup>5</sup> "An account in three columns, stating the totals of the revenue expected according to the settlement, the account received and the balances outstanding." *Fifth Report*, III, Glossary, 22b; *Yasin's Glossary*, f. 71.

<sup>6</sup> A monthly treasury account of receipts and disbursements. *Wilson's Glossary*, 32b.

<sup>7</sup> An abstract account containing receipts and disbursements. *Khulasat-us Siyaq*, f. 19b.

<sup>8</sup> The record showing deduction of *khurak-i duawwab* from the salary of the *mansabdars*.

<sup>9</sup> *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, f. 33.

- (c) salary registers of the royal ladies, and
- (d) audit of expenditure incurred on the troops in attendance of the Emperor.

The *diwan-i tan* signed the following papers:<sup>1</sup>

1. Estimates (*daul*) of cash payments.
2. Audited accounts of *jagirdars*, assignments made after transfer, and loans given from the treasury.
3. *Yaddasht* (memorandum) about the salary of state employees.
4. Orders of payment of money to the *a'imma* (land-grantees).
5. All other kinds of *parwanas* in accordance with orders.

His office compared the *yaddasht* of *mansabdars* which were signed by the *'arz-i mukarrar*. The *dagh-namah* and *tasil-namah* (papers of branding and verification) signed by the *diwan-i a'la* were received in his office. *Farmans* or orders by the Emperor were written in his office.

The office of the *diwan-i tan* maintained the following records:<sup>2</sup>

1. Details of *zamindars*.
2. Estimate (*daul*)<sup>3</sup> of the revenue from *jagirs* assigned to the governors.
3. Registers (*sar-rishta*<sup>4</sup>) of *paibaqi* and accounts of receipts and disbursements of the villages (*awarijah-i parganat*<sup>5</sup>).
4. *Taujil*<sup>6</sup> of *jagirdars* and ranks of *mansabdars*.
5. Orders of the salary of *jagirdars* of *ahadis* and treasury employees.

The *diwan-i tan* was required to put his signature on the registers of *jagirs*, orders of the resumption of *jagir*, and papers pertaining to demands of payment from the officers.

<sup>1</sup> *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, f. 36.

<sup>2</sup> *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, f. 35.

<sup>3</sup> "A statement of the particulars of the gross revenue levied from an estate or district, an estimate of the amount of revenue which a district or estate may be expected to yield." *Wilson's Glossary*, 129b.

<sup>4</sup> A public record. *Fifth Report*, III, Glossary, 48a.

<sup>5</sup> An abstract account containing receipts and disbursements.

<sup>6</sup> "A statement which contained all entries referring to the pay of the army and showed the manner in which it was given." For the functions of *sahib-i taujih* (adjuster of accounts) see, *Dastur-ul 'Amal Aurangzeb*, f. 38b.

*Mir Bakhshi*

The *mir bakhshi* was the chief head of the military department of the Mughal government. He was mainly responsible for the efficient functioning of the *mansabdari* system. In the exercise of his functions he was assisted by three other officers designated as second *bakhshi*, third *bakhshi* and fourth *bakhshi*. For the organization and control of other troops, like *ahadis* and *walashahi*, separate *bakhshis* were appointed. Closely associated with this department was the *mir atash*, the head of artillery, posted at the centre. The *mir bakhshi* dealt with all affairs relating to the appointment, posting and payment of salaries of *mansabdars* of all ranks<sup>1</sup>.

He presented candidates for service before the king, supervised the branding and verification and made reports regarding all affairs of *mansabdars* for favour of rewards.<sup>2</sup> He prepared the list of the guards and presented it before the Emperor for his approval. He also received the news and reports sent by the *waqa'i-nawis* from different provinces and put them before the king.<sup>3</sup> Every division of the army had a separate *bakhshi* and in most cases the duty of *waqa'i-nawis* (news-reporter) was also assigned to him. The distribution of loans, advances of money and the payment of salaries formed the chief duty of the *bakhshi* of the army on the active service.<sup>4</sup> Thus, matters relating to the *bakhshi* and *waqa'i-nawis*

<sup>1</sup> All orders of appointment of *mansabdars* passed through the hands of the *mir bakhshi*. When *ta'liqa*, or abridgement of *yaddasht*, was prepared for the award of *jagir* to a *mansabdar*, it was sent to the chief *bakhshi* who was to supervise the branding of the horses and specify the amount of the monthly salary on the basis of the number of horses brought by the *mansabdar*. Having satisfied himself with the muster, the chief *bakhshi* kept the *ta'liqa* with himself, and issued a certificate, called *sarkhat*, under his seal and signature. The *sarkhat* was entered in the records of the other *bakhshis* and forwarded to the *diwan-i a'la* who preserved the document in his office and prepared a statement on account of the annual and monthly salary due on it and reported the matter to His Majesty. In case the royal sanction was secured it was again reported to the chief *bakhshi* who issued the order of assignment under his seal and signature to the office of the *diwan*. "If His Majesty's order specifies a cash payment, the *farman* is made out in the same manner, but is generally called *barat* (cheque). A statement of accounts of the transactions is appended at the bottom of it. After the *nazir*, the *diwan-i buyutat* signed it, and when it has passed through the hands of the *bakhshis* and the *diwan*, it is sealed and signed by the *khansaman*." *A'in-i Akbari*, H. Blochmann, II, 271-272.

<sup>2</sup> For illustration, *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign*, 25, 52, 53, 55, 56, 59, 60, 80. The author of *Hidayat-i Qawwa'id* writes that the *mir bakhshi* should present only such candidates who belonged to respectable families for service in the army, ff. 11b, 12a.

<sup>3</sup> *Ruqa 'at-i 'Alamgiri*, 6.

<sup>4</sup> *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, f. 17a.



were directly dealt with by the office of the *mir bakhshi*. The *dastak* of appointment passed through the office of the second *bakhshi*. The division of the army into different sections was made in the office of the *mir bakhshi*; and a copy of the document was sent to the second *bakhshi*. The *mir bakhshi's* office dealt with the appointments of the *darogha* (superintendent of guard), *amin chauki* (the writer of guard), and *mushrif* (treasurer), who were responsible for the branding and verification of troops both at the court and in the provinces. Sureties produced by officers in respect of accounts, branding and verification of the troops of big nobles and *mansabdars* required his seal and signature. Orders of appointment of new *mansabdars* issued by the Emperor in the presence of the second *bakhshi*, were to be verified and drafted by him; after branding and verification, the papers were submitted to the *mir bakhshi* for his seal and signature. Awards of *mansabas* and sanctions of increments to the princes, *amirs* of high rank and other big officials were signed by him. Orders about the posting of *mansabdars*, issued in the presence of the second *bakhshi* was to be written in his office, but was to be sealed by the *mir bakhshi*.<sup>1</sup>

After the battle of Hasanpur Muhammad Shah appointed Khan-i Dauran the *mir bakhshi* with the rank of 8,000/8,000 and the title of Amir-ul Umara. But he was not made *subedar* of any province. He was the most conspicuous and dominating minister in the central government. He influenced the policy and acts of the Emperor in administrative affairs; and he played a very important role in the appointment and dismissals of the governors.<sup>2</sup> Throughout his life Khan-i Dauran lived in the capital, performing the duties associated with the office of the *mir bakhshi*. He disliked the idea of leaving the court for an active service. When ordered by the Emperor to march against the Marathas, the *mir bakhshi*, instead, asked the governor of Ajmer to encounter the enemy. In 1733-34 Khan-i Dauran himself proceeded to the trouble spot in Malwa and he was accompanied by *wala shahi* contingents along with his own army.<sup>3</sup> At the capital he introduced state officers, governors and chieftains to the Emperor. Defeated and severely wounded, Khan-i Dauran died on 16 February 1739. Nizam-ul Mulk secured the vacant post of the *mir bakhshi*, but he did not enjoy the confidence of the Emperor. He left Delhi on 27 July 1740, making his elder son Ghazi-u'd-din Khan Bahadur

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed discussion on the functions and duties of the *mir bakhshi*, *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, f. 17a; *Dastur-al 'Amal* (Bodleian) f. 8b; *Farhang-i Kardani*, f. 40a; *Al 'amal-ilm-i Navisindigi*, f. 159; *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, 215-227.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 197.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukhi Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 106a, 134b.

Firoz Jang, his deputy with authority to sign and seal the official papers. Ghazi-u'd-din Khan continued to work in the capacity of the deputy-*mir bakhshi* till the end of Muhammad Shah's reign.<sup>1</sup>

### Second Bakhshi

Before his promotion to *wizarat*, Qamar-u'd-din Khan, held the post of the second *bakhshi*. It is not mentioned to whom this post was given after Qamar-u'd-din Khan took over the charge of the office of *wizarat*. Towards the end of the reign the name of Intizam-u'd-daulah as holding this post appears in some contemporary works.<sup>2</sup> The duties of the second *bakhshi* may be summarised as follows :<sup>3</sup>

1. He dealt with the grant of new *mansabs*, service and increment of small *mansabdars*.
2. Orders of posting, if issued in the presence of the second *bakhshi*, were written in the office of the second *bakhshi*.
3. The *siyaha* (register) of guard duty was submitted in the office of second *bakhshi*.
4. He prepared a list of *mansabdars* of all ranks and kept registers which contained details of their postings.
5. His office maintained record of branding and verification of *mansabdars* posted at the court and in the provinces.
6. In the absence of the *mir bakhshi* he prepared a list of *mansabdars* who were in attendance at the court.
7. *Dastak* about posting *mansabdars*, if ordered either in the presence of the *mir bakhshi* or second *bakhshi*, was written in the office of former, but passed through the offices of both the *bakhshis*.

### Third Bakhshi

The third *bakhshi* assisted both the first and the second *bakhshis* in the conduct of miscellaneous business of the military department. His position was inferior to that of the second *bakhshi* who worked jointly with the chief *bakhshi* in several department functions. The third *bakhshi* dealt with matters relating to daily stipends and increment in the ranks of *mansabdars* as ordered by the king. He submitted relevant registers and

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Deccan*, Add. 26273, f. 69b.

<sup>2</sup> *Bada 'i-waqa 'i*, f. 115b.

<sup>3</sup> *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, f. 18b; *Farhang-i Kardani*, f. 40a. *Dastur-ul 'Amal*, f. 9a.

records before the chief *bakhshi* and the second *bakhshi* when they held their office. The certificate of branding and verification of a *mansabdar* the orders of whose appointment were issued by the Emperor in his presence, passed through the third *bakhshi* ; he affixed his seal on it and kept a copy of it in his own office. This was his exclusive right and the second *bakhshi* had no concern with it. Surety bonds of the newly appointed *mansabdars* were also kept in his office. He reported all such orders as were given by the Emperor in his presence to the *mir bakhshi* and the second *bakhshi*.<sup>1</sup>

The noble who first became the third *bakhshi* under Muhammad Shah, was Zafar Khan Roshan-u'd Daulah. In addition to it, he held the post of the *bakhshi* of *ahadis*. The third *bakhshi* was incharge of sending 12 lakhs of rupees annually to the garrison posted at Kabul. After his death in 1746 Amir Khan 'Umdat-ul Mulk was made the third *bakhshi*. On his murder, 25 December 1746, the Emperor conferred the post on Mirza Muhammad Ishaq Najm-u'd-daulah ; he was also made the *bakhshi* of *wala shahi* troops. All these *bakhshis* of the third grade—Zafar Khan, Amir Khan and Muhammad Ishaq—enjoyed great influence and prestige in the royal court, although the duties associated with their office were not of great importance.<sup>2</sup>

#### Fourth Bakhshi

We have no information regarding the position and functions of the fourth *bakhshi* during the reign of Muhammad Shah. It may be presumed that he assisted other *bakhshis* in their work and performed such functions as were assigned to him by the Emperor. Muhammad Shah appointed 'Aqidat Khan the fourth *bakhshi* after the battle of Hasanpur. Upon his promotion to the *subedari* of Bihar, Saif-ullah Khan occupied this post. He was succeeded by Saiyid Sa'adat Khan Bahadur Zulfiqar Jang who continued to work in the office of the fourth *bakhshi* till the end of Muhammad Shah's reign. As related to the Emperor, Zulfiqar Jang exercised enormous powers in the central government and commanded respect at the court. When the Emperor left Delhi on a campaign against 'Ali Muhammad Khan Rohillah, he left Zulfiqar Jang incharge of the general administration of the capital. Later, he sent him as *ataliq* of his son Prince Ahmad to Sirhind.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, f. 19b; *Dastur-al 'Amal*, f. 9b.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, ff. 12b, 42 ; *Zikr-us Siyar*, ff. 26, 22.

<sup>3</sup> For details, *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 47, 48, 55, 111, 134; *Tarikh-i Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, ff. 370, 374, 376, 379; *Autographs and Letters*, Or. 92; 36, f. 24a ; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 524-527 ; *Tarikh-i Muhammad*, 133.

For the control and maintenance of the *ahadis* and *wala shahi* contingents separate *bakhshis* were appointed by the Emperor. During the reign of Muhammad Shah the *ahadis* were called *qularan*. Their main duty was to protect the person of His Majesty. They were also deputed to arrest those nobles who had incurred the wrath of the Emperor. They served directly under the orders of the Emperor to whom they were bound by the close ties of loyalty.<sup>1</sup> The post of the *bakhshi* of the corps of *ahadis* was held in the reign of Muhammad Shah by Khan i Dauran, Zafar Khan, Munawwar Khan, Quswar Khan and others.<sup>2</sup> The *wala shahi* or royal body guard was regarded the most trusted and faithful of the troops, being directly in the pay of the Emperor. "They were chiefly, if not entirely, men who had been attached to his person from his youth and had served under him while he was still only a prince and were thus marked out in a special manner as his personal adherents and household troops."<sup>3</sup> There were *bakhshis* charged with the management of the affairs of *shagird pasha* (servants of the court), *risalah-i sultani* and *a'la-shahi troops*.<sup>4</sup>

### *Special Royal Troops*

The invasion of Nadir Shah completely shattered the Mughal armed forces and there was no regular army left at the centre to cope with the military needs of the state. Asad Yar Khan, a wise and experienced noble, suggested to the Emperor that a new force should be raised on permanent basis. Muhammad Shah ordered that an army of ten thousand horse and ten thousand foot should be built up; each soldier would receive a monthly salary of Rs. 50; and the horses would be branded with the mark of the sword. This army came to be known as *risalah-i shamshir dagh*. In 1739 the work of organizing the new army was entrusted

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-ul Istilah*, f. 8; *A'in-i Akbari*, *A'ins*, Nos. 4, 10. "Such persons belonging to the immediate servants of His Majesty are dignified by their independence." *A'in-i Akbari*, Blochmann, 259; *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, 43. Ashub writes that this *risalah* included soldiers belonging particularly to the Mughal and Buluch races, like Niaz 'Ali Khan, Teer Andaz Khan and Bloch Khan. *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 111a.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 55b; *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. 12b.

<sup>3</sup> *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, 44.

<sup>4</sup> *Al 'amal-'ilm-i Navisindigi*, f. 159a; *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. 12b, Hidayat-ullah Khan and 'Inayat Khan Rasikh were the *bakhshis* of *shagird pasha*, while towards the end of Muhammad Shah's reign Shakir Khan occupied the post of the *bakhshi* of *risalah-i sultani*.

to Asad Yar Khan who sought the cooperation of other nobles, like Hafiz-u'd-din Khan, Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan, 'Azam Khan and Sarbuland Khan. Each of them agreed to enlist from two hundred to four hundred horse and foot under his command on the sanctioned scale of pay. Asad Yar Khan appointed separate officers—*risalahdaran*—to record the descriptive rolls, while he took upon himself, the responsibility of supervising the branding of horses and equipage of soldiers. Nawab Muhammad Sa'eed Khan was allotted a quota of 200 soldiers for recruitment. The Nawab appointed Shaikh 'Abdul Bari of Meerut as the *bakhshi* to supervise the branding and Har Charan Das the clerk to put down the attendance of soldiers present at the muster. The Nawab settled that Har Charan Das would receive a monthly salary of Rs. 50 and 8 annas per horseman and one anna per footman as his commission.<sup>1</sup> Thus the new army was created and organized through the efforts of Asad Yar Khan; but it could not be maintained for long owing to the financial difficulties arising specially from loss of revenues which became acute after the departure of Nadir Shah. The Emperor found it hard to pay up the salaries of the soldiers; he, consequently, ordered that the strength of *risalah-i-shamshir dagh* should be reduced to one-half. In 1744 Safdar Jang and Amir Khan came to the court from Awadh and Allahabad respectively. Safdar Jang was appointed *mir atash*. Amir Khan suggested that there was no necessity of keeping a regular army and spending such a heavy sum of money on its maintenance. When some emergency would arise a fresh army could be immediately raised. The Emperor, unable to meet the cost of even half of the *risalah*, approved the proposal and issued instructions for its dismissal.<sup>2</sup>

### *Mir Atash*

*Mir Atash* or *daroghah-i top khana* was the chief officer of the artillery of the Mughal army stationed at the centre. He was in charge of military stores and arsenals, and supervised the manufacture of the gun-powder.<sup>3</sup> The artillery was always parked round the fortress or palace or the tents in

<sup>1</sup> Har Charan Das writes that he purchased a horse of Rs. 200, got it branded and went to Nawab's house early in the morning to begin the work of *chauki nawisi*. He earned nearly Rs. 112 in a month. Makhani Lal, the *diwan* of the Nawab, became jealous and wanted to secure this post for his sister's son Bishan Singh. He approached the Nawab with a present of Rs. 500 and tried to persuade him to dismiss Har Charan Das. But the Nawab did not accept the present and refused to displace his faithful servant. *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja'i*, ff. 60, 69, 70.

<sup>2</sup> *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja'i*, 71-73.

<sup>3</sup> *Hidayat-ul Qawwa'id*, f. 17b.

which the Emperor stayed. "The *mir atash* laid before the Emperor all demands made on his department; all orders to it passed through him. He checked the pay bills and inspected the diaries of the arsenal before sending them on to the *khansaman* or lord steward. He saw to the postings of the artillery and received reports about all losses and deficiencies. The descriptive rolls of artillery recruits passed through his hands, all new appointments and promotions were made at his initiative."<sup>1</sup> The names of the officers who held this post under Muhammad Shah are as follows:

1. Haider Quli Khan.
2. Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan.
3. Haider Quli Khan.
4. Khan Zaman Bahadur Mewati.
5. Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan.
6. Safdar Jang.

The artillery force which Sa'ad-u'd din Khan brought into the battlefield at Karnal consisted of the following corps:<sup>2</sup>

*hazariyan, ahsham, and surkhposhan.*

The total strength of this force was:

1. Cavalry	3,000
2. Matchlock-men	20,000
3. Cavalry of Kabul	500
4. Cavalry of <i>mansabdurs</i> who were paid in cash	1,000.

### *Sadr-us Sadur*

The *sadr* was the chief head of the department of religious affairs at the centre, called *sadarat-al-aliya*.<sup>3</sup> He was mainly responsible for the enforce-

<sup>1</sup> *Dastur-al 'Amal*, B.M. MS. 1641, ff. 24b-27b ; *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, 155-156. These powers were actually exercised by the *mir atash* in the reign of Muhammad Shah. A detailed analysis of their activities and administrative functions has already been made in the previous chapters. For references, *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, 159 ; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 82, 84, 91, 92 ; *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 508-509.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 134b.

<sup>3</sup> For a detailed discussion on the position and powers of *sadr-us sadur* or *sadr-i kul*, *A'in-i Akbari*, Blochmann, H., *A'in*, 19, under the chapter of 'Suyurghals,' 278-284 ; *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, 256-258,

ment of Islamic law (*shari'at*) through a well-organized judicial machinery, and administration of *madad-i ma'ash* grants, given to persons who were eligible for charitable support. As representative of the class of *'ulema*, who were the spokesmen of the *shari'at*, the *sadr* was supposed to protect their rights and privileges. He kept a watch on educational institutions, religious practices and moral norms of the Muslim public. In theory, the Emperor was required to base his policy in religious and legal matters on his advice, and distribute money in charity through him. The judicial powers of the *sadr* included recommending persons to the Emperor for appointment as judges and jurists all over the Empire.<sup>1</sup> He examined the claims of all those seeking financial support; on his recommendations and in his presence (*risalah*) the Emperor issued orders for daily allowances and revenue grants.<sup>2</sup> The *sanads* to that effect were issued under his seal. He not only scrutinized the applications for fresh grants but also verified and confirmed the old ones. His ability and experience to administer the department efficiently and deal with all sorts of men kindly and justly were far more important factors in his appointment than his scholarship and piety. He was assisted by a financial secretary styled *diwan-i sadat*.<sup>3</sup> The management of *madad-i ma'ash* grants in the provinces was carried out through the local *sadrs* (*sadr-i-juz*) who were generally appointed at his suggestion; the *parwanas* of their appointment were issued under his seal.<sup>4</sup> The *sadr-us-sadur* received from the provincial *sadrs* a statement showing the land occupied by the grant-holders, or *a'imma*.<sup>5</sup> He was also entrusted with the supervision of endowments (*waqf*) created by the government for providing assistance to the poor and needy.<sup>6</sup> Vested with these powers, the *sadr-us sadur* exercised great influence and prestige. But his authority was restricted by the complexity of procedure which necessarily involved formal supervision by the *wazir*.<sup>7</sup> For its validity and authenticity every

<sup>1</sup> *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, 257.

<sup>2</sup> *Dastur-al 'Amal 'Aurangzeb*, f. 38a.

"As the circumstances of the men have to be inquired into before grants are made, and their petitions must be considered in fairness, an experienced man of correct intentions is employed for his office. He ought to be at peace with every party and must be kind towards the people at large in word and action. Such an officer is called *sadar*." *A'in-i Akbari*, Blochmann, I, 268.

<sup>3</sup> *A'in-i Akbari*, Book II, 278.

<sup>4</sup> For his position and functions, *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, Supplement, 173.

<sup>5</sup> *Dastur-al 'Amal 'Alamgiri*, MS., Add. 6598, f. 34a.

<sup>6</sup> *Khawaja Yasin's Glossary*, f. 71.

<sup>7</sup> The procedure with respect to the conferment of *madad-i ma'ash* grants was similar to that as followed in the assignment of *jagirs*. The *sadr-us sadur* received all applications from persons entitled for the award; and he, having scrutinized their qualifications, submitted the truly deserving cases before the Emperor for

*sanad* was checked and countersigned by the *wazir* who controlled the strings of the imperial finances. The office of *diwan-i a'la* kept a copy of the *farman* of *madad-i ma'ash* and received the *parwanas* issued for the award of daily allowances by the office of *sadarat-ul 'aliya*. It was the duty of the *sadr* to supply the office of the *diwan* with full details about the grant-holders and the nature of the grant.<sup>1</sup> These official requirements doubtless inhibited the powers of the *sadar* but in no way placed him in an inferior position; for all the ministers stood on equal footing, and each was individually responsible to the king.

In the first regnal year of Muhammad Shah, Mir Jumla held the post of *Sadr-i kul*, and this he continued to retain till his death in 1733. Though a Turani Mullah and hot-tempered,<sup>2</sup> Mir Jumla was learned and generous; he showed profound respect towards the *'ulema* and kindness to the *a'imma*. He introduced learned scholars to the Emperor and secured customary rewards for them.<sup>3</sup> Being the father-in-law of the Emperor, he enjoyed his confidence and favour; his titles are indicative of the esteem and honour in which he was held by Muhammad Shah.<sup>4</sup> The Saiyid brothers, who arrogated to themselves a variety of judicial and religious functions, largely ignored the *sadr* and depressed his position.<sup>5</sup> But under the new régime Mir Jumla was able to activate the department and reassert its importance. He remained free from the interference of either the *wazir* or the *mir bakhshi* and he insisted on the supremacy of his position. On his death, the Emperor appointed his son, Shari'at-ullah Khan, the new

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his approval. The orders, passed by the Emperor in the presence of the *sadr* were entered in the diary of *waqa'i-nawis*, in attendance at that time, which after passing through the first stage became the *yaddasht*, and at the second, the *ta'liqa* and at the third the *sarkhat*. The *sarkhat* served as a draft of the *farman*, to be prepared in the office of *diwan-i kul*, and when it had been checked, signed and sealed by the *maustaufi*, it was sent to the office of the *diwan* of *sadarat-ul 'aliya*. The *diwan* noted its contents and got it signed by the *sadr*. After his seal and signature it was forwarded to the *diwan-i a'la* who put his seal and signature on the document. For details vide, *A'in-i Akbari*, H. Blochmann, 258-63; *Dastur-al 'Amal 'Alamgiri*, MS. Add. 6598, f. 34a; *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, MS. Or. 1641, ff. 36, 84; *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, 265-66.

<sup>1</sup> *Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, ff. 36-40.

<sup>2</sup> *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 711-713.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 523.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 79.

His titles were : Mu'azzam Khan-i Khanan, Bahadur, Muzaffar Jang, Tarkhan, Sultani.

<sup>5</sup> Saiyid 'Abdullah Qutb-ul Mulk, the *wazir*, awarded *madad-i ma'ash* grants and appointed judicial officers at his own will, without seeking proposals from the *sadr-i kul*. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 843.



*sadr-us-sadur* and bestowed on him the title of Tarkhan. After working in the office for nearly a decade, Shari'at-ullah Khan died in 1743.<sup>1</sup> There is a considerable number of extant documents which bear the seals of these two *sadrs*. After the death of Shari'at-ullah Khan, 'Azim-ullah Khan<sup>2</sup> took the charge of *sadarat-ul 'aliya*. He died in 1157 H/1745-46.<sup>3</sup> From a document it appears that in the 29 regnal year, 1748, one 'Ubaid-ullah Khan held the office of *sadarat*.<sup>4</sup>

During the reign of Muhammad Shah the posts of *sadr-us sadur* and *qazi-ul-quzzat* were occupied by two distinct persons. For instance, while Mir Jumla carried out the duties of *sadr-us sadur*, Wajih-u'd-din Khan was the *qazi-ul-quzzat*.<sup>5</sup> The *qazi-ul-quzzat* was the supreme judge of the Empire. His main function was to give advice in legal matters whenever solicited by the Emperor either at the court or in the camp. He heard appeals from the subordinate courts and dispensed justice in civil and criminal cases.<sup>6</sup>

The *darogha-i-'adalat* or superintendent of the courts was appointed, in accordance with the royal orders, under the seal and signature of the *sadr-i-kul*. His chief function was to investigate disputes between parties, and help the residents of the town in the settlement of their quarrels.<sup>7</sup> Other judicial officers appointed under the *sadr's* seal were the *qazi*,<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, f. 198b.

<sup>2</sup> 'Azim-ullah Khan, the son of Riyat Khan Zahir-u'd Daulah, was the son-in-law of 'Itimad-u'd Daulah Qamr-u'd-din Khan, the *wazir*. He served for a short time as the deputy-governor of Malwa. When Nadir Shah occupied Delhi, he was appointed to collect fines from the citizens of the capital. The title of his father, 'Zahir-u'd Daulah, was bestowed upon him. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 332-333.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 118.

<sup>4</sup> *Faramin-i Salatin*, 253. The author of *Tarikh-i Muzaffari* states that 'Azim-ullah Khan was succeeded by one 'Abdullah Khan, f. 263b.

<sup>5</sup> *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghata'i*, f. 378a; *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. 12b.

<sup>6</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 248, 275, 339.

<sup>7</sup> A *parwana* of Muhammad Shah appointing Saiyid Yar Muhammad as *darogha-i-'adalat* of Sambhal, *subah* Delhi. in 1722, was issued under the seal of Mir Jumla Mu'azzam Khan-i Khanan Tarkhan, the *sadr-us-sadur*. This document is contained in *Faramin-i Salatin*, 149.

<sup>8</sup> He administered both civil and criminal law, principally, in towns, in accordance with the principles of *shari'at*. He attended the court of justice of the governors and the *faujdar*s and gave his opinion in legal matters. His second important function was the attestation of deeds. The seal of the *qazi* was affixed on a number of documents, like the sale and mortgage deeds; the surety bonds and bails bonds required his signature. For a detailed discussion of the qualifications and duties of the *qazis*, see, *Provincial Government of the Mughals*, 339-341; *Farman* of Aurangzeb on the appointment of the *qazi* of Pattan in Gujarat in 25 regnal year, B.M. MS.; *sanad* of Ahmadj Shah conferring the post of *qazi* of

*mufti*<sup>1</sup> and *muhtasib*.<sup>2</sup> The following published documents pertaining to the appointment of the *qazis* and *muhtasib* bear the seals of the *sadr*s during the reign of Muhammad Shah :

1. *Sanad* appointing Himayat-ullah Khan, son of Fazl-ullah Khan, *qazi* of *pargana* Deoband, *sarkar* Sharanpur, *subah* Delhi, after the transfer of Saiyid Abrar. His jurisdiction extended to all villages and suburbs of the *pargana*. His duties as listed in the *sanad* were : settlement of disputes, dispensation of justice, making arrangements for congregational prayers, distribution of the inherited estates and legacies, and keeping under custody the property of the deceased. The *sanad* was issued under the seal and signature of Shari'at-ullah Khan Tarkhan, the *sadr-us-sadur*, in 23 regnal year.<sup>3</sup>
2. *Farman* of Muhammad Shah appointing *qazi* Raza-ullah Khan to the post of *muhtasib* in *pargana* Sonepat, *subah* Delhi, issued under the seal of 'Ubaid Khan Tarkhan, the *sadr-us sadur*, in 29 regnal year. It states that the *muhtasib* will perform his duties efficiently ; that he will punish the drunkards and sellers of wine and intoxicating drugs, and detect false weights and measures.<sup>4</sup>
3. *Sanad*, issued according to the orders of Ahmad Shah, confirming Muhammad Fazl-ullah son of Habib-ullah in the post of *qazi* of Panipat to which he had been appointed by Muhammad Shah in the 15 regnal year. His jurisdiction extended to Panipat and Karnal ; the *sanad* was issued in the first regnal year of Ahmad Shah. The document bears the seal of 'Ubaid Khan Tarkhan, the *sadr-us-sadur*.<sup>5</sup>
4. *Sanad*, issued according to the orders of Muhammad Shah in the first regnal year, confirming Shaikh Muhammad Raza in the post of

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the *pargana* Mullanan, *sarkar* Lucknow, upon Farhat-ullah, son of Muhammad Baqar issued in 1161, under the seal of *sadr-us-sadur*, Or. 11699; *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign*, 15, 16, 18, 19.

<sup>1</sup> He was a jurist and he expounded the canon law for the judges. He gave *fatwas* on matters of *shari'at*.

<sup>2</sup> He was appointed for the city and town by the *sadr-i-kul* according to the royal orders. At Ahmadabad, he held 250 *zat*, and 10 *sawar*; he also received assistance of some cavalry. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, Supplement, 184. "He was superintendent of markets and police, an officer to take cognizance of improper behaviour as of indecency, drunkenness, gambling; also of the sales of intoxicating drugs and liquors, and false weights and measures." *Wilson's Glossary*, 351a.

<sup>3</sup> Bashir-u'd-din Ahmad, *Faramin-i Salatin*, Delhi, 1926, 153.

<sup>4</sup> *Faramin-i Salatin*, 155.

<sup>5</sup> *Faramin-i Salatin*, 156.

*gazi* in *pargana* Jalessar, *subah* Agra. His *wakil* had represented that Shaikh Muhammad Raza had been appointed to this post in the reign of Aurangzeb.<sup>1</sup>

The system of *madad-i ma'ash*, was designed to provide financial support to religious and educational institutions and make revenue-free grants of land (*imlak*) and daily allowances (*wazifa*) to the poor and needy, scholars, mendicants, and such men of noble birth "who through their short-sightedness had not learnt a profession."<sup>2</sup> The recipients (*a'imma-i 'uzzam*) of revenue grants and subsistence allowance enjoyed the right to appropriate the produce of the soil and, at the same time, an exemption from payment of rent and other fiscal obligations.<sup>3</sup> Generally the *madad-i ma'ash* grants<sup>4</sup> "were made in terms of definite areas stated in bighas", but sometimes an entire village (*dar-o-bist*) could be bestowed on an individual as his subsistence allowance or for the maintenance of a shrine. The area thus assigned consisted, according to the rules, of half of cultivable waste (*uftada*) and half the cultivated land (*muzrari'*), the entire plot being excluded from the *jama'* or rent-roll (*kharj-jama'*).<sup>5</sup> The land so awarded was first to be measured by the *itahi gaz* and demarcated before it was handed over to the grantee.<sup>6</sup> The governors of distant provinces were authorised on the recommendations of the provincial *sadr*s to renew and confirm the grants in accordance with previous *farmans* and *sanads*. But the right to confer fresh grants, or curtail and annul the old ones rested with the Emperor. In the provinces adjacent to the capital—the Panjab and Delhi—the *a'imma* had to apply to the court for renewal and confirmation of their grants.<sup>7</sup>

It has already been pointed out that the Emperor gave orders for the *madad-i ma'ash* grants in the presence of *sadr-i kul* ; and that every *sanad* or *farman* prepared on the basis of these orders was signed and sealed not only by the *sadr* but also by the *wazir*. In order to illustrate this important feature of the official procedure followed in connection with the

<sup>1</sup> *Faramin-i Salatin*, 143.

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed discussion of *madad-i ma'ash* system, vide, *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, 260-284; *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*, 298-311; Modi, J.J., *The Parsees at the Court of Akbar*, 1903, 95-118; B.N. Goswamy and J.S. Grewel, *The Mughals and the Jogis of Jakhbar*; Zahiruddin Malik, "Documents of *Madad-i Ma'ash* Grants during the Reign of Muhammad Shah, 1719-1748", *Indo-Iranica*, 1975, 99, 123.

<sup>3</sup> For an explanation of the various taxes, vide, *The Parsees at the Court of Akbar*, 100-101; *The Mughals and the Jogis of Jakhbar*, 89-90.

<sup>4</sup> *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*, 301.

<sup>5</sup> *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, 262.

<sup>6</sup> *A'in-i Akbari*, Jarrett, H.S., II, 66.

<sup>7</sup> *Persian Revenue Records of Bengal*, ff. 24, 107b.

issue of *sanads* and other features of the grants a few documents are cited here:

1. On Friday, 4 January 1737, through the *risala* (in the presence) of Shari'at-ullah Khan, the *sadr-us-sadur*, and *naubat* (the man in royal attendance at that time) of the *waqa'i-nigar* (recorder) Ghulam 'Ali, it was ordered that 15 annas as daily stipend (*ruzina*) be paid from the *sa'ir* (customs) revenues of *pargana* Mulhihabad, *sarkar* Lucknow by way of *madad-i ma'ash* to the dependents (*muta'alliqan*) of Maulvi Muhammad Akbar, son of Maulvi Muhammad 'Azam. The grantees were exempted from the obligations of *asami-o-qismat*<sup>1</sup> and other miscellaneous imposts and they were not to be troubled for the renewal of the *sanad* every year.<sup>2</sup>

The signature of  
Shari'at-ullah Khan,  
*Sadr-us-sadur*

The signature of  
Qamr-u'd-din Khan,  
*Divan-i-a'la, wazir*

15 annas

Below is written the *zimin* or the annexed abstract. On the reverse of the *farman* are given the seals of :

- |                          |                      |
|--------------------------|----------------------|
| (1) Shari'at-ullah Khan, | <i>sadr-us-sadur</i> |
| (2) Qamr-u'd-din Khan,   | <i>wazir</i>         |
| (3) Ghulam 'Ali,         | <i>waqa'i-nigar</i>  |

On the margin are the notes with dates recorded in offices through which the document passed.

2. Muhammad Shah's *farman*.<sup>3</sup>

It is declared that two hundred *bighas* of cultivable waste land, not under revenue assessment, in *pargana-haveli, sarkar* and *subah* of Allahabad have been conferred, by way of *madad-i ma'ash*, on Mussamat Shah Bibi and others, according to the details on reverse (*hasb-ul zimin*), so that they may maintain themselves (*sarf-i-ma'ashiat*) with the produce (*hasil*) of the land and remain engaged in praying for the preservice (*muwazabat*) of the everlasting dominion. The present and future officers, '*amils* of *jagirdars*<sup>4</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> The term is used to signify the tenure of rent-free land held exclusively by one principal individual without the income from it being legally divided among the members of his family. Although the shares of the sons and dependents are not specified, they were entitled to inherit the land, and the revenue grant covered the expenses of the entire family.

<sup>2</sup> Hyderabad State Archives (Sajjad 'Ali collection).

<sup>3</sup> State Archives, Allahabad, No. 323.

<sup>4</sup> The *jagirdars* appointed their own *gumashtas* (agents) and '*amils* (officers) to collect revenues from the lands assigned in lieu of their salaries. *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*, 284-285.

*karoris*<sup>1</sup> are instructed to hand over the aforesaid land, duly measured and demarcated, to the grantees. The officers concerned are further directed to refrain from introducing any change or alteration in the assignment and also from demanding from the grantees any fiscal dues and royal demands (*takalif-i-diwani wa mutalbat-i-sultani*), such as *muhsatans* (a fee of tax-collectors), *muharana* (a fee due to the headman or superintendent of office), *muqaddami* (the headman's fee), *qanungoi* (one per cent fee due to the *qanungo*), *bad-tashkhis chak*<sup>2</sup>, *takrar-i-zira'at* and other dues on account of *mal-o-jihat*.<sup>3</sup> If they possess any plot in another *mahal*, it should not be considered theirs. It is incumbent on the officers to take every care in this matter. Written in the month of Sh'aban, 4th regnal year, May 1723.

3. *Parwana* regarding fresh *madad-i ma'ash* grant.<sup>4</sup> Seal of *qazi-ul-quzzat*.

*Parwana*, under the seal of *sadr-us-sadur*, was addressed to *gumashtas* (agents) of *jagirdars* and *karoris* (revenue-collectors) of *pargana* Amroha, *sarkar* Sambhal, *subah* Delhi. It states that Noni Ram, son of... represented to the *diwan* of *sadarat-ul 'alaiya* that he had no means of livelihood and was passing his life in the utmost poverty. He has requested that about 50 *bighas* of cultivable waste land, exempted from rent (*ma'ufi*) be granted by way of *madad-i ma'ash* to him. As the support of the needy and the poor is a state obligation, the above-mentioned land, has been conferred by way of *madad-i ma'ash* on the petitioner; so that he might, while maintaining himself with its produce, engage himself in prayers for the preservation of the everlasting dominion. The officers are accordingly directed to hand over the land to the grantee after it is duly measured and demarcated. Dated, January 1723.

### *Mir Saman*

The central government owned and managed a large number of stores and workshops (*karkhanas*) in the capital and other centres of industry

<sup>1</sup> He was an officer in charge of the revenue over one *karor* of *dams*.

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps a tax imposed on the landholders after the boundaries of the area were laid down.

<sup>3</sup> The land-revenue and charges were connected with its assessment. For a discussion of this term, *The Mughals and the Jogis of Jakhbar*, 60-70.

<sup>4</sup> Allahabad Archives, No. 688. For other documents of the reign, *Indo-Iranica*, 1975, 109-123.

throughout the Empire. The department incharge of their organization and control was called *buyutat* and its chief executive head the *mir saman* or *khan-i saman*. This department was mainly responsible for large-scale purchases of goods and materials and the manufacture of all essential things—from weapons of war to articles of luxury—which the government required for its multifarious needs. The *mir saman* supervised the working of every branch of the department, and exercised control over the personnel employed in it. He laid down rules for the smooth functioning of the workshops, issued slips for hire and wages of labour, and took security bonds from the heads and employees of the *karkhanas*. It was on his suggestion that *daroghas* (superintendents); *mushrifis* (accountants), *mustaufis* (auditors) and *tahvildars* (cash-keepers) were appointed and removed. He was also incharge of the state properties—gardens, shops and houses—and collected rents and other income due from them. He also accompanied the Emperor during hunting and military expeditions.<sup>1</sup>

The *mir saman* was assisted by a secretary, styled *diwan-i buyutat* who administered the financial affairs of the department. He was not subordinate to the *mir saman*, though certainly below in rank and status to him. Both these officers owed responsibility separately to the king. In addition, "the *diwan* registered the property of deceased persons, in order to secure the payment of the dues of the state as well as to safeguard the property for the heirs of the deceased."<sup>2</sup> The royal orders of escheating property and effects of deceased nobles were executed through him. He performed this important function in cooperation with *khan-i saman*.<sup>3</sup> He sent the estimate of the monthly expenditure to the office of *diwan-i a'la* and put

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed description of the *mir saman's* functions and his position in the government, *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, 237, 240, 241; J.N. Sarkar, *The Mughal Administration*, 41-46; *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff. 21-23; *Dastur-al 'Amal Aurangzeb*, f. 38a.

<sup>2</sup> *Mughal Administration*, 45.

<sup>3</sup> When Zakariya Khan, the governor of Lahore, died in 1745 the Emperor ordered Muhiy-u'd-din 'Ali Khan Bahadur, *diwan-i buyutat*, to proceed to Lahore and confiscate the effects and valuables of the deceased governor. The *diwan* brought to the court Rs. 9 lakhs, a considerable quantity of jewels, gold and silver wares, besides 5 elephants, 146 horses and 231 camels. He received *khil'at* of six pieces, flag and drum as a reward for the successful performance of his mission. *Bada'i Waqa'i*, ff. 53b, 54a. But the wealth and belongings of Muhammad Amin Khan, the *wazir*, were not confiscated. *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, f. 182. Another noble to whom this rare favour was shown was Sher Afghan Khan. Before his death, Sher Afghan Khan submitted a statement to the government about his property and effects valued at Rs. 4 crores. Muhammad Shah, out of favour, exempted him from the law of escheat. He, however, made a present of Rs. 6 lakh to the Emperor. *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, ff. 253.

his own seal on the rooms of the *karkhanas*. The *mushariff* and *tahvildar* worked directly under him.

'Inayat-ullah Kashmiri was the first *mir saman* appointed by Muhammad Shah. On his death in 1726 Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan became the *mir saman*, but he remained in the office for a short period.<sup>1</sup> He was succeeded by Sher Afghan Khan who died at the age of 66 years in 1731.<sup>2</sup> The Emperor appointed his brother Lutf-ullah Khan Sadiq to the post of *mir saman*. Lutf-ullah Khan Sadiq was an experienced and honest minister; he enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor and exercised great influence at the court. He continued to hold this post till the end of Muhammad Shah's reign.<sup>3</sup>

### *Mansabdars*

The institution of *mansabdari* formed the core and kernel of the Mughal state service. This system had been organized on the basis of unified service, subdivided into particular jurisdictions, in which every officer had a *mansab* or defined place. The *mansab*, being a symbol of status, denoted the personal rank of an officer in the administrative hierarchy. It had been designed primarily "to settle the precedence and fix the gradation of pay"; and it implied that the officer was bound to perform any functions when assigned to him.<sup>4</sup> The subordinate civilian employees such as clerks and revenue servants of the lowest grade did not hold a *mansab* though the principle underlying the system also embraced these functionaries.<sup>5</sup> A person was given *mansab* with some regard, of course, for his intelligence and practical capacity, but not usually for reasons that had connection with his knowledge of public affairs. He gained requisite acquaintance with official business, after passing through training of varied forms, to serve interests of the state. With necessary experience and modicum of skill, a *mansabdar* could hold office either in military or civil department; and he could be shifted from one post to another.<sup>6</sup> The minister, governors and other big officials, who rose to high positions from the lowest ranks of

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, ff. 193a, 199, 203, 253.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 78.

<sup>3</sup> *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, III, 177-178.

<sup>4</sup> *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, 4.

<sup>5</sup> During the reign of Farrukh Siyar even the clerks working in the offices of the *diwan*, *bakhshi* and *khansaman* obtained *mansab*, and took the possession of *jagirs*. Mirza Muhammad, 'Ibrat Namah, f. 70 b.

<sup>6</sup> This is true particularly about the recruitment and training of many younger sons of old and influential nobles. A chronicler of the 18th century writes,

service, belonged to this centralised bureaucracy. The *mansabdari* system provided an enormous variety of the skilled and trained personnel to the armed forces as well as civil services. The imperial service was a career par excellence to which were drawn able and ambitious men of the country and from beyond the frontiers.

It is beyond the scope of the present study to trace the origin and growth of the institution from the times of Akbar to the reign of Aurangzeb. It is unnecessary to discuss this extensive subject fully, because the source-material that would throw new light upon its various technical aspects during the 18th century is extremely scarce. The basic structure of the system, as established by Akbar, remained materially unchanged; and the rules and regulations drawn up for the smooth working of the machinery were still in force. This section is mainly confined to an analysis of the position of the *mansabdars* and the changes which appeared in the process of their appointments and promotions. A few salient features of the system may for convenience be first mentioned here.

The *mansab* was expressed in two numbers : one was designated *zat* (personal) and the other *sawar* (cavalry). The *zat* rank determined his personal salary that was meant to meet the expenses of his private establishment and the maintenance of some beasts of burden for the use of government; while *sawar* rank obliged him to keep a certain number of horsemen out of the emoluments paid to him separately. A *mansabdar* belonged to the category of first class of his *zat mansab* if his *sawar* rank was equal to that of his *zat*; in case his *sawar* rank was half of his *zat* rank he was placed in the second class; and if the *sawar* rank was less than half of his *zat* he was put under the third class. The *mansabdars* were further grouped into three classes which indicated their position within the system. From 20 to 400 they were *mansabdars*; from 500 to 2,500 they were called *umara* (nobles); and from 3,000 to 7,000 they were distinguished as *umara-i-'uzzam* (grand-nobles). During the period under review the *sawar* rank was generally equal to or less than the *zat* rank. If the Emperor

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“the sons of big nobles (*umra-i-'uzzam*) like *wazir*, *mir bakhshi*, *tan bakhshi*, *mir atash* and *subedars*, who enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor, received *mansabs* at the age of 14 or 15 years. In the beginning their *mansabs* ranged from 80 to 100. If any one among them could secure *mansab* of 150 *zat*, it was considered a great honour. As the Emperor was the patron of *khanazads* (members of the old families) he took upon himself the responsibility of educating and training these boys from the very outset. They were first appointed *mushrifs* and *daroghas* or given petty work of carrying sunshade, spectacles, sword, shield and bow. These services could not be assigned to any other person than the sons of *khanazad* nobles. Gradually they rose to the *mansabs* of 3,000 to 4,000.” *Mir'at-ul Haqaiq*, 90, 91.



wanted, writes Anand Ram, to raise the *sawar* rank of an officer out of favour, he made it *duaspa seh aspa*.<sup>1</sup> The *sawar* rank of a very few among the grand-nobles was raised by this means by Muhammad Shah.<sup>2</sup> The *mansabdars* were further divided into two groups: those serving at the court were called *hazur-i rakab* (present at the court); others, posted in the provinces, were termed as *tabinan*.<sup>3</sup> The *sawar* rank was again classified into two categories: one was *mashrut* (conditional), and the other *bilashart* (unconditional). The *mansab* conferred along with the *zat* rank was unconditional; while the conditional *mansab* was granted on posting to a particular office (e.g. of *faujdar*, or *qila'adar*), which required maintenance of force for the performance of its functions. The conditional *mansab* was added to his previous *sawar* rank at the time of his appointment to a new post; a new *jagir* proportionate to the additional rank was also assigned. On his removal from the post, his additional rank (*mashrut*) as well as *jagir* were taken away from him.<sup>4</sup> On special recommendation of some big nobles the Emperor could bestow *mansab* on a person in absentia. Such a *mansab* was known as *mansab-i ghaibana*.<sup>5</sup>

The Emperor was the sole authority for appointing or dismissing a *mansabdar*; he could alone sanction the increase or decrease in his rank.<sup>6</sup> In theory, the *mir bakhshi* was mainly responsible for introducing and presenting candidates before the Emperor, for the award of *mansab*. But

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-ul Istilah*, f. 3. This practice was first introduced by Jahangir when in the 10th regnal year he raised the *sawar* rank of Mahabat Khan. "The usual formula for stating the rank is, for example, 4,000 *zat*, 4,000 *sawar* all (*hama*) *duaspa seh aspa* which would mean 4,000+4,000; or 4,000 *zat*, 4,000 *sawar*, of which 1,000 *du aspa seh aspa*, i.e. 4,000/4,000+1,000. It could therefore never exceed the *sawar* rank." *The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb*, 43.

<sup>2</sup> Only Nizam-ul Mulk, the *wakil-i mutlaq*, Qamr-u'd-din Khan, the *wazir*, Khan-i Dauran, the *mir bakhshi*, Sarbuland Khan, the governor, and Haider Quli Khan, the *mir atash* held this rank.

<sup>3</sup> *A'in-i Akbari*, 252.

<sup>4</sup> In 1723 Kazim Beg Khan *alias* Ma'asum 'Ali Khan was raised to the *mansab* of 2,500/2,550 *bilashart* and *mashrut*, conditional on the service of the *mutasaddi* of Camby and *faujdari* of Maudha. Saiyid Faiz-ullah was granted the *mansab* of 500/100 unconditional, and the post of *faujdari* and *jagirdari* of Ahmadnagar. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 38.

<sup>5</sup> In the first regnal year Muhammad Shah conferred *mansab* of 5,000/3,000 on Ashraf Khan, father of Khani-i Dauran, in absentia. Muzaffar Khan, brother, of Khan-i-Dauran received the *mansab* of 7,000/5,000 in similar manner. The Emperor bestowed on Khawaja 'Abdullah, his father-in-law, and brother of Khawaja 'Abdul 'Aziz, the *mansab* of 7,000/6,000 in absentia. *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghia'i*, ff. 374, 375, 376.

<sup>6</sup> *A'in-i Akbari*, I, 248.

central ministers,<sup>1</sup> provincial governors<sup>2</sup> and other important nobles<sup>3</sup> also enjoyed the privilege to recommend and present their own men for appointment. Khan-i Dauran, the *mir bakhshi*, wielded most extensive patronage in matters of appointments and promotions of *mansabdars*; he is reported to have secured *mansabs* and high positions for seven hundred persons within a period of 26 years.

The presentation of a candidate before the Emperor was preceded by a definite and elaborate procedure. First a written statement, or *fard-i haqiqat*, containing necessary details about the candidate, was prepared in the office of the *bakhshi*. The *mir bakhshi* or any other *bakhshi* placed this paper before the Emperor who, if he approved it, issued orders that the candidate should appear in his presence and make obeisance. The royal order was accordingly written on the margin of the paper. On some fixed date the candidate presented himself in the audience

<sup>1</sup> For instance, on the recommendation of the *wazir*, the Emperor, bestowed *mansabs* on Anand Ram Mukhlis and his sons. He received *mansab* of 1,500/200, the title of Ray Rayan and *jagir*. *Bada'i Waga'i*, f. 46.

<sup>2</sup> On the proposal of Haider Quli Khan, governor of Gujarat, the Emperor conferred a *mansab* of 2,000/500 on Kazim Beg Khan. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 38. Due consideration was given to the proposals for the grant of *mansab* made by a governor. Saiyid Najm-u'd-din 'Ali Khan fought vigorously in a campaign against the Marathas in Gujarat. When reports of his exertions reached the court, the Emperor thought to raise the *zat* rank of the general and confer on him the gifts of special *khila'it*, one elephant, one horse with golden trappings, and one lakh rupees in cash as *inam*. He also wanted to promote him to the post of *risaladar* of 5,000 cavalry. But Roshan-u'd Daulah, the third *bakhshi*, objected on the ground that these promotions should not be made without the proposal of the governor (Sarbuland Khan) under whose command the noble had fought. The Emperor agreed and postponed the matter till authentic information was received from the governor. *Mir'at-ul Haqiqat*, f. 401a.

<sup>3</sup> The author of *Hadiqat-ul 'Aqalim* has given a graphic account of the ceremony held in *diwan-i khas* in which he obtained the rank of 2,500/1,000, the title of Khan, and the gift of a *khila'it* of five pieces. He writes, "Mubariz-ul Mulk Sarbuland Khan, took along with him 12 selected persons to the court at Delhi to secure *mansabs* for them. I was one of them. According to the government rule an *amir* was authorised to propose the name of any person from amongst his own companions and take him to the royal court. First they gave me a *khila'it* which I put on and sat down in *diwan-i khas*. When the Emperor appeared from a corner of a garden in the fort, all the candidates stood in a line before His Majesty. . . . Afterwards it was announced that so-and-so had been granted such-and-such *mansab* and title. This was followed by the playing of *naubat* and beating of drums. Then I came out of the line and stood before the throne and paid homage. A servant moved forward and put the '*alam* (standard) in my hands, and calling my name announced that the *mansab* of 2,500/1,000 and the title of Khan had been conferred on me. I bowed before the Emperor, went back and joined the group of other candidates."

hall before the Emperor who bestowed a *mansab* on him.<sup>1</sup>

The *mansabdars* were duty-bound to bring to muster their contingents they were required to command; for on the fulfillment of this vital obligation depended the payment of their emoluments. The office prepared a descriptive roll called *tasiha* which included details of a *mansabdar's* lineage and personal appearance. Similarly an elaborate description of the horses to be branded was made and entered in the diary; this process was called *dagh*.<sup>2</sup> The *darogah-i-dagh*, or superintendent of branding, supervised the work of branding of the horses; he sent the descriptive roll to the office of the *bakhshi* and after his signature kept its copy in his own records.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The procedure adopted in connection with the issuance of the royal orders may be summarised as follows: The *bakhshi*, in whose presence the order was issued, attested it and issued a certificate (*tasdiq*) which the *waqa'i-nigar* (diary writer) entered in his register. On the receipt of this certificate a *yaddasht* (memorandum) was made out by the office; it contained all details mentioned in *fard-i haqiqat* and *tasdiq*. The *wazir* wrote on the *yaddasht* that after comparing it with the *waqa'i* (diary) let it be sent to the office of revision ('*arz-i mukarar*). His instructions were complied with by both these officers. *Zawabit-i Alamgiri*, ff. 17, 30; *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, 40-42. A copy of Muhammad Shah's *farman* pertaining to the grant of a *mansab* is given below as a specimen to illustrate the above points: On Saturday 23 Zilhaj 3 regnal year, 1720 in the *risalah* (presence) of Qutb-ul Mulk Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan, recorded in the diary by Lakhet Ram, *waqa'i-nigar*, it was ordered that Saiyid Muhammad Waris, son of Saiyid Ghanzafar, a resident of Amroha, was granted the *mansab* of 1,000/700.

Endorsement of the *wazir*, "let it be sent to the office of revision."

Endorsement of the *mir bakhshi*, "granted according to the *waqa'i*."

Principal	Increase
700 <i>zat</i>	300 <i>sawar</i>
	200 <i>sawar</i>

500 *sawar*

Seals on the back of the *farman*:

1. Muhammad Amin Khan Chin Bahadur, *wazir* of Muhammad Shah.
2. Lakhet Ram, *fidvi* of Muhammad Shah.
3. Qutb-ul Mulk Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan *fidvi* of Muhammad Shah.

*Faramin-i Salatin*, 144-145.

<sup>2</sup> In the reign of Akbar *mansabdars* were ordered to have their horses branded every year. Delay in this matter cost him one-tenth of his *jagirs* assigned in pay. The *ahadis* posted at the court and receiving monthly salary in cash, brought their horses every 18 months. The nobles whose *jagirs* lay far away from the imperial capital had the privilege to get their horses branded after 12 years. *A'in-i Akbari*, I, 7, 265.

<sup>3</sup> For the supervision of branding an *amin*, *darogah* and *mushrif* were appointed by

The office charged with the control and supervision of branding existed and continued to function till the end of Muhammad Shah's régime. Mir Muhammad Hadi Saif-u'din Khan, son of Amir Khan Mir-i Miran was the *darogah dagh-o-tashiha*. Keeping in view the general laxity on the central administration it may be surmised that *mansabdars* had been irregular in bringing their horsemen to muster and observing the rules and regulations connected with branding. However, the *wazir* and the *mir bakhshi* maintained their contingents in full strength and kept them well-paid and well-disciplined.<sup>1</sup> Some provincial governors, too, exercised effective control over *mansabdars*, and the work of branding was carried out regularly.<sup>2</sup> Branding continued in operation in Gujarat until 1724; it was then suspended due to political chaos resulting from the civil wars and Maratha invasions.

The Emperor increased the *mansabs* of officers as a reward for service performed in military campaigns or in the areas of civil administration.<sup>3</sup> He also enhanced the rank of a noble at the time of his appointment to a post.<sup>4</sup> To keep the nobles contented and attached to the throne, he bestowed various types of titles and rewards on them. These distinctions were generally conferred when a noble attended the court, or on the occasion of festivals and anniversary of the king's enthronement.<sup>5</sup> "As the Empire declined in strength, so did the titles increase in pomposity, and

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the *mir bakhshi* in every province. The *amin* and *darogha* held *mansabs*. "These two with the *mushriff*, in former times, used to sit with their staff in four-valuated building in the market, making the attendance of their horses, their trappings and the equipage of the *mansabdars*. . . Certificates signed by the *amin*, the *darogah* and the *mushrif*, used to be regularly issued." *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, Supplement, 177.

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*.

<sup>2</sup> About the army of Burhan-ul Mulk, governor of Awadh, a writer states, "The revenues were deposited in the provincial treasury without delay or impediment. The troops received their pay regularly. Some received the pay every month, others either fortnightly or weekly. The Afghan *risaldars*, like Mian Khan and Muhammad Khan preferred to get their salary every day. The *tashiha* (verification) of the troops was inspected and reviewed every month." *Ausaf-ul Asaf*, f. 17.

<sup>3</sup> On reports of success won by Khanazad Khan, son of Sarbuland Khan, against the Marathas in Gujarat, the Emperor increased his rank to 6,000/5,000. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 91.

<sup>4</sup> The *mansab* of Sharf-u'd Daulah Iradatmand Khan was increased from 6,000/6,000 to 7,000/6,000 when the Emperor sent him to lead the campaign against Raja Ajit Singh. Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan held the rank of 5,000/5,000 before his appointment to the post of *mir atash*, it was increased to 6,000/6,000 when he took charge of the new office. *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghata'i*, ff. 84b, 380b.

<sup>5</sup> These rewards were mainly consisted of *khil'ats* of various types, jewelled

long before the end of the dynasty the discrepancy between man's real qualities and his titles was so great as often to be ridiculous."<sup>1</sup> The author of *Mir'at-ul Haqiq* writes:

*Mansab*, *khil'at* of six pieces, jewels, rank, titles of *daulah*, *jang bahadur* and *malik* have lost their significance and worth during the reigns of Farrukh Siyar and Muhammad Shah. . . . The clerks in the office of *bakhshi* accepted one hundred rupees for securing a *mansab* of 100 *zat* and Rs. 20 to 30 for a title. In the reign of Bahadur Shah the award of *mahi-o-maratib*<sup>2</sup> lost its value; from the times of Farrukh Siyar to the present regime of Muhammad Shah, this rare gift had been recklessly distributed.<sup>3</sup>

During the reign of Muhammad Shah the number of *mansabdars* grew enormously, as the following list of nobles holding *mansabs* of 5,000 *zat* and above under Muhammad Shah, shows; but the effective strength of contingents maintained against the *mansab* diminished. The difference between recorded and actual numbers of horsemen under the command of *mansabdars* had been a characteristic feature of the system right from the days of Shah Jahan to the close of the 17th century;<sup>4</sup> this divergence widened sharply in the first half of the 18th century.<sup>5</sup>

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ornaments, *naubat* (a set of large kettledrums struck at stated hours) flags and ensigns, *'alam* or standard, horses with gold-mounted and jewelled trappings, daggers with jewelled hilts, *palkis* with fringes of gold lace and pearls, *mahi-o-maratib* (fish and its accompanying emblems). For detailed explanation of these terms, *The Chronology of Modern Hyderabad, 1720-1890*, Hyderabad, 1954, Glossary, 7, 12, 17, 18, 19; *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, 29-34. For conferment of these rewards and titles during the reign of Muhammad Shah, *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, ff. 373-380.

<sup>1</sup> *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, 28.

<sup>2</sup> "It was borne on elephants or camels in a man's retinue. It was one of the very highest honours, as it was not granted to nobles below the rank of 6,000/6,000." *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, 23.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-ul Haqiq*, ff. 91-92. The rewards were sometimes sent to the officers and nobles through mace-bearer or their *wakils*. For instance, *khil'at* of 6 pieces and other rewards were sent by the Emperor through Khawajah Asad-ullah Khan, the mace-bearer to Raja Abhay Singh and Momin Khan. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 162, 242.

<sup>4</sup> *A'in-i Akbari*, 255; *The Mansabdari System and the Mughal Army*, 67.

<sup>5</sup> For instance, Sher Afghan Khan was given a *mansab* of seven thousand but he had no money to recruit even seven hundred horsemen under his command. Only the *wazir* and other big nobles maintained reasonable strength of contingents. *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, 136.

## TABLE VIII

## LIST OF MANSABDARS HOLDING THE ZAT RANK OF 5,000 AND ABOVE

## MANSABDARS OF 7,000 ZAT RANK

- |                                                                     |                                          |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| 1. Nizam-ul Mulk Asaf Jah, 9,000/- <i>du aspa seh aspa</i>          | 20. Raja Abhay Singh, 7,000/-            |
| 2. Muhammad Amin Khan, 8,000/- <i>du aspa seh aspa</i>              | 21. 'Umdat-ul Mulk Amir Khan, 7,000/-    |
| 3. Qamr-u'd-din Khan, 8,000/- <i>du aspa seh aspa</i>               | 22. Safdar Jang, 7,000/-                 |
| 4. Samsam-u'd Daulah Khan-i Dauran, 8,000/- <i>du aspa seh aspa</i> | 23. Shuj'a-u'd Daulah, 7,000/-           |
| 5. Roshan-u'd Daulah Rustum Jang, 7,000/-                           | 24. Murshid Quli Khan, 7,000/-           |
| 6. Haider Quli Khan, 7,000/- <i>du aspa seh aspa</i>                | 25. Muhammad Khan Bangash, 7,000/-       |
| 7. Sarbuland Khan Mubariz-ul Mulk, 7,000/- <i>du aspa seh aspa</i>  | 26. Ishaq Khan, 7,000/-                  |
| 8. Muin-u'd Daulah Dil Diler Khan, 7,000/-                          | 27. 'Abdul Samad Khan, 7,000/-           |
| 9. Lutfullah Khan Sadiq, 7,000/-                                    | 28. Zakariya Khan, 7,000/-               |
| 10. Sher Afghan Khan, 7,000/-                                       | 29. Asad Yar Khan, 7,000/-               |
| 11. Raja Jai Singh Sawai, 7,000/-                                   | 30. Naj-u'd Daulah, 7,000/-              |
| 12. Sa'adat Khan Burhan-ul Mulk, 7,000/-                            | 31. Mir Jumla Khan-i Khanan, 7,000/-     |
| 13. Muzaffar Khan, 7,000/-                                          | 32. 'Aliwardi Khan, 7,000/-              |
| 14. Raja Ajit Singh, 7,000/-                                        | 33. Saiyid Salabat Khan, 7,000/-         |
| 15. Nasir Khan, 7,000/-                                             | 34. Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan, 7,000/-          |
| 16. Nasir Jang, 7,000/-                                             | 35. 'Inayat-ullah Khan, 7,000/-          |
| 17. Ghazi-u'd-din Khan, 7,000/-                                     | 36. Zia-u'd Daulah, 7,000/-              |
| 18. Salabat Jang, 7,000/-                                           | 37. Saiyid Nusrat Yar Khan, 7,000/7,000  |
| 19. Nizam Jang, 7,000/-                                             | 38. Raja Girdhar Bahadur                 |
|                                                                     | 39. Khwaja 'Aba-dullah, 7,000/-          |
|                                                                     | 40. 'Aziz Khan Bahadur Chaghata, 7,000/- |
|                                                                     | 41. Shahmat Khan, 7,000/-                |
|                                                                     | 42. Allahwardi Khan, 7,000/-             |
|                                                                     | 43. Iradatmand Khan, 7,000/-             |
|                                                                     | 44. Nawazish Muhammad Khan, 7,000/-      |
|                                                                     | 45. Zain-u'd-din Ahmad Khan, 7,000/-     |
|                                                                     | 46. Sa'ced Ahmad Khan, 7,000/-           |
|                                                                     | 47. 'Ala-ullah Khan, 7,000/-             |

## MANSABDARS OF 6,000 ZAT RANK

- |                                |                                        |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| 1. Intizam-u'd Daulah, 6,000/- | 15. Sher Jang, 6,000/-                 |
| 2. Mu'in-ul Mulk, 6,000/-      | 16. Qa'im Jang, 6,000/-                |
| 3. Sadr-u'd-din Khan, 6,000/-  | 17. Ghairat Khan Salabat Jang, 6,000/- |
| 4. Fakhr-u'd-din Khan, 6,000/- | 18. Bairam Khan, 6,000/-               |
| 5. Mir Baqa Khan, 6,000/-      | 19. 'Aqidat Khan, 6,000/-              |
| 6. Khan Zaman Khan, 6,000/-    | 20. Na'imat-ullah Khan, 6,000/-        |
| 7. 'Azam Khan, 6,000/-         | 21. Saif Khan, 6,000/-                 |
| 8. Amin-u'd Daulah, 6,000/-    | 22. Khanazad Khan, 6,000/-             |
| 9. Fakhr-u'd Daulah, 6,000/-   | 23. Yahya Khan, 6,000/-                |
| 10. Munawwar Khan, 6,000/-     | 24. Shah Nawaz Khan, 6,000/-           |
| 11. Qa'im Khan, 6,000/-        | 25. Riyat Khan, 6,000/-                |
| 12. Anwar Khan, 6,000/-        | 26. Ahmad-ul Mulk, 6,000/-             |
| 13. Mazhar Khan, 6,000/-       | 27. Ghalib Jang, 6,000/-               |
| 14. Ma'ab Khan, 6,000/-        | 28. Mir Mushraf, 6,000/-               |

- |                                      |                                        |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| 29. Ahmad Khan Bangash, 6,000/-      | 37. Murtaza Khan, 6,000/-              |
| 30. Hamiduddin Khan Neemcha, 6,000/- | 38. Saiyid Niyaz Khan, 6,000/-         |
| 31. 'Ali Ahmad Khan Koka, 6,000/-    | 39. Najm-u'd-din 'Ali Khan, 6,000/-    |
| 32. 'Ali Hamid Khan, 6,000/-         | 40. Saiyid Hasan Khan, 6,000/-         |
| 33. 'Ali Amjad Khan, 6,000/-         | 41. Mir Hasan Khan Koka, 6,000/-       |
| 34. 'Ali Asghar Khan, 6,000/-        | 42. Fatch-ullah Khan Panipati, 6,000/- |
| 35. Bandi 'Ali Khan, 6,000           | 43. Momin Khan, 6,000/-                |
| 36. Murid Khan, 6,000/-              | 44. Ghazi-u'd-din Khan, 6,000/-        |

## MANSABDARS HOLDING THE ZAT RANK OF 5,000/-

- |                                       |                                 |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Tarbiyat Khan, 5,000/-             | 23. 'Abdul Wahab Khan, 5,000/-  |
| 2. Diler Himmat Khan, 5,000/-         | 24. Mir Nasrullah, 5,000/-      |
| 3. 'Inayat Khan Rasikh, 5,000/-       | 25. Mir Kallu, 5,000/-          |
| 4. Hidayat-ullah Khan, 5,000/-        | 26. 'Abdul Sattar Khan, 5,000/- |
| 5. Fakhr Khan, 5,000/-                | 27. Shahmat Khan, 5,000/-       |
| 6. Bairam Khan, 5,000/-               | 28. Ahmad Zama Khan, 5,000/-    |
| 7. Ruhullah Khan, 5,000/-             | 29. Arlat Khan, 5,000/-         |
| 8. Mahmud Beg Khan, 5,000/-           | 30. Taqhtamash Khan, 5,000/-    |
| 9. Ahmad Quli Khan, 5,000/-           | 31. Janish Khan, 5,000/-        |
| 10. 'Abdul Baqi Khan, 5,000/-         | 32. Najib 'Ali Khan, 5,000/-    |
| 11. 'Abdul Majid Khan, 5,000/-        | 33. Qara Khan, 5,000/-          |
| 12. Yadgar Khan, 5,000/-              | 34. Jani Khan, 5,000/-          |
| 13. Mustafa Quli Khan, 5,000/-        | 35. Jan Nisar Khan, 5,000/-     |
| 14. Saiyid Nijabat 'Ali Khan, 5,000/- | 36. Koka Khan, 5,000/-          |
| 15. Saiyid Mukkammal Khan, 5,000/-    | 37. Abu Tara Khan, 5,000/-      |
| 16. Ikhlas Khan, 5,000/-              | 38. Kokaltash Khan, 5,000/-     |
| 17. Hakim Khan, 5,000/-               | 39. Agha Khan, 5,000/-          |
| 18. Shadad Khan, 5,000/-              | 40. Dawar Dad Khan, 5,000/-     |
| 19. Kazim 'Ali Khan, 5,000/-          | 41. Mansiyar Khan, 5,000/-      |
| 20. Shari'at-ullah Khan, 5,000/-      | 42. Sabit Khan, 5,000/-         |
| 21. 'Ubaid-ullah Khan, 5,000/-        | 43. Asad Yar Khan, 5,000/-      |
| 22. Ja'afar Quli Khan, 5,000/-        | 44. Na'imat-ullah Khan, 5,000/- |

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*Jagirdars*

Under the Mughal administration the state officers and servants received their pay either in cash or in the form of assignment of revenues from a specified area of land. Such nobles and officers who obtained assignment of land-revenue in lieu of their salaries were known as *jagirdars* or holders of *jagirs*; while officers, generally employed at the centre, who received their pay in cash from the treasury were known *naqdi mansabdars*. The area assigned to a *mansabdar* was supposed to produce income in the shape of revenue equivalent to the sanctioned pay. As the calculation of pay was made in terms of *dams*, the assessment came to be known the *jama' dami*, the actual revenue collection from the *jagir* was called *hal-i hasil*, and the pay claim *mutalba*.

It would be unnecessary—were it possible within the limits of the present study—to review the development of the *jagirdari* system from the times of Akbar to the end of the 17th century and describe its various aspects. For, this extensive subject has been thoroughly discussed by several writers. The successors of Aurangzeb made no attempt to change or reform the institution. But under the new conditions, created by the decline of central government and the loss of vast territories, the working of the system underwent profound transformation. When the central authority broke down and land for assignment was no longer available, the fabric of *jagirdari* system began rapidly to crumble. The process of decay of the Mughal power and the final success of the forces of disintegration have been analysed in some detail in the preceding chapters. What is our chief concern here is to assess the effects of this resultant crisis on the working of the *jagirdari* system and the position of the *jagirdars*.

The fact that the official procedure with respect to the award of *jagir* and routines and practices connected with its administration were adhered to in the reign of Muhammad Shah is borne out by the evidence contained in many revenue documents of the period. The *sanad* for the grant of *jagir* mentioned, as usual, the name of *mansabdar*, his rank, the name of the *pargana* and the fixed revenue in terms of *dams* he was entitled to collect. The issue of *sanad* was sanctioned by the Emperor; it was drafted in the office of *diwan-i tan* and issued under the seal and signature of *diwan-i a'la*.<sup>1</sup> For instance, a *parwana*, regarding the grant of *jagir* to Raja Jai Singh Sawai, in *pargana* Naraina, *sarkar* Mominabad, *subah* Ajmer, yielding a revenue of 32,31,500 *dams* was issued under the seal of Qamr-u'd-din Khan. It was addressed to the local officers with directions for the payment of *mal-wajib* (land-revenue) and *haquq-i diwani* (the fiscal demands).<sup>2</sup> A *parwana* for the transfer of *jagir*, issued in the first regnal year of Muhammad Shah under the seal of Nizam-ul Mulk, states, *chaudhris*, *qanungos*, *mutasaddis* and *muzar'ain* of *pargana* Jhanjhana, *sarkar* and *subah* Shahjahanabad should know that the revenue of 104,214 *dams* from the above *pargana* has been assigned to Mir Ghulam Muhiy-u'd-din Khan Bahadur, son of Mir Muhammad Sajid from the commencement of half harvest of *kharif* after the transfer of *jagir* held by Badri Path. They are responsible to the new assignee for the payment of *mal wajib* and *haquq-i diwani*, fixed in accordance with rules; and they should be guided by the *jagirdar* in all matters of accounts and other details of management. Another *sanad* issued under the seal of Qamr-u'd-din Khan, 7th regnal year, in favour of Mir 'Ali

<sup>1</sup> For details of this procedure, *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, 16, 17; *Al 'amal-ilm-i Navisindigi*, ff. 156, 157; *Autographs and Letters of Qamr-u'd-din Khan*, Or. 9236, ff. 6, 18b, 25b.

<sup>2</sup> *Jaipur Records*, Miscellaneous, IV, 13.



Naqi, son of Mir Muhammad 'Arif, for the grant of revenues from *pargana* Kehkas in the *subah* of Agra amounting to 101,603 *dams*. The assignment orders were to come into force from the beginning of the *kharif* (autumn) harvest. The *jagir* was conferred after the death of Musta'id Khan. The local officers were made responsible for the payment of *mal wajib* and *haquq-i diwani* to the new assignee<sup>1</sup>. According to a copy of *parwana*, issued under the seal of Nizam-ul Mulk. 2nd regnal year, a *jagir* in *pargana* Amroha worth 81,212 *dams* was assigned to Saivid 'Ali Nazar after the transfer of Saivid Bhikan, son of Saivid Ghulam Shah<sup>2</sup>.

The big nobles, including the central ministers and governors, possessed vast *jagirs* in fertile areas which their *'amils* managed with the assistance of *qanungos* and *chaudhris*. The power and influence which they exercised in the government ensured the security of their interests. With the support of the central authority they were able to keep the local officers and revenue-collecting intermediaries under control. Nizam-ul Mulk, Qamr-u'd-din Khan, Khan-i Dauran, and the governors of Bengal, Punjab and Awadh held their *jagirs* permanently; the evils of sudden and rapid transfer did not affect their rights in the lands assigned to them. "Each of the grand *amirs*", writes Shakir Khan, "secured *jagirs* for both ranks, *zat* and *sawar* as their *mansabs* indicated; and according to their respective ranks some received *jagirs* of full value (*doazdah-mahah*) while others obtained less valuable *jagirs*. The revenue collected from every *mahal* was remitted to the treasury of each noble."<sup>3</sup> In theory, all the assignees were bound to administer their estates in accordance with the imperial rules and regulations, and to discharge the obligations, financial and military, imposed on them by the government. However, the big nobles, at least in the later part of Muhammad Shah's reign, enjoyed a fair measure of freedom in matters of assessment and collection, and their internal arrangements did not always conform to the declared objects of the imperial policy.

The following detailed statement of the *mahals* assigned to Nizam-ul Mulk shows that his *jagirs* in terms of area and the amount of revenue were extensive and rich, and they were mostly placed in the two provinces of Delhi and Agra where royal authority was generally respected.

When, in 1723, Nizam-ul Mulk went to Gujarat to curb the revolt of Haider Quli Khan, he obtained Dholqa' Bhairoch, Jamsur, Maqbulabad and Balasor, the most fertile *mahals*, as unconditional *jagirs*, and he appointed Rai Tonda as the *mutasaddi* for their management. After his dismissal

<sup>1</sup> Allahabad Archives, No. 12011.

<sup>2</sup> Allahabad Archives, No. 11917.

<sup>3</sup> Tarikh-i Shakir Khan, f. 14a.

## TABLE IX

JAGIR MAHALS HELD BY NIZAM-UL MULK DURING 1715-18<sup>1</sup>


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<i>pargana</i> Faridabad (Delhi)—Rs. one lakh
<i>mauza</i> Khunda (Delhi)—Rs. 80 thousand
<i>pargana</i> Siyana (Delhi)—half—Rs. one lakh and 50 thousand
<i>pargana</i> Kanana and Pathrawara (2 <i>mahals</i> ) Rs. 3 lakhs 5 thousand
Shahjahanpur and Kulkar (Bareilly)—Rs. 4 lakhs
21 <i>mauza</i> in <i>pargana</i> Shakarpur (Delhi) <i>altaghma</i> —Rs. 40 thousand
<i>pargana</i> Winahay (Agra)—Rs. 2 lakhs and 50 thousand
<i>pargana</i> Khaibalda—Rs. one lakh
Villages in <i>haveli</i> Agra <i>altaghma</i> —Rs. one lakh and 20 thousand
<i>pargana</i> Badol (Delhi)—Rs. 4 lakhs and 50 thousand
<i>pargana</i> Dansa including Ghaziabad ( <i>jagir</i> and <i>altaghma</i> )—Rs. 27 lakhs
Rampur, Shahabad <i>sarkar</i> (two <i>mahals</i> Sambhal)—Rs. 3 lakhs
<i>Jagir</i> in <i>chakla</i> Barielly—Rs. one lakh and 12 thousand
<i>pargana</i> Shikohabad (Agra)—Rs. 4 lakhs and 25 thousand
<i>pargana</i> Vinkor (Agra)—Rs. one lakh
<i>pargana</i> Khokhowal (Delhi)—Rs. one lakh
Income from the buildings and gardens in Delhi—Rs. 55 thousand per annum.

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from the governorship of Gujarat, these *parganas*, except Dholqa, were resumed by the government.<sup>2</sup> In 1728 all his *jagir* lands, both in northern India and in the Deccan, were restored to him by the Emperor, and since then he remained in possession of his holdings.<sup>3</sup> Qamr-u'd-din Khan, the *wazir* had his *jagirs* in Sirhind, Moradabad and Barielly; from the revenue of *chakla* Sirhind, the conditional *jagir*, the salaries of his five thousand Mughal soldiers were paid. The revenues from *parganas* in the provinces of Delhi, Agra and Bengal were assigned to Khan-i Dauran, the *mir bakhshi*, in *tankhawah*. Zafar Khan held *jagirs* in Sirhind and Panipat. In the districts Rohilkhand—Daranagar, Amroha, Aunola, Barielly and Shahjahanpur—several high officials like Amir Khan, Safdar Jang and Zulfiqar Jang possessed *jagirs*.<sup>4</sup> The *parganas* and villages round Ujjain formed another important area in which *jagirs* were assigned to such influential nobles as Sa'adat Khan Burhan-ul Mulk, Nizam-ul Mulk, Raja Jai Singh, Nawab Qudsia, the mother of the Emperor, Haif Ali Khan, Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan, Mir Hasan Khan Koka, 'Ali Ahmad Khan Koka, Raja

<sup>1</sup> *Kitab-i Asnad wa Daftar Diwani wa Mali wa Mulki Sarkar 'Ali*, 151-154.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 48, 97.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 123.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Farrukhabad*, ff. 14, 21,

Mul Raj and Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan Bahadur.<sup>1</sup>

The governors protected the interests of these big nobles by quelling disorders in the assigned lands and providing facilities to their agents for the work of revenue-collection. For instance, Muhammad Khan Bangash sent a force of two thousand men to reduce Jaswant Singh, a *zamindar* of Mainpuri, at the request of Khan-i Dauran who then held Bhongam in *jagir* in that district.<sup>2</sup>

The system of month-ratios for different ranks fixed in the days of Shah Jahan continued to operate during the reign of Muhammad Shah.<sup>3</sup> There is no evidence to show any change or alteration in the old sanctioned schedules of pay. The pay-scales given by Shakir Khan, the only contemporary writer who has alluded to this matter, are almost identical with the table or schedule-rates recorded in *Zawabit-i' Alamgiri*.<sup>4</sup> The rapid succession of monarchs at Delhi did not necessarily imply resumption or transfer of *jagirs* already held by small *mansabdars* in the provinces. They were usually confirmed in their assignments as the provincial *diwans* were asked through *farmans* by the new Emperor not to subject such *mansabdars* to the routine practice of renewing the *sanads*.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, the practice of frequent transfers of *jagirs* prevailed during the period under review. Gujarat offers some illuminating examples of the practice. In 1717, Raja Jai Singh Sawai, obtained assignment of 32 lakhs of *dams* in Anarsar after the removal of Khan Jahan Bahadur. Muhammad Shah confirmed the Raja in possession of this *jagir* in May 1721. Next year his *jagir* was again resumed and bestowed on Raja Abhay Singh. But later, in September 1723, it was restored to Raja Jai Singh Sawai.<sup>6</sup> In 1735 the *mahals* of *jagir* held by Sharf-u'd Daulah, and others, were transferred to Isma'il Muhammad Khan, a *mansabdar* of 500/50, posted in Ahmadabad. The *sanad* to that effect was issued from the *khalisa* department under the seal of the *wazir*.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad*, 318-319.

<sup>2</sup> *The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad*, 284.

<sup>3</sup> According to this method of payment the *jagir* areas were classified on the basis of revenue-collection in proportion to the *jama'* where the current *hasil* equaled the *jama'* the *jagir* was styled twelve-monthly (*doazdamaha*). For a discussion of the characteristics of this system, *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign*, 64, 248.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Shakir Khan*, 113-114; *Zawabit-i' Alamgiri*, ff. 50-51. For an analysis of the features of month-scales operating in the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, 46-49; *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*, 264-65.

<sup>5</sup> See Chapter Five.

<sup>6</sup> *Jaipur Records*, Miscellaneous, IV, 16, 20, 26.

<sup>7</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 175.

On the other hand, the laxity of administration combined with certain political factors led to the grant of assignment becoming hereditary in many cases. When Ishaq Khan died, his son Mirza Najm-u'd Daulah received the *jagirs* along with the *mansab*, titles and post held by the deceased.<sup>1</sup> After the death of Jawan Mard Khan, *faujdar* of Petlad, Mubariz Khan, governor of Gujarat, sent proposal to the royal court for the grant of his *jagir* in favour of his son, Kamal-u'd-din Khan.<sup>2</sup> Muhammad Shah confirmed Bhawani Ram in the possession of *jagirs* held by his father, Girdhar Bahadur.<sup>3</sup> In 1729 assignments in lieu of pay on the revenues of *pargana* Karnal amounting to Rs. 5 lakhs *dams* were granted to Dilawar 'Ali Khan Aurangabadi whose ancestors had formerly held the *pargana* in *jagir*.<sup>4</sup>

While the powerful nobles were secure in their holdings, the small *mansabdars* were faced with immense difficulties both in obtaining a *jagir* and in realising revenues from it. This arose essentially from the fact that there was often little or no land available for assignment. This ever-increasing pressure on the *khalisa* or land left in the Emperor's control, may be attributed to two broad reasons. In the first place, the later Mughals, right from Bahadur Shah to Muhammad Shah, granted *mansabs* most lavishly so that the numbers of claimants to *jagirs* arose enormously. Secondly, extensive areas in Gujarat and Malwa, belonging to *khalisa*, passed under the sway of the Marathas; at the same time the *jat* and Bundela chiefs also took possession of many districts in Agra and Bundelkhand. If some *mahals* were left for assignments the claimants were so numerous that only a few fortunate among them could receive the *sanad* of *jagir*.

Added to this steady contraction of *khalisa* and *paibaqi* lands was the cumbrous procedure relating to the grant of *jagir*. These two factors gave rise to bribery which in course of time became a deep-seated evil of public life. The officials and clerks of the revenue department openly demanded money before giving the *sanad*, and, according to the prevailing rates, a *mansabdar* of 100 *zat* had to pay one hundred rupees in order to secure his pay.<sup>5</sup> 'Ali Ahmad Khan, *darogha-i 'arz mukarrar* and brother of Koki Jiu, "did not place the representations of *mansabdars* before the Emperor for sanction without extorting money from them. There was no check on his illegal demands nor any redress from his oppression. The *mansabdars* gave up the *mansabs* and cursed the decay of the Empire."<sup>6</sup> In consequence of

<sup>1</sup> *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja'i*, 207-209.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, 11, 107.

<sup>3</sup> *'Aja'ib-ul Afaq*, f. 75b, Nos. 184, 195.

<sup>4</sup> *Karnal District Gazetteer*, Lahore, 1884, 31.

<sup>5</sup> *Mir'at-ul Haqiqat*, f. 92.

<sup>6</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, I, f. 47a.

these evils, most of the *mansabdars* ceased to assert their claims of pay and retired from imperial service. "From nearly one lakh to two lakhs of people are suffering from the non-availability of *jagirs*; the number of *khanazad* nobles is greater."<sup>1</sup> The Emperor himself accepted the *peshkash* which was another form of bribe. Abul Barkat Khan, brother of Nawab 'Abdul Majid Khan, spent a large amount of money in offering *peshkash* to the Emperor to secure the deputy-governorship of Kashmir.<sup>2</sup> Writing about the conditions of *jagirdars* in Gujarat Khafi Khan states:

In the past only a few unfortunate *jagirdars* received salaries for less than 10 or 12 months; many of them were given, out of favour, the pay for 20 to 25 months. After the death of Bahadur Shah conditions changed.<sup>3</sup>

Another contemporary writer says :

In these days officers took two rupees instead of one from the poor *ra'iyat*, but from the strong they demand nothing. This enhanced the power and influence of big landholders, resulting in the ruin of *jagirdars* as well as *ra'iyat*.<sup>4</sup>

However, the *mansabdars* retained their *mansabs* or ranks which, though bereft of *jagir*, still constituted the symbol of status and dignity in the society.

But the governors of Bihar, Bengal and Orissa respected the rights of the imperial *mansabdars* and took every measure to protect their interests.<sup>5</sup> In Bihar, under the governorship of Fakhr-u'd Daulah, the administration of *mahals* assigned to *mansabdars* was carried out by the provincial *diwan* who made the assessment, on the basis of *jama' bandi*, and issued the *sunad* to them. The *jagirdars* were required to submit the accounts of revenue collection in his office. Fakhr-u'd Daulah, however, imposed illegal cesses on the *mahals* of *jagirdars* which caused resentment among them. They made complaints against his oppression of which the upshot was the dismissal of the governor. Muhammad Shuja'-u'd-din Khan, the viceroy of the three provinces, tried to redress the injustice by abolishing all unlawful exactions. Though the administration of *jagir-mahals* was placed under direct supervision of 'Aliwardi Khan, deputy-governor of Bihar, *jagirdars* enjoyed the freedom to direct the affairs of their lands. The revenues

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-ul Haqiq*, f. 92.

<sup>2</sup> *Narain-i Sa'aden*, I.O. MS. 4039, f. 60.

<sup>3</sup> *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, II, 965.

<sup>4</sup> *Risala-i Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i Dauran*, f. 23b.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikht-i Shakir Khani*, f. 30b.

collected from the *jagirs* were sent to the court to be delivered to the *jagirdars* through their *wakils*; the remaining surplus was remitted to the provincial treasury at Murshidabad. The *sarishtadar*, or keeper of records, for the management of *jagirs* was separate from that of the *khalisa*. In Bengal the pattern of *jagir* administration, established by Murshid Quli Khan, continued to operate for a long period. The revenues from *mahals* of the *subah*, after deducting the *tankhwah* of the *nazim*, provincial *diwan*, and the imperial *mir bakhshi* and other *mansabdars*, were deemed to belong to the *khalisa*; and the pay from *jagirs* or other *mansabdars* was assigned on the revenues of Orissa.<sup>1</sup>

Much more difficult than the procurement of *jagir* was the problem of holding it under control by the small *mansabdars*. They lacked the necessary means to defend their possessions which were vulnerable to the attacks of turbulent *zamindars* and military adventurers.<sup>2</sup> A rebellious governor of Gujarat always made their *mahals* his first object of usurpation. Another province from where complaints of usurpation of land held by small *mansabdars* were reported was Awadh whose governor Sa'adat Khan lost no opportunity of depriving such persons of their holdings. Muzaffar Khan openly charged the governor in the *diwan-i khas* that he was forcibly taking possession of the lands which legally belonged to the weak *mansabdars* in that region.<sup>3</sup> Mangal Khan, an officer in the service of Muhammad Khan Bangash, complained that his *jagir*, in the *pargana* of Lucknow and Sitapur districts, had been occupied by Burhan-ul Mulk; and Sa'adat Khan confiscated the *jagirs* of Muhammad Ahsan Bilgrami.<sup>4</sup> Ashub bitterly criticises the highhandedness of 'Ali Asghar Khan, *faujdar* of the Doab in Panjab, in dealing with the *jagirdars*. He seized the *jagirs* of *mansabdars* instead of administering the area under his jurisdiction with justice and efficiency.<sup>5</sup> When the military warriors did not occupy the land straight away, they plundered the *ra'iyat* and *zamindars* thus rendering the payment of money to *jagirdars* as difficult as possible.<sup>6</sup>

With the waning power of the central authority the local chieftains and heads of clans enlarged their estates by absorbing those of their weaker neighbours and seizing the lands held by government officers. In Awadh, conditions of anarchy prevailed even before the accession of Muhammad Shah. These disturbances disrupted the whole pattern of agrarian relationship, which proved detrimental to the growth of agricultural

<sup>1</sup> *Persian Revenue Records*, ff. 54,69,70.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 171a.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 508; 'Aja'ib-ul Afaq, ff. 81,88.

<sup>4</sup> *The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad*, 304.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 47a.

<sup>6</sup> 'Aja'ib-ul Afaq, f. 79.

production. The entire area was the scene of perpetual warfare ; clans fought with clans, *zamindars* with *zamindars*, and all waged unceasing wars with the *faujdar*s. They ousted the 'amils of *jagirdars* and obtained possession of their lands.<sup>1</sup> The disorders and attendant chaos continued unchecked till Sa'adat Khan assumed charge of administration in that province. He devoted himself seriously to the suppression of local chiefs, who had set up their authority in the days of turmoil. How far the small *mansabdars*, who had lost control over their *jagirs*, benefited from his military operations and punitive measures is difficult to ascertain. But with the return of internal peace, it may be presumed that some of them should have recovered their lost lands and collected dues from the subdued *zamindars*. Ghulam Husain Khan, author of the *Zikr-us Siyar*, writes that his father had secured *jagirs* in the reign of Farrukh Siyar in *pargana* Jaunpur as *mansabdar* in the *risalah wala shahi* which position he held till the death of Muhammad Shah. But the income from the land was considerably reduced during the years of anarchy that followed in the wake of Nadir Shah's invasion ; the *zamindar* of the area completely stopped the payment and occupied the *jagir*. Formerly his family was happy and prosperous, but now they lived on the borderline of poverty.<sup>2</sup> The *jagirs* of the son of Nawab Khan-i Khanan which lay in the *parganas* of Karbat, Saidpur, Bhetri, Shadiabad and Zakurabad, were seized by Babu Mahabat Khan, a *zamindar* of 'Azamgarh. When the *jagirdar* received no money he himself went to meet the *zamindar* and requested him to pay the outstanding dues ; he stayed for a month or two but returned disappointed to Delhi. On his complaint, the Emperor dispatched a force under the command of one Asaf Khan ; but in the fighting the imperial captain suffered defeat and his army fled away. The Emperor then directed Sa'adat Khan to punish the rebel and satisfy the claims of the *jagirdar*. The governor accordingly gave one lakh of rupees out of his own treasury to the *jagirdar* and took from him the deed of lease by which he became the controller of his *jagir*. Following this transaction, he marched on the stronghold of the *zamindar* and demanded the payment of Rs. one lakh ; but Mahabat Khan would not yield. The governor's army then besieged the fort, and Mahabat Khan had to surrender for he had no artillery to face the challenge of his superior adversary. Sa'adat Khan now demanded

<sup>1</sup> For instance, the clans of Bachgotis and their kinsmen, the Rajkumars, were at large in Sultanpur; the Musalman Raja of Hasanpur, the chieftains of Kurwar, Dera and Meopur were fighting with each other; Bahle Sultans, the Parwar of Marwar, the Saiyids of Pirpur and the Shaikhs of Samanpur were all creating disturbances. The Bais of Baiswara, the Kauhpurias of Tiloi and the Sambansis of Pratapgarh were also in a state of rebellion against the government. For details, *The Chronicles of Oonao*, 29, 72.

<sup>2</sup> *Zikr-us Siyar*, f. 2.

Rs. 4 lakhs as the price of his safety and restoration of his land. After sometime, Mahabat Khan returned from his refuge and agreed to pay Rs. 4,64,000/- to the governor.<sup>1</sup>

Muhammad Khan Bangash, the governor of Allahabad, sternly enforced internal peace during his brief tenure. He was succeeded by less vigorous *subedars* like Sarbuland Khan and Amir Khan who failed to keep the unruly elements in check. In Jhansi and other areas of Bundelkhand, Chattrasal and his descendants gradually seized *jagir* and *khalisa* lands, and drove out the '*amils* and *faujdar*s from the *parganas*. After the death of the Bundela chief Jhansi fell into the hands of the Marathas. The Peshwa placēd Naru Shankar in possession of Jhansi and some other places in Bundelkhand which yielded a revenue of Rs. 8,05,336. In the Meerut district, famous for its gardens and pleasure resorts, the *jagirs* of Qamr-u'd-din Khan were captured by the Marathas in 1749. The Hingne brothers—Bapuji Mahadeo and Damodar Mahadeo—established their control over these *mahals*. In south-west of Meerut the *gujars* were supreme; in the south-east the *jats* of Kuchesar held the great part of Hasanpur *tehsil*; while the northern part of it was under the sway of the Saiyid families of Muzaffarpur. The *jagirdars* were at the mercy of these turbulent *zamindars* who refused to acknowledge the royal authority except under heavy military pressure. In 1737 Surajmal, the eldest son of Thakur Badan Singh, invaded the Agra district and seized 23 villages, which included many *jagir mahals*. During the confusion occasioned by Nadir Shah's invasion he added more villages to his possessions. The *jats* encroached upon the imperial territories in the environs of Agra and Delhi and extended their raids to as far as Gwalior.<sup>2</sup> Qamr-u'd-din Khan held conditional *jagirs* in Faridabad in the immediate vicinity of Delhi. They were plundered and seized by Balram Jat, a relation of Surajmal, when Ahmad Shah Durrani invaded the Panjab. The '*amil* of Qamr-u'd-din Khan put up a stiff resistance but was killed in the battle. The *jat* adventurer was defeated and driven out in 1748 by the army of Safdar Jang who, as the new *wazir* under Ahmad Shah, had obtained the *sanad* of these *mahals* as his conditional *jagir*.<sup>3</sup>

How the *zamindars* and other unruly elements took advantage of the disturbed state of affairs may be illustrated by the story of Mirza 'Aziz Beg, a *mansabdar* of 5,000 *zat* holding *jagirs* in the neighbourhood of Lahore. He did not appoint an '*amil* or farm out the revenues to a

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i 'Azamgarh*, I.O. MS. No. 4038, 47-50.

<sup>2</sup> For details of these events, *Jhansi District Gazetteer*, *Meerut District Gazetteer* and *Muthra District Gazetteer*.

<sup>3</sup> *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja'i*, 44.



*mustagir* (contractor), but managed his estate personally. The revenue-paying *zamindars* (*malguzar*) paid up the money every year regularly. When Nadir Shah invaded the Punjab, the *zamindars* withheld the payment of revenues. Mirza 'Aziz Beg took up arms against these *zamindars* and forced them to clear the dues.<sup>1</sup> 'Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla, after his return from Sirhind in 1748, brought the whole area stretching from Daranagar to Shahjahanpur under his control. The *jagirs* of big and small nobles which lay in this extensive tract of land were forcibly seized and their *'amil*s were ousted.<sup>2</sup> The destruction of Saiyid Saif-u'd-din, a *jagirdar* of Jansath in Muzaffarnagar, represents a striking example of revenge and tyranny displayed by no less an officer of the state than the *wazir* himself. Qamr-u'd-din Khan first sent Marahamat Khan, *faujdar* of Saharnpur, to resume the *jagirs* of Saif-u'd-din and other Saiyids whose growing influence and popularity in that area had provoked baseless fear in the minds of the Mughals. It was natural that the Saiyids should have resisted the attempt to dispossess them of their only means of subsistence. Brave and courageous, they fought with the *faujdar* and defeated and killed him in an encounter. The *wazir* made the death of a government officer a good excuse to dispatch a huge army to vindicate the imperial authority and secured the royal consent to punish the rebels. His real design was to destroy the Saiyids root and branch. The supreme command of the army, comprising the contingents of *faujdar*s and the Rohilla Afghans under 'Ali Muhammad, was entrusted to 'Azim-ullah Khan. The Mughal commander opened a major offensive, and in a severe engagement defeated and killed Saif-u'd-din. His soldiers plundered the town. The families of the Saiyids fled to other towns in consequence of this violence and terror.<sup>3</sup>

From the above sketch of political anarchy and decay of central authority it is clear that a large number of small *mansabdars* lost control over their *jagirs* and their economic position was completely ruined. Shah Wali-ullah in his letter addressed to Ahmad Shah Durrani wrote:

The grant of *jagir* should be reserved only to big nobles, small *mansabdars* should get their pay in cash, as was the rule in the reign of Shah Jahan. For the small *mansabdars* cannot keep the land under their effective control; they, therefore, resort to farming out the revenues of their *jagirs* to *ijarahdars*.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 192.

<sup>2</sup> Rafi'-u'd-din Khan, *Zikr-i Maluk*, I.O. MS. No. 4037, ff. 17,19; *Tarikh-i Farha Bakhsh*, f. 22b.

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 478.

<sup>4</sup> *Shah Waliullah Delhvi Ki Siyasi-Maktubat*, 51.

*Faujdar*

Parallel to *jagirs*, and sometimes combining with it, was another territorial jurisdiction known as *faujdari*, with its own sources of income (*faujdari* dues or cesses) and its obligations. The holder of the jurisdiction was known as *faujdar*. The jurisdiction sometimes coincided with *sarkar*, but most often was defined in terms of *parganas*, altering in several cases with each appointment.

The *faujdar*, as the executive head of a *sarkar* or district, occupied a position of vital importance in the Mughal administration. He was the most powerful instrument by which the central government enforced compliance with order in the far-off *parganas* and towns. The success in innumerable conflicts which took place between government and *zamindars* depended on the skill and energy of this single officer. Defence of the district against external invasion also formed part of his responsibilities. The *faujdar* was appointed by a royal *farman* that bore the seal and signature of the *mir bakhshi*. He was directly responsible to the Emperor and held office during his pleasure. However, he was to act immediately under the orders of the governor who had the privilege of making suggestions for his transfer and dismissal. His main duties were : (1) to maintain law and order within his jurisdiction ; (2) to exercise supervision over the army and police establishments ; (3) to assist the revenue-collectors in the realisation of dues ; and (4) to take care that other servants under his command should execute the imperial regulations faithfully. He was vested with the power to enlist additional levies in times of emergency. He was authorised to take military action against rebellious *zamindars* and cultivators, provided alternative method of persuasion failed and officers of revenue requested him in writing for aid. Besides these executive functions, he exercised judicial authority that was confined to the cognizance of such cases as related to public peace and order.<sup>1</sup>

The duties and powers of *faujdar*s were clearly laid down in a *sanad* issued to Tahir Muhammad Khan, deputy-*faujdar* of Carnatic, in the 5th regnal year of Aurangzeb.<sup>2</sup> These may be summarised as follows :

<sup>1</sup> Anand Ram bin Haranand, *Siyaq Namah*, Asafia Lib. MS. No. 850, ff. 52-54. According to *A'in* the *faujdar* was directed (1) to inspect the accoutrements of troops ; (2) to supply horses to those who lost them in action ; (3) to keep a record of the roll of troops present and absent ; (4) to send a report of all affairs to the royal court. *A'in-i Akbari*, II, *op. cit.* 41,42 ; J.N. Sarkar, *Mughal Administration*, 56-57 ; *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, Supplement, 170 ; *Nigar Namah-i Munshi*, f. 133b.

<sup>2</sup> *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign*, 40-41. In another *farman* addressed

1. He must perform his duties with honesty and sincerity and administer the area under his control with wisdom and sagacity.
2. He must chastise and punish the unruly and disruptive elements, and protect the weak against the strong ; he must also help the revenue-collectors.
3. He must forbid the blacksmiths from manufacturing matchlocks.
4. He must establish and organize *thanas* for the preservation of security and order. He must supervise and direct the work of police officers under him.
5. He must prevent the state officers from levying illegal cesses.
6. He must guard the high-ways so that travellers and traders could go freely without fear or anxiety.
7. Prevention of robbery should be his chief concern. If anywhere in the area under his control a theft took place, he must strive to recover the stolen property and return it to the owner and punish the thieves.

Ghulam Husain writes :

It was the duty of the *faujdar* to see that in the district placed under his charge no *zamindar* should erect fortifications or collect arms like matchlocks, rockets, artillery, bows and arrows. If he was found acting contrary to these rules, he should be asked to forthwith hand-over the arms and disband his troops. In case the *zamindar* attempted resistance, the *faujdar* should attack him immediately, chastise him with severity, demolish his castle, and reduce him to extremity. When the refractory *zamindar* was completely defeated, the *faujdar* should imprison and keep him in confinement until he received instructions from the royal court regarding the punishment to be inflicted upon him.<sup>1</sup>

Where the malefactors and disturbers of peace stirred trouble, the *faujders* should use their military force to liquidate them and stamp out all traces of lawlessness. The *faujders* continuously waged war

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to Sardar Khan, *faujdar* of Sorath, the Emperor also explained his functions. Some of the most important of these are as follows : That he should administer the district in such a manner that the *ra'iyat* and common folk should enjoy peace and security and offer prayers for the permanence of the Empire. He must try to create conditions in which residents of cities, towns and villages of *sarkar* Sorath should feel secure and happy. He should administer justice and save the weak from the tyranny and oppression of the strong. He should decide and settle cases concerning religious matters in consultation with the *qazi*, *mufti* and *mir'adal* in accordance with the holy law. *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, 257.

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhhherin*, II, 409.

against these unruly elements in the past. Consequently, the disturbers of peace dared not operate in the *khalisa* and *jagir* areas, or molest the holders of rent-free lands.<sup>1</sup>

In some cases the *faujdar* was appointed on the nomination made by the governor; and in matters of his posting and transfer the governor exercised a measure of discretionary authority. In 1728 Sarbuland Khan replaced Fida-u'd-din Khan, *faujdar-amin* of Petlad by Jawan Mard Khan Babi; the *faujdari* of Kari was entrusted to the charge of Mir Fakhr-u'd-din after the transfer of Tari Khan. The governor nominated Saiyid Nawazish Khan as *faujdar* of Petlad on the death of Jawan Mard Khan; and he anticipating royal *sanad* in the favour of his nominee, asked him to take charge of the office.<sup>2</sup> The *faujdar* was required, in addition to the discharge of his normal duties, to accompany the governor in campaigns against the rebels. During the crisis of major revolt the central government sent instructions direct to the *faujdar*s of the affected area to proceed to the aid of the governor.<sup>3</sup> Under certain circumstances the posts of *faujdari qila'adari* were combined in one person.<sup>4</sup> Muhammad 'Umar Khan, son of Husain, alias Shamshir Khan; was the *faujdar* and *qila'adar* of Mandu and Dhar. He died in 1735.<sup>5</sup> In the province of Gujarat there was an *amin-faujdar*<sup>6</sup> who performed the double functions of *amin*<sup>7</sup> and *faujdar* of the *pargana*. For instance, Muhammad

<sup>1</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta' akhherin*, II, 410. "Learn whether the local *zamindars* paid the revenue regularly or displayed a defiant spirit in your predecessor's time. In case they do not respond to your peaceful overtures making submission chastise them. When your own troops are insufficient to crush such a refractory *zamindar*, set his enemies up against him, and give this *zamindar's* land to his rival, and send your own troops to assist him in an endeavour to crush the rebel more easily." C. A. Elliot has quoted a *sanad* of appointment of *faujdar*, *diwan* and *amin* of *sarkar* Kanuj in the name of Saiyid Munawwar of Unnao. The *sanad* explains the duties of the officer which are similar as analysed in the sources cited here. *The Chronicles of Oonao*, 108.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 40,49,53,105-108.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 93.

<sup>4</sup> *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign*, 80-82.

<sup>5</sup> *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 86.

<sup>6</sup> The author of *Khulasat-us Siyaq* writes that Sa'd-ullah Khan, the *wazir* of Shah Jahan, created a new territorial division, called *chakla*, that comprised a number of *mahals*, and appointed an officer under the designation of *amin-faujdar*. He exercised chief controlling authority over this newly created territorial division and performed functions in the areas of revenue and police administration. *Khulasat-us Siyaq*, f. 17.

<sup>7</sup> He was the chief assessment officer of a *pargana*. His functions were: (1) to ascertain diligently the actual produce of the land by inspecting every field under

Iraj was the *amin-faujdar* of *pargana* Dholqa; while 'Abdullah Beg, held this office in Broach. The executive functions of this officer were the very same which were vested separately in the *amin* and *faujdar*.

From considerations of contiguity and more effective control a governor was sometimes appointed *faujdar* of an area adjacent to his province. For instance, in Gujarat, Haidar Quli Khan held the *faujdar* of several *parganas* and *sarkars* like Kari, Mohmudnagar, Patta Chanwal.<sup>1</sup> When he was made governor of Ajmer, the *faujdar* of Sambhar was also given to him.<sup>2</sup> The *faujdar* of Gorakhpur was generally held by the governors of Awadh, like Raja Girdhar Bahadur and Sa'adat Khan.<sup>3</sup> Similarly the *faujdar* of Mathura was the additional charge of the governor of Agra. The governor of Malwa exercised controlling authority over Gwalior in the capacity of *faujdar* Muhammad Khan Bangash, however, could not obtain the *sanad* of *faujdar* of Gwalior in spite of the assurance given to him by the Emperor at the time of his appointment to the *subedari* of Malwa.<sup>4</sup>

During the reign of Muhammad Shah the office of *faujdar*, like many other posts, tended to become hereditary. In 1728 the Emperor appointed Ghulam Muhiy-u'd-din Khan, after the death of his father Asad Quli Khan, as the *faujdar* of Junagadh. But he remained at the court and nominated Mir Isma'il Khan as his deputy; and the *sanad* to that effect was sent in his name from Delhi. Later, Ghulam Muhiy-u'd-din was transferred to Sorath. When he died in 1732 at Delhi, his brother Mir Hazbar Khan succeeded him in that office. Again, after the death of Karim Dad Khan the Emperor made his son, Muhammad Pahar, *faujdar* of Palampur, the post formerly held by his father.<sup>5</sup>

A *chakla* comprising more than one district usually formed the jurisdiction of the *faujdar* in the northern provinces of the Mughal Empire. Hashmat Khan held the *faujdar* of *chakla* Bareilly and Khair Andesh Khan the *faujdar* of *chakla* Sikandrabad.<sup>6</sup> In Gujarat a *faujdar* could be

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cultivation ; (2) to examine the condition of peasants ; (3) to compare the revenue-rates which prevailed during the last ten years ; (4) to prepare a detailed account of assessed revenue for the whole *fasli* year ; (5) to increase the area of cultivation, to assist the cultivators financially and to put oppression and injustice against peasants to an end. For a detailed discussion of his powers and duties, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*, 288-290 ; *Siyaq Namah*, *op. cit.*, ff. 22,23 ; *Farhang-i Kardani*, ff. 24,29,34 ; *Khulasat-us Siyaq*, f. 11.

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 41.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, f. 380b.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, f. 379a.

<sup>4</sup> *The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad*, 306, 307.

<sup>5</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 117, 133, 163, 184.

<sup>6</sup> *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. 16a; *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 75.

placed in charge of one or more *parganas*. Saiyid 'Aqil Khan occupied the office of *faujdar* of *pargana* Idr; Nahir Khan held the *faujdar* of *parganas* Petlad and Dholqa. Saiyid 'Azmat-ullah Khan was the *faujdar* of Godhra and Tehsra.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the territorial jurisdiction of a *faujdar* was distinct from other administrative or fiscal divisions, and it varied in size from place to place.<sup>2</sup> What determined the extent of *faujdar's* jurisdiction was, in the words of Ghulam Husain, the number of refractory *zamindars*, living in one particular area. It implies that the territory in which the *zamindars* were numerous and as well as disobedient was separately constituted and placed for its efficient management under the charge of a *faujdar*. The province of Bihar had eight *faujdar* divisions where *faujdar*s were appointed by the centre, namely, *sarkar* Shahabad, Rohtas, Bihar, Monghyr, Champaran, Saran, Tirhut and Hajipur.<sup>3</sup> On the same principle the province of Bengal had been divided into ten *faujdar* divisions: Islamabad (Chittagong), Sylhet, Rangpur, Rangamati, Jalalgadh, Purnea, Rajshahi, Burdwan, Mednipur (Midnapore) and Hugli Dacca was under the jurisdiction of the Nazim who took direct interest in its administration.<sup>4</sup>

The *faujdar*s held *mansabs* which generally ranged from one thousand *zat* to four thousand *zat*; some of them received royal gifts of '*alam* and *naqqara* (standard and kettledrum). The civil officers of a district engaged in the revenue administration were under the direct orders of the provincial *diwan*; while *mansabdars*, *bakhshis* in the army and *thanedars* worked under the superintendence of the *faujdar*s. No government officer employed in the district could be dismissed by the *faujdar*. The military force that a *faujdar* usually maintained ranged from 500 to 2,000 cavalry. They were all under the service of the central government. In the past, the *faujdar*s and other public officers served the imperial cause with courage and devotion; any one who disobeyed the royal commands and misused his power was severely punished.<sup>5</sup> The *thanedars* in the district of Murshidabad were duty bound to report to the *faujdar* whatever happened within the jurisdiction of their *thanas*. The *faujdar* supplied this information to the governor who took decision on its basis and issued orders to the *faujdar* for execution. The governor, in consultation with *qazi* and *mufti*, decided criminal cases relating to murder, compensation and robbery; the *faujdar* issued and enforced the law decrees passed by the governor. The

<sup>1</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 48.

<sup>2</sup> For the *faujdar* jurisdiction in Baiswara, *vide* Zahiruddin Malik, "Problems of Faujdari Jurisdiction in Baiswara", *Indian History Congress*, Chandigarh Session, 1971,

<sup>3</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 409, 410.

<sup>4</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 410.

<sup>5</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 140.

matters pertaining to the *faujdar* of *pargana* Asadnagar were dealt in accordance with instructions received from the governor.<sup>1</sup>

In the frontier districts of Bengal and Bihar, the *faujdar*s levied enhancements on the original *jama'* of the lands, in places which had been imperfectly conquered and partially assessed. This additional amount of levy, collected either from the *zamindars* or *ra'i'yats* in the frontier *faujdar*i districts under the authority delegated by the governor, was called *kaffayat* or profits. It was applicable only to *khalisa* territory, and was to be distinguished from the *taufir* or increased revenue from *jagir* areas.<sup>2</sup> Rangpur, the frontier *Sirkar* of Kuch Bihar, was famous for its tobacco ; it was under the charge of a district *faujdar* and the revenue derived from this source had been increased under the head of *kaffayat*. 'Aliwardi Khan had placed the administration of this important charge in the hands of his nephew, Sa'id Ahmad Khan. His second nephew was the *faujdar* of Rangmahal, a frontier to the *subah* of Bengal commanding the formerly important passes of Sikligarhi and Taliagarhi between the western hills of the Ganges. The district of Sylhet, in the eastern extremity of Bengal, was far remote from the seat of government and its *faujdar* exercised unlimited powers, but his charge was difficult in the sense that he had to keep under control not only independent chiefs but many warlike tribes.<sup>3</sup> The *faujdar*s of distant frontier districts levied imposts under the head of *faujdar*i *abwab* in areas under their jurisdiction. Apparently they were ment to defray the expenses of the *faujdar*s and their establishment; these cesses were imposed on the *ra'i'yats* and were permanent assessments. The total amount of *faujdar*i *abwab* realised in the times of Shuja'-u'd-din Khan was Rs. 7,90,638.<sup>4</sup> From a perusal of the Jaipur records it appears that in the province of Agra there was a special perquisite called *peshkash-i faujdar*i realised from the *jagirdars*. Raja Jai Singh Sawai assigned a *jagir* to Hakim Mashi-uz-zaman in the *pargana haveli* of Akhbarabad and directed the local officer that the assignee was exempted from the payment of *peshkash-i faujdar*i.<sup>5</sup>

The growing weakness of the central government encouraged the *faujdar*s to gather all powers into their hands and compel the people to submit to their decisions. Particularly in the provinces of Malwa and Gujarat, which were torn asunder by civil wars and external invasions, the *faujdar*s found ample scope to strengthen their position by imposing illegal cesses and forcibly taking possession of lands held by small *jagirdars* and *zamindars*.

<sup>1</sup> *Persian Revenue Records of Bengal*, f. 65a.

<sup>2</sup> *The Fifth Report*, II, 231, 283.

<sup>3</sup> *The Fifth Report*, II, 233, 234, 272, 276.

<sup>4</sup> *The Fifth Report*, II, 210.

<sup>5</sup> *Akhbarat-i Darbar-i Muallah*, II, 77, 95, 101.

When reports of wilful acts of injustice and oppression, committed by *faujdar*s, reached the royal court, the Emperor took stern action against them. But the ultimate responsibility of affording protection from the oppression of these officers fell on the governors. The contemporary evidence shows that strong governors—Nizam-ul Mulk, ‘Aliwardi Khan, Sa‘adat Khan and Zakariya Khan—tried to check and control the *faujdar*s in the exercise of their powers, and conspicuous success attended their efforts in quite a large number of instances. The source of evil was the military power which the *faujdar*s possessed and inevitably abused for aggrandisement in areas where the authority of government had relaxed. The small *jagirdars* and ‘*amils*’ divested of such military power, were helpless to defend their rights and privileges. In one of his letters Nizam-ul Mulk wrote :

The fact is this that *faujdar*s exploit the produce of lands held by small *jagirdars*, and no money is received by them. Possessing no military force, these *jagirdars* appeal for the *sanad* of *faujdari*, so that they may be relieved from the oppression of the *faujdar*s. Their ‘*amils*’ (agents) have no sufficient strength to suppress the malefactors; consequently the entire produce of their lands is wasted. The basis of *faujdari* rests on the principle that military force under the command of *faujdar* should be made available to the *mansabdars* for the defence of their *jagir* areas. The *faujdar* should keep the *zamindars* under constant vigilance, supervise the management of small *jagirs* and chastise the disturbers of peace. But the *faujdar*s are not performing these functions; they are merely concerned with their own profits, thinking that next day they will be transferred. Whatever comes into their hands they grasp and keep it for their own use.<sup>1</sup>

Some instances of the *faujdar*’s high-handed policies and the action taken by the government against them are given below :

1. A *hasb-ul-hukm* bearing the seal of Khan-i Dauran was issued to the effect that reports about the destruction of villages by Hashdar Khan, *faujdar* of Kotri were received at the court. The Emperor ordered the dismissal of the oppressive *faujdar* and appointed Rup Ram with instructions to go himself or send his deputy to take charge of the office and send the dismissed *faujdar* by any means to the royal court.<sup>2</sup>
2. Khandi Rai wrote to Jai Singh Sawai, “In Narwar big Rajputs reside;

<sup>1</sup> *Munsha‘at-i Mausavi Khan*, f. 66a.

<sup>2</sup> *Jaipur Records*, Sarkar’s Collections, Vol. 12, 213 (1727).



they are loyal and obedient to you. Saiyid Najm-u'd-din 'Ali Khan has been appointed *faujdar* of Gwalior, Ranod, Shahabad and Chamoni. The *zamindars* of these places did not acknowledge his authority, as they wanted some one belonging to their own class to be the *faujdar* of this area. The Saiyid has plans to bring all *jagirs* under contribution. . . . It is requested that you should try to safeguard our interests and urge Khan-i Dauran to prevent the Saiyid from oppressing us."<sup>1</sup>

It was again reported to Raja Jai Singh Sawai by his *wakil* that Saiyid Najm-u'd-din 'Ali Khan was molesting the *zamindars*. "He had resumed the *zamindari* of the former *zamindars* and granted the rights to new men of his choice. The displaced *zamindars* were planning to fight with the *faujdar*; while their ladies were contemplating to perform *jauhar*. The *faujdar* was, in fact, very strict and harsh in his dealings with the local *zamindars* and persons of importance."<sup>2</sup>

Sarbuland Khan, governor of Gujarat, dismissed Muhammad Iraj, *faujdar* of Dholqa on complaints brought by *muqqadams* and *desais* against him.<sup>3</sup>

Some *faujders* secured their appointments by making speculative offers of lump sums of revenue which they pledged to deposit after collecting the revenues from the district placed under his charge. In 1740 Qasim 'Ali Khan, for instance, gave a written undertaking to remit Rs. 3,36,000 at the time of his appointment to the *faujdari* of Rangpur district. This arrangement remained unchanged till 1758.<sup>4</sup> Several *faujders* in Gujarat held *parganas* in *ijarah*, with responsibility to pay the fixed revenue to the government. Jawan Mard Khan Babi held the *parganas* of Kari and Bijapur in *ijarah*. The *parganas* of Mandu and Arhar Matar were given to Safdar Khan Babi in *ijarah* by the governor. In 1741 Jawan Mard Khan held the *pargana* of Petlad in *ijarah*. The assessment and collection of revenues in the *pargana haveli* Ahmadabad was the additional charge of 'Ali Muhammad who occupied the post *faujdar gard*.<sup>5</sup> Thus the *faujdar* was also connected with the business of revenue administration.

<sup>1</sup> Jaipur Records, III, Part No. 5, 25, 26, dated 11 November 1727.

<sup>2</sup> Jaipur Records, III, Part No. 5, dated 11 November 1727.

<sup>3</sup> Mir'at-i Ahmadi, II, 94.

<sup>4</sup> Fifth Report, I, XXXIII.

<sup>5</sup> Mir'at-i Ahmadi, Supplement, English Trans., 186, 190, 195. The *faujdar gard* was appointed for the suburbs and the administration of places near the cities. He received a salary upto the amount of Rs. 20,000. He kept ready 500 horse, either as a regular force or from his retinue; half of the cavalry was utilized for the purpose of patrols, and the rest stationed at the redoubt in the suburbs. The villages of the *haveli pargana* had 32 *thanas* to safeguard the roads and punish malefactors. 165-166.

The changes introduced in the administrative set-up of *Sarkar* Benaras, a *faujdar* jurisdiction, provides an important example of government's incapacity to directly administer its territories and secure the collection of revenues from them. In the early years of Muhammad Shah's reign, Murtaza Khan was appointed *faujdar*<sup>1</sup> of *Sarkar* Benaras which comprised, besides Jaunpur, Ghazipur and Chunargarh, the districts of Azamgarh, Ballia and eastern part of Mirzapur. He engaged to pay annually a stipulated amount of revenue and supply, in addition, special variety of costly clothes to the royal court. The government posted in Benaras a *sazawal*, named Nand Kumar Khatri, to supervise the production of required goods and their despatch to Delhi. On the proposal of Murtaza Khan, the Emperor appointed Rustum 'Ali, deputy-*faujdar* to assist him in the discharge of his duties. Rustum 'Ali executed a contract to pay the *faujdar* an annual sum of Rs. 5 lakhs and keep the surplus for himself.<sup>2</sup> About this time Sa'adat Khan was establishing his power in Awadh by suppressing the local *zamindars* and gaining possession of *jagirs* alienated by small *mansabdars*. Apprehending danger from him, Murtaza Khan had recourse to the expediency of forming a settlement of land revenue with the governor in 1728. According to its terms, the *faujdar* farmed out on lease the revenues of the extensive territory to Sa'adat Khan who bound himself to pay him Rs. 7 lakhs per annum. The governor led a punitive expedition against Mahabat Khan, a hereditary chief of Azamgarh; he defeated and imprisoned the *zamindar* and installed his son Iradat Khan in the *ta'aluqa*.<sup>3</sup>

When *Safdar Jang* took up his duties as governor of Awadh in 1738, during the absence of Sa'adat Khan, he found the existing arrangement ill-equipped to deal with the violence and lawlessness prevailing in Benares, the effects of which offset the efforts of revenue officers in the realisation of dues. To him the source of evil, from which all troubles sprang, was the vastness of territory; this evil was aggravated by the indolence and incompetence of Rustam 'Ali. The governor dismissed the deputy-*faujdar* and divided the large tract of land into two units. The charge of three divisions—Jaunpur, Ghazipur and Chunargarh—was given to Mansa Ram<sup>4</sup> for an annual revenue of Rs. 13 lakhs; the administration of the

<sup>1</sup> The author of *Balwant Namah* has stated that Murtaza Khan was appointed *jagirdar* of the vast territory. But this is not borne out by the above facts. *Balwant Namah*, B.M. MS. 1847, and *Taufah-i Tazah*, I.O. MS. 3894 are two different works written by the same author.

<sup>2</sup> Ghulam Husain bin Himmat Khan, *Zikr-us Siyar*, Ethe, 429, f. 92, I.O.MS. 3978, B.M. MS. 6652, f. 6; *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. 15b.

<sup>3</sup> *Zikr-us Siyar*, ff. 92-94; *Balwant Namah*, 9; *Taufah-i Tazah*, f. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Mansa Ram, a Buniyar Brahman of Gautam subcaste, first took service under

remaining districts was placed in the hands of Shaikh 'Abdullah for Rs. 3 lakhs. However, Mansa Ram was vested neither with the superintendence of police and mint in Benares nor control over the fortress in Jaunpur. After his death, the governor of Awadh confirmed his son Balwant Singh in the possession of the above mentioned divisions. Balwant Singh sent a tribute of Rs. 31,775 to the Mughal Emperor who bestowed upon him the title of Raja and *zamindar* of certain *parganas* in Benares.<sup>1</sup>

There were *faujdar*s who maintained standards of discipline and efficiency in the local administration, strove manfully to defend the imperial dominion from invaders and rebels, and devoted attention to the promotion of agriculture. Yar Muhammad Khan, son of Dost Muhammad Khan, *faujdar* and *qila'adar* of Bhopal, established law and order and saved the life and property of people from the danger of Maratha invasions by paying *chauth* regularly. Muhammad Shah bestowed on him the *mansab* of 5,000/5,000 and the honours of *mahi-o-maratib*.<sup>2</sup> In 20 regnal year, Hidayat-ullah Khan, son of Jamal-ullah Khan, *faujdar* of Sambhar, defeated Bharat Singh, a local *zamindar* who had brought a force of 8,000 *rajputs* against him.<sup>3</sup> In 22 regnal year the *jats* of Maheyan rose in revolt against the *faujdar* of Firozabad; they defeated and killed him and stirred trouble in the *parganas*. The leader of the *jats*, Wantar Shah, assembled an army of 5 thousand and created disorders everywhere. However, 'Azim-ullah Khan, sent by the Emperor at the head of 6,000 cavalry, defeated and killed the *jat* chief.<sup>4</sup> Sabit Khan, *faujdar* of Kol, was a brave, able and generous officer. He followed a strong and vigorous policy against the rebels and *zamindars*, and held the reins of administration firmly to the end of his life. He maintained strict discipline in the army; he prescribed a white uniform, consisting of trousers and long coat, for his soldiers. He distributed Rs. 1,200 every day among the poor and needy; and thousands of people received cooked food from his kitchen. He held the *mansab* of 7,000/7,000. He died in 1731 at the age of 60.<sup>5</sup>

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Rustam 'Ali as an ordinary servant. By artful flattery as well as practical capacity Mansa Ram won the confidence of the deputy-*faujdar* and became virtually supreme in the administrative affairs. For details of his early career, *Zikr-us-Siyar*, ff. 92-106.

<sup>1</sup> *Zikr-us Siyar*, ff. 110-117.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 549-553.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 546.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 558.

<sup>5</sup> *Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, f. 75a ; *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 521-522; *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 75,

**TABLE X**  
**FAUJDARS OF SOME IMPORTANT PLACES**

Name of Place	Faujdar	References
1. Attok	Muhammad Ja'afar, alias 'Aqidat Khan, son of Amir Khan.	<i>Tarikh-i Muhammadi</i> , 117.
2. Ahmadnagar	Faiyaz Khan.	<i>Mir'at-i Ahmadi</i> , II, 38.
3. Baroda	Saiyid Rustam 'Ali Khan Bahadur Raza Quli Khan Husain-u'd-din Khan Sadru'd-din Muhammad Khan Mir 'Azmat-ullah Khan Sardar Muhammad Khan	<i>Mir'at-i Ahmadi</i> , II, 37, 93, 96, 133.
4. Barielly	Khair Andesh Khan.	<i>Kamwar</i> , f. 376.
5. Benares	Murtaza Khan	<i>Tarikh-i Shakir Khani</i> , f. 15b.
6. Bhagalpur	Haji Ahmad	
7. Doraha (Malwa)	Ruh-ullah Khan	<i>Kamwar</i> , f. 377b.
8. Dholqa	Qa'im Khan	<i>Mir'at-i Ahmadi</i> , II, 246.
9. Delhi	Fakhr-u'd-din, Marahmat Khan, Faujdar Khan Billoch	<i>Kamwar</i> , f. 376.
10. Etawah	Mehta Sadanand Muhammad Khan Bangash Raja Jai Singh Sawai	<i>Tarikh-i Muhammadi</i> , 94 ; <i>The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad</i> , 349.
11. Godhra, Thasra	Saiyid Ghulam Husain Khan, Saiyid Aqil Khan, Mutawwasil Khan	<i>Mir'at-i Ahmadi</i> , II, 44, 83, 112.
12. Gwalior	Saiyid Najm-u'd-din 'Ali Khan	
13. Hugli	Saeed Ahmad, Shuja Quli Khan, Ehsan-ullah Khan	<i>Riaz-us Salatin</i> , 294.
14. Hijli	Mir Ja'afar	
15. Jaunpur	Girdhar Bahadur	<i>Kamwar</i> , f. 377.
16. Cuttack	Shaikh Hidayat-ullah	
17. Kara Manikpur	Jan Nisar Khan, Sa'adat Khan, Baqa-ullah Khan bin Muhammad Khan	<i>Ashub</i> , f. 102. <i>Tarikh-i Muhammadi</i> , 94.
18. Kari	Khuda Yar Khan, Abdur Rahman Bhai	<i>Mir'at-i Ahmadi</i> , II, 93.
19. Kala Bagh	Muhammad 'Umar Khan	<i>'Aja'ib-ul Afaq</i> , f. 41b.
20. Midnapur	Mir Ja'afar 'Ali Quli Khan	
21. Mondah	Ram Rai Shujaat, Khan	<i>Mir'at-i Ahmadi</i> , II, 38, 55.
22. Moradabad	Muhammad Amin Khan, Qamr-u'd-din Khan, Rao Harnand (deputy-faujdar), Shaikh 'Azmat-ullah Khan (deputy-faujdar)	<i>Tarikh-i Hindi</i> , 502.
23. Mewat	Saiyid Nusrat Yar Khan, Bayazid Khan	<i>Kamwar</i> , ff. 374, 377.
24. Pattan	Jawan Mard Khan	<i>Mir'at-i Ahmadi</i> , II, 93.

25.	Narnol	Nahir Khan	<i>Ashub</i> , f. 89a.
26.	Panipat	Samandar Khan Bhupat Ram	<i>Kamwar</i> , f. 376.
27.	Rangpur	Qasim 'Ali Khan	
28.	Rohtas	Hamid-u'd-din 'Ali Khan	<i>Kamwar</i> , f. 378.
29.	Rodhanpur	Jawan Mard Khan Muhammad Anwar	<i>Mir'at-i Ahmadi</i> , II, 81, 107.
30.	Palanpur	Karim Dad Khan	<i>Mir'at-i Ahmadi</i> , II, 119, 133.
31.	Saharanpur	Hashmat Khan, Shahamat Khan, Hafiz-ullah Khan Qa'im Khan	<i>Tarikh-i Shakir Khani</i> , f. 16. <i>Kamwar</i> , ff. 369, 377.
32.	Sambhar	Momin Khan	<i>Kamwar</i> , f. 377.
33.	Sikandrabad	'Ali Asghar Khan, Nami Khan, Sabit Khan, Khwaja Abdur Rahim Khan	<i>Kamwar</i> , f. 376, 378.
34.	Sirhind	Qamr-u'd-din Khan	
35.	Rajmahal	'Ata-ullah Khan Zain-u'd- din Khan	

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## CHAPTER SEVEN

# CULTURAL SCENE OF THE PERIOD

During the eighteenth century the Mughal Empire disintegrated and its whole administrative structure collapsed; yet, paradoxically, the Mughal culture attained its most fully developed form and continued to exercise a great shaping influence on the texture of society for a long time. The kings and ministers failed to gain military success against their enemies and sustain the decaying administrative institutions. They, nevertheless, continued to patronize liberally the artists and men of learning whose splendid accomplishments in a way counterbalanced these serious military setbacks and other failures. The royal court that was often the scene of faction-fights radiated its civilizing influence across the political landscape of the country and gave a unifying moral vision to those who were associated with its multifarious functions. It was instrumental in fostering an unprecedented expansion of art, literature, philosophy and science. The major corpus of contemporary writings consisted of *diwans*, *masnavis*, *tazkirahs* and *malfuzats*. The Mughal nobles, governors and local chieftains were primarily moved by the ambition of gaining political power, but they also combined the life of court and camp with a passion for intellectual pursuits—for poetry, music, philosophy and science. Their interest in creative activities was not merely a compensation for the experience of defeat, and despondency in the political context. More positively they aimed at seeing the fulfilment of their aesthetic impulses even in the midst of the humdrum of their busy life. While political developments took their own course the poets, scholars and artists remained engaged, serene and undisturbed, in extending the frontiers of knowledge, reflecting the aims and aspirations of the common people, and cherishing such values and ideals as were likely to transfigure their life and being. Poetry flourished among all classes and its cultivation became a cohesive force for members of the upper strata of society in particular. During this period the later Indian pictorial art that reflected the splendour of the 17th

century reached its zenith.<sup>1</sup> At the same time there emerged religious and mystic movements which contributed to the moral transformation of society and growth of a cosmopolitan outlook among the people. Nadir Shah was so deeply impressed by the elegant arts of India that he chose to take with him a number of artists, musicians, dancing girls, physicians and architects. When the political power of the Mughals came to an end, these artists, poets and scholars flocked to the princely courts and got warm reception there. The chieftains and governors patronized these artists who added brilliance to their courts which in the late 18th century became centres of culture and civilization. The leaven of Mughal culture penetrated widely, affecting the social institutions and giving a new direction to the intellectual and aesthetic outlook of the people. The Marathas who had ousted the Mughals from their former position of supremacy adopted not merely their political and administrative machinery but also the paraphernalia of their cultural life.

Foremost among the features of this culture was the great synthesis which incorporated the contents of Hindu and Muslim systems of thought. It was the product of mutual interaction of the two communities in the spheres of social life, art, literature and religion. Muslim rulers, artists, saints and poets articulated their preference for things Indian, and made conscious efforts to absorb many elements from the Hindu ideals and philosophical doctrines; these efforts were reciprocated to a remarkable degree by Hindu thinkers and artists. Thus began the process of assimilation, and traits of the two cultures having distinctive characteristics and an historically independent existence merged and became inextricable during the process of history. "The history of Indian culture shows continuous reciprocity of feeling and solidarity of sentiment between the masses no less than the classes of the two communities."<sup>2</sup> The Muslims of India, who were assimilated into the vast cultural complex of the country, adopted native languages for common use and in day-to-day life, though Persian remained the literary and official language till such time as it was dethroned by Urdu. They learnt Hindi dialects, like Braja Bhasha and

<sup>1</sup> H. Goetz, *The Crisis of Indian Civilization in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, Calcutta, 1938, 17. The author writes :

Embodied sentiment, love, romance, music in an unreal atmosphere pregnant with never-heard excitements of the senses, of the soul-loving mistresses and swains, gods and goddesses of the musical modes, sentimental *zanana* girls and fairy tales, the tragic story of Rupmati and Bazbahadur, etc. in quiet gardens and unreal forests, at the golden set of the sun or at the light or torches of the moon, full of sympathetic life of the tame or wild beasts and birds. . . .

<sup>2</sup> Shafa'at Ahmed Khan, Foreword to S. J. Atulavanda Chakravarti's *Hindus and Musalmans of India*, xvi.

Awadhi, and their poets, saints and artists used them in expressing their ideas and feelings. "The devotional character of Hindi songs and the appeal which the language made to the *sufis* brought Hindus and Muslims closer together than any other influence."<sup>1</sup> The Muslims also took a prominent part in the development of regional languages and literatures such as Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati and Sindhi. Some Hindu communities—the Kayasthas, Khatries, Pandits of Kashmir and Amils of Sindh—took up the study of Persian language seriously and by their profuse writings enriched it, giving a new direction to the literary and cultural activities of the age. The growth of Urdu which took place during the long span of time—from the 13th to the 18th centuries—represents a process of linguistic and cultural synthesis, an admixture of Hindi grammar, Persian script and Arabic-Persian vocabulary. The language grew into a rich and effective medium of expression for values and concepts common to both Hindus and Muslims. In the domain of art heterogenous items took a more and more congruous shape, making its landscape pleasant and beautiful.<sup>2</sup> Thus, "an endless process of absorption, assimilation and adjustment of diverse elements and tendencies has gone for centuries giving shape and complexion to the cultural tradition of India."<sup>3</sup>

The spread of Mughal civilization followed in the wake of the establishment of their political ascendancy, and the two movements which derived strength from each other were sustained in a large measure on the secular policies followed by the Emperors in matters of religion and state administration. The Mughal Emperors exhibited tolerance in dealing with religious faiths prevalent in the country and admitted into government men of different races and creeds on the basis of sheer merit. Their policies were determined by political needs rather than religious considerations. But freedom in religious matters alone, divorced from political and economic privileges, could not make people loyal to the crown and could not promote harmony and concord between the various sections of society. People, who did not share the faith of their rulers, yet enjoyed political

<sup>1</sup> Professor M. Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, 166, 167, 170, 171.

<sup>2</sup> Beni Prashad, *Hindu-Muslim Question*, Allahabad, 1941, 11. The author writes :

Medieval Indian architecture represents an organic fusion of indigenous and Saracenic motives and styles and derives from it qualities of strength and grace. Painting, another of the great modes of the expression of a people's soul, developed from the 16th century onwards in common schools at the hands of Hindu and Muslim masters and became truly Indian. Styles of music and dance became and have remained absolutely common. In all these spheres there emerged by the 18th century a solid and permanent achievement, basically Indian, strictly speaking neither Hindu nor Muslim in technique.

<sup>3</sup> Presidential Address by Prof. K.A. Nizami, *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, Allahabad, 1965, 141.



status and economic security which their ability had ensured for them. Eclectic liberalism of the kings combined with mutual respect shown by the people for each other's religion led to the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the growth of a common cultural pattern in India.

The brilliance of Mughal culture, as described in non-political sources of information, stands out sharply against the background of political turmoil and the gloom and depression caused by it. Thus every estimate of Muhammad Shah's reign will remain incomplete unless it takes into account the aesthetic and artistic attainments of his times. But a full discussion of this historical phenomenon is difficult here as it requires a comprehensive survey of regional cultures which flourished at that time. However, for the purpose of the present study it is necessary to determine its main outlines and confine ourselves to the imperial court and the city of Delhi. This may serve as a sample to understand the patterns of culture prevailing in other capital cities—Hyderabad, Lucknow, Murshidabad, Lahore, Jaipur and Ahmedabad. The Mughal culture that developed in urban areas and centres of education pertained only to the upper and middle classes of society; it scarcely affected the mass of population living in far-off villages that continued to uphold the fundamental basis of the old socio-economic structure. Yet, it was the 'elite' class in the society concerned with changes in politics as well as the development of arts, science and philosophy which contributed to the advancement and transmission of higher levels of culture during the medieval times.<sup>1</sup> In describing the cultural milieu of the period special attention may be given to the intellectual, aesthetic and moral-religious aspiration of the elite and the position they occupied in society. This chapter further attempts to examine aspects of social life, Hindu-Muslim relations, religious movements and growth of Urdu literature.

### *Hindu-Muslim Relations*

It is true that doctrinal and ritualistic differences, which in a way were fundamental and irreconcilable, had set Hindus and Muslims sharply apart, giving rise to great diversity of social and religious organizations among them. Yet, there lay beneath the outward forms of belief and worship a certain broad unity in their thinking and attitude towards the higher ideals of religion; and in spite of the tensions in their relationship, Hindus and Muslims lived amicably throughout the chequered epochs of Indian history. They both subscribed to the universal faith in God which is the foundation of all religions. Apart from this basic doctrine, the concepts of life after

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Mauhiem, *Man and Society*, 81-82.

death, the immortality of soul, faith in moral values and transient character of the mundane world were common to Hindus and Muslims alike.<sup>1</sup> Amid turbulent currents of politics the religious thinkers and sages preached the gospel of unity of religions, denounced antagonisms of class interests, and stressed the need of peaceful co-existence among communities professing divergent creeds. They strenuously worked to build bridges across the two communities on the higher plane of spiritual life, and prepare the way to the ultimate goal towards which the two ideals were directed.

Some Muslim saints, particularly belonging to the *Shattari* order had borrowed many elements directly from *Yoga* and other forms of Hindu mysticism. Saiyid Muhammad Ghaus, a famous Shattari saint of the 16th century, had imbibed the Hindu mystic notions and *Tantric* ideas and applied them to the spiritual practices of his order. He had carefully studied the Hindu mystic system and translated *Amrit Kund* into Persian under the title of *Bahr-ul Hayat*.<sup>2</sup> Shaikh Nizam-u'd-din Aulia, the brightest luminary of the *Chisti* order in the 13th century, was the symbol of catholicity and humanitarianism. He emphasized the service of humanity as a true means to achieve spiritual salvation as well as worldly happiness.<sup>3</sup> The keynote of his philosophy was tolerance towards all creeds and faiths; as he once stated, "Every people has its Path, its Religion and its Temple." Commenting on this statement Professor Mohammed Habib writes:

This indeed, was the basis of our religious compromise in the Middle Ages, a compromise sanctioned by the greatest thinkers, scholars and statesmen of India. Underlying all our disagreement was an agreement to differ. For each of us his own creed was the most legitimate and the best.<sup>4</sup>

Amir Khusrau (1255-1325) discovered similarities in the prevailing systems of thought and belief. He wrote: <sup>5</sup>

Though Hindu is not a believer like me;  
he nevertheless believes in many things which I believe.

<sup>1</sup> Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided*, 30.

<sup>2</sup> K.A. Nizami, "The Shattari Saints and Their Attitude Towards the State", *Medieval India Quarterly*, 1958-59.

<sup>3</sup> K.A. Nizami, *Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India during the thirteenth century*, 1961, 236.

<sup>4</sup> M. Habib, *Politics and Society during the Early Medieval Period*, 1, 23.

<sup>5</sup> *Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India during the thirteenth century*, 1961, 236.

This potential universality of thought provided a pattern of common belief and created an atmosphere uniquely favourable for the development of a common culture. The Bhakti Movement, influenced by Islam's monotheistic egalitarianism, swept across the northern India in the 14th and 15th centuries. Its champions—Ramanand, Chaitanya, Dadu, Kabir and Nanak—based their philosophy on the principles of devotion to God, consecration of life and brotherhood of man. They held that all religions, stripped of ritualistic trappings, were same in essence. By refuting caste distinction and supremacy of the priests, these reformers opened the portals of the city of God to all men, the humble and the highly placed. Their message of mutual love and individual piety touched the deepest chord in the hearts of the masses and aroused thoughts of self-respect and self-betterment among them. The translation of Sanskrit and Hindi works into Persian, undertaken in the reign of Akbar, encouraged a systematic study of Hindu religion and philosophy by the Muslim scholars. They were now able to understand the correct import and significance of *Vedant* and *Yoga* and interpreted metaphysical aspects of Hindu faith with deeper insight. These liberal trends of thought are manifest in the writings of Abul Fazal who endeavoured to bring about a religious synthesis in that period. He wrote:

But have the religious and worldly tendencies of men no common ground? Is there not everywhere the same enrapturing beauty which beams forth from so many thousand hidden places? Broad indeed is the carpet which God has spread, and the beautiful colours which He has given it;

The inscription which he wrote for a temple in Kashmir begins with following lines:<sup>1</sup>

O God in every temple I see people that seek thee, and in every language I hear spoken, people praise thee, Polytheism and Islam feel after thee, Each religion says, "Thou art one, without equal."

Among the Muslim saints and thinkers of the 17th century who made a distinctive contribution to the advancement of speculative mysticism and theosophic-religious thought the most prominent were Mian Mir (1550-1635), Shaikh Muhibb-ullah (1587-1648), Dara Shikoh (1615-59) and Sarmad (d. 1660-61). They were ardent advocates of the doctrine of *Wahdat-ul Wajud* (unityism) propounded by Ibn-ul 'Arabi (1165-1240), and

<sup>1</sup> H. Blochmann, *A'in-i Akbari*, Preface, LV.

they held the love of God as supreme and *sumum bonum* for the seekers after Truth. They opposed religious bigotry and fanaticism and stressed the fundamental equality of all religions. They tried to reconcile Hinduism and Islam and establish relations of mutual respect and regard between the followers of the two rival faiths.<sup>1</sup> According to the authentic Sikh tradition Mian Mir, on the invitation of Guru Arjun, took part in the foundation-ceremony of the Golden Temple at Amritsar. These trends towards liberalism and eclecticism continued to influence the emotion and intellectual mainsprings of society in the 18th century, effecting a new secular orientation on social and religious matters. There arose among the Hindus and the Muslims a number of reformers who enjoined love and worship of one God, urged men to subordinate ritual to devotion, emphasized service of humanity as one of the main objectives of religion, and sincerely worked to narrow down the gulf that separated the Hindus from the Muslims.

Mirza Mazhar Jan-i Janan,<sup>2</sup> a Naqshbandi saint of the 18th century, had studied Hindu religious literature extensively and came to the conclusion that the *Vedas* were the revealed books, and the Hindus, therefore, possessed the status of *ahl-ul-kitab*. They should not be identified with the *kafirs* of Arabia who, before the advent of Islam, invoked idols as the *via media* between men and God. God also blessed them with prophets and messengers, for, according to the Quran, on every community has been bestowed

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<sup>1</sup> For a study of the philosophy and thought of these thinkers and the main objectives of their movement, the works of Dara Shikoh are most important. Some of them are : *Safinat-ul Auliya*, *Sakinat-ul Auliya*, *Risala Haq Nama*, *Hasanat-ul 'Arifin*, *Majma'-ul Bahrain*, and *Sirri Akbar*. The two modern works on Dara Shikoh are : J.B. Hasrat, *Life and Works of Dara Shikoh*; Qanungo, *Dara Shikoh*. See Tara Chand, "Dara Shikoh and Upanishads," *Islamic Culture*, 1943, XLVII. For Shaikh Muhibb-ullah, vide, *Islamic Culture*, 1973, XLVII, No. 3, 241-256. Arsh Malsiyani, *Naghma-i Sarmad*; Fazl Muhammad Asiri, *Ruba'iyat-i Sarmad*.

<sup>2</sup> Mirza Mazhar was born in 1699, in Kala Bagh in Malwa. His father Mirza Jan was a *mansubdar* in the Mughal government under Aurangzeb. The Emperor, according to the prevailing custom, named the child Jan-i Janan. He was gifted alike with a handsome personality and an outstanding intellect. He received military training along with the conventional education in language, religion, and philosophy. His father died when he was only 16 years old. Mirza Mazhar did not try to obtain a *mansab* or job, throughout his life he remained engaged in the devotion of God and reform of the people. For details of his biography : Maulawi Na'imat-ullah Bahraichi, *Ma'mulat-i Mazhari*, Kanpur, 1275, 11 ; *Kalimat-i Taiyibat*, edited by Maulawi Hafiz Muhammad Fazl-ul Rahman, Delhi, 1309 A.H., 13; Shah Ghulam 'Ali, *Maqamat-i Mazhari*, 15, 16, 18, 33; Azad Bilgrami, *Sarvi Azad*, 231.

its own prophet. Even belief in transmigration of souls did not imply blasphemy. Their faith in the oneness of God, ultimate end of the world and the Day of Resurrection approximated to the tenets of Muslim faith. He found little difference between idol worship and *tasawwar-i-shaikh*, or concentration on the mental image of the preceptor.<sup>1</sup> Shah Waliullah (1703-1761), the most learned theologian of the period, "admitted that the essence of all religions was the same; and all of them enjoined a similar basic code."<sup>2</sup> His son and immediate successor, Shah 'Abdul 'Aziz (1746-1824) studied *Bhagvat Gita* and was profoundly influenced by its philosophy. He regarded Lord Krishna as one of the greatest saints.<sup>3</sup> The *Chishti* mystics of the 18th century also upheld the ideals of tolerance, humanism and equality of religions; they denounced religious exclusiveness and prejudice and tried, by the diffusion among masses of enlightened ideas, to enhance the moral stature of society. They maintained cordial relations with the Hindus and admitted them into their *khanqahs*. Their influence on the social and cultural milieu of the age was considerable.<sup>4</sup>

The Hindu saints and preachers of the 18th century sprang from the lower strata of society and they derived inspiration from the religious philosophy of Kabir, Nanak and other saints of the *Bhakti* cult. Pran Nath, Swami Narayan Singh, Ram Charan, Bulaqi Ram, Aulechand, Balram Hari, Dariya Saheb, Garib Das and Majnu Nanak Shah and a host of others founded new sects in different parts of the country and popularized the ideals of monotheism, religious tolerance and humanism. The whole tenor of their teaching was directed towards weakening the hold of dogma and superstition and establishing the supremacy of liberal thought over the disposition of men. The movement produced results that were conducive to the realisation of religious unity and social integration. These saints received homage from all classes of people, including the Muslims. Muhammad Shah was so much influenced by the piety, selfless devotion and the eclectic views of Swami Narayan Singh that he became his disciple after the invasion of Nadir Shah. The Swami founded Shivanarayan order in 1734 in Delhi. He believed in one God, the Supreme Reality, and admitted persons of different castes and creeds into his fold.<sup>5</sup> Majnu Nanak Shah, a famous saint of Delhi, lived on the bank of Jumna. He attracted a large following of the Hindus and the Muslims, especially the rich among them who offered costly gifts to him.<sup>6</sup> Ram Charan, the founder of *Ram*

<sup>1</sup> *Kalimat-i Taiyibat*, Letter No. 14, 25-27.

<sup>2</sup> *Hujjat-ul Allah-al Baligha*, translated into Urdu by Muhammad Isma'il Godhri, Karachi, 222.

<sup>3</sup> Shaikh Muhammad Ikram, *Rud-i-Kawsir*, 394.

<sup>4</sup> K.A. Nizami, *Tarikh-i Mashaikh-i Chisht*, 348-351, 401, 408.

<sup>5</sup> *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, 206.

<sup>6</sup> Dargah Quli Khan, *Muraqqa-i Delhi*, 23.

*Sanehi* order, opposed idol worship and denounced caste distinctions; the mode of religious service prescribed by him for his followers bore resemblance to that of the Muslims.<sup>1</sup> Aulechand and Balram Hari, founders of *Karta Bhaja* and *Balrami* sects respectively, worked mainly in the district of Nadia for the spiritual and moral uplift of the masses.<sup>2</sup> In Bengal a common god, Satya Pira, was evolved and came to be worshipped by both the Hindus and the Muslims.<sup>3</sup> The Muslim writers of Bengal in the 18th century wrote a number of works in praise of Hindu gods and goddesses.<sup>4</sup>

The most outstanding among the Hindu pantheists was one Pran Nath, the disciple of Deva Chandra, the founder of *Pranami Samprodaya*, a liberal and reformist movement. He wrote *Kulzum Sarup* in Gujarati language, in which he attempted to show that the ideals underlying the two religions were the same and there were marked similarities between the philosophies embodied in the *Quran* and the *Vedas*. He believed in one God; denounced the formalities and superstitions among the Hindus as well as the Muslims; and he condemned caste system and laid stress on the nobility of Karma. Due to his liberal and egalitarian outlook, he had to face stiff opposition from the high-born Hindus and Brahmans. He had acquired great influence over Chhatrasal Bundela. The contemporary Muslim historians call him by the name of Ruhullah and state that he was a popular saint in Bundelkhand. Through his contact with the saint, Raja Chhatrasal developed great regard for Islam and its Prophet in whose praise he recited two couplets every morning after taking bath. According to Murtaza Husain, the *Quran* and the *Puranas* were placed on high chairs on opposite sides in the private chamber of the Raja's palace. On each side there sat Muslim *ulema* and Hindu priests who, in the presence of the Raja, discussed the subject of *tauhid* or unity of God. He lived in Panna till the end of his life. On his death Pran Nath was buried and not cremated.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, these thinkers and preachers attempted to blend together diverse elements embedded in the two religious systems and tried to evolve a common basis for spiritual life and social harmony. Their message of brotherly love and humanitarianism made a wide appeal among the people and set new trends in favour of cultural synthesis and religious tolerance. A

<sup>1</sup> *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, 205.

<sup>2</sup> K. Datta, *Survey of India's Social Life and Economic Condition in the Eighteenth Century*, Calcutta, 1961, 5-6.

<sup>3</sup> *Aliwardi Khan and His Times*, 258.

<sup>4</sup> D.C. Sen, *History of Bengali Language and Literature*, 793.

<sup>5</sup> *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, 199-200; *Hadiqat-ul Aqalim*, 669; *Tarikh-i Farrukhabad*, 54; Bhagwan Swaroop Gupta, *Maharaja Chhatrasal Bundela*, Agra, 1958, 104, 107, 108, 111.

century later, one famous British officer observed in Awadh, "The first thing which strikes any one who enquires into the mutual connexion of the Hindu and Mohammedan inhabitants of Oudh, is the total absence of any jealousy and feuds between the two religions."<sup>1</sup> A classical example of cultural fusion through religious institutions may be chosen from the 'urs ceremonies and other festivals in which crowds of men and women adhering to different faiths took part with pious zeal. Throughout the year, in every city and town the anniversary of one saint or another, was observed at the shrines in which members of all communities without any distinction of caste or creed participated. At the shrines the pious prayed and meditated, the musicians sang devotional songs, the rich distributed money, and the common people tied strings on railings of the grave to invoke the saint's favour for success in their worldly affairs. This was also taken advantage of for purposes of convivial gatherings. Princes and nobles came and pitched their camps outside the shrines, shopkeepers erected their stalls for earning money, and singers and dancers performed their arts. Sometimes, the open space of shrines was used as picnic resorts.<sup>2</sup> Related to 'urs was the festival of *chharis*<sup>3</sup> which was also held in commemoration of saints. Here again the Hindus and the Muslims joined together to celebrate the function and make it a success. Thousands of devotees and spectators followed the *chharis* in streets of the city of Delhi. The *chharis* of Khwaja Mu'in-u'd-din Chishti was raised at the *dargah* of Khwaja Bakhtiyar Kaki and at Huz Shamsi, the *chharis* of Zahir Pir was taken out towards Mewat, the *chharis* of Mas'ud Ghazi towards Bahraich and the *chharis* of Sarwar Sultan towards Lakhi Jungle. The occasion of taking out the *chharis* of Shah Madar was marked by great excitement and rejoicing in the city.<sup>4</sup> The washermen and other persons celebrated the anniversary of Shah Khizr<sup>5</sup> on the bank of Jumna. They made boats of grass and straw and drowned them in the name of the Pir whose spirit was supposed to be ruling over the water. They prepared *dalia* or wheat soup and distributed

<sup>1</sup> C.A. Elliot, *The Chronicles of Oonao*, 85.

<sup>2</sup> For details, Dargah Quli Khan, *Muraqqa'-i Delhi*, 1-8; Bindraban Das Khushgo, ✓ *Safinah-i Khushgo*, Patna, 1959. Zahiruddin Malik, "Some Aspects of Mughal Culture During the First Half of the 18th Century, *Studies in Islam*, Delhi, January, 1965.

<sup>3</sup> *Chhari* or standard was a long pole decorated with fine cloth of different colours, and to which were attached a large number of fans, feathers and cocoa-nuts.

<sup>4</sup> For details, Rai Chatarman, *Chahar Gulshun*, f. 39; Mirza Qatil, *Haft Tamasha*, 87-93.

<sup>5</sup> Murray Titus, *Islam in India and Pakistan*, 146, 149.

it among the beggars.<sup>1</sup> The Muslim sailors of Bengal venerated this saint and invoked his blessings when faced with storms and tides. The Mos of Alwar worshipped the banners of Mas'û Ghazi and Madar Saheb<sup>2</sup>

The Mughal Emperors and nobles took part in Hindu festivals of Dusehra and Holi. Jahandar Shah always witnessed the burning of the effigy of Rawan.<sup>3</sup> The festival of Basant was regularly celebrated at a grand scale at the royal court. It had special attraction for both the Hindus and the Muslims who indulged in merry-making in gardens or shrines. The celebrations which continued for seven days excited mirth for all classes of people and stimulated their cultural contacts.<sup>4</sup> The citizens of Delhi, including *amirs* and rich persons, dressed in costly robes, went to the bank of Jumna where the festivities of Dasehra were held.<sup>5</sup> In other towns and villages the Hindus and the Muslims celebrated this festival according to their traditions and tastes.<sup>6</sup> On the occasion of Diwali the Muslims, particularly of rural areas, illuminated their houses and huts, and freely took part in gambling, an important feature of the festival. The Meos and Minas, living in the states of Alwar and Bharatpur, celebrated not only Diwali and Dasehra but also Janamashtami, the birthday of Shri Krishna.<sup>7</sup> Mir Abdul Hai Taban, a contemporary Urdu poet, composed a poem in his simple and beautiful style, giving an account of the festival Amir Khan celebrated at his own palace.<sup>8</sup> The Nawabs of Bengal and Awadh celebrated this festival in right royal fashion.<sup>9</sup> The fair of Garh Mukhteshwar was an important fair in which thousands of people from Delhi and its suburbs assembled for a dip in the holy Ganges. Muslims in the company of their Hindu friends also visited the fair and enjoyed bathing and other gay scenes<sup>10</sup> Both the Hindus and Muslims took delight in fireworks which formed a part of Shab-i-barat festivities.<sup>11</sup> The Hindus participated in the Muharram, some of them actually observed it by raising *tazias*

<sup>1</sup> *Chahar Gulshan*, f. 39b.

<sup>2</sup> *Bundi State Gazetteer*, 223.

<sup>3</sup> *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, f. 119b.

<sup>4</sup> *Muraqqa'-i Delhi*, 30-33.

<sup>5</sup> *Chahar Gulshan*, f. 39a.

<sup>6</sup> *Haft Tamasha*, 74.

<sup>7</sup> *Haft Tamasha*, 77-78.


<sup>8</sup> *Diwan-i Taban*, edited by Dr. Abdul Haque, Aurangabad, 1935, 267-268.

<sup>9</sup> *Siyar-ul Muta'akhkherin*, II, 821-822.

<sup>10</sup> *Chahar Gulshan*, ff. 37. *Safar Namah-i Anand Ram Mukhlis*, edited by Syed Azhar Ali, Rampur, 1946.

<sup>11</sup> *Later Mughals*, II, 258.





Muhammad Shah entertained by musicians and dancers.

*Courtesy : Kashturbhai Lalbhai, Ahmedabad.*

while others joined the procession. Daulat Ram Sindhia and his officers participated in Muharram procession in green dress like the Muslims.<sup>1</sup>

Many a Hindu tribe—Rajputs, Jats, Gujars, Kolis and Bhils—and professional artisan classes—weavers, cotton-carders, shoe-makers, vegetable-sellers—retained their old exclusiveness even after accepting Islam as their new religion. They continued to follow old Hindu customs in marriages as also rules of inheritance; they worshipped old deities along with the Muslims saints raised to the status of gods. Their social manners and ethos remained unaltered and their tribal restrictions unrelaxed.<sup>2</sup> “The Muslims who settled in the village, became dyed in the same hue. The genius of the Hindu organization obtained hold on their minds.”<sup>3</sup> The Minas worshipped Bhairon, a form of Shiva; the Muslim cultivators of Karnal and Jaora worshipped the old deities and the goddess of small-pox. In Bengal the most popular deity, among both the Hindus and the Muslims, was Devata Maharaj; “his abode and temple consisted of nothing more than a bamboo planted in the ground.” Some Bengali Muslims worshipped the Hindu deity of Baishahari or the snake-goddess.<sup>4</sup> A common god, Satya Pira was evolved and worshipped by the Hindus and the Muslims in Bengal.<sup>5</sup> Professor Mohammed Habib writes:

The mass of Mussalmans being converts from Hinduism, forsook the temple for the mosque but never thought of changing their traditional customs; the prevalence of the ancient customs of Aryavarta among the Indian Mussalmans today is a notorious and undeniable fact.<sup>6</sup>

In the sphere of social relations the Hindus and Muslims exerted deep influence on each other's mode of living and pattern of behaviour. The Muslims learnt and accepted many social practices of the Hindus; while the Hindu social attitudes and norms were influenced by the Muslims egalitarian philosophy. The resultant of this social interaction produced a close identity of approach between the two communities and gave impetus to the growth of a sense of integration in national life. In dress, diet, life styles and ceremonies connected with family institutions, the dividing line between the Hindus and the Muslims of the same social stratum was very thin. Whatever differences in manners and customs were found among them were based on class and regional distinctions and not

<sup>1</sup> S.N. Sen, *Administrative System of the Marathas*, 401.

<sup>2</sup> Risley, *The People of India*, 208.

<sup>3</sup> Tara Chand, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, I, 108.

<sup>4</sup> For details, M. Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, 11, 14, 18, 19.

<sup>5</sup> Aliwardi Khan and His Times, 258.

<sup>6</sup> *Politics and Society During the Early Medieval Period*, 23,

on religious cleavages. A Muslim in the Deccan resembled his Hindu neighbours more closely than his co-religionist either in Punjab or Awadh. The ceremonies associated with child birth—*mundan* or *aqiqa*—or marriage, *mangni*, *mehdi*, *mundwa*, *barat*, *ru-numa'i*, *bidai*, etc. were common to the Hindus and the Muslims. Even some funeral rites like *tija* and *daswan* were observed by both of them.<sup>1</sup>

The spirit of tolerance and mutual goodwill was again reflected in the system of revenue-free grants which the Mughal Emperors and Hindu chiefs gave for the support of religious and educational institutions of both the communities. Muhammad Shah accorded due recognition to the position and status of Hindu shrines and extended vast patronage to the divines. In various documents on *madad-i ma'ash* grants the number of *farmans* and *sanads* issued to Hindu *vairagis*, *sanyasis* and priests as well as for the maintenance of shrines and temples is fairly large. For the purpose of illustration a few examples are given below:

1. Muhammad Shah granted the village of Mustipur Taradih to Mahant Lal Gir, the fourth in succession from the founder, of Bodh Gaya. The income from the *zamindari* area amounted to several lakhs of rupees.<sup>2</sup>

2. The Natha *jogis* of Jakhbar received revenue grants during the reign of Muhammad Shah. A *chaknama*, signed in the presence of a *qazi* in the 14th regnal year, for the demarcation of boundaries of 25 *bighas* of land in the *pargana* Domal of the Doab west Jullandhar, clearly shows that the same land was assigned to the Mahant by way of *madad-i-ma'ash*. Zakariya Khan, by a *sanad* issued in the 17th regnal year, confirmed Mahant Hira Nath in the possession of land in the *pargana* of Narwt, Jakhbar and Pathan on the basis of old imperial *farmans*.<sup>3</sup>

3. One Guru Prashad Daya Ram, a *sanyasi*, complained that *'amilis* of Gach Bairgachhi, Tappa Shahnagar, *pargana* Surajpur interfered with the affairs of the land he held in *madad-i-ma'ash*, dated 18 February 1732. Muhammad Shah issued orders for a proper investigation into the matter and redressal of the grievances of the *faqir*.<sup>4</sup>

Raja Jai Singh Sawai submitted a petition to the imperial court (4 June 1721) that officers of *bait-ul-mal* of *chakla* Barielly confiscated the houses

<sup>1</sup> The contemporary literature, consisting of *divans*, *masnavis* and poems in Urdu and Persian languages is replete with numerous illustrations to support this statement.

<sup>2</sup> *India Divided*, 35.

<sup>3</sup> *The Mughals and the Jogis of Jakhbar*, 36.

<sup>4</sup> *Some Firmans, Sanads and Parwanas*, 81-82.

and goods of some *bairagis* and *mahants* after their death. The Emperor issued a *parwana* to the effect that properties of the deceased *faqirs* should be restored to their lawful heirs and in future they should refrain from molesting the *faqirs*. "The present auspicious reign is the fountain and source of peace and tranquility to all creatures of God. These *faqirs* are the holy recluses who are revered by the Hindus and the Muslims alike; and they form the army of *du'a-goyan*."<sup>1</sup>

4. A *parwana* was issued in the 13th regnal year of Muhammad Shah for the assignment of land in the villages of Chak Barni and Barah Kona, *pargana* Dharampur, in the name of Dharani Barathi, *faqir*, *san-yasi* as *madad-i-ma'ash*.<sup>2</sup>

Najib-u'd Daulah, the Pathan chief, built big houses at Hardwar for the convenience and comfort of the Hindu pilgrims.<sup>3</sup> The Rajput Princes and the Maratha Peshwas also granted lands for the maintenance of Muslim shrines. For instance, Maharaja Ajit Singh assigned the jagir of the village Sarna for the maintenance of the famous *dargah* of Ajmer. Maharaja Jagat Singh of Mewar granted the villages of Rayala, Katdi, Arveta and Kanya for the same *dargah* of Ajmer.<sup>4</sup> Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao assigned 1½ *bigha* of land in *in'am* to Shaikh Daud for the maintenance of a *jama'-masjid* which he had constructed in the village of Mahagin Pakhadi in *pargana* Thana (near Bombay).<sup>5</sup> Shaikh Abu Bakr, *mutawwali* and *pirzada*, a resident of Aland (Maharashtra) visited Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao and petitioned for the grant of land to meet the expenses of the 'urs ceremony at the tomb of Shaikh Hazart Allah Din. The Peshwa assigned four villages with a total income of Rs. 7768-8-2 in *in'am* to him.<sup>6</sup> Peshwa Madhavrao assigned for the repair of shrines of Saiyid Sadat and Shaikh Salla in Poona.<sup>7</sup>

Men of talent and experience among the Hindus had occupied positions of distinction and honour in the various branches of public administration, and as capable and loyal officials they played a conspicuous part in war, diplomacy, court politics and processes of policy-making. They held

<sup>1</sup> *Jaipur Records* (Sitamau Transcripts), Persian Collection.

<sup>2</sup> *Some Firmans, Sanads and Parwanas*, 85, for other grants given to Hindu *faqirs* and priests, 37, 40, 46, 49, 50, 58.

<sup>3</sup> *India Divided*, 35.

<sup>4</sup> *Social Life in Medieval Rajasthan*, 117, 221, 223.

<sup>5</sup> *Selections from the Satara Rajas and Peshwa Diaries*, edited by D.B. Parasani II, Bombay, 1906, Letter No. 171, dated 1746-47, 101.

<sup>6</sup> *Selections from Peshwa's Diaries*, II, No. 190, 1758-59, 119.

<sup>7</sup> *S.P.D.* Nos. 22, No. 200, dated 8-4-1768,

the posts of governors<sup>1</sup>, commanders<sup>2</sup>, *diwans*<sup>3</sup>, *peshkars*, *mutasaddis* and *faujders*.<sup>4</sup> Throughout the Empire, at the centre and *pargana* level, Hindu clerks, accountants, *qanungos*, *karoris* and *fotadars*<sup>5</sup> held the mainsprings of civil and revenue administration, and exerted a measure of influence on the socio-economic structure of society. The Hindu *peshkars*, *wakils*, *diwans* and *mutasaddis*, working in the central and provincial governments, were opulent and enjoyed power and prestige and all of them were stamped with the same dye of Mughal culture. Luke Scarfton has observed:<sup>6</sup>

Thus all the money affairs are in the hands of the Government Gentoos, not only those of the Government but every Moorman of rank, and every merchant has his Gentoo agent, who keeps his accounts and is the petty tyrant over his tyrant's slaves.

The Rajput chieftains, holding high ranks in the government and representing diverse opinions and interests, had asserted their solidarity by forming

- <sup>1</sup> Raja Jai Singh Sawai, Raja Ajit Singh, Raja Abhay Singh, Raja Chhabela Ram Nagar, Raja Girdhar Bahadur, and Raja Bhawani Ram had been appointed governors of different provinces while Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao was the deputy-governor of Malwa.
- <sup>2</sup> During the period from 1712 to 1748, there were six Hindu *mansabdars* holding the *zat* rank of seven thousands, two of six thousands and four of five thousands. See lists of *mansabdars*.
- <sup>3</sup> The departments of *khalisa* and *tan* were invariably under the charge of Hindu *diwans*. Some of them were: Rairayan Nagarmal, Rai Bhokchand, *peshkar* of *khalisa* department, after whose death a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs had been brought under escheat; Rai Khemchand, Rai Nihal Chand, Rai Tonda, son of Rai Bhokchand, Rai Sadh Rai, Rai Navand, *peshkar* of *tan*, Rai Bishan Nath, Rai Pran Nath, Rai Kashinath, and Rai Kamani Rai. *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. III. The central ministers and provincial governors, perhaps with no exception, had Hindu *diwans* and *peshkars* in their service. For instance, Raja Sabha Chand, *diwan* of Zulfiqar Khan, and Raja Ratan Chand, *diwan* of Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan exercised considerable power in the management of public affairs. Qamr-u'd-din Khan's, *diwans* (secretaries) were Anand Ram Mukhlis and Qabil Ram; Haider Quli Khan's Raja Raghu Nath Das, Hamid Khan's Girdhar Lal and Nizam-ul Mulk's Khaim Karan. 'Aliwardi Khan, governor of Bengal, had appointed considerable number of Hindu *mutasaddis*, like Biru Dutt, Raja Kyretchand, Raiyayan Alam Chand, Umid Ray, Dulah Ram and Ram Narain. He had appointed Ram Singh, *faujdar* of Midnapur. Jugal Kishore, his *wakil* in Delhi, enjoyed prestige and influence and possessed a large fortune. Lala Lakhpat Rai and Jaspal Rai served Zakariya Khan as his chief minister and *diwan* respectively.
- <sup>4</sup> There are five Hindu *faujders* in the list given in Chapter VI. They are: Girdhar Bahadur, Ram Rai, Rao Harnand, Bhupat Ram and Mehta Sadanand.
- <sup>5</sup> The *pargana* documents from different regions contain names of these revenue servants, *Medieval India—A Miscellany*, III, 161-183.
- <sup>6</sup> *Reflections on the Government of Indostan with a Short Sketch of the History of Bengal*, London, 1763, 29.

alliances for mutual security, and made their weight felt in the arena of imperial politics by joining hands with the Muslim nobles, having similar aims to promote. They generally supported official lines of policy, but sometimes independently pursued their own schemes which they thought were necessary for the integrity and safety of the Empire. The Hindu warlike races had always constituted a vital element in the military organization and acquired the same socio-political status the Muslim soldiers enjoyed.

Those who stood apart from the imperial court and were unconcerned with the use of power controlled the means of production in the fields of agriculture and industry. In most parts of the country the *zamindars* and cultivators were predominantly Hindus; in urban areas they monopolized business and dominated various forms of productive activity.

The Mussulmans may be classified as entirely military, as few of them exercise any other employment, except collecting the revenue, which under the Moorish government has been always done by military force.<sup>1</sup>

The Hindu merchants and businessmen had displayed some sort of awareness in articulating the special interests of their class and organizing protests against official interference and oppression. It has already been noted how the Hindu merchants of Ahmadabad and Delhi had rallied and combined to agitate against the oppression of Ratan Singh Bhandari, deputy-governor of Gujarat.<sup>2</sup> The Hindu business magnates had formed guilds designed to regulate prices, managed the business of mercantile and banking houses, and stood surety on behalf of *zamindars* and soldiers.<sup>3</sup> Those who had specialized in currency held the privilege of the coining of money which the Mughal government had bestowed upon them.<sup>4</sup> With the spread of the farming system the Hindu capitalists found a new opportunity to participate in the process of revenue administration,<sup>5</sup> and in Bengal they began to take increasing share in public affairs, and ultimately became directly associated with the tide of political changes that swept the province.

Thus there was hardly any sphere in the politico-economic life in which opportunities were not open to Hindus to realize their ambitions and grow

<sup>1</sup> William Hodges, *Travels In India*, London, 1793, 35.

<sup>2</sup> *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, II, 164, 165, 193.

<sup>3</sup> Shaḳir Khan has given a list of the names of Hindu business magnates associated with the army, they possessed lakhs and crores of rupees which they had earned in trade and commerce. Some of them were : Sahu Sita Ram, Sahu Devi Dutt, Sahu Bindraban, Sahu Girdhar Lal, Sahu 'Alam Chand, and Sahu Jivandas. *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. III.

<sup>4</sup> For details of the great banking house of Jagat Seth in Murshidabad, Chapter V.

<sup>5</sup> *Risala-i Zira'at*, ff. 14-18.

to the full height of their stature. Their numerical strength coupled with superior talents tended to balance the overwhelming influence which the higher ranks of the Muslim nobility exercised in policy-making and executive functions of the state. The Hindus, belonging to the above mentioned categories, constituted superior social groups in society and an important component part of the ruling elite.

During this period religious differences never embittered Hindu-Muslim relations or impaired the harmony and unity of society. The internal tensions and conflicts among them were primarily caused by divergent economic interests and competitive secular politics rather than by inter-communal feelings. Dynastic rivalries, tribal jealousies, agrarian issues and struggle for power led to outbreak of fighting between the different sections of society. The armies involved in such warfare had been composed of heterogenous elements drawn from all religions and races. Attracted by the prospects of pay and plunder the mercenary soldiers joined the service of the warlords and changed masters at their convenience.<sup>1</sup> The Rajput Princes kept in their service Muslim soldiers and generals who fought against the Rajputs as well as the Marathas and Jats. In their mutual warfare the Hindu *zamindars* of Kather had employed Afghan soldiers, while the Muslim chiefs and *jagirdars* kept in their troops Hindu soldiers and used them against their Muslim rivals. By the middle of the 18th century the number of Muslim soldiers in the Maratha armies began to increase, and the Gardi force under Muslim captains like Muzaffar and Ibrahim formed an important element in their military organization. The army of Janoji Bhonsle of Nagpur included many Muslim Gardi officers who received more pay than the Hindu officers under his service.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the Muslims, as a community, did not organize themselves and rally to the support of the Mughal government in its fearful struggle against the

<sup>1</sup> "Money is here the essence of power, for the soldiers know no other attachment than their pay, and the richest party soon becomes the strongest." *Reflections on the Government of Indostan with a Short Sketch of the History of Bengal*, 30.

<sup>2</sup> DIFFERENCE IN SCALE OF PAY BETWEEN HINDU AND MUSLIM HORSEMEN

<i>Denomination of the horsemen</i>	<i>Scale of Pay</i>	<i>Actual Payment made</i>	<i>Deductions</i>
Hindu	Upto Rs. 25/-	Rs. 15/-	From Rs. 15/8/ to Rs. 50/8/ per hundred.
Mussalman	Upto Rs. 30/-	Rs. 20/-	From Rs. 4/8/ to Rs. 35/-

For details, *Tarikh Rajha-i Nagpur*, I.O.M.S., Ethe, No. 489, f. 101.

regional forces—the Marathas, Sikhs and Jats. They did not look on it as their national state, in fact, during the centuries when Muslims were so profoundly divided by racial, sectarian and class differences, the concept of *umma* remained a mere delusion.

The above brief survey of Hindu-Muslim relations during the first half of the 18th century should not be taken to imply that the two communities had completely coalesced and perfect unity existed between them. Indeed perfect unity could neither be achieved nor was it desirable. As T. S. Eliot puts it, "Excess of unity may be due to barbarism and may lead to tyranny; excess of division may be due to decadence and may also lead to tyranny; either excess will prevent further development in culture."<sup>1</sup> The instances of common cultural traditions, religious tolerance and cooperation, alluded to above, will serve to counter the arguments of those historians who seek to interpret Indian history of the 18th century in terms of conflicts and communal antagonism based on religious issues. "It would be perilous to assume that conflict between religious communities was the central theme around which the drama of Medieval Indian History revolved."<sup>2</sup>

### *Social Life in Delhi*

Delhi, the seat of royalty and the centre of trade and commerce, was the largest and the most renowned city of India. It was here that art and literature had flourished under the aegis of royal court, and fashions in dress, and food and rules of etiquette, current in the higher circles of society, set the pattern for sophisticated men and women elsewhere. In population, imposing buildings, sprawling markets, beautiful gardens, numerous colleges, shrines and places of worship, no other city in the country could match this metropolis.<sup>3</sup> Here people of different regions, races and creeds lived together in a friendly and congenial atmosphere; and to this famous city, flocked people from Iraq, Persia, Turkistan and other countries, and owing to royal patronage and aristocratic munificence, prospered and rose in the social scale. The inhabitants of Delhi, to quote another contemporary historian, were modest, courteous, hospitable and polite and, by and large, handsome and healthy.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> T.S. Eliot, *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, London, 50.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. S. Nurul Hasan, Presidential Address to Indian History Congress, *Medieval India*, Delhi Session, 1961, 107.

<sup>3</sup> Sunder Lal, *Mujmu'a-i Faiz*, Asafia MS., ff. 2-3.

<sup>4</sup> Hazwar Mubammad 'Aqil, *Jalwa-i Deedar*, Asafia MS., No. 130, 21. The work contains a number of poems in praise of the city of Delhi, its citizens, buildings, streets, markets and shrines of famous Chishti saints.



Of all the markets and pleasure-resorts Chandni Chowk was the most beautiful, having magnificent houses, well decorated shops, spacious streets and high gates. A long water-channel, called Nahr-i Faiz, flowed down the centre of the street where in the evening people of all classes gathered and enjoyed themselves under the shadow of tall trees and coffee-houses. These coffee-houses were the places where poets gathered together and recited their poems.<sup>1</sup> Anand Ram Mukhlis frequently visited these shops, though he used coffee prepared in his house.<sup>2</sup> Another place of social gatherings was Chowk Sa'ad-ullah Khan<sup>3</sup> which had a large number of buildings, shops and mosques. All streets and shops were always crowded with visitors and a newcomer was impressed by the picturesque display of luxury goods and fine products brought from all parts of India, and the interesting cultural and professional activities which were carried on by the road side. In one part of the market dancers and musicians performed their arts and attracted large number of people, while in another quarter professional orators delivered sermons on religious obligations and recited poems describing the tragedy of Karbala. There were speakers who were capable of dilating on a single theme the whole night and stirring the emotions of people to the highest pitch by their power of elocution. At the conclusion of their oration they collected money from the listeners who had had the patience to sit through the performance. In one corner the palmists, astrologers and geomancers carried on their trade, and in another buffoons and clowns were seen playing funny tricks, and thus moving the people to outbursts of laughter. There were wine shops too, which people visited without any fear of being checked by the censors of public morals.<sup>4</sup>

The citizens of Delhi were always crazy for outdoor recreation and entertainment. On off days, connected with festivals, fairs and 'urs celebrations, they went out in large numbers for sightseeing and merry-making in the suburbs of Delhi which were full of stately gardens, famous shrines and tombs of kings. On all such occasions the city wore a festive look, huge masses of people, including the Muslims and the non Muslims, merchants, soldiers, nobles, ministers and beggars, poured out into open spaces of gardens and other buildings. From early morning, men, women and children, clad in new dresses, started from their houses on horseback. bullock-carts, *palkis* and on foot, playing and singing on the way, till before

<sup>1</sup> For details, *Asar-ul Sanadid*, 134, 135, 136; *Murqqa'-i Delhi*, 17, 18.

<sup>2</sup> *Chamistan*, f. 105.

<sup>3</sup> From its name it is evident that the *chowk* was established by Sa'ad-ullah Khan, the *wazir* of Shah Jahan. For details, *Murqqa'-i Delhi*, 14, 15; *Waq'iyat-i Dar-ul Hakumma'-i Delhi*, II, 123, 124.

<sup>4</sup> *Murqqa'-i Delhi*, 14, 15, 16, 17.

noon the whole of Mehrauli, where 'urs at the *dargah* of Khwaja Qutb-u'd-din Bakhtiyar Kaki was to be observed, was fully crowded. Tents were pitched there for *amirs* and well-to-do persons; while the commoners spread out their carpets and sheets of cloth to sit on. The pious ones among them went to the mosques for prayer and meditation, while others placed flowers on the grave, recited *fateha*, tied threads on the railings of the tombs of the saint and invoked his blessings for worldly purposes. After finishing their meals they attended the *sama'* in which singers and dancing women took part, and passed the whole night enjoying other quasi-religious and cultural activities at the shrine.<sup>1</sup> There were also official functions like royal marriages, birth-days, reception of foreign embassies, coronations and celebration of a victory in which all people, high and low, took part. On such occasions the main streets and buildings of the city were illuminated, food was distributed among the poor, and music and dance performances were given in open places where cold drinks and betel leaves were freely distributed. Muslim festivals like 'Id and *Shab-i Barat* had their social aspects also and hence illuminations and display of fire-works. The Hindus had also several fairs of their own, besides important festivals like Dasherah, Diwali and Holi. The *mela* of Kalka took place twice a year and according to Rai Chetman at least one lakh persons gathered together. The fair of Gadhmukhteshwar was also important, for thousands of people from Delhi and its neighbouring villages were attracted to it. It continued for fifteen days and covered an area of 12 *kos*.<sup>2</sup>

Influenced by the pomp and pageantry of the royal court, the noblemen and aristocrats of Delhi lived in lofty and spacious mansions, kept a large number of eunuchs, servants, and concubines, laid out extensive and beautiful gardens, and maintained splendid equipage and grand levies. They spent huge sums of money on entertainment, festivities, musical soirees, sumptuous banquets and spectacular shows; they were all for ostentation, formalism, and elaboration in their daily routine of life. This necessitated heavy expenses which the aristocrats tried to meet through misappropriation, bribery and exploitation. Commenting on the swelling fortunes of this class Ashub states that it appeared as if streams of gold flowing from productive lands of the Empire were being deflected into their villas. As an illustration he cites the example of Zafar Khan Roshan-u'd Daulah who had amassed more wealth than what Pharoh had ever dreamt to possess. He writes that Zafar Khan's house looked like a mountain of gold; the walls and doors were lavishly gilded and decorated with costly tapestry and hangings of gold

<sup>1</sup> *Muraqqa'-i Delhi*, 4, 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Chahar Gulshan*, ff. 37, 38, 39.

embroidery; the roofs were painted with golden flower-work while the floors were covered with carpets of the richest silk. From the main gate to the inner apartments, from the drum-house to the courtyard of *diwan khana*, all walls and doors, roofs and floors were lavishly ornamented. The fountains made of gold and silver, set up in straight lines in the tanks dazzled the eyes of visitors when sun rays fell on them. The rooms were tastefully furnished with luxurious *diwans*, beds, tables, linens of brocade and silk. Even the chains and trappings of elephants, saddles of the horses and all other household articles were decorated with gold embroidery. He went to the royal palace in a costly state, always dressed in elegant and rich garments, attended by horsemen and servants, distributing money among the poor who thronged his way. Zafar Khan organized the ceremonies of *bara-wafat* (Prophet's Birthday) and 'urs of Khwaja Bakhtiyar Kaki on a grand-scale, and made them unusually spectacular and impressive by decorating streets and roads with bright lights. On the occasion of 'urs celebration of the Khwaja the whole area from the fort to the shrine was transformed into a blaze of light by thousands of candles and earthen lamps. The Emperor, his mother, and the ladies of *harem* sat at the Lahori gate of the fort, enjoyed the scene of grand illumination, and before midnight retired to their apartments. Once a week Zafar Khan held *majlis-i-sama'* to which he invited a large number of mystics, saints, 'ulema and pious persons of the city. In a state of ecstasy he tore up his golden clothes and distributed the pieces among the singers, besides offering coins of gold and silver to them. When the music was over, the gathering was entertained with sumptuous meals consisting of several dishes in gold and silver wares.<sup>1</sup>

This kind of luxury and ostentation enjoyed by Zafar Khan, holding the office of the third *bakhshi*, was generally prevalent among the wealthy aristocracy as well as lesser gentry. In design and decoration of the houses the architects of the period merely imitated the distinctive style of the seventeenth century, and the stately mansions of former nobles—like 'Ali Mardan Khan, Ja'afar Khan, Shayista Khan<sup>2</sup> and others—served as models for them. Vastness of size, richness of ornamentation and emphasis on amenities of life at the highest level were their chief concern. The house of a nobleman used to be lofty<sup>3</sup> and spacious, containing several apartments such as drawing

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, Patna MS., 89, 91, 94-95.

<sup>2</sup> The houses of Ja'afar Khan and Shayista Khan had been well-maintained as they were occupied by Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan and Husain 'Ali Khan after the accession of Farrukh Siyar. *Later Mughals*, I, 284.

<sup>3</sup> Janish Khan, the agent of Nasir Khan, had purchased a house on the bank of Jumna for Rs. one lakh. It was so high that Khan-i Dauran remarked, "From the high walls of its veranda he (owner) might have seen Persian armies marching on India."

rooms, guest rooms and females' quarters—all magnificently decorated and furnished with costly furniture. In view of the climatic conditions of northern India they had arranged to keep the building cool during summer. For instance, to a large mansion belonged subterranean rooms furnished with big fans, terraces on which the family could sleep at night, *tekhkhana* or underground rooms, tanks in the centre of the courtyard, windows for fresh air, baths (*hammams*) and orchards.<sup>1</sup> They made ample use of *khas*; sometime a temporary structure entirely made of this grass was erected in the house where the family could retire during the day time. The ceilings of the rooms were gilded and painted while the floors were covered with mattresses and carpets. The houses of middle class people were also spacious and two to three storeys high, made of bricks and stones, airy, elegant, having all the amenities which could provide comfort to the dwellers, specially during summer.<sup>2</sup> The house of Anand Ram Mukhlis, the *diwan* of Qamar-u'd-din Khan, had two wings, one was called *mardana* or a big living room where the nobleman held his office, received visitors and entertained them, the second wing, called *zanana*, was reserved for female apartments which were beautifully decorated and furnished. On the door-gate of the house a bodyguard in splendid uniform, generally recruited from the class of gunmen of Buxur, was posted and inside it a number of attendants and servants, both men and women, worked. There was a tank in the middle of the courtyard and a garden adjacent to the house.<sup>3</sup>

The nobles and courtiers, in imitation of their sovereign, used costly and gaudy clothes. Farrukh Siyar always appeared in the public in the most magnificent attire and wanted his nobles to come to the court in colourful robes. One day the Emperor, seeing Mian Maqbul 'Alam in a white dress, remarked, "If there was some occasion for mourning in his house he should have better stayed there." Amin-u'd-din Khan, another courtier, gibingly said that perhaps he had not received money from his *jagirs*.<sup>4</sup> Muhammad Shah wore lady's *peshwaz* and shoes embroidered with pearls;

<sup>1</sup> For a description of the houses in Delhi during the 17th century, Francois Bernier, *Travels in Mughal Empire*, I, 247-248. He writes: "They consider that a house to be greatly admired ought to be situated in the middle of a large flower garden, and should have four large *diwan*-apartments raised to the height of a man from the ground, and exposed to the four winds, so that the coolness may be felt from any quarter."

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Twining, *Travels in India*, London, 1893, 272; *Travels in Mughal Empire* I, 246.

<sup>3</sup> *Safar Namah-i Anand Ram Mukhlis*. For an account of the houses in Patna and Banaras, *Travels in India*, 152, 153, 154. George Forester, *A Journey from Bengal to England*, London, 1806, I, 38, 39.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 417.

but after Nadir Shah's invasion he adopted simple white attire.<sup>1</sup> The dress of a noble usually consisted of *perhan* (a loose vest or shirt), tight trousers or breeches, *peshwaz* (a coat with lining), *qaba* (a short tunic open in front), *jama'* (a coat or gown), *kamarband* (a belt or girdle) and *chira* or *dastar* (turban) of satin or finest muslin ornamented with jewels, particularly diamonds and rubies. In winter they wore *nimastin* (an upper robe with half-sleeves), with a collar of fox's skin. The style of tying turbans varied from caste to caste and region to region. The rich used the finest possible linen for their turban which was generally 23 to 25 yards in length. Anand Ram Mukhlis, in his younger days, wore a turban of the finest linen, and it was so lengthy that the tying process took from three to four hours, the one end of the turban interwoven with gold threads covered half of the face on one side, and on the top was fixed a costly jewelled ornament. The noblemen also tied their waist with a scarf of beautiful cloth and a long dagger was fixed to it. They carried in their hands a simple or ornamented stick which had become a popular fashion after Nadir's invasion and was known as *khandi*. The Hindu *amirs* wore a necklace of pearls round the neck and put *tilak*<sup>2</sup> on their foreheads.

The noblemen, big and small, recklessly squandered huge sums of money on the marriage ceremonies which were held with great pomp and grandeur. For instance, the display of dowry, made by *wazir* Qamr-u'd-din Khan on the occasion of his daughter's marriage, Qamar-un Nisa Begum, with Ghazi-u'd-din Khan Firoz Jang, son of Nizam-ul Mulk, was a captivating scene, an unbroken line of splendours from the imperial fort to Kotla Firoz Shah.<sup>3</sup> The marriage of Shuja'-u'd Daulah, son of Safdar Jang, and the daughter of Najm-u'd Daulah, was celebrated on a regal scale, and according to one estimate, at least Rs. 46 lakhs were spent on the dowry, feasts and festivals connected with it.<sup>4</sup> Raja Jughal Kishore had

<sup>1</sup> *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 97; *Hadisah-i Nadir Shah*, Hyderabad State Library MS., f. 3b; *Tarikh-i Fathiya*, f. 48a; *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, 76.

<sup>2</sup> *Hadiqat-ul 'Aqalim*, 44-45; *Khazana-i 'Amrah*, 355; *Safar Namah-i Anand Ram Mukhlis*, 17, 18; *Chaminstan*, f. 87a. Thomas Twining, *Travels in India*, 167, 278.

<sup>3</sup> The marriage procession included 50 to 60 young women, all of one age, of Turkish, Qalmaq and Qarghis races dressed in cloth of gold and adorned with jewels; they wore long cloaks of brocade trimmed with gold handkerchiefs, held together with chains and rings of gold; and on their faces veils sewn with pearls which left the face quite visible. They surrounded the bride, mounted on horses holding gold and silver sticks in their hands. At their back hung a bow case with bows and arrows. For details of the marriage procession and other ceremonies, *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 221.

<sup>4</sup> Safdar Jang sent costly gifts (*sachaq*) to the house of the bride. These gifts included trays full of various kinds of sweets, fruit, wearing apparel, ornaments, large number of vessels and crockery of various shapes and workmanship. "Conspicuous among these were more than a thousand silver vessels enamelled

spent at least Rs. 40 lakhs on the marriage of his son Kunwar Nand Kishore to which the entire population of Delhi was invited. Zafar Khan Roshan-u'd Daulah spent Rs. 60 lakhs on the marriage ceremony of his daughter.<sup>1</sup> Except the ritual of *nikah* Muslim marriages hardly differed from those of the Hindus, variations being dictated by the economic status and family traditions which a particular section of society represented.

Luxury and pomp accompanied the increasing wealth and power of the ruling aristocrats. Luxury was brought out by refinement in music and dance traditions and extravagant display of wealth in social and communal festivities. For long the noblemen had laid their arms aside and not tasted the heat of fight in a battlefield.<sup>2</sup> They disdained fighting as a dull occupation of rude men and the office work as the monotonous duty of a routine-bound clerk. They valued elegance of manners, politeness of behaviour and quick wit higher than courage, austerity and efficiency. Enjoyment of female company and preference for women's dress and her polite conversation were the ideals a nobleman cherished to achieve in society. The woman considered fit for love and pleasure was the courtesan, the model of grace, charm, gaiety and refined etiquette. She was the source of inspiration for the artists and poets; and her accomplishments formed the theme continuously repeated in love lyrics and paintings of the times. The well-to-do persons engaged them on festive occasions while men of lesser means visited their saloons. She won adoration and praise partly by the charm of her personality and partly by her artistic accomplishments.

The arts of music and dance were cultivated and patronized by the sovereign and noblemen, and owing to their munificence a large number of professional singers and dancing women had gathered in the city. No festivity or function, whether of social or quasi-religious character, could be observed without their participation in it. The most famous among the courtesans in the city was Nurbai who had acquired a great reputation as dancer and musician. She was attached to the court where she frequently gave performances of her art. The *amirs* sought interview with her and

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with gold, none of which cost less than one hundred rupees. Next day, Najm-u'd Daulah sent *menhdi* to the bridegroom's house which was even more costly than the *sachaq*. *Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja'i*, 394; *'Imad-us Sa'adar*, 36; *First Two Nawabs of Awadh*, 110.

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, f. 198.

<sup>2</sup> *Gul-i R'ana*, 108.

offered money and jewels as gifts in order to invite her to attend the function at their houses. In splendour and magnificence her house resembled the mansion of an aristocrat. Nadir Shah, impressed by the performance of her dance and music, had in vain tried to take Nurbai to Persia. There was another famous dancer named Taufah, whose performance attracted huge crowds of people.<sup>1</sup> The *amirs* of Delhi organized music parties at their houses, and some of them remained engrossed in the revelry day in and day out, oblivious of its effects on the discharge of their public responsibilities. For instance, the music parties, arranged by Latif Khan, continued from morning till night; Nurbai and other dancers and singers participated in them. Amir Khan, dressed in female attire, kept himself occupied day and night in the music and dance parties at his house.<sup>2</sup> His companions were so effeminate in their habits that they applied lampblack (*kajal*) to their eyelids, black powder (*missi*) to their teeth and red-dye (*menhdi*) to their hands and feet, wore finger-rings, silver bracelets and ear-rings.<sup>3</sup>

Dargah Quli Khan calls the house of Mirza Manu the paradise of *Shadad*, for beauties of diverse character used to embellish these convivial gatherings with sweet songs and lovely dances.<sup>4</sup> Meeran, another *amir* of Delhi, had made his house resplendent and charming by collecting a large number of "graceful male and female servants." Every day a new face was added to this ever-growing number. From morning to the late hours of night, music and dance continued in his house, which according to Quli Khan, was a bed of roses and an abode of beauty. These jovial gatherings were attended freely by people in hundreds, for tents were pitched and carpets spread for them, and they were enchanted by the bewitching looks of these faces.<sup>5</sup> During the 'urs celebrations of Khuld Manzil and Mir Musharaf, debauchery and drinking were common. Mir Kalu held the 'urs every year at the tomb and invited princes and the sons of *amirs*, who, with their beloveds went there and pitched their respective tents and in each tent, singers and dancers displayed their art. At night all became mad in the worship of Lord of revelry; there was none to prevent, none to advise; everyone was free to do anything he liked. Dancing girls, beautiful boys, wine and sumptuous meals contributed to the orgy. 'Azam Khan, son of Fidvi Khan, nephew of Khan Jahan Bahadur 'Alamgiri, was one of the big *amirs*, and well-known for his mastery in *rag* and his

<sup>1</sup> *Muraqqa'-i Delhi*, 29, 73; *Safar Namah Anand Ram Mukhlis*, 31.

<sup>2</sup> *Muraqqa'-i Delhi*, 33; *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 417.

<sup>3</sup> *The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad*, 338.

<sup>4</sup> *Muraqqa'-i Delhi*, 26.

<sup>5</sup> *Muraqqa'-i Delhi*, 28.

indulgence in the vice of pederasty. A part of his income was earmarked for the expenses of beautiful boys who were brought from all parts of the country. They joined the music parties at his residence and formed a part of his retinue. Wherever a beautiful boy was seen, he was identified as belonging to 'Azam Khan. The music parties arranged by Kasal Singh, a wealthy *mansabdar*, had also attracted a large number of dancing women to his house situated in the locality of Kasalpura. In spite of a large number of *muhatasibs*, music and dance parties were unchecked.

It would, however, be misleading to infer from the above instances of luxury and licence which characterized the social habits of aristocrats that the whole society was given over to corruption and debauchery. In fact such vices were generally confined to a small section of the aristocracy, and did not spoil the ordinary turn of the people. The traditions of austerity, simplicity and hard and honest labour were so deep rooted among common men that they remained unaffected by the degeneration of the few around them. Dargah Quli Khan, on whose account of social life the pre-going observations are based, visited places and attended functions in Delhi which had a special attraction for him. He hardly ever cared to see centres of piety and learning in order to familiarize himself with the aspirations and anxieties of the masses and to detect the sense of disharmony and doubt that attended upon the change of the old order. The canvas on which he sketched the picture of social life in Delhi is small, and the view he took of the attitudes of the *amirs* is limited. He creates the impression that, apart from drinking, dance and music parties, no other domain of human activity or channel of creative interest was available to these *amirs*. But even these noblemen, who had lost the basic sensitivity of response to new challenges of the period, played a constructive role in the advancement of art and literature, while some of them took keen interest in public welfare by constructing bridges, *sarais*, mosques, and schools. The classics of history, poetry, philosophy and law were regarded as part of one's intellectual equipment and helped in the growth of virtues like love, tolerance, fortitude, hospitality and generosity. Moral and ethical ideals, derived from classics like *Gulistan*, *Bostan*, *Masnavi-i Maulana Rum* and several others, broadened one's vision and fostered a spirit of humanism. A kind of urbanity and suavity of manners, brought out both in speech and writing, added to the charm of a nobleman's personality and made him the centre of attraction in society. To acquire knowledge and disseminate widely perhaps was a great passion with the Mughal noble. He almost always owned an impressive private library which contained a large number of volumes on various subjects. He



participated in literary and poetical gatherings at his home or at the residence of any one of his friends.

His literary gifts found expression in poetry. Some of the famous poets and literati who flourished in this period came from the class of nobles. The first poet in northern India who compiled a *diwan* in *rekhta* was Nawab Sadr-u'd-din Muhammad Khan Fa'iz.<sup>1</sup> Nawab Amir Khan 'Umadat-ul Umara had distinguished himself as one of the greatest patrons of poets and scholars. Witty, eloquent and polite, he was a skilled musician, well-versed in Arabic literature and composed verses with equal facility in Persian and Urdu. His own accomplishments, refined taste, and courteous disposition attracted famous contemporary poets like Rasikh, Shakir, Shah Hatim and Mir Zahik, who attended *musha'iras* held at his house. His *nom de guerre* was *Anjam*, and his style was simple, elegant and chiseled. He was, however, an accomplished schemer and a shrewd politician.<sup>2</sup> Nawab Asaf Jah I, whose *nom de plume* was *Shakir*, has left a *Diwan* or collection of poems in Persian. Anand Ram Mukhlis was a poet and writer of great repute.<sup>3</sup> Gul Muhammad Ma'aniyab Khan, Shaikh Husain Shirazi, and Nawab Asad Yar Khan Insan and In'am-ullah Khan Yaaqin were some of the few *amirs* who contributed to the growth of poetry.<sup>4</sup> Poetry served as a status symbol and a means to gain favour, at the court. The composition and recitation of poems was regarded as a mark of refinement and polished taste. Muslims, Hindus, 'ulema, soldiers and professional men, all alike seemed to have fallen under the spell of poetry. The nobles abundantly showered their patronage over poets and men of letters. Their liberality gave a fillip to intellectual and literary activities. Asaf Jah patronized several poets of Delhi like Mirza Beidil and Mazhar Jan-i Janan.<sup>5</sup> Khan-i Dauran sanctioned grant of one rupee per month as stipend to Mir Taqi Mir, one of the greatest Urdu poets.<sup>6</sup> Muhammad Khan Bangash was also a great patron of art and literature. During his time and in that of his son a large number of poets, writers and scholars went to Farrukhabad to seek refuge and patronage.<sup>7</sup> Raja

<sup>1</sup> *Diwan-i Fa'iz*, edited by Dr. Mas'ud Hasan Rizvi, 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Tazkirah Rekhtagoyan*, edited by Dr. Abdul Haq, Aurangabad, 1933, 20; *Gul-i R'ana*, 107.

<sup>3</sup> Anand Ram was author of fourteen books, some of the important ones were: *Guldasta-i Asrar*, *Bada'i-waqai*, *Mir'at-ul Istilah*, *Safar Namah*, *Chaminstan*, *Diwan*.

<sup>4</sup> *Diwan-i Yaqin*, edited by Mirza Farhat-ullah Beg, Aligarh, 1930, Ghulam Husain Azad, *Khazana-i 'Amrah*, Nawal Kishore, Lucknow, 28; *Ma'asir-ul Kiram*, 201, 235; Munshi Danishwar Rai Salim, *Miftah-ul Tawarikh*, Lucknow, 1867, 323.

<sup>5</sup> *Ma'asir-ul Kiram*, 180, 181.

<sup>6</sup> *Tazkirah-i Mir*, 62; *Khazana-i 'Amrah*, 246.

<sup>7</sup> For details, *Tarikh-i Farrukhabad*, 155-233.




PLATE IV

Muhammad Shah taking part in Holi, late in his reign (The original is a miniature showing the Emperor receiving Gulab Bai and her troupe of dancers.)

Courtesy : *Bodleian, Or. b3, fol. 22.*

Chhatar Sal Bundela, himself a poet, had a great regard for the learned and rewarded them munificently.<sup>1</sup> The arts of music and dancing owed a good deal for their growth to the encouragement given by the nobles. Some of these nobles, like Sarbuland Khan and Amir Khan, themselves commanded mastery over these arts.<sup>2</sup>

Shah 'Abdul 'Aziz (1746-1824) writes in his *Malfuzat* that in the reign of Muhammad Shah about 22 learned scholars and mystics of note lived in the capital, and that was unusual.<sup>3</sup> Rustom 'Ali, author of *Tarikh-i Hindi*, has given a long list of the learned theologians, teachers, jurists and mystics who enriched the religious life of the city. Among them the most well-known were : Shaikh Muhammad Ghous, Mian Muhammad Saleh, Shah 'Abdul Latif, Khwaja Muhammad Saghir, Shah Ghulam Muhammad, Maulvi Zain-u'd-din, Shah Muhammad Murtaza, Shah Muhammad Fazil, Haji Muhammad Sharif, Shaikh Muhammad 'Ali and Muhammad Husain.<sup>4</sup>

During this period Mulla Nizam-u'd-din founded a *madrasah* at his residence, called Farangi Mahal, in Lucknow, which became a reputed centre of higher learning in Islamic studies.<sup>5</sup> An accomplished scholar and gifted teacher, Nizam-u'd-din spent his whole life in teaching and

<sup>1</sup> Chhattarsal composed his poems in *Brajbhasa*. The collection of his poems is published under the title of *Chhattarsal Granthavali*. The famous poets whom he patronized were Bhusan, Lal Kavi, Harikesh, Nivaj and Brij Bhushan. *Maharaja Chhattarsal Bundela*, 114-116.

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 253; *Diwan-i Taban*, edited by Dr. Abul Haq, 1935, 266-293.

<sup>3</sup> *Malfuzat Shah 'Abdul Aziz*, 34.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 604-612. Shakir Khan has provided two lists, the one containing names of theologians and the other of saints who lived in Delhi during the reign of Muhammad Shah :

(i) *Names of Theologians* : Maulvi 'Abdullah, Amanat-ullah, 'Abdul Hakim, Nazar Muhammad, Ghulam Husain, Musta'id Khan, Nadiruz-zaman, Saiyid Zia-ullah Khan, Saiyid Hamid; Yunus 'Ali, Sarf-u'd-din, Jan Muhammad, Muhammad Mah, Usman, Maulvi Nudrat, Saiyid 'Abdul Karim. *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. 108.

(ii) *Names of mystics* : Shah Bhika, Shah 'Abdur Rasul, Shah Sherif, Basit, 'Abdul Manan, Faqir-ullah, Shah Sandhi, Shah Baz'ed, Shah Fazil, Kalim-ullah, Shah Ghulam, 'Abdul Samad, Kamal, Shah Budha, Mubarak, Shah Ramz, Karim-ullah, Nasir, Shah Husain and 'Shah 'Abdul Latif were preachers (*wa'iz*). *Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, f. 109.

<sup>5</sup> Mulla Nizam-u'd-din was the son of Mulla Qutb-u'd-din, an inhabitant of Sahali in the district of Barabanki. He claimed his descent from an Ansar family of Medina. In 1692 he was murdered by a group of Shaikh Usmanis of the same *pargana*, his house was burnt and family driven out. One of his sons, Mulla Muhammad Sa'eed submitted a petition to Aurangzeb who granted a spacious house in Lucknow for the residence of the family. Later, the whole

training a large number of students who came from nearly every part of northern India. The Mughal Emperors held him in high esteem on account of his piety and devotion to the cause of learning, they bestowed *madad-i ma'ash* grants, in the form of revenue assignment and as well as cash allowances, for the maintenance of the *madrasah* and his family.<sup>1</sup> He led a very simple and saintly life, and eschewed entanglement in worldly affairs. His fame chiefly rests on the success of the syllabus he had drawn up for theological studies in the Muslim *madrasahs* of India. This curriculum, known as Dars-i Nizami, was adopted all-over the country and is still in vogue in the Arabic *madrasahs*.<sup>2</sup> Mulla Nizam-u'd-din died in 1748. His son, Mulla 'Abdul 'Ali, also became popular as a religious divine and competent teacher. But he left Lucknow and went to Karnatak where Nawab Muhammad 'Ali patronized him and made all necessary arrangements for his comfortable stay. The Nawab conferred on the Mulla the title of Bahr-ul 'Ulum (ocean of knowledge) and built a *madrasah* for religious education. Throughout his life Mulla 'Abdul 'Ali Bahr-ul 'Ulum remained engaged in the work of disseminating knowledge and inculcating religious spirit among the people of the area. He died in 1819.<sup>3</sup> Though eminent scholars and teachers Nizam-u'd-din and 'Abdul

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family moved to Lucknow and settled in this big building which had been originally occupied by some French merchant, and on that account it was called Farangi Mahal, and the locality also came to be known by the same name. At this time Nizam-u'd-din was only 15 years old. As he had already completed his education under his father, he started teaching in a portion of the house to students of the town. Muhammad Raza Ansari, *Bani Dars-i Nizami*, Aligarh, 1973, 21, 29, 30, 34. Rahman 'Ali, *Tazkirah-i 'Ulema-i Hind*, Naval Kishore, 1914, 241-242.

<sup>1</sup> Aurangzeb had assigned cultivable land of 112 *bighas* in *pargana* Deva, District Barabanki, as *madad-i ma'ash* grant for the maintenance of the family. Bahadur Shah I fixed a daily stipend of two rupees exclusively for the use of Mulla Nizam-u'd-din; this grant was renewed by Farrukh Siyar, and later upheld by the governors of Awadh, Sa'adat Khan Burhan-ul Mulk and Nawab Abul Mansur Safdar Jang. *Bani Dars-i Nizami*, 172-180. The copies of these documents are preserved in the Seminar Library, Department of History, Aligarh Muslim University. Iqbal Husain, "Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Documents from the Farangi Mahal Collection," *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, Aligarh Session, 1975.

<sup>2</sup> The curriculum included subjects and books on grammar (*nahw*), scholasticism (*kalam*), logic (*muntiq*), principles of Islamic law (*usul-i fiqh*), Islamic law (*fiqh*), mathematics (*riyazi*), traditions of the Prophet (*hadis*) and exegesis (*tafsir*). The fact that these subjects are still taught in the Islamic *madrasahs* of India is indicative of conservatism of the theologians rather than the dynamic character of the educational system. *Rud-i Kawsir*, 405-410.

<sup>3</sup> Mulla 'Abdul 'Ali received one thousand rupees per month in salary while his students got stipends for their maintenance. *Bani Dars-i Nizami*, 114-116.

'Ali made no original contribution towards the advancement of Islamic thought and philosophy. They did not seek to study the problems of religious thought in Islam and discover possibilities of its reinterpretation in the light of changes operating in that period. Nor did they strive to find solution of contemporary political and economic problems which confronted the Muslims of India after the decline of the Mughal rule.<sup>1</sup> They were teachers and not reformers, and as such, can be compared with other learned theologians, like Maulana Nur-u'd-din of Ahmedabad,<sup>2</sup> who had dedicated themselves to the teaching work in many cities and towns of the country.<sup>3</sup>

The later Mughals were so preoccupied with political and personal problems that they could hardly take any interest in the establishment and maintenance of schools and colleges. Nevertheless, the nobles and other prosperous persons extended their patronage to men of learning and made

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- <sup>1</sup> Mullah Nizam-u'd-din wrote commentaries on texts relating to Islamic law (*Sharha Musallam-us Sabut*), scholasticism (*Sharha 'Aqa'id-i Jalali*), and philosophy (*Sharha Hidayt-ul Hikmat, or Sadra*). Mulla 'Abdul 'Ali wrote commentaries on *Masnavi-i Maulana Rum* and *Fiqh-i Akbar*, and composed *Risalah-i Tauhid*.
- <sup>2</sup> Shaikh Nur-u'd-din, son of Shaikh Muhammad Saleh, was born in 1650, in Ahmedabad. Endowed with sharp intellect and prodigious memory he quickly learnt all the traditional and rational sciences under the careful supervision of Maulana Ahmad bin Suleman and Saiyid Muhammad Abulmajid Mahbub 'Alam. It is said that he had finished *Gulistan* within a week when he was only a child. He had received the certificate of *khilafat* in Suharwardi *silsila* from Mahbub 'Alam. Apart from scholastic pursuits he devoted himself to mystic practices. His overwhelming erudition and piety attracted crowds of people and his fame spread far and wide. Muhammad Akram-u'd-din alias Shaikh-ul Islam, the *sadr* of *subah* Gujarat, his pupil and disciple, built a *madrasah* in Ahmedabad at the cost of more than one lakh of rupees in 1690-91, and a mosque attached to it was completed in 1698. For the construction of other buildings an additional amount of one lakh and twenty-four thousand rupees was spent. Maulana Nur-u'd-din went to perform *haj* in 1728 and returned in the same year to Ahmedabad. He was the author of nearly 170 books. He also wrote versified *tafsir* of *sura Fateha* and the first chapter of *Quran*, the number of verses amounted to ten thousands and sixty thousands respectively. He died in 1743. He spent his whole life in imparting religious education to students and delivering sermons on Islamic doctrines to the people. He left four sons: Shaikh Muhammad Saleh alias Pir Baba, Qazi Muhammad Nizam-u'd-din Khan, Shaikh Muhammad and Shaikh Fakhru'd-din. For details, *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, Supplement, text, 57-62; *Tazkirah-i 'Ulema-i Hind*, 247, 248, 249.
- <sup>3</sup> Rustum 'Ali Khan has given a brief account of teachers and preachers who were actively busy in imparting religious instructions in the *madrasahs* and seminaries found almost in every town of northern India in the middle of the eighteenth century. The names of some of the important teachers and towns where they

grants for the upkeep of the *madrasahs*.<sup>1</sup> Most of the *madrasahs* in Delhi as well as in northern India owed their existence to the munificence of aristocrats. Some prominent nobles established and maintained *madrasahs* in Delhi and they were known by their respective names, like Madrasah-i Ghazi-u'd-din Khan, Madrasah-i Shafr-u'd Daulah, and Madrasah-i Roshan-u'd Daulah. Muhammad Shah is credited with having granted a big mansion for the *madrasah* of Shah 'Abdur Rahim, father of Shah Wali-ullah, which soon acquired universal reputation because of the remarkable personality of its founder.<sup>2</sup>

The refined and cultured noble, with all his generous and moral impulses, was extremely disdainful towards those below him in the social scale. For instance, Zafar Khan, Roshan-u'd Daulah, did not acknowledge and return the salutations of those inferior to him. The Mughal noble laid stress on social distinctions and judged any one's work in proportion to his place in the social hierarchy. Noble birth was the symbol of respectability and the best qualification for attaining a privileged position

worked are given below. For details, *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 602-608.

Name of the Teacher	Name of the Town	Name of the Teacher	Name of the Town
Shaikh Habib-ullah	Qannuj	Shaikh Kamal-u'd-din	Ujjain
Maulvi Asghar	"	Mir, Saiyid Yasin	Bilgram
Shah 'Abdul Halim	Shahjanpur	Mir Muhammad Hashim	Jalesar
Shah Wali Muhammad	Shahbad	Shah Bahadur	Narnol
Hafiz 'Abdul Wahid	"	Shaikh Najm-u'd-din	Ajmer
Mir Saiyid Ahmad	"	Mian Shah	Sambhar
Shah Bulaqi	Moradabad	Shah Fazlullah	Mankpur
Shah Barkat-ullah	Marehra	Mufti Sar'a'-ullah	Jaunpur
Shah Allah Bakhsh	Koil	Shaikh Ahmad	Sandila
Mian Mustafa Khan	Sironj	Muhammad Qutab	Gopamau
Saimast Khan	Bhilsa	'Abdul 'Aziz	Radauli
Mian Shah Allhyar	Burhanpur		

<sup>1</sup> Saiyid Manazir Hasan Gilani, *Hindustan Main Musalmanun Ka Nizam-i Ta'lim*, Delhi, 1966, 1, 2-10; Ghulam Ali Azad, *Ma'asir-ul-Kiram*, 221, 222.

<sup>2</sup> Nawab Ghazi-u'd din Khan Firoz Jang had founded this *madrasah* near the Ajmeri Gate. When Shah Fakhr-u'd-din came from the Deccan he stayed in this college and started teaching. According to Ashub, another *madrasah* had been founded near Ajmeri Gate by Muhammad Amin Khan, the *wazir* of Muhammad Shah. There were many *madrasahs* attached to *khanqahs* and mosques, like the *khanqah* of Shah Kalimullah and the Fetehpuri mosque of Delhi. In the Dariba market Sharf-u'd Daulah had built a mosque and a *madrasah* in 1722. Bashir-u'd-din, *Waq'at-Darul Hakumat Delhi*, II, 286; *Asar-ul-Sanadid*, 309.

in the state as well as in society. Contemporary writers, describing events of this period, point out again and again that paths of preferment were thrown open to the base and low-born persons while members of noble families were pushed into the background, and they trace to this change of policy the fact of general decline in the administration. Nawab Sadr-u'd-din Khan Fa'iz holds that a low-born person (*razil*), even if he acquires knowledge and skill, cannot attain the level of culture maintained by the high-born or *sharif*. The *razil* is like a crow before the royal falcon, a gilded copper compared with pure gold.<sup>1</sup> The *sharif* was one who not only claimed noble descent but also pursued a noble profession. Shah Hatim calls goldsmiths, barbers, weavers, cloth-merchants, water-carriers as *razil* and scoffs at the good economic condition they enjoyed in this period.<sup>2</sup> As the concept of dignity of labour was absent among the nobles, they had nothing but contempt for the professional men who earned their livelihood by manual work. Mirza Qatil writes:

If a Mughal, even though compelled by circumstances, takes up the job of a water-carrier, he falls off from the place of nobility; he would marry his son to the daughter of water-carrier, and likewise his daughter would be married to the son of a water-carrier. Now, none of the nobles (*ashraf*) would like to have any contact with such a Mughal; he has made himself *razil* because of this base profession.<sup>3</sup>

He further adds that in the Muslim noble class standards of nobility (*sharafat*) were more rigid and exacting than what the upper class Hindus observed. The noble (*sharif*) looked down upon a *mansabdar* drawing a salary of ten rupees per month; an elephant-driver, though his income amounted to five hundred rupees a month, was also held in contempt. The *amir* loathed the company of *marsiya khwan* except in the days of *Muharram*.<sup>4</sup> Political and economic inequalities further deepened the social tensions between various endogamous units and this prevented a unified and harmonious growth of society. The "elites," who enjoyed the status of leadership in society did not try to elevate the social position of the under-privileged classes, and even failed to protect them against external pressures. Shah Wali-ullah attributed this failing of *amirs* to their frantic craze for materialism that brought about a narrowing of vision, and diverted their attention from ideals of collective welfare towards the pur-

<sup>1</sup> *Kulliyat-i-Fa'iz*, f. 96.

<sup>2</sup> *Diwan Zada*, Aligarh MS.

<sup>3</sup> Mirza Qatil, *Haft Tamasha*, 117.

<sup>4</sup> *Haft Tamasha*, 27, 28.

suit of selfish aims.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, when the power and prestige of this aristocracy declined, no other class in Muslim society could emerge to take up its place and reinforce or preserve those institutions which had sustained them.

### *Religious Reforms*

During the eighteenth century the Muslim society was distracted by doctrinal disputes and controversies which weakened the cohesive force of Islamic belief; many deviations from the Quranic injunctions in daily practice distorted the image of true faith and this introduced changes in the modes of social living. Undue veneration of tombs of saints, superstitious attachment to holy relics and indulgence in ceremonies and rituals were a matter of common experience. The celebrations of 'urs was the only popular form of religious sentiment. The pseudo mystics broke loose from the bonds of *shari'at*, prospered on what they could extract from disciples, formed their own orders and vied each other for personal aggrandizement. They went astray from the path of devotion and became worldly-minded; their *khanqahs* were no longer the places from where celestial rays of piety had once emanated, dispelling mists of doubt and disbelief. The theologians, by and large, sank into lethargy and failed to cater to the spiritual needs of the common people. Devoted exclusively to the study of Greek philosophy and Arabic grammar, the 'ulema engaged themselves in hair-splitting controversies and utterly futile discussions. They grew dogmatic in their teachings,<sup>2</sup> referred to books on jurisprudence instead of the *Quran*, quoted spurious *hadis* which suited their purpose, and employed unscrupulous methods to gain popularity and earn money.<sup>3</sup> With the decline of political power, the current of Muslim thought deflected from religion as the supreme ideal, and that brought about, in course of time, the weakening of the moral fibre which enables a person to explore new intensities of experience. The failure of the state to protect their economic interests and that of religion to guide them under changed circumstances corroded the confidence of the Muslims in these two important institutions. This resulted in a deepening moral crisis. Being desperate the noblemen started indulging in fleshly delights and the common people found satisfaction in the myths and miracles of

<sup>1</sup> *Shah Wali-ullah Kai Siyasi Maktubat*, 6.

<sup>2</sup> "The 'ulema of today are like camels with strings in their noses. They are tightened by *taqlid* and do not think over the problems afresh." *Shah Wali-ullah, Al-Musaffa*, I, 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Al-Balagh-ul Mubin*, 106; *Shah Namah-l' Deccan*, 230; *Al-Furqan*, 97-101, 149-150.



saints. Muslim leadership—political or religious—made no effort to extricate the community from the meshes of lack of faith and inertia and provide them with a forward looking vision.

Against this background of frustration and bewilderment a few religious leaders rose to restore the confidence of Muslims in their faith and bind them together in a firm religious nexus as a community. They felt the need of a new orientation in Islam through reinterpretation of its doctrines in the context of the emerging socio-economic needs. They laid emphasis on the pursuit of the ideals of Islam as embodied in the *Quran* and *hadis*, to remove the hiatus between the inner spirit of religion and its external visible form, to abandon outworn ideas and reconstruct socio-economic institutions. Equally important was their emphasis on the cultivation of moral values like piety, austerity, love and rectitude. However, the social reformers and saints of the eighteenth century confined their activities to the realm of religion and did not seek to influence the contemporary political trends by identifying themselves with any pressure group in the imperial court. Their message had a rational and humanitarian appeal and was in accord with moral ideas—toleration, mutual sympathy and brotherly love—ideas which are embedded in Indian philosophy and thought. Their attempts at revivalism were no doubt related to the primary sources of religion, but were in no way calculated to foster feelings of hatred and prejudice against the non-believers.

### *Shah Wali-ullah (1702-1762)*

The most prominent among the religious reformers who flourished in the eighteenth century was Shah Wali-ullah, the son of Shah 'Abdul Rahim, a learned scholar and mystic of the Naqshbandi order. He received his early education from his father who taught him Islamic theology and philosophy and initiated him in the principal mystic orders. Shah 'Abdul Rahim was one of the compilers of *al-Fatawa'-al 'Alamgiriya*; and he combined in his mystic system the doctrines of the *Naqshbandi* order with monistic ideas of Ibn-ul 'Arabi. The combination of the two fundamental modes of living the good life—*shari'at* and *tariqat*—made him develop a balanced personality. During his stay in Hijaz the young student attended lectures on *hadis* and jurisprudence in the schools of Shaikh Abu Tahir Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Kurdi and Shaikh Sulaiman Magharibi. These Arab scholars were known for their liberal approach to dogma. Their teachings fostered in him the spirit of compromise between extremes, he had inherited from his father. Wali-ullah returned to Delhi on 9 July 1732 and started teaching in the school of his father—*Madrasah-i Rahimiya*. Soon he attracted attention in religious circles for his erudite scholarship, original thinking, upright character and tremend-

ous zeal for reform. "His seminary became the nucleus of a revolutionary movement for the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam. Scholars flocked there from every nook and corner of the country. Indeed the Wali-ullah movement symbolized the dawn of a new age in the realm of Muslim theology and literature."<sup>1</sup>

Shah Wali-ullah was confronted with the complex problems of state and society, of religion and economics. He found Indian Islam in a state of chaos which multiplicity of creeds and sects, beliefs and opinions had produced. There was a conflict between the scholastics and the esoteric thinkers; between the jurists and the traditionalists, and between the jurists of the four schools of jurisprudence. Some believed in blindly following the authority, others found a wide field for interpretation (*ijtihad*). Some preferred the use of Greek philosophy in explaining the principles of religion, others opposed the application of reason and logic to their study and exposition. Besides, there was difference of opinion on issues of politics and social relationship, and on causes responsible for the internal disintegration of society.<sup>2</sup> The upholders of these different schools of thought presented varied pictures of the original faith, and each believing himself in possession of the truth, prescribed his own method for its resilience and reconstruction.

Shah Wali-ullah was profoundly disturbed by discovering tensions in society and the bouts of scepticism and despair the Muslims were subjected to. He approached the fundamental problems from a view point which was both rational and pragmatic, and after probing deeply into the genesis of religious disputes with an open mind, uninfluenced by any particular ideology, found the *via media* between the two extreme positions in the unity underlying diverse schools of thought. He held that ambiguity and discord could be eliminated by the application of Islamic princi-

<sup>1</sup> K.A. Nizami, "Shah Wali-ullah Dehlvi and Indian Politics in the 18th century," *Islamic Culture*, XXV, 1951, 133, 134. For a short biographical account and for a detailed discussion of his philosophy and thought, vide Maulvi Rahim Bakhsh, *Hiyat-i-Wali*, Delhi, 1319 H; Maulana Ubaid-ullah Sindhi, *Shah Wali-ullah aur unki Siyasi Tahrirkh*, Lahore, 1952; *Al-Furqan*, *Shah Wali-ullah Number*, Bareilly, 1360; *Anfas-ul 'Arifin*, Delhi, 1335; Abul'ala Muhammad Isma'il, Urdu translation of *Wali-ullah's Hujjat-ullah-al Baligha*, Lahore, 1, 76-83. Shaikh M. Ikram, *Raud-i Kawfir*; K.A. Nizami, *Shah Wali-ullah Ke Siyasi Maktubat*, Aligarh, 1951. Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*; Fazal Mahmud Asiri, *Shah Wali-ullah*, *Visva-Bharti Annals*, IV, 1951; "Philosophy of Shah Wali-ullah", *Oriental College Magazine*, XXXIII, May 1957; "Ijtihad," *Muslim World*, XLV, 4 October, 1955; K.A. Nizami, "Socio-Religious Movements in Indian Islam," *India and Contemporary Islam*, Simla, 1971. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent*.

<sup>2</sup> Tara Chand, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, I, 179.

ples contained in the *Quran* and *hadiths*, the two chief sources of guidance. He strove to harmonize intellect and emotion; to effect a compromise between the doctrines of ontological monism and phenomenological monism; and to unite mysticism and theology in their purer forms. The impact of his enquiring mind, his independent judgment and his keen insight into the basic issues of interpretation was keenly felt in all spheres. Synthesis was the core of his religious philosophy. Unlike his great contemporary, Ibn-i 'Abdul Wahhab (1703-1787), he was not a repudiator of what Islam had achieved in history, or a wrecker of all traditions that had gathered round the social institutions in the course of their development. Although Wali-ullah disapproved of indulgence in pomp and ceremony at the expense of the poor people, he was much more moderate in his criticism and always stressed the need of reform and correction. "His Islam is, therefore," writes Smith, "more comprehensive and richer than the Wahhabi, also more flexible."<sup>1</sup> In connection with reform in Islam his professed aims were: (1) to reinterpret the doctrines of Islam in the light of changed conditions; (2) to reform and revitalize religious institutions; (3) to reinforce the social cohesion of Muslims; and (4) to rejuvenate and strengthen the Muslim community which was expected to present a common front against external aggression.

Shah Wali-ullah believed that to meet the challenge of skepticism, prevalent in his time, it was necessary to place Islam on a rational basis. "The *Quran* has no desire to convince any one except through clear reason," he wrote in the introduction to *Hujjat-ullah-al Baligha*, "Time has come when the religious law of Islam should be brought into the open fully dressed in reason and argument."<sup>2</sup> He thought of himself, as under divine instruction, an instrument chosen by God to proclaim the truth and point out the direction in which Muslims were to move for their survival and well-being. He called himself *qa'im-ul zaman*, the religious pivot of the new order, entrusted with the task of reinterpreting Islam and bringing about reform. He explained its meaning in the following words: "When God desires to institute a new order in the world, he makes me an instrument for the realization of that purpose." To make his point clearer he stated: "One of the blessings of God upon me is that he had made me the spokesman, the philosopher, the leader and the guide of this age. I do not say it with any sense of pride."<sup>3</sup> He was thus the first Indian Muslim who felt the urge for reinterpreting all aspects of Islamic faith in the light of a rational inquiry and reshape the outmoded institutions in

<sup>1</sup> W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, 1957, 45.

<sup>2</sup> *Hujjat-ullah-al Baligha*, 28.

<sup>3</sup> *Fuyuzal Harmayan*, 62-89.

accordance with new socio-economic changes which were taking place in the country.<sup>1</sup>

Shah Wali-ullah declared that the doors of *ijtihad* were not closed and there was wide scope to make an exhaustive endeavour to understand the basic principles of the holy law. He maintained that interpretation of the tenets of Islam should respond to the specific requirements of the contemporary society; and the conclusions of the earlier scholars should not be recognized as final if they were not applicable to the new socio-economic changes. Every Muslim possessing requisite qualification and knowledge had a right to enquire into the real meaning of the religious law and exercise his own free will in interpreting it. But he did not concede this right to the ignorant who were in any case to follow the specific and well-defined injunctions laid down by the jurists. "But to adhere to the regulations evolved by an *Imam* if the true sayings of Prophet contradicted them was forbidden. The Prophet always made only such things obligatory on the faithful which were simple and easy for them to observe."<sup>2</sup> He thus sought to break the chain of *taqlid* or simple acceptance of religious truths on authority, and explored new dimensions in the new religious consciousness of the Muslims. In keeping with his general attitude of compromise he attempted to reconcile the opposing groups engaged in conflict over the issues of interpretation by emphasizing the underlying unity among them. "The renewed emphasis on *ijtihad* is Shah Wali-ullah's main contribution to modernist speculative thinking in Muslim India."<sup>3</sup> Dr. Muhammad Iqbal drew inspiration from his concept of interpretation for solving the socio-religious problems of the Muslims in India.

Shah Wali-ullah attempted to bring the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence — Hanfi, Hambli, Shafi and Malki — closer to one another and declared that recourse to different schools in different matters was permissible as circumstances demanded or as it suited one's convenience in a particular situation.<sup>4</sup> He had preference for Malkite school of *fiqh* and used *Mu'watt'a* as means to evolve a synthesis between conflicting and divergent interpretations. Imam Malik bin Anas was a working judge, dealing with real cases every day; he had based his system of deduction on tradition and *sunna* rather than on pure *ijma'* (agreement) and *qiyas* (analogy). Wali-ullah held that *Mu'watt'a*, written by Imam Malik, was a common factor between these two systems and could help one to form a balanced view in

<sup>1</sup> "Shah Waliyullah had read the portents of change clearly on the horizon and had warned his contemporaries of the impending blow to their out-of-date systems of thought and behaviour," *India and Contemporary Islam*, 98.

<sup>2</sup> *Raud-i Kawfir*, 356-359.

<sup>3</sup> *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, 205.

<sup>4</sup> *India and Contemporary Islam*, 100.

doctrinal and judicial rules. Though Wali-ullah did not concern himself with a detailed discussion of all the aspects of jurisprudence, yet he wrote a brief and succinct treatise on the subject, *Insaf fi Biyan Sahab-ul Ikhtilaf*, in which he deals with the origin and development of *fiqh* and *hadis*. He has analyzed in the work the main characteristics of all the four systems separately and examined the basic issues which had caused endless controversies among jurists and 'ulema. In reply to a question as to which school of *fiqh* he belonged, Wali-ullah stated :<sup>1</sup>

I try my best to combine all the points of agreement in all the schools and in matters of variance I adhere to what is supported by the genuine *hadis* which thanks God I can, do. If any body asks me for a *fatwa*, I give it according to whatever school he wishes to adhere to.

Shah Wali-ullah urged the theologians to take a keen interest in the study and diffusion of *hadis* and *Quran* as they had been overshadowed by jurisprudence that qualified the Muslims for judicial services. He found the *hadis* literature replete with spurious as well as genuine sayings of the Holy Prophet and this confused amalgamation led to misunderstanding and distrust of the validity of Islamic doctrines. The people did not regard *hadis* as an infallible source of guidance to shape their religious and social ways of life. Wali-ullah made conscious efforts to remove these defects by simplifying the methods of teaching and framing rules to distinguish the genuine sayings from the spurious ones. He divided the entire literature of *hadis* into two categories: the first containing only such *hadis* which were commonly recognized as genuine like *Mu'watt'a Malik*, *Sahi Bukhari*, and *Sahi Muslim*, and secondly the collection of those *hadis* which were generally regarded as based on dubious authority. Hence he wrote several books, including commentaries on *Mu'watt'a Malik* both in Persian and Arabic.<sup>2</sup> Bold and original as thinker, Wali-ullah felt the necessity to popularize the *Quran* and make its message more widely known, so that a large section of society could draw maximum benefit from it. With this object in view, he translated the *Quran* into Persian, a language which was understood by the majority of people. After his death his two sons, Rafi'-u'd-din and Shaikh

<sup>1</sup> *Raud-i Kawsir*, 354, 359; *India and Contemporary Islam*, 100.

<sup>2</sup> His works on *hadis* are as follows:

<sup>1</sup> *Musaffa*, Commentary on *Mu'watt'a Malik* in Persian.

<sup>2</sup> *Mussawa*, Commentary on *Mu'watt'a Malik* in Arabic.

<sup>3</sup> *Majmua Rasa-il Arabia*.

<sup>4</sup> *Sharha-Tarajum Abwab Sahi Bukhari*.

<sup>5</sup> *Chahal Hadis*.

*Raud-i Kawsir*, 353. *Al-Furqan*, 283-85.

'Abdul Qadir, produced two separate renderings of the *Quran* into Urdu that had far-reaching effects on the spiritual and religious life of the Muslim community in India. 'Wali-ullah wrote a treatise, *Muqqadima fi tarjumat-ul Quran-ul Majid*, on the problems of translating the *Quran*, and a book on the science of exegesis, *al-Fawz-ul Kabir fi Usul-ul Tafsir*. 'Allamah Rashid Raza has paid homage to his remarkable services for the revival of religious learning in these words:<sup>1</sup>

If the *'ulema* among the Indian Muslims had not taken interest in the study of *hadis*, the subject would have disappeared from the East, for since the 18th century, this subject had fallen into deterioration in countries like Egypt, Iraq and Hijaz.

Shah Wali-ullah acquired a profound knowledge of mysticism as well as practical experience of it in the course of spiritual discipline as is evident from the illuminating treatment of the subject in his famous work *Ham'at*. In this work he has traced the growth of the institution in its historical context from days of the Prophet to Ibn-ul-'Arabi, discussed the characteristics of the mystic way of life, and laid down instructions for the seekers after truth. He maintains that self-discipline, the basis of human progress, can be attained by cultivating the virtues of self-purification, humility, patience and sagacity in social behaviour. The *salik* (seeker after truth) should root out from his heart evils like anger, jealousy, hypocrisy and abuse of others, for these impede the progress towards the realization of the spiritual goal. According to him Islam has two aspects, first, *zahiri* (external) which is relevant to the preservation of *shari'at* laws and values, and this is the concern of the *'ulema* and the jurists; and secondly, the *batini* (internal) which relates to the spiritual betterment of the community, and this is the responsibility of the *sufis* and the saints. As these two elements are inter-related and one meant to uphold the religious structure of Islam, no kind of conflict, Shah Wali-ullah holds, should arise between the advocates of *shari'at* and *tariqat*.<sup>2</sup> Though himself a mystic, he was opposed to the 'latitudinarian nonchalance,' deplored the degeneration in which popular mystics had fallen and subjected to his scathing criticism the then current superstitions and innovations tolerated in the name of *tariqat*.

He believed that through a dynamic use of these two active principles, both the structural and spiritual aspects of Muslim religious life could be

<sup>1</sup> *Al-Farqan*, 220, 238.

<sup>2</sup> *Wali-ullah*, *Ham'at* Urdu translation by Muhammad Sarwar, Lahore, 1946, 36, 45, 53, 73, 79, 184, 197. He has explained various other aspects of mysticism in *Al-Qul-ul Jamil*, *Altaf-udus* and *Khair-i-Kasir*.

resuscitated, and the healthy balance between the form and the spirit of religion could be restored!<sup>1</sup>

Endowed with a unique and penetrating insight, Wali-ullah could discern through the disharmonies in religious doctrines, a spiritual nexus and strike a conciliatory note between opposing groups and differing opinions. For instance, he sought to prove that the two doctrines, *wahdat-ul-wajud* (unityism) and *wahdat-ul-shuhud*, though apparently distinct from one another, were one in essence.<sup>2</sup> If real facts are taken into account and studied without the garb of similes and metaphors both the doctrines will appear almost the same.<sup>3</sup> Likewise, he tried to remove prejudices and misconceptions among Shī'as and Sunnis who were at loggerheads on the problem of the caliphate. He urged the Shī'as to hold the first three caliphs in respect and at the same time asked the Sunnis to consider Shī'as as Muslims. He had deep faith in the spiritual excellence of the fourth caliph, Hazrat 'Alī, and held him in great respect. Thus, he directed all his talents and energies towards creating unity among diverse religious

<sup>1</sup> *India and Contemporary Islam*, 100.

<sup>2</sup> The doctrine of *wahdat-ul-wajud* (Unity of Being), propounded by Ibn-ul-'Arabi in his two famous works, *Futuhāt-i Makkiya* and *Fusus-ul-Hikam* implied that all Being is essentially one, the universe of space, time and causation was merely phenomenal, the manifestation of divine substance or the One Reality. God is the First, the Last, the Outward and the Inward. "He is the substance of what is manifested and the substance of what remains at the time of manifestation." Ibn-ul-'Arabi believed that in man the Real and Phenomenal meet and the divine in him, which is obscured by the transient, strives to attain to the knowledge of his true being. "As a monist he held that all forms of religious belief were relatively true. These views were modified by Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1563-1626) who put forward the theory of *wahdat-ul-shuhud* (Unity of Appearance) which means to see One; namely nothing but One is seen by the Sufi." For instance, "the *wajudi* would deny the existence of the stars while looking at the sun, because he is overwhelmed by the spectacle and cannot see any thing except the sun itself. The *shuhudi*, on the other hand, knows that the stars do exist, though he also sees only the sun. His consciousness is in the stage of *ain-ul-yaqin*, while that of the *wajudi* remains at the lower stage of *ilm-ul-yaqin*." Moreover, identification with Reality is not the only mystic experience, but separation is the essence of love, and obedience its highest stage; the mystic cry should be 'I am His creature' (*ana-'abdūh*). According to him, the correct dictum should be 'All is from Him' (*hamah-az-ust*), and not 'All is He' (*hamah ust*). For a detailed discussion of these doctrines, Yohaman Friendman, *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi*, Montreal; 1971, 59-61; Burhan Ahmad Faruqi, *Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid*, Lahore, 1940; *Rud-i, Kawsir*, 193-198, 362; *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, 183-188.

<sup>3</sup> Mir Valiuddin, *Reconciliation between Ibn-'Arabi's Wahdat-i Wajud and the Mujaddid's Wahdat-i Shuhud*, *Islamic Culture*, 1951, 51.

creeds and bringing about a resurgence in society.<sup>1</sup>

From his ideology of religious reform, based on the principle of synthesis, sprang the concept of social justice on which Wali-ullah envisaged to design the whole structure of human relationships. To him social justice meant that human relations, rooted in financial transactions, civil liberty, property, contract and family life, were to be governed by harmonious adjustment and mutual cooperation. This kind of social justice could be established by the same process of purification and inner discipline that was necessary to reorganize the religious life. Social institutions were to be purged of a number of insidious evils which were sapping the inner life of society. His aim was not only to level off distinctions of caste and calling, but to effect a change in the ethos and behaviour pattern of individuals forming diverse ethnic and occupational groups. He contemplated a righteous and well-integrated society in which mutual ill-will and antagonism, caused by grim competition, will yield place to mutual sympathy, fellow-feeling, sanity and sacrifice. The term social justice included two elements : '*adl* and '*tawazun* — justice and equilibrium — essential conditions for establishing peace and equity in society. One of the important factors that disrupted the equilibrium of society in his-times was grinding poverty in the midst of affluence. Concentration of wealth in a few hands and exploitation of the downtrodden produced civil strife, resulting in anarchic conditions. The strong and influential men — office-holding aristocrats, feudal lords and big merchants — exploited the classes involved in production and spent the ill-gotten wealth on their pursuit of pleasure. Heavy taxation on peasants, craftsmen, travellers and traders became an intolerable burden and adversely affected trade and agriculture.<sup>2</sup>

Such a system based on exploitation and oppression of the poor was doomed to collapse and only restoration of justice in human affairs and the re-establishment of harmony could save society from the impending ruin. Shah Wali-ullah was opposed to concentration of wealth as well as to its complete abolition; he, on the other hand, favoured moderation in the pursuit of economic growth, balance between materialism and spirituality, without which social harmony in society could not be achieved.<sup>3</sup> Spiritual progress was not attainable by a society that was starved of the basic needs of life or that was suffering from a lack of economic equilibrium. He stressed the virtues of industry, economy, charity and plain-living.<sup>4</sup> He called upon the *amirs* to change the pattern of their living and transform themselves according to the moral

<sup>1</sup> *Ham'at; Rud-i Kawsir*, 373-79.

<sup>2</sup> *Hujjat-Allah-al Baligha*, 119, 122, 125, 267-269.

<sup>3</sup> *Hujjat-Allah-al Baligha*, 267, 268.

<sup>4</sup> *The Muslim Community*, 187.



and ethical principles of Islam. They should shun extravagance, refrain from oppressing the weak and selflessly serve all human beings. He urged the soldiers to give up wine and other kinds of intoxication, fight against evils, and avoid extracting money from the helpless by means of coercion and fraud. He asked the artisans and craftsmen to eschew non-Islamic practices and observe the moral code contained in the Divine law. They should not attempt to hoard gain through unfair means. He forcefully criticized all those *sufis* who cloaked their worldly desires and personal ambitions in the respected garb of mysticism. The *sufis* were divided into diverse and often hostile groups and sharply opposed with one another over a variety of philosophical and ritualistic issues. They exploited the humble folk by preying upon their superstitions, and every pseudo-*sufi* considered himself a permanent spiritual *peshwa*, though in reality he was himself misguided and led his followers away from the true path of religion. He warned the people against yielding to the spell of those *sufis* who did not follow the rules of *shari'at*. "The path of God is straight; you should walk along it, do not traverse other roads which will take you away from the goal towards God." He advised the '*ulema* to go to villages and towns to preach sermons and propagate the true form of religion. They should discard rigidity and narrowmindedness in their approach to religious problems. The Muslims should do hard work to earn their livelihood and for their income they should not depend on the *bait-ul mal*. He denounced all such '*ulema*, *sufis*, *mansabdars*, poets, devotees and officers who demanded financial help from the state without properly discharging their duties or contributing to the accumulation of public wealth.<sup>1</sup>

### *Mazhar Jan-i Janan*

Another great religious reformer who successfully carried on the mission of reform during this period was Mazhar Jan-i Janan (1702-1781). He was the most celebrated saint of the *Naqshbandi* order which he reorganized and named it *Shamsiya Khalifas*, after his name Shams-u'd-din.<sup>2</sup> He believed in the concept of *wahdat-ul shahud* and opposed those who wanted to reconcile it with that of *wahdat-ul wajud*. His disciple, Ghulam Yahya, criticized Shah Wali-ullah in his famous work, *Kalimat-ul Haqq*, for treating the two doctrines as identical. However, Mazhar Jan-i Janan

<sup>1</sup> *Hujjat-Allah-al Baligha*, 270-279; Manazir Ahsan Gilani, *Tazkirah Shah Wali-ullah*, Karachi, 1559, 89-104.

<sup>2</sup> *Kalimat-i Taiyyabat*, 71, 72.

was more liberal' and tolerant in his attitude to the religion of the Hindus whom he gave the status of *ahl-ul kitab*. He held that the *vedas*, their sacred books, had' been revealed' through an angel called Brahama, and' God graced this land' also with Prophets, though their names have not been mentioned in the *Quran*. All the sects of Hindus unanimously believe in the unity of God, in the creation and destruction of the universe and in the day of judgment; they possess excellent knowledge of philosophy and metaphysics, and a unique capacity for devotion, ascetic exercises and mystic intuition. Prostration of Hindus before their idols was an expression of reverence and' not an act of confusing of any gods with the True God. Even belief in transmigration did not imply *kufr*.<sup>1</sup> To quote the *Quran*, "And certainly we sent messengers before thee. There are some of them that we have mentioned to thee, and there are others we have not mentioned to thee." He advised' his disciples that in every matter Mujjaddid Saheb (Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi) should not' be followed without proper inquiry.<sup>2</sup> He tried to create an atmosphere of better understanding and mutual'harmony among the Hindus and the Muslims, and also improve the relations between the Shi'as and the Sunnis. All his life he endeavoured, through preaching and writing, to promote feelings of amity and love among different sections of Indian society who were passing through a period of'political and'social' crisis.

Having attained spiritual perfection under the guidance of Nur Muhammad Badauni, an eminent saint of the period, Mazhar Jan-i Janan settled in Delhi and' devoted himself to the task of reforming the religious and moral standards of the people along the lines of *'shari 'at* reorganizing the *Naqshbandi* order and extending the sphere of its activities. Under his leadership the order flourished and its saints gained remarkable success in the *propagation of his message*. He was a man of incisive intellect, strong will and austere morality; his affable temperament, hospitality, erudition and saintly virtues made him a popular figure in Delhi.<sup>3</sup> He composed Urdu poetry and his *nom de plume* was *Mazhar*. Mir Taqi Mir speaks very highly of him and' describes him, "as a *darveshi* full of' grace and accomplishments, incomparable sense of honour and enjoying esteem of the highest order."<sup>4</sup> He imparted' religious instruction with a missionary zeal to all those who approached' him in search of Divine light.

<sup>1</sup> *Kalimat-i Taiyyabat*, Letter No. 14. Shaikh Muhammad Ikram has translated the whole letter and explained in detail the meaning and significance of Mirza Jan's statement.

<sup>2</sup> *Kalimat-i Taiyyabat*, 72.

<sup>3</sup> *Sarv-i Azad*, 231. *Ma 'mulat-i Mazhariya*, 15, 16, 17.

<sup>4</sup> *Nukat-ul Shu'ra*, 5.

He carefully selected his disciples and imposed on them a severe mystic discipline. They had to undergo rigorous mystic exercises and the tests of penitence and poverty. Having thus trained and inspired a large number of disciples, he allowed them to proceed to different parts of the country to set up independent *khanqhas* and disseminate the teachings of the *Naqshbandi* order. He is reported to have despatched nearly two hundred *khalifahs* to various towns and villages of India for the purpose of preaching religious sermons and accomplishing his mission. He continued to keep a careful watch over the activities of his *khalifahs* even after their departure from Delhi; he always took keen interest in their personal problems and dealt with the difficulties they had to face in carrying out their missionary programme. His contribution to the organization and expansion of the *Naqshbandi* order lay in the fact that he prepared a band of devoted and selfless saints, fired with missionary fervour, to preach and propagate the ideals of mysticism. He wrote to one of his disciples:<sup>1</sup>

Pursue my mission vigorously, for there are few wise scholars and *sufis* in this age. With patience keep yourself busy in your task and brook no fear. Spend your time in imparting spiritual training and religious knowledge to others.

Mazhar Jan-i Janan gained great credit with the Rohillas, and when he left Delhi, owing to disturbances, he chose their land for his next abode. His scholarship, piety and austerity attracted the attention of the king and nobles, and elicited praise from famous theologians and saints alike. Shah Wali-ullah admired and honoured him for his strict adherence to the laws of *shari'at*. Mazhar Jan-i Janan led an extremely austere life; he lived in a rented house and took simple food generally brought from the market. He did not accept any gift in the form of money or land from either the monarch or an *amir*. Muhammad Shah offered him, through his *wazir*, revenue-free land, but the stern saint declined to accept the gift. Nawab Asaf Jah I once sent him an amount of rupees thirty thousand as gift, but Mazhar would not even touch it; upon this the Nawab requested him to distribute the money among the poor and the needy, but this request was also not conceded to. Such was his disdain for earthly riches and so firm was he in his attitude of indifference towards worldly-minded persons and politicians. He asked his disciples to completely reject all earthly ties and break contacts with the rulers and the official class. He worked to promote the cause of religious reform under distressing circumstances,

<sup>1</sup> *Ma'mulat-i Mazhariya*, 33; *Kalimat-i Taiyyabat*, 24, 32, 35, 37, 38, 42, 49, 65.

and he urged his followers to develop self-reliance and inner strength of spirit to bear trials and tribulations in the arduous campaign of spreading his spiritual gospel. He constantly laid emphasis on the inwardness of faith that could be realized by the purification of soul and the cultivation of an intense love of God. Besides devotion and piety, he stressed the moral values of simplicity, humility, self-restraint, contentment, and self-reliance, and denounced avarice, mundane interests and faith in external support. He taught his followers to help the poor and the downtrodden and attend to the needs of the common man, and strive to reform men's ways and turn their hearts to the worship of God.<sup>1</sup>

### Khawaja Mir Dard—1719-1785

Mir Dard<sup>2</sup> was a leading spokesman of *Tariq-i Muhammadi*, a new mystic order, founded by his father Khwaja Nasir Andleeb (1693-1759) who was an eminent scholar and saint of the *Nagshbandi* order. Khwaja Nasir had made a deep and thorough study of all the prevailing beliefs and creeds, and concluded that their emergence was the result of factors which had confused the meaning and content of the concept of *tauhid*, the very foundation of the spiritual edifice of Islam. He criticized different schools of thought and their claims to finality. He asserted that the basic concept of *tauhid*, as expounded and preached by Prophet Muhammad, was the only source of true knowledge and the fountain of eternal life and light. He painstakingly worked to reform Islam and restore its original purity and simplicity as a mode of worship. By

<sup>1</sup> *Kalimat-i Taiyyabat*, 26, 30, 31, 40, 42, 46, 52, 74; *Muqamat-i Mazhari*, 34, 36; *Ma'mulat-i Mazhariya*, 127; Abdul Razzaq Qureshi, *Mirza Mazhar Jan-i-Janan aur unka Urdu Kalam*, 59-69. Mirza Jan-i-Janan left a large number of successors who worked for the spiritual progress of society. Shah Ghulam 'Ali has given a list of 48 *khalifas* in his *Muqamat-i Mazhari*. The most important ones among them were : Qazi San'-ullah, Maulvi Na'im-ullah, Maulvi Ghulam Yahya and Shah Ghulam 'Ali.

<sup>2</sup> On the life and philosophy of Khwaja Mir Dard, no exhaustive or monographic study published in English seems to be available. Annemarie Schimmel has devoted one full section on the discussion of Dard's spiritual thought in her latest scholarly study of Islamic mysticism. *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, 1975, 373-383. Waheed Akhtar's *Khawaja Mir Dard—Tasawwuf and Sh'airi*, is an admirable monographic study in Urdu. The contemporary Urdu *Tazkirahs* and Mir Dard's own works form the basic source of information for the study under review. Some of these are: Mushafi, *Tazkirah-i Hindi*; Mir Hasan, *Tazkirah Shau'ra-i Urdu*; Mir Taqi Mir, *Nukat-us Shau'ra*; Muhammad Husain Azad, *Ab-i Hiyat*; Khwaja Andleeb, *Nala-i Andleeb*; Khwaja Mir Dard, *Ilm-ul Kitab, Sahifa Waridat, Nala-i Dard; Diwan-i Dard*, edited by Habib-ur Rahman Khan Sherwani, 1922, Introduction.

pruning the over-growth of the once simple and unified faith he tried to initiate powerful movement of spiritual thought in the Muslim society suffering from the baneful effects of internal schisms. He held that the Divine law, contained in the *Quran* and *hadis*, was the common meeting ground for Muslims of different shades of opinion, and revival of faith would wean them away from the speculative philosophers, theologians and extreme *sufis*, and unite all of them in the service of God and man.<sup>1</sup>

But Khwaja Nasir could not give concrete shape to his ideas till he was himself converted to the mystic way of life by Imam Husain. Once the Khwaja fell in a state of deep meditation and remained shut up in a room for a week. He observed absolute silence all these days, was without food or sleep, and had no contact with the outside world. Only his son, Mir Dard, sat at the door of the room and he also denied to himself the comforts of food and sleep. When Khwaja Nasir opened the door, he out of affection kissed the forehead of his son and told him:<sup>2</sup>

Oh Muhammadi, do not worry and bother, but feel delighted and reassured, because God Almighty has blessed us with special favour and bestowed on us a rare honour. The soul of Imam Husain entered into my heart and kindly initiated me into a new mystic way and urged me to call it *Tariq-i Muhammadi* as it had been professed and propounded by the Prophet of God. When I requested him to allow me to call it by his name because it had been revealed by him, the Imam replied that all of us were directly connected with Prophet Muhammad, establishment of new sects under different names was the work of others.

Mir Dard was thus the first disciple of Khwaja Nasir who instructed him in the principles and discipline of the *Tariq-i Muhammadi*. At the age of thirty-nine Mir Dard wrote his famous treatise *Sahifa-i Waridat*, which consists of 111 *waridat* or mystic experiences, dealing with the philosophy and problems of *tauhid* in the light of the teachings of the *Quran* and the Prophet. He also wrote a copious commentary to it under the title of *'Ilm-ul Kitab* in which he elucidated the theories regarding *tauhid* and mysticism already dealt with in his early work. After the death of his father in 1759 Mir Dard became the head of this order, and undertook the responsibility for its organization and expansion.

According to Mir Dard the two important concepts of *tauhid*, signified by the terms *whadat-ul wujud* and *wahadat-ul shahud*, were not there in the days of Prophet Muhammad. Whatever the Prophet stated or hinted at

<sup>1</sup> *'Ilm-ul Kitab*, 84, 87.

<sup>2</sup> *'Ilm-ul Kitab*, 85, 86.

regarding the existence and attributes of God the Faithful treated as final. But after his death skepticism became widespread and this gave birth to different sects and creeds. Some devotees, illumined with the light of divinity, discovered in their mystic absorption a new interpretation of *tauhid-i mutlaq* and gave it the name of *tauhid-i wajudi*, while others putting a different construction on *tauhid*, came to call it, *tauhid-i shahudi*. In fact both derived their inspiration from the *Quran* and *hadis* and made their pronouncements on the basis of their direct mystic experience. However, the former relied on intellect and ecstasy, while the latter depended on *shari'at* as the sole guide for the attainment of knowledge and self-realization. The essence of the two doctrines was the same, only their approach to meaning was different.<sup>1</sup>

“That speaking objectively *wahdat-ul wajud* (unity of Being) is absolutely invalid, it is not the truth about the Reality. Objectively, *wahdat-ul shahud* (apparentism) alone is valid. But speaking subjectively, i.e. in the bearing of the *salik* and his spiritual growth, both the doctrines are directed to the same end, viz. to dissociate him from *ma-siwa*, or things other than Allah.”<sup>2</sup> Mir Dard criticized those *sufis* who, without understanding the underlying meaning of these complex doctrines banded with them while in conversation with their ignorant followers. The theologians were involved in tracing the origin and meaning of words, while the philosophers were engaged in speculation and hair-splitting theories to determine the relationship between God and man. Their theoretical knowledge was insufficient to fathom the depths of *tauhid*, and was no avail without spiritual realization. He appealed to the advocates of the two concepts to give up futile discussion and adopt the *Tariq-i Muhammadi* which was the fountain-head of spirituality in Islam.<sup>3</sup>

Khwaja Dard proclaimed that among all the prevailing modes and methods prescribed by different mystic orders for spiritual attainment, the *Tariq-i Muhammadi* occupied a unique position, for it was a pure creed unalloyed by any sets of belief or formulas which had been borrowed from foreign sources. The *Tariq-i Muhammadi* was based on absolute love of God and true adherence to *shari'at*, and by traversing this path one could easily comprehend both the inward and the outward aspects of Reality. Mir Dard warned the people against calling it a new sect or order. The term *Tariq* signified the way of worship of Allah as preached and practised by His Prophet; it was the pivot round which the whole system of Islam moved; it was the central radiance of inspiration from which all lights of

<sup>1</sup> *‘Ilm-ul Kitab*, 610, 611, 612.

<sup>2</sup> *‘Ilm-ul Kitab*, 184, 185; *Khwaja Mir Dard—Tasawwuf aur Sh'airi*, 128-138.

<sup>3</sup> *‘Ilm-ul Kitab*, 169, 617, 618.

spirituality emanated. "When the light of *tauhid-i mutlaq* illumines the heart of a true Muhammadi, he no longer stands in need of any external help of guidance. The pure water of *ma'rif-i tauhid* will wash off the dust of doubts, and the *salik* will pass on from the stage of annihilation (*fana*) to that of satisfaction (*raja*)."<sup>1</sup> Another trait of Muhammadi was that he did not indulge in polemics and scholastic debates on the issues of the unity of God and His relation with the universe and man, but unquestioningly carried out all the commands of God and vigorously performed the obligatory duties.<sup>2</sup>

I am not a *sufi* that may open a new chapter on mysticism, nor am I a Mullah that I may start discussion and disputation. I am a sincere adorer of Muhammad, and I am intoxicated with his pure wine. The *sufi* is engrossed in mysticism and the Mullah is busy in teaching the rules of grammar. Oh Dard, we the lovers attend the school of Love to read our lessons from the *nala-i andlib* (the melody of the nightingale).<sup>3</sup>

He preferred the use of the word *nur* (light) for *wajud* (Being) and he explained that both the words conveyed the same meaning and implied self-manifestation without the help of another. "Allah is the light of the Heaven and the Earth." He held that survitude (*'abdiyat*) to God was better than nearness (*qurb*) to Him; for the Prophet called himself a slave (*'abd*) first and *rasul* afterwards.<sup>4</sup> He recognized the necessity of love of God but that love should be subjected to the limits set by Divine law. Like any true mystic of Islam, Khwaja Mir Dard emphasized the cultivation of moral and spiritual virtues by seekers after truth. A true believer, determined to tread the path of self-realization, should first purify his heart by suppressing the evil propensities of the self (*nafs*), vanity, anger and lust for worldly goods and glory; he should develop the virtues of trust in God (*tawakkul*), abstinence (*wara'a*), renunciation (*zuhad*), poverty (*fugr*) and patience (*sabr*).<sup>5</sup> By renunciation of the world he did not mean a life of retirement or severance of all earthly connections, but giving up interest in materialistic pursuits and rejecting the allurements of wealth, position and

<sup>1</sup> *'Ilm-ul Kitab*, 6, 85-88, 615. The *Tariq-i Muhammadi* is a comprehensive term which includes all the essential characteristics of *wahdat-ul wajud* and *whadat-ul shuhud*. The knowledge gained by Muhammadi is absolutely the real knowledge, and the *Kalam* of Muhammadi is in fact purely a commentary on the *Quran*. *'Ilm-ul Kitab*, 85, 161, 614, 615.

<sup>2</sup> *'Ilm-ul Kitab*, 614, 615.

<sup>3</sup> *Nala-i Dard*, 9; *'Ilm-ul Kitab*, 89.

<sup>4</sup> *'Ilm-ul Kitab*, 107.

<sup>5</sup> *'Ilm-ul Kitab, Waridat*, 24, 61, 74, 76.

honour. Mir Dard lived with his family and properly discharged his duties as its head. "I am of the world, yet live apart from others, very much as the *sam* (final beat) in the measure called *rupak* is outside the musical tune." While the state of anarchy and violence in the capital had forced the people to leave the city and migrate to various parts of the country, Khwaja Mir Dard continued to stay in Delhi; no change or event could perturb the serenity and calmness of his mind; he ever remained devoted to his mission, firm like a rock, unshaken in his self-confidence and trust in the mercy of God.<sup>1</sup>

Khwaja Mir Dard was not a fanatical theologian, opposed to the aesthetic aspects of life or hostile to other creeds. To him religion did not mean blind adherence to a set of rituals but selfless love of human beings. He believed that a true devotee was one who helped and solaced the people in their distress and loved the creatures of God without any distinction of rank or creed. In his attitude towards music he differed from other mystics belonging to the *Naqshbandi* order as he was fond of *sama'* (audition) and appreciated the performance of musicians. He was himself well-versed in music, and had composed *khayals*, *thumris* and *dhrupads*. But he never sent for any musicians; they visited his house on their own and sang whatever they preferred. He explained his position in these words: "I do not put music so high as do other mystics, nor do I rate it so low as the theologians concerned with externals of Islam do." His chief contribution to the philosophy of Islamic mysticism was the synthesis between absolute legalism and pure love of God. He tried to keep Islam free from syncretic and heterodox elements and put the concept of *tauhid* in true perspective.<sup>2</sup>

### Revival of the Chishti Order

The *Chishti* order (*silsilah*), introduced in India by Shaikh *Mu'in-u'd-din* Sijzi (1142-93) had gained considerable popularity during the Sultanate period. The *Chishti* saints had established *khanqahs* (communes) to train the seekers after truth in mystic discipline and devotion to the service of humanity as a means to attainment of spiritual exaltation. Their cosmopolitan outlook, the emphasis laid by them more on the inner spirit of religion than on formal theology and law, complete withdrawal from political affairs and rejection of royal patronage as well as worldly possessions made the *Chishti* saints popular and raised their prestige in society. This movement being in consonance with Indian spirit and character took roots in the religious life of the people. Some of these great mystics succeeded in creating a general spiritual ferment among the masses. To their

<sup>1</sup> *Tazkirah-i Shu'ara-i Urdu*, 97; *Ab-i Hiyat*, 225.

<sup>2</sup> *Tazkirah-i Hindi*, 92, 93; *Nala-i Dard*, 7; *A History of Urdu Literature*, 102.



*khanqahs* were drawn all sorts of people—the rich and the poor, the privileged as well as the downtrodden, and “the mystic teacher not only soothed their excited nerves but integrated their personalities to the highest point of harmony.”<sup>1</sup> Having carefully trained and prepared their disciples (*murids*) the *Chishti* mystics sent them to far flung corners of the country to set up their own centres, enroll followers and guide all those who turned to them in search of light and peace of mind.<sup>2</sup> Far from the atmosphere of courts and camps the disciples lived a humble life, associated themselves with the common men and worked for their moral uplift and spiritual betterment. The principal teacher mystic supervised from the centre the development and progress of all the *khanqahs* of the *silsilah* and directed the activities of his disciples. But after the death of Shaikh Nasir-u’d-din Chiragh-i Delhi in 1356,<sup>3</sup> the *Chishti silsilah* began to disintegrate and by the end of the fourteenth century it lost its cohesive character. Thereafter a number of devoted and distinguished saints appeared in different parts of the country, struggled hard for the dissemination of *Chishti* ideals and kept burning the torch of truth and light, but none of them could restore to the institution its old status and position.

It was in the eighteenth century that the *Chishti* order was revived, and reorganized by Shaikh Kalim-ullah (1650-1729) and his prominent successors. Shaikh Kalim-ullah had received *khilafat* (a certificate of succession) from Shaikh Muhiyu’d-din Abu Yusuf Yahyah al-Chishti, a great mystic of Medina, and on his return to Delhi he set up *khanqah* in the Khanim market. Attracted by his learning and piety a considerable number of students came from different parts of the country and lived in the *madrasah*. The Shaikh not only taught *hadis* and trained them in mystic discipline but also provided food and clothing to them. He infused fresh hope and inspiration among his followers, and as a result of his ceaseless efforts the *Chishti silsilah* regained its primacy in the religious life of the people. In conformity with the *Chishti* traditions he did not accept of any gift either in the form of money or grant of land from the king and nobles. Once Farrukh Siyar wanted to offer money to him, but the Shaikh declined to accept it. He used to say to his disciples, “We and you should not collect *tankas*, riches and commodities, but bring the hearts of the people together.” He was amicable, sagacious and kind-hearted; he forgave his

<sup>1</sup> *Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India During the Thirteenth Century*, 210.

<sup>2</sup> *Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India During the Thirteenth Century*, 214-19.

<sup>3</sup> For details of the life and career of Shaikh Nasir-u’d-din Mahmud Chiragh-i Delhi, see M. Habib, *Politics and Society during the Early Medieval Period*, I, 356-384.

worst foes who violently opposed him. A learned scholar and prolific writer, he wrote thirty-two books on different aspects of mysticism, including a commentary on the *Quran* under the title of *Quran-ul Quran*. His letters, addressed to his disciples, throw light on the unrest and turmoil through which society was passing, and bear testimony to his courage and zeal as a missionary and reformer. He acted with energy and self-control under the stress of unfavourable conditions, and made every effort to organize the *silsilah* by giving systematic training and direction to his disciples. In one of his letters he urged a disciple: "Sacrifice your comfort, rest and happiness in the propagation of God's message and the service of human beings. This is a great task to be accomplished, it will secure God's blessings." He advised them not to indulge in discussion on the issue of *wahadat-ul wujud*, and to refrain from expressing their views before every one. He further instructed them to establish cordial relations with the non-Muslims, live and work among the people, sympathize with their sorrows and help them in their needs.<sup>1</sup>

The most prominent successor of Shah Kalim-ullah was Shah Nizam-u'd din<sup>2</sup> who had established his *khanqah* in Aurangabad and devoted his whole life to promoting the cause of the *Chishti silsilah*. Following the pattern of his teacher in training and guiding those who joined his circle, Shah Nizam-u'd-din pursued with single-minded devotion the mission of spreading the ideals of the *Chishti* order. In the Deccan he was a source of inspiration for thousands of people who were drawn from far and near to seek his guidance. He exerted immeasurably great influence on the contemporary religious life and organized the *Chishti* order in the Deccan on firm foundations. He avoided coming into contact with the governor and official class, and persistently refused to accept any land or amount of money offered by them. Though fond of holding *sama'* (audition) he insisted on the observance of its rules, and always laid stress on following the principles of *shari'at* that led (*tariqat*) to the attainment of the ultimate spiritual goal. Nizam-ul Mulk Asaf Jah was his devoted disciple who

<sup>1</sup> K. A. Nizami, *Tarikh-i Masha'ikh-i Chisht*, 367-381, *Maktubat-i Shah Kalim-ullah*, 19, 39, 66, 72, 74, 95.

<sup>2</sup> He was born in Kakuri, a town in the district of Lucknow. He claimed his descent from Hazrat Shaikh Shahab-u'd-din Suharwardi. After completing his early education in his home-town, he went to Delhi, the centre of religious learning, and became the disciple of Shah Kalim-ullah. His teacher took keen interest in his education and training; he was sent to the Deccan to work in the army and preach religious sermons among the soldiers. He lived in many important towns of the Deccan, like Burhanpur and Sholapur; in the end he settled in Aurangabad. His famous *khalifahs* were Khwaja Nur-u'd-din and Khwaja Kamgar Khan. *Tarikh-i Masha'ikh-i Chist*, 227-32.

wrote a book about the saint's life and activities, entitled *Rashk-i Gulistan-i Iram*. Shah Nizam-u'd-din died in 1730.<sup>1</sup>

Another outstanding figure among an illustrious line of *Chishti* saints in the eighteenth century was Shah Fakhr-u'd-din,<sup>2</sup> son of Shah Nizam-u'd-din, who made Delhi the centre of his activities and provided a new motivating force to the *Chishti* organization. Shortly after the death of his father, Shah Fakhr-u'd-din took service at the age of 19 years in the army of Nasir Jang in the Deccan, but after a period of eight years, which he passed in meditation, prayers and mystical exercises, he resigned from the post and settled in Aurangabad to manage the affairs of the *khanqah* of his father. Soon the fame of his intellectual and spiritual attainments spread throughout the Deccan and a large number of people crowded his abode to seek his guidance in their mystic yearnings. He then proceeded to Delhi where he started teaching *hadis* in the *madrasah* of Ghazi-u'd-din Khan near Ajmeri Gate. He launched a vigorous propaganda to popularize the *Chishti* ideals of mysticism among the masses and due to his efforts the *silsilah* attained great success. He believed in the doctrine of *wahdat-ul-wajud* but avoided discussion of subtle and delicate point relevant to it in the general public. He adhered to the path of *shari'at* and urged his followers to act in accordance with the commands of the sacred canon. His piety, learning and polite manners impressed all those who came into contact with him. He had cordial relations with Shah 'Abdul 'Aziz and other members of his family. Shah 'Alam held him in great reverence and frequently visited his *khanqah*. Shah Fakhr-u'd-din suggested that the *khutba* in the Friday congregation should be recited in Urdu. He died in 1785 at the age of 73.<sup>3</sup>

### Growth of Urdu Literature

The first half of the eighteenth century that witnessed the decline of the Mughal power was the most glorious period for the development and progress of Urdu literature. During this period Urdu poetry acquired a definite form, content and style; it gained the position of a literary language and could rival Persian in that respect. The Urdu poets, in order to

<sup>1</sup> *Maktubat-i Kalimi*, 22.

<sup>2</sup> He was born in Aurangabad in 1717. The name Fakhr-u'd-din had been given by Shah Kalim-ullah who had also predicted the future greatness of the child. His father, Shah Nizam-u'd-din had made excellent arrangements for his early education. Besides theological subjects, he learnt medicine and art of fighting. Among his teachers were Mian Muhammad Jan, Maulana Abdul Hakim and Hafiz Asad-ul Ansari who taught him philosophy, jurisprudence and *hadis*. For details of his early life and career, *Takmila Siyar-ul Auliya*, 106, 107.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Masha'ikh Chishti*, 502, 507, 508.

enrich and refine their language and mode of expression, excessively borrowed themes and imagery from Persian and systematically weeded out words and phrases of Indian dialects which appeared them to be clumsy and cumbersome and did not come up to the requirements of prosody. They also adopted the metrical system and forms of Persian poetry and drew heavily on its vocabulary and allusions. Though deeply saturated with Persian literary and cultural heritage, the Urdu poets and writers made enough use of the Indian landscape in the portrayal of characters and situations particularly in the composition of *qasida*, *masnavi*, *hiju* and *marsiya*, if not of *ghazal*.<sup>1</sup> The main characteristics of their poetry, which again had been taken from Persian, were *ibham* (ambiguity) *ista'ra* (similes and metaphors), and *ramz-i bleegh* (fantastic conceits) and all these woven into a highly artificial style. They did not express their genius in writing the erotic poetry only but their poetry was also touched with elements of mysticism, humanism and a certain degree of liberalism. Their poetry, by and large, reflects the spirit of the age, its political and social decadence, its economic strains and tensions—a vivid description of which is wanting in the contemporary chronicles. Moreover, the art of poetry and its appraisal was confined not only to the aristocratic class but had also cast its spell on all sorts of people—the Muslim and the Hindu princes, the officers, the *'ulema*, the soldiers, and men of professional classes. For instance, Muhammad Aman Nisar was a musician; Husain Bakhshi, a cloth merchant; Madan Singh Shagufta, a goldsmith; Shambhu Nath 'Aziz, a banker; Mir Sadiq 'Ali Sadiq, the broker; and all of them composed verses and felt proud of being associated with some eminent poet or the officer. The poetry became the fashion of the day, an exclusive passion, a source of literary enjoyment and a sure passport to popularity.<sup>2</sup>

The most distinguished among the early poets who rendered a remarkable service to the cause of Urdu poetry was Mian Wali Muhammad (1667-1744), a native of Aurangabad but who had spent his whole life in Gujarat. In 1700 Mian Wali, accompanied by 'Abul Ma'ali, visited Delhi where he

<sup>1</sup> Ram Babu Saksena, in his *History of Urdu Literature*, Allahabad 1940, 23, has criticized this blind adoption of the Persian tradition and called it 'servile absorption, and 'servile imitation.' Prof. Mujeeb holds a different view, and states: "Urdu never broke with (Persian) tradition, and it would have been a serious loss if it did, for the Persian tradition represented in a unique form the union of the spiritual, the physical, the godly and the human at the highest aesthetic level, and its images and conventions enabled the mind to seek self-expression with a boundless freedom." *The Indian Muslims*, 464-65.

<sup>2</sup> Mir Hasan, *Tazkirah-i Shu'ara-i Hind*, edited by Habibur Rahman Khan Sherwani, Preface, 14.

met famous poets and scholars, including Sa'ad-ullah Gulshan,<sup>1</sup> a poet, scholar and saint of Delhi, the teacher of Khwaja Muhammad Nasir. His personality and poetic achievements inspired the poets of Delhi to use Urdu as a medium of literary expression. In 1720 his Urdu *Diwan* (collection of poems) reached Delhi and created a great stir in the literary circles as it contained Persian themes, forms and idioms, which were current coins at that time. It was highly appreciated by the people, and his poems were sung in public places, the court, the markets and streets of Delhi and the social and religious gatherings held there. His *Diwan* served as a model for the poets of Delhi to enrich Urdu prosody by compiling *Diwans* on the pattern set by him.<sup>2</sup>

His poetry is mainly lyrical (in the form of *ghazals*) and is erotic in its implications and his style is simple, elegant and chaste. There is great emotional appeal in his verses, "which are eloquent, flowing and spontaneous and have no signs of labour."<sup>3</sup> He used a large number of the figures of speech known as *sana* and *bada*, and the Persian element is predominant in his poetry. "What Wali lacks as a poet is depth, strength and variety. His assets are fluency and youthful naivety."<sup>4</sup> However, he made a definite departure from the beaten track and introduced subjects which were natural and interesting, such as references to Indian seasons, festivals, animals, birds and rivers. As a result of the tremendous influence which his poetry exerted, great pioneers arose in northern India who consolidated the language, purified and refined it by discarding obsolete words and excluding rhetoric and figures of speech. But excessive use of *ibham* or ambiguity was made at the expense of thought, flow of expression and purity of language. All their efforts rendered Urdu popular as a fit vehicle of expression and shook the supremacy of the Persian.

The first poet in northern India who compiled a *Diwan* in *Rekhta* was Nawab Sadr-u'd-din Muhammad Khan Fa'iz, son of Zabardast Khan, a Mughal noble and resident of Delhi. He had completed his *Diwan* in 1715, five years before the *Diwan* of Mian Wali reached Delhi. A profound scholar and a prolific writer, Sadr-u'd-din Faiz had intimate contacts with the contemporary literary figures and prominent Mughal nobles, including Khan-i Dauran, the *mir bakhshi* of Muhammad Shah.

<sup>1</sup> Shah Gulshan was an eminent saint of *Naqshbandi silsilah*, and the grandson of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi. Khwaja Nasir Andleeb, father of Khwaja Mir Dard, was his disciple. Shah Gulshan not only wrote poetry but possessed profound knowledge of the art of music. *Ab-i Hiyat*, 225, 228-29.

<sup>2</sup> For details of his life, N.H. Hashmi, *Kuliyat-i Wali*, 11-14; *Nikat-ush Shu'ara*, 89-90; *Tazkirah-i Rekhta Goyan*, 144; *Tazkirah-i Shu'ara-i Urdu*, 204.

<sup>3</sup> *History of Urdu Literature*, 44.

<sup>4</sup> M. Sadiq, *History of Urdu Literature*, 62.

He participated in the *musha'irahs* and academic gatherings held at the residence of Khan-i Dauran and these he describes vividly in *Risala-i Manazrat*. He exerted considerable influence on the contemporary writers and poets and his literary output enriched the Urdu literature. In the preface to his *kulliyat* he has expounded his own theories of the art of composing poetry. He considered writing of panegyric poems (*qasida*) in praise of a king in return for some reward below the dignity of a poet; only God, His Prophet, and Imams deserved to be praised; and even an exaggerated description of the physical features of the beloved was justified. For him mode of expression was all-important, and the content of a poem was of secondary importance. He insisted on simple and direct style, use of polished and popular idiom, and a strict observance of the rules of grammar, meter and rhyme. He has used Hindi words and idioms, and his *Diwan* contains poems on *jogan*, *tambulan* and *panghat*, etc. which have given local colour and added charm to his poetry.<sup>1</sup>

Shaikh Zahur-u'd-din Hatim (1699-1793), generally known as Shah Hatim, was the next celebrated poet who founded the Delhi school of poetry which gave an impetus to the process of the development of Urdu literature. He trained more than 45 pupils in the art of versification and stimulated the poetic talents of a large number of other persons who came into contact with him during the long span of his life. Almost from boyhood he took poetry for his vocation and spent forty years over mastering the art. A Shaikhzada by birth and a soldier by profession, Shah Hatim believed in the aristocratic traditions of life and manners, and he possessed means to support his position. Mushafi informs that Hatim regularly visited his house to take part in the *musha'rah* that was generally held after sunset. His first *Diwan*, written on the old model, was voluminous and abounded in words and idioms which had been rendered obsolete.<sup>2</sup> *Ibham* (ambiguity) in Urdu poetry had been abundantly used by Saiyid Muhammad Shakir Naji, and this practice was initiated by Najm-u'd-din Abru (1692-1747) and Sharf-u'd-din Mazmun (1689-1745). But after the death of Shakir Naji, in 1754, a reaction against *ibham*, which had exercised such a sway over the poetry for four decades (1720-1758), set in, and the poets ultimately set it aside.<sup>3</sup> Under the influence of new literary modes and conventions, Shah Hatim, too, revised and abridged his *Diwan* by dropping out odd words in order to present his poems in a chiselled form. The outcome of his efforts was a new *Diwan* which he called *Diwan-zada*, and owing to its improved style it won wide acclaim

<sup>1</sup> For details of the life and literary achievement of Fa'iz, vide *Diwan-i Fa'iz*, edited by Saiyid Masud Hasan Rizvi, Delhi, 1946.

<sup>2</sup> Ghulam Hamdani Mushafi, *Tazkirah-i Hindi*, 80, 81.

<sup>3</sup> M. Sadiq, *A History of Urdu Literature*, 78, 79.

in the literary circles of Delhi. His poetry illustrates a masterly skill in the manipulation of words, sustained felicity of style and sweetness and simplicity of versification. His *Shahar Ashub* is a long disquisition on the contemporary scene marked by pessimism and gloom; it throws light on the economic ruin of the aristocrats (*sharif*) and the increasing prosperity of the professional men (*razil*) whom he treats contemptuously.<sup>1</sup>

Khwaja Mir Dard (1719-1785) was not only a great *sufi* but a poet of great distinction who set up new standards in the composition of Urdu *ghazals* and contributed to the development of Urdu poetry. Unlike Sauda and his other contemporaries, he never indulged in writing lampoons or panegyrics, but, on the other hand, wrote on philosophic and mystic themes. His poetry represents the charm and dignity of sublime thought, pure culture and humanity.<sup>2</sup> He considered poetry a noble art, an instrument of self-revelation and not a means of earning money by writing odes in praise of patrons or satirising one's opponents. He wrote poetry only when wave of inspiration was on him, and in a state of heightened emotionality, and consequently his output is slender. "I have never written poetry without a spontaneous inner urge; never written it by a deliberate effort or out of an unwilling heart."<sup>3</sup> His poetry is permeated with pure mysticism and ideals of spiritualism; one-third of his poetry is devoted to various topics of mystic thought, such as Love of God, other worldliness, contentment, mutability of human existence, its joys and sorrows, the dignity of man and the fallibility of intellect.<sup>4</sup> "Once or twice a month he held *musha'irah* at his house and that was attended by nearly all the important poets like Sauda, Mir and Soz; and they seriously discussed the technique of refining the language by the exclusion of vague and obsolete words and idioms. He exercised considerable influence over his contemporaries and they all held him in high esteem. Mir Taqi Mir, for instance speaks highly of him and calls him a pre-eminent poet of the day.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Tazkirah-i Hindi*, 80; *Diwan-Zada*, edited by Sirajul Haq Kurcishy, Aligarh, MS.

<sup>2</sup> *Ab-i Hiyat*, 225-30; *Nikat-us Shau'ra*, 49-50. *Tazkirah-i Hindi*, 92. *Khwaja Mir Dard—Tasawwuf aur Sh'airi*, *op.cit.*, 310-311.

<sup>3</sup> *A History of Urdu Literature*, *op. cit.*, 102.

<sup>4</sup> *Khwaja Mir Dard—Tasawwuf aur Sh'airi*, 312-329; *A History of Urdu Literature*, 104.

Is this life or a raging tempest?  
 We are dying at the hands of this life.  
 We entered the assembly of this world with tears  
 rolling down our eyes, like the candle,  
 We are leaving it with our skirt drenched with sin.

<sup>5</sup> *Nikat-us Shau'ra*, 49-50; *Makhzan-i Nukat*, 1; *Tazkirah-i Shu'ara-i Urdu*, 96-97.

Muhammad Husain Azad has placed Mazhar Jan-i Janan in the rank of those pioneer poets who refined the language and championed the cause of *Urdu-i Mu'allah*.<sup>1</sup> The contemporary *Tazkirah* writers have extolled his services to the cause of Urdu poetry, but his view, as M. Sadiq correctly holds, "is supported neither by the quality nor the quantity of his verse."<sup>2</sup> Mushafi writes about him, "When Mir and Sauda had not yet come into their own, and it was the age of *ibham*, the first poet who wrote verses in Urdu modelled on Persian was Mazhar."<sup>3</sup> Another leading poet and scholar of the period who played a significant role in raising Urdu poetry to a high position was Siraj-u'd-din 'Ali Khan, surnamed Arzu (1689-1750). He inspired and guided a number of promising poets who later on attained fame, reformed and enriched the language by eliminating rough and unmusical plebeian words, and took pains to develop *Urdu-i Mu'alla* on the pattern of the Persian.<sup>4</sup> Azad has paid him a glowing tribute in these words:<sup>5</sup>

Khan-i Arzu has done for Urdu what Aristotle did for logic. As long as all logicians are called the descendants of Aristotle, all Urdu scholars will also be called the descendants of Khan-i Arzu.

One of the most distinguished pupils of Shah Hatim was Muhammad Rafi' Sauda (1713-1781)<sup>6</sup> who enriched the poetic diction, called *rekhta*, and raised it to the dignity of the Persian language. Sauda was the originator of two new forms in Urdu poetry, namely, *qasida* and *hiju*, laudatory odes and satire, and in these he excelled all his contemporaries and the subsequent poets. His ideal, in fact, was Persian poetry on which he modelled all his poems. He freely imported Persian expressions, metaphors, similes, allusions and idioms and skilfully wove them into the texture of his poetry. The extravagant hyperbole (*ghuliv*), a feature of the Persian style, reached its highest point in his poetry. He believed that any poetic statement, unless presented in the garb of a hyperbole, was bound to be reduced to the level of the common place, and that was to be avoided

<sup>1</sup> *Ab-i Hiyat*, 132, 144.

<sup>2</sup> *Tazkirah-i Hindi*, 203; *A History of Urdu Literature*, 82.

<sup>3</sup> *Tazkirah-i Hindi*, 203.

<sup>4</sup> *Nikat-us Shu'ara*, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ab-i Hiyat*, 121; *A History of Urdu Literature*, 70.

<sup>6</sup> Mirza Muhammad Rafi' was born in 1713 in Delhi and died on 26 June 1780 in Lucknow. His father, a rich merchant, had migrated from Kabul and established his business in Delhi. After the death of his father Sauda inherited considerable wealth which he, however, soon squandered in the pleasure and enjoyment of life. He then took to soldiering which he also gave up. In search of employment



by the poet. Therefore, "he merged realism in the world of fancy and high imagination." He had the capacity not only to coin new words but also blend together Hindi and Persian words. Some of his meters are very difficult, and *radif* (double rhyme) and *qafiya* (rhyme) are complex and stiff, but with his supreme command over language and his superb technical skill he could fashion his verses with felicity and without creating a sense of muddle. His poetry flows like a stream that smoothly rushes down a rugged and tortuous course without losing its force. "In their flamboyance, majesty and richness his panegyrics rival the works of the greatest *qasida* writers in Persian,<sup>1</sup> like 'Urfi, Khaqani and Anwar."<sup>2</sup>

Satire which is "the humourous or caustic criticism of men's faults and foibles in all their manifestation, the hotch-potch or farrago, the vagries of human conduct,"<sup>3</sup> reached its high water-mark in his composition. He removed the ruggedness of a lampoon and transformed it into a piece of art. His admirable command of language, his exercise of lively wit, his fertility of imagination and keen observation of things, his knowledge of matters of general import, and his over-all ingenuity made his satires humourous as well as biting. He vehemently criticized the vices and defects of his age and also vivaciously satirised these in the society of his day.<sup>4</sup> The *Qasida-i Shahr Ashub*, *Mukhammas-i Shahr Ashub*, and *Qasida-i Tazhik-i Rozgar* belong to the first category while lampoons on Mir Zahir, the father of Mir Hasan, a rich man, an ignorant Hakim, and *Masnavi dar Hajv-i Sedi Faulad Khan*, Kotwal of Delhi, Zabita Khan and Nusrat belong to the second.<sup>5</sup> In his long disquisitions he has described most vividly the

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and patronage he left Delhi in 1754 for Farrukhabad, where he joined the service of Mihrab Khan, *diwan* of Ahmad Khan Bangash. After living for 17 years there he went to Faizabad, and became the court poet of Nawab Shuja'-u'd Daulah. When the Nawab died in 1774 his successor Nawab Asaf-u'd Daulah took him to Lucknow, the new capital of the Awadh kingdom. Sauda was jovial and cheerful man who seldom felt disappointed or discouraged by the mishaps and misfortunes he experienced in his life. For details of his life, career and literary achievements, Shaikh Chand, *Sauda*, Aurangabad, 1936, 35-37; Ralph Russell and Khurshid-ul Islam, *Three Mughal Poets*, London, 1969, 37-50; Ghulam Sarwar, *Dryden and Sauda—A Comparative Study*, reprint from M.U. Journal, June 1935; Abdul Hayy, *Gul-i Rana; Tazkirah-i Hindi*, 125, 126.

<sup>1</sup> *A History of Urdu Literature*, 91.

<sup>2</sup> *Gulshan-i Hind*, 6; *Dastur-ul Fasahat*, 118.

<sup>3</sup> *Cambridge History of English Literature*, VIII, 58.

<sup>4</sup> *A History of Urdu Literature*, 91.

<sup>5</sup> All these satires have been translated and analyzed in *Three Mughal Poets*. M. Sadiq has also translated some stanzas from the poems and discussed their literary qualities. Translation of a few verses taken from these two authentic

degradation and impoverishment of the aristocrats who once enjoyed power and prestige. the wide spread chaos and lawlessness of the times and the gloom and depression pervading the whole society—all these emanated from the collapse of the Mughal power. In personal satires he has mercilessly exposed the manners and morals of some important figures in the capital, and indirectly ridiculed the professions they belonged to. All these poems reveal his mastery of the craft, the wide-range of his vocabulary, and his familiarity with the arts and sciences of the day.<sup>1</sup>

Mir Taqi Mir<sup>2</sup> (1722-1810) has been acknowledged as the greatest poet of Urdu *ghazal* by the *Tazkirah* writers of the eighteenth century. The modern critics have also lavished on him the highest encomium for his poetic achievements and valuable contribution to the development of Urdu poetry. In recognition of his poetic merits he was popularly called *Khuda-i Sukhan* or "God of poetry." About him Mir Hasan has written: "The chief of the poets of Hindustan, the most eloquent of the eloquents of his time, a heart-attracting poet, and incomparable writer of verses."<sup>3</sup> He had laboured to learn and practise the art of writing poetry and the suc-

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studies are given below as samples. The satire against the ignorant Hakim:

There is a *hakim*, the mention of whose name;  
 Makes every good physician blush with shame.  
 Down in the main *bazar* you will find his house;  
 He looks like *Satan*, yet his name is Ghaus.

*Three Mughal Poets*, 49.

Against Sedi Faulad Khan:  
 The police officer was above corruption,  
 And not a single thief was to be found in the city.  
 But alas ! Corruption is rampant everywhere now,  
 And the city is full of thieves, loafers and cutpurses.

*A History of Urdu Literature*, 92.

<sup>1</sup> *Three Mughal Poets*, 60, 61.

<sup>2</sup> Mir Taqi Mir was born in 1722, in Allahabad, and died at an advanced age in Lucknow on 20 September 1810. On the death of his father in 1739 he came to Delhi in search of a job. Khan-i Dauran, the *mir bakhshi* patronized him and fixed the daily stipend of one rupee for his subsistence. Mir Taqi could enjoy this financial support for a short period because Khan-i Dauran died in the battle of Karnal in the same year. Khan-i Arzu, his foster-brother, took him under his kind care and helped him for sometime after which he went to Lucknow on the invitation of Nawab Asaf-u'd Daulah and became his court poet. During his long stay in Lucknow he enjoyed the benevolence of his patrons and great popularity among the people. Besides his *Divans*, he composed four *Masnavis*, viz. *Mi'amlat-i 'Ishq*, *Khwab-o Khayal-i Mir*, *Darya-i 'Ishq*, and *Shula-i Shauq*. For details, Khwaja Ahmad Farooqi, *Mir Taqi Mir*, 51-69; *Three Mughal Poets*.

<sup>3</sup> *Tazkirah-i Shu'ara-i Urdu*, 174.

ness achieved produced in him a sense of pride and self-consciousness. He states: "I exerted myself to the utmost in practising it, and the day soon came when the poets of Delhi acknowledged my supremacy, and my verses became popular with the high and the low throughout the city."<sup>1</sup> His main domain was *ghazal* and in this he outshone all the poets of his day and brought this form to the highest degree of perfection. He believed that love was the whole of life, its principal driving force, and he made it like others the central theme of his poetry.<sup>2</sup> But what added charm to it and won for him universal praise was the sincerity of his feelings and the verbal beauty of expression. He adopted a simple and straightforward style and used short meters in expressing his feelings and emotions in erotic poetry.<sup>3</sup> The language he used in *masnavis* and *ghazals* was the one spoken by the common men in the streets of Delhi, and this factor helped him to establish direct communication between the poet and the audience. Whatever he felt and experienced, either in matters of love or his dealings with fellow beings, he truthfully uttered without hiding it behind the veil of allusion, subtlety, and complexity of thought. This feature of his poetry which distinguished him from others may be illustrated by his own statement in the following verse:

I speak the secrets of my heart to old and young alike,  
My voice is free and unrestrained, and none can curb my tongue.

Pessimism is another dominating characteristic of Mir's poetry. He has expressed the sufferings of his life and the misery and despair of the citizens of Delhi with deep passions. "Tears flow like rivers from my weeping eyes, my heart like Delhi city, lies in ruins now." His own frustration and the all-pervading gloom in the society, which was then passing through a period of transition, had created in him a deep sense of the futility of life, a kind of world-weariness and a sense of nostalgia for the world that was no more. The mental outlook so formed was extremely depressing: "My heart is like the dimly-burning lamp of a pauper," or, "carvan after carvan moves off to leave this world, on every side you see their dust that rises in air." Such verses had a great appeal for those who experience similar moods of sadness and pain in a situation occasioned by

<sup>1</sup> *Zikr-i Mir*, 67; *Three Mughal Poets*, 214.

<sup>2</sup> "Love alone drives on the work of the world; without it the world would cease to move, and the heavens to revolve. It is love that gave heat to the sun, love that scarred the heart of the moon. Love can set fire to water." *Kulliyat-i Mir*, 890-91; *Three Mughal Poets*, 208.

<sup>3</sup> *Mir Taqi Mir*, 321-375; *A History of Urdu Literature*, 99-100.

the overthrow of the old order of things.<sup>1</sup> "In the ardour of passion, in the melody and music, in the felicity of phrase, in the ecstasy of feeling, his *ghazals* rank the best in Urdu literature. Many of his verses have that haunting quality which is regarded as a hall-mark of true and great poetry."<sup>2</sup>

### Music

Though the popularity of music among the aristocracy apparently waned during the reign of Aurangzeb, under the later Mughals it regained its former place of importance in the court festivities and ceremonies. Bahadur Shah I revived and patronized the art. He once asked the Dutch musicians to give their performances; and three Dutch musicians played at night on the violin, harp and hautboy before the Emperor and royal ladies who were seated behind a screen.<sup>3</sup> During the reign of Jahandar Shah, musicians and dancers were favoured with royal patronage and even raised to high *mansabs* and positions.

Muhammad Shah too was a great patron of art and music; and in his court were gathered some of the finest music talents of the age. The singing of *khayal* which had been introduced by Sultan Hussain Sharqi in the fifteenth century was brought to a state of perfection by the performers of repute attached to his court. Many new types of songs and forms of music were also introduced in his reign, for instance, *dhurpad gayaki* and *khayal gayaki* reached an advanced state of development, and from now onwards became two equally popular forms of vocal music in northern India. The point of distinction between *dhurpad* and *khayal* was that *dhurpad* concerned itself with *swara-uchcharan* (Pronunciation of notes) and it has only *gamaks* to its credit for embellishment; while the *khayal* had

<sup>1</sup> *Three Mughal Poets*, 213. The two following verses indicate his attitude towards religion:

I went to Mecca, and Medina, and to Karbala  
And what I was, I still remain now that I have returned.  
What does it mean to me? Call me 'believer' call me 'infidel.'  
I seek His threshold, be it in the temple or the mosque.

In his *Shahr Ashub* and other poems, Mir has lamented the change from the days of plenty and happiness to the times of desolation and destitution.

Here where the thorn grows, spreading over mounds of dust and ruins,  
These eyes of mine once saw the gardens blooming in the spring.  
Here in this city where the dust drifts in the deserted lanes,  
A man might come and fill his lap with gold in days gone by.

*Three Mughal Poets*, 146.

<sup>2</sup> Ram Babu Saksena, *History of Urdu Literature*, 76.

<sup>3</sup> *Later Mughals*, 1, 153.

numerous forms of embellishment such as *miras*, *palta*, *murki khatka* and various *tan* varieties associated with *qol* and *tarna*. The *khayal* was more lyrical in theme and erotic in approach; this greatly enhanced its popularity. Moreover, *khayal* was open to every rhythmic pattern, while *dhurpad* and its accessories like *dhamar* and *sadra*, were composed and sung in slow moving *tal* such as *chatal* and *ektal*. The development of *khayal gayaki* and its great popularity is associated with Na'imat Khan Sadarang and Firoz Khan Adarang, the two famous musicians in the court of Muhammad Shah.<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note that both these masters were fond of the *dhurpad*, but they inspired and guided a number of pupils in the *khayal* style, and composed various *khayals*. Muhammad Shah himself composed *khayals* under his pen name Rangila Piya. During this period *mujra* (concert music) was developed; and in course of time it became a generic term for all the forms of long dance and drama. *Tabla* and *sitar* were used in solo play and also as accompaniments of the concert music.

### Painting

During the eighteenth century the art of Mughal miniature revived, and several schools of painting flourished in different parts of India. Not only the Pahari and Rajasthani schools emerged but ateliers independent of Mughal court were established at Lucknow, Hyderabad and Murshidabad. Various traits of the composition which marked the Mughal *qalam* in the seventeenth century still dominated the whole execution. Placement of the main figure in the centre or a prominent part of the picture plane and encircled by subsidiary objects, figures drawn from the direct view and shown on the margins, and greater propensity for profile faces, were the main trends in the Mughal painting which survived in the eighteenth century too. However, the difference may be clearly seen when greater emphasis was laid to make the picture plane broader by leaving an ample open space for the movement of eye. Crowded animation seems to have been preferred less by the painters, and more interest was shown in painting of the landscape comprising buildings, trees, springing plants, etc. An isometric drawing of the palace and its garden drawn from the direct view as evinced in a painting representing Muhammad Shah listening to the musicians and dancers (collection of Kasturbhai Lalbhai, Ahmedabad), mani-

<sup>1</sup> Besides these two artists of fame, there were many other musicians attached to the court of Muhammad Shah. To name a few; Advat Sen, Rahim Sen, Shaikh Mu'in-uddin, Kasim 'Ali, Husain Khan, Debi Singh, Boli Khan, Shuja'at Khan, Taj Khan, Baj Khan, Ghulam 'Ali and Nur Muhammad. *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khani*, f. 112.

fects further improvement achieved by the painter to enhance the effect of instance, though this is not correctly followed everywhere. The aerial perspective is identical with the Persian *qalam*, and all the objects appear bathed in light and treated as separate units. Multiple perspective seems to have been discarded; its place was taken by portrait painting. The composition based on direct view involved the placement of objects in an ascending order. Further, it introduced symmetry in the composition to balance the whole picture.

Foliage of trees, forms of clouds, architectural designs and symmetrical setting of similar objects as seen in the paintings of Muhammad Shah's reign, are merely decorative. The pigments are laid thin (a technique bringing it close to water-colour painting). Women's faces are stereotyped, and the leaf-shaped eye is drawn as a type. A painting of an unusual size (Goloubew collection, Fogg Art Museum, Boston) depicts Muhammad Shah in a garden. The trends already observed may be seen in this painting. The style is characterized by same quaint formality in the drawing of bodily poses and in architectural and garden designs.

Portraits of the Emperor, courtiers and chieftains are executed strictly in profile faces, where greater emphasis is laid to represent the characteristic features of the person. Though the rest of the body is drawn standardized in form and fleshy as a matter of rule, the part below the waist is a type and remains isolated from the action shown in the upper half of the body. The variety is observed in the varying postures of hands. Thin or partial colouring attracted the painters. Lines were usually considered of greater importance to report the action and theme. These are deep and sometimes shaded, though fragile. The brush work is rough and lacks the delicate and minute touches of the painters of Akbar, Jahangir and Shahjahan. The paintings of this period, are mixed in style, sometimes predominantly Rajput and sometimes Mughal, both in technique and subject matter.

The rise of the Kangra School of Pahari painting in the latter part of eighteenth century and early nineteenth century falls outside the period with which we are concerned. More contemporary was the Kishangarh school of Rajasthani painting which stood apart from other Rajasthani styles. Certain features, such as the depicting of a new type of female physical form, are quite different from the conventional type that the painters of Rajasthan generally practised. Savant Singh, son of Raja Raj Singh (1706-48) of Kishangarh, was the patron under whom the school flourished. Savant Singh had a great fascination for the Mughal fashion of dress and style of painting in vogue at Farrukhsiyar's court. Manohar Kaul writes: "The Mughal elegance and aesthetics stimulated Savant Singh's love for painting and developed in him both critical judgement and taste in drawing

and brush work."<sup>1</sup> Nihal Chand was the ablest painter of his court and continued to paint in his son's reign also. Several other painters worked at the Kishangarh atelier and produced excellent miniatures. The painters of this school mostly represent faces in strict profile, and women are invariably drawn as a type with narrow elongated faces, arching eyebrows, long leaf-shaped eyes, prominent nose, chins distinctly marked and slim bodies. Ornamentation of figures seems an integral part of human representation. Trees become stylized; and this is largely true of animals and birds as well.

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<sup>1</sup> Manohar Kaul, *Trends in Indian Painting*, 73,

## MUHAMMAD SHAH AND DECLINE OF THE EMPIRE

When Muhammad Shah ascended the throne in 1719 at the age of 18 years, he was strong in physique and free of any malady. After his accession, he kept practising archery and frequently went out for hunting. But after some time, he seems to have developed some stomach trouble which was aggravated by the use of opium; his health accordingly began to suffer<sup>1</sup>. He could no longer ride a horse in the ordinary fashion, and, according to Azfari, a saddle-maker of Lucknow designed a special saddle for his use<sup>2</sup>. The Emperor occasionally rode with the help of this saddle; otherwise he went in a *palki* (litter), on the *takhat-i-rawan* (travelling throne) or on an elephant. In the closing years of his life he suffered an attack of paralysis which rendered him so feeble and emaciated that he was unable to take even nominal command of the imperial army against Ahmad Shah Durrani, in the battle of Manopur. The author of the *Tarikh-i Ahmadi* states that "Muhammad Shah was of a weak constitution, and frequently subjected to bad fevers."<sup>3</sup> A day before his death, the Emperor was carried in a litter to the Sanghi Gate Mosque inside the fort, and there sat in state with all his nobles and attendants. All of a sudden he fainted and could not speak. Roz Afzun Khan, *Nazir*, Khwaja Javed Khan and physicians brought him to *Hiyat Bakhsh garden*, and the *amirs* also came from *Diwan-i Khas* to see him. That day and whole night, he remained unconscious and the next morning (27 Rabi-us Sani, 1161/15 April 1748) in the 31st year of his reign, Muhammad Shah breathed his last at the age of only 49 years. The news of his death was kept secret until the arrival of his son and heir-apparent, Mirza Ahmad, from Sirhind. He was later buried in accordance with his will, in the precincts of the mausoleum of Shaikh Nizam-ud-din Auliya.<sup>4</sup> The length of his reign in lunar terms was actually

<sup>1</sup> *Tazkirah Padshahan-i Hindustan*, f. 107.

<sup>2</sup> Mirza 'Ali Bakht Azfari, *Waqi'at-i Azfari*, 155.

<sup>3</sup> *Tarikh-i Ahmadi*, f. 11.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarikh-i Ahmadi*, 13.



30 years 4 months and 12 days; but according to official calculation which dated its beginning from the date of Farrukh Siyar's deposition, it was 30 years 11 months and 18 days. It was the usual fashion of the Mughal chancery to designate a dead king by a special posthumous title; and so Muhammad Shah came to be designated as Firdos Aramgah. He was survived by a son, Mirza Ahmad, and a daughter, Hazarat Begam.<sup>1</sup>

Contemporary chroniclers generally praise Muhammad Shah for his sagacity and generosity. He was benevolent and kind-hearted and showed a sense of anxiety for public welfare. Owing to his clemency, sense of justice, he enjoyed a certain amount of popularity among the people of Delhi. He also possessed common sense and a sense of realism. His character presents an amiable contrast to that of his predecessors. He was not a shameless debauch like Jahandar Shah, nor an irresolute imbecile like Farrukh Siyar. He maintained the etiquette and decorum of the court, and did not make it the centre of pleasure and revelry by openly indulging in wine and venery; as was the wont of Jahandar Shah. He succeeded in liquidating the power of the Saiyid brothers who had deposed Farrukh Siyar, and raised two more dummy kings to the imperial throne to subserve their interests. He revived the prestige of the Mughal monarchy which had fallen very low and saved his court from disastrous effects of a *quo-dete*. The fact that he was able to wield the scepter for thirty years in very difficult circumstances is a testimony to his political tact and adroitness. He was usually equal to the machinations of individual nobles whom he kept under check and never permitted to reduce him to a position of figure-head. He was at the same time able to infuse warmth in his personal relationships with the ministers and officials of the state, and even those chiefs and governors, who chose to have their own way, did not repudiate their allegiance to him and always showed him great regard and respect.

Muhammad Shah was also a distinguished patron of arts. A polished gentleman, a poet and himself well versed in music, he united in his person the best elements of Mughal culture—urbanity, humanism and elegance.

<sup>1</sup> *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 353; *Mir'at-i Aftab Numa*, 489. After accession, Muhammad Shah married Badshah Begam, the daughter of Farrukh Siyar who received the title of Malika-i Zamani. The author of *Tarikh-i Muhammadi* has given the titles of his other three wives, viz. Rup Bai, Fatehpuri and Roshan Abadi, 52, 135. He also married the daughter of Zulfiqar Jang. Udham Bai, the mother of Mirza Ahmad, received the title of Mumtaz Mahal after the accession of her son to the throne. Two other sons of Muhammad Shah, Taj Mahmud and Shaharyar were born to Fatehpuri and Malika-i Zamani respectively; they both died in 1726. His brother, Farkhanda Akhtar, died in 1732; and a year later his mother, Fakhr-un Nisa, died. *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 52, 78, 83; *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, 454, 455.

Genial and forbearing, he retained to the last the affability and charm of his character, despite the successive set-backs he received in political and military spheres. He was of a devout turn of mind, visited shrines of saints, went to mosque to offer prayers and observed the rites of his religion. He showed deep reverence towards religious divines, scholars and pious men; every Friday, he convened meetings of divines in the court and participated in discussion on religious subjects. He also provided them financial assistance in the form of *madad-i-m'ash* grants. But he did not permit them to interfere with political affairs or oppose the secular policies of the government. In his attitude towards the Hindus he pursued a policy of tolerance and liberalism. He abolished the *jaziya* and sought to protect the interests of the Hindu chiefs and generals whom he appointed to the posts of trust and authority. He also accorded generous treatment to Hindu scholars and holy men who had frequent access to his company. A contemporary writer even complained:

The Hindus are favoured against the Muslims for the simple reason that the Hindu *peshkars* are numerous and influential, and they carry on the administration while the ministers and nobles indulge in luxury.<sup>1</sup>

The one great personal disadvantage to him was that he was destitute of military valour and incapable of leading armies and conducting operations. He had fought no war of succession; he had simply been brought on and crowned by the faction of the Saiyid brothers. He thus received no instruction or training in the art of warfare, and found no scope for the development of any military talents that he might have possessed. Since the death of his father, Jahan Shah, in 1712 to his accession in 1719, he had remained confined within the walls of the Delhi Fort, and passed this important period of life, meant for systematic training, in an atmosphere of gloom and despair. He had the latent quality for back-door intrigues, by virtue of which he organized the *coup* against the Saiyid brothers; but in the fighting that ensued between the Saiyids of Barha and the Mughals after the assassination of Husain 'Ali Khan he failed to play any visible role; he remained inside the camp, waiting all the time for its outcome with almost abject terror.

Though Farrukh Siyar had fought the war of succession, yet after enthronement he never came out of the Fort to lead campaigns against rebels. In the course of the grim struggle with the Saiyid brothers, he several times put his hand in anger on the sword but never used it to vindicate his honour. His lack of will and martial spirit has been attributed to his physical degeneration. His two immediate successors, Rafi-'u'd Darajat and Rafi-'u'd Daulah, were sickly young men who could not stand the strain and toil of office and within few months followed each other to the

<sup>1</sup> *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, f. 135; *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 682.

grave. Neku Siyar and Ibrahim, too, were of weak constitution and ignorant of public affairs. In this incapacity, Muhammad Shah was by no means unique among the later Mughals. None of the kings, excepting Bahadur Shah, who succeeded Aurangzeb, displayed energy and ability characteristic of their ancestors.

Even though Muhammad Shah was no general, it would be wrong to lay all his failures at the door of this defect. Short of leading the campaigns against the Marathas in person, which, considering his bad health and undoubted military incapacity, would not in any case have affected the situation materially, Muhammad Shah did all that lay in his power to save the Empire from disintegration and ultimate break-up. He took steps, as the foregoing analysis of events show, to safeguard the provinces by sending expeditions and providing for them as much as his scanty resources permitted. So far as he himself was concerned, he never accepted the defeat his generals suffered and never approved the treaties which they hastened to make with their adversaries. In his own way, he never gave up the struggle and his efforts were unabated till the very end, despite their repeated failures. More of a poet and artist, than a man of action, his measures in response to the successive threats to imperial authority were often of an escapist nature. News coming from the provinces strained his nerves and confused his mind, and in the interval before he could brace himself for a renewed attempt, he sought relief in hunting excursions and picnics in his gardens and in music and other artistic entertainments, to which Shafi' Warid alludes.<sup>1</sup> But from this, to say, that he was unmindful of his obligations, as the historians would have us believe, or that he was even a drunken profligate, as some others suggest, would be going too far.

Apart from his own personal defects, which as we have seen, were not by any means irremediable, there were larger factors which would have made an even herculean effort seem futile. The chronic bankruptcy, want of resources coupled with disunity among the nobles made it impossible to undertake large scale and sustained military operations which the situation demanded. Besides, there was always the possibility of a *coup d'etat* in the capital even when there was no debacle in war. His absence from the capital could always act as a temptation to intriguing nobles who, either of themselves or in league with an enemy, would feel no scruple in raising another prince to the throne. The fear of *coup d'etat*, always present since

<sup>1</sup> Shafi' Warid writes, "For years it had been the custom at court, when the Deccan intelligencers reported the invasion of Gujarat and Malwa to send out Muhammad Shah on long visits to the various gardens round the capital, or to distract his mind by hunting and shooting expeditions in the many royal preserves." *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 681.

the death of Bahadur Shah I, haunted Muhammad Shah and his closest advisers. Even Shah Wali-ullah, who exhorted the Mughal court to recapture the initiative it had lost and advocated a policy of boldness and courage in the conduct of imperial affairs, considered it imprudent for the Emperor to lead campaigns in person. Nizam-ul Mulk in one of his letters to Shah Wali-ullah appears to have taken the view, viz. that it was not possible for the nobility to conduct the campaigns when the Emperor was not prepared to lead them in person. Shah Wali-ullah counselled Nizam in his reply that such a course would not be wise and suggested that it would be better if one of the princes, and not the Emperor, accompanied the nobles in campaigns.<sup>1</sup>

To emphasize the personal failings of the Emperor, as the principal cause of decline is to ignore the basic defects in the working of the existing institutions, the role played by various groups of the ruling class and the impact of socio-economic forces on the political structure of the period. In fact, the decline had set in the imperial institutions—civil as well as military—long before Muhammad Shah assumed sovereignty, as is clear from the study of the immediate background to his accession, made in the first chapter of the present work. The administrative problems had become so complex and financial crisis so deep-seated that even a more capable person would not have succeeded in coping with the situation. In a domain such as the Mughal Empire, the responsibility of carrying out the administration, making vast plans for defence and reorganizing institutions to meet the requirements of the day, squarely rested on the governing class because its leaders, by virtue of training, experience and skill in different functions of the government, were in a better position to perform this role. But as no higher ideals for the public weal or preservation of common inheritance inspired the individual leaders of groups engaged in competition and conflict, they made no attempt to integrate the polity or reform the administration of the Empire. The ministers and officials, working at the centre, were content to conduct administration according to its traditional forms without endeavouring to provide the tottering edifice with any new supports. The investigation should be, therefore, extended from the assessment of the Emperor's character to the analysis of factors responsible for changes in the institutions and their effects on the stability and strength of the Empire.

The administration of the imperial army owing to the expansion of its civil side had become so complicated and unwieldy that a bankrupt and distracted government under Muhammad Shah could not exercise effective control over its branches and enforce orders regarding military operations throughout the vast Empire. The civil departments attached to it caused

<sup>1</sup> *Shah Wali-ullah Delhvi Ke Siyasi Maktubat*, letter No. 22.

difficulties for *mansabdars* and soldiers as their staff consisting of clerks, accountants, news-reporters and stewards were immersed in sloth and corruption. The rules and regulations which had been devised to prevent false musters were not strictly followed during this period; and in the midst of general confusion following the invasion of Nadir Shah, the system of muster and branding broke down. Moreover, the war expenditure, owing to incessant fighting with the Marathas, rose enormously while the sources of state income continuously diminished, as territories were lost or yielded no net income. The imperial government consequently could not raise and maintain the needed cavalry and artillery. With the exception of a few big *amirs*, like the *wazir* and *mirbakhshi*, other nobles and *mansabdars* did not bestow personal care on the maintenance, discipline and drill of horsemen under their command. Sarbuland Khan, Mir Jumla, Amir Khan and several other nobles kept the pay of their soldiers in arrears, reducing them to an abject condition. The economic insecurity seriously affected the discipline of soldiers and undermined their morale. Thrown out of work and afflicted by poverty, they sold their horses and confined themselves to their houses, spending dull hours in wrestling and hunting; others joined the ranks of thieves and highway robbers; and some took up service under Afghan chiefs, Maratha leaders, Rajput chiefs and governors of the provinces. The poets of the period have bewailed the soldiers' sorrows and painted a lurid picture of the ruin that had overtaken the soldiers in Delhi. The contemporary historians and thinkers considered the wretched condition of the Mughal soldiery as one of the major causes responsible for the decline of the Empire.<sup>1</sup>

The real strength of the Mughal army lay in its cavalry; the other two arms of the service—artillery and infantry—were regarded of no great military value and much reliance was not placed on them. The cavalry had played a prominent role in the battles fought during the medieval period, and it continued to hold a dominant position till the mid-eighteenth century, when infantry with rapidly-firing muskets, equipped with gun-power and organized on the European model, threw it into background. The armoured cavalry trained to shoot arrows or engage in hand to hand fighting in pitched battles, proved of no avail in the face of the swift raiding cavalry force of the Marathas; and it failed to stand before the destructive fire of Nadir Shah's *zambuk* and *jazairs* in the battle of Karnal. The Mughal cavalry during this period had lost its former vigour and mobility; and it was no longer able to make lightening dashes, rapid and incessant charges for which it was once reputed. The Mughal camp looked

<sup>1</sup> *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, 264-65; *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 105; *Mir'at-ul Haqa'iq*, ff. 458, 464; *Kulliya'-i Sauda*, 89, 363.

like a city of tents with markets, heavy baggage, store-houses, and civilians who out-numbered the combatants. Besides, their artillery was too unwieldy and cumbrous to serve any useful purpose except in bombarding the forts and capturing enemy's strongholds. It was too heavy to be moved quickly from one point to another during a battle; it could fire only once in half an hour, and after the first charge it became inactive for quite some time. The heavy guns were dragged by 250 oxen aided by five or six elephants; in the battle of Karnal, for instance, guns, which 500 to 1,000 bullocks aided by five to ten elephants, had brought into the field, could not be used at all.<sup>1</sup> Nadir Shah's success at Karnal demonstrated the irresistible power of mobile musketry. *Zambuk* or light survival-gun mounted on camels and *jazayirchs* or infantry armed with heavy muskets wrought havoc in the columns of the Mughal cavalry and smashed the forces which came within the range of their rapid and accurate fire. The striking success of the Persians, achieved through the means of new weaponry and the superb generalship of their leaders, left a deep impression on the minds of the Indian generals and governors, some of whom took steps to reorganize and re-equip their troops on new lines. For instance, 'Ali Muhammad Khan in Rohilkhand<sup>2</sup> and Safdar Jang in Awadh improved the strength and efficiency of their respective infantry forces by arming them with musketry and gun-power.

The Maratha army, on the other hand, was composed of light cavalry which carried no heavy guns, carts and baggage on its march to the field of battle. Their horsemen, known as *ekas* or *ekandas*, were armed only with swords, spears and lances; they wore scanty clothes and kept small bags of corn for their subsistence. The soldiers, who generally belonged to the lower strata of society, maintained an austere and frugal ways of life and despised the dangers of toil. The organization of this light-armed and low-paid horsemen into vast armies presented no major difficulty—military or financial—to the Maratha generals, who, by the example of their personal zeal, stimulated their ambition for the acquisition of spoils. Built-up and led in this fashion, the Maratha army was best fitted for undertaking arduous and long marches through distant lands, launching surprise attacks at several places simultaneously, and returning with breath-taking speed to safe positions after having achieved decisive results. Without coming to close grips and risking pitched battles they made encircling movements round the imperial fortifications and cut off supplies, while their detachments, spreading over areas of hundreds of miles of countryside, struck terror into the hearts of helpless people and imposed their demands of money on them.

<sup>1</sup> *The Army of the Indian Mughals*, 119, 120.

<sup>2</sup> *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, 33.

The Mughal mail-clad cavalry, tied down with cumbersome artillery and baggage, was unable to move swiftly, and encounter and drive out the enemy from different fronts of war. The light foray tactics constantly employed by Maratha generals gave no breathing space to the Mughals and ultimately reduced their combat capability to a low level. The rout of the imperial forces under the command of Girdhar Bahadur at Amjhera demonstrated beyond doubt that in warfare expert generalship, mobility, and superior numbers counted far more than the heavy cavalry guarded by artillery. Thereafter, the Maratha army grew stronger year by year, both in numbers and quality of fighting, and this made the military situation dismal for the Mughals. A successful response to the challenge required concerted plan of action, large-scale and sustained military operations and effective use of fire-arms. But the Mughals continued to hold fast to the age old methods of battle-formation, fortification of the camp, and a desire for hand to hand combats. Their extravagant habits and luxurious standards of life prevented them, in the words of Azad Bilgrami, from undertaking long marches and incessant campaigning.<sup>1</sup> Even repeated defeats did not break the sense of complacency and shatter their belief in the worth and utility of their military system.

For instance, in 1733-1734 Baji Rao invaded Malwa and Rajputana with an army of fifty thousand horses spread over a vast region, and ravaged the countryside far and wide. Muzaffar Khan and Khan-i Dauran, in accordance with royal instructions, raised an army of ten-thousand troops on the basis of a monthly cash salary of fifty rupees for each horseman. When they approached the enemy, the Mughals pitched their camp and fortified it by digging trenches and filling them with trees cut down from forest. They had hoped, as Ashub writes, that the Marathas would deliver a charge on their fortification, and a pitched battle would follow; but, contrary to their calculation, the invaders spread over the entire area and devastated villages and towns. The Mughals remained inactive behind their fortified lines and could not venture to come out and engage the enemy. Upon the departure of the Marathas the imperial commanders returned to Delhi and disbanded their forces.<sup>2</sup> The same strategy was planned and executed by Nizam-ul Mulk in Bhopal with similar results.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the Mughals lost their offensive power and in course of time even the capacity for resistance. Shafi 'Warid writes, "the Marathas invaded the environs of Akbarabad (Agra) and escaped unpunished, although a considerable number of *zamindars* and nobles, some of them holding *mansabs* from five to seven thousand troops and possessing resources, lived there."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Khazana-i 'Amrah*, 49,

<sup>2</sup> *Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa julus-i Muhammad Shah*, f. 105.

<sup>3</sup> Chapter Three.

<sup>4</sup> *Mir'at-i Waridat*, 644.

In addition, the success of the Mughal army depended on the efficient working of the *jagirdari* system which provided the economic basis for the whole Mughal state. The *mansabdars* or commanders of the army were paid through assignment of land-revenue, assessed and expressed in cash, for maintaining the cavalry contingents and bringing them into the field of battle whenever required by the government. The assignment system with its uniform methods of revenue collection and effective control over *mansabdars*, operated successfully under the Great Mughals; but when its inherent defects appeared most glaringly in the eighteenth century, and as Aurangzeb's successors failed to remove them, the system became increasingly unworkable, with the result that after the death of Muhammad Shah, it collapsed.

The first symptoms of the decline of the system were discernable in the second half of Aurangzeb's reign which witnessed a heavy pressure on the *khalisa* lands owing to a rapid increase in the number of *mansabdars*. The scarcity of land for salary assignments continued to prevail after his death; but Bahadur Shah took no account of this factor and displayed reckless generosity in the grant of ranks and promotions to his numerous adherents and other job seekers. However, a majority of these rankholders could not obtain *jagirs* and consequently remained discontented. The process of award of *mansabs* regardless of actual resources continued unchecked in the following decade. Under Farrukh Siyar, lands could not be found for assignment to even the special *walashahi* troopers, seven to eight thousand in number; and the central government was now faced with a crisis which threatened the disintegration of the whole *jagirdari* system. At the same time, rules and regulations, laid down for recruitment and promotion, were violated by officials and the evils of corruption and oppression permeated the complicated processes of revenue administration. Even the fall of the Saiyid brothers brought no change in the situation. The *jagirs* and *mansabs* of Barha Saiyids and their underlings were distributed among members of the opposite factions, but still the claims of an overwhelming number of *khanazad* nobles and others could not be satisfied due to the chronic dearth of *jagir* lands. These nobles were still loudly clamouring for assignment of *jagir* when Nizam-ul Mulk assumed charge of the *wizarat*. His measures of reforms in the system of assignment were not carried out as they involved redistribution of lands among various sections of the nobility, liquidation of vested interests embedded in the revenue-farming and *peshkash* systems, and payment of salaries in cash to small *mansabdars*. Except this half-hearted attempt for reforms, no plan was formulated during the whole reign of Muhammad Shah to improve the condition of *mansabdars* and restore the financial strength of the government. The number of *mansabdars* continued growing, promotions continued to be awarded out of political considerations, and lands



belonging to *khalisa* were recklessly alienated, so that while the condition of *mansabdars* became worse than before, the King's own revenues too declined.<sup>1</sup>

The crisis in the *jagirdari* system affected every branch of state activity. It transformed the whole character of the army and brought it to the lowest levels of efficiency and discipline. The *mansabdars* possessing no *jagirs* found it beyond their means to raise contingents and incur any expenses upon their maintenance. The income of *mansabdars* of lower ranks was so meagre that it was virtually impossible for them to fulfil their military obligations. Such *mansabdars*, therefore, kept far smaller contingents than were required on paper; they took little interest in the state military activities and felt little concern for the declining fortunes of the Empire. Even in the case of big *mansabdars*, the *jama'* had become so inflated that the real produce from their *jagirs* rendered futile any efforts to maintain the contingents as required against their *mansab* and salary assignment. These factors may account for the raising of forces on cash basis, whenever a need arose, to resist a serious Maratha incursion. With government subsidy, the commander might manage to recruit a considerable army, but he found it extremely difficult to maintain it for a longer period, and he herefore had to yield to the persistent pressure of his adversary and come to terms with him.

The crisis of *jagirdari* produced its decisive impact on the agrarian relations and growth of agriculture. The *mansabdars*, pressed heavily with their financial problems, resorted to enhancement of revenue and imposition of illegal taxes; these in turn were strongly resisted by *zamindars* and cultivators. The intensive tussle between *jagirdars* and *zamindars* on the issue of assessment often resulted in armed conflicts which consequently led to disorders in the countryside, severely damaging cultivation. In areas where the *mansabdars* had no strong force at their disposal, they contented themselves with an amount far less than the actual authorized revenue demand; or they were forced to abandon the

<sup>1</sup> Table showing the increase in the number of *mansabdars* from 1679 to 1748.

<i>Mansabs</i>	<i>Aurangzeb</i> 1679-1707	<i>Farrukh Siyar</i> 1712-1719	<i>Muhammad Shah</i> 1719-1748
5,000	44	22	44
6,000	18	18	44
7,000	17	19	47

Since the period of the reign of Farrukh Siyar is a short one, the number of holders of *mansabs* under him should have naturally been less than under Aurangzeb. But *mansab*-holders of 7,000 under him still exceed those under Aurangzeb, although the latter's reign covered a period over 7 times longer than his. The proliferation of numbers under Muhammad Shah is too obvious to need comment.

collection of revenues. The big nobles and governors; on the other hand, were able to crush the armed resistance of the local refractory elements and enforce their will on the weak *zamindars* and helpless cultivators. With growing laxity in the central administration and depredations of the Marathas, the majority of *jagirdars* adopted the practice of farming out revenues of their *mahals* to the local powerful chiefs and military leaders because it not only furnished them with money in advance but also saved them the trouble of assessment and cost of collection through their agents. As the law and order situation further deteriorated the evil practice of *ijarah* spread widely in *jagir* lands; and in *khalisa* areas, too, it was introduced during the reign of Farrukh Siyar by Raja Ratan Chand, *diwan* of Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan. Though the Emperor insisted on its abolition from the *khalisa mahals*, revenue-farming continued to operate on a wide scale; and after the invasion of Nadir Shah it became rampant in large parts of the Empire. The practice led to the most odious forms of oppression of the peasantry and was regarded as a major source of ruin of cultivation. The revenue-farmer, mainly concerned with maximum profit, increased revenue demand and extorted money by every means. He naturally took little interest in the growth of agriculture and cared little for the improvement in the condition of cultivators.

Giving lands on *ijarah* meant the sale of the country and peasants. The *'amils* to whom the lands were farmed out wanted that the government authorities would not take notice of complaints made by the revenue-payers and *ra'iyat* against them. Hundreds of peasants came with their families to official headquarters to submit petitions but no one tried to redress their grievances.<sup>1</sup>

Shah Wali-ullah in a letter addressed to the king pleaded<sup>2</sup> :

The practice of *ijarah* should be abolished from the *khalisa* lands. Honest and experienced *amins* (assessors) should be appointed everywhere. Under the *ijarah* system the country is ruined and the condition of the *ra'iyat* became deplorable and wretched.

As the system of revenue-farming became established, the farmers tended to become hereditary; and *ijaradars* in the end often secured *zamindari* rights.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Persian Revenue Records of Bengal*, Add. 6586, f. 122.

<sup>2</sup> *Shah Wali-ullah Delhi Ke Siyasi Maktubat*, Letter No. 1.

<sup>3</sup> For details, see Zahiruddin Malik, "Agrarian Structure of Bengal at the Beginning of British Conquest," *Medieval India—A Miscellany*, Vol. IV, 1977.

The crisis of the *jagirdari* system also led to the intensification of factional feuds within the higher ranks of the Mughal nobility. The rival factions, based on family groupings, struggled for monopoly of power which they could use to take possession of fertile and easily manageable *jagirs*. Each faction strove hard to acquire a dominant place in the government by excluding members of the rival faction from positions of power and influence, so as to ensure for themselves the maximum material advantages that domination brought. This factionalism was further aggravated by the disastrous consequences of civil wars, constant Maratha incursions and loss of territory. The Emperor, on his part, tried to maintain a sort of balance of power between different antagonistic groups by not allowing any one of them to become so formidable as to threaten his position. Moreover, he put the central government in charge of obedient and loyal officials who entertained no ambition to usurp his paramount position. The success of these measures ensured the security of his throne, but could not save the Empire from ruin and disintegration. Talented and ambitious nobles, like Nizam-ul Mulk and Sa'adat Khan, seeing in the court little chance to attain the full extent of their ambition, devoted themselves to the establishment of semi-independent principalities in areas under their jurisdiction. Towards such nobles the Emperor followed a policy of minimum interference with their internal affairs so long as they paid nominal allegiance to him. The example of Nizam-ul Mulk was emulated by other provincial governors and chieftains, who taking advantage of the political confusion carved out principalities and became mere on-lookers to the misfortunes which befell the centre. Their assertion of independence and apathy towards the central government in its turn gravely subverted the stability and integrity of the Empire.

The source of the decline of the Mughal Empire therefore, clearly lay in the decadence of its military and civil institutions. The decay followed a chain pattern, the effect of one defect transforming itself into a cause of another. The chain could not be broken without a wholesale transformation of the very nature of the Mughal regime. It may indeed be urged that the Mughal Empire could have been saved not by petty measures of reform, but by a change in the entire outlook of its ruling class. It has been argued that "what was really required was the rapid expansion of industry and trade, based on the introduction of new technology and removal of all barriers hindering that expansion."<sup>1</sup> The failing in this direction was not of one individual—a king or noble—but almost of all classes that had been fastened to the chariot of the imperial order.

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<sup>1</sup> *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, Introduction, XVII.

## Appendix 'A'

## MANSABDARS WHO SUPPORTED NIZAM-UL MULK

Name	Mansab	Office	Group	Reference
1. Ghiyas Khan	5,000/5,000	<i>Faujdar</i> of Baglana	Mughal	M.U. III, 769-71.
2. Iwaz Khan	5,000/5,000	<i>Nazim</i> of Berar	Mughal	M.U. II, 832-36.
3. Muhammad Shah Farouqi	5,000	<i>Daroghah</i> of artillery in the Nizam's army	Shaikh	M.U. II, 708-11. K. K. II, 876.
4. Nuru Allah Farouqi	—	—	Shaikh	K.K. II, 876.
5. Marahamat Khan	5,000/5,000	<i>Nazim</i> of Burhanpur	Irani (Mughal)	M.U. III, 713-15.
6. Abdur Rahim Khan	1,500/300	—	Mughal	K.K. II, 876.
7. Muhd. Mutawasil Khan	3,000/2,000	—	Shaikh	M.U. II, 520-24.
8. Riyat Khan	5,000/5,000	—	Mughal	M.U. II, 332-33.
9. Rustam Beg Khan	—	<i>Faujdar</i> of Bijagadh	Mughal	K.K. II, 852.
10. Qadir Dad Khan	3,000/2,000	—	Shaikh	M.U. III, 140-41.
11. Mir Ahsan Khan	—	<i>Bakhshi</i>	Saiyid	K.K. II, 881.
12. Munawwar Khan	—	<i>Jagirdar</i>	Shaikh	M. U. III, 654-55.
13. Muhd. Hafiz	3,000/2,000	<i>Khan-i Saman</i>	Shaikh	M.U. II, 748-49.
14. Darab Khan	1,000/500	—	Irani	M.U. II, 39-42.
15. Musafir Khan	5,000	<i>Bakhshi</i>	Saiyid (Deccani)	Ahwal, f. 202.
16. Rambhaji Nimbalkar	5,000	—	Maratha	Ahwal, f. 161.
17. Mir Taqi	—	—	Saiyid	Ahwal, f. 161.
18. Nasiruddin	—	—	Saiyid	Ahwal, f. 161.

1	2	3	4	5
19. Fateh Khan	—	—	Afghan	Ahwal, f. 161.
20. Dilair Khan	—	—	Afghan	Ahwal, f. 161.
21. Abbas Beg	—	—	Mughal	Ahwal, f. 161.
22. Ghaffar Beg	—	—	Mughal	Ahwal, f. 161.
23. Aziz Beg	—	—	Mughal	Ahwal, f. 161.
24. Mir Ismail	—	—	Saiyid	Ahwal, f. 161.

## Appendix 'B'

### NOBLES WHO OPPOSED THE SAIYID BROTHERS (FROM THE TIME OF FARRUKH SIYAR'S FALL TO THE BATTLE OF HASANPUR, FEBRUARY 28, 1719-NOVEMBER 13, 1720)

Name I	Mansab 2	Office 3	Group 4	Reference 5
1. Mir Muhammad Taqi	6,000/6,000	Governor of Kashmir	Irani	Father-in-law of F. Siyar T. M. 39.
2. Sha'ista Khan	4,000/3,000	Governor of Kashmir <i>Diwan of Khalisa wa Tan</i>	Saiyid of Irani origin	Maternal uncle of F. Siyar K. K. II, 921; M. U. II, 828-32.
3. Ghazi-u'd-din Khan	7,000/6,000	<i>Darogha Julu Khana</i>	Turani	He afterwards joined Abdullah Khan, M.U. 879.
4. Raja Jai Singh	7,000/6,000	Governor of Malwa	Rajput	M.U. II, 81-83.
5. Tahawwar Khan	—	—	Turani	K. K. II, 832.
6. Ruhullah Khan	—	—	Irani	K.K. II, 832; M.U. II, 315-17.
7. Mitter Sen	—	<i>Wakil</i> of Naku Siyar	Nagar Barhman	K. K. II, 825-26.
8. Raja Chhabela Ram	7,000	Governor of Allahabad	„	M. U. II, 328-30.
9. Raja Girdhar	5,000/5,000	Governor of Awadh	„	K.K. II, 843.
10. Nizam-ul Mulk	7,000/7,000	Governor of Malwa	Turani	Ahwal, 157b.

11. Muhammad Amin Khan	7,000/7,000	Second <i>bakhshi</i>	„	Shiu Das, 46b.
12. Haider Quli Khan	6,000/6,000	<i>Mir Atash</i>	Mughal	Shiu Das, 48b.
13. Sa'adat Khan	5,000/5,000	<i>Faujdar</i> of Hinduan and Bayana	Irani	K. K. II, 903.
14. Saiyid Nusrat Yar Khan	7,000/7,000	—	Saiyid of Barha	He joined Muhammad Shah in the battle of Hasanpur-Shiu Das, 52b.
15. Sabit Khan	5,000/5,000	faujdar of Kol	Mughal	T. M. 75.
16. Dost Ali Khan	5,000/5,000	—	—	Shiu Das, 51a.
17. Ghalib Khan	4,000/4,000	—	—	Shiu das, 51a.
18. Abid Khan	4,000/4,000	—	—	Shiu Das, 57a.
19. Muhammad Khan Bangash	6,000/6,000	Governor of Allahabad	Afghan	M. U. III, 771-74.
20. Zafar Khan	7,000/7,000	Third <i>bakhshi</i>	Mughal	Shiu Das, 48b.
21. Aziz Khan Rohillah	6,000/5,000	<i>Nazim</i> of Oudh	Afghan	T.M. 43; Kamwar, 352a.
22. Bayazid Khan Mewati	5,000/5,000	—	—	Siyar, 439.
23. Sher Afghan Khan	6,000/6,000	<i>Faujdar</i> of Karra	Ansari (Indian)	T. S. F. 115a.
24. Tarbiyat Khan	3,500	<i>Mir Tuzuk</i>	Irani	M.U. I, 498-503.
25. Azam Khan	5,000/4,000	Deputy governor of Kashmir		K. K. 981, Kamwar, 348a.
26. Ikhlas Khan	7,000/7,000	<i>Mir Munshi</i>	Indian	M.U. I, 350-52.
27. Raja Gopal Singh	4,000/4,000	<i>Zamindar</i>	Chuhan	T. M. 63; Shiu Das, 48b.
28. Asad Ali Khan	—		—	K. K. 921; T.M. 86.
29. Muhamid Khan	5,000		Mughal	T. M. 43.
30. Amin-u'd-din Khan	6,000/6,000	<i>Mir Tuzuk</i>	Shaikh	M. U. I, 357-58.

1	2	3	4	5
31. Khan-i, Dauran	7,000/7,000	<i>Mir Bakhshi</i>	Shaikh	<i>Ausaf-al Asaf</i> , 49a. . .
32. Khaimat Jat	—	—	Jat	Irvine, II, 71.
33. Saifullah Khan	6,000/6,000	<i>Wala Shahi</i>	Mughal	T. M. 73.
34. Dost Muhammad Khan	—	<i>Zamindar</i>	Afghan	T. M. 121.
35. Raja Bahadur	—	<i>Zamindar of Kishangadh.</i>	Rathor	K. K. II, 921.
36. Azimullah Khan	—	—	Mughal	T. M. 125.
37. Mir Musharaff	5,000/5,000	<i>Faujdar of Lucknow</i>	Saiyid	He joined Muhammad Shah in the battle of Hasanpur. Shiu Das, f. 46.
38. Diyatmat Khan	—	—	—	<i>Ausaf-al Asaf</i> , f. 49.
39. Mir Jumla	7,000/7,000	<i>Sadar-us Sadur</i>	Mughal	<i>Ausaf-al Asaf</i> , f. 47.
40. Hadi Khan	—	—	—	<i>Ausaf-al Asaf</i> , f. 49.



Appendix 'C'

RANKS AND POSITIONS OF THE SAIYIDS OF BARHA AND THEIR PARTISANS IN 1719

Name	Rank	Group	Office	References
1	2	3	4	5
1. S. Abdullah Khan	7,000/7,000	Barha	Wazir	
2. S. Husain Ali Khan	7,000/7,000	"	Mir Bakhshi	
3. S. Khan Jahan Bahadur	6,000/5,000	"	Governor of Ajmer	Kamwar, f. 371b.
4. S. Nusrat Yar Khan	5,000/5,000	"	Darogah of artillery Faujdar of Narnol, Mewat	He fought in the battle of Hasanpur against S. Abdullah Khan, M. U. II, 681-83; K.K. II, 911; T.M. 44; Kam- war, f. 375a. Kamwar, f. 346a; T. M. 40-41; Siyar, 43b.
5. S. Ghairat Khan, son of S. Nasrullah, sister's son of S. Husain Ali Khan	—	"	Governor of Agra	
6. S. Najmuddin Ali Khan	4,000/2,000	"	Dorogha-i Diwan-i Khas	Kamwar, 360b.
7. S. Nijabat Ali Khan, nephew and adopted son of Abdullah Khan	—	"	Superintendent of the harem	Kamwar, 360b.
8. S. Saifuddin Ali Khan	—	"	Faujdar of Moradabad	Kamwar, 350a
9. S. Ibrahim Khan, title S. Hasan Khan	5,000	"	Deputy governor of Multan	Kamwar, 357b, 369b; T. M. 59.

1	2	3	4	5
10. S. Alam Ali Khan, son of Nuruddin Ali Khan	—	„	Deputy governor of the Deccan	T. H. p. 456.
11. S. Shuja'at-ullah Khan, sister's son of Abdulah Khan	—	„	<i>Doroghah</i> of <i>Dagh-o Tashih</i> (branding)	Kamwar, 363b.
12. Babar Khan	—	Barha	—	<i>Mi'at-ul Safa</i> , f. 43a.
13. Shamsheer Khan	—	„	—	„
14. Ashraf Khan	—	„	—	„
15. Amin Khan	—	„	—	K. K. 895.
16. S. Ghulam Ali Khan	4,000/3,000	„	<i>Daroghah</i> of <i>Diwan-i Khas</i>	Ijad, 135a.
17. S. Himmat Khan	—	„	<i>Ataliq</i> (guardian) of Rafi-u'd Drajat	K. K. II, 829, 831.
18. S. Dilawar Ali Khan	4,000/4,000	„	<i>Bakhshi</i> of Husain Ali Khan	—
19. S. Muhammad Khan, cousin of Husain Ali Khan	—	„	Superintendent of Privy Audience	K.K , II 918; Siyar, II, 433,
20. S. Karimullah	—	„	<i>Bakhshi</i> of Husain Ali Khan's army	K. K.
21. Shah Ali Khan	6,000/5,000	„	Governor of Allahabad	Kamwar, 370b.
22. S. Shahmat Khan	—	„	<i>Faujdar</i> of Sahranpur	Kamwar, ff. 369d, 363 b.
23. Zafar Ali Khan	—	„	<i>Faujdar</i> of Sikandarabad	Kamwar, f. 375a.

2	4. Abdul Nabi	—	„	Head Officer of mace-bearers	Kamwar, 360b; M.M. 117a.
	25. Dost Muhammad Khan	3,000/2,000	Afghan	<i>Zamindar of Bhopal</i>	Kamwar, f. 369a.
	26. Raja Rattan Chand	5,000	Indian	<i>Diwan of Abdullah Khan</i>	—
	27. Muhkam Singh	5,000/5,000	Rajput	<i>Diwan of Husain Ali Khan</i>	Shiu Das, 48a.
	28. Churaman Jat	5,000/5,000	Jat	—	Shiu Das, f. 30; Kamwar, 356a.
	29. Ajit Singh	7,000/7,000	Rajput	Governor of Gujarat	—
	30. Bhim Singh	5,000/4,000	Rajput	<i>Zamindar of Kota</i>	M.U. II, 305-307; Kamwar, 352a.
	31. Balaji Vishwanath	—	Maratha	<i>Peshwa of Raja Shahu</i>	—
	32. Raja Gaj Singh Narori	—	„	—	K.K. II, 877; T. M. 41.
	33. Shankraji Malhar	—	„	—	K.K. 891.
	34. Raja Gaj Singh	—	Rajput	—	T.M. 41.
	35. Tabawwar Khan	—	Afghan	—	M.U. III, 776-93.
	36. Muthawwar Khan	—	„	—	M.U. III-776-93.
	37. Umar Khan	—	„	—	K. K. II, 891.
	38. Ghalib Khan	5,000	Deccani Saiyid	—	T.M. 42; M.U. II, 504.
	39. Ghiyasuddin Khan	—	Deccani	—	K.K. I <sup>r</sup> , 894.
	40. Rahmatullah Khan	—	Shaikh	—	K.K. II, 891.
	41. Fidai Khan	—	Deccani	—	K.K. II, 891.
	42. Wali Muhammad	—	Saiyid	—	K. K. II, 895.

*Abbreviations*

1. Kamwar, Hadi Khan Kamwar, *Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghtai*.
2. K. K., Khafi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*.
3. T. M., Mirza Muhammed *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*.
4. M.M., Mirza Muhammad, *Ibrat Namah*.
5. Shiu Das, *Munawwar-ul Kalam*
6. Siyar, *Siyar-al Mutakhhherin*.
7. T.H., Rustum Ali Khan, *Tarikh-i Hindi*.
8. Ijad, Ahsan Ijad, *Farrukh Siyar Namah*.

## Appendix 'D'

### SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

#### A—Political Chronicles

Abul Faiz M'ani.

*Tarikh-i Futuhai-i Asafia* alias *Shah Namah-i Deccan*. State Library Hyderabad, MS. No. 1493; Storey, C.A., *Persian Literature*, II, 604-605.

It is a versified history of the first half of the eighteenth century of the Deccan, beginning from the reign of Bahadur Shah I to the death of Nizam-ul Mulk Asaf Jah I (1748). Its author, according to Storey, is Muhammad Ahsan Ijad; this statement is actually derived from the *Asafia Catalogue* on page 96. But Ahsan Ijad had died in 1720. The author does not mention his name any where in the book; only one verse in the introductory section indicates his pen-name as M'ani. This suggests his identification with Abul Faiz, a pupil of Mirza Bedil, a famous poet of the period. The name of Abul Faiz M'ani has been recorded in *Subah-i Gulshan*, a *Tazkirah* of poets, compiled by 'Ali Hasan Khan Saleem of Bhopal, 1881 (p. 431). Ghulam Hamdani Mashafi gives account in his *Tazkirah* of another poet, Shaikh Muhammad Mas'ud, with the pen-name of M'ani, also a contemporary of Nizam-ul Mulk. But no *Tazkirah* writer has attributed the authorship of this important work to either of the poets. The author seems to have been in the service of Nizam-ul Mulk and his close associate; for he has given a panegyric account of the achievements of his patron. He has vehemently criticized the Saiyid brothers and also those nobles who had opposed the Nizam at the imperial court during the tenure of his *wizarat*. He has held the central ministers responsible for the ruin and disintegration of the Empire. The *Shah Namah-i Deccan*, in spite of its clear bias, provides much

valuable information about the invasion of Nadir Shah, the Maratha incursions, court politics and Muhammad Shah's relations with 'Aliwardi Khan.

'Abdul Karim ibn  
'Aqibat Mahmud  
Kashmiri.

*Bayan-i Waq'i*, Aligarh MS.

It contains an eye-witness account of the political events from 1739 to 1785. The first chapter of the work deals with the invasion of Nadir Shah while others furnish information regarding the invasions of Ahmad Shah Durani and his contemporary Mughal rulers of India. 'Abdul Karim had joined the service of Nadir Shah in 1739 and accompanied him to Persia. He went to Gazwin and from there to Mecca, returning to Delhi in 1743. Besides details of contemporary events, he has given an account of his travels.

Anand Ram Mukhlis.

Anand Ram Mukhlis, a famous writer and poet, was born in Sodhra, district Sialkot in 1699. His grandfather, Gajpat Rai was a *peshkar* in the central government and enjoyed the confidence of ministers and nobles; while his father, Hirday Ram, served as a *wakil* of Muhammad Amin Khan. Anand Ram became secretary to Qamr-u'd-din Khan and *wakil* of 'Abdul Samad Khan, governor of Lahore and Multan. A learned and prolific writer, he has left fourteen works on varied subjects. These include a collection of letters and *Diwan*. He had unique opportunities of gathering information of all the events which took place during his life-time. He maintained cordial relations with *amirs* and nobles belonging to different factions, and in his dealings with them he showed regard and consideration. His description of events and assessment of the main actors in the political drama of the period are marked by restraint and moderation. He has neither glorified his patrons nor has he indulged in indictment and censure of their opponents, a feature that distinguishes him from other contemporary writers and poets. He has avoided to entangle himself in controversial

issues current in those days. Although he spent his whole life in the management of administrative affairs, Anand Ram usually omits to record details of administrative procedure and the changes in the working of *mansabdari* and *jagirdari* systems. His most important work is *Bada'i Waqa'i*, divided into three parts: the first dealing with the invasion of Nadir Shah, the second with the imperial expedition to Bangadh, the stronghold of 'Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla, and the third with the invasion of Ahmad Shah Durrani and the political situation prevailing in Punjab at that time. Anand Ram was an eye-witness to all the events and happenings described in the book. The manuscript copy, preserved in the Aligarh Muslim University Library, is complete, clearly written and in good condition. Prof. M. Shafi' of Lahore edited the manuscript that was available in the Punjab University Library and published it in *Oriental College Magazine*, Lahore, February 1941. S. Azhar 'Ali has edited the second part of the work; and this has been published under the title *Safar Namah* in 1946.

Anonymous.

*Tarikh-i Ahmad Shah*, B.M. MS. Or. 2005.

The work contains a detailed contemporary account of Muhammad Shah's successors—from Ahmad Shah to Alamgir II. The author was a citizen of Delhi and himself witnessed the events which took place in the capital. He is very critical of Muhammad Shah and his son and successor, Ahmad Shah. It is useful for the history of the period, particularly for details regarding the court politics and conflict between Safdar Jang and the Emperor.

Anonymous.

*Risalah-i Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i Dauran*, B.M. MS. Or. 180.

It supplies useful details concerning the life and activities of Khan-i Dauran, the patron of the author. But the account is panegyrical and exaggerated. The author has severely criticized the nobles opposed to his patron,

like Nizam-ul Mulk and Sa'adat Khan Burhan-ul Mulk.

Anonymous.

*Sahifa-i Iqbal*, B.M. MS. Or. 1900.

The work contains a brief account of the political events from the fall of the Saiyid brothers to the early part of Muhammad Shah's reign. The author is prejudiced against the Saiyid brothers and has used harsh language in criticizing them.

Anonymous.

*Hadisah-i Nadir Shah*, Asafia MS.

It deals mainly with events relating to the invasion of Nadir Shah and the moral degeneration of the nobles which was, according to the author, an important factor responsible for the tragedy.

Anonymous.

*Tarikh Raj' Hai Nagpur*, MS. Ethe. No. 489.

The work is mainly concerned with details pertaining to the rise of the Bhonsle family to the establishment of Nagpur State and its final dissolution. It throws light on the administrative system of Nagpur State in the times of Raghaji Bhonsle and Ranoji Bhonsle. The author compiled the work in 1823 at the suggestion of Richard Jenkins, the British Resident at Nagpur.

Anonymous.

*Asrar-i Samadi*, edited by M. Shuja'-u'-d-din, Lahore, 1965.

It deals with the life and career of Nawab 'Abdul Samad Khan, governor of Lahore and Multan during the reign of Muhammad Shah. It gives detailed information regarding the military expeditions of the governor against the Sikhs and the refractory *zamindars*.

Bhimsen.

*Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, B.M. MS. Rieu, 1, 271; Or. 23.

He was the son of Raghunath Das. He served under Rao Dalpat who had played an important role in the campaigns of Deccan during the reign of Aurangzeb. His uncle Bhugandas held the title of Diyanat Rae and the office of *diwan* under Aurangzeb. Rao Dalpat had espoused the cause of A'zam Shah and was killed in the battle of Jaju on 18 June



1708.' The work supplies information of these campaigns and sheds light on general economic conditions in the Deccan and the plight of *jagirdars*.

Ghulam Husain Salim.

*Riyaz-us Salatin*, Bibliotheca Indica, 1898.

The author was *munshi* to George Udny and lived for many years in Mauldha, and compiled the work in 1788 at the desire of his patron. It is a general history of Bengal beginning from early Rajas to the British rule. The portion dealing with the affairs of the Mughal governors from Murshid Quli Khan to 'Aliwardi Khan is very useful.

Ghulam 'Ali.

*'Imad-us Sa'adat*, Nawal Kishore Press, Lucknow.

Ghulam 'Ali was born in Rai Barielly but at the age of eight years went to Delhi to join his father Saiyid Muhammad Akmal Khan who served as a physician to Shah 'Alam II. Later, he went to the Deccan and lived with his father who had settled there after returning from Mecca. After his father's death he again came to his home town, and in 1222, he entered the service of Col. John Baillie, the Resident at the court of Lucknow. It was at Baillie's suggestion that he wrote the work in 1808. It is a history of the Nawabs of Awadh from Sa'adat Khan Burhan-ul Mulk to Sa'adat 'Ali Khan. The book also contains important details relating to the affairs of the Marathas, invasions of Ahmad Shah Durrani, the Rohillas and Sikhs and short biographical accounts of important nobles, governors and chieftains of the period. It provides with an important source-material for the study of political history of the eighteenth century.

Ghulam Husain Khan.

*Zikr-us Siyar*, 2. O. 429; Ethe, 162.

The author's father, Muhammad Himmat Khan, was in the service of the Mughal government and died in 1754. It is a history of the Mughal Empire from 1739 to the end of Shah 'Alam's reign. It furnishes important and interesting information about local affairs of the

territories of Awadh and Benares, such as conflicts between *zamindars* and government authorities, rise of Mansa Ram to power and conditions of *jagirdars* and peasants.

Harcharan Das.

*Chahar Gulzar-i Shuja'i*, B.M. MS. Rieu, III, 912, Or. 1732.

The author was a native of Meerut where his ancestors had held the office of *chaudhri* and *ganungo*. After the invasion of Nadir Shah he proceeded to Delhi and entered the service of Nawab Qasim 'Ali Khan, father-in-law of Muhammad Ishaq Khan Najm-u'd Daulah, *diwan-i khalisa* and a *mansabdar* of 6,000 *zat*. In 1167 he accompanied his patron to Faizabad and settled there. Nawab Shuja'-u'd Daulah patronized him and fixed some allowance for him; and he, therefore, dedicated the work to the Nawab. He has written a comprehensive account of the Later Mughals, from Muhammad Shah to Alamgir II, as well as a narrative of the Nawabs of Awadh. The work contains some information regarding revenue administration and the *mansabdari* system.

Harnam Singh.

*Tarikh-i Sa'adat-i Javed*, B.M. MS. Rieu III, 913; Or. 1820.

The author was a native of Lahore, but he migrated to Awadh where his father was in the employment of Sa'adat 'Ali Khan. He composed the work between the years 1805-1814, and dedicated it to the Nawab. It is useful for biographical details of some of the prominent nobles and governors of the reign of Muhammad Shah.

Iradat Khan.

*Tarikh-i Iradat Khan*, Aligarh MS.

The author, whose original name was Mirza Mubarakullah, received the title of Iradat Khan in the 40th regnal year of Aurangzeb. He held the posts of *faujdar* of Aurangabad, and *qila'adar* and *faujdar* of Mandu. After the death of Aurangzeb he supported the cause of 'Azam Shah, but Bahadur Shah treated him kindly. Zulfiqar Khan disliked Iradat Khan on account of his friendship with Mun'im Khan, and his

sympathies for 'Azim-ush Shan. Later on, however, a reconciliation took place between the two, but Iradat Khan could not obtain a job in the reign of Jahandar Shah. "But, His Majesty observed, that though he forgave, he would not on any account employ me in his service." The account given in his *Tarikh* regarding the war of succession among Aurangzeb's sons and the events of the reigns of Bahadur Shah and Jahandar Shah is rich in factual material, and the mass of descriptive data has been chronologically arranged. It also throws light on the administration and relations of Zulfiqar Khan with the court nobles and royal princes. Criticizing the conduct of that noble he writes, "He took enormous emoluments and revenues for himself, while he disposed of money to others with a hand so sparing that even his own creatures felt severe poverty with empty titles, for he never allowed *jagirs* to any one." Iradat Khan died in 1716, three years after the accession of Farrukh Siyar.

Imam-u'd-din al Husaini. *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shahi*

The work was composed in 1798. It is a useful source of information for the first invasion of Ahmad Shah Durrani. The account comes down to Shah Zaman who invaded the Punjab in 1796-1799.

Jagjivan Das Gujrati.

*Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh*, B.M. MS. Rieu I, 23-1a, Add. 26253.

The author served in the intelligence department of the Mughal government under Bahadur Shah I who once bestowed on him a robe of honour. It is a general history beginning from the reign of Mu'izz-u'd-din Ghuri to the end of the second regnal year of Bahadur Shah I, and contains a useful table of *jama'* (assessed revenue) of the Empire.

Kamraj bin Nain Singh.

He belonged to the family of Kaisth, and was an inhabitant of Phaphund in the district of Etawah, U.P. His ancestors had been in the imperial service, and he himself was attached

to Prince A'zam Shah and accompanied him to Malwa. He states that he obtained information from the official diary writers.

(a) *A'zam-ul Harb*, B.M. MS. Rieu, III, 939. Or. 1899.

It is a detailed account of A'zam Shah's short reign (from 15 March 1707 to 17 June 1708), including events connected with the war of succession fought at Jaju. Specially valuable is the list of Aurangzeb's nobles serving in the Deccan who joined the Prince after the Emperor's death.

(b) *Ibrat Namah*, MS. I.O.L. Ethe, 391.

It is a political history of the Mughal Empire from 1707 to the end of Farrukh Siyar's reign, 1719. It gives considerable information of great value about the appointments and promotions of officers and the factional politics in the imperial court.

Khair-u'd-din Muham-  
mad.

He was a learned scholar and author of several historical works. He served as a confidential agent of James Anderson and rendered valuable services in conducting negotiations with the Marathas, in recognition of which he received pension from the British government. During the latter part of his life he settled in Jaunpur, and died in 1827.

(a) *Ibrat Namah*, MS. Aligarh.

This is a detailed history of the reign of Shah 'Alam II, and gives full and accurate information, in simple and intelligible language, about events which took place during the long but chequered reign of that Emperor. He has denounced the atrocities of Ghulam Qadir in the strongest terms.

(b) *Balwant Namah*, B.M. MS. Rieu, III, 964b. Or. 1847.

This is a comprehensive history of the Rajas of Benares from Mansa Ram to Chait Singh, and it gives valuable details concerning their relations with the Nawabs of Awadh and administration of the districts under their jurisdiction. The work is also known by the

## APPENDICES

title of *Tuhfa-i Taza*.

*Muzaffar Namah*, MS. Aligarh.

The author belonged to the family of Nawabs of Murshidabad, and was on intimate terms with 'Aliwardi Khan. He served under Muhammad Raza Khan, also known as Muzaffar Jang, to whom he dedicated this work. It is a detailed history of Bengal province from the time of 'Aliwardi Khan to Muzaffar Jang who was deposed by the English in 1772. But the work is wanting in information concerning the working of civil and revenue administration in the province.

Karam 'Ali.

*Ma'asir-i Asafi*, MS. Osmania University Lib., Hyderabad.

Lachhmi Narayan Shafiq  
Aurangabadi.

The author, poetically surnamed Shafiq, was the son of Mansaram and lived in Aurangabad. He held the office of *peshkar* in the Deccan for forty years and later entered the service of 'Alijah, son of Nizam 'Ali. In the art of writing poetry he was a disciple of Azad Bilgrami, the well-known poet and scholar of the period. The present work is voluminous, covering more than one thousand pages, but contains very little additional information for the history of the Nizams which is the main burden of the book.

Murtaza Husain.

*Hadiqat-ul Aqalim*, Litho. N.K. Press Lucknow, 1879.

The author had served from 1729 to 1773 under Sarbuland Khan, Sa'adat Khan, Safdar Jang and Ahmad Khan Bangash, the most powerful nobles of the period. In 1776 he was introduced to Captain Jonathan Scott, Persian Secretary to Warren Hastings, who immediately appointed him as his *mumshi* and patronized him. Though primarily a geographical work, it contains useful information of historical significance. He has given an interesting account, lacking in chronicles, of the career and achievements of the nobles under whom he had served, and description of events in the provinces of Awadh, Bihar and Bengal.

Muhammad Hadi Khan  
Kamwar.

*Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghta'i*, Aligarh MS.

He had first served in the Deccan under Aurangzeb, and after his death accompanied 'Inayat-ullah Khan Kashmiri to Delhi where in the central government he held several posts. He had thus an unique opportunity of collecting his data for writing this monumental work which is divided into two parts. The first deals with the Mughal history from the origin of the Mongols to the death of Jahangir, and the second part begins with the death of Jahangir, and ends with the six years of Muhammad Shah's reign. The account from the reign of Bahadur Shah I to that of Muhammad Shah assumes the character of a diary of events, mainly a record of appointments, promotions and transfers of officials. As the author wrote the work under the patronage of neither a king nor a noble, the account of events reflects the approach of an impartial observer.

Muhammad Shafi' Warid. *Mir'at-i Waridat*, Aligarh MS.

The author was a native of Nagina, a *pargana* in the *sarkar* of Sambhal, *subah* of Delhi. His ancestors had come from Tehran. On his father's death in 1117 he took service under Prince 'Azim-us-shan, but a few years later he resigned and retired from public life. From his early life he was interested in literature and composed verses under the pen-name of Warid. In the preface to the work he states "the greater portion of what I have recorded, I have myself seen, and that which I have heard from trustworthy persons I took the utmost pains in shifting and inquiring into, and whatever statements I had the slightest doubt about, I discarded. But from the commencement of the war of the late Sultan Muhammad 'Azam upto the present time, or for 22 years, I have seen every thing with my own eyes." Thus, the account of the history of the Later Mughals, given in this work, is contemporary and full of information. It is extremely useful for details and new facts about the Maratha affairs, court

- politics, shoesellers' riot and the activities of Sarbuland Khan and other nobles. But it is lacking in the information regarding administration and position of *mansabdars*, and the style is pretentious and ornate.
- Muhammad Hasan Raza Khan. *Akhbar Hasan*, Aligarh MS.
- The work begins with the origin of the Afghans and is exclusively devoted to the history of their rise to power in Rohilkhand during the eighteenth century.
- Muhammad 'Ali Khan. *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, Aligarh MS.
- The author was the grandson of Lutfullah Khan Sadiq, the *khansaman* in the imperial government, and he himself held the post of the *faujdari 'adalat* of Tirhut and Hajipur. He had close contacts with the European officers of Bengal and Bihar. He completed this work in 1800 and dedicated it to Nawab Muzaffar Jang, Naib-Nazim of Bengal, who died in 1792. Namah Shakir, author of *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khani*, was his paternal uncle. *Tarikh-i Muzaffari* is the principal authority for the history of Muhammad Shah, as it contains valuable information regarding political affairs as well as administrative appointments. It gives full account of the foreign invasions and furnishes biographical details of the important nobles of the reign.
- Muhammad Muhsin Siddiqi. *Jauhar-i Samsam*, B.M. MS. Or. 1898.
- He was a native of Bijnaur, a town in Awadh, and served as a *walashahi* trooper. The work, which he dedicated to Samsam-u'd Daulah Khan-i Dauran, the *mir bakhshi* of Muhammad Shah, extends from the death of Aurangzeb to the departure of Nadir Shah in 1739. The author has glorified Khan-i Dauran but denounced his opponents like Nizam-ul Mulk and Sa'adat Khan. It is written in a very complicated and extravagant style and the account of events and personalities is exaggerated with a tendency to distortion.
- Muhabbat Khan bin Faiz 'Ata Khan. *Akhbar Muhabbat*, B.M. MS. Rieu, III, 911a. Or. 1714.

The author was a descendant of Diler Khan Da'udzai, who along with his brothers had played a conspicuous role in the wars of Deccan in the reign of Aurangzeb. It is a general history of India from the time of the Ghaznivi-des to the accession of Muhammad Akbar II in 1806. It contains useful information for the study of factional politics at the Mughal court.

Muhammad Bakhsh  
Ashub.

*Tarikh-i Shahadat-i Farrukh Siyar-wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, B.M. MS. Rieu, III, 944-45, Or. 1832; and Patna MS.

Muhammad Bakhsh, whose poetical soubriquet was Ashub, was a soldier by profession and closely connected with the Mughal Court. He was present in the battle of Karnal. In the battle of Manupur he fought under the command of Mu'in-ul Mulk against Ahmad Shah Durrani. He later on served under Intazm-u'd Daulah, the *wazir* of Ahmad Shah, and 'Imad-ul Mulk Ghazi-u'd-din Khan. He then retired to Lucknow where he was introduced to Jonathan Scott who induced him to write this history. In his preface he speaks of the English in highly eulogistic terms and extols the learning and accomplishments of Jonathan Scott. The author acknowledges his debt to a number of books available to him, chiefly *Tarikh-i Muhammad Shah*, but also recorded "what he heard from trustworthy persons and what he saw when serving Sultans and Wazir." The book starts with the death of Farrukh Siyar and ends with the death of Zakariya Khan, governor of Lahore in 1158. It gives a full and exhaustive account of political events which took place during the reign of Muhammad Shah. He supports the cause of the Mughals in their conflicts with the Saiyid brothers and the group of Khan-i Dauran. Moreover, he is a *great exponent* of the imperial cause and advocates a strong policy towards the Marathas and other refractory *zamindars* and chieftains. Some useful references to the working of



administration and condition of *mansabdars* and *jogirdars* are found in the work. The author has also mentioned some general causes which in his opinion were responsible for the decline of the Mughal Empire.

Mustajab Khan.

*Gulistan-i Rahmat*, Aligarh MS.

The author was the son of Hafiz Rahmat Khan the Rohilla Chief, and he wrote this work with the object of glorifying the acts and achievements of his father. This work is the most important source of information for the history of Afghans in Rohilkhand, giving a detailed account of the career and activities of Hafiz Rahmat Khan who was killed in 1774.

Muhammad Qasim  
Aurangabadi.

*Ahwal-ul Khawqin*, B.M. MS. Rieu, I, 276a-277, Add. 26, 244.

The author held the rank of *bakhshi* in the army of Nizam-ul Mulk and took part in various military operations launched by that noble. As he was closely associated with the government of Nizam-ul Mulk in the Deccan, he wrote the work in a spirit of partisanship, defending his patron on every occasion but denouncing those hostile to him in the strongest terms. The work is mainly devoted to the history of Nizam-ul Mulk—his wars with the Saiyid brothers, his relations with the courtiers during the term of *wizarat*, wars with the Marathas and the administrative arrangements made in the Deccan after his victory over Mubariz Khan.

Munshi In'am 'Ali.

*Ausaf-ul Asaf*, Aligarh MS.

The author was an inhabitant of Bijnaur, and he had served under Safdar Jang and Shuja'-u'd Daulah. The work is mainly devoted to the political history of the Nawabs of Awadh from the times of Sa'adat Khan Burhan-ul Mulk to the year 1198.

Muhammad 'Azam.

*Waqi'at-i Kashmir*, Aligarh MS.

This is a general history of Kashmir from the earliest times to 1160. It contains biographical notes on the saints and poets who flourished in Kashmir during the medieval

period.

Muhammad Faizbakhsh. *Farha Bakhsh*, Aligarh MS.

It is a history of Faizabad, but contains useful account of the Mughal Emperors from their origin to the downfall of the Saiyids. The work was completed in 1233.

Muhammad Mehdi  
Astrabadi.

*Tarikh Jahan Kusha'i Nadri*.

The author served as a secretary to Nadir Shah and was present in the battle of Karnal. The account of Nadir Shah's invasion of India, given in this work, is extremely useful, though eulogistic and partisan. Sir William Jones translated this valuable source of information for the life and career of Nadir Shah both in French and English, and these were published in 1770 and 1773 respectively.

Muhammad Hashim  
Khafi Khan.

*Muntakhab-ul Lubab*. Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1874.

Muhammad Hashim, son of Khwaja Mir, had served as an *'amil* in the Deccan during the reign of Aurangzeb. When Nizam-ul Mulk became governor of the Deccan in 1713 he appointed him *diwan*, and few years later Muhammad Shah bestowed on him the title of Khafi Khan. The second volume of the book contains a full and connected account of Aurangzeb's successors, from Bahadur Shah I to Muhammad Shah. This is a very valuable contemporary source for the political events and administrative changes which took place during the period.

Muhammad 'Ali bin  
Muhammad Sadiq.

*Mir'at-us Safa*, B.M. MS. Rieu, I, 129a. Add. 6539.

The author was an inhabitant of Burhanpur and attached to the court of the Nizams of Hyderabad. The work is a brief general history from the earliest times down to 1785. It is divided into two parts; the second is devoted to the history of the later Mughals and Nizam-ul Mulk and his successors.

Mir Fath-ullah.

*Tarikh-i Fathiyah*, MS. State Library, Hyderabad.

Mir Fath-ullah who held the title of Yusuf

Muhammad Khan was closely associated with Asaf Jah I and his successors. He begins his history from 1720 and brings down the record of events to 1754. Besides political details relating to the reign of Muhammad Shah and the career of Asaf Jah I, the work includes short notices of *amirs*, saints and poets who lived in the Deccan during this period. It is very useful for the history of the Deccan.

Mir Ghulam Husain  
Khan Tabatabai.

*Siyar-ul Muta'akshkherin*, Calcutta, 1833.

He was the son of Saiyid Hidayat 'Ali Khan Saharanpuri, deputy-governor of Bihar under 'Aliwardi Khan to whom he was related. In 1748 Ghulam Husain took service under Sa'eed Ahmad Khan, the son-in-law of 'Aliwardi Khan in Bihar and soon gained his esteem and confidence. This is the principal source of our information for the history of the eighteenth century, particularly for the history of Bengal. But like other histories of the period it is wanting in information relating to administrative system and economic conditions of the people. The author is prejudiced against the Mughal faction at the imperial court under Muhammad Shah.

Mun'im Khan  
Aurangabadi.

*Sawanil-i Deccan*, MS. State Library, Hyderabad.

The author was in the service of Nizam 'Ali Khan and composed this work in 1783. This is a history of the Nizams of the Deccan from Asaf Jah I to Nizam 'Ali Khan. It contains an account of the six *subas* of the Deccan, their *sarkars*, *parganas* and revenues. It also includes biographical particulars of the prominent *amirs* who played an important role in the history of the Deccan during this period.

Muhammad Wali-ullah.

*Tarikh-i Farrukhabad*, Aligarh MS.

The author of this work was born in 1780 at Saudi, district Khairabad. He was a learned scholar and religious teacher. He has described in the book not only the life and achievements of Muhammad Khan Bangash, the founder of Farrukhabad, but also a number of contempor-

ary events. He has further given brief biographical accounts of the prominent historical personages of the period.

Mir 'Alam.

*Hadiqat-ul 'Alam*, Litho. Hyderabad, 1892.

Mir 'Alam was the title of Abul Qasim who came of an illustrious Saiyid family of Shustar. He was a minister and trusted adviser of Nizam 'Ali. He died in 1223 A.H. The work is divided into two parts, the first deals with the history of Qutbshahis and the second with that of the Nizams of Hyderabad. The account of Asaf Jah I is useful for the study of the internal conditions prevailing in the Deccan at that time.

Mir Muhammad Raza.

*Sharf Namah-i Muhammad Shah*, B.M. MS. Rieu III, 1002b. Or. 2003.

Mir Muhammad belonged to a Saiyid family, settled in Suffeedun, a small town in Sirhind. This is a versified history of Muhammad Shah's reign, and the author, whose poetical surname was Raza, dedicated it to the Emperor in order to gain his favour. The work throws new light on the character and policies of Muhammad Shah.

Muhammad Mun'im  
Ja'farabadi.

*Farrukh Namah*, I.O. Lib. MS. Ethe, I, 144; 388.

It contains a detailed account relating to the war of succession among the sons of Bahadur Shah, the reign of Jahandar Shah and accession of Farrukh Siyar.

Mirza Muhammad bin  
Mu'tamad Khan.

*Ibrat Namah*, Patna MS.

The author had served under Aurangzeb during the last years of his reign. He begins his account from the accession of Bahadur Shah and brings it down to the death of Farrukh Siyar. He has recorded the events of which he was an eye-witness in a systematic way, without showing partiality to either Farrukh Siyar or the Saiyid brothers. His other important work is *Tarikh-i Muhammad* which contains dates of death of members of the royal family, nobles, *mansabdars*, chiefs and scholars of the eighteenth century.

## APPENDICES

- Munshi 'Abdul Karim. *Tarikh-i Ahmad*, Mustafai Press, Kanpur, 1266 A.H.
- It is useful for the rise of Ahmad Shah and his first invasion of India.
- Mir Muhammad Qasim Husaini. *'Ibrat Namah*, B.M. MS. Rieu, III, 939a, Or. 1934.
- Muhammad Qasim, surnamed 'Ibrat, was originally an inhabitant of Lahore; he went to Delhi in search of employment which he ultimately obtained under Saiyid Husain 'Ali Khan, the *mir bakhshi* of Farrukh Siyar. He wrote the present work at Agra and completed it in 1135 A.H./1722-23. It deals with the reigns of Aurangzeb's successors from Bahadur Shah to the downfall of the Saiyids of Barha. The author is a great champion of the two Saiyid brothers, and has defended their conduct towards Farrukh Siyar and his courtiers. *Farrukh Siyar Namah*, B.M. MS. Rieu, I, 273a, Or. 25.
- Muhammad Ahsan Ijad. It is an official history of Farrukh Siyar's reign, "written with the most irksome prolixity and the pompous monotony of strained panegyric." It deals mainly with the early life of Farrukh Siyar, his proclamation at Patna, march through Benares, Awadh and Allahabad and victory over the army of Jahandar Shah in the battle of Agra. It also gives an account of events connected with his accession and day-to-day occurrences at the court down to the year 1713.
- Muhammad 'Ali Hazin. *Tazkirat-ul Ahwal*. The text with English translation was published by F.C. Belfour, London, 1830.
- Muhammad 'Ali Hazin was born in Isfahan in 1692 but spent the latter part of his life in India and died in Benares, 1766. He wrote this account of his life in 1752. Besides containing biographical sketches of contemporary poets, the work gives interesting information about the invasion of Nadir Shah and the prevailing political conditions in India.
- Mansaram. *Ma'asir-i Nizami*, MS. State Library Hyderabad.

Mansaram's father, Bhavanidas, and his grandfather, Balkrishna, had served Khwaja 'Abid and Ghazi-u'd-din Khan Firoz Jang respectively, while he himself acted as secretary to Nizam-ul Mulk. Lachhmi Narayan Shafiq, the son of Mansaram, was secretary to Nizam 'Ali Khan. *The Ma'asir-i Nizami* is a biographical account of Nizam-ul Mulk Asaf Jah I and includes 94 anecdotes of the Nizam which throw new light on various aspects of his character and the general conditions prevailing in the Deccan.

Muhammad Saleh.

*Tarikh-i 'Ali*, MS. O.P.L. Patna.

It is a general history of the eighteenth century. It contains useful information about the Saiyids of Barha. The author who held the title of Qudrat, was in the service of an English officer, James Brown, and it was at his suggestion that he wrote this work.

Nizam-u'd-din 'Ishrat.

*Shah Naman-i Ahmadi*, MS. State Library, Hyderabad.

The author, poetically surnamed 'Ishrat, belonged to Sialkot. He accompanied Ahmad Shah Durrani to Kabul where he lived for a short time. The Afghan King bestowed on him the title of Malik-ul Shu'ra and other rewards in recognition of his poetic merits and loyalty. He then returned to his home-town and devoted himself to writing a poetical account of his patron's life and achievements. The narrative begins with the rise of Ahmad Shah and concludes with his victory over Nasir Khan, the Buluch chief, in 1760. Nizam-u'd-din also wrote *Shah Namah-i Nadri* (MS. Hyderabad), which is a versified history of Nadir Shah including a lengthy description of his Indian invasion. But both the works are deficient in factual data, and the account of events is exaggerated and biased.

Nur-u'd-din Faruqi.

*Jahandar Namah*.

The work contains a detailed eye-witness description of the wars of succession among Bahādur Shah's sons, and between Jahandar

Nawab Samsam-ud  
Daulah Shah Nawaz  
Khan.  
Rustum 'Ali Khan.

Shah and Farrukh Siyar. Particularly valuable for our purpose is its list of nobles who participated in these wars.

*Ma'asir-ul Umara*, Persian text, 3 Vols. Bibliotheca Indica, English Translation by H. Beveridge.

*Tarikh-i Hindi*, B. MS. Rieu, III, 909a. Or. 1628

Rustum 'Ali Khan, son of Muhammad Khalil, was born in Shahabad. In 1738 he joined the army of Baji Rao I but soon after gave up the job and went to Bhopal where Yar Muhammad Khan, son of Dost Muhammad Khan, took him under service. He composed the present work in 1742, in which historical events from the times of Hindu Rajas to 23rd regnal year of Muhammad Shah's reign have been briefly recorded. At the end of the book the author has given short notices of the contemporary saints and religious teachers. He is a partisan of the Saiyid brothers and deeply biased towards Nizam-ul Mulk. Dost Muhammad Khan of Bhopal had supported Dilwar 'Ali Khan, the general of Husain 'Ali Khan, in the battle of Burhanpur against Nizam-ul Mulk. When after the overthrow of the Saiyid brothers, Nizam-ul Mulk became *wazir* of the Empire, he settled all his accounts with Dost Muhammad Khan. The *wazir* launched a campaign against the Rohilla chief and forced him to surrender the fort of Bhopal. On this account Rustum 'Ali Khan has shown undisguised contempt for Nizam-ul Mulk, and accused him for defeat and humiliation which the imperial armies suffered at the hands of Baji Rao I in Bhopal.

*Shah Namah-i Munawwar-ul Kalam*, B.M. MS. Rieu, I, 274a, Or. 26.

The author was a resident of Lucknow and served under some noble as *munshi*. He has recorded in this present work political events connected with the reign of Farrukh Siyar and the first four years of Muhammad Shah's

/ Shivdas.

reign. It contains copies of official letters and imperial *farmans*, and gives day-to-day account of transactions in the imperial court after the battle of Hasanpur. Written in plain language and free from defects of prejudice or partisanship, the work constitutes a primary source for the history of the period covered by it.

Shah Nawaz Khan.

*Mir'at-i Aftab Namah*, MS. Aligarh.

The author, who held an important office at the Delhi court under Shah 'Alam, completed the present work in 1218. A.H. It is a general history from the earliest times to the 45th regnal year of Shah 'Alam, and includes brief notices of Hindu saints and singers.

Sultan Muhammad  
Khan bin Musa Khan  
Durrani.

*Tarikh-i Sultani*, Litho. Bombay, 1298.

San'ati Zadah Kirmani.  
Salimullah.

*Nadir Fateh-i Delhi*, Tehran, 1956.

*Tarikh-i Bengal*, MS. Aligarh.

The author wrote this work by the order of Henry Vansittart, governor of Bengal. It is a history of Bengal from 1696 to 1756, full of information about the life and career of 'Aliwardi Khan.

Shiu Prashad.

*Tarikh-i Faiz Bakhsh*, MS. Aligarh.

The author wrote this work in 1786 at the request of Kirkpatrick and dedicated it to Nawab Faiz-ullah Khan. This is a history of the Rohilla Afghans from their early settlement in Kather to 1775. It gives a connected account of the lives and activities of the Rohilla chiefs, such as Daud Khan, 'Ali Muhammad Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan.

Shakir Khan.

*Tarikh-i Shakir Khani*, B.M. MS. Rieu, I, 279b. Add. 6585.

The author was the son of Lutfullah Khan Sadiq and held the post of *bakhshi* in the *Risalah-i Sultani*. The work mainly deals with the history of Muhammad Shah and his successors. But the account of events, given in the work, is neither complete nor connected; and it is devoid of dates. The author has cast aspersions on Nizam-ul Mulk and other



Mughal nobles. However, he has given lists of *mansabdars*, officials, 'ulema, saints, musicians, dancers, astrologers, Hindu *peshkars* and businessmen. At the end it assumes the form of an administrative manual, giving *jama'* figures of the imperial *subahs* as well as models of appointment letters.

Yahya Khan.

*Tazkirat-i Muluk* M.S. I.O.L., Ethe. No. 409.

The author had been the *mir munshi* in the court of Farrukh Siyar and composed the present work in 1736-1737. This is a general history of India, from the Arab conquest to the year of its composition and includes some valuable information concerning the history of the later Mughals.

#### B. Administrative Manuals

Abul Fazal Allami.

*A'in-i Akbari*, Calcutta, 1877. English translation by Blochmann and Jarrett, 1939.

A'itmad 'Ali Khan.

*Mir'at-ul Haqiq*, MS. Bodleian, Fraser Collection, No. 124.

It appears that A'itmad 'Ali Khan, son of A'itmad Khan, was a retired Mughal official who had served both at Surat and Cambay and had access to official circles as well as merchants of the above ports. This is a voluminous work comprising various tracts and a diary which occupies the major part of it. The information given in the manuscript mainly deals with the *sa'ir* customs and mint revenues at the Gujarat ports, like Surat and Cambay, and it includes lists of *karkhanahs*, *mahals* and prices in the province.

Anand Ram Mukhlis.

*Mir'at-ul Istilah*, B.M. MS. Or. 1813.

It contains explanatory notes of various literary and administrative terms. Some useful references to the institutions of *wizarat*, *mansabdari* and *jagirdari* are found in the work.

Anand Ram bin  
Hiranand.

*Siyaq Namah*, MS. State Library, Hyderabad, Nawal Kishor, Lucknow, 1879.

Anonymous.

*Risala-i Zira'at*, MS. Edinburgh University, No. 144.

It deals with the main features of the agrarian institutions operating in Bengal before the British conquest of the *subah*. The subjects dealt within the treatise are : Stratification of peasantry, position and powers of *zamindars* and *ta'alluqdars*, *ijadari* system and operation of usury in the rural areas.

Anonymous.

*Khulasat-us Siyaq*, Add. 6588, Rieu, II, 799. MS. Aligarh University.

It is a treatise on arithmetical notations, and the keeping of public accounts. It also deals with the powers and functions of various functionaries associated with the revenue administration of the Mughal Empire during the reign of Aurangzeb.

Anonymous

*Dastur-ul 'Amal 'Alamgiri*, B.M. MS. Add. 6598, Rieu, I, 403a.

It is an administrative manual compiled by order of Aurangzeb in the third regnal year. It contains models of revenue accounts and returns, besides the description of duties and functions of revenue officials of the Empire.

Anonymous.

*Zawabit-i 'Alamgiri*, B.M. MS. Or. 1641, Rieu, III, 989a.

It is an administrative manual written in the 34th regnal year of Aurangzeb. The treatise gives information concerning the powers and functions of officials. It also includes rules of the service, forms of appointments and list of the *mansabdars* of Aurangzeb's reign.

Anonymous.

*Dastur-ul 'Amal*, B.M. MS. Or. 1690, Rieu, III, 989a.

It is an important administrative manual prepared during the reign of Aurangzeb.

Anonymous.

*Dastur-ul 'Amal-i 'Ilm-i Navisindagi*, B.M. MS. Add. 6599.

Hidayat-ullah Bihari.

*Hidayat-ul Qawa'id*, MS. Aligarh.

The work was composed in 1715. It deals with the powers and functions of different officials of the Mughal government, the nature of the office work and the problems faced by

Jawahar Mal Bekas.  
Jagat Rai Shuja'i-  
Sakesana.

every officer. "Here we get an inside view of that administration which mere theoretical treatises can not give us."

*Dastur-ul 'Amal*, MS. Aligarh.

*Farhang-i Kardani*, MS. Aligarh.

### C. Administrative Records

1. A collection of the copies of *farmans*, *parwanas* and official papers relating chiefly to *madad-i-ma'ash* grants in the *pargana* of Batala (Punjab), A.D. 1527-1758., I.O., 4438.
2. A collection of Persian documents in the Central Record Office (U.P.), Allahabad, consists mainly of *farmans*, land grants, sale-deeds, etc. The records concerning *madad-i-ma'ash* and *jagir* assignment during the reign of Muhammad Shah have been consulted and used.
3. State Archives of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. Documents relating to *chauth* and land grants found in various collections have been used.
4. Jaipur Records (Sitamau Transcripts). The records are classified as *Akhbarat* or daily court reports which were sent by the agent of Raja Jai Singh Sawai. They deal mainly with the transactions at the imperial court and supply important information about political and administrative matters.
5. *Persian Revenue Records of Bengal*, B.M. MS. Add. 6586, Rieu. I, 408b, 409. This collection of revenue records, on which James Grant's account of the Finances of Bengal in the Fifth Report is based, is a mine of information for the study of revenue system prevailing in Bengal before the Permanent Settlement. The collection was compiled in 1788.
6. *Akhbarat-i Darbar-i Mu'alla*, Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris. MS. 613. A.D. 1743 Transcript in the Sitamau Library.  
The collection contains daily reports received from different parts of the Empire at the imperial court. It also includes an account of everyday events taking place at the Mughal court and the daily routine programme of the Emperor.
7. Bashir-u'd-din Ahmed, *Faramin-i Salatin*, Delhi 1926.  
A collection of *farmans* pertaining to land grants and appointments of *mansabdars* and *qazis*, covering a period from the reign of Akbar to that of Shah 'Alam II.
8. *Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign*, edited by Yusuf Husain

- Khan, Hyderabad, 1959.
9. Some *Firmans, Sanads and Parwanas* (1578-1802), preserved in Bihar, Calendered by K.K. Datta, Patna, 1962.
  10. B.N. Goswamy and J.S. Grewel, *The Mughal and the Jogis of Jakhhar*.
  11. Gense and Banaji, *Gaikwads of Baroda* (English Documents), Vol. I.
  12. G.H. Khare., *Itihasik Persian Sahitay*, Poona, 1949.

#### D. Epistolary Collections

Anonymous.

‘*Aja’ib-ul Afaq*, B.M. MS. Or. 1776.

It is a collection of letters written by Farrukh Siyar, Muhammad Shah and central ministers to Raja Chabella Ram Nagar, Girdhar Bahadur and Bhawani Ram together with the answers the addressees wrote. These letters throw light on the political conditions and administrative affairs in the provinces of Awadh and Malwa.

Bhagwan Das.

‘*Aziz-ul Qulub*, Aligarh MS.

The author was a native of Hisar Firoza and compiled the work in 1748. Its only extant copy, preserved in the Aligarh University Library, was transcribed in 1813. Bhagwan Das says in the preface that he learnt the art of *insha* from Sahib Rai who possessed excellent and perfect style and few writers could rival his lucid prose. Employed in the department of *insha* Sahib Rai wrote letters under the instructions of Muhammad Khan Bangash. Bhagwan Das claims to have selected important letters from the vast mass of documents heaped up in his office. He put them together in a systematic form and gave their collection the title of ‘*Aziz-ul Qulub*. He does not mention the well-known work, *Khujasta Kalam*, composed by his teacher. He, however, acknowledges that all the papers recorded in the work were written by Sahib Rai. The present collection is divided into five parts: the first includes 25 *‘arzdashits* (petitions) addressed to Muhammad Shah; the second section comprises large number of

letters sent to Qamar-u'd-din Khan, Nizam-ul Mulk, Khan-i Dauran, Raja Jai Singh, Baji Rao, and Raja Shahu; the third and the fourth incorporate replies from these prominent persons, while the last section contains copies of six *farmans* and valuable material pertaining to topics of social importance. These letters supply important information regarding political events, administrative changes and economic conditions prevailing in Bundelkhand and Malwa.

Mausvi Khan Mir Hashim.

*Munshat-i Mausvi Khan*, MS. State Library, Hyderabad.

Mausvi Khan was a scholar and poet, and his *nom de plume* was *Jur'at*. He was closely associated with Asaf Jah I, and though he held the post of *mir munshi*, he exercised great influence in the court of the Nawab. The letters, written in a flowery language, deal with varied aspects of Asaf Jah's political relations with the central government and the Marathas. They supply new details about battles which he fought against Dilawar 'Ali Khan, 'Alam 'Ali Khan, Maratha generals and Mubriz Khan. For understanding Asaf Jah's changing policies towards the Marathas and his solution of problems facing the Empire, the study of these letters is very useful.

Muhammad Amin.

*Majmua'-i Insha'*, MS. *Daftar-i Diwani*, Hyderabad, No. 1863.

A voluminous collection of letters exchanged between Nizam-ul Mulk and his contemporary nobles and chiefs. It contains copies of a few royal *farmans* addressed to him.

Munshi Daya Ram.

*Balmukand Namah*, MS. Patna, edited and translated by Satish Chandra.

This is a collection of letters written by Saiyid Abdullah Khan Qutbul Mulk to Raja Chabella Ram Nagar, Girdhar Bahadur, Haider Quli Khan, Raja Shahu and other officers and chiefs during the period 1719-1720. The letters supply valuable information for the study of the political situation which the king-makers faced after

- the deposition of Farrukh Siyar.  
 Shah Wali-ullah. *Shah Wali-ullah Ke Siyasi Maktubat*, Aligarh, 1950.  
 A collection of his political letters, edited and translated into Urdu by K.A. Nizami.

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 Khawaja Mir Dard. *'Ilm-ul Kitab*, Ansari Press Delhi, 1891.  
 Mirza Mazhar Jan-i Janan. (a) Collection of letters, edited and translated by Khaliq Anjum, Delhi, 1962.  
 (b) *Muqamat-i Mazhari*, Urdu translation, Lahore, 1915.  
 (c) *Kalimat-i Taiyyabat*, Mujtabai Press, Delhi, 1892.  
 Shah 'Abdul Aziz. *Malfuzat-i Shah Abdul 'Aziz*, edited by Qazi Bas-hir-u'd-din, Mujtabai Press, Meerut, 1314 A.H.  
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G. *Tazkirahs*

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Fateh 'Ali Husain  
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Ghulam Hamdani  
Mushafi.  
Muhammad Husain  
Azad Bilgrami.
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*Tazkirah Rekhta Goyan*, Anjuman Taraqqi-i Urdu, 1939.  
*Tazkirah Hindi Goyan*, edited by Maulvi Abdul Haque, Anjuman Taraqqi-i Urdu, 1933.
- He claimed his descent from the noble family of the Vasti Saiyids, settled in Bilgram where he was born in 1705. After his return from Mecca in 1740, he settled in Aurangabad, and died there in 1785. In the Deccan he was favoured and patronized by the successors of Nizam-ul Mulk Asaf Jah I. He was one of the most accomplished scholars and poets of the eighteenth century and his contribution to history writing and Persian literature is great. His two important works, *Khazana-i 'Amrah* and *Ma'asir-ul Kiram*, are devoted to biographical notices of Indian saints, 'ulema, poets, particularly belonging to Bilgram, and famous historical personages of the period. In *Khazana-i 'Amrah* he has given a short account of the Maratha affairs and discussed causes of their success against the Mughals.
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## ERRATA

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Read</i>
82	Table II, No. 4	Fakhiruddin	Fakhruddin
91	F.N. 2	Pannah	Panah
120	24	Dahar	Dhar
120	26	Dabhai	Dabhoi
130	F.N. 3	Hingane	Hingne
133	22	Bandshahpur	Badshapur
133	25	ignomity	ignominy
136	10	Hirda	Hirdey
146	F.N. 3	Hughli	Hugli
162	10	Bhochla	Bhojla
165	10	Yaminabad	Eminabad
165	F.N. 3	Tazkirah	Tazkirat
178	15	Abul	Abdul
190	1	finished	punished
207	F.N. 1	th	the
207	F.N. 1	hise	his
207	F.N. 1	cout	court
227	4	Irdad	Iradat
228	List, No. 10	Faiz-u-ullah	Faiz-ullah
240	8	whs	was
288	F.N. 1	Saltanate	Shahadat
318	List, 30	Naj	Najam
318	List of <i>Mansabdars</i> , 4	Delete serial number 4	
361	7	tombs	tomb
369	1	Chhatar	Chhatara
369	8	Rustom	Rustum
372	5	Shafr-u'd	Sharf-u'd
388	19	banded	bandied
400	F.N. 2	Allahabad	Akbarabad
403	7	Na'imat	N'aimat
403	F. N. 1	Kasim	Qasim
407	6	Hazarat	Hazrat
410	29	integrate	invigorate

# INDEX

## A

- Abdul Aziz, 372  
Abdul Baqi Khan, 181, 319  
Abdul Gafoor, 95, 96  
Abdul Hakim, 369  
Abdul Hamid Khan, 14, 20  
Abdul Karim, 18, 172  
Abdullah Beg, 333  
Abdullah Khan Barha alias Saiyid Miyan, 31  
Abdul Ma'abud Khan, 168  
Abdul Nabi Khan, 148, 150  
Abdul Rasul, 150  
Abdul Samad Khan, 15, 17, 24, 26-28, 31, 35, 52, 60, 70, 71, 76, 82, 249, 251  
Abdul Sattar Khan, 319  
Abd-un-nabi Khan, 37, 87.  
Abdur Rahim Khan Nasir-u'd Daulah Bahadur, 82, 225, 228  
Abdur Ra'uf Khan, 17  
Abhay Singh, 17, 47, 97, 98, 102, 112, 120, 121; 129, 132, 217, 218, 220-222, 258-262, 318, 323, 356  
Abul Hasan, 146, 147  
Abul Khair Bahadur, 232  
Abul Nabi Beg, 119  
Abu Tara Khan, 319  
Adaura, 99  
Adoni, 226, 228  
Advat Sen, 403  
Afrasiyab Khan, 13, 17, 53  
Afzal Khan, 11  
Agha Mu'ain, 227  
Aghar Khan, 168, 319  
Agra, 3, 9-11, 14, 28, 34-37, 48, 51, 53-55, 63, 69, 82, 90, 99, 105, 106, 124, 129, 131-133, 135, 136, 149, 260, 321, 335, 400  
Ahmadabad, 20, 41, 86, 101-103, 107, 117-119, 121-123, 176, 203, 212, 214, 216, 218-222, 337, 345, 357  
Ahmad Beg, 10, 28, 29.  
Ahmad Khan, 137, 399  
Ahmadnagar, 3, 340  
Ahmad, Prince, 168, 194, 299, 406, 407  
Ahmad Shah Durrani, 189-197, 256, 285, 328, 329  
Ahsan Khan alias Mir Malang, 3  
Ahtida Khan, 228  
Ajit Singh, 1, 2, 15-17, 19, 20, 33, 35, 36, 39, 45-50, 69, 74, 82, 86, 138, 139, 211, 213, 257, 258, 288, 318, 355, 356  
Ajmer, 36, 48, 49, 54, 69, 82, 93, 97, 105, 149, 257, 258, 260, 297, 333, 335  
Akbarpur, 64  
Akbar, son of Aurangzeb, 3  
Akbar, son of Muh. K. Bangash, 138  
Akbar—the Emperor, 176, 312, 404  
Alam 'Ali Khan, 63-66, 212, 224-226  
Alam Shaikh, 26  
'Ali Ahmad Khan, 94, 319, 324  
'Ali Akbar Khan, 232.  
'Ali Asghar Khan, 9, 82, 94, 319, 326  
'Aligarh, 9, 14, 19, 53, 56, 99, 104  
'Ali Hamid Khan, 52, 94, 171, 319  
'Ali Khan, 65  
'Ali Muhammad Khan Bahadur, 57, 99, 118  
'Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla, 194, 211, 273, 276-282, 299, 329, 412  
'Ali Murad, 8  
'Ali Qarawal, 231  
'Aliwardi Khan, 142-154, 187, 229, 233, 236, 238, 240-249, 272, 318, 325, 335, 336  
Allahabad, 10, 32, 36-38, 63, 71, 79, 82, 99, 105, 138, 187, 228, 241, 267, 272, 308  
Allahwardi Khan, 94, 318  
Amanat-ullah, 369  
Amanullah Kashmiri, 171  
Ambala, 166  
Amber, 1, 36, 39, 46, 47-49  
Amin-u'd-daulah, 94, 318  
Amin-u'd-din Khan Sambhali, 17, 28  
Amir Khan Miran-i Mir, 3, 63, 83, 161, 232

- 232
- Amir Khan Umdat-ul Mulk, 131, 184, 185-188, 209, 241, 265, 269, 285, 299, 322, 352, 366, 368, 369, 411
- Amir Khusrau, 346
- Amjad Khan, 11
- Amjhera, 100, 103, 125
- Amroha, 274, 282, 322
- Anandgarh, 50
- Anand Rao, 137
- Antaji, 118, 127
- Antaji Mankeshwar, 266
- Anup Singh Bhandari, 212
- Anwar-u'd-din Khan, 230, 231
- Anwarullah Khan, 137, 228
- Appa Rao, 226
- 'Aqidat Khan, 340
- 'Aqidatmand Khan, 83, 318
- 'Aqil Beg, 171
- 'Aqil Khan Kambhu, 228
- Arcot, 227, 228
- Artat Khan, 98, 319
- Asad Khan, 5, 6, 8, 10, 24-26, 48, 318
- Asad Quli Khan, 88
- Asadullah Khan, 17
- Asad Yar Khan, 184, 185, 188, 300, 301, 319
- Asaf Jah *see* Nizam-ul Mulk
- Ashraf Khan, 83
- Asirgarh, 64
- 'Ata'Ali Khan, 81
- 'Ata-ullah Khan, 341
- 'Ati-ullah Khan, 81, 166
- Attock, 181, 340
- Aulechand, 349, 350
- Aunola, 322
- Aurangabad, 21, 65, 82, 90, 109, 185, 228, 232
- Aurangzeb, 1, 3-5, 13, 15, 18, 20, 23-25, 31, 32, 38-42, 45, 46, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 58, 91, 104, 111, 142, 161, 175, 200-206, 223, 225, 226, 229, 233, 273, 289, 307, 369, 370, 402, 415
- Azam Shah, 3, 5, 24, 27, 42, 46, 54, 142, 202
- 'Azim-ullah Khan, 26, 88, 98, 174, 176, 179, 184, 265, 275, 305, 329, 339
- 'Azim-ush Shan, 8-10, 14, 24, 27, 32, 204
- 'Aziz Khan Bahadur, 17
- Azmat-ullah Khan, 281, 334
- A'z-u'd-din, 4, 8, 9, 28, 207
- Babar, 176
- Babuji Naik, 230
- Badi-uz Zaman, 87
- Badnawar, 103, 126
- Badri Nath, 320.
- Badshah Begam, 407
- Baglan, 34.
- Bahadur Shah, 3-8, 13, 14, 24, 27, 32, 43, 44, 46-48, 51, 52, 54-57, 71, 203, 206, 207, 223, 225, 231, 275, 317, 402, 410, 414
- Bahar Singh, 139
- Bahman Yar I'tiqad Khan, 25
- Bahrahmand Khan, 5
- Baji Rao I, 102-104, 106-110, 113, 114, 116, 118-120, 125, 126, 128, 130-137, 140, 141, 168, 216, 225, 261, 265, 266, 268, 269, 413
- Baj Khan, 403
- Bakhat Singh, 47, 258, 259, 262, 264
- Bakhtawar Khan, 94
- Balaji Baji Rao, 211, 244, 245, 248, 265-267, 269, 270, 272, 355, 356
- Balaji Vishwanath Bhatt, 43, 45, 64, 108, 109, 116, 118, 119
- Balapur, 66, 225
- Balasore, 147, 152, 233, 234
- Balram Hari, 349, 350
- Balwant Singh, 339
- Banda Bahadur, 51-53
- Bapuji Mahadeo, 328
- Baqa-ullah Khan, 340
- Bareilly, 82, 274, 275, 277, 278, 282, 322, 333, 340, 354
- Baroda, 112, 120, 121, 124, 340
- Bayana, 25
- Bayazid Khan, 82, 257, 340
- Baz Khan, 24.
- Benaras, 37, 118, 131, 141, 264, 272, 338-340.
- Bhagalpur, 152, 340
- Bhandari Amar Singh, 112
- Bhaskar Ram Pandit, 118, 145-14
- 150, 231, 241, 247, 248
- Bhawani Ram, 103, 104, 106, 126, 356
- Bhilsa, 112, 372
- Bhim Sen, 3, 4
- Bhojpur, 151
- Bhopal, 88, 127, 132, 136, 137, 172

Bhupat Ram, 82, 341  
 Bidar Bakht, 5, 40, 54  
 Bidyapur, 57  
 Bijapur, 3, 6, 27, 31, 228  
 Birbhum, 151  
 Bishan Singh, 46, 54  
 Biund, 69  
 Boli Khan, 403  
 Broach, 87, 124  
 Bu 'Ali Khan, 94  
 Budh Singh, 17, 262  
 Budh Singh Hada, 17, 44  
 Bundi, 263  
 Burdwan, 145-148, 151, 153, 334  
 Burhanpur, 6, 63-66, 82, 109, 117, 135, 227, 228, 236, 372.

## C

Calcutta, 19, 39, 42, 45, 50, 107  
 Cambay, 118, 119, 121, 122, 124, 203, 221  
 Chambal, 54, 63, 131  
 Chandar Kunwar Bai, 263  
 Chandra Bans, 88  
 Chandra Sen Jadav, 44, 107, 108.  
 Chankhandi, 139.  
 Chhabela Ram Nagar, 9, 11, 17, 35-37, 54, 209, 356  
 Chhatrasal Bundela, 17, 44, 55, 136-141, 350, 369  
 Chikalda, 127  
 Chimnaji, 112, 113, 119, 120, 125, 126, 128, 131, 141, 265  
 Churaman Jat, 2, 15-17, 33, 35, 39, 49, 54, 55, 260  
 Cuttack, 142, 145, 149, 151

## D

Dabhoi, 109, 112, 119, 120  
 Dacca, 18, 334  
 Dado Bhimsen, 125  
 Dado Malhar, 41  
 Dalel Singh, 262  
 Dalpat Rao, 24  
 Damaji II, 102, 103, 117, 120-122, 124  
 Damodar Mahadeo, 328  
 Dandwa Sarai, 48  
 Darak Das, 20  
 Dara Shikoh, 347  
 Datiya, 136, 141

Daud Khan, 13, 19, 20, 37, 44, 127  
 Daud Khan Panni, 17, 19, 20, 24, 33, 223  
 Daud Khan Rohilla, 274-276  
 Daudnagar, 149  
 Daulat 'Ali Khan, 66  
 Daulat Ram Sindhia, 353  
 Dawar-dad Khan, 94, 319  
 Daya Bahadur, 126  
 Debi Chand, 275  
 Debi Singh, 403  
 Deep Singh, 126  
 Delhi, 3, 6, 8, 10, 14, 19, 25, 27, 29, 35, 36, 45, 46, 50, 52-54, 56, 57, 62, 63, 67-72, 74, 75, 79, 82, 86, 87, 90, 91, 97, 99, 101, 106, 129-137, 141, 157, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 167, 169, 174, 176, 194, 197, 213, 214, 217, 226, 227, 229, 235, 241, 244, 246, 251, 252, 255, 256, 259, 264, 265, 267, 268, 270, 281, 282, 299, 307, 309, 321, 322, 328, 333, 340, 345, 349, 357, 359-361, 366, 368, 372, 385, 390, 391, 393-396, 399, 401, 411, 413

Dhana Jadav, 41, 42  
 Dhar, 87, 125-127, 131, 266, 333  
 Dholqa, 87, 119, 333, 334, 337, 340  
 Dilawar 'Ali Khan, 62, 63, 65, 66, 88, 224-226, 324  
 Dil Dier Khan, 80  
 Diler Himmatt Khan, 319  
 Diler Khan, 137, 138  
 Dilras Banu Begam, 3  
 Dipalpur, 127  
 Dip Singh, 104  
 Diyanat Khan, 60, 87  
 Doraha (Malwa), 82  
 Dost 'Ali, 230  
 Dost Muhammad Rohilla, 65, 88, 339  
 Durgadas, 46  
 Durjan Sal of Kotah, 129, 262  
 Durlabram, 151

## E

Edar, 88  
 Ehsan-ullah Khan, 340  
 Etawah, 9, 340

## F

Faizabad, 148



Faizullah Khan, 76  
 Fakhruddin, 82, 166, 237, 288, 318, 325  
 Fardapur, 66  
 Farkhanda Akhtar, 56, 407  
 Farrukhabad, 10, 279  
 Farrukh Siyar, 1, 2, 9-13, 15, 16, 18-21,  
 25, 28-35, 37, 45, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55, 57-  
 59, 61, 63, 89, 91, 137, 225, 227,  
 250, 317, 363, 391, 407, 408, 414-416  
 Farzand Khan, 17  
 Fatch Chand Jagat Seth, 143  
 Fatehgarh, 50  
 Fatehpuri, 407  
 Fatehpur Sikri, 57, 58  
 Fatch Singh, 128  
 Fazil 'Ali Khan, 81  
 Fazil Khan, 135  
 Fida'i Khan, 79  
 Fida-u'd-din Khan, 122  
 Firozabad, 132, 339  
 Firoz Khan Mewati, 52  
 Firoz Khan Sadarang, 403

## G

Gaj Singh, 65  
 Ganga Ram, 147  
 Gaya, 131, 149, 244  
 Ghairat Khan, 48  
 Ghalib Khan, 17  
 Ghazipur, 99  
 Ghazi-u'd-din Khan, 87, 91, 133, 135, 136,  
 298, 318, 393  
 Ghazi-u'd-din Khan Firoz Jang, 26, 27,  
 31, 206, 225, 231  
 Ghazi-u'd-din Khan Ghalib Jang, 13, 17  
 Ghazni, 31, 56, 164, 181  
 Ghulam 'Ali, 403  
 Ghulam 'Ali Khan, 13, 57, 67, 71  
 Girdhar Bahadur, 17, 37, 60, 70, 75-77,  
 82, 103, 104, 114, 125, 126, 258, 260,  
 333, 340, 356, 413  
 Gopal Singh, 53, 70  
 Gopamau, 372  
 Gorakhpur, 38  
 Gudawari, 51  
 Gujjarmal, 81, 90  
 Gurdaspur, 52, 53  
 Guru Arjun Singh, 348  
 Guru Govind Singh, 50-53  
 Gwalior, 5, 127

## H

Hafiz 'Abdul Waheed, 372  
 Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan, 77, 84, 93, 94  
 Hafiz M. Afzal, 17  
 Hafiz-u'd-din Khan, 188, 301  
 Haidar Quli Khan, 20, 37, 67, 69, 70, 71,  
 73, 78, 80, 82, 84-88, 93, 97, 208, 213,  
 214, 257, 258, 302, 314, 318, 321, 333,  
 356  
 Haider Beg Kashghari, 68, 69  
 Haji Ahmad, 142, 143, 144, 146, 152, 153,  
 340  
 Haji Muhammad Sharif, 369  
 Hakim Muhsin, 3  
 Hamid Khan, 26, 27, 82, 87, 88, 92, 93,  
 101, 102, 107, 117, 118, 128  
 Hamid Khan Bahadur, 31, 215, 218  
 Hamid-u'd-din Khan, 28  
 Hamid-u'd-din Khan Neemcha, 319  
 Hardwar, 355  
 Harnam Singh Nami, 92  
 Harzullah Khan, 226  
 Hasan 'Ali Khan, 31, 32  
 Hasanpur, 71, 73-75, 138, 209, 233, 260,  
 297  
 Hayatullah Khan Bahadur, 166, 181, 192,  
 193, 197, 252, 253, 255, 256  
 Hazrat Begam, 407  
 Hidayatullah Khan, 17, 26, 76, 81, 319  
 Hijili, 148, 152  
 Himmat Khan Barba, 11, 12  
 Hindaun, 25, 32, 100  
 Hirda Shah, 136, 142  
 Hirday Narayan, 138  
 Hodal, 55  
 Holkar Malhar Rao, 43, 121, 125, 127-  
 129, 136, 259, 262, 271  
 Hugli, 146, 147, 334  
 Hurda, 259, 262  
 Husain Afghan, 60  
 Husain Khan Barba, 48  
 Hyderabad, 3, 5, 82, 110, 208, 226, 228,  
 233, 345, 403

## I

Ibn-i Abdul Wahhab, 377  
 Ibn-ul 'Arabi, 347, 375, 381  
 Ibrahim Khan, 199-201  
 Ibrahim-u'd-din Khan, 13

Ikhlās Khan, 7  
 Imam Malik bin Anas, 378  
 Imtiyāz Mahal, 8  
 In'am Khan Bahadur, 15  
 'Inayat Khan Rasikh, 94, 319  
 'Inayatullah Khan Kashmiri, 12, 49, 79,  
 80, 206, 311  
 Indore, 125  
 Indus, 22  
 Intazam-u'd Daulah, 318  
 Iradat Khan, 227  
 Iradatmand Khan, Sharfud Daulah, 80,  
 98, 258  
 Isanpur, 121  
 Isfahan, 155-157, 159  
 Islamgarh, 88  
 Islam Khan, 14, 17, 76  
 Iswari Singh, 196  
 Itimadpur, 132  
 'Iwaz Khan, 26, 28, 31, 79, 82, 87, 108,  
 225, 226, 231  
 'Izzat 'Ali Khan, 83

## J

Ja'afar Khan, 14  
 Ja'afar Quli, 46, 319  
 Jagat Seth, 146  
 Jag Ram, 71  
 Jahandar Shah, 7, 9, 10, 15, 24, 27, 28, 54,  
 56, 225, 402, 407  
 Jahangir, 32, 404  
 Jahan Khan, 83  
 Jahan Murad Shah, 19  
 Jahan Shah, 8, 56, 408  
 Jaipur, 69, 157, 128, 130, 137, 257, 263,  
 264, 345  
 Jai Singh Sawai, 1, 15-17, 35, 36, 39, 44,  
 46-49, 55, 71, 76, 77, 82, 97, 98, 103-  
 106, 114, 125, 126, 128-132, 135, 168,  
 259-261, 263-265, 267, 269, 270, 318,  
 320, 322, 335-337, 340, 354, 356  
 Jaitpur, 139-141  
 Jaju, 5, 24, 27, 32, 54, 142  
 Jalalabad, 52, 164  
 Jalesar, 132, 154, 372  
 Jambuser, 87, 112  
 Jamrud, 3  
 Janish Khan, 319  
 Janki Ram, 145, 150, 151  
 Jan Muhammad, 369

Jan Nisar Khan, 83, 98, 99, 319, 340  
 Janoji Bhonsle, 153, 358  
 Jaswant Rai, 80  
 Jaswant Singh, 45, 46  
 Jaunpur, 372  
 Javid Khan, 94  
 Jawahar Khan, 94  
 Jawan Mard Khan, 122, 213, 219, 324,  
 340, 341  
 Jhansi, 328  
 Jinji, 39, 40  
 Jiund, 69  
 Jivraj Bhandari, 121  
 Jodhpur, 46-49, 103, 257-260, 262, 263  
 Jugal Kishore, 144  
 Junagadh, 333

## K

Kabir, 349, 397  
 Kabul, 3, 4, 13, 82, 93, 97, 157, 158, 160-  
 164, 166, 174, 181, 191, 192, 197  
 Kalka, 133  
 Kalpi, 137, 138  
 Kalyanpur, 139  
 Kam Baksh, 3, 5, 42, 43  
 Kanthaji Kadam Bande, 101, 107, 112,  
 117-121  
 Kapadvanj, 121  
 Kara, 25  
 Karana, 40  
 Karim Dad Khan, 341  
 Karlars, 129  
 Karnal, 96, 97, 166, 168, 169, 171, 175,  
 176, 182-184, 189, 194, 240, 265, 324,  
 353, 411, 412  
 Karoli, 69, 71  
 Karra Manikpur, 9, 99, 340  
 Kather, 273, 275, 282  
 Katwah, 146-148, 151  
 Kavi Kalash, 39  
 Kazim Khan, 87  
 Khaibar Pass, 164  
 Khair Andesh Khan, 82, 333, 340  
 Khair-ullah Khan, 228  
 Khanderao Dabhade, 108-110, 116-118, 120  
 Khan-i Dauran, 17, 20, 28, 77, 78, 81, 86,  
 88, 96-100, 104-106, 110, 113, 114, 128-  
 130, 132, 134, 138, 141, 161-163, 167-  
 172, 174, 182-184, 219-222, 236, 238,  
 257-259, 261, 265, 268, 288, 289, 297,

- 300, 314, 318, 321-323, 336, 395, 396, 400, 413.
- Khan-i Zaman, 4, 9, 86
- Khan Jahan, 55, 323
- Khan Zaman Bahadur, 17, 52, 302
- Khasusiyat Khan, 8
- Khawaja 'Abdul 'Aziz, 83
- Khawaja 'Abd-ul Hamid, 203, 205
- Khawaja Ahmad, 226, 227
- Khawaja Monis Khan, 83
- Khelna, 46
- Khidmatgar Khan, 128
- Khoja Zamarrud Khan, 83
- Khudayar Khan, 182, 251, 340
- Khujista 'Akhtar, 4, 56
- Khwaja 'Abdullah Khan alias Abul Wafa Khan, 227, 230, 231
- Khwaja Javed, 406
- Khwaja Mir Dard, 386-390, 395, 397
- Khwaja Muhammad Saghir, 369
- Khwaja Nasir Andleeb, 386, 387, 395
- Khwajah 'Abdullah, 77, 83
- Khwajah Hamid Khan, 81
- Khwajah Hasan, 8
- Khwajah Kuli, 63
- Khwajah Nizamuddin Auliya, 75.
- Khwajah Quib-u'd-din Kaki, 8, 75, 351, 361, 362
- Kifayatullah, 75, 81
- Kirpa Ram, 81
- Kishangadh, 262, 404, 405
- Koil, 372
- Koka Khan, 133, 319.
- Kokaltash Khan, 8, 319
- Koki Jiu, 84, 92-96, 285
- Kolhapur, 39, 43, 44, 108
- Kota-Bundi, 62.
- L
- Lachman Das, 51
- Ladah-Danger, 129
- Lahore, 3, 4, 7, 9, 14, 24, 28, 31, 35, 45, 52, 56, 60, 82, 165, 166, 174, 192, 193, 195, 197, 250-252, 254-256, 345
- Lakhpur Rai, 250, 254.
- Lal Kunwar, 8, 9.
- Lohgarh, 50, 52, 55.
- Lucknow, 149, 345, 403
- Lutf 'Ali Khan, 143
- Lutfullah Khan Sadiq, 11, 18, 311, 318
- M
- Ma'ali Khan, 76
- Madan Singh, 44
- Madar Shah, 275
- Madhavrao Peshwa, 355
- Madho Singh, 263
- Madina, 31, 391
- Magror, 151
- Mahabaleshwar, 47
- Mahadaji Gaikwad, 121
- Maharana Amar Singh, 263
- Maharao Durjan Sal, 262
- Mahi, 101, 117, 118
- Mahmud Afghan, 155, 156
- Mahmud Khan, 17
- Mahoba, 140
- Majnu Nanak Shah, 349
- Mandah, 139
- Mandesor, 41
- Mandeswar, 127
- Mandsur, 112, 128
- Mandu, 63, 106, 126, 131, 337
- Mankara, 150
- Mankeshwar Antaj, *see* Antaji
- Mankpur, 372
- Mansa Ram, 64, 338, 339
- Mansur Khan, 87
- Maqbulabad, 87
- Marathas, 6, 13, 21, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39-45, 55, 58, 62, 63, 64, 66, 73, 74, 89, 97, 100-128, 130-134, 136-138, 140-142, 145-154, 158-160, 187, 215-217, 223, 226, 229, 231, 242, 246, 247, 259, 262-265, 267, 268, 270, 275, 289, 314, 328
- Mardan 'Ali, 143
- Marhamat Khan, 63, 340
- Masaulipatam, 227
- Mashhed, 3
- Mas'um 'Ali Khan, 94
- Mathura, 118, 131, 132
- Maulana Nur-u'd-din, 20, 371
- Maulvi Abdullah, 369
- Maulvi Asghar, 372
- Maulvi Ghulam Yahya, 383
- Maulvi Nudrat, 369
- Maulvi Zain-u'd-din, 369
- Mazhir-u'd-din Khan, 76
- Mecca, 19

- Meerut, 301  
 Mehta, Bhagwati Prasad, 9  
 Mehta, Sadanand, 340  
 Mertha, 45  
 Mewar, 39, 45, 46  
 Mewat, 48, 82  
 Mewatis, 133  
 Mian Mir, 347, 348  
 Mian Muhammad Saleh, 369  
 Mian Mustafa Khan, 372  
 Mian Shah, 372  
 Mian Shah Allahyar, 372  
 Mian Tansen, 8  
 Mian Wali Muhammad, 394  
 Midnapur, 147, 152  
 Mihr-un Nisa Begam, 5  
 Mihrab Khan, 46, 47  
 Mihr Parwar, 7  
 Mir 'Abid Qulich Khan, 26  
 Mir Afza, 25  
 Mir Baha-u'd-din, 26  
 Mir Baqa Khan, 318  
 Mir Ghulam Muhiy-u'd-din Khan Bahadur, 320  
 Mir Habib, 146, 152, 154  
 Mir Haider, 68, 69, 98  
 Mir Hasan Khan Koka, 83, 94, 133  
 Mir Ibrahim, 63  
 Mir Ja'afar, 152  
 Mir Ja'afar 'Ali Quli Khan, 340  
 Mir Jumla, 12, 17, 19, 28, 29, 80, 226, 304, 305, 411  
 Mir Mohammad Fazil, 91  
 Mir Mohammad Pannah, 91  
 Mir Muhammad 'Ali Burhanpuri, 61, 78  
 Mir Muhammad Amin, 17, 25  
 Mir Muhammad Hashim, 372  
 Mir Muhammad Mehdi, 17  
 Mir Muhammad Naseer, 25  
 Mir Muhammad Rafi', 25  
 Mir Muhammad Sajid, 320  
 Mir Murtaza, 143, 144  
 Mir Mushraf, 318  
 Mir Qasim, 35  
 Mir Saiyid Ahmad, 372  
 Mir Saiyid Yasin, 372  
 Mir Taqi Mir, 397, 400, 401  
 Mir Wali-ullah, 10, 104  
 Mirza Aziz Beg, 328, 329  
 Mirza Baqar, 145  
 Mirza Mazhar Jan-i Janan, 348, 368, 383, 385, 398  
 Mirza Muhsin, 170.  
 Mitra Sen, 35, 36.  
 Momin Khan, 88, 103, 121-124, 220-223, 289, 319  
 Momin Yar Khan, 109.  
 Monghyr, 149, 334.  
 Mubariz Khan, 82, 90, 106, 107, 208, 223, 225, 226, 268, 324.  
 Mufti Sana'ullah, 372.  
 Muhammad 'Ali Khan Ansari, 57  
 Muhammad 'Ali Taban, 5  
 Muhammad Amin Khan, 3, 25-31, 52, 54, 59-61, 66-70, 73-75, 77-80, 85, 91, 208, 250, 251, 288, 310, 315, 318, 340  
 Muhammad Anwar Khan, 31  
 Muhammad A'zam, 3  
 Muhammad Ghiyas Khan, 225  
 Muhammad Hussain, 369  
 Muhammad Ishaq Khan, 168, 174, 184-188, 299, 318, 324  
 Muhammad Ismail, 5  
 Muhammad Ja'afar Shirazi, 17, 25  
 Muhammad Kazim, 17  
 Muhammad Khan Afghan, 84  
 Muhammad Khan Bahadur, 98  
 Muhammad Khan Bangash, 9, 10, 17, 71, 77, 82, 83, 93, 98, 99, 104-106, 109, 110, 112, 114, 126-129, 137-140, 241, 244, 246, 258, 279, 288, 318, 326, 327, 333, 340, 368  
 Muhammad Mah, 369  
 Muhammad Mu'azzam, 3  
 Muhammad Qutab, 372  
 Muhammad Raza, 143, 144, 146  
 Muhammad Rafi 'Sauda, 398  
 Muhammad Shah, 1, 2, 19, 25, 39, 56, 58-63, 68-79, 82, 84-86, 89-91, 94-98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 117, 124, 126, 129-132, 144, 148, 152, 158, 159, 161, 164, 166, 170, 171, 173-177, 181, 182, 185-187, 194, 197, 208, 210, 211, 214, 222, 225, 226, 229, 233, 237, 240, 241, 243, 244, 246, 251, 260, 272, 284-287, 289, 294, 297-300, 304-306, 308, 311, 313, 317, 320-324, 326, 333, 338, 339, 345, 354, 355, 364, 369, 372, 385, 395, 402-404, 406, 407, 409, 410, 414, 415  
 Muhammad Sultan, 3  
 Muhammad Taqi, 234, 236  
 Muhammad Turkoman, 160

Muhammad Wala Jah, 5  
 Muhammad Yar Khan, 17, 25  
 Muhiy-u'd-din 'Ali Khan Bahadur, 310  
 Mukham Singh, 20, 93  
 Muhtashim Khan, 87  
 Mu'in-u'd Daulah Dil Diler Khan, 318  
 Mu'in-ul Mulk, 196, 278, 318  
 Mukhlis Khan, 28  
 Mukhtar Khan, 54  
 Mulhihabad, 308  
 Mulla Abdul 'Ali, 369  
 Mulla Nizam-u'd-din, 369-370  
 Multan, 9, 10, 33, 63, 82, 87, 251, 252, 255  
 Munawwar Khan, 94, 318  
 Mungi Shevgaon, 109  
 Mun'im Khan, 3-7, 24, 43, 203  
 Muqarrab Khan alias Shaikh Nizam Hyderabad, 39  
 Muqem Khan, 127  
 Muradabad, 12, 25, 27, 29-31, 89, 225, 276, 278, 282, 340, 372  
 Murad 'Ali, 146  
 Murad Kashmiri, 12, 17, 29, 30  
 Murad Khan, 6  
 Murshidabad, 143-149, 151-153, 234, 235, 237, 242, 243, 334, 345, 403  
 Murshid Quli Khan, 17-19, 23, 75, 82, 142, 204, 233-237, 246, 318, 326  
 Murtaza Husain, 8  
 Murtaza Khan, 151, 179, 184, 338, 340  
 Musi Yar Khan, 98  
 Mustafa Khan, 148, 150, 151, 247, 248  
 Musta'id Khan, 3, 7, 14  
 Mutahawwar Khan Khwashgi, 225  
 Mutawwasil Khan, 340  
 Muzaffar 'Ali Khan, 97-100, 129, 169, 171, 220, 221, 257, 318, 413  
 Muzaffarnagar, 31

## N

Nadirabad, 182  
 Nadir Shah, 53, 113, 114, 124, 156-161, 163-167, 169-182, 184, 189, 190, 238, 239, 241, 252, 253, 255, 265, 268, 284, 301, 305, 327-329, 349, 364, 366, 411, 412, 416.  
 Nagor, 259  
 Nagpur, 148, 151, 244, 358  
 Nahir Khan, 341

Najeeb 'Ali Khan, 98  
 Najib-u'd Daulah, 355  
 Najm-u'd-din Abru, 396  
 Najmuddin 'Ali Khan, S., 93, 94, 319  
 Nalchha, 125  
 Namaji Sindhia, 43  
 N'amat Khan 'Ali, 4, 5, 9, 47  
 N'amat Khan Sadarang, 403  
 Nanak, 50, 347, 349  
 Nandair, 31  
 Nanded, 51  
 Nandurbar, 32  
 Narela, 176  
 Narmada, 1, 47, 48, 52, 55, 60, 63-65, 104-106, 125, 127, 129, 132  
 Naroji Shankar, 266  
 Narwar, 128, 129, 141, 336  
 Nasir Jang, 267, 268, 251, 318  
 Nasir Jang Nizam-u'd Daulah, 100, 135, 136  
 Nasir Khan, 17, 93, 161-166, 191, 192, 318  
 Nasir Muhammad Khan Sher Jang, 170  
 Nasrullah Khan, 174  
 Nawab Sadr-u'd-din Khan Fa'iz, 373  
 Nawab Shuja' ud-Daulah, 399  
 Nawazish Muhammad Khan, 247  
 Nazar Muhammad, 369  
 Neku Siyar, 35, 36, 409  
 Nihal Chand, 405  
 Nijabat 'Ali Khan, 71, 93, 130, 131  
 Nikulsarai, 145  
 Nima Sindhia, 41  
 Nimatullah Khan, 184, 319  
 Nishapur, 25  
 Nizam-u'd-daulah, *see* Momin Khan, 124  
 Nizam-ul Mulk, 17, 21, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 44, 59-65, 67, 68, 70, 73, 74, 75, 77-79, 82, 84-93, 98-101, 103, 105-111, 113, 114, 125, 128, 133-137, 144, 145, 167, 169, 170, 171, 173-175, 177, 179, 182, 183, 186, 187, 206, 208, 212, 214, 215, 223-227, 229-233, 240, 241, 258, 265, 267-269, 272, 284, 285, 287, 288, 290, 294, 297, 318, 320-322, 336, 356, 364, 385, 392, 410, 413, 414  
 Nobai, 103  
 Nolai, 126  
 Nurbai, 366  
 Nur Muhammad, 403  
 Nur-u'd-din, 9  
 Nurullah, 69

Nusrat Khan, 12, 74  
Nusrat Yar Khan, 71, 75, 82, 257, 340

## O

Orchha, 136, 141, 244

## P

Palanpur, 341  
Palkhed, 109, 125  
Palwal, 55  
Pandhar, 65, 66  
Panipat, 82, 145, 168, 169, 176, 194, 197, 322, 341  
Panna, 139  
Patna, 9-11, 25, 46, 141, 144, 148-151, 153, 242, 243, 248  
Patwal, 71  
Pavagadh, 119  
Per Khan Bangash, 137  
Peshawar, 3, 4, 158, 160, 163, 165-167, 181, 192, 193  
Petlad, 119, 121, 124, 332, 334  
Pidiya Nayak, 41  
Pilaji Gaikawad, 101, 102, 112, 117-120  
Pilaji Jadhev, 129, 130, 132, 140, 271  
Plassey, 149, 245  
Poona, 103, 109, 120, 132, 136, 149  
Pran Nath, 349, 350  
Pratap Singh Hada, 262  
Prayag, 131, 149  
Prince Ibrahim, 70-72, 86  
Prophet Muhammad, 386-389  
Purneah, 147

## Q

Qa'imganj, 10  
Qa'im Khan Bangash, 82, 94, 138-140, 279, 280, 318, 340  
Qamr-u'd-din Khan, 17, 26, 28, 30, 31, 53, 66, 69, 70, 78-80, 85, 91, 92, 94-96, 98-100, 110, 113, 114, 129, 133, 136, 144, 168, 169, 171, 173-175, 178, 182, 184, 186, 193, 195, 196, 241, 254-257, 280, 282, 288, 289, 298, 305, 308, 318, 320-322, 328, 329, 340, 341, 356, 363, 364  
Qandhar, 191, 192  
Qannuj, 372

Qasim Ali, 403  
Qasur, 60  
Qudsia Fakhr-un-nisa Begum, 56-59, 86, 294, 322

## R

Radauli, 372  
Rafi'-u'd Daulah, 11, 12, 57, 408  
Rafi'-u'd-din, 379  
Rafi'-ud Darajat, 11, 49, 57, 408  
Rafi'-ul Qadar, 3  
Rafi'-ush Shan, 8, 57, 71  
Raghuji Bhonsle, 43, 145, 148, 149, 151-154, 230, 231, 244, 245, 248  
Raghuji Gaikwad, 150  
Raghunath Jay Ram, 152  
Rahim Khan, 83  
Rahim Sen, 403  
Raigadh, 39  
Raisin, 131  
Rajas Bai, 42  
Raja Gopal Singh Gaur, 228  
Raja Raj Singh, 404  
Raja Ram, 39-41, 43, 54, 116  
Raja Shahu, 20, 21, 33, 39, 41-45, 64, 103, 104, 107-109, 111, 116, 117, 120, 124, 126, 131, 148, 149, 152, 230, 238, 266  
Rajauri, 51  
Rajgadh, 5, 142  
Rajit Raju, 3  
Rajmahal, 143, 152  
Rajpura, 166  
Rambha Nimbalkar, 41  
Ram Charan, 349  
Rampura, 127, 129, 261-263  
Ram Singh Hara, 24  
Rana Amar Singh, 46, 47  
Rana Sangram Singh, 17  
Rangoji (Sindhia), 121-123, 259, 262, 265, 271  
Rangpur, 143, 334, 335, 337  
Rani Sarai, 153  
Ranthambor, 32  
Rao Bhim Singh, 65  
Rao Chand, 88  
Rao Nimbalkhar, 107, 108, 225  
Rao Rambha Neimbalkhar, 44  
Rasulabad, 120  
Ratan Chand, 12, 17, 35, 37, 50, 71, 171, 356, 416

- Ratan Singh Bhandari, 102, 103, 121, 219-222, 357  
 Ratlam, 103, 126  
 Ravideghi, 151  
 Ri'ayat Khan Zahir-u'd Daulah, 26, 31, 129, 133, 305, 318  
 Riwa, 139  
 Riza Khan, 54  
 Roh-Rameshwar, 110  
 Roshan Abadi, 407  
 Roz Afzum Khan, 406  
 Ruhullah Khan, 4, 82, 340  
 Rupbai, 407  
 Ruprai, 132  
 Rustam Dil Khan, 28, 52  
 Rustam Jang, 145, 146
- S
- Sa'adat Khan, 17, 68-70, 73, 77, 78, 81, 82, 99, 100, 110, 132, 133, 159, 167, 169-171, 173-176, 336, 338  
 Sa'adat Khan Burhan-ul Mulk, 78, 81, 105, 177, 182, 183, 237, 257, 260, 268, 326, 327, 340  
 Sa'adat-ullah Khan, 21  
 Sa'ad-u'd-din Khan, 171  
 Sa'ad-ullah Gulshan, 395  
 Sa'adullah Khan, 227, 230  
 Sabit Khan, 71, 319, 339  
 Sadhaura, 52  
 Sadr-u'd-din Muhammad Khan Fa'iz, 368, 395  
 Sadr-u'd-din Muhammad Koka, 83, 318  
 Sa'd-u'd-din Khan, 78, 168, 182, 188, 301, 302, 311, 318  
 Sa'eed Ahmad Khan, 143, 144, 236, 247  
 Sa'eed Lashkar Khan, 137  
 Safdarjang, 148, 184, 187, 188, 195, 196, 209, 241-244, 246, 265, 266, 272, 273, 278, 301, 302, 318, 328, 338, 364, 412  
 Safi Khan, 52, 76, 147  
 Saharanpur, 52, 82, 341  
 Saifuddin 'Ali Khan, 72, 93  
 Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan, 11, 55, 69, 71, 206, 286, 315, 416  
 Saiyid Abul Farha, 31  
 Saiyid Ahmad Sa'eed Khan Barha, 47, 48  
 Saiyid 'Aqil Khan, 88, 340  
 Saiyid Ghulam 'Ali Khan, 53  
 Saiyid Hamid, 369  
 Saiyid Hidayatullah Khan, 340  
 Saiyid Husain 'Ali Khan, 10, 15, 17, 20, 25, 29-34, 36, 44, 45, 49, 59, 60, 62-71, 93, 144, 206, 209, 408  
 Saiyid Jamal Khan, 225  
 Saiyid Khan Jahan, 13, 17, 57  
 Saiyid Mahmud Khan, 76  
 Saiyid Muhammad Ghaus, 346  
 Saiyid Muhammad Shakir Naji, 396  
 Saiyid Muzaffar 'Ali Khan Daipuri, 257, 260  
 Saiyid Najm-u'd-din 'Ali Khan, 72, 93, 103, 314, 337, 340  
 Saiyid Nawazish Khan, 332  
 Saiyid Nur, 152  
 Saiyid Saifuddin, 64, 65, 99  
 Saiyid Shah 'Ali, 37  
 Saiyid Wajih-u'd-din Barha, 52  
 Saiyid Wali, 66  
 Saiyid Zia-ullah Khan, 369  
 Salabat Muhammad Khan, 184, 213, 217, 318  
 Samandar Khan, 35  
 Sambhaji, 5, 39, 41-44, 108-110  
 Sambhal, 89, 274, 282  
 Sambhar, 257, 258, 333, 339, 341, 372  
 Sandila, 372  
 Sangram Singh, 262  
 Sanjar Khan, 16  
 Santa Ghorpade, 41  
 Santhal, 151  
 Saqi Musta'id Khan, 39  
 Sarai 'Azimabad, 166, 169  
 Sarai Chat, 71  
 Sarangpur, 103, 126, 127  
 Sarbuland Khan, 17, 24, 25, 75, 78, 82, 93, 97, 101, 102, 105, 107, 112, 118-120, 128, 168, 179, 205, 209, 214, 216-218, 288, 301, 318, 328, 329, 337, 369, 411  
 Sarfraz Khan, 142-145, 236, 238, 240, 244, 246  
 Sarfuddin, 369  
 Sar-Lashkar Sultanji, 108  
 Sarmad, 347  
 Satara, 40, 42, 43, 149  
 Savant Singh, 404  
 Shahabad, 166  
 Shahabu'ddin Ghori, 31

- Shah 'Abdul 'Aziz, 348, 369, 393  
 Shah 'Abdul Ghafur, 59, 84, 92, 95, 96  
 Shah 'Abdul Latif, 369  
 Shah 'Abdul Manan, 369  
 Taqqarub Khan, 17, 25, 28  
 Shah 'Abdur Rahim, 372  
 Shah 'Abdur Rasul, 369  
 Shah 'Alam, 3, 4, 43, 161  
 Shah 'Ali Khan Barha, 37, 93  
 Shah Allah Bakhsh, 372  
 Shahamat Khan, 13, 19, 98, 226, 318, 319  
 Shah Bahadur, 372  
 Shah Barkat-ullah, 372  
 Shah Basit, 369  
 Shah Bhika, 369  
 Shah Budha, 369  
 Shah Bulaqi, 372  
 Shaheryar, 407  
 Shah Fakhr-u'd-din, 372, 393  
 Shah Faqir-ullah, 369  
 Shah Fazlullah, 372  
 Shah Ghulam, 369  
 Shah Hatim, 368  
 Shah Jahan, 5, 32, 175, 176, 404  
 Shahjahanpur, 127, 322, 372  
 Shah Kalimullah, 369  
 Shah Kamal, 369  
 Shah Muhammad Fazil, 369  
 Shah Muhammad Murtaza, 369  
 Shah Nawaz Khan, 4, 56, 83, 318  
 Shah Nizam-u'd-din, 392, 393  
 Shah Sharif, 369  
 Shah Wali Muhammad, 372  
 Shah Waliullah, 53, 372, 373, 375-383, 385, 410  
 Shaikh 'Abdul Bari, 301  
 Shaikh 'Abdul Qadir, 380  
 Shaikh Ahmad, 372  
 Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, 381, 384, 395  
 Shaikh Habib-ullah, 372  
 Shaikh Kalim-ullah, 391-392  
 Shaikh Kamal-uddin, 372  
 Shaikh Masum, 145, 147  
 Shaikh Muhammad 'Ali, 369  
 Shaikh Muhammad Ghaus, 369  
 Shaikh Muhibb-ullah, 347  
 Shaikh Mu'in-u'd-din, 403  
 Shaikh Najmuddin, 372  
 Shaikh Nasir-u'd-din Chiragh-i Delhi, 391  
 Shaikh Nizam-u'd-din Aulia, 346, 406  
 Shaikh Wajih-u'd-din, 20  
 Shaikh Zahur-u'd-din Hatim, 396, 398  
 Shakar Kherda, 225, 227, 228  
 Shams Khan, 52  
 Shankaraji Malhar, 44, 64, 66, 151  
 Sharf-u'd Daulah, 372  
 Sharf-u'd-din Mazmum, 396  
 Shari'at-ullah Khan, 304-306, 308, 319  
 Shayista Khan Amir al Umara, 5, 35, 200, 202  
 Sher Afghan Khan, 77, 82, 94, 100, 251, 310, 318  
 Sher Jang, 170, 318  
 Shesh Rao, 147, 148  
 Shikohabad, 132  
 Shiraz, 146, 156  
 Shivaji, 39, 42, 45, 108  
 Shivaji II, 40, 41, 43  
 Shiv Singh, 133  
 Shuja'at Khan, 107, 200, 201, 213-215  
 Shuja'at-ullah Khan, 93  
 Shuja'-u'd Daulah, 318  
 Shuja'-u'd din Khan, 142, 143, 145  
 Shuja'-u'd-din Muhammad Khan, 234, 236, 238, 246, 325, 335  
 Sidi Faulad Khan, 399  
 Sikandrabad, 82, 333, 341  
 Sipahdar Khan, 83  
 Siraj-u'd-din 'Ali Khan Arzu, 398  
 Sirhind, 14, 15, 51, 166, 195, 197, 282, 299, 329, 341, 406  
 Sironj, 41, 112, 129, 136, 372  
 Sonagadh, 117  
 Sonapat, 176  
 Sorath, 36  
 Soron, 90  
 Sultan Beg, 4  
 Sultan Husain Sharqi, 402  
 Sultanpur, 32, 52  
 Surat, 1, 40, 88, 101, 107, 112, 117, 129, 203  
 Swami Narayan Singh, 349

## T

- Tahawwur Khan Turani, 35  
 Tahmasp Khan Jalayir, 175-177, 179  
 Tahmasp Mirza, 155, 156, 159  
 Taj Khan, 403  
 Taj Mahmud, 407  
 Tajpur, 57



Tanjore 39,131  
 Taqqarub, Khan, 17,25,28  
 Taqtamsh Khan, 319  
 Tara Bai, 40-43, 125  
 Tarahwan, 138, 139  
 Tarbiyat Khan, 319  
 Tegh Bahadur, 50  
 Thanesar, 166  
 Thatta, 4, 49, 82, 87, 253  
 Thun, 55  
 Timur, 34, 58, 158  
 Toda Bhim, 69  
 Toda Tank, 36  
 Trichinopoly, 230, 231  
 Trimbak Rao Dabhade, 117, 118, 120  
 Tukaji Pawar, 140  
 Tungabhadra, 109

## U

‘Ubaid Khan Tarkhan, 306  
 ‘Ubaid-ullah Khan, 319  
 Udaiji Chuhan, 108  
 Udaiji Pawan, 43, 118, 119, 127  
 Udaipur, 46, 47, 130, 259, 263  
 Udham Bai, 407  
 Ujjain, 47, 87, 126-128, 265, 269, 372  
 Umabai, 102, 120, 121  
 Ummat-ul Habib, 7

## V

Vadnagar, 118  
 Vijai Singh, 46, 47  
 Viramgam, 121, 122, 124, 213, 217

## W

Wafa Khan, 76

Wajeeh Khan, 94  
 Warna, 109  
 Wasit, 31  
 Wazir Khan, 51

## Y

Yadgar Kashmiri, 131  
 Yadgar Khan, 171, 262  
 Yahya Khan, 10, 57, 78, 165, 254-256, 318  
 Yaqut Khan, 76  
 Yar Mohammad Khan, 88, 127, 130-132, 339  
 Yeshwant Rao Dabhade, 120  
 Yesu Bai, 39, 44  
 Yunus ‘Ali, 369  
 Yusuf Muhammad Khan, 78, 87

## Z

Zabita Khan, 399  
 Zafar Jang, 10  
 Zafar Khan, 17, 30, 80, 84, 92, 93, 95-97, 100, 159, 178, 179, 285, 288, 299, 300, 314, 318, 322, 361, 362, 365  
 Zain-u’d-din Ahmad Khan, 144, 147, 153, 247, 341  
 Zakriya Khan, 26, 31, 82, 165, 181, 182, 250-252, 254, 255, 310, 318, 336, 354, 356  
 Ziaul-lah, 76  
 Zorawar Singh, 262  
 Zuifiqar Khan, 5, 6, 8-10, 20, 24, 25, 27, 40, 42, 43, 206, 223, 356