

ECHOES OF INDIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA

Sobhag Mathur

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*Dedicated to
the loving memory of my father
Dr. Umraomal Mathur*

PREFACE

The principal intention and purpose of this work is to illustrate and emphasize the point that India's freedom was not only an imperative but constituted an integral part of the peace plans of the United States. I want to argue that to the foreign governments the problems of India, and India herself, were a maze of complexities of the interests of the minorities, ruling princes of the states and other sections of society. But it would be clear on a little deeper consideration that many of these complexities and difficulties were no more than the fantasies of interested propagandists.

In the determination of the structure of the world after the Second World War and in the formulation of policies, America's position was of supreme pre-eminence. Her national leaders acknowledged the need for holding the banner of democracy, freedom and human personality. The relations between America and Britain were strengthened by the close liaison between their military general staffs and their common anxiety to preserve the secret of the atom bomb. America also exerted her influence on the side of the evolution of a world order by her active participation in the San Francisco Conference and in the deliberations of the United Nations Organisation. It showed that America was an active participant in the promotion and preservation of peace.

It was in view of these considerations that Indian leaders looked to American support in their demand for freedom and fulfilment of their national aspirations. It was obvious to them that the British Government was anxious to cultivate American public opinion and secure American approbation for their policy in India. This conclusion could easily be drawn from the British propaganda in America in connection with India. It showed that Britain's conscience was not immune from qualm on that score. American apprehensions about India were gradually becoming deeper. The question about American attitude to Indian freedom upset and provoked the British statesmen. They castigated Americans for making statements about India in which they emphasized

and argued that 'by our silence on India we have already drawn heavily on our reservoir of goodwill in the East.' Americans asserted and declared that 'India is our problem'. Indians felt that the need for India's freedom would be recognised by the wise men of the West as it was recognised by the wise men of the East. America realized that India's freedom was indispensable for the preservation of peace in Asia, if not the whole world.

At that time tremendous propaganda against India was going on in America on behalf of the British Government. Compared to it the presentation of India's case in correct perspective and from the Indian nationalist viewpoint was no more than a feeble endeavour. In the United States, only a few Americans besides Indians and Indian organisations were interested in India's freedom. They put forward facts and emphasised realities about India's freedom movement. But such attempts were not continuous and unremitting. There was a lot of ignorance in the American public about India. India required more men like Louis Fischer from among the Americans themselves who could present India's cause with restraint, dignity and impartiality. Indian nationalists did not want their viewpoint to be distorted by either overstatement or understatement.

The one outstanding question was where did America stand in this matter? How far the American Government was prepared to go to tackle the Indian problem? It was quite evident that American Government had its own problems of post-War peace and internal reconstruction. So it could not be expected to devote much time, energy and thought to an extraneous problem like that of India. Indians realised their limitations and did not expect that American Government would be in a position to take any direct interest in the issue of India's freedom. Indian public opinion was remarkably pro-America. It was, therefore, recognised that if the American Government could take any interest in furthering the cause of India's freedom, it would be doing so not only for India but for the sake of the United States of America herself.

After the Second World War the immediate task before the United States was the reorganisation of the world order on the basis of four freedoms—freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom from exploitation and freedom of worship. These principles were based on the clauses of the Atlantic Charter and were necessary imperatives for humanity aspiring for peace and real progress.

America took part in leading the world towards these goals. This role she could play, however, not by shirking stark, unignorable political and other realities as she did at the time of the First World War, but with all the courage, determination and statesmanship. India was interested in the manner in which America would discharge her responsibilities with special reference to the problems of the dependent countries like India. Opinion of enlightened publicists and sections of public opinion in America considered that India's freedom was a problem for the United States also.

The Americans were asking the question : Why should India not expect that the problems of her political freedom and economic prosperity should receive attention of the United States, as was desired? The answer was that a free India and her cooperation were essential for the success of the peace aims of the United States. America was interested in the Indian question for the success of democracy, freedom and justice.

It is my good fortune to be able to work with such an eminent scholar as Dr. S.R. Goyal, whose profound knowledge has been a source of inspiration to me. I also wish to express my thanks to Drs. P.R. Arya, S.K. Purohit, N.K. Sharma, B.B.L. Mathur and Shankar Goyal who gave their valuable suggestions and went through the manuscript. Finally, I must acknowledge my indebtedness to Saroj Sobhag who has always helped me in my endeavours.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- Dep. Deposit
- DCI Director Criminal Intelligence, Government of India
- P&S Political and Secret
- H.P. Home Political Records
- J&P Justice and Public

INDIAN
REVOLUTIONARIES
IN AMERICA
(1900-1920)

1

Historians widely believe that the collapse of the Mutiny of 1857 marked the end of the armed challenge to the British power in India and ushered in an era of constitutional agitation by the English educated middle classes. But the rebellions by the Wahabis, the Kookas, the Maratha peasants as well as the Arms Act of 1879 bear testimony to the continued attempts at meeting force with force which should be looked upon more as resurgence rather than emergence of extremism in the Indian national movement.

The resurgent extremism became a two dimensional movement. The one looked wistfully back at the superiority of Indian values and culture and the achievements of our forefathers; the other studied the international scene and national movements abroad telescoping them with the hope and aspirations of the Indian political landscape.¹ The ideas of the use of bomb, secret societies, and propaganda through action and sacrifice were imports from the West; and so were the beliefs that someone like Cavour would secure foreign arms and intervention against Britain in India. The banners and the war-cries were those of the Indian tradition, but the struggle was to be waged with modern techniques and tools.

However, even before the nineteenth century was over, the thrust of the revolutionary movement was thwarted, zeal of the revolutionaries crushed, and voice of sanity muffled, if not completely silenced. Instances of repression became order of the day. It was a period of elimination

1. Pradhan, R.C., *India's Struggle for Swaraj*, Madras, 1930, pp 88-89. Chitrol, V., *Indian Unrest*, London, 1910, p. 146.

of any anti-establishment movement and dissent and of ruthless suppression.²

But the picture outside India was not so dismal. Even in Britain, Indian revolutionaries 'could live and work with greater liberty and, therefore, many Indian revolutionaries went abroad in search of safety and opportunities. There they came into close contact with their counterparts from other subject countries waging a similar struggle against British imperialism. This is how it came to happen that in the early nineteenth century, Indian revolutionary centres came into existence in the metropolitan cities of London, Paris and New York. A number of Indian thinkers and missionaries created in Europe and America a climate favourable for India. Swami Vivekananda, during his visit to America to attend the World Conference of Religions generated tremendous goodwill and friendly interest for India. Branches of the Ramakrishana Mission were opened in New York and other leading cities of America and Vivekananda's task of propagating India's message in that country was carried on by his close associates and followers.³ They made a very favourable impression on the American public and their lectures and writings interpreted the aspirations of resurgent India as much as the message of Vedanta. In fact, religious fervour and patriotic feeling characteristic of these holymen often greatly facilitated the work of the Indian nationalists and their friends and patrons there.⁴

However, the position of the Indians in America was different from the position of their compatriots in Britain. Britain had a substantial Indian student and trader community which was mostly concentrated in London. It had some eminent individuals capable of shaping the

2. Tilak was arrested for his articles in the *Kesari*, Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh were deported to Mandalay and the 'Prevention of Seditious Meeting Act', Indian Criminal Amendment Act' and the 'Press Act' were passed.

3. India's message was carried out first by Abhedananda and then by Bodhananda, Parmananda, Prakashananda and Trigunatitananda. From London, Abhedananda went to New York in 1897 and stayed there till May, 1906. His lectures in America were seditious. On April 10, 1907, Prakashananda and Trigunatitananda were given rousing reception at the California University, with Prof. Wheeler in the Chair. Abhedananda, *India and Her People*, New York, 1906. Political and Secret (India Correspondence) 1251, Vol. 190, 1906; *The Gaelic American*, September 22, 1906.

4. Abhedananda and Prakashananda were in full sympathy with Indian patriots in America. Bodhananda even allowed Chandra Chakravarty to use his address in connection with Germany (*ibid.*).

movement and giving it a new direction. And quite a few could chip in with finance. However, before 1903, there was no such Indian community worth the name in New York. Even much later, the number of Indians in America was substantially smaller than that of London, and it had no one among them capable of giving leadership. The Indians in Britain had to work in the home of their enemies; their counterparts in America enjoyed not only the freedom of an independent democratic nation but also the support and goodwill of the American people, specially the Irish settlers.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, most of the Irish Americans were seething with anti-British sentiments. They had their own patriotic organisations and journals. Many of them were in correspondence with Indian revolutionaries like Shyamji Krishna Verma⁵ and Madam Cama.⁶ They found in the increasing anti-British agitation among Indians a growing force to ally with against their common enemy.⁷ It was anybody's guess as to where and by whom were the seeds of this Indo-Irish collaboration were sown in America. But it is a fact that in early 1903, Indian students in New York did manage to send revolutionary literature to India with Irish cooperation.⁸

At the beginning of 1905, the popular Irish organ in America, *The Gaelic American*⁹, under the editorship of George Fitzgerald

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5. Shyamji Krishna Verma was born on October 4, 1857 at Mandavi in Cutch. He was a Sanskrit scholar. He studied and taught at Oxford University. He served many Indian States in important capacities. He spent his last years at Geneva, where he died on March 31, 1930.
 6. Madam Vikaji Rustamji Cama was the daughter of Sorabji Framji Patel, a Parsi businessman of Bombay. She was born in 1861. She was married to K. Rustamji Cama, a legal practitioner. She went to London in 1901. She visited America for a few months. She settled down in Paris in May 1909. She returned to India in 1934 and died in Bombay in 1936.
 7. *The Gaelic American*, September 29, 1906, P.S. (India Corr.), *op. cit.*
 8. P.&S. (Home Corr.) Vols 318 and 321, 1906. Wasti, S.R., *Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalists*, Oxford, 1964, p. 90
 9. Its seditious articles pleaded for Indo-Irish cooperation, revolutionary secret society movement and passive resistance. On April 28, 1906 it published translation of the patriotic song *Bande Mataram*. On July 21, 1906 it referred to the repressive measures adopted to break up the Barisal Conference. On September 1, 1906 it spoke bitterly of press censorship in India. On November 11, 1906 it published extracts from the *Mahratta*, the *Bande Mataram* and the *Amrit Bazar Patrika* to voice India's demands. P. & S. (India Corr.), *op. cit.*

'Freeman', openly incited Indian soldiers to rise against the British and the local Irish and Indians began organising Indian students in New York in an 'India House' type movement. 'India House' was a pioneering movement; it had prestige and for Indian students abroad it envisaged the shape of things to come. The Indians in New York, however, were a disorganised lot for they did not have any dominating political figure who could give orientation to their efforts. In fact, the Irish in America were themselves divided in many groups and the Indian movement under their inspiration reflected a similar state.

The earliest Indian organisation in America was the Pan-Aryan Association. It was established in New York in 1906¹⁰ by Samuel Lucas Joshi and Maulavi Barkatullah.¹¹ For a few years the organisation carried out an effective anti-British propaganda. On account of the American abhorrence for any form of colonialism and their love for human liberty, the Pan-Aryan Association advocating Indian independence enjoyed a lot of local sympathy. However, the Association soon disintegrated when in February 1909, Barkatullah went to Japan and Joshi to Britain in the following month.

On September 5, 1907 Myron Phelps, an eminent Irish-American, founded, with one dollar as its membership fees, the Indo-American National Association in New York. In the following November, the association changed its name to Society for the Advancement of India, and Myron Phelps became its Secretary-cum-Treasurer. The other five Directors were all Americans, a fact which suggests the weakness of the Society as an Indian organisations and also political indifference of the local Indian students. Still it did survive for a few years as a centre of pro-Indian propaganda.¹² At the Society's first meeting

10. Notes of Criminal Investigation Department, Government of India, Home Political Records, August 12, 1911. 17 Dep.

11. Maulvi Barakatullah was born in 1870. He went to America towards the end of the 19th century. He was involved in the Indian revolutionary movement there. He was an active revolutionary leader in Japan, West Asia and Soviet Russia. He settled down in America and died in California.

12. On February 26, 1909, it protested against President Theodore Roosevelt's speech of January 18, 1909 in support of the British rule in India. Appendix to Director, Criminal Intelligence, Government of India C.R. Cleveland's Circular No. 4, May 16, 1910; Simla, H.P. October 1910, 17 Dep.

in New York, Myron Phelps read out letters from swadeshi agitators in India and Rev. Dr. Cuthbert Hall spoke of the deplorable predicament of Indians under the British rule. A three-man committee consisting of Phelps, Weraer and Hall was formed to devise ways and means for making the movement more effective for its purpose. In its second meeting, with the aim of suggesting remedies, they decided to enquire into the causes of Indian famines. Little, however, is known about the work and report of the committee.¹³

Myron Phelps and the Pan-Aryan Association had rented a house in New York to work more effectively among the Indian students. The house was named the 'India House', obviously after its more reputed namesake in London. Apart from providing boarding and lodging to Indian students, it was a meeting ground for its members and their local friends. It bulgeoned into Chicago and Detroit and soon the total membership rose from a few tens to a few hundred.¹⁴ The Indo-Irish cooperation was highlighted in a statement of the Irish friends of India in the New York daily, *The World*. The Irish used to openly proclaim their political affiliations to the Indian revolutionaries.¹⁵ But a large number of the Indian members of 'India House' were not interested in the political activities of Phelps.¹⁶ Moreover, many of them were antagonised by Phelps' over bearing manner¹⁷ and the membership soon came down to one hundred and fifty only. The American public in general was largely ignorant about Indian affairs and, therefore, did not respond with enthusiasm. Phelps, therefore, had no option but to close down the 'India House.' He did so and soon after left Boston for Naples *en route* to India.

In January 1909, Freeman, who had so far kept himself aloof from the organisation of Phelps, founded a short-lived association called the Indo-American Club. This too was wound up in March, 1910.

13. *Ibid.*

14. DCI Circulars 1 to 4 & 12, *op. cit.*

15. DCI Circular No. 5, H.P. November 1908, 6 Dep.

16. On November 20, 1908, Phelps wrote in *India* (London) that Indians were not sufficiently interested in their affairs. DIC Circular No. 4, *op. cit.*

17. On March 15, 1908, some Indians wrote to Phelps an open letter which was published in the *Bande Mataram*, Calcutta, April 11, 1908.

According to the Director of Criminal Intelligence, C.R. Cleveland, 'with the failure of these societies, organised agitation among the Indian student community in New York came to an end.'¹⁸ These efforts proved ineffective largely due to the absence of any proper leadership and adequate financial resources. In the absence of these pre-requisites the laudable intensions of the few unknown Indian patriots in America and their local friends could not produce any tangible results. However, it has to be admitted that the American sympathy for the Indian question owed its origin to these little known Indian students and their Irish friends in America.¹⁹ Besides, these years were utilised by the Indian students to master the technique of handling explosives and smuggling the much needed arms and bomb manuals.²⁰

However, Indian agitation in North America achieved effective dimension only when the message of revolution percolated to the relatively large and growing Indian community on the West Coast of the continent. The organisers of the Indian agitation in North America had remained unaware of the revolutionary potential of the fast growing Indian community settled on the Pacific Coast. It was on the Pacific Coast of America that an emergence of a large Indian community created new problems and brought about a new situation. The Indian immigration to the West Coast of America began around 1904 and the number swelled to thousands within a couple of years.²¹ Some of the shrewd employers of the area realised the utility of cheap Indian labour as an asset which would also weaken the bargaining strength of the local trade unions. Unscrupulous shipping agencies sought to make a profit by enticing the sturdy Punjabi peasants to emigrate with tempting assurances and travel facilities.²² Most of these immigrants were Sikh ex-servicemen. They were fired by the vision of prosperity and encouraging accounts of their predecessors, who had returned home to take back

18. DCI Circular No. 12, *op.cit.*

19. H.P. November 1910, 40-47 B.

20. Freeman was in touch with Cama in Paris regarding the smuggling of arms. DCI March 9, 1915, H.P. April 1915, 412-15 B. The history sheet of Myron Phelps, DCI Circular No. 4, *op. cit.*

21. Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration for 19-20, Washington, 1920, pp. 180-81.

22. Minto to Morely, September 26, 1907, Minto Collection.

their families. Besides, the failure of the monsoon between 1905 and 1910 in the Punjab gave an added incentive to the Punjabi emigrants to head for the promised land.²³

The Indians came in various village groups or from the same units of the Indian army or police. As such they used to live in small concentrated groups in the land of their adoption also. Most of them worked on farms and orchards, in railways and saw-mills, or cleared the forests on contract. Their average daily income ranged from one and a half to two dollars. Work was aplenty and they could on an average make a saving of thirty-five dollars every month. Many of them bought their own farmlands. Everywhere they formed their own clubs for social contacts, mutual cooperation and religious ceremonies. These were known as Hindusthancee Associations.²⁴ The sikh immigrants came to have their own *gurudwaras* which became centres of their community life and their contribution to the economic development of the region was considerable. In California, it were these immigrants who opened up the Imperial Valley to farming and developed rice cultivation in the Colusa county.²⁵

Prosperity, however, did not ensure to the Indian immigrants an equitable place in the American society.²⁶ On the contrary, they were disliked by many, especially the white labour unions for whom these Indians were strike breaking blacklegs and tools for forcing down the whites' wage levels.²⁷

In 1907, Indian workers were expelled from mills at Bellingham²⁸ in Washington, and a few western towns. Many Indian houses were raided during a railway strike at Tacoma.²⁹ Still the Indian immigrants continued to pour into America. The request of the British and Indian

23. Singh, Khushwant, *The Sikhs*, London, 1955, pp. 199-20.

24. The Hindusthancee Associations were different from the Indian students organisation Hindustan Association established in Chicago in 1911.

25. Chadrashekhher, S., 'The Indian Community in the United States', *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 11, June 6, 1945, pp. 147-48.

26. Singh, Randhir, *Ghadar Heroes*, Bombay, 1945, pp. 6-7.

27. Das, P.K., *Hindusthani Workers on the Pacific Coast*, Berlin and Leipzig, pp. 8 and 16.

28. Kite, S. Elizabeth, 'An American Criticism of 'the Other Side of the Medal'', *Modern Review*, February, 1927, p. 169.

29. Singh, Randhir, *op. cit.*, pp. 6.

governments to the American government to exclude Indians from its territories also accentuated the bitterness of the immigrants against their own government at home.

The American authorities did not resort to any special legislation but used some existing regulations to turn back the intending immigrants.³⁰ However, many immigrants continued to circumvent the regulations by staying for the request period at Honolulu on their way to America. It was thus that the Indian community in the western states of America continued to grow. As an opposition to this influx several Asiatic Exclusion Leagues came up to curb what they called 'the tide of turbans.'³¹ There were fresh anti-Indian riots in Oregon and St. John. It was only after 1911 that the annual rate of Indian immigration decreased substantially.

Most of the Indian students to these western towns lived near their own poor countrymen and the bond of Indianness in an alien land was indeed very strong. These students shared their feelings of humiliation and injustice and felt the urge to do something for their less fortunate countrymen. With such assorted views Tarknath Das,³² Pandurang Khankojje,³³ Ramnath Puri, and Khagendra Chandra Das formed in 1907 the Indian Independence League in San Francisco. Its main purpose was to safeguard the rights and interests of the

30. The reasons were liability to public charge, suffering from dangerous contagious diseases, and violating the 'alien contract labour law.' Singh, K. and Singh, S., *Ghadar*, 1915, New Delhi, 1966, p. 9.

31. Das, R.K., *op. cit.*, pp. 8 and 16; Kondapi, C., *op. cit.*, p. 207; Chandrashaker, S., *op. cit.*, pp. 139--141.

32. Taraknath Das was born at Kathanpara, near Calcutta, on June 15, 1884. He went to America in 1906, and worked among Indian immigrants on the Pacific Coast. At the end of World War I, he was jailed for twenty-two months for his revolutionary activities. He studied in the Universities of Washington and Norwich. He received Ph. D. degree from the Georgetown University in 1924. He was an active exponent of India's cause in America. He paid a short visit to India in 1952 and died in New York on December 22, 1958.

33. Dr. Pandurang Khankojje was born at Wardha on November 7, 1885. He went to Japan in 1906 and then to America in 1907. He worked among the Indian immigrants. He got military training and Master's Degree in agricultural sciences. In war years he went to Iran. He paid a secret visit to India in 1919 to meet Tilak and visited Moscow in 1921. He settled down in Mexico. Soon after Indian independence he was invited back home to head an Agricultural Policy Commission at Nagpur, where he died on January 18, 1967.

Indians in America and to give them 'proper political education.' Such social and political action took place in almost all the major settlements. Their other aim was to divert and intensify their bitterness towards the British with the conviction that the only panacea was national independence. The Hindustanee Associations became centres of their political activities and a few of these revolutionaries even sought to help their comrades at home.

Among the Indian immigrants Ramnath Puri was the first to start publishing a journal in 1907 for revolutionary propaganda. It was an Urdu weekly, known by the English translation of its name *Circular of Freedom*. Its publication began first from the 3700, California Street, San Francisco, and later from 11, Mangolia Street, Oakland. Revolutionary pamphlets were also printed and secretly sent home. But the journal, for want of financial support, folded up within a period of less than twelve months.³⁴

The focus of the Indian agitation now shifted to Vancouver, which by this time had become the largest Indian settlement on the Pacific Coast. Surendra Mohan and Taraknath started the Indo-American Association³⁵ to espouse the Indian cause. But it was tough for the two Bengalis to win over the confidence of the Sikh workmen and their Association too proved to be short-lived. Earlier in March 1908, the two had started publishing from Vancouver, a bi-monthly journal in English, the *Free Hindustan*.³⁶ Its purpose was not so much to arouse the immigrants as to advise the Indian revolutionary leaders at home and abroad. It began enjoying a respectable circulation within and beyond the American continent. In 1908, Taraknath had moved to Seattle to publish his journal from there.³⁷ His strategy was to make appeal to the Sikhs and to persuade and ultimately win over the Indian Army to the cause of India's freedom. As a result, the Government of India sought to take legal action against the paper.³⁸ However,

34. H.P., November, 1908, 6 Dep. .

35. Chirol, V., *op. cit.*, pp. 146-147.

36. Its Motto was 'Resistance to tyranny is service to humanity and a necessity of civilization.'

37. DCI, September 30, 1908; H.P., November 1908, 17-18A. DCI Circular No. 12, *op. cit.*

38. Cleveland's suggestion, H.P., September 1911, 4 Dep.

it was difficult to establish that the journal had violated the American law. Moreover, American public opinion too had swung in favour of such an independent organ which spoke for the millions of India. The *Free Hindustan* shifted to New York when Taraknath moved there and once again Freeman came to be closely associated with its publication.³⁹ But the paper ceased to appear after November 1910 due to paucity of funds.⁴⁰ In its short span, the paper had tried to propogate views which were a definite departure from the old line of thought expressed by other Indian revolutionary journals. It asked Indians to follow the Chinese way and warned that 'India will never achieve her freedom by mere political assassinations'. In another number it pleaded: 'uplift the masses to uplift the country, otherwise we will fail like we did in the Mutiny,' and quoted Mazzini : 'Education and insurrection are the only methods by which we can arouse the mass of the people'.

Before moving to New York, Taraknath, in cooperation with American liberals, had founded at Seattle, the Association for the Promotion of Education for the People of India. Professor Edward McMohan of the Department of History, Washington University, was elected its first President, and Taraknath, became its first Secretary. But in his absence this Association soon went defunct.

By 1910, revolutionary activities of the Indian emigres on the West Coast of America were gaining momentum. Kansiram Joshi and Sohan Singh Bhakhna had succeeded in moulding the Hindusthane Association of Portland into a compact political body.⁴¹ Its influence spread fast and the atmosphere being conducive, major Indian centres in Washington, Oregon and California came to have within a short period similar organisations all urging political work for the liberation of the motherland.

The revolutionary movement in North America acquired an added edge of militancy when some of the revolutionaries underwent training in arms.⁴² The Indian community in America was roused to revolutionary

39. DIC Circular No. 12, *op. cit.* British Ambassador to Washington to Foreign Secy., Britain, June 25, 1909.

40. Notes in H.P., August 1911, 17 Dep.

41. Pandurang Khankojé's letter, June 7, 1949, quoted in Bhupendranath Dutta, *A Prokasto Rajanitik Itihasa* (Bengali), Calcutta, 1953, p. 230.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 228 and 231.

fervour but no one so far had been able to knit the entire Indian community for a single movement. The illiterate immigrants brought with them their old sectarian outlooks and narrow beliefs and their personal and group rivalries blocked every attempt of uniting them into a compact group with a single purpose. An increasing number among them wanted to do something for their motherland but there was no unanimity about what should be done and how. In short, it was an unorganised movement which was in search of a direction. It was Lala Har Dayal⁴³ who gave the Indian agitation unity, force and direction. His arrival ushered in a new epoch in the history of Indian revolutionary movement in North America.

Lala Har Dayal was a comparatively late arrival for America; he went there in June 1911. Soon he made acquaintance with Dr. A.W. Ryder of California University and Dr. Stuart of Stanford University. Shortly later he joined Stanford as a lecturer in Indian Philosophy. As a University lecturer, Lala started his anti-British propaganda openly. He became a friend of John D. Barry of the *San Francisco Bulletin* and began writing in its columns. But in the University, Har Dayal became a subject of criticism and it compelled him to resign from his post. The fiery Indian then joined the Hindusthancee Association of Astoria and there published the first revolutionary pamphlet of his illustrious career. It was entitled *Sidelights on India*. Now he began publishing and sending anti-British revolutionary pamphlets to India regularly; some of these were later banned in India.⁴⁴

Har Dayal had formulated plans to attract Indian students to America. At his request Jwala Singh made an offer to California University to sponsor five scholarships for students from India. As it turned out, when four out of the five students reached America, Jwala Singh realised that he could finance only three of them. At Har Dayal's request, Nawab Khan agreed to finance Sayed Mohammed, the fourth

43. Har Dayal was a product of the Punjab University. In 1905, he went to Oxford as a scholar. He came in contact with India House movement and gave up his scholarship. He was the founder of the Ghadar Movement in America. He played an important part in the Indian revolutionary movement. By 1919, he gave up all connections with the Indian nationalist movement and spent his time in Sweden and America.

44. H.P., March 1913, 23-28 A.

scholar. Whatever the reason, Sayed Muhammed started complaining to Nawab Khan and other Muslim members of the Hindusthance Association against Har Dayal. This incident unfortunately brought in communal feelings among the Indians. Nawab Khan dissociated himself from the Hindusthance Association and wrote to other Indian Muslims in North America not to play the Hindu game in any anti-British agitation.

The Government of India had taken umbrage to the Indian agitation in North America.⁴⁵ As a countermeasure and to create a wedge in the Indian ranks the Government of India sent its agents which included Christian missionaries and Sikh *granthis*--the latter two to extol the benefits of the British raj. To devise a strategy for facing this new move a meeting of the Hindusthance Association was convened at Berkley and the Association's aims and programme of action were reaffirmed and accepted by the all present.⁴⁶ A convention at Astoria called by Sohan Singh Bhakhna on March 13, 1913, followed. It was attended by 120 representatives from different centres. A Hindi Sabha was founded. Sohan Singh Bhakhna was elected its first President and Har Dayal the General Secretary. It was also resolved to locate the central office of the party in a rented house at 436 Hill Street, San Francisco and name it Yugantar Ashram after the famous revolutionary group and journal of Bengal. It was also decided that its own office building would be built at 5, Wood Street, San Francisco.⁴⁷

Har Dayal left for an extensive lecture tour of the U.S. West Coast. For the first time he came in direct contact with the Indian immigrants. He vitalised the Indian community into a compact militant body. The massive upsurge of immigrants gave a new legitimacy to the movement. Money and volunteers began flowing in and Har Dayal became the undisputed leader of the Indians there.⁴⁸

After the completion of Har Dayal's tour, a general meeting of the Hindi Sabha was called at Sacramento. It decided to bring out an Indian revolutionary journal from the Yugantar Ashram. The purpose

45. Justice and Public 1257 with 257, Vol. 1129 of 1912.

46. H.P., June 1913, 5-17B.

47. Singh, Randhir, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9; Singh, Khushwant, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-24.

48. H.P., January 1915, 278-282 B.

was to inspire and organize Indian nationalist sentiments throughout the world. Har Dayal was convinced of the need of having a newspaper of their own. It was to be called *Ghadar* i.e. 'the mutiny'. This Hindi-English bilingual was to be published from San Francisco every week. Its first issue which came out on November 1, 1913 boldly declared: 'Today there begins in foreign lands.....war against the British Raj.... What is our name? Mutiny. What is our work? Mutiny. Where will mutiny break out? In India. The time will soon come when rifles and blood will take the place of pen and ink.' It was a clear enough enunciation of the policy of the paper. The *Ghadar* soon acquired a wide circulation. It openly incited the Indian settlers for a revolt and soon began to be published in six languages—English, Urdu, Hindi, Pashtu, Gorkhali and Gurumukhi.

Each issue of the paper carried on its front page a set banner--'Angrez Raj ka Kachcha Chittha' The *Ghadar* sought to arouse national pride of the Indians by emphasizing that they got no respect in the world because they were not free. The *Ghadar* also kept the Indian national movement in the forefront by publishing the biographies of the great Indian patriots. It suggested several measures, such as the seduction of Indian troops, murder of British subjects and officials, hoisting the revolutionary flag, breaking of jails, looting of treasuries, *thanas* etc., propagation of seditious literature, union with known foreign adversaries of the British, commission of dacoities, procuring of arms, manufacture of bombs, formation of secret societies, destruction of railways and telegraphs, and the recruitment of young men for revolutionary work.

The *Ghadar* became so popular that the revolutionary movement in America came to be known as the 'Ghadar Movement'. Har Dayal organised the members of the Ghadar Party into inner and outer circles. All members had to strictly abide by the party rules.⁴⁹ Har Dayal also established contacts with some labour organisations in America and was friendly with socialists and anarchists. He was an admirer

49. These rules were : (i) all new recruits must be recommended by at least two members, (ii) none was entitled to know all the party secrets before six months of his obtaining the membership, and (iii) if anyone leaked out any secret or misappropriated the party funds, he would be punished with death. Besides, there were seventeen other principles guiding the conduct of different categories of members.

of Marx and Engels. He became the Secretary of the San Francisco branch of the 'Industrial Workers of the World'.⁵⁰

While the Ghadar Party was acquiring strength and prestige, Har Dayal had to suddenly quit the scene of his activities. He had denounced in strong language the new immigration policy of the U.S.A. of the total exclusion of the Orientals and had lost the sympathy and support of the Americans by an act of great indiscretion when he championed the cause of the Syndicalist Party and made public speeches from its platform. The U.S. authorities, whose mind was already prejudiced by the British Government, were irritated by his Marxist views.⁵¹ Now on a complaint by the British Consul, Har Dayal was served with a warrant of arrest, which was a prelude to his deportation as an undesirable alien. Har Dayal was released on bail due to, it was believed, the influence of W.J. Bryan,⁵² the then Secretary of States. He took advantage of the bail and left America,⁵³ leaving his faithful adherent Ramchandra incharge of the affairs of the Ghadar Party.

But the outbreak of the First World War and the Indo-German agreements altered the situation. On the one hand, it made the U.S.A. an important base of operation against the British *raj* in India and on the other introduced fresh elements of tension and discord in the Ghadar Party. The Indian Independence Committee⁵⁴ took over the leadership of Indian revolutionary groups in various countries, and the German Foreign Office, as their paymaster, acquired a dominant

50. Har Dayal, 'Wealth of Nations', *Modern Review*, Calcutta, July 1912, pp. 43-50.

51. Majumdar, R.C., *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1962, pp. 396-97.

52. Majumdar, R.C., *Struggle for Freedom*, Bombay, 1969, p. 210.

53. Landau, Henry, *The Enemy Within : the Inside Story of Sabotage in America*, New York, 1917, pp. 28-29. Spellman, J.W., 'The International Extension of Political Conspiracy as Illustrated by the Ghadar Party', *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XXXVII, Part i, April, 1959, p. 32.

54. In early 1905, Indian revolutionaries in Germany had organised themselves into an Indian Independence Committee with headquarters at 38 Wieland Strasse, Charlottenburg, Berlin. It was an autonomous body in regular receipt of a specified monthly amount and occasional ad hoc grant from German Foreign Office. It was formally organised sometime in February or March 1915, after Har Dayal's arrival in Berlin.

voice in their affair.⁵⁵ From Berlin Dhirendranath Sarkar arrived and established contacts with the German Legation staff in New York and Washington. Monetary support too came to Indians through the Legation. The influence of the Indian Committee in New York further increased with the arrival, as its official representative,⁵⁶ of Herambal Gupta and the city emerged as a new centre of Indian revolutionary activities in America competing with San Francisco in importance. In fact, the two major decisions of arms shipment to and armed raids into India were taken at New York and Washington.

The Ghadar Party, however, retained its independent identity. In the first year of the War, relations between Ghadar leaders and the Indian representatives from Berlin were very cordial. The Ghadar Party alone could provide volunteers and organisational base--the two of the three basic requirements of insurrection anywhere and without which it was impossible to organise revolt in India from America. The Ghadarites were in need of the third-- i.e. money, and found it (through the Indian Committee) coming from their friendship with the Germans though, despite their common aims and interests, relation between the two organisations was rather one of tension. The Ghadar leaders never liked the dominating role of the Indian Committee. The close connection between the German Foreign Office and the Indian Committee and their representatives in America had pushed the Ghadar leaders to a subordinate role even on their home ground. In fact, the Indians and the Germans did not like the Ghadar way of exporting revolution to India. The tension aggravated partly from the fact that the Indian Committee was controlled by old revolutionaries and highly educated students. Most of them were from non--martial races of India. The Ghadar Party was a party of Punjabi peasants with soldierly traditions and attitudes. The two never understood and appreciated each other. Still, for a whole year, the Ghadarites, the representatives of the Indian Committee and the German Foreign Office worked together as a cohesive team. Due to disgraceful fiascos of Maverick and Henry S., Herambal and Dhirendranath were externed from America. Chakravarty became

55. H.P., September 1916, 16 Dep.

56. Chakravarty, Chandra, *New India*, Calcutta, 1950, p. 19-21; Roy, M.N., *Memoirs*, Bombay, 1964, p. 34.

the official representative of the Indian Committee in America.⁵⁷ He established his headquarters in a flat at 364 West, 120th Street.⁵⁸ But the whole affair left a bitter taste and ushered in a period of accusations and counter-accusations that lasted till the end of the War.

Herambal's departure for Asia and the developments in New York were of great advantage to Ramchandra. From the date of Herambal's departure to the time when Chakravarty returned from Berlin in his new capacity, Ramachandra conducted the Ghadar affairs independently. It was his highhanded manner, his fanatical obsession with the expensive but largely infructuous propaganda campaign and above all his alleged tempering with the Ghadar funds that raised a mountain of opposition against him. Prince Hatzfiel of German Consulate at San Francisco sent Euphrat to Berlin complaining against Ramchandra's ways of handling the affairs. Euphrat came back with certain instructions for Ramchandra, including a request that he immediately suspend his propaganda campaign. It did not have the desired effect on Ramchandra. Mrs. Marie Leonhauser, wife of a German Buddhist priest at San Francisco, wrote to Har Dayal, referring to Ramchandra as 'a scamp and a traitor' and asked for his removal. But Ramchandra was still a man with a clout, though no longer the undisputed leader among the West Coast immigrants. His cooperation was still essential for any effective revolutionary work in the U.S.A. According to a decision taken at Berlin, on return Chakravarty formed a steering committee of seven members. In this, two seats were kept reserved for the Ghadar Party. For consultation with Ramchandra, he left for San Francisco, and met with some success. He wired to Zimmerman that Ramchandra was expected to join their Committee and added with some glee that the Ghadar group was fast breaking up.⁵⁹ The fact was that it was the growing internal dissensions within the Ghadar Party that obstructed the unity of command Ramchandra sought to build up. Anyway, without the participation of the Ghadar representatives the new committee proved to be ineffective and short-lived and Ramchandra continued

57. Chakravarty, Chandra, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-28.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 28; Voska, E.V. and Irwin, William, *Spy and Counterspy*, London, 1914, p. 122.

59. Sperry, E.E., *German Plots and Intrigues in the USA During the Period of our Neutrality*, Washington, 1918, p. 52.

with the publication of the *Ghadar* and carry on his propaganda work in his old style.

Arrival of Chakravarty also brought about a change in the policy of assistance to the revolutionaries in India. By 1915, the Ghadar exodus to the homeland registered a definite decline and even in the Punjab the activities of the Ghadarites no longer posed any problems for the Indian Government.⁶⁰ The Indian Committee could afford to pay less attention now to Ramchandra and his associates. Around this time, daring attempts at sending shiploads of arms and of organising raids into India had failed and the Indian Committee as well as their German friends felt guilty for their inability to help the revolutionaries in India in the hour of their need.

Jealousies and suspicions within the Ghadar group now began to surface. The causes were personal envy at Ramchandra's prominence, a dislike for his arrogant ways and hatred of the orthodox elements of the Khalsa Diwan Society for irreligious conduct of Ramchandra's followers. The real reason, however, was money.⁶¹ As long as the movement depended entirely on voluntary donations from local Indians, the funds at the disposal of the leaders were too meagre to arouse any suspicion.⁶² In fact, the account sheet of the Ghadar Party showed a debit balance of three hundred forty-two dollars and twenty-four cents. But when money began flowing into Ghadar funds from the German Consulate at San Francisco, it had repercussions in the attitudes of and relations among the Ghadar leaders.⁶³

The Ghadarites had two separate funds for their work : one was for local expenses raised through subscription, while the other, called the National Fund, was created with German money. The latter was for all practical purposes the personal money of Ramchandra who never permitted any discussion about what he did with it. But the immigrants, who joined the movement, had to suffer for their dedication

60. Singh, Khushwant and Singh, Satindra, *Ghadar*, 1915, New Delhi, p. 44.

61. H.P., February, 1917, 552-55 B.

62. The first treasurer of the Ghadar Party in the War period was Munshi Ram. He was succeeded by Godha Ram. His successor was Nidham Singh. Bhishan Singh took over from him. He remained in that post till January, 1917, when the Ghadar Party finally split into two.

63. H.P., December, 1914, 216-17 B.

and enthusiasm for the cause. They had made sacrifices in terms of time and money and yet their full time workers were paid a paltry sum of mere two dollars inclusive of food expenses.

In December 1915, a section of the Ghadar Party openly opposed Ramchandra and sought to replace him by Umrao Singh.⁶⁴ But in the ensuing showdown Ramchandra managed to hold his own.⁶⁵ The opposition then sought to utilise the services of Lala Lajpat Rai who had returned from Japan.⁶⁶ Lajpat Rai refused to be involved in these 'personality squabbles'. With the support of the Muslim members Ramchandra commanded majority even in the next showdown,⁶⁷ but his position was getting increasingly precarious. There were reasons to believe that British money and agents were also active against him. At the party meeting on August 13, 1916 at Stockton, the split between the two sections was complete. It was obvious now that the Ghadar Party was in a process of disintegration.

Opposition against Ramchandra gathered added momentum when Bhagwan Singh arrived from Central America. Ramchandra was compelled to fall in line and ultimately resigned in January, 1917. Bhagwan Singh became the leader of the majority group of the Ghadar Party and editor of the *Ghadar*. He also started a new monthly, the *Yugantar*⁶⁸. Ramchandra however, retained some following and the balance of the 'German' money. He also had the possession of the Ghadar building at 1017 Valencia Street and 5 Wood Street, San Francisco. He also started publishing a rival *Ghadar*. Both the groups claimed that their journal was the natural and lawful continuation of the original *Ghadar* started by Har Dayal. They indulged in mud-slinging, pushing the once powerful Ghadar movement on its way out. By then America had entered the War against Germany and most of the Indian revolutionaries were put behind bars or under police surveillance as undesirable aliens.

Vigorous efforts were made to mobilize moral support for India's cause and Shailendra Nath Ghose was deputed by the Yagantar leadership to America. Unfortunately for Ghose, America had just joined the

64. H.P., March 1916, 667-70 B.

65. *Ibid.*

66. The opposition was led by Karan Singh, Bhishan Singh, and Santara Singh.

67. H.P., May 1916, 557-80 B.

68. H.P., November 1916, 452-53B.

War on the side of Britain and its allies and Shailendra Nath and M.N.Roy had to seek refuge in Mexico.⁶⁹ Shailendra Nath returned in the third week of November to start a fresh diplomatic offensive with the help of friends there. By then, the Bolshevik Revolution provided to the world a new fascination and vision, which seemed to bear fruits for the cause of nationalism and liberty. At a secret meeting at Yugantar Ashram, two very important decisions were taken : one, the status of a provisional government should be claimed for this all India revolutionary organisation and the other, to carry out negotiations with friendly governments on a quasi-diplomatic level.⁷⁰ It was given out that Rasbehari Bose in Japan was the President of the self-styled Indian Nationalist Party in America. To complete the accompanying paraphernalia and show of office they purchased high grade diplomatic paper and their letters and envelopes bore the print 'Diplomatic Correspondence.'⁷³ To establish that their letters to personages like President Wilson and other heads of states originated from Calcutta, addresses such as the 'Tagore Castle, Calcutta' were given. These letters bore different dates but most of these were actually posted in New York. However, embassies of other countries refused to forward these letters to their respective governments. Copies of their letter to President Wilson were sent to different journals for publicity. Usually it was Miss Agnas Smedley who signed as R. Bose or J. Mukherjee.⁷⁴ It was the time of war and the letters created little impact on the American mind. Ramchandra made a fervent plea to President Wilson that subject countries 'should be represented in the Peace Conference not by their governments but by representatives of their own selection.'⁷⁵ But the President of America gave little heed to these entreaties.

The Hindu Conspiracy Case was nearing its end. Judgment was pronounced and the prominent among the Indian revolutionaries in

69. Indian Nationalist Party Case. Violation of Espionage Act.

70. *Ibid.*

71. *Ibid.*

72. *Ibid.*

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Ibid.*

75. *Ibid.*

the U.S.A. were all sent to imprisonment. But by then the War was over and in the changed political scene, the Indians were allowed to resume their political activities. A new born political permissiveness permeated the American society and the Indians too braced themselves for a fresh offensive. The situation asked for a new strategy and new political tools, and Lajpat Rai proved to be the man for the occasion. His known dislike for German militarism⁷⁶ had secured for him influential friends. Lajpat Rai formed the Indian Home Rule League.⁷⁷ The League, started a monthly journal, *Young India*.⁷⁸ The office of both the Indian Home Rule League and the *Young India* was at 1400 Broadway, New York.⁷⁹ The Hindustan Students Association and the Hindu Workers Union of America were also organised after a time, with their headquarters in the same building. The Indian Home Rule League, however, being the parent body, served as the link between the *Young India* and the Societies,⁸⁰ the latest being the Indian Information Bureau in New York.⁸¹

As long as the War continued, Lajpat Rai carried his work with restraint. But with its end the Indian Home Rule League and *Young India* emerged with vigour of their own. The Fourteen Points of President Wilson had raised new hopes in Indian hearts, and it was for the Indian patriots in America to influence the American public opinion and the U.S. Congress in their favour. With this object, the League moved its headquarters to Washington and soon succeeded in establishing a profitable relationship with some of the most influential members of both the Houses.⁸² Senator Medill McCormick of Illinois was a strong critique of the British rule in India.⁸³ Lajpat Rai, N.S. Hardikar

76. *The New York Times*, March 9, 1917; Rai, Lajpat. 'My Farewell', *Young India*, Vol. II, No. 11, November, 1919, p. 276.

77. Lajpat Rai and J.T. Sunderland became President and Vice-President respectively. Keshav Deo Shastri was made its General Secretary and N.S. Hardikar, the Executive Secretary.

78. N.S. Hardikar was its Editor and O.S.V. Rao General Manager.

79. *Young India*, Vol. I No. 4, April 1918, back cover. Sunderland, J.T., 'Mr. Rai's Work in America', *Young India*, Rai Number, Vol. III, No. 2, February 1920, p. 42.

80. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 7, July 1919, p. 152, and No. 11, November 1919, p. 242.

81. Khemka, Ram Kumar, 'A New Development of Activities', *ibid.*, Vol. II, No.3, March 1918, pp. 59-60.

and D.F. Malone addressed the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. They challenged the authority of the Secretary of State for India and the Maharaja of Bikaner to sign the peace treaties and the League's Covenant on India's behalf.⁸⁴ Senator France of Maryland opposed the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and emphasised that it sought to perpetuate the British rule in India.⁸⁵ The *Young India* earned encomiums of Senators A.J. Gronna and Norris.⁸⁶ By May 1919, the Indian Home Rule League had fanned out with several branches in towns like Berkeley, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbia, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Philadelphia, Louisville and Minneapolis.⁸⁷

The Indian movement in America now received support from the American working class. The labour conventions that met at St. Louis and Illinois, endorsed the League's demands. The Fabian Club of Chicago also lent the League its moral support. Many Indians connected with the War time revolutionary activities had been given order of deportation. The American Federation of Labour and the Cigar Makers Progressive International Union balked at these harsh measures.⁸⁸

At the end of 1919, the Indian nationalist agitation in the U.S.A. had placed itself on a sound footing. The Peace Treaty was signed by the U.S.A., but it cast her dice in favour of isolationism. As a result the scope for useful work for India was considerably hampered. At home India became a scene of massacres, martial law and the mass movement under Gandhi. Lajpat Rai returned home.⁸⁹ J.T. Sunderland was elected President of the Indian Home Rule League.

Meanwhile, in America those convicted in Hindu Conspiracy Case were released. They took lead in organising the Friends of Freedom for India to plead for their national cause.⁹⁰ They received considerable

82. Holliman, Charls T., 'India at Washington, D.C.', *Ibid.*, Vol. No. 2, February 1919, p. 37.

83. *Congressional Records*, Vol. 58, Part 4, Washington, 1919, pp. 4042-43.

84. *Young India*, Vol. II, No. 10, October 1919, pp. 219-20.

85. *Congressional Records*, Vol. 58, Part 7, pp. 6607-09.

86. 'Some Opinions of Young India', *ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 9, September, 1919, p. 214.

87. *Ibid.* Vol. III, No. 5, May, 1919 pp. 138-39.

88. *Ibid.* pp. 105, 108-9.

89. *Ibid.* Vol. II, No.1, January, 1920, p.3.

support from the Irish nationalists as well as from socialists and anarchists. They looked upon the Indian Home Rule League as unduly cautious and moderate. Because of this, they started their own monthly journal, the *Independent Hindustan*. By 1920, the Friends of Freedom for India were well organised. However, with all these efforts the sad fact remained that after America had opted for isolationism in world politics, all political issues concerning Indian national movement were put on the back bench.

The interest of American public in the government and politics of India was again aroused when Gandhi assumed leadership of India's national movement. In 1916, the Muslim League and the Congress demanded political concessions. The British Government seemed to concur with the views expressed by them. E.S. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, made a declaration in the House of Commons enunciating the new constitutional policy towards India. This declaration marked the end of one epoch and the beginning of another in the constitutional history of India. After ascertaining the public opinion in India, Viceroy Chelmsford and Montagu made their report, which was known as the 'Montagu-Chelmsford Report'. On its basis the British Parliament passed the Government of India Act of 1919. It was received by the Indian leaders with mixed feelings. Gandhi said, 'The reforms are undoubtedly incomplete; they do not give us enough; we are entitled to more.'¹

The obstacle in the development of Indian policy was the problem of communal differences. In India, this problem was started by the introduction of communal representation to Muslims in legislatures. But by 1917, when the scheme of self-government was about to be formulated, the differences between Hindus and Muslims had been adjusted by the Lucknow Pact of 1916. At this time Americans were not much interested in the political condition of India. American public was not enlightened about the racial feuds in Indian life. Interested Americans were startled when they read of a joint Hindu-Muslim delegation presenting a joint Hindu-Muslim programme of reforms to the Secretary of State. *The Nation* observed : 'Too cynical an interpretation of races

1. *Young India*, December 31, 1919.

and motives will be eschewed by those who know how frequently before this a complex of motives has worked for national progress and national unity; not excluding our own United States. The outstanding fact is that the masses or their representatives in India now think very much alike on the essentials of India's national needs and national rights as formulated in the Congress-League programme. There is general agreement that complete home rule for India on an equality with other British dominions is for the future.²

The Government of India Act of 1919 was subject of criticism equally in India and England. The British Parliament and people felt that in conceding the goal of self-government to India, Great Britain took leap in the dark. Indian leaders felt that the principles should have been stated more clearly and whole-heartedly and should have been applied more generously. Such was the political situation in India. The American public was not fully aware of autocratic administration of India. Official pronouncement from England and articles written for the American and British press by Anglo-Indian officials on Indian administration were treated authentic, but they presented only the official point of view. In fact, Indians did not control the administration. It was almost entirely conducted by British officials. The Americans were not expected to be familiar with the Indian administration. The average American had little or no interest in such matters. Whatever knowledge the American public had about Indian administration, it came to them through British publicists, who put only their own point of view. For example, Sir Valentine Chirol wrote : 'They (the western educated Indians) have almost a monopoly of all the liberal professions; they sit on the Bench and in the Legislative Councils; they are even represented in the Executive Council of the Government, as well as in all the higher "Imperial" public services, whilst the subordinate services, commonly called "Provincial", are almost wholly recruited from their ranks.'³ Such statements were misleading. In theory this observation was undoubtedly true but in practice the scope of those professions was infinitesimal in proportion to the population of the country. Such statements as that of Sir Chirol were published in those British magazines and papers which had large circulation in America. This created a

2. *The Nation*, February 28, 1918, p. 228

3. Chirol, Valentine, 'India in Unrest', *The Edinburgh Review*, July, 1918; p. 155

wrong impression in America about India. Some writers maintained that representative self-government had penetrated every corner of the British Empire in India. Charles Johnston remarked: 'But, taking these old bases of nationality as the larger units of its administration, the British Indian Government has for a long time been working to introduce the representative principle at this point also. The head of each of these provinces, the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, as his style may be, is assisted in his work by a Legislative Council, and this Legislative Council always includes elected natives side by side the official members. They have, therefore, at least the beginnings of Parliamentary life in each of these resuscitated ancient nations, and the practice of it is steadily spreading and expanding.

'In the Legislative Council of the Governor-General of India, there are also elected native members, many of them men of high ability and great influence; and the views invariably carry great weight.

'So far, then, representative self-government has already gone in India, while real, effective democracy, safeguarding the rights and wishes of even small minorities, penetrates into every corner of the whole British Indian Empire, taking care of races and tribes so various that they form a vast museum of ethnology.'⁴ Such accounts of the British propagandists were false and misleading. But, at the same time, India was far away from American interest.

By the middle of 1918, some information regarding the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals had reached America. The high sounding phrases of the declaration did create a favourable impression. The *New York Times*, published a news item from London, according to which it was a very great step in the direction of 'Indian home rule.' Reviewing the proposals the paper said, 'Its recommendations are the completion of the edifice of local self-government, giving a considerable measure of responsibility in various fields of provincial legislatures, which are to be composed of directly elected representatives and which will act under the broadest franchise possible under Indian conditions'.⁵

Articles and letters by the British and Americans appeared in some magazines but they were without thoughtful comments. S.K. Ratcliff

4. Johnston, Charles, 'Democracy and India,' *Asia*, December, 1917, p. 774.

5. *New York Times*, July, 6, 1918.

wrote: 'Americans have been impressed by the announcement that the same Government (British Government) is entering upon a scheme of constitutional reconstruction in India.'⁶ Beside the comments of publicists, the press also wrote editorials. *The Nation* praised the British Government on Montagu's so-called, 'Monumental Report on India' and wrote: 'while the scanty notice thus far received by cable offers little basis for judgment as to just how far that statesman has thought it possible to go in meeting the legitimate demand of Britain's Asiatic subjects for Home Rule, the well-known liberal views and clear intelligence of Mr. Montagu are themselves a guarantee that the full report will be found to embody the largest measure of self-government that a wise statesmanship can devise.'⁷ In the absence of a detailed report, *The Nation* had taken its cue from the British press and believed on a statement published in the *London Times* of May 18, 1918,⁸ that 'the principle clearly enunciated by Mr. Montague before he visited India has now been accepted by most divergent British schools of thought.'⁹ *The American Review of Reviews* observed: 'There is no denying the fact that the British statesmen are gradually realizing the necessity of bringing about reforms in the government of India. The mind of England is fast changing as is changing also the mind of the world.... The task of the British administration in India has been much simplified by reconciliation between the Hindus and the Mohammedans.'¹⁰ *The Bellman* considered that 'limited home rule now seems promised to India. There can be no doubt of the sincerity and generosity with which Britain is entering upon this phase of her historical development.'¹¹

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In America it was argued that India created problems to any experiment in self-government. Those problems were racial, historical, social and political. But, all in all, the opinions expressed by the American

6. Ratcliffe, S.K., 'A Communication--England and India', *The New Republic*, August, 1918, p. 197.

7. *The Nation*, July 1918, p. 59.

8. *The London Times* declared, 'The fundamental principles...have been fortunately placed beyond controversy by the very clear and definite terms of the pronouncement which heralded the mission.'

9. *The Nation*, LVII, July, 1918, p. 60.

10. *The American Review of Reviews*, LVIII, September, 1918, p. 315.

11. *The Bellman*, XXV, August 10, 1918, p. 147.

press were complimentary. Americans were further impressed when they came to learn that the Labour Party at its Nottingham Conference *unanimously passed a resolution in favour of home rule for India*. Americans believed that the voice of the British people was behind India's aspirations. They felt that there was no lack of goodwill in England but due to the pressure of the War, there might be undue delay. *The Nation* warned the British that the process of democracy should be hastened and more than necessary delays were dangerous. Further, *The Nation* wrote: 'For India, as her leaders have said more than once recently, no longer appeals to Great Britain's generosity but asks her to save the Empire. India in chains would drag Britain down to perdition; India free and prosperous and content will be a bulwork against all that the future may threaten. For the throne is established by righteousness.'¹²

No doubt, the American press commented favourably, but only a small section of press took interest in the scheme. No American daily wrote editorial on the scheme and many national dailies did not give importance even to the news itself. At that time the *New York Times* was known for its interest in foreign affairs, and it published only one-fourth of a column. Comment on the scheme was confined to periodicals and journals and few individual writers. This constitutional development of India did excite only a small section of America. Hence, only a small section of the press showed some interest. The hope that was aroused in some quarters in America by the report of the proposals, was due to ignorance of the Indian affairs. Mrs. Annie Besant's arrest and internment and political repression created an adverse effect. All this indicated to the Americans that there were strong forces working against the cause of Indian freedom. *The Nation* remarked, 'It was apparent that those same influences of Tory reaction that have bedevilled the Irish situation are at work against the Indians. We do not refer simply to such organizations as Lord Sydenham's Indo-British Association whose interests and animus are well-known and are correspondingly discounted. But there are some evidences of an anti-Indian campaign in the press, not only of Great Britain but of our own country as well. We know little about India and unfortunately care less; and if we can only be made to believe that a great state is a mere congerie of unrelated, illiterate, quarrelsome, degenerate people,

12. *The Nation*, July 20, 1918, p. 60

we shall be more easily led to support those who would for their own ends refuse the right of self-government.’¹³

There were many British magazines which had wide circulation in America and contributed to the shaping of the opinion of the American people regarding India. The propaganda of these magazines kept the people of America in dark about Indian affairs. The ugly side of the British administration was kept out of purview of the American public. *The Bellman* commented, ‘Because of distance the inevitable rigors of censorship and the pressure of great issues elsewhere in the world, the restiveness of India has not, until lately, gained due attention outside the British Government.’¹⁴

However, critics of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms could be discovered in America. Robert L. Schuyler, a keen observer of Indian affairs, wrote, ‘The plan thus outlined does not in fact establish full responsible government on the English model, even with respect to the transferred functions. For the Governor is not to be under obligation to act upon the advice of his ministers.’¹⁵

But most of American critics failed to understand the importance of the Reforms and their superficial knowledge added to the confusion. The surveys of the scheme produced distorted picture in America. *The World's Work* wrongly commented in its leading article, that ‘The chief obstruction to the success of the scheme is that the official Government has no efficient means of obtaining legislative and financial support. The Bill, as presented, empowers the Governor to call a ‘Grand Council’ for discussions on legislation needed by the official Government; but as two-thirds of the Council would be representative of the Ministry, this gives no real authority to the officials. Moreover, although official requisitions are given priority in exchequer disbursements, taxation can be imposed only by the legislatures. Thus the official Government is left dependent on the support of the Ministry. If the bill is enacted without modification it must be assumed that the later will never be opposed to the policies of the former, or it is inevitable that the official Government will become a mere name and powerless as an administrative unit. The most obvious solution of this difficulty is the

13. *Ibid.*

14. *The Bellman*, XXVI, May 17, 1919, p. 540.

15. Schuyler, Robert L., ‘The Constitutional Reconstruction of India’, *The Nation*, November, 1918, p. 537..

establishment of a second legislature and exchequer to supply the official wants; but Indian politicians rigorously oppose this on the ground that it would nullify the purpose of the whole Bill.¹⁶

Robert L. Schuyler wrote about the efficacy of the Reforms: '...only an optimistic doctrinaire could fail to see in the practical working of the scheme the possibility of endless friction and collisions—collisions between ministers and the Governors who need not act upon their advice; between ministers and legislatures which cannot remove them; and between two parts of an Executive which strives to coordinate conflicting principles of government. Of the difficulties which may arise if their plan is put into operation the authors of the Report are aware, and they recognize that the plan can work successfully only by mutual forbearance and a strong common purpose.'¹⁷

The year 1919 saw changed conditions which arose from the end of the First World War and which effected the internal politics of India. During the War India had remained loyal to England. India believed that the War was fought for justice, for freedom and for the cause of self-determination. She supported England with men, money and material. But when the War was over and India found that England was not in a mood to abide by the principle that the War was fought to 'make the world safe for democracy,' the attitude of the Indian leaders also changed. It was difficult for Indians to reconcile British autocracy with British wartime aims. The War message of President Wilson, delivered in the Congress, had echoed the sentiments of the Indians struggling for their freedom. The President had said that America's object was to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the world against autocratic powers. He had added that the chief menace to world peace and liberty lay in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force and not by the will of the people. He had continued, 'Only free people can hold their purpose and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interests of their own. America is prepared to fight for the ultimate peace of the World and for the liberation of its peoples; for the rights of nations great and small and for the privilege

16. *The World's Work*, XXXIX, November, 1919, p. 18.

17. Schuyler, Robert L., *op cit.*

of men everywhere to choose their way of life for the rights of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Government; for the rights and liberties of small nations; for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free people as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at least free.¹⁸

This statement was appreciated by the leaders of India. So far as Britain's conduct was concerned, the sentiments of the President was in perfect accord with Indian thought. To Indians, England was a 'selfish and autocratic power', while the Government of India was 'backed by organized force' controlled by the will of the Government and not by the will of the people. The Indians felt that they were deprived from privilege to have a voice in their own government. The Indians were made hopeful by the President's address. But after the War, the same old reasons were given for the old order. In this connection Valentine Chirol remarked, 'These areas are peopled by alien races either still on an extremely primitive or entirely different plane of civilizations..... we have pledged ourselves to an attempt to acclimatize democratic institutions amongst huge congeries of Indian people to whom democratic forms of Government and the whole conception of democracy have been hitherto wholly alien.'¹⁹ Such statements set the pace of India's post-War internal politics.

The Congress maintained that the people of India were fit for responsible government. The Muslim League also adopted the resolution on the same lines as did the Congress. Indians were agitated by the feeling of being left out in the cold now that the danger to the Empire was over. The Muslims were excited over the Khilafat question. In this atmosphere, surcharged with passion and excitement, the two Rowlatt Bills served as fuel to the fire. At this time Gandhi entered the political arena of India. He opposed the Bills and said, 'when the Rowlatt Bills were published I felt that they were so restrictive of human liberty that they must be resisted to the utmost. I observed, too, that the opposition to them was universal among Indians. I submit that no State, however, despotic, has the right to enact laws which are repugnant to the whole body of the people, much less a Government

18. *New York Times*, April 3, 1917.

19. *Young India*, 1919-22, p. 11.

guided by constitutional usages and precedents such as the Indian Government.²⁰

The sentiments of the Indians were expressed by Bernard Houghton, when he said: 'India during the War had remained loyal to the British flag. Believing that the War was waged for liberty, for justice, and for the rights of the people to govern themselves, she supported freely the cause of the Allies with men and food and so far as her poverty allowed, with money. For reward she received the Rowlatt Act. This Act, which aimed to perpetuate the arbitrary powers exercised during the War, came to India as a slap on the face. Every man felt himself in fetters, his future progress threatened, himself and his belongings at the mercy of officials and informers.'²¹

The Americans did not understand the implications of the provisions of the Rowlatt Bills. According to them the Bills were justified and necessary to deal with plots instituted by foreign agents. Ernest B. Lee wrote: 'The Britons justified the Rowlatt Committee Report on the ground that the extremists in India were in league with the Germans and maintained that had the plot succeeded it would have plunged India into a state of turmoil and anarchy similar to that which prevails in Russia today..... No Englishman who reads the Rowlatt Report can fail to be impressed with its scrupulous fairness, its clear and cogent reasoning and its weight as an unimpeachable record of facts based upon an enormous mass of intricate documentary evidence.'²²

The *Christian Science Monitor* took much interest in the matter and wrote: 'Nevertheless, in spite of the quite outrageous mis-statements which have been assiduously put in circulation about the Rowlatt Act, especially throughout the Punjab, it needs to be remembered that the Act cannot in any way, and does not in any way, affect the rights of the law-abiding citizen. The Rowlatt Act is aimed, first and last, at that peculiar product of India described by Montagu as "the real revolutionary", the man who lurks in dark corners, whom nothing can locate or convert, who never works directly but always indirectly, and whose chief mark is the young student, often a mere schoolboy, of

20. *Ibid.*

21. Houghton, Bernard, 'Reforms in India', *Political Science Quarterly*, XXXV, December, 1920, p. 549.

22. Lee, Ernest B., 'The Case for the Rowlett Act' *The Fortnightly Review*, CVI, August 1919, p. 229..

the "respectable classes". The Punjab has been the special hunting ground of these men. They have done and are doing their utmost, but as a well-known authority declared recently, the vast majority of the people have been no more fundamentally affected by these machinations than by the numerous plots and conspiracies engineered, chiefly in the Punjab, through German agencies during the first years or two of the War.²³

The same paper in a leading article under the title 'India and the Rowlatt Bills' gave reasons for the enactment of the Bills. The paper said that prior to the outbreak of the War, revolutionary activities in India were a matter of grave concern for the British authorities. The paper observed that: 'The situation was unquestionably as complex a one as has ever faced the Indian authorities and the chief difficulty lies in the fact that the Indian leaders, while professing, and indeed quite evidently displaying, the utmost loyalty to the British rule, have quite failed to grasp the fact that the Rowlatt Bills do not and are not designed to restrict in any way the legitimate ventilation of opinion; that the Government is responsible for the peace and tranquillity of the whole country, and is bound to deal with law-breakers wherever they may be found. As one prominent Anglo-Indian paper pointed out, the arguments used against the Bills have no relation to the terrible problem of anarchical crime. There is much talk of the "liberty of the subject," of the danger of interfering with political activities, of the "slur on India's honour," of the danger of arming the bureaucracy with special powers and so forth, but opponents of the measures have come forward with no alternative proposals.'²⁴

The Bellman gave different reasons and remarked: 'The Bills appear to have been formed in anticipation, not necessarily of a revival of terrorist plots, but of the special danger to public order likely to arise with the ending of the War, the return of the Indian army from many fields, and the likelihood of modest political reconstruction.'²⁵

The Rowlatt Act did not attract much attention in the American press. The important journals and leading dailies did not give much space to it. There were reasons for it : firstly it was not likely to

23. *Christian Science Monitor*, August 29, 1919.

24. *Ibid.*, May 27, 1919.

25. *The Bellman*, XXVI, May 17, 1919, p. 540.

invite the interest of the Americans and secondly its propagandists had prepared favourable ground for it in America. The American public had been told that the Act was intended to strengthen the hands of the British administrators to subdue the undesirable activities of misguided youth of India. It was impressed on the American public that the loyal citizen of India need not fear. The opinion expressed by a small section of the American press only justified British Government's action. They used the same arguments as those put forward by the British Government. One special feature of British post-War propaganda in America stands out clearly: All revolutionary activities by Indians were traced back either to Berlin or Moscow. Even Rabindranath Tagore, who went to America on a cultural mission, was accused of being implicated in the activities of the revolutionaries. The *New York Times* published, 'secret papers intercepted by the Government purporting to show that Sir Rabindranath Tagore had enlisted the interests of Counts Okuma and Teranchi, former Japanese Premier, in a movement to establish an independent Government in India.'²⁶ It told the American people that the Indian nationals who were tried at San Francisco were members of the Ghadar Party formed to overthrow the British Government in India. They were in league with the Germans and Indian revolutionaries. The proceedings against the Indian nationals in America was connected with British propaganda. George A. McGowen, Attorney for the defendants, told the court: 'The whole case is being tried at the instigation of the British Government. The United States' Government has never found anything seditious in the writings of these defendants.'²⁷

A news item, published in the *New York Times*, illustrates how the American public was told of the danger to the British Empire from the agencies working outside India: "We have acquired a direct route in Russia, Persia and Afghanistan," says a dispatch from the Wolff Bureau, the German semi-official agency here today.' 'The announcement of the Wolff Bureau, if true, has an important bearing on the situation in Western Asia and possibly even in India. The peace terms forced upon Russia at Brest-Litovsk took away from Russia

26. *New York Times*, February 28, 1918.

27. *Ibid.*, March 1, 1918.

a district in the Cis-Caucasian region through which it would be possible for the German allies to gain entrance from the Black Sea or Turkey into Persia. Passage through Persia probably would meet with only nominal opposition, while a still further advance into Afghanistan would be possible.²⁸

Gandhi declared his intention of *satyagraha* if the Rowlatt Bills should be embodied into an Act. April 6 was fixed to be a day of *hartal*. All sections of the people submerged their differences to fight against the implementation of the Act. *The Bellman* wrote, 'one significant development in the Indian question has come home most forcefully to the British Government, and that is the fact that in the April demonstration, Hindu, Sikhs and Mohammedans acted together. The conclusion seems inescapable that the state of mutual and consistent antagonism between the several communities into which Indian people have always been divided can no longer be counted upon to lessen the difficulties of the British Government. This, however, viewed in its most hopeful sense, is only another surety for the success of the Indian adventure in self-government, once it is under way.'²⁹

The Government of India imposed strong censorship on news relating to the Jallianwala Bag tragedy. America was unaware for months of the happenings in the Punjab. Disclosure began only with the opening of an inquiry at Lahore by the Hunter Commission. When the British press started commenting on the event, the news finally reached America. On this news *The Independent and the Weekly Review* observed: 'For the last five years India has been a sealed book. The British censorship has been so strict that wars of more than minor importance and political disturbances involving millions of natives have not become known to the outside world in any detail until long afterwards. For instance, it is only now that we are beginning to get full information of riots at Amritsar last April.'³⁰

Some news did appear in the American press about mid-1919 to the effect that in India there were disturbances in the Punjab and the British Government wanted to suppress them. This type of news was confined to journals and periodicals. But the notice taken by

28. *Ibid.*, March 9, 1918.

29. *The Bellman*, XXVI, May 17, 1919. p. 540.

30. *The Independent and the Weekly Review*, January 3, 1920, p. 26.

the American press was negligible. On Amritsar American opinion was divided. Some condemned General Dyer's action; other gave him credit for saving the British Empire in India. Bernard Houghton wrote, 'Never before, except in Ireland, has the British name been sullied by a crime so black. Other, if minor, atrocities followed elsewhere in the Punjab, where for a time there ruled a reign of terror. The Indian Government not only condoned all these atrocities, but it suppressed by every means in its power a knowledge of the facts. When, against its will, the Hunter Commission—an inadequate and partial commission—was sent out to inquire, it hastened to pass an act of indemnity to shield the perpetrators.'³¹

H.M. Hyndman was also critical of the British Government. He wrote: 'It is quite right to denounce assassinations; anarchy is no remedy for misgovernment. But when public meetings are not allowed; when freedom of the press is entirely abrogated; when men are arrested, imprisoned or transported to a criminal colony under an obsolete but resuscitated law a century old without trial and even without accusation, when young students are publicly flogged by an infamous person for purely political offences—when all these things are done by a foreign Government which has disarmed the whole people and allows them no direct representation whatever—it is impossible not to recognize that these anarchist outbreaks have been deliberately provoked.'³²

Helena Normanton was no less critical of General Dyer's action. She remarked: 'That a British General could pitilessly exhaust his ammunition upon thousands of unarmed and unwarned Indians squatting upon the ground at an open-air meeting, leaving the dead unburied and the dying unattended, and forbid for a number of hours even their removal by means of a Curfew Order, is something new to civilization.'³³ Liberal writers and press were also critical of the British Government. The *Current Opinion* observed: 'India is held down by bayonets despite the optimistic observations of Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of States for India, in the Commons.'³⁴ Of all the American periodicals,

31. Houghton, Bernard, *op. cit.*

32. Hyndman, H.M., 'Unrest in India and a Remedy,' *Asia*, XIX, July 1919, p. 669.

33. Normanton, Helena, 'White Washing British Rule in India,' *The Nation*, June 19, 1929, p. 83.

34. *Current Opinion*, LXVI, June 1919, p. 350.

The Literary Digest published articles and comments in more than one issue. This periodical used to quote at length from the British press and never expressed its own opinion. Under the heading 'Riotous Passive Resistance in India,' it wrote: 'According to report from the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, the worst trouble has been at Amritsar, where it is said three British Bank Managers were burned to death, one of whom apparently was clubbed before he was burned.'³⁵ Only two dailies, the *Springfield Republican* and the *Christian Science Monitor*, printed worthy comments. The *Springfield Republican* disapproved the action of the British Government and wrote: 'Only by winning the consent of the governed, upon which British rule has mainly rested in the past, can the Empire either be justified or made lasting. Harsh and autocratic measures may be necessary in a crisis, but their continuance after the crisis has passed would bring disaster.'³⁶ The *Christian Science Monitor* considered the action of General Dyer as 'frankly and admittedly terrorism.' It said: 'Let it be, at once and gladly, admitted that General Dyer is all that his friends claim for him, a worthy soldier with over thirty years' unblemished service to his credit; that he was placed in a position of extreme difficulty, and that drastic action was necessary. None of these things, however, alters the fact that organized shooting at Amritsar was the expression of a policy which is utterly and entirely inadmissible. The condemnation of such a policy cannot be too definite nor too final.'³⁷

The Liberal press of England censored General Dyer's action. On the other hand, conservative papers lauded the action of General Dyer and made him a national hero. They gave credit to him for having saved northern India. *The Literary Digest* observed: 'But even these defenders of the strong hand at Amritsar regret that the British public was not allowed to know at the time all that happened in the Punjab.... "All human beings deplore such a loss of life as occurred at Amritsar," remarked *The Morning Post*, "but all men of sense agree that it is a mere trifle compared with the loss of life which must certainly have occurred if those heroic men had not done as they did and as we hope Englishmen will continue to do in similar circumstances.'³⁸ The

35. *The Literary Digest*, LXI, May 10, 1919, p. 23.

36. *Springfield Republican*, December 23, 1919.

37. *Christian Science Monitor*, July 12, 1920.

38. *The Literary Digest*, LXIV, January 24, 1920, p. 24.

Manchester Guardian pleaded that the public should wait for the report of Hunter Commission. Many papers in London censored the action of the government. *The Literary Digest* wrote: "Various other journals postpone final judgment until the conclusions of Lord Hunter's Committee are made known, and among them is the *London Times* which remarks, however, that on his own showing General Dyer's conduct "appears to us indefensible, and its worst feature is that he did not stop firing when the crowd began instantly to disperse." "The public is shocked by these revelations", the *Times* continued, "but it is shocked also because disclosure has only been made in Great Britain nine months after the event occurred." It was innocently assumed in England, observed the *London Daily News*, that when the armistice was signed the reign of frightfulness was over. That assumption was wrong. It added: "The scene of this new frightfulness is not Belgium, but India; the General responsible is not German, but British. The Government which has practised this concealment—in its way one of the most shocking features of the whole concern—is British. The victims are not even technically enemies, but 'rebels', in General Dyer's words; that is to say, British subjects who innocently or otherwise ventured to act in contravention of his decrees. We do not ignore the gravity of the crimes previously committed..... we do not forget the difficulty and delicacy of the position. It is just to remember, moreover, that the case is in a sense *sub judice* and that the final conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry may to some extent modify the story as we know it at present. We hope profoundly that it will, for what could be more futile than to talk of Indian reforms, of 'self-government for India,' of Indian Government as a trust held by the British Parliament and people if wholesale massacres could be perpetrated without the British Parliament or people knowing a word about them for months?" The appalling news from Amritsar is a revelation to the British people of what their rule in India might have come to but for the change of course set up by the measure of self-government now passing into law, according to the *London Westminster Gazette*, which continues, "Whatever may have been the impression made in the Punjab, this amazing narrative will recall to the inhabitants of the United Kingdom chiefly the episodes of the early German occupation of Belgium and the old 'Peterloo Massacre' in England Not the least astonishing thing of all is that such an episode did not precipitate a real rebellion."³⁹

39. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

The British press influenced the American press. The *New York Times* wrote that Muslims and Hindus had formed a secret organization in Switzerland. The paper further wrote, 'Under the name of Oriental League, there has recently been established at Berne a central organization uniting all the various secret societies of Moslem and Hindu nationalists in Europe which have hitherto acted independently. The aim of the new association is to prepare for joint revolutionary action in Asia and Africa after the definite conclusion of peace.....Evidence exists that recent insurrections in Egypt, the sudden attacks of the Afghans and the rising in India, remarkable for cooperation between Moslems and Hindus, were connected with the activities of the League.'⁴⁰ The same paper commented on the Russian menace to India. 'Trotsky is making good his threat of carrying war towards India.'⁴¹

A prominent journalist Nihal Singh wrote: 'Some of these explanations cannot be lightly dismissed but all put together, they do not reveal the root cause of the trouble and therefore lead us nowhere. They set thinking persons wondering if Indians are really so bereft of common sense and political acumen that, after having remained staunchly loyal during the darkest hours of the War when the fate of the Empire hung in the balance, they should begin to play into the hands of the enemy when Britain stands triumphant, Germany and Turkey have been brought to their knees and Russia is reduced to chaos—and, moreover, when British statesmen are devising measures to advance India towards responsible self-government. On the very face of it that suggestion is so preposterous that anyone who knows aught of educated Indians will dismiss it as unthinkable.'⁴²

In America reasons and explanations given about unrest in India were based on British sources. Due to the lack of unbiased material Americans were unable to draw independent conclusions. The American press had to depend on British news sources for Indian news. So it had to fall in line with the British point of view. Some American papers based their opinion on official statements from London and Delhi. *The Literary Digest* wrote: 'Bloodshed and pillage in many parts of India as the result of "passive resistance" would perhaps seem a ridiculous inconsistency if the conditions were not so grave. Officials of the British Government have discovered a direct connection between

40. *New York Times*, July 3, 1919.

41. *Ibid.*, January 12, 1920.

42. *The Contemporary Review*, CXV, June, 1919 p. 625.

the Bolsheviks of Russia and the disturbing elements in the Punjab, in consequence of which six Russians—apparently of the better class, well-educated and speaking several different Indian dialects— were arrested in this part of India and jailed.⁴³

American newspaper the *Christian Science Monitor* attributed the unrest to the propaganda by *sadhus*. According to the paper they were moving from village to village spreading the wildest stories about the ruthless repression. The paper wrote: 'The latest information on the subject shows quite clearly that the authorities had been aware, for many months previous to the outbreak, that this propaganda was being carried on. Sir Michael O' Dyer, the retiring Lieutenant- Governor, in the course of his farewell speech practically intimated as much and, whilst all the necessary military and police precautions were taken, no attempt appears to have been made to counteract the movement with a propaganda setting forth the facts of the case.'⁴⁴ This paper commented and consistently maintained that the real cause of the unrest in India was propaganda. It remarked : 'Nevertheless, the fact remains that as a general rule, traced to its ultimate source, it (the unrest) is never found to have its beginnings in any great fundamental need or fundamental desire among the people, but it springs from the wild notions and impressionable class, namely, the young students and even the schoolboys, by the "real revolutionary" the man who lurks in dark corners and takes care never to appear in person.'⁴⁵

The *Springfield Republican* observed : 'India too was called upon for great sacrifices, and little reciprocity was shown. Moreover, the shocking incompetence of the Indian military authorities as shown in the Tigris campaign for Baghdad, did much to discredit the British rule; an overlord should at least be efficient. Nor have the political reforms expected been forthcoming, and the continuation in peace of the wartime sedition laws has caused much illwill.'⁴⁶

The Bellman did not indulge in speculations and wrote: 'In view of this promising and unquestionably earnest programme (Reforms of 1919) it is difficult to understand the recent disturbances in India, which were of an extent and virulence not easy to minimize.'⁴⁷

43. *Ibid.*, LXI, May 10, 1919, p. 22.

44. *Christian Science Monitor*, July 1, 1919.

45. *Ibid.*, November 10, 1919.

46. *Springfield Republican*, December 23, 1919.

47. *The Bellman*, XXVI, May 17, 1919, p. 540.

American journals which wrote frequently on Indian problems had more or less the same views, but Hyndman had different views on the problem. He commented : 'Here the unrest was the direct effect of terrible economic injustice. Solemn official promises made to the cultivators in regard to taxation were deliberately broken in a manner absolutely ruinous to the ryots. Excessive charges were made for all irrigation water supplied by the Government in order that the capital sunk in the official enterprise might show a profit. The poor folk were prohibited from using water from their own wells so that they would be driven to buy Government water. No attention whatever was paid to the complaints of the ryots or of their leaders.'⁴⁸

The publication of the Hunter report went almost unnoticed in America but Helena Normanton criticized the report and commented, 'The report is a disgrace to the signatories and a deeper blot on the name of Britain. The crimes were committed in hot blood. The report is the product of eight men icy in their callousness.'⁴⁹ Bernard Houghton observed that the report of the Hunter Commission, the Dyer debates in Commons, and support to Dyer by the white people in India had grave significance. He further said: 'The report is looked upon as so much whitewash. Confidence in British is destroyed, and a wall of hatred set up between the races.'⁵⁰

The Nation was also critical. It commented : 'Of course, says the report in effect, bombing villages from airplanes sometimes results in the death of innocent persons, and this is deplorable; but in general, it is a method we are called upon to approve. Of course, if people assembled in an illegal gathering refuse to disperse they must be fired upon, but it is worthwhile even at the expense of several seconds' time to order them to disperse before killing them. Thus have argued tyrants and their apologists in all ages. When the Czar shot down hundreds of peaceful petitioners "illegally assembled" before the Winter Palace in January 1905, he doubtless argued as the Hunter Commission argues with regard to Amritsar. When the Germans dropped bombs on British babies in English villages they doubtless urged the same necessity that forces English airmen to drop bombs on Indian babies

48. Hyndman, H. M., *op. cit.*

49. Normanton, Helena, *op. cit.*

50. Houghton, Bernard, *op. cit.*

in defenseless villages in the Punjab. The history of atrocity and the history of autocratic military rule are one and the same. And the nation which builds that sort of history, be it Russian or German or British or American, is doomed to the horror of war with its neighbours and the rebellion at home.⁵¹

In America reaction to the Reforms was varied. The majority of the people in the United States knew little or nothing about Indian political problems. They did not care to learn much. But the outlook of the Americans was progressive and enlightened. Espousing the cause of and giving their support to the people struggling for freedom has been the tradition of the American people. So the section of the progressive public opinion in America sympathized with the people of India to achieve their political aspirations. They had been under British domination and won their freedom only after a long struggle. So Americans were in a better position to understand the feelings of those who were struggling for freedom in India. George Washington had said, 'My sympathetic feelings and my best wishes are irresistibly excited whenever in any country I see an oppressed nation unfurl the banner of freedom.'⁵² The same sentiment was expressed by Abraham Lincoln in many of his speeches and by many other national heroes. It is a fact that the Americans are and have always been freedom-loving people. Many times in the United States Congress condemned British rule in India. Resolutions expressing sympathy and moral support were introduced in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. The Christmas message of 1921, which appeared in the *New York Times*, signed by American officials and publicists,⁵³ expressed sentiments of the American people. The United States of America has never failed to extend sympathy and support to all peoples who struggle for freedom.

'A short time ago our army returned from overseas after having brought victory to the Allied cause. Our entry into this great struggle

51. *The Nation*, June 19, 1920, p. 814.

52. Sunderland, J.T., *The Truth About India*, New York, p. 13.

53. Among the signatories were—Senators David L. Walsh of Massachusetts and George W. Norris of Nebraska; Representatives William J. Burke of Pa; Edward F. Dunne, ex-Governor of ILL.; Chas P. Gillen, ex. Mayor of Newark; Patrick Griffen, Mayor of Hoboken, N.J.; Frank L. Hoge, Mayor of Jersey City, N.J.; Reverend John Haynes Holmes of the Community Church, New York; Basil M. Manley, former Joint Chairman of the War Labour Board; Justice James F. Minturn of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Hoboken.

was predicated upon the principle that the just powers of Government are derived from the consent of the governed; and our aid was accepted by the Allies upon the theory that at the close of the war peoples everywhere should be permitted to determine for themselves the character of Government under which they shall live. Our right not only to sympathize with the people of India and Ireland and Egypt who are struggling for the right of self-determination, but to give them active support, is conceded by the promises of our associates in the great war and sealed by the blood of our soldiers.⁵⁴

Liberal public opinion in America, related to Indian problem, was always critical of the British domination. It was of the view that even if the rule of the British had been efficient, economical and in the interest of the people of India, that would still be no argument for its indefinite continuation. The good government was no legitimate substitute for self-government. Many Americans were of this view that in fact the rule of the British in India had not been economical and in the interests of the Indian people. Liberal minded Americans came to know of the injustice done to the Indians by the Britishers. They found that even in the administration of justice discrimination was made between Indians and Europeans. Eleanor Franklin Egan wrote: 'In effect, there has always been in India one law for Englishmen and another law for Indians, though the distinction may not have been defined in the statute books. I am not making this statement on my own original authority, but am merely repeating an often repeated and very familiar accusation. No Englishman could be tried except before an all British court, and the general result is declared to have been that an Indian could seldom obtain judgment against an Englishman while in everything that had to do with litigation he has always suffered humiliating disadvantages.'⁵⁵

Irish nationals in America were always sympathetic to India. They felt that "an enemy of the enemy is a friend." De Valera, leader of the Irish Republicans, delivered a speech at a dinner of the Friends of Freedom for India in New York in which he said: 'But surely no American need wait for these facts, to be convinced that the British are in India not for India's good but to exploit India and the Indians, and that to ensure the continuance of their exploitation the British

54. *New York Times*, Dec. 26, 1921.

55. Egan, Eleanor Franklin, 'British Conservatism in India', *The Saturday Evening Post*, CXCVI, September 15, 1923, p. 137.

do not hesitate to resort to any means, no matter how revolting and how cruel, provided these means appear to them the readiest and most effective for the purpose. Dyer had to shoot the people of India else the British Empire could not endure in India. He was nothing but the faithful servant of his imperial masters, and as a faithful, trusted servant they promoted him for his deeds.⁵⁶

There was a group of people in America who took interest in the social conditions in India. They believed that India was a country of peoples of different races, languages and creeds, different social classes and of widely varying cultures. In their opinion, population and area aggravated the complexity of her problem. They also felt that *swaraj* could not be attained without Hindu-Muslim cooperation. The problem of minorities was there and the Muslims believed that they would be in hopeless minority if India attained self-rule. This group of Americans was honest in its opinion but in absence of first-hand information, its judgment was influenced by the anti-Indian British propaganda in America.

There was another group of Americans who magnified Indian problems and considered the Indians unfit for self-government. Naturally they were influenced by British propaganda and used almost the same language and arguments as were used by the conservatives in England. As regards the American press, different opinions were expressed in it. Only a small section of press offered comments on the Reforms. They devoted their space to a summary of the Report or to the opinions of the British papers. American dailies took much less interest and only a few dailies wrote editorials. The *New York Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor* showed superficial interest in the Reforms. Few articles did appear in magazines and journals but they were not upto the mark.

In 1921, the beautiful strip of coastland of western India known as Malabar witnessed an upheaval. The fanatic, hot-blooded and excited Moplahs rose in revolt. This uprising was known as the Moplah Rebellion and resulted in some loss of life among Hindus and a few English officers. The Government of India was forced to enact a legislation known as the 'Moplah Outrage Act' to deal with the trouble. In America this uprising was given more publicity by the press of the East Coast. American press still had no independent news service in India and had to depend on the British news agencies. American press was

56. *India and Ireland*, New York, Friends of Freedom for India, 1920, p. 15.

aware of fact that it was not in a position to arrive at an independent and unbiased conclusion. *The Nation* made it clear when it wrote, 'some of the accounts represent the rising as another illustration of the revival of the militant spirit of Islam. Hindu peasants, they say, suffered more than the British *raj*; which may or may not be British propaganda.'⁵⁷ The same paper summed up, '... But whatever is or isn't true, this new revolt gives fresh proof of widespread Asiatic discontent with Western Imperialism—a discontent not confined to India. It is an important subject involving half the population of the globe. Why do our enterprising news associations leave us so carefully in the dark?'⁵⁸

In America, the news of the Moplah rebellion strengthened the propoganda that the moment the British left, the Hindus and Muslims would be at each other's throats and anarchy would prevail in India. Many interpretations of this uprising were given in the American press. The *New York Times* said that the trouble arose from fanaticism and intense hatred of the Moplahs for Europeans and Hindus. The paper further said that of politics and home rule they knew nothing, as they were barbarians, but the religion would always stir them to bloodshed. They lived for religion and were willing to die for it. The *Christian Science Monitor*, observed that the Malabar riots: '... no doubt were an indirect result of the tremendous agitation at present carried on throughout the country by Mr. Gandhi and his followers...for some time past, there has been a growing uneasiness throughout the great Mohammedan belt on the question of the solidarity of Islam.'⁵⁹ The *Weekly Review* opined that the rebellion was an indication of more or less general unrest in India, but it was not to be confused with the nationalist movement.⁶⁰ This journal further wrote: 'Doubtless the hands of Soviet agitators is to be seen in it, as well as the popular effect of Gandhi's non-cooperation propogands.'⁶¹ The *Times* wrote: 'These tribesmen are not happy unless they can go out on a raid with their two-edged sword. They are wild Mohammendans who love to slaughter Hindus whether they are nationalist or not.'⁶²

57. *The Nation*, September 7, 1921, p. 251.

58. *Ibid.*

59. *Christian Science Monitor*, August 31, 1921.

60. *The Weekly Review*, September 3, 1921, p. 203.

61. *Ibid.*

62. *Times*, August 31, 1921.

American press advanced many reasons for the outbreak of revolt but they were not sufficient. The force behind this revolt was the agrarian problem and the famine. But none of the journals was convinced of this reason. The *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrate* only raised a query when it observed: 'The uprising is attributed directly to the efforts of political agitators and no reason is assigned why such agitators, who are numrous in India, should be more successful in this portion of the country than in other portions.'⁶³ The *Springfield Republican* came to an independent conclusion when it observed: 'Announcement of the India Office of famine in the disturbed area of Malabar is disquieting, beause this region, while inferior in many respects to much of India, is normally exempt from famine... The cost of living also has in the past been closely connected with the revolts of the Moplahs which, although ascribed to religious fanaticism, have also had their agrarian side.'⁶⁴

After a study of the news and editorials of the American press, one comes to the conclusion that the news of Moplah uprising was distorted and the American readers did not get the true picture of it. In fact, the British controlled agencies succeeded to such an extent that the *New York Times* expressed that it was the beginning of a general uprising of the Muslims of the world against western civilization. The paper wrote: 'The rising has been accompanied with what seems to have been the murder of many foreigners. While it may not be politically very serious, it is made disquieting by a recent assertion, coming from apparently well-informed sources that the whole Muslim world is meditating and preparing for a new attack on the Western nations it once before came conquering and destroying.'⁶⁵ Practically, all the press maintained that it was an indication of general unrest of Muslims all over the world and would spread to the whole of Asia. The *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrate* wrote: 'It was to guard against possible dangers arising in India that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was originally entered into. The Malabar resistance to authority, should it prove stubborn, might have an important influence on the question of renewing that alliance.'⁶⁶ The *Baltimore Sun* did not share the popular

63. *St. Louis Daily Globe Democrate*, August 16, 1921.

64. *Springfield Republican*, August 30, 1920.

65. *New York Times*, August 29, 1921.

66. *St. Louis Daily Globe Democrat*, August 26, 1921.

opinion. It wrote : 'Yet since the English rule is in large measure wise and far-seeing since it seeks to spread the enlightenment which alonge will permit any secure or enduring Indian autonomy, it is to be hoped that we shall soon learn that the Malabar disorders are not indicative of any wide-spread rebellion.'⁶⁷

The Government of India took stern action to put down the revolt. It captured a number of Moplahs, shoved them into a railway carriage and brought it to Madras. On opening of the door it was found that half of the prisoners had died from suffocation and heat. On account of the incident, the Government of India was censured by the American press. The *Philadelphia Inquirer* did not think there was 'much consolation in that'⁶⁸ when the Governor of Madras announced that everything possible was being done for the survivors. The *New York Times* considered the incident only 'a terrible mistake.'⁶⁹ The *Times* observed: 'The affair too nearly parallels the tragedy of the Black Hole (of Calcutta) over which the British themselves have shuddered with horror, now, for the greater part of the Century; and the native Indians cannot be expected to forget a grievance so real and so terrible.' The most severe criticism of the tragedy came from *The Nation*. It wrote: 'And now, under a liberal and supposedly humane British Government, 100 Moplah prisoners have been left overnight in a closed British railway wagon, so suffocating that by the morning 64 of them were dead. Do the British shudder with horror and go into sack-cloth and ashes that civilised white men should repeat the horrors of a century and a half ago? Do their leaders follow Gandhi in fasting in penitence for the excesses of their followers? No more than after Amritsar.'⁷⁰

The London papers completely ignored the whole affair. The correspondent of *London Times* observed that the wagon was unfit for its purpose and that at any rate it was a mistake to put so many prisoners in it at once. *The Nation* came out with a sharp reaction: 'Clive did not feel so mildly after the Black Hole of Calcutta. Nor did Gandhi comment so lightly on the far more excusable riots in Bombay.'⁷¹

67. *Baltimore Sun*, August 28, 1921.

68. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 27, 1921.

69. *New York Times*, November 26, 1921.

70. *The Nation*, December 7, 1921.

71. *Ibid.*

AMERICAN REACTION TO THE NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT

3

From the year 1921 Gandhi became one of the foremost leader of Indian politics. He started Non-Cooperation Movement. But this movement had no effect on the institution of the schemes embodied in the new reforms. The Duke of Connaught came from England to inaugurate the Central Legislature. Gandhi wrote him a letter in which he said: 'Your visit upholds Dyerism. Three hundred million innocent people are living in a fear for their lives from one hundred thousand Englishmen. I oppose British rule to the bitter end.'¹ On this, the Duke tried to placate the feelings of the Indians and appealed: 'I have reached at a time when I most desire to heal wounds and to reunite those who have been disunited. As an old friend of India, I appeal to you all--British and Indians--to bury, alongwith the dead past, the mistakes and the misunderstandings of the past, to forgive where you have to forgive and to join hands and to work together to realize the hopes that arise, from today.'² But the memory of the Punjab massacre was fresh, so the Duke's words did not have any effect on the people of India.

The Non-Cooperation Movement gathered strength and its scope became wider. At the height of the movement, the Government of India announced that the Prince of Wales would arrive in India on November 17, 1921. The purpose of his visit was to become personally acquainted with the rulers of the Indian states and the people of India. Gandhi, however, attributed a different motive to the visit. He stated that the visit was for the purpose of advertising the 'benign' British rule in India.

1. *The New York Times Current History Magazine*, XIV, May 1921, p. 238.

2. Basu, B.D., *India Under the British Crown*, Calcutta, 1933, p. 513.

This visit was widely reported in the American Press. The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* wrote that as the Indians were hostile to the British Government: 'it was a rather daring stroke of policy to send the Prince of Wales on the visit to Britain's Asiatic Empire.'³ Many American papers, however, did not share this view. There was much speculation on the results of the royal visit. The same paper changed its views and added: 'His Indian visit may well prove to be just what is needed to still the troubled waters. He may do more than all the wisest statesmen and ardent conciliators have been able to accomplish.'⁴ The *New York Tribune* commented on Prince's personality: '...if he could only hob-nob with Gandhi, that remarkable psychologist who has wilted India to passive resistance-non-cooperation, she might suffer a change of heart in spite of himself.'⁵ To The *New Republic* the visit of the Prince to India was intended by the British Cabinet as a means of conciliation. It remarked: 'The Prince was either a vessel of reconciliation or an agent of provocation.'⁶ The *New York Times* was, however, silent on the subject.

The Government of India had made great preparations for the royal visit. But Gandhi asked his countrymen to boycott it. The Prince arrived in Bombay as scheduled and non-cooperators greeted him with a *hartal*. There were rioting and bloodshed in Bombay. The news of rioting was censored and, therefore, the American press was in no position to draw a true picture. The British Government created the impression in America that the visit was a success and only a few agitators under Gandhi's leadership created trouble. The *New York Times* published distorted news from India: 'Nowhere upon the surface of Bombay was there visible even a trace of that disaffection which is troubling India today, but Mr. Gandhi is determined to challenge the spontaneous, whole-hearted welcome of the Indians of every race, religion, caste and color. It is reported that he arrived in Bombay early this morning and held a meeting of malcontents but, if so, the "first city in India" has completely and contemptuously ignored him and all his works. Nothing could have exceeded the magnificence of the welcome of the Prince from the moment he landed at the brilliant

3. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, November 22, 1921.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *New York Tribune*, November 24, 1921.

6. *The New Republic*, December, 1921.

pavilion at the Gateway of India to the last cheer that followed him into the quite of the Governor's ground.'⁷ The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* wrote that Gandhi was in Bombay and he tried to fizzle the reception of Prince but failed. The paper went on to say: 'His failure is a satisfying indication that the Indian people are by no means unanimous in their resentment against the British overlordship. It is also another indication of the winning personality of the British heir.'⁸ By such propaganda, the British were able to convince the American people that the Prince's visit was a great success. When the news of riots finally leaked out, the *New York Times* published a news item and placed the entire responsibility for the riots on Gandhi. It wrote: 'M.K. Gandhi, the leader of the Non-Cooperationalists, chose the day of the Prince's arrival for a passionate appeal to the malcontents of Bombay and crowned the occasion with the usual bonfire of English cloth and English-made clothes brought for the purpose second hand in the bazaar.'⁹

Many editors in America, however, did not swallow the British propaganda. They did not believe that Gandhi incited the people to violence. *The Nation* was aware of the distortion of the news from India and the nature of the official hand-outs meant for America. In an article the paper wrote: 'News is what the news agencies choose to make it, particularly Indian news. We read that the Prince of Wales landed at Bombay amid a tumult of enthusiasm and that the city decked itself in gay colors to greet him. We read columns of this stuff; and then six or eight lines reporting native riots 'attributed by the authorities to agitation by the followers of Mahatma Gandhi.' Official welcomes we take for granted, of the native reception we should like to know more. Not so much from the New York papers as official propaganda in India is responsible for the distorted stories that reach us. Whenever there is violence in India the authorities blame it on Gandhi. Falsely--for to anyone who reads Indian papers it is plain that Gandhi does his uttermost to restrain violent expression of the growing bitterness against British exploitation.'¹⁰ Under the heading 'Loving Your Enemy in India,' *The Nation* published the text of the

7. *New York Times*, November 18, 1921.

8. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, November 22, 1921.

9. *New York Times*, November 21, 1921.

10. *The Nation*, November 30, 1921, p. 609.

appeal Gandhi made to the people of Bombay. In it he had declared that he would not eat and drink until the Hindus and Mussalmans of Bombay made peace with the Parsis, Christians and Jews. The journal quoted Gandhi's own words: 'The Swaraj that I have witnessed during the last two days has stunk in my nostrils....The non-violence of the non-cooperators has been worse than the violence of the cooperators. For, with non-violence on our lips we have terrorised those who have differed from us and in so doing we have denied our God.'¹¹

The news of Gandhi's fast was reported in America. Americans were thrilled by the unique method of non-violence. The *Philadelphia Inquirer* remarked that Gandhi, the leader of the anti-British movement, 'has not only disclaimed any responsibility in the matter but has earnestly deplored and condemned the inexpedient unruliness of his misguided followers.'¹² The *New York Times* was critical of Gandhi. It remarked: 'As a remedy for the situation for which he is responsible—a responsibility he has the decency to admit—Gandhi has imposed upon himself a complete fast for one day each week.'¹³ But the *Times* failed to understand how the fast would bring the people back to passive resistance. The *New Republic* declared that Gandhi accepted responsibility, but the fact was that the responsibility belonged to the British to a far greater degree. It observed: 'After all, their rule must finally rest on the consent of the governed, and if that consent is largely withdrawn in consequence of their acts, the burden of proof is upon them. It is for them to define their position in India by negotiation or by the sword.'¹⁴

The Prince toured all over the country. His visits were marked by mass arrests of Congress volunteers and leaders but the people remained peaceful. At Madras, as the *New York Times* reported, 'The Prince was greeted with fatal riots and the warcry "Hail Gandhi"'. The only spectators en route greeting the Prince were the school children.'¹⁵ At Calcutta the Government arrested a large number of Congressmen. It was not considered a wise step by *The Nation*. In an editorial, it wrote: 'with these wholesale arrests and sentences has gone no charge

11. *The Nation*, January 18, 1922, p. 80.

12. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 27, 1921.

13. *New York Times*, November 22, 1921.

14. *The New Republic*, January 14, 1922.

15. *New York Times*, January 14, 1922.

that the victims advocated violence. The English are taking strange methods to secure the peace of India or an enthusiastic welcome to the Prince of Wales, and he at least ought to be a good enough sport to know it. To imprison men for peaceful non-cooperation is to invite violence. Perhaps the British *raj* thinks it would be easier to deal with that than with Gandhi's tactics.¹⁶ *The Nation* once again deplored the paucity and distortion of the news from India. It observed: 'once more we deplore the lack of an American news service in India. We are obliged to depend for news of tremendous import upon fragmentary and biased semi-official British dispatches.'¹⁷ The same paper wrote about the rigid censorship applied by the British controlled agencies. 'Most of the British correspondents say that the boycott was a failure. . . . Other British dispatches declare that on the first day the streets were deserted and in the same paragraph in which they call the *hartal* (general strike) a failure, they admit that 3,500 arrests were made in Calcutta alone, probably in order to ensure popular enthusiasm for the Prince.'¹⁸

The Khilafat movement gave anxious moments to the British Government. Lord Reading sent a telegram to His Majesty's Government. E.S. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, published the telegram without aouthorization and during the absence of Lloyd George. It cost Montagu his official position. The text of telegram ran as follows: 'On the eve of the Greek-Turk conference, we feel that it is our duty again to lay before your Majesty's Government the intensity of feeling in India regarding the necessity for a revision of the Sevres Treaty between Turkey and the Allies.

'The Government of India is fully conscious of the complexity of this problem, but India's record in the War, in which Indian Moslem soldiers participated in such great numbers, and the support which the Indian Moslem cause has received in the entire nation, entitle her claims to the completest fulfilment and justify her reasonable aspirations.

'The Government of India particularly emphasizes the necessity of guaranteeing the neutrality of the Dardanelles and the security of its non-Moslem peoples. It also urges evacuation of Constantinople,

16. *Nation*, January 14, 1922.

17. *Ibid.*, January 11, 1922.

18 *Ibid.*

sovereignty of the Sultan over holy places, restoration of the Turks in Thrace, also in Adrianople and Smyrna. The Government urges that these points are of supreme importance to India.¹⁹

The publication of this telegram and the resignation of Montagu evoked interest in the American press, which was critical of the Muslim attitude. The *New York Times* wrote, 'conditions in India are serious.'²⁰ It supported the stand taken by Lloyd George and opposed the Khilafat movement for the revision of the Treaty of Sevres. It further wrote that the revision of the Treaty was a matter of European politics. It was of the opinion that the question could not be settled by any single power. It wrote: 'The Moslems of India are only twenty percent of the population of India, and more than a hundred million people in the British Empire--and the dominant hundred million at that--are outside of India. If the British Government should change its whole Near Eastern policy at the behest of the Indian Moslems, it would give an object lesson of the power of organized minorities such as even the American Anti-saloon League has never accomplished.'²¹

Many other American papers were hostile to the demands of Indian the Muslims. *The Independent and the Weekly Review* wrote: 'There is no such thing as an Indian nation, and only the strong hand of the British *raj* has kept the Mohammedans from the throats of the Hindus whom they loathe. Now the agitators have patched up a temporary truce between these traditional enemies and reflex of this is seen in the demand of Mohammedans for the revision of the Treaty of Sevres and a restoration of power and territory of the Sultan as Caliph.

'A liberal and enlightened world, accustomed to the slogans of democracy, shrinks from the application of force to dependent people, but here is a choice between that appalling anarchy and chaos. England must pay for the concessions mistakenly made to maudlin sentimentalism.'²²

The story of the resignation of Montagu was ignored by the American press of the west and the south. It was not an exciting news for them. Very few American papers followed the thread of Indian politics.

19. *The New York Times Current History Magazine*, April, 1922.

20. *New York Times*, March 10, 1922.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

The majority of American readers did not like the link of the resignation of Montagu with the Khilafat question. However, the American papers of East Coast were critical of India. The American had been told that the Hindus and Muslims were at daggers drawn. Naturally, then, the Americans were surprised to see common cause made by the Hindus and Muslims with regard to the Khilafat. A few Americans were of the opinion that Gandhi was responsible for the Khilafat issue and that he did not represent the masses. He used this problem to stir up agitation against the British Government. The *New York Herald* summed up thus: 'The appeal bears the mark of another effort of that shrewd revolutionary and disturber to harass Great Britain further by involving her in serious religious and international complications.'²³ Other American newspapers believed that when the Khilafat question would be settled, there would remain nothing to keep the two communities together. But optimistic observer Bernard Houghton wrote: 'It is no longer possible to govern India on the principle of *divide et impera*, to play off Mohammedan against Hindu.'²⁴ The *New York Times* also shared this view and observed, 'Indian Moslem agitation now has, on the whole, purely Indian objectives, even though it may employ purely Moslem means of propaganda.'²⁵

The *Time* saw an excellent opportunity in the resignation of Montagu to sever his connection with the Government. According to this paper, England was heading to troubled times with regard to India. The *Time* reached the conclusion that Britain seemed determined to abandon the policy of compromise which Montagu and Reading had tried to carry out. The appointment of Lord Derby, a Conservative, in place of Montagu, looked as if the Government was preparing for a showdown. 'It looked as if Britain were getting ready to use the strong hand, and Mr. Montagu is likely to congratulate himself in the next few months at having left while the leaving was good.'²⁶ The *Time* was inclined to the opinions of Conservatives and wrote: 'Students of the Near East have felt for two or three years past that he was a dangerous influence on British policy in the Levant, for he has always acted

23. *New York Herald*, March 10, 1922.

24. Houghton, Bernard, 'Reforms in India', *Political Science Quarterly*, December 1920, p. 552.

25. *New York Times*, March 10, 1922.

26. *Ibid.*, March 11, 1922.

as if he considered Indian Moslem opinion the one and only decisive factor.²⁷

The American press wrote frequently on Gandhi's personality, his life and his career. American journals commented on his Non-Cooperation Movement and his philosophy of *satyagraha*. His saintly life impressed the people of America. They knew that he was exercising a tremendous influence on the Indian people. They considered him an enemy of the British *raj*. *The American Review of Reviews* wrote: 'Persons in power should be very careful how they deal with a man who cares nothing for sensual pleasure, nothing for riches, nothing for comfort or praise or promotion, but is simply determined to do what he believes to be right. He is a dangerous and uncomfortable enemy because his body, which you can always conquer, gives you so little purchase upon his soul.'²⁸ This was the trend of American public opinion during the period of the Non-Cooperation Movement. Such views were not evoked out of undue criticism but were the natural outcome of the personality of Gandhi, such as the Americans had never witnessed. Biographical notes of the 'Leader of India' appeared in the press. 'Soft dark eyes, a small frail man, with a thin face and rather large protruding eyes, his head covered with a little white cap, his body clothed in coarse white cloth, barefooted. He sleeps on the floor, sleeps very little and works incessantly. His body does not seem to count at all. His expression proclaims 'infinite patience and infinite love.' W.W. Pearson, who met him in South Africa, instinctively thought of St. Francis of Assisi. There is an almost childlike simplicity about him. His manner is gentle and courteous even when dealing with adversaries and unassuming to the point of sometimes seeming almost timid, hesitant, in making an assertion. Yet you feel his indomitable spirit. He makes no promises and never tries to hide a mistake. Nor is he afraid to admit having been in the wrong. Diplomacy is unknown to him; he shuns oratorical effect or, rather, never thinks about it, and he shrinks unconsciously from the great popular demonstrations organized in his honor. Literally 'ill with the multitude that adores him' he distrusts majorities, fears 'mobocracy' and the unbridled passions of the populace. He feels at ease only in a minority and is happiest when, in meditative solitude, he can listen to the "still small voice"

27. *Ibid.*

28. *The American Review of Reviews*, March 1921, p. 316.

within.²⁹ The quotation cited was written by a French thinker and writer Romain Rolland. He wrote articles about Gandhi, published in *The Century Magazine*. It is a sober appraisal of Gandhi's personality. He wrote about Gandhi that he was religious by nature and his doctrine was essentially religious. He said, 'Most religious men I have met are politicians in disguise. I, however, who wear the guise of a politician, am at heart a religious man.'³⁰ The American people admired Gandhi's personality; yet it was difficult for them to accept his philosophy, particularly his views on the modern mechanised civilization. So the American people could not subscribe to his doctrines. The American press did not comment on Gandhi's ideas about modern civilization but wrote many articles about his personality and his sincerity of purpose. However, the *Christian Science Monitor* wrote on Gandhi's views on modern civilization. It observed: 'Mr. Gandhi, in spite of all his well-known qualities of statesmanship which have earned for him high regard in Great Britain as well as in India, has stood revealed more and more, during the past few months, as the embodiment of reaction, in the simplest meaning of that word. Mr. Gandhi sees in the ways and methods of western civilization, in the railways, the telegraph, and the modern industrial system, nothing but the ruin of India.'³¹ But for such stray remarks, the American press consistently paid him warm tribute in appraisal of his personality. The *New York Times* wrote: 'Concerning Gandhi, however, not even the British are able to cast the slightest aspersion on the high sincerity of the man.'³² The *New York Times Current History Magazine* observed: 'There are plenty of people in India who want to fight and the simple truth is that it is Gandhi's great doctrine of non-violence and his miraculous personal power which hold their hands from bomb and bullet. Even the extreme revolutionaries are waiting to see if the greatest experiment ever tried can possibly succeed.'³³ The *Nation* voiced almost the same feeling of respect to Gandhi: 'In an age men call cynical materialistic and disillusioned, the national hero and leader of India is a saint whose singular devotion, unselfishness and spiritual power have won him the

29. Romain, Rolland, 'Mahatma Gandhi', *The Century Magazine*, CVII, December, 1923, p. 163.

30. *The Literary Digest*, April 2, 1921, p. 40.

31. *Christian Science Monitor*, July 7, 1921.

32. *New York Times*, July 10, 1921.

33. *The New York Times Current History Magazine*, June 1922. p. 440.

almost superstitious reverence of his own people and the respect of the most sceptical critics. At a time when the western world is unable to think of concerted resistance in other terms than those of war, Gandhi has been able to persuade the organised Indian national movement to use non-cooperation as its weapon. The freedom of India, he realizes, may have to spring from the blood of her heroes, but he pleads, 'let it be said by coming generation that the only blood shed was our own.' 'Not only violence of deed but of thought is a spiritual weakness. The brave man will renounce hate even of the oppressor.'³⁴ *The Nation* and *The New Republic* quoted extensively from his writings and speeches expounding his doctrines.

The American press concluded that Gandhi had created a revolution in India. He had strong hold on the Hindus as well as on the Muslims. In this connection, the *New York Times* wrote, 'The Mohammedans attached themselves to a powerful figure who had arisen outside the ranks of Mohammedanism. The figure was that of Gandhi....With Gandhi stand two Mohammedan leaders, Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, huge, bluff men.....They are a strange trio, this tiny, frugal Hindu vegetarian and pacifist and the two enormous Mohammedan meat-eaters and warriors. Were the British not too busily occupied with far more serious matters, they might conceivably permit Mohammedans looming beside Gandhi.'³⁵ Various writers accepted Gandhi's influence on the people of India. P.O. Shasnain wrote: 'He has actual political power, the power given him by over a hundred million followers.' He continued, '...Bullets, bayonets, artillery, aeroplanes, bombs, are useless against the man who is teaching all India to despise death, even to die loving the slayer. For Gandhi insists that his followers shall not harm the British, no matter what evil they do. He treats the British as if they were children playing with a force they know not of.'³⁶ Clair Price in 'Gandhi and British India', which was published in the *New York Times*, wrote: 'The Government of India in its own country is the most powerful government in the world. It has met and overcome many an obstacle in one way or another, but today it is up against an obstacle of a sort which is brand new in its experience. It is up

34. *The Nation*, CXIII, September 14, 1921, p. 282.

35. *New York Times*, July 10, 1921.

36. Shasnain, P.O., 'Hind Swaraj', *The Catholic World*, July 1922, p. 498.

against M.K. Gandhi, a dark little wisp of a man who looks as if he could be picked up in one's arm and carried off like a child. In point of personal following he is far and away the greatest man living in the world today....He is a philosophic anarchist, a new Tolstoy without Tolstoy's past. He specialized in reducing his wants. He has fasted so long and so often that he physically is a mere shadow of a man. He is an idea living for a movement in a frail and brittle body.³⁷ W.H. Roberts observed: 'He preached a gospel even more amazing than his personality. It was a message of renewed self-respect and regenerated manhood, of freedom and a future of spiritual glory for India. Not by warfare was this to be won. Indeed freedom so won would not be worth the cost. Real freedom could come only from moral regeneration,'³⁸ W.W. Pearson wrote, 'It is not because he stands for a definite policy in regard to the British *Raj*, but because he is a saint, a man of austere and ascetic life who follows truth at whatever cost to himself. Not even his worst enemy has ever doubted Gandhi's sincerity.'³⁹ Bernard Sexton described Gandhi as a 'morning star of India.' He added: '...The man through whose leadership these things have come to pass is evidently one of the great characters of history, one of those 'pale thinkers' whom Emerson describes as being let loose on the planet now and then for its purification.'⁴⁰

However, some American writers were carrying anti-Indian propaganda. They considered Gandhi a danger to modern civilization. Gandhi's main critic was Maurice Joachim. He was a member of the Indian civil service. He came to America to put his views before the American public. He wrote, 'Popular support for a new fad is not an uncommon thing in India. There has always been an undercurrent of ruthless criminality in the Indian masses. This is kept under control in normal times, but Gandhi's doctrines have brought it to the surface and he has received a ready response because the majority of Indians experience

37. Price, Clair, 'Gandhi and British India', *New York Times*, July 10, 1921.

38. Roberts, W.H., 'A Review of Gandhi's Movement in India', *Political Science Quarterly*, June 1923, p. 230.

39. Pearson, W.W., 'Gandhi - An Indian Saint', *The New Republic*, July 27, 1921, p. 240.

40. Sexton, Bernard, 'Gandhi's Weaponless Revolt in India', *The New York Times Current History Magazine*, February, 1922, p. 745.

an abnormal pleasurable excitement in defying law, provided they are in a crowd.⁴¹ He asserted that the Hindu-Muslim unity which Gandhi has brought about would be shortlived. His passive tolerance, his pose as a martyr, his methods of life, his clothes, his food were means to an end. Joachim wanted the American people to know that Gandhi was obsessed by a sense of self-importance. He considered him a hypocrite. He wrote, 'He thrives in this age of cheap notoriety because political reputation (often depend upon the persistence and vehemence with which the catch phrases and the popular) cries of the movement are reiterated.'⁴² Barker expressed almost the same views. He said, 'England's difficulties, however, have by no means ended. Numerous agitators continue making mischief and deluding the masses. Among these Mr. Gandhi is by far the most prominent.'⁴³

But by and large the American people were impressed by Gandhi and liberal American press commented on him favourably. American press gave variety of comments on his Non-Cooperation Movement. Different opinions, both favourable and unfavourable about the Non-Cooperation were expressed by American correspondents and columnists. The comments were on different aspects of the movement like his influence on the masses; the efficacy of the non-violent technique; its achievements and about the leader of the movement. The majority of the comments were not favourable. Only liberal press of America had sympathy with Indian struggle. On the other hand, pro-British journals, commented differently. They wrote that Gandhi's movement was reactionary and against modern civilization. Indians were well off under British rule and Gandhi's movement was doomed to failure. They misrepresented the facts and some time contradicted them. Maurice Joachim was most critical. He always referred to India as 'my country'. In his article entitled 'What is Wrong with India' he opend that Gandhi's demands were impractical. He criticized Gandhi's call to use homespun clothes and boycott foreign clothes. He wrote, 'I do not know whether he (Gandhi) has taken into consideration the teeming millions numbering, according to the latest census, nearly 325,000,000—85 percent of whom

41. Joachim, Maurice, 'What is Wornng with India', *The New York Times Current History Magazine*, July 1922, p. 649.

42. *Ibid.*,

43. Barker, J. Ellis, 'Giving India Self-government', *ibid.*, May 1921, p. 233.

are engaged in agricultural pursuits. These agriculturists work between twelve and sixteen hours a day, and I would like to know where they are going to find the time to weave the cloth.⁴⁴ He also wrote about the inability of Indians to defend themselves from foreign attack. He observed, 'over most of India, the climate, for considerable part of the year, is not conducive to the human energy. The excessive temperature is inimical to sustain either physical or mental effort.'⁴⁵ He contradicted himself in another article. where he wrote, 'Assuredly the Indian agriculturists, who comprise 85 percent of population, are very poor, but their poverty does not make them discontented with their lot. It is not commonly appreciated that the agriculturalist's indigence is very largely accounted for by the fact that he does so little work, and what is more that he does not need to do more.'⁴⁶ He went on to say that the Indian peasant did not need to build a house, though he had observed that the exposure to winter caused many deaths. He summed up his article thus : 'These cultivators do not even realize that they are under the protection of the Union Jack, and the Government never interferes with them, but allows them to pursue the even tenor of their ways. Thousands of them have never seen a white man. Ninety percent, or about that proportion, have never heard of the name of Gandhi who, as is not known in the west, recruits most of his followers from the student class of India.'⁴⁷

A small section of the American press took lively interest in Indian politics. *The New Republic* gave favourable comments on Gandhi and his movement. It wrote, 'when Mr. Gandhi calls on his followers to renounce the social order which the British raj has imposed on India, to give up titles and offices, to refrain from courts, to withdraw their children from Government schools, and above all to abstain from violence, to hold every English life and the life of every officer serving the Government as sacred as those of our own dear ones, he is following more closely the methods of Jesus than any leader since Saint Francis.'⁴⁸ *The Nation* predicted, 'But even now it is possible to say that British or rather western imperialism is doomed. We are witnessing one of

45. Ibid.

46. Joachim, Maurice, 'America's Attitude Towards India', *ibid.*, September, 1922, p. 1031.

47. Ibid.

48. *The New Republic*, July 27, 1921, p. 232.

the great historic movement of our time in the awakening of Asia.⁴⁹ It further commented that the struggle of the oppressed Indians deserved the sympathetic understanding of every man who desired a new birth of freedom in every land. It further wrote: 'but if the triumph of India should mean the triumph of spirit and method of Gandhi, then indeed would a new day dawn for all mankind. For war would be shown to be as unnecessary for winning the outer semblance of freedom as it is destructive to the realization of its inner spirit.'⁵⁰ *The New York Times History Magazine* observed that the first two programmes of Gandhi — refusal to accept titles or honours and refusal to attend Government schools—were successful, but next two programmes — refusal to serve in the police or the Indian army and refusal to pay taxes, failed. It wrote: 'What cares Gandhi — this dark little wisp of a man, who lives like a Hindu monk and fanatically believes that India can be saved only by a return to the teachings of ancient Vedas and to a primitive state of society — for the public renunciation of his movement by Indians of lofty intellectual rank such as Rabindranath Tagore ? England, the national enemy, must be dispossessed. And so powerful is Gandhi that Government of India is afraid to arrest him, and Gandhi and the people of India know that Government is afraid to arrest him.'⁵¹

The Government of India was tightening the repression everyday, and made it difficult for the people to give up the notion of violence. The Indian people were not used to non-violence against repression. It was easier for the Government of India to suppress violence rather than non-violence. Bernard Houghton wrote, 'The chief form that this agitation took was Satyagraha or passive resistance... There was in it nothing seditious, nothing dangerous to public order. But officialdom saw danger where there was no danger.'⁵² *The Nation* hoped that he would succeed: 'At least, if Gandhi succeeds in spite of all obstacles and in the face of the growing desire of many Indians to use violence, it will mean that mankind has at least found a way to resist oppression without resorting to war. The peace of the world depends upon the

49. *The Nation*, September 14, 1921, p. 282.

50. *Ibid.*

51. *The New York Times Current History Magazine*, October 1921, p. 178.

52. Houghton Bernard, 'Reforms in India', *Political Science Quarterly*, XXXV.

perfection of some method of non-violent resistance to imperialism.⁵³ *The Literary Digest* saw new method in the movement and wrote: 'Non-cooperation, a negative word describing the most powerful resistance ever offered to British rule in India, has perhaps puzzled the outside world about the movement led by Mr. Gandhi, who is described by some opponents as a combination of a religious mystic and anarchic agitator.'⁵⁴

Many articles were written on Non-Cooperation Movement in America. Those papers who were neither anti nor pro towards India or England, refrained from expressing any opinion and gave only an outline of the movement, because they lacked first hand information. There were very few Americans who had witnessed the movement from close quarters. Gertrude Emerson was one of them. She visited India at the time of Non-Cooperation Movement. She met people of all shades of opinion. She wrote a series of articles for *Asia*. According to her, the boycott of courts was successful but the administration was not paralysed. With regard to election, only twenty percent of the total number exercised the franchise. She wrote: 'Instead of wrecking the electoral machine, the non-cooperators merely succeeded in excluding themselves from a position where they might have made their influence directly felt in the administration of the Government. As it is, Liberals rather than Extremists, have, held the legislative posts and have been able to contribute valuable work to the first year of the new system.'⁵⁵ Normally the news from India was inadequate for the people of America to form a picture of the Indian political situation. Lothrop Stoddard was aware of the Indian situation. He wrote: 'Not only are the most fundamental interests of the British Empire and Asia at stake, but every quarter of the globe, including America, will feel the result. India is far away. Nevertheless, the spark of Serajevo proved once and for all how small and close-knit is the modern world.'⁵⁶ To Bernard Sexton, the Non-Cooperation Movement was the mass movement of all India. He wrote that it was a determination to return to the Aryan Way. He wrote: '..... those Aryans who are our own cousins and whose speech we still carry into daily life. In India today

53. *The Nation*, November 16, 1921, p. 557.

54. *The Literary Digest*, LXX, July 30, 1921, p. 19.

55. Emerson, Gertrude, 'Non-violent Non-Cooperation in India,' *Asia*, XXII, August 1922, p. 607.

56. Stoddard, Lothrop, 'The Problem of India', *The Century Magazine*, CI, February, 1921, p. 492.

they cry in different words the same slogan that was used by our ancestors — the words that fired the English at Runnymede, the American at Bunker Hill. It is an ancient word, a word that has ever stirred the Aryan blood — the word Freedom.⁵⁷ J.Z.Hodge saw in Indian national awakening a hopeful future. He observed, 'without observation but not without significance, the miracle has been wrought and this ancient people after centuries of internal division and political childhood rises to the dignity of national self-consciousness. The "white man's burden" reverts back to the shoulders of the "Aryan brown". He further wrote: 'The emergence of India in the arena of world politics is an event we dare not ignore. There is challenge as well as appeal in the new call of the East.'⁵⁸

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A very small section of the American press formed a critical view. The *Christian Science Monitor* believed that the Non-Cooperation movement was a failure. This paper declared: 'The Non-Cooperation Movement inaugurated by Gandhi, the well-known Indian leader, last summer, a campaign which sought to bring the Anglo-Indian Government of India to a standstill by the simple refusal of all Indians, Mohammedan or Hindu, to take part in it, has proved a failure.'⁵⁹ The paper further commented on election: 'but if the recent general election, the first to be held under the new Government of India Act, proved that the extremist elements are by no means in control in India, but that on the contrary there is a strong disposition to give the new Act a fair trial and to endeavor to make it a success.'⁶⁰ This paper claimed to be well-informed about Indian affairs but failed to see that a few people could always be found to cooperate with the government. The paper wrote this when the movement had gained strength. 'There is, however, this to be said of it that its collapse may be as rapid as its rise.'⁶¹ A few months later the same daily wrote: 'It is wishful thinking that the movement has failed.' It observed: 'The elections to the new councils proved an unqualified success, while little or no response was made by the educated classes to Mr. Gandhi's general

57. Sexton, Bernard, 'Gandhi's Weaponless Revolt in India,' *The New York Times Current History Magazine*, XV, February, 1921, p. 752.

58. Hodge, J.Z., 'The United States of India,' *The North American Review*, CCXIV, October, 1921, p. 450.

59. *Christian Science Monitor*, January 21, 1921.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*, August 26, 1921.

appeal for Non-Cooperation.⁶² After three months it came to conclusion: 'The situation in the country, generally speaking, although difficult, is not unduly serious. Mr. Gandhi has failed so far, in practically everything he has attempted, and there is no reason to suppose that he will succeed any better in the future.

'In spite of all that may be said to the contrary, time is working steadily on the side of law and order; the simple justice of the Government of India Act is wearing down opposition, whilst aiding every movement towards better things is the far-reaching statesmanship of the Governor-General.⁶³ The *Monitor* gave those reasons which could not be considered sympathetic to India. It wrote, 'The most baffling feature of the whole movement is the designedly intangible objectives which are set before the people, the avenging of the Punjab massacres, the revision of the Treaty of Sevres and granting of full Swaraj.'⁶⁴

The caste system in India is a serious problem to the working of democracy. The *Monitor* wrote: 'The one obstacle between India and the full realization of her hopes of self-government is caste. A freely elected Parliament in India today would simply mean a Brahmin Parliament and nothing else.'⁶⁵

J.J.Sunderland commented thus on the role of caste in Indian politics: 'The British offer many reasons for their claim that Indian people cannot rule themselves and therefore, the British must stay. One of these is the existence of caste. But why should caste prevent self-rule? Caste is not a political institution. It has nothing to do with politics or government. It is solely social and religious. In political and governmental matters all castes work together.'⁶⁶ The *Monitor* considered the movement a failure and concluded that it had lost its political character: 'More and more, as the months go by, it is coming to be seen that the Non-Cooperation Movement in India is rapidly losing its political character. As a matter of fact, it never was a true political movement, and never depended for its success upon the political ability of its advocates.'⁶⁷

62. *Ibid.*, November 15, 1921.

63. *Christian Science Monitor*, November 15, 1921.

64. *Ibid.*, August 26, 1921.

65. *Ibid.*, July 29, 1921.

66. Sunderland, J.J., *India in Bondage*, New York, 1930, p. 13.

67. *Christian Science Monitor*, August 26, 1921.

The New York Times Current History Magazine was of the opinion that the movement had proved a failure. This view was expressed at the time, when the movement was gaining strength. It wrote: 'The situation in India continues to present an aspect far from assuring to the British Government, despite the fact the Non-Cooperation Movement launched by Mr. Gandhi, the Indian nationalist leader, had by no means met with the success which its sponsors had expected.'⁶⁸ This journal wrote that movement intensified anti-British feeling in India. It also felt that Gandhi made a critical mistake in applying this movement to the colleges.⁶⁹ It considered Gandhi's programme impractical.

Well-known Americans also commented in the press on Non-Cooperation and the political situation in India. J. Ellis Barker, in an article entitled "Giving India Self-government" wrote, 'The carrying out of the Gandhi programme would lead to complete chaos in India, as the British established law courts, schools etc., cannot be replaced by native institutions.'⁷⁰ Barker believed that the Gandhi's programme would involve India's reversion to barbarism. Maurice Joachim opined: 'In spite of the popularization of Gandhi's antediluvian economics, a spirit of moral courage and logical thinking still survives among the people of India. Gandhi's economics, like his politics, are being thoroughly discredited, and doubting souls are troubled over the actual form of Government that they will have if Swaraj ever materializes'.⁷¹ In another article 'What is Wrong with India', Joachim strongly criticised the Non-Cooperation Movement. He tried to prove that Hindu-Muslim unity during the movement was 'a sham, a mockery'. He asked, 'will Gandhi be prepared to answer before the altar of the world's judgement when, after a few years of his attempt at government, he gazes on the ruins of a shattered India and sees how the work of centuries has been destroyed.'⁷² Joachim was regular contributor to the press. He indulged in anti-India propaganda, and laboured hard to influence

68. *The New York Times Current History Magazine*, January 1921, p. 93.

69. *The Weekly Review*, September 3, 1921, p. 203.

70. Barker, J. Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 233

71. Joachim, Maurice, 'India Turns Away from Gandhi', *The New York Times Current History Magazine*, December, 1922, p. 472.

72 *Ibid.*, July 1922, p. 645.

American public opinion. He told the Americans: 'Unhesitatingly I make this statement — Americans, beware! Do not lend an atom of support to Gandhism which is nothing more nor less than the most formidable enemy of western culture and a cleverly devised conspiracy against the progress of civilization.

'The American who is cooperating in the movement for the promotion of self-government in India, or in other words, who is helping India to attain the "Swaraj" of the Nationalists led by Mohandas K. Gandhi, is slowly but surely paving the way to make his brother American a pariah in the East; is unconsciously helping to drive out every American from India; is aiding and abetting the abolishment of American enterprise in the East; is contributing his time and money to uproot and disrupt all the good work that American missionaries, the American Salvation Army and the American YMCA have performed after years and years of self-sacrifice; in short, is cooperating in a movement to turn back the clock of civilization.'⁷³ He made it clear to his readers that when he left India ('My Country') he left behind his politics which was in no way connected with administration of the government. He wrote that he was neither pro-British nor pro-Gandhi. Another writer, P.W. Wilson made an apology for British rule. He wrote, 'You will seldom or ever find a missionary — not an American missionary — who would wish to see India, here and now, committed to the sole rule of Indians what the missionary fears in the national movement is its conservation.'⁷⁴ W.H. Roberts observed: 'As the idealism of Gandhi's message suffered from its connection with the political agitation, so the political movement was weakened by a lack of contact with the prosaic, everyday realities of Indian need. The movement was negative in name and character. Its emphasis was upon destruction and it lacked either sharply defined aims or constructive programme.'⁷⁵ James W. Warner in his article, 'The Problems of India' admitted that Gandhi was a "practical idealist". Commenting on the movement he wrote: 'Some of his proposals for the destruction of British power, such as the boycott of the courts, were childish, while others like the withdrawal of the children from government - supported schools.... were suicidal.'⁷⁶

73. Joachim, Maurice, 'America's Attitude Towards India's Revolt', *ibid.*, September 1922, p. 1031.

74. Wilson, W.W., 'The Unrest in India', *The World's Work*, March 1922, p. 549.

75. Roberts, W.H., 'A Review of the Gandhi Movement in India', *Political Science Quarterly*, June 1923, p. 243.

76. *Harper's Magazine*, October 1923, p. 645.

The press and people of America were handicapped in estimating the political activities in India due to lack of unbiased news from India. The *New York Times* wrote: 'Little news gets out of India. The censorship is doing its work thoroughly. But occasional correspondence appears in English newspapers to yield hints of what is going on under the stricter Government policy since the arrest and imprisonment of Gandhi.'⁷⁷ Americans who visited India used lecture platforms. Professor Claude Van Tyne of the University of Michigan, after visiting India, was optimistic about the situation. He delivered a lecture at Williamston, Massachusetts. He said: 'The British will work out some solution of their problems England may have come too slowly to her present policy towards India, but those who know the truth will not chide her for the way in which she has done things there since her policy was once determined.'⁷⁸ Booth Tucker, who was Salvation Army Commissioner in India, told the audience at the Hotel Algonquin in New York that Gandhi would fail in his attempt to drive the British out of India. He said, 'Gandhi's policy of passive resistance, civil disobedience or Non-cooperation, as it has been variously designated, is not as thoroughly successful as is generally believed.'⁷⁹ Philo M. Buck, an Exchange Professor at Baroda College wrote: '..... But, I may gather evidence during a very few weeks sojourn in upper India through more or less intimate talks with people in the streets and villages, that Gandhi's influence may be described as on the wane. There are very few Gandhi caps now seen even in Allahabad which was once almost the centre of the movement.'⁸⁰ Gertrude Emerson made the closest study of the political condition of India. In India she travelled widely and met a variety of people. On her return to America, she wrote articles on India which were published in *Asia*. Her articles showed an honest effort to appraise the movement objectively. Her opinion was that Gandhi had done his work and made India self-conscious. Gandhi gave self-respect to India. She wrote: 'His programme has been characterised by many negative features, in some respects it has worked disaster, the reverberating influence of which is still to be

.77. *New York Times*, June 11, 1922.

78. *Ibid.*, August 20, 1922.

79. *Ibid.*, October 2, 1921.

80. Buck, Philo M., 'The Ferment in India,' *The Independent and the Weekly Review*, November 11, 1922, p. 264.

calculated and paid for'.⁸¹ The views of Evelyn Roy were different on the Non-Cooperation Movement. She told the American people that Gandhi's philosophy was 'reactionary and medieval'. She wrote, that Gandhi's movement was to strengthen mill-owners and to extract more concession from the British to develop their industries. She thought that the masses were only tools in the hands of Gandhi. Gandhi exploited ignorance and backwardness of the Indian people to support the upper classes of the Indian society. She wrote: 'the boycott of foreign cloth constituted the most important clause of the non-cooperation programme, not only because it coincided with Gandhi's reactionay social philosophy that decried the advent of modern civilization and preached the cult of the spinning-wheel and homespun, but because the backbone of the non-cooperation movement, founded upon sacrifice, suffering and soul-force, was the native mill-owner whose competition to Lancashire products was immensely stimulated by the preaching of the doctrine of boycott of foreign cloth and the wearing of swadeshi (home manufactured goods). It was the mill-owners of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras who financed the Non-Cooperation Movement who, together with the landlords of India, represent the rising bourgeoisie which insistently claims for itself a place in the sun.'⁸² Miss Roy further wrote that Gandhi's activities were controlled by the Indian capitalists. In 1921-22 the Congress raised a fund of ten million rupees. The money was largely donated by the capitalists of India. She wrote: '.....this fund largely on paper, constituted the string which controlled the activities and dictated the tactics of Mahatmaji in critical moments; it lay behind his address of the hooligans of Bombay and Madras, it lay beneath his exhortation "not to make political use of the factory workers", it constituted the real reason of his failure to declare mass civil disobedience and non-payment of taxes, and for his insistence on the tactics of non-violence and respect for law, order and private property.'⁸³

The section of American press, which took passing interest in Indian politics, was influenced by incidents as the Moplah revolt, the riots at Bombay, the Chowri-Chawra incident, results of the general election of legislatures and the arrest of Gandhi. It found it difficult to apprise

81. Emerson, Gertrude, *op. cit.*, p. 609.

82. Roy, Evelyn, 'Gandhi, Revolutionary Metic,' *The Living Age*, October 20, 1923, p. 110.

83. Roy, Evelyn, *op. cit.*

the American people of the real situation due to lack of unbiased views. The *New York Times* observed: 'Mr. Gandhi makes no appeal to violence; in fact he distinctly preaches against it; but it is clear that his ideas have an explosive power and will have to be handled carefully.'⁸⁴ The *Christian Science Monitor* wrote 'that the great spread of violence during the past few months has aroused him to a recognition that his movement is getting out of hand, but he still fails to see the reason why. He still fails to see that the great mass of the people to whom he makes his appeal is entirely unable to appreciate the philosophic position which he takes up, whilst for every moderate which Lord Reading wins to his side, a restraining influence is withdrawn from the Non-Cooperation Movement.'⁸⁵ The *Baltimore Sun* observed: 'The passive resistance which brought fame to Gandhi appears to have become unsatisfactory to certain elements in India. They have sought to emulate most of the other restless portions of the earth by taking fire and blood for their arguments.'⁸⁶ The *New York Herald* was of the opinion that: '..... it is possible that Gandhi's appeal for order will be heeded. His influence in India is extra ordinary and is potent regardless of caste or religion. He is looked on as a saint, even as a divine . Yet when a mob has drawn blood even the most respected leaders may be ignored when they urge a return to peaceful methods. Passion and fear of retribution unite to put the frenzied men beyond control. Gandhi may have started some thing he cannot stop.'⁸⁷ The *Christian Science Monitor* again wrote: 'Again and again, during the past eighteen months, it has been pointed out in this paper that whilst it might be possible for Mr. Gandhi and his immediate followers to adopt an attitude of "passive suffering" and to avoid anything in the nature of violence, the great mass of the Indian peasantry to which he made his most forcible appeal could not be trusted to exercise any such restraint'. The paper summed up, 'on the whole there can be little doubt that the riots and outrages which were deliberately made to synchronise with the arrival of the Prince of Wales in Bombay will have the effect of clearing the political air to remarkable extent.

84. *New York Times*, January 9, 1921.

85. *Christian Science Monitor* , July 7, 1921.

86. *Baltimore Sun*, August, 28, 1921.

87. *New York Herald* , November 22, 1921.

It cannot fail to arouse vast number of people in India to realize the will-o' the-wisp they are following and the extent to which they are in danger of casting away the substance for the shadow.⁸⁸ The *New York Herald* once again vehemently remarked, 'while he has preached non-resistance the blood of thousands lies at his door. To his activities are due beyond any question most of the thirty-five outbreaks in India in the last year. To his incitement must be credited the recent barbarous murder of twenty-one native policemen at Chowri Chawra in the United Provinces. The Mohammedan malcontents who brought about the disastrous clash at Moplah say that Gandhi should bear chief responsibility of the deaths resulted.... That his campaign of non-resistance and non-cooperation has stirred India as has nothing since the sepoy mutiny is evident. What may be the end of it all is not now by any means clear, but whatever the result, it will be impossible for Gandhi to escape responsibility for a movement seriously menacing the peace of the world.'⁸⁹

The news of Gandhi's arrest did not attract much attention in the American press. But the liberal American press was bound to take note of this event. *The New Republic* and *The Nation* came out with sharp criticism and condemned the British government. *The Nation* wrote: 'when an ally government arrests a national hero who, as its apologists admit, is the most saintly figure in the modern world, no further proof is required that it rests its case on naked force.' The same paper condemned British domination of India and remarked: '... Even so, protagonists of imperialism, England and America, assure us that there was no other course open to the government. However clouded England's title, she and she alone, it is asserted, protects India from external invasion and internal chaos and strife. She has brought justice and modern civilization to a country where they could not exist but for her strong arm. The argument is not convincing. It clearly overstates both the evil conditions prior to the British conquest and the blessings of the British rule. It attributes material progress solely to alien rule rather than to the general march of science which has coincided with the period of British dominance. At best the imperialist case smacks too much of the argument of the burglar who justifies his continued occupation of another man's house by saying: 'I keep order in the household and I keep other burglars out.'

88. *Christian Science Monitor* , November 26, 1921.

89. *New York Herald*, March 12, 1922.

'The Indian are willing to take the risk of doing that themselves. They believe that they can end the economic drain of an alien rule which has multiplied famines, increased illiteracy, and reduced the people of a land which was once a synonym for wealth to the poorest on earth. They are weary of seeing their sons enlisted and their property taken to fight England's wars. They passionately affirm that in losing native government they have not gained good government.'⁹⁰ *The New Republic* wrote, 'It is proverbial that the virtues men most pride themselves on are the virtues they do not possess at all. For generations the British have prided themselves on their genius for governing subject peoples. Perhaps they stammered a bit when they tried to explain Ireland; but, after all, had they exhibited marvellous governing intelligence in India ? We are now given an excellent opportunity to determine the quality of the intelligence. The British paraded the Prince of Wales from end to end of India, in the fond hope that in this age of fallen kings the lands of India would be irrigated with loyal fears. And since this signal mark of British favour did not appear to be appreciated, they have struck out truculently. They have arrested Mahatma Gandhi.'⁹¹ The paper further commented thus on British rule in India: 'The age of conquest is past. Humanity is on the march. There seems no escape from the conclusion that choice before the nations now dominant in the world is terrible but clear. It is a choice between a futile, and in the end fatal attempt to check by force the drive of the people, and a daring resolution to throw open the gates and lead them into freedom.'⁹² A few months after Gandhi's arrest, *The Nation* again expressed the opinion: 'What is certain is that whenever any Government lives by confining as common felons ten thousand of the most idealistic and capable of its subjects, it forfeits its right to the respect of mankind and inflicts a grievous wound on society.'⁹³

From 1922 to 1927, Indian politics was at a low ebb. The Non-Co-operation Movement was withdrawn by Gandhi. Now the Congress played the dominate role in the Councils. The Congress had no con-

90. *The Nation*, C XIV, March 22, 1922, p. 332.

91. *The New Republic*, March 22, 1922.

92. *Ibid.*, March 29, 1922

93. *The Nation*, June 7, 1922, p. 663.

structive programme. In such an atmosphere, the Indian politics also did not evoke interest in America. The Councils' activities of the Congress did not attract much interest in the American press. *The Nation* rightly observed: 'Except in the event of battle, murder or sudden death, India hardly appears on the horizon of American news. Our knowledge of that strange land is a series of shocking incidents — whether of great beauty or great horror. The Black Hole of Calcutta, Amritsar, the Akali trouble, Tagore, Gandhi. Yet significant though seemingly unimportant events are occurring with great rapidity.'⁹⁴

94. *The Nation*, October 1, 1924, p. 332.

AMERICAN REACTION TO THE SIMON COMMISSION

In 1928 the Simon Commission arrived in India. The composition of the Commission was resented by the Indian National Congress and others. No Indian was included in it. The Congress boycotted it and passed a resolution at its Madras Session that 'Whereas Government have appointed the statutory Commission in utter disregard of India's right of self-determination, this Congress resolves that the only self-respecting course for India to adopt is to boycott the Commission at every stage and in every form.'¹ The arrival of the Simon Commission in India and its boycott attracted the American press. All the important American newspapers published the news on their front pages. The notable papers were the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Springfield Daily Republican*, the *Baltimore Sun*, the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Atlanta Constitution*. On the visit of Simon Commission the *New York Times* wrote: 'popular disturbances have attended the arrival in India of the Simon Commission. Hindu communities are proclaiming the day as mourning. It is illustrative of the wrong-headed attitude of this nationalist opposition that Ramsay McDonald was burned in effigy at Bombay along with those of Premier Baldwin, Lord Birkenhead and Sir John Simon. The British Labour Party has been the strongest champion in England of India's claims and rights. But the British Labour Party refuses to see in the make up of the present Commission the injustice and the slight to native susceptibilities which the extremists have discerned. Mr. MacDonald has openly stigmatized this state of mind as an enemy of India.'² The paper failed to understand the Congress's boycott and

1. Sitaramayya, Dr. Pattabhi, *History of the Indian National Congress*, Vol. I, Bombay, p 318
2. *New York Times*, February 6, 1928

wrote : 'Actually, therefore, the contemplated procedure allows greater scope for the expression of native opinions than if the Commission included representatives of India to be 'coerced' or 'cajoled' or otherwise swayed by the British majority. It comes close to being a form of treaty negotiation between the people of Great Britain and India.'³ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* wrote that the boycott of the Commission was a failure, 'some of the reforms instituted under the Montagu scheme proved unsound and unworkable. The attempt to placate native politicians has weakened the whole system upon which the effective government of the country depends. It has encouraged the attitude of hostility revealed by Hindu demonstrations against the Parliamentary Commission on its arrival in Bombay.' The paper further wrote, 'The attempt to boycott the Commission has apparently failed and this is a sign of good omen. There are many Indians who believe that they have a better chance of justice at the hands of a British Commission than at the hands of their own countrymen. If Sir John Simon and his colleagues fulfil expectations, they should be able to do a great service for India.'⁴ The *Christian Science Monitor* also wrote about boycott of the Commission : 'Once more it appears that the situation in British India is not so hopeless as certain recent dispatches would lead one to believe. The way still lies open to peaceable negotiation, progress and reform. The Parliamentary Commission whose work was threatened with delay if not with failure by the attitude of agitators and revolutionaries, has attained a primary success... The Swarajist leaders preached a suspension of all work. When the day arrived for the strike or "hartal" to become effective, it was not universally, nor even generally, observed. The students and agitators, exasperated at the failure of the boycott, attacked those Indians who remained at their work. Order was restored by the police and in some instances by the military.'⁵ The *Living Age* commented on the boycott of the Simon Commission thus : 'The English press have vainly tried to avoid discussing the significance of recent events in India. Although the English censor still prevents our getting a clear picture of what is going on, it is at least clear that anti-imperialist strikes and demonstrations are taking place in all parts of the country. The big cities of India are now in a state of siege. English armoured automobiles circulate

3. *New York Times*, February 6, 1928.

4. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 7, 1928.

5. *Ibid.*, February 9, 1928.

through the streets and English police fire at parading demonstrators who have here and there embarked upon a barricaded warfare with the armed powers of English imperialism.⁶

The first volume of the Simon Commission Report was published on June 10, 1930. It gave background information of Indian people. Savel Zimand rightly remarked, 'The remark hurled at American tourists—that no one can really understand India without a long residence in the country—was entirely forgotten and the British members, without 'preconceived idea,' sailed for Bombay.'⁷ Richard B. Gregg said more or less the same thing. He observed, 'There are in it (the Report) some distortion of emphasis amounting almost to omissions of pertinent facts, but these were probably unintentional. The impression it made upon England and upon the United States was that India presents a problem of tremendous extent and complexity. *The London Spectator* aptly describes it as a 'Book of Difficulties'. The picture of India split into a medley of divided castes, religions, sects, parties and classes was eagerly accepted as true by British opinion. It coincided with prior reports and unconscious British hopes.'⁸

The Report generated some interest in the American press. The *Baltimore Sun* felt that the British approached the Indian political problem with 'a magnificent intelligence.'⁹ Most of the American press agreed with the Report, and came to the conclusion that the task of the institution of self-government in India was difficult and the pace of the reforms should be slow. The *Philadelphia Inquirer* wrote: 'though self-government must be the ultimate ideal, it would be futile to overlook the many difficulties in the way of its realization. Among these are the caste system, the racial and religious animosities, the illiterate character of a large part of the population and the existence side by side of British territory of quasi-independent native states. The criticism of British rule comes mainly from the educated few who are impatient of any delay in establishing their political authority. How far the masses sympathize with these aspirations may be doubted. They may be aroused from their 'pathetic contentment' by movements

6. *The Living Age*, April 1, 1928, p. 584.

7. Zimand, Savel, 'The Empire Dies Hard', *The New Republic*, July 9, 1930, p. 199.

8. Gregg, Richards B., 'The Empire Dies Hard'. *The Nation*, July 9, 1930, p. 36.

9. *Baltimore Sun*, June 11, 1930.

like Gandhi's, but they have no clear idea of the use they would make of greater liberty if they had it. In this fact may be found, perhaps, the real problem of India.'¹⁰ The *Kansas City Star* observed that the Indian nationalists—who were committed to complete independence—argued that the Commission had insulted their country and they were prepared to use the Report as campaign material. The paper wrote, 'If the dissatisfaction proves to be general and is not removed by recommendations embodied in the second volume, the position of the British Government in India will be made increasingly difficult... At a distance the statement of the situation in India, as presented by the Simon Commission, sounds eminently unbiased and reasonable. If the recommendations to Parliament are made in the same spirit, confidence may be placed in the wisdom of the Commission's plan. Unfortunately, conditions may have passed the point where wise counsels will peacefully prevail.'¹¹ According to the *Baltimore Sun* the appearance of the Report was an event of interest and importance. The paper remarked, 'The Report ranges over an immense field, and covers and it presents its pictures with exact and impartial statements. And one must confess that even a cursory knowledge of those facts appalls one by showing the magnitude of England's task and the responsibility in attempting to establish the principle of responsible government, the complexity and vastness of the consequences of India's own quest for freedom... The actual recommendations may disappoint either or both sides, or they may fail of being applicable. But it is impossible to feel after the first half of the report that more than a brilliant and sincere effort is being made to bring satisfactory order out of almost maddening complications.'¹² The *New York Times* had an editorial entitled 'Preliminary Report on India,' in which it wrote : 'Particularly striking is the obvious effort of the Simon Commission to rid itself of English presumptions, and to penetrate beneath the strange and alien surface to a real understanding of the character and aspirations of the native population.... While no positive conclusions are drawn from the data gathered, the whole spirit of this part of the Report is one of anxiety to discover the truth and to set it forth

10. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 11, 1930.

11. *Kansas City Star*, June 11, 1930.

12. *Baltimore Sun*, June 11, 1930..

13. *New York Times*, June 11, 1930.

in all its legitimate implications. If the Independence party in India resents and denounces this factful and appreciative effort to understand the real political problem of India, it shows itself capable of disregarding the interest and advice of sincere and loyal friends.¹³

The *Christian Science Monitor* was sympathetic to British's attitude towards Indian politics. The paper was of the opinion that the methods adopted by the Commission in India was justified because the members of the Commission visited India, spent many months, and took evidence from the members of all the main communities, except nationalists who declined the invitation of the Commission. The paper wrote, 'Meanwhile, however, it is not difficult to read between the lines that the Commission, while aiming at helping forward the development of institutions in India as energetically as possible, finds that progress must necessarily be slow in the interests of law and order, having regard to the still prevailing intensity of racial, religious, tribal and national animosities which the strong hand of the British administration keeps in check at present.'¹⁴ The *New York Herald Tribune* observed and that the Report a was remarkable summary and 'There is a great deal in the volume essential to any real understanding of India. But there is one notable omission. India is discussed dispassionately, at arms's length, as it were, and in the tone of asking nothing save what will be best for her people. Yet it must be obvious that a very real factor in the problem is the repercussion upon Great Britain and British interests of what happens in India. The Report shows how great are the difficulties in the way of granting further self-government to India, It is silent upon the dangers, if any, of not granting further self-government.

'The danger that the city leaders (who would control any independent government) might be imposing tariffs to injure the real interest of the great agricultural population is mentioned. The possibility that an independent government might injure Great Britain with such tariffs is not discussed. Possibly such considerations do not really influence English thought, but the failure even to suggest that they could exist must be irritating to Indian politicians, and to foreign readers it seems a gap in the complete picture.'¹⁵ This remark exposed the confusion which prevailed in the United States about Indian politics. The *Springfield*

14. *Christian Science Monitor*, June 12, 1930.

15. *New York Herald Tribune*, June 11, 1930

Daily Republican did a sincere effort to understand the issues involved in the Report. The paper wrote : 'with the whole of exploited Asia awakening with unlooked for rapidity, it may not be possible to wait for the ideal step by step progress towards dominion status which the Commission urges. Timely concessions may be required to keep the situation from getting out of control, and at such critical times the greatest danger may be the slowness of a well meaning ruling power in carrying out long overdue reforms.'¹⁶

The first volume of Report was favourably received by America's daily. The American periodicals, however, criticised the Report. *The Christian Century* of Chicago wrote....'The fact that the Report opens with a reiteration of the same promises that were included in the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals of 1918, again emphasizing the fact that the grant of self-government depends upon the guarantees of maintenance of order of the important British commercial interests in India (for this is what, in the last analysis, is meant by the safeguarding of the prosperity of the country) painly foreshadows a report so cautious and so hedged about with reservations as to fail to satisfy most considerable body of Indian opinion.'¹⁷ The *Time* magazine wrote on Gandhi, 'vague though it is, the No.1 section of the Simon Report slams the door on St. Gandhi's demand for independence now.'¹⁸ *The Nation* wrote that the Report did not make definite proposals. 'The report is thoroughly temperate and friendly in spirit but the question whether India will any longer accept government by England is another matter.'¹⁹

The British press including the *Daily Herald*, the *Daily Mail*, the *London Times* and the *Morning Post*, considered the Report a parliamentary document of importance, and a great achievement of the British Government. But the Indian press was critical and considered it an insult of the nation. The Indian moderates were also disappointed. The reaction in India was correctly given by the *New York Times*: "The Simon Commission insults India', 'Dominion status in the dim and distant future', 'India not a nation,' 'British domination to continue', headings such as these, glaring across the front pages of the leading Swarajist

16. *Springfield Daily Republican*, June 12, 1930.

17. *The Time Magazine*, June 23, 1930, p. 23.

18. *The Nation*, June 18, 1930, p. 683.

19. *New York Times*, June 11, 1930.

20. *Ibid.*, June 24, 1930.

newspapers of India epitomize the feelings of the Congress extremists towards the first volume of the much heralded Simon Commission report on India."²⁰

The second volume of the Report came out on June 24, 1930. It drew more comments from the American press. The general opinion was the same as in the case of the first volume. The majority of the American press was impressed that there was unanimity of opinion and the Report was the result of two and a half years of labour. The American press took the Report on its face value. The comments made by the American press were almost the summaries of opinions expressed by the Commission itself. It is surprising that the British press was more critical than the American. The American press showed a superficial knowledge of the event. The liberal American press did not fall in line with the general trend. The *New York Times* wrote: 'From the beginning it is evident that the Commissioners approached their heavy and complicated task with kindly recognition of the aspirations of the people of India.' The paper wrote about defence thus: 'National defence is not to be turned over to native hands. In fact, they do not desire it. Even the party in India which demands immediate independence has been willing to leave the military power under the control of Great Britain.'²¹ The *Springfield Daily Republican* remarked that the second volume of the Report was discouraging. It wrote: 'A first reading suggests that the principles laid down might be adequate for the gradual development on sound lines of the self-government within the Empire which would probably satisfy all but the extremists in India.'²² The *Philadelphia Inquirer* observed: 'The Report is a long one in which every phase of the subject is considered....The character of the Commission as representing all three parties should secure an impartial study of its recommendations. It is in every sense a document of the first importance.'²³ The *New York Herald Tribune* remarked that the recommendations of the Commission opened the door to self-government in India. The paper added that more powers 'still rest with the Secretary of States for India in Council, the Governor General in Council with the permission of the Secretary of States, and the 'Instrument of Instructions to Governors.' If these officials still retain much of their power for carrying on the king's government,

21. *New York Times*, June 24, 1930.

22. *Springfield Daily Republican*, June 24, 1930.

23. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 24, 1930.

it is also true that the Indians receive enlarged opportunities of participation which should enable them to give the world some idea of their capacity for self-government.²⁴ The *Kansas City Star* wrote that the Report was a document of importance not only for the future of India but for the development of the British Commonwealth of Nations,.....it does not, however, affect the major problems at the moment. The whole Report will inevitably be judged now upon how far it meets the Indian demands and may be expected to detach moderate support from the rebellion.²⁵ The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* wrote, 'For 300 pages the Simon Commission maps a programme for an ideal government of India. But it does not set a date when this ideal can be realized. Herein the report will displease the Nationalists who think Britain has already delayed for too long.'²⁶ The *Los Angeles Times* observed that the Report '....recommends, not dominion status, but a limited self-government which, if successful, undoubtedly would grow into dominion status. Nothing resembling the complete independence which the Nationalists and Gandhi have been demanding is suggested in the Report; in fact, the plan appears to strengthen British rule in some particulars, since the British provincial governors proposed will have sweeping powers.'²⁷ The *Baltimore Sun* was not much hopeful about the proposals: 'And yet, as one reads the digests and precis of the second volume, there is disappointment. The conclusion and proposals arrived at by the Simon Commission seem a good deal less brilliant and satisfactory than was the study of the situation. It does not seem to promise the successful solution which, perhaps too optimistically, had been hoped for as a result of the remarkable thoroughness, candor and ability in the first part.'²⁸ The *Sun* was of the opinion that the dissatisfaction and opposition of Indian nationalists could not be dismissed lightly. The *Christian Science Monitor*, who had pro-British opinion wrote that the Commission's proposals were worth studying and it was difficult to find a parallel report. The paper further wrote, '.....It lays down elastic guiding propositions directed to conceding full self-government within the British Commonwealth of Nations, with such reservations only as it has become convinced are necessary to produce

24. *New York Herald Tribune*, June 24, 1930.

25. *Kansas City Star*, June 24, 1930.

26. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, June 24, 1930.

27. *Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 1930.

28. *Baltimore Sun*, June 25, 1930.

a smooth working in practice at the present time. These reservations are intended to drop off automatically as fast as any of them are made obsolete by the disappearance of racial, religious, tribal and caste differences which they are to meet.²⁹ The *Chicago Daily Tribune* remarked on the recommendations, 'The Simon Report on India...has been generally accepted in Great Britain and rejected in India. A few English radicals did not think it was much, but all Indian revolutionaries thought it was nothing. It recommended extensions of suffrage, more preparation for a greater degree of self-government, and slow approaches to a country of federated states, with the withdrawal of Burma from Delhi control.'³⁰ The *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat* observed that the Report proposed the establishment of a federal system of government in which Indian states and the provinces of British India would have control of their provincial affairs. The paper wrote, 'A strong central government would be created with its powers limited to matters pertaining to the welfare of the whole country.... The franchise would be extended and native participation in legislation and administration gradually increased.'³¹

American periodicals criticised the Simon Commission. *The New Republic* wrote that it would not amount to anything. It remarked, 'Final comment on the report of the Simon Commission on India must await the publication of the complete document. But the news dispatches covering the substance of the first volume indicate that its first effect is likely to be extremely unfortunate. Here is a nation which is seething with the demand of freedom. Its leaders anxiously await a clear statement of policy by the Government of the nation, which at the moment is employing force to retain its rulership. And the recommendations are to come from the Commission consisting wholly of the representatives of the ruling country—representatives, moreover, whose responsibility is emphasized by the fact that they comprise members not of one British party alone but of all.'³² The *Time* magazine remarked, 'As in the case of most concessions by masters to subject people, the Simon Report contains qualifications by which the Viceroy and his subordinate Governors could "in case

29. *Christian Science Monitor*, June 26, 1930.

30. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, June 28, 1930.

31. *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat*, June 25, 1930.

32. *The New Republic*, June 18, 1930, p. 110.

of emergency" resume substantially their present powers and put down such a movement as St. Gandhi's by the sword. On the other hand, the Report does not in fact smell of "British hypocrisy" though angry Indians are sure to proclaim a veritable stench.³³ The *Time* remarked that the Report was denial of Gandhi's demand for independence and offered only Dominion Status. *The Christian Century* wrote that the Report failed to deal with the main issue in India. The paper further wrote, "it does not touch the evident evils of the present system of dyarchy. And on the one over-whelming issue it maintains a fatal silence. The Report says not a word about Dominion Status. Not a word. After all the discussions, all the promises, the Commission tells India, "No Dominion Status in our stock, but here is something just as good."³⁴

The Nation had liberal approach to Indian problems. It remarked, "it will not soothe the troubled water of India but will gravely inflame the populace. It will make impossible the proposed October Round Table Conference. We doubt if even the Indian moderates will now be lured to that proposed parley. Indeed, we believe that it puts the final seal upon the long struggle which began with Gandhi's march to make salt, and, for better or worse, will not end until the Indian people are in complete control of their own destiny."³⁵ *The Commonwealth* wrote differently. It believed that India could not govern herself. It also lauded the Simon Report. It observed, "Once more British statesmanship has shown itself capable of a masterly document, written with all the objective sense of values and justice of Aristotelian politics, yet produced in times of grave crisis and trouble...Sir John's report is not the least sensational. It says what everyone has long known, that India cannot govern herself completely for many years to come. Yet it recommends another step in the direction of self-government, a limited dominion status."³⁶ The same magazine commented upon the views expressed by Nicholas Murray Butler: "Those who have tried to study the Simon Report with some impartiality may not agree with President Nicholas Murray Butler that it is 'broad-minded, constructive and liberal,'" but will surely admit that the Commissioners have based

33. *Time*, June 1930, p. 25-26.

34. *The Christian Century*, July 1930, p. 835.

35. *The Nation*, July 1930.

36. *The Commonwealth*, June 1930, p. 203.

an impressive argument upon vast quantities of unimpeachable evidence.³⁷

The Literary Digest gave a brief resume of the press in London and India. It remarked, 'Not independence, nor yet Dominion status. But an "elastic" All India Federation to foster "progressive realization of responsible government," under British grip'.

This quintessence of recommendations of the Simon Commission for handling the knotty problem of India is either "atrocious" (*Bombay Chronicle*), and an "evasion of the main problem" (*London Daily Herald*; Labour party), or it "will virtually eliminate the mischievous cry for Dominion Status" (*London Daily Mail*), and "marks the most hopeful advance of our generation toward solution of the problem" (*London Times*).³⁸ *The New York Times Current History Magazine* wrote, 'Among the political groups the Liberals were hit hardest by the annihilation of their dream of Dominion status. It is of some significance also, that no Indian native ruler or Indian Minister ranged himself on the side of the Report.'³⁹ *The World's Work* also wrote, 'This Report is a precise and comprehensive document proposing a gradual extension of authority to India under careful safeguards. Published a year ago, it might have inflamed public opinion. Now it is handicapped by a high tide of ill feeling.'⁴⁰

Mahatma Gandhi had launched Civil Disobedience Movement in 1930. The Congress refused to participate at Round Table Conference. Because of this the negotiations were started by moderate leaders. Tej Bahadur Sapru and M.R. Jayakar. They had many meetings with Gandhi and other prominent Congress leaders. The American press took note of the negotiations. *The New Republic* wrote, 'It will be remembered that passive resistance started only when the nationalists asked in vain for assurance that the Conference would discuss not whether dominion government should be granted, but how. They wanted not the temporising of a vague hope but a definite promise. They still want it. The Government is now attempting to satisfy them, so that Gandhi will call off his followers and substitute cooperation for non-cooperation.'⁴¹ The negotiations failed. The majority of the American

37. *Ibid.*, July 1930, p. 295.

38. *The Literary Digest*, July 1930, p. 10.

39. *The New York Times Current History Magazine*, August 1930, p. 871.

40. *The World's Work*, September 1930, p. 18.

41. *The New Republic*, September 3, 1930, p. 58.

papers blamed Gandhi for the breakdown of the negotiations. The *New York Herald Tribune* wrote that a compromise would have been good for Indian politics and Gandhi would have played a major role at the Round Table Conference at London. The paper opined that the failure of negotiation means continuance of civil disobedience and absence of the Congress at the Round Table Conference. It remarked, 'The efforts of the moderate conciliators are said to have come to grief against the intransigence of the Nehrus rather than against the attitude of Gandhi, but then the Nehrus are frequently credited with being the "brains" of the nationalist movement. Whoever made the decision, it was no doubt arrived at after a careful consideration.'⁴² The *Christian Science Monitor* was optimistic even after the breakdown of the negotiation: 'Happily the term "breakdown" although a convenient phrase generally means only that negotiations are temporarily suspended; so it is possible that there may yet be a satisfactory outcome to the unofficial mission which the Moderates have conducted.'⁴³ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* wrote that Gandhi's refusal to come to any terms with the British Government, put an end to Macdonald's conciliation policy. The paper said, 'The Moderates among the Indians who have been conferring with the Mahatma have apparently broken off negotiations: recognising their futility. Gandhi still sticks to his demand for universal amnesty and immediate independence, which he knows perfectly well cannot be granted.'⁴⁴ The *New York Times* blamed the Congress leadership for the breakdown of negotiations, 'peace negotiations between the British Government and the Indian Nationalist leaders have collapsed before the impossibilist position of Gandhi and his associates.'⁴⁵ The *Nation* thought differently and observed: 'The India Office has announced that the Conference will be held as planned; yet it is plain that no real settlement can be reached without the agreement of Mr. Gandhi whose terms, steadily adhered to by him for months, the government has flatly refused.'⁴⁶

The Round Table Conference was scheduled to meet in the beginning of November. The American press started writing comments about

42. *New York Times Herald Tribune*, September 6, 1930.

43. *Christian Science Monitor*, September 6, 1930.

44. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, September 7, 1930.

45. *New York Times*, September 8, 1930.

46. *The Nation*, September 17, 1930, p. 285.

the forthcoming conference. The *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrate* raised the question, 'if the two-third of India refuses cooperation, continues its programme of Non-cooperation and Civil Disobedience, what then?'⁴⁷ The American public was asking, whether the Conference would succeed without Gandhi's participation. Most of the American papers believed that without Gandhi the Conference would be a failure. This view was subscribed to by *The Nation* and *The New Republic*. *The Nation* wrote, 'The complete failure of the negotiations between the Indian Government and Mahatma Gandhi means the definite wrecking of the Round Table Conference for the next month in London.'⁴⁸ *The New Republic* remarked, '...Nevertheless, the fact remains that Gandhi's opposition to the Round Table Conference, if it is not removed, will cause the Conference to fail.'⁴⁹ The *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat* observed, 'Any new scheme of Government that may be devised by the so-called Round Table Conference must depend for success on native cooperation.'⁵⁰ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* remarked, 'of course some solution of the Indian problem cannot be indefinitely postponed. But there is force in the contention that the restoration of law and order should precede discussions as to the future. The Prime Minister and the Viceroy have alike yielded too much to threats. That is not the way to deal with orientals as anyone familiar with their mental processes must know.'⁵¹ *The World's Work* wrote, 'If Gandhi were won to the side of reconciliation,..... the Conference would plainly hold the possibility of a settlement. If the Conference is boycotted by Indian leaders, or if the Indians who attend it cannot speak with authority for the Indians who are making trouble, the Conference is likely to be barren of results.'⁵²

But there were some American papers which believed that the Conference might arrive at some conclusion. The *New York Herald Tribune* wrote: 'There is the possibility that the English, with the aid of the Princes and of the British Indian Moderates, may work out

47. *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat*, September 7, 1930.

48. *The Nation*, *op. cit.*

49. *The New Republic*, *op. cit.*

50. *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat*, September 7, 1930.

51. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *op. cit.*

52. *The World's Work*, *op. cit.*

something which will give them enough popular support within India to undercut the extremists.⁵³ The *New York Times* remarked, 'To a certain extent, this aim may be promoted by the intransigent action of Gandhi and his lieutenants. Without the presence of the latter the Conference can hardly live up to the character of a constituent assembly for India. It can nevertheless make its contribution to a settlement by formulating an alternative to the Nationalist programme and submitting it for the judgment of public opinion in Great Britain and India.'⁵⁴ The paper modified its view and wrote, 'To go further is impossible. The fate of India cannot be decided in a consultation from which the many millions who do stand with Gandhi have abstained. But there is no reason for supposing that the Conference will take it upon itself to decide for India without the absentees.'⁵⁵ The American press believed that the Conference had no chance of success without the cooperation of the Congress. Only pro-British paper the *Christain Science Monitor* opined that non-participation of the Congress was an advantage. 'So many influential Indians will, after all, attend the coming 'round table' Conference in London as to raise reasonable hopes that any agreed decisions which this gathering may reach will command sufficient support in India to enable them to be put into operation. It would no doubt have been well if Mathama Gandhi and other Indian Nationalist leaders had been willing to participate. There are compensating advantages, however, in the very abstention of these extremists, for this has rendered possible a wider range of representation than would otherwise have been the case.' It went on to say, 'It is true that those who are to attend have been selected for this purpose by Lord Irwin, the king's representative at Delhi, and not chosen by any special popular vote. But the vastness of the Indian population and its extreme backwardness in political development is thought to have made any other course impracticable.'⁵⁶

On November 12, 1930, the Round Table Conference was inaugurated by His Majesty King George V. Much colour was added by the Indian princes but the Conference was conspicuous by the absence of the 'half-naked *fakir*', Gandhi. The inauguration of the Conference aroused interest in the American press. The *Christain Science Monitor* was

53. *New York Herald Tribune*, *op.cit.*

54. *New York Times*, *op. cit.*

55. *Ibid.*, September 13, 1930.

56. *Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 13, 1930.

optimistic about the outcome of the Conference. It wrote: 'There is agreement in fundamentals between Great Britain and the Indian delegates. The goal is complete self-government for India; the dispute solely concerns speed and ways and means. With goodwill, tolerance, a resolute facing of facts and commonsense, there should be no unbridgeable breach between the two sides as to what the next step should be.'⁵⁷ The *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat* wrote that the Nationalists '.....will be represented indirectly. More or less of a reflex of their views is found in the attitude of the hereditary Indian princes and other delegates of vested privilege and even in the very summoning of the Conference itself.'⁵⁸ The *Kansas City Star* observed that the success of the Conference was not only important to England but to every nation interested in the development of the orient. The paper remarked that the rise of the standard of living in India would improve the market of American goods. The paper also wrote about the Congress. 'The Congress leaders have declined to participate in the Conference, but the present rebellion would probably collapse at once in the event of an agreement at London.'⁵⁹ The *New York Times* wrote about the demand of the Congress for Dominion Status. 'There will be very little time wasted on the extremist claims of the absent Gandhi and his Nationalist followers, formidable though the movement may be which they represent. The demand for full dominion status, with control over the Indian Army and the 'right of secession,' is a demand for virtual independence which no one in Great Britain will listen to and which is impossible in the nature of things.'⁶⁰ The *Springfield Daily Republican* in its editorial 'Tackling India' wrote that the Conference was for free and full discussion. They were knowing the difficulties. It wrote, '....even if agreement is impossible, however, the round table is as good a way of working toward an agreement as could be found, and it is a pity that so sensible a plan was not resorted to earlier.'⁶¹ According to the *New York Herald Tribune*, the Conference created many problems to Britain. 'At the Conference a dozen Englishmen, representing all three of the British parties and by no means unanimous to their own views, are confronting seventy three Indians who are

57. *Ibid.*, November 12, 1930.

58. *St. Louis Daily Globe—Democrat*, November 13, 1930.

59. *Kansas City Star*, November 13, 1930.

60. *New York Times*,

61. *The Daily Republican*, November 13, 1930.

at least equally divided. From the composition of the Conference it is easy to understand why so many are predicting its total failure. Whether the abstention of the Nationalists is a help or hindrance is an arguable point. If they had come they would have wrecked the proceedings; by staying away they threaten to doom them to futility.⁶²

The liberal American press expressed serious and thoughtful opinions. They were not optimistic about the outcome of the Conference. They were aware of the problems before the Conference. The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* remarked that India had many races and religions. But removal of British sovereignty would not result in chaos. The demand for self-government was the demand of educated Indians of different classes, races and religions. The paper wrote, 'The only question which agitates the British mind is as to whether these great personages really exercise any large influence in Hindustan. It is feared that the anti-British movement may have gone so far under the leadership of humble men that all the potentates acting in unison would be powerless to halt it.'⁶³ *The Outlook and Independent* noted, 'Even should the Indian and British Conferees agree, their plan probably would be unacceptable to Gandhi's Nationalists who boycotted the Conference and demanded a full National Government responsible only to the people of India and possessing the right to secede from the Empire.'⁶⁴ *The Nation* was always anti-British. It wrote: 'With the convening of the Round Table Conference in London, the problem of India once more directly confronts the British Government. The action of the Government recently in India, the discussion on India in the British press and the resolutions on this topic at the recent conference of the British Labour Party make it abundantly clear the Great Britain will yield without further struggle what Gandhi and the Congress Party are demanding.'⁶⁵ *The Nation* gave importance to the composition of the Indian delegation, which did not represent the masses of India. The delegates were trying to protect their own interests in the Conference. The paper wrote: 'But the Indian delegates are all aware, and so are the British, that

62. *New York Herald Tribune*, November 12, 1930.

63. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, November 16, 1930.

64. *The Outlook and Independent*, November 19, 1930, p. 448.

65. *The Nation*, November 19, 1930, p. 543.

the power of the Indian case lies not in declamation or arguments, but in the will of Gandhi and the Congress Party.....Whatever bargaining power the Indian delegates possess depends not on their strength but on the strength of the little man in Yeravda jail. The possible threat of the Indian delegates which will carry most weight with British will be: "If you do not do as we ask, we shall go back and join Gandhi."⁶⁶

The plenary session of the Round Table Conference ended on the November 21, 1930. The attitude of the rulers of the Indian states was surprising. Maharajas of Bikaner and Patiala supported federation. This development created interest of the American press in the proceedings of the Conference. The *New York Times* felt that the communal forces were not strong enough to cope with the growing nationalism, but it was creating problems for India to operate complete system of home rule. 'The capacity for complete self-government in India still lags behind the desire for it.'⁶⁷ The *Richmond Times Dispatch* wrote: 'The Round Table Conference concluded its last week's deliberations with the general appearance of forthcoming dominion status for India..... To judge by speeches of the Indian delegates, none of the ancient difficulties to home rule in India exists.'⁶⁸ The paper further wrote that it was hard to believe that the Brahmin would wipe out caste system, or Muslims would temper their religious faith to accord with the Hindu way. The paper also found it difficult to visualize that the Indian princes could exist in India without British support.' The *Kansas City Star* also wrote about the Indian princes. 'The first week of the Conference has shown an India united in its desire for home rule in a way that will be difficult for the British to ignore.'⁶⁹ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* wrote that what had happened at the Conference was not surprising. The paper concluded that, "the real test will come when the new constitution is evolved."⁷⁰ The *Herald Tribune* remarked: 'The participation of the rulers of the native states, not to mention the Muslims and Sikhs, in a demand for an autonomous all-India federation was, at the outset, the best possible guarantee that the gathering would either evolve a constitutional programme which would

66. *The Nation*, November 19, 1930, p. 543.

67. *The Nation*, November 22, 1930.

68. *Richmond Times Dispatch*, November 2, 1930.

69. *Kansas City Star*, November 24, 1930.

70. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 24, 1930.

more rigidly limit the scope of radical Hindu nationalism than the most expensive British policy system or would break up and prove to the world that the Indians could not find among themselves a formula for self-government.⁷¹

On January 19, 1931, the Conference came to an end with the declaration of British policy with regard to the Indian constitutional problem. Almost every important paper of America commented on it. Most of the American press considered the Conference a great success. The newspapers applauded the work of the Federal Structure Sub-Committee presided over by Lord Sankey. Many American papers remarked that the scheme of All-India Federation was a step towards the achievement of self-government. *The Herald Tribune* wrote that the outline of a constitution for India was a triumph of statesmanship of Lord Sankey's Committee. The paper observed, 'The draft constitution goes very much further toward a self-governing India than anything which the British have previously dared to offer. The princes, one cannot help feeling, are the key to the solution; they have made it possible to transfer authority to "India" without necessarily transferring it only to hostile and radical Indians.'⁷² The paper further wrote that the success of the draft constitution rested with Gandhi who could destroy it, if he chose to do so. According to the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* the important achievement of the Conference was the Hindu-Muslim agreement on the basis of which the draft of India's federal government was framed. It wrote: 'To date the pessimists have been confounded. It remains to be seen whether the reception of the Government report will justify continued optimism.'⁷³ *The Los Angeles Times* was optimistic about the achievements of the Round Table Conference and the report of Lord Sankey. It remarked, '....about the only question remaining to be settled before the formation of the new nation is a matter of finances. The credit of India must be preserved, and England is expected to guarantee it. To what extent, however, is a matter for future arrangement.'⁷⁴ *The New York Times* considered the new constitution for India a long step towards Dominion Government. It commented: 'In one respect, the new constitution probably goes beyond the expectations of the Indian nationalists themselves. It brings

71. *The Herald Tribune*, December 10, 1930.

72. *Ibid.*, January 14, 1931.

73. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, January 18, 1931.

74. *The Los Angeles Times*, January 19, 1931.

on the stage a united Indian nation.....should the followers of Gandhi accept the new constitution, they will be greatly strengthened in working for complete self-government by the fact that they will be speaking for a united India. The paper was of the opinion that Gandhi's boycott of the constitution would not be fatal. It further wrote: 'Strategy from the British side would demand its (the new constitution) promulgation in any case, so as to put the Nationalists at the disadvantage of combating a national Indian Government.'⁷⁵ The *Kansas City Star* said that the Conference ended with a fine record of achievement, and the success was most remarkable. The paper wrote that it was remarkable because Gandhi refused to participate in it and Indian Moderates denounced the Simon Report. The paper wrote that the Conference '.....has succeeded in out-lining a form of Government for India that gives every indication of offering a swift transition to home rule under conditions acceptable to the great body of Indian opinion.'⁷⁶

The *Christian Science Monitor* was always pro-Britain in its comments on India. It had all along opined that the nationalist leaders of India were a small group of extremist agitators. But on this event it changed its tone and added that many points had been left out, particularly the communal question. The Congress had to be won over for it stood for the happiness and welfare of the Indians. It further wrote: 'Powers have been reserved to British officers to enable them to intervene if things go wrong, but such intervention is intended to be of a continually diminishing nature. Whether the constitution succeeds, therefore, or fails, will depend upon Indians and upon them alone.'⁷⁷ The *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat* wrote: 'In estimating how much of real self-government is preferred, it must be remembered that the States of India now have no small measure of home rule, of control of their own local affairs, and this will be retained. The all-India super-government, of course, will be adapted from the American federal principle, but with modifications already in force in several countries.'⁷⁸ The *Richmond Times Dispatch* wrote that 'The groundwork of dominion status under a federal union has been established.'⁷⁹ The *Springfield Daily Republican*

75. *New York Times*, January 20, 1931.

76. *Kansas City Star*, January 20, 1931.

77. *Christian Science Monitor* January 21, 1931.

78. *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat* January 21, 1931.

79. *Richmond Times Dispatch*, January 21, 1931.

praised the British government : 'The round table discussion on a new status for India, which opened in London last November, closed Monday with a larger achievement to its credit than most people had anticipated..... one of the most hopeful features of the discussions was the general disposition of the British delegates to consider the problem of India in a broad-minded way with little regard for party lines.'⁸⁰

The *Philadelphia Inquirer* was critical of the federal plan. According to the paper the success or failure of the federal plan depended upon two factors—the attitude of the British Parliament and that of Indian people. It wrote : 'Clearly dominion status is still unachieved and independence is a long way off. In the new constitution there are careful provisions for maintenance of some measure of British authority. Many believe that with all the checks and balances it will not be easily workable.'⁸¹ The paper again and again criticised the plan. It wrote that parliamentary form of government was not a blessing for India because it had no conception of any other form of rule than despotism. The paper opined: 'Even with such restrictions as the new plan has imposed, there is a real danger that the conduct of political affairs will fall into the hands of the Congress party, which so far has shown little conception of the real meaning of democracy or little desire to practise it. For the welfare of the mass of the toilers in India, for which British rule has done so much, they apparently have slight regard... The success of the plan depends more on what India may do than on what Great Britain may do. It would be perilous to give up control over foreign affairs, defence and finance to a party which has persistently sought to gain its ends by violence.'⁸² The *Chicago Daily Tribune* did not praise British diplomacy, the patriotic sentiments of the Indian princes and the integrity of other Indian delegates. It was of the opinion that success had been achieved due to the fact that the Indian nationalists were sitting behind bars in India. Their refusal of cooperation, their passive resistance, evasion of taxes and boycott of British goods had put pressure on the British government for reforms. The paper wrote : 'the plan will attempt the raising of India to a dominion status, with reservations, retaining for Great Britain

80. *Springfield Daily Republican*, January 21, 1931.

81. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, January 22, 1931.

82. *Ibid.*, January 25, 1931.

the control of defence and of foreign affairs and a supervision of finance. Otherwise the Indian states and federation are to have what is described as "responsible government."⁸³ *The Christian Century* wrote: "for in the new constitution there is, if not an immediate "substance of independence, " something so close to that and pointing so straight in that direction that the powerful nationalists may well see the quickest road to their goal inside the new form of government. At any rate, the centre of interest now shifts back to India. For the moment, everything hangs on the decision of Gandhi and his associates."⁸⁴ However *The Nation* was of the opinion that 'Concessions like these might have gone a long way to satisfy Indian opinion a year ago, but it is doubtful whether such a plan will be accepted today either by the Congress Party or their sympathisers in view of the event of the last twelve months.'⁸⁵ *The New Republic* observed, 'The Round Table Conference on India has closed, and neither a constitution nor a definite pledge of dominion status has come out of it. What was accomplished was a survey of difficulties, an honest attempt to bring the minds of the Conferees together, and a tentative agreement on certain important objectives like a federal constitution, with some protection for minorities, and autonomy modified in the transitional stages by reservations in the British interest.'⁸⁶

These comments of the American dailies on the Conference showed lack of understanding of Indian politics. The *Christian Science Monitor* wrote about the Residents in the Indian States : 'These Residents as a rule take no part in the affairs of the states to which they are accredited. . . . They are always on the spot, however, and have wide powers in reserve to intervene in case of need. It is not unreasonable to expect that system which has worked well on a small scale in the Indian states may prove successful in the larger field in which it is now proposed to try it.'⁸⁷

Thus the American press failed to appraise the Conference rightly. None of the American papers showed a correct understanding of Indian politics and its problems. They failed to understand the reason of the change of attitude of the autocratic princes in joining hands with

83. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, January 23, 1931.

84. *The Christian Century*, January 28, 1931.

85. *The Nation*, January 21, 1931, p. 59.

86. *The New Republic*, Jan. 28, 1931. p. 282.

the so-called federal scheme. The joining of federation was advantageous to both the Indian princes and the British government. This change misled the American opinion in its evaluation of the Round Table Conference.

87. *Christian Science Monitor*, January 8, 1931.

GANDHIAN
MOVEMENTS, 1930-33,
IN AMERICAN EYES

In April, 1929, the Simon Commission left India. After that for some time there was a lull in the political atmosphere. The Council work of the Swarajists attracted the elite. The Congress under Gandhi's leadership adopted the programme of untouchability, *khaddar* and prohibition. But on October 31, 1929, Governor General of India, Lord Irwin, made an announcement 'providing for the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.' After consultation with the British Government, Lord Irwin returned to India and said: '..... it is His Majesty's will and pleasure that the plan laid by Parliament in 1919 should be the means by which British India may attain its due place among his Dominions that it is the desire of the British Government that India should, in the fullness of time, take her place in the Empire in equal partnership with the Dominions..... I am authorised on behalf of His Majesty's Government to state clearly that in their judgment it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the natural goal of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of dominion status.' Lord Irwin also announced the holding of another Round Table Conference for the purpose of discussion with regard to both the British India and the princely states. Gandhi met Lord Irwin and demanded assurance that the next conference would proceed on the basis of full Dominion Status. Lord Irwin was unable to give such a promise. After this meeting, the Congress met at Lahore. It was an important session of the Congress for two reasons—young Jawaharlal Nehru presided it and the aim of the Congress became 'Complete Independence for India'. In 1930 England faced acute unemployment and economic problems. These facts accounted for Governor General's announcement.

But the young members of the Congress were critical of it and wanted complete separation from England. The people were full of enthusiasm. In this atmosphere Gandhi launched 'Civil Disobedience Movement'. He asked the government to fulfil his demand that the proposed Conference should be held on the basis of full Dominion Status for India. He also demanded a predominant representation of Congressmen in the Conference, a general amnesty of political prisoners and the working of the Government of India on the lines of a Dominion Government. Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy that if he would not accept his demands then he would start Civil Disobedience Movement. The Viceroy's reply was quick but not favourable. Gandhi's rejoinder was strong. He wrote: 'On bended knees I asked for bread and received a stone instead. The English nation responded only to force and I am not surprised at the Viceregal reply. The only public peace the nation knows is the peace of public prison. India is a vast prison house. I repudiate this (British) law and regard it as my sacred duty to break the mournful monotony of compulsory peace that is choking the heart of the nation for want of free vent.'¹

In America, at this time the press did not take much interest in Indian politics. But *The Outlook and Independent* was critical of Viceroy's statement: 'Early last November Lord Irwin announced that Britain intended to confer Dominion Status on India adding that Indian leaders would be invited to a conference in London. The promise was far from revolutionary. Britain has often made it. This time it salted rather than salved the inflamed feelings of the Indian nationalists.'² The *Christian Science Monitor* was critical of nationalist leaders. 'Recently Lord Irwin, taking alarm at threats of hostile action used by extremists, made an attempt to counter their efforts by a declaration of India's ultimate attainment of Dominion Status. This he did with the very best intentions, though against the advice of the Simon Commission, leading Liberals, many Conservatives and an experienced official class, for he had hopes not only of rallying the Moderates but also of winning back the Extremists. He even went so far as to confer with Gandhi and Pandit Motilal Nchru, another extreme Nationalist leader. These negotiations failed and at Lahore much wild talk was indulged in

1. Sitaramayya, Dr. Pattabhi, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, Vol. II, p. 377.

2. *The Outlook and Independent*, January 8, 1930.

and independence was demanded regardless of the fact that today the withdrawal of British rule would mean chaos in India.³

Gradually the interest of the American press in Gandhi-Irwin talks and its failure increased. Gandhi's threat to launch a movement was not an exciting news for the American press because his first movement was a failure. The *New York Times* wrote: 'This is not the first time that a campaign of civil disobedience has been led by Mahatma Gandhi against the British Government in India. Eight years ago, events moved along a course very much like the present one. So close, indeed, is the parallel that the arrest of Gandhi, now thought to be imminent, may fall on the anniversary of Gandhi's incarceration on March 10, 1922..... On more than one occasion he subjected himself to penance for bloodshed following upon the violation of his orders. His authority over the people of India was unquestionably great, yet when he was arrested and sentenced to six years in prison, his influence melted away rapidly. When he was released after two years, the non-cooperation movement was virtually dead.' The paper further commented: 'but the Nationalist movement is now stronger, numerically and morally, as part of the general development of self-consciousness among the people of Asia. Another favourable factor would be--at least in Nationalist calculation--the Labour Government in England and its greater desire to avoid coercion.'⁴ The *Christian Science Monitor* was of the firm opinion that the movement would end in a complete failure. It wrote: 'Mahatma Gandhi is once more advocating non-violent civil disobedience in India. This is done in the face of disasters which, by his own admission, befell India during his previous attempt to apply this policy..... However, Gandhi and the extremist politicians who work with him are apparently convinced that the weapon which failed before can succeed now.'⁵ The *Chicago Tribune* in an editorial entitled "Opportunity for Little Brown Brothers" did not speculate on success and failure of the movement. It observed, 'Gas, high explosives, airplanes, longrange and quick-firing guns, have given their possessors advantages which makes opposition madness to consider, but the very means of repression are an embarrassment to the Government confronted with the problems

3. *Christian Science Monitor*, March 10, 1930.

4. *New York Times*, March 10, 1930.

5. *Christian Science Monitor*, March 12, 1930.

of unrest in the massed ranks of the brown brothers..... The strength of the supervising whites is their weakness in these moral days when strength is dreaded and when there is an avowed intention to make the next war civilized and painless. A recognition of the altruistic predicament of the bossing races prevails in the leadership of the bossed.⁶

On March 12, 1930, Gandhi started 'Dandi March'. He thought it fit to launch his movement by breaking the law of the salt tax. On the twenty-fourth day, he reached the seashore of Dandi and broke the law. It was a signal for Indian people to start the movement. The Dandi March made front page headlines in all the important newspapers of America. Many newspapers published regular reports of the progress of the March. The American press took keen interest in this event. The *Baltimore Sun* wrote: '.....There is no other political leader in the world today who could dare so deliberately to put aside all traditional instruments of leadership and put his faith in a ceremony so simple that it appears almost trifling.

'Where his march of civil disobedience will really lead, no one at this moment can say. In the past Gandhi's most pacific moves have released forces which shocked even him. It is quite possible that this time the parade of seventy persons led by an old man will have profound influence upon the course of history. It is that contrast and that chance that make the campaign seem, in spite of itself, one of the most dramatic of events.'⁷ The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* described the Dandi March as the 'strangest revolution of all time.' The paper remarked: 'Mahatma Gandhi is marching to the sea. A brown wisp of a man, a puny ascetic, yet he defies the might of the British Empire and leads millions in "Civil disobedience." He has no arms and wants none. He has none of the paraphernalia of militarism.' The paper found this event a parallel to American's own history: 'It is such a symbolic gesture as a poet might contrive, yet it strikes at an economic grievance too. Salt is one of the necessities of life, and it is but human nature to resent governmental action to make it artificially dear by setting up a monopoly. The feeling is deep-rooted that the salt of the sea is for all and that all should be free to use it; in defying the government on this issue he has immemorial instinct behind

6. *The Chicago Tribune*, March 12, 1930.

7. *Baltimore Sun*, March 13, 1930.

him as well as patriotic hostility to British rule. Gandhi's challenge to the salt monopoly may be as notable an incident as Boston's short way with tea.⁸ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* wrote: "The Mahatma's doctrine of "Civil disobedience" is in effect rebellion, and the probabilities are that the demonstrations of his followers will eventually have to be put down by force. It may be wise for the authorities to refrain from acting until the last possible moment, lest they unleash passions hard to control. But the oriental is not to be controlled by persuasion; the only argument that appeals to him is the strong hand."⁹ The *Los Angeles Times* opined: "Between the watchful waiting policy of the British Government and the torrid Sun, Gandhi and his little band are having a heck of a time making an impression with that trek to the salt bed."¹⁰

British Government of India arrested Gandhi on May 5, 1930. His arrest was a big news for the American press. The opinions expressed in the American press were critical of Gandhi and his movement. The *New York Herald Tribune*, under the heading 'Mr. Gandhi is Again Arrested', commented that the revolution was no final answer. The paper wrote: "Thus the Indian Government has moved with suddenness and eclipsed Mr. Gandhi. The immediate object, according to the official communique is to prevent the violence and bloodshed which his leadership seemed more and more to be inciting. But as the Nationalist rioting and its kindred unrests did not appear to have risen to a really dangerous point, one may suppose that it was in reality a calculation of more subtle factors. The whole problem is to find some measure of popular support for whatever reform projects may be laid before the coming round-table conference. It is evident that the arrest of Mr. Gandhi might heighten Indian resistance to these projects, or that it might by silencing a disturbing voice."¹¹ The *Chicago Daily Tribune* remarked: "The British Indian Government has arrested Gandhi, whose civil disobedience had this as one of its purposes and prospects. The issue was supposed to indicate whether the Government was timid, or confident and, if the arrest was made, whether the revolutionary activities were superficial or profound. The seizure of Gandhi answers one question.

8. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, March 14, 1930.

9. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, March 14, 1930.

10. *Los Angeles Times*, March 21, 1930.

11. *New York Herald Tribune*, May 6, 1930.

'British imperialism has a tradition of wisdom which may be largely fable. The proconsular gentlemen have a way of getting along well enough when they have normal conditions in hand, but their record of muddling an unquiet situation has its impressiveness. There is no proof that they have changed much since the American revolution, although they have been popularly believed to have taken a different road since 1783.'¹² The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* remarked: 'But Gandhi in jail may be much more troublesome than Gandhi outside..... So far in this strange revolution, this defence of the might of a great empire by a ragged philosopher, the score favors Gandhi. He has the government guessing. The Viceroy of India has imposed a censorship and prorogued the Indian parliament.'¹³ The *Springfield Daily Republican* wrote on Gandhi's arrest: "In leaving the leader of the civil disobedience movement in India so long at large, the Government has shown great patience and undoubtedly his arrest now, however welcome to the *sahibs* in India, was not sanctioned by Prime Minister MacDonald and his Cabinet without regret and misgivings. There is, indeed, a touch of the absurd in the resort under a British Labour Government to arbitrary powers conferred under a law more than a century old. So far as the treatment of Gandhi goes, this was the kindest course if he was to be arrested at all.'¹⁴ The *Christian Science Monitor* observed: 'It is obviously not easy for any government to arrest a "Saint" for collecting salt on a bleak and deserted seashore, especially when the "Saint" himself was courting arrest. On the other hand, there are objections to waiting until many innocent people have perished before arresting the instigator of lawlessness unless it is clear that to have arrested him before would have led to even greater bloodshed. But arrest is clearly justifiable as it is, and greatly as the Mahatma himself probably welcomes it as a possible further impulse to the cause to which he had devoted himself, it will not solve the almost unprecedented problem which confronts Great Britain in India today.'¹⁵ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* was critical of Gandhi. It wrote: 'Mahatma Gandhi has been arrested at last. It was high time. The reluctance of the Government to take this step is easily understood. Yet it was

12. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, May 6, 1930.

13. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, May 6, 1930.

14. *Springfield Daily Republican*, May 7, 1930.

15. *Christian Science Monitor*, May 8, 1930.

inevitable from the first. "Passive resistance" is only a phrase. Open rebellion is the deliberate sequence.

'It is sufficiently clear, however, that the situation is full of perils, and that the Government will have to use both tact and resolution in dealing with it. The Indian masses are not vocal. Whether their self-appointed leaders really speak for them is a question.'¹⁶ The *Richmond Times-Dispatch* was also critical of Gandhi. The paper felt that 'the British must put Gandhi down, just as we would put him down if it were our institutions which were endangered, but there is no joy in the job.'¹⁷

The Nation, always a champion of the cause of India, in the leading article entitled "Let India Go," wrote: 'The idea of national liberty is abroad in India for better or for worse. Censorship of newspapers will not affect it. Neither will the arrest of Gandhi. If England is wise and far-seeing, the Simon Commission, whose report is momentarily expected, will find that India is ready for dominion status.'¹⁸ *The New Republic* observed that the arrest of Gandhi was expected. The paper wrote: 'In 1922 when he was arrested and sentenced to six year in prison, the British made the excuse that this was done to protect his life. He was in perfect health at the time, and two years later it was necessary to release him because he was about to die under the prison regime. This time no such ridiculous plea has been made; Mr. Gandhi is frankly being locked up because the British are afraid to leave him free any longer.' The paper further observed: 'Even now it is not too late for such an action. In a few weeks it may be; India may be plunged into a violent revolution which, whatever the outcome, will cost thousands of lives.'¹⁹ *The Christian Century* remarked: 'Gandhi in jail weighs heavily upon the conscience of mankind. Men may consider that his incarceration had become necessary. They may consider his methods wrong. They may consider his aims mistaken. Most men, it is probable, have serious misgivings as to the wisdom and practicability of his course. But the thought of the Mahatma--the "great souled one"--in prison raises questionings that are not easily put down. Does

16. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 6, 1930.

17. *Richmond Times Dispatch*, May 7, 1930.

18. *The Nation*, May 14, 1930, p. 561.

19. *The New Republic*, May 14, 1930, p. 336.

the arrest of this apostle of revolution by "soul force" indicate a conflict between Gandhi's world and our own, much more fundamental than any conflict between India and Britain?²⁰ The paper published philosopher Will Roger's comment on Gandhi's arrest: "They have got Gandhi in jail in India. He preached "liberty without violence." He swore all his followers "to truth and constant poverty." He wanted nothing for himself, not even the ordinary comforts. He believed in "prayer and renunciation." Well, naturally a man that's holy couldn't run at large these days. They figured that a crazy man like that was liable to get other people wanting those fanatical things. Civilization has got past "truth and poverty and renunciation" and all that old junk. Throw those nuts in jail."²¹

Gandhi's arrest and repression by the Government were unable to stop the movement. Webb Miller, who visited India for first hand information about Indian politics, reported: "In eighteen years of reporting in twenty-two countries during which I have witnessed innumerable civil disturbances, riots, street fights and rebellions, I have never witnessed such harrowing scenes as at Dharasana....Sometimes the scene was so painful that I had to turn away momentarily. One surprising feature was the discipline of the volunteers. It seemed they were thoroughly imbued with Gandhi's non-violence creed."²² Brailsford, who also visited India, wrote in the *Manchester Guardian*: "...At Calcutta some students, witnessing from a balcony of the University, the brutal beatings of participants in a peaceful procession, shouted "Cowards"! Two hours later the police returned, entered the University under an English officer, invaded the classroom and beat the students indiscriminately as they sat at their desks, till the walls were spotted with blood. The University made an official protest but no punishment followed."²³ The stories of public brutalities reached America. Negley Forson, reporter of the *Chicago Daily News* cabled from Bombay, which was quoted in *The New Republic*. It ran: "Heroic, bearded Sikhs, several with blood dripping from their mouths, refusing to move or even to draw their *Kirpans* (Sacred swords) to defend themselves from a shower of lathi blows—

20. *Christian Century*, May 21, 1930, p. 647.

21. *Ibid.*,

22. *New York Evening Telegram*, May 23, 1930.

23. *Manchester Guardian*, January 12, 1931.

'Hindu women and girls dressed in orange robes of sacrifice flinging themselves on the bridles of horses and imploring mounted police not to strike male volunteers as they were Hindus themselves--

"Stretcher bearers waiting beside little islands of prostrate, unflinching, immovable *satyagrahis* who had flung themselves on the ground grouped about their women upholding the flag of swaraj-

'These were the scenes on the Maidan Esplanade today.

'Dark-faced Mahratti policemen in their yellow turbans marched along in column led by English Sergeants across the field towards the waiting crowd....Crash! Whack! Whack! At last the crowd broke. Only the orange-clad women were left standing beside the prostrate figures of crumpled men....

'A minute's lull and then, with flags flying, another column of volunteers marched onto the vast green field. A column of Mahrattis marched to meet them. They clashed....and again there was the spectacle of the green field dotted with a line of fallen bodies...Here sat a little knot of men, their heads bowed, submitting to a rain of lathi blows--refusing to move until completely laid out....

'I stood within five feet of a Sikh leader as he took the lathi blows. He was a short, heavily muscled man. The blows came--he stood straight. His turban was knocked off...He closed his eyes as the blows fell--until at last he swayed and fell to the ground. No other Sikh tried to shield him, but now, shouting defiance, they wiped away the blood streaming from his mouth...Restored to consciousness, the Sikh gave a smile and stood up for move.

'In this episode of a single day in a single city, five hundred men stood and let themselves be battered into unconsciousness by the police, without lifting a finger in "non-violent non-cooperation"²⁴

On April 23, 1930, the police with the help of army opened fire and a number of people were shot dead. The Government of India imposed rigid censorship of news. Gandhi's paper *Young India* gave a detailed news of the incident, from which *The Nation* quoted: "When those in front fell down wounded by the shots, those behind came forward with their breasts bared and exposed themselves to the fire, so that some persons got as many as twenty-one bullet wounds in

24. *The New Republic*, July 2, 1930, pp. 165-66.

their bodies, and all the people stood their ground without getting into a panic. A young Sikh boy came and stood in front of a soldier and asked him to fire at him, which the soldier unhesitatingly did, killing him. Similarly an old woman, seeing her relatives and friends being wounded, came forward, was shot and fell down wounded...The crowd keep standing at the same spot facing the soldiers and was fired at from time to time, until there were heaps of wounded and dying lying about. The Anglo-Indian paper of Lahore, which represents the official view, itself wrote to the effect that the people came forward one after another to face the firing and when they fell wounded they were dragged back and others came forward to be shot at. This state of things continued from eleven till five O'clock in the evening...

Two facts are noteworthy in this connection. One is that of all the dead collected by the Congressmen there was not one single instance where there was the mark of a bullet in the back. Further, all the wounds were bullet wounds and there was no trace of grape shot. Neither the police nor the military nor anybody else alleges that there was any stick or weapon, blunt or sharp, with the persons in the crowd. The attitude of the crowd and the splendid hold that the Congress had on the people are evidenced by the fact that in spite of the presence of the British troops patrolling the city, the picketing went on without a break and the batches of volunteers were sent according to the programme.²⁵ The British Government of India took such action many times at various places. But the news of such events did not reach America. It was difficult for the American press to get authentic news from India because the news agencies were controlled. *The Nation* wrote: 'But the news from India, which has increased greatly in volume, is filled with riots and rumours of riots. In the past, reports from India have too often been unsatisfactory both as to the reliability and as to emphasis. In the present crisis, some of the dispatches seem to reflect the political sympathies of the reporters. Never was there greater need of unprejudiced reporting.'²⁶ The same journal again remarked: 'Lord Irwin has revived press censorship in India. It is true that the native nationalist press is very sensational and provocative, but it has been so for a long time, and the fact that the Viceroy feels that he must employ the weapon of suppression indicates the

25. *The Nation*, June 25, 1930, p. 741.

26. *Ibid.*, April 16, 1930, p. 438.

seriousness of the present situation.²⁷ A week later the paper wrote: 'Censorship on press messages to and from India was put into effect shortly after the Mahatma's arrest.'²⁸ On this subject *Chicago Tribune* wrote in its editorial entitled 'British Force in India': 'The censorship has been effectively administered for the most part and the disagreeable facts, not violently spread even in the United States, are very softly spoken in Great Britain.....without the censorship Great Britain would be in danger of taking the old place of the unspeakable Turk, and it hasn't found a way of getting out of the hole.'²⁹ The American press deplored the lack of news from India. Most of reporters who wrote or cabled news from India for America were British. *The New Republic* wrote: 'The one important source of American opinion has been the Indian news reports in the columns of our press. Very much of this news, probably more than half of it, has come from British sources through Reuters, the British news service which has a cooperative arrangement with the Associated Press. This news, written by Englishmen for Englishmen and passed by the British censorship, certainly has not been unduly tender to the Indians.'³⁰

The *Christian Science Monitor* used the old argument that due to different races and creeds the bloodshed would follow if the British left India. The paper under the heading "Can Gandhi Keep Control?" wrote: 'Even sympathetic observers of India's agitation against British rule question whether that country could maintain orderly government if the British administration were withdrawn. So bitter are the animosities between Indian religious groups and social classes that there is every likelihood that any achievement of complete independence at this time would almost surely be followed by a period of near chaos.' The paper also wrote that 'India's nationalist movement will pass through many stages before it is finished.'³¹ The paper talked of the influence of Gandhi and wrote: 'Gandhi's chief supporters are Hindu students, always an element to be reckoned with seriously where political agitation in India is concerned. These young men, organized as the Indian

27. *Ibid.*, May 7, 1930, p. 533.

28. *Ibid.*, May 14, 1930, p. 561.

29. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 12, 1930.

30. *The New Republic*, August 20, 1930.

31. *Christian Science Monitor*, April 23, 1930.

Nationalist Congress Volunteers, have been leaders in minor breaches of the salt laws in many parts of India.³² The *Richmond Times Dispatch* remarked that Gandhi was working against a power stronger than the Congress. It also wrote that his idea of passive resistance was not able to give complete freedom to India. It wrote: 'And should India be given her freedom, which seems highly improbable, she would be unable to take care of herself and organize and maintain a capable government, because her people need protection and guidance. India can stand protection and obedience to experience much better than she could stand an internal turmoil such as her complete independence would create.'³³ The *Commonweal* wrote: 'On behalf of the British it may be said that they would probably be glad to give India a "dominion status" with as much self-government as Canada now enjoys—if such a thing were possible. It simply is not. And here Gandhi himself would seem to be the more pertinent illustration.'³⁴

Most of the American papers believed that England was not going to grant independence to India. Majority of the American papers favoured Dominion Status for India and according to them it was the best way to achieve independence. The *New Republic* wrote: 'Whatever we may think of the desirability of complete freedom for India, it is at the present moment a political impossibility. Great Britain may yield something under pressure, but it is fantastic to suppose that she will yield as much as that in one sudden act.'³⁵ The *New York Times* believed: 'To set out to win India's independence by non-violent means was to attempt the impossible.' It remarked, 'British troops are not firing upon crowds in defence of a Bourbon policy. India's representatives have been invited to meet the representatives of the British nation in a conference of which the outcome is humanly certain to be Dominion rule for India within a few years. Very few reasonable men will contend that it is worth while to let loose revolution and repression for the sake of a delay in India of immemorial patience--or for the sake of the shadowy difference between independence and Dominion rule.'³⁶ American press believed in the inherent right of

.32. *Ibid.*, April 12, 1930.

33. *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, March 16, 1930.

34. *The Commonweal*, May 21, 1930, p. 66.

35. *The New Republic*, May 7, 1930, p. 313.

36. *New York Times*, May 11, 1930.

the people to rule themselves but for India they feared of chaos and bloodshed. *The Review of Reviews* observed: 'It may be that the Indian people are unfit for complete self-government. Its vast chaos of races and religions might ensure failure and rapid destruction of public order and organization. But it is at least as hard to see how millions of people can be denied their right to liberty, even to self-misgovernment, in an age of self-determination.

'It would seem to be the misfortune of British in India, as in Ireland and indeed as in America a century and a half ago, to give too little and to give a little too late. Yet in simple justice one must say of the British that they have already given more, resigned a greater fraction of their once absolute power, than any people has ever done under like circumstances.'³⁷ The *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat* observed: 'It may be regarded as absolutely certain that Great Britain will not grant the independence Gandhi demands...Besides that there is not the slightest doubt that nothing worse could happen for the people of India than the full independence Gandhi demands. The diverse and largely ignorant elements of India's vast population are not the stuff from which successful self-government can be created off hand...Full independence with them would be complete and calamitous chaos. Therefore, for themselves and for itself, Great Britain must maintain its domination.'³⁸ The paper admitted that there had been a awakening in India and people of India had learned many things and Englandwill have to make great concessions to India sooner or later, and it will take the wisest powers of its great statesmanship to solve the problem that confronts it here.'³⁹

The pro-British American paper, the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, wrote: '....to give India independence or even Dominion status would clearly increase rather than diminish the difficulties of the situation. Every Englishman who knows India is perfectly well aware of this.'⁴⁰ Another pro-British paper, the *Christian Science Monitor* wrote: '....throughout it all, in the United States, at least, sounds the clear note of conviction that difficult as is the situation in India, the British are by nature

37. *The Review of Reviews*, July 1930, p. 66.

38. *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat*, May 7, 1930.

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, September 27, 1930.

and experience best fitted to cope with it, and that no immediate relaxation of their authority over its heterogeneous people is to be desired or to be feared.⁴¹ After a few months, the *Philadelphia Inquirer* again wrote, '....Dominion Status in the full sense of the phrase would give too much power to those unable to wield it, while independence would leave the whole country a prey to anarchy. In one form or another, England must have a reasonable measure of control.'⁴² The same paper under the heading 'The Indian Problem Illustrated' wrote: "Race riots between Hindus and Muslims at Cawnpore suppressed by British troops after many persons, including women and children, had been killed, as well as the less serious disorders which attended Gandhi's return to Karachi, offer further illustrations, if any were needed, of the serious results which would follow any weakening of British authority in India.' The paper further observed: 'More rioting in India emphasized the fact that Gandhi has loosened forces he cannot control even if he wishes. "Civil Disobedience" was from the first a fiction. It was certain to lead to violence, as Gandhi must have known.'⁴³ Thus, a section of the American press considered India quite unfit for Dominion Status.

However, liberal American press was sympathetic to Indian aspirations.. They did not consider the different races, religions and cultures obstacles in the way of India's right to self-government. Therefore, the British papers were critical of the American liberal press. Professor Edward Thompson wrote articles for the *London Times* on American press and India. He criticized the attitude of the American press toward Britain's policy. On Thompson's articles *The New Republic* wrote: 'There was no reason why this paper should be under obligation to reprint the Viceroy's letter to Mr. Gandhi or the statement of the Government at the time of his arrest. *The New Republic* is not a daily newspaper whose duty it is to print all the news. On the contrary, one important task of *The New Republic* is to print the news which does not appear in the daily papers. Mr. Gandhi's letter to the Viceroy had been almost overlooked by the American press. The *New York Times*, which has published by far the most voluminous accounts of the Indian situation, printed only 300 words of his 1500 word letter. The attitude of the

41. *Christian Science Monitor*, December 1, 1930.

42. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 22, 1930.

43. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, March 31, 1931.

British, on the other hand, had been adequately and repeatedly set forth. Almost everyday for a week, at the time of Mr. Gandhi's arrest, the Viceroy made a speech or published a document giving in detail the Government's arguments in favour of its course of action and these were all reported in ample detail. So far as we can learn, Mr. Gandhi's letter was given less space in other important American papers than in the *Times* or was ignored, while the Government's view was given much space.⁴⁴ The liberal section of American press was impressed by Gandhi and his methods of fight. The same journal wrote: '.....Among the Hindus there are, however, thousands of persons who are not satisfied with his non-resistant philosophy, who feel that the force of the English must be answered with force of their own. If Gandhi should be imprisoned, or should die as a result of some incident in connection with his present campaign, the tidal wave of hatred would break, with consequences which it is impossible to foresee.'⁴⁵ *The Christian Century* admired Gandhi. It remarked: '.....his trial brings all the Wes. to judgment. Pilate's seat stands again in the midst of the nations. Does Gandhi appear to us a fanatic, fantastic, unfathomable? So likewise appeared another who confronted the mightiest empire of his time before the seat of a Judean proconsul, nineteen hundred years ago this week. "My Kingdom," he said, to the baffled and exasperated Roman, "My Kingdom is not of your world." Is the Kingdom which Gandhi seeks of ours.'⁴⁶ *The Nation* observed, 'India's demand for self-government can no longer be answered either by a recital of the good works of the British raj or by reiteration of the opinion that Indians are not fit to rule themselves.'⁴⁷ *The New York Times* remarked: 'yet despite such reservations, the historic argument for liberty stands. If India is determined to be free, one cannot go on indefinitely pleading the benefits of British rule. Neither can one use in the old form the argument that India is not yet ready for independence.'⁴⁸ *The Nation* wrote: '.....We cannot see how anybody who believes in American institutions and the principles underlying them can hesitate. India has just as much right to take over its own government today as the Americans had in 1776. It is not for us, nor for the British either, to sit in

44. *The New Republic*, August 20, 1930, p. 6.

45. *Ibid.*, March 26, 1930, p. 137.

46. *The Christian Century*, April 16, 1930, p. 488.

47. *The Nation*, April 23, 1930, p. 478.

48. *New York Times*, May 28, 1930.

judgment upon the fitness of these people to rule themselves or to prophesy what the future may hold in store for them.⁴⁹ *The New Republic* rightly observed: 'if a Simon Commission had been sent to the American colonies in 1755, it would undoubtedly have found that they would require many years of development before they were ready for independence. The leaders of the nationalist movement were, many of them, fanatical; there were the problems presented by our long frontiers open to attack by wild natives and religions in our population; by the institution of Negro slavery. Those who actively desired independence were unquestionably in the majority. Such a report would have been true in detail, indeed nobody can be sure today that this nation might not have been better governed if it could have remained subject to the British crown. But all this is irrelevant in view of that contagious spirit of self-assertion which came to dominate the colonies. They wanted independence and they proposed to have it; years of warfare could not suppress the desire. When this spirit is abroad, alien government, even if it seems more fit in the abstract, is really incompetent.'⁵⁰ The Britishers were not happy with the American press opinion on India. The *New York Times* wrote: 'An English audience was told today that anti-British and pro-Indian feeling was far more prevalent in the United States today than pro-British opinion in connection with the present upheaval in India. The speaker was Professor L.F. Rushbrook Williams.....'⁵¹ *The New Republic* commented, 'British propaganda in America is quite as extensive as the Indian or more so, and it has been skilful and persistent. If, in spite of this fact, many Americans lean to the cause of India, we suggest that perhaps that cause has some innate merits which are deserving of consideration.'⁵² The most important British propagandist was Professor L.F. Rushbrook Williams. He visited America to present British point of view. *The New Republic* wrote about his visit: 'The good luck which proverbially serves the British Empire was never better exemplified than in the arrival of Professor Rushbrook Williams in New York....At the moment when American liberal opinion is gravely concerned over the turn of events in India and inclined to be harshly critical of British policy, along comes Mr. Williams to assure us that all is, on the whole, well.

49. *The Nation*, May 21, 1930, p. 588.

50. *The New Republic*, September 3, 1930 p. 58.

51. *New York Times*, June 20, 1930.

52. *The New Republic*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

The Indian unrest is about to end, he says, and will be all over by October. The outbreaks have been sporadic, the work of "the turbulent element" from the bazaars. Gandhi is not regarded as a real political leader. India cannot be united because it is composed of many peoples and many cults. Mr. Williams is travelling privately, and it is of course sheer coincidence which causes him to bob up in New York at the same moment when the British case so badly needs stating. It reminds us of the similar coincidence by which Sir Gilbert Parker arrived to tell us, during the War, how sweet and pure were the Allies and how dastardly were the Germans.⁵³ *The Nation* wrote about Professor Williams's activities in America thus: '.....when it is remembered that Professor Williams is envoy at London of the Chamber of Indian Princes, probably the most reactionary body in India, it is easy to understand why he calls Gandhi a "fanatical reactionary". Even so, it seems hardly necessary to produce "from among his private state papers" as new and conclusive evidence against Gandhi and his movement, the "confession" (consisting of Gandhi's strictures on the machine age and modern science generally) which was openly printed in 1909 and which, according to C.F. Andrews, one of Gandhi's closest friends, Gandhi would probably modify if he re-cast it at this time. Why Professor Williams should be going immediately to Washington to report on the Indian situation to the British Embassy of a Labour Government is hard to understand.'⁵⁴

Katherine Mayo after a tour of India came out with a book, *Mother India*, in which she painted Indian life in the most sombre colours. *The New Republic* remarked: 'only one book about India has sold in large numbers in the United States in recent years, or has had any appreciable effect upon opinion here. That is Katherine Mayo's *Mother India*, a work which is cruelly unfair to the Indians and their cause and is the most effective pro-British propaganda ever written.'⁵⁵ This book was condemned by some sections of the American public opinion. In defence of this book Harry H. Field wrote another work entitled *After Mother India*. C.F. Andrews wrote in *The New Republic*: 'In spite of the profession of giving full documentation, the ignorance displayed about India in these books is so crude that one is surprised

53. *Ibid.*, May 21, 1930, p. 2

54. *The Nation*, May 28, 1930, p. 612.

55. *The New Republic*, *op. cit.*

to find them carrying weight either with the American or British public as serious publications. Unfortunately, the peculiar style of propaganda which they represent seems to captivate a certain type of mind. They offer on the surface a pseudo-scientific appearance by copious quotations from documents which are unknown to the reader and often given without their full context. When analyzed the scientific side of things breaks to pieces, because there has been no detailed study of the subject such as would correct false and hasty impressions.

'There is one chapter in this book called "The Messenger", which has nothing to do with "*Mother India*" itself, but is a deliberate and provocative attack on Mahatma Gandhi's private character.⁵⁶ *Mother India* created sensation and as a reaction to it, K.L. Guba wrote *Uncle Sham*. It was followed by another book called *Unhappy India* written by Lala Lajpat Rai. Gandhi called Mayo's work a 'drain inspector's report.'

On January 25, 1931, Lord Irwin declared that the Government would release the Congress leaders from jail so that they could think of joining the Second Round Table Conference. On January 26 Gandhi was released and in the following few days the members of the Congress Working Committee were released. The release of Gandhi was front page news in the American press. The *New York Herald Tribune* wrote an editorial entitled "Gandhi Accepts Freedom". The paper commented: "Lord Irwin, at all events, has manoeuvred to associate Mr. Gandhi once more in the great work of Indian government building. Mr. Gandhi has not at the outset rejected the manoeuvre. It is another optimistic sign."⁵⁷ The *Los Angeles Times* observed: 'Confidence of the British Government that the Indian Conference in London will reach results acceptable to the majority of the Indian people is indicated by the release from jail of Mahatma Gandhi, leader of the Nationalist movement.'⁵⁸ The *Baltimore Sun* wrote: 'Gandhi is now out of jail because sitting physically helpless in a room under guard he was showing himself more powerful than all the brains and all the legions of Britain.'⁵⁹ The *New York Times* wrote about Gandhi's release: 'Freeing of Mahatma Gandhi and his chief lieutenants, with removal of the ban on the

56. *Ibid.*, January 8, 1930. p. 199.

57. *New York Herald Tribune*, January 27, 1931.

58. *Los Angeles Times*, January 27, 1931.

59. *Baltimore Sun*, January 27, 1931.

Indian National Congress in not a retreat on the part of the British Government. The steps are necessary after the London round-table conference. The scheme of Indian home rule drafted by it must be ratified by the British people and the Indian people.⁶⁰ The *Christian Science Monitor* praised the act of Lord Irwin and official policy: 'The release of Gandhi and other Indian Congress Party leaders, announced from Delhi, is a courageous and commendable act of faith upon the part of the British authorities.'⁶¹ The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* remarked: 'The British Government has done something so eminently sane that one wonders why it had not been done before. Gandhi, Nationalist leader and apostle of civil disobedience, walks serenely forth from jail.'⁶² The *Kansas City Star* opined that due to two factors the Indian national movement was bloodless. First, Gandhi who was worshipped by Indians and second, that cultured Englishman, the Viceroy of India. The paper wrote: 'It is a remarkable tribute to Gandhi's influence that despite the failure of his methods so far to produce results in the way of forcing the British out of India, he is still the commanding figure among the Nationalists.'⁶³

The *Philadelphia Inquirer* believed that the release of Gandhi was dangerous to the British rule. The paper asserted : '...these prisoners are not simply political; they have committed, or incited the commission, of serious crimes and disorders. Their object has been to make government impossible, and they have not hesitated to use assassination as a weapon. To set them free is in effect an assurance that they can continue their agitation with impunity.' The paper further wrote: 'The control of foreign affairs, of defence and of finance must remain vested in the British Government. But Gandhi and his followers have given no indication that they will be satisfied with this. The Indian delegates at the Conference do not expect it of them. Will their agitation be checked by opening the jails.? It is far more likely to be stimulated.'⁶⁴

The *New Republic* considered Gandhi's release an act of expediency. It observed: '...Unless the tentative agreement reached by the Round Table Conference in London is accepted by the Gandhi group, the

60. *New York Times*, January 27, 1931.

61. *Christian Science Monitor*, January 27, 1931.

62. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, January 27, 1931.

63. *Kansas City Star*, January 27, 1931.

64. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *op-cit*.

present deadlock must continue; and the Gandhists could hardly arrive at a decision while their leaders were locked up and prevented from conferring.⁶⁵ *The Nation* was of the opinion that the release of Gandhi and other leaders would make the situation fluid. It remarked: 'It is hard to see how the Working Committee, in the light of past pronouncements, can consistently accept the Round Table recommendations as they stand without convincing assurance that self-government promised therein shall be real and the reservations shall not be merely a device for preserving British dominance.'⁶⁶

The release of Gandhi and members of the Congress Working Committee did not put a stop to the movement. The talk of settlement and repressive policy of the Government were going on. Gandhi said that he had come out of jail with an open mind. The Working Committee of the Congress authorised Gandhi to seek an interview with Lord Irwin. The interview was granted by the Viceroy. This Gandhi-Irwin talk did not create interest in the American press. Only a few periodicals commented on the event. On the decision of the Congress to continue the movement *The Commonwealth* commented: 'Absolute pacifism may be as dangerous as militarism being the other extreme of a fallacy. If ever a middle path—that of reasonable compromise—were needed, it is in India today.'⁶⁷ *The Outlook and Independent* wrote: 'Hopes for peace in India neither brightened nor disappeared in the week after Mahatma Gandhi was released from jail.'⁶⁸ *The New Republic* opined: 'The situation in India is dark, but not entirely bleak as regards the prospect for a peaceful settlement If the negotiations break down and affairs in India get worse, they (the British) will be quite as much to blame as the Indians.'⁶⁹ According to *The Christian Century* 'If the conference succeeds, a new day will have dawned in international statecraft.'⁷⁰ When there was no sign of a settlement the paper wrote: '...If Lord Irwin and Gandhi cannot agree, and the nationalist leaders go back to jail, the initiative in the Indian Congress movement is almost certain to pass into the hands of younger firebrands and out

65. *The New Republic*, February 4, 1931, p. 309.

66. *The Nation*, *op. cit.*

67. *The Commonwealth*, February 11, 1931, p. 395.

68. *The Outlook and Independent*, February 1931, p. 209.

69. *The New Republic*, February 1931, p. 1.

70. *The Christian Century*, February, 1931 p. 259.

of that will come widespread violence.⁷¹ Another paper *The World Tomorrow* was also not hopeful of a settlement: 'Peace may be brought much nearer as a result of the conference between Gandhi and Lord Irwin.. our prediction, however, is that no satisfactory agreement will be reached.'⁷²

The opinion of the American press on Gandhi-Irwin talks was not hopeful of a settlement. However, on March 4, 1931, an agreement was reached, known as Gandhi - Irwin Pact. All the important American dailies gave a prominent space to this settlement in India. Most of the American papers changed their tone. Now they were not talking of chaos and confusion but believed that this pact would be a relief to both the parties. The *Atlanta Constitution* observed: 'It would be greatly to his (Irwin's) honour as a representative of Imperial throne to have reached an understanding with that strange and potential apostle of Indian aspirations—Mahatma Gandhi, whereby peace is maintained in India and millions of people of both Great Britain and India saved from the slaughters, wants and ruin of an unnecessary war-conflagration.'⁷³ The *Christian Science Monitor* under the heading 'Good News from India' remarked: '... the agreement means that the chief political organization among Indians has for the first time shown that it sees in the Round Table Scheme the promise of a genuine road toward that independence to which India looks forward.'⁷⁴ The *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat* wrote: The compromise reached Tuesday, none too soon, and called an armistice compact, is the longest step yet taken for transforming old India into New India.⁷⁵ The *Baltimore Sun* was of the opinion that the success of the Gandhi-Irwin talks 'makes the diehards on both sides look a little silly'⁷⁶. The *Los Angeles Times* wrote under the heading 'Mahatma's Magic:' There was a certain King Pyrrhus whose defeat of the Romans has become historic. It looks as though Mahatma Gandhi has done even better than Pyrrhus.'⁷⁷ The *Kansas City Star* paid tribute to Gandhi: 'In his hour of triumph

71. *Ibid.*, March, 1931, p. 331.

72. *The World Tomorrow*, March, 1931, p. 67.

73. *Atlanta Constitution*, March 5, 1931.

74. *Christian Science Monitor*, March 5, 1931.

75. *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat*, March 9, 1931.

76. *Baltimore Sun*, March 5, 1931.

77. *Los Angeles Times*, March 6, 1931.

the Mahatma sipped hot goat-milk from a battered can. Although the report does not so state, it is safe to assume that he was dressed as usual in a loin cloth and that his spinning wheel was not far off.⁷⁸ *The Nation* remarked: 'The agreement between Lord Irwin and Mr. Gandhi, which brings at least a temporary peace to India after a year of intense and bitter strife, seems to us to constitute a firm beginning towards a solution of the British-Indian dilemma.'⁷⁹ *The Christian Century* believed that due to this agreement India would achieve independence. It wrote: '...What words are adequate to pay tribute to the victory which he has won? It has been the strangest, yet the most marvellous victory in modern history. It has been not a victory of Indian nationalism over British imperialism, but of spiritual compulsion over the pretensions of materialism. It has been as much a victory over the soul of India as over the might of Britain. And it has been a victory which puts a new face on the world's hope for international peace. For Gandhi has proved that the re-dressing of the political and racial balances, which is bound to come between Asia and Africa and the West, need not involve the resort to force.'⁸⁰ The periodical had a kind word for Lord Irwin: 'In these negotiations Lord Irwin has come out with his already good reputation for love of truth and fair play greatly enhanced.'⁸¹

In the editorial entitled 'Everybody Wins' *The World Tomorrow* wrote: '..... Lord Irwin has won a notable victory. Even greater is the triumph of Mahatma Gandhi. The deadlock has been broken, and a pacific settlement of the problem of India's status now seems possible.'⁸²

A section of the American press believed that no successful solution of India's future could be achieved without the help of the Congress. The *Springfield Daily Republican* observed: 'Much hard work remains to be done before a solution of the Indian problem can be found, but the truce agreed to by Mahatma Gandhi and the Viceroy at least gives this needful work a chance to go on.'⁸³ *The National Herald*

78. *Kansas City Star*, March 10, 1931.

79. *The Nation*, March 18, 1931, p. 289.

80. *The Christian Century*, March 18, 1931, p. 367.

81. *Ibid.*, April 15, 1931, p. 525.

82. *The Worlds Tomorrow*, April, 1931, p. 101.

83. *Springfield Daily Republican*, March, 5, 1931.

Tribune also believed that the Pact was a triumph for Gandhi and other Congress leaders. The *New York Times* opined that the Pact was a victory for the British Government. It wrote: 'In the Gandhi-Irwin Pact it is Great Britain that seems to have conceded the least and won the most.'⁸⁴ *The New Republic* wrote: '..... Partly for diplomatic reasons, but mainly, no doubt, as an example of wishful thinking, the British represent the case as being closer to complete agreement than it is in fact. Yet undoubtedly a tremendous forward step has been taken, and there is today more hope of a peaceful, satisfactory settlement than has ever before existed.'⁸⁵

There were few American papers which differed from the general opinion of the American press. They were of the opinion that Lord Irwin had made the political situation in India more difficult and the Pact lowered the British prestige. The *Philadelphia Inquirer* wrote: 'By signing a "truce" with Gandhi, the Viceroy of India, no doubt unwittingly, has done much to impair British prestige. Treating with rebellion against constituted authority is always a dubious experiment. In this instance Lord Irwin approached the chief of the rebels as if he were the representative of an independent power, though the Congress party had deliberately abstained from the London Conference and took no part in the approach to a settlement there reached. The terms of this agreement are really of less consequence than the fact that it has been reached in this backstairs fashion.'⁸⁶ *The World Tomorrow* talked of the mixed reaction on the Pact in England: '*The Daily Mail* complains of the mischief done through "the sentimental weakness of Lord Irwin" in consenting to "prolonged and humiliating confabulations with Gandhi, that convicted criminal and avowed enemy of the British Empire". When an announcement of the truce was made in the House of Commons there were prolonged cheers from Laborites and Liberals, but "from the Conservative benches, however, there was nothing but stony silence.... Mr. Baldwin fidgeted in his chair, passed his hand over his face and kept his lips shut. Sir Austen Chamberlain, next to him sat impassively with his top hat pulled down over his eyes and his feet on the Clerk's table.'⁸⁷

84. *New York Times*, March 6, 1931.

85. *The New Republic*, March 18, 1931, p. 113.

86. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, March 5, 1931.

87. *The World Tomorrow*, April 1931, p. 102.

The British Civil Service had not approved the Pact. They saw victory of the Congress in it. Due to this Gandhi declared his inability to participate in the coming London Conference. However, on August 29, 1931, he sailed for England from Bombay to participate in the Conference. He reached England on September 12, 1931. He was well received by the Englishmen. The people were friendly to him. The *Philadelphia Inquirer* wrote that 'Some people in the crowd laughed at him but Gandhi took it seriously.'⁸⁸ At the second Round Table Conference Gandhi was the centre of interest. The *Baltimore Sun* remarked: 'So far Gandhi is centre of the Conference; indeed, he is likely to remain the centre of it.'⁸⁹ *The Nation* observed: 'When before has the world seen a spectacle comparable to Mahatma Gandhi in St. James's Palace? Here is one naked little man, physically a ridiculous figure negotiating with the British Empire.'⁹⁰ H.N.Brailsford, an admirer of Gandhi and who knew him well, wrote in *The New Republic*: 'He (Mahatma Gandhi) holds our fate in his hands. With all his gentleness and courtesy, he is capable of smashing with a remorseless rejection all the schemes which titled but unrepresentative persons are working out in the courtly chambers of St. James's Palace. He knows what he means to obtain; and if the hope of getting it should vanish, he will pack up his spinning wheel and return to India. With a word he can bring about the resumption of civil disobedience. Trade will stand still and taxes will cease to flow into the exchequer. And how, one asks, with the pound trembling, would that end? This little man may bring an empire down.'⁹¹

Gandhi in his speech at the Conference said: 'there was a time when I was proud of being called a British subject. Now I would rather be called a rebel than a subject. But I have aspired and still aspire to be a citizen, not in the empire but in a commonwealth—a partnership, if God wills it, indissoluble, but not a partnership imposed by one nation on another.'⁹² The *Baltimore Sun* wrote about his address: '... the whole burden of his speech was sweet reasonableness. He was

88. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, September 14, 1931.

89. *Baltimore Sun.*, September 15, 1931.

90. *The Nation*, September 30, 1931. p. 323.

91. *The New Republic*, October 21, 1931 p. 250

92., *New York Times*, September 20, 1931.

humble-- he did not wish to obstruct the Government... he was conciliatory' he bore down on the " spirit of cooperation;" he was realistic.....?⁹³ The *Springfield Daily Republican* remarked: "Neither in words nor in tone was there the slightest trace of rancor such as might be expected from a rebel who has more than once been in jail. His purpose is unfaltering, but it is based not on hatred but on love."⁹⁴ Ferdinand Kuhn Jr. wrote in the *New York Times*: "Saint and social reformer, politician and propagandist, he now shows himself to be a diplomat with one of the subtlest minds that ever came out of the East."⁹⁵ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* wrote: "With all his assumption of humility, there is a note of arrogance in his utterances.He has no authority to speak for all India."⁹⁶ It believed that Gandhi 'has come to confer as an irreconcilable and everything he says must be interpreted in the light of this fact.'⁹⁷ The paper concluded, "It would be better to have the Round Table Conference fail utterly than to yield to such a preposterous threat."⁹⁸ The *Christian Science Mointor* changed its critical tone. It remarked: "On broad lines his critics will find little in his speech to grumble at; it is when he claims to be representative of the peasant that Mr. Gandhi is treading on dangerous political grounds."⁹⁹ The *Los Angeles Times* wrote that the future of India as Gandhi visualized was 'a theoretical impossibility, at least as a basis for discussion. It is not too far from federation scheme proposed by the Simon Commission to rule out all likelihood of compromise, and since Gandhi specifically declares he is willing to talk compromise, the round -table discussion seems likely to get somewhere—at least so far as Gandhi and his following are concerned.'¹⁰⁰ The *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat* wrote that it is likely '....that this little man will be an obstacle exceedingly hard to overcome.'¹⁰¹

93. *Baltimore Sun*, September 17, 1931.

94. *Springfield Daily Republican*, September 17, 1931.

95. *New York Times*, September 20, 1931.

96. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, September, 14, 1931.

97. *Ibid.*, September 18, 1931.

98. *Ibid.*

99. *Christian Science Monitor*, September 17, 1931.

100. *Los Angeles Times*, September 19, 1931.

101. *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat* September 15, 1931.

On December 1, 1931, the second Round Table Conference was concluded. The American press paid little attention to the proceedings of the Conference. The majority of the American press considered the Conference a failure. The pro-British American papers blamed Gandhi for its failure. The liberal American press held the British responsible. The independent views oriented American papers blamed both.

The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* opined: 'The eclipse of Labor in the recent election killed any lingering hope that Gandhi would get any approximaion of the self—rule he demands for India. With a British Government, Tory in fact if not in name, reform in India is likely to be pushed backward.'¹⁰² The *Atlanta Constitution* remarked, 'So far as the accomplishment of any material progress towards smoothing over conditions in disturbed India is concerned, the Conference, with its three months of sessions and million-dollar expenses, accomplished little or nothing.'¹⁰³ The *Kansas City Star* wrote, '...like the first, the second Round Table Conference has failed....'¹⁰⁴ The *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat* wrote that the Conference came to an end "with no definite solution of the problem yet in sight."¹⁰⁵ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* blamed Gandhi for a failure. It wrote that Gandhi 'has been from the first the chief obstacle to any amicable arrangement with the British GovernemntThe second Conference, like the first, has gone on the rocks in consequence.'¹⁰⁶ According to the paper Gandhi '....might well be called the evil genius of Inida'¹⁰⁷ The paper concluded that the Conference, 'has failed to accomplish anything..... Gandhi more than any other one man, is responsible for the failure...'¹⁰⁸ The *New York Times Herald Tribune* remarked: "But between this and total failure there is a wide gap; the real question is how far the way be kept open for further progress."¹⁰⁹ The *Christian Science Monitor* recorded two achievements: The Conference has shown that a plan

102. *Cleveland Plan Dealer*, December 1, 1931.

103. *Atlanta Constitution*, December 3, 1931.

104. *Kansas City Star*, December 2, 1931.

105. *St. Louis' Daily Globe-Democrat*, December 2, 1931.

106. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 1, 1931.

107. *Ibid.*

108. *Ibid.*, December 3, 1931.

109. *New York Times Herald Tribune*, December 1, 1931.

for creating a federated India from British India and the native States is practicable, and it has strengthened the growing faith of Indians in British statesmanship'.¹¹⁰ The *Chicago Daily Tribune* believed that the British had gained much. 'The Round Tables have been more advantageous, it would seem, to the imperial interest than to that of Indian independence, since they have advertised the internal conflicts and postponed substantial concessions, have encouraged moderate opinion in India, and, by giving Mr. Mac Donald the opportunity to put responsibility for the breakup of the Conference upon the Moslem-Hindu impasse, will react favorably in foreign opinion upon British policy.'¹¹¹ The *Springfield Daily Republican* wrote: 'The London Round Tables have been helpful both to India and to the British people, who have come to understand much better both the difficulty of the problem and the pressing need of solving it.'¹¹² The *New York Times* remarked: 'Adjournment of the second Round Table Conference without drafting a new constitution for India, might be called a failure if the lack of agreement had been between Britain and India. But the deadlock at the London Conference was between Indians and Indians.'¹¹³ The *Nation* observed: 'Only a British right-about-face could apparently have rescued the Round Table Conference from the abyss toward which it drifted in its closing weeks. But instead of frank generosity on the part of the British Government, which might have stilled the conviction of futility growing in the minds of the Indian delegates, the discussions merely reveal that India's major demands are to be ignored.'¹¹⁴

On August 17, 1932, Ramsay Mac Donald announced separate electorates to the untouchables in India. On September 20, Gandhi started his fast unto death against this decision of His Majesty's Government. The *New York Times* wrote: 'Gandhi's position in the matter is easy to understand and to sympathize with. Yet there can never be self-governing India if divisions among her people are multiplied.'¹¹⁵ The paper appreciated Gandhi's point of view. It remarked: 'it is certainly for the best interests of the Indian people that the great

110. *Christian Science Monitor*, December 1, 1931.

111. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 3, 1931.

112. *Springfield Daily Republican*, December 3, 1931.

113. *New York Times*, December 6, 1931.

114. *The Nation*, December 9, 1931, p. 629.

115. *New York Times*, September 19, 1932.

Hindu constituency should not develop a new group cleavage in a country afflicted with too many factions and separate interests.¹¹⁶ *The Nation* wrote: 'The death of Gandhi by self-starvation would not only mean the loss to the world of one of its most significant figures, it would let loose in India a storm which the British already foresee. It is to be hoped that the government and Gandhi will somehow find a compromise.'¹¹⁷ *The Philadelphia Inquirer* criticised Gandhi's fast. It commented: 'To the unsympathetic eye the Mahatma seems to be making merely a grandstand play... His grievance is that the untouchables are to have some share in the future government of India which to a high caste Hindu like himself is well nigh unthinkable. In other words, the apostle of liberty for India would keep millions of his countrymen in hopeless subjection. If any consciences are shaken it should be those of Gandhi and his supporters.'¹¹⁸

On May 1933, Gandhi began another fast for twenty-one days for 'a prayer for purification of myself and my associates for greater vigilance and watchfulness in connection with the Harijan cause.'¹¹⁹ *The New York Times* wrote: 'Gandhi's latest fast, now happily concluded, is a bit hard to understand if we think of it as addressed to the outside world. A three-week hunger strike would not be an effective weapon against the British Government since, to put it roughly, the British Government would probably expect Gandhi to come alive out of the ordeal. For the same reason the propaganda value on outside opinion other than British would be small. We might almost say that the outside world has lost a good deal of interest in that particular spiritual weapon.'¹²⁰ *The Nation* remarked: 'Gandhi's fast which began on May 8 is directly aimed at the removal of untouchability. Indirectly it is aimed against British rule in India; and it may prove to be the most effective attack he has ever made... The British authorities, in releasing him from prison, have seized upon their one means of self-defence, but Gandhi's death, even outside of jail, would have tremendous repercussions.... But it is certain that the fast, whether Gandhi survives it or not, by increasing

116. *Ibid.*, September 25, 1932.

117. *The Nation*, September 28, 1932, p. 267.

118. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, September 23, 1932.

119. Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 558. ---

120. *New York Times*, May 31, 1933.

Indian unity will mark a great step toward Indian independence.¹²¹

The Christian Century wrote: '... The immediate struggle involved may be entirely within the Hindu community, but its ultimate effects may be felt in every part of the world... The human stakes immediately at issue are, therefore, immense. The outcome, whatever it may turn out to be, is likely to go on shaping the course of history after every human being now living is dead.'¹²²

On August 1, 1933, Gandhi started individual civil disobedience movement. On August 4, he was arrested. He again started fast. On fifth day he was removed to hospital. At last Government of India released him. The *New York Times* wrote: 'After all, passive resistance, if it is exerted for an unyielding, uncompromising demand, is much the same thing as violence. If Gandhi is out to have things his own way, come what may, he might as well organize a Hindu Shirt Movement and prepare to use force.'¹²³ After some time the paper again wrote: 'One does not hear so much of Gandhi "the saint" as one used to. The world has come to recognize that the weapons employed by the Mahatma may resemble the spiritual weapons of holiness, but at the bottom Gandhi is a very astute political leader, as he has every right to be. He makes use of passive resistance because primarily that is the only weapon available to the Hindu people.'¹²⁴ *The Nation* remarked: '... where else is there a spectacle of power faintly comparable to that of this frail body opposing its lone personality, peaceably yet effectively, against the united land, sea and air forces of the British Empire? Without any of the adjuncts which we regard as essential to power, without fortune or family or office, or armed supporters, this humble Indian is known and revered all over the world because almost alone among the so-called great of the day there is not a shadow of a doubt of his utter, unselfishness, of his complete devotion to his cause. We may or may not believe in Gandhi's objectives, but unless all of man's supposed progress upward from the cave is fictitious, unless the idea that reason is destined to prevail over brute force is false, then the methods and spirit of the Mahatma are bound to

121. *The Nation*, May 17, 1933, p. 543.

122. *The Christian Century*, May 17, 1933, p. 648.

123. *New York Times*, August, 27, 1933.

124. *New York Times*, September 16, 1933.

125. *The Nation*, August 16, 1933 p. 170.

survive his weak and ungainly body and become an increasing power on the earth.¹²⁵

The American press projected Jawharlal Nehru as possible successor of Gandhi. According to the general opinion it was inevitable in Indian politics that the Congress party leadership would pass to other hands and the only acceptable leader seemed to be young Nehru. But *The Christian Century* wrote: 'It is too early to predict what effect his withdrawal from the Congress presidency will have on the situation in India, although it is clear that the effect will be great. A struggle is likely to develop within the Congress between the socially conservative older generation of orthodox Hindus, who will be content to keep up a form of opposition to Britain so long as slight political concessions are made from time to time, and the younger men led by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who are coming swiftly to believe that India requires both a social and political revolution. Some day Britain will realize that in the withdrawal of Gandhi from politics, she has lost her best friend.'¹²⁶

126. *The Christian Century*, November 7, 1934, p. 1396.

INDIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA'S PERCEPTION DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

On September 1, 1939, the Second World War started. India, as a British colony was automatically dragged into it. American President Roosevelt realised that India was going to be very important in the War. Therefore, in 1941, America agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives with India. America placed a Commissioner with the rank of Minister at New Delhi and India sent an Agent-General with the same rank to Washington. At this time the question of India's freedom created a delicate situation between America and Britain. The British War Cabinet was not prepared to pacify Indian leaders while the Working Committee of the Congress declared: 'This Committee cannot associate itself or offer any cooperation in a war which is conducted on imperialistic lines and which is meant to consolidate imperialism in India or elsewhere'. The Congress wanted and demanded that India be declared an independent nation with effective powers to be transferred forthwith. Events of great importance were taking place in India but they were not able to attract much attention in America. In America people felt mainly concerned with the War, though India was not totally out of their perception. American attitude towards India was detached and disinterested but with the Japanese occupation of South-East Asia and Burma, America became concerned with the fate of India also. India was not only the base of operation against Japan, with a large American force stationed here, she also controlled the supply line to China. America was aware of the need of Indian cooperation in the War. Later General Eisenhower observed: 'Aside from preserving lines of air and sea communication to Australia, we had to hold the Indian bastion at all cost, otherwise junction between the Japanese and German forces would be accomplished through the Persian Gulf.'¹

1. Eisenhower, Dwight D., *Crusade in Europe*, New York, 1948, p. 28.

On March 10, 1942, President Roosevelt sent a long cable to Churchill, the Prime Minister of England, on the Indian question. In his cable Roosevelt suggested '...the setting up of a government to be headed by a small group representative of different religions and geographies, occupations and castes; it would be representative of the existing British Provinces and the Council of Princes, and would be recognised as a temporary Dominion Government. This representative group would be charged with the duty of considering the structure of permanent Government of India, such consideration to extend for five or six years, or at least until a year after the end of the present war.' Roosevelt wrote, 'perhaps some such method, with its analogy to the problems and travails of the United States from 1783 to 1789, might cause the people of India to forget past hard feelings, and to become more loyal to the British Empire, and to emphasize the danger of domination by the Japanese, and the advantage of peaceful evolution as contrasted with revolutionary chaos.' Roosevelt added that this was 'none of my business and for the love of Heaven do not bring me into this, though I want to be of help.'² But the British Prime Minister was determined not to move an inch on the question of Indian independence. Robert E. Sherwood wrote about Churchill's reaction thus : 'It is probable that the only part of that cable with which Churchill agreed was Roosevelt's admission that it 'is none of my business.' Hopkins said a long time later that he did not think that 'any suggestions from the President to the Prime Minister in the entire War were so wrathfully received as those relating to the solution of the Indian problem.'³ This move of President Roosevelt gained Indian goodwill for America. Nehru said, 'may I also say that all of us in India know very well, although it might not be so known in public, what great interest President Roosevelt had in our country's freedom and how he exercised his great influence to that end.'⁴ So not only was America interested in India, the British Government and the Indian National Congress were also interested in American opinion as a powerful force which could change the course of Indian politics.

On March 22, 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in India with proposals from the British Government. At the same time Roosevelt sent Colonel

2. Sherwood, Robert E., *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, New York, 1948, pp. 511-12.

3. *White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins*, Vol. II, pp. 515-16.

4. Nehru, J.L., *India's Foreign Policy*, Delhi, 1961, p. 593.

Louis Johnson to India as his personal representative with the rank of an Ambassador. He talked with many Indian leaders and also with Sir Cripps. This created an impression in India that Roosevelt hoped for a liberal political settlement and added to the American prestige in Indian eyes. Gandhi appreciated the value of American opinion and sent a letter to President Roosevelt on July 1942 through Louis Fischer. Gandhi asked Roosevelt, 'why should India be deprived of her freedom?'⁵ Roosevelt sent a reply to Gandhi on August 5, 1942, but it was not delivered to him by the Government of India until two years after. It was sympathetic and stated that the American Government had 'consistently striven for and supported policies of fair dealing and fair play and all related principles looking towards the creation of harmonious relations between nations.'⁶ It ended with the hope that 'our common interest in democracy and righteousness will enable your countrymen and mine to make common cause against a common enemy.'⁷

President Roosevelt took keen interest in the Cripps negotiations. Its failure disappointed him. He did not see eye to eye with Churchill on the Indian question. He sympathised with the point of view of the Congress leaders. On April 11, 1942, he wrote a letter to the British Prime Minister in which he conveyed his feelings in the matter. He wrote to Churchill that the Americans felt that the deadlock in the talks had been caused by Britain's attitude not to concede the right of self-government to the Indian people 'notwithstanding the willingness of the Indians to entrust technical, military and naval defence control to the competent British authorities.

'If the Cripps talks failed and India was subsequently invaded with success by Japan with attendant serious military or naval reverses for the Allies, the prejudicial reaction on American public opinion can hardly be overestimated.' President Roosevelt further wrote: 'I am sorry to say that I cannot agree with the point of view set forth in your message to me that public opinion in the U.S. believed that the negotiations have failed on broad general issues. The general impression here is quite the contrary.'⁸ President Roosevelt did not want to make the

5. Fischer, Louis, *The Great Challenge*, New York, 1946, p. 169.

6. Hull, Cordell, *Memoirs*, New York, 1948, p. 1489.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 1490.

8. U.S. State Department Documents, *Foreign Relation of the U.S., 1942*, Vol. 1.

Indian case a public issue But the British Prime Minister was adamant. He wrote back to the President that 'Anything like a serious difference between you and me would break my heart and surely deeply injure both our countries at the height of this terrible struggle.'⁹ Therefore, Roosevelt kept his discussion on informal basis though, as Cordell Hull remarks, 'in private conversations, the President talked very bluntly about India with Prime Minister Churchill..... while for the sake of good relations with Britain we could not tell the country what we were saying privately; we were saying everything that the most enthusiastic supporters of Indian freedom could have expected and we were convinced that the American people were with us.'¹⁰ Due to Churchill, President Roosevelt was unable to apply the provisions of the Atlantic Charter to India.

In December 1942, William Phillips was named in place of Louis Johnson, presidential envoy to New Delhi with the rank of Ambassador. He strongly advised President Roosevelt to take a firm action on the political deadlock in India. He wrote: 'I feel strongly, Mr President, that in view of the military position in India, we should have a voice in these matters. It is not right for the British to say that this is none of your (American) business when we alone presumably will have the major part to play in the struggle with Japan... words are of no avail, they only aggravate the present situation. It is time for the British to act. This they can do by solemn declaration from the king-Emperor that India will achieve her independence at a specified date after the war and that as a guarantee of good faith in this respect, a provisional representative coalition government will be reestablished at the centre and limited powers transferred to it.'¹¹

Thus the American reaction to the political developments in India was an inevitable clash of support for Britain as an American ally and traditional American championship of the cause of dependent nations fighting for independence. United States had to harmonise her interests also with this clash. The result was a fluctuating opinion, sincerely desirous of helping India, but only if it did not offend Britain as her ally. In the opinion of Julia Johnson, the American opinion 'has fluctuated between the full recognition and acceptance of the

9. *The Hindustan Times*, June 21, 1960.

10 Hull, Cordell, *op. cit.*, p. 1483.

11. *The Hindustan Times*, *op. cit.*

position of its British ally and appeals for Presidential and United Nations intervention on behalf of India'.

The fluctuation of American opinion was well illustrated by the editorials in the *New York Times*. This paper criticised the plan of the Congress to launch a movement. It wrote that 'Britain cannot tolerate anarchy in India while her own life is at stake, nor can we in this country urge her to do so. A similar tone was to be seen in another editorial of the same paper. But when the repression became known the same paper reminded Britain that 'if they mean to recognise the freedom and equality of the Indian people, they must not use against a rebellious minority any measure that they would not use against a similar minority in Britain itself.' The paper appreciated Britain's difficulties at that time also and criticised Senator Reynolds for his "Help- India Speech." It came out with definite statement that Americans must, in self-defence, as a nation at war with Japan, refuse to support the non-cooperation movement. There was, however, a swing of opinion to the side of India after the speech of Churchill in the House of Commons. Referring to this speech the editorial said, 'We know too much about human nature to believe that a plan produced by fallible cabinet and interpreted by fallible emissary can be final and perfect. The whole history of the evolution of the British Empire into the British Commonwealth is ringing and noble answer to any such superstition.' The trend in the opinion of the *New York Times* may be taken to be representative of the general American opinion.

Liberal newspapers like *The Nation* and *The New Republic* did not like the idea of a mass movement. *The Nation* called the attitudes of both the British Government and the Congress as 'unreasonable and unrealistic.' Senator Reynolds had raised the question of Indian independence in the Senate and he was criticised by his five colleagues. But after the movement had been put down, and it began to become clear that Britain was not going to make a settlement, American opinion shifted predominantly in favour of Indian independence. In a meeting held at New York townhall, a crowd of two thousand shouted that 'India must be free' and passed a resolution asking Roosevelt to intervene. A memorandum signed by one hundred and fifty one prominent American citizens was submitted to the Senate to request Roosevelt to intervene to secure the 'full participation of the Indian people in the war and to assure their political freedom.' The *Washington Post* urged for the

first time the solution of the Indian problem by the mediation of the United Nations. Even the editors of *Life* addressed an open letter to the people of England, as members of the Anglo-Saxon family, in which they explained why India should be made free.

In America, there was at all times a group of intellectuals, writers, columnists and progressive leaders who were ardently desirous of seeing that the Indian deadlock ends in favour of Indian freedom. Pearl Buck, Edgar Snow, Lin Yutang, C.L. Schuman, Louis Fischer, Norman Thomas, Wendell Wilkie will all go down in history as fighters for India's cause in America.

Lin Yutang, the well-known Chinese author, argued the case for immediate grant of freedom to India. He observed that the atmosphere of abuse, misrepresentation and calumny against India was prevalent in America. Intelligent citizens knew that India's case had never been represented before Americans except through the eyes of British censors at Calcutta and New Delhi and that the news given about India were generally incorrect, inaccurate and often distorted. The British had tried to create the impression that 'Gandhi is an appeaser, that he is a wily and crooked politician, that he has no sense of reality, and that he wants the ruin of the British.'

Lin Yutang satirically wrote in the *Free World*: "Gandhi is a fool, because he is fighting for what George Washington was fighting for — for his country's freedom and independence from England. Nehru is such a fool, because he feels as keenly about the little word 'liberty' as Washington or Thomas Paine ever felt." 'Gandhi and Nehru were as stubborn as Washington and De Valera were in the past. The injustices in India were exactly like the injustices in the American colonies and in Ireland. But now that Americans had achieved their liberty, they have forgotten what that little word means.'

Ernest Lindley, America's leading journalist of that time, with a reputation for being the unofficial spokesman of the White House, expressed America's anxiety about India. In an article in the *Washington Post* he observed that the relations between the Congress and the British authorities were embittered and the Indian political problem was a delicate one for American Government. But after the rejection of the Cripps proposals American opinion, official and private, swung against the Congress. It swung even more sharply with the revelation that Gandhi was against armed resistance to the Japanese and proposed

to negotiate with it. The White House thought that the attitude of the Congress and its leader was dangerous for the security of the United Nations as a whole as well as India herself. But American policy of favouring 'self-governement for all people' was not altered. It was a policy to which Britain was also committed by the Atlantic Charter and the declaration of the United Nations no matter what exceptions or mental reservations one might have noted in individual British statesmen. The American observers reported that there was still a chance of composing the Indian political difficulties by negotiation. They doubted if negotiation could be carried through by the British and the Congress alone. It would fail because their mutual distrust was too deep. So friendly intercessions probably by the United States and China would be necessary. Lindley further observed that reaction against the Congress and its leaders in the American press came as an unpleasant surprise. There was danger that its effect would be to turn the Congress and its leaders quite as bitterly against the United States as against the British and to create an impression that white people were joining hands in a policy of repression. This danger was alleviated by the President's announcement that American troops in India were there only to fight the Axis and instructions had been given to them to keep aloof from internal affairs. But the danger was not entirely removed and perhaps could be eliminated only 'if another effort is made to settle the Indian internal political difficulties by negotiations.'

America's State Department was also faced with two opposite considerations. On the one hand, it felt that doing nothing for India would have unfavourable repercussions both on the general war efforts and on the Far Eastern situation. On the other hand, as the British Governemnt believed that India was Britain's problem, any attempt by the United States to bring pressure might give rise to a controversy between the two Governments. The American policy had to be based on these two rather contradictory considerations. The first objective was to win over the confidence of the Indians by making known to them that the United States was sympathetic to their cause. The second was to make efforts to bring about reconciliation and settlement between Britain and India but only if asked by Britain to do so, and to observe full diplomatic norms on the question. This is clear from the letter which Roosevelt wrote to Chiang-kai-shek, wherein he said that they had no moral right to force themselves upon the British or the Congress

Party but desired that the fact should be made known to both that the United States and China stood in 'the position of friends who will gladly help' if they were 'called on by both sides'. Britain did not want the United States to intervene but in fact resented it. So the American policy became the 'policy of non-intervention.' Hull saw Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States because American public opinion was getting impatient after the suppression of riots. But matter remained where it was. The Government of the United States was not prepared to go beyond these diplomatic soundings. Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles made this policy clear in his letter to Professor Ralph Barton Perry, Chairman of American Defence; Harvard Group, who had charged the U.S. Department of States that their policy regarding India was based 'not on military expediency but on settled reactionary sentiments.' The American Government could not win over the confidence of Indians as her efforts were confined to the diplomatic level with no results. At the time of Gandhi's fast, William Phillips, American Ambassador in India, asked Viceroy's permission to see Gandhi in detention. But the Viceroy refused the permission. This decision was upheld by Churchill, in spite of a diplomatic request by Hull. The American Government could do nothing further. The Indian press and leaders began to doubt if the American Government had the power to do anything or even wanted to do anything. They began to say they did not want American intervention. The Department was aware of the growing feeling of sullenness.

After 'Quit India' resolution, Britain renewed its propaganda against the Congress. For about four months Britain continued to mislead the world and, to discredit the principles and services of Gandhi. The American Weekly, the *Times* of New York, reported that Gandhi wrote to Lord Linlithgow from the Aga Khan Palace protesting against this official propaganda. He asked Linlithgow to convince him with proof of the complicity of the Congress with violence what the arrest of the Congress leaders had precipitated. He assured the Governor General that he would make 'ample amends', if the official charge-sheet should be brought home to him. This expostulation did not move the 'Stern Symbol of British Policy'— whom the British praised as the first Viceroy to withstand the pressure of a Gandhi fast. The news that Gandhi was preparing himself for a fast of twenty-one days to cleanse himself and the atmosphere of India had no impact in America. Reacting to the news, the *Time* of New York wrote : 'the

West was not greatly concerned about the life or death of a shrivelled little man in a loin cloth.' The *New York Herald Tribune* characterized Gandhi's fast as 'political blackmail' and as a means 'to restore his own failing leadership'. Another American Weekly, *The Nation* wrote, 'Mr. Gandhi's 21 days' fast appears to be politically a confession of weakness, and personally a token of strength.' Apparently the majority of the American commentators had no proper appreciation of Gandhi's methods.

The Government of India issued a publication entitled 'Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances 1942-43'. Gandhi circulated equally bulky pamphlet in his reply to the Government. At the time Louis Fischer came to Sevagram and stayed with him for nearly a week. Gandhi asked him to put his questions which Gandhi answered through the *Harijan*. Regarding this interview he wrote: 'I do not regard my answers to Louis Fischer as 'cryptic statements.' They were deliberate answers given to deliberate questions.' American journalist Grover, representative of the Associated Press of America had also interviewed Gandhi. About this interview Gandhi observed : 'If that interview had not chanced to come about, there might have been no statement 'more definite' than what appeared in my reply to Louis Fischer.' Grover tried to draw a picture of a free India after an Allied victory. He asked Gandhi 'why not wait for the boons of the victory?' Gandhi replied that the boons of the last World War were the Rowlatt Act and martial law in Amritsar. Grover argued that greater economic and industrial prosperity— not due to the Government of India but by the force of the circumstances— would be a step forward toward *Swaraj*. Gandhi was doubtful whether there would be any gains if one keeps in mind the industrial policy that was being followed during the War. Grover asked Gandhi whether he expected any assistance from America in persuading Britain to relinquish her hold on Indian with any possibility of success? Gandhi replied, 'I do indeed. I have every right to expect America to throw her full weight on the side of justice if she is convinced of justice of the Indian cause.' Gandhi was of the opinion that the American Government was not committed to the continued British stay in India. But he knew that the British were clever and that inspite of the desire of President Roosevelt and of the American people to help India, India might not succeed in getting their help. British propaganda was so well-organised in America against the Indian cause that the few friends India had, had no chance

of being effectively heard. Further, the political system of America was very rigid and public opinion did not affect the administration there. Grover made it sure that Gandhi did not insist on the literal withdrawal of the British troops. Then putting himself in the position of the Allies, he began to enumerate the gains of the bargain. Gandhi, told him that he did not want independence as a reward for any services. He demanded it as a right and in discharge of a debt long overdue. Grover raised the question of communal disunion as a handicap, and himself added that before the American independence there was not much unity in the States. Gandhi replied: 'I can only say that as soon as the vicious influence of the third party is withdrawn, the parties here will be face to face with reality and close up ranks'. Finally, Grover asked him about Rajagopalachari's statement on the formation of Pakistan. Gandhi said: 'it is ugly to be talking of a valued colleague. My differences with him stand, but there are things which are too sacred to be discussed in public.' Grover said that he did not have in mind the Pakistan controversy so much as C.R.'s crusade for the formation of a National Government. Grover made it clear that in his view C.R. could not be motivated by the British Government. His position only happens to harmonise with their's.' Gandhi remarked that it was the fear of the Japanese that made C.R. tolerate the British. He would postpone the question of freedom until after the War. Gandhi concluded his interview with the assertion : if the War is to be decisively won, India must be freed to play her part today. I am sure that India's independence is not only essential for India, but for China and the Allied cause also.'

The well-known American columnist Drew Pearson had made a name for himself as a newshound who could scent out the most well-preserved state secrets. He made some sensational allegations in the *New York Daily Mirror* in its syndicated column entitled 'Washington Marry Go Round'. He wrote that President Roosevelt sent a friendly letter to Gandhi 'urging nationalist cooperation with the Allies.' But the British authorities refused to deliver the communication to Gandhi. Later, when William Phillips, President's special envoy in India, sought an interview with Gandhi, he got a curt refusal from the Government. According to Drew Pearson, Roosevelt himself tried to urge on Churchill at the Washington Conference to follow a more liberal policy in India but 'Churchill was almost insulting' and virtually told the President

'to mind his own business.' Though the White House Secretary, Stephen Early denied knowledge of 'any thing of this sort,' the story of Pearson did not appear to be wholly improbable. It was in common knowledge of the Americans that Phillips did ask for an interview before leaving India but his request was flatly refused. Pearson also disclosed the causes of the 'recall' of Phillips.

The post of President Roosevelt's personal envoy at New Delhi seemed to be a ill-fated one. Colonel Johnson was first occupant and remained in office for only six weeks. During the 'Quit India Movement' President sent a man of different calibre and temper, a 'career diplomat', William Phillips, to New Delhi. In India he went round and interviewed politicians, officials, soldiers, businessmen and princes. This enabled him to clarify his own ideas about the Indian problem. He sent many reports to the President, one of which leaked out and created a sensation when Drew Pearson published it. Following this disclosure, other American papers began to publish Phillips' letters. The question arose as to how so many leakages occurred in the State Department which is the repository of all correspondence received from all parts of the world, from American diplomats and men of affairs who informed the Department about their experiences of men and matters.

At this time Phillips was General Eisenhower's special political adviser in London. Pearson disclosed that Eden had called Sir Ronald Campbell, British Charge d'affaires in Washington, stating that he and Churchill were perturbed and ordered the Embassy to approach the State Department with a demand for investigation. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of States, informed the Embassy that letter had leaked out through the Under Secretary Sumner Welles. Eden expressed surprise that a paper of the status of the *Washington Post* published Phillips' letter and suggested that the *Post* should publish an editorial contradicting and criticising the story. The British bureaucracy, both at New Delhi and at London, also reacted vehemently against the exposure before all the world by a near Englishman and the representative of the greatest Anglo--Saxon power. Drew Pearson made a colourful story of it. 'In London Mr. Churchill and Eden put the heat on the United States Ambassador, John Winant, and had that official ask Phillips if he still held the same views. Phillips said he did more than ever but was sorry his letter was published, adding that 'I have my other reports, even stronger, but they will not leak.' Eden called his Embassy

to inform the State Department that Phillips was *persona non grata* in London, observing : 'India is more important than a thousand Phillips.'

The British Ambassador Lord Halifax emphatically denied that they had asked the recall of Phillips. On this denial, Senator Chandler of Kentucky made public a telegram which, he said, had been sent by Sir Olaf Caroe, Secretary to the External Department of the Government of India, informing the London India Office that Phillips could not expect to be welcomed. The telegram was in 'code language'. It showed that the State Department of the American Government had its spying arrangements on the inner activities of the British Government. The British Foreign Office also could not afford to be less inquisitive. The public in India were kept ignorant of these goings on by strict censorship. J.J. Singh, President of the India League of America, urged the lifting of British censorship to and from India. He demanded that Phillips' position in India and Louis Johnson's report on India should also be made public.

When the controversy ended between British and America officialdom the former had its way—Phillips did not return to India. The resolution moved in the House of Representatives by the Republican member Colvin Johnson that the British Minister at Washington, Sir Ronald Campbell and the Government of India's Agent-General in the United States; Sir, Girija Shankar Bajpai should be declared *persona non grata* to the Government of the America was not pressed or encouraged by the Roosevelt administration. The question is why the officialdom of United States bowed before the storm of anger of their opposite number in Britain? Be that as it may, the episode was used as an opportunity by the British press to lecture their Anglo-saxon brothers on the other side of the Atlantic on the beam in their own eyes, represented by the Negro problem, on their colour prejudice which carried the implication of the superiority of the white pigmented men and women over those of other colours.

But the debate on Phillips' return to Washington continued unabated in the American press. The Hearst Chain owned New York journal, *The American* stated that Congressional speeches on the alleged British interference with American diplomacy 'threatened to bring a Congressional investigation of British interference in American internal affairs.' The journal asked President Roosevelt to reveal the contents of the second confidential report on India submitted to him by Phillips.

The *Chicago Sun* wrote an editorial on the matter. The British Conservative member of Parliament Reginall Purbrick wrote a critical letter to the *New York Times*. Purbrick referred to the Republican Congressman Calvin Johnson's resolution as containing 'fantastically inaccurate statements.' The *Chicago Sun* editorial took side of Britain. *The American* in an editorial declared that the Phillips incident is 'assuming serious proportions and indeed is a serious matter.' The journal devoted much space to stories on the Phillips incident, most of them featuring alleged British interference in American affairs. Kare Von Wiegand, the columnist of the journal, wrote that 'Phillips is pro-British and while American Ambassador to Rome he did not welcome criticism of Britain.' Wiegand, who was known as 'the Dean of American War Correspondents', continued that the British attitude towards him, therefore, was somewhat astounding. He further wrote that usually Americans were for independence because they enjoyed it themselves. Few Americans knew anything or very little about India. They knew the name of one Indian—Gandhi—and some knew a second—Nehru.

Gandhi's new programme, published in the *Gelder Interview*, evoked keen interest among political observers. In some responsible quarters it was considered an encouraging move from the United States' view point. The Chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Sol Bloom, said: "it is a step in the right direction." Millard Tydings, Chairman of the Senate's Territories Committee' said: 'it looks like progress towards a solution of the Indian problem.' The Republic Senator Gerald Nye observed : 'It is gratifying to see the possibility to get together on an issue which is threatening to become the most embarrassing'. The Democratic Senator, Dennis Chaves, said: 'It is Indian nation's problem and I am willing to go along any solution they desire. If they want to cooperate with the British that is fine. If they want to be anti-British I would not criticise. Nations should be allowed to decide their destinies.'

G.L. Mehta, Deputy Leader of Indian Delegation to the International Business Conference in America, disclosed in his interview at Calcutta the 'tendentious propaganda' that was being carried on in America against the Indian national movement and particularly against the Congress. In fact, American public opinion was sympathetic to Indian aspirations but was ill-informed about the Indians situation. Information about India was really lacking to the people of America. Even the

circle which was working for India stated that they were having very meagre information about India. On the other hand, the Indian Agent General carried on a continuous and tendentious propaganda against the Congress. Lakhs of rupees from the Indian treasury were spent for this purpose. Millions of pounds were spent by the British propaganda machine to confuse and mislead American public opinion about the conditions and aspirations of India. It was well-known that numerous persons from India as well as from England were sent for this purpose. Scores of lecturers were employed. Pamphlets and literature were distributed all over the country to show that Indian disunity stood in the way of her freedom and that the Congress and Gandhi were pro-Axis. As against this, the machinery for publicity and education on behalf of the Indian national bodies was poor in equipment and resources although rich in personnel. They were endeavouring their utmost to place the Indian view point and disseminate information about the national movement. There was an Indian Chamber of Commerce in New York but it was also not adequately equipped. It was, therefore, essential to strengthen such bodies which were functioning in America and provide them adequate information from India.

Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit visited America as the leader of Indian non-official delegation to the Pacific Relations Conference. She did not receive enough publicity presumably because of certain influences at work. Mrs. Roosevelt also expressed her inability to receive Mrs. Pandit at the White House. It might be because Mrs. Pandit strongly emphasised in her press conference at Hot Springs that 'we were the first nation to boycott Japanese goods in 1937 when the United States was sending to Japan goods that made this war possible. By making this mistake the United States made it possible for Indian boys to be killed by the Japanese instead of helping them to rebuild their country.' Mrs. Pandit, speaking at the Indian Independence Day dinner given in her honour by the Indian League of America, declared: 'America and India have many points of similarity. You have your freedom from the British we are striving for ours. You have established the freedom for your people, we work for its establishment in our country.'

Mrs. Pandit's visit to America produced the first direct comment from the State Department on Indian affairs in many months. In her press conference she had regretted the lack of stronger or more precise

show of interest by the American Government regarding Indian demand for independence. The reporters, who discussed the Indian issue with Mrs. Pandit in her press conference, asked the Acting Secretary of States J. Grew for comments on the 'surprise and disappointment expressed by some Indian national leaders now in Washington, over the United States' silence'. Grew replied by reading from a piece of paper on which he had drafted his comment, obviously anticipating such a question. His answer was not permitted to be published in direct quotations. In his answer he had said that the America would be glad to assist in achieving a satisfactory settlement of the Indian question. A reporter asked him whether his statement implied the offer of America's good offices to settle the issue between Britain and India. Grew declined to give an explicit reply but the correspondents were made to believe that his remark carried no implication beyond the general idea expressed. Regarding America's policy towards dependencies, specifically India, Grew referred to Hull's statement that 'the United States championed liberty for everybody, encouraging them at all times and in all places.' When Mrs. Pandit was informed by the United Press about Grew's remark, she commented: 'Of course, the statement does not go very far but I believe it is helpful in the sense that it shows appreciation of the problem.'

In the Washington Press Club Auditorium, one thousand persons were packed for an 'Indian Independence Day' meeting under the auspices of the National Committee for India's Freedom. The crowd enthusiastically responded to addresses by John M. Coffee from Washington, Emanuel Celler from New York, author Louis Bromfield and the guest of honour Mrs. Pandit. The meeting passed a resolution stating that the citizens of Washington call upon the United States Government to help the people of India by asking British Government to release the ten thousand political prisoners who were imprisoned in India without trial. They also asked the American Government to help India in achieving her constitutional freedom now, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The keynote of all the addresses was a plea to the American Republic to express itself on the Indian problem and press the Government for making a statement on its position. Coffee said : We are fanning the flame of discontent and revolt when we refuse to lend the Indian people a sympathetic ear.' He warned that world peace would be endangered if the United

States 'washed its hands of India in the hour of struggle.' He said that to leave India restless was to leave a people, comprising a large part of the world's population, 'in a state of sullen frustration'.

Mrs. Pandit conducted a private campaign in the United States to inform the Americans on the Indian problem. In a series of lectures and interviews, she attempted to clear up what she considered to be some American misconceptions about the question of independence for India. The main point she made was her personal view that her countrymen would accept any reasonable plan consistent with the goal of independence. One of the 'misconceptions' she tried to eliminate was a widely held belief that India could never be a united nation because of the antagonisms between the Hindus and Muslims. In her interview she said that that was a dead issue and Hindu-Muslim problem was not acute. She pointed out that the President of the Congress was a Muslim and emphasised on the all-India representative character of the Indian National Congress.

INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

7

After the end of the Second World War freedom from worry did not ensue and freedom from want for the widest commonalty of the world did not arrive. The reasons were various. For years the contrivances of science, mental and material, that could have helped the restoration, had been devoted to destructive purposes. Now they had to be suddenly diverted to purposes of peace. In addition, the spirit of camaraderie that marked the relations between the victorious powers under the stress of a common danger had disappeared and jealousy, rivalry and suspicion took its place. It created suspense and tension that was not helpful towards the restoration of real peace and amity which the world so badly needed. Everything was uncertain. In the political, social and economic relations men and women were dazed by the shock of political and social upheavals. They were afraid and knew nothing about the safety in the post-War order of things.

This was a world phenomenon and India was a victim of uncertainty with the rest of humanity. The threat of war and invasion was removed. The old argument between free competition and totalitarian communism started again and became the breeding ground for further controversies. War left a vacuum and it was difficult to predict how it would be filled up. There was no surity that in the attempt to fill it up, the victorious powers would not clash and once again push modern civilization towards total ruin. This was the background of the world of the post-War period and India shared the uncertainties and anxieties of the present and the future along with the rest.

The Anglo-American cooperation in Asia was a fact that should always be kept in mind in interpreting political and economic developments of the age. The material and spiritual ties that bind the two people are a permanent factor even though the United States came

into being out of a revolt against Britain. Britain and America had no quarrel that required recourse to arms to settle it, though there might have been conflicts and competitions between the capitalists of the two countries. New York had often fretted and fumed against the predominance of London as the financial capital of the world. The two world wars brought about a change in their respective positions. London had to yield place to New York. Bertrand Russell in his *Prospects of Industrial Civilization* said that 'the resources of America are more adequate than those of any previous aspirant of universal hegemony.' One of the greatest British Prime Ministers, William Gladstone had already prophesied such an evolution of the power of the United States. The First World War laid the foundation of America's supremacy firmly and strongly and the Second World War gave the finishing touches to it. Britain's supremacy over the world affairs just passed into the hands of the United States.

Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence had no effect on the Americans. But the leaders of America came to realize that even for the bare survival, there was no other philosophy of conduct that could help the world out of the crisis of civilization, which another great Indian Rabindra Nath Tagore had also indicated in clear terms. At the same time Americans took care to remember that the 'quietism' implicit in Indian thought and indirectly resulting from Gandhi's precepts did not 'comport' with the electric atmosphere of the United States, 'born of her rich resources and a rich terrain.'

In 1945 momentous events took place in India. On June 25, 1945, Simla Conference began and leaders of various political parties attended it. The conference ended in a deadlock. Lawrence K. Rosinger, American expert on Far Eastern affairs, observed: 'even before the end of the war, Indo-American political relations began to enter a new, more active phase. Through diplomatic channels, the United States played a part in the release of the Indian leaders from prison and in the organization of the Simla Conference in June-July 1945. The Viceroy—the supreme British official in India—the Congress and the Muslim League participated. Although the conference failed, the Congress leaders probably appreciated American Government's renewed positive interest in the search for an Indian settlement.'¹

1. Rosinger, Lawrence K., *India and the United States*, New York, 1950, p. 12.

After the victory of the Labour Party in the elections of 1946 the new Prime Minister Clement Attlee explained the British Government's policy behind their decision to send a cabinet delegation to India. Attlee said that he was impressed by an incident which occurred when he visited the United States. He was having dinner with a number of distinguished Indians and the talks turned on the way in which principles worked out in Britain were applied in the continent of America. It was pointed out that America had inherited a great legacy from Britain. 'But my Indian friend said that Americans sometimes forgot that there was another great nation that had inherited those principles and that was India.'

The British Government was trying to hold a Round Table Conference at London with a view to persuading the leaders of the Congress and the League to make it up and to cooperate in making a constitution for the future governance of India. America was interested in these negotiations. Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the United States administration, gave expression to their concern when he said that the decisions of the Indian leaders 'at this moment in history may directly affect world peace and prosperity for generations to come.' He did not confine himself to this high argument alone; he referred to the purpose of the London Conference in unambiguous terms:

'The crux of the internal problem now confronting appears to arise from differences of opinion between the two principal parties as to the conditions under which provinces can elect to join or remain out of sub-Federations in North-West and North-East India.

'I am confident that if the Indian leaders show the magnanimous spirit which occasion demands they can go forward together on the basis of the clear provisions on this point contained in the constitutional plan proposed by the British Cabinet Mission last spring to forge an Indian Federal Union in which the elements of the population will have ample scope to achieve their legitimate political and economic aspirations.'

When the war ended, American's image in India was high. Norman Brown wrote: 'America was idealized as a nation, in fact overidealized.'² Lawrence K. Rosiner opined: 'The first formal agreement concluded

2. Brown, Norman, *The United States and India and Pakistan*, Cambridge, 1958, p. 161.

between India and the United States was signed on May 16, 1946 in Washington. It was an overall settlement of land lease, reciprocal aid and surplus property questions arising from wartime aid and the disposition of American military property in India. The second formal agreement between the two countries was the India-United States air transport agreement of November 14, 1946. The United State Government also played an important part in bringing about a smooth and unexplosive transition from British to Indian rule on June 10, 1948. A State Department declaration announced that the acceptance of the British partition plan of July 3 by the major Indian parties "is a source of much encouragement to India's friends. It is hoped that this meeting of minds will bring an end to civil disorders in India and avoid further bloodshed..."³

On February 20, 1947, the Government of India declared that British rule in India would end by June 1948. If the Constituent Assembly failed to make a constitution 'His Majesty's Government will have to consider to whom the provinces of the Central Government in British India should be handed over on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of Central Government for British India or in some other way as seems most reasonable and in the best interest of the Indian People.'⁴

Prime Minister Clement Attlee said that the British Government have declared their intention to transfer full power to Indian hands not later than June 1948 and responsibility for the security of India from external aggression will fall upon India from the date when full power is transferred. The United States Secretary of State, George Marshall declared at Washington that the British Government's plan for the transfer of power to responsible Indian hands 'offers a just basis for cooperation.' He further expressed the opinion that Indian political leadership would accept this clear-cut challenge and proceed to break the impasse between the Congress and the Muslim League. But the challenge was not clear-cut. There was a debate in the House of Lords on the subject. A Conservative member of the House, Viscount Templewood opened the debate by moving that 'any provision for the protection of minorities or the discharge of their other obligations is likely to imperil the peace and prosperity of India.' Sir John Anderson

3. Rosiner, Lawrence K., *op. cit.*, p. 29.

4. Basu, D. B., *The Indian Independence Act and the Dominions of India and Pakistan*, Calcutta, p. 4.

criticised the Labour Government's policy and said that by fixing a date for withdrawal from India the Government had lost a bargaining power to fulfil their obligations in India. Winston Churchill, leader of the opposition, suggested that the problem of India should be handed over to the U.N.O. for solution. Churchill said: 'handing over the Government of India to these so-called political classes, is handing over it to men of straw, of whom in a few years no trace will remain.' Attlee in his reply said: 'We believe we have done great work in India. We believe the time has come when Indians must shoulder their responsibilities. We can help, but we cannot take the burden on ourselves.'

America was worried about communal trouble in India. Commenting on the partition agitation, Henry F. Grady, the first U.S. Ambassador-designate to India declared in Washington: 'India has a great future, but the key to that future is the elimination of communal strife and the development of cooperation among all her people. Her strength and the basis of her progress as well as the realisation of her great destiny lie in national unity.' Mrs. Pearl S. Buck, the noted American author, also declared in New York: 'There no is more hope of unity between Muslims and the Hindus in India than there is between the left and the right in China. Unless India can act with leadership in the East and for the world, there will be no opposing voice anywhere today to the narrow nationalism and the inhuman political creed which I see in the West.' Sumner Wells, former United States Secretary of States, also declared in Washington that communism had strengthened its hold in all cities in India and was rapidly spreading to the rural areas. He further added: 'A solution to the Indian problem will only be found if and when the Indian leaders are willing to think in terms of India rather than that of their own communities and are also willing to enter into agreement about the federative system similar to that in the United States.'

The Interim Government of India was careful about American public opinion. Asaf Ali, the Indian Ambassador to the United States of America, in his broadcast from Washington pledged India's support to every effort that the America would make towards the establishment of peace, freedom and prosperity in the world. He added, 'It would be only reasonable for any peace-loving people, who want an orderly settlement of the world's problems, to expect the United States of

America to give the lead to post-War world in the moral, economic and political fields.'

When Labour Government decided that they should quit India, the *New York Herald Tribune* discussed the reasons behind this decision : 'The British decision to leave India may bring the British more profit than they would win if they could scrape up power to remain there for the time being. Their tenure there, it must be granted, would be short under almost any conditions that can now be foreseen. By retiring with grace and with expressions of goodwill they may preserve the bulk of their economic interests for a long period, provided Indians can create a government stable enough to maintain peace and order.'

But the strongest argument in support of this decision was Britain's weaker position as a great power in the new international set up resulting from the decline of her resources during the two World Wars. Ernest Bevin, Britain's Foreign Minister, let the secret out, perhaps unconsciously, when he said in the course of a speech delivered on the occasion of a dinner in London held in honour of Asaf Ali, India's Ambassador to the United States. He disclaimed any personal responsibility for the Indian policy adopted and followed by the Labour Government. He only helped to 'hold to ring' his colleague, the Secretary of States for India. And in this duty of watchfulness in face of America's 'financial imperialism' and 'communist imperialism' he often became anxious about the changing face of things in Africa and Asia, in the basin of the Indian ocean for which Britain's naval power did not have its former strength. He often projected on his mind's eye how India could be made strong and become the guardian of peace over this region. And he suggested that as it was not possible for India under British control to develop the required strength to fill this 'power vacuum' and it was best for all concerned that Britain's hold over India should go.

Historians have often wondered whether or not the British Government consulted the United States before arriving at their decision of 'Quit India' because it was bound to bring about a revolutionary change in the balance of power in world affairs, specially in Asia and Africa, where the United States had developed vast interests—financial and strategic. Attlee's predecessor in office, Winston Churchill, had not allowed the then President of United States of America, Franklin Roosevelt, to take any interest in Indian affairs. He used to resent

any suggestion that he should make up with the Indian leaders. But the year 1944 was quite different from the year 1947. Not only Churchill had been driven out of office but the first two years of peace had exposed the financial and economic weakness of Britain and made it clear that she had become dependent on the resources of the United States. This dependence on and expectation for further help placed an unwritten obligation on the Government of the Britain to consult President Truman and his administration before they could liquidate their imperial responsibilities in India. Not only would there be strategic repercussion of this fateful step on the United States military arrangements in the Middle East, Near East and the Far-East, but there would also be repercussions on her economy. These basic facts of the situation appeared as items of the news sent by the Associate Press of America, a week after the Attlee announcement. These facts indicate that Attlee could have hardly made this declaration if the United States Government had raised any objection to the step he proposed to take.

United States Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall said that his country profoundly hoped that the Indian political leaders would set aside their differences so that India can become completely independent by June, 1948. He told a press conference that the United States fully supports Britain's efforts to free India on a constitutional basis that would lead to the establishment of a federal union. He observed that relations between the United States and India have assumed a new significance since the arrival of Indian Ambassador-designate, Asaf Ali. Drawing attention to the statement by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, Marshall said: 'This Government fully appreciates the grave character of the British decision to set a definite and early date for the completion of transfer of power to responsible Indian hands. It profoundly hopes that the Indian political leadership will accept this clear-cut challenge and will proceed to break the impasse between the Congress and the Muslim League. The Indian internal crisis threatens to prevent India from making its rightful and honourable contribution to the maintenance of internal peace and prosperity.' He continued, 'An India torn by civil strife would not only find it difficult to make this positive and greatly needed contribution but might conceivably become a source of new internal tension in a world only now beginning to grope its way back to peace.' The Secretary of State pointed out that the United States had made clear its interest in

India's peaceful transition to full self-government. He added that the United States had also welcomed the 'persistent and sincere efforts' of the British Government to bring together the major Indian political parties. The United States, Marshall declared, continues to believe that the British plan offers a 'just basis for cooperation.' He also observed: 'It would be difficult to exaggerate the magnitude of the task faced by the Indian leaders and of the heavy responsibilities that rest upon them as they endeavour to bring freedom, political stability and economic progress to such a large segment of the human race.'

The many considerations advanced by the United States Foreign Secretary for reconciliation of differences in India placed on Indian leadership the responsibility for bringing it about. The Foreign Secretary could not be expected to appreciate the Indian situation. If he had exercised a little imagination he would have easily found resemblance between the United States of 1860 and the India of 1947. He knew how his country's Government had met the challenge to its unity and integrity. But George Marshall could not be expected to put himself in Indian shoes, and, therefore, Indians made no grievance against it. Indian leaders knew that America was a newcomer to world leadership and followed the 'Monroe Doctrine.' An instance of such borrowing intruded upon India's attention when John Dulles, a member of the United States of America's delegation to the United Nations Organisation, went out of his way to declare that India's interim Government was a Hindu Government. The offence was given by the use of the word Hindu in this connection. And this could be given because Dulles had taken on trust what Winston Churchill and his followers had been saying in their speeches in the two Houses of the British Parliament and in their writings in the press. In this background Indians were not much impressed by Marshall's words of advice. Marshall ignored India's positive contribution towards Asian stability, her immense manpower and her leadership in the third world when he discussed with American publicists the points of the Attlee's statement. There was no indication that he appreciated the evils of a divided India.

The United States had their own reasons to agree with the 'divide India' decision. America must have reasoned that British imperialism had been a liability causing immense loss in two world wars. They must have realised that their liability outweighed the profits. The United States might have thought that two World Wars had demonstrated

her strength and confirmed her in the leadership of the Anglo-Saxon world, and that it would not be a bad thing if the stigma attached to her as a defender of British imperialism was removed.

Meanwhile the work of the Constituent Assembly was progressing in India. Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha was its Provisional Chairman. In his inaugural address he rose to the dignity of the occasion. He called upon his fellow members to realise their responsibilities as the architects of their country's future. The world recognised that a new epoch was being opened before India. America sent 'good wishes' for the success of its work. The British Government, however, failed to take notice of this historic event. It revealed the same grudging spirit that characterized all their concession to Indian sentiments and their responses to India's demand for freedom. Lord Wavell was deliberately absent from New Delhi. The significance of this silence and his absence was not lost on anybody in India. But these were heightened by what the representatives of the United States said on the occasion. Dr. Sinha read the following messages of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United States :

'With the approach of December 9, I extend to you as Provisional Chairman of the Constituent Assembly and through you to the Indian people the sincere good wishes of the United States Government and of the people of the United States for a successful conclusion of the great task you are about to undertake. India has a great contribution to make to the peace, stability and cultural advancement of mankind, and your deliberation will be watched with deep interest by freedom-loving people throughout the entire world.'

Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha in his inaugural address drew attention to the American Constitution, which, he pleaded, should be carefully studied by the Indian Constituent Assembly, not necessarily for wholesale adoption but for judicious adoption to the necessities and requirements of India. The American Constitution, he pointed out, was based on 'a series of agreements as well as a series of compromises' and speaking from fifty years' experiences of public life, he said that 'reasonable agreements and judicious compromises are nowhere more called for than in framing a Constitution for a country like India.'

Pandit Nehru, in his first press conference as Minister of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of the Interim Government of India said, 'with the United States of America, India already has a form of diplomatic contact. The relations thus already existing will,

it is hoped, shortly be strengthened by the exchange of representations on an independent diplomatic footing.'

In a statement Pt. Nehru replied to the charges made by the Republicans' foreign affairs expert, J.F. Dulles at Washington that some foreign powers exercised a strong influence over Nehru Government. He said, 'Our policy is to cultivate friendly and cooperative relations with all countries and not to align ourselves with any particular foreign grouping. Our policy is going to be an independent one based on the furtherance of peace and freedom everywhere on the lines laid down by the United Nations Charter.' Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, leader of the Indian delegation to the U.N., described as 'complete misapprehension' the statement of Dulles, then one of the United States delegates to the U.N., that 'in India Soviet Communism exercised a strong influence through the Hindu Interim Government.'

Independent India and America had many things in common. Both had no territorial ambitions. Due to geographical distance both had little scope for mutual conflict. Both believed in world peace. Both also believed in the rule of law in international affairs. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, declared in the Constituent Assembly: 'We propose to keep on the closest terms of friendship with other countries unless they themselves create difficulties. We shall be friends with America. We intend cooperating with the United States of America.'⁵ Nehru said, past history, common objectives and the call of the future have pushed India and America in the direction of friendship and cooperation. 'We may not agree with American people always, but you have always seemed in some ways near to us, near in certain ideals you hold and which are enshrined in your constitution and which we took into our own constitution, and your open-hearted friendship and hospitality.'⁶

On November 18, 1947, America figured in the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, Nehru being the Minister for External Affairs gave information to the members that the embassy of India in Washington had a staff of 47. The approximate gross cost per annum of the embassy was Rs 12,10,000. In the year 1946-47 the embassy incurred the expenditure of Rs 7,76,500.⁷ Asaf Ali was first Ambassador

5. Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

6. *The Hindustan Times*, November 10, 1961.

7. *The Constituent Assembly Proceedings*, November 18, 1947.

of India to America. He received Rs. 3,500 per month as pay, Rs. 4500 per month *às frais de representation* with free furnished house, free heating of the house, free car, and chauffeur at government expense.⁸ The Indian Ambassador at Washington was aided in his duties by one Counsellor, one First Secretary, one Second Secretary, one Third Secretary, one Assistant Secretary, and one Private Secretary to the Ambassador. There were one Financial Adviser, one Transportation Officer, eight Personal Assistants, one Cypher Assistant, one Establishment officer, one Accountant, one Courier, one Registrar, Six Stenographers, ten clerks, two switch board operators, and six clerical assistants.⁹

In the Constituent Assembly questions were put on 'anti-India propaganda' in some sections of the American press. In his replies, Sardar Patel, the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, conceded that 'unfortunately tendentious, exaggerated and one-sided reports of the situation in India are published in America.' An allegation was made in a question that the British Broadcasting Corporation had circulated in India photographs and 'gruesome false tales' about communal atrocities in India. The Minister replied that the Government was unable to stop such false reports because in India there was no censorship on foreign correspondents. Sardar Patel admitted that there was a lack of failure of publicity by the Government of India in America.¹⁰

Nehru told the Constituent Assembly about his own ideas on foreign policy. He said: 'Ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy and till that time, when India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate and will rather grope about.' The Prime Minister further said, 'whatever policy you may lay down in foreign affairs of the country, you will have to find out what is most advantageous to your country. Therefore we propose to look after India's interests in the context of world cooperation and world peace, insofar as world peace can be preserved.'

India and America differed in their approach to the post-War world problems. This was inevitable. Foreign policy is bound to be influenced by factors which differ from country to country. Nehru once remarked:

8. *Ibid.*, December 11, 1947.

9. Qanungo, Bhupen, *American History by Indian Historians*, Vol. II, Hyderabad, 1969, p. 184.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 1840-85.

'...there is a tendency in leading statesmen in Europe and America to look at things from the European and American points of view. If you look at the same thing from Delhi or Karachi, the problem looks slightly different. Take the question of China. China is a distant country to the people of Europe and America. But China has 2000 miles of frontier with India. It is a different picture here.'¹¹ On the question of colonialism in Africa, he said that 'India sees colonialism almost exclusively as an abstract moral issue rather than as a mosaic of concrete political problem.'¹² Nehru declared that colonialism as it existed in Asia or Africa will be a threat to peace. America did not agree with India's moral approach to international affairs. America made a difference between old colonialism and Soviet imperialism. So America could not take a stand against old colonialism. Due to the threat of Soviet Russia and Chinese Communism, America supported the colonial powers.'¹³ On this issue Nehru said: 'It is no use telling us that we have to support some colonial power because if we do not Communism will enter here.'¹⁴ Both countries had different points of view on the question of Indonesian independence. On this issue, Nehru invited thirteen Asian countries to New Delhi. In his presidential address he said: 'we meet today because the freedom of a sister country of ours has been imperilled and a dying colonialism of the past has raised its head again and challenged all the forces that are struggling to build up a new structure of the world.'¹⁵ America did not oppose Indonesia's freedom but she wanted to accommodate the Netherlands because of her role in the Western Union and the proposed Atlantic Pact. Claud A. Buss said: 'The United States... sought to harmonise the conflicting interests of the Dutch and the Indonesians and it alienated the sympathies of both.'¹⁶ America's attitude on colonialism was not liked by Indian public opinion. Nehru opined: 'I have no doubt that the countries of Europe and America are themselves very much disturbed and distressed by what is taking place in Indonesia. They want to

11. *The Hindustan Times*, June 14, 1953.

12. Cottrell, Dougherty Strauss, ed., *American-Asian Tensions*, New York, 1956, p. 34.

13. Dalal, B.P., 'The United States and India', *American History by Indian Historians*, Vol. II, Hyderabad, 1969, p. 198.

14. *India News*, March 21, 1953, p. 69.

15. Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

16. Buss, Claud A., *The Far East*, New York, 1955, p. 604.

help Indonesia. I think they realise that Indonesian independence is not only desirable in itself, but is also desirable in the larger scheme of things which they have before them, and if by chance any kind of imperialistic domination succeeds in Indonesia it will effect the larger plan they have for the future. So that while generally we may agree about various matters, the emphasis may be very different. We may look upon something as No.1 which for them is No. 2, and what is for them No.1 may be No. 2 for us. Although we may not be against No.2, it is for us not No.1. It does make a lot of difference what priorities you give to them.¹⁷

India and America were in full agreement regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. The Government of India was doing everything to help in the preservation of peace. George McGhee, former Assistant Secretary of State for the Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, wrote: 'as leaders responsible for the destiny of a very young nation, their attitude might be expressed in the words of another prominent statesman who said, 'with me a predominant motive has been to endeavour to gain time for our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions and to progress without interruption that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.' That statement by George Washington is even more cogent when we apply it to the masses of India's population, the great dislocations which India is undergoing as a result of the precipitate withdrawal of the British authority and the pressure of the present time. With this background in mind, the strong desire of Indian leaders is to let nothing interfere with the strengthening of their country. It is apparent why India is making every effort to stay out of the so-called Cold War and to avoid possible involvement in a shooting war should it come,"¹⁸ America criticised India's policy 'to keep out of any international involvement.' But India's position could not be compared with that of America. India's army was small and her resources were limited. Vincent Sheean wrote: 'India's geographical position is such that any military alliance with the U.S. would be, to say the least, delusional. For the sake of that delusion, and in order to take a place at the bottom of the

17. Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 543.

18. *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1951.

list of applicants for military and economic assistance, would any sensible Indian Government invite an invasion from the immense communist territories of the Eurasian continent and to plunge into military alliance against the neighbouring Sino-Russian power. To proclaim it an enemy would be rash and fatal. And in addition to all these realistic considerations there is the further fact, important in India, if nowhere else, that the country has a moral legacy of considerable persuasiveness, which sets its mind against military combinations and involvement.¹⁹

India's policy of non-alignment was a source of irritation to America. Americans called it 'Indian neutrality.' American attitude was that 'those who are not with us are against us.' Nehru clarified this when he said: 'If we align ourselves with the groups, I am not criticising them but I do say that alignment means giving up any policy that we may independently seek to pursue and that means giving up our independence insofar as that matter is concerned. It means others telling us what policy to pursue, it means not functioning as an independent country but as a dependent and a satellite country.'²⁰

After the Second World War, Soviet Russia emerged as a world power. Secretary of States John Dulles called communism 'immoral and devil.' America took measures against this danger. It created a network of alliances against it. In view of this danger Dulles supported the view of the Salazar regime in declaring Goa a part of Portugal. America gave armed aid to Pakistan. It was a threat to India's security. Nehru said. '..... But look at the reaction of Asian countries. I do not know how far the Honourable Members have read these reactions of the press of many countries in Western Asia, in South or South-East Asia. Almost in every country, almost without exception, these reports of military aid, etc., coming to Pakistan from the United States of America have been viewed with concern..... In this connection I might say that the Prime Minister of Burma expressed himself rather strongly the other day about this military aid from the U.S. to Pakistan. The Prime Minister of Ceylon also did so.'²¹ Unfortunately Nehru's leaning towards socialism was misunderstood in America. Vincent Sheean tried to clarify this misunderstanding. He wrote: 'But to suppose that Mr.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *The Hindustan Times*, November 24, 1953.

21. *Ibid.*, December 24, 1957.

Nehru has a weakness for communism is arrant nonsense. He has been personally responsible and has publicly accepted responsibility for the imprisonment without trial of practically every Indian communist organizer or agitator of any consequence. The number is not precisely known. It changes constantly. But I heard that some 12,000 to 15,000 communists are in prison. This was done with the utmost secrecy and without trial, and without *habeas corpus* or any other constitutional safeguards which are observed in the U.S.²² On this issue President Kennedy said: 'I never thought, to use your phrase, that Mr. Nehru works consciously or unconsciously for the communist movement and I know of no rational man in the United States who holds that view. There are matters on which we differ. As the Prime Minister said in 'Meet the Press' on Sunday, geography affects a good deal of the policy as well as internal conditions, traditions, culture and the past, all these affect foreign policy. So there are areas where we differ. But I do not know any figure in the world, as I have said on other occasions, who is more committed to individual liberty than Mr. Nehru..... I think the people of India are committed to maintaining their national sovereignty and supporting liberty of the individual as personal and religious tradition. We are going to disagree, but I am sure it is possible for us to disagree within the framework of not charging each other with bad faith.'²³ This statement saw policy shift towards India. Now Americans realised the role of India in world affairs. The concept that 'those who are not with us are against us' was no longer considered a sound policy. America started appreciating that India would not align itself with one block or another. They realised that India holds the key position in Asia.

Due to the economic condition of India, Nehru visited America. He was interested to have a first-hand look at America. The Prime Minister travelled to many parts of that country. He addressed the Congress. 'The United States of America is not an unknown country even in far-off India and many of us have grown up in admiration of the ideals and objectives which have made this country great. Yet, though we may have known the history and something of the culture of our respective countries, what is required is a true understanding

22. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 1, October 1951. p. 85.

23. *The Hindustan Times*, November, 10, 1961.

and appreciation of each other even where we differ. Out of that understanding grows fruitful cooperation in the pursuit of common ideals. I have come here , therefore, on a voyage of discovery of the mind and heart of America and to place before you our mind and heart.²⁴ His visit did promote friendship and understanding between the two countries but no striking results were achieved. Americans who wanted to support Nehru were also disappointed though, after his visit, America began to appreciate the policy of non-alignment and it helped economic cooperation.

Regarding Indo-Pak disputes, America took a pro-Pak stand. In January 1948, India took the Kashmir issue to the U.N. She expected that in the Security Council America would support her stand. But she found American stand unsympathetic. This caused disappointment and resentment in India. The differences between the two countries were due to suspicion in America that India was supporting the Communist block.²⁵ After 1953, the relations began to improve. This was due to the fact that public opinion in America began to appreciate the Indian policy of non-alignment and realize the importance of India in Asia.

24. Nehru, *op.cit.*, p. 589.

25. Dalal, B.P., *op.cit.*, p. 213.

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