

History of Pakistan Army - Volume One- 1757 to 1948

THE PAKISTAN ARMY TILL 1965

MAJOR AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN (RETIRED) – ARMoured CORPS



ISBN-13: 978-1546553632

ISBN-10: 1546553630



MAJOR AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN (RETIRED)

Author of History of Pakistan Army

11 Cavalry, 29 Cavalry, 58 Cavalry, 15 Lancers, 5 Independent Armoured Squadron, 14 Lancers

17 August 1999

NOTE

**ALL MAPS IN THIS BOOK
HAVE BEEN ENTIRELY
CREATED,HAND
DRAWN,CONCEIVED BY
MAJOR AGHA H AMIN AND
NOTHING IS OWED TO ANY
PREVIOUS MAP.THESE
MAPS NEVER EXISTED
BEFORE.NOTICE TO THE
DESPICABLE WINDBAG
PLAGIARISERS OF THE
HOPELESS INDIAN AND
PAKISTAN ARMIES**

AUTHORS NOTE

The title has been conceived by the author and designed to highlight certain landmarks of the British – Indian-Military tradition. The unit badges are those of the 39 Bengal Native Infantry and of the 64 Bengal Native Infantry. The 39 Bengal Native Infantry, had it not rebelled in 1857, would have had more battle honours than most units of Pakistan Army. It had fought against Mysore in 1799 and in the Sikh Wars but rebelled in 1857 and disappeared from the Bengal Army list. The portrait of Clive is there to signify the fact that Clive was the father of the Indian Army. One picture shows a panoramic view of the fortress city of Delhi in 1830s. The other picture is that of the Musa Bagh on the western outskirts of Lucknow where the last action of the capture of Lucknow between British-Punjabi-Pathan Muslim-Punjabi Sikh and the Hindustani-Hindu-Muslim-Ranghar Muslims from a combined force of Bengal and Oudh Irregular Cavalry was fought. The Ranghar/Hindustani Muslim cavalry man on horseback is from one of the reorganised Bengal Cavalry units of post 1857 era. Another picture shows the execution by firing squad of the 21 rebels of the first batch of the Ranghar/Hindustani Muslims of the old 42 Bengal Native Infantry, which was later renumbered as the 5th Light Infantry. The 5th Light Infantry – an all Muslim Hindustani Mussulman/Ranghar unit then stationed at Singapore – holds the unique distinction of being the only unit of the Indian Army to successfully rebel en masse and of having captured a garrison town for some time in the First World War! The man standing is Sepoy Khudadad Khan, 129th Baluchis, a Punjabi Muslim from Jhelum and the first Indian to win a Victoria Cross. The man in civilian clothes is the hero of 1948 war i.e. Ex Major General Akbar Khan, D.S.O. as around circa 1970 in lawyers dress. The group photograph is that of the Pathan/other Militia Volunteer veterans of the 1947-48 Kashmir War. The two officers being awarded medals are Major General Abrar Hussain and Brigadier Eftikhar. Abrar, a Hindustani Muslim, was the real hero of Chawinda in terms of higher military leadership, but was sidelined and not promoted after the war. Brigadier Eftikhar Janjua, the other officer was a half Punjabi Muslim and one of the finest military commanders of the Indo Pak in both 1965 and 1971 wars! Ironically despite being Pakistan Army's finest general later in 1971 war he was at least technically a non Muslim as the Qadiri Muslims were declared constitutionally after 1973-74 and were ruthlessly persecuted/discriminated against and denied promotion in the post 1977 Pakistan Army! The last picture is a battle scene of 1965 war showing a destroyed Indian AMX-13 and a Truck in the bed of the Tawi River in Chhamb Sector.

This volume is the first part of the trilogy on the Pakistan Army. The Second and the third volumes titled "From 1965 to 1971" and "The Pakistan Army since 1971" are in the preparatory stage.

The author welcomes constructive criticism comments opinion or any information that may be of historical value; from any ex veteran of the 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 wars or any other officer or civilian who wants to assist the author, in terms of historical accuracy/justice in the last two books of the trilogy which are still in the preparatory stage.

The author also looks forward to receive constructive opinion/criticism on "The Pakistan Army till 1965"

This can be done by e mail or fax or letter addressed in the name of the author on the publishers address or directly to the author on the following e mail address:-- pavocavalry@hotmail.com.

**DEDICATED TO EX MAJOR GENERAL
AKBAR KHAN (DSO) AND MANY OTHERS
WHO DID NOT BECOME FIELD MARSHALS
IN PEACETIME , GENERALS WITHOUT
COMMANDING DIVISIONS IN PEACE OR
WAR , OR BRIGADERS DESPITE HAVING
BEEN GOOD REGIMENTAL SOLDIERS; BUT
LAID THE FOUNDATION OF THE PAKISTAN
ARMY!**

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| ATTACK | ATTK |
| LINE OF COMMUNICATION | L of C |
| SITUATION | SIT |



Lieutenant Colonel Tariq Khan
 Commanding Officer
 12 Cavalry (Frontier Force)
 Bahawalpur Cantonment
 PF/ 17625 / A

27 April 2000

Major Agha Hamayan

Cavalry Ground
 Lahore Cantonment

My dear Hamayan:-

It was extremely thoughtful of you to have sent me your book which I intend to go through immediately. I will definitely give you my views if that is what you want but do remember, the opinion will be probably jaundiced, and the outcome of a prejudiced mind that has been corrupted by the experiences of an 'insider'. Will be in touch.

Your's

Tariq Khan
As Col. 2000
27/4/00

*Received
 23rd June
 2000 Thursday*

**THE PAKISTANI ATTITUDE
TOWARDS FRANK AND
FORTHRIGHT ANALYSIS IS
OUTRIGHT DENIAL**

Major Agha Humayun Amin
(Retired)
(Armoured Corps)
P.O Box 13146
Arlington, VA-22219
U.S.A
05 June 2000

Major General Tariq Waseem Ghazi
Command and Staff College
Quetta

Dear General Tariq
Assalamalaikum

I am writing this demi official letter in connection with the fate of my book sent in your name for the Command and Staff College Library by my friend Major Ehsan vide registered letter number. 504 dated 7th February 2000 . Later Major Ehsan confirmed from your personal assistant on 22 February 2000 that you had received the book. Lately through an inquiry from a dear friend serving as one of the directing staff I was very disappointed to learn that the book had not landed at the place for which it had been sent i.e the "Command and Staff College Library".

I do not contest your right to reject my book for the library . However I thought that men of supposed integrity and competence like you who rise to the position of general officer rank should at least have the courtesy and integrity to return a book which they think is unsuitable for the library. In your opinion it may be worse than used toilet roll .The book however is very valuable for a man who has spent a considerable fortune in sending it to libraries, only to find that the custodians of citadels of learning assign his work for which they have not paid to the trash can. I waited for the book to come back but have so far not received it at either my Lahore address or US.

Through the medium of this letter I request you to either send the book on my Lahore address written on the book or let me know if your financial powers do not allow you to waste official money on matters pertaining to retired majors, so that I can request some comrade to collect it from your PA in Quetta.

I hope that God Almighty elevates you to the highest ranks . Pakistan needs men like you.



Regards

**NOT RETURNING A BOOK
FOR WHICH YOU DID NOT
PAY.AND NOT RETURNING
UNSOLICITED MATERIAL !
WHAT A GRAND
CONTRADICTION OF BASIC
STAFF PROCEDURES !**

Command and Staff College
Quetta - 2
Telephone: Military - 3641
No. ML/11/Library
13 July 2000

To: Major Agha Humayun Amin (Retired)
P. O. Box 13146
Arlington, VA-22219
USA

Subject: Return of Material

Your ltr No. Nil dated 05 June 2000 refers.

It is not the policy of Command and Staff College to return
unsolicited material.



Lt Col
for Comdt
(Sajjad Hussain)

About the Author

Agha H. Amin , Retired Tank corps major who served in five tank regiments and commanded an independent tank squadron and served in various staff , instructional and research assignments. Presently heads think tank Centre for Study of Intelligence Operations. Editor in Chief of monthly Intelligence Review and monthly Military and Security Review. In his Pakistan Army tenure he wrote three original tactical papers on Reconnaissance Troops Tactical handling, Reconnaissance support group , and RFS Concept. His writings were published in Pakistan Armys prime journals , Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel Journal of Command and Staff College Quetta.

His recommendations regarding bifurcation of officer corps into command and staff cadre advanced in 1998 were later accepted. In addition his recommendation of grouping various corps into army commands advanced in an article published in Citadel Journal in 1998 were accepted in 2005 or so. Wrote Pakistan Armys first tactical paper on Tactical handling of Reconnaissance Troop in 1986 which is now being incorporated in Pakistan Armys most important general staff publication " The Armored Regiment in Battle". Wrote The Essential Clausewitz in 1993, Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 in 1998 , Pakistan Army till 1965 in 1999 ,Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2010) ,Taliban War in Afghanistan (2009). Served as Assistant Editor of Defence Journal ,Executive Editor of globe and Founder Editor of Journal of Afghanistan Studies .

An associate of the think tanks ORBAT and Alexandrian Defense group. Expert in social impact and environmental assessment carried out various LARP surveys for Asian Bank and World Bank projects. He has lectured at various think tanks and organisations worldwide and shares his knowledge without any honorarium and at zero financial benefits. Carried out various oil and gas and power transmission line surveys in West Asia. One time Assistant Editor Defence Journal , Executive Editor Globe, Editor Journal of Afghanistan Studies Feedback is welcome at e mail address L19aircraft@gmail.com

PREFACE

An army is a dynamic living social organism. It is difficult to do justice in a book to an army if the author is not a soldier. There are certain common factors that link soldiers all over the world and only soldiers can best analyse military history.

The greatest names in military history Liddell Hart Fuller Clausewitz etc were thus all soldiers.

After the Second World War American professors started analysing armies and it is unfortunate that their verdicts were accepted as a gospel truth. It has become fashionable that anyone who has an American or a British University degree thinks that he is the most competent person to write a book on any subject.

I am a firm believer of Gibbon's observations about the futility of having studied at a so called great British University; " To the University of Oxford I acknowledge no obligation; and she will as willingly renounce me for a son, as I am willing to disclaim her for a mother . I spent fourteen months at Magdalen College; they proved the fourteen months the most idle and most unprofitable of my life".

I want to acknowledge my gratitude to certain individuals from whom i learnt a great deal, and who played a most formative part in my education.

I learnt English language ,at least the creative side, from two individuals,one was a relatively unknown individual a certain Mr Irshaad who taught English at the Cantonment Public School Quetta,the second being the more famous Major Tims of the Royal Artillery or Royal Pakistan

Artillery, who was a Mathematics teacher at Saint Mary's Academy Lalazar Rawalpindi.

At the Forman Christian College not much English was taught, thanks to the nationalisation of that previously excellent institution by Mr Bhutto.

The only sunny but very brief period in learning good English there occurred when a certain Chaudhry Mohammed Ali of Rabwah taught us the subject for a week or so.

This gentlemen was under some kind of suspension in the nauseating and stinking days of the Zia regime.

However I learnt a great deal browsing through books in the magnificent Ewing Memorial Library.

This beautiful library had one of the finest collections of classics in Asia.

I learnt military history through self study.

I started with Palit and Liddell Hart was one teacher from whom.

I Learnt the basics of military history and military analysis.

Captain Bashir (now Lieutenant Colonel) who taught us English from 11th May 1981 to March 1982 at the Pakistan Military Academy Kakul was a much larger man than a teacher of English. He stood shoulders above all serving there at that time in both actual height as well as intellect!

He was a towering personality, both literally as well as figuratively. Mr Bashir was one of the most decisive influences in my life.

He was a somewhat controversial figure, being a self made man who had learnt English by sheer single-handed hardwork without the advantage of having been to an English medium school, and was thus secretly despised by the more outwardly impressive English teachers as an actor and as non genuine.

To Tipu Platoon 67 Long Course Bashir was much more than a teacher. He was a father figure, a great teacher, a great philosopher, a Sufi Saint and one who was approachable and one with whom a cadet could communicate and feel with conviction that his intellectual calibre was far higher than the vast majority of officers. I came across in my thirteen years service in the army.

The English syllabus that Mr Bashir was tasked with to teach was limited, but he made it far more bigger once he conducted his monumental lectureships. His lectures reminded one of an Athenian sage. I did not agree with all his views but this was irrelevant since Mr Bashir was much bigger in stature than most men I came across and it was not possible to conduct an argument with him.

He was too big for that. He would convey his viewpoint without attaching weight of his rank and was never annoyed if anyone differed with him.

He had the rare knack of turning a debate into a very harmonious discussion which would result in neither party feeling worsted, while both felt at the end that they had reason to respect the other man's point of view!

Major Ashraf (now Brigadier) and Hamed ur Rahman were one of the very few genuine platoon commanders of cadets at that time. Ashraf although from artillery, was competent precise

and unassuming and I learnt more about infantry tactics and map reading from him than any infantry officer. Hamed ur Rahman (son of the famous Justice Hamood) I admired for his earnest and extremely genuine passionate approach.

He was not a careerist and a misfit in that gathering of careerists (all whom were not professionals) i.e. the Military Academy. No wonder that he never went beyond brigadier.

On being commissioned in March 1983 I learnt a great deal from Brigadier Rao Abid Hameed our brigade commander. While in service we always remained on logger heads, but after both of us retired I discovered that Brigadier Rao was far more than a brigadier.

A very fine gentleman and companion who was a combination of the traditional Ranghar cavalry tradition with the British-Indian urban style of life!

Rao Abid was an excellent commander. He made it a point to hold a presentation on some military history subject every week and 8 Armoured Brigade was no less than a university while Rao was commanding it.

Brigadier Rao was a cool man and one in whose life scheme military rank and protocol were far less important than professional considerations and human values. I remember an incident when I had a very hot exchange of words with Brigadier Rao leading to a point when Brigadier Rao was about to place me under arrest but finally cooled down; and the gentleman never mentioned the incident to my commanding officer who he met just half an hour later!

Rao was too sophisticated to fit in with the particular clique dominating the army at that time; being neither from north of Chenab, or from between the Sutlej and the Beas, or from an old unit, or a hypocrite with a lotah, or a whiskey drinker who knew how to get along through sycophancy with any boss with any sort of personality and thus never became a general.

It speaks volumes for the man that Rao enjoys far more respect and affection than most of his contemporaries who became generals through sycophancy and hypocrisy which was the hallmark of that particular era! He is one of the very few brigadiers in the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.

At the Infantry School Quetta I was lucky in being able to interact with two gentlemen, who were my instructors. The first of these was Captain Hamid or Hameed Qazi, an instructor in the Weapons Wing. Captain Qazi was a great gentleman and possessed all the qualities necessary to rise in the Indo Pak Armies except one most important one; i.e. "Obsequiousness". I am making it a point to mention this officer who I even today hold in very high esteem because later on I realised that many officers who were far more mediocre in comparison did much better in the army as compared to Captain Qazi; who as far as I know did go beyond major or colonel!!

The essence of the matter is that pure ability or talent is not enough for worldly advancement! This is true all over the world, as proved by Gabriel Savage and Norman Dixon, but more true in the subcontinental armies which suffer from the invisible but highly adverse effects of colonization.

Generals are exposed in war only while promotions take place in peace!

Thus the great truth in Moltke the Elder's saying ; "The field of reality for the army is war, but its development and its ordinary life fail in time of peace".

As the length of my service in the army increased I realised that many colonels brigadiers and generals who I served with or saw, were far inferior to Hameed ullah Qazi; in terms of ancestry ,intellect,grace and knowledge of profession!But these essentially mediocre men knew how to dodge the system and did much better (and are doing much better) till exposed in crisis situations;which unfortunately occur rarely!

Lucky are the nations who go through the hottest fire to discover which of their leaders are composed of the finest steel.

This feeling was one of my motivations in writing this book.

A burning desire to present the layman reader with certain facts, knowledge of which may enable him to separate fact from fiction ,myth from fantasy and to distinguish between true greatness and mediocrity!

To come back to the main line of discussion,the second instructor in infantry school from whom I learnt a great deal was Captain (now probably brigadier) Zarin Khattak.A Saghri Khattak from Chhabb who was forever discussing the Chindits.This was just 12 years after the 1971 war and we learnt a great deal of Indo Pak military history of at least infantry battalion level from Khattak

.We were inspired by Zarin's graphic accounts of the Sulaimanke battle. These used to revolve around Majors Shabbir Sharif and Talat Umar , who I met many years later. Khattak was the combination of the old British regimental officer and the more meticulous German type officer.

He was groomed in the old British Indian PIFFER tradition by virtue of having been commissioned in the 6 Frontier Force Regiments and was greatly influenced by the German Army having attended some tactical course in West Germany.

The three months stay with Khattak was most rewarding and I owe most of what I know of infantry tactics to Khattak. I did not meet him after 1983.

Service in II Cavalry by virtue of being commissioned in that unit enabled me to meet many veterans of the battles of Phillora Chhamb and Chawinda.

There can be no finer schooling in military history than chatting with the soldier veterans who were the tank crews in an actual war.

It was here that I learnt about Tommy Masud who features very prominently in the 1947-48 war. The old cavalry tradition of being seen and not being heard ; and being located in a remote garrison town enabled me to concentrate more on books .

Thus the period spent in Kharian was a most useful period as far as improving my military history knowledge was concerned. In 1984 a disciplinary problem in II Cavalry proved a Godsend blessing for me since I served for some time in I 5 Self Propelled Field Artillery Regiment where I learnt

more about artillery than any armour officer could, in normal circumstances.

In 15 SP I experienced more solidarity than in some armoured regiments in which I later served.

Colonel Afsar Gulji the Commanding officer did not take nonsense even from higher headquarters and at least on one occasion got into trouble with the brigade headquarters because of me!

Major Zohrab my battery commander was another very fine man who suffered from the major disqualification of being a professional without being a careerist! He was from a breed who were good regimental officers, many of whom really fought the 1965 and 1971 wars, retiring as majors and doing the real dirty job of fighting or regimental soldiering!

There is a great amount of truth in General Joginder Singh's observation that the 1965 war was a show of about 20 Indian Lieutenant Colonels or units!

The same is true for Pakistan Army. After all Gadgor was triumph of Nisar and 25 Cavalry only and no headquarter beyond regiment level in the Pakistan Army.

Valtoha was Sabizad Gul's or 6 Lancers triumph and failure of 5 Armoured Brigade and 1st Armoured Division!

When actions are won or lost because of valour or coup d'oeil at unit level alone; the simple conclusion is that there was little except mediocrity at higher levels!

I began with this contention in mind when I developed a conviction to write this book.

A few months of study convinced me that this was the essence of the issue!

I also want to mention certain regimental officers from whom I learnt a great deal in some way. Colonel Liaquat Shah; an officer and a gentleman; my commanding officer in 11 Cavalry, was from a fast disappearing breed of a genuine aristocracy with extremely fine military and social ideals.

Majors Anwar Mirza, Mumtaz, Farooq Malik, Iftikhar and Colonels Asghar Feroze, Ayaz Peer Mohamad, Mohammad Farooq and Khalid all from 11 Cavalry were fine, comrades and good friends and Khalid was particularly instrumental in getting my service prolonged by seven years when both my corps and division commanders had requested General K.M Arif that the Army no longer required my services!

Major Iqbal Shah (later lieutenant colonel) my squadron commander was a great teacher in the training manoeuvres of Tamewali as well as in the gaddi nasheen city of Multan!

I learnt a great deal about both professional and non professional things from him. He was my companion and guide for four years in Multan!

Major Munawar another very fine officer with whom I had the opportunity of serving in 58 Cavalry. He was a Nathoka from the left bank of Chenab near Sahiwal (in Sargodha District), a fine breed of pastoral tribes of Punjab who assumed the settle status only after the British dug some canals for them after 1851.

He left the army in 1988 despite being very talented ,as a result of the policy of discrimination against the Qadianis.

He was a great comrade, an ideal regimental officer and a very fine senior and one who was ; solid as a rock in any crisis.

Captain (later Major) Azam Niazi my squadron commander in 29 Cavalry was another expert in his own field and a very fine friend! Major Mazhar Qayyum from 58 Cavalry and my officers of 5 Squadron; Khalid Behram, Moin ,Khurram, Mekan and Mansoor were excellent juniors and comrades in field as well as cantonment!



Officers of 5 Independent Armoured Squadron
, November 1992

They co-operated with me as an excellent and well knit team enabling me to practice certain tactical and training ideas that I had long theoretically held ; but was able to practice on ground only once I commanded an independent squadron without any deadweights or impediments in shape of a colonel or brigadier , breathing down one's neck , knowing all the regulations , and not interested in any tactical innovations !

They were a spirited lot and because of their immense zeal and hardwork our independent squadron won a corps level firing trophy defeating eight illustrious armoured regiments. It was an unprecedented honour in the armoured corps for a squadron !

We received letters of congratulations from many units and headquarters except both the armoured division headquarters and the armoured corps directorate !



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Received
16 Oct 93
Saturday
Okara Cantt

Lieutenant General
Muhammad Akram Khan
Headquarters 31 Corps
Bahawalpur Cantonment
Telephone: Military-731
Number.PF/6344/D0
October 1993

Major Aqha Humayun Amin
Officer Commanding
5 Independent Armoured Squadron
Okara Cantt

Dear Major Humayun,

Thank you very much for sending me a copy of Special Order of The Day dated 24 Sep 93.. I am delighted to learn that the 5 Independent Armoured Squadron has won the trophy at Corps level in Armoured Fighting Vehicle Sub Calibre firing competition. Please keep it up and convey my heartiest congratulations to the officers and all ranks of 5 Independent Armoured Squadron.

Yours

Sincerely,

Haran

Colonel Munawar my commanding officer , a man most often misunderstood , despite having a heart of gold , was one of the very few commanding officers who took a stand for his officers and suffered.

Brigadier Tirmizi (later Lieutenant General) my commander in the 3rd Armoured Brigade was one of the very few general officers who I genuinely respect.

Tirmizi was one of the few generals who remained the same after attaining general rank and never took advantage of protocol or other such petty considerations in distancing them from those they knew in the earlier years of their career.

Lastly and most important among all these is my very dear friend Colonel Khalid , who hails from a rare and very fine pedigree of Khanzada Rajputs of Ferozpur Jhirka .

He retired as a colonel from the army but was and is, far superior to many who did well at least in terms of worldly rank and advancement, despite being far less deserving!

All these comrades both senior and juniors in some way made life very rich in intellectual moral or emotional terms and I remain forever indebted to them.

The first two years out of the total four years service in the 1st Armoured Division was one of the most professionally instructive periods of my life. This was largely because of Major General Hameed Gul who was a great trainer of troops. I did not agree with many of Gul's views and never joined him in many religious rituals ; performing which at that time was a must in order to assure advancement in service.

At this time Hameed Gul and Major General Sajjad had combined to have joint divisional exercises and the resultant training manoeuvres of the 1st

Armoured and 37 Infantry Division were a thrilling experience.

All this changed after Hameed Gul departed and the next two years ; as far as I think were the most barren years of the armoured division at least as far as military training was concerned! But that was a time when military training was not as important as Darbari manners!

One year at the Tactical Wing of the School of Armour Nowshera was the last most formative experience of my military career.Colonel Idrees Niazi was an excellent armour officer and a great teacher.It is unfortunate that he never became a brigadier.

Idrees was a hard taskmaster and to some a nut.However I found him an excellent senior and a great professional.

A few words about the motivation to write.! took up serious writing from 1989

onwards.Captain Abid Hamza who is now a pilot in the PIA was instrumental in spurring me to focus more attention on creative writing. This was when we were serving in the 3rd Armoured Brigade at Lahore and spent about one and half year in the same office room.

Colonel Iftikhar ud Din Hassan as Editor of the Pakistan Army Journal was very kind in encouraging me to write and published my first piece of writing in the Pakistan Army Journal in the form of a letter.

Both of his successors Colonels Syed Ishfaq Ali and Syed Jawaid Ahmad were very kind and encouraging and published all that I sent them whether it was an article or a letter.

Alas while the world all around us is growing the intellectual situation in Pakistan can be gauged from the fact that the Pakistan Army's prime military journal's frequency of publication has been reduced from four issues per year since 1993 when the above mentioned individuals were its successive editors to one or two issues per year in 1998-99 !

I also want to mention certain officers on the editorial board of the "Citadel" magazine of Command and Staff College Quetta who greatly encouraged me to continue writing and on many occasions went out of the way to ensure that some of my more blunt thoughts found some space on the Citadel's pages .The first of these was Colonel Arshad Mian Iqbal .

I came to know Arshad as a hot rod major in the 19 Lancers back in 1985 ! We were sideroom mates for a long time. Arshad was the man who may be described as the finest definition of an officer and a gentleman! As far as I know he did not rise beyond a brigadier despite having all the qualifications to achieve a much higher rank; which he missed since he was far more talented than many who were his superiors! Once I think about him I am reminded of one of Somerset Maugham's sayings that " Good luck always brings merit , but merit very seldom brings good luck !

Then there was Colonel Munawar Ahmad Rana again from that excellent unit 19 Lancers ; where excellence seemed to have been institutionalised

Munawar also ended as a brigadier only, which is the maximum ceiling for the Qadianis ; long live the

equal opportunity policy of the anti Qadiani
Apartheid enforced with great vigour since 1977 !

It's a great tragedy and a conspiracy against talent ! While the Indians are making use of Parsis Christians Sikhs and even Muslims in their armed forces, we have been persecuting a community which was more loyal to Pakistan than many dirty bearded priests from the so called religious parties back in 1947 and till to date!

This community produced two of our finest generals and yet today they are treated like the untouchables in the armed forces !

There was Colonel Mohammad Ashraf Saleem (from Air Defence) from Sanjar Kot in Rahimyarkhan, who took great interest in my articles and was instrumental in getting my first article in Citadel published in 1994

Colonel Kaizad (now major general) Colonel Ahsan (from Engineers) and Colonel Tariq Khan (from 4 Cavalry) were also very kind to me and published a great deal of what I sent to them in the Citadel Magazine of Command and Staff College Quetta.

It was during Colonel Kaizads editorship that one of my letters pointing out a factual error in a general officers article was published. On the face value this may not sound very big.

I had been sending letters to various editors of the staff college magazine but it was only Colonel Kaizad who possessed greater forthrightness and intellectual honesty than all brother Muslim officers of the "Editorial Board" of the "Citadel Magazine"(!) ; who was finally instrumental in getting the error acknowledged in one of the issues of the "Citadel".

During Kaizad Maneck's , Munawar Rana's and Tariq Khan's time the Citadel Magazine was indeed the bastion of dynamic soldiering rather than a bastion of pedantry as it mostly remains under the editorship of the much larger majority commodity ; ie docile conformist mediocre and timid editors !The capacity to listen to mild criticism or even to accept feedback from subscribers may be gauged from the fact that the insignificant "Readers Forum" of the Citadel Magazine which used to publish "Letters to Editor" was discontinued in 1995.

As a protest and to disprove the fact that no letters were being written ; I in my humble capacity kept writing letters to the Citadel till 1998 ,but finally discontinued it,as a waste of stationery.

' An outwardly insignificant but essentially crucial change had taken place when the "Readers Forum" was abolished; but no one noticed it! After all the aim was to churn out career officers while feedback and intellectual interaction was a waste of four to five precious pages of the precious space of the institution's magazine 'Someone in the higher echelons was not happy even with mild criticism !

This was 1995 and continues to date! General Tucker an eminent general of the Indian Army once wrote ; " In order to promote discussion , it is necessary that our military journals shall be more lively to all things new , more able to interest the army at large.They must be prepared to take a line not necessarily in favour with those of us at the top of the fighting forces. The "Yes Man" (which is one inexhaustible commodity which both Indo Pak armies posses in excess and which is found in abundance in all military training establishments and schools/colleges of instruction) is more

dangerous when he is an editor of a service periodical than when he is a subordinate in the army itself .We have to remember that whether we are at the top or bottom it is only by rubbing our wits against the wits of others who hold varying views that we can sharpen them .A man must fear something if he is not prepared in peacetime to discuss his opinions on matters of importance with both his seniors and juniors .He has much to gain from what he will hear in the course of the discussion".

This our army's intellectual tragedy and perhaps of all third world armies ! There were some exceptions to the rule and some commandants of that institution did try to make the institution a bastion of dynamic military instruction !The tragedy is that dynamism has not been institutionalised in the Indo Pak subcontinent! Three of the commandants of that institution ie Generals Naqvi General Saeed Uz Zafar and Syed Mohammad Amjad ; who also made some worthwhile efforts to make that institution dynamic ; were also very kind to me; as far as giving the final approval of publishing my articles was concerned.

The first two of these worthy commandants , with whom I had direct communication in writing always took the trouble of reading whatever I sent them and replying to my letters. My motivation to continue writing owes a great deal to all the individuals mentioned above and through the medium of this book I wish to once again express my gratitude to them.

Unfortunately our army's journals are run on entirely whimsical basis . Thus in 1994 I had sent an article on armoured warfare directly to the commandant General Saeed-Uz-Zafar. Soon

afterwards I received two letters from the editor , an infantry officer from the Punjab Regiment , thanking me for the articles (an absolutely rare phenomena , which had occurred not as a matter of normal courtesy , but simply because I had sent the article to the commandant) .

Soon General Saeed-Uz-Zafar was however posted out and that was the end of the issue.

My article was not published! On the contrary none of my further letters were acknowledged and even a copy of my subscription issue was not sent to me!

I was naturally disgusted but kept writing letters subjecting the articles published in the magazine to some critique.

In January 1998 however I was most pleasantly surprised to Learn that one of my letters had been published as a short article.

On further inquiry I discovered that this had been done entirely on the initiative of an engineer officer who had dug up one my old letters from a file!

Had he not done so the matter would have ended right there! It was a matter of whims and that is how the staff college journal was run! I was however encouraged and once again despatched a copy of the article I had sent in

1994 to this engineer officer editor, who by this time I had discovered was one Colonel Ahsan!

Finally my article which was despatched in 1994 and then sent into cold storage was published in July 1998, simply because one editor decided it, on

some basis, while three editors before him found it bullshit!

This whimsical attitude towards new ideas or towards anyone's effort, good or bad is one constant factor that discourages growth of intellectual dynamism in our army!

In civilised countries articles are sent to three or four referees without the authors name and these referees decide which article should be published' In our army's journals and even in civilian journals the issue is decided by one whimsical editor who has one eye on his boss's likes and dislikes and is more interested in promoting his personal interests and in improving his prospects of advancement in service! In any case the prospects of my articles being printed were markedly increased while Ahsan (from Engineers and Tariq Khan (from 4 Cavalry) were on the editorial board!

The whole situation was however reversed when both were posted out. This I discovered once I sent another article on battle of Chhamb which was much better written than the ones previously published. The new editor, a certain Aziz Tariq did not even acknowledge receipt of the article.

The whole geopolitical and operational scenario had changed ! General Amjad one of the most upright officers of this army was no longer the commandant, the new commandant was from infantry, and I was from armoured corps ! It could be anything ! Even being from " X " district or Tehsil " Y " or Village " Y " can be a reason for an article being published or not published in the journal of a third world army ! Finally the article was published in the Defence Journal of Karachi !

We manage everything on whims and personal interest , whether it's the army or politics or even the country's foreign policy' This is true for all whether soldiers or civilians whether it was democracy pseudo democracy or martial law!

The result is simple! While individuals have prospered the country has failed to rise to a decent place in the world community!

I want to add here a few more lines about certain typical Indo Pak attitudes towards any intellectual effort. In the course of my service I wrote about three tactical booklets one book on military history connected with the staff college military history paper and one summary on Clausewitz's work "On War".

I sent copies of all five to the General Headquarters but never received any feedback except a demi official letter from General Arif Bangash the Inspector General Training in 1990 ! Those in charge of running the army's nucleus were not interested in anything new !

I had the opportunity of frequently meeting General Attig Ur Rahman after retirement during the period 1994-95 and found him very inspiring. I did not agree with many of his views but found every word that he uttered thought provoking.

This ends the list of individuals from whom I learnt a great deal and who greatly helped me at various stages of my career in the army by their solidarity and understanding. I know that very few Pakistanis read books, other than those on sex and scandal and few outside Pakistan would be interested in a book on Pakistan Army.

Writing a book on Pakistan Army is a most non profitable and most futile venture. Pakistanis only read books, which enable them to get something in shape of institutional advancement or material reward.

They do so only out of external motivation. This ensures that they will always remain behind countries where knowledge is acquired out of pure internal motivation. Even then I decided to make a humble attempt to write a book on the Pakistan army did so because of inner compulsions.

I did so because I feel that a soldier never retires and the spiritual bond established on the ridges of Kakul and in the Tobas of Tamewali cannot be severed just because one is no longer in active service! It is for the reader to decide how far I succeeded in presenting a balanced picture.

INTRODUCTION

This book is the history of the post 1947 Pakistan Army as seen through the eyes of an officer who served in this army for a certain period of time. Unlike many books it is not an attempt to glorify an organisation.

It does not aim to prove that one religion is better than another is or one country is more pure than another is, while the other is an evil state. It does not project any party or political leader like many post 1958, post 1971 or post 1977 works pertaining to the history of the Pakistan Army do.

There are no silent soldiers or visionary soldiers, projected as heroes, as has been done in many

post 1988 books, financed off course by dirty money of US dollars siphoned off from the Afghan war!

There are however some forgotten or neglected heroes, which this book seeks to, rehabilitate or at least endeavour to restore them to their rightful position.

The prime motivation to write this book was disgust with deliberate distortion of history, to a lesser or greater degree in both Pakistan and India.

The Indian military history situation is far better than Pakistan because a democratic system ensured that the Indian Army officers were more free to write critical accounts of all three wars, a right which was denied to their Pakistani counterparts by two paper tiger soldiers who not only destroyed all political institutions in Pakistan, but also inflicted incalculable loss on the army as an institution.

Ironically a substantial part of Pakistani military history has been distorted by the negative effects of the deliberate efforts of military and civilian dictators who usurped power from 1958 to 1988, three fateful decades, which disrupted intellectual growth of the Pakistani nation and ensured that no progress is made in real intellectual terms in anything to do with history.

When freedom of opinion was destroyed and intellectual growth was suffocated under able sycophantic civil servants and army officers in the role of intellectual watchdogs of Ayub Zia and Bhntto regimes.

A significant part of the work deals with the various myths and misconception pertaining to Indo Muslim political and military history.

Unfortunately modern authors without sufficient scrutiny accepted many of these myths, and resultantly many of these myths have acquired the status of reliable and irrefutable facts. Since the Pakistan Army like the Indian Army is essentially the continuation of the old British Indian Army, an effort has been made to highlight the formative and decisive influence of the colonial heritage on the post 1947 performance of both the armies.

In this regard an attempt has been made to analyse the failures and successes of the post 1947 army in relation to the pre 1947 British operational and tactical concepts.

Most of the works on the history of Pakistan Army suffer from certain inherent drawbacks which nullify their historical value.

Firstly we have the semi official accounts written during Ayub's tenure, Bhutto's tenure and during Zia's tenure.

The first set of books were written during Ayub's period are of dubious value since they could not dare to analyse Pakistani politics or the army from a strictly neutral and critical point of view.

These were followed by books written during Mr. Bhutto's period, which again were written with official blessings, with an axe to grind, with one eye on likes and dislikes of Mr. Bhutto.

During the Bhutto period also there was no real freedom of speech although lip service was paid to the idea of democracy and socialism. Mr. Bhutto

though himself a product of Martial Law was keen to prove that he had little to do with the secession of East Pakistan.

Thus he employed General Fazal Muqueem in writing the officially patronised "Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership". Fazl I Muqueem was a past master in writing books tailor made to satisfy the whims and wishes of those in power, and had already written "The Story of the Pakistan Army" during the Ayub period.

Fazl I Muqueem made Yahya the scapegoat for the East Pakistan crisis while exonerating Mr Bhutto of all the share of responsibility!

This was followed by the Zia era during which General Shaukat Raza was commissioned to write a history of the Pakistan Army. As a result of this project General Shaukat Raza produced three volumes covering the history of the Pakistan Army.

The first of these volumes dealing with 1965 war was published in 1984, and was vetted and edited by various staff officers of the General Headquarters and the vice Chief of Army Staff, thereby robbing the work of its independence of judgement and reducing it to the level of a repetition of events, without frank and forthright analysis of the higher levels of command.

It appears that Shaukat Raza was allowed to criticise the intermediate and junior level commanders while fully exonerating the self styled Field Marshal President and the Commander in Chief.

Thus the President was presented as an angel who had been duped by his devilish foreign minister

Bhutto into a war with India that neither the army nor the president wanted! This criticism was a natural reaction of the fact that Zia was obsessed with Bhutto and made it a point to hold Bhutto responsible for all the maladies that had afflicted Pakistan.

The second and third volumes of Shaukat Riza's book published again under supervision of the General Headquarters of the Army in 1989 and 1990 are again non committal and refrain from critical analysis,so much so that the final one dealing with 1971 war ended without any detailed conclusion.

The era after 1988 was not one in which freedom of opinion was restricted unlike the period 1958-88 when intellectual growth was suffocated by Ayub Bhutto and Zia ,but few forthright accounts came out,since many of the participants of the three wars were either dead senile or too much afflicted by apathy or disgust to take up the pen and write anything substantial.

The most valuable although controversial and to some extent biased by egoism is General Gul Hassan's narrative,which contains valuable and thought provoking insights about the history of Pakistan Army.

The outstanding fact about Gul Hassan was the fact that unlike many Ayub and Zia era generals from humble background and who later on became very rich thanks to the Ayub or Zia martial law,Gul Hassan stands out as one plain simple soldier who is not known for his assets or snobbery.Even in 1983 when I was commissioned in the army,eleven years after his departure,Gul Hassan was one of the few generals apart from General Eftikhar,to be remembered with great

respect and affection by the rank and file of at least five armoured regiments in which I served from 1983 till retirement.

General K.M Arif's book has limited historical value since his entire narrative is devoted to analysing or justifying the actions of his benefactor Zia.

It is an interesting aspect of this book, that nowhere does K.M Arif state; as to what was his advice or counsel to Zia in any of the decisions that Zia took while Arif was his Chief of Staff/Vice Chief of Army Staff!S

Idriq Salik's book although very interesting is primarily the narrative of a non fighting arm officer who is known more for literary prowess than for any military analytical ability.

Cohen's two books on the Indian and Pakistan Army are a valuable contribution, but has certain factual errors and does not explain at all the performance of both the armies in actual war apart from citing certain statistics.

The British accounts mostly end with the transfer of power and the latest account written by an Australian officer finds that most failures of the Pakistan Army had no "connection with the British colonial legacy.

On the other hand he exonerates many senior officers of all the share of responsibility in many military failures of 1965 and 1971 wars

Only those aspects of the pre 1947 British Indian military history have been dealt with in greater detail which have a connection with various controversial aspects of modern Indo Pak military

history, like the 'Martial Races Theory', the nature of resistance against the English East India Company and various other historical events which have a connection with some aspect of the history of the post 1947 Pakistan Army.

There is a misconception in some quarters that the military history of Pakistan army starts after 1947 or after 1849, when the Punjabi Muslims or Pathans were recruited for the first time in the army.

Historically this is incorrect. The pre 1849 military tradition runs in a continuous line via various Ranghar/Hindustani Muslim cavalry and infantry units of the Company's pre 1849 Bengal Army, and the military history of Pakistan Army has deeper origins than 1849, although not as deep as 1091 or 711 A.D as many myth makers might like to propagate!

Some readers may find the first part dealing with the pre 1947 background of the Pakistan Army lengthy and unnecessary. As a matter of fact without this background it is impossible to understand various myths like the much trumpeted and propagated "Martial Race Theory" which created a false sense of superiority in Pakistan particularly.

The military record of various ethnic and religious groups in the pre partition era has been discussed so that the reader who is a layman to Indian military history is made aware of who exactly did what before 1947.

In addition some attention has been devoted to ulterior biases which have played an important role in both the army and in politics in Pakistan.

An effort has been made to provide a consolidated view of the Pakistan Army taking into account the colonial heritage, the political developments, the ethnic factors, the experience of the two world wars and the post 1947 politics and their relation to actual war performance. It is for the reader to judge as to how far I have succeeded in doing so.

Some foreigners and some Pakistanis have written books on the history of the Pakistan Army.

All these books suffer from one common defect i.e. no one has really gone into the exact operational sociopolitical doctrinal organisational and tactical factors which retarded the development of the Pakistan Army; as far as actual on ground operations in all three wars were concerned; and resulted in military incompetence and military failures which had less to do with any sort of "influence of heavy odds" or with "any British or Hindu conspiracy" or any situational factors which were beyond the control of those at the helm of affairs at various levels in the army, and most particularly as far as the army higher command level was concerned.

No book has taken into account the negative aspects of political history of the Indian Muslims which had a certain negative influence on the army.

The various ethnic and religious factors in Indo Pak military history have been dealt with in a manner which some may find as ruthless! As a matter of fact I feel no compulsion to prove that the Muslims or Hindus or the Punjabis or the Pathans are better than each other or anyone else.

The only thing which inspires me and which I revere is the spirit of man, and this spirit is not the sole preserve of any one special ethnic religious or

ideological group but is found in a small minority of men of every nation religion or group' If the Punjabis were brave it was not so because they were Muslim or Sikh or simply because they were Punjabis!

They were brave because they were product of a certain historical situation as far as group achievements were concerned, and individually simply because one particular man was brave and this man could have been from just any other ethnic or religious group!

I admire the spirit of defying heavy odds whether it is the Sikh against Mughal or the Afghan against Russian or the Russian against German or the Viet Minh against Americans or the British against Hitler. The spirit of rebellion against the tyranny of state in any form. There are no chosen people in this book. Men of substance have been praised whether Muslim Hindu Sikh or anything.

Thus there are no favorite parties and no favorite theories and no favorite races or nations in this boo... Man can fight for any cause; that does not matter; all causes are in some way right or men who fight for them think that they are fighting for a righteous cause; but how a man fights does matter and anyone from any race caste religion ideology or no ideology can fight.

CHAPTER ONE - BACKGROUND

The Muslim factor to which Pakistan owes its creation emerged for the first time in Indian history in 711 A.D when the Muslim Arabs attacked and captured Sind located in the North West of India.

This was followed by a lull period till the tenth century when the Ghaznavids, a Muslim Turkish tribe based in Ghazni in modern Afghanistan came into conflict with the Hindu rulers of Eastern Afghanistan from around 962 A.D. The Ghaznavids first captured Eastern Afghanistan and then followed it up by attacking across the Khyber Pass and also captured modern N.W.F.P and Punjab province of modern Pakistan by 1006 A.D.

The Ghaznavids were followed by the Ghauris another Turkish Muslim tribe who defeated the Hindu Rajput rulers of northern India and established Muslim Turkish rule in northern India in the eleventh and twelfth century.

The Ghauris (1148-1215) were succeeded by various slave kings (1193-1287) of Turkish descent who consolidated Muslim rule in India.

These were succeeded by the Khilji Turks (1290-1320), the Tughlaqs (1320-1412), the Sayyids (1414-43) .By 15th century the greater part of India except the south had been brought under the Muslim Turk government based at Delhi.

The Turks were overthrown by the Lodhi Pathans who ruled northern India from 1451 to 1526 when they were defeated by the Turco Mongol Babar.

The Mughal dynasty ruled India from 1526 (with one short period of Pathan Muslim rule from 1539 to 1555) till the advent of the Marathas and British.

During the entire period from 711 till British times the Muslims remained an overall minority, but constituted the majority in the north-western and the eastern part of India. Initially the Mughals ruled only northern India. However by the end of the

seventeenth century they brought the larger part of India under their rule. From the middle part of the seventeenth centuries the Hindu Marathas and the Punjabi Sikhs started a low intensity guerrilla war against the Mughals as a result of which the Mughal Empire's decline commenced.

The death of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 was followed by the acceleration of the pace of the empire's decline. The decline of the Mughal Empire had a deep and direct connection with Aurangzeb's rule (1659-1707).

Aurangzeb though a very able man alienated all sections of the society by his oppressive policies, which led to the Maratha War in the south.

The Maratha War shook the financial foundations of the Mughal Empire and exhausted the state morally militarily and economically.

The coup de grace to the Mughal Empire was delivered by the Turk-Persian Muslim Army of Nadir Shah who invaded India in 1739 and looted all the movable wealth of the Mughal Empire accumulated since the advent of Babar in 1526. This was followed by gradual break-up of the Mughal Empire. Governors of many Mughal provinces became independent rulers.

The Marathas captured many parts of southern western and central India. While the Afghans frequently raided and looted Muslim Northern India under the able bandit King Ahmad Shah Abdali.

The Portuguese sailor Vasco de Gama discovered the sea route to India via the Cape of Good Hope when he reached Calicut on the western coast

of India on 20 May 1498. The English arrived in India more than a decade after the Spanish Armada had been defeated and defeated the Portuguese off Surat in 1612. The French East India Company was established in 1664 and the first French ships arrived in India in 1668. The main French base at Pondicherry was established in 1674. In the beginning the European companies were only peaceful merchants.

However once the decline of the Mughal Empire commenced after 1707, the Europeans became more active and militarily stronger, since there was no strong central government to restrain or regulate their commercial and military activities. European trading companies like the French English Portuguese and Dutch East India Companies fought each other and local Indian rulers for commercial concessions and dominated port cities like Bombay Madras and Calcutta and their hinterland.

It may be noted that the English East India Company was formed in 1599 and established its first factory at Surat on the western coast of India in 1612.

In 1640 the English founded Fort Saint George which later became famous as Madras. Calcutta was founded in 1660. Both the French and the English companies used private armies composed of largely native troops reinforced by a nucleus of European troops. The English and French who were the strongest among European Companies fought for supremacy in the First Anglo French War (1744-49), the Second Anglo French War (1750-54) and the third and decisive Anglo French War (1758-63) which led to the triumph of the English.

East India Company over the French Company.

Meanwhile in 1757 Robert Clive defeated the ruler of Bengal at Plassey and the English East India Company clearly emerged as the dominant European power in eastern India. This was followed by the battle of Buxar in 1764 as a result of which the East India Company became the sole dominating power in the Gangetic plain.

The East India Company employed three different regional forces of Native and European troops against their military opponents. These were known by the names of the port towns which housed the respective governors of East India Company's territory in India.

These were the Madras Army, based at Madras on the south east coast, the Bombay Army based on the western coastal port of Bombay and the Bengal Army based around the eastern port city of Calcutta. In addition the English East India Company also employed certain regular regiments of the Royal British Army on rent.

The first of these regiments to be employed by the East India Company was His Majesty's (HM) 39th Foot which arrived in India in 1754 ! **(1)**

On the other hand some 80 % of East India Company's private army consisted of Native Regiments officered by Europeans and a few European regiments in which the entire rank and file was composed of British Hanoverian or other European troops.

During the period between 1775 and 1805 two major Indian powers were in the field against the English East India Company.

These were the Marathas and the Muslim ruled state of Mysore. The English East India Company fought four major wars with Mysore .

In the First Mysore War (1767-69) the Company was almost defeated and forced to make peace. In the Second Mysore War (1780-84) the Company suffered many reverses and its outcome was inconclusive. This was followed by the Third Mysore War (1790-92) in which Mysore was militarily defeated but not destroyed.

The Mysore Wars were brought to a final conclusion by the complete defeat of Mysore in the Fourth Mysore War (1798-99). The English East India Company fought three wars with the Marathas who were a more numerous and stronger adversary.

The first i.e. the First Maratha War (1775-82) was inconclusive.

In the Second Maratha War (1803-1805) the Marathas were decisively defeated at Assaye in the south by Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington and by General Gerald Lake at Laswari in the north. Delhi was captured during this war by General Lake in 1803 and the British became the masters of all India except the independent Sikh state of Punjab and the weaker Muslim state of Sindh.

The Second Maratha War was followed by the Anglo Nepalese war (1814-1816) in which the English East India Company convincingly defeated the Gurkhas after having initially suffered some reverses. Nepal was not annexed, but Nepali neutrality was secured, since the Nepalis realised the military effectiveness of the English East India Company.

The Nepal War was followed by the Third Maratha War (1817-1818) which resulted in the final pacification and subservience of the Marathas to the English East India Company.

In 1839 the East India Company declared war on Afghanistan to support a candidate to the Afghan throne and to check Russian ambitions towards Afghanistan and India.

The First Afghan War turned out to be an expensive and futile adventure, primarily because of length of communications from India and the resultant exorbitant logistic cost. Afghanistan was essentially a non-productive country with a very weak economy and just like Nepal the East India Company had no intention to permanently occupy it. The First Afghan War is a subject for many military myths of British Indian Military history.

The most notable event of this war was the destruction of East India Company's Kabul Brigade of some 4500 men including about 700 European troops **(2)** at the hand of a numerically phenomenally superior Afghan force.

This event had a deeper connection with individual incompetence of the local East India Company Commander at Kabul than with Afghan valour. At the same time a similarly small force comprising 75 % Native troops (three fourth Hindu and one fourth Muslim) and one European regiment successfully held Kandhar against repeated Afghan assaults.

The East India Company recaptured Kabul in September 1842, burnt its main bazar as a punitive measure and withdrew its entire army out of Afghanistan.

The East India Company was a trading company, and its Directors in England correctly assessed that the decision to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan was a blunder in terms of financial input and military effort in occupying a country which offered no economic rewards.

The company had no intention of permanently occupying Afghanistan, which was a barren and poor country. The significance of this war was in making the Afghans realise that the East India Company was not like the later Mughals who were raided at will by Ahmad Shah Abdali !

The extreme docility and timidity exhibited by the rulers of Afghanistan fifteen years later in 1857, as we shall discuss later was a convincing proof that militarily the First Afghan War in the final reckoning was a British victory!

Later on many myths were created about Afghan invincibility ! The fact that the same Afghans were kicked out of India by the Punjabi Sikhs by 1823 proves that their so called military prowess was only effective when , sniping from high mountains and raiding an invading or withdrawing army's baggage train or camp followers, in the Maratha fashion!

As a matter of fact both the Afghans and Marthas during the period 1707-1799 looted all ethnic and religious groups without any discrimination. It is ironic that later in the twentieth century both were projected as champions of Hinduism or Islam!

Sind was annexed in 1843 following the Sindh campaign which was militarily a very insignificant affair. This was followed by the contest with

Sikhs, who turned out to be the toughest opponents of the East India Company in India, Afghanistan, Nepal or Iran.

The First Sikh War was won by a very narrow margin by the English East India Company despite the fact that the Sikhs were not aided by adverse mountain terrain, as was the case in Afghanistan and Nepal. The East India Company had no logistic problems unlike Afghanistan and the war was fought on relatively even strength.

The East India Company did not annex Punjab after the First Sikh War (1845-46). Just two years later the Sikhs revolted against the East India Company's Resident at Lahore and the East India Company was again forced to declare war. The result was the Second Sikh War (1848-49), another costly affair in which the East India suffered a reverse at the battle of Chillianwalla (13 January 1849), but decisively defeated the Sikhs at the battle of Gujarat (21 February 1849).

Punjab was annexed and the boundaries of the East India Company were extended till the border of Afghanistan.

The last significant military event of English East India Company's military history in India was the

Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 in which the native Bengal Army of the East India Company seized Delhi and proclaimed independence in the name of the last Mughal Emperor of India who was East India Company's pensioner, but also the de jure ruler of India.

The East India Company was saved by divisions among Indians and Afghan neutrality which was a

natural result of the lesson taught to the Afghan King by Messrs General Nott and Pollock.

British naval power came into action and the largest British army to be concentrated outside Britain in any single country, till 1858 was concentrated in India . **(3)**

At least Indians should have the consolation, that in terms of volume of British troops concentrated, the Sepoy Rebellion, was a larger event than the much trumpeted American War of Independence!

The suppression of the Sepoy Rebellion in 1858 was followed by the end of East India Company's rule from India and assumption of government of India by the British crown.

ENDNOTES

(1) Page-327-The Imperial Gazetteer of India-Volume-Four--Administrative-Based on material supplied by Lieutenant General Sir Edward Collen-New Edition-Oxford Press-Clarendon-1907.

(2) Page-230- A History of the British Army-Volume XII-1839-1852-Hon J.W Fortescue-Macmillan and Company Limited-London 1927.

(3)Page-391 & 392-A History of the British Army-Volume-XIII--Hon J.W Fortescue-Macmillan and Company Limited Saint Martin's Street-London -1930.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NATIVE ARMY AND THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY'S CONQUEST OF INDIA-1757-1849

We have seen that Native troops played a significant role in the East India Company's conquest of India.

Certain aspects however made the military potential and effectiveness of East India Company's troops from their other opponents in India.

The East India Company employed European officers trained in the European way of war to drill train and command native Indian troops. In addition in almost every battle native troops were grouped around a relatively much smaller nucleus of European troops.

Another factor which played an important part in the East India Company's conquest of India was naval power. Naval power gave flexibility to the operations of the East India Company.

This meant that troops from Bengal Army could be swiftly transported from Bengal Presidency to the Madras presidency, thereby reinforcing the Madras troops in case of any serious military reverse.

This happened many times during the Mysore Wars. Naval power also played an important role in logistically supporting the operations of land based armies.

Three widely separated bases of the English East India Company which were interconnected with each other by sea meant that loss of any one of these could not defeat the company, since troops from one presidency could be switched to another quickly via the sea route. No single Indian power had common borders with all the three presidency and this meant that no single Indian power could destroy the English East India Company.

The only way that this could be done was by an alliance of native powers and this was made extremely difficult since no two native powers could agree on anything for a long time. Above all the centre of gravity of the English East India Company was naval power and no native power possessed naval potential to challenge British naval mastery.

For sometime the French were in a position to do so, but the only opportunity to do so was lost during the Second Mysore War at Cuddalore when all the French squadron under Admiral D'Orves had to do was to remain in position off the coast of Cuddalore while the English East India Company's main army under Sir Eyre Coote facing Hyder Ali of Mysore could have been starved into surrender. **(1)**

Due to some inexplicable reason D'Orves simply sailed away and the French lost their last decisive opportunity to defeat the English East India Company.

The origin of English East India Company's native army were guards enrolled for the protection of their trading posts and factories in the seventeenth century.

The French were the first European nation to employ natives as soldiers in India.

In 1676 Francois Martin the French Governor of Pondicherry enrolled 300 Natives to beef up his very small force of European troops. **(2)**

In 1740 Benoit Dumas another French governor of Pondicherry was employing a force comprising

4,000 to 5,000 Indian Muslims apart from the European troops.

This force was led by one Paradis, described as a brilliant Swiss officer serving as a mercenary soldier of fortune in the army of the French East India Company. It may be noted that the superiority of the infantry-artillery team based European way of war, over the cavalry charge based Asiatic way of warfare, was, for the first time demonstrated at the Battle of Saint Thome in 1746, where the French-Native troops of the French East India Company, under the same Paradis, brushed aside the much larger and at least outwardly awesome cavalry heavy army of Anwaruddin, the Nawab of Carnatic. Thus in words of the Cambridge historian "Cavalry could make no impression on troops that kept their ranks and reserved their fire. The terror of Asiatic armies had disappeared" ! **(3)**

Major Stringer Lawrence an officer of the Royal British Army is generally acknowledged by historians as the "father of the Indian Army".

He came to India in 1748 at the age of 51. Initially Calcutta was under the governor of Madras but in 1699 Bengal also became a Presidency (i.e. administered by a governor known as the President).

Robert Clive later famous as Lord Clive was the first Englishman to organise Indian troops on pure European lines in June 1757, shortly before the decisive battle of Plassey. Plassey as a result of which the English East India Company became the master of the revenue rich provinces of Bengal Bihar and Orissa was a true Mughal Indian battle; which the English won by bribing the Muslim courtiers of the Muslim Nawab of Bengal !

Thus the Army of Nawab of Bengal consisting of 50,000 infantry, 18,000 cavalry and a very powerful artillery train was effortlessly defeated by a British-Indian Army consisting of 750 Britishers, 200 Topasses and 2,100 Native Sepoys supported by just ten artillery pieces.

The vast bulk of the Nawab's army did not fight as its commanders were in league with Clive.

The battle was basically a cannonade and an exchange of musketry fire which the English Company won at the cost of just 18 killed and 48 wounded.

The battle is remembered as one of the most decisive battles of world (listed by J.F.C Fuller as one of the decisive battles of the Western world) because it enabled the English Company to raise and support a private army with which it subsequently captured the whole of India within the next eighty two years!

Robert Clive the father of the modern Indian Army was neither from the British Army, nor a soldier by profession.; but a simple clerk in the English East India Company's service. Clive won the appointment of an officer in volunteer infantry for a daring escape from French captivity in 1746.

Clive was a man of crisis and won fame for a daring military manœuvre during the siege of Trichinopoly in 1751.

He landed at Calcutta in 1757 with a British-Indian force tasked to relieve Calcutta which was besieged by the Muslim ruler of Bengal. Clive raised the " Bengal Native Infantry" in January 1757.

At that time this unit was known as "Lal Paltan" because of the red coats which it wore. This unit consisted of volunteers from the Gangetic Plain. These consisted of Hindu Jats, Hindustani Pathan Rohillas, Rajputs and even Brahmans.

Robert Clive later famous as Lord Clive was the first Englishman to organise Indian troops on pure European lines in June 1757, shortly before the decisive battle of Plassey.

Before Clive raised the Lal Paltan i.e. the first Indian regiment dressed, trained and organised on pure European lines the Indian troops employed in Madras, Bengal and Bombay were ill-disciplined and dressed, trained and organised on haphazard and ad hoc basis.

The Lal Paltan which later on came to be known as the 1st Bengal Native Infantry was organised, trained and equipped just like any other European unit of that time and officered by Europeans. It may be noted that there were no Bengalis in this regiment which was largely composed as we have already discussed of Muslims and Hindus of Rohilla, Jat, Rajput and Brahman castes from areas west of Bengal proper.

Clive's experiment was successful and immediately after the battle of Plassey in which the Lal Paltan participated a second sepoy (English distortion of the Indian word "Sipahi" which means soldier) battalion was raised. In Madras six similar battalions were raised in 1759. Similarly in Bombay Native Companies were formed in 1760 and these were eventually reorganised as Native Battalions in 1767.

Three factors played an important part in the rapid expansion of the Native Army. The first was

availability of manpower , the second was the economic factor, and the third was East India Company's intense military activity during the period 1757-1771.

European manpower was not readily available in India during this period. On the other hand due to decline of the Mughal Empire many soldiers were forced into unemployment and the English East India Company had a very wide choice of excellent recruits who flocked to Calcutta to get recruited.

Some time after the acquisition of Bengal as a result of the battle of Plassey the East India Company was forced to meet a new military threat from the west i.e. the Nawab Wazir of Oudh. This necessitated raising of new regiments.

Thus by 1766, 29 infantry battalions had been raised in Bengal presidency alone apart from the Lal Paltan. Three out of these battalions were disbanded for mutiny in 1764 in which 24 mutineers were blown by artillery guns . **(4)**

There is no doubt that Robert Clive the ex clerk was the real founder of the British Empire and Bengal Army which conquered major part of India for their British masters.

Clive is remembered only for Plassey, but it is forgotten that even after Plassey it was Clive who saved the East India Company by creating the Bengal Native Army trained on European lines. Clive performed the duty of the Commander in Chief of the Bengal Army and the overall East India Company army chief in India from December

1756 to 25 February 1760 and again from April 1765 to January 1767.

While it was true that Clive won the battle of Plassey by bribery and treachery, no one can refute the fact that Clive laid the essential foundations of British rule in India by organising native infantry battalions on European lines.

Had these native battalions trained equipped and organised on European lines not been there, the English East India Company could not have held Bengal during the period 1757-66, and, would have been simply overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers of the army of the Nawab of Oudh.

Thus in 1763 shortly before war between the English East India Company and the Nawab of Oudh commenced, the company had on its strength some 10,000 Native troops and approximately 1,500 Europeans (including 220 British Army Infantry) . **(5)**

At the decisive battle of Buxar fought on 23 October 1764 as a result of which the invasion of Bengal by the Nawab of Oudh was defeated and Oudh became a vassal of the English East India Company there were only 857 Europeans out of the total force of 7,072 men. **(6)**

The Native contribution to this battle may be gauged from the fact that out of the total East India Company Army's 825 casualties, some 744 were Natives. **(7)**

J.W Fortescue the official historian placed the casualties suffered at Buxar at 847 out of which 103 were suffered by Europeans and 744 by Natives. **(8)**

Clive had left India when Buxar was fought, but there is no doubt that without the Native

Regiments conceived and created by Clive, the East India Company would have been defeated at Buxar, and the East India Company would have surely lost Bengal. There is no exaggeration in stating that the future British Empire of India was saved at Buxar by 857 European troops and 6,115 Native troops.

In August 1765 the military genius of Robert Clive again came into action when he reorganised the Bengal Army into brigades.

Each brigade was a composite force of all arms, consisting of one regiment of the private European infantry of the English East India Company, one company of artillery, one rissalah of native cavalry (118 sabres), and the formidable cannon fodder i.e. seven infantry regiments (911 each) of Native Sepoys.

Clive deployed three brigades of the above mentioned composition for the defence of Bengal, making it impossible for any opponent of the East India Company to militarily surprise it by a sudden invasion.

Thus the First Brigade was stationed at Monghyr, the Second Brigade at Allahabad in the territory of the Wazir of Oudh, who was now only an insignificant vassal of the East India Company, the Third Brigade was stationed at Bankipore again in the territory of the Nawab of Oudh. **(9)**

It may be noted that the ethnic composition of the East India Company's Native Armies was quite diverse. These included Pathans, Hindustani Pathans, Muslim Rajputs, Hindu Rajputs, Arabs

(mostly in Bombay Army) ,Abbysinians (Bombay Army) and various categories of Hindustanis (inhabitants of the territory between Bengal proper and Ambala).

Most of the native troops of the Bengal Army however were from the tract of country in between the Ganges and Gogra rivers located in modern eastern United province and Bihar province of India.The bulk of the infantry was Hindu Rajput and Brahman while the bulk of cavalry comprised Rohilla Mussulmans and Hindustani Pathan or Hindustani Rajput Mussulmans. **(10)**

There is a common myth in Pakistan that bulk of East India Company's army was Muslim.In reality this belief is the creation of the ridiculous imagination of some who think that the Muslims were the only fighting class in India,and that too from the area of Punjab and Frontier in modern Pakistan!

As a matter of fact the pre British Mughal armies had a large proportion of Hindu Rajputs from the Gangetic plain.

Notable among these were high caste Hindu Bhumihars and the Oudh and Bihar Hindu Rajputs,from the areas of eastern Oudh and Benares region. **(11)**

It is important to note that in Mughal India the army was a purely mercenary force.

There was no compulsion or no obligation on any Muslim to enter the army and the army was a purely volunteer army in which any man Muslim or Hindu could enrol.

The army's aim was not to conduct any holy war or Jihad but to fight for the Mughal Emperor against any enemy regardless of religion or ethnicity. Thus the Mughal Army was frequently employed against the Muslim Pathan tribesman just like the British Army in so many post 1849 frontier expeditions.

It was employed against Muslim states like Persia Bukhara Bijapur Golconda etc. Very often it was commanded by Hindu Rajput generals, even when fighting against the Frontier Pathan Muslims.

During the Mughal times broadly speaking three broad categories of men were regarded as good soldiers i.e. "Mughals" from central Asia or descendants of those Mughals who had settled in India, "Afghans or Pathans" including the large number of Pathans settled east of Jamna river and known as Hindustani Pathans and Rohillas, and thirdly "Rajputs" who were largely pure Hindu Rajputs from Rajputana proper or from the Gangetic plain. **(12)**

Thus a very small proportion of Mughal soldiers were recruited from Punjab proper. A very large number of Mughal soldiers classified as "Chelas" were bought as infants from Hindu parents during times of famine and converted to Islam.

Since most of the Hindu majority areas were south of river Sutlej, this meant that these Chelas also had no connection with the area of present Pakistan.

This explanation is for those layman readers who mistakenly believe the myth advanced by many Pakistani historians, that the Martial races of India were only those from the area between river Chenab and river Indus I

It is necessary to briefly analyse certain differences between the army of the English East India Company and its native opponents, in order to understand the reasons why the East India Company was able to repeatedly defeat its native opponents by employing a force which was largely composed of Indian troops.

The first major reason was the primacy of the infantry way of war, which for India was a new concept.

It may be noted that cavalry was no longer the main arm of decision in Europe after Gustavus Adolphus revolutionised infantry tactics during the Thirty Year War (1618-1648) in Europe.

On the contrary in India during the Mughal times Infantry was regarded as an inferior arm **(14)**

On the other hand "Cavalry" which was regarded as an arm of decision in India had the following drawbacks.

Firstly it had been already proved in European wars that well drilled infantry with good fire control procedures, under good leadership supported by artillery could stand the shock of a cavalry charge.

Another factor which further reduced the effectiveness of early Indian armies largely composed of cavalry against the troops of the English East India Company was the financial aspect.

A horse in India in the eighteenth century was four times more expensive than in Europe. The horses in Indian armies belonged to the cavalry troops.

Thus if a man's horse was killed in battle, he was ruined for life. This factor further reduced the

effectiveness of Indian cavalry versus East India Company's army. **(15)**

Another factor which greatly increased the effectiveness of the native troops was the leadership factor. While most of the armies of Indian states were led by officers **(16)** of various ethnicities like Pathan Persian Maratha Arab etc the East India Company's army had only European officers who were mostly Britishers and were more strongly internally motivated to do their duty than their counterparts in the armies of Indian princes.

Another important aspect was the "Pay Factor".

The East India Company was an excellent paymaster. The Bengal Army Sepoy's pay of Rs 80 per annum was several times higher than what a specialist field worker could earn in one year. In addition this pay was regular and guaranteed unlike the armies of native princes where pay ran many months or years in arrears. This was made possible during the crucial period from 1757-1799 by the revenues of the rich province of Bengal which the Company was able to acquire thanks to Clive's brilliant coup at Plassey.

The company's main opponent in the south was Hyder Ali, the Muslim ruler of Mysore. It may be noted that later on when the Indian Army was reorganised after 1885 the Madras and Mysore Muslims who were the 99 % bulk of Hyder's Army were declared as non martial by men like Lord Roberts.

This was despite the fact that their on ground performance against the English East India Company was far superior to any Muslim race north of river Tunga Bhadra including all areas of

Northern India UP Rajputana Punjab Frontier
Afghanistan etc!

Hyder's greatness consisted in realising that the English Company could be defeated only by combining with all other native powers including the Hindu Marthas and by French naval help. Hyder's attempts to create an all India Mysore-Maratha-Hyderabad alliance were however frustrated by the half hearted cooperation and negative attitude of both the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Marthas.

Ironically Hyder's most trusted and relatively reliable ally was France (even at Plassey in 1757 only the French mercenaries had whole heartedly fought against the English!) **(17)** which was neither Indian nor Muslim but European and Christian! Hyder concentrated on improving his infantry and managed to inflict a crushing defeat on Colonel Hector Munro, the victor of Buxar in September 1780 .

This happened on 10th and 11th September 1780 when Hyder defeated two separate British detachments under Bailie and Munro. Bailie's detachment which was defeated and captured comprised 3853 men out of which 347 were Europeans (including 46 officers) . **(19)**

This battle severely reduced the English East India Company's standing in Southern India but did not enable Hyder to destroy To evict the East India Company from southern India.

This happened because of two reasons. Firstly the East India Company was able to reinforce the Madras Army thanks to English naval mastery by European and native troops from Bengal and secondly because the Nizam and the

Martahas, thanks to superior British diplomacy were induced not to assist Mysore.

The contest between Hyder and the company was a narrow one.

But Hyder's main problem as we have already seen was naval power.

Even if he militarily defeated the Company's Madras Army, which he as a matter of fact successfully did twice (in September 1780 and December 1782), the Company reinforced its troops in Madras by sea from Bombay and Bengal, thereby making Hyder's task impossible.

In any case the economic centre of gravity of the Company was the rich province of Bengal, with whose revenues they paid all their armies.

Hyder could not attack Bengal since he did not have the naval capability to do so. The Second Mysore War in which Hyder came very close to defeating the English Company at least in South India remains a totally neglected campaign in Pakistani schools. Few people in today's world, where it is not really important and in today's Pakistan, where it is most important; know that Mysore came very close to annihilating the East India Company at Cuddalore (8th to 13th February 1781) when in the words of Fortescue the official historian of the British Army "Every road to the southward was beset by Hyder's detachments, and not a grain of rice was to be procured. Unless the French Squadron (blockading the Army of the East India Company under Eyre Coote in the Bay of Bengal) could by a miracle be removed, and the sea thrown open for transport of supplies, Coote and the whole of his army were doomed men. For five days he remained in suspense, when to his unspeakable

relief he saw the French Squadron sail away to eastward, removed in the nick of time by the miraculous folly of its commander. Thus by happy fortune the British Army and the British Empire in India were saved". **(20)**

From, now onwards the pendulum of history started moving in favour of the English. Even Admiral Mahan the famous naval historian discussed this battle in detail.

No one to this day exactly knows why Admiral D Orves withdrew **(21)** , but this folly finally led to the exit of the French from India and to the final destruction of Mysore in 1799.

Hyder was convincingly defeated by General Eyre Coote at Porto Novo (1st July 1781) in a battle where Coote dislocated Hyder's Army by an oblique order march in the fashion of Frederick the Great, and by a narrow margin at Pollilore (27th August 1781).

These battles were more decisive in the sense that they frustrated Hyder's attempts to totally destroy the English East India Company in South India.

On the other hand these victories still did not enable the English East India Company to defeat Mysore; something which was beyond the Company's capability till at least 1782.

The key to the issue however was the fact that using the revenue of Bengal the East India Company could economically sustain as well as rapidly expand its army much more rapidly than any native power in India including Mysore.


Diplomatically the East India Company succeeded in isolating Mysore by 1785 and from 1790 onwards the balance of power was no longer in Mysore's favour.

There is an interesting parallel here. A recent book by an American also cites poor diplomacy or , "New European Diplomatic abilities to gang up" in words of a reviewer, who I heard at one forum, recently as one of the principal reasons of failure of the Ottoman Turks in defeating European powers in the period 1500-1700. **(22)**

France shaken by the French Revolution of 1789 was in no position to any longer effectively aid Mysore by its naval power.

Thus by 1792 the East India Company was able to successfully contain the Muslim state of Mysore, which was their principal opponent in India from 1767 to 1792.

The part which native troops played in the Siege of Seringapatam of 1792 as a result of which Mysore was reduced to a secondary power may be gauged from the fact that out of the total East India Company force of 30,991 men 21,899 were natives. **(23)**




Thus in 1796 the regular native army consisted of 57,000 men subdivided as Madras and Bengal Army which consisted of 24,000 men each and the Bombay Army which was 9,000 strong.

According to another source during the period 1789-1805 ,the regular and irregular troops and subsidiary forces of the English East India Company's total Army strength in India rose from 115,000 to 155,000 . **(25)**

By 1799 English East India Company's superiority in numbers at Seringapatam was absolutely overwhelming.

APPROXIMATE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY ORBAT FINAL ASSAULT ON SERINGAPATTAM -MAY HAVE ERRORS 1799- CONTRARY TO PROPAGANDA THE SULTAN WANTED TO MAKE TERMS BUT DECIDED TO FIGHT AFTER HE FOUND CORNWALLIS MORE ARROGANT THAN HIS EXPECTATIONS - HIS SONS HOWEVER PREFERRED SURRENDERING THAN DYING.



This meant that the English East India Company was the employer of one of the largest standing European armies in the world, at least in 1805.

By 1805 the East India Company's army strength was 154,500 troops, with Bengal Army having 64,000 troops (57,000 Natives and 7,000 Europeans), Madras Army having 64,000 troops (53,000 Natives and 11,000 Europeans) and Bombay Army having 26,500 troops (20,000 Natives and 6,500 Europeans) . **(26)**

In 1792 Mysore was defeated but not annihilated. In the Fourth Mysore War Mysore was annihilated as a power and now the Company turned its attention to the Marathas, who ruled greater part of India and were the Company's main opponents.

Till 1799 apart from the First Maratha War (1775-82) which was inconclusive the East India Company successfully kept the Marathas away from Mysore its principal opponent by use of skilful diplomacy.

In 1803 however the Second Maratha War broke out and the Marathas were decisively defeated at Assaye by Wellesley and at Laswari by General Lake.

At Assaye (23 September 1803) Wellesley defeated the Marathas with a Native-British army of approximately 6000 troops out of which 1,500 were of dubious value/reliability being Mysoreans/Marathas, while the 4,500 consisting of British and Native troops did bulk of the fighting.

The infantry consisted of two Royal British Army regiments and five native regiments of the Madras Army, while the cavalry consisted of one Royal British Army cavalry regiment and three Native cavalry regiments from the Madras Army.

The Maratha Army opposing Wellesley consisted of 10,500 Maratha infantry organised and disciplined on European lines by French officers and around 40,000 irregular horse.

The major reason why the British won the victory was the future victor of Waterloo's brilliant flank march, executed before the battle. Wellesley was initially advancing straight towards the Marathas. A battle fought would have enabled the Marathas to effectively utilise their numerical superiority against the British.

Wellesley exhibited tremendous coup d'oeil and decided not to attack frontally. Earlier he had been assured by local guides that there was no ford across which Wellesley could take his army to outflank the Marathas.

He noticed two villages opposite each other on the north and south banks of river Kaitna and assessed that there must be a ford connecting the two villages.

A ford was discovered and Wellesley turned the Maratha front, forcing them to change their entire front and to face the British in an area in which their numerical superiority was nullified, by virtue of frontage restricted by two rivers flowing on each flank. British writers generally claim, that most of the fighting was done by the European troops in this battle. This statement is totally incorrect.

It is necessary to discuss this battle in some detail, since many myths about European troops invincibility date originate from this battle as far as British military historians are concerned.

(One British historian Sir Arthur Bryant is pleased to show only the British regiments on the battle map of Assaye in his book, while omitting the native regiments!)

On face value it appears that the Europeans did all the fighting since the total casualties suffered stand out at 644 European and 940 Natives **(27)** Closer examination of the casualties reveal that only H.M 74th Foot suffered exceptionally heavy casualties i.e. 401 and this happened because this regiment attacked built up area, which was difficult to clear.

On the other hand the other British infantry regiment H.M 78th Foot suffered only 105 casualties, high casualties but less than four Madras native infantry battalions which fought the same battle i.e. 14 Madras Native Infantry which suffered 116 casualties, 1/8 Madras Native Infantry which suffered 170 casualties, 1/10 Madras Native Infantry which suffered 139 casualties and above all 2/12 Madras Native Infantry which suffered 222 casualties. **(28)**

Assaye was one of the most decisive battles of India which destroyed the Maratha confederacy forces of Sindhia and Bhonsla, and as we can see from the casualties, the native troops played a very important part in the battle. It is fair to state that without the natives, the British could not have been won this battle, on the other hand the battle proved that British leadership organisation and tactics were the greatest force multipliers.

No other Indian Army of similar size as small as the British Indian Army at Assaye could have defeated the Marathas at Assaye!

It was the triumph of the European way of warfare using a European led, and with a European

nucleus, but an essentially predominantly Indian force to defeat another Indian force which had adopted the European way of war but was still organisationally and operationally far behind the superior British Company.

At Laswari (1st November 1803) which was equally as decisive as Assaye another British Indian Army of eight regiments of cavalry (including three Royal British Army Dragoon regiments) and seven and half infantry battalions including one European regiment i.e. H.M 76 th Foot General Gerard Lake of the Bengal Army defeated a Maratha force commanded by a Hindustani Muslim Pathan general Sarwar Khan ,consisting of 9,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.

Estimates of the East India Company force vary between 6,000 **(29)** and 10,000 **(30)** Laswari was basically a more fluid affair than Assaye since the Marathas were not entrenched unlike at Assaye. The principal feature of the battle was a pre battle cavalry night march led by Lake, and an encounter battle in early hours of the day, when marching infantry joined the cavalry which was already in contact with the enemy. The British-Indian casualties in this battle were 172 killed and 653 wounded . **(31)**

The only morally and psychologically important though strategically insignificant feature of the Second Maratha War was the British failure to capture the Hindu Jat fort of Bhurtpore (January-February 1805) .

Bhurtpore proved to the Indians that the British were not invincible and valour was no substitute for generalship or employment of artillery. Bhurtpore also made the Nepali Gurkhas falsely conclude that

the East India Company could never successfully penetrate the natural mountain fortress of Nepal.

Long before the British reverse in Afghanistan in 1842 i.e British failure to capture Bhurtpore made the Indians realise that the Hindu Jats of BHURTPORE were one martial race right in the heart of India!

Thus the British failed at Bhurtpore despite having six European infantry regiments (H.M 22nd Foot, H.M 65th Foot, H.M 75th Foot, H.M 76th Foot ,H.M 86th Foot, and the English East India Company's 1st Bengal European Regiment) ,what they had achieved at Assaye with two European regiments and at Laswari with one .

Even in terms of siege warfare the British casualties were heavy since they had captured Seringapatam twice in 1792 and 1799 with a casualty figure of 535 **(32)** and 1,486 **(33)** respectively.

The total British loss at Bhurtpore was more than the combined British loss at both the successful sieges of Seringapatam i.e. 3,203 (including 446 killed) **(34)** .

The unique aspect of this battle was the fact that three European battalions i.e. H.M 75th , H.M 76th and the 1st Bengal European Regiments became so demoralised that they refused orders to advance while under enemy fire. **(35)**

If there is any fort that the British failed to capture in one siege it is only , THE HINDU JAT FORT OF BHURTPORE, located in India and not in any area of Pakistan Afghanistan or Iran .

A man not belonging to the sub continent may feel odd at all the stress I am laying on the

comparative geographic ethnic and religious factors of Indian military history.

It is so because repeatedly while serving in the Pakistan Army I came across the ridiculous myth that the Punjabi Muslim or the Pathan

Muslim was braver than the Hindus!

The British suffered so much from Bhurtpore complex that they developed a Bburtpore complex, and waited for an opportunity to disprove the Bhurtpore Myth.

They finally got an opportunity to do so in 1825-26, when they finally attacked Bhurtpore in 1826 and succeeded in capturing it; though, with a much larger and well equipped army, as compared to 1805, consisting of 112 heavy guns, 50 field guns, 18 battalions of infantry and 8 regiments of cavalry, under the direct command of their Governor General in India. **(36)**


The Second Maratha War led to the East India Company's final confirmation as the power which ruled India.

Till 1803 the Marathas were the power who held Delhi the Imperial capital of India and the Mughal Emperor as their insignificant pensioner.

The Company's frontiers were extended till Punjab held by the formidable Sikhs under Ranjit Singh the most brilliant leader in the history of Punjab. In the north lay another state which had so far kept aloof from Indian politics, i.e. Nepal. In 1814 the Nepal war broke out which was a unique war in British Indian military history, having been fought in much higher mountain terrain than any other war till 1814.

Initially the British suffered some reverses but by 1816 they were able to defeat the Gurkhas in some pitched battles and the Gurkhas were wise enough to sue for peace.

ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANYS INITIAL PLAN AGAINST AMAR SINGH THAPA -1814



ORDER OF BATTLE –INITIAL- EASTERN DIVISIONS

MAJOR GENERAL BENNET MARLEY

ARTILLERY TOTAL 868 MEN

1 X EUROPEAN COMPANY 
 3 X NATIVE COMPANY 
 4 X 3 POUNDS, 8 X HOWITZERS 4.4 INCH, 2 X MORTARS 4.4 INCH, 20 WALLPIECES—

CAVALRY

TWO RISALAHS 
 GARDNERS HORSE 

INFANTRY


HM 24TH FOOT (907 MEN) 

1ST BATTALION 8TH REGIMENT 
 2ND BATTALION 15TH REGIMENT 
 2ND BATTALION 22ND REGIMENT WING (HALF BATTALION) 
 2ND BATTALION 25TH REGIMENT 
 RAMGARH BATTALION 
 CHAMPARAN LIGHT INFANTRY 
 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD PIONEERS 


MAJOR GENERAL JOHN SULLIVAN WOOD

ARTILLERY TOTAL 114 MEN


5TH COMPANY 2ND BATTALION OF BENGAL ARTILLERY

3 X 3 POUNDS, 2 X 4.4 INCH HOWITZERS, 2 X 4.4 INCH MORTARS 

CAVALRY

Troop Ex 6th Native Cavalry 

INFANTRY

HM 17TH FOOT (958 MEN) 

2ND BATTALION 8TH REGT 
 TWO COMPANIES 
 2ND BATTALION 12TH REGIMENT 
 1ST BATTALION 14TH REGT WING (HALF BATTALION) 
 2ND BATTALION 14TH REGT WING (HALF BATTALION) 
 2ND BATTALION 17TH REGIMENT 
 PIONEERS, 8TH COMPANY 

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COLONEL OCHTERLONY TO DIRECTLY
ATTACK AND FIX MAIN GURKHA
FORCE OF AMAR SINGH THAPA

NEPAL WAR –DETAILED -FIRST ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY ATTACK PLAN – OCTOBER 1814



MAJ GEN GILLIESPIE
TO CUT OFF AMAR SINGH
THAPAS COMMUNICATIONS
WITH MAIN NEPAL
HEARTLAND

MAP CONCEIVED
AND HAND DRAWN
BY A.H AMIN

**COLONEL OCHTERLONY TO DIRECTLY
ATTACK AND FIX MAIN GURKHA
FORCE OF AMAR SINGH THAPA**

NEPAL WAR - DETAILED - FIRST ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY ATTACK PLAN - OCTOBER 1814



Interestingly the first attempt to defeat Nepal there were three columns with European troops and one under Ochterlony with only Indian infantry troops. The columns with European troops were total failure while Ochterlony with Indian troops was a great success.

The composition of the force which led the final campaign against Gurkhas forcing them to sue for peace was three British Army Regiments (H.M 24 Foot, 66 Foot and 87th Foot) and some fourteen Bengal Native Infantry regiments i.e. a total of 17,000 men. **(37)**

The Nepal war was followed by conquest of Burma which was done in two wars i.e. First Burma War 1824-26 and Second Burma War 1852.

Again both the Bengal and Madras Native armies played an important role in both these wars in addition to the European troops.

In 1839 the English East India Company started the First Afghan War to assist a former king of Afghanistan in regaining his throne.

This was a very difficult enterprise, not because the Afghan Muslims were any braver than the Hindu Marathas but because logistically it was very difficult to reinforce the East India Company's invading troops since their line of advance from their base at Ferozepur in India till Kabul via Sindh and Baluchistan was more than 1000 miles long, and passed through long stretches of extremely desolate difficult and barren terrain.

The European component of the invading army was much smaller i.e. some five European infantry and three cavalry regiments accompanied by 14 Native infantry and five cavalry regiments large

number of units were left to guard the line of communications in Sindh and Baluchistan and the East India Company invaded Afghanistan with only approximately 9,500 strong **(38)** and having only three European infantry regiments (two from British Army and one from Company's Bengal Army).

The East India Company's reached Ghazni after a long march of 1,200 miles.

The Native troops were on half rations since marching from Quetta. Ghazni, once a formidable name proved to be a cheap war trophy being captured with a loss of just 17 killed and 165 wounded **(39)** by two European regiments and a few native (largely Hindu majority) infantry units !

Kabul was captured on 7'h August without a fight and the East India Company withdrew most of its forces from Afghanistan leaving a weak brigade with one European regiment and few detachments at Kandhar Ghazni and Jalalabad and Shah Shuja who they were backing as King of Afghanistan.

Later due to incompetence of the East India Company political agent at Kabul a revolt broke out against the Shah Shuja.

The East India Company's military commander at Kabul General Elphinstone was equally incompetent. Thus he wrongly decided to withdraw the Kabul Brigade to Jalalabad rather than occupying the fort in Kabul and holding it against overwhelming Afghan numbers, till relieved by a fresh force sent from India. Kabul brigade was destroyed by an overwhelmingly large force of Afghans in January 1842, while withdrawing from Kabul to Jalalabad.

This force which was exaggerated to being the Army of Indus by propagandists in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 comprised just around 4500 starved men out of whom just about 700 were British! **(40)**

The simple reason for this reverse was incompetence ,since similar East India Company garrisons at Kandhar and Jalalabad in fortified positions successfully held their positions despite assaults by Afghans in overwhelming numbers .

Thus the British held Jalalabad with a small garrison of just about 2,000 troops from just one European infantry regiment one Native infantry regiment and some cavalry.During this period when a major earthquake also damaged the walls of the fort,they were repeatedly defeated assaults by overwhelmingly large Afghan forces. In this five month period the British casualties were less than 100 men **(41)** Kandahar was held by a similarly small garrison of just one European regiment and six Native infantry regiments and successfully held out from August 1839 till August 1842 .

Only Ghazni was lost which was held by one weak native infantry battalion.

The East India Company's forces recaptured Kabul in September 1842 and withdrew from Afghanistan,since the East India Company being a commercial entity had no wish to annex to its territory a barren non productive country.Later on a myth was made and popularised as part of anti Soviet propaganda after 1979,that Afghanistan was a formidable country and had never been successfully invaded!

The actual fact remains that troop strength wise it was a small affair. The only fact which made it costly was the logistic aspect of supplying the army via a 1,500 miles long route through terrain which had very limited local foraging and agricultural resources.

The Afghan war contrary to the popular myth was a British success since the lesson taught in September 1842 was so convincing that the Afghans desisted from the temptation of attacking British India even in 1857, when the Company was very vulnerable and even ready to abandon territory till river Indus!

The First Afghan War was followed by the Sind War as a result of which Sind was annexed.

Militarily the Sind War was a highly insignificant affair. The British force which won the decisive Battle of Miani (17 February 1843) had less than 1,800 men (including just one European infantry regiment).

The British losses in this battle were just 64 men killed and 194 wounded. **(42)**

According to the British historian Fortescue the Sindhis (Baluch) fought well, but lost because of lack of discipline !

It is worth quoting the scientific manner in which Fortescue described the British victory at Miani. Instead of stupidly claiming that the British won Miani because they were more martial or that Christians were more brave than the Muslims ; Fortescue squarely singled the main cause of the Baloch defeat as lack of military discipline and ignorance of military tactics.

Fortescue thus wrote;

" From time to time the Baluchis made furious counterattacks in small bodies. Some chief called upon his clansmen, and they stormed forward, irresistible, bearing the sepoys back: but, being only a few, their flanks were riddled and shattered before they could drive their charge home. Had they made such an onslaught from end to end of the line, they must have carried everything before them. Had they fallen upon the guns, they must inevitably have captured them. But they were an assembly of tribes and not an army, under the direction of a score of chiefs and not of one, and Napier's cannons swept their masses with enfilading fire of grape, unchecked and unmolested ". **(43)**

In contrast with the Balochis, the the Sikhs; as we shall discuss in the next paragraph; proved to be the toughest opponent of the British; because of having adapted themselves more successfully to the modern European way of warfare; by introducing modern military organisation tactics and European instructors during the period 1800-1839.

The Baluchis of Sindh were as brave and motivated as the Sikhs but could not perform as well as the Sikhs because of antiquated military tactics and a zero level military organisation.

The most formidable opponent of the English East India Company in relative terms however were neither the Marathas Mysoreans Afghans Gurkhas or anyone else, but the Punjabi Jat Sikhs (the Bhurtoreans were also Jats, but Hindu Jats).

Both did exceedingly well not because they were more martial but largely because of situational

historical reasons which enabled both to face the challenge extremely well!

Numerically a much smaller group than the Afghan or Pathan Muslims, the Punjabi Muslims, the Bengalis, Hindustanis the Tamils or the Hindu Marathas, but qualitatively extremely superior like perhaps the modern Israelis having been persecuted by the Mughal and Afghans for some 120 years !

The Sikhs were lucky in having Ranjit Singh as their leader. Ranjit organised the Sikh Army on modern European lines and employed a large number of Europeans of various nationalities including Italian (4) , French (12) , American (3) , German (3) , Russian (1) , Spanish (2) , English (3) , Anglo Indian (7) , Scotch (1) , Prussian (1) and Greeks (2) Many of these Europeans were veterans of Napoleonic wars and thus groomed the Sikh Army on the most modern lines.

The Sikh Army have done better had its higher political leaders not dismissed all these Europeans after Ranjit Singh's death. The tragedy of the Sikhs was the fact that their Sikh leaders did not trust Sikh generals and instead employed Hindustani Hindu and Dogra Hindu generals.

These men had nothing in common with the Sikhs in terms of religion (ideology) or race and acted treacherously, as a result of which the Sikhs were defeated in the First Sikh War. The Sikhs were further unlucky in having as their leader a promiscuous woman who was serviced by water hearers, but was their ruler by virtue of being Ranjit Singh's favourite wife.

This woman ie Rani Jindan was more keen to get the Sikh Army destroyed, or at least

discredited; since she viewed the Sikh Army as a greater threat than all the external enemies ! She conspired in league with her paramours and incited the Sikh Army to invade East India Company's territory in 1845! **(44)**

The Sikh Army despite the finest in India was doomed to be destroyed, since its political leaders were more afraid of it than the external enemies!

Tej Singh the Hindustani Hindu from Meerut led the Sikh Army with the firm secret intention of destroying it ! **(45)**

The East India Company thus managed to defeat the Sikhs in the First Sikh War (1845-46). But

this was a costly affair and as we have briefly discussed had a deep and direct connection with the treachery of Sikh (*Hindustani and Dogra*) Generals, who were more interested in seeing their own army defeated . **(46)**

It is significant to note that the pure European casualties in the head "troops killed", i.e. 499 Killed at Ferozshah (21-22 December 1845) in the First Sikh War exceeded casualties suffered in any other single one or two day battle in any other battle that the British fought in India Afghanistan Nepal or Iran from 1757 till 1947 !

This excludes sieges since these are spread over a long period and the defender possesses hundred fold advantage over the attacker.

The First Sikh War was also unique in the sense that more European regiments were employed at Ferozshah (7 infantry regiments and one cavalry), Mudki (4 infantry and 3 cavalry) and Sobraon (9

infantry and 3 cavalry), than in any other single pitched battle against any single other native opponent in India till 1846!

This raises the First Sikh war battles higher than any other battle which the British fought against any other opponent.

The Sikhs who were Punjabi by race, Jat by caste and Sikh by religion thus stand out unchallenged as the toughest opponents of the British in India.

The province of Punjab is unique in being the home of two almost purely Punjabi religions; ie the Sikh and the Qadiani (a Muslim dissident sect) .

I don't think that Punjab produced any politico religious group greater than the Sikhs !

The same however cannot be said about the Punjabi Hindus or Muslims who supported the status quo ; although unfortunately for tactically correct and pragmatic reasons ! Perhaps the Sikh net spiritual and moral experience of honourable defiance and resistance against unjust religious persecution by the Mughals and Afghans, and the heroic and resolute nature of their tremendous guerrilla war; fought against the materially and numerically far superior Mughal and Afghan armies, really refined and purified them, making them the most qualitatively superior politico-religious-ethnic group which Punjab has produced after the Gandhara civilisation and Porus!

The saying that the finest steel goes through the hottest fire fits well with the Sikhs! The East India Company did not annex Punjab following the First Sikh War.

They were so much shocked by the quality of Sikh defiance in the First Sikh War that they decided not to annex Punjab, which unlike Afghanistan was very fertile. Sikh revolt against the East India Company's regent in Lahore however forced the East India Company to once again fight another war and annex Punjab. (1848-49).

The Second Sikh War was again a unique war of British Indian military history.

At Chillianwala on 13 January 1849 in another battle without any precedent in British Indian Afghan military history the Sikhs faced the East India Company's army of four European infantry and three cavalry regiments supported by eleven Native infantry regiments and four cavalry regiments.

Chillianwala is again the only battle in British Indian Afghan military history where a British army comprising four European infantry regiments and exceeding 10,000 men failed to breakthrough their Indian opponent and win the battle.

As a yardstick of comparison it is worthwhile to note that at Porto Novo (1781) which was the most decisive and tough battle of all Mysore wars Sir Eyre Coote defeated Hyder Ali with a force which had 8,476 men out of which only 2,070 were Europeans at a loss of only 306 men **(47)** Nepal was humbled despite mountainous terrain with a force of three European regiments and fourteen Native regiments.

But at Chillianwala despite having some 3,700

European infantry and 7,700 Native Infantry supported by three European cavalry regiments and four Native cavalry regiments the British failed

to defeat the Sikhs despite having suffered a very heavy total loss of 2,357 **(48)** .

The Sikh War was however won by the British once they defeated the Sikhs at Gujrat (21 February 1849) by a very large force comprising 8 European Infantry and 15 Native Infantry regiments supported by 100 guns. **(49)**

The conquest of Punjab in 1849 made the English East India Company the master of entire India right till the border of Afghanistan. The reader may find the figures of troop strength cited in the preceding paragraphs as boring.

This was most necessary since I find the repetition of the myth that the Muslims were more brave or that the non Muslims were less brave to be a dangerous distortion of history, and something which must be tackled with the help of concrete facts and figures which prove otherwise.

It was necessary to briefly analyse the East India Company's conquest of India.

It is a distortion of history to state that the East India Company conquered India through bribery and treachery as is being ridiculously taught to school children in the sub continent.

This statement is only true for Plassey, which in any case is more of an adverse reflection of the "Indian character" rather than "British character" since while Clive was a great British patriot, Mir Jafar was the great traitor.

It is true that Clive resorted to bribery and intrigue at Plassey, there was no other way in which Clive could have won the battle, keeping in view the great disparity of numbers.

Treachery in any case was a standard stratagem of subcontinental warfare employed by Muslims Hindus etc to win battles.

Bribery was a regularly employed method to win Maratha forces in Deccan during Aurangzebs Deccan Wars.

But it is erroneous to think that Europeans would not have colonised India if the English had failed at Plassey. It was naval power which had brought the European companies to India, and even if they had lost at Plassey, they still had Madras and Bombay, from where they could recover and reorganise.

The foremost factor which stands out is naval supremacy.

Naval supremacy enabled the English to quickly switch forces and to logistically support the operations of their land forces.

The second factor was the organising genius of Clive which enabled the British Company to organise the Natives on European lines. This had a link with Plassey, since Plassey enabled the English Company to raise and pay all the Native battalions that they did thanks to the revenues from the rich province of Bengai. But British rule in India was not firmly established till 1805. It was challenged various times and came on the verge of being extinguished on many occasions between 1757 and 1803.

During this period the most crucial factor which saved the English East India Company was Superior Diplomacy and superior military organisation/ leadership. Superior diplomacy ensured that the most formidable native powers

did not combine into an alliance aimed at defeating the English Company .

Thus while the Mysore wars were being fought Hyderabad and the Marathas stood aside while the East India Company could have been destroyed, in case they had joined Mysore.

While the decisive Second Maratha War was fought Mysore which could have significantly helped the Marathas had already been destroyed.

While the Second Maratha War was being fought Nepal and the Sikhs who could have played a crucial role stayed neutral.

In 1814 when the Nepal War was fought and Nepal humbled the Marathas who could have helped Nepal were already done away with in the Second Maratha War.

In 1845-46 the Sikhs were destroyed since they were left alone, whereas they could have helped the Marathas and Nepal destroying the English Company in 1803 or 1814.

In 1857 the Afghans stayed neutral while the East India Company was highly vulnerable only to be once again militarily humbled in 1880. All these examples prove that superior diplomacy apart from qualitative military organisational/command superiority played a crucial role in the East India Company's triumph. Now we come to the influence of the European way of warfare and its influence over the outcome of various wars fought between the English Company and the Indian states.

In 1757 the European way of warfare had not been mastered by Indian states and this considerably

helped the English Company in its various wars during the period 1757-64.

By 1780 however the gap in terms of superiority by virtue of having the superior European military organisation was decreasing.

In this regard the French played a crucial role in training the armies of their Indian ally states in the European method of war. It was here that the factor of superior diplomacy came into operation and the East India Company brilliantly succeeded in ensuring that all native states did not combine to defeat it. The manpower gap caused by lack of sufficient European soldiers was met by Clive's brilliant system of organising Native Infantry battalions trained on European lines.

The native troops played a decisive role in the English Company's military success which was not possible despite naval power and superior diplomacy, had not the native troops been there to fight side by side organised around the nuclei of European troops, who constituted hardly one fourth of the entire strength of the English Company's army.

Another lesson which stands out is that the native troops regardless of their ethnicity did well not because they were more or less martial, but simply because the British officer was a better leader by virtue of belonging to an organisation in which great stress was laid on military efficiency.

Thus whoever served in the English Company's army did well whether he was a Muslim Hindu or Sikh by religion, or a Madras Maratha Hindustani Punjabi or Patban by race.

It was the leadership factor which was the principle force multiplier of the native troops. Economics played a crucial role, since the English Company, thanks to the immense revenues of Bengal and subsequently the annexed parts of the state of Oudh was the best paymaster in India.

One reason why perhaps the Sikhs did the best as military opponents of the company was the fact that they were able to get military training from European instructors without being interrupted by a major war, against a European or major Indian foe, longer than any other Indian state opposing the company.

In addition their more than 100 year guerilla war against the Mughals and Afghans made them qualitatively far superior to the Punjabi Muslims or Hindus who had a far greater numerical strength than the Sikhs. The reasons for being more or less martial were thus more connected with situational factors than with race or religion !

The famous Punjabi saying that three things ie a woman, a Jat and Wheat ; improve with beating was true at least as far as the Punjabi Sikhs were concerned !

Much later persecution and discrimination at least at the psychological and social level resulted in the same as far as the Qadiani Muslims (a very large number of them also being incidentally Jat !) of 1947 Pakistan were concerned .

Another important aspect of British Indian military history was the connection of other factors with British success or failure.

In the First and Second Mysore Wars the British were handicapped by lack of numbers ,and helped by superior naval strength.

In the Nepal War the mountainous terrain apart from Gurkha bravery played an important role in the initial British reverses.

In Afghanistan the logistic factor adverse terrain coupled with overwhelming numerical inferiority played a more crucial role in the destruction of the half starved Kabul brigade than Afghan valour.

In the Sind war lack of knowledge of European military methods and political disunity played a crucial role in the triumph of the very small British force of 1,800 men pitched against a brave but ill disciplined force exceeding 12 to 15 thousand men.

At Assaye Wellesleys brilliant pre battle flank march saved the day rather than superior European battle drills,since the Marathas had a large number of infantry (exceeding 10,000) trained on the European lines against Wellesleys force of 4,500 men.

At Bhurtpore the British failed in 1805 because they misused the "Valour Factor" of British/Native troops in absence of heavy siege artillery!

At Ferozshah the British came very close to defeat, but won because of one non Sikh generals internally motivated treachery.

At Chillianwala the British failed when Gough was surprised by circumstances which were not beyond his control.

To conclude various factors helped the British,but most decisive of these was their organisational

superiority which greatly multiplied the efficiency of their army both European and Native, based on an iron frame system of administration and revenue collection organised by the East India Company.

Naval power was crucial in the period 1740-1782, but with the exit of the French after 1782, this became irrelevant since there was no other naval power which could challenge the British after 1782.

After the Second Mysore War the East India Company's army was greatly expanded, negating the influence of acquisition of the European military methods by Indian armies, which would have been doubled had the company not expanded its army in numerical terms.

Lastly some statistics of certain British Indian Battles and Sieges are reproduced so that the layman reader may form a more clear picture about the military worth of the various Indian states who opposed the British during the period 1757-1849:--

BRITISH INDIAN TOTAL ARMY STRENGTH IN SOME MAJOR WARS

| WAR | EUROPEANS | NATIVES | TOTAL |
|---|--------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| THIRD MYSORE WAR – 1792 ⁵⁰ | 9092 | 21,899 | 30,991 |
| FOURTH MYSORE WAR – 1799 ⁵¹ | 7490 | 33,306 | 40,288 |
| ANGLONEPAL WAR 1816 ⁵² | 3,000 A pprox. (3 Battalions) | 14,000 Approx | 17,000 |
| PINDARI WAR - 1817-18 ⁵³ | Minus 6000 | Over 124,000 | Over 130,951 |
| SIEGE OF BHURTPORE – 1826 ⁵⁴ | Minus 3000 | 18,000 | 21,000 |
| FIRST AFGHAN WAR 1839 – 42 ⁵⁵ | Minus 7500 | 24,000 Approx | 31,500 |
| FIRST SIKH WAR - 1845-46 ⁵⁶ | Around 10,000 | Around 30,000 | 40,000 |
| SECOND SIKH WAR – 1848 – 49 ⁵⁷ | 8,500 Approx | 20,000 | 30,000 |
| SEPOY WAR - 1857-58 ⁵⁸ | Above 70,000 | 80,000 to 90,000 | 150,000 to 160,000 |
| SECOND AFGHAN WAR 1878-80 ⁵⁹ | 18,801 | 46,151 | 64,952 |

BRITISH-INDIAN STRENGTH IN SOME INDIVIDUAL BATTLES IN INDIA

| BATTLE | EUROPEANS | NATIVES | TOTAL | ARTILLERY | REMARKS |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|------------------------|--|
| PLASSEY-1757 ⁶⁰ | 950 (INCLUDING 200 TOPASSES) | 2,100 | 3,050 | 10 Guns | The most decisive battle of India and even the modern Western World.Laid the financial foundation of the East India Company's military power. |
| BUXAR-1764 ⁶¹ | 857 | 6215 | 7072 | 20Guns | Decisive.Further extended East India Company's influence in Northern India. |
| PORTO NOV0-1781 | 2070 ⁶² | 6406 | 8,476 ⁶³ | 48 Guns | Most decisive battle of all Mysore Wars |
| POLLILORE-1781 | 1900 ⁶⁴ | 9,500 | 11,000 ⁶⁵ | 48 Guns | Indecisive Battle |
| SERINGAPATAM-FEB 1792 ⁶⁶ | 9092 | 21,899 | 30,991 | 122 Guns | This was a Siege and thus not a great infantry battle in open which means that its stature was lower than Mudki Feroz Shah or Chillianwala |
| ASSAYE-1803 | Approx 1,500 | Approx 4,500 | 6,000 ⁶⁷ | 22 Guns ⁶⁸ | A tough battle with great odds won by superior general ship.Crushed the Maratha Confederacy. |
| LASWARI-1803 | Approx 1,800 | Approx 4,200 | 6,000 ⁶⁹ | | Decisive.Crushed the Maratha Confederacy. |
| MUDKI-1845 ⁷⁰ | Approx 4,000 | Approx 8,000 | 12,000 | 42 Guns | |
| FEROZSHAH-1845 ⁷¹ | Approx 6,000 | Approx 10,700 | 16,700 | 69 Guns | The battle where the British suffered maximum number of casualties in all battles they fought in India or Afghanistan with forces over 8,000 men |
| SOBRAON-1846 ⁷² | Approx 7,000 | Approx 9,000 | 16,000 | 100 Guns ⁷³ | Decisive |
| CHILLIANWALA-1849 ⁷⁴ | Approx 4,500 | Approx 9,000 | 13,500 | 66 Guns | The only battle in which a British force over 10,000 men failed to defeat a native opponent in India Iran or Afghanistan |
| GUJERAT-1849 ⁷⁵ | Approx 8,000 | Approx 17,000 | 25,000 | 100 Guns | Decisive |
| LUCKNOW-MARCH 1858 ⁷⁶ | Approx 12,000 | Approx 15,000 | 27,277 | 164 Guns | |

CASUALTIES IN SOME FAMOUS OR DECISIVE BRITISH INDIAN BATTLES

| BATTLE | KILLED/ MISSING (incl but also shown in brackets) | WOUNDED OR CAPTURED WHERE INDICATED | TOTAL | EUROPEANS KILLED + MISSING (calculated on one third basis where exact figure not available) | EUROPEAN WOUNDED | TOTAL EUROPEAN & NATIVE CASUALTIES IN BRACKETS |
|---|--|---|------------------------------|---|---------------------|---|
| PLASSEY- 1757 ⁷⁷ | 18 | 48 | | 5 | 18 | <u>66</u> (43) |
| BUXAR- 1764 ⁷⁸ | 379 (85) | 499 | 878 | 39 | 64 | <u>103</u> 775 |
| HYDERS DEFEAT OF BAILIE-10 th SEPT-1780 ⁷⁹ | Approx. 500 | Approx. 500 | 3853 (Mostly Prisoner) | 341 | 200 | <u>541</u> 3312 (Mostly Prisoners) |
| PORTO NOVO JULY-1781 ⁸⁰ | Around 90 | Around 210 | 306 | Around 30 | Around 80 | <u>Around 110</u> (Around 190) |
| POLLILORE -1781 ⁸¹ | 53 | 470 | 421 | | Around 20 | <u>Around 100</u> (Around 300) |
| ASSAYE- 1803 ⁸² | 446 | 1138 | 1,584 | 202 | 442 | <u>644</u> (940) |
| LASWARI- 1803 ⁸³ | 172 | 653 | 825 | Around 160 | Around 220 | <u>Approx 380</u> (around 440) |
| KALAT-13 NOV 1839 ⁸⁴ | 31 | 107 | 138 | Around 20 | Around 40 | Around <u>60</u> (Around 78) |
| MIANI-1843 ⁸⁵ | 62 | 194 | 256 | 29 | 65 | <u>94</u> (100) |
| MUDKI- 1845 ⁸⁶ | 215 | 657 | 872 | Around 250 | Around 256 | <u>506</u> (366) |
| FEROZS- HAH 1845 ⁸⁷ | 1099 (379) | 1778 | 2,877 | 499 | 1132 | <u>1631</u> (1246) |
| SOBRAON- 1846 ⁸⁸ | 321 | 2064 | 2,385 | Around 150 | Around 920 | <u>Around 1070</u> (Around 1300) |
| CHILLIANW ALA-1849 ⁸⁹ | 706 (102) | 1651 | 2,357 | 332 | Around 719 | <u>1051</u> 1306 |
| GUJRAT- 1849 ⁹⁰ | 100 (4) | 706 | 806 | Around 40 | Around 60 | <u>Around 350</u> Around 450 |

Note--Statistically the defeat of Colonel Bailie's Detachment was an impressive feat. In reality it ranks lower than many other battles like Mudki Chillianwala Ferozeshah etc because the total European strength was only 541 men and the Mysorean strength was over 10,000

ENDNOTES

1 Page-250-The Decisive Battles of India-Colonel G.B Malleson-Oxford-1883

2 Page-326-The Imperial Gazetteer of India-Op Cited.

3 Page-326-Ibid and Page-122- Cambridge History of India-Volume Five-British India-1497-1858 -H.H Dodwell Reprinted by S.Chand and Company-New Delhi- 1987.

4 Appendix "A" and Pages-18 to 36-Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army-Lieut F.G Cardew-Government Press-Calcutta- 1903 . Basic facts of Clive's life are based on the bio-note on pages-53 & 54- A Concise Dictionary of Military Biography -Martin Windrow and Francis .K.Mason -Osprey Publishing Limited - Berkshire-Great Britain- 1975.

5 Page-9-Ibid.

6 Page-865-A Comprehensive History of India-Volume One-Henry Beveridge-London-1862.

7 Page-26-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

8 Page-104-A History of the British Army-Volume Three -1763-1793-Hon J.W Fortescue-Macmillan & Co Limited London-1911

9 Pages-30 & 31-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

10 Page-329-The Imperial Gazetteer of India-Op Cit.

11 Page-84-The New Cambridge History of India-Volume II.1 - C.A.Bayly-Cambridge University Press-Cambridge- 1988 and Pages-159 & 176-Naukar

Rajput and Sepoy-Dirk-H.A Koiff-Cambridge University Press-1990.

12 Page-118-ii -Mirat-I-Ahmadi-Ali Mohammad Khan-Composed-1174-A.H-Lithographed-Bombay-1889/1307 A.H.

13 Page-I!- The Army of the Indian Mughals-Williarn Irvine-London-1903.

14 Page-219-Travels in the Mughal Empire-1665-1668-F Bemier-Edited by A.Constable-1891.

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19 Pages-445 to 449-Ibid.

20 Page-455 & 456- Ibid.

21 Page-626-A Comprehensive History of India-Volume Two-Hemy Beveridge-London 1862.

22 See-Ottoman Warfare-1500-1700-Rhoads Murphey-New Brunswick,NJ-Rutgers University Press-1999-ISBN-0- 8135-2685-X- 1999.

23 Page-593-See Footnote-).W Fortescue-Volume-Three-Op Cit.

24 Page-333-Imperial Gazetteer of India-Op Cit.

25 Page-85-The New Cambridge History of India-Op Cit

26 Page-335-The Imperial Gazetteer of India-Op Cit.

27 Page-176-Wellington's Campaigns in India-Government Printing Press-Calcutta-1908.

28 Page-176-Ibid.

29 Page-169-The Battle Book- Bryan Perrett-Arms and Armour Press-1992.

30 Page-232-A Dictionary of Battles- David Eggenberger-George Allen and Unwin Limited-London-1968.

31 Pages-85 & 86-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op cit.

32 Page-608-J.W Fortescue-Op Cit.

33 Page-67-Life of Duke of Wellington-Volume-One- Fourth Edition-MDCCCXLV-W.H Maxwell-Henry.G.Bohn London-MDCCCXLV.

34 Page-1003-A Comprehensive History of India-Volume-Two-Henry Beveridge-London-1862 and Page-99-Lieut F.G

Cardew-OpCit.It may be noted that Cardew placed the total loss at 2,925.However Malleson placed the total loss at above 3,100 (Page-323-Malleson-Op Cit).On the other hand Beveridge who was very meticulous with figures placed the total loss at 3,203 men.

35 Page-129-A Matter of Honour-Philip Mason-Jonathan Cape-London-1974. While serving in Pakistan Army I cited Bhurtpore as one battle which convincingly proved that courage had little to

do with being from Jhelum Chakwal or Agra and more with situational factors. This may sound outwardly insignificant, but it is dangerous when young officers fervently believe in it, and later once under fire, and once it is too late may find that their earlier beliefs were unrealistic! An army must be trained on realistic lines rather than cheap motivation that any race north or south of any river is braver than another! In my service in the army it was common to find officers from north of river Chenab to despise the Seraikis from Southern Punjab or even Punjabis from south of river Chenab as less martial than Punjabis from the Potohar area! All this may sound impossible to believe, but there are people who hold such ridiculous beliefs; thus definition of core areas as given by one Pakistani officer to Cohen (Page-45-The Pakistan Army-Cohen-Op Cit).

36 Page-130-Ibid.

37 Pages-124 & 125-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit

38 Pages-78 & 79-A History of the British Army-Volume-XII-Hon J.W Fortescue-Macmillan and Co-London-1927.

39 Page-85-Ibid.

40 Page-230-Ibid.

41 Page-184-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit and Page-146-The Battle Book-Op Cit.

42 Page-292-J.W Fortescue-Volume XII-Op Cit.

43 Pages-290 and 291-Ibid.

44 Statistics about the European advisors etc are taken from Pages-xxxvi and xxxvii-Appendix-A History of the Reigning Family of

Lahore-Edited by Major G.Carmichael Smyth (3rd Bengal Light Cavalry which rebelled and seized Delhi in 1857)-First Published 1854-Reprinted Nirmal Publishers-New Delhi-1987.For the intrigues of Rani Jindan see the excellent and brief bionote given on pages-359 to 361-A Dictionary of Modern Indian History-1707-1947- Parshotam Mehta-Oxford University Press-Delhi-1985.

45 Page-69 and 70- Fidelity and Honour-Lieutenant General S.L Menezes-Viking-New Delhi-1993.

46 Pages-366 & 367-Colonel G.B Malleson Op Cit.

47 Page-252-Colonel G.B Malleson-Op Cit and Page-631-Beveridge-Volume Two-Op Cit.

48 Page-234-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

49 Pages-463 & 562-J.W Fortescue-Volume XII-Op Cit.

50 Page-593-Foot Note-J.W Fortescue-Volume Three-Op Cit.Cardew calculated the East India Company strength in 1792 operations as 22,033 men subdivided into (1) One British Cavalry Regiment (404) and Two Native Cavalry Regiments along with Two Risalas of Native Body Guards (702) ;making a total of 1 106 Cavalry (2) Seven British Infantry Battalions (4,482) and Seventeen Native Infantry Battalions (11,133) making a total of 15,615 Infantry (3) Artillery-British -1,145 and Native-3,077 i.e. a total of 4 222 Artillerymen (4)Engineers-41 which included 21 Natives.In addition the Nizam and Marathas Armies supporting the British consisted of 18,000 and 12,000 Cavalry respectively (Page-60-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit)

51 Pages-725 & 726- A History of the British Army-Volume- Four-Part Two- Hon J.W Fortescue-

Macmillan and Co London-1915. Fortescue placed the European and Native strength at:-- Europeans Madras Army:-- (I) Cavalry-884 (2) Infantry-4,381 .Europeans Bombay Army:- Infantry and Artillery-1,617. Natives Madras Army:-- Cavalry-1751 and Infantry-10,695. Natives Bombay Army:-- Infantry and Artillery-4,803. In addition the Hyderabad Contingent which played little part and was of dubious fighting ability has been excluded. The strength of this contingent was 9,621 Cavalry and 6,536 Infantry i.e. a total of 16,157 men. In addition 608 Madras European artillerymen have also been included. These were not listed by Fortescue but mentioned separately by Henry Beveridge (Page-884-Henry Beveridge-Volume Two-Op Cit).

52 Page-124-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit

53 Calculated from the various statistics and details given in the Official British Indian Army Publication:--The Mahratta and the Pindari War-Compiled for the General Staff India by Lieutenant Colonel R.G Burton, 94th Russell's Infantry-Government Monotype Press -Simla-1910. Cardew placed the British Indian Strength at:--Main Army i.e. Grand Army of Bengal and General Hislop's Army of the Deccan:--87,951 and of the two Subsidiary protection forces at 43,000 men. (Pages-128 & 129 -Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit). According to Henry Beveridge the Army of Hindustan (also known as Grand Army) totalled 63,000 men while the total British strength was 113,000 men. There were Three British Cavalry Regiments (8th Dragoons, 24th Light Dragoons and 22nd Light Dragoons, Five British Infantry Battalions (14th Foot, 87th Foot, 67th Foot, Royal Scots, and 65th Foot), More than Fifteen Regiments of Native Cavalry and more than Forty Six Regular Battalions of Native Infantry. In addition there

were large number of Native State units and large number of irregular cavalry units (Pages-78,79 & 80-Henry Beveridge-Volume Three-Op Cit)

54 Page-154-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.Page-228-Henry Beveridge-Volume Three"Op Cit.Page-130-Philip Mason"OP Cit.The total British force was 18 Battalions of Infantry(including three European Battalions) ,8 Regiments of Cavalry (including two European Regiments), 112 Siege Guns and 50 Field Guns.

55 Pages"34 to 280-J.W Fortescue-Volume- XII-Op Cit and Pages-167,168,186 ,189 & 192-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit. Calculated approximately from Fortescue's and Cardew's Accounts.

56 Pages

68,69,70,75,76,86,87,88,90.,92,121,122,124-Sikhs and the Sikh Wars-Op Cit and Pages-206 to 214-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.Fortescue placed the total British-Native strength at the start of the campaign in early December 1845 at approximately 30,000 men (Page-349-J.W Fortescue-Volume XII-Op Cit.) This was however reinforced to approximately 40,000 men.At Mudki on 18" December the British Strength was approximately 12 350 (Page-609-Henry Beveridge-Vol-III-Op Cit),at Feroz Shah on 21 and 22" December 1845 it was 16 700 men (Page-611-Ibid) and at Sobraon on 10" February 1846 it was 16 000 (Page-218-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit).Apart from these other units were committed in guarding camp,line of communications and the various critical points like the line of river Sutlej opposite Ludhiana,Budhowal,Aliwal and at Ferozepur.

57 The approximate calculation is based on the fact that at Gujarat alone the British mustered approximately 24,000 (Page-462-Fortescue-Vol-XII-

Op Cit) to 25,000 men (Page-651-Henry Beveridge-Volune-III-Op Cit) .In addition they were also having protective detachments on the lines of communications and garrisons at Lahore the capital of Sikh Punjab and at Multan which they had just captured after a protracted and bloody siege.

58 There were 68 British Infantry Battalions,& Cavalry Regiments (Pages-391 & 392-J.W Fortescue-Vol-XII-Op Cit) and Eight Infantry battalions of the East India Company in 1858.These meant approximately minimum 70,000

European Troops.In addition the loyal Bengal Army strength stood at approximately 80,053 men (General Return of the Bengal Army as on 01 April 1858 as quoted in the Report on the Organisation of the Army-Op Cit and as reproduced in Kayes-Volume Three-Op Cit).In addition the Native troops of the Madras and Bombay Army numbered 49,737 and 31 601 men respectively (Page-345-Incidents in the Sepoy War-Op Cit).

59 Page-684-Appendix Twenty- The Second Afghan War -Compiled under the direction of Major General Sir Charles Mac Gregor-Intelligence Branch India- Reprinted by Army Education Press- GHQ -Rawalpindi-1975. NOTE:--The above table proves in a very simple statistical manner that the Third Maratha War/Pindari War and the Sepoy War of 1857-58 were far more militarily serious affairs than the First or Second Afghan Wars.If the difficult terrain of Afghanistan is kept in mind then even the First and Second Sikh Wars and the Third and Fourth Mysore Wars were far more serious affairs than the Afghan Wars.

60 Pages-7 & 8-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

61 Page-865-Henry Beveridge-Volume One-Op Cit.

62 Page-252-Colonel G.B Maileson-Op Cit. Fortescue placed the total British-Indian strength at 7,500 men including 500 Native Cavalry and 500 Artillerymen with 48 Guns (Page-454-Foot Note-1---- J.W Fortescue-Vol-Three-Op Cit. and Page-457-Ibid). There were three European Regiments i.e. two from the East India Company's private army and one Royal British army regiment and about ten native infantry battalions and four native cavalry regiments.

63 Page-631-Henry Beveridge-Volume Two-Op Cit. As per Beveridge the British-Indian strength was:-- 8,476 men sub divided as 830-Cavalry, 598-Artillery and 7,048-Infantry.

64 Approximate figure as from Porto Novo which was fought a short time before it.

65 Page-634-Beveridge-Volume-Two.

66 Pages-592 & 593-J.W Fortescue-Val-Three-The Artillery was as following:-- (!) Field Guns-66 (2) Siege Guns/Mortars-52 (3) Howitzers-4. There was a record number of European Regiments which was broken only at the Final Assault at Lucknow in March 1858. These were Nine Royal British Army Infantry battalions (HM 36th, 76th, 52nd, 72nd, 74th, 71st, 75th, 77th and 73rd) and Two European Regiments of East India Company's Private Army making a total of 11 European Infantry Battalions and 1 Royal British Army Cavalry Regiment (19 Light Dragoons). In addition there were Seven Battalions of Bengal Native Infantry, and 18 Battalion of Madras Native Infantry along with two regiments of Madras Native Cavalry.

67 Beveridge's figure of 4,500 is an understatement. (Page-955-Henry Beveridge-Volume Two-Op Cit). Philip Mason placed the total

strength at 6,000 men apart from 5,000 Nizam Cavalry who were unreliable under fire (Page-162-Philip Mason-Op Cit).

68 Page-161-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

69 Page-169-The Battle Book-Op Cit.

70 Page-350-J.W Fortescue-Vol-XII-Op Cit.Beveridge placed the total strength as 12,350 men (Page-609-Henry Beveridge-Volume Three-Op Cit).

71 Page-611-Ibid and Pages-98 to 106-The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars-Gough and Innes.The British strength is approximate and based on the fact that each British unit had a total strength of 800 to 1000 men.

72 Page-218-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.The strengths are approximate.

73 Page-274-The Battle Book-Op Cit. Fortescue says that it was impossible to say how many guns were exactly there at Sobraon (Page-384-J.W Fortescue-Vol-XII-Op Cit).Gough and Innes who are conservative and apologetic authorities maintain that the total number of guns did not exceed 60 (Page-122-The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars-Op Cit).S.S Thorburn placed the total guns as over 100 Pieces including 25 Howitzers ranging from 5.5 inches to 8 inches,five twenty four pounders, five eighteen pounders,and fifteen nine pounders enlarged into 12 pounders quoting Gough the commanding Generals despatch (Page-65-S.S Thorburn-Op Cit).

74 Page-217-The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars-Op Cit.Gough and Innes placed the European infantry strength at 3,700 and Native Infantry strength at approximately 7,700.This has been calculated on

the fact that as per Gough and Innes each Native Infantry Battalion had average strength of 700 men and three European infantry units had a strength of 900 men and one had a total strength of 1000 men. In addition there were three Royal British Army Cavalry Regiments (one of which i.e. 14th Light Dragoons bolted away from the battle !) and four units of Bengal Native Cavalry apart from Artillery Division (Pages-216 & 217-Ibid). S.S Thorburn placed the total strength after deducting camp /baggage guard as 13,000 men (Page-127-S.S Thorburn-Op Cit). J.W Fortescue placed the total strength as 12,000 men and 66 Guns (Page-450-J.W Fortescue-Vol-XII-Op Cit).

75 Page-651-Hemy Beveridge-Volume Three-Op Cit. S.S Thorburn placed the total strength as 20,000 men and 106 Guns (Page-143-S.S Thorburn-Op Cit) out of which as per Thorburn 18 Guns were of the heaviest ordnance in use at that time. S.S Thorburn was frank enough to admit that Gujarat was the triumph of "The power of superior artillery and disciplined Cooperation against a more numerous equally brave but less coherent enemy compelled to fight on open ground" (Page-148-Ibid). If it was a Pakistani historian he would have said that it was Islamic zeal alone which succeeded without even mentioning the word artillery!

76 Fortescue placed the British strength as Infantry-12,498, Cavalry-3,169 , Artillery-1,745 and Engineers-865, or

18,277 in all supported by 164 Guns. (Page-338-J.W Fortescue-Vol-XIII-Op Cit) . Beveridge repeated figures given by Fortescue and placed the Nepali Gurkha Contingents strength at 9,000 men and 24

Field Guns(Pages-837 and 839- Henry Beveridge-
Volume Three-Op Cit)

77 Page-8 Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

78 Pages-26 & 27-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit and
Pages-104-J.W Fortescue-Vol-III-Op Cit.

79 Page-447-J.W Fortescue-Vol-III.

80 Page-461-J.W Fortescue-Vol-III.Fortescue gives
arough figure of slightly above 300 while Beveridge
gives a total figure of 306 (Page-631-Henry
Beveridge-Volume-11)

81 Page-634-Ibid.Beveridge placed the casualties
at 421 but in this case Fortescue was more
specific placing them at 53 killed and 370
wounded (Page-464-J.W Fortescue-Voi-III)

82 Page-176-Wellington's Campaigns in India-
Intelligence Branch Army-India-Superintendent
Government Printing Calcutta-1908

83 Pages-85 & 86-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

84 Page-171-Ibid.

85 Page-197-Ibid.Page-292-J.W Fortescue-Op Cit

86 Pages-207 & 208-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.Page-
354-J.W Fortescue-Vol-XII-Op Cit

87 Pages-106-The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars-
Gough and Innes-Reprinted by Nirmal
Publishers-New Delhi October1986.Page-210-Lieut
F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

88 Page-219-lieut F.G Cardew-op cit. And Page-
388-J.W Fortescue-Vol-XII

89 Page-234-ibid.Pages-223 to 234-The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars-Op Cit

90 Page-240-Ibid

91 Page-62-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

92 Page-608-J.W Fortescue-Volume-Three-Op Cit.

93 Page-67-Foot note-*- Life of Duke of Wellington-Volume One-W.H Maxwell-Fourth Edition-Henry.G.Bohn-York

Street-Covent Garden-London-MDCCCXLV.

94 Page-99-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

95 The reader should note that the British casualties were over 3,100 and around 3,200 as written by Malleson and Beveridge.However since both have not given the detailed breakdown into killed and wounded etc,I have followed Cardew's figures,which though lower are still more than both the sieges of Seringapatam.

96 Page-155-Ibid.

97 Page-85- A History of the British Army-Volume-Twelve-J.W Fortescue-Macmillan and Co-London-1927

98 Page-146- The Battle Book-Bryan Perrett-Arms and Armour-London-1996.

99 Page-645-Popular History of India-Volume Three-Henry Beveridge.

100 Page-309-J.W Fmiescue-Vol-XIII-Op Cit.

CHAPTER THREE

THE BRITISH AND THE INDIAN MUSLIMS **1757-**

1857

A myth has been long propagated in Pakistan that before the English East India Company conquered India the Muslims were the rulers of India. While good as a propaganda theme this fact is only the partial truth and as a matter of fact a gross distortion of history!

The Muslims were ruling greater part of India when the East India Company arrived in the seventeenth century. But by the time Clive won the battle of Plassey in 1757 the Hindu Marathas who had successfully challenged the Mughals under the brilliant Sivaji since mid seventeenth century were the strongest native power in India .

In 1761 they were defeated by a combined Afghan/Indian Muslim army at Panipat, but by 1788 they had again reoccupied Delhi and were masters of greater part of India.

The only significant Muslim ruled state to challenge the English East India Company was not in the north of India but in the Indian south i.e. Mysore.

The only two large Muslim states i.e. Oudh and Hyderabad which had a very poor military record against the Marathas as a matter of fact survived because of being the ally of the English Company owed their existence to the English; East India Company's policy of not to annex them, despite having the military effectiveness to annex them. Hyderabad was regarded as too non productive to be annexed and politically highly

reliable since it was the best toady of the East India Company in Indo British history.

Oudh was very rich but not annexed immediately after having been convincingly defeated by the East India Company at Buxar, since the English Company felt that it was not administratively advisable to extend its territory so rapidly, since such an action would make the East India Company's territory too large and unwieldy to hold, keeping in view the limited administrative machinery/civil servants of the company, as was the case during the period 1764-1801.

When Wellesley became the Governor General of India, he very resolutely decided to annex a large part of Oudh in 1801, in order to increase the East India Company's sources of revenue. This step enabled him to vastly increase the revenue of the company, enabling it to expand its army and wage a series of wars which greatly expanded its territory during the period 1798-1849.

In 1803 when the Second Maratha War started, all territory including and west of Aligarh, including Delhi Punjab and Trans Indus Frontier was not held by the Muslims but by the Marathas and the Sikhs. The Mughal King was only a pensioner of the Marathas. In this sense when the English East India Company's army under General Lake captured Delhi, it actually liberated the city from the Hindu Marathas, rather than capturing a city, whose masters were the Muslims!

This point is very subtly sidelined in Pakistani school history textbooks! There is little doubt that, had the East India Company not extended its territory westwards, during the period 1803-1849, Delhi and the surrounding territory, Punjab

and the Trans Indus Frontier would have remained a Hindu Maratha or Sikh ruled territory.

Thus the fiction that Muslims were ruling Delhi or northern India before the English Company came would never have arisen. As a matter of fact the timely arrival of the East India Company on the northern Indian scene saved all Muslim territory between Aligarh and Peshawar from being ruled by the Hindu Marathas and the Sikhs!

The Muslims in 1803 and 1849 were clear about this fact, but later on in the Muslim poetry literature and political discussions in the period following 1918 this fact was downplayed.

Thus by 1947 this simple reality simply disappeared from text books! The simple fact is that the Marathas had recovered from the much trumpeted battle of Panipat (1761) by 1801 and were politically and militarily better organised.

If their power was destroyed, it was done by Wellesley and Lake at Assaye and Laswari respectively and not by Abdali at Panipat! Mickey Mouse Muslim states like Bahawalpur and Sind survived thanks to the treaty of Amritsar

(1809) between the English Company and Ranjit Singh, under which Ranjit was not to have any territorial designs south of river Sutlej.

The Muslims of Punjab were saved from the Sikhs not by any Afghan army of any Abdali king but by General Hugh Gough of the English Company's Bengal Army, when Gough defeated the Sikhs in the First and Second Sikh Wars. Till 1849 the Muslims of all areas west of Sutlej, which suddenly became martial after 1857 were ruled by the numerically few, but qualitatively highly

superior Sikhs,who used many Muslim Mosques as stables and powder magazines!

The Sikhs never allowed the Muslims to publicly recite the Azzan (call to prayers).

The British liberated Muslim Punjab or Muslim Frontier,just like they liberated Muslim Delhi or Muslim Aligarh!This is not taught in the school text books in Pakistan.

The Muslims of Lahore knew better once they most gratefully thanked the Chief Commissioner of Punjab John Lawrence,for having restored to the Muslims in 1856,seven years after the liberation of Muslim Punjab, the famous Badshahi Mosque if Lahore,which had been used by the Sikhs first as a stable and subsequently as a military magazine.

(1)

In Maratha ruled Muslim cities like Delhi Aligarh etc,Mosques were never used as stables or powder magazines,nor was any ban imposed on Azzan,but the political power belonged to the Marathas and not to the Muslims,and there is no doubt that had Lake not captured Delhi in 1803,the Maratha policy,with the passage of time, may have become more repressive.

Even in terms of military resistance,the Marathas were initially tough opponents of the English Company.

In the First Maratha War fought at a time when the British were already suffering serious reverses in America,the East India Company's rule in India was saved because the Muslim state of Hyderabad chickened out of the alliance of all Indian states against the English Company.

In the English Company's struggle with the Muslim ruled state of Mysore, no native state played a more disgraceful role, than the Muslim ruled state of Hyderabad!

Nehrus annexation of Hyderabad, as a matter of fact was a symbolic tribute to the heroic defiant spirit of Hyder and Tipu!

It is interesting to note that this myth about Muslims ruling India had pre 1947 origins.

Sleeman an East India Company official serving in the Company's subsidiary vassal state of Oudh noted in 1844 that the Muslims in general identified with the Mughal dynasty, longed for its restoration, and conceived of themselves as the former ruling class' Sleeman made an interesting remark about this fantasy dominated state of mind, he stated, "Whether they really were so matters not; they persuade themselves or their children that they were" . **(2)**

The subtle psychological aspect of this myth was that the Muslims convinced themselves that they had been defeated by the English East India Company, and had it not been for that accursed company, they would still have been rulers of India!

The fact that Muslims were on the decline from 1748 and that Delhi Punjab Frontier etc was long in the hands of non Muslim rulers long before the English Company captured them was selectively and subconsciously distorted!

The English Company may not have been the best choice, but the subtle but unfortunately actual aspect of the whole affair was the fact, that it was English East India Company, which saved the Muslims of Northern India, whether Hindustani

Punjabi or Pathan from Hindu and Sikh rule! Long before 1947 the non Muslim Hindus and Sikhs were closer to political supremacy, based on military effectiveness, than in 1947 'The English East India Company changed the whole situation'.

This is unpleasant to discuss and difficult to digest for a common Pakistani Muslim fed on official propaganda, but this is how it all happened.

The ironic aspect of the whole affair is the fact that the toughest Muslim resistance to the English Company came not from northern India, where the Muslims had held political power for long, like at Delhi Lucknow etc, or where they were in a majority, like Punjab or Frontier, but from the south, ie Mysore, where they were a very small minority! And these men, thank God were neither of Turkish Afghan or Persian descent for a change.

The fact is that long before the English Company arrived the Muslims of the north, whether from the old political centres like Delhi etc or the Muslim majority areas had lost the will to resist.

This had happened because of the developments of the period 1707-1788 when the Sikhs and Marathas became the most powerful political groups of northern India.

Between 1764 and 1843, not a single took place in northern India which had anything to do with a Muslim state deliberately resisting the English East India Company from advancing northwards.

The only minor exception to this rule was Sind in the western extremity of India, but Sind also owed its independence to East India Company's pressure

exerted on Ranjit Singh,during the period 1809-1839,not to have territorial designs towards Bahawalpur and Sindh.

The crux of the problem once analysed came to rest with individual leadership.

Oudh with a long tradition of Muslim rule since the twelfth century, possessed much larger resources much larger Muslim population of both Indian converts and Muslims of foreign extraction.

However during the period 1760-82 when Hyder Ali started from a scratch as a junior officer in Mysore's Hindu king's army and created a strong state in an area which had been under nominal Muslim subjugation throughout the course of history.

Oudh which had been under one Muslim dynasty of provincial governors turned hereditary rulers since 1722 failed to rise to the occasion and challenge the English Company in Bengal,except a short period during 1757- 64.

The same Colonel Hector Munro who so convincingly defeated Oudh's army at Buxar in 1764,was roughed up and humbled in such a manner by Hyder in 1780 ,that Fortescue the official historian of the British Army,who rarely found any fault with the British commanders was forced to admit,"Munro must be held solely responsible for one of the greatest calamities that had ever befallen the British arms.A degree of blame attaches to him which cannot be fastened on Burgoyne nor on Braddock,nor on Abercomby,nor even on Cornwallis..... he had eyes to see, but would not perceive; he had ears to hear,but would not understand,and thus it was that the victor of Buxar,a good and gallant soldier,went near

by sheer perversity to accomplish the ruin of British power in India" **(3)**

Oudh lasted much longer than Mysore i.e. from 1722 till 1856, it had much larger resources, much larger area, but miserably failed to qualitatively produce anything like Hyder!

How can we blame Wellesley or Dalhousie for annexing them! The Mughal tradition stands out as the principal culprit.

The emphasis on court etiquette effeminate manners, poetry large number of camp followers, harems, the failure to keep abreast with developments of the methods of warfare as improved and practised in western Asia and Europe, all these were dead-weights because of which Buxar was lost!

Mysore luckily did not have the Mughal tradition of debauchery and dissolute life!

Surrounded by enemies and ruling a state which had hardly any experience of direct rule by the Muslims Hyder had to qualitatively ensure that his state was not destroyed by the Marthas the Nizam or the English Company!

The irony of Muslim history is the fact that long before the battle of Plassey, the Muslim supremacy in India was clearly on the decline, and the pace of change from decline to fall was accelerating when the English Company had just established itself in Bengal, and yet Muslims historians like to imagine, that it was only the East India Company which evicted them from power.

They even today fallaciously like to believe that the inferior Hindu Maratha or the Sikh just could not have done it!

Thus once the events of the later Mughal era were assessed and interpreted it was rationalised that the rulers of India before the English came were the Muslims.

Indian military history of the period 1757-1849 proves otherwise !

Another reason for overextension of the myth that the Muslims were ruling India was the reluctance of any figure to challenge the de jure authority of the Mughal Emperor who was only a hostage of the Pathans Marathas or the English Company after 1803, but in whose name all ruled various parts of India.

As a matter of fact the situation in India after 1707 was towards subdivision into more efficient, more ethnically or ideologically compact smaller states. This as a matter of fact was a positive trend, but was reversed by East India Company, who initially benefited from it, while consolidating its hold on India.

In the period following 1803 i.e. after the capture of Delhi, the Indian Muslims gradually accepted the political realities and were adjusting to the Company's rule.

Delhi as a city greatly benefited from the East India Company's rule. The period 1707-1803 was one of the darkest periods of Delhi's history. During this period the city saw various factional wars between the different parties at the Mughal court, raids of Marathas, the sacking of the city followed by a general

massacre by Nadir Shah, repeated plundering and sacking raids by Ahmad Shah Abdali (who ironically became a Muslim hero once Muslim history was distorted by various Muslim intellectuals during the period 1907-57), during the period 1748-61.

After 1761 the city was dominated by various factions and the Pathans of Rohailkhand, who made the de jure Mughal Emperor dance like a woman and blinded him in 1788.

The Marathas captured the city in 1788 and although their rule was less erratic and uncertain than that of the Rohailkhand Pathans, the city went through an uneasy and uncertain when finally General Lake captured the city and the city came to enjoy the blessings of uninterrupted peace and prosperity after almost 100 years.

The period 1803-57 was one of reconstruction and enlightenment when the great storm of 1857 once again destroyed the Imperial city. In Punjab and the Trans Indus Frontier the Muslims very enthusiastically welcomed the English Company's rule, because the Sikhs although great soldiers were brutal masters thanks to their century long experience of brutal persecution by the Mughals and Afghans.

ENDNOTES

1 Pages-8 & 9-Old Lahore-Reminiscences of a Resident-Universal Books-Zulqarnain Chambers-Ganpat Road-Lahore Reprint-1976.

2 Page-284-Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official-Volume One-W.H Sleeman-J.T Hatchard & Son-London- 1884.

3 Pages-448 & 449-J.W Fot1escue-Volume III-Op Cit.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE REBELLION OF 1857- MYTH AND REALITY

During the period 1848-56 India witnessed radical political changes accompanied by massive and unprecedented development in terms of infrastructure and communications.

The main personality responsible for these changes was the brilliant Governor General Lord Dalhousie (1812-60) whose tenure lasted from 1848 to 1856.

Dalhousie was a Utilitarian at heart and was genuinely determined to modernise India, modernise the laws, introduce modern communications, irrigation, education and destroy the princely native states and introduce direct British rule in India.

He thus laid the foundation of railways (the first track in Asia), improved agriculture by excavating canals, introduced cheap postage, introduced telegraph which connected all parts of India from north to south and east to west. More roads were metalled during Dalhousies' tenure than during the tenure of all four of his predecessors from 1828 to 1848.

Legislation done during Dalhousies tenure though progressive and positive in outlook affected Hindu society and was perceived as an attack on religion. In his levelling zeal Dalhousie annoyed the feudal from whom he took the arbitrary and unjust judicial powers over their tenants.

His annexation of native states, which he regarded as an anachronism annoyed the rulers whose states were annexed.

The Bengal Army which had completed the East India Company's conquest of India in 1849 also became uneasy because of a number of reasons including abolition of allowances, reduction in army strength, and the overall long term expectation that, now that the conquest of India was complete, the Company would reduce its army.

The immediate reason for the rebellion however was the introduction of the new Enfield Pritchett Rifle in the Bengal Army.

The Enfield Rifle was introduced primarily as a measure to modernise the Bengal Army which was armed by the old Brown Bess Musket of Napoleonic war vintage. By an administrative oversight however the Company failed to take into account the religious implications of the cartridges of the rifle which were bitten by the teeth in order to be unloaded.

Pig and Cow fat was used in the wax lubricating these cartridges and this was perceived by both the Muslim and Hindu soldiers as an attack on their religion, Pig being forbidden to Muslims and the Cow being revered by the Hindus.

This administrative lapse provided the soldiers of the Bengal Army with an ideal common ground for a series of military rebellions which took the form of the first Indian War of Independence against the English East India Company.

The Bengal army started resisting orders to use the cartridges from March 1857 when the first

Enfield Rifles were issued. Some units were disbanded and the English Company realising the dangerous implications of the cartridges issued orders that the soldiers could lubricate the cartridges using the wax of their own choice and that the cartridges were no longer to be opened by the teeth but by hands.

The harm however had been done and on 11TH May 1857 the 3rd Light Cavalry of Bengal Army having rebelled at Meerut on 11th May seized Delhi, proclaimed the old pensioner Mughal Emperor as de facto ruler of India and transformed the purely military rebellion into a political revolt against foreign rule.

This was a period when European troops had been greatly reduced in India because of the Crimean war. Thus the strength of Royal British Army infantry regiments in India had been reduced from 39 in 1852 to 22 in 1856. **(1)**

The strength of the Native Troops of the Company was 232,224 against 45,522 Europeans (British). **(2)**

The distribution of Native troops army wise was approximately subdivided as :-- **(3)**

Bengal Army-118,663 troops,

Madras Army-49,737 troops

Bombay Army-31,601 troops

It was the Bengal Army alone which rebelled against the Company. The Madras and Bombay Army stayed loyal barring few exceptions.

The rebellion was suppressed by the British by the aid of reinforcements from Britain, assistance of Madras and Bombay armies and assistance of loyal irregular Punjabi Muslim, Sikh and Pathan Muslim troops from the newly annexed territories of Punjab and the Trans Indus frontier.

The great bulk of the Bengal Army was not Muslim as many erroneously think but approximately 75 to 80 % Hindu.

The prime Muslim contribution was the fact that the cavalry(though numerically a much smaller arm) which led the rebellion in almost all cantonments was predominantly Hindustani and Ranghar Muslim.

The much larger infantry which comprised approximately 119 regiments or men as against 34 cavalry regiments **(4)** was some three fourth Hindustani Hindu Rajput and Brahman wholeheartedly **(5)** joined the Muslims and most of the infantry regiments fought at the predominantly Muslim political centres of Delhi and Lucknow rather -than at the Hindu dominated centres of Jhansi and Cawnpore.

Elements of approximately 33 infantry and cavalry regiments fought at Delhi, while 23 converged at Lucknow to fight, only 6 went to Cawnpore, 4 to Banda and 10 concentrated at Kalpi to attack Cawnpore. The larger concentration at Delhi had a deep connection with the defensive potential of Delhi apart from its political significance.

The second rebel favourite city Lucknow was favoured because it had the largest built up area in India and could be defended much easier than the much smaller Cawnpore. The following tables will enable the reader to form a clear picture of where

most rebel regiments fought in 1857:--

SUMMARY OF ALL UNITS OF BENGAL ARMY / MAJOR STATE FORCE UNITS BEHAVIOUR IN 1857

| TYPE OF UNIT | LOYAL | LOYAL BUT DISARMED | DISBANDED OR DESTROYED | PART REBELLED AND PART LOYAL | SUCCESSFULLY REBELLED AND FOUGHT LATER |
|-----------------------------|----------|--------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| REGULAR INFANTRY 74 UNITS | 4 | 6 | 27 | 2.5 | 34.5 |
| IRREGULAR INFANTRY 35 UNITS | 23 | NIL | NIL | 0.5 | 11.5 |
| TOTAL INFANTRY | 27 | 6 | 27 | 3 | 46 |
| REGULAR CAVALRY | NIL | NIL | 5 | NIL | 5 |
| IRREGULAR CAVALRY | 9 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 10 |
| TOTAL CAVALRY | 9 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 15 |
| TOTAL BENGAL ARMY | 36 | 9 | 36 | 4 | 61 |
| STATE INFANTRY UNITS | NIL | NIL | NIL | 1 | 7 |
| STATE CAVALRY UNITS | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | 2 |
| TOTAL STATE UNITS | NIL | NIL | NIL | 1 | 9 |
| GRAND TOTAL UNITS 156 UNITS | 36 UNITS | 9 UNITS | 36 UNITS | 5 UNITS | 70 UNITS |

BLOCK REGION WISE ANALYSIS*

SUMMARY OF BENGAL ARMY UNITS BEHAVIOUR IN 1857-58

| Region | Total Regiments | | Rebelled & Fought | | Disarmed Disbanded or Loyal | |
|---------------------------|-----------------|----------|-------------------|----------|-----------------------------|----------|
| | CAVALRY | INFANTRY | CAVALRY | INFANTRY | CAVALRY | INFANTRY |
| Bengal Bihar & Orrissa | 3 | 19 | 3 | 3.5 | Nil | 15.5 |
| Benares Region | 1 | 7 | Nil | 1.5 | 1 | 5.5 |
| Oudh and Rohailkhand | 6 | 21 | 5.5 | 17.5 | 0.5 | 3.5 |
| Doab & Agra | 2 | 11 | 2 | 8 | Nil | 3 |
| Delhi Region | 1 | 4 | 0.5 | 4 | 0.5 | Nil |
| Punjab & Frontier | 21 | 38 | 2 | 4 | 19 | 34 |
| Central India & Rajputana | 5 | 17 | 5 | 15 | Nil | 2 |
| Total | 39 | 117 | 18 | 53.5 | 21 | 63.5 |

Note:--Where a unit has partly rebelled it has been assumed for simplicity that half of it remained loyal and half rebelled.

TABLE SHOWING REGIONS OF ORIGINAL LOCATION AND REGIONS WHERE REBEL UNITS FOUGHT IN 1857

| ORIGINAL LOCATION | TOTAL REGIMENTS INVOLVED | | LOCATION WHERE THE REGIMENT INITIALLY FOUGHT IN THE REBELLION | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|------|---|-----|---------|------|----------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|
| | | | DELHI | | LUCKNOW | | CAWNPORE | | KALPI | | BANDA | |
| | CAV | INF | CAV | INF | CAV | INF | CAV | INF | CAV | INF | CAV | INF |
| Bengal Bihar & Orissa | 3 | 3.5 | -- | -- | 1 | 3 | -- | -- | 1 | -- | 1 | 0.5 |
| Benares Region | -- | 1.5 | -- | -- | -- | 1 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Oudh & Rohailkhand | 5.5 | 17.5 | 0.5 | 5 | 5 | 12.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Doab & Agra | 2 | 8 | 1 | 3 | -- | -- | 1 | 5 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Delhi Region | 0.5 | 4 | 0.5 | 4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Punjab & Frontier | 2 | 4 | 2 | 4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Central India & Rajputana | 5 | 15 | 2 | 7 | -- | -- | -- | -- | 3 | 6 | -- | 2 |
| TOTAL 71 UNITS | 18 | 53.5 | 6 | 23 | 6 | 16.5 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 2.5 |

SUMMARY OF BENGAL ARMY UNIT BEHAVIOUR-1857

| REGION | TOTAL REGIMENTS | | REBELLED SUCCESSFULLY | | LOYAL & ALSO THOSE WHO WERE LOYAL BUT WERE DISARMED | | DESTROYED OR DISARMED AND LATER DISBANDED OR IMMEDIATELY DISBANDED | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----|-----------------------|-----|---|-----|--|-----|
| | INF | CAV | INF | CAV | INF | CAV | INF | CAV |
| PUNJAB | 38 | 21 | 4 | 2 | 14 | 12 | 20 | 7 |
| NW PROVINCE | 43 | 10 | 31 | 8 | 7 | 1 | 5 | 1 |
| CENTRAL INDIA AND RAJPUTANA | 17 | 5 | 15 | 5 | 2 | -- | -- | -- |
| BENGAL | 19 | 3 | 3.5 | 3 | 11 | -- | 4.5 | -- |
| TOTAL | 117 | 39 | 53.5 | 18 | 34 | 13 | 29.5 | 8 |

The odds against the British as is evident from the above statistics, were not as great as they later exaggerated them to be.

Approximately 21 cavalry and 64 infantry regiments never rebelled or were successfully disarmed or disbanded. Approximately 18 cavalry

and 53.5 infantry regiments rebelled in all, and these were divided between Delhi Cawnpore Lucknow and Central India.

How many troops stayed and fought with the rebels after the initial rebellion, no one knows and no one can ever find out. The British insist that complete regiments did so, contemporary accounts indicate that many sepoys dispersed to their homes after the initial rebellion at many places.

Against these 50 to 60 thousand rebels the British had the whole Bombay and Madras Native armies totalling 81,338 men, 24,027 Punjabi Muslims and Pathan Muslims, 13,344 Sikhs **(7)** six European infantry regiments of the English East India Company and above all eight cavalry and sixty eight infantry regiments of Royal British army. Due to a variety of complicated reasons which cannot be discussed in detail in this text, not being directly relevant, most of the rebels were not Muslims and greater part of the Native troops who assisted the British were not Sikhs as is widely believed.

Delhi was captured after one of the bloodiest sieges in the history of British Army in September 1857.

The majority of native troops at Delhi were not Sikhs but Punjabi and Pathan Muslims **(9)** who now constitute some three fourth of the present Pakistan Army.

Lucknow was captured by a predominantly British force in March 1858 and by May the rebellion was suppressed in most parts of India. The prime connection of the rebellion with Pakistan Army is in terms of the changes in recruitment policy of the British in the

aftermath of the rebellion. The Martial races Theory, which had many adherents in the Pakistan Army as late as 1983-94 as I personally observed has a deep and direct connection with British recruitment policy and outlook in the decades following the rebellion of 1857.

The Sepoy rebellion of 1857 was a watershed in Indian history. It was necessary to discuss the rebellion in some detail in order to give the layman reader an idea about the men who rebelled against the English Company.

This was necessary because, due to inadvertent, unintended and sometimes deliberate distortion of history, a reader who is new to Indo Pak military history, may believe modern, and mostly American authors into thinking that, all or most of the rebels were Muslims, and the Sikhs alone helped the British in suppressing the rebellion!

Cohen an American historian repeats thrice a statement in his book on the Pakistan Army that there were no all Muslim units in the British Indian Army, and that this was a legacy of British distrust of Muslim loyalty dating back to 1857. **(10)**

A reader who has no time to search through a library for dusty old volumes dealing with Bengal Army would think, that ancestors of the Punjabi or Pathan Muslims now serving in the Pakistan Army now were the ones who rebelled against the company in 1857, or that perhaps there were all Muslim units in the Indian Army before 1857, or that there were no all Muslim units in the British Indian Army after 1857.

All these above mentioned ideas however have no connection with actual history! These flow out of a factually wrong and incorrect assertion made by

one of the first Pakistani historians of the Pakistan Army i.e. General Fazal I Muqueem who made the sweeping judgement, " there was never a single combatant all-Muslim unit" . **(11)**

Before 1857 the English Company Bengal Army which rebelled in 1857 was not organised on basis of religion,almost all the regiments of this army had Hindus and Muslims mixed even within companies and platoons,and the great bulk,ie some three fourth of the Bengal Army infantry was not Muslim but Hindu Rajput and Brahman from the Gangetic Plain.The cavalry was predominantly Muslim,but this numbered less than 10,000 men.

It is interesting to note that the Madras Army which had a higher proportion of Muslims stayed loyal.

The Madras Army had some 37.10% or 15,856 Muslims in its total infantry of 42,725 and 77.37% or 2024 Muslims in its total cavalry of 2616 men. **(12)**

According to Thorburn some 50 % of the regiments raised in Punjab and Frontier consisted of Muslims,the Sikhs recruited being 33 % and the Hindus being 17 % . **(13)**

No fact or figure prove that the rebellion was a predominantly Muslim show or that the loyal troops were predominantly Sikh.

The only true aspect of this myth was the fact that the rebellion was led by the Hindustani (Ranghar Muslim) cavalry and some other Muslims from artillery and infantry.

Even then only one out of seven rebels were Muslim; since the bulk of the Bengal Army infantry; as already mentioned were Muslims!

A better statement may be that the rebellion was a Hindustani Muslim led affair while a large number of troops who stayed loyal to the British were Punjabi and Pathan Muslims, and even Madras Muslims of the Madras Army.

There were an almost equal number of non Muslims fighting on both sides; while a larger number of Muslims (those from Punjab and NWFP) fought for the English East India Company.

These are important facts since they are sources of many myths about Indian British military history as we shall discuss in the later chapters.

Lastly the British were too subtle and far sighted to commit the folly of not having any all Muslim

regiment after 1857. They did have some all Muslim regiments right from 1857 onwards.

The Curetons Multani Pathan Risala later famous as 15 Lancers was an all Muslim Patban regiment right from 1857, the year of its raising till 1915 when it refused to fight against the Turks in Mesopotamia.

The 1st Bengal Cavalry famous as Skinner's Horse was an all Hindustani/Ranghar Muslim unit from 1864 till the First world war. **(14)**

In addition six regiments of infantry were Mussulmanized in 1892-93.

These were the 5th, 12th, 17th, 18th, Bengal Light Infantry which were purely All Muslim Hindustani Mussulman/Ranghar Muslim units, the 33rd Bengal Infantry (Punjabi Muslim) and the 40th Bengal Infantry (Pathan Muslim). **(15)**

In addition in 1889 (**16**) 17th Bengal Cavalry became the third pure Muslim regiment of cavalry with "4 Troops of Punjabi Muslims" and "4 Troops of Pathan Muslims".

In 1889 as per the same G.G.O; the class composition of the 1st Bengal Cavalry (Skinners Horse) was all "Horse Troops"-Hindustani Muslim/Ranghar Muslim

,15th Bengal Cavalry's composition was changed from pure Pathan Muslim to "5 Troops Trans Border Muslim Pathans" and "3 troops Punjabi Muslims".

All these are facts of history and yet Fazl I Muqueem wants us to believe that there never was a combatant single Muslim unit. A profound reflection on the intellectual calibre and degree of research that he did to write his book, which is full of praise for Ayub

The British continued with these all Muslim units till First World War, when rebellion in the Pathan and Ranghar/Hindustani Muslim units forced them to change the policy of having some All Muslim units.

Even then they retained at least one all Muslim infantry 'In addition there was another pure Muslim battalion i.e. the 106th Hazara Pioneers consisting of Hazara Mongol Shia Muslims from Quetta (**17**) .

Even as late as 1945 while General Fazal I Muqueem was very much serving in the British Indian Army, there was one pure Muslim Paratrooper Infantry Unit i.e. the 4th Battalion, the Indian Parachute regiment (**18**) .

Even after WW One there were all Muslim infantry units like the 11/ 1st Punjabis (**19**) ,but the Pakistanis including every officer that I came

across in the Pakistan Army still like to believe that the British trusted only non Muslims as one class units!

Such ridiculous ideas are forwarded in PHD thesis in Pakistan and Pakistani University award PHDs without checking them! How can they be blamed when a self styled American Specialists like Cohen has authenticated this ridiculous view!' Long live John Gaylor!The Americans remain naive ,at least as far as Asian history is concerned. The British historians on the other hand are far more subtle and incisive as far as Asian history is concerned; despite all their outward constipated mindedness!

ENDNOTES

- 1 Page-9- The Indian Mutiny-Fitzgerald and Lee.Publisher unknown-Date of Publication :--approximately the period 1858-60-Found in Punjab Public Library-Lahore-Pakistan.
- 2 Page-341- Report of the Royal Commission on the Organisation of the Indian Army-London-1858.
- 3 Page-345-Appendix- Incidents in the Sepoy War-General Sir Hope Grant-Edinburgh-1873.
- 4 Page-9-The Indian Mutiny-Guide Book for Staff College Candidates-Dr Fitzgerald Lee and Captain F.W Radcliffe Calcutta-1908. Page-171-Cambridge History-1858-1918-Op Cit.Pages-125 & 126-Philip Mason-Op Cit.. Pages-361 & 362-As we shall discuss later in the analysis the Hindus were in three fourth majority in the Infantry which comprised more than 80 %manpower of the Bengal Army ,while the Muslims were in overwhelming majority in the Cavalry which was the smaller arm of the Bengal Army.(A History of the British Cavalry-1816-1919-Volume Two -The Marquess of Anglesey-London-

1975) .As a matter of comparison it may be noted that the East India Company in all its three armies had a total of 232,224 Natives out of which 188,286 were in infantry,30,923 were in Cavalry,while 4176 were in Artillery.Bengal Army Cavalry strength was 25,846 and Infantry strength was 138,666 Report of the Royal Commission on the Organisation of the Indian Army as reproduced by Sir John William Kaye in his History of the Sepoy War in India-1857-1858-Volume Three-London-1880.Even a post rebellion analysis of the Madras Army proved the same findings (Computed from various statistics given in the "Report of the Royal Organisation of the Indian Army" as reproduced by Kaye -Volume-Three of the "History of the Sepoy War in India" from Page-621 The following was the communal composition of the Madras Army (Pages-622 to 624-Ibid.) as found by the Royal Commission on the organisation of the Army in India in 1858:--

Infantry

| | | | | |
|-----|-------------|---|--------|------------|
| (1) | Hindus etc. | - | 26,869 | or 62.89 % |
| (2) | Muslim | - | 15,856 | or 37.10 % |

Cavalry

| | | | | |
|-----|------------|---|------|------------|
| (1) | Hindus etc | - | 592 | or 22.62 % |
| (2) | Muslims | - | 2024 | or 77.37 % |

The following was the religious composition (Page-23- The Sepoy Revolt- Its Causes and Consequences - Henry Mead-John Murray-Able Marle Street-London-1857.) of the first unit which rebelled against the British:--

Composition of Mangal Pandey's Unit 34 NI

| | | | |
|---------------|--------------------|---|-------------|
| 1. | Brahmans | - | 335 |
| 2. | Chettryas | - | 237 |
| 3. | Lower caste Hindus | - | 231 |
| 4. | Muslims | - | 200 |
| 5. | Christians | - | 12 |
| 6. | Sikhs | - | 200 |
| <u>Total:</u> | | | <u>1089</u> |

5 The following are the religious composition figures of the infantry regiments of Bengal Army which did not rebel. (Pages-621 to 626-History of the Sepoy War in India-Volume Three-Op Cit)The

reason for their not rebelling was the fact that they were either disarmed, sent on furlough or located in areas with strong British military presence or simply because they were in Punjab and Frontier where the population both Muslim and non Muslim was overwhelmingly pro British. The figures convincingly prove that Bengal Army's infantry was Hindu majority:--

(1) Muslims 2418 or 13.08%

(2) Hindus etc 14680 or 79.44 %

(3) Sikhs 1380 or 7.47%

Total: 18 478

6 This is an absolutely original table. Compiled by the author through study of a large number of books. It may not be wholly accurate, but is basically an attempt to illustrate the general trend.

7 Letter Dated 25 May 1858-R . Temple to the Secretary to the Government of India-Punjab Mutiny Reports-Labore- 1858.

8 Pages-391 & 392-J.W Fortescue-Volume-XIII-Op Cit.

9 Page-210- The Punjab in Peace and War-S.S Thorburn-First Published London 1904-Reprinted by Usha Publications New Delhi-1987.

10 Pages-6 , 37 and Footnote Nine-Page-41-The Pakistan Army Stephen.P.Cohen-Oxford University Press-Lahore- 1992.

11 Page-9- The Story of the Pakistan Army- Major General Fazal I Muqueem Khan-Oxford University

Press-Lahore- 1963.Fazal I Muqueem was a Punjabi speaking Pathan from Julundhur Doab in East Punjab.This book was written while he was serving in the army and large part of it was devoted to sycophancy in praising Ayub Khan the President and Supreme Commander of Army; who Fazal was to later criticise in a later book published after both Ayub and Fazal had retired I

12 Calculation done by the author from the various details about ethnicity etc from the Appendix " A" to the RoyalCommission Report on the Organisation of the Indian Army of 1858 -Op Cit.

13 Page-21 0-S.S Thorburn-Op Cit.

14 Adjutant General Circular Number 117-N-Dated 9'6 September 1864-Army Headquarters-Calcutta-1864.Also see Pages-329,330 and 331-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op cit.

15 Pages-428, 460, 461 ,462, 464, 468-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit and G.G.O Dated-2nd January 1889-Archives of India-New Delhi -Also quoted on pages-405 to 409-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit

16 Ibid.

17 Pages-154 , 185 & 186- The Armies of India -Major George.F.Macmunn-Adam and Charles Black London-1911.

18 First page of Preface (not numbered) of Fallacies and Realities- Major General A.O Mitha-Maktaba Fikro Danish Lahore-1994.

19 Page-132- Sons of John Company-The Indian and Pakistan Armies- 1903-1991 -John Gaylor-First Published in UK- 1992-Spellmount Ltd- Reprinted by Lancer International- New Delhi- 1993.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE INDIAN ARMY 1849-1914

In 1849 the British conquest of India was accomplished and it was Bengal Army which had been single-handedly doing it since 1803 apart from the role played by Madras and Bombay armies in the Second Maratha War.

The officers of East India Company were deeply impressed by the tremendous fighting qualities of the Punjabi Sikhs. Thus the First Sikh War of 1845-46 brought one major change in the East India Company's Bengal Army. This was the recruitment of Punjabis in the Company's Bengal Army.

In 1846 as per G.G.O dated 30 July 1846 two predominantly Sikh "Irregular Infantry" units i.e. "The Regiment of Ferozepur" and "The Regiment of Ludhiana" from the Jat Sikhs of Sutlej river and surrounding country were raised. In addition later in December the same year in accordance with G.G.O Foreign Department No .2457 dated 14 December 1846 it was decided to raise a "Frontier Brigade" consisting of one light field battery of artillery and four regiments of infantry and also "Corps of Guides" for general service .

These troops were to be raised in the Trans Sutlej and Cis Sutlej states for general service and police duties.

Another major change in the Bengal Army which took place as an economy measure in 1847 was reduction in the strength of infantry units from 1000 to 700 men.

This step greatly demoralised the troops and they thought that, now that the conquest of India was over, the Company may further reduce its army.

In accordance with G.G.O of 14 December 1846 1st Sikh Infantry was raised at Hoshiarpur, 2nd Sikh Infantry at Kangra, 3rd Sikh Infantry at Ferozepur and 4th Sikh Infantry at Ludhiana.

"The Corps of Guides" was raised at Mardan.

Contrary to common myth which led many like Wolpert to conclude later that the British were aided by Delhi at Sikhs, the class composition of the newly raised Sikh infantry units was "never wholly Sikh, nor even did the Sikhs preponderate **(1)** even at the start. The reason for calling them Sikh Infantry was the fact, that they were raised mainly though not wholly from the troops of the Sikh Army disbanded as per the peace terms of the First Sikh War.

Thus in 1862, class composition of the 1st Sikh Infantry was; Sikhs-4 Companies, One and half Company-Punjabi Muslims, One Company-Trans Indus Pathan Muslims, One Company-Hindustani Muslims and One Company-Dogra Hindus.

The 2nd Sikh was mostly Dogra Hindu with some Pathans, the 3rd Sikh had 5 Companies-Sikhs, 2 Companies-Pathans, 2 Companies-Punjabi Muslims and 1 Company-Dogras. **(2)**



The final annexation of Punjab in 1849 led to raising of more irregular units for service in Punjab since the area was large and more units were required for controlling it.

Thus G.G.O dated 18th May 1849 envisaged raising of certain irregular infantry and cavalry units as part of the Bengal Army, which were to be raised from the manpower of districts north of Sutlej, for protection of the new East India Company's frontier.

These units were designated as "Punjab Infantry" and "Punjab Cavalry" units.

Their nucleus were the Hindustani/Ranghar troops of the existing Bengal Army.

In accordance with this new G.G.O five new Punjab infantry and five new Punjab cavalry units were raised.

Again these units had a large proportion of disbanded Sikh units of the old Sikh Army, disbanded as a result of the Second Sikh War.

Again there were a large number of Punjabi and Pathan Muslims in these units. It may be noted that though raised by Bengal Army officers of the English East India Company's Army the irregular units raised in Punjab both as Sikh and Punjab units were administratively under the Chief Commissioner of Punjab rather than directly under the C in C of the Bengal Army.

Instructions were given by the Government that equal proportion of Sikhs Hindustanis and Yusufzais should be enrolled in the units.

However recruitment was done entirely as per the discretion of the British officers who raised them and some did not follow the instructions of recruiting Hindustanis like Captain Coke of 1st Punjab Infantry who was biased against Hindustanis and regarded the Punjabis as more loyal or trustworthy.

Thus the 1st Punjab Infantry later known as Cokes had Afridis Khattaks Dogras Punjabi Muslims.

This unit was a part of the 3rd Column in the assault on Delhi in 1857.

5th Punjab Infantry raised at Leiah and Mianwali by Captain Gastrell an interesting experiment was

carried out by Captain Vaaughan who became its Commandant in 1852.

Vaughan on his own initiative organised this unit on the basis of Class Companies, dividing the unit into, 2 Companies-Sikhs, 2 Companies Punjabi Muslims, 2 Companies-Pathan Muslims, 1 Company-Dogra Hindus, and 1 Company----Mixed. **(3)**

The Sikh and Punjab regiments were an important change in the class composition of the East India Company's Army

.In 1851 the inegular forces in Punjab was reorganised as "Punjab irregular Force" or the "P I F " to which was later added the additional title "Expeditionary Reserve" making it famous as "PIFFER".

The Sindh Camel Corps raised on the Sindh Frontier in 1843 was also transferred to the Punjab Irregular Force in October 1849 and was numbered as the 6th Punjab Infantry.

The Punjab Irregular Force consisted of the six regiments of Punjab Infantry and five regiments of Punjab cavalry raised in 1849, the Corps of Guides, the four regiments of Sikh Infantry raised in 1846, one regiment of Gurkha infantry, four mountain batteries etc. **(4)**

The Punjab Irregular force although a relatively small entity played an important part in 1857 in four respects.

Firstly since it was ethnically different from Hindustani troops, both Muslim and Hindu and stayed loyal to the East India Company, assisting them in disarming various native infantry units of the Bengal army.

Secondly although numerically relatively small, it gave the British valuable manpower which they badly required in the period June-September 1857 to maintain the Delhi Field Force engaged in the crucially important siege of Delhi.



If this force had not existed there is no doubt that the siege of Delhi could not have been carried on and the city may not have been captured as early as September 1857, thereby greatly increasing the chances of success of the First and the only Indian War of Independence.

Thirdly had the English Company failed to disarm the native units in Punjab or to hold the province, there was all the likelihood that Afghanistan would have attacked India, and all the frontier tribes would have joined the Afghan

invading army, making the British task of India much more difficult.

Fourthly and perhaps most important, the successful experiment of having such a force in 1857 enabled the East India Company to raise more than 27 regiments and levies which proved invaluable in holding the rear areas of Punjab and in protecting the lines of communication while the British were engaged in Siege of Delhi.

The brilliant British policy of chivalrously treated the Sikhs and the perception of Punjabi and Pathan Muslims who viewed the English Company as liberators from Sikh rule played a crucial role in ensuring Punjab loyalty, which saved the British position in northern India, which was most precarious by all definitions.

The Punjabis perhaps were prisoners of the flow or pressure of history. The most decisive aspect of the whole affair was the immense resolution and decisiveness with which the British disarmed or handled more than 41 Hindustani cavalry and infantry regiments stationed in Punjab area, with just about 13 British regiments assisted by the twelve odd units of the Punjab Irregular Force.

This loyalty was the foundation of the subsequent change in British recruitment policy in India in the period 1858-1914. Later we shall see that "Loyalty" was rephrased as "Martial Races" in order to give the term greater respectability and later on some new myths were created.

By 1857 the Bombay and Madras Armies were much smaller than the Bengal Army. Thus while the Bengal Army had more than 119 regiments of cavalry and infantry the Bombay army had just 3 cavalry and 29 infantry regiments, while the

Madras Army had 52 infantry regiments and 7 cavalry units.

The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 brought radical changes in the Indian Army. The first major change was the change of masters i.e. from the English East India Company to the British Government, the abolition of the private European regiments of the company, and many other major changes in the army.

Following 1857 when the Bengal Army was reorganised. Just 11 regular infantry units and 8 Irregular cavalry regiments of the predominantly Hindustani Bengal Army survived the rebellion.

Whereas more than 11 cavalry regiments and more than 19 irregular infantry regiments had been raised in Punjab during the rebellion bringing the number of Punjabi units to more than 49 once the Punjab Irregular force was added .

In addition many purely Hindustani low caste Hindu infantry units were raised from the areas of present UP province of India. The British very brilliantly employed low caste Hindus against the predominantly High caste Hindu Bengal Army, dividing even Hindustanis on class basis!

Many British officers wanted to have no Hindustanis in the post 1857 reorganised Bengal Army. The British character was however too subtle and far sighted to take such a short sighted step.

It is one very rational British trait to act moderately and rationally even in the aftermath of traumatic upheavals, and the British were too brilliant to show that they held one community in distrust while favouring another!

Thus contrary to the commonly held myth the Punjabisation of the British Indian Army started not immediately after 1857 but after 1885 when Roberts became the Bengal Army C in C. The reconstituted Bengal Army in 1861 consisted of the following units :-- **(5)**

| ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF BENGAL ARMY UNIT/S-INFANTRY ONLY-1861 | NUMBER OF BATTALIONS |
|---|----------------------|
| PREDOMINANTLY HINDUSTANI UNITS OF THE OLD PRE 1857 BENGAL ARMY | 11 |
| IRREGULAR NON PUNJABI INFANTRY UNITS OF THE OLD PRE 1857 BENGAL ARMY | 2 |
| NEW UNITS CREATED FROM LOYAL REMNANTS OF PRE 1857 HINDUSTANI INFANTRY UNITS OF THE BENGAL ARMY | 2 |
| IRREGULAR PUNJABI SIKH UNITS OF THE PRE 1857 BENGAL ARMY | 2 |
| UNIT CREATED FROM LOYAL REMNANTS OF OLD PRE 1857 GWALIOR CONTINGENT (HINDUSTANIS) | 1 |
| IRREGULAR UNITS OF NON HINDUSTANI NON PUNJABI NON PATHAN ORIGIN AND RECRUITED FROM CALCUTTA/SYLHET/ASSAM ETC AND PART OF THE OLD PRE 1857 BENGAL ARMY | 4 |
| PUNJABI/PATHAN UNITS OF PUNJABI AND TRANS FRONTIER ORIGIN RAISED IN 1857 | 14 |
| LOW CASTE HINDUSTANI HINDU UNITS RAISED IN NORTHWEST PROVINCES IN 1857-58 | 8 |
| GRAND TOTAL INFANTRY UNITS-RECONSTITUTED BENGAL ARMY OF 1861 | 44 BATTALIONS |

| ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF BENGAL ARMY CAVALRY UNITS IN 1861 | CAVALRY UNITS (REGIMENTS) |
|---|---------------------------|
| HINDUSTANI/RANGHAR IRREGULAR CAVALRY REGIMENTS OF THE OLD BENGAL ARMY WHICH STAYED LOYAL/PARTIALLY LOYAL AND SURVIVED THE REBELLION | 8 |
| NON HINDUSTANI IRREGULAR CAVALRY UNITS WHICH WERE RAISED IN PUNJAB AND TRANS FRONTIER MOSTLY AND WERE RETAINED AFTER 1858 | 11 |

In addition the Gurkha infantry units were withdrawn from the Bengal Army Grouping and numbered separately as 1" to 41 Gurkha Battalions, while staying under command C in C Bengal Army.

Apart from this many irregular units/contingents like the Hyderabad Contingent, the Punjab Irregular Force comprising six Punjab Infantry units, five Punjab cavalry units, four Sikh infantry units and the Corps of Guides, although officered by Bengal Army British officers was not under the C in C India but under the Government of India.

It has been wrongly propagated and asserted in Pakistan that the British were anti Muslim in the army recruitment. As a matter of fact the Punjabi Muslims who form the great bulk of the Pakistan Army were the most loyal British soldiers in 1857, and greatly benefited from this loyalty in the period following 1857.

Lately in a book written by General Shaukat Riza with the assistance of a large team of officers from the Pakistan Army's General Headquarters, this distortion of history was given an official stamp once the General wrongly asserted ; "The majority of soldiers in East India Company's Army were Muslim. They were recruited from areas south of Sutlej i.e. Delhi Agra and Oudh. After the insurrection the majority continued to be Muslims, but the emphasis of recruitment was shifted to the loyal tribes in Punjab and NWFP. **(6)**

While it is true that prior to 1857 most of the Muslims in the army were from south of Sutlej and after 1857 from north of Sutlej; the statement about their being in majority in the army has no connection with truth.

Neither were the Muslims in majority in the Bengal Army before the rebellion nor after the rebellion. However by 1914 due to policies of Roberts after 1893, they may have come near the figure of 45 %.

The trend changed after 1918 and by 1939 there were just 37% Muslims in the Indian Army. On the average and as a general rule the Muslims never crossed the 40 % mark as far as representation in the fighting arms was concerned.

It is more probable that on the whole they never crossed the 35 % mark as far as the fighting arms were concerned.

The Peel Commission established after the rebellion to study the future organisation of the Indian Army recommended that the Native Army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule mixed promiscuously through each regiment 'Recruitment in India however had a more intimate connection with views of the C in C and the Governor General.

In any case the Peel Commission did not make any specific recommendations about which caste or religion should be grouped or in what manner.

There is a very commonly believed myth that the British greatly reduced the recruitment of Hindustanis in the aftermath of 1857.

Facts do not prove any such thing even as late as 1884 as we shall see later.

The general line followed by the British after 1857 was, something very close to the view expressed by Lord Canning the Governor General during the rebellion; "All exclusion of Mahomeddars, Rajpoots or even of Brahmans should be a matter of management rather than of rule; and indeed that it will be right to take an opportunity, though not just yet, to show by an exception here and there, that the rule does not exist.!! is desirable that no class

should feel that it had henceforth nothing to expect from the government " . **(8)**

The important point to be noted is the fact that although the British did become apprehensive about recruiting Hindustanis; after 1857; this bias was not adopted at least at the policy making or implementation level till 1885 when Roberts became the C in C Bengal Army and thus C in C India.

The events of 1857 did give birth to a staunchly pro Punjabi (both Muslim and non Muslim Punjabis) group of officers in the Bengal Army.

The important point to be noted is the fact that these officers were not occupying the highest civil and military positions till at least 1885. It was only after 1885 that these officers reached the highest rank and instituted the policy of Punjabising the army !

Again the important point to be noted that Punjabisation did not mean bias in favour of the Punjabi Muslim but a general inclination to recruit Punjabis over Hindustanis (both Hindus and Muslims). Roberts was biased against Hindustanis (both Muslim and Hindu) because of his experiences of 1857 but later rationalised his bias by stating that they were less martial than the Punjabis.

By 1918 the Punjabis and the Britishers **(9)** were convinced that the Punjabis were really a martial race. To it one may add that the rain irrigated areas of Punjab from where the army was recruited were ideal recruiting area both for the recruited and recruiters and there was a common cause to enlist and to fight as the army was the best livelihood.

After 1947 this bias was slightly modified in Pakistan by falsely asserting that 75 % of the old British Indian Army was Muslim (and above all Punjabi Muslim!) and thus the Muslims (and specially the Punjabi Muslims were more martial!).

This false assertion had no connection with actual on ground statistics as far as the pre 1947 Indian Army was concerned.

Sultan Khan who was Pakistan's Foreign Secretary in 1971 has asserted that many Pakistani officers (including all those who mattered) were convinced in 1971 that the Punjabi and Pathan Muslims were more martial than the Hindus who constituted the bulk of the Indian Army.

This misconception led them into underestimating the Indian Army which was in any case numerically significantly superior to the Pakistan Army in the Eastern Theatre of war. But more of this in the next book.

Coming back to our main line of discussion; in 1864 when Bengal Army was reconstituted in the light of Adjutant General's Circular No.17 N, Dated 9th September 1864, nothing proved that there was any anti Hindustani or any anti Hindustani Muslim or any anti Hindustani Hindu bias as far as recruitment to the Bengal Army was concerned.

Among the 19 cavalry units whose class composition was described in these orders, no specific figure is given for recruitment in five regiments; except that they should gradually have a mixed composition of Muslims Dogras Hindu Jats Rajputs Brahmans and Marathas in equal number mixed ; but specific figures are given for the 14

remaining cavalry units and these are as following :- **(10)**

| HINDUSTANI MUSLIMS (INCLUDING RANGHARS) | PUNJABI MUSLIMS | PATHAN MUSLIM | TOTAL MUSLIM TROOPS | SIKH TROOPS | HINDU TROOPS | TOTAL NON MUSLIM TROOPS |
|--|--------------------|------------------|----------------------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------------------|
| 11 TROOPS | 11 TROOPS | 17 TROOPS | <u>39</u> <u>TROOPS</u> | 15 TROOPS | 30 TROOPS | <u>45 TROOPS</u> |

Nothing above shows any Muslim majority or anything that proves that the British thought that the non Muslims were worse than Muslims as cavalry soldiers.

In infantry the table was less specific but nothing pointed towards any Muslim majority in the infantry also. In 1883 G.G.O Dated 20 January 1883 dismissed all remaining vagueness about who was in majority in cavalry or infantry:-- **(11)**

**BENGAL REGULAR ARMY CLASS COMPOSITION--
1883**

| ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS TYPE | CAVALRY (TROOPS) | INFANTRY COMPANIES | TOTAL |
|-----------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| PUNJABI MUSLIM | 14 | 25 | 39 |
| PATHAN MUSLIM | 10 | 15 | 25 |
| HINDUSTANI " | 23 | 36 | 59 |
| TOTAL MUSLIM | 47 TROOPS | 76 COMPANIES | 123 TROOPS/COYS |
| HINDU | 31 | 146 | 177 |
| SIKH | 24 | 77 | 101 |
| GURKHA | -- | 53 | 53 |
| TOTAL NON MUSLIM | 55 TROOPS | 276 COMPANIES | 331 TROOPS/COYS |
| TOTAL BENGAL ARMY | 102 TROOPS | 352 COMPANIES | 454 TROOPS/COYS |

From the rough ethnic region wise classification this comes to the following percentages:--

| PUNJABI INFANTRY COMPANIES | HINDUSTANI INFANTRY COMPANIES | GURKHA/HILL MEN INFANTRY COMPANIES | PATHAN INFANTRY COMPANIES |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| PUNJABI MUSLIM- 25 | MUSLIM- 36 | GURKHA- 53 | SETTLED- 10 |
| DOGRA- 18 | HINDU BRAHMAN- 25 | NEFA HILL MEN- 9 | TRIBAL- 5 |
| SIKHS- 77 | HINDU RAJPUT- 47 | ASSAMESE- 3 | |
| | OTHER HINDU- 44 | | |
| TOTAL- 120 | TOTAL- 152 | TOTAL- 65 | TOTAL- 15 |
| 34.09 % | 43.18 % | 18.46 % | 4.26 % |

Those who are obsessed with the murder of history may now think keeping in line with Shaukat Raza that the Muslims were in majority in the Punjab Frontier Force!

Even this is incorrect!

As per the G.G.O Dated 2nd January 1889 following was the class composition of the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force :--- **(12)**

This came to the following strength percentage wise:--

| COMPANIES TOTAL COMPANIES IN THE BENGAL ARMY OF EACH WITHIN THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS TOTAL BENGAL ARE UNDERLINED WITH PERCENTAGE BELOW ARMY | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| RELIGION/ GROUP | | BRA- HM- AN | RA- JPUT HI- NDU | OTH- ER HINDU | PUNJABI DOGRAS | GURK- HAS | PUNJABI MUSLIM | HINDUSTANI MUSLIM | PATHAN MUSLIM |
| HINDU | <u>199</u> 56.53% | <u>25</u> 12.56 | <u>47</u> 23.61 | <u>56</u> 26.63 | <u>18</u> 9.04 % | <u>53</u> 26.63 | | | |
| MUSLIMS | <u>76</u> 21.59% | | | | | | <u>25</u> 32.89 | <u>36</u> 47.36 | <u>15</u> 19.73 |
| SIKHS | <u>77</u> 21.87% | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL %AGE | <u>352</u> | <u>25</u> 7.10 | <u>47</u> 13.35 | <u>56</u> 15.90 | <u>18</u> 5.11 | <u>53</u> 15.05 | <u>25</u> 7.10 | <u>36</u> 10.22 | <u>15</u> 4.26 |

A foreigner may find the above mentioned details about class composition unnecessary. But there is an important rationale behind these details.

In my thirteen years service in the Pakistan Army, I repeatedly heard this myth about the Muslims in general and the Punjabi Muslims in particular in majority in the Frontier Force and the Bengal Army right from 1857 hundreds of times in countless discussions, both formal and informal at various forums.

Just like Shaukat Raza asserted in his above quoted book. The crux of the argument used to be that even the British relied on Muslims particularly

from the Potohar etc and the Hindus are a non Martial race!

While it is true that the share of Punjab as a province was ascendant right from 1857 onwards and became a preponderant majority by the time of WW One ; this growth had little to do with war performance but with perceptions of Lord Roberts who became the Cin C India/Bengal Army in 1885.

Between 1893 and 1914 a point was reached where Punjabi Muslims were more than 35% of the fighting arms and all Muslims may have touched the overall figure of 45 %,but this trend was reversed in Second World War when Muslims constituted less than 45% of the fighting arms.

In 1886 the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force which was under command the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab was placed under the command of the C inC Bengal Army.

During the period 1879 to 1890 a certain bias developed against the fighting qualities of the Bombay and Madras Annies.Earlier in 1879 the Eden Commission had already recommended that the Madras Army should be reduced in size so that illegal recruitment of men from other provinces could be controlled in the Madras Army.

The same commission also rationalised its case for reducing the Madras and Bombay armies since internal security was not a problem in Bombay or Madras,unlike Bengal **(13)** Thus in the light of the recommendations of the Eden Commission which had recommended that a mere 60,000 men were sufficient for the defence of India **(14)** ; some 18 infantry and 4 cavalry units were disbanded in 1881.

5 infantry and 2 cavalry units were from Bengal Army while 8 infantry units were from the much smaller Madras Army.

The remainder being from the Bombay Army (1 cavalry and 4 infantry) and one infantry and cavalry unit from the Punjab Frontier Force. **(15)**

Between 1858 and 1914 the major war which the Bengal Bombay and Madras Armies fought were the Second Afghan War (1878-80) and the Third Burmese War (1885-89).Both of these wars were by no definition major wars in terms of breadth or scope of operations,but major in terms of number of troops employed.

The Second Afghan War was a much more better organised affair than the First Afghan War.

Roberts the British commander holding Kabul understood the Afghan character much better than Elphinstone and kept the tempers in Kabul within control by resorting to a large number of summary executions which kept the population within bounds of decent behaviour!

The most significant British disaster in the war was the disastrous though strategically insignificant Battle of Maiwand which the British lost with heavy casualties.

This battle was fought by one British infantry regiment and some Native regiments of the Bombay Army.

Later on it became fashionable to theorise that this battle was lost because the Bombay Army troops being Hindu and thus Non Punjabi Muslim or Sikh or Pathan were less martial .

Subsequent research proved that most of these troops were not from Bombay Province but from Punjab Frontier and other areas outside Bombay .

The most active engagement of the British Indian Army was in Expeditions against the Frontier Tribes, which again was a minor affair as far as casualties were concerned.

It is interesting to note that the British suffered maximum casualties during all expeditions from 1849 to 1881; not against any Pathan or Baloch Tribe but against the Hindustani Fanatics as the followers of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid of Rai Bareilly were called by the British.

Thus the British suffered 908 casualties in the 1863 Ambeyla expedition.

These were 667 more than the second highest casualties which the British suffered against the Mahsud Waziris in 1860! **(16)**

We will also discuss in brief the process of successive reduction of the Madras and Bombay Armies. Firstly we will deal with the Madras Army.

The process of reduction of the Madras Army commenced from 1824 and reached its logical conclusion only in 1922.

We have already discussed that the East India Company faced the toughest military resistance in Southern India during the period 1780-1803. By 1803 all military threats were disposed off in Madras and in the southern states of India.

This led to a change in attitude on part of the British governors of Madras. The army was no longer the first priority, since there was no

threat, and this meant that civilians were now more keen to reduce the Madras Army and increase their surplus revenue.

Thus the Madras Army was reduced from 52 infantry battalions in 1824 to 1864. This reduction had no link with the "Martial Races Theory".

It may be however noted that the Madras Army had a higher ratio of Muslims than both the Bengal and Bombay Armies. The following table illustrates the percentage of Muslims in the Madras and Bombay Armies as in 1858 :-- **(17)**

| ARMY | TOTAL STRENGTH | MUSLIM TROOPS | MUSLIM PERCENTAGE | TOTAL INFANTRY | MUSLIM INFANTRY TROOPS | TOTAL CAVALRY STRENGTH | MUSLIM CAVALRY TROOPS |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| MADRAS ARMY | 45,341 | 17,880 | 39.43 % | 45,725 OR 52 REGIMENTS | 15,856 | 2,616 OR 7 REGIMENTS | 2,024 |
| BOMBAY ARMY | 26,894 | 2,630 | 5.8 % | 25,433 OR 29 REGIMENTS | 2,159 | 1,461 OR 3 REGIMENTS | 471 |

The Bengal Army share around 1857 as earlier discussed in the last chapter, being about 20 % and that of Madras Army being 39.43 and 5.8% as shown in the table above.

During the period 1880-1893 the bias against the Madras and Bombay Armies was systematically advanced by various British officers headed by Roberts who commanded Madras Army from 1881 to 1885. Roberts served as C inC Bengal Army and thus C inC India (the C inC Bengal Army was also overall C inC India) from 1885 and 1893.

During this period he advanced a theory based on his observations of the Madras Army that the Madras soldier was less martial than the soldiers recruited from the north. The bias against Madras Army was also rationalised based on its poor performance in Burma.

Later research proved that Madras Army's alleged poor performance in Burma was based more on subjective and situational factors; rather than on anything specifically bad or non martial in the Madras Army.

Roberts cited the cases of the 12'h Madras Infantry at Minhla in November 1885 in the Third Burmese War and of the 10'h Madras Infantry during the Chin Hills insurrection of 1888-89.

An infantry or cavalry units refusing to advance in face of enemy fire though highly improper has little to do with martial qualities of a nation or race as a whole.

At the siege of Bhurtpore as we have already discussed earlier three purely British infantry units i.e. H.M 75'h Foot, H.M 76'h Foot and the 1st Bengal Europeans refused to advance **(18)** at Parwan in September 1840 in the First Afghan War the 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry due to some inexplicable reason refused to charge **(19)** and was therefore later disbanded.

Fortescue did not term this incident as an example of non martial behaviour but said that" it was one of those incidents which after endless explanations remain always mysterious" **(20)**

At Chillianwala on 13 January 1849,one of the most illustrious cavalry regiments of the British Army H.M 14th Light Dragoons,when ordered to charge the Sikhs,turned about and galloped rearwards! **(21)**

This regiment was not disbanded,nor did its conduct make the British any less martial than the Madrasis.

These incidents as a matter of fact are complex and have a deep connection with a multiple number of complex situational factors like the personality of the commander (s)/commanding officer/other officers,strength and nature of enemy resistance,terrain factors,defensive strength of enemy fortifications,logistics etc etc.

The British Army is one of the finest armies in the world, but it failed at Gallipoli,in France in 1940 and in various other places.

The reverses however in no way prove that the British Army was non martial or bad.

These merely prove that the troops were badly led,or suffered from organisational or doctrinal imbalances or inadequacies.

Thus the bad performance of the Madras Army at Minhla in Third Burma War,had a deep connection with the fact that the commanding officer and some other officers were unfit for active service.

They were physically so unfit that they could not walk along with their troops.

In addition these officers were newly posted to the 12th Madras Infantry and hardly knew their men.
(22)

Roberts and others were however bent upon reducing the Madras Army and the 1857 War was taken as a test case to justify the reduction of the Madras Army!

Thus the number of Madrasis serving in infantry and cavalry units was rapidly reduced once the three Presidency Armies were amalgamated in 1895 .

The size of the Madras Army was already being reduced since 1858 since no internal or external threat justified the number of troops it had.

But the ethnic bias of Roberts and others decisively reduced the number of Madras soldiers in the Indian Army. Thus the Madras infantry units whose total number stood at 52 in 1858 were reduced to 1864 to 40 units.

This reduction was an economy measure and had no connection with the Martial Race Theory.

In 1882 another reduction in the light of Eden Commissions recommendations of reducing all three armies, brought the number of Madras infantry units down to 32, just like in Bombay and Bengal Armies. From 1891 to 1922 however the number of Madrasis serving in the army was rapidly reduced in the light of Roberts views.

The following table illustrates this process which started in 1824 and reached its logical conclusion in 1922-33:-- **(23)**

| TOTAL MADRAS INFANTRY REGIMENTS IN 1824 | TOTAL BY 1864 | TOTAL BY 1882 | TOTAL BY 1891 | TOTAL BY 1904 | TOTAL BY 1907 | TOTAL BY 1922 |
|--|----------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------|---|
| 52 | 40 | 32 | 31 | 28 | 26 | 22 |
| REMARKS | From 1862 to 1864 | | | Between 1902 and 1904 | | In 1922 15 of the above mentioned units were redesignated as Punjab Regiments and the remaining 7 units were disbanded between 1923 and 1933. |

By 1922 the remaning 22 Madras Infantry units were totally reduced or Punjabised/Gurkhised/Moplahised/Disbanded . **(24)**

According to one estimate by 1904 only thirteen Madras Infantry Units consisted of locally recruited men **(25)**; while the fifteen remaining Madras Infantry units had been Punjabised.

The plea that the Madrasis were not fit to serve in the cold weather of NWFP was cited as an excuse for recruiting Punjabi aud Pathan troops . **(26)**

This argument does not explain as to how and why are the same Madrasi Hindus are today successfully serving in much harsher and colder climate in Siachin and Ladakh etc!

A similar bias was rationalised against the Bombay Army based on its supposedly poor performance at

Battle of Maiwand in the Second Afghan War, which we have seen was wrong since the regiments which allegedly performed badly were not composed of manpower from Bombay province.

However somehow the Marathas survived despite the propaganda against them by Roberts and proved their worth in the First World War.

A major reason of this was the military requirements of Frontier protection and Internal Security duties in Sindh and Baluchistan which were part of the Bombay Presidency/Province. Even then the process of smuggling Punjabi manpower was encouraged and a large number of Punjabi/Pathan troops enrolled in the Bombay Army in the period 1880-1922.

The only major bias which was given official approval was that of discouraging Hindustani Muslim recruitment in the army. The Eden Commission Report of 1879 stated that the UP Muslims were too dangerous for recruitment in the Army. The report further explained this point by stating that "the lower stratum of the Muhammandan urban population, the dispossessed landholders (many of whom were Muslims), the predatory classes, and perhaps the cadets of old Muhammadan families were the only sections of the people who dislike British rule. (27)

The recommendations of this report were not agreed to by the British policy makers. This is proved by the class composition of Bengal Army as given in GGO of 1883.

General Roberts however translated this recommendation into practice when he became the C in C of the Bengal Army in 1885.

The major casualty of Roberts bias however was the Hindustani/Ranghar Muslim and the Hindustani Hindus whose numbers were rapidly reduced from majority in the fighting arms in 1884 to a minority in favour of Punjabis by 1911. **(28)**

Roberts anti Hindustani bias was based on his experiences as a young officer during the rebellion in which the prime role was played by the Hindustanis ,both Hindus and Muslims.On the other hand Roberts admired the Punjabi and Pathan Muslims for their loyalty to the British during the rebellion.

Thus the anti Hindustani bias of Roberts had a deep connection with the issue of political loyalty to the British than with any martial superiority of the races north of Sutlej over those south of Sutlej.

Thus Roberts rationalised his anti Hindustani bias by theorising that the Hindustanis had degenerated as a result of the benefits of the British rule and : not enough adversity . **(29)**

The recruitment policy changes which took place between 1884 and 1911 ,which led to the phenomena called Punjabisation of the Indian Army, was not a deliberate British policy followed after 1857,but a result of opinion of certain individuals,who were responsible for major policy decisions by virtue of their peculiar institutional positions in the army and civil government.

These included Roberts (C in C Bengal Army/India -1885-1893),Kitchener (1902-1909) followed by General Sir O Moore Creagh (C inC India-1909-1914).

A British Indian army officer who wrote a history of the Indian Army was more near the truth about the

martial races theory when he said," Reasons for preferring northerners were largely racial.To Kiplings contemporaries,the taller and fairer a native,the better man he was likely to be.....There was a general preference for the wild over the half educated native as being less addicted to unwholesome political thinking.....Brahmins had been prominent in the mntiny,and their diet and prejudices made difficulties on active service . **(30)**

During the period 1885--1911 when the ethnic composition of the British Indian Army changed from a Hindustani majority/Hindu/Non Muslim dominated army to a Punjabi Majority/Punjabi Muslim heavy army in 1911;no major war took place;that could prove that Punjabi troops or Punjabi Muslim troops were better than Hindu troops or the Hindustani troops,and the concept that the British changed the ethnic composition based on proven fighting ability in actual combat; has no connection with any reality of military history.

This is a very important fact from the Indo Pak military history point of view,since it was generally thought in the Pakistan Army till 1965 that the Hindus were non Martial and were inferior as soldiers to Muslims in general and Punjabi/Pathan Muslims in particular.

The Punjabi was regarded as better as a soldier not because he was a Muslim essentially,but because he belonged to a more rugged area where the weather terrain and climate made him tougher and sturdier,and thus a better soldier.

The Punjabi category included Punjabi Muslims,but only those north of Chenab river,Dogras from Kangra Nurpur and Jammu region of Kashmir and the Jat Sikhs and the Mazhbi (Sweeper) Sikhs. **(31)**

In 1892-93 the British carried out a new experiment in the Bengal Army. They turned certain units into ethnically/religiously homogeneous units. Thus the following changes took place **(32)** :--

| NAME OF UNIT | NEW ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION |
|--|--|
| 1 ST AND 3 RD BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY | ALL HINDUSTANI HINDU BRAHMAN |
| 2 ND 4 TH 7 TH 8 TH 11 TH AND 16 TH BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY | ALL OUDH/AGRA PROVINCE HINDU RAJPUTS |
| 13 TH BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY | ALL RAJPUTANA HINDU RAJPUT UNIT |
| 5 TH 12 TH 17 TH AND 18 TH BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY | ALL HINDUSTANI/RANGHAR MUSLIM |
| 6 TH AND 10 TH BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY | ALL HINDUSTANI HINDU JAT AND DELHI TERRITORY HINDU JAT |

This was an important experiment and clearly dismisses all myths about the fact that there was no all Muslim unit in the British Indian Army before 1947.

As a matter of fact by 1911, the pure Muslim unit strength in infantry had reached the figure of seven units. These were the 5th 17th and 18th regiments comprising Hindustani Muslims/Ranghar Muslims, the 12th and 33rd infantry comprising Punjabi Mussulmans, 40th comprising Pathan Muslims and the 106th Hazara Pioneers comprising Hazara Mongol Shia Muslims from Quetta. **(33)**

In 1895 all three Presidency Armies were merged and the appointments of C in C Bombay and Madras Armies were abolished.

In place of these armies four commands under lieutenant generals were established.

These were the Punjab, Bengal Madras (including Burma) and Bombay (including Sindh and Baluchistan). The Indian Army was basically an internal security army and whatever battles it fought till 1914 except those of 1857 were of

much smaller scale than European battles fought during the same period. Thus the brigade of one odd British unit and two or three Indian units was the highest formation, which normally fought battles or operated under one commander.

The concept of Division existed, but there was no dedicated specialist general staff or headquarters which were maintained in peacetime to control/co-ordinate the operations of an actual division in war.

Further since most of the units were dispersed in various places for internal security, there was no room for holding exercises with large formations. This imbalance was remedied once Kitchener became the Cin C India.

Another important organisational change in Indian infantry's organisation was instituted in 1900. Till this year Indian infantry was organised in eight company battalions, and two wings of four companies each. **(34)**

These were now grouped as in Europe on four company basis; while retaining eight companies for internal administration, with each company under command of the native officer, while on parade and in field each double company as it was called was commanded by one British double company commander assisted by another Britisher who was called double company officer.

Kitchener came to India in November 1902, he decided to reorganise the Indian Army. According to Kitchener's perception, the Indian Army was ill organised to face the external enemy i.e. a likely Russian invasion of India, which was regarded as a

serious likelihood by the British since the Panjdeh incident of 1885.

Kitchener may be rightly regarded as the conceptual father of the modern Indian Army. He introduced three categories under which the Indian Army was to be organised/operate.

These were firstly- "Covering Troops" , secondly - " Field Army" and thirdly- " Internal Security Troops " .

Kitchener also pressed for introduction of modern weapons, new artillery, latest small arms and Divisions and Corps organised under dedicated full time staffs to command/co-ordinate their formations in both peace and war.

The brigades and divisions as per Kitchener's system were to train as complete formations in peacetime. Staff College for the Indian Army was established on the lines of Camberley in 1905. Kitchener stressed the fact that general officers must lead in war the field formations that they had trained in peace. He managed to abolish thirty four small military stations and managed to scrap enough units to form nine field divisions instead of the old four which used to operate, under the old system without any full-time/peacetime divisional headquarters.

He separated Burma from Madras in 1903, thereby eliminating an unnecessary and unhealthy deadweight which had encumbered the Madras Army/Command thanklessly since 1824.

Kitchener reorganised the Indian Army in 1907, into three commands under lieutenant generals i.e. the :--

NORTHERN COMMAND

1st (Peshawar), 2nd (Rawalpindi) and 3rd (Lahore) Divisions

WESTERN COMMAND

4th (Quetta), 5th (Mhow) and 6th (Poona) Divisions.

The EASTERN COMMAND

7th (Meerut) and 8th (Lucknow) Divisions.

Two Divisions i.e. the 9th (Secunderabad) which was Army Reserve and Burma Division were under the direct command of the army headquarters.

Each formation was assigned a specific operational role and exactly knew what they were required to do in case of war.

The Northern Commands principal operational role was to defend the northern approach i.e.- Kabul-Peshawar-Lucknow-Calcutta against a likely Russian attack into India.

The Southern Commands role was similar;ie to defend the southern approach-i.e. Kandahar-Quetta-Bombay-Mhow.

Each of the Divisional commands could in case of war put into field an infantry division and a cavalry brigade; while simultaneously setting aside troops for internal security duties.

The regiments were not to be permanently allotted to Divisions but to be rotated after some years to ensure that did not become localised in habits or thought.

Each unit of the Indian Army was to have an opportunity to experience semi active service on the Frontier,which previously was not the case and

played an important role in the decline of the Bombay and Madras armies.

Even today with minor improvements Kitchener's system is followed in both the Indian and Pakistan armies.

Kitchener also renumbered the Indian army units. All old Bengal cavalry and infantry regiments retained their old numbers, 20 and 50 were respectively added to the old numbers of the Punjab Frontier Force cavalry and infantry regiments, 50 and 60 respectively to old Madras cavalry and infantry units, 30 and 100 to the old Bombay cavalry and infantry units, etc etc.

There is absolutely no doubt that it was this reorganisation of Kitchener which saved the very weak British position in France in 1914, but this will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Indian Staff College at Quetta in 1947 was perhaps the most valuable asset that the Pakistan

Army inherited from the British! It's a pity that this great initial advantage was not improved upon as much as was potentially possible.

In 1906 the Indian Army was organised as following:---- **(35)**

| TYPE/ARM | BRITISH | INDIAN |
|-----------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| CAVALRY | 9 REGTS OR 5,652 MEN | 40 REGTS OR 25,239 MEN |
| INFANTRY | 52 BNS OR 53,798 MEN | 129 BNS OR 121,206 MEN |
| ARTILLERY | 70 BTYS OR 14,824 MEN | 11 BTYS/CORPS & 7,099 MEN |
| MISC | 210 ENGINEER CORPS PERS | SAPPERS ETC—4,800 MEN |
| TOTAL | 74,484 MEN | 158,344 MEN |

The reserves were organised as followmg:--

| TYPE/ARM | BRITISH | INDIAN |
|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| BRITISH VOLUNTEERS | 61 CORPS OR 34,000 MEN | |
| INDIAN RESERVISTS | | 27,500 MEN |
| IMPERIAL SERVICE TROOPS | | 41 CORPS OR 18,000 MEN |
| MILITARY POLICE | | 21 BNS OR 17,500 MEN |
| FRONTIER MILITIA/LEVIES | | 14,500 MEN |
| TOTAL | 34,000 MEN | 77,500 MEN |

The above mentioned figures represented a major transition from 1857 when India was garrisoned by just 39,751 British and 226,418 Indians.

On the other hand the major change in area of recruitment can be gauged from the following table

illustrating the region wise rough breakdown of Indian infantry units **(36)**

| REGION/YEAR | 1862 | 1885 | 1892 | 1914 |
|---------------|------|------|------|------|
| PUNJAB | 28 | 31 | 34 | 57 |
| NEPAL | 5 | 13 | 15 | 20 |
| EAST OF JUMNA | 28 | 20 | 15 | 15 |
| BOMBAY | 30 | 26 | 26 | 18 |
| MADRAS | 40 | 32 | 25 | 11 |

By 1911 the ethnic composition of the Indian Army may be gauged from the following rough description of its infantry units **(37)** :---

| ETHNICITY/RELIGIOUS ORIGIN OF THE SOLDIERS | NUMBER OF BATTALIONS |
|--|----------------------|
| CLASS COMPANY PUNJABI BATTALIONS IN WHICH THE CLASSES ARE SOME VARIATION OF MOHAMMADAN,SIKH, PATHAN OR DOGRA | 41 |
| SIKH BATTALIONS INCLUDING THREE WHICH ENLIST THREE OF MAZHBI (SWEAPER/UNTOUCHABLE CLASS SIKHS) | 9 |
| DOGRA HINDU BATTALIONS (DOGRAS WERE ALSO CLASSIFIED AS PUNJABI) | 3 |
| HINDU RAJPUTS FROM OUTSIDE PUNJAB | 7 |
| HINDU JAT BATTALIONS | 2 |
| CLASS COMPANY BATTALIONS OF WHICH THE CLASSES ARE NOT EXCLUSIVELY FROM PUNJAB | 28 |
| PURE MUSLIM BATTALIONS OUT OF WHICH THREE ARE NOT FROM PUNJAB OR FRONTIER AND THREE ARE EXCLUSIVELY FROM PUNJAB AND FRONTIER | 6 |
| MARATHA BATTALIONS EACH WITH TWO COMPANIES OUT OF EIGHT COMPOSED EXCLUSIVELY OF DECCANI MUSSULMANS | 6 |
| PURELY AFGHAN SHIA MUSLIM MONGOL HAZARAS (106 TH HAZARA PIONEERS) | 1 |
| GARHWALI HINDUS FROM UNITED PROVINCES | 2 |
| CONSISTING EXCLUSIVELY OF CLASSES FROM CARNATIC | 10 |
| HINDU GURKHAS FROM NEPAL | 20 |
| TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIAN ARMY INFANTRY BATTALIONS IN 1911 | 135 |
| | BATTALIONS |

There are no exact figure about the ethnicity of fighting arms in 1914.

However one authority places the figure of ethnically Punjabi soldiers at about 50 %.

These were roughly assessed from the approximate statistics of 1096 infantry companies out of which 431 were wholly Punjabi and 221 were partly Punjabi, and 155 total squadrons of cavalry out of which 95.5 were wholly Punjabi and 47.5 were partly Punjabi . **(38)**

No discussion of this period can be completed without discussing the "Martial Race; Theory" expounded by Lord Roberts and many others during the period 1880-1914.

This theory had many adherents as late as 1990s while I was serving in the army, many Pakistani officers seriously believed in this ridiculous Imperialist theory!

The general line of thought of these officers was as following. One serious misconception, which I heard, hundreds of times, while serving in the army, was as following: -

"THE MUSLIMS IN GENERAL AND THE PUNJAB! MUSLIMS (PARTICULARLY THOSE NORTH OF CHENAB) AND THE PATHANS WERE THE MAINSTAY OF THE BRITISH INDIAN ARMY AND THAT THE HINDUSTANIS IN GENERAL AND THE HINDUSTANI HINDU AND ALL OTHER HINDUS, AND IN PARTICULAR THOSE FROM AREAS SOUTH OF AMBALA WERE A NON MARTIAL RACE" _

The Martial Race Theory was a clever British effort to divide the people of India for their own political ends. It may be noted that the British by expounding the "Martial Race Theory" further improved the old Mughal policy of "Divide and Rule" which was successfully for at least 180 years adopted by the Mughals to rule India, making the Yusuf zai Pathan fight against the Khattak, the Hindu Rajput against the Hindu Maratha etc etc.

Thus the British cleverly and as far as their national interest dictated, rightly employed such strategies aimed at dividing people.

The theory had many loopholes.

The Martial Race Theory did not explain why the Gurkhas were nobodies till the East India Company made them fight for seven or eight rupees a month.

The theory does not explain why the 8 or 9 percent Sikh minority was able to rule the Muslim majority areas of Punjab and large parts of Frontier including Peshawar Bannu Haripur Charsadda Mardan etc!

The reason for this was not that the Sikhs were more martial It was a complex historical phenomenon and occurred due to a large number of situational reasons.

It may be noted that the toughest military resistance to the English East India Company as far as the Muslims were concerned was offered in South India by Mysore, an area where the Muslims were a minority!

But after 1885 the Madras Army which had about 30% Muslims was declared non martial by the British and replaced by Punjabis.

The toughest resistance to the Sikhs in Punjab was offered by the Seraiki Pathan Saddozai/Durrani Muslims of Multan during the period 1799-1818. But very few of these Seraiki Muslims enlisted in the British Indian Army.

Were these Muslims non martial, as I unfortunately heard being confidently asserted by many officers in my army career The Britishers successfully used the "Turi Militia against other Pathans because the other tribes in Kurram were non Shia. Their strict division of units into Hindustani Muslim, Hindustani Jat, Brahman, Rajput, Punjabi Sikh, Punjabi Dogra, Punjabi Muslim, Afridi, Non Tribal Area Pathans etc was aimed to divide people.

Thus they first used the Hindustanis of the Bengal Army as mercenaries against all native states of India including Sirajud Daulah, Oudh, Marathas , Rohailkhand, Sikhs, Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan. Later the Punjabis were elevated to Martial Races because they had due to a complicated number of historical reasons stayed loyal in 1857.

Much later the Punjabis learnt their lesson in 1919, when Martial Law was imposed in Punjab and when Jallianwala massacre took place and Gujranwala was bombed.

By this time the British had once again diversified their mercenary pool with Marathas once again elevated as a martial race and increased recruitment of Gurkhas.

By the Second World War when Punjabis especially the Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus alongwith a lesser number of Punjabi and Pathan Muslims, played an instrumental role in INA the British had the Madrasis and many other nationalities in service! The Afridi was good till Mir Mast deserted with 14 other Afridis in France till 1915 and after this became unsuitable military material. The Sikhs were good in 1857 and till WW One but they became bad in WW Two for some time once the Kirti Lebar propaganda influenced them.

The Hindustanis were good till 1857 when they rebelled and at least till 1883 when they constituted 43.18 % of the Indian Bengal Army (three fourth of whom were Hindus) with Punjabis trailing behind at 34.09% (out of which less than one fourth were Punjabi Muslim), with the Pathans at 4.26% and the Gurkhas at about 18.46 %. But by 1911 the Hindustanis and Hindus east of Jamna were less martial with an approximately 65 %

Punjabised army with Punjabi and Pathan Muslims at about 35 to 45 % of the total.

All these were policy decisions and even very few Punjabi Muslims from areas south of river Chenab preferred going to the army which was regarded by them as a desperate option which was reserved for people of the Barani areas north of Jhelum and parts of north of Chenab river.

Thus more than 80 % of the Punjabi Muslims who went to the army were from the economically backward rain irrigated barren and relatively unproductive areas north of Jhelum River. So does this mean that all-Punjabi Muslims south of river Chenab non-martial.

The Martial Races Theory had firm adherents in Pakistan and this factor later played a major role in the underestimation of the Indian Army by the Pakistani soldiers as well as civilian decision makers in 1965.

ENDNOTES

1 Page-3- The Frontier Force Regiment -Compiled by Brigadier W.E.H Condon-Aldershot-Gale and Polden- 1962.

2 Pages- 6 ,8 and 9-Ibid.

3 Pages- 3 ,4 ,5 ,6, 8 & 12 -The Frontier Force Rifles- Compiled by Brigadier W.E.H Condon-Aldershot-Gale and Polden-1953.

4 Page-4-The Frontier Force Regiment-Op Cited.

5 As per G.G.O Number 494 Dated 31 May 1861, G.G.O Number 400 Dated 3rd May 1861 and G.G.O Number-990

Dated 29 October 1861-Quoted and produced on Pages 300 to 303-Lieut F.G Cardew Op Cit.

6 Page-39- The Pakistan Army-1947-1949- Major General Shaukat Riza-Wajid Alis Limited-Lahore-1989.

7 Page-XIV- Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Organisation of the Indian Army Together with Minutes of Evidence and Appendices-London-1859

8 Letter Number 18-Letters to Lieutenant Governor of NorthWestern Provinces- March 1856 to February 1862-Canning Papers -

9 The British historian of the Indian Army Brigadier Moberley noted that "after the mutiny (1857) the Hindustani sepoy the mainstay of the Bengal Army was condemned in mass" (what Moberley fails to note is that this happened only after 1885).The significance of this remark is the fact that this book was published in 1923. (Page-65- History of the Great War-The Campaign in Mesopotamia-1914-18-Volume One-Brigadier General F.J Moberly-His Majesty's Stationery Office-London-First printed-1923-Reprinted-1927.

10 Adjutant Generals Circular Number 117-N Dated-9th September 1864-Also Quoted on Page-329-Lieut F.G Cardew OpCit.

11 Pages-405,406 & 407-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

12 Pages-408 & 409-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

13 Page- 41- Quoted in The Indian Army- Stephen.P .Cohen-Oxford University Press-New Delhi-1991.

14 Page-98- Report of the Special Commission Appointed by His Excellency the Governor General in Council to

Enquire into the Organisation and Expenditure of the Army in India-Also known "Eden Commission Report of 1879"Government of India Printing Press-Simla-1879.

15 Page-207-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

16 Heathcote stated that the class composition of these Bombay troops who fought at Maiwand was from outside Bombay and from Punjab etc.Page-88-The Indian Army-T.A Heathcote-David and Charles-London-1974. Figures of the Frontier Expeditions are based on table given on Pages-654 & 655-Appendix-Four- Record of the Expeditions against North West Frontier Tribes -Lieutenant Colonel W.H Paget & Lieutenant AH Mason-First Published-1873-Revised Edition- 1884-Whiting & Company Limited-London-1884.

17 Calculated from details given in the appendix of the Royal Commission on the reorganisation of the Indian Army-1858.

18 Page-129-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

19 Page-138-J.W Fortescue- Volume-XII-Op Cit. Page-138-Ibid.

Government of India Printing Press-Simla-1879.

15 Page-207-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

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17 Calculated from details given in the appendix of the Royal Commission on the reorganisation of the Indian Army 1858.

18 Page-129-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

19 Page-138-J.W Fortescue-Volume-XII-Op Cit.

20 Page-138-Ibid.

21 Page-456-Ibid

22 Page-289-S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

23 Pages-349, 360 & 361-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

24 Page-361-Philip Mason-Op Cit. Pages-9, 130 to 142, 240, 244, and 341- John Gaylor-Sons of John Company-Op Cit.. Pages-216 and 217-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit. The following table illustrates how the Madras Army was first reduced and finally

disbanded—

| NAME OF UNIT | NEW DESIGNATION | REMARKS |
|--|--|--|
| 10 MADRAS INFANTRY | 10 TH GURKHA RIFLES FROM SEPTEMBER 1901 | THE MADRASIS WERE MUSTERED OUT/PENSIONED AND REPLACED BY GURKHAS/ASSAMESE IN 1890. IN 1895 THE UNIT BECAME PURE GURKHA UNIT WHILE RETAINING THE TITLE OF MADRAS INFANTRY; FINALLY BECOMING GURKHA RIFLES UNIT BY NAME IN 1901. |
| 13 MADRAS INFANTRY 15 MADRAS INFANTRY 19 MADRAS INFANTRY 26 MADRAS INFANTRY | REDESIGNATED AS 3 RD MADRAS REGIMENT IN 1922 | DISBANDED BETWEEN 1923 AND 1928 |
| 17 MADRAS INFANTRY 18 MADRAS INFANTRY | REDESIGNATED AS 77 AND 78 TH MOPLAH RIFLES BETWEEN 1902 AND 1904 | MADRASIS WERE REPLACED BY PURE MOPLAH MUSLIMS. BOTH UNITS WERE DISBANDED IN 1904 WHEN MOPLAHS SHOWED DISAFFECTION. |
| 1 MADRAS INFANTRY 4 MADRAS INFANTRY 21 MADRAS INFANTRY | CONVERTED INTO PIONEERS AROUND 1880 | DISBANDED IN 1933 |
| 2 MADRAS INFANTRY 6 MADRAS INFANTRY 16 MADRAS INFANTRY 22 MADRAS INFANTRY 24 MADRAS INFANTRY | FIRST REDESIGNATED AS 62, 66, 76, 82 AND 84 PUNJABIS IN 1903. REDESIGNATED AS FIRST PUNJAB REGIMENT IN 1922 | JUSTICE DEMANDS THAT THE PUNJAB 1922 PUNJAB UNIT WHICH HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH BATTAL HONOURS OF THE PREVIOUS MADRAS INFANTRY BE BARRED FROM CLAIMING THE OLD BATTAL HONOURS WON BY THE ETHIOPIAN MADRAS TROOPS! |
| 7 MADRAS INFANTRY 9 MADRAS INFANTRY 12 MADRAS INFANTRY 14 MADRAS INFANTRY 27 MADRAS INFANTRY | THE PROCESS OF PUNJABISATION IN TERMS OF RECRUITMENT STARTED IN 1890. BY 1903 THESE UNITS WERE REDESIGNATED AS PUNJABI UNITS AND 60 WAS ADDED TO THEIR OLD NUMBERS. REDESIGNATED AS SECOND PUNJAB REGIMENT IN 1922 | DITTO |
| 29 MADRAS INFANTRY 30 MADRAS INFANTRY 31 MADRAS INFANTRY 32 MADRAS INFANTRY 33 MADRAS INFANTRY | PUNJABI RECRUITMENT STARTED IN 1890S AND THE UNITS WERE REDESIGNATED AS PUNJABIS IN 1903. REDESIGNATED AS 8 TH PUNJAB REGIMENT IN 1922 | DITTO |

CHAPTER SIX

THE INDIAN ARMY IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

In 1914 two hundred and fifty million Indians were ordered to war without being consulted when Britain declared war on Germany and Turkey.

Few people in today's world know about the crucial part played by the Indian Army in the First World War.

The contribution and role of Indian Army in the First World War cannot be gauged in terms of casualties alone, but has to be seen in light of the relative level of contribution and the gravity of the peculiar operational circumstances in which Indian troops played a role; also keeping in view the net impact of their employment on the overall outcome of that particular battle or campaign in which they were employed.

The first important point to be understood is that Indian troops were not employed in the European theatre; as the result of a leisurely or routine decision taken in the British war office but as a measure reflecting extreme desperation of the British military position in France in the aftermath of the battle of Marne, once both the contending armies were engaged a life and death struggle at Ypres in 1914.

In the Boer War even despite availability and relatively close location the Indian Troops were not employed simply because the imperial streak in the British mind thought it improper and politically

counterproductive to deploy Indian Troops against any White army!


In 1914 a similar excuse was no longer valid since the British position in France was desperate, and the pampered white dominions of Canada Australia South Africa and Newzealand possessed no trained body of men like the Indian Army. The first yardstick to measure Indian Army performance vis a vis the other pampered White Dominions are the following self explanatory statistics :--- **(1)**

COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF DOMINION CONTRIBUTION IN BRITISH WAR EFFORT DURING WORLD WAR ONE

| <u>DOMINION/REGION</u> | <u>TOTAL FORCES</u> | <u>SOLDIERS KILLED</u> |
|----------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| INDIA | 680,000 | 62,056 |
| AUSTRALIA | 331,814 | 59,330 |
| SOUTH AFRICA (WHITES ONLY) | 76,184 | 7,121 |
| NEWZEALAND | 112,223 | 16,711 |
| CANADA | 458,218 | 56,639 |
| TOTAL | 2.5 MILLION | |
| BRITAIN | | 702,000 |

Even the above mentioned figures cannot tell the whole story.

Two Indian Divisions were mobilized for France :--





The Indian Corps in France arrived in two parts i.e. first the Lahore Division which arrived in late September 1914 and then the Meerut Division which arrived in October 1914.

Essentially British Cavalry Corps was thinly stretched and Germans were in a position to achieve a breakthrough.


The arrival of Lahore Division transformed the precarious British position in the Cavalry Corps Sector.


SITUATION BATTLE OF YPRES -18 TO 2

OCT 1914

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When the Indian Corps arrived in France and relieved the Second British Corps at Ypres at a time when in words of the official British historian,

" The position was critical,for the allies were outnumbered and outgunned .There was no prospect for several days while it was known that the enemy was bringing up large bodies of troops from the east" (2)

At this critical stage,there was simply no trained Canadian or Australian Divisions available to relieve the Second British Corps,every man and every single battalion mattered,and it was at this critical stage that the Indian Corps arrived,having landed at Marseilles in mid October,and just issued with

Lee Enfield Rifle with which the British would not have trusted the Indians for twenty more years, had the Germans not given them such mauling in France.

In the initial stages Indian Corps Lahore Division which had arrived earlier was ham-handedly used with units dished out to British Cavalry Corps in Ypres area in penny packets.

The Division entrained for Orleans from Marseilles on 30th September 1914 and reached Orleans on 3rd October 1914. Here it was new rifles (Indians were not trusted with new rifles after 1857) and rudimentary winter clothing and stayed here till 18th October when it entrained to move to the frontline near Arcques.


LAHORE DIVISION IS MOVED INTO THE BATTLEFIELD OF YPRES

LAHORE DIVISION REACHES ARCQUES AND BLENDERCQUES ON 20TH OCTOBER 1914 BY TRAIN ENTRAINING FROM ORLEANS ON 18TH OCT

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CONNAUGHT BATTALION OF LAHORE DIVISION IS DISHED OUT TO THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION ON 21 OCT 1914




The processing of dishing out the division continues as desperate battles raged around Ypres.

Thus when the meager available transport that transported Connaught battalion returned 57TH Wildes Rifles was dished out in two parts to two cavalry brigades.

FEROZPUR BRIGADES TWO REMAINING UNITS MARCHED TO BAILLEUL ON 26TH OCTOBER 1914

REMAINING TWO UNITS OF FEROZPUR BRIGADE
129TH BALUCHIS AND BHOPAL INFANTRY MARCHED
TO BAILLEUL ON 26TH OCTOBER 1914 WHILE
JULLUNDHUR BRIGADE AND 15 LANCERS
REMAINED AT WALLON CAPPEL


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The Indian troops did just one or two day practice with the new rifle and were loaded on the train to Ypres.

Here on 21 October the first two battalions ie 57th Wildes Rifles of the old Punjab Frontier Force and the 129th Baluchis were loaded in buses to rush to trenches south of Ypres into the forward defended localities.

129 Baluchis Naik Khudadad won the first Indian Victoria Cross on 30 October 1914. Indians had become eligible for this award only in 1911.



The Afridi Pathan Muslim Company of 57TH going to trenches near Oost Taverne and the Dogra Hindu Company to trenches between Wytschaete and Messines **(3)**.

The gravity of the British position in the First Battle of Ypres has been described by General Edmonds, the official British historian, very accurately in the following words ,


" The line that stood between British Empire and ruin was composed of tired, haggard and unshaven men, unwashed, plastered with mud, many in little more than rags ". **(4)**

Another British author has more accurately described the British position in Ypres and the significance of the Indian Corps relief of the Second British Corps;


" NEVERTHELESS IT WAS DECIDED TO TAKE THE RISK OF SENDING THE INDIAN TROOPS TO FRANCE.NO OTHER DECISION WAS POSSIBLE.THE BRITISH SECOND CORPS,AT ITS LAST GASP IN THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES,HAD TO BE RELIEVED;AND THERE WERE NO TRAINED BRITISH OR CANADIAN DIVISIONS TO DO THE JOB"
 . (5)

It is difficult to further emphasise the great contribution of the Indian Corps to the outcome of the principal and decisive battle which was fought by the British Empire during the most critical time of the First World War.

The second Ferozpur Brigade of Lahore Division and subsequently 9th Bhopal Infantry and 34th Sikh Pioneers (Divisional pioneer battalion) were used to reinforce the French Cavalry and 4th British Division holding line south of British Cavalry corps as map below shows.



Subsequently both Lahore and Meerut Divisions replaced parts of British Second Corps as map below shows.



The Indian Corps relieved the British Second Corps and deployed with 14,000 rifles and 1700 sabres and after being strengthened by an extra brigade its total numbers were approximately 32,000 men.

It successfully held for a period of three months this critical sector which included Neuve Chapelle and La Bassée. After this it was relieved and allowed to refit and reorganise and was again back in line in March 1915 for the Neuve Chapelle Offensive.

The magnitude of fighting may be gauged from the fact that the purely Indian casualties from the time of being inducted into battle till 1st February 1915 were 7225 (967 killed-4539 wounded-1719 missing), while the British units of the Indian Corps and the British officers of Indian units lost 2528 (462 killed-1450 wounded-616 missing) taking the total casualties of the corps to 9753 men (1429 killed-5989 wounded-2335 missing); a very high casualty rate for a corps totaling approximately 32,000 men; ie a figure of 30.48%. **(6)**

The Indian Corps took prominent part in the attack on Neuve Chapelle and was commended for it by Sir John French **(7)**.

In March 1915 the Indian Corps was assigned another sector near Chapigny. It handed over its old positions to the 1st British Corps and relieved the 4th British Corps. In April-May 1915 the Indian Corps participated in the Second Battle of Ypres.

In contrast with the Indians, the pampered First Canadian Division was given six months training before being committed to battle **(8)**.

The other dominion troops like the Australians Canadians etc fought well, but they came much later at a time when the battle's outcome was not balanced on the razor's edge as at Ypres and the ultimate victory of the allies was a foregone conclusion. This does not however diminish the fact that the racist bias remained and the Indian Army despite being much less pay allowances or facilities

was still thought less worthy to get Victoria Crosses in comparison with the Dominion forces.

Thus while the total Victoria Crosses of Indian Army awarded to Indians in both world wars, never went beyond the figure of 36 the Dominion forces got a much larger number of Victoria Crosses in both world wars despite not having any significant differences in numbers of casualties.

The Australians getting approximately 95, Canadians 80 and Newzealanders 22. **(9)**

It is instructive here to examine the racial composition of the Indian units in France.

It is a commonly propagated and convincingly believed myth that Muslim soldiers from Jhelum and Rawalpindi saved the British position in France in 1914.

The units sent to France were certainly the best available in Indian Army. The class composition of the various units of the Indian Infantry Corps was as following:-- **(10)**

| SERIAL NO | NAME OF THE INFANTRY BATTALION WHICH WAS PART OF THE INDIAN CORPS IN FRANCE-1914-1915 | ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF THE BATTALION |
|-----------|---|--|
| 1 | 15 TH LUDHIANA SIKHS | WHOLLY SIKH |
| 2 | 34 TH SIKH PIONEERS | WHOLLY SIKH |
| 3 | 47 TH SIKHS | WHOLLY SIKH |
| 4 | 6 TH JAT | WHOLLY HINDU JAT |
| 5 | 41 ST DOGRA | WHOLLY PUNJABI HINDU DOGRA |
| 6 | 1 ST AND 2 ND BATTALION OF 39 TH GARHWAL RIFLES | WHOLLY GARHWALI HINDU FROM HIMALAYAN REGION OF UP |
| 7 | 40 TH PATHAN | A GREATER NUMBER OF PATHANS MIXED WITH A LESSER NUMBER OF PUNJABI MUSLIMS |
| 8 | 129 TH BALUCHIS | SIX COMPANIES OF PATHAN MUSLIMS (INCLUDING THREE MAHSUD COMPANIES) AND TWO PUNJABI MUSLIM COMPANIES |
| 9 | 27 TH AND 33 RD PUNJABIS AND 57 TH 58 TH AND 59 TH FF RIFLES | VARYING NUMBER OF PATHAN MUSLIM COMPANIES RANGING FROM ONE OR MORE |
| 10 | 27 TH 33 RD 69 TH AND 89 TH PUNJABIS AND 57 TH 58 TH AND 59 TH FF RIFLES | VARYING NUMBER OF PUNJABI MUSLIM TROOPS RANGING FROM ONE OR MORE COMPANIES |
| 11 | 27 TH 33 RD 69 TH AND 89 TH PUNJABIS AND 57 TH 58 TH AND 59 TH FF RIFLES | VARYING NUMBER OF SIKHS FROM ONE TO MORE THAN ONE COMPANY |
| 12 | 9 TH BHOPAL INFANTRY HAD TWO BATTALIONS IN FRANCE | ONE BATTALION HAD A COMPANY EACH OF SIKHS,HINDU BRAHMANS, HINDU RAJPUTS AND PUNJABI MUSLIMS.THE SECOND BATTALION HAD COMPANIES OF HINDU AHIRS,HINDU GUJARS,HINDU JATS AND HINDUSTANI MUSLIMS |

It is instructive to note that the Indians who were not used to the extreme cold weather of Northern Europe were not issued any winter clothing till Christmas 1915. **(11)**

When the Germans used poison gas for the first time at Ypres on 24 April and the French colonial troops simply dispersed in face of enemy attack,the Indians were used as the fire brigade to put down the fire of chaos and confusion!

The Indian Corps had done its duty at the decisive moment in the Battle for France in October November 1914.

By November 1915 it became apparent that the system of reinforcements designed for the Indian Army by the British could not stand the high rate of casualties of the European war.

The pre war ceiling of the Indian reserve had been fixed at 35,000. The system of recruiting only certain classes/ethnic groups from the Northwest also restricted the rapid growth of the army since the areas of the Northwest from where these men were recruited were having sparse population as compared to the more populous but ethnically excluded areas of the United Provinces and Bengal Area.

The reinforcements being received were not strictly as per the water tight class composition of each company of each different unit and it became difficult to maintain the ethnical homogeneity of various sub units.

Once a unit is mixed with manpower from other units, the units efficiency greatly suffers since the troops being from other units do not know each other and the resultant ease of acting under crisis conditions with full knowledge of each others nature and plus and minus points is not there; as a result there is little or no *Espirit de Corps*; which is the most important .

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The unit was initially composed of one fourth of Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Hindu Brahmans and Hindu Rajputs each. Once it suffered casualties and was reinforced by fresh drafts, the unit was composed of the following different classes in May 1915:---

(12)

CLASS COMPOSITION OF THE 9TH BHOPAL INFANTRY AS IN MAY 1915

SIKHS FROM THE ORIGINAL UNIT AND FROM 21 PUNJAB INFANTRY

HINDU RAJPUTS FROM 4TH 11TH AND 16TH RAJPUT INFANTRY

PUNJABI MUSLIMS FROM THE ORIGINAL UNIT AND FROM 9TH 17TH AND 18TH PUNJAB INFANTRY

HINDUSTANI HINDU BRAHMAN FROM 1ST BRAHMAN AND FROM 89TH PUNJAB INFANTRY

OTHER CLASSES FROM 8TH RAJPUTS 89TH PUNJAB AND FROM 96TH INFANTRY

Another major problem in France was availability of British officers to replace the original British officers of the Indian units who became casualty. The replaced officers mostly did not know Indian languages and could not effectively communicate with the soldiers.

In November 1915 the Indian Corps was withdrawn from France for service in Egypt .

Even this withdrawal for redeployment was a service, since the switching of Indian troops to Egypt enabled Allen by to send 60,000 British troops to France. **(13)**

However the 4th and 5th Indian Cavalry Divisions which saw much less fighting due to cavalry's nearly negligible role stayed in France till 1918, the only consolation being that the one of the only two Indian Victoria Cross of Indian Cavalry/Tank Corps was won by Lance Daffadar Gobind Singh 14 of 2nd Lancers at Cambrai in 1917.

The role/contribution of Indian Armoured Corps may be gauged from the fact that not a single Victoria Cross was awarded to any Indian from the armoured corps in the Second World War.


The performance and contribution of the Indian Army in France requires no long volumes.

Their presence on 21 October 1914 around Ypres was decisive, the only one day on which Britain could have lost the war in France, if the Germans had broken through the weak British force opposing them, and rushed on to capture the Channel ports.

The operations which followed 21 October 1914 were heroic, costly in terms of loss of human life and tragic, but never as critical as those in October 1914. However the allies had emerged victorious through the Critical Time Span of war and the issue after 21 October 1914 was never as gravely in doubt ever again till armistice.


British historian C.C Trench summed up decisive role of Indian Corps in France in following words :--

“The 21st October 1914, was perhaps the most critical day of the whole war. If the Germans had broken through the wafer thin screen of British Cavalry to the Channel ports, the war would have been lost. It was the Indian Corps which showed at Neuve Chapelle that the Germans could be driven from their formidable trenches.” (Refers-Page 44-The Indian Army and the Kings Enemies-1900-1947-Thames and Hudson-1988).



The Indian infantry corps from October 1914 to November 1915 on the average fielded 6 to 12 British units and 20 Indian infantry units and the total Indian casualties were 20,876 (2452 killed, 3,198 missing but most of whom were most probably killed, 14,559 wounded and 667 deaths due to reasons other than battle) . **(15)**

Indian troops under Major General Wilson arrived from India on 16 November 1914 , under Major General Wilson to replace all British troops who were sent to England and France.





There were some issues of desertions but by and large Indian Army remained staunch.

Operations in East Africa

The first Indian unit to reach East Africa was 29 Punjabis which reached East Africa on 1st September 1914.

Subsequently Indian Expeditionary Force B arrived in Mombassa on 1st November 1914.

The force was composed of following troops :--

27th Infantry Brigade

2nd Battalion Royal North Lancashire

63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry

Operations in Mesopotamia

The great bulk of Indian casualties occurred not in France but in Mesopotamia.

These casualties had less to do with any important operational task and more to do with incompetence of the British General Townshend whose phenomenal blunders have been well documented in the British writer Norman Dixon's , "The Psychology of Military Incompetence".

Townshend's force surrendered at Kutalmara, after a siege and a large number of Indians died at Kutalmara or in the Turkish prisoner of war camps later (It has been estimated that about 7,000 of the 13,000 British Indian troops captured died while prisoners). **(16)**

ORDER OF BATTLE FORCE D MESOPOTAMIA 1ST DECEMBER 1914


PREPARED BY MAJOR
A.H AMIN ®
FOR INDO PAK REGT
HISTORY GROUP

Indo Pak
Regimental
History
Group



GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING

LT GEN SIR A.A BARRETT, K.C.B , K.C.V.O , INDIAN ARMY



Subsequently General Maude launched another offensive and captured Baghdad in March 1917.

In this campaign the Indians did not fight under heavy odds as in France. The Turks were vastly outnumbered Maude having 340,000 men out of whom 166,000 men were fighting troops (107,000 Indians and 59,000 British) against 42,000 Turks (17)


In total recruitment the Punjabi Muslims India having the largest available eligible male population out of the classes which were allowed into the Indian Army.

This point is sometimes misunderstood in the sub continent and abroad.

Recruitment in army was not open to all classes ,but only those considered suitable for being recruited or politically reliable.


PUNJAB DISTRICTS RANKING IN CONTRIBUTING SOLDIERS TO BRITISH INDIAN ARMY IN FIRST WORLD WAR





PUNJAB DISTRICTS KILLED IN ACTION IN FIRST WORLD WAR

PREPARED BY MAJOR A.H AMIN ® FOR INDO PAK REGIMENTAL HISTORY GROUP



Thus Bengal had the largest population, but Bengalis were considered politically unreliable having led the anti British sentiment in India as established on ground by acts of terrorism and also temperamentally too volatile and unruly to be recruited. In relative proportion however the Punjabi Sikhs contributed the highest recruits since they were a much smaller group than Punjabi Muslims.

Many eminent foreign historians have falsely asserted that fewer Bengalis enlisted in the Indian Army despite the fact that enlistment was voluntary and open to all provinces.

These self styled experts are not aware that although military service was open to all provinces; Bengalis were not accepted in the fighting arms but only in the services and in supporting arms. Even then there were Bengalis who won high gallantry awards while serving as Regimental Medical Officers ! **(18)**

As a matter of fact the only man who got a Victoria Cross twice in the First World War was a doctor from the British Army's medical corps . **(19)**

Thus the following was the province and ethnic/religious group contribution to Army recruitment in India during the First World War :--
(20)

| PROVINCE | POPULATION | COMBATANTS RECRUITED | NON COMBATANTS | TOTAL | COMBATANTS AS % AG OF TOTAL POPULATION |
|-------------------------|---------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-----------|---|
| MADRAS | 43,300,000 | 51,223 | 41,117 | 92,340 | 0.12 % |
| BOMBAY | 19,300,000 | 41,272 | 30,211 | 71,483 | 0.21 % |
| BENGAL | 46,700,000 | 7,117 | 51,935 | 59,052 | 0.01 % |
| UP | 45,600,000 | 163,578 | 117,565 | 281,143 | 0.36 % |
| PUNJAB | 20,700,000 | 349,688 | 97,288 | 446,976 | 1.69 % |
| NWFP | 2,250,000 | 32,181 | 13,050 | 45,231 | 1.43 % |
| BALUCHIS TAN | 422,000 | 1,761 | 327 | 2,088 | 0.41 % |
| BURMA | 13,200,000 | 14,094 | 4,579 | 18,673 | 0.11 % |
| BIHAR AND ORRISSA | 34,000,000 | 8,576 | 32,976 | 41,552 | 0.02 % |
| CP | 13,900,000 | 5,376 | 9,631 | 15,007 | 0.04 % |
| ASSAM | 7,600,000 | 942 | 14,182 | 15,124 | 0.01 % |
| AJMER- MERWARA | 496,000 | 7,341 | 1,632 | 8,973 | 1.5 % |
| TOTAL INDIA | XXXXXXXX X | 683,149 | 414,493 | 1,097,642 | |
| NEPAL | | 58,904 | | | |

The contribution of each province was relative. The contribution of Punjab was balanced community wise.

Thus out of the 349,688 combatants which enlisted from Punjab the Muslims contributed 38.89 %, the Sikhs 25.16 % and the Punjabi Hindus (Dogras Jats Rajputs etc) 35.9 %. In the context of the much misused martial race theory this means that the Punjabi Hindus were as martial as the Punjabi Muslims and the Punjabi Sikhs more martial than both since the Punjabi Sikhs ratio of enrolment was much higher than their total share in Punjab's population!

The Sikhs being just around 10 % while the Punjabi Muslims being about 55 to 56 % and the Hindus being about 34 to 35 %!

Thus UP provided mostly personnel for the Hospital Corps, the Service Corps, other ancillary troops, and the largest number of non combatants while till 1883 this province had provided bulk of the Bengal Army's infantry.

However the Muslim Ranghars which were included in Punjab were classified as Hindustani Muslim in the British terminology but were not mentioned as a separate ethnic group in the above mentioned tables compiled by British civilians.

Recruitment in combatant arms was controlled and regulated according to policy and was not a matter of free will as in western countries. The fighting arm soldiers from the UP province as in 1857 and 1883 mostly consisted of Hindu Jats, Hindu Rajputs, Hindu Garhwalis (who provided just four infantry battalions, but won relatively higher number of gallantry awards including two

Victoria Crosses, both in France) and some Muslims from western districts of UP.

The policy of recruiting from selected provinces/classes also limited India's potential contribution to the British war effort in the war. Thus while potentially it was possible to provide 219 divisions in the First World War, it was called upon to produce seventeen divisions.

(21)

On the other hand the British policy of recruiting soldiers predominantly from the Punjab paid rich dividends in terms of unit reliability.

The Punjabis whether Muslim or non Muslim and the Pathans (the non tribal ones) we have seen earlier had proved to be the best mercenaries in terms of reliability in 1857 and in the Afghan Wars.

The Germans who knew little about the pragmatic and opportunistic approach of these two races were thus proved totally wrong in their pre war perceptions about the Indian troops in case of war between the British and the Turks.

On the other hand one may state that heroism is an anachronism and not the norm in history and why should the Indians have rebelled against British who actually brought order and reform to India? But these are intangibles which one can debate endlessly?

Despite the fact that the bulk of the Indian Army was deployed against the Turks and despite the fact that the Muslims constituted at least 40 % of the fighting arms no major mutiny took place in the Indian Army.

The only exception to this rule at the unit level were the 15th Lancers and the 5th Light Infantry.

Both the units were All Muslim Units, the 15th since its raising in 1858 and the 5th since 1893. But here too the Punjabi Muslim troops proved their loyalty or pragmatism.

Thus while the two Pathan Squadrons of 15 Lancers defied orders to fight against the Turks (the unit had reached Mesopotamia from France) its Punjabi Muslim Squadron remained staunchly loyal and the Pathan Muslim Squadrons were replaced by Hindustani Hindu Jat Squadrons from 14th Murray's Jat Lancers!

The 5th Light Infantry was entirely composed of Ranghar/Hindustani Muslims and rebelled en masse at Singapore. The unit captured Singapore for a few hours till a British-Allied force recaptured Singapore and the rebellion was crushed. More than 200 of the indomitable Hindustani muslim Ranghars were killed/executed! Such heroism and independent spirit did not exist in the dictionary of any other Muslim race in the Indian Army! The major reason why the Indian Army remained staunch despite having a large presence of Muslims

, was the British policy of mixing Muslims with non Muslims in each unit. Thus there were relatively few one religion units in the Indian Army. On the individual level the tribal area Pathans and the Hindustani Muslim Ranghars showed more independence of spirit and defiance than non tribal area Pathans and the Punjabi Muslims. The 129 Baluch was 811 All Muslim Unit. It had six Pathan Companies (out of which three were pure Mahsud Companies) and two Punjabi Muslim Companies and was thus a Pathan dominated unit. Initially

this unit fought in France right from 1914, and won the singular honour of being the first unit of Indian Army which attacked the Germans! **(23)**

Sepoy Khudadad (a Punjabi Muslim from Jhelum District) the first Indian to get a VC was from this unit. Later the British were forced to send this unit to East Africa because it was discovered that many of its tribal Pathan Mahsuds, who were earlier presumed to be missing/dead/prisoners had actually deserted to the German lines in France; and from there had travelled all the way back to Tirah and Waziristan! **(24)**

On the other hand its Punjabi Muslims and non tribal Pathans remained staunchly loyal! Philip Mason well summed up the loyalty assessment of the Indian Army by saying that "A faint question mark hung over the Pathans throughout the war but the Punjabi Muslims were steady as a rock. **(25)**

" Many Pathans defected to the Turkish lines in Mesopotamia and Egypt. Jemadar Mir Mast Afridi deserted to the German lines in France with 14 other Afridi sepoys in France in 1915 and was awarded the German Iron Cross.

Indian Army was used in Persia also but this was a minor affair as illustrated by the example map below :--

WHEN 400 MEN HALF A BATTALION OF 124 BALUCHISTAN CHASTISED PERSIA-1916

Tehran

Qom

Kashan

Isfahan

As Russians left a bandit but clownish tribe German backed Bakhtiari were creating trouble so right wing 124 Baluchistan was re-tasked to chastise Bakhtiari which it did with perfect ease reaching Isfahan on 11 September 1916. Casualties 124 = NIL !!!

Bakhtiari simply fled like mice. 124 resumed march towards Shiraz on 20 October 1916

ALL
PLOTTINGS BY
AGHA H AMIN

Kumisheh

124 Baluchistan Infantry left small team at Kerman to raise South Persian Rifles Brigade at Kerman and commenced its march for Shiraz via the longer 460 miles via Yazd on 27 July 1916. It reached Shiraz on 12 November 1916.

In Kumisheh area the unit took extremely successful punitive action against a notorious bandit. At same location locals handed over some German prisoners to the unit.

Yazd

ALL
PLOTTINGS BY
AGHA H AMIN

Atlas of Baluch
Regiment Military
history
Authored by
Agha Humayun Amin
Volume Two
ISBN-13: 978-1507628287
ISBN-10: 1507628285

PERSIA

Kerman

Rafsanjan

Shiraz

Right wing of 124 Baluchistan Infantry commenced its march from Bandar Abbas on 17 May 1916 and marched 280 miles to Kerman reaching it on 11 June 1916. It suffered Nil casualties.

Baft

Daulatabad


Tang I Zandan

Bandar Abbas

**PERSIAN
GULF**

A US SECOND SECRETARY IN KABUL IN JANUARY 2006 DESCRIBED HIS SUPERIORS IN STATE DEPARTMENT AS WET PUSSIES HIDING BEHIND E MAILS WHEN IT CAME TO DEALING WITH IRAN ! BUT LOOK AT 400 MEN OF 124TH !





ON 12 FEBRUARY 1916 AN ATTACK BY TWO SOUTH AFRICAN REGIMENT BATTALIONS ON SALAITA HILL EAST OF TAVETA WAS REPULSED ACCOMPANIED BY HEAVY CASUALTIES AND SOUTH AFRICANS WERE THREATENED BY ENVELOPMENT FROM FLANKS BY GERMANS.


130 BALUCHIS SAVED THE DAY WHEN THEY ATTACKED MAIN GERMAN WEAPONS POST AND HELPED EXTRICATING BADLY SHAKEN SOUTH AFRICAN REGIMENTS.

130 BALUCHIS PLAYED ACTIVE ROLE IN EVACUATING SOUTH AFRICAN WOUNDED SOLDIERS.

MAJOR GENERAL C.P FENDELL IN HIS FAMOUS BOOK ***THE EAST AFRICAN FORCE , H.F AND WITHERBY , LONDON, 1921*** REFERRED TO 130 BALUCHIS ROLE IN THIS ACTION.

W.S THATCHER IN HIS 4TH BATTALION ,10TH BALUCH REGIMENT (THE 129TH BALUCHIS) , OXFORD UNIVERISTY PRESS , 1932 ALSO REFFERED TO THIS CTION.

SIR PATRICK HENRY CADELL ALSO REFERRED TO THIS ACTION IN HIS MONUMENTAL HISTORY OF BOMBAY ARMY PUBLISHED BY LONGMANS AND GREENS,LONDON, 1938.




129 Baluchistan Infantry attacked Germans twice and earned admiration of indomitable Superman Von Lettow Vorbeck. It suffered its first casualties of East African campaign.




129 Baluchistan Infantry attacked Germans twice and earned admiration of indomitable Superman Von Lettow Vorbeck. It suffered its first casualties of East African campaign.





INDIAN ARMY UNITS FROM WHOM SOLDIERS DEFECTED TO TURKISH LINES OVERWHELMINGLY MEHSUDS AND AFRIDIS





In retaliation but on some outward pretext the British awarded the Victoria Cross to Mir Mast's brother Mir Dast who was fighting in the same sector!

A unique incident where two brothers were awarded by two different European masters fighting against each other in the same sector'

In all India provided approximately 680,000 combatants and 400,000 combatants. Thus a total of approximately 1,215,000 officers and men were sent overseas and the total Indian casualties were approximately 101,000 . **(26)**

Another authority placed the total Indian contribution at 1,105,000 subdivided as France-138,000, Mesopotamia-657,000, Egypt and Palestine-144,000, while smaller contingents were sent to Aden East Africa Gallipoli and Salonika. **(27)**

VICTORIA CROSSES IN FIRST WORLD WAR



The number of fatal casualties give an idea of role of Indian Army in First World War:--

| Theatre | Combatants Killed officers and other ranks | Remarks | ROLE |
|---------------|--|----------------|--|
| France | 5492 | Second Highest | DECISIVE IN OCTOBER 1914 AS ACKNOWLEDGED BY VARIOUS BRITISH HISTORIANS |
| East Africa | 2472 | Fourth Highest | MARGINAL |
| Mesopotamia | 17,931 | Highest | DECISIVE |
| Dunster Force | 158 | | SMALL AFFAIR |
| Persia | 1804 | | SMALL AFFAIR |
| Egypt | 3,787 | Third Highest | DECISIVE |
| Gallipoli | 1,624 | | MARGINAL |
| Aden | 507 | | SMALL AFFAIR |
| Muscat | 40 | | SMALL AFFAIR |

From -India's Contribution to the Great War-Op Cit

ENDNOTES

- 1 Pages-165 & 166 - The Realities behind Diplomacy-Paul Kennedy-Fontana Press-London-1985 and Pages-61,63,237,474-478- Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire and Common Wealth -H.M.S.O-London- 1919.
- 2 Page-23- The Indian Corps in France-Lieutenant Colonel J.W.B Merwether and Right Honorable Sir Frederick Smith-John Murray-Ablemarle Street-London-1919.
- 3 Page-24-Ibid.
- 4 Page-129-Quoted in- Liddell Hart's History of the First World War-Captain B.H Liddell Hart-Pan Books-London- 1972.
- 5 Page-32-C.C Trench-Op Cit.
- 6 Page-211-Colonel J.W.B Merewether-Op Cit.
- 7 Page-278-Ibid.
- 8 Page-479-Ibid.
- 9 Page-358-Appendix-One- For Valour-Ian.S.Uys-Galvin and Sales-PTY Limited-Cape Town-South Africa-1973.
- 10 Compiled from Colonel J. W.B Merewether-Op Cit.

- 11 " Page-43-C.C Trench-Op Cit.
- 12 "Pages-88, 89 & 90- The Common Wealth Armies-Manpower and Organisation in Two World Wars -F.W Perry Manchester-1988.
- 13 Page-434-Philip Mason-Op Cit.
- 14 Gobind was a pure Hindu Rajput from Rajputana proper and the only Rajput from Rajputana to get the VC in WW One.
- 15 Pages- 469 & 470 -Colonel J.W.B Merewether-Op Cit.
- 16 Page-252-S.L Menezes-Op Cit.
- 17 Page- 205- A Concise History of World War One -Brigadier General Vincent.J.Esposito -Pall Mall Prtss-London 1965.One of USA's most eminent military historians and editor of West point Atlas and Military History of Napoleonic Wars.
- 18 Page-48-C.C Trench-Op Cit.
- 19 This was Captain Noel Chavasse the Medical Officer of the 1st Liverpool Scottish!He won his first VC at the Battle of Sonune at Guillemont on 9TH August 1915 and the second VC at Wietye in Belgium for services rendered during the period from 31 July to 02 August 1917.Noel had also ran for England in the Olympics of 1908 at London.In addition Noel and his twin brother had also won an MC also. Noel an Oxford graduate was the son of the Bishop of Liverpool.See Page-132- Article:-- "Where is the Service Record ofWW I's only Double VC"- " Army and Defence Quarterly Journal"-Volume Number 128-Number-2-April1998-I West Street-Tavistock-Devon-UK.

20 Figures of recruits have been taken from India's Contribution to the Great War-Government of India-Calcutta-1923 and from-Page-97 Statutory Commission Report-Volume One-. Government Of India Publications-Calcutta-1930-The population figures are not of 1914-1918 but based on the 1921 figures as given on Page-238 of Cambridge History of

India-The Indian Empire-Volume- Six- .Edited by H.H Dodwell-Reprint-S.S Chand and Company-New Delhi-1988.

21 Page-228-F.W Perry-Op Cit.

22 Pages-425 and 426-Philip Mason-Op Cit.Pages-278 to 280-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

23 Page-164-John Gaylor-Op Cit.Class composition based on the authority of Merwether's description. The 129 Baluch was also the first Indian unit which served in Japan.This happened in 1864. See Page-496-The Indian Corps in France Op Cit.This unit was also greatly praised by Von Lettow Vorbeck, against whom it fought in East Africa.Later the same unit,renumberd as IIBaluch distinguished itself at Pandu in the 1947-48 Kashmir War.

24 Page-425-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

25 Page-442-Ibid.

26 Page 417-23-India as I Knew It-Michael O Dwyer-London-1929.

27 Pages-68 & 69- Statistics of the British Military Effort in the Great War-War Office-H.M.S.O-London-1922.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE INDIAN ARMY-1918-39

The First World War was followed by two major developments in the Indian Army. The first was massive reduction in numbers and the second was the acceptance of Indians in the officer rank in line with the long outstanding Indian demand to admit Indians as officers.

Reduction in the army meant reversion to the pre war recruitment policies. Thus by 1929 the Army was again largely Punjabised as the following figures illustrate:- **(1)**

| INDIAN ARMY PROVINCEWISE COMBATANT STRENGTH IN 1929 ¹ | |
|--|--------|
| NWFP | 5,600 |
| KASHMIR | 6,500 |
| PUNJAB | 86,000 |
| BALUCHISTAN | 300 |
| NEPAL | 19,000 |
| UP | 16,500 |
| RAJPUTANA | 7,000 |
| BOMBAY | 7,000 |
| CENTRAL INDIA | 200 |
| CP | 100 |
| BIHAR AND ORRISSA | 300 |
| BENGAL | NIL |
| ASSAM | NIL |
| BURMA | 3,000 |
| HYDERABAD | 700 |
| MYSORE | 100 |
| MADRAS | 4000 |

Meanwhile by 1923 the number of soldiers in the Indran Army had been reduced from 500,000 in 1918 to 120,000 in 1923. **(2)** As per the 1922 reorganisation the number of cavalry regiments was reduced from 39 to 22 by amalgamating two regiments except the Guides and the 7th Light Cavalry, the infantry units were also reduced and the old 131 separate regiments of 1913 were reorganised into nineteen infantry regiments of the line (each of five active battalions, one training regiment for recruits/reservists and one territorial battalion), four regiments of Pioneers (which were later disbanded in 1931), and ten regiments (each of two battalions) of Gurkha Rifles. **(3)**

Contrary to all the rhetoric in Pakistan, about the Khilafat Movement most of the Muslim troops (particularly Punjabi Muslims) ;from the Muslim majority area that later became Pakistan ; stayed staunchly loyal to Britain despite mostly being deployed against Muslim Turks and this reliability gave the Martial Races Theory stronger value and more adherents in higher British Command circles.

On the contrary the races like the Tribal Pathans (Afridis, Mahsuds, Mohmands) and the Ranghar Muslims (who came in the Hindustani category) and had resorted to rebellion/defiance/defection during the war became Persona Non Grata (and thus non martial) as far as army recruitment was concerned .Thus the 5th Light Infantry which had rebelled in 1915 disappeared from the new army list in 1922.

In addition the Trans Frontier (Tribal area) Mahsuds Wazirs and Mohmands(who had given the British great trouble in 1919) enlistment was stopped in the regular army. In addition the Afridis who had whole Afridi Companies before the war suffered

mostly due to defection of Mir Mast Afridi to German lines in France and Afridi enlistment to the regular army was greatly reduced . **(4)**

The tremendous setback that the Pathans received because of not having been good mercenaries for their British colonial masters may be gauged from the following figures. Before the first world war there were about 5,000 Tribal Pathans in the Indian Army and these included ten pure Mahsud Companies . **(5)**

In addition there was a larger number of Pathans from the settled district and at least 10,000 Pathans were serving in the Indian Army.

By 1929 there were just 5,600 men from the NWFP serving in the Indian Army! The First World War also brought a great economic boom to the Punjab.

More than 421,000 acres of land (mostly in West Punjab) was distributed to the Indian VCOs (Viceroy Commissioned Officers)'. **(6)**

The long term sociopolitical implication of this step for Pakistan perhaps was reinforcement of the belief in supporting the status quo rather than any abstract and no profit all loss vague and unrealistic ideals of democracy liberty etc'.

As a token appreciation of India's great contribution to war as a policy ten vacancies per year were fixed at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst for Indian Cadets.

In addition 39 cadets were given Temporary Commission in the Indian Army in December 1919, having graduated from Daly Cadet College Indore. Field Marshal Cariappa the first Indian to

pass the staff college and the first Cin C of Indian Army was from this batch of 39 .**(7)**

Major General Iskandar Mirza of Pakistan Army who was more famous for political intrigue and palace coups rather than any war performance was among the first batch of Indians who graduated from Sandhurst. The first criteria for selection to officer corps was proven family loyalty to the British Raj. The overall interest of the more educated and prosperous classes in joining the army as officers was limited; the first priority being the Indian Civil Service whose doors were open for Indians through competitive examinations since 1853.

Thus in 1915 there were 63 Indians (approximately 5 %) in the civil service. **(8)**

The limited interest of the Indians in the Army as a career can be gauged from the fact that between 1918 and 1926 just 243 Indians competed for the 83 positions earmarked for Indians at Sandhurst .
(9)

One reason why the most educated and the more well to do Indians were reluctant to join the army was the general perception that an Indian had much lesser prospects of advancement in the army than in other walks of life.

In 1920 Esher Committee appointed by the British government to examine the future of Indian Army again rejected broad-based recruitment in the Indian Army and recommended cautious and slow induction of Indians as Army officers. forefront of the anti British agitation since 1905 and were regarded as politically unreliable and thus non Martial!

The First Legislative Assembly of India took up the issue of Indians having a greater say in the army affairs and this process of allowing Indians some say/participation in army affairs/organisation of the Indian Army came to be known as "Indianisation of the Army". Sir Sivaswamy Ayer an Indian Legislative Assembly member from Madras who took a deep interest in military affairs and moved 15 resolutions on army reorganisation during the debate on Esher Committee report in the Legislative Assembly in March

1921. These resolutions became the basis for greater participation of Indians in military affairs and the Indian Army. One of these resolutions called for reservation of 25 % vacancies for Kings Commission in the Indian Army for Indians, another called for establishment of an officer training military academy in India . **(10)**

Swamy's resolution dealing with induction of Indian officers based on pure merit open to all qualified Indians was however amended by one vote under pressure of the government and so called martial race representatives; rewording it with the sentence that " the large majority of selections should be from the communities which furnish recruits to the army, and as far as possible, in proportion to the numbers in which they furnish such recruits to the army" . **(11)**

The whole rationale of this amendment was faulty; the recruitment was controlled by a pre decided quota, for each community, therefore if a certain class was providing more recruits, it was only because its quota for recruits was more than another class, and not because it was more keen to enlist! It is important to note that the very low

number of Bengali and non Punjabi officers in the post partition Indo Pak armies; had a direct link with the consequences of this amendment. Since the so called martial (more loyal) races were protected by a quota which guaranteed their predominance in the officer corps regardless of merit or intellectual calibre (valour being an intangible quality which can only be put to test in actual crisis conditions/war); it ensured that many relative duds from the so called martial races could get through the entrance examination; whereas relatively more promising candidates from the so called non martial or lower recruitment quota races had lesser chances of being selected to the officer corps! The seeds of poor intellectual calibre of the Indo Pak army officer corps were thus comfortably ensured via this amendment!

All this went very well for the so called martial races; however since there was no similar quota in the Indian Staff College entrance examination (' !) not a single Muslim officer (being poorer in education being mostly from the least educated (and thus politically most reliable regions of India) , ever managed to qualify the regular two year Indian Staff College course run before the war.

Most of the officers of the post 1947 Pakistan Army attended the much shorter emergency staff course run during the war, which were adhoc courses, with poorer quality of Directing Staff and with much lower selection standards. The resolutions of Swamy were accepted but their on ground implementation proved to be a slower process.!! is common knowledge that Swamy was the main man behind the resolutions, but Shaukat Raza insists that Mr Jinnah was the moving spirit behind the resolutions . **(12)**

In addition merit was just one subsidiary factor in selection for the officer corps. The first factor was "Loyalty to the British Raj".

This was ensured by the simple expedient of the aspirant being first screened by the Deputy Commissioner of the home district, followed by a long chain of command including the Divisional Commissioner etc and additional inquiries being made by other official agencies like the intelligence etc.

Those who were successful in this acid test of loyalty (subservience) could then sit in the entrance examination!

There was nothing wrong in the British motivation to recruit those whom they perceived as the most politically reliable material; however to assert that the sole criteria to do so was the fact that they were more martial; as was being done in pre 1947 India, or is being done in Pakistan Army even today, is preposterous and a sheer distortion of historical reality!

The essential and the key factor in making any race fight well was the superior leadership of the British officer, who provided first rate leadership, enabling a largely Hindu majority Bengal Army to humble Afghans Gurkhas Sikhs and Marathas in battle till 1849 and a more Punjabi dominated army in the First World War!

There was nothing intrinsically superior in the largely Hindustani pre 1883 Bengal Army or in the post 1911 Punjabi dominated Army over their opponents, except that they were led by better officers from a European race; and above all were backed up by the immense logistical maritime and

material resources of one of the greatest empires in modern history!

Thus we have earlier discussed that India was conquered by the British Company with a largely Native majority army, which was also Hindu majority.

Till 1883, this army was Hindu majority and by 1883 all major British Wars in India had been fought. Between 1883 and 1911 this army became Punjabi majority and Muslim dominated; without any major war having been fought.

So where is the question of Martial or non Martial; it is evident that this change in recruitment policy had nothing to do with any war performance since no major war was fought in this era; but was a pure policy decision. India in any case was a poor country and the British could find plenty of recruits everywhere in India, who were ready to die for the British Empire for ten rupees a month! Even in Punjab; most of the Muslims recruited in the army came from the agriculturally non productive and thus much poorer areas between river Chenab and Indus.

In 1923 in line with the Swamy Aiyer resolutions which were tenaciously resisted by the British Officers of the Indian Army, on lines that efficiency would suffer if Indians were allowed greater say in the army administration "eight unit scheme" was announced by General Rawlinson Indian Army C in C (1920-25). According to this scheme eight units (six infantry and two cavalry-7th and 16th Light Cavalry) were to be slowly Indianised (officered wholly by Indian officers) in a long period spread over 22 to 23 years. **(13)**

In 1926 the Indian Sandhurst Committee (of which Mr Jinnah was a very active member) under the chairmanship of General Skeen recommended that the 20 vacancies reserved for the Indians at Sandhurst should be increased annually by four till an Indian Sandhurst was established by 1933 . **(14)**

In 1930 after the First Round Table Conference the total number of Indianised units was increased to 15. **(15)**

In December 1932 the Indian Military Academy at Dera Dun was established. In 1925 the "Indian Sandhurst Committee" set up to study the setting up of a military academy in India had recommended the initial annual intake at 33 cadets ,with a projected annual increase of 12 vacancies per year.

Later a committee headed by the C in C fixed yearly intake at sixty subdivided into 30 vacancies through open competitive examinations and thirty for rankers subdivided further through 24 by a competitive examination for which only rankers were eligible and six for rankers (called the "Y Cadet Scheme" under which many like Musa Tikka Niazi etc entered the officer cadre) recommended by the C in C.

This was a clever, and a typically British innovation of ensuring that the best available Indians were restricted in the Army . The rankers were viewed as more pliable and less independent minded than candidates coming direct from civilian institutions.

There was little competition in the ranker vacancy examination since very few Indians from the more educated/higher classes, regardless of their

province they belonged to, preferred joining the ranks.

This also laid the foundation of intellectual backwardness, orders orientedness and lack of initiative in the officer rank of both the Indian and Pakistani Armies. Later after partition Ayub by selecting the "Ranker Breed" in preference to the "Sandhurst or Dera Dun Civilian Direct Entrants" for the slot of C in C laid the final stamp on intellectual growth of the Pakistan Army; but more of this later. In India on the other hand the ranker breed was less successful and all their Chiefs were from the Sandhurst/Daly/Direct Commissioned breeds!

By 1st October 1939 the total Indian regular officer strength in the Indian Army stood at 333 against the British officer strength of 3,031 . **(16)**

In 1937 two Indian cavalry regiments i.e. Scinde Horse and 13th Lancers were mechanised (both were given a squadron each of Vickers Light Tanks and Crossley Armoured Cars, phased out from British units) in line with the policy to modernise Indian Army **(17)** .

In addition in January 1935 the First Field Brigade of Indian Artillery was raised with batteries comprising Madrassis, Punjabi Muslims, Hindu Rajputs and Ranghar Muslims. This was a major policy change since Indians were declared *Persona Non Grata* in mainstream artillery (apart from few insignificant mountain batteries) after 1857. In addition this Indian artillery brigade was also selected as one of the units to be Indianised **(18)** .

In 1938 it became evident that war was inevitable; and a major decision was taken to

modernise Indian Army, keeping in view its certain involvement in a future war with Nazi Germany.

At this time it was envisaged that the Indian Army would be employed in defence of Malaya Iraq Iran and a general purpose reserve.

The Viceroy Linlithgow showed great military acumen when he voiced the danger of a likely Japanese threat to Burma; but was told by the army that no such attack was possible **(19)** .

In 1938 Auchinleck observed that in terms of modernisation and equipment the Indian Army was even behind such relatively obsolete armies as the Egyptian, Iraqi and Afghan Armies ! **(20)**

Keeping in view the recommendations of this report the British Government at last sanctioned 34 million pounds for the modernisation of the Indian Army in 1939. The reason for this lack of progress in the modernisation of the Indian Army till 1939 was simple, i.e. the post world war one economy measures to reduce defence expenditure of India.

Thus in 1939 on the eve of the Second World War the Indian Army was decades behind other armies in terms of quality of military thought, understanding of the modern mechanised way of war and in number of Indian officers serving in the army. This legacy had far reaching effects and played a major role in the underemployment and poor employment of armour in the 1965 war.

Intellectual development in training for higher leadership can be gauged from the fact that from 1933 to 1939 only six Indian officers, had

graduated from the Staff College Quetta. There was no Muslim among these six graduates . **(21)**

No Muslim thus qualified for the staff college course despite the fact that many Muslim officers were eligible and many sat in the entrance examination . **(22)**

The Second World War changed the whole scenario. The entrance requirements were lowered, the staff college course was shortened to one fourth and officers were nominated to attend the staff college instead of the earlier system of qualifying through competitive examination.

ENDNOTES

1 Figures as given in map facing page-96-
Indian Statutory Commission Report-Op Cit.

2 Appendix- The Army in India and Its Evolution
-Government Printing Press-Calcutta-1924.

3 Page-402 -Cambridge History-Volume Six-Op
Cit.

4 Page-116- C.C Trench -Op Cit.

5 Page-27-The Frontier Scouts-C.C Trench-Oxford
University Press-1986.

6 Footnote- 37, Page -72-The Indian Army-Cohen-
Op Cit.

7 Page-237-India's Contribution to the Great War-
Op Cit.

8 Page-53- The Indian Civil Service -Edward Blunt-Faber and Faber- London -1937.

9 Indian Sandhurst Committee Report- November 14- 1926 -Government of India Press- Calcutta -1927.

10 Page-1739 to Page-1754- Debate held on 28 March 1921-Volume One-Part Two -Legislative Assembly of India-

11 Page-1754-Ibid.

12 Page-96-The Pakistan Army-1947-49-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

13 Page-107-The Indian Army-Cohen-Op Cit.

14 Skeen Committee Report-November 1926 -Government of India -Central publications Branch-Calcutta-1927.

15 Page-329-S.L Menezes- Op Cit.

16 The Indian Sandhurst Committee under General Skeen was set up in 1925. See pages-98 and 99-Shaukat Riza-The Pakistan Army-1947-49-Op Cit. The figure of 60 per year was decided by the "Indian Military College Committee" under the C in C India. The qualification for these was "Matriculation/Armed Forces Matric Examination". See Page-188 of the "Report of the Indian Military College Committee"- Dated 15 July 1931-His Majesty's Stationery Office London-1931. Figures of the officer strength have been taken from Shaukat Riza's book. See Pages- 99 & 100-The Pakistan Army-1947-49-Op Cit.

17 Page-135- C.C Trench -Op Cit.

18 Page-135-Ibid

19 Page-136-Ibid:

20 Report of Auchinleck Modernisation Sub Committee -Ministry of Defence-Historical Section-New Delhi-1938.

21 Page-115-The Pakistan Army-1947-1949-Op Cit.

22 Major General Sher Ali for example stated in his book that his brother in law was preparing for the staff college entrance examination in 1935. See Page-24-The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan-Major General Sher Ali (Retired)-First Printed-1976-Third Edition-Syed Mobin Mahmud and Company-Lahore-1988.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE INDIAN ARMY AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

On 1st October 1939 the British Indian Army was 194,373 men strong and these including 34,515 enrolled non combatants.

The Army consisted of 96 infantry battalions and 18 cavalry regiments. In addition there were four cavalry regiments and seven infantry battalions belonging to the Indian Princely State Forces. Apart from these the Indian Territorial forces numbered 19,000 troops and the Indian State Forces had a total of 53,000 troops . **(1)**

On 1" January 1940 there were 37.64% Muslims, 12.82% Sikhs (reduced as opposed to Punjabi Muslims for disloyalty to the British during the period 1919-40), 37.55% Hindus and 10.96% Nepali Gurkha Hindus . **(2)**

In May 1940 the Indian British Government volunteered to field five infantry and one armoured division for the British war effort. The British government agreed to pay for the infantry divisions but overruled the proposal of an Indian armoured division . **(3)**

It is heartening to note that the first major Indian contribution to the British war effort was rendered by the extremely able and energetic Indian mules from four Indian Animal Transport (AT) companies of the Indian Army Service corps (RIASC) in France during the retreat to Dunkirk. **(4)**

The role of Indian Army was less crucial than in the Second World War than in the First World War.

However because of the particular logistic and administrative requirements in Burma the size of the Indian Army far exceeded the size of the Indian Army during the First World War. In addition because of the Japanese threat the Indian Army received a great boost as far as modernising and mechanising the army was concerned. Casualty wise the Second World War was a much smaller affair than the First World War.

On the other hand a very large numbers of Indians were awarded Victoria Cross as British bias against Indians had decreased.

The role of the Indian Army and its contribution to the British war effort cannot

be understood unless relative the role of Britain and other and other allied nations in the Second World War is understood.

In the First World War Britain suffered far greater military casualties than in the Second. In the Second World War most of the fighting was done by Soviet Russia, while the Americans supplied most of the financial support and armaments to conduct the war.

The Indian Army was employed in North Africa and Italy against the Axis powers i.e. Germany and Italy and against Japan in Burma. In addition it performed operational duties of a much smaller and limited scale in Ethiopia Iraq Syria and Persia. In Burma where the Indian Army was employed against the Japanese, for the greater part of the war the odds were almost overwhelmingly in favour of the British as far as material numerical and logistic factors were concerned. Contrary to the commonly held belief the Japanese attack from Burma into India was never their major attack.

The Japanese intention in capturing Burma had three major objectives; the first was to secure their Western flank against a likely British future attack against Japanese held Malaya Indo China and East Indies, and to secure a base using which they could later dominate the Bay of Bengal.

The second major Japanese objective was to isolate China from the west, since China was keeping around 80 Japanese divisions committed in China, and the main overland allied supply route to China ran from Burma i.e. the famous Burma Road. The third major Japanese objective in capturing Burma was to secure the use of its raw materials like oil rubber etc in sustaining the logistic part of the Japanese military effort. The grand Japanese

strategic plan had visualised that capture of Burma would complete the great defensive barrier visualised in their strategic design . **(5)**

The first major battle involving the Japanese and the Indian Army was in Malaya. Here the British had some 88,000 troops (19,000 British, 15,000 Australians, 37,000 Indians and 17,000 Malays) . **(6)**

The Japanese had less than 88,000 troops but achieved a dramatic victory ,by virtue of following a brilliantly conceived and executed plan involving a terrain wise extremely difficult unexpected and lengthy approach of attack. The guns of the supposedly impregnable British naval base Singapore were facing the sea.

The Japanese in order to avoid them invaded Malaya from many hundred miles north of Singapore and took Singapore from the landward approach from Malaya, which was defended by no guns, all the fixed guns facing the sea i.e. the south and the east!

The Malayan campaign involving the surrender of Singapore has been frequently criticised as a supreme example of British military incompetence.

On the other hand the Burma campaign which followed the Malayan campaign has been inflated out of proportion as an example of great generalship.

As a matter of fact the situation faced by the British-Dominion-Indian Army in Malaya was highly complex. The soldiers could not be blamed for the guns of Singapore since this was an example

| <u>FIGHTING ARMS</u> | | <u>SUPPORTING ARMS</u> | <u>NON COMBATANTS</u> | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|----------|--------------------------------------|
| TANK CORPS | 43,030 | ENGINEERS | 264,243 | PIONEERS | 233,682 |
| INFANTRY | 491,961 | ARTILLERY | 81,087 | OTHERS | 389,228 |
| | | ORDNANCE | 103,695 | | |
| | | A.S.C | 466,240 | | |
| | | MEDICAL | 114,719 | | |
| | | SIGNALS | 65,397 | | |
| | | E.M.E | 17,225 | | |
| | | OTHERS | 229,402 | | |
| GRAND TOTAL | 534,991 OR 21.40 % | GRAND TOTAL | 13,42,008 % | OR 53.68 | GRAND TOTAL 622,910 OR 24.91 % |

The British Indian 14th Army which fought the war in Burma from 1942 to 1945 was commanded by one of the greatest British generals of modern history Field Marshal Slim.

Slim never faced tremendous odds like Rommel or Manstein. Slim's achievements are relative and comparative once the whole record of British generalship in Second World War is compared, but there is no doubt that he was the greatest or as great a British general as Montgomery as far as the British Army was concerned .

Till Slim took over the British and the Indian troops were plagued by an overwhelmingly inferiority complex as far as facing the Japanese in battle was concerned. This complex was a result of the long succession of British defeats since the fall of Malaya in 1942.

The standard Japanese tactics of infiltrating in the rear areas of the British Indian lines was too much for the nerves of the British Indian soldiers.

This is to Slim's credit that he restored confidence in the British Indian army units from the moment he took over command of the 14th Army.

Slim did so by a deliberate series of administrative tactical and operational measures, that enabled the 14th Army to face the much feared Japanese more effectively.

It is however a tribute to Japanese and German tenacity high morale and good generalship ; and a good indicator of the relative quality of British generalship in Second World War that both the major victories of the British i.e. at Alalamein in North Africa and Imphal Kohima in Burma were won in circumstances in which numerical and material factors heavily favoured the British!

The odds which the British Indian Army faced in Burma were never as severe as those faced by the Japanese army fighting against them. Logistically the British were on an extremely sound footing with more than one million Indians maintaining the lines of communication and manning the supply and transport echelons consisting of almost unlimited supplies of American stores and equipment.

On the other hand the Japanese were at the far end of a precarious and almost non existent line of communications comprising more than 600 miles of dirt roads which were almost totally non functional from April May to September due to heavy monsoons.

They had extremely limited manpower resources to reinforce their army or to replace their casualties, while Britain had whole of India's vast population of people eager to fight for a monthly salary of thirty or forty rupees minus the comfort girls consisting largely of Korean and Chinese

girls, which was perhaps the only advantage the Japanese had over the Indians ! **(11)**

In addition the British had complete air superiority and immense air supply potential thanks to the US aircrafts and could switch or regroup whole divisions from one sector to another hundreds of miles away in just few hours, or could aerially deliver supplies to formations whose line of communications was threatened by the enemy or temporarily disconnected because of adverse weather or terrain .

The Japanese had no such luxuries and survived on dry rations without being resupplied for weeks and months. The essential question in Burma was not of fighting prowess or greater valour but of space logistics and terrain, and all three favoured the British Indian Army.

Numerically the British Indian Army outnumbered the Japanese by two or three to one as a rule of the thumb in most battles.

The 14th Army which fought the Burma campaign has been called the largest single army in the world. Its battlefront of 700 miles was almost as long as the Russian front in Germany and roughly 700,000 out of the total approximately one million troops of the South East Asia Command under which 14th Army fought were Indian Army troops. **(12)**

The actual battle front over which actual battles were fought was however very short since the terrain was so adverse that few troops could be actively fielded to fight in a highly adverse jungle terrain devoid of any communications. Casualty wise the Burma campaign was a much smaller

affair than the major campaigns of Second World War.

In Burma Indians got an opportunity to handle tanks. Thanks to Slim's positive attitude towards Indians and shortage of British replacements Indians were trusted with tanks and the 254 Indian Tank Brigade (Grants and Stuarts) and 255 Indian Tank Brigade (Shermans) were formed.

The Western desert was an altogether different story. While Auchinleck and O'Connor were in command the Indians were deployed to fight the main infantry battles.

After Auchinleck's departure, his successor the less gifted though more lucky Montgomery, who had some subconscious bias against the more gifted Auchinleck and thus against the Indians tried to keep Indians in the background, despite General Tucker commanding the 4th Indian Division was not the sort of man who could be overawed by Montgomery types.

Tucker protested in writing to General J. Horrocks the commander 30 Corps. Horrocks forwarded Tucker's protest letter to Montgomery with the remarks that he entirely agreed with Tucker. At a much later stage in the North African campaign Montgomery did praise the Indians stating that his best formations were the 4th Indian and 7th Armoured Division. **(13)**

In Burma both the Indian tank brigades i.e. 254 (which led 33 Corps advance) and 255 (which led 4 Corps advance) had a limited infantry support role. .

It cannot be said that the Indians who fought as tankmen learnt anything really worthwhile about modern armoured warfare.

The tank warfare conducted in Burma was a one sided show with the British Indian Army having 300 most modern Grant and Sherman tanks **(14)** against just one Japanese Tank Regiment **(15)** consisting of tanks which could not have the firepower or capability to destroy the Grants and Shermans of the Indian tank brigades ! **(16)**

Mostly they were in support of infantry and the Japanese in front of them had hardly any tanks to match the heavy Shermans etc with which the Indian cavalry regiments were equipped .

Thus there were hardly any tank to tank fights since the Japanese hardly possessed anything to oppose the latest Sherman and Grant tanks.

In war once the enemy is vastly undergunned and underequipped to oppose you, little can be learned in terms of tactical or operational lessons.

There was one important measure which the British undertook and which most probably attracted the best available manpower to try to enrol in the Indian Armoured Corps. This was an almost doubling of the pay of the Armoured Corps soldiers from around 14 rupees to 30 rupees per month **(17)**.

In addition General Martel took measures to get rid of unsuitable manpower and tried to have the best available Indian officers posted to the Indian Armoured Corps.

In December 1943 the 14th Army launched a major offensive into Burma with the strategic objective of opening the Burma Road.

The offensive involved two major thrusts i.e. one in the north in Ledo Myitkyina area and one in the south in Arakan area. While these two attacks were in progress the Japanese launched a major attack starting from 816 March 1944 against the major part of the 14th Army based around Imphal in the centre.

This Japanese attack was not the prelude to an invasion of India as propagated by the British and believed to be the truth even now by many in Indo Pak. The primary aim of Japanese was only to forestall and dislocate the expected British offensive of 1943. **(18)**

The Japanese attack on Imphal was mounted by three infantry divisions, while a stronger British force of 60,000 men was well entrenched to defend Imphal.

Despite these odds the Japanese came very close to success but lost the battle mainly because of lack of initiative on part of one of their Divisional Commanders General Sato who could have easily severed the land communications of the British Indian troops holding Imphal Kohima area by capturing Dimapur which was almost undefended.

Sato did not do so because he did not have the intellect to appreciate that although he had not been ordered to attack Dimapur ; had he done so the British could not have held on to Imphal Kohima for long!

Slim was large hearted enough to admit the fact that had Sato left a small force to watch Kohima

and marched onwards with major part of his force to capture the railhead of Dimapur, he could have inflicted the most terrible damage on the British!

In Slims words it did not strike the bullet head of Sato and he failed to march forward to take undefended Dimpur **(19)** .

Now air power came into action. The British Airforce completely dominated the air. The Japanese had less than 200 aircrafts in entire Burma. The British on the other hand could supply Kohima-Imphal divisions whose strength had now increased to 120,000 men (despite having 35,000 others who were wounded) without any interference!

The ultimate test became that of aerial ability to supply forward troops, something which the British could do at will, while the Japanese were half starved and almost eating grass!

Finally on 16th July the Japanese commander gave the order to retreat!

The protracted effort to take Imphal strategically doomed the Japanese cause in Burma.

The Japanese lost more than 50,000 troops out of the total of 84,000 troops which they had brought into action in the battle of Imphal-Kohima against the vastly logistically and numerically British Indian force defending Imphal-Kohima ! **(21)**

The British who were in defence lost less than 17,000 out of a much larger total strength as compared with the Japanese. Six well supplied British Indian divisions had defeated the three Japanese Divisions at Imphal-Kohima. There was no miracle nor some exceptionally higher martial

fervour on the part of the British or Indians which had played a major role. In sum total the major difference was in superior numbers, airpower and superior leadership on part of Slim, that led to a Japanese defeat!

The story of the British reconquest of Burma and the final defeat of the Japanese Army was now only a foregone conclusion.

The major threat to the Japanese was in the Pacific and Burma was now an orphan as far as the priorities of the Japanese war effort were concerned.

The Japanese were unable to make up the losses suffered at the battle of Kohima-Imphai. Thus the subsequent offensive of the British Indian Army against the Japanese opposite 14th Army on the Central axis of British advance ; which was launched by approximately nine divisions as against just 21,000 Japanese **(22)** .

It must be remembered that the 14th Army was brilliantly led by Slim and it is to Slim's credit that he was able to use material superiority to achieve decisive victory.

Something which many other British commanders like Cunningham Ritchie etc had failed to achieve, despite enjoying material and numerical superiority!

The final offensive to capture Burma in 1945 involved two major forces i.e. the 14th Army under Slim which was to launch the main attack, supported by the US-Nationalist Chinese forces.

On 16th December 1945 both the forces linked up and pushed southwards towards Mandalay. The US Chinese force captured Lashio on 7th March thus reopening the Burma Road supply route to China.

Contrary to Slims initial hypothesis the Japanese decided to give the main battle south of Chindwin river. Slim brilliantly regrouped his forces and changed the weight of his main attack from the centre to the left, crossing the Chindwin by coup d main at Pakkoku Nyaungu and Chauk and racing on to Meiktila deep in the Japanese rear.

The 14th Army captured Mandalay on 20th March and Prome and Pegu on 2nd May 1945. Rangoon was captured by the 14th Army's 15th Corps by a seaborne assault on 3rd May.

The British offensive to recapture Burma launched in 1945 was almost entirely sustained by being supplied from the air.

According to Mountbatten 96 % of supplies went to the 14th Army by air and three quarters of these were lifted by the US Airforce. **(23)**

The Japanese could put up only 50 obsolete planes against over 800 allied combat aircraft (650 Bombers and 177 Fighters). **(25)**

British air superiority was such that even if the Japanese severed the line of communication of the advancing forces, the British simply supplied them by air till the formation was relieved by a landward thrust.

Thus the 17th Division and 255 Tank Brigade's communications were momentarily cut by Japanese once one of their detachments occupied

Taughta once the British were advancing towards Meiktila.

In absence of air supply potential this would have been a serious drawback but the British were so strong in air power that they simply kept the 17 Div and 255 Tank Brigade well supplied by air for two days and the Japanese were driven back. **(25)**

In the west the most important theatre of war where the Indian Army was deployed was the North African Desert. Here the role/contribution of the Indian units was much more limited as compared to Burma.

The most important contribution here was that of the Indian Infantry Divisions as far as the positional aspect of the highly armour oriented battle were concerned.

Names such as Indian Motorised Brigade etc which appear as one reads an account of the North African Campaign can lead the reader to false conclusions. Like the name 3rd Indian Motorised Brigade sounded impressive, but on ground this brigade consisted of three cavalry regiments (including my own regiment 11 Cavalry) mounted in unarmoured trucks and without any sort of wireless communication !

The first Indian formations to reach Egypt were the 11th and 5th Indian Infantry Brigades who reached Egypt in August and September 1939 and later became famous as the 4th Indian Division.

In November December the 4th Indian participated alongwith the 7th British Armoured Division in the famous battle of Siddi Barani in which Graziani's Italian Army was routed .

The 4th Indian Division could not however take part in the pursuit of the Italians into Libya since it was now switched over to operations against Italian held Abyssinia and Somaliland in East Africa.

In September 1940 the 5th Indian Division reached Sudan and later took part in the conquest of Italian held Abyssinia along with the 4th Indian Division which had reached Sudan following Sidi Barani in December 1940.

It was during this campaign that the first Indian officer Victoria Cross was won on 4th December 1940 by Lieutenant Premindra Singh Bhagat a from Indian Sappers and Miners. **(26)**

In March 1941 the 3rd Indian Motorised Brigade (2nd Royal Lancers, P.A.V.O Cavalry and 18th Cavalry) reached Cyrenaica.

In April this brigade came in contact with Rommel's Africa Corps advancing from El Agheila after having routed the British 2nd Armoured Division.

With lorries and no supporting artillery all that 3rd Motorised Indian Brigade could do was to extricate and withdraw as fast as they could!

In the Crusader Battles the 4th Indian held the frontier wire defences opposite and was tasked to capture the Libyan Omar held by the Italian and German infantry, a task which was accomplished by 30th November 1941.

The role of the Indian 4th Division was limited but proved that Indians could still face the Germans as well as in France in 1914.

In December 1941 the Division took part in the pursuit of the Germans till Benghazi. Once Rommel struck the British once again in January 1942, the

4th Indian Division under Major General Francis Tucker's able leadership carried out a balanced withdrawal all the way back to Gazala with just 600 casualties out of a total strength of 12,000 men **(27)** .

The 4th Indian division and 3rd Motorised Brigade took part in the battle of Gazala which was a classic example of phenomenal incompetence of the higher British commanders.

Ritchie the 8th Army commander lost the battle despite considerable material and numerical superiority and 8th Army was forced to withdraw to Alamein where Rommel was finally defeated in November 1942 by Montgomery in a highly uneven and one sided battle whose issue was never in doubt and in which material and numerical superiority of an exceptionally high degree made British victory a foregone conclusion!

The role of Indians was limited unlike Burma and the two Indian Divisions i.e. the 4th and 5th were employed in battles in which infantry whether British or Australian had a far more limited role than tanks.

Indian cavalry was employed in light reconnaissance role and was equipped with lorries or light armoured cars.

In Italy also the Indians were employed as infantry and performed all their operational tasks well. It must be added that Italian campaign was also, merely another example of incompetent allied generalship, where the allied achievements were not commensurate with all the material and numerical advantages that they possessed.

It important to add that the future Indian and Pakistan armies carried forward a legacy of conservatism in military thought, extreme caution in execution, and an orders oriented approach inherited from what the young Indian officer witnessed in Burma or North Africa.

Mellenthin a great German General Staff Officer who fought against the British in North Africa indirectly described the British Staff Officers as devoid of any initiative and little more than clerks and mouthpieces of their commanders . **(28)**

No discussion of the Indian Army is complete without discussing the Indian National Army which the Japanese formed out of the Indian prisoners captured mostly in Malaya/Singapore. Many Indians joined it and many did not do so.

Many joined it out of genuine internal motivation and some to escape the monotony as well as the extremely harsh conditions of the Japanese prisoner of war camps. The Japanese armed the Indian National Army very poorly **(29)** since their own army was under supplied logistically.

The figures of the whole affair were as following. There were approximately 55,000 Indian prisoners. 5,000 prisoners remained staunch non volunteers. The Japanese provided weapons for 16,000 , although 55,000 including 18,000 Indian Civilians) enlisted . **(30)** Another estimate states that 20,000 Indian soldiers joined the INA . **(31)**

6,000 INA men participated in the Battle of Imphai-Kohima out of which 400 were killed, 2,000 were admitted as sick into hospital, 1,500 died of disease and starvation, 715 were captured and about 800 surrendered . **(32)** Out of the total of 15,500 who

enlisted 5,000 surrendered or deserted, 7,000 were captured and 2,000 escaped **(33)**

Shaukat Riza condemned the INA **(34)** and so did many others. They were not allowed to enlist in the post 1947 Indian or Pakistani armies.

It must be remembered that the British won in both Burma and North Africa because of massive material and numerical superiority.

Thus their Indian junior officers could not have possibly learnt much in terms of operational art from them ; apart from good British table manners.

It is true that the British created the Indian Army and laid the foundations of a modern officer corps. It is fair however to add that organisationally doctrinally and in terms of mission oriented approach, the Indians learnt little from the British.

In any case there was little experience in commanding formations higher than infantry battalions or tank squadrons for most Indians.

The only Indian who commanded an infantry brigade in actual operations was Brigadier Thimaya from the Indian Army , and that too only in an officiating capacity for few weeks".

Further it must be remembered that though at the end of the war there were approximately 8,340 Indian officers in the Indian Army , **(36)** Very few of these ever commanded anything beyond an infantry company or a tank troop.

Most of the Indian officers belonged to the administrative arms/services like A.S.C or Ordnance.

As a matter of fact Major Praval an eminent historian of the Indian Army observed that an officer who became a Major General in the Indian Army soon after the war; was a censor officer during war, while another Major General was in charge of a "Dil Khush Sabha" or entertaining troupes of singers and girls during the war ! **(37)**

General Gul Hassan also mentioned a similar officer in charge of a "Dil Khush Sabha" who later on became a general officer; and that too a very pompous and snobbish one; in the post 1947 Pakistan Army! **(38)** A quick glance at the following casualty figures gives us a more accurate idea of the Indian Army casualties as far as the relative significance is concerned :-

TABLE GIVING COMPARATIVE CASUALTIES OF VARIOUS DOMINION ARMIES AND THE INDIAN ARMY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
(39)

| COUNTRY/REGION | KILLED | MISSING | WOUNDED | TOTAL |
|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| GREAT BRITAIN | 233,042 | 57,472 | 275,975 | 566,489 |
| INDIA | 23,295 | 12,264 | 62,064 | 97,623 |
| CANADA | 36,018 | 2,866 | 53,073 | 91,957 |
| AUSTRALIA | 21,415 | 6,519 | 37,477 | 65,411 |
| NEWZEALAND | 9,844 | 2,201 | 19,253 | 31,298 |
| COLONIES | 6,741 | 14,811 | 6,773 | 28,235 |
| SOUTH AFRICA | 6,417 | 1,980 | 13,773 | 22,170 |

General Tucker gave a detailed analysis of Indian casualties **(40)**, which is slightly different from the above mentioned figures:--

| SERIAL GENERAL FRANCIS TUCKERS FIGURES OF INDIAN ARMY NO CASUALTIES IN WW TWO | | |
|--|---|---------|
| 1 | KILLED | 24,338 |
| 2 | WOUNDED | 64,354 |
| 3 | MISSING | 11,754 |
| 4 | PRISONERS (OUT OF WHICH LARGE NUMBERS DIED) | 79,849 |
| TOTAL | | 179,935 |

Shaukat Riza who was bent upon proving in his extreme old age during Zia's tenure in which a Jullandhari East Punjabi Muslim cliques dictatorship was thrust upon Pakistan under the farce of religion makes yet another glaring distortion of history in his book on the history of the Pakistan Army.

Shaukat claims that in 1939 70 % of the rank and file was Muslim! **(41)**

This is not true. As a matter of fact the Muslim percentage was around 37.64 % in January 1940 as we have already discussed in the beginning of this chapter.

Major General Shaukat Riza or "Chaudhri Mohammad Shaukat Riza of the Survey battery of 1948 "as the official history described Shaukat Riza **(42)** ; the man who dropped the prefix Chaudhri, which Shaukat found as a bit too rural as he rose higher, as later records reveal, wanted to say something without actually saying it in black and white; when he said that 70% of the Indian Army troops were Muslims.

A civilian or a foreigner may not understand the ulterior motivational biases of Shaukat Raza who was just one typical average Punjabi Muslim Pakistan army officer. Shaukat cannot be blamed for this chauvinism, it is but human to project the ethno-religious group to which one belongs, but not at the cost of history !

As one who served in the Army understand it to the pin point, ie that Shaukat was trying to say that even before the partition the Punjabi Muslims were the only martial race in India!

As a race I have deep respect and regard for the Punjabis, they are as good or as bad as any race of the subcontinent, but I will not for one minute agree to the ridiculous assertion that there is any difference between Punjabi Hindus or Muslim or Sikhs as far as individual valour is concerned .

If there was a difference, it was in terms of collective experience as a ethno religious group and in this regard I have ten times more respect for the Sikhs than for the Punjabi Hindus or Muslims who are equally good but second to Sikhs as far as intrinsic qualitative superiority as a separate ethno-religious group is concerned.

And this is so because of the peculiar "Challenges" which the Sikhs faced, not because they were Punjabis but because they were from the Sikh faith.


A similar parallel though on a much smaller scale can be seen in the Punjabi Qadiani Muslims, who although Punjabi were qualitatively superior to other non Qadiani Punjabi Muslims, because of being subjected to persecution and produced two of Pakistan Army's finest soldiers i.e. Generals Akhtar Malik and Eftikhar Khan Janjua.


If Punjabis were good soldiers it was not so because they were Sikhs or Hindus or Muslims but because the current of history placed them in a peculiar situation where it was both in British and Punjabi interest to soldier for initially the East India Company and later for the British Crown.

We will deal with this factor in a greater detail at a later stage, but at this point I will only state that if this was wholly true the Pakistan Army in 1965 with more martial soldiers, better equipment and better tanks should have really convincingly thrashed those non martial Indians! How is it that such a martial race had never had anything to do with any invasion of India between

1099 and 1857, but suddenly became martial between 1849 and 1911.

Interestingly no Muslim from Pindi Division won a VC in Second World War.





When I was commissioned in the Pakistan Army I very frequently heard the myth that most of fighting troops of the Indian Army Second World War were Muslims, and that too from Jhelum Chakwal etc.

This myth probably played a part in Indian Armys underestimation by many senior officers in Pakistan till 1965 and as late as 1971.

No evidence proves that Muslims of any ethnicity or race , not even from Pindi Division were in majority in fighting arms in the Second World War. General Tucker did a great service to military history by providing the table below:--

| REGIMENT | CASTE HINDUS | MUSLIMS | SIKHS | OTHERS |
|---------------------|-----------------|---------|-------|--------|
| 1 PUNJAB | 1/2 | 1/2 | NIL | NIL |
| 2 PUNJAB | 1/3 | 1/3 | 1/3 | NIL |
| MADRAS | 1/2 | 1/4 | NIL | 1/4 |
| INDIAN GRENADIERS | 1/2 | 1/2 | NIL | NIL |
| MAHRATTA | 1 | NIL | NIL | NIL |
| RAJPUT RIFLES | 2/3 | 1/3 | NIL | NIL |
| RAJPUT | 1/2 | 1/2 | NIL | NIL |
| 8 PUNJAB | 1/4 | 1/2 | 1/4 | NIL |
| JAT | 1/2 | 1/2 | NIL | NIL |
| BALUCH | 1/4 | 3/4 | NIL | NIL |
| SIKH | NIL | 1/4 | 3/4 | NIL |
| FF REGIMENT | 1/4 | 1/2 | 1/4 | NIL |
| FF RIFLES | 1/4 | 1/2 | 1/4 | NIL |
| 14 PUNJAB | 1/4 | 1/2 | 1/4 | NIL |
| 15 PUNJAB | 1/4 | 1/2 | 1/4 | NIL |
| 16 PUNJAB | 1/3 | 1/3 | 1/3 | NIL |
| DOGRA | 1 | NIL | NIL | NIL |
| RAMGARH RIFLES | 1 | NIL | NIL | NIL |
| KUMAON | 1 | NIL | NIL | NIL |
| ASSAM | NIL | NIL | NIL | 1 |
| SIKH LIGHT INFANTRY | NIL | NIL | 1 | NIL |
| MAHAR | NIL | NIL | NIL | 1 |
| BIHAR | NIL | NIL | NIL | 1 |
| TOTAL | 9 1/3 | 6 3/4 | 3 2/3 | 3 1/4 |

It may be noted that General Francis Tucker was an expert on class composition of Indian Army and long before any Muslim leader including Mr Jinnah could even visualize , had presented to the Indian Army Chief FM Auchinleck , a scheme how to divide Indian Army. **(44)**

Even for the Armoured Corps Major General Shaukat Rizas wild assertions about Muslim majority in fighting arms have no connection with hard reality.

| TANK UNIT | HINDUST-ANI MUSLIM & RANGHAR | PUN-JABI MUS-LIM | PATHAN MUSLIM | KAIM KHANI MUSL-IM | DECCANI MUSLIM | HINDU RAJPUT | HINDU JATS | SIKH | DOGRA HINDU |
|---------------------|------------------------------|------------------|---------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------|------------|---------|-------------|
| SKINNE-RS HORSE | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | |
| 2 LANCERS | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | |
| 3 CAVALRY | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | |
| 4 HORSE | | | | | | | | 2 | 1 |
| 7 LIGHT CAV | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | |
| 8 LIGHT CAV | | | | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | |
| DECCAN H | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | |
| SCINDE. H | 1 (R) | | 1 | | | | | 1 | |
| 16 LIGHT. C | 1/2 | | | 1/2 | | 1 | 1 | | |
| POONA H | | | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | |
| 18 CAVALRY | | | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | |
| CENTRAL IDIA HORSE | | 1 | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| 45 CAVALRY | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| 61 CAVALRY | | | | 2 | | 1 | | | |
| 13 LANCERS | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | |
| GUIDES | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| P.A.V.O 11 CAVALRY | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | |
| PROBYNS HORSE | | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| 6 LANCERS | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | |
| 19 LANCERS | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | |
| VICEROYS BODY GUARD | | 1/2 | | | | | | 1/2 | |
| TOTAL | 6 1/2 | 6 1/2 | 5 | 4 1/2 | 1 | 7 | 12 | 13 1/2 | 5 |
| PERCENTAGE | 10.65 % | 10.65 % | 8.19 % | 7.37 % | 1.63 % | 11.47 % | 19.67 % | 22.13 % | 8.19 % |

SUMMARY OF CLASS COMPOSITION OF INDIAN ARMoured CORPS IN 1946 AS PER RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION (IN SQUADRONS) :-

| MUSLIM SQUADRONS | HINDU SQUADRONS | SIKH SQUADRONS |
|------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 23.5 SQUADRONS | 24 SQUADRONS | 13.5 SQUADRONS |

If we analyse the ethnic/religious figures of the recruits who joined the Indian Army during the Second World War, nothing proves that Muslims were in majority even in the fighting arms.

Now we will examine the figures of all recruits of the Indian Army ethnicity wise as well as arm wise for the entire We have already discussed in the first paragraph of this chapter that Indian Army before the war consisted of approximately 96 regular infantry battalions and 18 cavalry regiments.

This meant that approximately 90 to 95 ,000 Indians were in the fighting arms and approximately 100,000 to 110,000 Indians were in other supporting arms and services.

We have already discussed that Muslims were about 38 % of the totalThe cavalry and the infantry class composition above mentioned clearly proves that Muslims were not in the majority in the fighting arms.The same was the case for services/supporting arms etc.

We have earlier discussed that about 534,991 men were recruited to the fighting arms in the war,while 13,42,008 were recruited to the service.

Now the following facts prove that majority of the Muslim recruits did not go to the fighting armsThese statistics cover the recruitment in the Indian Army during the period of WW II :- **(45)**

| MUSLIMS | | HINDUS | | SIKHS | | OTHERS |
|-----------|---------|----------|-----------|--------------|---------|---------|
| PUNJABI | 314,356 | GURKHAS | 109,702 | JAT SIKHS | 44,751 | 243,434 |
| PATHANS | 65,103 | MADRASIS | 302,732 | MAZHBI S | 33,244 | |
| ASSAMESE | 3,122 | BRAHMANS | 66,608 | OTHERS | 34,383 | |
| BALUCHIS | 1,195 | RAJPUTS | 73,121 | | | |
| BENGALIS | 61,615 | DOGRAS | 29,944 | | | |
| DEKHANIS | 19,354 | JATS | 71,339 | | | |
| HAZARAS | 23,884 | GARHWALI | 18,932 | | | |
| HINDUSTAN | 27,638 | BENGALI | 19,239 | | | |
| MADRASIS | 28,799 | GUJARS | 15,865 | | | |
| MEOS | 2757 | MAHRATTA | 58,421 | | | |
| RANGHARS | 7581 | CHAMARS | 7,453 | | | |
| OTHERS | 61,949 | KUMAONIS | 20,110 | | | |
| | | MAHARS | 10,059 | | | |
| | | ASSAMESE | 2,772 | | | |
| | | AHIRS | 38,150 | | | |
| | | OTHERS | 220,389 | | | |
| GRAND | 617,353 | GRAND | 10,64,836 | GRAND | 112,378 | 243,434 |

- a. 61,615 Bengali Muslims, since no Bengali fighting arm unit was raised in the second world war. This brings down the number of Muslims recruited theoretically eligible to join the fighting arms to 555,738.
- b. 109,702 Gurkhas recruited did not go the supporting arms/services as far as the large majority was concerned since Gurkhas were elite troops and not wasted in services/supporting arms. This brings the number of theoretically eligible Muslims for the fighting arms to 446,036.

- c. All 29,944 Dogras and 18,932 Garhwalis also could not have gone to the services or supporting arms since the Dogras and Kumaon regiments were single class regiments and both the communities were recruited almost exclusively for fighting arms. This brings down the total of theoretically eligible Muslim down to 397,160.
- d. There was extremely limited quota for Hindustani Muslims in infantry which constituted the bulk of the fighting arms men recruited during the war (43,030 recruits for armoured corps and 491,961 for infantry). Further Hindustani Muslims shared the quota to the much smaller 10.65 % quota in the armoured corps with Ranghars. This quota translated on paper meant that not more than 2500 of Hindustani Muslims could have gone to armoured corps and much less to infantry. This reduces the Hindustani Muslims theoretically eligible for fighting arms to just about 5,000 men even if we make the liberal assumption that 2,500 recruits may have gone to infantry. Thus the remaining i.e. 22,638 out of the total 27,638 Hindustani Muslims could not have gone to the fighting arms. This brings the total number of theoretically eligible Muslim recruits to the fighting arms to 469,323.
- e. A maximum number 38.52 % Muslims could go to the armoured corps as we have seen in the above mentioned tables. This means that theoretically out of 43,030 recruits of the armoured corps only a maximum of about 17,000 could have been Muslim. This reduces the theoretically eligible fighting arm non

Muslim recruit figure as far as the armoured corps was concerned as approximately 26,030 recruits. This reduces a further 26,030 theoretically eligible Muslims from armoured corps and thus to the fighting arms to 443,293.

- f. We have already seen that the largest infantry group of Indian Infantry i.e. had Y, or 1/3 Muslim quota .Therefore it is logical that the Muslim representation in infantry could not have been more than a figure between half and one third recruits. In any case it was not possible that all 315,356 Punjabi Muslim recruits could have all constituted the total infantry recruit figure of 491,961 or that no Punjabi Muslim was a part of 13,42,008 men who were recruited in supporting arms/services like engineers artillery and other corps'.
- g. Nine infantry groups of the Indian Army were exclusively non Muslim and did not accept any Muslims.

There may be certain errors in the above statistics but there is no doubt that Muslims did not constitute bulk of the rank and file at all, or even the fighting arms (infantry and cavalry), as Shaukat Riza claims.

It is important to refute this baseless claim since it led to the formation of various baseless myths which created a false sense of superiority in the Pakistan Army which proved counter productive in both 1965 and 1971.

These myths were created and fostered by the pre 1947 officers of the Indian Army who served in the Pakistan Army after partition and Shaukat Riza was

merely one of many such people. We have already seen that Muslims did not constitute the majority of the fighting arms i.e. infantry and cavalry.

Even If we take the Indian Army of the Second World War period; statistics prove that Muslims were not in majority :- **(46)**

INDIAN ARMY ON 1st JANUARY 1940 AND FINAL THEORETICAL STRENGTH AT THE END OF WORLD WAR TWO

| <u>PERIOD</u> | <u>TOTAL STRENGTH OR TOTAL MEN RECRUITED</u> | <u>NUMBER/% OF MUSLIMS</u> | <u>AGE</u> | <u>NUMBER/ % AGE OF NON MUSLIMS</u> |
|--|--|----------------------------|------------|-------------------------------------|
| <u>TOTAL STRENGTH AS ON JANUARY 01 1940</u> | 247,965 | 93,346 | | 154,619 |
| | | 37.64 % | | 62.36 % |
| <u>NUMBERS RECRUITED DURING THE WAR</u> | 20,38,001 | 617,353 | | 14,20,648 |
| | | 30.29 % | | 69.71 % |
| <u>GRAND TOTAL OF INITIAL STRENGTH AND NUMBERS OF COMBATANTS RECRUITED</u> | 22,85,966 | 710,699 | | 15,75,267 |
| | | 31.08 % | | 68.92 % |

Books written in Pakistan try to prove that Muslims inhabiting areas which constitute Pakistan were more anti British. On the contrary these areas remained absolutely peaceful as far as the Punjabi Muslims, its majority group were concerned.

The Sikhs however were involved in significant revolutionary activity. Already before the Second World War a recruitment ban was imposed on certain Sikh villages, since they were regarded as too anti British. **(47)**

No such ban was ever imposed on any Punjabi Muslim village. In the Second World War also the only serious incident of military defiance took

place in a Punjabi Sikh unit i.e. the Central India Horse in which one squadron refused to embark for Egypt at Bombay.

Thus 108 Sikhs were court martialled in July 1940. Four were executed and 100 sentenced to transportation . **(48)**

Punjab albeit non Muslim led India in defying the British as far as the Indian Army was concerned. How can we change history!

How can anyone create a Chakwal Punjabi Muslim or even any other Muslim ,who did anything similar, while not in the safety of a Japanese prisoner of war camp!

It is an unfortunate ironic and strange paradox of history, that bravery defiance and heroism are produced not by religion or race in particular but by the peculiar experience of any race or religion.

The Sikhs though Punjabis proved qualitatively superior than both the other two i.e. the Muslim and the Hindu Punjabis. But they proved equally tough in battle winning a proportionately larger number of gallantry awards than any other Punjabi community. These indomitable Sikhs had been influenced by Kirti Lebar revolutionary communist propaganda. In 1940 a ban was placed on Sikh recruitment . **(49)**

The more pragmatic Sikhs however realised that they would lose a lot in the Army if Sikh recruitment was stopped, since the British had already decided to leave India.

Thus as a result of efforts of Sardar Baldev Singh and the ruler of Patiala Sikh recruitment was resumed again in 1940-41.

In Sindh two infantry brigades were committed in anti Hnr operations in 1942. This raises the level of the Sindh; Muslims higher in the scale of defying the British than all other provinces of present Pakistan except the tribal areas of Frontier where a larger British force was committed in controlling the anti British tribesmen !

Here in the tribal area the Fakir of Ipi who was assisted by the Germans with financial support kept three regular brigades and the considerably large corps of Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts occupied . **(50)**

In books written forty five or fifty years after partition in Pakistan one sometimes comes across the fantastic assertion that British reduced Muslim recruitment in the Indian Army during the course of Second World War!

This wild assertion is as true as the famous "when shrimps learn to whistle" joke of Khrushchev! The Muslims in general and the Punjabi Muslims in particular proved their 1857 and 1914-18 staunchness once again in 1939-45.

There was no policy deliberately executed to reduce the Muslim recruitment on part of the British during world war two. The increase in non Muslim recruits and non Punjabi recruits had a deeper connection with the available eligible manpower resources of Punjab which population wise was much smaller than Madras or UP.

Even within Punjab most of the manpower was recruited from areas north of Chenab river which were rain irrigated and where joining the army was the only viable option in most cases. These areas contributed large recruits but the war demand was

greater and the immense requirements of manpower in Engineers ASC and other arms could not be met by recruiting from Punjab alone. Thus Madras Bombay Bengal and UP were incorporated.

The Muslim League was regarded as a more loyalist party than congress in the period 1939-45 and Mr Jinnah was against non cooperation with the British as far as the war effort was concerned.

Outwardly defensive and somewhat unheroic this policy was Jinnah's masterstroke since it greatly improved British perceptions about Muslims as those who stood by their side unlike the Congress in the dark days of the Second World War!

Above all it led to a great increase of Muslim League influence in the Muslim majority provinces where the Muslim League was able for the first time to form its own ministries and greatly improve its previously extremely theoretical and flimsy organisation.

The policy of loyalism to the British in which the Muslims in general and the Punjabi Muslims in particular led whole of India however unheroic, did play a major part in Mr Jinnah's success in defeating Congress-British designs during the Simla Talks.

When President Roosevelt of USA exerted pressure on Churchill to negotiate with the Congress in connection with India's freedom, Churchill bluffed Roosevelt by telling him that he could not ignore the Muslims since they constituted 75 % **(51)** of the Indian Army (something which was factually totally incorrect).

This was the result of Jinnah's somewhat opportunistic, but essentially brilliant, approach of conditional cooperation with the British War Effort.

Brilliant , I would say; in view of the on ground peculiar subjective realities of the Sub Continent,with the Muslims in minority and under threat of being crushed under the tyranny of the Hindu majority (unfortunately it was later replaced by tyranny of West Pakistani majority!!!!) .

There is however no truth in the fantastic assertion advanced by many in Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s that Muslim recruitment during the war was decreased because Pakistan Movement was gaining momentum!

If any community really defied the British as far as the army was concerned it was the Sikh community,and this led to a temporary ban on their recruitment.

The chances of failure or success in rebellion against a foreign master is not important,as far as net worth of a particular community/group is concerned.

What is important is how they behaved,and there is no doubt that the Sikhs were the only community in the army who did anything close enough to real defiance cursory glance at the recruitment figures proves that the number of Muslims recruited in the army was much higher than their total population warranted.

It has also been wrongly asserted that the Muslims suffered more in the post 1945 demobilisation and reduction of the Indian Army!

No one has been able to cite any figures to prove this. Most of the recruitment had been done as we have already discussed in detail in the supporting arms and services.

The overall reduction of Muslim percentage from pre war figure of approximately 36% to 30% was the result of the fact that Muslims were in minority in India as a whole and once the army was expanded the overall potential eligible number of Muslim recruits became lesser and lesser as the war demands increased.

The pre 1939 Indian Army was maintained for limited defensive and a major internal security role. The post 1940 scenario was entirely different and the limited total population of major Muslim recruiting regions between Chenab and Indus rivers, simply could not cater for the war demands.

The population of Rawalpindi Division from which most of the Muslim soldiers were recruited was barely 24.7% of the total Muslim population of Punjab. The bulk of the remaining except Ranghars (not Punjabis by race but in Punjab area) all lived in canal irrigated areas and were not interested in joining the army.

Administrative units were raised for purely war specific functions relating to logistic efforts in Burma Persia Iraq North Africa etc. Muslims were never in majority in these units and once these were disbanded after the war, all communities who were recruited in the war suffered. The simple fact is that 70% of the men recruited in the war were non Muslims.

Thus it was natural that once the army was reduced the larger community suffered. There has

been a great deal of talk about this myth in Pakistan, although no one has been able to cite specific figures to prove this fantastic assertion. These are good indoctrination myths, but absolute trash as far as pure history is concerned.

A historian cannot be a Muslim or Hindu or Christian, at least as far as the employment of his intellectual faculties while he is writing history are concerned.

As a soldier I will fight for the Pakistan Army and above all for its cavalry against any army, Muslim or non Muslim, but once one picks the pen one cannot write a purely Muslim Christian or Hindu history! It will be good for the mental health of the Pakistani Muslims to accept the fact that the majority of population of old West Pakistan and present Pakistan were the most loyal British subjects of pre 1947 India!

Why this was so and whether it was good or bad is an altogether different issue, but this was how things were. Mr Jinnah had a difficult task in front of him since the majority of Muslim League leaders under him were essentially loyalist people and he had to make use of them. If any people defied the British in a significant manner, these were the tribal Pathans after 1849 and the Hindustani/Ranghar Muslims in 1857.

After 1857 by and large Muslims whether from Punjab or UP were more loyal British citizens than the Hindu Bengalis who led the more militant type of revolutionary movement against the British.

Mr Jinnah's greatness primarily lies in his brilliant leadership in leading an essentially more intellectually backward and more loyalist Muslim

middle and higher classes, and in convincing the British about the Pakistan demand, despite reservations of British against division of India.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Pages-100 to 102-F.W Peny-Op Cit.
- 2 Pages-120 to 129- Annual Return showing Class Composition of the Indian Army, Indian State Forces, Frontier Corps Levies. Military Police Assam Rifles Burma Frontier Force Hong Kong Singapore Artillery- India Office Library Records-L/MIL/14/234.
- 3 Page-138-C.C Trench-Op Cit.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Pages-243 & 244- History of the Second World War --Captain B.H Liddell Hart-Pan Books-London-1970.
- 6 Page-234-Ibid.
- 7 Pages-243 & 244-Ibid.
- 8 Pages-246-Ibid.
- 9 Pages-247-Ibid.
- 10 Calculated from various tables and statistics given in Appendix-Fifteen- Expansion of Armed Forces and Defence Organisation-1939-1945 -S.N Prasad and Dharm Pal-Combined Inter Services Historical Section-India and Pakistan- 1956.
- 11 There were approximately 139,000 comfort women forced into prostitution. Most of these were Koreans and others like Chinese, Philipino, Indo Chinese, Japanese, Thai, Malaysian and British-Dutch served in relatively less numbers providing forced free sex to approximately 7 Million Japanese

troops (a Herculean/Gigantic task) in all theatres of war (Page-xix- The Comfort Women -George Hicks- Allen and Unwin-Australia-1995.The modern day Government of South Korea has dumped this issue and is more keen to do business with modern Japan!

12 Page-579- While Memory Serves- Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tucker- Cassell and Company-London-1950.

13 Pages-223 & 229-C.C Trench-Op Cit.

14 Page-277-Ibid.

15 Page-3 & 4-Campaign of the 14ili Army-1944-45- Campaign of the 14ili Army in Burma-Compiled by 14th ArmyHeadquarter-1945-Printed in Government Printing Press-Calcutta.Presented by Field Marshal Sir William Slim,Chief of the Imperial General Stafffor use by the Pakistani Armed Forces.

16 For the relative inferiority of the Japanese tanks see-Pages-240 to 251- Hand Book on Japanese Military Forces-US War Department-Technical Manuai-TM-E-30-480 -!October 1944-United States Government Printing Office Washington-1944-Reprinted by Louisiana State University Press-Baton Rouge-1995. Slint does not tell us anything about the overwhelming British tank superiority in his otherwise excellent book Defeat into Victory .Neither does General Gul Hassan who was then serving as an ADC and was to later lament about the anti armour bias in the Post 1947 Pakistan Army.

17 Pages-187 & 188- Our Armoured Forces-Lieutenant General G.L.Q Martel-Faber and Faber-London-1949.

- 18 Page-537-Liddell Hart-WW TWO-Op Cit.
- 19 Page-311- Defeat into Victory -Field Marshal Sir William Slim-Cassell and Company-London-1956.
- 20 Page-543-Liddell Hart-WW TWO-Op Cit.
- 21 Page-544-Ibid.
- 22 Page-663-Ibid.
- 23 Pages-481 & 482 of Article- The Strategy of the South East Asia Campaign -Admiral Viscount Mountbatten-Journal of Royal United Service Institution-November 1946-
- 24 Page-668-Liddell Hart-WW TWO-Op Cit.
- 25 Page-666-Ibid and Pages-20 & 21-Campaign of the 14th Army-1944-1945-
- 26 Pages-143 and 144-C.C Trench-The Indian Army-Op Cit.
- 27 Page-174-C.C Trench-Op Cit.
- 28 Pages-89 7& 90-Panzer Battles -General Von Mellenthin-Corgi/Bantam Books-USA-1977.
- 29 Pages-142 & 144- The Forgotten Army-India's Armed Struggle for Independence-1942-1945 -Peter Ward Fay-First Published by University ofMichigan-1994-Reprinted by Rupa and Co-New Delhi-1994.
- 30 Pages-525 & 526-Ibid.
- 31 Page-459-Ibid.
- 32 Page-125-The Springing Tiger-Hugh Toye-Cassell-London-1955.
- 33 Page-397-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

- 34 Pages-23 to 26-Shaukat Riza-The Pakistan Army-1947-49-0p Cit.
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CHAPTER NINE

THE DIVISION OF THE INDIAN ARMY AND THE INITIAL ORGANISATION OF THE PAKISTAN ARMY

The Indian Army was drastically reduced after the second world war. This was a natural and logical step based on financial considerations and the future non utility of large number of administrative airborne and logistic units raised to support the war effort in various theatres of war.

The rank and file and the officer corps had experienced a tenfold increase. The British decided to reduce the army and the Wilcox Committee under Lieutenant General Sir Henry Wilcox was convened to make recommendations regarding the post war reduced composition of the Indian Army. Wilcox Committee recommended a reduction to approximately 280,000 men . **(1)**

These recommendations were implemented and by August 1947, when power was transferred

the army was still going through this process of reduction and had been reduced to 400,000 men from the 1945 total strength of over two million men ! **(2)**

The Wilcox Committee also recommended retention of 850 Indian officers out of the total approximate 8,000 Indian officers granted Emergency commissions during the war, while retaining the entire cadre of pre war regular Indian commissioned officers. This meant that Wilcox Committee visualised a total of approximately 850 officers, subdivided into 400 pre war regular Indian officers and 450 Emergency Commissioned Officers which were to be selected from the entire lot of 8,000 total ECOS commissioned during the war. **(3)**

This figure of 850 officers was highly unrealistic and too small for the post 1947 Pakistan and Indian Armies and this proposal was not implemented.

Since 1947 it has been alleged that many gifted Muslim officers commissioned during the war were not granted permanent commission during the downsizing process; since the selection boards were Hindu dominated. The authors of these books have failed to cite the name of a single Muslim officer who did well in the war on the basis of gallantry awards and was not retained.

The conduct of 1948 and 1965 wars however certainly proves that the supposedly biased Hindu officers on the selection board possessed tremendous human insight not to weed out some highly incompetent Muslim as well as Hindu and Sikh officers who finally joined the Pakistan and Indian Army and rose to great heights!

No attempt was made after 1947 to rehabilitate or reinduct in the post 1947 Pakistan Army to re commission those supposedly gifted officers weeded out by the allegedly Hindu dominated boards'

We have already seen that the first man to practically visualise the division of Indian Army on communal lines was the brilliant British Indian Army officer General Tucker. Tucker had worked out the exact mechanics of this division and had submitted these to the Indian Army Chief and Viceroy in late 1945.

The scheme was rejected by both Wavell and Auchinleck. The partition of India in 1947 into Pakistan and India necessitated the division of the Indian Army.

It was perfectly logical and natural that two countries could not have one army. Jinnah the founder of Pakistan saw it very clearly and took a firm stand about it despite vigorous opposition by the British.

The British argument against division of the army was illogical without precedent and based on selfish considerations about the future defence of the commonwealth!

In this regard Mr Jinnah ably assisted by his team played a most decisive role, which if explained in detail would merit a whole book. Mr Jinnah was too brilliant to be duped in this regard for both Wavell and specially Mountbatten who was more famous for a series of brilliant and unprecedented disasters **(4)** in his entire coveted naval career!

Again the list of these disasters is long enough to constitute a book on naval incompetence! Mr Jinnah countered the British argument by stating that if joint defence was necessary it could be accomplished through a joint defence treaty on basis of sovereign equality. **(5)**

Once the British failed to convince Jinnah not to divide the Indian Army, they changed their tactics and started insisting on not dividing the Indian Army till June 1948.

Jinnah correctly insisted that the armed forces must be divided by the date of transfer of power i.e. 14 August 1947. **(6)**

The salient aspects of the final plan to divide the Indian Army were as following, announced by the Partition Council set up on 26 June 1947 under the chairmanship of Viceroy Mountbatten and six members (three from the Indian National Congress and three from the Muslim League) announced the guidelines for the division of the armed forces on 30 June 1947. The salient points were as following :-- **(8)**

- a. The ratio of division was agreed at 64:36 on India Pakistan basis. All manpower movable stores assets equipment etc were to be divided on the basis of this ratio. Out of the approximate 400,000 total troops of the Indian Army roughly 260,000 went to India and 140,000 to Pakistan.!! may be noted that the Wilcox Commissions proposed reduction which had been agreed to by Indian Army Headquarters and was in the process of being implemented was stopped in June 1947 in view of the imminent partition of India.
- b. India and Pakistan respectively were to have within their territory forces predominantly Non Muslim and Muslim respectively. These would be under control of India and

Pakistan's respective governments from 15 August 1947 onwards.

- c. Selection of heads of services of the two Dominions straightaway and entrusting the selected heads with the authority to establish their headquarters, so that they are in a position to take command of their respective forces by 15 August 1947.
- d. The two forces were to be under the administrative control of the Supreme Commander. However Operational control over all units was to be exercised by the respective C in Cs. The Supreme Commander had control only over those units which were in transit from one dominion to another. agreed to by Indian Army Headquarters and was in the process of being implemented was stopped in June 1947 in view of the imminent partition of India.
- e. At a later stage individual choices or options could be exercised with certain limitations i.e. an Officer could opt for retirement in case he did not wish to serve in either dominion. There was however a ban on Non Muslim officers originally from areas within India : from opting for Pakistan and on Muslim officers originally from areas in Pakistan for opting for India. A Muslim from areas lying in post 14 August Indian territory could opt for Pakistan and a non Muslim from areas within Pakistan could opt for the Indian Army.
- f. The Supreme Commander India in turn would be under a Joint Defence Council consisting of Governor Generals and Defence

Ministers of both dominions and the Supreme Commander himself.

An Army Sub committee was established to implement the gigantic task of division of an army which had been created in approximately 200 years in just about 45 days!

By early July 1947 the army sub committee consisting of an equal number of British Muslim and Hindu members and headed by Major General S.F Irwin finalised its recommendations dealing with division of the major arms i.e. Armoured Corps Infantry Artillery and Engineers, and these decisions were made public on 14/15 July 1947. **(9)**

On 30 July 1947 Lieutenant General Frank Messervy, who was at that time GOC Northern Command was nominated by Mr Jinnah as C in C Pakistan Army **(10)**.

Messervy was an old Indian Army officer having been commissioned in Hodsons Horse in 1913. He commanded 13 Lancers which was allotted to Pakistan in 1938-39, the 1st British Armoured Division against Rommel at Gazala (not very illustriously like most British generals of that period), the 4th Indian Division in North Africa, and the 41 Corps in Burma. **(11)**

Messervy's Chief of Staff was General Gracey who had been commissioned in 1914 and served for the greater part of his career with the Indian Army.

We will discuss the long-term effects of these appointments subsequently.

By 7th November 1947 movement of all armoured regiments and artillery regiments had been

completed both from and to India and Pakistan, movement of all infantry units from Pakistan to India had also been accomplished, while all the infantry units except one had completed their move from India to Pakistan. Till the same date all Engineer Companies had successfully completed movement from India to Pakistan, while 9 Engineer Companies were still left in India.

(12)

The following table explains the broad division of the Indian Army :-- **(13)**

| ARMS/SERVICES/TYPE OF UNIT | PAKISTAN | INDIA |
|--|----------|-------|
| ARMoured REGIMENTS | 6 | 14 |
| ARTILLERY REGIMENTS | 8 | 18 |
| INFANTRY BATTALIONS | 33 | 88 |
| PIONEER COMPANIES | 2 | 10 |
| GARRISON COMPANIES | 8 | 15 |
| ARMY SERVICE CORPS SUPPLY UNITS | 23 | 40 |
| ARMY SERVICE CORPS TRANSPORT UNITS | 24 | 53 |
| ARMY SERVICE CORPS ANIMAL TRANSPORT UNITS | 3 | 4 |
| ORDNANCE FIELD UNITS | 4 | 9 |
| ORDNANCE STATIC UNITS | 11 | 32 |
| WORKSHOP COMPANIES OF ELECTRICAL/MECHANICAL ENGINEERS CORPS | 13 | 20 |
| FIELD MEDICAL UNITS | 9 | 18 |
| SPECIALISED MEDICAL UNITS | 5 | 14 |
| ENGINEER COMPANIES | 34 | 61 |
| REMOUNT AND VETERINARY UNITS | 28 | 29 |

The above figures however do not tell the complete story. India was larger in size and thus most of the ordnance depots and armament factories were located in India.

Plans indeed were made to shift some of the machinery of various ordnance factories to Pakistan, but none of these were ever implemented since an undeclared war started between the two states from September 1947 in Kashmir.

Thus India got all nineteen Ordnance factories located in its post 1947 territories **(14)**.

These included factories producing artillery guns (25 pounders/5. Inch howitzers), rifles, machine guns, gun barrels, shells, fuses, gun carriages, all kinds of small arms ammunition etc. **(15)**

Apart from this severe handicap with long term implications Pakistan was further logistically handicapped by virtue of having only four ordnance depots and one ammunition dump, while India got six Central Ordnance Depots three Ordnance Depots, five ammunition depots, three vehicle depots and one Base Ordnance Depot. **(16)**

This was not the whole story; since most of the ordnance stores theoretically allotted to Pakistan were housed in ordnance depots in Indian territory, a very limited part of the whole allotted ever reached Pakistan. The following figures tell part of the story :-- **(17)**

| TYPE OF EQUIPMENT/STORES | DUE SHARE OF PAKISTAN | ACTUALLY TRANSFERRED TO PAKISTAN |
|---|---|----------------------------------|
| ORDNANCE STORES | 160,000 TONS | 23,225 TONS |
| SOFT VEHICLES (UNARMoured) | 1,461 | 74 |
| ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES (TANKS ETC) | 249 (INCLUDING 118 SHERMAN AND 46 STUART TANKS) | NIL |
| AMMUNITION-ALL TYPES- INCLUDING EXPLOSIVES | 40 TO 60 THOUSAND TONS | NIL |
| ENGINEERING STORES- INCLUDING PLANT/MACHINERY | 172,667 TONS | 1,128 TONS |

The rationale behind retelling this whole story is not the morality or the ethics involved ,but merely to point out that logistically Pakistan Army was on a much weaker footing than the Indian Army,as far as the initial ten year period was concerned.

The laws of war are silent and the Indians did perhaps what any other state at war with another would have most logically done.

It is important that all Pakistani statesmen must always remember that there are no laws which should be honoured as far as the enemy is concerned.

Today unfortunately Pakistan's political leaders are more concerned in selling sugar made in their private sugar mills to India!

It would however be erroneous to think that the above mentioned logistic disadvantages played a major role in the failure of the Pakistani bid to capture Kashmir or the Indian bid to entirely drive the Pakistanis out of Kashmir. But more of this in the next chapter.

In 1947 the Pakistan Army had on its strength a total of 3450 officers (including 118 who had qualified the emergency staff course) as against a total requirement of 7750 officers. **(18)**

The most serious organisational imbalance which inhibited the Pakistan Army's organisational dynamism was lack of a proper General Headquarters unlike the Indians who inherited the old General Headquarters of the British Indian Army at Delhi.

The challenge was not as severe as Ataturk had faced while organising the Turks in Anatolia or Trotsky had faced in organising the Red Army in 1919; but was severe for an essentially mercenary army employed by its foreign masters to control its own people.

There was no imminent threat to the new state, but a war of lost opportunities was about to start in Kashmir and every organisational imbalance was to hamper every Pakistani military plan, movement and articulation of command.

Mr Jinnah's decision to not to trust the country with Mountbatten as Governor General was a fine political decision; but his decision to appoint a Britisher as Army C in C reduced his effectiveness as far as control over the army was concerned.

The two Britishers at the top did not have the degree of interest in conducting the Kashmir War or respect for Mr Jinnah as a Pakistani in his place. As far as the Indians were concerned a Britisher at the top was not as serious a disadvantage since a large number of Hindus were around the Britishers to ensure that orders were executed in letter and spirit.

Further the Hindu politicians around Nehru had not been the toadies and lackeys of British in the pre 1947 era as was the case with most Muslim Leaguers around Jinnah.

On the subtler level Nehru had bolstered Mountbatten's ego by accepting him as the Governor General while Jinnah had injured Mountbatten's ego by correctly thwarting his ambition of becoming Governor General of Pakistan.

While Nehru was more securely in control thanks to a British Viceroy with a strong personality to influence the Supreme Commander and the Indian Army Chief, both Britishers, Mr Jinnah had selected two Britishers who as we shall see in the next chapter, obeyed him at will and only conditionally, and ironically outlived Mr Jinnah by two years, and even to this day are remembered as the founding fathers of Pakistan Army.

Although no evidence exists it is possible that Mr Jinnah may have been influenced in this decision by Iskandar Mirza, a Bombay man, who harboured intense military and political ambitions and enjoyed the push and pull of strong benefactors including the Agha Khan, but was looked down upon by the World War Muslim veterans as a cheap political agent who had knew little more than a spinster, about how to command a tank squadron or infantry company in the field! Sikandar a colonel in 1947 had not even commanded anything beyond an infantry platoon and was secretary defence in 1947!

He compensated for his lack of active soldiering by virtue of excellent connections, and direct communication with Jinnah by virtue of being in the nuisance valiewise all powerful Ministry of Defence.

Sikandar Mirza's Bombay background gave him an advantage which the far better soldiers as far as real soldiering was concerned did not have with Mr Jinnah.

Fate was cruel in the sense that the Pakistani Ministry of Defence was headed by a man who had little to do with practical soldiering and had spent greater part of his career in a job involving bribing frontier tribes and making them

fight against each other so that the British could rule India in a more relaxed manner!

In August 1947 Pakistan Army possessed no Divisional or Corps Headquarters unlike the Indian Army which possessed many headquarters including the Indian GHQ. In 1947 the GHQ commanded all that was Pakistan Army through the following Headquarters, subdivided as following :-- **(19)**

LAHORE AREA:-

The only formation under command the Lahore area was the 14 Para Brigade. This was initially part of the pre 1947 2nd Airborne Division with headquarters at Karachi. Once this Formation was disbanded and one of its brigade 50 Para Brigade moved to India, the 14 Para Brigade which was initially under command Sind Sub area in August 1947 was moved to Lahore Area in September-October 1947.

RAWALPINDI AREA:--

- 1- 10 Brigade-Located at Campbellpur.(Attock)
- 2- 25 Brigade-Headquarters at Rawalpindi and units employed in internal security duties in Rawalpindi Sargodha and Mianwali area.
- 3- 114 Brigade-Located at Lahore

PESHAWAR AREA:-

- 1- Peshawar Brigade
- 2- Kohat Brigade
- 3- Thal Brigade
- 4- 3rd Armoured Brigade (Headquarters at Risalpur)

WAZIRISTAN AREA:-

- 1- Razmak Brigade
- 2- Bannu Brigade
- 3- Wana Brigade
- 4- Gardai Brigade

SIND SUB AREA:--

- 1- Zhob Brigade in Baluchistan.

EAST PAKISTAN SUB AREA

Messervy along with Gracey as Chief of Staff and his team of Pakistani and British officers organised the Pakistani General Headquarters at Rawalpindi in the old buildings that had once housed the pre 1947 headquarters of the old Northern Command.

By January 1948 Messervy had reorganised the Pakistan Army as following :-- **(20)**

- a. **7TH DIVISION**:- Headquarters at Rawalpindi and consisting of I 0 Brigade(headquarters first at Attock and later at Abbotabad),25 Brigade(headquarters at Rawalpindi) and Divisional troops consisting of II Cavalry (known as P.A.V.O II Cavalry till 1956) and a medium machine gun battalion.
- b. **8th DIVISION**:-Headquarters at Karachi and consisting of two brigades i.e. the old Karachi sub area now redesignated as 51 Brigade (from INovember 1947) and the old Quetta Zhob sub area which was redesignated as 52 Brigade (from September 1948).In May 1948 the Divisional Headquarters was moved to Quetta for operations against the Baloch people of the state of Kalat.
- c. **9TH DIVISION**:-Headquarters at Peshawar and consisting of the old

Peshawar Brigade (redesignated as 100 Brigade), Kohat Brigade (101 Brigade), Bannu Brigade (102 Brigade) and Divisional Troops (Guides Cavalry tank regiment and one medium machine gun infantry battalion).

- d. **10 TH DIVISION**:-Headquarters at Lahore and consisting of 14 Para Brigade which was first based at Lahore and then moved to Rahwali (Gujranwala), Thal Brigade (redesignated as 103 Brigade) based at Sialkot, 114 Brigade at Lahore and Divisional Troops (6 Lancers Tank Regiment and an infantry medium machine gun battalion).
- e. **3RD INDEPENDENT ARMoured BRIGADE GROUP**:-Headquarters at Risalpur and consisting of three tank regiments (13 Lancers, 5 Horse and 19 Lancers).

In addition following other headquarters/groups were organized :-- **(21)**

- a. **1st ARMY GROUP ROYAL PAKISTAN ARTILLERY**:-Headquarters at Rawalpindi and consisting of four artillery regiments (one field, one mountain, one self propelled, and one medium).
- b. **2ND GROUP ROYAL PAKISTAN ARTILLERY**:-Headquarters at Karachi (Malir) and later moved to Multan in January 1948 and consisting of four artillery regiments (One field, one heavy anti aircraft, one light anti aircraft, and one anti tank).

- c. **RAWALPINDI LINES OF COMMUNICATION SUB AREA:-** A logistics/administrative organisation to cater for the rear administration requirements of formations within its boundaries. This sub area was tasked to look after the war and peace administrative requirements of all formations within NWFP and Punjab provinces.

Apart from the above mentioned formations Pakistan Army also had the support of the State Force of the Princely State of Bahawalpur's comprising one infantry brigade with headquarters at Bahawalpur.

THE FORMATION OF THE EAST BENGAL INFANTRY REGIMENT

It is significant to note a new infantry regiment i.e. the East Bengal Regiment was raised on 15th February 1948 from the nucleus of two Bengali Muslim Pioneer Companies and Muslim soldiers of the Bihar Regiment which had been allotted to India. **(22)** .

Mr Jinnah personally reviewed the ceremonial parade of the 1ST East Bengal Regiment and made a very thought provoking speech; "I am much impressed with the success you have achieved in such a short spell of time.....I am confident you will be second to none as soldiers. During the foreign regime you were classed as non martial ! **(23)** It is your country, your own state now and it is up to you to prove your worth" Alas Mr Jinnah was wrong! **(24)**

His successors, influenced by the most able advice of Ayub Khan of Burma fame(!) viewed the Bengalis as essentially an inferior people and

Bengalis were kept out of the army as far as enrolment as soldiers in the fighting arms was concerned! The second battalion of the East Bengal Regiment was raised in December 1948 and then the third battalion.

No more units were raised in the population wise largest Muslim province of Pakistan till at least 1966. **(25)**

Mr Jinnah who had a broader intellect than the sons of VCOs and ex rankers who were later destined to dominate the Pakistan Army, alone was responsible for this decision and the proof of this assertion is the simple fact that the successors of Jinnah and Ayub in particular did not raise any more Bengali units during the period 1948-65 !

Perhaps it was considered politically inadvisable to encroach on an easy source of employment monopolised by the so called martial races north of Chenab!

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE ETHNIC ORIGINS OF FIGHTING ARM TROOPS OF THE PAKISTAN ARMY IN 1947

Finally we will discuss in brief the class composition of the fighting arms of the Pakistan Army in

1947 with a view to illustrate that the Pakistan Army's origins went beyond 1849 when the British conquered Punjab and NWFP.

The following tables are self explanatory:--

**ORIGINAL CLASS COMPOSITION OF UNITS
ALLOTTED TO PAKISTAN (26)**

| <u>REGIMENT</u> | <u>BNS</u> | <u>HINDU GUJAR COYS</u> | <u>PUNJABI MUSLIM COYS</u> | <u>PATHAN MUSLIM COYS</u> | <u>SIKH COYS</u> | <u>HINDU RAJPUT COYS</u> | <u>HINDU JAT COYS</u> | <u>HINDU DOGRA COYS</u> |
|-----------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| PUNJAB | 25 | 7 | 46.33 | 9 | 23.33 | 5 | 4 | 5.33 |
| BALUCH | 6 | | 7 | 5 | | | | 6 |
| FF | 7 | | 13 | 7 | 7 | | | 7 |
| TOTAL | 38 BNS OR 152 COYS | 7 | 66.33 | 21 | 30.33 | 5 | 4 | 18.33 |

There were thus a total of 87.33 Muslim Companies in the above mentioned units leaving a deficiency of This meant that there was a deficiency of 64.67 Companies as a result of transfer of Non Muslim Companies to the Indian Army.

This was met by transfer of Muslim Companies from infantry units allotted to India.

Deficiencies if any were made up by direct fresh recruitment of Muslims. Most of the companies transferred from units allotted to India were composed of Punjabi Muslims.

There were however some companies of Hindustani/Rajput/Ranghar Muslims, which thus establish the link between the post 1846 army recruited from Punjab and Frontier and the pre 1846 army recruited from areas south and east of Ambala and from Rajasthan. These included units like 2/4 Grenadiers, 4/4 Grenadiers, 1 Jat Light Infantry, 3 Jat Light Infantry 5 Jat Light Infantry, Rajput Regiment etc. Most of these companies went in the Punjab group of Pakistan Army's

infantry. These Pakistani units included 5/8 Punjab, 1/16 Punjab, 8 Punjab Regiment, 1/8 Punjab Regiment and the 8 Punjab Regiment Centre. The 1st Jat Light Infantry was the old 43 Bengal Native Infantry raised in November 1803 at Fatehgarh in UP by Captain Keene . **(27)**

It survived the rebellion despite being a pure Hindustani unit since it was initially disarmed and later sent to China. After 1857 when the most battle worthy Bengal Infantry units with which the British had conquered whole of India and chastised Afghanistan Nepal and Iran were destroyed or defeated in the rebellion, the 43rd was renumbered as 6th Bengal Native Infantry . **(28)**

It became an All Hindustani Jat unit in 1892-93 and was renumbered as 1st Royal Battalion of Jat Infantry in 1921 **(29)** an honour granted to very limited number of Indian infantry units for exceptionally distinguished services in WW One!

In 1947 153 Hindustani Muslims from this unit joined the 1/16 Punjab of Pakistan Army in 1947. There was another battalion which linked the Pakistan Army's Punjab Regiment directly with the old pre 1843 Bombay Army.

173 Hindustani Muslims (Ranghars) were transferred from the 2 Jat Battalion (old 19th Bombay Native Infantry) to the 5/8 Punjab of Pakistan Army . In all some 996 Hindustani Muslims (mostly Ranghars) joined the 1/16 Punjab, 5/8 Punjab, 8 Punjab, 1/8 Punjab and 8 Punjab Centre. **(30)**

The 2/4 Bombay Grenadiers which sent a Company of Hindustani Muslims (Rajputs) to the 5/8 Punjab Regiment was the old 2nd Bombay Native Infantry

which was raised before 1817 and had participated in the Third Maratha War . **(31)**

The Hindustani Muslims (Ranghars) also constituted 50 % of strength which was transferred from various Indian infantry units to the 4/8 Punjab which was later redesignated as 4 Baluch . **(32)**

ORIGINAL CLASS COMPOSITION OF ARMOURED UNITS ALLOTTED TO PAKISTAN **(33)**

ORIGINAL CLASS COMPOSITION OF ARMOURED UNITS ALLOTTED TO PAKISTAN³³

| <u>REGIMENT</u> | <u>RANGHAR/ RAJPUT MUSLIM (HINDUSTANI MUSLIMS)</u> | <u>PATHAN MUSLIM</u> | <u>PUNJABI MUSLIM</u> | <u>SIKHS</u> | <u>HINDU DOGRAS</u> | <u>HINDU JAT</u> |
|--------------------------|--|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|-------------------------|------------------|
| 13 LANCERS | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | |
| GUIDES | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | |
| 11 CAVALRY | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | |
| 5 HORSE | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| 6 LANCERS | | | 1 | 1 | | 1 |
| 19 LANCERS | | | 1 | 1 | | 1 |
| TOTAL 18 SQUADRONS | 2 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 2 |

The deficiency of 10 Muslim Squadrons was made up by inter unit transfers from the following units allotted to India **(34)** :--

| REGIMENT | PUNJABI MUSLIMS | HINDUSTANI MUSLIMS (RANGHARS) | KAIMKHANI MUSLIMS (RAJPUTS) | PATHAN MUSLIMS |
|--------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------|
| 17 POONA HORSE | | | 1 (TO 19 LANCERS) | |
| 14 SCINDE HORSE | | 1 (TO 13 LANCERS) | | 1 (TO GUIDES) |
| 4 HODSON HORSE | 1 (TO GUIDES) | | | |
| 2 LANCERS | | PARTS TO 11 CAVALRY | | |
| 9 DECCAN HORSE | SOME MEN TO 11 CAVALRY AND 1 SQUADRON TO 5 HORSE | | | |
| 7 CAVALRY | 1 (TO 6 LANCERS) | | | |
| 8 CAVALRY | 1 (TO 6 LANCERS) | | PARTS TO 11 CAVALRY | |
| 1 ST SKINNERS HORSE | 1 (TO 11 CAVALRY) | | | |
| 18 CAVALRY | | | 1 SQUADRON TO 5 HORSE | |
| CENTRAL INDIA HORSE | 1 (TO 19 LANCERS) | | | |
| TOTAL | 5.5 SQUADRONS | 1.5 SQUADRONS | 2 SQUADRONS | 1 SQUADRON |

| ETHNIC GROUP | PATHAN MUSLIMS RECRUITED FROM 1846 | PUNJABI MUSLIM ONLY RECRUITED FROM 1846 | RAJPUT/HINDUSTANI/KAIMKHANI/RANGHAR MOSTLY FROM UNITS RAISED IN 1804-1846 |
|---------------------|------------------------------------|---|---|
| NUMBER OF SQUADRONS | 3 | 9.5 | 5.5 |

The Skinner's Horse was raised in 1803 and thus the Punjabi Muslims of Skinners Horse brought the traditions of a unit raised in 1803 to the Pakistan Army!

These Punjabi Muslims were however introduced in the Skinner Horse after 1885 and thus cannot be called the bearers of the pre 1885 battle traditions of Skinners Horse, during the period when Skinner's Horse won most of its battle honours.

These can be claimed only by the Ranghar and Hindustani Muslims of Skinner's Horse who were the only ethnic group recruited in the unit from 1803 to 1885.

However the Pakistan Armoured Corps old units have a stronger connection with the pre 1846 Hindustani/Ranghar Muslim Cavalry since all the Punjab Cavalry units including Guides were raised by the officers of the pre 1846 Bengal or Bombay Armies assisted by Ranghar/Hindustani Muslim Risaldars/NCOs and Sowars.

The 2 Lancers which sent some of its Ranghars to 11 Cavalry was raised in 1809 and survived the rebellion by virtue of being stationed in loyal Punjab during the rebellion.

The 7th Light Cavalry which sent its Punjabi Muslim Squadron was the oldest surviving cavalry units of the British Indian Army.

However these Punjabi Muslims who came to Pakistan joined the unit only after 1895 and cannot be said to bear the traditions of the pre 1895 7th Light Cavalry.

It may be noted that most of the battle honours of the 7th Light Cavalry were won in the pre 1895 period. The same was true for 8th Light Cavalry raised in 1787. The same applies to 13 Lancers, and 18th Cavalry **(35)** .

Scinde Horse was another exception to this rule since this units Ranghar Squadron joined Pakistan's 13 Lancers and these had served in the unit right from the time when it was raised on the Scinde Frontier in 1838.

Jacob in words of an eminent authority "frankly expressed a preference for the Hindustani Muslim (including Ranghars plus the fact that the term was used as one for both by the pre 1885 British officers) over Sikhs, Pathans, Punjabi Muslims or anyone". (36)

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE ETHNIC/SOCIAL/SERVICE ORIGINS OF THE PAKISTANI OFFICER CORPS IN 1947

Lastly we will have a brief look at the officer corps of the Pakistan Army. Very few people in today's Pakistan know that the men who fought and won the battle for granting Indians the "Kings Commission" in the Indian Army were two British Jews ie Sir Edwin Montagu the Secretary of State for India and Lord Reading the Viceroy of India!

The Indians who were granted the King's Commission, may be subdivided in three main categories; ie Sandhurst/Daly College/Imperial Cadet Corps Commissioned Officers, Indian Military Academy Commissioned Officers and the Emergency Officer Training School Commissioned officers. Many more Indians served as Medical officers in the army during WW One but these were of no consequence as they were not from the fighting arms.

At least two of these one a Bengali Hindu and a Parsi also did win the MC and DSO (37) respectively.

Indians selected for the "King's Commission" were trained at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst or Woolwich from 1917 to 1932.

One Emergency War Course was also run at Daly College Indore from which 39 Cadets were granted temporary commissions. These included ex servicemen and civilians who entered through recommendations+competitive examinations.

Later 32 of these were granted permanent commissions.

Cariappa who was Indian Army's first Indian C in C was from this entry. **(38)** In addition nine ex Imperial Cadet Corps Cadets who had been granted temporary commissions in fighting arms were also granted permanent commissions in 1919. **(39)**

From 1917 ten vacancies per year were finally allocated to Indians at Sandhurst. These were from "families of fighting (loyal) classes which had rendered valuable services to the state during the war".

We have earlier discussed that these candidates were selected through competitive examinations, but this process was governed by a fifty percent quota for candidates from provinces which contributed the larger share of recruits to the Indian Army.

This meant that the relative chances of success of anyone from Punjab or Frontier were greater as compared to any other province. Thus as per one estimate the 89 candidates who were selected for Sandhurst during the period from 1918 to 1926 were subdivided as following :-- **(40)**

It may be noted that selection for the army was not like the ICS examination. Only those recommended by the initial tiers of British Civil and Military could sit in the entrance examination.

Thus only 257 Indians had competed for the Sandhurst vacancies from 1918 to 1927 **(41)**.

The 30: 30 formula for IMA Dera Dun ensured that Indian Army was able to get only half best available material in India.

According to Shaukat Riza as earlier discussed there were 333 Indian Regular Officers in the Indian Army in October 1939. These figures appear to be on the minus side.

We may subdivide these into roughly about a 100 from Sandhurst etc and the remaining 200 from IMA Dera Dun.

Exigencies of war led to a vast expansion in the Indian Army and by 1940 three officer training schools were training emergency commissioned officers at Mhow Bangalore and Belgaum **(42)**.

During this period a larger number of candidates with relatively better education and an urban background joined the army .

The magnitude of expansion of the officer corps may be gauged from the fact that by 1945 there were 8,340 Indian officers serving in the Indian Army . **(43)**

Thus there were three broad categories of officers in the Pakistan Army of 1947; ie the Sandhurst Commissioned officers; the IMA Dera Dun Long Course Regular Officers subdivided into ranker and

non ranker category and the "Emergency Commissioned Officer". In 1947 the following was the officer strength of the Pakistan Army :-- **(44)**

COMPOSITION OF PAKISTAN ARMY'S OFFICER CORPS IN 1947 :--

| ORIGIN/INSTITUTION | NUMBER | REMARKS |
|--|------------------|---|
| SANDHURST COMMISSIONED-1917-1935 | 34 ⁴⁵ | SHAUKAT RIZA'S FIGURES |
| DERA DUN COMMISSIONED (REGULAR COURSES) 1934 - 40 | 120 | SHAUKAT'S SANDHURST FIGURE SUBTRACTED FROM MUQEEMS TOTAL PRE WAR FIGURE OF 154 |
| EMERGENCY/SHORT SERVICE COMMISSION- 1940-45 | 1,950 | FAZAL MUQEEM'S FIGURES |
| POST WAR DERA DUN REGULAR COMMISSION-1945-47 | 400 | DITTO |
| BRITISH VOLUNTEERS | 355 | MUQEEM'S FIGURES. |
| LOANED ON SPECIFIC REQUEST BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT | 129 | PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED FOR 266 OFFICERS |
| TOTAL | 2,988 | SHAUKAT RIZA PUTS THE TOTAL OFFICER STRENGTH IN 1947 AT 3,450 OFFICERS. ⁴⁶ |

The Punjabis were the largest single group in this officer cadre followed by Pathans and Muslim minority province Muslims.

There were very few Bengalis and other Muslims in the officer corps. It may be noted that before partition the non Muslim Punjabis dominated the officer corps and according to various estimates varied between 60 to 65 % of the total officers selected from Punjab.

The same trend was carried on in India and as late as fifties Punjabi candidates dominated the officer corps. **(47)**

The Hindustani Muslims and the Punjabi Qadiani Muslims were two relatively small but qualitatively superior groups in the Pakistan Army's officer corps. Attiq ur Rahman being one of the very few Muslims to win a Sword of Honour for all round best cadet from Sandhurst in 1939 . **(48)**

Cohen has assessed the strength of the UP/CP/East Punjabi officers at the time of partition at 12 % but has given no authority for this figure . **(49)**

No exact figures exist but various interviews with a large number of officers who served in the forties and fifties have led me to the following assessment.

About 65 to 70 % of the officer corps was Punjabi with at least 60 % who were from areas south of river Chenab and stretched till Ludhiana in the East Punjab.

The Ranghars/Kaim Khanis who were from Eastern Punjab districts of Rohtak Hissar Gurgaon Kamal and Rajputana were about 5 %, Hindustani Muslims/CP/Bihar/Madras/Bombay Muslims around

10 %,Pathans around 20 % and about 2 % Bengalis/Assamese/Sindhis. Ex Rankers/ Servicemen as a group may have touched the figure of at least 25 %.

However these rankers were better placed than the south of Chenab Punjabi Muslims who mostly joined the army as direct entrants only thanks to the emergency commission boom after 1940 .This was so because most of the rankers had been steadily joining the army as 50 % of Dera Dun Military Academy from 1932 to 1940 and occupied relatively more senior positions than most emergency commissioned officers.

It may be noted that more Muslims joined the officer corps from the ranker category since educational standards of the Muslims in Punjab were far behind non Muslims.

Thus in Pakistan Army the rankers were better off than in the Indian Army.

The Qadiani Muslims constituted an important group in the new army.The Qadianis were almost 99 % Punjabi by race,better educated by virtue of being mostly from more urbanised areas of Punjab between Chenab and Sutlej and above all ; were far more internally motivated to excel since they were acutely conscious of their "minority under siege" status.

This community excelled itself as soldiers but were unjustly persecuted ,discriminated against and hounded out of the army from 1973-74 when Mr Bhutto declared them non Muslims through a constitutional ammendments.

This means that as per Pakistan's 1973 constitution two of the Pakistan Army's finest generals were "Non Muslims" !

The Qadianis were persecuted with systematic venom after 1977 and many fine officers of this community which served Pakistan well were as a policy barred from promotion beyond colonel rank !

According to one estimate there were at least 200 officers who were Qadiani and held the King's Commission during and after WW Two.

This list was supplied to the Punjab Boundary Commission during the partition proceedings.
(50)

It includes names of officers who distinguished themselves as Pakistan's finest divisional commanders in 1965 and 1971 wars. These included Brigadier Nazir Ahmad, Akhtar Hussain Malik (famous for Grand Slam in 1965 war), Eftikhar Ahmad Janjua (Rann of Kutch 1965 and capture of Chhamb 1971) etc.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Page-370-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.
- 2 Pages-7 & 8- Indian Army after Independence -Major K.C Praval (Retired)-Lancer-New Delhi-1987.
- 3 Page-112-The Pakistan Army-1947-1949-Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired)-Wajid Ali-Lahore-1989.
- 4 Page-363-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit and Page-517-The Rise and Fall of the British Empire-Op Cit. Mountbatten manipulated an abnormally

accelerated promotion in the navy thanks to his connection with the Royal family of

Britain. He was responsible as a naval commander for a series of disasters including causing unnecessary damage to HMS Javelin under circumstances which were not beyond his control and for the loss of HMS Kelly in the Dieppe Raid. His biographer Philip Ziegler termed Mountbatten's appointment to the South East Asia Command as a case of successful "upward failure"!

5 Pages-66 to 74 - Jinnah's Interview with the Cabinet Delegation and Wave!! of April 4, 1946
-India Office Records- . LIP & J/5/337

6 Viceroy's Seventh Miscellaneous Meeting attended by the British Staff and Jinnah-Held on April 23 1947- Mountbatten Papers-Manuscript-BUR-F. 200/6- India Office Records.

7 Page-22-Fazal I Muqueem•Op Cit.

8 Pages-28 & 29-Ibid.

9 Page-29-Ibid.

10 Page-44-Ibid.

11 Page-153-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

12 Page-136-Ibid.

13 Page-136-Ibid and Page-29-Fazal I Muqueem-Op Cit.

14 Page-138-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

15 Page-317-Annexure-"C"-Ibid.

16 Page-324-Annexure-"E"-Ibid.

17 Page-40-Fazall Muqueem-Op Cit.

18 Page-115-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

19 Page-45-Fazall Muqueem-Op Cit.

20 Page-47-Ibid and Pages-178 to 187-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

21 Shaukat Riza-Ibid.

22 Page-52-Fazall Muqueem-Op Cit.

23 Bengal was a relatively highly politically conscious province of British India. Unlike UP after 1858 and Punjab (except in 1919 and that too only the cities between Chenab and Sutlej led by the Congress) etc the Bengalis in general and the Bengali Hindus in particular were a source of great trouble for the British and Bengal led India in assassinations of British civil servants and police officials during the period 1905-1947. Two attempts were made to raise Bengali units by the British in WW One and Two, but were unsuccessful since the Bengalis were highly volatile and incidents of murder and insubordination forced the British to call off the effort. Thus 49th Bengal Regiment raised in Karachi in 1917 and comprising of Bengalis was sent for service to Mesopotamia but disbanded in 1918 after two VCOs were murdered because of promotion rivalries (Page-281 & 282-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit). The British officers of the unit were in any case against the Bengalis since they were not as easy to manage as the Punjabi or other races found in the Indian Army. Another attempt was made in WW Two but failed. A Coastal Defence Battalion i.e. the 4th Madras Battalion with a large percentage of Bengalis (mostly Hindus was formed). On 18th April 1943 12 Soldiers most of whom Bengalis were

arrested and court martialled for conspiring to overthrow the British Government and nine of them were hanged on 27 September 1943 (Page-187- India's Struggle for Freedom -Department of Information and Cultural Affairs-Government of West Bengal-Glasgow Printing Company-Howrah-1987) ,and the unit was disbanded (Page-282-Lieut General S.L Menezes-Op Cit). The Bengalis were declared non martial by the British not because they were less brave than the Punjabi or Gurkha,as has been fallaciously maintained by many army officers and civil servants from what was known before 1971 as West Pakistan, but essentially because they were not politically reliable ! Their crime was to have produced a Titu Mir who rose against the East India Company in 1831 (Page-25-Ibid) and a real man like the indomitable Rash Bihari Bose who threw a bomb on the British Viceroy in Delhi in 1913 (Page- 82-Ibid) !It must be noted however that the leaders in most of the anti British activity in Bengal were non Muslim Bengali Hindus and not the Muslims who although extremely poor were politically naive and far less educated than the Bengali Hindus.! It must however be noted however that even in Punjab UP and Bombay the Muslims were mostly loyalists whereas the anti British parties in these provinces were led by Hindus or Sikhs.The only Muslim provinces with a worthwhile anti British record were the NWFP (especially the Tribals) and Sindh! It must be noted that terrorist activity in Punjab during the period 1928-40 was significant but confined mostly to the Sikhs,whereas the Muslims of this province as those of many other provinces like UP Madras etc were good British subjects!

24 Page-7- The Military in Pakistan-Image and Reality -Brigadier A.R Siddiqi (Retired)-Vanguard-Lahore-1996.

25 Page-52-Story of Pakistan Army-Op Cit. Major General SherAli has described Ayub's anti Bengali feelings as far as recruitment in army was concerned in considerable detail. See pages- 136,137 and many more all over SherAli's book- Sher Ali-Op Ci .

26 Reconstructed by the author from various details about class composition as given by Shaukat Riza. See Pages- 201 to 224-The Pakistan Army-1947-49-Op Cit.

27 Page443-Lieut F.G cardew-Op Cit

28 Page-303-Ibid.

29 Page-160-John Gaylor-Op Cit.

30 Page-162-Ibid.

31 Pages-142 to 144-Ibid.

32 Page-205-Shaukat Riza-The Pakistan Army-1947-49-Op Cit.

33 Pages-190 to 194-Shaukat riza-1947-49-Op Cit. Pages-59 to 105-John Gaylor -Op Cit. Pages-559 to 561-The Indian Armour-1941-1971-Op Cit.

34 Ibid.

35 Years of raising taken from "So they Rode and Fought" by Shahid Hamid-Op Cit and John Gaylor-Op Cit.

36 Page-320-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

37 Pages-48 and 90-C.C Trench-The Indian Amny-Op Cit.

38 Pages-313 and 314-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit

39 Page-314-Ibid.

40 Page-119-Cohen-The Indian Army-Op Cit.

41 Page-328-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

42 Page-100-Shaukat Riza-1947-1949-0p Cit.

43 Ibid.

44 Pages-222 and 223-Story of Pakistan Army-Op Cit.Pages-

45 Page-23-Shaukat Riza-The Pakistan Army-War-1965-0p Cit.

46 Page-115-Shaukat Riza-The Pakistan Anny-1947-49-0p Cit.

47 Page-183-Stephen Cohen-Op Cit.

48 As given in bionote on page-65-The Citadel-Issue-1/9!-Command and Staff College Quetta-July 1991.

49 Page-57-Stephen Cohen-The Pakistan Army-Op Cit.

50 Appendix Number Three-Pages-464 to 469-The Partition of the Punjab-Volume One-National Documentation Centre-Lahore-1893


CHAPTER TEN

WAR OF LOST OPPORTUNITIES

History is made by those who seize fleeting opportunities in the critical time span in any particular situation and relentlessly execute their plans without second thoughts, subduing inner fears, overcoming procrastination and vacillation,

and above all by those who are propelled by the burning desire to defeat the enemy rather than any half hearted judiciousness and timidity. Ninety years of loyalism and too much of constitutionalism had however made the Muslims of 1947 slow in taking the initiative and too much obsessed with consequences of every situation.

This attitude was excellent as long as the British were the rulers, but not for a crisis situation, in which geography, time and space, alignment of communications and weather temporarily favoured Pakistan, in case initiative and boldness was exercised and simple but audacious plans were executed in the shortest possible time!



Today, it is fashionable to blame the Indians, Mountbatten, Gracey etc as far as the 1947-48 War is concerned. A dispassionate study of the events of 1947-48 clearly proves that victory was closer in 1947 than ever again as far as the Pakistan Army was concerned. Opportunities were lost because very few people who mattered at any level apart from Mr Jinnah, Brigadier Akbar Khan and some others were really interested in doing anything!

The 1948 war was fought over the Muslim majority state of Kashmir ruled by a Hindu ruler, who did not want to accede to Pakistan. The specific sole and immediate aim of this chapter is to briefly analyse the 1948 war and to explain why Pakistan failed to achieve, what was within its grasp and why the Indians despite their overall material superiority could not achieve as much as they should have done.

The morality of Kashmir dispute and who is morally right is beyond the scope of this book, except the simple point that as far as the broad mechanics of the philosophy governing the partition of India was concerned; i.e. division of India on a communal basis and as Non-Muslim and Muslim India, Kashmir should have been a part of Pakistan.

There are detailed accounts of the Kashmir Dispute and whole books have been dedicated to it, a reader interested in this dispute should study those books. So we shall directly move on to the exact discussion of military mechanics of the 1948 war.

Theoretically, a Princely state could join any state i.e. India or Pakistan or stay independent. The British policy in this regard was not precise. A Princely State could join one of the two states

i.e. India or Pakistan, with regard off course to physical propinquity. The choice of country was left entirely to the rulers of the princely states. As far as physical propinquity was concerned the state of Kashmir had all road rail and river communications with Pakistan and none with India.

As far as the sentiments of the population were concerned, everything indicated that they did not certainly want to join Hindu majority India. The ruler Hari Singh was not inclined to joining Pakistan. In the third week of August 1947 the Kashmir State Force opened fire on a political meeting at a village near Dhirkot in Poonch district. On 24 August 1947 the Muslims of the area started a small rebellion under Qayyum Khan an ex sepoy from the army. Other similar rebellions of small scale broke out in various parts of the state and the state forces were soon dispersed all over the state in internal security duties. It may be noted that the Kashmir State Forces consisted of nine infantry battalions out of which had the communal ratio of 22.2 % Muslim, 5.5 % Sikh and 55.55 % Dogra .
(1)

**COMPOSITION OF J & K STATE
FORCE AS PER KASHMIR
CAMPAIGN- PAKISTAN ARMY
OFFICIAL HISTORY -1970**

**Pakistan army
till 1965**

ISBN-13: 978-1546485667
ISBN-10: 154648566X



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APPENDIX THREE

**JAMMU AND KASHMIR STATE FORCES IN
SEPTEMBER 1947**

1. Jammu and Kashmir Bodyguard Cavalry Regiment. All Hindu Dogras.
2. 1st Jammu and Kashmir Infantry Battalion. All Hindu Dogras.
3. 2nd Jammu and Kashmir Rifle Battalion. Half Gurkhas, half Muslims.
4. 3rd Jammu and Kashmir Rifle Battalion. Half Gurkhas, half Hindu Dogras.
5. 4th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry Battalion. Half Hindu Dogras, half Muslims.
6. 5th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry Battalion. All Hindu Dogras.
7. 6th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry Battalion. Half Sikhs, half Muslims.
8. 7th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry Battalion. All Hindu Dogras.
9. 8th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry Battalion. All Hindu Dogras.
10. 9th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry Battalion. All Hindu Dogras.

In addition, twelve garrison companies were raised from non-Muslims just before partition. They were armed with rifles and were regarded as reinforcements for the State Forces.

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As the rebellion spread the principal anti-India leader Sardar Ibrahim fled to Pakistan and started considerable efforts to mobilise Pakistani public opinion and military support in sustaining the rebellion, which had little chance of success at least in the valley in case the Hindu ruler was able to secure Indian Army's assistance by virtue of acceding to India. **(2)**

As true or exaggerated reports of anti-Muslim atrocities reached the Trans-Indus Pathan tribal

area the Pathans who have been historically famous for a multi- faceted motivation combining thirst for glory, Islamic zeal and lust for loot started movement towards Abbottabad and Murree on their own initiative.

While all this was going on Hari Singh the ruler of Kashmir kept sitting on the fence, inclined to joining India, but unable to arrive at a firm resolve to do so for fear of the backlash against this decision from the Muslims, who constituted the 75 % majority. The situation was getting very swiftly out of control of the Maharaja's forces.

There were more than 60,000 demobilised Muslim ex- servicemen who were World War II veterans, and many of these men formed militias and started harassing the dispersed state forces and harassing the various roads and bridges in the state.

By 15th October these militias forced the State Forces to abandon Fort Owen, around the same time the Dogra communication between Kotli and Poonch was severed and the state forces Muslim troops had almost deserted and joined the rebels while the non- Muslim units were besieged at Bhimbar, Mirpur and Mangla. **(3)** It must be

remembered that at this moment the Pakistani GHQ was not involved in the operations.

The Muslim League's high command had tasked Mian Iftikhar ud Din Minister for Refugees to prepare a plan aimed at ensuring that the Muslim majority state of Kashmir should join Pakistan. Brigadier Akbar Khan then serving in the Pakistani GHQ wrote an appreciation 'armed revolt inside Kashmir ' on Mian Iftikhar ud Din's request. It appears that Mr Jinnah had tasked Liaquat to handle the Kashmir business.

Liaquat in turn earmarked Mian Iftikhar ud Din. Iftikhar requested Sardar Shaukat Hayat and Brigadier Akbar Khan for advice. A conference presided by Liaquat was held at Lahore in September 1947. This was attended by Akbar whose appreciation had already been shown to Liaquat by Iftikhar ud Din earlier. Ghulam Mohammad the Finance Minister who was a contemporary of Liaquat at MAO College Aligarh **(4)** and at this time was foremost in playing sycophant par excellence with Liaquat also attended the conference.

Brigadier Akbar recalls that everyone was enthusiastic but no one including the Prime


Minister had any concrete idea about the tangible and concrete aspects of the actual plan of operations, specially as far as the logistic and armament aspect was concerned. Shaukat was appointed as overall incharge with Major Khurshid Anwar (Retired) commanding the northern tribal force which was as per Akbar's appreciation to attack on Muzaffarabad-Srinagar axis and Major Zaman Kiani of the INA to command the southern force tasked to operate against the Kathua area in the south.



Brigadier Akbar Khan D.S.O briefs Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Disgusted with Liaquats conduct in Kashmir war Akbar later planned a coup against him in 1950

Shaukat Hayat was not in favour of appointing Khurshid Anwar since he was a non-fighting arm soldier. Shaukat states in his book that Liaquat under Ghulam Mohammad's influence appointed Khurshid Anwar, then commander of the Muslim League's semi-military national guard to command the main northern invasion force. Akbar was to provide logistic support to the tribesmen which were to be employed for the invasion. There were three principal parties in the whole invasion affair.

On one side was the Muslim League leaders like Shaukat Hayat (an ex-major) Iftikhar ud Din and Khurshid Anwar who had been ordered by Mr Jinnah to do something to help the Kashmiri Muslims. Then there were the tribesmen who were concentrating at Batrasi opposite the Kashmir border and there was Brigadier Akbar Khan a Burma DSO who was Director of the newly formed Weapon And Equipment Directorate at the General Headquarters, tasked unofficially to support the tribal raiders logistically, using all resources at his disposal in GHQ as Director Weapons and Equipment without letting the Britishers controlling the Pakistan Army know!



Brigadier Akbar Khan , DSO chats with the tribal raiders

The tribesmen were brought from the NWFP tribal areas on trucks requisitioned by Government of Pakistan and concentrated in Batrasi north-east of Abbottabad. The invasion was to commence from 20th October 1947; the main northern tribal force invading Kashmir under Khurshid Anwar on Abbottabad-Garhi Habibullah-Muzaffarabad-Srinagar axis with a smaller auxiliary force advancing along Murree-Kohala-Muzaffarabad axis.

The official history does not mention the Lahore conference presided by Liaquat but merely states that 'Major Khurshid Anwar (as a result of some divine revelation!) undertook to organise and lead (whether voluntarily or on someone else's orders is left to the readers' imagination!) the tribesmen into Kashmir when the opportunity arose' !

In addition Major Aslam Khan an ex- Kashmir State Force Officer and a MC of WW Two also joined the Lashkar.

Aslam was son of Brigadier Rahmatullah who was a loyal subject of the Hindu Dogra ruler of Kashmir before 1947!

There comes a time in history when a man has no choice but to rebel and Major Aslam Khan MC had taken this crucial decision.

The Lashkar of tribesmen had been assembled by the efforts of Khan Khushdil Khan of Mardan. On the night of 20/21 October 2,000 tribesmen captured the bridge spanning the Neelam river on the Hazara Trunk Road linking Muzaffarabad with

Abbottabad without a fight, since the all Muslim guard platoon of 4 Jammu and Kashmir Infantry joined the tribesmen.

The Muslim companies of his state forces 4 Jammu and Kashmir Battalion in Muzaffarabad area rebelled and joined the tribesmen. By morning of 21 October the 2,000 raiders assisted by the Muslim Companies of the 4 Jammu and Kashmir State Infantry Battalion had captured the first major border town Muzaffarabad. Fighting continued till 23 October since other Dogra troops of the 4 Jammu and Kashmir infantry fought on till 23 October in the localities of Domel and Kohala. The 1947-48 Kashmir War had formally started. **(5)**

Geography, weather, sentiments of the bulk of the population, initial comparative location of regular army troops available for action in Kashmir and the layout/alignment of communication; all favoured Pakistan. Rawalpindi was not more than 47 miles from Abbottabad, 51 miles from Murree and 90 miles from Rawalpindi the three major garrison towns of Pakistan.

All the major road and rail links to the state ran through Pakistan. The likely direction through which the Indians could rush in the reinforcements ran

through a dirt road from Pathankot to Jammu and from here to Riasi across the Bannihal Pass (snowbound from November to March) to Srinagar which was more than 257 miles long. Whereas Muzaffarabad was linked to Srinagar by an all weather tarmac road without any major water obstacle or any serious gradient.

The distance between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad was less than 100 miles. The only rail link of the state was the one connecting the town of Jammu with Sialkot in Pakistan. The only way Indians could reinforce the State and save its capital Srinagar was by airlifting troops to Srinagar. If Srinagar was captured the whole Kashmir vale and the entire northern areas including Ladakh could no longer be held by the Indians. There were no subtleties or complexities of operational strategy in the whole situation except following one simple straightforward plan ie; a bold and swift advance to Srinagar assisted by a troop or squadron of armoured cars. We will discuss in brief in the following paragraphs what actually happened and the major reasons which led to failure

The entire Kashmir War of 1947-48 was fought over a large area comprising more than 89,000 square miles and over the highest mountain barriers in the world. However the innumerable actions of the war studied in detail are confusing and do not provide the layman reader with a clear picture, thus the

result is a situation in which the trees become more important than the whole forest.

In brief the Kashmir War was fought in four areas, one of which was most important and the centre of gravity for the other three. These four areas were the Jhelum Valley or the Muzaffarabad-Srinagar Road, the Northern Areas comprising the Gilgit-Leh axis in the Indus Valley and the Zojila Pass area, the Poonch River Valley and fourthly the area between Jammu and Mirpur.


The centre of gravity of the whole war was the Jhelum Valley, which was the only place where an advantageous decision could have been achieved at the earliest and in the relatively shortest time and space as far as the Pakistan Army was concerned; had the Pakistani political and military leadership possessed greater strength of resolution and independent spirit; than they actually did!

The fate of the war in Indus valley depended on the degree of success in the Jhelum Valley since the Indian line of communication to this theatre lay through the Jhelum Valley. The fighting in Poonch river valley also depended on the success of the struggle for Jhelum Valley, since a Pakistani success in Jhelum Valley in terms of capture of Srinagar

would have freed all Pakistani troops for a concentration against Poonch town from the north and would have definitely led to the capture of Poonch. The fourth sector of the war i.e. the area south of Bannihal Pass and between Akhnur Tawi river was the only area that the Indians could have held with a certain degree of success in terms of relative forces available, geographical location and the terrain factor.

First of all we shall deal with the battles in Jhelum Valley on the Muzaffarabad-Srinagar Axis, the most decisive part of the whole war where the Indian position was most critical and hung on the razor's edge. We have already seen that the tribesmen assisted by the Muslim elements of the Kashmir State Forces had successfully cleared Muzaffarabad-Domel area by 23 October. In terms of odds and comparative forces this was a predictable affair since the Hindu Dogra elements of the 4 Jammu and Kashmir Battalion, approximately two companies or about 350 men were dispersed in penny packets over an area of thirty miles, and were further internally weakened by having a 50% Muslim strength or two companies. Added to these the 2,000 tribesmen who attacked Muzaffarabad on 21 October achieved complete surprise since the crucial bridge over the otherwise impassable river Neelum (Kishanganga) was handed over to them by the Muslim guard of the 4 Jammu and Kashmir infantry,

and all that they had to deal were isolated Dogra platoons dispersed in various localities separated by many miles.



After capturing Domel the last Dogra held locality on the main road to Srinagar on 23 October in lorries and trucks. There was practically nothing between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar to stop the tribesmen. Brigadier Rajinder Singh the chief of staff of the Kashmir State Forces was a brave man.

He rushed to Uri 63 miles west of Srinagar on the main Muzaffarabad-Srinagar road with 200 soldiers and blew a bridge spanning a nullah (water course smaller than a river) on the main road on 23 October 1947. **(6)**

This delayed the advance of the tribesmen and other volunteers who now numbered about 5,000 by one day. Brigadier Rajinder Singh who believed in leading from the front was killed in action on 24th October.



The tribesmen resumed advance and captured Baramula which was 35 miles west of Srinagar on 26th October 1947. A very respectable Indian military historian has frankly admitted that 'had the lashkar gone on, there was nothing between Baramula and Srinagar to stop it. **(7)**

The tribesmen sole motive was not liberation of Kashmir, and they started looting the town. Srinagar was just a few hours lorry drive away from Baramula.

According to Sardar Shaukat Hayat who was one of the Muslim League men tasked to oversee the invasion the issue was Rs 300,000 found in the Kashmir State Treasury. Khurshid Anwar foolishly argued that this money belonged to Pakistan Government (as if the tribesmen were fighting just for two nation theory, while no Muslim League leader was sixty miles near Baramula!) while the tribesmen correctly asserted that it belonged to them. **(8)**

Once this issue was settled the tribesmen who had no conception of Time and Space factor insisted

that they will not move before the three day Eid festival was over. **(9)**

In the meantime the Indian GHQ was acting real fast.

The Maharaja of Kashmir had been requesting the Indian government for military aid since 24th October and on 26th October signed the Instrument of Accession joining India. Meanwhile the Indians had already sent a staff officer from their military operations department on 25th October to study the military situation.

The Indians collected 30 Dakotas for the airlift and flew two companies of 1 Sikh to Srinagar on 27th October from Willingdon airport near New Delhi. At this moment the Indian situation was highly critical; only 40 men were holding a weak defensive position 5 kilometres east of Baramula. It was Indian good luck that all commanding officers during this situation believed in leading from the front, Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai the Commanding Officer of 1 Sikh being another such man.

Dewan on landing at Srinagar immediately rushed in lorries to Baramula hoping to stop the Lashkar at the mouth of the funnel which opens east of Baramula into a wide valley as one advances from Baramula towards Srinagar. 1 Sikh joined the state troops 5 kilometres east of Baramula, but could not hold the Lashkar of 5,000 men. Dewan was killed in the fighting and the remaining elements of 1 Sikh withdrew eastwards losing 24 men (killed) to take another defensive position at Patan 25 kilometres west of Srinagar. **(10)**

On 28th more Indian troops flew into Srinagar and the balance of strength started tilting in Indian favour.

The tribesmen who were used to fighting based on hit and run tactics could not use weight of numbers in the open valley and resorted to bypassing tactics instead of the conventional infantry attack. They bypassed 1 Sikh's position at Patan from the flanks but was forced to stay close to the main road since manoeuvrability in the whole area was restricted by marshes and small lakes and the lashkar Pathans were by and large non swimmers ! **(11)**

By 2nd November the Indians had flown in a very strong infantry brigade (161 Brigade) consisting of approximately four battalions into Srinagar.

In addition the overall command of Indian Army operations in Kashmir was entrusted to Headquarters Jammu and Kashmir Force based at Srinagar and headed by Major General Kalwant Singh. The commander of 161 Indian Infantry Brigade (from 2nd November) was Brigadier L.P Sen a Bengali Hindu with an excellent Second World War record (unlike the first Muslim C-in-C of Pakistan Army as we shall discuss later) in Burma where he had won a Distinguished Service Order.


(12)



Brigadier L.P Sen ,DSO , 16/10 Baluch Regiment

The tribesmen had lost the really golden opportunity to capture Srinagar on 27th October. There is no doubt that Pakistan had lost its first decisive battle without the Pakistan Army's direct involvement. All was not over still; and another

major opportunity to capture Srinagar was yet to be lost. We will discuss this in a subsequent paragraph.



on leave) of the Pakistan Army to attack Kashmir. Gracey who had been handpicked by Mr Jinnah on the grounds that Field Marshal Auchinleck the Supreme Commander of both the armies did not allow it!

(13) Auchinleck flew to Lahore the next day and convinced Mr Jinnah to retract his order. Auchinleck's threat that all British officers would be withdrawn in case such an order was pressed further convinced Mr Jinnah into retracting this order. **(14)** Mr Jinnah was unlucky unlike Nehru in having no Patel by his side. When Bucher the British C-in-C of the Indian Army advised the Indian government not to attack Hyderabad till the Kashmir War was over, and Patel insisted otherwise, Bucher threatened to resign.

Patel simply told him on the spot that he could resign and then ordered Sardar Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister 'The Army will march into Hyderabad as planned tomorrow morning'.

(15) Mr Jinnah was undoubtedly; by virtue of having taken an iron and most resolute stand on the division of the Indian Army; the father of Pakistan Army.

It was remarkable that as a very sick 71-year-old man in 1947, Mr Jinnah possessed the tremendous Coup d Oeil (unusual strategic insight) and

resolution to order Gracey in October 1947 to employ two brigades of Pakistan Army to attack Kashmir; one from Sialkot going for Jammu and one from Rawalpindi going for Srinagar ! **(16)** It was indeed a pity that he did not possess any adviser, who could be called a 'Man' (A MAN LIKE PATEL) of sufficient ability and independent judgement to convince him to override Gracey who was behaving little better than a glorified headclerk and mouthpiece of Auchinleck!

It was yet another tragedy that this glorified headclerk was retained and succeeded Messervy as the second C-in-C of Pakistan Army! It is strange that Shaukat Riza who wrote his book in the 1990s did not even mention this incident. A reflection on the roundabout way in which the book was written and on the analytical ability and grasp of military history of all the brilliant Principal Staff Officers of Pakistan's General Headquarters whose name are so proudly mentioned in the Acknowledgement section of his book . **(17)**

The Indian GHQ ordered 7th Light Cavalry to be ready to move into Kashmir in the end of October. Its Hindu Jat Squadron equipped with armoured cars (this was from 6 Lancers which went to Pakistan) started movement from Ambala on 1st

November and after a tough march reached Srinagar on the evening of 5th November. It has to be noted that although the Indians starting reinforcing Srinagar from 27th October onwards, the Indian superiority till the end of the first week of November was not as formidable as to ensure that Srinagar could not be threatened again, in case the Pakistan Army joined the tribesmen.

This was so because the Indians were forced to defend simultaneously various locations which if lost could seriously jeopardise the whole Indian position in Kashmir. Their communication from Pathankot to Jammu ran parallel and very close to the Pakistan border. Jammu the main town on their north-south communications was a few miles from Pakistan. In addition several Dogra garrisons at Bagh, Mirpur, Mendhar Poonch, Skardu, Leh etc were besieged by the various local militias and their fall could further exacerbate the Indian position in Kashmir.

We had left the battle at Patan where 1 Sikh had taken a defensive position after being forced to withdraw from 5 kilometres east of Baramula. The tribesmen launched an attack on the reinforced Indian position at Patan on 30th October but failed to capture it due to intense strafing by Indian Air Force and the inherent defensive strength of the Indian defensive position which was well sited and

dominated the area around. The tribesmen now decided to infiltrate, bypass the Indian position from both north and south and capture the Srinagar airfield, which was the centre of gravity of the whole battle. The tribesmen who were masters of guerrilla warfare successfully went into the rear of the Indian position from its south by infiltration (see definition) and managed to reach Badgam a village just a few kilometres away from the Srinagar airfield on 3rd November. Here they successfully raided and dispersed an Indian infantry company inflicting in the process an extremely heavy loss on the Indians in terms of men killed including the Indian Company commander Major Somnath Sharma. **(18)**

The tribesmen were very close to establishing a roadblock between Srinagar airfield and town, but their paucity in numbers restrained them from doing so. At this critical juncture when no Pakistani politician ever dared to cross the River Jhelum (it may be noted that till ceasefire in Dec 48, no major Muslim League leader including the Prime Minister ever visited Kashmir!) in order to inspire and pat the indomitable tribesmen. The Indian political leadership was more energetic and on hearing about our indomitable tribesmen's action at Badgam Sardar Patel the second most important Indian leader after Nehru visited Srinagar on 4th November. **(19)** Patel stressed the importance of holding Srinagar and assured the soldiers that reinforcements were on the way.

There is one extremely important event which has generally been ignored by most Pakistani military historians including Shaukat Riza. This was a conference held between 30th October and 4th November. Brigadier Akbar Khan the military man incharge of the raiders operations had returned to Pindi after a visit to the frontline at Srinagar. The tribesmen had not yet been repulsed and were planning infiltration operations with the aim of capturing Srinagar airfield. Akbar Khan's analysis about the operational solution to the problem of tribesmen's inability to attack well entrenched Indian infantry, supported by aircraft and artillery was to provide the tribesmen with armoured cars.


Major Masud from 11 Cavalry stationed at Rawalpindi volunteered to take his own squadron's armoured cars to Srinagar, on his own initiative, without informing any superior headquarter. Akbar Khan states in his book 'Raiders in Kashmir' that Major Masud said that the armoured cars would go without official permission, at his own risk and that the men would be in civilian clothes. This fact is proved by two independent authorities who were not from armoured corps and thus had no ulterior motivation or desire to project 11 Cavalry.

One was General Akbar who was present at the conference and the other was Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry who was a gunner, and was also present at the same conference. **(20)** Akbar states that as the conference was coming to an end Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan a Muslim League leader and Central Government Minister entered the room. Brigadier Sher Khan who was the Director Military Operations had also joined the discussion. This, Raja Ghazanfar (despite being from a so-called martial area) was horrified about the armoured cars proposal, and according to both Akbar Khan and Amjad Chaudhry opposed the idea. He was supported by Brigadier Sher (Lion) Khan! Both the Minister and the Lion Hearted brigadier feared that such a step would lead to an open war between Pakistan and India. **(21)**



Brigadier Tommv Masud

Map hand drawn and conceived By Agha H Amin-1999



Amjad Chaudhry states that one of the participants at this conference a Muslim League minister Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan even voiced an apprehension

that the unruly tribesmen may get unruly and damage the Maharajas palace at Srinagar ! **(22)**



Thus in the end Akbar Khan who was not directly in charge of the operations of tribesmen was overruled by a pacifist Minister more keen to enjoy ministerial perks and a paper tiger brigadier wearing the mask of the high-sounding appointment of Director Military Operations!

The only difference between India and Pakistan was not whether one side possessed armoured cars or not, but the simple fact that while Mr Jinnah did not have any able Muslim deputy to advise him about military affairs (whether Punjabi, Hindustani or Pathan)



Major General Akbar Khan ,the real hero of the 1947-48 War.A DSO of Burma and the architect of philosophy of armed insurrection by aiding non state actors as state proxies.His ideas of use of non state actors as advanced in his writings were picked up much later and practised in

Afghanistan, NEFA and Kashmir




Nehru was assisted by a much larger team of more resolute, more intellectually capable Hindu deputies like Patel who ensured that armoured cars of 7th Light Cavalry; under command Lieutenant N.G David; did reach Srinagar area on 7th November and inflicted on the poorly armed tribesmen equipped with bolt action rifles a defeat at what the Indians themselves call the decisive battle of Shalateng!

It may be noted that on the night of 2/3 November the tribesmen had successfully infiltrated north of

the Indian main position at Pattan and had reached Shalateng in the rear of Pattan and a little to the north of Srinagar. Sen the Indian brigade commander countered this move by ordering 1 Sikh to pull back from Patan and to take a position at milestone four astride the Srinagar-Baramula road. By 6th November a large number of tribesmen who had been slowly infiltrating since 3rd November had gathered at Shalateng.

Major Aslam and Major Khurshid Anwar the Pakistani officers in charge of these tribesmen decided to launch their main attack on Srinagar on the night of 6/7 November. The Indian Brigade Commander Brigadier Sen was also simultaneously analysing this threat and had decided to launch a deliberate attack on this force supported by 7th Light Cavalry's squadron on 7th November. Sen's plan was to launch a frontal attack supported by aircraft while one troop of 7th Light Cavalry under Lieutenant David which had already been sent towards Bandipura on a recce mission and was already in the tribesmen's positions rear was ordered by wireless to attack the tribesmen from the rear. **(23)** The result was the battle of Shalateng on the morning of 7th November.



The tribesman had started their main attack by infiltration on the night of 6th November and were fighting on the northern outskirts of Srinagar when the Indians launched their main attack at first light. David's troop had already got into the rear of the

tribesmen as planned; thus while the tribesmen were attacked frontally by Indian infantry supported by armoured cars and aircraft, armoured cars were attacking them from the rear. This was too much for men armed with bolt action rifles. The tribesmen were routed and it was with great difficulty that the situation was finally stabilised at least temporarily at Rampura a narrow defile halfway between Baramula and Uri. **(24)**

The abandonment of the conduct of war to tribesmen armed with bolt action rifles; while the Indians attacked them with Spitfires, Tempests, Harvards and Daimler/Humber/GMC Armoured cars was without any doubt one of the most disgraceful acts in Pakistani military history. Even in the whole of 1947-48 War in all probability no regular Pakistan Army officer beyond the rank of captain was killed! An indicator that officers were not leading from the front. General Akbar Khan's views about the whole affair at Shalateng are more controversial. Akbar is of the opinion that, no battle ever took place at Shalateng, since the bulk of tribesmen had already withdrawn to Baramula on 5th November. **(25)**

Akbar was not present at Shalateng and there is no doubt that a battle did take place at Shalateng; however it is possible that after appearance of the Indian regular army units supported by aircraft; and no similar counteraction from Pakistani side in shape of a similar commitment in terms of

army/airforce involvement; it is likely that many tribesmen may have withdrawn from Srinagar area between 27th October and 5th November .

Major General Akbar Khan was more accurate once he said in his book; ' They felt themselves let down by Pakistan.

They had, of their own free will, agreed to come and fight in Kashmir but only against the State Army. In this they had done more than what was expected of them. But no one had arranged with them. But no one had arranged with them to fight also against the regular Indian Army, with artillery tanks and aircraft. **(26)** It must be noted that there was one very major difference between the tribesmen and the vast majority of Muslim League leaders like Ghazanfar Ali and men like Aslam Khan, Khurshid Anwar etc, i.e.; these men and their ancestors since 1849 had been serving the British and even the and suddenly in 1940 or 1947 these men had become leaders of Pakistan or officers of the Pakistan Army; in contrast the tribesmen and their ancestors had been fighting the British with unequal intervals since 1849!

Baramula was recaptured by Indians on 8th November and the Indians aided by their airforce


which was attacking the entire tract of road between Baramula and Muzaffarabad **(27)** continued their advance towards Uri. The Indian Prime Minister Nehru visited Kashmir on 11th November and travelled in an armoured car of 7th Light Cavalry till Baramula. **(28)** Compare this with the attitude of the Pakistani politicians. Neither Liaquat the Prime Minister nor any single of his ministers; Hindustani, Punjabi, Sindhi, Bengali or Pathan crossed river Jhelum. **(29)** The attitude of Gracey in not agreeing to commit the army to Kashmir, however disgraceful and negative can be explained by saying that he was a foreigner!



While Nehru boldly visited frontlines in Kashmir during the war ,Pakistans prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan dared not visit Kashmir till after cease fire.Extreme left

Brigadier Akbar Khan ,the only Pakistani observer who noted this fact in his monumental book "Raiders in Kashmir"

What kept the Pakistani political leadership from visiting the tribesmen who had won a territory that to this day has been ruled by Pakistan is hard to explain. Akbar Khan was not wrong once he said that fear prevented these leaders from visiting Kashmir while the war was on ! **(30)** Liaquat eventually fell victim of an assassin in 1951.



Had he died because of enemy action while visiting Kashmir, posterity would have remembered

him as a much greater man. According to Akbar, Messervy was the main culprit for spreading a fear of Indian reaction in Pakistan Army. 'Messervy addressing a meeting of G.H.Q officers warned us against hostilities with India. He said that, in his opinion, in case of war India would overrun Pakistan within ten days' . **(31)** Compare this negative attitude with the Israeli Army which defeated far better armed and well organised Arab armies in the 1948 War. Just 30,000 Jews had served in the British Army in the second world war. **(32)** More than 600,000 Muslims, more than half of them from areas which constituted

Pakistan had fought in the Second World War and yet the Pakistani leadership was unwilling to stand on its own feet preferring the two unreliable British crutches i.e. Messervy and Gracey!

Mr Jinnah had already done too much for the army by insisting on the division of Indian Army, against tremendous opposition on part of the Britishers. The great tragedy was that Mr Jinnah was surrounded by men of zero military insight and devoid of all independent judgement. The Secretary of Defence, Mirza being a man who had never fought in actual war and the Muslim League politicians who were only good followers!

General Akbar Khan (then Lieutenant Colonel) met the tribals at Uri on 8th November. The tribals questioned Akbar about why Pakistan Government was behaving so spinelessly and not assisting them with artillery/regular troop support etc. Akbar Khan had no answer and tried to explain the legal position or simply lack of guts in the Pakistani political leadership and lack of guts in most the Pakistan Army's Muslim officers, except few indomitable men like Major Tommy Masud to risk their commissions by disobeying orders of the British C-in-C and showing some initiative (authors opinion in italics) . **(33)**

According to General Akbar Khan the tribesmen were so demoralised and disappointed by lack of Pakistan Army support that they withdrew from the frontline opposite Baramulla on 31st October and 10th November, and withdrew to Uri area, contemplating about returning to the tribal area. **(34)** Had the Indians possessed sufficient resolution or a commander with coup d'oeil there was nothing stopping them from capturing Muzaffarabad between 31st October and 10th November. The same viewpoint is advanced by the official history. **(35)**

The probability that Akbar Khan who wrote the famous book 'Raiders in Kashmir' or Major Aslam, whose personal account was one of the many

personal accounts used by the official historians who compiled the official history dealing with operations in Kashmir, were exaggerating their own role cannot be ruled out. There is one fact, however, that stands out as the crux of the issue, and which still raises the stature of the tribesmen higher than both Akbar or Aslam; i.e. the fact that the initial shock of the tribal onslaught on Srinagar was so traumatic that it imposed a 'once bitten twice shy approach' on the mind of the Indian Commanders. This ensured that the Indians despite the absence of any tribals in front of them; (as Messrs Akbar and Aslam allege) were in no mood to advance hurriedly towards Muzaffarabad after having captured Baramula.

After 10th November according to Akbar Khan the Mahsud and other tribesmen returned and played a major role in stabilising the front between Uri and Muzaffarabad. **(36)**

As one advances westwards from Baramula to Uri the Jhelum Gorge becomes narrower and the defenders task becomes easier while the attackers task becomes more difficult. The Indian Army although supported by aircraft artillery and armoured cars was too psychologically shattered to advance rapidly westwards, despite the fact that most tribesmen were not fighting the battle, at least temporarily few demolitions and a few snipers

who were too motivated to withdraw stopped the Indian advance approximately 3 miles west of Uri. **(37)**

The official Pakistani history is hell bent upon giving the credit for this to Aslam Khan, while Akbar Khan also claims the credit for having stopped the Indians. The tribesmen who did the actual dirty work of fighting were never consulted by the authors of the official account! The start of snowfall from first week of December ensured that no major fighting took place between December 1947 and April 1948.

We must also remember that the tribals did the actual fighting between 20th October and in November 1947, while books were written by Pakistan Army officers from 1970 onwards, some 23 years after the war. The Indian behaviour after capture of Uri showed that their higher commanders lacked the initiative, which was the only commodity required to capture Muzafarabad as far as the Indians were concerned. Instead the Indians wasted three infantry battalions, two artillery batteries and a squadron of armoured cars in passively defending Uri. **(38)**

The Indian problem like Pakistan Army as we shall see later, was not lack of valour, for there was plenty of valour at the lower level; but lack of resolute leadership at the higher level. In the same Uri area there was a living legend of the pre-1945 British Indian Army; i.e. Jemadar Nand Singh a Punjabi Sikh who (as a Naik in 1/11 Sikhs) had won the Victoria Cross in Burma at the Battle of Buthidang in Arakan on 12th March 1944 for having cleared three Japanese foxholes singlehandedly.

(39)

But there were no Rommels or Nicholsons or Bluchers. Thimaya who came to Uri area later was a little better than other Indian commanders, but his initiative was limited and kept in check, by the higher military Indian commanders.

The battles around Srinagar, although small in terms of size of forces involved were the most crucial battles of the Kashmir War. By 13th November when the Indians captured Uri the remotest chance of any future threat developing ever again to Srinagar was removed.

The Srinagar Valley was the heartland of Kashmir. Possession of it meant that the Indians could reinforce and relieve its besieged garrisons at Leh, Skardu, Poonch. Attack Muzaffarabad, Tithwal, Kargil and mount air attacks on all supply routes on Murree-Muzaffarabad-Uri Road, Kaghan-Babusar-

Chilas track, all tracks and roads around Poonch etc.


The next logical Indian operational objective should have been to straight thrust westwards from Uri to Domel-Muzaffarabad and close the main raider point of entry into Kashmir. We have already seen that the Indians were too psychologically shattered to do so. Instead they wasted their strength in various relief operations which we will discuss in brief. Since September-October various Kashmir State Forces garrisons consisting of Hindu Dogra troops were besieged all over the state by the tribals who had entered various parts of Kashmir and by local Kashmiri Muslim militias of ex-World War II veterans.

The besieged garrisons were defended by numerically small forces and started surrendering one by one; Bhimbhar and Mendhar on 3rd November, Bagh was abandoned by its non-Muslim garrison on 9th November which broke out to join Poonch Garrison. Rajauri was captured by the Militia/Tribals on 12th November and Rawalakot whose defenders managed to breakout and join Poonch around the same time. **(40)**

In various Pakistani and Indian accounts both sides accuse each other of atrocities against prisoner women and other non-combatants.

I have deliberately avoided discussing these, since; the subject of this book is not ethics or human rights violation. I am of the firm conviction that both sides were guilty of this charge and both i.e. the Tribals/Militia and the Dogras/Indian Army were not angels or philanthropists by any definition; the best course being to accept the fact there were villains in higher proportion on both sides as far as the Non-Regular Forces i.e. Kashmir State Force and Tribals/Kashmiri Militia were concerned. In mid-November the Indians brought another regular army brigade i.e. 268 Infantry Brigade in Kashmir.

For example there is case of Nand Singh VC whose dead body after being killed in action was allegedly dragged by tribals tied behind a jeep and thrown in a garbage dumps for many days to be eaten by pariah dogs and jackals.



armoured cars of 7th Light Cavalry which had joined it at Jammu on 9th November (41) was to

move from Jammu northwards on axis Jammu-Akhnur-Nowshera-Jhangar-Kotli-Mirpur relieving Mirpur right on the Kashmir Pakistan border by 20th November 1947.


The Indians were not wholly successful in executing this plan. Tribal/Militia resistance was tough and the terrain difficult, and the Uri force could not relieve Poonch but managed to breakthrough to it and reinforcing it with one battalion. The force attacking northwards from Jammu i.e. 50 Para Brigade succeeded in capturing Nowshera Jhangar and relieving Kotli garrison on 26th November.


However, news of fall of Mirpur which had been captured by the tribals/militia on 25th November forced the Indians to abandon Kotli, which could not be defended, while Mirpur was in hostile hands. Around the end of December the Indians inducted another regular army brigade in Kashmir i.e. the 80 Infantry Brigade in area Chamb-Akhnur.

This brigade relieved 50 Para Brigade which had been earlier located in Gurdaspur area and had entered Kashmir in end October of the defence of Jammu Akhnur area. The Indians now planned a relief operation aimed at relieving Mirpur Poonch and Kotli garrisons, two battalion size force (from

161 Brigade) was to move from Uri southwards to Poonch while a brigade size force (50 Para Brigade) supported by a squadron of

Siege of Poonch






This brigade captured Chamb on 10th December and had been captured by the militia soon after the rebellion started in October. It may be noted that the 50 Para Brigade was commanded since end of

November by Brigadier Usman an Indian Muslim officer who had decided to opt for the Indian Army .

(42) Intense fighting involving small size forces took place in area Bhimbhar-Jhangar-Mirpur etc; we will not discuss these minor actions since they did not have any major impact on the overall strategic situation in Kashmir.

Most important of these actions but of limited tactical consequence was recapture of Jhangar by the Militia/Tribals on 24 December. In mid-February 1948 the Indians inducted 19 Brigade (three infantry battalions) in Nowshera area. **(43)**



It may be noted that the Indians were extra sensitive about the security of Jammu and had deployed two squadrons of Stuart Light Tanks (one from 7th Light Cavalry and one from Central India Horse) at Jammu from December onwards. In addition a squadron of Sherman Tanks (Deccan

Horse) was stationed first at Samba on the Pathankot-Jammu road from January 1948 and later moved to Jammu. **(44)**

It may be noted that the overall incharge of all Indian Army operations in Kashmir was Lieutenant General Russell in the capacity of General Officer Commanding in Chief, Delhi and Punjab Command. This Russell performed his task most religiously and ably in marked contrast with the two inefficient British crutches employed by Pakistan i.e. Messervy and Gracey. British government however had imposed a ban on Russell's entry in Kashmir, and Russell who was a brave man and a good soldier asked the Indians to either lift this ban or relieve him of his command. Once the ban was not lifted the Indians replaced Russell by Lieutenant General Cariappa on 20th January 1948. **(45)**

We will now briefly deal with the Gilgit Rebellion which led to the liberation or capture of Northern Areas of Kashmir State by anti-Maharaja Muslim forces. The Northern areas comprised the areas of Baltistan, Gilgit Wazarat and Ladakh. Gilgit was leased to the British in 1901. The British had raised an all Muslim para military force known as Gilgit Scouts under British officers to garrison the area and to act as a scout and early warning force against an invasion from Czarist Central Asia. In 1947 once the Britishers were withdrawing

from India they returned the area to the Kashmir State.

The area was all Muslim and Dogra rule was unpopular. The Maharaja sent a new Governor and some Kashmir State troops to take over the area. Once the Gilgit Scouts realised that the Dogras (Kashmir State) were planning to disband them, **(46)** they planned a rebellion against the Dogra rule in which their two British officers i.e. Major Brown and Captain Mathieson who were dedicated enough to identify themselves with their Muslim rank and file also joined. The total strength of the Gilgit Scouts was 582 men. **(47)**

There were no Kashmir State Force troops at Gilgit the capital of the Gilgit Agency where the Dogra Governor Brigadier Ghansara Singh was housed. The nearest Kashmir State Force Unit i.e. 6th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry Battalion was at Bunji 36 miles south of Gilgit. This unit had two companies of Punjabi (Kashmiri Muslims from Poonch area) Muslims and two of non- Muslims. (one Hindu Dogra and one Sikh). **(48)** When the Scouts received news of accession of Kashmir State on 28th October, they planned a revolt and executed their plans on 4th November capturing Gilgit and placing the Dogra Governor Ghansara Singh under arrest.

The scouts also seized Bunji without much effort since the non-Muslim troops, who were overwhelmingly outnumbered, were too demoralised to put up a fight. Some of them took the great risk of attempting to escape towards Skardu in Kashmir State territory or Astor on the Gilgit-Bunji-Srinagar route, however few of these reached Skardu. The Gilgit Scouts initially proclaimed an independent Republic, but later, probably keeping in view the more dangerous regular Indian Army intervention threat; decided to join Pakistan in mid November.

In order to understand accurately the nature of Northern Areas terrain, the reader may note that within 65 miles radius of Gilgit there are eight mountain peaks above 24,000 feet including Rakaposhi (26,050 feet), and Nanga Parbat (26,650 feet) and a large number of glaciers etc. Gilgit was about 231 miles from Srinagar the Kashmir State capital and a mountain track connected Srinagar-Gilgit, with the 13,780 high Burzil Pass, which was snowbound from November to March in the middle.

The other route to Kashmir territory was the Gilgit-Skardu track in the Indus valley which was little more than a mule track and was about 118 miles

long. All the rivers in the area were extremely swift, unfordable and unnavigable except by ferry rafts made of inflated buffalo skin and these also required great expertise and skill in order to be employed successfully. part of the non-Muslim garrison at Bunji surrendered while some elements tried to withdraw to Skardu in the Kashmir State territory or towards Astor on the Gilgit-Srinagar route, but most were killed or captured.

The Gilgit Scouts and the Muslim companies of 6th Jammu and Kashmir conducted their operations after the capture of Gilgit/Bunji on three axis. It may be noted that following the fall of Gilgit, a large number of locals of Gilgit and Hunza had volunteered for military service and the total strength of the Scouts reached the figure of approximately 2,000 men. **(49)**

The Ibex Force (approx. 400 men) was given the objective of advancing on axis Gilgit-Skardu under the indomitable Major Ehsan Khan; with a view to capturing Skardu which was held by a Dogra battalion. The Tiger Force under Captain Hassan Khan (400 men) was tasked to advance on axis Bunji-Kamri-Gurais-Bandipura; the axis which the Indians were likely to adopt; after the snow melted in early 1948 to capture the Northern Areas. The Eskimo Force (400 men) under Lieutenant Shah Khan was to move from Astor through the

snow bound and uninhabited Deosai Plain above 10,000 feet and attack Dras-Kargil and Zojila Pass area from the rear severing the communications of the Dogra garrisons holding Dras-Skardu and Leh with the Kashmir valley/Srinagar area.

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 Worcester WR8 0RA
 Telephone Upton upon Severn (01684) 592306

30th September 2000

Dear Aggie

Herewith the promised picture. It was taken at Babusaer in summer, 1945 and shows me with my and later Brown's Agency Munshi (political, judicial and administrative secretary) Krishnan Gopal. The dog is my young golden retriever Brutus.

The photographer who produced it has doubts whether it is in the ideal form for reproduction in print. I get all sorts of conflicting advice, none of which I can understand, still less follow, about the best method of transmission to you, so am using the one with which I am familiar, namely this. If you need anything better could you let me know exactly what, and I will do what I can to provide it.

My granddaughter is now away at her university, and our E-mail service will be more erratic. So perhaps now is the time for more detailed comment on your Defence Journal article, with an eye to your new one. The main points that catch my eye are these:

1. I don't know how much you will want to write about Brown as a person. Your perceptions may be very different from mine, but I think if it were me I would try to find space for the following. First his political importance. For example early in the Kashmiri governorship he took over the neglected civil affairs of the Province, virtually acting as Political Agent. His Scouts work was often intensely political, and later there were his dealings with Rawalpindi and Peshawar. Then his outstanding leadership skills, his physical prowess and stamina, his thoroughness, hard work and his methodical, comprehensive and to my mind brilliant planning ahead. Whether you will want to mention his (very Scottish) capacity for monstrous binges is not my business!
2. You say the Maharaja sent troops into Gilgit "to take over the area." If so they were a very small force, far inferior to the Scouts. Could the decision in fact have been the Governor's and perhaps meant (if he was capable of such analysis) to be as much defensive as aggressive? Or have you other information from Kashmiri sources? How on earth did that

LETTER FROM ASSISTANT POLITICAL AGENT NORTHERN AREAS 1947 TO ME IN 2000

man get made a brigadier—unless it was to impress the ignorant tribesmen with the Might of the Maharaja?


3. The Scouts "planned a revolt... capturing Gilgit". Does not "capturing" imply some sort of military action? I would respectfully suggest "taking full control of Gilgit". And would the statement be complete without a mention of Brown's role?
4. About the proclamation of the Republic. The received version, doubtless backed by the massive authority of Baber Khan and his friends, who may well have believed it, seems to be that, as you say, this was the work of the Scouts as a whole. But if Brown is to be believed, and I am sure he is, it was the work of only a minority. Most of the Scouts and their leaders were loyal supporters of Pakistan. It was only this group of Shiahhs from Nagir, not all in the Scouts, (and those who were represented at most 30% of the men) plus two or three defecting Kashmiri officers, who backed the "Republic". Men like Haider, Shah Khan and Brown himself played along to avoid open conflict, but with every intention of steering the Province back to Pakistan.
5. On the capture of Bunji—were the non-Muslims there really so outnumbered, even allowing for their detachments at Jaglot, Ramghat and south of the Kamakdori Pass? I note that Brown, who went to see for himself, quotes roughly equal numbers of Muslims, Sikhs and Dogras; your sources give two Muslim and two non-Muslim companies. Safiullah's Scouts platoon from Gilgit, which seems actually to have done the job, will not have been much over thirty strong and yes, there were Azad forces there as well, but so abominably led by Mirza Hussein that their contribution seems to have been small. Of course Brown's cheeky reconnaissance of the place and the surrender order he forced the Governor and Majid to send were crucial. So was the battle of Jaglot "Without much trouble," you say. I wonder.
6. We always regarded the Burzil as snowbound until June rather than March (which ties in with the timing of Eskimo Force's operation). Shah Khan once told me he crossed the Deosai Plains on skis, some years after Independence, to deliver urgent medical supplies to I think Skardu.
7. I hope that listing Ladakh among the Northern Areas does not imply a Pakistani claim to it? Too much culture-clash. Certainly the Scouts under the British Raj never claimed or were intended to garrison anything but the Gilgit Agency proper. I wonder who made Leh an objective. I can see that, militarily, it had to be masked to protect the rear of the Zoji La position, but to try and take it, among an inevitably hostile population (with whom Pakistan had no direct quarrel), looks both politically unwise and against to the principles of guerrilla war. Do you know, by the way, if Dras and Kargil belong in Ladakh or Baltistan? I can find no map that can tell me, and no text either. It would be helpful if your new article could make this clear.

On re-reading the above, I see that I have raised a number of points in the form of questions. These are not meant to call for answers by mail, but for consideration, if you see fit, in your new article. The other thing you may notice is that that I am interested in more things than just the role of the British officers, though I confess that in finalising my draft I found myself harking back to Brown more often than I expected.

With best wishes,

*Yours
Aust*

Peter Inchbald.



The operations of the Gilgit Scouts in the Northern Areas are the most fascinating and inspiring part of the entire 1947-48 War, however, for lack of space we will discuss them in a very brief manner. The Ibex Force commenced its advance along northern bank of Indus river in end January 1948 and besieged the Dogras at Skardu from 12 February. The Dogras were vastly outnumbered and their defeat; keeping in view numerical disparity, limited supplies and distance from Srinagar; was a foregone conclusion.

Despite all their tangible inferiority the Dogras led by Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jang Thapa; an extremely resolute commander and a very chivalrous human being as far as treatment of non-combatants was concerned **(50)** held on till 14th August 1948; when 200 of his garrison broke out towards Kargil, while Sher Jang with the remainder 250 of his troops surrendered. **(51)**

SIEGE OF SKARDU –OVERWHELMING NUMBER AGAINST 250 LED BY SHER JANG THAPA



The Indians had made many attempts to relieve Skardu, but these were foiled by the Scouts/Volunteers who defeated the various Indian relieving columns by laying some very unconventional and brilliant ambushes on the Skardu-Kargil Road.



Dras on the Kargil-Skardu road was captured by the Gilgit Scouts on 6th June 1947. In June the Scouts finally advanced towards Zojila Pass the gateway to Srinagar Valley from the east. Zojila Pass (11,578 ft) was captured by the Gilgit Scouts under the


leadership of Lieutenant Shah Khan on 7th July 1948.

The Gilgit Scouts also advanced towards Leh about 160 miles east of Skardu in the Indus valley, but could not capture it since, their relative numerical inferiority, lack of adequate logistic support and a majority of non-Muslim population in the area, made the success of their operation doubtful.

By mid-July the Scouts, without any regular army troops had liberated the entire Northern Areas and had reached the administrative boundary of Srinagar district holding an area stretching in the west from outskirts of Bandipura 40 miles north of Srinagar, holding Zojila Pass 62 miles east of Srinagar and at Nimu few miles west of Leh.

The Scouts had achieved more than their actual potential warranted and could only be praised for doing what they did. It was not possible for the Scouts any further, since an advance west south or east of the line they were holding would have brought them into open territory, where high mountains and steep cliffs and high altitude were no longer present to act as force multipliers and where the Indians could effectively employ their

regular army supported by modern artillery, aircraft, armoured cars and tanks.



From November onwards when Brigadier Akbar Khan was tasked to organise militias in Kashmir, greater reliance was placed on recruiting ex servicemen from Poonch and Bagh area. Before the Second World War a large number of troops in the Punjabi Muslim class in the Indian Army were from Poonch and Bagh areas of Kashmir State. During the Second World War 65,362 men were recruited for the Indian Army. Based on the fact that total Dogra recruitment in the war (including those from Kangra/Nurpur in Punjab) was 29,944 **(52)** one can safely conclude that more than 75 % of these were Kashmiri Muslims (Sudhans/Kianis etc) from Poonch, Bagh, Bhimbhar, Rajauri etc. While tribesmen already in Kashmir since October 1947 and fresh volunteers from tribal area once again started returning to the frontline from end November, more Kashmiri ex servicemen were recruited and armed with old rifles issued by the Pakistani GHQ. The ex INA officers led all the officers in fighting and proved that the INA was not as bad a lot as Shaukat Riza was to paint in his book much later . **(53)**

Jhangar was captured by the Azad Militia/Tribesmen on 24th December 1947. **(54)** By evening of 25th December the same men who had captured Jhangar besieged the Indian force at Nowshera, but failed to capture it. Nowshera was of crucial strategic significance and the Indians gave it very high priority as a strategic point. Loss of it could deny the Indians with a southern approach to relieve Poonch at a future stage.

The militias bypassed Nowshera but lack of artillery and air support ensured that Nowshera remained in Indian hands. Later failure of the Militia to capture and hold Nowshera proved to be the first Indian

stepping stone to the final relief of Poonch. The fighting in Jhangar- Nowshera area was of little significance in strategic terms. The mountains here were lower than 7,000 ft unlike Srinagar-Uri and Northern areas and the local militias had more difficulty in contesting advance of regular Indian Army troops supported by artillery aircrafts and armour.


Thus by 17th March the Indians launched a two brigade attack and recaptured Jhangar. It may be noted that Indians made much greater progress in area Jammu-Jhangar-Rajauri because unlike the area in the north which restricted effective employment of armour and regular units by virtue of mountains above 6,000 feet the terrain in the south consisted of mountains which were below 5,000 feet and where few odd snipers sitting on the mountain tops could not stop whole brigades. It still speaks very poorly of the Indian Army that despite having aircrafts tanks armoured cars and modern artillery and no regular troops to oppose them, their progress in the south was not as fast as should have been.

The next logical Indian objective was Rajauri, a town of strategic importance on the road from Jammu to Poonch and of vital importance for any future operation to relieve the Indian garrison at Poonch. Rajauri had been liberated by the Kashmiri Militia under one Major Rahmatullah in November 1947. **(55)** Two battalions of the Militia (called Azads) had been raised from the many ex soldiers in the area.

Loss of Jhangar and withdrawal of Azad forces besieging Nowshera meant that the Militia at Rajauri could not be effectively reinforced or replenished/supplied by the main Militia forces in Bhimbhar-Jhangar area. Thus the Indians were

successful in capturing Rajauri, which was captured by a tank squadron of Central India Horse entirely on its own on 12 April . **(56)** The culprit for this serious strategic loss was not the militia but the Pakistani government who had left the Militia to fight the Indian tanks with bolt action rifles!

Later Rajauri proved Indian Army's springboard for the final relief of Poonch. Absence of Pakistan Army support between October 1947 and May 1948 ensured that Indians occupied the entire area between Nowshera and Poonch.



It may be noted that by April 1948 the Indians had two complete armoured regiments and one squadron of a third regiment in Kashmir. The 7th Light Cavalry had two squadrons of armoured cars in Srinagar-Uri area and its third squadron of Stuart Tanks at Akhnur. The Central India Horse had a squadron each at Jhangar and Nowshera and a third

squadron near Jammu. The Deccan Horse had a squadron minus of Shermans at Jammu and one troop at Chamb. **(57)** Rajauri and Jhangar were not captured by valour alone but by tanks against men armed with bolt action rifles, while Pakistani armour was doing nothing across the border!

In April 1948 the Indians launched an attack which at last forced Pakistan's unassertive civilian leadership to finally convince the British crutch that they had employed to finally commit the Pakistan Army into Kashmir. By this time Nehru had already sacked the first British Chief of the Indian Army i.e. General Sir Rob Lockhart, K.C.B., C.I.E., M.C. for inefficiency in conducting the Indian Army operations in Kashmir. **(58)**

Mr Jinnah possessed an iron will imprisoned in a very weak body; unfortunately to balance this deficiency his prime minister and the entire cabinet possessed stronger bodies but much weaker spirits. In 1917 after the Bolsheviks were successful in Russia, Trotsky a total civilian organised the Red Army from a scratch employing communist party members as commissars and ex Czarist officers at gunpoint to fight a civil war against more experienced armies led by generals and assisted by the entire might of the victors of the first world war i.e. Britain and France.

Thus the Red Army the brainchild of a civilian defeated far more experienced troops of the White Army who enjoyed the full military and economic support of Britain in a savage civil war lasting over four years (1918-22).

Mr Jinnah the founder of Pakistan was as great a man as Lenin or Mao, but was not assisted by a

capable and motivated team. The Pakistan Army had fought no crippling war like the Russian Army in 1918 i.e. one in which the Russian Army had lost more than 91,50,000 casualties including 17,00,000 killed. **(59)** Pakistan was not the result of a revolution but a constitutional transfer of power. But Mr Jinnah was like a piece of rock in empty space, a lone lighthouse in a sea of mediocrity.

Mr Jinnah's advisers, all his handpicked colleagues including the Prime Minister lacked independent judgement and resolution to advise him successfully into committing the regular Pakistan Army in Kashmir! Apart from Mr Jinnah no other Pakistani politician possessed the courage to spur, prod or overrule the British C-in-C the way men like Nehru and Patel did in India. 99% of Muslim politicians who constituted the Cabinet including the Prime Minister had never participated in any serious anti-British political movement before independence and had never been to jail unlike 90% of Congress leaders!

99% of them except Mr Jinnah had not even openly and directly criticised the British government inside the relative safety of the floors of pre 1947 Indian Legislative Assembly! The situation was an exact reflection of the total net backwardness and passiveness of Indian Muslims in terms of overall leadership. Mr Jinnah was the only exception ;but there was no one in his lieutenants who possessed even 5% of Jinnah's ability or strength of character. Thus political genius was not institutionalised in the Indian Muslims. In contrast Nehru relatively speaking had a much better team.

There was no full time Defence Minister and the Secretary Defence, the seniormost Pakistani Muslim who could have correctly advised Mr Jinnah was apology of a fighting soldier! Sikandar Mirza

had never fought any war or commanded even a company, and was more of an authority on arranging cocktail parties moonlight picnics **(60)** or in tribal area double cross and factional intrigue than the art of war! Thus the Pakistan Army lost half of Kashmir without ever having entered it!

While Jhangar, Rajauri and Uri was lost, the Pakistani Government was not stirred to move an inch. The Indian capture of Rajauri 45 kilometre north of Nowshera finally forced Gracey to conclude that unless Pakistan Army intervened in Kashmir, Pakistan's security would be endangered and additionally Pakistan could face a serious refugee problem and a major loss of morale as far as the army's rank and file were concerned. **(61)** But even here Gracey played the double game, i.e. in ordering the 7th division commanded by a Britisher i.e. Major General Loftus Tottenham into Kashmir

.The first Pakistan Army formation to go into Kashmir was the 101 Brigade. **(62)** The 101 Pakistani Brigade was the first regular army formation to enter Kashmir. This act of singular decisiveness took place in May 1948. One battalion each from this brigade went to Uri and Muzaffarabad-Kohala-Bagh area, while one company (later replaced by a battalion) went to Tithwal. **(63)**

In early May 1948 the Indian Army in Kashmir was reorganised. Two Divisional headquarters were created, the northern being Sri Division (later 19 Infantry Division) under Major General Thimaya (DSO of Burma and the only Indian to command an infantry brigade in actual operations in the 2nd World War); and the southern with headquarters at Jammu and known as JA Division (later 26 Infantry Division). Pir Panjal crest was the inter division boundary, but Poonch though south of Pir Panjal for sometime stayed under command Sri Division.

The JAK Force headquarters was abolished. **(64)** Thimaya the 19 Division Commander planned an offensive against Muzafarabad employing two brigades; ie 161 Brigade on Uri Domel axis (4 battalions and one armoured car squadron) and the newly formed 163 Brigade on axis Kupwara-Chowkibal-Tithwal (three battalions and one squadron).


The 77 Para Brigade which had reached Srinagar in first week of May was tasked to defend Uri-Mahura area. The Indian plan was ambitious and extremely difficult terrain dictated that both the thrusts ,despite numerical superiority and support of armour (which had almost zero room for manoeuvre) would not succeed.

The Uri-Domel approach is very narrow with mountains above 7,000 ft on both sides, while the supply route to Tithwal ran across the 3,048 metre high Nastachun Pass. It is human that both Indian and Pakistani accounts reduced the influence of situational factors like terrain and numerical superiority when they succeeded and increased it when they failed, success being ascribed by historians on both side to superior ideology or martial fervour!

While Thimaya was busy finalising his plans for a summer offensive the Pakistani GHQ had finally taken a decision to commit 7th Division in Kashmir. The 7th Division had three brigades i.e. 10 Brigade (Abbottabad area), 101 Brigade (Kohat) and the 25 Brigade (Rawalpindi). 25 Brigade was inducted in area Mirpur in May 1948. **(65)** While 10 Brigade and 101 Brigade entered the war in Tithwal and Uri Sectors as we shall see in the following paragraph.

Initially 101 Brigade was looking after both Tithwal and Uri sectors but soon 10 Brigade took over Tithwal Sector while 101 Brigade area of responsibility was confined to Bagh-Uri sector .
(66)

Advance of the 163 Brigade which commenced from 18/19 May was rapid since the militia were not expecting a brigade across a 9,000 ft high mountain, however, the advance made no progress after having reached Tithwal which was captured on 23 May. The only troops in front of the 163 Brigades leading battalion was a regular company of Pakistan Army which had finally decided to enter Kashmir. This was, however, soon reinforced by two more companies and finally by the whole 10 Brigade by 30th May. **(67)**



Thus the chances of any further Indian advance on this axis were frustrated. The other Indian thrust on Uri-Domel axis made limited progress.

Here they were opposed by a regular Pakistan Army formation i.e. the 101 Brigade. The Indians succeeded in capturing Pandu which was 9178 ft high on 25 May, however, beyond Pandu the Indian advance petered out and nothing of any strategic consequence was gained as far as the 19

Division offensive was concerned. Thimaya inducted the second brigade i.e. the 77 Para Brigade also but little was accomplished. The Indians were to claim later that they were capable **(68)** of advancing till Muzaffarabad but were restrained from doing so by their government! **(69)** Such claims are a typical reflection of the character of Indo-Pak people regardless of religion or race and should be treated with a pinch of salt specially by foreigners .

Similar claims were made by Pakistani authors about Poonch **(70)** and Operation Venus. **(71)**

The supposed facts that victory was so close and yet these noble commanders; as Indians and Pakistani authors have claimed meekly obeyed their governments; merely prove how timid and orders oriented these military commanders were.

Sarrail the French General had disobeyed an order to abandon Verdun in WW One **(72)** and history vindicated his act of disobedience, so did Lyautuey when ordered to abandon French Algeria in WW One **(73)** and Francois a similar order to attack in a wrong direction at Tannenberg ! **(74)**

The history of warfare is full of examples where military commanders disobeyed orders and won battles **(75)** , but if one wants to study how victory (that is if there is a grain of truth in what Pakistani and Indian authors assert) was not gained by obeying orders, it is Indian and Pakistan Armies that provide classic examples of such cases. These officers had joined the army as mercenaries of a subject race. Many were ex rankers and had achieved the ultimate aim of their life ;ie attaining officer rank!

This narrative would not be complete in case we do not briefly discuss the battle of Pandu which though of negligible strategic significance, tactically greatly improved the defence of the Pakistani position west of Uri. Pandu was as we have already seen a 9000 ft plus high feature which dominated the Pakistani held position at Chakothi on the main Uri Domel road.

The 101 Brigade executed a brilliant attack by infiltration in which two Pakistani infantry units completed infiltration in two days and recaptured Pandu on 24 July. **(76)**



Lieutenant J.H Harvey Kelly 4/10 Baluch .
The man who planned the brilliant Pandu Infiltration
operation

On the strategic level this battle is of no consequence, but at a much more crucial level i.e. in terms of morale of troops this battle had tremendous significance for Pakistan Army.

The Pakistan Army had fought its first major battle against Indians in a situation where one brigade was pitched against two as far as the overall situation in the sector was concerned; a case of

success in face of considerable numerical and tremendous terrain odds.



The Pandu Attack by infiltration operation

The position was held by an Indian battalion of Bihar Regiment. The Biharis were not considered good soldier material by the British after 1857 since the Hindu Rajputs and Brahmans of Bihar who were widely recruited in the old Bengal Army had taken a very prominent part in the Sepoy Rebellion!

The Biharis were recruited once again after a long time as infantry soldiers only in the Second World War, because the manpower reserves of Punjab etc could not keep pace with the extremely heavy demands of the Burma Front. The historian of the Indian Armoured Corps, a thoroughbred Sikh, Jat, Punjabi without naming the Bihar regiment just drily noted that Pandu was lost because it was held by an inexperienced battalion. **(77)** The battle served as a good morale booster for the troops and younger officers and imposed caution on the Indian Army. The plan to capture Pandu **(78)** and

overseeing its execution in all stages was the achievement of Brigadier Akbar Khan one of the very few Muslim officers of the Pakistan Army to get the DSO in WW Two and probably the only DSO holder who reached the rank of Brigadier **(79)** as far as Pakistan Army was concerned.

The Pakistan Army's appearance in Kashmir did not lead to any spectacular results.

The fatal state of indecision which had plagued Pakistani political leadership during the period October 1947-May 1948 had ensured that Pakistan Army's introduction could at best stabilise the frontier and little else at best and still lose some more territory which had been captured by the Gilgit Scouts/Militia/Tribals.

From May 1948 till December 1948 two major strategic victories were won by the Indian Army. These were strategic in the sense that although Kashmir was not entirely captured but Indian hold on two major portions of Kashmir i.e. the Ladakh and Poonch areas which was in doubt till November 1948 was at last ensured.

On the other hand Pakistani political leadership conducted the war half-heartedly and did not spur or goad Gracey into launching any major offensive.

The 7th Division which was responsible for the only sector where a decision could have been favourably achieved was under a Britisher who was not really keen to do anything. The Pakistani political leadership did not convey any interest in the war and neither the Prime Minister nor any of his ministers ever visited the battlefield at any time during the entire war from October 1947 till the last bullet had been fired on 31 December 1948! Akbar Khan who had proved his mettle was not

promoted to Divisional command since the British officers disliked him.

Today it is fashionable in Pakistan to hold that Indians were in any case superior and Pakistan could not have captured Kashmir. This is merely a distortion of facts. The simple point to be kept in mind is that had the Pakistani political leadership been courageous enough to override Gracey. One Pakistani Brigade supported by a squadron of armoured cars could have accomplished in October 1947, what two Divisions in July 1948 failed to do.

The initial situation was extremely fluid and favoured Pakistan, but the golden opportunities were missed and every minute of inaction on Pakistan's part enabled India to augment its strength in the valley. The question was not of material or numerical superiority in October 1947, but of greater resolution and "Coup d Oeil" to seize the critical time span by the forelock. Mr Jinnah saw the opportunity but was not supported by his team and what was lost in a moment was lost to eternity. Three Pakistani Divisions were committed to permanent Guard Duty in Kashmir for five more decades and the Indian threat factor was rationalised as an excuse by Messrs Ayub and Co to make Pakistan a beautiful girl which was ready to sell herself to the highest bidder at a very low price during the period 1954-65.

The Indians launched a link up operation with Poonch from the south between 14 and 22 June and made a temporary link up, carrying some supplies but were forced to fall back on 29/30 June because of inadequate troops to guard their communications. **(80)**

Fighting in Tithwal and Uri sectors became stabilised after June and no side made any

significant gains till cease fire in December 1948. By the end of May Pakistan inducted 100 Brigade in area Mendhar-Chamb. This Brigade relieved the 25 Brigade which was previously looking after this sector. **(81)**

25 Brigade was freed from this additional burden and tasked only with the Poonch sector. 6 Azad Brigade (composed of militia battalions) was also deployed in Poonch sector. Pakistan also inducted 102 Brigade in Bagh area from 17 July. **(82)** This brigade relieved 101 Brigade of the defence of this area freeing 101 Brigade to take care of only the crucial Uri Sector. By November 1948 the Pakistan Army in Kashmir was organised as follows :— **(83)**

9 DIVISION:—Headquarters at Abbottabad and 104 Brigade (10 Brigade earlier holding Tithwal Sector had been redeployed at Rawalpindi as strategic reserve) holding Tithwal Sector, 101 Brigade Uri Sector, 102 Brigade in Bagh Sector, 25 Brigade in Hajira (Poonch) Sector.

7 DIVISION:—Headquarters at Rawalpindi and 100 Brigade in Jhangar Sector, 14 Para Brigade (moved forward from Lahore) in Bhimbhar area and 3rd Armoured Brigade in Gujrat Area.

The remaining borders of Pakistan south of Kashmir were held by the 8 Division which was responsible for the entire border from Bahawalpur to Sindh/Balochistan and the 10 Division which was responsible for the border from Sialkot till Lahore/Multan. **(84)**

The 10 Division had one brigade each at Lahore and Sialkot. **(85)**

The Indians also reorganised their command structure in the beginning of September 1948.

Previously the Sri and Jammu Divisions had been operating independently of each other. Now a co-ordinating corps headquarters was established and designated as the 5th Corps (subsequently as 15th Corps) under Lieut General Shrinagesh. **(86)**

Cariappa as we have earlier discussed was the overall commander as GOC Western Command.

The first Indian major strategic success in 1948 was the final relief of Poonch. We have already seen that Poonch since November 1947 had been besieged by Azad militia/Tribals and later since May 1948 these forces had been joined by Pakistan Army's 25 Brigade. Two Kashmir State Force battalions and one regular Indian Army battalion which had managed to break through the siege from Uri Poonch axis constituted the 101 Indian Brigade holding Poonch.

The Indians regularly replenished Poonch by air till September 1948 since they could land Dakotas at the airstrip or airdrop supplies while Pakistan Airforce which had only 12 fighter aircrafts **(87)** could not contest Indian air superiority. The Indians gradually increased their numerical superiority in the area and brought in one more brigade i.e. 268 Infantry Brigade which had taken over part of frontage held the 50 Para Brigade in Jhangar area in July. **(88)**

Effective utilisation of artillery by Pakistani forces surrounding rendered the Poonch airstrip inoperational and forced the Indians to finally go for a relief operation . **(89)**

We will discuss this in a little more detail since it illustrates how very few guns or armoured cars influenced the conduct of war in Kashmir and how an odd artillery gun or two or a squadron of armour could completely alter an operational situation in

Kashmir. Just two 25 Pounder Guns **(90)** influenced the conduct of Indian operations in 1948 in a decisive manner.



These guns one 25 Pounder and one 6 Pounder according to Shaukat Riza **(91)** and two 25 Pounders according to Amjad Choudhry which fired for the first time on 6th September 1948 **(92)** and rendered use of Poonch airstrip impossible for the Indian supply aircrafts were cited by Indians **(93)** as the principal reason for the Indian decision to undertake the final relief of Poonch and extension of Indian control over the entire area between Rajauri and Poonch.

The incident illustrates that in mountain warfare even few artillery guns anti tank guns tanks or armoured cars could decisively tilt the whole outcome of an operation into success or failure.

Above all it proves that it was possible for the Pakistani GHQ to prevent the final relief of Poonch by shifting few more guns or units armed with anti

tank guns and supported by artillery while the Indians had not yet captured Rajauri.

The Pakistani GHQ on the other hand was sent repeated reports by Commander 25 Brigade about Indian intentions against Poonch **(94)** but took no counteraction either to reinforce 25 Brigade or to embark on any operation planned to reduce the chances of the expected Indian attempt to relieve Poonch.

Somehow Gracey sitting in Pindi assumed that somehow Indians would never be able to relieve Poonch and that was it. No effort was made to economise troops in one sector and shift them to reinforce Poonch or to make any threatening posture to force the Indians to abandon their planned attack on Poonch.



The official history is silent about this aspect but merely comments that a plan was made in September to launch an attack in December 1948 or January 1949 to capture Poonch. **(95)**

The sentence provides an indication about the relaxed manner in which Gracey and Co were conducting the war in Kashmir. It also shows that the political leadership i.e. the Prime Minister, his cabinet (whether Punjabi or any other ethnic group) and his defence secretary were in no hurry to prod the Britisher they had hired to do nothing.

The lack of energy perception and independent judgement on part of the political leadership as far as higher direction of war doomed the Pakistani military cause in Kashmir.

How could a brigadier or colonel or a soldier who had the drive determination and the potential to fight well do so while the the Army C in C and the Divisional Commander were two non-interested foreigners who knew that no one in the Pakistani political leadership possessed the moral courage or the assertiveness to spur and prod them, or to sack them despite proven lethargy in the conduct of operations! At one place between the lines the official historian did make an attempt to show this lethargic attitude when he said that two companies of the 25 brigade which were available for an attack on Poonch were at Jhelum and Kohat (more than 60 and 150 miles west and south of Poonch)! **(96)**

There were three alternative routes from which Poonch could be relieved i.e. the Uri-Haji Pir-Poonch approach from the north, the Jhangar-Kotli-Poonch approach from the south west and the Nowshera-Rajauri-Poonch approach from the south east.

5 Infantry Brigade which reached Rajauri on 20th October **(97)** was specially brought into Kashmir for taking part in the final relief of Poonch. The Indian plan to relieve Poonch envisaged employment of two brigades attacking from general area Rajauri-

Nowshera and was based on a deception plan to deceive the Militia/Pakistan Army troops about the direction of main attack. Pir Badesar a 5430 ft high feature dominating both Jhangar-Nowshera Valley to its east and Seri Valley to its west was to be attacked and captured by 268 Infantry Brigade about three weeks before the main attack was to be launched.

The objective of this preliminary manoeuvre apart from securing the subsequent advance by capturing a dominating objective was also to deceive the Pakistanis into thinking that the main attack would come on axis Nowshera-Kotli-Poonch. The main attack towards Poonch involved an advance on two axis by the 19 and 5 Infantry Brigades along axis Rajauri-Bhimbhar Gali-Mendhar-Topa with 19 Brigade on the left and 5 Brigade on the right. The deception plan envisaged a feint attack towards Kotli from Pir Badesar by 268 Infantry Brigade, and another from Kailash towards Thana Mandi (the route of Indian link up with Poonch in June 1948) by one unit of 5 Brigade. An adhoc Brigade formed from three units at Rajauri and the task of this adhoc brigade was to secure the left flank of the main Indian attack by capturing Ramgarh Fort before the main attack commenced on 8th November. According to their plan the 268 Indian Infantry Brigade duly attacked Pir Badesar held by one militia company **(98)** and captured it on 14/15 October 1948. This was followed by capture of Pir Kalewa a 6,650 high feature which was held by just one militia company **(99)** by the 5 Brigade on 28 October as a preliminary task.

The adhoc Brigade commenced its attack against Naghun/Ramgarh from 4th November and captured Naghun on 5th November and Ramgarh on 9th November. Main attack was commenced by the 19


and 5 Brigade from 8th November supported by aircrafts and tanks .Point 6307 was captured by the 19 Brigade by a night attack on 8th November and Bhimbhar Gali and Pir Sayyid Fazal Shah (Point 6945) were captured on 9th November.

Meanwhile Brigadier Azam Khan (25 Brigade Commander) had reached Mendhar on 7th November and after having observed the ongoing battles from the top of Point 6945 sent an urgent message to Headquarters 7 Division requesting for despatch of regular troops and artillery for defence of Mendhar **(100)** as a result of which two infantry companies(coming from Jhelum) and one section of 3.7 inch mountain guns finally reached Mendhar on 9th November. **(101)**

It is ironic to note that while this life and death struggle in face of an overwhelming Indian attack was going on Brigadier Azam was called by 7 Divisions GOC Loftus Tottenham to 7 Division Headquarters at Hajira on 9th November for discussing with him the planned attack on Poonch which was to be launched in December 1948 or January 1949! **(102)**

Finally by 11th November Azam succeeded in convincing Loftus to request GHQ to send another infantry battalion from Abbottabad to Mendhar Sector **(103).**


The Indians resumed their advance but on 10/11 November but their left Brigade i.e. the 19 Brigade was held at Point 5732.



The Indian commander Brigadier Yadunath Singh exhibited operational insight and leaving one battalion of 19 Brigade to watch Point 5732 switched the remaining battalions of this brigade under towards the right to join the 5 Brigade and continued the advance, bypassing Mendhar from the east and capturing Point 5073 Northwest of Mendhar on 18th November.

Thereafter the Indian task was simple,ie they bypassed Topa from the north and linked up with Poonch garrison which had attacked from Poonch towards Point 6793 on 20th November 1948.

Poonch which should never have been relieved was irrevocably lost on 20th November 1948, thanks to Gracey and an unassertive political leadership. In all fairness we can confidently assert that Poonch was not lost by the militia who faced tanks and regular army for so long. The Indian plan was reasonable and well executed, but numerical odds were heavily in their favour and they could take the liberty of bypassing every position which gave them tough resistance, because unlike on the Uri-Domel axis the terrain was more open and there was plenty of room for bypassing/ manoeuvre.



The other important Indian strategic success of the 1948 War was the capture of Zojila Pass and the relief of Leh. We have earlier seen that Zojila Pass commanding the land link to Kargil-Leh etc in Ladakh region had been captured by the Gilgit Scouts under Lieutenant Shah Khan on 7th July 1948. The Scouts crossed Zojila and exploited till Sonamarg and till the outskirts of Leh but could not either capture Leh or seriously threaten Srinagar as they were numerically too few and could not

fight against regular army troops aided by artillery and airpower. The Indians continued to air supply their garrison at Leh, while the Scouts remained too weak to attack Leh and no regular Pakistan Army unit was sent to Leh or Zojila area. Thimaya the GOC Srinagar Division was a determined and able military commander and had firmly resolved to capture Zojila and relieve the Leh Garrison.

To improve command and co-ordination he brought Headquarters 77 Para Brigade from Uri area to Baltal area and placed the three infantry battalions (including one Gurkha battalion) under command of this brigade. **(104)**

The Zojila Pass (11,578 ft) was held by approximately a company plus of Gilgit Scouts and had withstood various determined Indian assaults supported by artillery, Tempest aircrafts and launched by regular Indian Army units of Brigade size. **(105)**

The strength of the Pakistani position at Zojila lay in immense natural defensive strength, unusually high altitude and extreme toughness and determination of the indomitable Gilgit Scouts to defend their fatherland against the Indians. Thimaya appreciated that tanks alone could achieve a breakthrough and took the brilliant decision of employing tanks at the highest altitude in the history of warfare till that time.

This record was broken by the Indians again during the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 once the Indians broke the record and again by 7th Light Cavalry when Stuart Tanks were employed at 14,000 feet only. **(106)**


A squadron of Stuart Light Tanks of 7th Light Cavalry was brought all the way from Akhnur a

distance of 445 Kilometres, in about a fortnight, in conditions of absolute secrecy. **(107)**

The tanks reached Baltal 60 miles east of Srinagar on 15th October where their turrets which had been taken separately were refixed. **(108)**

The Indians were lucky in having Thimaya (a South Indian) who believed in leading from the front. Thimaya personally flew an air reconnaissance mission over the Pass on 15th October. **(109)**

Meanwhile snow fall had started and this resulted in postponing date of attack from 25 October to 1st November. Finally on 01 November the tanks, Thimaya in the leading tank **(110)** attacked the Pass leading two infantry battalions in the attack on the Zojila. No army in the world could have stopped these juggernauts without anti tank guns and the Gilgit Scouts were forced to abandon the Pass which they had successfully held since July 1948. Following this great technological success nothing could stop the 77 Para Brigade.



Thus Dras was captured on 15th November and Kargil on 23rd November . **(111)** The small Gilgit Scouts force blocking Leh was forced to withdraw and Leh was relieved. There is no doubt that employment of tanks at Zojila was the wars greatest strategic surprise, and a non armour officer was its architect. The Indian Army owes its possession of Ladakh through which it later infiltrated into Siachen Glacier to Thimaya's genius and to 7th Light Cavalry. There were tanks and armoured cars on the other side also, but were not used because the extremely naive and miserly political leadership trusted a Britisher who had no interest in the war.

By 23rd November the Indians were firmly in possession of Ladakh, had secured Poonch for

eternity and were no longer in a state of imbalance which had plagued them since October 1947. The Pakistani political leadership at last realised that an effort must be made to at least assume a more threatening posture, failing which the Indians emboldened by their success at Poonch and Zojila may attempt an offensive operation which may bring them yet closer to the Kashmir-Pakistan international border. **(112)**

It may be noted that area south of Poonch is mostly below 5,000 ft and operations in this area are not severely restricted unlike the higher area in the north because of heavy snowfall. Keeping this fact in view the Pakistani GHQ felt that an Indian advance towards Mirpur and Bhimbhar was likely unless the Pakistan Army now at last assumed a more responsible and offensive posture.

We will now deal with the famous 'Operation Venus' which was given the shape of a political controversy by two gentlemen, one an army officer and the other a civil servant! By mid November the Pakistani political leadership at last realised that a more active military policy must be adopted in Kashmir.

Finally the civilian political leadership was moved from its state of supreme lethargy and indecision and gave the army its first responsible political directive ; 'The Pakistan Government therefore, directed the C-in-C that, subject only to the defence of West Pakistan frontiers with India, the Pakistan Army was to prevent at all costs, the Indians from extending the area of their occupation in the Jammu and Kashmir State'. **(113)**


This directive was issued in mid November 1948 and following this the GHQ decided to move sizeable forces for offensive action in Bhimbhar

Sector in Kashmir. In addition the Pakistani Cabinet asked the C-in-C to 'examine in detail the military implications of the proposed counterstroke'. **(114)**

Gracey proposed a counterstroke involving an armoured brigade and infantry brigade originating from Bhimbhar area and directed at Beri Pattan on the main Indian supply route from Akhnur to Nowshera-Rajauri and Poonch. **(115)**

The aim of the projected Operation Venus as the counterstroke was code named was not to recapture Kashmir or even to recapture Poonch but in words of the official history of the Kashmir War to:—


'FORCE THE INDIANS TO SUE FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE ON THE BASIS OF THE STATUS QUO AS THEIR RECENT OPERATIONS HAD INVOLVED THE MAXIMUM EFFORT THEY WERE CAPABLE OF PUTTING FORTH AT THAT TIME.THE MANOEUVRES NOW CONTEMPLATED WOULD INSTEAD OF PROLONGING THE FIGHT IN KASHMIR,FORCE THE INDIANS TO TERMINATE THE CONFLICT'. **(116)**



The preliminary plan of Operation Venus involved launching a subsidiary offensive manoeuvre nicknamed 'Operation Little Venus' , **(117)** involving capturing two insignificant hill features called Reech and Maindak hills few miles west of Beri Pattan; and this was scheduled to be launched on 8th December .**(118)** Sometime before 8th December the cabinet decided not to launch 'Little Venus' but wait and see if Indians did not undertake any offensive action in Kashmir, in case of which 'the planned counteroffensive was to be launched'. **(119)**

On 14th December when the Indians resorted to some offensive moves in Bhimbar area a 'Modified Little Venus' involving heavy artillery shelling on

Beri Pattan area without any physical infantry attack was executed. **(120)**



The shelling continued for two days and temporarily disrupted movement of Indian supply convoys on road Akhnur-Nowshera. **(121)**

The Indians stopped offensive raids after this cannonade. **(122)**

On 30th December the Pakistani GHQ received a signal from the Indian GHQ requesting for ceasefire **(123)** and finally on the midnight of 31 December 1948/01 January 1949 ceasefire came into formal effect.

Thus ended the 1948 War as it is now remembered. The Official Pakistani history did not give any figure

of Pakistan Army casualties. The approximate Indian casualties according to an author thus were :-- **(124)**

- a. KILLED —1,500
- b. WOUNDED —3,500
- c. MISSING —1,000

(INCLUDING PRISONERS)

Very few participants of the Kashmir War have left any written accounts of their war experiences. General Iqbal who participated in the war and later on rose to the rank of full general and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, long after the Kashmir War made one very thought provoking remark about the Kashmir War in an article in the Pakistan Army Green Book 1992.

This particular publication was sub titled 'Year of the Senior Field Commanders'. Iqbal wrote; 'During 1948 Kashmir Operations I saw one senior officer sitting miles behind the frontline and counting availability of mules and rations. He had relegated the fighting to a senior battalion commander . **(125)**

In 1963 once Major General Fazal I Muqueem Khan (Punjabi speaking although by caste a Pathan from East Punjab) wrote 'THE STORY OF THE PAKISTAN ARMY' as a serving officer and with blessings of Ayub Khan (being dedicated to Ayub, with a foreword written by Musa the Army C-in-C) Fazal I Muqueem made a veiled remark criticising the political government and particularly the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan (a Hindustani Muslim who was not forgiven for having been chosen by Mr Jinnah as Pakistan's first Prime Minister, by Punjabi

Muslim leaders of that period in particular) without naming Liaquat.

Fazal thus wrote; 'To the Army's horror, Pakistan during her greatest hour of triumph in Kashmir agreed to accept the ceasefire...it was difficult to understand why Pakistan let that opportunity pass. Was it assumed weakness; or as a result of pressing advice; or from misplaced chivalry towards an unfriendly neighbour in distress? Whatever the reason, Pakistan's reluctance to accept the risks of continuing the war, cost her Kashmir at that time. It was a risk worth taking". **(126)**

In other words Fazal I Muqueem was saying that Pakistan lost Kashmir because that accursed Hindustani was Pakistan's Prime Minister! It may be noted that Liaquat bashing has been a favourite pastime of Punjabi Muslim historians in Pakistan, and is a favourite conversation topics in many Punjabi and Sindhi Muslim households.

The Hindustani Muslims on the other hand have been projecting Liaquat as Pakistan's greatest politician. As a matter of fact both these extreme positions are ridiculous and a great distortion of history! Using Fazal's criticism as an authority and a factual basis; another historian mildly criticised Liaquat's handling of Kashmir issue once he said, 'The decision of Liaquat's government to accept the cease-fire in Kashmir at the time it did 'to the army's horror' (QUOTING FAZAL I MUQUEEM) also has been criticized. **(127)**

It is worth examining Fazal's ridiculous allegations levelled like an old pre 1947 one anna witness in a little more detail! Less than five lines will suffice to prove the absence of any foundation of Fazal's allegation.

The Pakistani attack force collected for Operation Venus consisted of about six infantry battalions and two armoured regiments. **(128)**

To oppose this the Indians had two infantry brigades (50 Para Brigade and 80 Infantry Brigade) .In addition there were two armoured regiments in the same area i.e. Central India Horse and the Deccan Horse. **(129)**

In addition the Indians also possessed 10 other armoured regiments which were not in Kashmir but in Punjab or Western UP and could move to Kashmir.

We shall see in 1965 how Pakistani armour functioned and the reader can keep that as a yardstick in order to appreciate how Pakistani armour and infantry would have behaved in Operation Venus; had it been ever launched!

Fazal does not explain how capture Of Beri Pattan bridge would have led to complete collapse of Indian hold over Kashmir, apart from temporary severing of the line of communication to Poonch. Greater part of the Central India Horse was at Nowshera close to Beri Pattan while Deccan Horse in Chamb-Akhnur area was also within striking range and the battle would have been a hotly contested affair! Shaukat Riza did not take the extreme viewpoint similar to Fazal's when he wrote his book on Pakistan Army. He merely said that 'On December 30 both sides saw the wisdom of cease-fire'. **(130)**

There is another aspect in Shaukat Riza's case i.e. the fact that once his book was being finalised and published in 1989 a Hindustani Muslim i.e.

General Aslam Beg was the Army Chief and the book's final draft was vetted and approved by the GHQ. An officer who worked with Shaukat Riza while serving as a staff officer in GHQ confided to the author in 1993 that Shaukat Riza despised Beg, due to some incident in East Pakistan in 1971, and felt that the GHQ was not giving him a free hand in writing the book. There is no doubt that Shaukat's trilogy was heavily doctored and modified by too many cooks!

In any case history writing in Pakistan has remained an extremely dicey affair in which ulterior motives of authors, based largely on ethnic biases play an instrumental role. Lately in an article General K.M Arif adopted a more rational viewpoint, when he stated that the Kashmir War of 1948 was mismanaged simply because Pakistan was not in a position to fight it successfully summing it up by stating ; 'It is too hazardous a risk to fight a war on ad hoc basis'. **(131)**

There is no doubt that Pakistan was in a favourable position to win the Kashmir War at least till the first week of November. Mr Jinnah exhibited great Coup de Oeil when he ordered Gracey to employ two brigades and advance with one brigade each towards Jammu and Srinagar. But Mr Jinnah was unlucky in possessing no one like Patel and his Prime Minister and his entire Cabinet proved to be an undoubted failure at least as a war cabinet!

Mr Jinnah's decision not to have a Pakistani C in C although taken in the best interest of the country and the Army as Mr Jinnah saw it ensured that the British acting C in C procedurally blocked the execution of Mr Jinnah's orders in October to attack Kashmir.

Pakistan was unlucky in having a man like Iskandar Mirza at the Ministry of Defence. Mirza did not advise Mr Jinnah correctly and the fact that he had hardly served in the Army and did not understand military affairs further ensured that Mr Jinnah and the Prime Minister remained as ignorant as they were about military affairs as they were when they were in high school. It is incorrect to criticise Liaqat for Operation Venus since in December 1948 the Indian position was much more secure than in 1947.

Liaqat can be criticised for not ever visiting Kashmir while the war was on and for not standing by Mr Jinnah in pressurising Gracey in October 1947 to order the Army to attack Kashmir. Had a Pakistani C in C been appointed even in December or in March 1948 the Indians may not have held on to Poonch-Nowshera area at least.

Had Major Masud been allowed with his armoured cars on Domel-Baramula Road despite Ghazanfar Ali and Sher Khan's objections; Srinagar may have been captured by the Tribesmen by first week of November 1947. The Indians were lucky in having comparatively more regular army officers who led from the front and is evident from higher officer casualties among Indian Army officers above the rank of captain vis a vis the Pakistan Army. The subsequent Pindi Conspiracy of 1950 was a logical result of disgust of the army officers with the irresolute civilian political leadership as exhibited during the 1948 war.

We can say with the benefit of hindsight that if the army did have to rule Pakistan as it later did from 1958; it would have been far better had real soldiers and patriots taken over in 1950! These men after all were men of crisis ; highly patriotic and outlook; and possessed an independent mind!

Ironically paper tiger soldiers with poor war record and naive intellect ; more interested in improving their personal fortunes took over. A seal of essential mediocrity despite an outwardly impressive form , was thus firmly stamped ; as far as higher military leadership, doctrine and organisation was concerned; on the Pakistan Army. But this was proved only fourteen years later in 1965!

ANNEXURE TO THIS CHAPTER

Major William Alexander Brown

Major Agha.H.Amin (Retired) , Armoured Corps

Major William Alexander Brown was born at Melrose, Scotland on 22 December 1922.

His father had served in the Gordon Highlanders in WW One and won an MC. His grandfather had been a liberal MP from 1886 to 1892.

After education at St Marys preparatory school and George Watson College Edinburgh Brown joined Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders as a plain soldier in April 1941.

In December 1941 he sailed for India and was selected for the Officer Training School Bangalore, receiving his commission as a second lieutenant in the 10/12 Frontier Force Regiment.

Soon after being commissioned he was transferred to the frontier scouts and served in South Waziristan Scouts with which he fell in love. He here acquired proficiency in Pashto. In early 1943 Brown was posted as APA in Chilas where he built a polo ground. Here he acquired proficiency in the local language Shina as well as Burushaski. In 1946 he was posted to the Tochi Scouts in North

Waziristan. In June 1947 he was posted to Chitral as Acting Commandant of Chitral Scouts.

On way to Chitral he was posted as Commandant of Gilgit Scouts in view of new developments as Lord Mountbatten had decided to transfer back lease of Gilgit to Kashmir state. He was promoted to rank of major and arrived in Gilgit on 29 July 1947. Gilgit was handed over to Jammu and Kashmir state on 1 August 1947 and the British flag lowered. He was now 25 years old.

In October 1947 the unofficial Kashmir war began. The Maharaja of Kashmir decided to disband Gilgit Scouts as it was an All Muslim unit and feared a revolt. To pre-empt this the Gilgit Scouts planned a rebellion. They found an unexpected ally in Major Brown who decided to lead them. On 31 October 1947 Major Brown led the Gilgit Rebellion as a result of which Northern Areas and Baltistan were captured by Gilgit Scouts and the area acceded to Pakistan. Major Brown planned all major attacks of the Gilgit Scouts. He returned to Pakistan from Gilgit in January 1948.

In July 1948 the British Government awarded him an MBE with a very vague citation. This proves that his actions were accepted as that of a hero in higher quarters of the British Empire.

He joined the ICI and stayed on in Pakistan till 1959.

In July 1957 he married Margaret Rosemary Cooksley who was serving in the British High Commission at Karachi from whom he had a son named William in 1958.

Brown died of a heart attack on 5 December 1984.

He was posthumously awarded Pakistans highest civilian award Sitara e Pakistan on 23 March 1994.

His diary titled Gilgit Rebellion was posthumously published by her widow in 1998.

Major Brown had a deep understanding of human nature in war. This was of course a result of his knowledge of frontier warfare.

He thus defined " Blood Lust" as the most powerful desire in human nature ! A desire he said was even more powerful than the sex lust !

He loved the Pashtun tribesmen and his tombstone contained the epitaph " DATTA KHEL" in fond memory of his service as a Wing Commander in North Waziristan. DATTA KHEL was also the code word for commencing the coup d'etat at Gilgit.

Major Brown thus assessed the Baramula massacre of 1947 in the following words--

"The ghastly story of the sack of Baramula is too well known to be repeated. I would however like to say that an excess of blame for the dreadful atrocities must not be laid on the tribesmen. They committed atrocities no doubt, but they committed them while under the influence of bloodlust. Bloodlust is the most powerful human desire, even more so than the sex lust. When a man is under its spell he cannot be held responsible for his actions. As those with experience of warfare between so called civilised nations will testify, the bloodlust is not merely confined to barbaric races such as the trans frontier Pathans. I am not attempting to condone the massacre of Europeans at Baramula, or the dreadful things which happened to the nuns of St Josephs hospital; but they were not treated thus because they were Europeans, rather

they were victims in the general welter of blind fury and unbridled passion which raged in the township".

Brown identified himself in the spirit of man with the Pashtuns who he loved.

He thus compared himself with the tribal Pashtuns in the following words-

"My views may be influenced by my Scottish Border blood. In the good old days of receiving and robbing in the "debatable land" it was a case of every man for himself and the survival of the fittest. We had a slogan which went: "Let him take who has the power" , " And let him hold who can". And this , I thought was Pakistan should have done in Kashmir".

Major Brown a keen shot loved his Gilgit lunches of Chukor (Red Legged Partridge) washed down with good wines and liquors.

Major Brown noted that Pandit Kak the Kashmir state prime minister sacked on 11 August 1947 saw the future peace and prosperity of Kashmir in joining Pakistan.

My association with Northern Areas began in July 1979 when my father was posted as commander of a brigade group with headquarters at Jaglot Farm for being vocal in making fun of the tinpot Zia regime in July 1979.

This was a dark period in Pakistans chequered history when a shabby looking man with a most unofficer like appearance , through extreme sycophancy had become Pakistans army chief !

There is no doubt that we all hated him !

It was here at Jaglot where I read a much unknown book titled "The Liberation of Northern Areas" by one Major Sikandar Khan (later colonel). The book contained details of one Major Browns central role in this small but decisive campaign. This was October 1979. Much later I met Sikandars son who served with me in my fourth unit 15 Lancers in 1988-90.

In 2000 after I wrote my book Pakistan Army till 1965 I received a letter from one Mr Peter Inchbald who had served in Northern Areas with Major Brown. Inchbald also sent me Browns book " The Gilgit Brown" as directed by Mrs Major Brown.

This obituary is part based on the above mentioned books.

Major Sikandar states in his book that Major Brown was on verge of escaping to Chitral on his horse when he was dissuaded by the Gilgit Scouts and requested that he lead their rebellion ! This Major Brown gladly did ! The reason for his going to Chitral was that he loathed and disliked the Dogras as he identified himself with the Muslims.

My account of the Gilgit Rebellion was more influenced by Major Sikandar Khans book rather than Major Browns book which I saw for the first time only in 2000.

After reading Major Browns account it appears that the Gilgit Rebellion was not as smooth as depicted in Sikandars book.

Both Brown and Mr Peter Inchbald with whom I actually communicated by e mail were at loggerheads with Captain Mirza Hassan.

Brown actually described Hassan at various places as ambitious, a liar and one who made himself as a field marshal. The following are Browns summing up of Captain Mirza Hassan.

“Captain Mirza Hussan , anglicized, dashing and quite the man of the world. He was tall, thin yet well built, he had a fair complexion with handsome features, a neatly clipped moustache, and dark wavy hair. He wore a well cut uniform of the cavalry style which showed off his figure to a perfection. He carried the purple and white ribbon of the military cross. His family were ordinary peasants in Gilgit proper. They had managed to educate their son, who had repaid their trouble by doing well for himself in the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces. Whatever Hussan’s failings were, one could not help admiring his original initiative”.

Mirza Hussan , Brown states wanted to usurp Browns achievement of planning and leading the rebellion. Thus Brown states that Mirza Hussan told Brown ; “Now , Major Brown, we are all very grateful for the help you gave us last night. But you must understand that this blow and all succeeding blows are being struck in the name of Islam, and since you are a non-Muslim we regret that we cannot allow you to join our glorious band of Ghazis and take part in our Jihad. This of course applies to Captain Mathieson as well”.

Major Brown states that Mirza Hussan wanted to proclaim Gilgit as an independent Islamic State.

Thus Hussan said “ We know of course that you are loyal to Pakistan-all Britishers are-but it is not our intention to join Pakistan. We intend to set up an independent Islamic State called the United States of Gilgit, and although we shall keep friendly

relations with Pakistan we shall in no way owe allegiance to that dominion”

Brown saw Mirza Hussan as over-ambitious. He thus states “He removed his captains badges of rank and replaced them with those of a general. On arrival at Bhup Singh Parri he announced that he had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of all forces in Gilgit area”.

“Major Brown, Hussan began, you may not have heard , but we have formed a Provisional Government, and he looked around at those present.” You must understand that it is impossible to appoint you or Captain Mathieson to an executive post in an Islamic State as you are outsiders by religion. We have therefore decided that you will be Chief Military Advisor and Assistant Advisor respectively. You will hold the rank of Major-General and Mathieson that of Brigadier. I am now Field Marshal”.

Mirza Hussan , Brown states ignored his suggestion to immediately capture Skardu and thus in opinion of Brown made a fatal strategic blunder. Thus Major Brown stated “There is no doubt at all that if Hussan had taken Skardu when I suggested he should, then, with the help of the Frontier Constabulary and Chitrali reinforcements which arrived in the spring, all Baltistan and Ladakh-in fact all the country of the Indus basin up to Leh and Zoji La Pass, would have been in our hands by the middle of the summer. Instead of that long siege gave the Indian Army the chance to secure the Zoji La.....resulting in their securing the major portion of Ladakh including Leh”.

All these matters can be researched into by future historians but there is no doubt that Major Browns role in the Gilgit Rebellion was central and

decisive. As an officer who had held command of a wing he was far superior in planning abilities to the JCOs of Gilgit Scouts.

Brown particularly admired Shah Khan who was to remain a central figure in Gilgit much later.

However there is no doubt that the rebellion was a joint effort of both the Ismailis, the Shias who Brown and Inchbald did not like and some Sunnis too.

It may be too late to understand the reality now as most key characters of that era are dead or senile in their old age.

ENDNOTES

1. Pages-271 & 272-Shaukat Riza-The Pakistan Army-1947-49-Op Cit.

2. Page-19- Raiders in Kashmir- Major General Akbar Khan-First Published-1970-Reprinted by Jang Publishers-Lahore-1992.

3. Page-34 -Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

4. Pages-295, 296 & 297- History of the MAO College Aligarh-S. K Bhatnagar- First Published-1969-Reprinted—1975-Book Traders-P.O Box 1854-Lahore. Liaquat and Ghulam (ie Ghulam Mohammad) Zakir Hussain (later India's President), Umar Hayat Malik (later an ambassador) authors paternal grandfather (from Indian Secretariat Service/Ministry of Defence) were contemporaries at the MAO College Aligarh during 1916-1919. Ghulam Mohammad excelled in academics and was awarded the Morison Medal for being the best student in MA Economics. Umar Hayat Malik again excelled in academics and was awarded the Crosthwaite Medal for being the best student in BA

Mathematics. Zakir Hussain was awarded the Iqbal Medal for being the best Muslim student in the Allahabad University examinations. Zakir Hussain was the Vice President of the MAO College Students Union (Siddon's Union) 1918 while the author's grandfather Mohammad Amin was also an office-bearer in the same body with the appointment of Librarian (Refers Group Photograph of Students Union 1918 facing page- 321). Nawabzada Liaquat was noted for hospitality in throwing parties (Page-252). It appears that Ghulam Mohammad later made good use of the MAO College old boy net with Liaquat in the Pakistani cabinet. By 1951 later however as per Liaquat's Secretary; Liaquat was planning to sack Ghulam. Ghulam was a Kakkezai from Jullundhur born in Lahore. The readers may note that the MAO College at this time was a meeting place of all Muslim Classes. Liaquat being a rich Nawabzada from Karnal. The authors grandfather being from a rural/service background (son of an official of the Punjab Police) was born at Dinga in 1896 and received his basic education from Gujrat, Jhelum Chauntra Gujar Khan and Satiana and finally joined the MAO College in 1913 coming all the way from a remote village of Lyallpur near Satiana. Umar Hayat was from a Punjabi feudal background and Ghulam from a Punjabi urban background.

5. Facts/ Information given in this paragraph is based on the details given in the following accounts/books:— Page-214 ,215 and 216 The Nation that Lost Its Soul —Major Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan (Retired)-Jang Publishers-Lahore-1995 , Pages- 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25- Raiders in Kashmir-Op Cit and pages —58, 59 and 60 - The Kashmir Campaign-1947-48 —Historical Section-General Staff Branch-General Headquarters-Rawalpindi-December 1970. The reader must note

that the Kashmir Campaign was a very meticulously written book, not in terms of analysis, because of being an official history, but in layout, presentation of facts and in terms of continuity and clarity. Shaukat Riza simply reproduced a large number of maps from this book without bothering to improve them! Compare this book with Shaukat Riza's relatively substandard trilogy on Pakistan Army history, and one can safely conclude that the quality of intellect and efficiency as far as producing military history works was higher in the Pakistani GHQ in 1970 than in 1986-90 when Shaukat Riza assisted by a whole team of staff officers and with the blessings of Zia and of two of Zia's Vice Chiefs of Army Staffs produced his monumental three books on what the Pakistan Army did, or did not do! It is important to note that both the official history and Akbar's book were published in 1970. Akbar wrote his book after reading the official history which disgusted him! Publication of Akbar's book was made possible only because of Ayub's exit from power. During Ayub's government an unofficial ban was imposed on all books .

6. Page-35-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

7. Page-36-Ibid.

8. Page-216-Sardar Shaukat Hayat-Op Cit.

9. Ibid.

10. Pages-39, 40 & 41-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

11. Page-42-Ibid and Page-42-Akbar Khan-Op Cit.

12. Pages-40 & 41-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

13. Page-343- Report of November 7, 1947- Mountbatten's 'Top Secret' Personal Reports as

Viceroy of India—India Office Library-L/PO/433.
 Page-154- Looking Back- Mehr Chand Mahajan- Asia
 Publishing House London-1963- and Pages-91 & 92-
 Fazal I Muqueem-Op Cit.

14. Page-343-Mountbatten Top Secret Report-Op
 Cit.

15. Page-115-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

16. Page-154-Mehr Chand Mahajan-Op Cit.

17. Page-3 of 'Acknowledgement' Section where
 Shaukat Riza thanked all those who assisted him in
 writing the book and read the draft of the book!-
 Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. These are Generals K.M Arif,
 Mirza Aslam Beg, Zia ul Haq etc.

18. Pages-42 , 43 & 44-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit and
 Pages-66 & 67-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.

19. Page-44-K.C Praval-Op Cit.

20. Page-44-Major General Akbar Khan-Op Cit and
 Page-6 - September 65 —Before and After —
 Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry-Ferozesons
 Lahore-1977. Akbar Khan was born in December
 1912 and joined the Royal Military Academy
 Sandhurst after studying at Islamia College
 Peshawar. Commissioned in 1934, he joined 1st
 Hampshire Regiment and subsequently the FF
 Rifles. Saw active service in Waziristan operations
 (1937-38) and in WW Two in Burma in the 20th
 Indian Division where he was awarded the DSO. A
 man of immense drive Akbar while a lieutenant
 colonel served as one of the members of 'Army
 Sub-Committee' which supervised the process of
 division of the Indian Army. After partition Akbar
 took over as Deputy Director Weapon and
 Equipment Directorate till 1948 when he was

posted full time in Kashmir. He was unofficially associated as a volunteer with the Kashmir War right from October 1947. He was described by Shaukat Riza as 'an impatient man with an almost uncomfortable drive and initiative' (See - page-158-Shaukat Riza-1947-1949-Op Cit) something which most Pakistani senior officers of that time as well as till to date terribly lack! Akbar commanded the 101 Brigade in the Kashmir War where he conceived and executed the Pandu operation which was described in Pakistani Official history published in 1970, nineteen years after Akbar had been dismissed and sentenced to jail; as: one of the most humiliating Indian defeat in which one complete Indian battalion was wiped out (See—page-207-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit). Akbar was anti- British and thus disliked by British officers who held the highest posts in the army of the so-called independent Islamic state till 1950! Akbar was, however, promoted to the rank of Major General and Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan Army in December 1950. Akbar was disgusted with the timid policies of the Pakistani political leadership and planned a coup but was arrested in March 1950. Akbar's arrest led to reduction of the Pakistani officer's status in legal terms to that of a clerk; making him vulnerable to dismissal from service without any reason; as a result of the new laws instituted by Prime Minister Liaquat. Akbar and a large number of officers and some civilians were tried by a secret court and sentenced to fourteen years jail. Akbar served his jail term for four years till 1955 on bail by the high court on a habeas corpus petition. Akbar qualified as a lawyer in 1964 and practised law from 1968 at Karachi. He became Bhutto's National Security Advisor in 1972 and played an instrumental role in sacking General Gul Hassan and the Air Chief. Bhutto later became apprehensive about Akbar and sent him abroad to

Czechoslovakia as an ambassador. Akbar died in Karachi in 1990. Akbar was a thorough bred Pathan but married in Lahore's famous Baghbanpura Arain family of Sir Mohammad Shafi. As a result he came in contact with various Punjabi intellectuals like the great poet Faiz, Mazhar Ali Khan etc. One of Akbar's associates was the indomitable Major Ishaq who fought against the NC type stinking hypocrite Jullundhuri usurper Zia and spent a great part of his life in jail .

21. Page-44-Major General Akbar Khan-Op Cit.

22. Page-6-Brigadier Amjad Chaudhry-Op Cit.

23. Page-45-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit and Page-276-The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1941-1971—Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-1994.

24. Page-68-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.

25. Page-52-Major General Akbar Khan-Op Cit.

26. Ibid.

27. Page-46-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

28. Page-47-Ibid.

29. Pages-175 & 176-Raiders in Kashmir-Original Edition-Pak Publishers Limited-Karachi-1970.

30. Pages-174 & 175-Ibid.

31. Pages-90 & 91-Ibid.

32. Page-18- The Arab Israeli Wars — Chaim Herzog-Vintage Books-Random House-New York-1984.

33. Pages-56 & 57-Major General Akbar Khan-Raiders in Kashmir- 1992 Edition-Op Cit.
34. Pages-52 & 53 to 66-Ibid.
35. Pages-68 & 69-Ibid.
36. Pages-67 & 68-Ibid.
37. Page-69-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.
38. Page-278-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.
39. Page-503-Philip Mason-Op Cit.
40. Pages- 76 ,77 , 78 & 79-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit and Pages-47 & 48-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
41. Page-281-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.
42. Page-56-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
43. Pages-284 & 285-The Indian Armour-Op Cit and Page-64-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
44. Page-282-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.
45. Pages-58 & 59-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
46. Pages-4 & 5-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.
47. Page-5-Ibid.
48. Page-291-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit-
49. Page-10-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.
50. Page-30-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.
51. Ibid

52 Appendix Thirteen-Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation-1939-1945- Op Cit.

53 Pages-100 to 106-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

54 Page-57-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

55 Page-107-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.

56 Page-297-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.

57 Page-285-Ibid.

58 Page-49-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

59 US State Department Report of February 1924 quoted on Page-372-A Concise History of World War One-Brigadier V.J Esposito-Op Cit.

60 Page-685- Shahab Nama-Qudrat Ullah Shahab-Sang I Meel Publications-Lahore-1997.Shahab was staff officer with Mirza.

61 Pages-98 ,99 &100-Major General Fazal I Muqueem-Op Cit.

62 Page-276-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

63 Ibid.

64 Page-70-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

65 Pages-103 & 104-Fazal I Muqueem-Op Cit.

66 Pages-276 , 277, 278 & 280-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

67 Pages-143 & 144-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.

68 Page-75-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

69 Pages-75 & 76-Ibid.

70 Page- 9-Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry-Op Cit.

71 Page-115-Fazal I Muqueem-Op Cit and Pages-16 & 17-Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry-Op Cit.

72 Pages-201 & 202- Decisive Battles of the Western World-Volume-Three — Major General J.F.C Fuller-Eyre and Spottiswoode-London-1963.

73 Page-62- Creative Thinking in Warfare-Brigadier Nazareth-Lancer Books-Delhi-1987.

74 Pages-205 & 206- The World Crisis-The Eastern Front- The Rt Hon Winston.S. Churchill — Thornton Butterworth Limited — 15 Bedford Street — London-1931.

75 But most of these commanders who were mission oriented and of an independent judgement were not rankers and from races with a leadership tradition;whereas in Indo Pak a large number of commanders were ex rankers or rankers sons and above all there was no leadership tradition in the Indo Pak,as we shall discuss in the chapter analysing the 1965 war in a later part of this book.

76 Pages-206 and 207-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.

77 Page-290-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.

78 Pages-190 ,191 & 192-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.

79 Page-441-Appendix-One—The Frontier Force Rifles-Compiled by W.E.H Condon-Aldershot-Gale & Polden Ltd-1953. Akbar Khan got the DSO while serving in the 14th Battalion of the Frontier Force Rifles at the Battle of Kwanlan Ywathit in Burma.The DSO it may be noted is given for

outstanding military leadership and gallantry, normally above or at battalion level. It was Pakistan Army's misfortune that Akbar was dismissed for involvement in the Pindi Conspiracy case and the Pakistan Army lost one of its very few officers who possessed real potential and resolution as far as higher military leadership was concerned. Ayub and company who dominated the scene between 1950 and 1969 were not men who had done anything commendable during the Second World War, but essentially show case soldiers, who were masters in the art of getting extensions from politicians! Akbar Khan was not a ranker and thus not liked by Ayub who found Sandhurst Commissioned officer more difficult to handle!

80 Pages-91 & 92-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

81 Page-228-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.

82 Page-220-Ibid.

83 Page-265-Ibid.

84 Page-264-Ibid.

85 Page-267-Ibid.

86 Page-87-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

87 Page-267-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.

88 Page-292-The Indian Armour-Op Cit and Page-94-K.C Praval-Op Cit.

89 Page-92-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

90 Page-I! & Foot Note Number-1-Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry-Op Cit.

91 Page-285-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

92 Ibid.

93 Page-292-The Indian Armour-Op Cit and Page-92-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

94 Page-116-Major General Akbar Khan-Raiders in Kashmir-1992 Edition-Op Cit

95 Page-250-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.

96 Ibid.

97 Page-94-Major K.C Pravai-Op Cit.

98 Page-251-The Kashmir Carnpaign-Op Cit.

99 Page-252-Ibid.

100 Page-255-Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102 Page-256-Ibid.

103 Ibid.

104 Page-82-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

105 Pages-82 & 84-Ibid.

106 Page-322-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.

107 Page-84-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

108 Page-294-The Indian Annour-Op Cit.

109 Page-295-Jbid.

110 Page-85-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.Gurcharan Singh being a Punjabi Sikh did not think it necessary to mention the fact about Thimaya (who

was from the Indian South, and thus non Martial as per the Northerners') riding in a tank'

111 Page-296-The Indian Annour-Op Cit.

117 Pages-263 & 264-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.

113 Page-264-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit

114 Page-267-Ibid.

115 Pages-113 & 114-Fazal Muqem -Op Cit.

116 Page-267-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.

117 Page-266-Ibid.

118 Pages-267 & 268-Ibid and Page-114-Fazal Muqem -Op Cit.

119 Page-268-The Kashmir Campaign -Op Cit.

120 Ibid.

121 Page-270-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit and Page-297-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

122 Page-270-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.

123 Page-271-Ibid and Page-295-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

124 Page-101-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.

125 Page-2- The Pakistan Army Green Book-1992-The Year of the Senior Field Commanders- Pakistan Army General Headquarters-1993

126 Pages-115 & 116-Fazal Muqem-Op Cit. Fazal offered no reason, in any of his book why Punjab, was lost to a minority community less than 8% of Punjab's population during the period 1799-1849!

127 Page-343- Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan -S.M Ikram-Shiekh Mohammad Ashraf-Kashmiri Bazar

Lahore-Second Edition-July 1965.

128 Map facing Page-263 and Pages-265 & 266-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.

129 Pages-292 & 293-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.

130 Page-297-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

131 Page-16- Article- "Military Leadership"-General K.M Arif(Retired)- Citadel Magazine Issue Number 2/98-The Command and Staff College Quetta.

