Decentralization and Intrastate Struggles

Chechnya, Punjab, and Québec

KRISTIN M. BAKKE

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There is no one-size-fits-all decentralized fix for deeply divided and conflict-ridden states. One of the hotly debated policy prescriptions for states facing self-determination demands is some form of decentralized governance – including regional autonomy arrangements and federalism – which grants minority groups a degree of self-rule. Yet the track record of existing decentralized states suggests that these have widely divergent capacities to contain conflicts within their borders. Through in-depth case studies of Chechnya, Punjab, and Québec, as well as a statistical cross-country analysis, this book argues that while policy, fiscal, and political decentralization can, indeed, be peace preserving at times, the effects of these institutions are conditioned by traits of the societies they (are meant to) govern. Decentralization may help preserve peace in one country or in one region, but it may have just the opposite effect in a country or region with different ethnic and economic characteristics.

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Acknowledgments

Every step of the process of writing this book has benefited from good colleagues, friends, family, and perfect strangers who kindly have offered me their advice, encouragement, criticism, and time. While in Russia, Canada, and India, I met with people who, without knowing me, graciously took the time to tell me about their thoughts on or involvement in the self-determination struggles at the heart of this book. Not only did these conversations teach me a lot; they also made me feel welcome.

The book began its life as a PhD dissertation in the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington in Seattle. Inspired by Karen Rasler and her course on political violence at Indiana University, Bloomington, I came to graduate school knowing that I wanted to write about civil wars. Beyond that, I knew little about what doing a PhD actually meant. Luckily, I got to work with the best. Joel Migdal and Erik Wibbels, who co-chaired my dissertation committee, gave me both the critical and kind comments I needed to complete the PhD, and they continue to be role models as scholars, teachers, and mentors. Joel's scholarship has taught me how to think about states and the people who live in them. He is an extraordinary mentor, who generously shares his time with his students, past and present. Among Joel's key pieces of advice was to listen to people's stories and not forget that the world is a puzzling place. I hope I have done those pieces of advice justice. Where Joel taught me not to lose sight of the puzzling bits of the world, Erik helped me think about those puzzling bits systematically. Through his research and seminars, he sparked my interest in topics that I might not otherwise have thought (or cared) much about. Erik is an academic superman, and by way of example, he showed me how to go about "doing" political science. Trying to be part of this profession would have been a lot more mysterious and a lot less fun without his guidance.

I have had the privilege to work with some amazing students both here at UCL and at Leiden, whose enthusiasm for research often makes my day.

The fieldwork for this book was made possible thanks to grant funding from the Chr. Michelsen Institute, the National Science Foundation, and the University of Washington. In the field, I benefited greatly from the advice and assistance of Vladimir Kolossov at the Institute of Geography at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Valery Tishkov at the Institute of Ethnography and Anthropology at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Éric Bélanger and Steve Saideman at McGill University in Montréal, Harish Puri at Guru Nanak Dev University in Amritsar, and Pramod Kumar at the Institute for Development and Communication in Chandigarh.

I have received critical and constructive feedback on various parts of this project from participants at seminar presentations at Harvard University, Laval University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, McGill University, and Yale University; at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association; as well as at workshops organized by Oxford University, the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, and ETH Zürich/ the European Network of Conflict Research. My thinking and writing about decentralization and conflict have benefited from comments by Nancy Bermeo, Lars-Erik Cederman, Jeff Checkel, Scott Gates, Henry Hale, Simon Hug, Jason Lyall, Luca Mancini, Scott Radnitz, Nicholas Sambanis, Klaus Schlichte, Dan Slater, and Monica Duffy Toft. Paul Brass, Manjit Singh, and Steven Wilkinson offered practical advice before I went to India. I am grateful for the advice of Lew Bateman and his team at Cambridge University Press (and very excited that they are publishing my book), and I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and close reading of my manuscript. Needless to say, none of my many "helpers" along the way bears any responsibility for the shortcomings of this book.

Earlier versions of parts of the material here have been published in Kristin M. Bakke and Erik Wibbels, "Diversity, Disparity, and Civil Conflict in Federal States," *World Politics*, vol. 59, no. 1 (October 2006); "State, Society and Separatism in Punjab," *Regional and Federal Studies*, vol. 19, no. 10 (May 2009); and "The Turn to Violence in Chechnya and Punjab: Self-Determination Struggles in Decentralized States," in *Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict,* edited by Erica Chenoweth and Adria Lawrence (MIT Press, 2010). I acknowledge permission from the publishers to use the material. The maps were drawn by David Cox at Cox Cartographic.

One of the many exciting things about researching and writing this book was that it got me interested in questions I did not initially set out to study. In particular, the politics and struggles in Chechnya and Punjab highlighted the importance of considering the fragmented nature of self-determination movements, and I have explored these questions in collaborative works with Kathleen Cunningham and Lee Seymour. Working with them has been both

intellectually rewarding and great fun, and our collaboration continues to shape and sharpen my thinking.

Let me also thank the people in my life who might not care all that much about the contents of this book but who will think it is exciting that it exists. I could not have done it without them. Umut Aydin, Ceren Belge, Rose Ernst, and Erica Johnson made life in Seattle a lot of fun. We hosted some unforgettable parties, made all the better by Arda Ibikoglu, Tuna Kuyucu, Isik Özel, and Rafael Vargas. Rose Ernst's mom, Bridget, deserves an award for some equally unforgettable Thanksgiving dinners. In Moscow, I had the pleasure of the always entertaining company of Melanie Getreuer, and I was happy that our paths crossed again in Cambridge, MA. Life in Leiden would not have been the same without Berna Güroğlu. Both in Seattle and London, Tilde Rosmer has been a great Norwegian "ally." Cathrine Seierstad makes London feel like home (and keeps me informed about news from Norway). Along with Maryam Aldossari, Grant Allen, Jeff Kucik, Nils Metternich, Lisa Milinkovic, Christine Reh, Stephanie Rickard, Natasha Slutskaya, and Lisa Vanhala, she has made my no-work-on-weekends policy more than worthwhile.

Last but not least, I must thank my family. My sister, Ingvild, is one of the most adventurous people I know, and if she thinks that what I do is even remotely interesting, I must be on to something. My brother, Knut-Harald, taking after our dad, asks the kinds of questions that make me wish I knew more about the world. My parents, Gerd and Knut, make me believe that there is nothing I cannot do, and regardless of what I do or where in the world I am, I know that they are cheering for me (and that my mom will be calling). I dedicate this book to them.

1

"Peace-Preserving" Decentralization?

In March 2012, five months after the violent fall of the country's long-time dictator Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan city of Benghazi was the scene of clashes between supporters and opponents of federalism. While the supporters of federalism argued that regional autonomy would prevent the eastern parts of the country from being marginalized, opponents claimed that federalism would be a slippery slope toward state disintegration.[1] A few months later, in the midst of a civil war, Kurdish voices in Syria made the case that should the Assad regime fall, they would like to see a federal Syria with greater autonomy for Kurdish majority areas.[2] And in the spring of 2014, in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea, the idea of introducing federal reforms in Ukraine appeared to gain momentum, at least among outside observers, as tensions between Kiev and the eastern regions increased.[3] As such, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine joined a large number of divided societies and conflict-ridden states where, at least for some, hopes for long-term intrastate stability and peace are pinned on decentralized governance, including federalism and regional autonomy arrangements.

[1] Sean Kane, "Federalism and Fragmentation in Libya? Not So Fast…" *Foreign Policy*, the Middle East Channel, March 20, 2012, available at http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/20/federalism_and_fragmentation_in_libya_not_so_fast (last accessed June 26, 2012). This debate continued into 2014. See, for example, "Federalism in Libya: The Never-Ending Debate," Al Jazeera, May 9, 2014, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/federalism-east-libya-debate-201442493215796441.html (last accessed May 13, 2014).
[2] Ben Gittleson, "Syria's Kurds Look to Iraqi Minority for Support," *New York Times*, January 31, 2013.
[3] Gwendolyn Sasse and James Hughes, "Building a Federal Ukraine?" the Monkey Cage at the *Washington Post*, March 19, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/19/building-a-federal-ukraine/ (last accessed May 13, 2014). On the debate about decentralization and federalism in Ukraine in the immediate post-Soviet period (and earlier), see Wolczuk (2002).

In October 2005, for example, the Iraqi government ratified a draft consti-
tution that emphasized federalism as a means to accommodate the state's dif-
ferent ethnic and religious groups. The federal structure of India, where many
of the states are formed along linguistic lines, is considered key to holding this
vast and diverse country together by giving ethnic minority groups a certain
degree of self-rule. In Northern Ireland, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement,
which included provisions of restoring a devolved Northern Ireland legislative
assembly within the United Kingdom, was an important step toward ending
thirty years of fighting, "the Troubles," between forces for and against British
rule. And in Indonesia in 2005, the central government and the Islamist Free
Aceh Movement signed an accord in which the rebels agreed to give up their
long-time armed struggle for autonomy in return for the right to establish a
form of regional self-government. Although there are differences both across
and within these states, they all have in common that power is shared among
tiers of government – among central, regional, or local governments – which
is the key defining characteristic of decentralized, as opposed to centralized,
governance.

It is precisely by dividing power among tiers of government that decentral-
ization promises to be "peace preserving," serving as a compromise between
central governments concerned about the state's territorial integrity and
regional or ethnic minority groups in pursuit of greater autonomy.[4] The pop-
ularity of decentralization measures is evident in past and present debates
about how to contain conflicts in countries as different as Bosnia, Colombia,
Cyprus, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Yet decentralization is not a pana-
cea for internally divided and conflict-ridden states. A number of decentralized
states, including India, Spain, and Russia, have experienced self-determination
disputes and violent conflicts. By analyzing how states and societies interact,
this book aims to explain decentralization's mixed peace-preserving record.
Emphasizing that institutions do not work in isolation from the societies they
(are meant to) govern, I argue that the very same institutions may have widely
diverging effects, depending on a society's ethnic and economic characteristics.

Policy discussions both prior to and after the adoption of the Iraqi consti-
tution in 2005 revealed radically opposed arguments about the merits of fed-
eralism. Within Iraq, the main proponents for federalism were the Kurds, who
saw federalism as a second-best alternative to independence. Also, some among
the Shia Muslims favored autonomy for "their" region in the south, while the
Sunni Muslims were more inclined to argue that only a strong central govern-
ment could hold the ethnically and religiously diverse Iraqi state together. In the
United States, the Bush administration, while encouraging the Iraqis to adopt the

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[4] The term "peace-preserving" federalism was coined by Nancy Bermeo (2002) in an article that
helped spark my interest in questions about decentralization as a means for conflict manage-
ment. Parts of the argument in this book have been developed in Bakke and Wibbels (2006);
Bakke (2009); and Bakke (2010).

constitution, worried that strong regional governments would be a step toward state disintegration. Other U.S. policy makers thought otherwise. In 2007, Joe Biden, then chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that "The last best chance for a stable Iraq is federalism – giving the warring factions breathing room in regions with control over the fabric of their daily lives."[5] In the years to come, discussions about federalism in Iraq continued.[6] Adopting a federal constitution was, it seems, only one step toward figuring out how decentralization can contain violent conflict – and, perhaps not surprisingly, the constitution left the details of a federal Iraq to be worked out later.

Likewise, even though federalism in Nigeria is seen as critical for holding this ethnically diverse state together, the country's federal system is also subject to major disagreements among regional elites, especially over the redistribution of oil revenues (Suberu 2001, 2004). While the central government's principle for dividing oil revenues has ensured a relatively even geographic distribution, it has fueled political alienation in oil-rich regions, particularly in the Niger Delta, where elites are frustrated by their lack of autonomy over their own resources – and the relative poverty in the region contributes to unemployment and violence.

The examples of Iraq and Nigeria suggest that even within the same country, the population may perceive the pros and cons of decentralization quite differently, contributing to decentralization's mixed peace-preserving record. Similarly, as this book explores, in the Indian state of Punjab and the Canadian province of Québec, views on the advantages and disadvantages of federalism have changed over time. In Russia, center-region relations did not similarly affect the Chechen Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia in the early 1990s, even though the two until 1992 were one region within Russia and the USSR. While the Chechens sought independence, the Ingush wanted to remain part of Russia.

This book explains the diversity of decentralized states' capacity to prevent intrastate conflicts, particularly struggles over territory or self-determination. Through in-depth case studies of Chechnya, Punjab, and Québec, as well as a statistical cross-country analysis, it examines how decentralization can help contain the often violent struggles between regions or ethnic minority groups and the states in which they live. I argue that decentralization can, indeed, be peace preserving at times, but there is no one-size-fits-all decentralized fix to divided societies. In contrast to the dominant debate in the literature, I do not analyze decentralization in either/or terms, as either "good" or "bad" at containing violent conflict and preserving peace. Rather,

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[5] Quoted in "Senators: A Federal System Is Last Best Chance for Iraq," *States News Service*, June 7, 2007. See also Greg Bruno, "Plans for Iraq's Future: Federalism, Separatism, and Partition," *Backgrounder* by the Council of Foreign Relations, October 22, 2007, available at http://www .cfr.org/iraq/plans-iraqs-future-federalism-separatism-partition/p14547 (last accessed August 14, 2014).

[6] Points of contention included the border of regions, the right of regional governments (particularly in the northern Kurdish regions) to develop the oil industry and sign contracts with foreign companies, and the role and funding of the Kurdish *peshmerga* forces.

I argue that, while decentralization may help preserve peace in one country or in one region, it may have just the opposite effect in a country or region with different social and economic characteristics. The book's central contribution is to consider how decentralization's effect on intrastate conflicts is conditional on, specifically, the regions' ethnic makeup and wealth. For example, while cultural policy autonomy, which is one dimension of decentralization, may appease some self-determination groups, others may want more, depending on their region's ethnic identity and demographics. Likewise, fiscal autonomy, which is another dimension of decentralization, may make some regions favor staying put in the state, while others may prefer fiscal transfers, depending on the region's wealth, which means that there is no one "right" level of fiscal decentralization. That is, conditional on any given region's ethnic makeup and wealth, policy and fiscal decentralization shape conflicts by affecting regional or ethnic minority groups' grievances and their assessments about the value of remaining part of the state. Whether regional opposition to the center stays within the boundaries of nonviolent bargaining also hinges on political ties between central and regional elites. The absence of political ties between leaders at the center and in a minority region (a potential "challenger" to the center), as well as the presence of political ties between the center and the other regions of the state, can complicate negotiations with the challenger, diminishing the chances of conflicts fought without bloodshed.

I develop this argument in depth later in this chapter, but first, I briefly situate decentralization among other strategies for containing conflicts in divided societies. In the second section, I introduce the dominant debate about the pros and cons of decentralization, and in the third section, I conceptualize decentralization and its different dimensions. The chapter's fourth section presents the book's argument, and the fifth section explains how I go about testing this argument. The final section speaks about the book's contributions to academic debates.

CONTAINING CONFLICTS IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES

The struggles in Chechnya, Punjab, and Québec represent the most common type of conflict in the international system today – those within, rather than between, states (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Sarkees et al. 2003; Themnér and Wallensteen 2013). Although the long-term trend shows that the world is becoming more peaceful (Goldstein 2011; Pinker 2011), from the end of World War II to the 1990s, policy makers had to add civil wars, rebellions, ethnic conflicts, and secessionist tendencies to their list of grave security threats, alongside – and even in place of – concerns about interstate wars and arms races. Millions have died in intrastate conflicts, and many more have died in the aftermath of such wars due to diseases, shortened life expectancies, and destroyed infrastructure (Ghobarah et al. 2003; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Collier et al.

2008). As in Chechnya and Punjab, in many of these intrastate conflicts, the warring parties are central governments and territorially concentrated minority groups in pursuit of self-determination – greater autonomy within the borders of the existing state or sometimes outright independence. One can think of the on-and-off secessionist Acehnese movement in Indonesia, the Basques' and Kashmiris' long pursuits of independence, and the Kurds' quest for self-governance in Turkey. Since 1950, about seventy such armed conflicts have taken place in the world, and more than eighty ethnic groups, including the Québécois, have pursued greater autonomy or independence through non-violent means or militant tactics such as mass protests and boycotts (Marshall and Gurr 2005). As in these examples, in most cases, the minority groups challenging the state are ethnically distinct from the state's majority population, but the cleavages around which such groups have formed can also be based on other social or economic features (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004). The key is that society is divided along certain cleavages, where territorially concentrated groups, who perceive themselves as collectively distinct from other groups, make claims for greater autonomy of some sort. In this book, I refer to such territorially concentrated groups as regional minority groups or subnational challengers. I refer to the struggles they fight in the name of greater territorial autonomy for their group or region as self-determination struggles.[7]

Scholars have theorized (and state leaders have tried out) different ways for containing conflicts in divided societies.[8] Common, while not always morally acceptable, strategies include coercion, partition, assimilation, and power sharing, each of which has a mixed record of success.[9]

One of the tools governments have made use of to eliminate challenges from so-called troublesome ethnic minority groups is coercive strategies such as genocides, ethnic cleansing, and forced population transfers (Mann

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[7] Amoretti and Bermeo (2004) refer to territorial conflicts for the same kind of struggles, while scholars focusing particularly on ethnic groups typically refer to self-determination, nationalist, secessionist, or separatist conflicts. Horowitz uses a broad definition of separatist or secessionist movements, as "movements seeking a separate region within an existing state, as well as those seeking a separate and independent state" (1981, 169). This definition is consistent with what I call self-determination struggles.

[8] In contrast to interstate wars, which typically end through some sort of negotiated settlement or die down without any decisive outcome, from 1946 until the end of the Cold War, most intrastate conflicts lasted until one of the warring parties was defeated. Since 1989, in contrast, more intrastate conflicts have come to an end through a peace agreement or ceasefire than military victory, although nearly half have come to an end without either a settlement or victory (Licklider 1995; Toft 2010; Kreutz 2010).

[9] For a discussion of taxonomies or typologies of various forms of conflict regulation, see McGarry and O'Leary (1993) and Schneckener (2004). Although desirable, it may be difficult to resolve conflicts by entirely eliminating their underlying causes. As a second-best alternative, policy makers and scholars often talk about conflict management, containment, regulation, or accommodation (Lake and Rothchild 1996). Burton (1993) calls for a conflict resolution approach, in which individual and group needs are satisfied.

1999; Valentino 2000; Naimark 2001; Bulutgil 2009), each of which is morally repulsive and likely to backfire by creating "explosive and historically entrenched bitterness and fear amongst the descendants of victims" (McGarry and O'Leary 1993, 7). For example, as Chapter 3 demonstrates, the Soviet government's deportation of nearly the entire Chechen population from its territory in 1944 is a vivid memory that still defines many Chechens' relationship to Moscow. Regardless of the identity of the targeted population, a number of studies have shown that state repression and coercion may fuel rather than dampen political mobilization (della Porta 1995; Rasler 1996; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Goodwin 2001), transforming nonviolent conflicts into violent ones (Sambanis and Zinn 2006; Lawrence 2010).

Perhaps a more morally acceptable strategy of conflict regulation is de jure partition, which is applicable to conflicts in which ethnic or regional groups have territorial claims. Indeed, according to Kaufmann, partition is the most suitable manner for defusing ethnic, nationalist, or secessionist conflicts, as it "reduces both incentives and opportunity for further combat, and largely eliminates both reasons and chances for ethnic cleansing of civilians" (1999, 136). However, critics of partition claim that it can have detrimental consequences if it leads to forced population transfers and that, in many cases, all this strategy achieves is to move the conflict from the national to the international level (Radha Kumar 1997; Sambanis 2000). Indeed, there is an ongoing debate about whether partition does bring about postwar peace (Chapman and Roeder 2007; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2009; Jenne 2010). Moreover, not only are state leaders unlikely to go along with regional or ethnic minority groups' demands for independence; secession does not necessarily protect minority rights in the new state(s), thus potentially fostering new intrastate conflicts. Therefore, suggests Horowitz (2003), rather than trying to divide the world into several homogeneous countries, which may be impossible anyway, policy makers ought to find ways for people to live peacefully within heterogeneous states.

Another common state strategy, however, has been aimed at reducing the heterogeneity of states through (forced) assimilation or "nationalizing" strategies such as imposing a majority language on minority groups (Brubaker 1996; Mylonas 2012). Though not advocating assimilation, research on social identity theory has suggested that processes aimed at creating overarching rather than, or at least alongside with, particularistic identities may contain or even resolve intergroup conflicts (for good overviews, see Brown 2000; Hewstone and Greenland 2000). While assimilation as a strategy is also aimed at creating one (overarching) identity, it has flaws. For starters, it assumes that it is ethnic identities *per se* that cause conflict, and it does not consider that factors such as poverty and economic discrimination may be equally, if not more, important. Moreover, whereas social identity theorists envision conflict resolution based on voluntary contact between groups, which may result in updated beliefs,

trust, and deeper understanding of "the other" (Trew 1986; Maoz 2000; Hewstone et al. 2006; Kelman 2008), states' assimilation strategies have often been forced, which means that they cannot escape power relations between the majority and the minority groups within a state. That is, assimilation typically means assimilation of the minority into the majority culture, which in turn may cause conflict. In Turkey, the central government placed severe restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language and expression of Kurdish culture, denying that there was a cultural difference between Turks and Kurds, but the approach has eliminated neither differences nor conflict (Belge 2011). Indeed, in explaining the decline of ethnic conflict in the 1990s, Gurr (2000b) has pointed to, among other factors, the positive effect of policies that prohibited forced assimilation and, rather, protected minority rights.

Power sharing has long been the number-one democratic policy prescription for managing conflicts in divided societies, building on Arend Lijphart's work on consociationalism (Lijphart 1990; Sisk 1996; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009). Power sharing's major component is the creation of a grand coalition at the center, referring to the participation of the representatives of all significant groups in a state's central government. Other components include proportional representation, veto power to minority groups, and some form of segmented autonomy for the different groups, such as federalism or autonomy. The idea is to give minority groups a stake in the integrity of the state and institutional protection of their rights. According to Walter (2002), power sharing is an important element in making former combatants credibly commit to implementing a peace agreement, as it gives the warring parties a stake in the postwar government. However, the experience of some states suggests that while power sharing might be a useful transitional means, it creates unstable governments and may not be a good long-term solution. Moreover, for the key component of power sharing – a grand coalition at the center – to work, the warring parties must already have reached a certain level of agreement, which means that power sharing is likely to be successful only to the extent that the conflicting parties have more or less resolved their differences (Spears 2002). Indeed, there is an ongoing debate as to whether power sharing impedes both long-term peace and democracy (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Statistical studies of postwar societies show that the constituent components of power sharing may have effects that are different from one another (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003, 2005; Binningsbø 2011), suggesting the importance of in-depth understanding of each component, including decentralization.

Indeed, particularly since the beginning of the war in Iraq in 2003, decentralization has featured prominently in discussions about conflict resolution and prevention (e.g., Brancati 2004; Anderson and Stansfield 2005; O'Leary 2010); and even before then, Gurr (2000b) gave credit to policies endorsing autonomy arrangements when explaining the wane of ethnic warfare in the 1990s. Yet debates about the pros and cons of decentralization, particularly

federalism, has long been central in comparative politics. Notable is a set of countervailing arguments. While some argue that decentralization contains self-determination conflicts by meeting subnational challengers halfway and providing them with institutional channels for voicing their demands, others suggest that such institutions fuel further conflict and even state disintegration.

DECENTRALIZATION AS A CURE OR CURSE?

Based on the premise that decentralization combines shared rule with self-rule, a number of scholars have come to view decentralized governance, including regional autonomy and federalism, as a useful strategy for managing conflicts between central governments and regional minority groups. Bächtiger and Steiner (2004, 34–35), for example, point to how the Swiss federal arrangements have helped meet religious and linguistic groups' demands for autonomy over policy areas such as education, religion, and language, thus alleviating cultural grievances. Likewise, Brass (1974) and Kohli (2004) argue that federalism in India, by embracing the country's linguistic diversity, has helped hold this vast and ethnically heterogeneous state together. The advantage of federalism or other forms of decentralized governance is the combination of shared rule with self-rule (Elazar 1987, 1994), which serves as a compromise between regional minority groups seeking greater autonomy and the central government of the state, which is unlikely to give up territory or power.[10]

Bermeo (2002) finds that both democratic and nondemocratic federal states do better than unitary states in terms of defusing armed rebellion and reducing political and economic discrimination, as well as political, economic, and cultural grievances – hence her concept of "peace-preserving" federalism. These findings echo others in suggesting that decentralized governance reduces the incidence of self-determination conflicts by funneling ethnic collective action into forms of protest within the bounds of "normal" politics (Cohen 1997; Gurr 2000a; Hechter 2000; Stepan 2001; Saideman et al. 2002; Lustick et al. 2004). Likewise, Lijphart (1990) points to regional autonomy as part of successful power sharing. To these advantages one can add the checks that decentralized institutions provide on the central government (Weingast 1998a) – a significant concern of regional minorities fearful of being swept aside by national majorities (Lake and Rothchild 1996). Unifying much of this research

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[10] Though much of this research is focused on the capacity of decentralization to address distinctly ethnic tensions, a substantial body of work has linked decentralized governance with peace in otherwise divided societies. In Russia, for example, while the federal system was inherited from the USSR's "affirmative action empire" (Martin 2001), in the 1990s, federalism became a means to manage regional demands from nonethnic as well as ethnic regions. Many of the bilateral power sharing agreements Yeltsin signed with regional elites in the 1990s were agreements with nonethnic regions over fiscal and economic matters. According to former vice premier (1992–1994) Sergei Shakhrai (2003), who was in charge of formulating many of these agreements, this feature of Russian federalism helped stem centrifugal tendencies.

on peace-preserving decentralization is a sense that such institutional engineering offers the prospect of reducing conflict around territorial cleavages – be they based on social or economic features. Sambanis and Zinn (2006) show that self-determination movements are likely to turn to violence in reaction to state strategies that limit their autonomy (cf. Gurr 1993; Siroky and Cuffe 2015), although once a group has turned to violence, granting greater autonomy is not necessarily going to have a conflict-dampening effect.

Yet while this branch of the literature has pointed to decentralization as a potential cure for internal conflicts, others have argued that such institutions instead may be more of a curse for intrastate peace and stability. Decentralization might offer regional minority groups the opportunity to mobilize resources and a network of institutions through which to collectively organize – a dynamic observed in both ethnically homogenous and heterogeneous societies. According to Eaton (2006), for example, decentralization in Colombia has served to increase financing for rebels, further eroded the capacity of the central government, and contributed to the creation of "parallel states" on the ideological left and right within the country. A number of scholars suggest these problems are particularly acute in ethnically divided societies. Many, for instance, see the ethno-federal structures of the Soviet Union as key to understanding its demise (Roeder 1991, 2007; Suny 1993; Brubaker 1996; Bunce 1999). The Soviet Union, writes Suny, was an "incubator of new nations" that helped form the nationalist movements that led to its disintegration (1993, 87). Likewise, Bunce argues that the federal structures of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia contributed to those states' collapse (see also Bunce and Watts 2005). Combined with economic decline and state repression, the ethno-federal structures promoted subnational consciousness. The federal systems also encouraged shifts in power from the center to the periphery, which provided regional minority challengers with resources for mobilization. The result was breakdown along regional lines.[11]

In addition to this long-standing debate about the capacity of decentralization, particularly federalism, to prevent intrastate conflicts, recent research shows similar divisions with regard to decentralization's ability to foster or maintain peace in postconflict settings (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003, 2005; Lake and Rothchild 2005; Chapman and Roeder 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Jenne 2009; Guss and Siroky 2012).

This book engages the debate about peace-preserving decentralization. But, consistent with the advice of Amoretti and Bermeo (2004), rather than asking *whether* these institutions contribute to intrastate peace, my approach is to explore *the conditions under which* they do so. This shift of focus is important

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[11] Others have found that a high degree of regional autonomy has been positively correlated with separatism in Russia in the 1990s (Treisman 1997; Hale 2000). It is along similar lines that Snyder (2000) argues that federalism (or power sharing) does not represent a means to contain nationalist conflict, as such institutions lock in elite-driven hostile ethnic identities.

for two reasons. First, as the cure/curse or pro/con debate stands, it is indeterminate. Both sides make theoretically sound claims, backed up with empirical evidence. Second, this debate does not shed much light on the divergent record of conflict in decentralized states. Rather, the main lesson from the diverging views on decentralization's impact on intrastate conflict is that there is no single decentralized formula for peace in divided societies (Treisman 2007, 236–244). Although researchers have rightfully investigated the decentralized/centralized (or federal/unitary) distinction, there has been less systematic attention to decentralization's varying capacity to ameliorate – or exacerbate – intrastate cleavages and conflict (but see Hale 2004a; Sambanis and Milanovic 2004; Brancati 2006; Christin and Hug 2012; Siroky and Cuffe 2015; Cederman et al. 2015).

Indeed, given the tremendous diversity of issues facing any given country, it is impossible to prescribe a priori the distribution of powers between national and regional governments in any given case (Sharma 1953). In this regard, two issues are prominent. First, the appropriate design principles are likely to vary depending on the ends one seeks. The institutions ideally suited for regional fiscal discipline, for example, may be different from those that foster peace. Which one of these goals is most important is a political consideration that may vary from country to country, as well as over time. Second, the institutions likely to foster peace are dependent on the challenges facing any given state, even the challenges facing any given region within the state. While one set of institutions might promote peace in one state or in one region of the state, they might do just the opposite in another with different underlying social and economic characteristics. This last proposition goes contrary to important works in the literature on comparative federalism, which puts forward institutional design principles that treat institutions as independent of their context. Weingast (1995), for instance, argues that federalism protects markets (is "market preserving") if regional governments have regulatory control over economic policies and face hard budget constraints (see also Montinola et al. 1995), but Wibbels (2005) shows that the effect of such formal institutions on macroeconomic policies may vary, depending on politics within any given region and the nature of intergovernmental bargaining. Writing about intrastate stability, Filippov and colleagues (2004) propose a strong national or statewide party system as a means to promote stability in federal states. They maintain that even though the "supergame" of norms, conventions, and culture matters, it "lies outside the realm of conscious design so that we can focus on formal rules and the question of whether choices exist that encourage federal stability regardless of culture" (Filippov et al. 2004, 161). This book argues that the cultural and economic context in which institutions are embedded cannot be set aside. Institutions governing center-region relations do affect intrastate conflicts, but they do not do so in uniform ways across diverse societies.

Noting the complex interactions between states and societies, Bächtiger and Steiner (2004, 48) write about the Swiss experience that "No single formula

can be handed over to the political engineer. The mix of factors and particularly the intertwining of formal and informal institutions cannot be easily transferred to another setting."[12] While accepting that it is problematic to prescribe a blueprint of decentralization for vastly different states and societies, I suggest that it is nonetheless possible to think of generalizable propositions by systematically considering the ways in which these institutions interact with the societies they govern. We know, from the conflict literature, that both ethnic identity and distribution of wealth are likely to affect intrastate conflicts, particularly self-determination conflicts. Hence, important steps in assessing decentralization's peace-preserving capacity include considering the ways in which specific institutions work in conjunction with these societal traits. For example, is granting fiscal autonomy to a rich region going to have the same effect as granting fiscal autonomy to a poor one? More generally, does fiscal decentralization affect the likelihood of conflict similarly in a country with significant regional inequalities and in a country without such inequalities? These are the kinds of state–society relationships I explore in this book.

Before developing the specifics of my argument, let me define and disaggregate what decentralization means. Several large-*n* conflict studies treat decentralization as a dichotomous or three-point variable (Cohen 1997; Saideman et al. 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009),[13] but this is somewhat problematic as no decentralized state has the same "amount" of decentralization as another or across different dimensions and measures – or even over time (Rodden 2004).

DEFINING DECENTRALIZATION

Decentralization means that power is shared between tiers of government and that lower tier units, such as regions, exercise some form of self-governance. Decentralized states typically have three tiers of government: the national, regional, and local. When studying the effects of decentralization on conflict, the division of power scholars emphasize is typically between the national level (also referred to as the central or, in federations, the federal level) and the level of government one tier down, the regional level. The subunits at the regional level go by different names. In India, for instance, they are referred to as states, in Canada, provinces, and in Russia, regions. The kind and "amount"

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[12] Similarly, writing about institutions that can help overcome the common-pool resource problem, Ostrom argues that "Instead of presuming that optimal institutional solutions can be designed easily and imposed at low cost by external authorities, I argue that 'getting the institutions right' is a difficult, time-consuming, conflict-invoking process. It is a process that requires reliable information about time and place variables as well as a broad repertoire of culturally acceptable rules" (1990, 14).

[13] As for the three-point scales, Cohen (1997) captures whether states are federal, unitary, or mixed, while Mattes and Savun (2009) capture whether a peace agreement has territorial power sharing on a three-point count variable from none (0) to local autonomy (1) and federalism (2).

of autonomy exercised by lower tiers vary across and within states. This book focuses on policy, fiscal, and political decentralization. These are three key dimensions of decentralization and, as the next section explores, are central to existing arguments about how decentralization affects conflict.

Policy decentralization (or decision-making decentralization) "exists if at least one subnational tier of government has exclusive authority to make decisions on at least one policy issue" (Treisman 2007, 24). This definition of policy decentralization comes close to what scholars refer to as territorial autonomy (Weller and Nobbs 2010) and William Riker's classic definition of federalism, except federal states are formally decentralized in that the constitution refers to the distribution of power:

> A constitution is federal if (1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere. (Riker 1964, 11)[14]

Fiscal decentralization typically refers to a division of tax revenues in which regional and local governments account for a large share of public revenues or spending, but it can also refer to decision-making decentralization on issues of taxation and expenditures (Rodden 2004; Treisman 2007, 25–26). Often, political decentralization refers to whether regional and local governments are popularly elected. In this book, the emphasis with respect to political decentralization is not whether regional governments are elected but the degree to which regional and national executives share political party affiliation – are copartisans. A high level of copartisanship, or partisan harmony, between regional and national elites suggests closer ties between tiers of government than low levels of copartisanship (Rodden 2004, 487–489).

Any one country can score differently across these three dimensions of decentralization, and over time, and there is also often asymmetry within countries, as some regions have more autonomy than others (Elazar 1987; Stepan 1999; Watts 2005; Weller and Nobbs 2010). As the case study chapters in this book will show, the central government can also control the regions in ways that do not neatly fall into the categories of policy and fiscal decentralization, and the two are often intertwined (for example, it is hard to imagine that a region can have much policy autonomy if it has little or no fiscal autonomy). As a result, it is useful to think of institutions as encompassing "the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded

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[14] Similarly, Bednar (2009, 18–19) maintains that a government can be considered federal if the constitution (or a declaration serving similar purpose) stipulates that the state's territory is divided into mutually exclusive subunits, the center and the subunits have independent bases of authority, and each of these levels of government directly governs the citizens. If the constitution of a decentralized state or union does not meet one of these criteria, Bednar considers it to be a quasi-federation.

in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy" (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938). These institutions are part of what we think about as the state; hence this book's argument about decentralization's peace-preserving capacity belongs under a broader research agenda of how states affect – and are affected by – the societies they govern (Migdal 1988, 2001; Migdal et al. 1994; Evans 1995).

THE ARGUMENT: STATE, SOCIETY, AND INTRASTATE STRUGGLES

Self-determination conflicts involve central governments (central elites), movements representing regional minority groups (regional elites), and the population they (claim to) represent. These struggles can revolve around demands that radically challenge the integrity and idea of the state, such as independence, decentralization of security, or decentralization of taxation,[15] or they can revolve around demands that may be equally important to the group but that less radically challenge the integrity of the state, such as greater cultural autonomy for ethnic minorities. Besides these differences in goals, the means can vary. Some struggles are fought with guns and grenades, while others are fought with pens and paper through boycotts, demonstrations, elections, protests, and referenda.

I argue that policy and fiscal autonomy in conjunction with ethnicity and wealth shapes self-determination conflicts. The interaction of institutional and societal variables affects the regional minority population's grievances and their assessments of the value of remaining part of the state – as opposed to the value of independence. The regional minority population's allegiance to regional versus central elites is, as such, influenced by how institutions governing center-region relations respond to societal traits of their region. To the degree that center-region institutions allow leaders of regional movements to blame the central government for the population's day-to-day problems, the easier it is for these leaders to garner popular support for greater autonomy or independence, and the more likely we are to see oppositional mobilization. Whether the conflict stays within the boundaries of nonviolent contention depends also on the availability of channels for negotiation and incentives to reach compromise solutions between central and regional elites, which in turn affects the regional elites' ability to govern their region. Thus, while the overarching outcome I aim to explain is the incidence of territorial or self-determination conflict, I aim to explain both why regional minority groups mobilize to challenge the existing distribution of power between tiers of government (i.e., collective action based on presence/absence of conflict of interest), which can manifest itself in demands that range from autonomy to

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[15] Given standard definitions of the state, these are functions that define what it means to be a state (Weber 1958; Levi 1988).

independence and opposition short of outright violent confrontation with the state, and why such conflicts in some cases come to be fought violently but in other cases not (i.e., presence/absence of violent conflict). For short, I refer to decentralization's ability to stem conflict – be that conflict violent or not – as such institutions' peace-preserving capacity (cf. Bermeo 2002).

An argument that explores decentralization's impact on self-determination struggles needs to begin by considering why any given territorially concentrated group would want to confront or leave the state. Such conflicts are often motivated by concerns related to ethnicity and wealth but not by these factors alone; institutions condition the degree to which societal traits cause conflict (cf. Cederman et al. 2010; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012).[16]

Most people would probably like the chance to express themselves in their own language, celebrate their religious holidays, and feel free from discrimination and persecution based on their culture, religion, language, race, and other ethnic markers. Indeed, a large literature points to how ethnic identity motivates conflict and opposition to the state. While some argue that ethnicity contributes to conflict due to long-standing hatreds (Kaplan 1993) or resentment toward ethnic groups other than one's own (Petersen 2002), others suggest that fear may make ethnic minority groups resort to violence as a means to protect their existence (Horowitz 1985, 175–184; Posen 1993; Lake and Rothchild 1996). Some point to group discrimination as a motivating factor for ethnic conflict (Gurr 2000a), emphasizing that the roots of ethnic conflicts, like "ordinary" politics, are driven by political, material, or other kinds of interests (Hale 2008, 52–55). Others maintain that political leaders may stir up hostility among different ethnic groups ("play the ethnic card") in order to keep or acquire power (Gagnon 1994/1995), using myths and symbols to justify such hostility (Kaufman 2001). Scholars drawing on social identity theory maintain that ethnic conflicts rest on people's tendency to favor their own group (Horowitz 1985). Regardless of the specific mechanisms, in nearly all cases, ethnicity is hypothesized to help solve the collective action problems associated with mass mobilization, especially when ethnic minority groups see themselves as distinct from the majority group(s) in the state and are concentrated in an area they consider to be their homeland (Toft 2003). Similarly, so-called ethnic majority/minority regions, which are regions where the majority of the population belongs to an ethnic group that is a minority in the state as a whole, are considered particularly prone to mobilize against the center in decentralized states (Alemán and Treisman 2005; Christin and Hug 2012).

Arguments of a more materialist nature posit that it is not identities but unequal access to resources and wealth that cause conflict. Income inequalities

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[16] Horowitz (1985, 613–628) suggests but does not systematically theorize or test that it is important to consider how federalism works in ethnically homogenous versus heterogeneous settings and points out that regional levels of wealth may influence devolution as a conflict management tool.

may create economic grievances on the part of the poorer party (Muller and Seligson 1987). In Gurr's (1970) classic formulation, collective disadvantages and relative deprivation are at the heart of violent political mobilization, and he later argues that ethnic minority group discrimination, including economic discrimination, contributes to conflict (Gurr 2000a; see also Stewart 2003; Østby 2008). Similarly, Hechter (1975) suggests that the cultural division of labor and economic inequalities between ethnic groups contributes to distinct ethnic identities and resistance to political integration by the less advantaged group. Others have maintained that a particularly wealthy region or group in an unequal society may find subsidizing the rest of the country burdensome and hope to improve its economic lot by escaping via secession or, at least, loosening the ties with the center – an action itself likely to promote conflict (Gourevitch 1979; Bolton and Roland 1997; Alesina et al. 2000; Sambanis and Milanovic 2004).[17] Thus, redistributive demands can come from either rich or poor groups (Cederman et al. 2011; Deiwiks et al. 2012), as people desire material security and the ability to prosper and do not want to be unjustly deprived of their wealth.

These aspirations of regional minority populations, which can fuel demands for self-determination, are typically mitigated or exacerbated by political institutions. The state's institutions can shape the regional minority population's economic well-being and opportunity to express their identities and, as such, foster antistate collective action if the state is seen as responsible for the problems people face in their everyday lives (Goodwin 2001).[18] In particular, institutions governing center-region relations can, contingent on how they respond to ethnicity and wealth, shape the perceived legitimacy of the state by affecting regional minority groups' grievances and cost-benefit assessments about the value of being part of the state. That is, these institutions shape subnational populations' relationship to the central government. Note that the approach here does not privilege grievance-based explanations over cost-benefit calculations.[19] Rather, the task is to consider how state–society configurations affect each of these motivations.

[17] Some of the oft-cited studies of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) find no support for the proposition that inequality contributes to conflict. A problem with these findings, however, is that the measure for inequality is Gini coefficients, which measure inequality at an individual level, while the theoretical arguments often concern intergroup (or interregional) inequality.

[18] The social movement literature on framing suggests that specific blame attribution regarding who is responsible for people's grievances (as well as specific recipes for what to do about those grievances) aids collective action (e.g., Snow and Benford 1992; Zald 1996). For related arguments applied to Russia, see Javeline (2003) and Giuliano (2006).

[19] Some large-*n* studies of civil war have attempted to make clear distinctions between grievance-based explanations and explanations more in the cost-benefit vein (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), but this approach has been challenged. Once these statistical studies are supplemented with case studies, argues Sambanis (2004, 260), it becomes clear that the distinction between so-called grievance and greed-based explanations are "shades of the

Decentralization can also strengthen regional or ethnic identities and resources for mobilization. Indeed, an important argument among those opposed to such institutional arrangements is the possibility that autonomy arrangements enhance subnational identities (Roeder 1991; Chapman and Roeder 2007), even institutionalize them (Guss and Siroky 2012), and possibly weaken attachments to the state as a whole (Elkins and Sides 2007). Similarly, decentralized governance can provide regional elites with resources for mobilization, including encouraging the formation of regional or ethnic-based parties, both of which are considered destabilizing for a country (Horowitz 1985; Brancati 2006). The social movement literature that underpins such arguments about collective identities and resource mobilization, however, takes as its starting point that there are grievances and rationales for mobilization – motives, so to speak.[20] That is, strong subnational identities or attachments *per se* are not considered causes of conflicts; rather, strong collective identities can facilitate mobilization when paired with grievances that, some argue, can be manipulated by elites or attributed to the center. Similarly, resource mobilization alone is unlikely to cause conflict, but in the presence of grievances or negative assessments about staying put, it helps facilitate collective action. The focus in this book is to identify the different ways in which institutions affect grievances and rationales (motives) by responding to certain societal traits, specifically ethnicity and wealth.

Let me now turn to the specifics of these state–society relations. Building on the decentralization literature, the institutions I focus on are (1) policy autonomy (the degree to which regional governments make policy decisions) and (2) fiscal autonomy (the degree to which regional governments fund their own public good provision). These institutions, in conjunction with ethnicity and wealth, shape regional minority groups' opposition to the state; they shape the degree to which there is collective action based on conflict of interest. Such opposition can manifest itself in violent conflict, but it can also play out through nonviolent tactics, such as protests and boycotts. Whether opposition to the state stays within the boundaries of nonviolent political bargaining also hinges on (3) political decentralization, particularly the political (party) ties across tiers of government. The absence of political ties between leaders at the center and in a minority region as well as the presence of political ties between the center and other regions of the state can

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same problem." With respect to the sovereignty debate in Québec, some have argued that people are primarily motivated by rational considerations, such as the feasibility of independence, while others have proposed explanations more in the social-psychology vein. With respect to Québec, attempts at bridging these approaches through large-*n* analysis have concluded that the support for sovereignty is determined both by short-term economic consequences *and* variables such as ethnic pride and recognition (Mendelsohn 2003).

[20] Similarly, in-depth studies of several insurgencies suggest that grievances are important for the emergence of insurgent movements, while "supply-side explanations," such as opportunities for enrichment, help sustain movements once emerged (O'Leary and Silke 2007).

complicate negotiations with the minority region, increasing the chances of conflicts turning violent.

In many intrastate conflicts, the challengers to the state are ethnic minorities seeking self-determination, and the proposed solutions often address concerns that are considered ethnic in nature. Drawing on the classic fiscal federalism literature (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972, 1999), Hechter (2000) suggests that federal institutions can contain such conflicts if they allow ethnic minority groups policy-making capacity over issues central to their recognition, such as language, education, religion, and culture. Local provision of public goods that are valued by only segments of the population can be "superior because it increases the likelihood that the right mix of goods will be produced – that mix which is most consistent with the distinctive values of the national group" (2000, 143). Likewise, Gurr suggests that the optimal strategy to prevent ethnic groups from mobilizing in pursuit of increased autonomy is to "give such peoples the means – legal, political, and material – to protect and promote their cultural practices in those regions and spheres of life where they matter to group members" (2000a, 165). Along these lines, the successful accommodation of ethnic and religious divisions in Switzerland has been attributed to federal arrangements that give the cantons policy autonomy with respect to language, education, and religion (Bächtiger and Steiner 2004).

Underpinning these arguments is the notion that policy autonomy in the cultural sphere, which I refer to as cultural policy autonomy, can contain popular grievances based on ethnic discrimination (Gurr 2000a) and diminish the benefits of independence, making it more difficult for regional elites to "play the nationalist card" (Hechter 2000, 144). These are good reasons for arguing that cultural policy autonomy is likely to appease demands for self-determination. However, one can think of at least two reasons why cultural policy autonomy may be insufficient: ethnic demographics and the basis for group solidarity or mobilization. These variables are likely to shape the content of the self-determination demands raised and, thus, the possibility for cultural policy autonomy to meet the demands – and, as such, help prevent conflict.

First, let me turn to ethnic demographics. In many self-determination struggles, the struggle is in the name of a region or geographic area, not just an ethnic minority group. The Akali Dal in Punjab, for example, sought greater autonomy in Punjab, which is part of the geographic area that the Sikhs consider their homeland. If the struggle is in the name of a region and not only an ethnic minority group, the ethnic composition of that region may affect the content of the demands raised – and, in turn, whether cultural policy autonomy is sufficient to meet the demands. Assuming that a self-determination movement is a stronger challenger to the state when the

movement is in control of the regional government or supported by a large share of the regional population, to the degree that ethnicity is insufficient to create a critical mass in the region, regional elites are unlikely to try to mobilize people based on ethnicity alone. Similarly, assuming that regional elites want to stay in power, they are likely to raise demands or use policy frames that attract the most public support (Hale 2008, 84).[21] Whether ethnicity is sufficient to establish a critical mass or large public support in the region depends largely on the ethnic group's share of the regional population (cf. Posner 2004). The smaller the share of a region's population is made up of a single ethnic minority group (and the more ethnically heterogeneous the region is), the less likely regional elites are to mobilize people around ethnicity alone.[22] Nationalist mobilization may take a civic rather than ethnic form. In turn, cultural policy autonomy may not be sufficient for accommodating self-determination demands, as the elites are mobilizing their supporters based on a wider agenda. Indeed, it may even be the case that if a region's population is ethnically heterogeneous, centralized policies with respect to language, education, religion, and culture may be the more peace-preserving option, as centralization would better ensure the protection of cultural differences between the ethnic groups within the region and, thus, avoid conflict between the groups (cf. Cunningham and Weidmann 2010). If, in contrast, the majority of the regional population belongs to one ethnic minority group, or if the struggle is fought in the name of an ethnic minority group only, the demands are more likely to emphasize concerns specific to the ethnic group. In such settings, cultural policy autonomy may mitigate self-determination demands, while the lack thereof does the opposite. Note that the outcome here is not necessarily violent conflict but opposition based on conflict of interest, which can manifest itself in collective action short of violence. Thus, at the regional level of analysis, I hypothesize the following:

> H1a: Cultural policy autonomy is likely to contain self-determination conflict where the struggle is fought in the name of an ethnic minority group rather than a region *and* in regions where the majority of the population belongs to an ethnic group that is a minority in the state as a whole (ethnic majority/minority regions). Cultural policy autonomy is likely to have none or the reverse effect if the region's population is ethnically diverse.

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[21] In regions without democratic competition, forming a critical mass may be less important than in democratic regions, but even in nondemocratic regions, the larger the share of the regional population supporting the self-determination struggle, the stronger and more credible the challenge to the state is. Moreover, leaders of nondemocratic regions may face competition in the form of demonstrations and riots, even violent overthrows, which means that they, too, may seek to frame regional demands in a manner that attracts wide public support (Hale 2008, 84).

[22] Moreover, members from an ethnic minority group may be unlikely to support a mobilization effort that revolves solely around ethnicity if they believe that their group is too small to have an influence (Chandra 2004, 86–92).

Based on a similar rationale, ethnic demographics also have national-level implications. Indeed, there are two reasons why cultural policy autonomy, particularly policy autonomy over education, can have a conflict-provoking effect. Autonomy over education can be important to give regional minority groups a degree of control or, at least, influence over matters that are central to their identity, such as a say in the development of school curricula or choice of language of instruction. Yet to the degree that policy autonomy over education means that the regions carry the costs for education, such autonomy is potentially a high price to pay, especially for poorer regions. In ethnically heterogeneous countries, the benefits of decentralized education may outweigh or trump these distributional concerns, but in ethnically homogenous countries, decentralized education could be a source of tension between the center and the regions. For example, in Canada in the 1990s, increasing provincial costs for education contributed to dissatisfaction with the center among the provinces, especially as central transfers were decreasing. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, even in Québec, where the Francophone population wants policy autonomy over education, the expenditure aspect of it has been a source of tension with Ottawa. Moreover, in countries where ethnic minority groups are not concentrated in certain regions and rather constitute small minorities in a number of regions, centralized decision making over education, language, and culture may be the most appropriate option, as it ensures equality both among and within regions, thus avoiding conflict among ethnic minority groups as well as between these groups and the center. As such, while cultural policy autonomy may help stem self-determination challenges to the state when a large share of the population lives in ethnic majority/minority regions (and the lack thereof has the opposite effect), it is likely to have no such effect in more ethnically homogenous countries:

> H1b: Cultural policy decentralization is likely to contain self-determination conflict in states where a large share of the population lives in regions where the majority of the population is a minority in the state as a whole (ethnic majority/minority regions). Cultural policy decentralization is likely to have none or the reverse effect in states where there are few or no ethnic majority/minority regions.

The second reason why cultural policy autonomy might not prevent conflict rests with the basis for solidarity around which a regional minority group mobilizes, which is likely to shape the demands raised. Arguments about the danger of ethno-federalism and decentralization along ethnic lines are based on how institutions politicize an ethnic identity dimension, such as language in the Soviet Union, and provide regional elites with resources for mobilization. But the fact that an ethnic (or other identity) dimension is institutionalized does not necessarily explain what the group wants. Drawing on research in psychology, Hale (2004b, 2008) proposes that a way to think about identity, including ethnicity, is as a set of social reference points that

help people make sense of the world. It is about figuring out who I am with references to someone and something else. As such, people's identities may change as a result of encountering new people, situations, and institutions. Typical ethnic reference points, such as speaking the same language and having a common history, can become "thick" with extra meaning and more salient for people's self-categorization when paired with other factors that are important for their life chances, such as material welfare. Indeed, while ethnic identity is a tool people may use to situate themselves vis-à-vis others, there are no given ethnic preferences; ethnicity by itself is not the motivation for self-determination. Rather, ethnic groups, like other groups, may be motivated by a desire for material goods, security, power, and status (Hale 2008, 52–55, 77–80). Thus, if ethnicity overlaps with territorial divisions and economic deprivation, for example, the combination creates a stronger motivation for behavior than ethnicity alone. Indeed, Bunce's (1999) account of the disintegration of the former communist federations is not only about the dangers of ethno-federalism; important to her story is the combination of institutionalized linguistic lines *and* state repression and economic decline facilitating anticenter sentiments.

   The implications for cultural policy autonomy are twofold. First, it is not a given that cultural policy autonomy alone will meet an ethnic minority group's demands for self-determination, as the typical ethnic reference points that bind a group together may be intertwined with other, nonethnic concerns that are important in their lives and affect the demands they raise. Second, while "thick" ethnic identities among members of a minority group may make them more inclined to consider the state threatening than groups without such thick identities, a combination particularly likely to cause radical self-determination demands is ethnicity and a history of central repression of the group. Such a combination would suggest that the state is a threat to the physical security, even survival, of the group (Hale 2008, 78–79). If the state is or has been considered a threat to the existence of the ethnic minority group, elites can more easily mobilize the group around radical demands. In such settings, the ethnic group may not be as concerned about institutions that allow policy autonomy over education and culture. Rather, the concern is about ensuring the group's physical safety and checking the center (Weingast 1998a; Lake and Rothchild 1996). Thus, if a history of a threatening center is key to mobilizing an ethnic minority group, it is reasonable to expect that the group will want control over issues that help protect its physical security, including defense. Given that the monopoly of the legitimate use of force is integral to what it means to be a state, defense, for example, is a state function that the central government most probably is unwilling to decentralize. Similarly, if the center is seen as a threat to the physical security of an ethnic minority group, it is likely easier for regional elites to rally the group around the most extreme type of self-determination demands, independence, rather than a more limited call for greater autonomy. As most central governments are unwilling to give in to

demands for independence, such demands heighten the chance of violent con-
flict.[23] Thus, cultural policy autonomy may be an insufficient peace-preserving
means if an ethnic minority group is mobilized based on fear of a threatening
center. This leads to the following hypothesis:

> H1c: Cultural policy autonomy is likely to contain self-determination conflict in
> regions where the majority of the population is mobilized or identifies around a
> common language, culture, or religion, that is, where the struggle is about *cul-*
> *tural* survival. Cultural policy autonomy is likely to have little or no effect on
> self-determination conflict if the region's population rather mobilizes or identifies
> around fear of a threatening center, that is, where the struggle is about *physical*
> survival.[24]

The discussion so far assumes that people often act as a group, but it is not
a given that groups – be they ethnic or not – are unitary, or cohesive, actors
(Brubaker 2002). By helping individuals situate themselves in relation to oth-
ers, identities function as rules of thumb that people use to navigate the social
world, and ethnicity is a strong navigation tool (Hale 2008). Yet as the case stud-
ies in this book show, different factions within a self-determination movement
may have different demands and employ different tactics in pursuit of those
demands. While some factions may be appeased by cultural policy autonomy,
others may not. The more fragmented the movement representing the regional
group, the less likely it is that the same institutional arrangement will appease
its diverging demands. Indeed, there is a growing literature on the effects of
movement or group fragmentation on conflict dynamics.[25] Theorizing and test-
ing the effects of movement fragmentation on self-determination struggles is
not at the heart of this study (see my collaborative work in Cunningham et al.
2012 and Bakke et al. 2012), but I turn to how fragmentation shapes negotia-
tions with the center in what follows, as well as in the book's conclusion.

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[23] It is also plausible that mobilization around fear of the center makes people more risk acceptant
and willing to resort to violence than mobilization around promoting a group's status. This was
nicely put by the Russian sociologist Emil Pain, who suggested that if it is fear that drives mo-
bilization, the means are arms. If it is about culture, the means are pens and pencils (personal
communication, Moscow, May 30, 2005). See prospect theory on operating in the domain of
losses versus the domain of gains (Levy 1997).

[24] I do not present a national-level equivalent to this hypothesis due to limitations of meaningfully
assessing what ethnic ties mean to different ethnic groups cross-nationally.

[25] The long-dominant way to model intrastate conflicts, including self-determination struggles,
is as struggles between a unitary state and a unitary, or cohesive, challenger (e.g., Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Walter 2006a; 2006b). A growing body of work, how-
ever, is challenging the unitary actor assumption, pointing out that dynamics of intrastate strug-
gles are often shaped by divisions within the challenger (e.g., Gates 2002; D. Cunningham 2006;
Weinstein 2007; Pearlman 2008/2009; Kenny 2010; Lawrence 2010; K. Cunningham 2011;
2013; Christia 2012; K. Cunningham et al. 2012; Bakke et al. 2012; Findley and Rudloff 2012;
Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Staniland 2012a; 2012b; Krause 2013/2014) and even within the state
(Carey et al. 2013).

FISCAL AUTONOMY AND WEALTH

To the degree that decentralization can accommodate regional minority groups by granting them policy autonomy, such autonomy – regardless of the policy area – means little or nothing in the absence of money to spend on decentralized priorities. If regional preferences about, for example, language and schools deviate from those in the rest of the country, the capacity to act on those preferences is limited if regional governments are unable to finance the relevant programs. Regional governments can either raise revenues on their own to cover most of the expenses for these tasks (through taxes and user fees), or they can rely on transfers from the central government (loans and grants). The peace-preserving potential of these options, however, is likely to be conditional on any given region's resources and level of development.[26] Recall that both poor and rich regions may have reasons to leave the state; the argument here suggests that these reasons are mitigated by the economic gains or losses that the state offers.

On one hand, if a region is relatively resource poor and underdeveloped, reliance on its own source revenues will probably impair its ability to implement policies rather than empower it, fueling both grievances related to the lack of public goods provision and a sense that the region is not receiving its fair share from the central government. Indeed, in contrast to rich regions, poor regions need the central government – or at least a piece of the resources the center controls. To the degree that the state's social control rests with delivering what Migdal (1988, 26) calls "strategies of survival" to its citizens, in relatively poor and poorly developed regions, central transfers are probably the more peace-preserving option. In such regions, significant central transfers are likely to tip the balance in favor of staying put.

On the other hand, relatively resource-rich and highly developed regions can afford to fund public goods provision from their own revenues. The population and elites in such regions are unlikely to want to finance the state's poorer regions. Thus, if relatively rich regions are to stay put in the state, they are likely to prefer fiscal autonomy, which also enables policy autonomy.[27] These expectations are outlined in Table 1.1. The table's bottom-left and upper-right boxes (1a and 1b) represent scenarios in which conflict is likely to emerge. In

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[26] Hale (2008, 84–87) makes a distinction between resource wealth and economic development. Whereas natural resources contribute to a region's wealth, high levels of development – in terms of education, GDP per capita, urbanization, industrial employment, and mass communication – may be more immediately important to people's lives; indeed, natural resources are important primarily to the extent that they contribute to economic development. For the purpose of the argument here, both natural resources and level of development matter, as both may affect the ability of the regional government to raise revenues.

[27] Also rich regions may seek to take advantage of central transfers (Treisman 2001; Gimpelson and Treisman 2002). However, because rich regions are likely to be financing poor regions through transfers, it is reasonable to expect them to favor decentralized taxation as a means to fund region-level tasks.

TABLE 1.1. *Expectations about Fiscal Autonomy and Regional Wealth*

	Fiscal Autonomy High	Fiscal Autonomy Low
Relatively rich region	2b Conflict less likely	1b Conflict likely
Relatively poor region	1a Conflict likely	2a Conflict less likely

both scenarios – a poor region left to fend for itself and a rich region without much fiscal autonomy – the regional population and elites are likely to be dissatisfied with the central government. It is plausible that in the first scenario, where the region is poor (1a), the likelihood of violent conflict is higher than in a dissatisfied rich region (1b), as armed groups may easier find recruits among poorer populations (cf. Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

The bottom-right and upper-left boxes (2a and 2b) are scenarios in which conflict is less likely to emerge. In either scenario – a poor region with low fiscal autonomy (i.e., high transfers) and a rich region with high fiscal autonomy – the regional population is less likely than in scenarios 1a and 1b to be dissatisfied with the central government. In scenario 2a, the region's poverty may still make for an environment in which conflicts can emerge: grievances may be high due to poverty, and if there are political entrepreneurs who are in favor of pursuing independence or using violent means, the region's poverty means there may be a pool of recruits to draw from. Yet I would expect most people in such regions to be opposed to a struggle for independence, as the region depends on transfers from the central government; independence may not be a viable option. In scenario 2b, the combination of wealth and fiscal autonomy means that there are significant resources for mobilization at hand for political entrepreneurs, yet they may have a difficult time convincing the population that there are reasons to confront the central government. In sum, I hypothesize the following:

> H2a: Fiscal autonomy is likely to contain self-determination conflict where a region is relatively resource rich. Fiscal autonomy is likely to have the reverse effect if the region is relatively resource poor.

Turning to the national level of analysis, the expectations for fiscal decentralization are also conditional on wealth. Proponents of decentralized solutions to governing divided societies often cite fiscal decentralization as a means to foster unity through diversity in both ethnically homogenous (Buchanan 1995; Inman and Rubinfeld 1997) and heterogeneous settings (Hechter 2000; Simeon 2004), but recommendations for fiscal decentralization miss one crucial point, namely that it has a tendency to exacerbate interregional inequalities (Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Linz and Stepan 2000; Swank 2002). Given that poor regions have greater fiscal needs and a harder time raising the revenues to meet those needs, central governments are typically responsible for addressing

deep regional inequalities via interregional redistribution – a responsibility oftentimes complicated by fiscal decentralization. Several mechanisms seem to underpin this regularity.

First, as regional and local governments consume a larger share of the public budget, the central government is left with less capacity to engage in redistribution from wealthy to poor regions (Prud'homme 1995). Even if a central government in a highly decentralized setting is dedicated to easing interregional inequalities, the fiscal tools at its disposal are diminished. For instance, in Belgium, reforms aimed at greater fiscal autonomy and regional spending power in 1989 were of less concern in the relatively rich Flemish region than in the poorer Walloon region, where they accepted a gradual reduction of central transfers in return for control over redistributive policies that could help ease the transition (Hooghe 2001, 71–73). Second, fiscal decentralization is associated with intergovernmental competition for capital that under some conditions can exacerbate inequalities. As Cai and Treisman (2005) note, when there is significant divergence in initial endowments across regions, decentralized intergovernmental competition for capital can exacerbate inequalities, as poor regions have little potential to attract capital, while rich regions actually draw capital out of poor regions. The competition for tax base can also exacerbate regional inequalities by fostering an intergovernmental race to the bottom, where social policy is decentralized (Peterson 1995). Hesitant to increase taxes on mobile factors and serve as a magnet for the poor, regional politicians are likely to restrict the kind of redistribution that might alleviate inequalities. As a result, there is near universal accord on the negative impact of federalism on social spending (Castles 1999). Third, the propensity for regional governments to serve as important veto players at the national level in fiscally decentralized settings can contribute to the difficulty of establishing extensive redistributive policies at the central level (Swank 2002). As the number of veto players mounts, it becomes easier for a coalition of relatively wealthy regions to block legislation aimed at reallocating societal resources from wealthy to poor regions.

The net result of these factors may be that while wealthy regions will be able to fund substantial public goods provision, crowd in private-sector investment, and grow, poor regions will lag ever farther behind. Thus, where interregional income inequality is high, fiscal decentralization will likely exacerbate those inequalities, contributing to conflict:

> H2b: Fiscal decentralization is likely to prevent self-determination conflict in states characterized by low interregional inequality. Fiscal decentralization is likely to have the reverse effect in states characterized by high interregional inequality.

POLITICAL ELITE TIES

The potential for violent conflict is probably higher the more people are dissatisfied with the status quo and see few benefits of staying put in the state. In

that respect, violence is a degree of conflict – the more intense the demands at the heart of the conflict of interest, the more likely that the conflict turns violent. A growing body of work, however, maintains that violence is not merely a "self-explanatory outgrowth" of conflict (Brubaker and Laitin 1998, 426); violence can have dynamics of its own, separate from the causes of the conflict from which it emerges (Kalyvas 2006; Chenoweth and Lawrence 2010).

Importantly, opposition groups may radicalize and turn to violent means in the absence of more routine channels for voicing their demands (della Porta 1996; Tarrow 1998; Goodwin 2001). In this view, whatever the aspirations of the actors, whether the conflict can be settled without bloodshed rests with the political process through which the central government and subnational challengers interact with one another. If the challengers are represented by organizations that operate through institutional channels and have access to central policy makers, such as political parties, violent conflict may be less likely than if the challengers are represented by movements that have little access to central policy makers and turn to extra-institutional means to gain attention.

Indeed, beginning with Riker (1964), an influential branch of the federalism literature places great emphasis on how political parties can integrate tiers of government. Political party ties across tiers of government is considered an important institutional channel, or safeguard (Bednar 2009), for stable intergovernmental bargaining. Political parties, argues Stepan (2001), are the glue that holds federations, particularly multiethnic federations, together. According to Filippov and colleagues (2004), strong statewide parties with regional branches, which they refer to as "integrated" or "federal-friendly" parties, constitute a self-reinforcing mechanism for federal stability, ensuring that highly divisive issues, such as the state's constitutional design or territorial integrity, are not challenged by political elites as "local and national parties and candidates rely on each other for their survival and success" (ibid., 191). The stabilizing feature of integrated parties lies in that they cause politicians at each level of government to be imperfect agents of their constituents; central politicians cannot consider only central interests, while regional politicians cannot consider only regional interests (Bednar 2009, 113–119). Moreover, in systems with integrated parties, many disputes are resolved within the parties rather than between parties.[28] On the flipside, Horowitz (1985) warns that local ethnic parties may deepen ethnic cleavages, and Brancati (2006) suggests that regional parties increase the chances of secessionist conflicts in decentralized states by strengthening regional identities and groups.

The federalism literature's argument is about political parties as safeguards, but one can think of an institutionalized intergovernmental bargaining process more broadly. Although not self-reinforcing, shared histories or backgrounds among regional and national policy makers (Horowitz 1985, 565–566) or patronage networks (George 2005; Stroschein 2009) can ease negotiations.

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[28] Cf. Brownlee (2007) on cohesive ruling parties in authoritarian regimes.

The key is interdependence between central and regional elites. To capture interdependence, I examine the degree to which the elites that govern in the regions are from the same political party or coalition, or politically affiliated with, the ruling elites at the center. The case studies also allow me to explore whether there are other, more informal, relationships of political interdependence between regional and central elites. While political ties across tiers of government can exist between opposition parties in the regions and the opposition at the center, they are more likely to have an integrating effect if they include the ruling elites.

Note that while the purported benefit of policy and fiscal autonomy is that these institutions have the potential to contain conflict by accommodating the demands of regional minority groups (that is, by changing the distribution of power between tiers of government), the benefit of political ties is that they can make regional voices heard at the national level but also, in perhaps a more conservative fashion, contain conflict by preserving the status quo.

I focus on the ways in which the absence of political ties between ruling elites or coalitions at the center and ruling elites in ethnic majority/minority regions affects the turn to violent conflict, as well as how the presence of political ties between the center and other regions of the state can affect the center's interactions with the majority/minority region. The aim is to specify the processes that connect political elite ties to one of the most unstable forms of federal bargaining, violent conflicts between center and periphery. The link between political elite ties across tiers of government and violent conflict is the process of negotiation. Violent conflicts likely result from negotiations characterized by radical demands, few concessions, and/or noncredible commitments, each of which is affected by political ties across tiers of government.

First, if the electoral fortunes or political careers of elites at the regional level depend on the party's success at the central level, or if funds or promotions come from the central level (that is, if regional elites owe their position to the elites at the center), regional elites may think twice about pushing the central government for radical demands that challenge the integrity of the state (Filippov et al. 2004). Indivisible or radical demands, such as independence, are harder to negotiate than more divisible ones, such as greater autonomy (Toft 2003). It may also be the case that political ties across tiers of government provide regional elites with a sense of inclusion in the state. Political inclusion, argues Goodwin, "discourages the sense that the state is unreformable or an instrument of a narrow class or clique and, accordingly, needs to be fundamentally overhauled" (2001, 46). Second, if central elites need the help of regional politicians to win elections or stay in power, they are likely to try to reach a compromise when faced with regional demands and, more generally, aim to strengthen the regional politicians' hold on power in the region. Third, political ties among elites can also ensure that concessions and promises, once given, are more credible, as defecting would hurt both sides. Moreover, to the degree that

political party ties across tiers of government facilitate personal contact and communication with officials at different tiers of government, the officials may be more likely to trust one another and consider promises credible. Just like indivisible demands are considered an obstacle to bargaining, so are noncredible commitments (Walter 2002). The absence of any of these factors is likely to provide for a stalled negotiation process, which increases the likelihood that conflicts turn violent.

Yet the central government has political relationships to elites not just in one region but in all regions of the state, and central elites' ties to these other regions may affect the negotiation process described earlier. The central elites' concern for their political allies or copartisans in one region may come at the expense of other regions. Indeed, research on India (Khemani 2001), the United States (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2004), and Argentina (Jones et al. 2000) suggests that parties at the center often target transfers to regional copartisans at the expense of regions governed by opposition parties. Similarly, the central elites' relationship to other regions may trigger two of the characteristics of stalled negotiations described earlier: an unwillingness to provide concessions and credibly commit to any promises made. In particular, if a majority/minority region is not part of the centrally governing party or coalition *while many other regions are*, the majority/minority region may be further isolated from the central government. Not only do the elites in such regions have no sense of inclusion or incentives to cooperate with the center, but the central elites' relationship to other regions may adversely affect the excluded majority/minority region, thus further contributing to troubled negotiations.

Once center-region negotiations stall, one of the mechanisms that further makes violent conflict a likely outcome is a deepening of divisions within the self-determination movement. Few if any self-determination movements representing regional minority groups are unanimously supported by the population they (claim to) represent, and many movements consist of more than one faction or organization speaking in the name of the group (Cunningham 2014). To the degree that the regional elites involved in negotiations with the center fail in their efforts, opposition in the region may grow. Other factions of the movement may seek power or even try to oust the regional elites, believing that they would be better fit to represent the region's interests. A growing body of research is suggesting that violence in self-determination conflicts rests with such divisions within movements (Cunningham et al. 2012). Factions in a fragmented movement may seek to "outbid" one another in order to appear as the leader, as such propelling a radicalization of strategies and goals (Bloom 2004). Alternatively, fragmentation might leave the movement without a disciplining leadership that can integrate its behavior (Pearlman 2008/2009), leading to (violent) intramovement conflict (Lawrence 2010) and possibly complicating the regional minority group's bargaining with the central government due to divergent preferences and a leadership that cannot credibly commit to peace

(K. Cunningham 2013). Although states might "like" a divided movement in the sense that it can try to strategically offer concessions to some factions rather than others, concessions to fragmented movements are unlikely to resolve the dispute (Cunningham 2011). In essence, a fragmented self-determination movement is a particularly challenging negotiating partner for the center because there is no *one* movement there. Thus, growing fragmentation feeds back into the process of stalled negotiations, making a peaceful resolution increasingly difficult. The hypotheses at the regional and national levels of analysis are:

> H3a: Political ties between a majority/minority region and the central government (ethnic copartisanship) are likely to prevent violent self-determination conflict in that region. The absence of ethnic copartisanship is likely to have the reverse effect in a region, *especially* when many other regions of the state are copartisans of the center.

> H3b: Political ties across tiers of government (copartisanship) are likely to prevent violent self-determination conflicts in a state if ethnic majority/minority regions are included in these ties (ethnic copartisanship). If there are political ties across tiers of government but majority/minority regions are excluded, copartisanship is likely to have the reverse effect.

In sum, policy and fiscal autonomy, conditional on ethnicity and wealth, can contain or foster self-determination conflicts by affecting regional minority groups' demands, as state–society interactions jointly shape people's grievances and assessments about the value of remaining part of the state. A high level of grievances and an unfavorable assessment of the values of staying put increase the chance of oppositional mobilization. Whether such conflicts turn violent is not only a result of the intensity of grievances and unfavorable cost-benefit calculations; it also depends on the degree to which there are channels that allow regional and central elites to negotiate with one another. If this argument holds, I would *not* expect cultural policy autonomy to consistently discourage conflict. Rather, I would expect cultural policy autonomy to discourage conflict only if the self-determination bid is in the name of an ethnic group or a relatively ethnically homogenous majority/minority region and if the basis for ethnic solidarity in that group or region comes from a wish to protect the ethnic group's cultural survival – as opposed to protecting its physical survival. In other cases, cultural policy autonomy may not be important or insufficient. Similarly, I would *not* expect fiscal autonomy to consistently discourage conflict. Rather, I would expect high fiscal autonomy to discourage conflict in relatively rich regions, but I would expect relatively poor regions to be appeased with high fiscal transfers instead. The flipside of these hypotheses is that ethnicity and wealth are not uniformly affecting violent conflict, as the impact of these societal traits is mitigated or exacerbated by policy and fiscal autonomy. As for political ties between elites at the center and in the regions, I would *not* expect that a state with strong ties between central and most regional elites

FIGURE 1.1. From Decentralization to Peace Preservation.
Note: In the figure, **x** indicates a conditioning relationship.

would consistently prevent violent conflict. Rather, I would expect that such elite ties help prevent violent conflict only if the elites of majority/minority regions are also included. Indeed, if majority/minority regions are excluded but most other regions of the state are political allies of the center, the chance of violent conflict may be exacerbated. Figure 1.1 presents the argument.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The book combines a statistical study with three in-depth case studies of the self-determination struggles in Chechnya (Russia), Punjab (India), and Québec (Canada). This combination of large-*n* and small-*n* enables me to assess general relationships among institutions, societal traits, and conflict, as well as pay close attention to how societal context affects the working of institutions. Each method compensates for the weakness of the other.[29]

The statistical part of this study, Chapter 2, is a time-series cross-sectional analysis of different types of intrastate conflict across twenty-two federal states from 1978 to 2000, employing data that measure fiscal decentralization, copartisanship across tiers of government, interregional inequality, and regional ethnic concentration. For any given country-year, I assess whether the interactions

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[29] For discussions about combining large-*n* and small-*n* research and the benefits of case studies, see Brady and Collier (2004); Sambanis (2004); Lieberman (2005); Gerring (2007); Checkel (2013).

of certain institutions and societal traits affect the incidence of conflict. The advantage of this analysis is that it enables me to test country-level implications of my argument against alternative explanations. Yet statistical analyses cannot easily capture nuanced arguments about how ethnicity is mobilized or people perceive the central state. Indeed, while establishing a number of statistically significant correlations that provide support for my argument cross-nationally, the large-*n* analysis says little about the processes at work at a lower level of analysis. Hence, a major part of this study, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, consists of case studies at the regional level – three self-determination struggles in different states. As the cases go through periods of mobilization and demobilization, each includes several observations.

The purpose of the case studies is to better understand the processes that underpin the correlations established in the large-*n* analysis and explore dynamics that cannot be captured through such an approach (cf. Collier et al. 2004). The task is to uncover how center-region institutions and societal traits in these three regions have influenced conflict trajectories and whether there are similar dynamics at work, both within and across the cases. Case-oriented research is particularly useful for identifying how conjunctural causation works – how one independent variable's impact on the dependent variable is affected by other independent variables (Ragin 2004). The main question that guides the case studies, therefore, asks how institutions have affected mobilization in the region. In particular, it is important to try to assess the ways in which a region's population perceives – and acts on – grievances and costs and benefits of staying put. The case studies are also central for examining endogenous relationships by allowing within-case analysis of temporal sequences (Munck 2004).[30] While the argument in this book is that societal traits and institutions jointly shape self-determination conflicts, it is plausible that institutions may shape societal variables and vice versa and that conflicts have feedback effects on the design of institutions.

In analyzing the cases, I use the method of structured-focused comparison (George and Bennett 2004), asking the same questions from each case. These questions aim to shed light on the larger research question, which asks, under which conditions can decentralization help contain intrastate struggle? In cases and time periods of violent conflict, I ask what role policy and fiscal decentralization played in encouraging or discouraging grievances and negative assessments about the value of being part of the state, as well as how political ties between central and regional elites shaped bargaining around those demands. In cases and time periods of nonviolence, I ask whether policy and fiscal decentralization helped reduce grievances and positive assessments about the value of staying put, as well as whether political ties between central and regional elites created channels for bargaining that helped prevent violence.

[30] For works that have begun to examine such relationships statistically, see Cederman et al. (2015).

Thus, although the qualitative chapters are organized on a case-by-case basis, the reader will find similar sections in each chapter – sections on policy autonomy and ethnicity, fiscal autonomy and wealth, and political ties between central and regional elites.

The cases I focus on are self-determination conflicts between the center and an ethnically distinct region in three different states. In each region, the majority of the population are members of an ethnic group that is a minority in the state as a whole – the Chechens in Chechnya, the Sikhs in Punjab, and the Francophone Québécois in Québec – and have a history of trying to redefine their relationship to or simply escape the central government. Each of these regions could be carved out for independent statehood, but they have followed different trajectories in their struggle against the central government. Chapter 3 analyzes the Chechen case, where a newly emerged nationalist movement came to power in 1991 and immediately declared the republic independent. In the final days of 1994, Russian troops rolled into Grozny, the Chechen capital, marking the beginning of two rounds of bloody and brutal conflict (1994–1996, 1999–2007). Chapter 4 focuses on the case of Punjab, where the Akali Dal has called for the Indian union to become a "real" federation with greater autonomy for the states since the 1970s. In the 1980s, groups of militants also called for the creation of a separate state, Khalistan, for Punjab's Sikh majority. These demands turned into a violent conflict with the central government in Delhi in 1984. In 1993, the violence came to an end, although the conflict was never resolved through a political agreement. Finally, Chapter 5 examines the case of Québec, where the sovereignty movement has sought to redefine the province's relationship with the rest of Canada since the 1960s, calling for Québec to become a sovereign state in a close association with Canada. In 1995, the movement, spearheaded by the Parti Québécois, led the province to a referendum that almost brought Canada to a breaking point, as barely 50,000 votes separated those who wanted to remain part of the federation and those who wanted to split. In Québec's long struggle for sovereignty, only once – in October 1970 – has the conflict led to a violent confrontation.

I intend for the study to be a broad comparative analysis and have opted to focus on cases in different parts of the world. Although such a research design means I cannot control for similar structural, cultural, and historical contexts, each of the cases involves an ethnically distinct region with a long history of resistance to the central government. Besides providing me with comparative leverage, by comparing conflicts in different countries, I avoid the potential problem of within-country diffusion, which may occur in the more conventional research design of comparing conflicts within a country. In such comparisons, it is likely that mobilization and center-region interactions in one region may affect the extent of such mobilization and interactions in other regions.

The case selection allows for variation on the dependent variable, both over time and across regions, as shown in Table 1.2. The dependent variable,

TABLE 1.2. *Self-Determination Conflicts in Chechnya, Punjab, and Québec*

	Collective Action Based on Conflict of Interest	Violent Conflict
Chechnya	Emergence of nationalist movement in the late 1980s. The Chechen government declares independence in 1991.	Violent from 1994 to 1996 and from 1999 to 2007. Still some violence today.
Punjab	Emergence of an opposition movement (Punjabi *Suba* movement), spearheaded by the Akali Dal, which calls for a Punjabi-speaking state of Punjab in the Indian union in the 1960s. Such a state is created in 1966. Akali Dal calls for greater autonomy for Punjab from 1973, while militant groups call for independence from 1986. The Akali Dal and more separatist groups still exist today but do not actively pursue greater autonomy.	No violence in the Punjabi *Suba* movements in the 1960s, but violence from 1984 to 1993, particularly between 1989 and 1992.
Québec	The "sovereignty movement" calls for sovereignty-association from the 1960s.	With the exception of the October Crisis of 1970, no major violent incidents.

self-determination conflict, is about collective action around conflict of interest, which can manifest itself in opposition short of violent conflict and can exhibit different degrees of demands on the state (from autonomy to independence), as well as whether the conflict turns violent. The purpose of the case studies is not to test competing hypotheses against each other, which is what the large-*n* part of the study seeks to do, but to assess the dynamics that underpin the proposed hypotheses about the ways in which institutional and societal traits interact. The cases exhibit variation on both aspects of the dependent variable: a case of violent conflict in pursuit of independence in Chechnya, a case of on-and-off violent conflict and oppositional mobilization in pursuit of greater autonomy and independence in Punjab, and a case of nonviolent conflict in pursuit of independence in Québec.[31] Such variation allows me to consider the nuances of how societal traits and institutions interact. To consider the book's findings in a wider comparative perspective, in the concluding chapter, I also examine self-determination struggles elsewhere.

[31] According to King et al. (1994, 147–149), who generally advise against selecting cases on the dependent variable, doing so is acceptable as long as the cases display variation on the outcome to be explained.

Another case selection concern was feasibility of collecting data. Data availability is a consideration for any research project, but it is perhaps even more so when the outcome is violent conflict. There is a significant body of literature on each of the conflicts chosen for this study. Moreover, both Québec and Punjab were feasible cases in terms of going there. I did my research on the Chechen case based on secondary sources, newspaper accounts, and fieldwork in Moscow but not in Chechnya. When in Québec in late summer and fall of 2005, I interviewed a number of "sovereigntists" (many of whom were or had been representatives or officials of the Parti Québécois or other sovereignty organizations), as well as a few members of the current provincial cabinet and representatives of Québec's Liberal party (which favors greater autonomy for Québec but not independence) and union representatives (the unions have typically played a key role in the sovereignty movement). Québec's quest for sovereignty has also generated a wealth of public opinion research, most of which is publicly available. Thus, data on the sovereignty movement in Québec are readily available. The fall of 2005 was a hot time for doing research on the sovereignty movement in Québec, as the Parti Québécois was holding its first leadership election since 1985, and the support for sovereignty had surged.

Punjab was plagued by violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but life in the region is today more or less back to "normal." The conflict officially came to an end in 1993, after a highly efficient (and, many would argue, brutal) counterinsurgency campaign of weeding out militants, but there are still lingering concerns. For starters, the counterinsurgency campaign itself created new grievances among the population in Punjab, and a number of human rights organizations, some of them with alleged ties to former militant groups, have been fighting for justice. Moreover, the central government in Delhi is still not comfortable with anyone raising demands for a separate Sikh state, Khalistan, even though the support for such a state is not – and never was – widespread. In March 2006, for example, the Punjab police arrested a handful of well-known (former) militants for making "antinational" statements in a TV talk show, where they raised the prospects of Khalistan.[32] Indeed, in June 2007, it was reported that one of these former militants was again "registered" by the police for making pro-Khalistan slogans in a protest march.[33] When in India – where I split my time among Delhi, Punjab's holy city of Amritsar, and Punjab's state capital, Chandigarh, which is shared with the neighboring state Haryana – I met with local scholars, many of whom had lived in Punjab during the violence of the 1980s and who helped guide me to already-published material on the "Punjab crisis." These meetings made me aware of the wealth

[32] See "Police for Check on Anti-National Telecasts," *The Tribune* (Chandigarh), March 9, 2006.
[33] See "Punjab Police Book Daljit Singh Bittu in Sedition Case," *Punjab Newsline*, June 3, 2007, available at http://www.punjabnewsline.com/content/view/4369/38 (last accessed September 11, 2009).

of local scholarship on the conflict, much of it based on personal observations. In addition, I met with journalists who covered and still cover Punjab, human rights activists, and a few representatives of the Akali Dal, as well as former and current officials in the state and federal government. I did not meet with any former militants. Indeed, many of the militants were killed in the counter-insurgency campaign. Thus, to learn more about the militants' perspectives, I used secondary sources of interviews with militants, their families, or fellow villagers.

At the time when I was conducting research in Russia, in spring 2005, going to Chechnya was not a safe option. Nonetheless, I decided to include Chechnya as one of my cases, as its bloody and long-lasting nature makes it an intrinsically important case. Although I could not meet with Chechens in Chechnya, I interviewed two Chechen politicians visiting or living in Moscow. I also met with members of the Chechen community in Moscow, most of whom had left Chechnya due to the war and now lived in rather poor conditions. While people who have left Chechnya are likely to have a different view on the conflict than those staying behind, these meetings gave me a firsthand impression of the perceptions of people who lived in Chechnya but were not actively involved in the conflict that broke out in 1994. At least in English-language scholarly works, these voices are rarely heard (an exception is Tishkov 2004). Academics at the Institute of Ethnography and Anthropology and at the Institute of Geography at the Russian Academy of Sciences, which house some of Russia's foremost scholars on Chechnya and the North Caucasus, gave me guidance as to literature on Chechnya. In addition, I met with human rights organizations working on Chechnya, and I interviewed public officials and policy makers in the federal government who had been involved in decisions regarding Chechnya and matters relating to my variables of interest, particularly intergovernmental fiscal relations.

In Québec, I had the opportunity to make sure I interviewed both younger and older representatives of the Parti Québécois, hard-liners and soft-liners, men and women, although my sample of respondents is not random and representative. In researching the Chechen and Punjab cases, I did not have the opportunity to carry out as many formal interviews and have as diverse a representation. In all cases, I followed a snowball sample strategy, which introduces numerous biases, so I do not use my fieldwork materials to make general claims. Rather, combined with secondary sources, public opinion surveys, newspaper articles, and historical documents, I use my meetings and interviews to gain a fuller understanding of each case, particularly how people in these three regions have perceived their situation.

The primary purpose of the case studies is to examine the argument developed in this chapter, but I also allow for the case studies to challenge some of my original thinking. Thus, in the final chapter, Chapter 6, I revisit the argument outlined in the preceding pages. I situate my findings in the context of a wide range of past and present self-determination struggles across the world

and discuss implications for ongoing debates about the merits of decentralization in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. I then suggest ways in which the research conducted in this book points to new avenues for research. In particular, scholars examining how decentralization can help restore peace in postwar states might benefit from further considering the effects of intraregional divisions and the legacy of wartime institutions.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY TO ACADEMIC DEBATES

Why are some states better able to avoid intrastate conflict than others? In particular, why are some states able to maintain peaceful relations with minority groups within their borders, while others are characterized by violent struggles? These are the broad questions motivating this study, reflecting questions that are central to contemporary policy and academic debates. Indeed, given the rise in intrastate conflicts for much of the post–World War II era, both policy makers and scholars have tried to figure out what kind of institutional fixes can be implemented before a conflict turns violent, or in the aftermath of violent struggles as a long-term state-building strategy for preserving peace.[34] Decentralization, including federalism and regional autonomy arrangements, has come to be considered a promising means for governing divided societies and containing conflicts between central governments and regional minority groups in pursuit of greater autonomy or independence.

As a consequence, the relationship between decentralized governance and intrastate conflicts has emerged as a dynamic research program, drawing on literatures in comparative politics, international relations, sociology, and economics. Yet as this chapter has shown, the literature gives decentralization mixed reviews. While some scholars applaud such measures as a compromise that can please both central governments and their subnational challengers, others see the very same institutions as a slippery slope toward conflict, even state disintegration. The problem is that this dichotomous view does not shed much light on the divergent record of conflict across and within decentralized states. In response, scholars have begun to examine the conditions under which decentralization can and cannot help preserve peace. In this book, I hope to bring this literature forward by considering how the peace-preserving effects of

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[34] More immediate strategies for restoring stability and peace in conflict-ridden societies include third-party intervention, mediation, and monitoring of any agreements reached (e.g., Zartman 1995; Regan 2002; Walter 2002; Fortna 2004; Autesserre 2009; Beardsley 2010; Clayton 2013); the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs (e.g., Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Zyck 2009); and strategies for dealing with replacement and refugees (e.g., Lischer 2008; Tuathail et al. 2009). Long-term strategies also include programs and institution-building aimed at economic reconstruction (e.g., Paris 2004; Collier 2009) and social reconciliation (e.g., Hewstone and Greenland 2000; Sikkink and Walling 2007; Kelman 2008; Maoz 2011).

decentralized institutions are conditional on traits of the societies these institutions (are meant to) govern. By emphasizing how institutions and societal traits *jointly* shape self-determination conflicts, the argument presented in this chapter overcomes the indeterminacy in the cure/curse debate and enables analysis of variation both across and within decentralized states.

The book takes three steps to advance the literature. First, building on insights from the literature on self-determination conflicts, I argue that a society's ethnic makeup and distribution of wealth enable the very same institutions to have diverging effects. That is, in contrast to most existing large-*n* studies that have examined the relationship between decentralization and intrastate conflict (e.g., Cohen 1997; Hechter 2000; Saideman et al. 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003, 2005; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009), this book suggests that such institutions cannot be analyzed in isolation from their societal context. Amoretti and Bermeo (2004) and Weller and Nobbs (2010) set the stage for such a research agenda, but these edited volumes fall short of systematically testing decentralization and autonomy arrangements' divergent peace-preserving effect. Others, though, have begun to systematically examine such conditional effects. Yet while Sambanis and Milanovic (2004) analyze how regional wealth affects the demand for autonomy, Hale (2004a) and Christin and Hug (2012) show that ethnic demographics affect the chance of conflict or federal disintegration, Brancati (2006, 2009) argues that the peace-preserving effect of decentralization depends on the political party system, and Deiwiks and colleagues (2012) examine whether marginalized ethnic groups have access to political institutions, this book considers how *different* societal traits and *different* dimensions of decentralization interact.

Second, building on insights from the comparative literature on decentralization and federalism, the book disaggregates decentralization, recognizing that policy, fiscal, and political decentralization may affect the chance of conflict in a society in different ways. This stands in contrast to studies that make claims about decentralization, federalism, or autonomy arrangements more generally (e.g., Roeder 1991; Brubaker 1996; Bunce 1999; Snyder 2000; Stepan 2001; Bermeo 2002; Hale 2004; Bunce and Watts 2005), as well as large-*n* studies that examine whether a state is decentralized or a group has some, little, or no autonomy (e.g., Cohen 1997; Saideman et al. 2002; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; Siroky and Cuffe 2015). These studies have all shown that our understanding of armed conflict or conflict recurrence benefits from considering the role of decentralization. But decentralized states vary a great deal. No one decentralized state has the same amount of region-level autonomy as another, which means that a dichotomous (or trichotomous) variable approach provides relatively little information about the effects of specific institutional designs. Nor can we assume that any one state will score similarly when looking at different dimensions of decentralization, and we also know that there is often variation across regions. Hence, in order to be able to assess

the effects of various institutional setups, disaggregating what decentralization means is an important step.

Third, the book combines quantitative and qualitative and national-level and regional-level analyses, allowing me to pay attention to both correlations and causal processes, as well as allowing the empirics to reveal new insights (cf. George and Bennett 2004). Empirical studies of decentralization's effect on intrastate conflicts have primarily consisted of large-*n* analysis either cross-nationally (Saideman et al. 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Brancati 2006; Christin and Hug 2012) or within the same country (Treisman 1997; Hale 2000) or (comparative) case studies (Hanson 1998; Bunce 1999; Aalen 2002; Cornell 2002; Suberu 2001, 2004; Amoretti and Bermeo 2004; Hale 2004; Van Houten 2004; Alemán and Treisman 2005; Ahuja and Varshney 2005; Bunce and Watts 2005; Kefale 2009; Weller and Nobbs 2010). Few studies have combined large-*n* analysis with in-depth comparative case studies (from different parts of the world; but see Roeder 2007; Brancati 2009). This book aims to systematically test correlations and piece out the causal processes of a number of conditional hypotheses across different states and regions in different states, giving me comparative leverage. I find, for instance, that even in cases that, at first glance, may seem as different as Punjab and Québec, concerns about the central government's ability to bypass the provincial governments through its spending power are remarkably similar. A promising further step in this research agenda is studies that examine the effects of decentralization across a large number of subnational units (Deiwiks et al. 2012) or groups (Siroky and Cuffe 2015; Cederman et al. 2015), and the ideal research design is to accompany the move to statistical analysis at the level of regions with disaggregated measures of the different dimensions of decentralization.

In finding that decentralization matters – though not in uniform ways – for the very prospects of peace in a society, the book provides incentives to further theoretical and empirical specification of the role of domestic political institutions in conflict studies. Although research on intrastate conflicts has near exploded since the end of the Cold War, it has taken time for large-*n* studies to examine the role of institutions and domestic politics. Indeed, the one institutional variable that has been consistently considered in this literature is regime type (e.g., Hegre et al. 2001), but researchers have begun to introduce variables such as decentralization and electoral rules (Saideman et al. 2002, 2003, 2006), particularly in statistical studies of power sharing in post-conflict societies (e.g., Walter 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003, 2005; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; Binningsbø 2011). The relatively recent entry of such institutional variables in the large-*n*–driven conflict literature is somewhat curious given the vast comparative politics and sociological literatures on revolutions and political violence, which long have highlighted the role of the state and its institutions (e.g., Huntington 1968; Skocpol 1979; Goodwin 2001). Consistent with these literatures and the emerging literature

on institution building in postconflict states, this book underscores the importance of bringing the state into studies of violent conflict (see Cederman et al. 2010; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). But the book goes beyond that and shows the importance of focusing on how states are embedded in the societies they govern (Kohli 1991; Migdal et al. 1994; Evans 1995; Migdal 2001). The peace-preserving effect of institutions governing center-region relations is shaped by the distribution of wealth and ethnic diversity in a society – and that peace-preserving effect may in turn shape both state and society.

Beyond these academic considerations, I hope the book can provide policy guidelines for thinking about the ways in which decentralization can(not) contribute to peace in divided societies. Although decentralization has come to be considered a key component for stability in a number of internally divided and conflict-ridden states, we know little about what kind of institutional arrangement is likely to work as peace preserving under which conditions. This book aims to address such questions.

2

Divisions and Diversity in Federal States

In policy circles, decentralized governance as a means for containing conflicts in divided states has become a hotly debated topic. According to one of President Boris Yeltsin's former advisors, for example, the only way to manage a state as diverse as Russia is through some sort of federalization.[1] Others are more skeptical. With respect to Afghanistan, former president Hamid Karzai argued that federalism has the potential to fuel state disintegration.[2] As Chapter 1 shows, the scholarly review of decentralization's peace-preserving potential is mixed. Whereas some see decentralization, including federalism and autonomy arrangements, as a compromise between central governments and subnational challengers, others see the very same institutions as enhancing already existing divisions, paving the way for further conflict. This debate about the pros and cons of decentralization remains inconclusive, as both sides make reasonable theoretical claims, backed up with empirical evidence. Moreover, the empirical record of conflict in decentralized states demonstrates significant diversity, suggesting that we do not get very far by thinking about decentralization's peace-preserving effects in either/or terms.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the track record of both ethnic demonstration and self-determination/territorial violence in federal states, which are states in which decentralization is enshrined in the constitution. Over the past decades, some federations have been completely free from self-determination struggles, others have seen people mobilize and challenge the state through nonviolent means, while some have seen violent conflicts. On a 0–1 scale, the columns in the figure indicate the average country scores for (1) whether ethnic demonstrations have

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[1] Personal communication, Moscow, May 30, 2005. This chapter is a revised version of Bakke and Wibbels (2006).

[2] "Afghanistan Visit: Prime Minister's Press Conference with Hamid Karzai," Cabinet Office, London, UK, June 29, 2013, transcript available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/afghanistan-visit-prime-minister-and-hamid-karzais-speech (last accessed June 25, 2014).

FIGURE 2.1. Average Level of Ethnic Demonstration and Violent Self-Determination Conflict in Federal States, 0–1 Scale.

Notes: Not all states are federal in the entire 1978–2000 time period: Belgium is included from 1993; Ethiopia from 1994; Russia from 1992; South Africa from 1994; Spain from 1979; the USSR until 1991; Yugoslavia until 1991; and Czechoslovakia until 1992.

taken place (1985–2000) and (2) whether there has been a violent struggle in the name of self-determination or territorial control (1978–2000). I discuss these measures later in the chapter. From left to right, the countries are organized based on their average level of fiscal decentralization in the time period, from centralized to the left and decentralized to the right.

As the figure shows, not only is there no uniform record of self-determination struggles among federal states; there appears to be no optimal level of fiscal decentralization that somehow contains such conflicts. Thinking about decentralization as either "good" or "bad" for intrastate peace does not take us far in explaining these differences. Nor does such a dichotomy allow us to investigate the record of conflict within decentralized states. Russia, for instance, has had largely peaceful relations with most of its now eighty-five regions but done poorly in maintaining peace with Chechnya and a handful of others. India's violence score has been due largely to struggles in Punjab, Kashmir, and the north-eastern states, while most of the country's thirty-six states and union territories have peaceful relations with the central government in Delhi. Hence, the question that guides this book is not whether decentralization can help preserve peace but rather the conditions under which it does so.

I argue that in order to understand the conditions under which decentralization can help contain self-determination conflicts and preserve peace, scholars

and policy makers should analyze how institutional arrangements interact with underlying societal traits, in particular the distribution of wealth and ethnic concentration. While the chapters that follow focus on the regional level of analysis (qualitative studies of dynamics within Chechnya, Punjab, and Québec), this chapter tests hypotheses about the conditional effects of institutions and societal traits at the national level in a time-series, cross-sectional analysis of self-determination conflicts across twenty-two federal states. The findings support my expectation that the same institutional arrangements will not have similar effects across countries with different underlying ethnic and economic characteristics.

NATIONAL-LEVEL HYPOTHESES ABOUT DECENTRALIZATION AND CONFLICT

Following from the argument developed in Chapter 1, this chapter emphasizes interactions between policy decentralization and ethnic divisions, between the fiscal system and interregional income inequality, and between copartisanship and ethnic divisions in shaping the likelihood of conflict.[3] I restate the national-level hypotheses here:

> H1b: Cultural policy decentralization is likely to contain self-determination conflict in states where a large share of the population lives in regions where the majority of the population is a minority in the state as a whole (ethnic majority/minority regions). Cultural policy decentralization is likely to have none or the reverse effect in states where there are few or no ethnic majority/minority regions.

> H2b: Fiscal decentralization is likely to prevent self-determination conflict in states characterized by low interregional inequality. Fiscal decentralization is likely to have the reverse effect in states characterized by high interregional inequality.

> H3b: Political ties across tiers of government (copartisanship) are likely to prevent violent self-determination conflicts in a state if ethnic majority/minority regions are included in these ties (ethnic copartisanship). If there are political ties across tiers of government but ethnic majority/minority regions are excluded, copartisanship is likely to have the reverse effect.

The point here is that neither institutions nor societal traits are likely to have independent effects on self-determination struggles. While others have examined how, for example, interregional inequality shapes conflict in federal states (e.g., Deiwiks et al. 2012), the argument here emphasizes that the effects of such societal traits will be conditioned by specific institutional arrangements.

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[3] I have elsewhere examined also how ethnicity and inequality jointly may shape conflict in federal states, as well as the role of central transfers, conditional on ethnicity (Bakke and Wibbels 2006), but in this chapter the emphasis is on the hypotheses developed in Chapter 1.

DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

To test these hypotheses, I conduct a time-series, cross-sectional analysis of the incidence of peaceful and violent self-determination conflict in twenty-two federal states from 1978 to 2000. Ideally, I would test the hypotheses across all decentralized states, but given the challenges involved in collecting the necessary subnational data, I restrict the sample to federal states. Note that the purpose here is not to explain differences between federal and unitary states but variation among federal states; hence, a sample of federal states only is appropriate.

To be included, a country must have an intermediate (between local and national) level of government with nontrivial, independent powers. The cases are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, the Soviet Union, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United States, Venezuela, and the former Yugoslavia. These include the countries that scholars in the field have traditionally defined as federal based on Riker's (1964) definition and add cases (Belgium and South Africa) where constitutional reforms in the 1990s introduced federalism more recently – and, importantly, for which a reasonable time-series of data could be collected.[4] Note that not all of the states included existed as (federal) states in the entire time period analyzed. Given the timing of when they became federal states, Belgium is, thus, included from 1993, Ethiopia from 1994, South Africa from 1994, and Spain from 1979. Given the dates of their birth/death as states in the international system, Russia is included from 1992, the USSR until 1991, the former Yugoslavia until 1991, and Czechoslovakia until 1992.

In selecting the sample, I have chosen to err on the side of inclusiveness so as to maximize comparisons and approximate the universe of federal cases while avoiding arbitrary exclusion.[5] The time period covers the decades with the largest number of self-determination conflicts in the post-World War II period, as well as the decades with the largest number of intrastate conflicts since 1816, certainly since World War II (e.g., Gurr 2000a; Sarkees et al. 2003; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005; Marshall and Gurr 2005). The chapter's appendix provides sources for the data, many of which have been collected from country-specific materials.

Independent Variables

The chapter introduces a series of variables that distinctly measure decentralization (many new to the study of intrastate conflict) and interaction

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[4] See Elazar (1994); Watts (1996); Treisman (2007); Bednar (2009).

[5] The dataset builds on that collected by Rodden and Wibbels (2002) by including region-specific measures of inequality and identifying ethnic majority/minority regions, including the share of ethnic majority/minority regions governed by the party governing nationally, and adding several cases: Belgium, Ethiopia, Russia, South Africa, and the three communist countries that disintegrated in 1991 and 1992.

terms that capture the conditional relationships hypothesized. To capture the societal traits that are hypothesized to condition the effect of institutions, I use both a new measure for ethnic concentration, which indicates the share of a country's population living in ethnic majority/minority regions, and a new measure for interregional inequality. Consistent with much of the ethnic conflict literature, I use a broad definition of ethnicity based on group identities such as race, language, and religion in determining ethnic regions. I consider ethnic regions to be those in which at least half of the population belongs to an ethnic group that is a minority in the country as a whole, so-called ethnic majority/minority regions (Alemán and Treisman 2005). Several countries have regions that are commonly known as ethnic regions even though the ethnic groups in question actually make up a fairly small share of the region's population. For example, in the time period under analysis, the Russian Federation has thirty-two regions that are designated as ethnic regions, but in some of these, only a small percentage of the population belongs to the ethnic group that the region is named after. Eight of the federations in my sample do not have any ethnic regions per the majority/minority definition (Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Germany, Mexico, the United States, and Venezuela), but fourteen of them are ethnic federations. The chapter's appendix provides an overview of ethnic majority/minority regions across federal states (Appendix Table A.2.1), as well as a list of sources.[6]

To capture the interregional component of the theoretical arguments about income discrepancies, I do not use Gini coefficients, which measure inequality among households or individuals. Instead, I use regional GDP per capita data, relying on country-specific sources. For states where provincial GDP data are not available, I use either regional income data (Switzerland) or primary school enrollment data (Ethiopia and Nigeria). For each country-year, I calculate the interregional decile dispersion ratio, which measures the income of the richest 10th percentile among the regions divided by the income of the bottom 10th percentile. In other words, the income of the rich is presented as multiples of the income of the poor. The higher the score, the higher the level of interregional inequality. In the sample, the mean value is about 2.4, while the minimum is 1.12 and the maximum is 5.46. While I have gone to great lengths to collect annual region-level data on wealth over time, there are still some missing observations.[7] Although, as my data show, regional-level wealth and interregional inequality do vary over time (cf. Milanovic 2005), there is also reason to believe that major changes do

[6] I would like to thank Henry Hale for a detailed e-mail of the sources he used to determine ethnic federations from nonethnic federations in Hale (2004a). Note that census questions in Nigeria are highly disputed. I relied on Nigeria expert Rotimi Suberu's (2001, 2004) classification of which ethnic and religious groups dominate in the different states.

[7] To assess the effect of region-level wealth on conflict across regions in federal states, Deiwiks and colleagues (2012) use 1990 measures of wealth for the entire 1991–2005 period.

not happen rapidly.[8] I have, therefore, used the data available to estimate the missing observations.[9] Given this measure, countries that in the time period studied have, on average, higher levels of interregional inequality than the sample mean are, in descending order, Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Russia, South Africa, USSR, the former Yugoslavia, and Malaysia. The countries with smallest income discrepancy among regions are Czechoslovakia, Australia, and the United States.

To assess the first hypothesis, I construct a variable that assesses whether the responsibility for primary and secondary education is decentralized (either local or regional), shared between the center and the regions, or centralized. The data for this measure come from country-specific sources, which are listed in the appendix. For regionally concentrated ethnic minority groups who want to protect and promote their cultural distinctiveness, decentralized education is important, as it provides them with a degree of autonomy over what children are taught in schools. I interact this indicator with the indicator for ethnic concentration described earlier (i.e., create a multiplicative term), expecting decentralized education to diminish the likelihood of conflict in countries in which a large share of the population lives in ethnic majority/minority regions.

The variable for decentralization of education is constructed as a three-point scale, where 1 denotes that education is a central responsibility, 2 denotes that it is a shared responsibility, and 3 denotes that it is decentralized. The average across my sample is 2.15, and the median is 2. For a few countries – Austria, Malaysia, USSR, and Venezuela – education is a central responsibility across all years. In Argentina and Mexico, there was a move from a highly centralized to decentralized system (in 1992 and 1998, respectively). In socialist Czechoslovakia, education was a shared responsibility, in the sense that the constitution included ideological guidelines, but these were in effect abolished from 1990, making education a decentralized responsibility (Svecová 1994). For quite a few countries, education is consistently a regional or local-level

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[8] For a review of the economics literature on growth models, including debates on the concentration of economic activity, see Easterly and Levine (2001). On the persistence of horizontal inequalities, see Stewart and Langer (2007).

[9] For countries for which I have measures for intermittent years, I use those years to interpolate the missing years in between. For countries for which the available time series ends before the end point for the country's inclusion in the dataset, I use the measure for last year available for the remaining years – for example, I use Yugoslavia's measure for 1989 for 1990 and 1991; the same goes when data are missing for the first couple of years of the country's inclusion in the dataset. Although this is an imperfect strategy compared to the ideal scenario of having all available data, it is a better option than the alternative strategy, which is to drop from the analysis all country-years with missing observations. Indeed, to the degree that the most conflict-prone years are the ones most likely to have missing data, dropping those years is problematic. I have data for interregional inequality for 314 out of a total of 418 country-year observations; of the missing country-years, 11 are years with violent conflict, which is a substantial share of the 54 country-years with violent conflict in the dataset.

responsibility, as in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, India, Switzerland, and the United States. In only one case, Nigeria, does the trend in the time period studied go from greater to less decentralization. For a few years between 1988 and 1993, education in Nigeria went back and forth between being a decentralized and shared responsibility, and from 1993 it was a shared responsibility (Gershberg and Winkler 2003). Thus we see diversity both across cases and over time.

For the second hypothesis, I measure fiscal decentralization as the share of total public-sector spending that is conducted at the regional level. Figure 2.2 shows the average level of fiscal decentralization for each country in the sample. Expanding on the data collected by Rodden and Wibbels (2002), I rely on the IMF's *Government Finance Statistics* (*GFS*) for some of this data but note, as they advise, that this source does not report data for many of my cases and mischaracterizes the fiscal system in others.[10] In these latter cases, as well as for cases not covered by the IMF's *GFS*, the measure for fiscal decentralization is based on national sources. To assess the hypothesis, the measure of fiscal decentralization is interacted with the interregional inequality measure described earlier. I lag the measure of fiscal decentralization, as I do not expect such institutions to have an immediate effect on the incidence of conflict. Figure 2.2 is an overview of the sample, but it masks the variation over time that is captured in the analysis. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Spain, the United States, and Venezuela became more decentralized from 1978 to 2000, as did the former Yugoslavia in the final years of its existence. Others, Canada for example, remained stable. As the figure reveals, per Soviet budget data, the union republics of the USSR had significant expenditure responsibilities. However, as I discuss in Chapter 3, this high level of fiscal decentralization was in some ways offset by central directives, which meant that the union republics could not necessarily freely make decisions on decentralized expenditure responsibilities. I address this caveat in the analysis below.

For the third hypothesis concerning copartisanship, I use data on national and regional election results to construct a variable that measures the share of regional governments controlled by the nationally governing party or coalition. For both the federal and regional levels of government, the ruling party or coalition is the party of the chief executive. This indicator is designed to assess the argument that inclusive governing parties or coalitions, copartisanship, promote smooth intergovernmental bargaining better than narrow governing parties or coalitions. In order to test whether ethnic copartisanship has a peace-preserving effect, I construct a measure that captures the share of the ethnic majority/minority regions ruled by the same party or coalition that rules

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[10] The IMF counts automatic transfers from national taxes to regional governments as revenue raised by the regions themselves for several of the cases (including Germany, Mexico, and Argentina) and as revenue to the central government (Rodden and Wibbels 2002).

FIGURE 2.2. Average Level of Fiscal Decentralization in Federal States, 1978–2000.
Notes: Not all states are federal in the entire 1978–2000 time period: Belgium is included from 1993; Ethiopia from 1994; Russia from 1991; South Africa from 1994; Spain from 1979; the USSR until 1990; Yugoslavia until 1991; and Czechoslovakia until 1992.

at the national level. If it is, for example, coded 0.5 for any given year, it means that half of the ethnic regions are copartisans of the center, while half are nonallied with the center. I interact this variable with the indicator for overall copartisanship, and I expect that governing parties or coalitions that exclude ethnic regions will exacerbate conflict.

The copartisanship measure expands on Rodden and Wibbels (2002), but a few notes on coding are in order. First, for country-years in one-party or authoritarian states, such as Malaysia and the Soviet Union, the copartisan variable is coded as 1, to capture a high level of central control of the regions. Second, due to particularities of the party system in Ethiopia,[11] Russia,[12] and

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[11] Since Ethiopia became a federal state in 1994, it has in many ways functioned as a one-party state, where many of the parties governing in the regions are either officially constituent parts of the ruling EPRDF or affiliates of the EPRDF (Aalen 2002). Thus regions that look like they are ruled by opposition parties are actually ruled by parties that are affiliated with, even established by, the EPRDF.

[12] For post-Soviet Russia, there is a growing literature on the weakness of political parties, and one could object that an argument about copartisanship makes little sense in the Russian context. Indeed, neither governors nor presidents are necessarily formally representing a political party (e.g., Golosov 2004; Hale 2006), which Filippov and colleagues (2004) consider to be a key factor for federal instability in post-Soviet Russia. Nonetheless, by consulting a number of sources on the Russian regional elections, I have compiled data for the regional executives' party affiliation. Even with less formal party affiliation, there are still benefits for the regional executives to support or be supported by the nationally governing party, such as media exposure, expertise, and financial aid (Orttung 2000) – all of which are the kind of incentives that would make the

Switzerland,[13] I had to take special considerations when assessing the degree of copartisanship. In federations without ethnic majority/minority regions, such as Austria and the United States, the ethnic copartisanship variable is coded as 1, to capture the fact that no regions can possibly be excluded from the nationally governing party or coalition based on ethnicity. Although it may appear intuitive to code ethnic copartisanship as 0 in federations without ethnic regions, such a score would mistakenly equate nonethnic federations with ethnic federations that exclude its ethnic regions. Instead, by coding ethnic copartisanship as 1 for federations without ethnic regions, I equate nonethnic federations – where no region can possibly be excluded based on ethnicity – with ethnic federations that do not exclude ethnic regions.

The indicators for copartisanship range from 0 to 1. In the sample, the average level of copartisanship is 0.65. Not surprisingly, in the socialist cases – Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia – the average level for both general and ethnic copartisanship in the time period studied is higher than the average. The same goes for states that are or have gone through periods of nondemocratic rule or are one-party states, including Ethiopia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Pakistan. But also democratic states, such as post-1994 South Africa and Switzerland, display a much higher-than-average score for copartisanship. In India and Russia, which both are multiethnic federations that have faced numerous subnational challengers, the average level of copartisanship in the time period studied – 0.53 and 0.59, respectively – is lower than average but still encompasses many regions in many years. Notably, in both countries, the average level of copartisanship among the ethnic majority/minority regions is lower than general copartisanship – 0.46 in India and 0.39 in Russia.

I also consider several alternative explanations expected to influence conflict in federal states. First, I include a measure for the economic strength of

party system the mechanism that holds a federation together. As for the coding, a region was considered copartisan of the center if the regional executive (1) was appointed by Yeltsin or if there had been no election in the region yet (this applies mainly to the period between 1992 and 1996); (2) had been a Yeltsin appointee and then won the subsequent election, unless there were reports that that appointee had become anti-Yeltsin; (3) was supported by, member of, or affiliated with the party-of-power Our Home is Russia (and Our Home is Russia only) between 1995 and 1999; and (4) supported the party-of-power Unity (and Unity only) immediately prior to the 2000 presidential elections.

[13] Because of Switzerland's unusual executive power, where neither the national nor regional executives are embodied in one person but in a collegial body of seven persons at the national level and collegial bodies of five to nine members at the regional level, I code copartisanship as follows: In each region (canton), I considered the number of executive members who were from the four parties that have been represented in the national executive since 1959; if all members of a region's executive body were from one, two, three, or four of the parties in the national executive, it was coded as 1. If one of the members of the canton's executive body was from any of the parties represented in the national executive, the measure for copartisanship was "one over total number of seats in the provincial executive," and so on. The yearly number in the dataset is the average for all the ethnic regions in that year.

the state, measured as real per-capita income (in 1985 U.S. dollars, lagged).[14] Bermeo (2002) finds that in comparison to unitary states, federations are more likely to be peace preserving if they are economically developed. Fearon and Laitin (2003) see GDP per capita as an indicator of state strength, arguing that stronger states are more likely to have the financial, administrative, military, and police capacities needed to capture and destroy potential violent challengers. I would expect this to be particularly important in decentralized states, where the central government has given up some authority to regional actors.[15] For the same reason, I include a variable indicating the size of the country's population (logged). Second, I include a dummy variable for whether the state's revenues derive primarily from oil exports. Not only are oil exporters prone to have a weaker state apparatus (ibid.); primary commodity exports represent an attractive target for nascent opposition movements and can, thus, fuel conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Although oil resources are linked to conflict across all states, there is reason to believe that decentralized states in particular may experience conflict over such resources, especially if the oil is concentrated in a few regions and the central government seeks to redistribute the revenues generated from such resources (Suberu 2001, 2004). Moreover, Treisman (1997) has suggested that in Russia in the early 1990s, oil-rich regions were in a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the central government than regions without such natural resources, and they were, thus, more likely to be assertive in their demands to the central government. Third, given Gurr's (2000a) argument that democracies are less likely than authoritarian states to experience political violence (see also Hegre et al. 2001), I control for democracy using the lagged Polity IV regime index for democracy minus autocracy score. Authors such as Brancati (2006) and Bermeo (2002) have argued that decentralization may be meaningful only in democracies; hence, it is of particular importance to control for democracy across a sample that includes both democratic and nondemocratic states. To account for previous conflict, I include the lagged dependent variable.

The relatively small number of observations underscores the need for parsimony in the models and precludes a "garbage can" approach to independent variables. Indeed, Clarke (2005) warns against including a large number of control variables out of concern for omitted variable bias. Thus, while the conflict literature suggests a longer roster of alternative explanations, I consider only the alternative explanations particularly likely to affect conflict in federal states.

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[14] Control variables from Fearon and Laitin (2003), supplemented with data from Penn World Tables, Polity IV (Marshall et al. 2014), and country sources.

[15] Collier and Hoeffler (2004) see the same indicator as measuring how poor or rich a certain state is, and they find that richer states are less likely to experience conflict than poor ones. Again, I would think that wealth may be of particular importance in federations, at least if the central government is to engage in redistribution among the regions.

The Dependent Variable

The purpose in this chapter is to assess how policy decentralization, fiscal decentralization, and political party ties across tiers of government interact with interregional inequality and ethnic concentration to affect the incidence of self-determination conflict within a state. I employ two dichotomous measures for the dependent variable: the first measure aims to capture whether there is collective action short of violent conflict in the name of self-determination, and the second captures whether the country is experiencing violent struggle(s) over self-determination or territory in any given year. My expectation is that fiscal and policy decentralization is likely to affect self-determination demands but not necessarily violence (although it could), while copartisanship will more directly affect whether such conflicts end up as violent struggles. Figure 2.1 shows the average conflict score for each country in the time period covered in the analysis.

To capture collective action in the name of self-determination short of violence, I rely on the Minorities at Risk (MAR) protest data (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).[16] For each country-year, I consult the MAR record of the protest behavior of ethno-political groups likely to be raising self-determination demands – groups defined as ethno-nationalist, indigenous, communal contenders, religious sects, and national minorities – and report the highest level of protest activity in that year. The scale captures no protest (0), verbal oppression (1), symbolic resistance (2), small demonstration of less than 10,000 (3), medium demonstration of less than 100,000 (4), and large demonstration greater than 100,000 (5). I transform this into a dichotomous variable, where the cutoff point is whether there is collective action along the lines of small to large demonstration (i.e., MAR categories 0, 1, and 2 are coded as 0 and categories 3, 4, and 5 as 1). Because the MAR protest data are not only about groups calling for self-determination, some of the protest activity captured in the data is about demands concerning protection of rights short of autonomy.[17] That said, when checking the list of groups engaged in demonstrations, as outlined in Appendix Table A.2.2, against Marshall and Gurr's (2005) list of self-determination movements, Cunningham's (2011) data on self-determination factions, Hewitt and Cheetham's (2000) *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*, and the MAR profiles for the different groups,[18]

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[16] Groups included in the MAR data are ethno-political groups deemed to be "at risk" because they collectively suffer or benefit from systematic discrimination and form the basis for political mobilization. For more on criteria on inclusion in the data and the different kinds of groups categorized, see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/definition.asp (last accessed June 25, 2014).

[17] My measure excludes protest by groups categorized as ethno-class in the MAR data, such as African Americans in the United States; Turks in Germany; the Roma in Russia, Spain, and Yugoslavia; Jews in Argentina and the USSR; foreign nationals in Switzerland; and Blacks in Venezuela. These are groups that form a distinct social or economic stratum, and their grievances are likely to be more generally about ethnic-based discrimination than self-determination.

[18] For MAR profiles, see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp (last accessed June 25, 2014).

the measure for ethnic demonstration is a reasonable operationalization of collective action/oppositional mobilization in the name of self-determination across the states in my sample. The MAR protest data are available annually from 1985 only. There are no annual data for the USSR and Czechoslovakia, nor for all groups in Yugoslavia. Rather than dropping these cases, I gathered data for the USSR based on Beissinger (2002), whose detailed event data can be recoded to capture annual protest scores on the MAR scale.[19] I code Czechoslovakia based on news reports (via Lexis-Nexis) of protest activities of the Slovak and Hungarian minorities in the state.[20] For Yugoslavia, there are no annual data for the protest behavior of the Croats and Slovenes, but this does not matter for the coding of the variable in the analysis, as the Kosovo Albanians are engaged in protest the entire time; hence the country scores 1 in the entire time period.

To capture violent self-determination struggles, I rely on two sources of data: the University of Maryland Center for International Development and Conflict Management's (CIDCM) data on violent self-determination conflicts (Marshall and Gurr 2005) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) dataset on armed conflicts (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005). I also consult the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia entries and the MAR profiles of the groups in question, as well as secondary sources.[21] If there are reports that in any given year there is a violent self-determination struggle (CIDCM) or an armed struggle over territorial control (UCDP), I code the variable as 1. In most cases, the CIDCM and UCDP agree, although in a few cases, CIDCM's data show a longer time period for the violent conflict. Generally, I stick to the time period denoted in the UCDP dataset, given that they have a clear operational definition of when a conflict counts as violent (twenty-five battle-related deaths). In some cases, I consult secondary sources to clarify timing and death toll. Appendix Table A.2.2 provides detailed information.

In a few cases, my coding of violent conflict differs from that of CIDCM and/or the UCDP armed conflict dataset. In Mexico, I code the 1994 Chiapas rebellion as a violent self-determination incident, even though the UCDP data consider this as a conflict over central government rather than territorial control. However, this violent conflict was closely tied up with self-determination for the Chiapas region. In early 1994, indigenous groups organized under the umbrella of the Zapatista National Liberation Army took control over areas in the Chiapas region of southern Mexico, demanding economic and social

[19] Available at http://www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin/research1.htm#Data (downloaded September 13, 2009).
[20] MAR identifies these as ethno-political groups but does not provide annual data on their actions. Note that while 1989 was a year of protest in Czechoslovakia, specifically ethnic protests in that year appear to have been overshadowed by the Velvet Revolution, while 1988 and the years 1990 through 1992 witnessed more specific ethnic protests.
[21] For the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, see http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php (last accessed June 25, 2014).

change for the region – and calling for the president to step down. More than 100 people died in fighting with the Mexican army.

In the case of Nigeria, Marshall and Gurr (2005) note that there were low-level hostilities in the Niger Delta due to the Ijaw's demands for self-determination since 1995. I code this struggle as violent only in 1997, 1998, and 1999, based on the UCDP coding of the conflict and Ukiwo's (2007) account of the conflict. While the violence looked more like clashes between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri (indeed, UCDP considers this to be a case of nonstate violence), Ukiwo (2007) suggests that the interethnic violence was closely tied up with the Ijaw considering the Itsekiri to be on the government side, against Ijaw local authority. Similarly, in 1998, the Ijawi clashed with the Urhobo over local government control, resulting in some thirty fatalities.

In Pakistan, I consider the violent conflict between the central government and the Mohajir People's Movement (MQM) in 1990 and 1995–1996 as a self-determination conflict, even though it is not noted as such by CIDCM and, for these years, coded as a conflict over central government control by UCDP. However, as both the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia entry on the conflict and the MAR profile of the group in question indicate, the conflict emerged as a fight for the rights of the Mohajir group within the Pakistani system. Concentrated in Sindh province, the demands of the MQM included the division of Sindh to create a separate Mohajir-dominated province.

In Russia, which is included as an independent Soviet successor state since 1992, Marshall and Gurr (2005) categorize the Chechen self-determination struggle as an armed self-determination struggle in the entire time period covered in my dataset. However, based on UCDP and secondary sources, I do not code this conflict as having significant self-determination violence in 1992–1993 and 1997–1998. In contrast, in the case of the USSR, which is included through 1991, I do follow Marshall and Gurr's (2005) categorization of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as violent from 1988 (and not just in 1991, as coded by the UCDP dataset on armed conflict), given Zürcher's account of the conflict (2007, 157–171).

In the case of Spain, Marshall and Gurr (2005) categorize the Basque struggle as an armed self-determination struggle in the entire time period covered in my dataset. However, the struggle has gone through violent ups and downs, which is captured in the UCDP coding of the case followed here.

ESTIMATION PROCEDURES AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

To investigate the effects of the independent variables on the two measures for self-determination conflict, I run logit regressions. The results are reported in Table 2.1, with robust standard errors defined as clustering on the cross-sections. In each model, I include the variables for the alternative explanations, as well as three interactive terms and their constitutive variables to assess the role of the conditional hypotheses. I also introduce the interaction terms one by one,

shown in Appendix Table A.2.3, and the sign and significance of the interaction terms are consistent with the full models. Given complications associated with interpreting the results of models with interaction terms (more in what follows), I use the results to generate graphical representations of the predicted impact of the interaction variables on self-determination conflict. The results lend support to several of the conditional hypotheses. After a brief discussion of the controls, I focus on the chapter's major hypotheses and illustrate the dynamics of these interactions.

Turning first to the nonfederal variables' impact, I find that countries with large population size are more prone to experience self-determination struggles than those with smaller populations. It is to be expected that countries with larger populations are more conflict prone than smaller countries, simply because it is harder for the central government to control a large population and there is more potential for grievances. The effect of GDP per capita also goes in the expected direction – the wealthier the country, the less likely it is to experience self-determination conflict – but the coefficient is not statistically significant for violent conflict.[22] As for regime type, the results reveal that contrary to findings in many large-*n* studies of intrastate conflict, democracy has no significant effect on the incidence of violent self-determination conflict in federal states. Given the diverse range of federal countries that have experienced violent self-determination struggles, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, these no-findings for GDP per capita and democracy's effect on violent conflict are perhaps not surprising. Contrary to the literature linking natural resources to separatism, I find that oil-exporting federations are less prone to experience self-determination violence than those without such natural riches. This is most likely a function of the fact that some of the oil-exporting countries in the sample – Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela – evince relatively low or nonexistent levels of violent self-determination conflict. The only oil-exporting country with significant violent conflict in the sample is Russia, and the rather conflict-prone India and Ethiopia are not oil exporters. Not surprisingly, previous conflict is associated with present conflict.

In terms of the distinctly federal variables' relationship to violent conflict, the statistical significance of the interaction terms in Table 2.1 lends some support to hypotheses discussed. I see preliminary evidence that the interaction term "fiscal decentralization × interregional inequality" has a positive and statistically significant effect on violent self-determination conflict; the more fiscally decentralized a country is and the higher the country's interregional inequality, the higher the chance of conflict occurrence. The interaction term does not, as I would have expected, have any significant effect on nonviolent protest. As expected, the interaction term "ethnic regional concentration × decentralized education" has a

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[22] In some of the reduced models that introduce the interaction terms one by one, as shown in Appendix Table A.2.3, the effect of GDP per capita is statistically significant (in a negative direction), but the effect of the control variables otherwise remains the same as in the full model.

TABLE 2.1. *Explaining Self-Determination Conflict in Federal States*

	Model 1 Ethnic Demonstration	Model 2 SD/Territorial Violence
Controls		
Per capita GDP (lag)	−0.156**	−0.156
	(0.071)	(0.102)
Oil	0.684	−1.704***
	(0.670)	(0.600)
Population (log)	0.574**	1.831***
	(0.238)	(0.243)
Democracy (lag)	0.078	−0.075
	(0.052)	(0.069)
Lagged DV	1.904***	2.707***
	(0.455)	(0.603)
Components of interaction terms		
Ethnic regional concentration	13.011***	1.366
	(4.817)	(3.393)
Interregional inequality	−0.071	−0.578
	(0.546)	(0.584)
Fiscal decentralization	5.108	−11.204**
	(4.292)	(5.089)
Decentralized education	0.287	−0.242
	(0.495)	(0.556)
Federal-regional copartisanship	−0.459	8.575***
	(3.201)	(2.952)
Ethnic federal-regional copartisanship	−2.215	−4.918
	(1.765)	(4.177)
Interaction terms		
Fiscal decentralization × Interregional inequality	−1.138 (1.638)	5.527** (2.198)
Ethnic regional concentration × Decentralized education	−5.649*** (2.085)	−0.327 (1.799)
Copartisanship × Ethnic copartisanship	0.400	−4.818
	(3.247)	(4.480)
Constant	−5.712*	−22.110***
	(3.235)	(3.883)
N =	287	404
Pseudo *R* squared	0.4163	0.7120

Notes: The estimations are the result of logit regressions (in STATA 10). The table reports coefficients and, in parentheses, standard errors (defined as clustering on the cross-section). * indicates significant at 0.10, ** indicates significant at 0.05, and *** indicates significant at 0.01.

negative and statistically significant effect on ethnic demonstrations, but it has no bearing on violent conflict. That is, the higher the share of a country's population concentrated in ethnic regions and the more decentralized the country is in the sphere of education, the lower the chance of ethnic demonstration occurrence. The interaction "copartisanship × ethnic copartisanship" has an expected negative impact on violent conflict, but it is not statistically significant. Yet interpreting regression output for interactive models is complicated by the conditional relationships among the variables (Franzese et al. 2001; Braumoeller 2004; Clark et al. 2006). First, the coefficients in interaction models no longer indicate the average effect of a constitutive variable as they do in an additive model. The coefficients on the constitutive terms themselves may not have substantive meaning and rarely speak directly to the interactive relationships of interest. The coefficient for fiscal decentralization, for instance, tells us the impact of a one-unit increase of fiscal decentralization when regional inequality is 0. But there are no cases in the dataset that score a 0 on regional inequality, which varies from 1.12 to 5.46. Second and relatedly, multicollinearity between constitutive and interaction variables (a byproduct of multiplicative terms) can inflate standard errors, making standard significance measures useless.[23] Standard errors of interaction coefficients may tell us little about the standard errors of the estimated effects of the interaction, which depends on the values of the constitutive terms. Thus, the nature of interactive models requires a different approach to interpreting statistical output than in standard additive models.

Therefore, I present the impact of the interactive hypotheses on conflict graphically, as conditional expectations/predicted values with accompanying confidence intervals (Franzese et al. 2001), using the Clarify software (King et al. 2000; Tomsz et al. 2001). I do so by holding one constitutive variable constant at two theoretically interesting values (high and low), interacting it across different levels of the other constitutive variable, and generating predicted values for the probability of conflict on the basis of the results reported in Table 2.1. All other variables, including the other interaction terms, are set at their mean value. Intuitively, these graphs show how the interaction of the variables impacts the incidence of self-determination conflict. For the sake of

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[23] The correlation between the interaction terms and their constituent components is as follows: For violent conflict, the correlation between the interaction "fiscal decentralization × interregional inequality" and fiscal decentralization is 0.658 and, for interregional inequality, 0.690. For "ethnic regional concentration × decentralized education" and ethnic regional concentration, the correlation is 0.942 and, for decentralized education, 0.390. For the interaction "copartisanship × ethnic copartisanship," the correlation to copartisanship is 0.885 and, for ethnic copartisanship, 0.680. For ethnic demonstration, the correlation between the interaction "fiscal decentralization × interregional inequality" and fiscal decentralization is 0.647 and, for interregional inequality, 0.693. For "ethnic regional concentration × decentralized education" and ethnic regional concentration, the correlation is 0.948 and, for decentralized education, 0.356. For the interaction "copartisanship × ethnic copartisanship," the correlation to copartisanship is 0.884 and, for ethnic copartisanship, 0.642.

parsimony, I have presented only those relationships that are significant. In assessing the significance of the interactive relationships, I use two rules of thumb: first, whether there is a significant difference in the predicted value of the probability of conflict occurrence between high and low values of a constitutive variable and second, whether there is a significant change in the predicted value of conflict occurrence across the value of a constitutive variable. If either condition holds, I graph the predicted value of conflict occurrence. In assessing significance, I rely on 90 percent confidence intervals.

Hypothesis 1 suggests that there is an interaction effect between decentralized education and ethnic concentration. In countries in which a large share of the population lives in ethnic majority/minority regions, decentralized education bears the promise of stemming self-determination conflict by giving ethnic minority groups a certain degree of decision-making power over matters that are central to their recognition, such as language of instruction and school curricula. In contrast, I expect that centralized education may provide a sense that the central government interferes in these policy areas, thus fueling conflict. I hypothesized that this interaction is likely to shape self-determination conflict, although not necessarily violent conflict. Indeed, I find no evidence that the interaction has a significant effect on violent conflict. When I graph the predicted values of decentralized, shared, and centralized education, they all have a very low impact on violent conflict, with overlapping and wide confidence intervals, making it hard to say, with any confidence, in which direction the relationships go and whether there are significant differences among the effects of different levels of centralized/decentralized education. The findings are more telling when it comes to ethnic demonstrations. In Figure 2.3, the three solid lines demonstrate how centralized education, shared education, and decentralized education shape the likelihood of ethnic protest at increasing levels of ethnic concentration in majority/minority regions. The corresponding dotted lines are the 90 percent confidence intervals.

As expected, centralized education, as illustrated by the solid black line, enhances the likelihood of a country facing ethnic demonstration as the share of the population living in ethnic majority/minority regions increases. Shared responsibility for education, as illustrated by the light-grey line, looks like it has a similar effect, although the corresponding light-grey confidence intervals, which form a trumpet shape, allow the solid line to go either up or down. As for decentralized education, as illustrated by the dark-grey line, the likelihood of a country facing ethnic protest diminishes as ethnic concentration increases, although note that the upper bound of the confidence intervals suggests that this relationship could be almost flat.

While not significant, it is notable that the effect of shared education more closely resembles that of centralized than decentralized education. Even though one could reason that shared responsibility for education should, to some degree, appease ethnic minority groups that want cultural policy autonomy, these findings suggest instead that shared responsibility might be a source of

FIGURE 2.3. The Impact of Decentralized Education on Ethnic Demonstration, Conditional on Ethnic Concentration.

frustration, most likely because it creates divergent expectations. Indeed, as the chapter on Québec demonstrates, even in countries in which education is decentralized, a source of tension between the center and the provinces is the (occasional) instances in which the central government seeks to bypass the provincial autonomy through its spending power, as such creating a discrepancy between autonomy on paper and in practice (cf. Eaton 2001 on Argentina). Similarly, when I did the analysis substituting the measure for decentralized education with a measure that tried to capture whether education was decentralized in practice,[24] I found, when making a figure akin to Figure 2.3, that the downward slope of decentralized education was almost flat (but statistically insignificant due to wide confidence intervals). Again, this suggests that a discrepancy between "on paper" and "in practice" decentralization diminishes the ability of such institutions to stem minority-group grievances and mobilization.

Turning to fiscal relations, Hypothesis 2 suggests that while fiscal decentralization is likely to prevent self-determination conflicts in states characterized by low interregional inequality, it is likely to have the reverse effect and promote conflict when interregional inequality is high. Although I would have expected

[24] For example, while, in the time period covered here, education in Austria is centralized, it moved from a highly centralized system to one in which education is a shared responsibility, in the sense that the schools in 1993 are taking on more control over the curricula (Ansell and Gingrich 2003). In Argentina and Mexico, there was a move from a highly centralized to decentralized system (in 1992 and 1998, respectively), with an intermediate period of education as a shared responsibility (Hanson 1996; Murillo 1999; Winkler and Gershberg 2000).

FIGURE 2.4. The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Violent Conflict, Conditional on Interregional Inequality.

the interaction between fiscal decentralization and interregional inequality to shape also the incidence of nonviolent demonstrations, the findings are inconclusive; the confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities of low and high inequality are wide and overlapping, making it hard to say, with much confidence, whether there is a difference between the two or across different levels of fiscal decentralization. The findings do, however, reveal that fiscal decentralization and inequality jointly have a direct effect on the incidence of violent conflict. Figure 2.4 demonstrates the likelihood of violent conflict in countries with high as opposed to low interregional inequality at different levels of fiscal decentralization. High and low levels of interregional inequality are here defined as, respectively, one standard deviation above and below the mean.

The figure shows that when interregional inequality is low, as illustrated by the grey line that clings to the x-axis, the likelihood of violent conflict is lower than when interregional inequality is high. As expected, the black line shows that when interregional inequality is high – as in Ethiopia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, the USSR, and Yugoslavia – increased fiscal decentralization increases the likelihood of violent conflict, seemingly quite drastically. While decentralization in such cases serves to underscore inequalities, fiscal centralization, in contrast, likely facilitates central redistribution that can serve to mediate the impact of regional inequities.

Turning now to political decentralization, I examine the interaction between copartisanship and ethnic copartisanship. Hypothesis 3 suggests that copartisanship across tiers of government is likely to contain violent self-determination

FIGURE 2.5. The Impact of Copartisanship on Violent Conflict, Conditional on Ethnic Copartisanship.

conflict when ethnic majority/minority regions are included in those ties, but if such regions are excluded, copartisanship is likely to have the reverse effect. This interaction has no significant impact on the incidence of ethnic demonstrations, but, as expected, Figure 2.5 underscores the importance of intergovernmental partisan relations in shaping violent conflict. It shows that intergovernmental copartisanship, as indicated by the share of regional governments held by the nationally governing party or coalition, has a divergent impact on conflict conditional on whether ethnic regions are copartisans of the center.

As expected and illustrated by the grey line, the likelihood of violent conflict mounts with the strength of the centrally ruling party or coalition when many ethnic regions are governed by an opposition party (low ethnic copartisanship is set as one standard deviation below the mean). When all ethnic regions are allied with the center (or there are no ethnic regions to be excluded), however, the black line shows that the likelihood of conflict remains low.[25] This

[25] When introducing the three interaction variables one by one, as shown in Appendix Table A.2.3, in the models that exclude the "copartisanship × ethnic copartisanship" interaction variable, the individual components of it generally show that general copartisanship has a positive and significant influence on the incidence of violent conflict, while ethnic copartisanship has a negative and significant influence on violent conflict. Ethnic copartisanship also has a negative influence on the incidence of ethnic demonstration in the models that exclude the interaction term. This

scenario is consistent with, for example, Lijphart (1990) and others' account of the unity-promoting effect of the Congress party in India (and similar arguments have been made about the less democratic UMNO in Malaysia and PRI in Mexico), but here I both specify that ethnic regions need to be part of the center-region political ties and test the argument across a large number of cases.

Goodness of Fit and Alternative Estimations

Though I have gone to great lengths to collect as much data as possible, I would like to emphasize that the relatively small number of cases under analysis suggests caution in interpreting the results. To assess the robustness of the findings, I report the models' goodness of fit and estimate several alternative model specifications.

First, I assessed the models' ability to predict the outcome on the dependent variable within the sample used. Relying on the area under the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve as a measure for accuracy (King and Zeng 2001), I found that the models fare quite well. The area under the ROC is 0.8940 for the model estimating ethnic demonstration and 0.9802 for the model estimating the incidence of violent conflict.[26] In terms of sensitivity and specificity, the model for ethnic demonstration correctly classifies 82 percent of the sample's observations. It has a lower level of sensitivity (78 percent) than specificity (87 percent), suggesting it is somewhat worse at predicting the occurrence of protests than the nonoccurrence of protests that did not happen. The model for violent conflict correctly classifies 96 percent of the observations. Its specificity (98 percent) is higher than its sensitivity (83 percent).

Second, I examined the effect of fiscal decentralization on violent conflict without Nigeria and Ethiopia. Because I had to rely on primary school data to assess wealth in these two countries, I wanted to check whether the estimations for the interaction between inequality and fiscal decentralization were affected by including these cases. Ethiopia experienced violent self-determination conflicts in all years but 1997, and Nigeria was the scene of violent struggles between 1997 and 1999. The relationship portrayed in Figure 2.4 still holds when these cases are excluded, showing that fiscal decentralization has a divergent effect on the chance of self-determination conflict at high and low levels of interregional inequality, although the model is overdetermined.[27]

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bolsters the proposition that ethnic copartisanship can help foster smooth intergovernmental bargaining.

[26] The area under the ROC curve ranges from 0.5 to 1, and numbers closer to 1 are preferred, as 1 indicates that the diagnostic test for the model achieves both 100 percent sensitivity and 100 percent specificity.

[27] Given the smaller sample, I do not include all three interaction terms, but only the one for "fiscal decentralization × interregional inequality" (equivalent to model 4 in Appendix Table A.2.3). With the exclusion of these two cases, 22 failures are completely determined.

Third, I estimated the model of violent conflict excluding the USSR to examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and interregional inequality without this case. Soviet budget data, which are the basis for the measure of fiscal decentralization here, show that the union republics of the USSR had significant expenditure responsibilities, but the union republics were in many ways limited by central directives. Thus, measuring fiscal decentralization based on public expenditure data may leave the USSR looking more decentralized than what it really was.[28] The exclusion of the USSR shows clearly that fiscal decentralization shapes conflict differently under conditions of high and low interregional inequality.[29] The relationship also holds when excluding all three communist cases – Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and Yugoslavia – from the analysis, although the lower bound of the confidence interval suggests that the upward slope for high inequality could be somewhat flatter than portrayed in Figure 2.4.

Fourth, due to the coding of ethnic copartisanship – which equates ethnic federations where ethnic regions are not excluded from the governing coalition with nonethnic federations where ethnic regions do not exist and thus cannot be excluded – I examined copartisanship's effect on violent conflict on a smaller sample of ethnic federations only, that is, including only the countries listed in Appendix Table A.2.1.[30] As expected and consistent with the findings illustrated in Figure 2.5, I find that copartisanship is likely to reduce the chances of violent conflict only when ethnic regions are also copartisans of the center. Indeed, the growing impact that lack of ethnic copartisanship has on conflict propensity as copartisanship in general increases is even more pronounced when looking at ethnic federations only.

Finally, I analyzed the effect of policy decentralization on ethnic demonstrations using a higher cutoff point on the MAR scale, coding as 1 only protests that reached a threshold of more than 10,000 participants (rather than counting also protest below 10,000 participants). That higher threshold casts some doubt on the findings portrayed in Figure 2.3, as wide and overlapping confidence intervals allow me to say little about the divergent effect of centralized, shared, and decentralized education. This finding, along with the fact that different levels of decentralized education have no clear effect on the incidence of violent conflict, suggests that while decentralized education can be an institutional means toward stemming minority group mobilization, it is not an institutional solution sufficient for preventing large-scale challenges to the state.

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[28] For a discussion of problems related to measuring fiscal decentralization in general, see Rodden (2004).

[29] Given the smaller sample, I do not include all three interaction terms, but only the one for "fiscal decentralization × interregional inequality" (equivalent to model 4 in Appendix Table A.2.3).

[30] Given the smaller sample, I do not include all three interaction terms, but only the one for "copartisanship × ethnic copartisanship" (equivalent to model 6 in Appendix Table A.2.3).

CONCLUSION

There is an ongoing debate about the pros and cons of decentralization in divided societies. In the large-*n* conflict literature, some find that decentralization, including federalism and autonomy arrangements, contains conflicts, while others find that such institutions have a conflict-promoting effect, and yet others find these institutions to have no effect. This chapter sheds light on why the literature to date has come to such divergent conclusions, demonstrating that the effects of decentralization vary depending on a state's interregional income distribution and ethnic concentration. Indeed, there is no theoretical reason to think that the same institutions will have the same effect across widely divergent societies, and the empirics in this chapter support that claim. I find that the effect of decentralized education on ethnic protest has different effects depending on whether a large or small share of a country's population lives in ethnic majority/minority regions. I find that the effect of fiscal decentralization is likely to have a peace-preserving effect when interregional inequality is low, but it may have the opposite effect when interregional inequality is high. And I find that copartisanship between tiers of government does help contain violent self-determination conflicts, but only if ethnic regions are not excluded from those copartisan ties. Decentralization clearly matters but in divergent ways across different societies.

The chapter also demonstrates the importance of separately considering the effects of policy decentralization, fiscal decentralization, and political decentralization rather than treating decentralization as one (dichotomous) variable. Indeed, the empirical findings indicate that while cultural policy decentralization, here operationalized as decentralization over education, has no clear effect on the incidence of violent conflict, it influences the probability that a country faces ethnic demonstrations short of violent conflict. Fiscal decentralization and the political ties between center and regions seem to more directly shape the incidence of violence. Again, decentralization clearly matters, but in divergent ways depending on which institutions we talk about.

With the caveat that a relatively small number of cases, imperfect measures, and incomplete data should caution our interpretation of the statistical findings in this chapter, the findings have important policy implications. They suggest that decentralization is not a panacea for divided societies. Under certain conditions, decentralized institutions do preserve peace, but under other conditions, they do not. Thus, any policy advice – be that to Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, or Ukraine – must be based on close knowledge of these societies, particularly their economic and ethnic makeup, and how specific institutional arrangements will work in diverse societal settings.

As with any large-*n* cross-country analysis, the findings here can tell us about correlations and generalizability across cases, but they mask causal dynamics. In particular, as people may be motivated by a mix of facts and perceptions of these facts, it is informative to supplement the statistical analysis with in-depth case studies, to which I turn next.

Chapter 2 Appendix

DATA SOURCES FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Data on fiscal decentralization rely and expand on Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems," *World Politics* 54 (July 2002) and are taken from the IMF, *Government Finance Statistics (GFS) Yearbook,* various years, with the following exceptions:

Argentina	Unpublished Ministry of Finance Data.
Czechoslovakia	Jim Prust and IMF Staff, *The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: An Economy in Transition* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1990).
Ethiopia	David L. Devan, "The Fiscal Dimensions of Ethiopia's Transition and Reconstruction," Discussion Paper no. 2001/56 (New York: United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2001).
	World Bank, *Ethiopia Public Expenditure Review,* vols. 1, 2, Report no. 20810-ET (World Bank Country Department 6, Country Office Ethiopia, 2000).
	World Bank, *Ethiopia: Regionalization Study,* Report no. 1 8898-ET (World Bank Country Department 6, Country Office Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, 2000).
Germany	German Federal Statistics Agency. At www.destatis.de Unpublished data provided by the Finance Ministry of the state of Baden-Württemberg.
Mexico	Combination of *IMF's Government Finance Statistics* and "Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales de México"

	(Aguascalientes: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, various years).
Nigeria	Central Bank of Nigeria, *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts* (Lagos: Central Bank of Nigeria, various years). At www.cenbank.org/documents/data.asp.
Pakistan	Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, *Economic Survey* (Karachi: Manager of Publications, various years).
Russia	Data on Russian Public Finance Data, 1993–1999, provided by Judith Thornton, Department of Economics at the University of Washington, Seattle.
South Africa	Combination of *GFS* and *Intergovernmental Fiscal Review* (Pretoria: South Africa National Treasury, various years). At www.treasury.gov.za/publications/igfr.
USSR	Donna Bahry, *Outside Moscow: Power, Politics, and Budgetary Policy in the Soviet Republics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
	Finansy SSSR (1989–1990 gg): Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1991).
	Gosudarstvennyi biudzhet SSSR i biudzhety soiuznykh respublik: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, various years).
	Gosudarstvennyi biudzhet SSSR (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, various years).
Venezuela	República de Venezuela, Oficina Central de Estadística e Informatica, *Anuario Estadistico de Venezuela* (Caracas: La Dirección, various years).

Data on copartisanship rely and expand on Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems," *World Politics* 54 (July 2002) and are taken from the *Europa World Yearbook,* various years, with the following exceptions:

Argentina	Ministry of the Interior election data.
Australia	*Europa World Yearbook* and Campbell Sharman, "Discipline and Disharmony: Party and the Operation in the Australian Federal System," in Sharman, ed., *Parties and Federalism in Australia and Canada* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1994).
Belgium	"Belgische Verkiezingen sinds 1830," website maintained by Vrije Universiteit in Brussels. At www.vub.ac.be/belgianelections.

Canada	Frank Feigert, *Canada Votes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989).
	Unpublished data provided by John Wilson at the University of Waterloo.
Czechoslovakia	M. Steven Fish, "The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World," *East European Politics and Societies* 12 (winter 1998).
	Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
Ethiopia	Lovise Aalen, *Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991–2000.* Report R 2002:2 (Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2002).
	Asnake Kefale, *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Analysis of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions* (PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, Leiden University, 2009).
	Yasin Mohammed Yasin, "Political History of the Afar in Ethiopia and Eritrea," *Afrika Spectrum* 42 (issue 1, 2008).
Germany	American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. At aicgs.org.
India	Election Commission of India. At eci.gov.in/infoeci/key_stat/keystat_fs.htm.
Malaysia	*Elections in Malaysia: A Handbook of Facts and Figures on the Elections, 1955–1995* (Kuala Lumpur: NSTP Research and Information Services, The New Straits Times Press, 1990).
Nigeria	Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran, eds. *Transitions without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).
	Richard A. Joseph, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
	The Independent National Electoral Commission, Nigeria. At www.inecnigeria.org.
Pakistan	*Report on the General Elections* (Election Commission of Pakistan, various years). At www.ecp.gov.pk.

Russia	*Vybory glav ispolnitelnoi vlasti sub'ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995–1997* (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 1997).
	Vybory i partii v regionakh Rossii: sbornik uchebnykh materialov po kursu "Politicheskaia regionalistika" (Moscow: IGPI Letnii sad, 2000).
	Vybory v organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub'ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1997–2000, vols. 1, 2 (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 2001).
	Robert W. Orttung, ed., *The Republics and Regions of the Russian Federation* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, East West Institute, 2000).
	Marc Zlotnik, "Russia's Elected Governors: A Force to Be Reckoned With," *Demokratizatsiya* 5 (issue 2, 1997).
	Marc Zlotnik, "Is Russia Really a Federation? Russia's Governors: All the President's Men, *Problems of Post-Communism* 43 (issue 6, 1996).
	Henry E. Hale, *Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) and data at http://home.gwu.edu/~hhale/contents.htm.
	Center for Russian Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: Database on Russian politics. At www.nupi.no.
United States	*America Votes* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, various years).
Yugoslavia	M. Steven Fish, "The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World," *East European Politics and Societies* 12 (winter 1998).
	Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

Data on decentralized education are taken from the Forum of Federations country pages (at www.forumfed.org), Daniel Elazar, *Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal, and Autonomy Arrangements* (Essex: The Longman Group, 1994), and Ronald Watts, *Comparing Federal Systems* (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1996), supplemented with the following resources:

Argentina	Kent Eaton, "Political Obstacles to Decentralization," *Development and Change* 32 (issue 1, 2001).

E. Mark Hanson, "Educational Change under Autocratic and Democratic Governments: The Case of Argentina," *Comparative Education* 32 (issue 3, 1996).

Maria Victoria Murillo, "Recovering Political Dynamics: Teachers' Unions and the Decentralization of Education in Argentina and Mexico," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 41 (issue 1, 1999).

Austria   Christopher Ansell and Jane Gingrich, "Trends in Decentralization," in Bruce E. Cain, Russell J. Dalton, and Susan E. Scarrow, eds., *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Jan Erk, "Austria: A Federation without Federalism," *Publius* 34 (issue 1, 2004).

Belgium   Christopher Ansell and Jane Gingrich, "Trends in Decentralization," in Bruce E. Cain, Russell J. Dalton, and Susan E. Scarrow, eds., *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Brazil   Emanuela di Gropello, "Education Decentralization and Accountability Relationships in Latin America," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3453 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2004).

Donald R. Winkler, "Decentralization in Education: An Economic Perspective," PPR Working Papers: Education and Employment (Washington DC: World Bank, 1989).

Czechoslovakia   Jana Svecová, "Chechoslovakia," in Sjoerd Karsten and Dominique Majoor, eds., *Education in East Central Europe: Education after the Fall of Communism* (Münster and New York: Waxmann, 1994).

Ethiopia   Alec Ian Gershberg and Donald R. Winkler, "Education Decentralization in Africa: A Review of Recent Policy and Practice," in Brian Levy and Sahr Kpundeh, eds., *Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003).

Edmond J. Keller and Lahra Smith, "Obstacles to Implementing Territorial Decentralization: The First Decade of Ethiopian Federalism," in Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Germany   Christopher Ansell and Jane Gingrich, "Trends in Decentralization," in Bruce E. Cain, Russell J. Dalton, and

	Susan E. Scarrow, eds., *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Malaysia	Jere R. Behrman, Anil B. Deolalikar, and Lee-Ying Soon, "Conceptual Issues in the Role of Education Decentralization in Promoting Effective Schooling in Asian Developing Countries," ERD Working Paper Series No. 22 (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2002).
Mexico	Maria Victoria Murillo, "Recovering Political Dynamics: Teachers' Unions and the Decentralization of Education in Argentina and Mexico," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 41 (issue 1, 1999).
	Donald R. Winkler and Alec Ian Gershberg, Education decentralization in Latin America: The Effects on the Quality of Schooling," in Shahid Javed Burki and Guillermo E. Perry, eds., *Annual World Bank Conference on Development in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2000).
Nigeria	Alec Ian Gershberg and Donald R. Winkler, "Education Decentralization in Africa: A Review of Recent Policy and Practice," in Brian Levy and Sahr Kpundeh, eds., *Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003).
Pakistan	Dawood Shah, "Country Report on Decentralization in the Education System of Pakistan: Policies and Strategies," Academy of Educational Planning and Management (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, 2003).
Russia	Mary Canning, Peter R. Moock, and Timothy E. Heleniak, "Reforming Education in the Regions of Russia," World Bank Technical Paper No. 457 (Washington DC: World Bank, 1999)
	Jana Sackman Eaton, "The Russian Federation Islamic Republic of Dagestan: Curricular Decentralization, Social Cohesion, and Stability," *Peabody Journal of Education* 80 (issue 1, 2005).
	Stephen P. Heyneman, "Education and Social Stability in Russia: An Essay," *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education* 27 (issue 1, 1997).
	Stephen L. Webber, *School, Reform, and Society in the New Russia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
South Africa	Alec Ian Gershberg and Donald R. Winkler, "Education Decentralization in Africa: A Review of Recent Policy and

Practice," in Brian Levy and Sahr Kpundeh, eds., *Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003).

Soviet Union   Jeanne Sutherland, *Schooling in the New Russia, 1984–1995* (London: University of London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 1999).

Spain   M. Fernanda Astiz, Alexander W. Wiseman, and David P. Baker, "Slouching towards Decentralization: Consequences of Globalization for Curricular Control in national Education Systems," *Comparative Education Review* 46 (issue 1, 2002).

               Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Pamela O'Malley, *Education Reform in Democratic Spain* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

               Mark E. Hanson, "Democratization and Educational Decentralization in Spain: A Twenty Year Struggle for Reform," Country Studies: Education Reform and Management Publication Series (Washington DC: World Bank, 2003).

               John M. McNair, *Education for a Changing Spain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

Venezuela   Mitchell Tracy, "To Transfer Power or To Transfer Responsibility: Educational Decentralization in Venezuela," *International Journal of Education Development* 17 (issue 2, 1997).

Yugoslavia   Peter John Georgeoff. *The Educational System of Yugoslavia* (Washington DC: United States Department of Education, 1982).

               Vladimir Mužić, "Teacher Education in Yugoslavia," *European Journal of Teacher Education* 7 (issue 3, 1984).

Data to determine regions' ethnic demographics are based on the following sources:

Belgium   Eduardo Alemán and Daniel Treisman, "Fiscal Politics in 'Ethnically-Mined,' Developing, Federal States: Central Strategies and Secessionist Violence," in Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

               Gordon, Raymond G., Jr., ed., *Ethnologue: Languages of the World,* 15th ed. (Dallas, TX: SIL International, 2005). At http://www.ethnologue.com.

Canada	2001 census data from Statistics Canada. At www.statcan .ca.
Colombia	1993 census data from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) Estadistica. At www.dane .gov.co.
Czechoslovakia	Eduardo Alemán and Daniel Treisman, "Fiscal Politics in 'Ethnically-Mined,' Developing, Federal States: Central Strategies and Secessionist Violence," in Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
Ethiopia	*The 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia* (Addis Ababa: The Central Statistical Authority, 1998).
India	1991 census data from Census of India. At www.indiastat .com.
Malaysia	*Anggaran-anggaran kajian semula penduduk pertenga-han tahun mengikut umur, jantina dan lumpulan etnik bagi Semenanjung Malaysia, Sabah dan Sarawak, 1970–80* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perangkaan, 1986).
	Buku tahunan perangkaan, Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perangkaan, various years).
	Kajian semula anggaran penduduk pertengahan tahun antara banci Malaysia, 1981–1990 (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perangkaan, 1997).
	Lapuran am banci penduduk (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perangkaan, various years).
	Laporan penduduk kawasan pihak berkuasa tempatan (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perangkaan, 1995).
	Laporan penduduk negeri (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perangkaan, various years).
	Laporan penyiasatan selepas penghitungan, 1980 (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perangkaan, 1985).
Mexico	Guilerrmo Trejo, "Mexico: The Political Foundations of Indigenous Mobilization and Ethno-Territorial Conflict (1975–2000)," in Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo, eds., *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
Nigeria	Rotimi T. Suberu, "Nigeria: Dilemmas of Federalism," in Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo, eds., *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).

Pakistan   Eduardo Alemán and Daniel Treisman, "Fiscal Politics in 'Ethnically-Mined,' Developing, Federal States: Central Strategies and Secessionist Violence," in Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

                  Raymond G. Gordon, Jr., ed., *Ethnologue: Languages of the World*, 15th ed. (Dallas: SIL International, 2005). At www .ethnologue.com.

                  Census data from the Population Census Organization. At www.pbs.gov.pk/content/population-census.

Russia/USSR   1989 census data from Goskomstat.

South Africa   Statistics South Africa. *Census 2001: Primary Tables [state]: 1996 and 2001 Compared* (Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, 2001).

Spain   Eduardo Alemán and Daniel Treisman, "Fiscal Politics in 'Ethnically-Mined,' Developing, Federal States: Central Strategies and Secessionist Violence," in Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

                  Raymond G. Gordon, Jr., ed., *Ethnologue: Languages of the World*, 15th ed. (Dallas: SIL International, 2005). At www .ethnologue.com.

Switzerland   Linguistic data from Bundesamt für Statistik. At www.bfs .admin.ch.

United States   1970–2001 census data from the U.S. Census Bureau. At www.census.gov.

Venezuela   *Censo Idigena de Venezuela* (Caracas: Oficina Central de Estadistica e Informatica, 1985).

Yugoslavia   Eduardo Alemán and Daniel Treisman, "Fiscal Politics in 'Ethnically-Mined,' Developing, Federal States: Central Strategies and Secessionist Violence," in Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

                  Raymond G. Gordon, Jr., ed., *Ethnologue: Languages of the World*, 15th ed. (Dallas: SIL International, 2005). At www .ethnologue.com.

Data on regional income are based on data collected for Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management

in Multitiered Systems," *World Politics* 54 (July 2002), supplemented with the following sources:

Austria	GDP data from the OECD's Territorial Database.
Belgium	The National Bank of Belgium's Belgostat's National Social-Economic Database. At www.nbb.be/belgostat /startSDW.do.
Colombia	GDP data from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) Estadistica. At www.dane.gov.co.
Czechoslovakia	*Statistická rocenka Ceskoslovenské socialistické republiky/ Státní úrad statistický, Ceskoslovenské socialistické republiky* (Prague: Státní nakl. technické literatury, various years).
Ethiopia	*Ethiopia: Social Report* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998).
Malaysia	*Malaysia Plan* (Putraja: Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Office, Government of Malaysia, various years).
Nigeria	*Annual Abstract of Statistics* (Lagos, Nigeria: Federal Office of Statistics, various years).
Pakistan	Nuzhat Ahmad and Syed Ashraf Wasti, "Pakistan," in Yun-Hwan Kim and Paul Smoke, eds., *Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Asia: Current Practice and Challenges for the Future* (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2003).
Russia	Data from Lev Freinkman at the World Bank.
Soviet Union	William Easterly and Stanley Fischer, "The Soviet Economic Decline," *World Bank Economic Review* 9 (1995). At www .worldbank.org/research/growth/ddeasfis.htm.
Switzerland	Bundesamt für Statistik. At www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de /index/themen/volkswirtschaft/volkseinkommen_der _kantone/blank/kennzahlen/gesamtes_volkseinkommen .html.
	Bundesamt für Statistik, *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz 1994* (Zurich: Verlag Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 1993).
Venezuela	Héctor Valecillos, *Impactos Regionales del Crecimientoy la Contracción Económica en Venezuela 1936–1990.* (Caracas: Banko Central de Venezuela, 1998).
Yugoslavia	*Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije: Socijalisticka Federativna Republika Jugoslavija, Savezni zavod za statistiku* (Belgrade: Zavod, various years).
	Data from Branko Milanovic at the World Bank.

APPENDIX TABLE A.2.1. *Ethnic Regions in Federal States, 1978–2000*

Federation	Ethnic Majority/Minority Regions
Belgium (1993–)	Walloon: Hainaut, Liège, Luxembourg, Namur, Walloon Brabant (French)
Canada	Québec (French)
	Nunavut (Inuktitut)
Czechoslovakia (–1992)	Slovak Republic (Slovak)
Ethiopia (1994–)	Afar (Afar)
	Somali (Somali)
	Tigray (Tigraway)
India	Andhra Pradesh (Telugu)
	Assam (Assamese)
	Goa (Konkani)
	Gujarat (Gujarati)
	Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmiri/Urdu, Muslim)
	Karnataka (Kannada)
	Kerala (Malayalam)
	Maharashtra (Marathi)
	Manipur (Manipuri)
	Meghalaya (Khasi, Christian)
	Mizoram (Lushai/Mizo, Christian)
	Nagaland (non-Hindi, Christian)
	Orissa (Oriya)
	Punjab (Punjabi, Sikh)
	Sikkim (Nepali)
	Tamil Nadu (Tamil)
	Tripura (Bengali)
	West Bengal (Bengali)
	UT Dadra and Nagar Haveli (Gujarati), UT Daman and Diu (Gujarati), UT Lakshadweep (Malayalam), UT Pondicherry (Tamil)
Malaysia	Pulau Pinang (Chinese)
Nigeria	Abia (Igbo, Christian)
	Akwa-Ibom (Southern minority, Christian)
	Anambra (Igbo, Christian)
	Bayelsa (Southern minority, Christian)
	Cross Rivers (Southern minority, Christian)
	Delta (Southern minority, Christian)
	Ebonyi (Igbo, Christian)
	Edo (Southern minority, Christian)
	Ekiti (Yoruba)
	Enugu (Igbo, Christian)
	Imo (Igbo, Christian)
	Lagos (Yoruba)
	Ogun (Yoruba)
	Ondo (Yoruba)

Federation	Ethnic Majority/Minority Regions
	Osun (Yoruba)
	Oyo (Yoruba)
	Rivers (Southern minority, Christian)
Pakistan	Sindh (Sindhi)
	NWFP (Pashtun)
Russia (1992–)	Aginsk-Buryat AOk
	Chechen Republic
	Chuvash Republic
	Republic of Dagestan
	Republic of Ingushetia
	Kabardino-Balkar Republic
	Komi-Permyak AOk
	Republic of North Ossetia
	Republic of Tuva
South Africa (1994–)	Eastern Cape (Xhosa)
	Free State (Sotho)
	Limpopo (Sepedi)
	Northern Cape (Afrikaans)
	North-West (Setswana)
	Western Cape (Afrikaans)
Spain (1979–)	Catalonia (Catalans)
	Galicia (Galicians)
	Basque Country (Basques)
Switzerland	Geneva (French)
	Jura (French)
	Neuchâtel (French)
	Vaud (French)
	Valais (French)
	Fribourg (French)
	Ticino (Italian)
USSR (–1991)	Belorussian SSR
	Ukrainian SSR
	Moldavian SSR
	Lithuanian SSR
	Latvian SSR
	Estonian SSR
	Azerbaijan SSR
	Armenian SSR
	Georgian SSR
	Uzbek SSR
	Tajik SSR
	Turkmen SSR
	Kyrgyz SSR
Yugoslavia (–1991)	Slovenia (Slovenes)
	Croatia (Croats)

Federation	Ethnic Majority/Minority Regions
	Montenegro (Montenegrins)
	Macedonia (Macedonians)
	Kosovo (Albanians)

Notes: In majority/minority regions, more than half of the population belongs to an ethnic group that is different from the largest ethnic group in the country as a whole. Ethnicity is based on census category ethnic affiliation, religious affiliation, and/or mother tongue/regional language spoken at home. Capital territories are not counted as majority/minority regions. In Ethiopia, there is no one national majority group, and the two largest ethnic groups, the Oromo and the Amara, are almost of the same size. Thus, I consider both of these groups to be the majority groups. The data for Nigeria are based on Nigeria expert Rotimi Suberu's classification of which ethnic and religious groups *dominate* in the different states. The Hausa-Fulani is the largest ethnic group (29 percent), while Islam is the dominant religion (50 percent) in the country as a whole. Census data in Nigeria are highly disputed. For South Africa, the breakdown is based on language groups (language most often spoken at home). There is no one majority language group in South Africa. The largest language group is the Zulu speakers, who per the 1996 census made up 23 percent of the population (the second-largest group was Xhosa speakers at 17.9 percent).

APPENDIX TABLE A.2.2. *Demonstrations and Violent Conflict in Federal States*

Federation	Groups Engaged in Ethnic Demonstrations and/or Violent Self-Determination and Territorial Conflict	Years Engaged in Demonstrations, 1985–2000 (MAR)	Years Engaged in Violent Struggle, 1978–2000 (CIDCM and UCDP)
Argentina	Indigenous peoples	1998, 2000	
Australia	Aborigines	1988, 1990–1997, 2000	
Austria			
Belgium (1993–)			
Brazil	Amazonian Indians	1989, 1992, 1996, 1999–2000	
Canada	Indigenous peoples	1990–1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999–2000	
	Québécois and French Canadians	1988–1992	
Czechoslovakia (–1992)	Hungarians and Slovaks	1988, 1990–1992	
Ethiopia (1994–)	Afars		1996
	Amhara	2000	
	Oromos	1999–2000	1994–1995, 1998–
	Somalis/Ogaden		1996
Germany			
India	Assamese	1985, 1990–1991, 1997–2000	1990–1991, 1994–2000
	Bodos	1989–1990, 2000	1989–1990, 1993–2000
	Kashmiris	1985–2000	1989–2000
	Kuki tribe (in Manipuri)		1997
	Mizos	1985, 1999–2000	
	Manipuri		1982–1988, 1992–2000
	Muslims	1986, 1990–1993, 1995–2000	
	Nagas	1985–1989, 1994, 1997–1998	1992–1997, 2000
	Scheduled tribes/Naxalites	1990–1995, 1998–2000	1990–1994, 1996–2000
	Sikhs	1986–1987, 2000	1983–1993

APPENDIX TABLE A.2.2 (*continued*)

Federation	Groups Engaged in Ethnic Demonstrations and/or Violent Self-Determination and Territorial Conflict	Years Engaged in Demonstrations, 1985–2000 (MAR)	Years Engaged in Violent Struggle, 1978–2000 (CIDCM and UCDP)
	Tripuras	1985–1989, 1991–1993, 1997–1998	1979–1988, 1992–1993, 1995, 1997–2000
Malaysia	Dayaks	1987, 1990	
	Chinese	1999	
Mexico	Mayans	1992, 1994–1997, 2000	1994
	Zapotecs	1986–1987, 1990–1991, 1994–1995, 2000	
	Other indigenous peoples	1992, 1994–1995, 1998–2000	
Nigeria	Ibos	1994–1997, 2000	
	Ijaw		1997–1999
	Ogoni	1993–1996, 1998, 2000	
	Oron		
	Yoruba	1989, 1993–1997, 1999–2000	
Pakistan	Baluchis	1997–2000	
	Hindus	1998–2000	
	Mohajir	1987–1996, 1998–1999	1990, 1995–1996
	Pashtuns	1985–1988, 1994–1996, 1998–2000	
	Sindhis	1985–1988, 1991–1993, 1998–2000	
Russia (1992–)	Buryat	1998	
	Chechens	1992–1996, 1999–2000	1993–1996, 1999–2000
	Dagestan (Avars, Lezgins)	1992–1994, 1996,	1999
	Ingush	1994, 1996–1997, 1999	
	Karachay	1998	
	Kumyks	1993, 1997	
South Africa (1994–)	Afrikaners/Europeans (2000)	2000	
	Zulus	1994–1996, 1998	

	Colored	1994, 1997–1998	
Spain (1979–)	Basques	1985–1994, 1997–2000	1979–1982, 1985–1987, 1991–1992
	Catalans	1987–1990	
Switzerland			
United States	Native Americans	1987–1988, 1990–1991, 1993–1994	
	Native Hawaiians	1992–1994	
USSR (–1991)	Abkhaz	1989–1991	
	Adjarians	1988, 1991	
	Armenians	1987–1991	1988–1991
	Azerbaijanis	1988–1991	1990
	Belorussians	1987–1991	
	Bashkirs	1990–1991	
	Chechens	1989–1991	
	Cherkess	1991	
	Chuvash	1990–1991	
	Crimean Tatars	1987–1991	
	Dagestanis (incl. Laks, Lezgins, and Avars)	1989–1991	
	Estonians	1987–1991	
	Gaugaz	1989–1991	
	Georgians	1987–1991	
	Ingush	1989–1991	
	Kabardinians	1990–1991	
	Karachai	1990	
	Kazakhs	1986, 1989–1991	
	Khakass	1991	
	Kyrgyz	1990–1991	
	Kumyks	1990–1991	
	Kurds	1989, 1991	
	Latvians	1986–1991	

APPENDIX TABLE A.2.2 (*continued*)

Federation	Groups Engaged in Ethnic Demonstrations and/or Violent Self-Determination and Territorial Conflict	Years Engaged in Demonstrations, 1985–2000 (MAR)	Years Engaged in Violent Struggle, 1978–2000 (CIDCM and UCDP)
	Lithuanians	1987–1991	
	Moldavians	1988–1991	
	Meskhetian Turks	1988–1991	
	Ossetians	1988–1991	
	Russians	1987–1991	
	Tajiks	1987, 1989–1991	
	Tuvinians	1990	
	Turkmens	1991	
	Ukrainians	1988–1991	
	Uzbeks	1988–1991	
	Volga Tatars	1988–1991	
	Yakuts	1990	
Venezuela	Indigenous peoples	1993, 1997–1998, 2000	
Yugoslavia (–1991)	Croats	Years missing	1991
	Hungarians	1991	
	Kosovo Albanians	1985–1991	
	Sandzak Muslims	1990–1991	
	Slovenes	Years missing	1991

Notes: The demonstration measure comes from MAR's protest data, and the measure of violent conflict comes from Marshall and Gurr (2005) and UCDP. The MAR protest scale goes from 0 to 5 and captures actions from symbolic resistance to demonstrations of more than 100,000 participants. Ethnic demonstrations are here operationalized as protest events including and above category 3 on the MAR scale. This means that some groups engaged in resistance below the threshold of a demonstration (and not engaged in violent struggle), such as symbolic and verbal resistance, are not included here. MAR does not include annual data for all groups in the three communist countries. The demonstration score for the USSR is based on Beissinger (2002); for Czechoslovakia, news sources via Lexis-Nexis. For Yugoslavia, there is no annual data for the protest behavior of the Croats and Slovenes, but this does not matter for the coding of the variable in the chapter's analysis, as the Kosovo Albanians are engaged in protest the entire time; hence the country scores 1 in the entire time period.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Ethnic Demonstration			SD/Territorial Violence		
Controls						
Per capita GDP (lag)	−0.103	−0.151**	−0.097	−0.180**	−0.186*	−0.149
	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.098)	(0.103)
Oil	0.425	0.886	0.532	−1.623***	−1.745**	−1.689***
	(0.766)	(0.609)	(0.658)	(0.519)	(0.692)	(0.500)
Population (log)	0.718***	0.561**	0.699***	1.851***	1.617***	1.553***
	(0.247)	(0.246)	(0.244)	(0.262)	(0.290)	(0.233)
Democracy (lag)	0.068	0.078	0.064	−0.043	−0.048	−0.079
	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.056)
Lagged DV	2.031***	1.906***	2.041***	2.664***	2.884***	2.928***
	(0.419)	(0.447)	(0.432)	(0.581)	(0.543)	(0.574)
Components of interaction terms						
Ethnic regional concentration	1.041	12.683**	1.022	0.966	1.540	−0.470
	(1.270)	(5.032)	(1.284)	(1.703)	(3.083)	(1.167)
Interregional inequality	−0.149	−0.451	−0.354	−0.667	0.737	0.713
	(0.620)	(0.290)	(0.332)	(0.602)	(0.345)	(0.331)
Fiscal decentralization	4.804	2.610	3.346**	−12.558**	3.267*	3.723**
	(3.989)	(1.945)	(1.612)	(5.315)	(1.856)	(1.562)
Decentralized education	−0.372	0.237	−0.376	−0.377	−0.425	−0.641
	(0.465)	(0.485)	(0.466)	(0.359)	(0.705)	(0.443)
Federal-regional copartisanship	0.248	−0.135	1.159	5.859***	5.609***	9.068**
	(1.073)	(1.209)	(3.207)	(2.198)	(1.871)	(3.794)
Ethnic federal-regional copartisanship	−1.361**	−1.974***	−0.897	−8.321***	−8.377***	−4.170
	(0.630)	(0.672)	(1.655)	(2.011)	(1.708)	(4.232)

APPENDIX TABLE A.2.3 (*continued*)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Ethnic Demonstration			SD/Territorial Violence		
Interaction terms						
Fiscal decent. × Interreg. inequality	−0.654 (1.512)			5.942*** (2.152)		
Ethnic reg. conc. × Decent. education		−5.468*** (2.124)			−0.888 (1.749)	
Copartisanship × Ethnic copartisanship			−1.009 (3.266)			−5.834 (5.263)
Constant	−7.377** (3.249)	−4.863 (3.196)	−7.147** (3.091)	−20.232*** (4.458)	−20.271*** (4.233)	−21.375*** (4.065)
N =	287	287	287	404	404	404
Pseudo R squared	0.3903	0.4145	0.3906	0.7092	0.6945	0.6989

Notes: The estimations are the result of logit regressions (in STATA 10). The table reports coefficients and, in parentheses, standard errors (defined as clustering on the cross-section). * indicates significant at 0.10, ** indicates significant at 0.05, and *** indicates significant at 0.01.

3

The First War in Chechnya

> Every 50–60 years, they are trying to crush us.
> – Chechen woman on Moscow's
> relationship with Chechnya[1]

INTRODUCTION: THE PARADE OF SOVEREIGNTIES
AND THE CHECHEN WARS

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1990–1991, the majority of
the thirty-two ethnically defined Russian regions issued declarations of sov-
ereignty, demanding control over the resources and land within their borders.
Of them, only Chechnya ended up battling the Russian federal government.
This chapter will show how and why the institutions and practices governing
relations between Chechnya and Moscow fell short of resolving differences
between the two and, rather, helped precipitate a violent conflict.

   Besides issuing declarations of sovereignty, many of the Russian ethnically
defined regions unilaterally raised their administrative status from autonomous
republics and *oblasts* to republics, indicating status on a par with Russia itself,
at the time one of fifteen union republics of the USSR.[2] Leaders in several of

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[1] Personal communication, Moscow, June 11, 2005.

[2] The Soviet Union was a layer cake of autonomy. While the regional structure varied over time
(and has done so in Russia as well), the broad structure was as follows: The Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) consisted of fifteen union republics, Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs),
each with its own constitution and chamber of deputies (Supreme Soviets). The union repub-
lics were, in turn, divided into units with less autonomy: twenty Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republics (ASSRs), which were subordinate to their parent union republic but with their own
constitutions and legislatures, as well as eight autonomous *oblasts* and ten national *okrugs*,
which were administrative regions. All of these units were ethnically defined in that they were
named after one (or two) titular ethnic group(s). The union republics were also divided into a
number of non ethnic administrative regions known as *krais*, *oblasts*, and *okrugs*. In Soviet times,
the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was one of the fifteen union republics,

these ethnic regions also undertook other acts in pursuit of self-determination, such as asserting the supremacy of regional law over federal law, demanding the right to have their own foreign policy, independent budgets, separate tax policy, and currency, and boycotting federal elections (Treisman 1997; Giuliano 2006). These kinds of autonomy demands were not limited to the ethnic regions. Several *oblasts* and *krais* demanded control over issues ranging from agricultural policy and natural resources to fiscal relations and foreign trade (e.g., Pain 1995; Herrera 2005). The Federal Treaty of 1992 and the Russian constitution of 1993 did little to resolve these center-region conflicts over the distribution of power between tiers of government. Although the Federal Treaty established areas of responsibility for the republics and granted them extensive autonomy, the 1993 constitution left ambiguous – and, in some cases, eliminated – these rights.[3] The constitution itself delegates no specific tasks to the regions.[4] Thus in the early 1990s, there was a serious concern among both Russian and Western observers that Russia would follow in the footsteps of the Soviet Union and disintegrate. But she did not.

Not only did Russia not disintegrate; for the most part, regional demands for autonomy were resolved peacefully through a series of bilateral power-sharing treaties with the central government under President Boris Yeltsin. By 1998, forty-six of the eighty-nine regions had signed one-on-one treaties with the Kremlin. Several observers and scholars agree that at least the first wave of treaties in 1994 and 1995 was a helpful step toward calming nationalist

by far the largest in terms of territory, population, and influence. It consisted of sixteen autonomous republics, five autonomous *oblasts,* and ten autonomous *okrugs,* in addition to several *krais, oblasts,* and *okrugs.* Post-Soviet Russia initially had eighty-nine regions, also called subjects, but some regions have merged, reducing the number to eighty-three. In March 2014, the number of federal subjects increased to eighty-five, when the Russian Federation annexed the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which, by the other states in the international system, are recognized as part of Ukraine. Among the initial eighty-nine regions, there were twenty-one republics, forty-nine *oblasts*, six *krais*, two federal cities, ten autonomous *okrugs*, and one autonomous *oblast*. The republics, the autonomous *okrugs,* and the autonomous *oblasts* (thirty-two of eighty-nine regions in the 1990s) are ethnically defined.

[3] The Federal Treaty was a sequence of agreements meant to clarify the responsibilities of the central government and the regions, although it primarily addressed the demands of the republics. It granted the republics the right to form their own constitutions and government structures and to pass legislation, and it further established that the republics had the right to secede from the federation. All republics except Tatarstan and Chechnya signed the treaty, but Bashkortostan, Karelia, and Sakha/Yakutia did not sign until they had negotiated additional treaties that granted them rights beyond those in the Federal Treaty (Slider 1994, 247). Unlike the Federal Treaty, the constitution equalized all federal subjects. Voters in only twelve of the twenty-one republics approved the constitution in a 1993 referendum.

[4] Article 71 of the constitution assigns policy jurisdictions to the federal level, and Article 72 details shared responsibilities between the center and the regions. There is no article on the regions' jurisdictions, but Article 73 says that "Outside of the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the powers of the Russian Federation on issues within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation, the subjects of the Russian Federation shall exercise the entire spectrum of state power."

demands (e.g., Hughes 1996; Lynn and Novikov 1997; Treisman 1997, 2001; Drobizheva 2002; Herrera 2005), although perhaps at the price of weakening the central government (Stoner-Weiss 2004, 2006). According to Sergei Shakhrai, who served as deputy prime minister from 1992 to 1994 and played a key role in the bilateral bargaining process with the regions, these treaties "began a period of centripetal motion and an active process of 'assembling' the Russian territories" (2003). Similarly, the sociologist Emil Pain, who served as the head of the Presidential Council's Group of Nationalities Policy under President Yeltsin, credits the bilateral power-sharing treaties of the 1990s for giving regional elites a stake at the center, thus limiting centrifugal tendencies (Pain 1995, 2003). The exception was Chechnya.

As in most of the thirty-two ethnically defined republics in Russia at the time, on November 27, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), under First Secretary Doku Zavgayev, issued a declaration of sovereignty.[5] This declaration was a toned-down version of the demands articulated by the newly founded Chechen National Congress, which was the umbrella organization of the Chechen nationalist movement that emerged in the late 1980s. From the National Congress's initial meeting in November 1990 to its second meeting in June 1991, the radical branch of the nationalist movement came to dominate. It called for political sovereignty and the ouster of the republic's Supreme Soviet, the local legislature, which most Chechens long had considered corrupt. Under the leadership of Dzhokhar Dudayev, an ethnic Chechen who had served as a Soviet Air Force general, the nationalist movement quickly gained the support of the emerging democratic, Islamic, and environmental movements in Chechnya (Muzayev 1992). Their combined struggle to overthrow the communist-led Supreme Soviet is known as the Chechen Revolution of 1990–1991, which culminated in the election of Dudayev as president on October 27, 1991. A few days later, on November 1, 1991, he declared Chechnya independent. Besides Chechnya, the government of Tatarstan, too, took steps that were considered highly secessionist (Treisman 1997), such as holding a referendum on sovereignty that many considered a referendum on independence (Giuliano 2006, 285), but in February 1994, it reached a power-sharing treaty with Moscow. Only the Chechen demand for independence resulted in two bloody wars with the central government.[6]

After nearly three years of failed negotiations between the leaders in Moscow and Grozny, as well as several attempts by Moscow to forcibly remove the

[5] From 1934 until 1992, Chechnya was part of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, consisting of two titular national groups, the Chechens and the Ingush. The precise demarcation of the internal border between the two republics remained a contentious matter.

[6] The two wars have been characterized by massive civilian suffering and human rights violations. For firsthand accounts of violence in Chechnya, see Politkovskaya (2001, 2003), Nivat (2001), and Gilligan (2010). The Russian soldiers fighting the war also suffered, and their plight was taken up by the Committee for Soldiers' Mothers, which is an organization that was openly critical of Moscow's war against Chechnya.

Chechen president from power, on November 30, 1994, Yeltsin sanctioned the use of military force. The official catalyst for the invasion was the "criminal" Chechen regime and its threat to Russian citizens as hijackings and kidnappings of civilians in Chechnya's border regions began in the summer of 1994.

In the first weeks of December 1994, Russian troops were deployed along the Chechen border, and all-out war broke out in the final days of 1994, when the troops stormed Grozny. They were met with fierce resistance from the Chechen fighters, but air strikes gave the Russians the upper hand as the city fell into ruins. By March 1995, the Russian forces controlled Grozny. About 27,000 civilians had lost their lives.[7] The Chechen fighters retreated to the mountains in the southern part of the republic, from where they continued guerrilla campaigns that proved far more difficult to combat than the policy makers in the Kremlin had expected. In August 1996, the Russian troops withdrew, and the Chechens emerged as the victors – albeit in the presence of a massive civilian death toll and material destruction. The victory was partial and short lived. The Khasavyurt accord promised that Russian-Chechen relations would be based on international law, but it left Chechnya's status undecided until 2001. In September 1999, Russian forces again entered Chechnya in response to Chechen-led attacks into neighboring Dagestan in early August. Over the next few years, the conflict carried over and encouraged conflicts and terrorist events in other regions of the North Caucasus and in Moscow.[8] While the Russian Defense Minister in February 2007 declared that Russia had succeeded in its latest war in Chechnya,[9] reports about violent clashes, human rights abuses, and kidnappings continued,[10] but the struggle largely turned into a Chechen-on-Chechen one, between the pro-Moscow Chechens in power and the self-determination movement, as well as among factions of the movement (e.g., Hughes 2007; Gilligan 2010; O'Loughlin and Witmer 2011; Russell 2011; Bakke 2014).

The chapter investigates the relationship between cultural policy autonomy and ethnicity, the relationship between fiscal autonomy and wealth, and the role of political copartisanship in shaping the self-determination conflict that emerged and turned violent in the early 1990s. I argue that because the basis for Chechen solidarity that the nationalist leaders invoked revolved around the

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[7] Gall and de Waal (1998, 227), citing estimates from the Russian human rights organization Memorial.

[8] Among the high-profile terrorist attacks that Chechens have been involved in are the Dubrovka theater siege in Moscow in October 2002 and the Beslan School hostage crisis in North Ossetia in September 2004, which resulted in hundreds of dead civilians, including children, as well as the bomb explosion at the Moscow metro in March 2010 and at Moscow's Domodedovo Airport in February 2011.

[9] C. J. Chivers, "Russian Official Says Insurgency in Chechnya Has Been Tamed," *New York Times,* February 12, 2007.

[10] Mairbek Vatchagaev, "What Russian Statistics on Militant Attacks in the North Caucasus Reveal," *North Caucasus Analysis,* December 9, 2011.

central state's threat to the very survival of the group, cultural policy making was not sufficient for stemming the struggle, which was driven by demands for independence. At the same time, transfers and investments from the central government did not appear to offset the region's poverty, which led both the Chechen nationalists and their opponents to agree that Chechnya would benefit from greater autonomy. These demands set the stage for a violent confrontation with Moscow, but the turn to violence in 1994 was also influenced by a third aspect of center-region institutions – the political ties (or lack thereof) between elites at the central and regional levels of government. In Chechnya, the revolution in 1990–1991 broke all political and otherwise institutional ties between regional and central elites, complicating negotiations and deepening divisions within Chechnya, which further obstructed the bargaining process and chances for a peaceful resolution. The case study also allows for examining endogenous relationships. For example, the case of Chechnya demonstrates that understanding the basis for people's solidarity and the republic's economic situation requires consideration of how past institutions and central practices governing center-region relations shaped Chechen society. Central to the chapter, therefore, is explaining the constitution of the societal traits (both ethnic and economic) characterizing Chechnya in the early 1990s – and how those, in turn, shaped the ability of cultural policy autonomy and fiscal autonomy to mitigate demands for self-determination.

The chapter briefly contrasts the conflict trajectory of the Chechen Republic with that of its separated cousin, the Republic of Ingushetia, which formally split from Chechnya in June 1992 and has had a more peaceful relationship with Moscow. I conclude by discussing implications of my argument for existing scholarship on Chechnya and the emergence of the second war in 1999.

SOCIETY-STATE RELATIONS AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA

Ethnicity and Policy Autonomy

The small Chechen-Ingush ASSR was among the most ethnically homogenous minority regions within the USSR. The majority of the population was – and still is – Muslim, and more than half of the Muslim population belonged to the Naqshbandi and Qadiri orders of the "mystical" branch Sufism. Per the 1989 census, about 70 percent of the republic's 1.27 million inhabitants belonged to the two titular nationalities, Chechens (about 734,500) and Ingush (about 163,700). Ethno-linguistically close yet distinct from one another, the Chechens and Ingush are collectively known as the *Vainakh* people, which means "our people," and their languages are part of the Nakh language group. In the Chechen part of the republic, about 66 percent of the population was ethnic Chechens. More than three quarters of the Chechen population in the USSR lived within the boundaries of the Chechen-Ingush republic (Henze 1991).

DENMARK
NORWAY
SWEDEN
FINLAND
Norwegian Sea
Baltic Sea
POLAND
Kaliningrad (RUS)
LITH.
LAT.
EST.
BELARUS
St Petersburg
Leningrad
Pskov
Novgorod
KARELIA
Murmansk
Barents Sea
Novaya Zemlya
Franz Josef Land
A R C T I C   O C E A N
Severnaya Zemlya
New Siberian Islands
Kara Sea
Laptev Sea
East Siberian Sea
Wrangel Island
Bering Sea
Chukotka AOk
Koryak AOk
1000 km
600 miles

UKRAINE
MOL.
Smolensk
Bryansk
Kaluga
Tula
Kursk
Belgorod
Voronezh
Moscow
Oryol
Tver
Yaroslav
Kostroma
Vladimir
Ivanovo
Ryazan
Lipetsk
Tambov
Penza
Ulyanovsk
Nizhny Novgorod
Arkhangelsk
Vologda
KOMI
Nenets AOk
Komi-Permyak AOk
Kirov
Perm
TATARSTAN
7
9
10
Taymyr AOk
Yamalo-Nenets AOk
Khanty-Mansi AOk
Evenk AOk
SAKHA (YAKUTIA)
Magadan
Kamchatka
Sea of Okhotsk
Kuril Islands
Sakhalin

GEORGIA
ARMENIA
AZERBAIJAN
Black Sea
KRASNODAR KRAI
1
STAVROPOL KRAI
2
3
4
5
6
DAGESTAN
KALMYKIA
Caspian Sea
IRAN
Rostov
Volgograd
Astrakhan
Saratov
Samara
Orenburg
BASHKORTO-STAN
Sverdlovsk
Chelyabinsk
Kurgan
Tyumen
Omsk
Tomsk
Novosibirsk
KAZAKHSTAN
Aral Sea
ALTAI KRAI
ALTAI
Kemerovo
KHAKASSIA
TUVA
KRASNOYAR KRAI
Irkutsk
Ust-Orda AOk
Lake Baikal
BURYATIA
Chita
Amur
Agin-Buryat AOk
Chita
Yevrey AO
KHABAROVSK KRAI
PRIMORSKY KRAI
JAPAN
Sea of Japan
NORTH KOREA
CHINA
MONGOLIA
Lake Balkhash
TURKMENISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
CHINA

ALTAI	Republics
ALTAI KRAI	Krais
Evenk AOk	AOks and AOs
Kurgan	Oblasts

1	ADYGEA	6	CHECHNYA*
2	KARACHAY-CHERKESSIA	7	MORDOVIA
3	KABARDINO-BALKARIA	8	CHUVASHIA
4	NORTH OSSETIA	9	MARI EL
5	INGUSHETIA*	10	UDMURTIA

* Formerly Chechnya-Ingushetia; the boundary between Chechnya and Ingushetia has not been established.

MAP 3.1. The Russian Federation (1993).

MAP 3.2. Chechnya.

These demographics paint a portrait of a territorially concentrated group, yet the Chechens do not necessarily constitute a cohesive ethnic group.

Indeed, historically Chechens' primary identity has been tied to their clans and extended families, or the peoples of the (North) Caucasus region, rather than the ethnic group (Dunlop 1998, 20–21). Prior to Russian rule, Chechen society was horizontally divided among different clans or *teips*. This clan system, which formed a web of social communities, was loosely tied to one of the two dominant Sufi brotherhoods. Particularly in the mountainous areas in the south, clan ties and traditional customs and institutions (such as the Council of Elders, which is a body governing relations between different *teips*) continue to play a role in regulating people's lives, although it is unclear how important they are today for people's identity (Dunlop 1998, 147–49; Lieven 1998, 339–45; Isaenko and Petschauer 2000; German 2003, 80–83; Vachagaev 2003; Tishkov 2004, 63–68; Sokirianskaia 2005, 2009). Despite this fragmented social structure, a collective Chechen solidarity has developed, much due to the policies and practices of the tsarist and Soviet states. This solidarity is based on the notion of collective suffering at the hands of central rulers – and has in turn affected the demands of the Chechen nationalists.

The Chechens have a long history of resisting central rule (see Dunlop 1998, 1–84; Gammer 2006). In the Caucasian War of 1817–1864, the Chechens and the peoples of Dagestan fought relentlessly against the Russian imperial army, their fight most vividly remembered by the heroic image of the resistance leader Imam Shamil (1796/97–1871), a Dagestani man of Avar ethnic origin. From 1816 into the 1820s, Russian General Alexei Yermolov's strategy for turning the Chechens into loyal subjects of Alexander I's empire included brutally deporting them from the region's fertile lowlands into the mountains or to Siberia. Similarly, the tsarist forces did not hesitate to employ brutal strategies in the 1840s and 1850s, and upon defeating Imam Shamil in 1859, the tsarist government forced masses of Caucasians, including as many as 100,000 Chechens, to leave their homeland for the Ottoman Empire.

The most infamous state practice contributing to and reinforcing a Chechen solidarity or identity based on collective suffering is the deportation under Joseph Stalin in February 1944. During a few winter days, nearly half a million Chechens (about 387,200) and Ingush (about 91,300) were forcefully evicted from their homes and packed into sealed cattle cars on trains heading for the Central Asian republics of the USSR.[11] The justification for the deportation, which was not made public until two years after it took place, was the population's alleged cooperation with the Nazis, who occupied the North Caucasus for parts of 1942. Historians have later found that while some 100 Chechens actively fought for and collaborated with the Nazis, several thousand Chechens

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[11] Most Chechens and Ingush ended up in settler camps in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but some were also sent to live in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Yakutia in Siberia, as well as to Siberian labor camps.

also fought against the Nazis as soldiers in the Red Army (Dunlop 1998, 58–62; Bugain and Gonov 2002). Nonetheless, they were "punished peoples" (Nekrich 1978). According to Soviet documents, in February and March 1944, a total of 602,193 people were deported from the North Caucasus; among them, nearly 80 percent were from the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (Tishkov 2004, 25). As many as 10,000 Chechens and Ingush may have died during the long trip to Central Asia, while about 100,000 died during the first years in exile. By the time they were "rehabilitated" and allowed to return home in 1956–1957, more than 20 percent of the population was lost (Dunlop 1998, 70–71; Naimark 2001, 97; Tishkov 2004, 27). Between 1944 and 1957, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was deleted from maps, libraries, and public documents, and it was turned into an administrative region called Grozny oblast (Naimark 2001, 98).

Rather than weaken or eliminate the Chechens, the Soviet state's radical attempt at centrally controlling the group through deporting it from its homeland contributed to political mobilization against the state. If the Chechens had not had a collective solidarity or identity before the deportation, the deportation helped create one. The ethnographer Sergei Arutyunov notes that Chechens are well known for their long historical memories:

> For a Chechen, as for every Caucasian, to be a man is to remember the names of seven generations of paternal ancestors: the father, grandfather, great-grandfather and seventh great great-grandfather; and not only their names, but the circumstances of their deaths and the places of their tombstones. This constitutes an enormous depth of historic memory, and in many cases the remembered deaths occurred at the hands of Russian soldiers – under Catherine the Great; under Nicholas the First; under Stalin. So for every Chechen, there is a Russian soldier or general who is viewed as evil incarnated, as the devil himself. (1995a, 16)

He further notes that more than any other ethnic group in the North Caucasus (and Russia), the Chechens have suffered at the hands of the policies and practices of the center (1995b).[12] When the time came for the deported peoples of the North Caucasus – the Balkars, the Chechens, the Ingush, the Kalmyks, and the Karachai – to return to their homelands, the process was filled with obstacles (Williams 2000). The territory of what used to be the Chechen-Ingush ASSR had been colonized by new settlers, making it difficult for people to return to their ancestral homes. In fact, fighting broke out in Grozny between local Russians and returnees, inciting fear among some that they would, again, be deported (Nekrich 1978, 146–152). The Soviet authorities also tried to prevent the Chechens and Ingush from returning to their villages in the mountains,

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[12] Among all the ethnic groups in Russia, Arutyunov (1995b) notes that perhaps only the Crimean Tatars have suffered as much from central policies and practices as the Chechens. Unlike the deported peoples of the North Caucasus, the Crimean Tatars never returned, as a group, to their homeland. Other deported peoples included the Baltic peoples, Bulgarians, Greeks, Koreans, Meskhetian Turks, Poles, and Volga Germans.

thinking it would be easier to keep them in check in the lowlands (Dunlop 1998, 79–80).[13]

It is impossible to assess who, among the deported peoples of the USSR, suffered the most, so to speak, or even to say that one group suffered more than others. As such, it is problematic to claim that the deportation is to blame for the Chechen conflict (Tishkov 2004, 219). To some, it was not so much the deportation by itself that motivated the first Chechen war; rather, the deportation was part of a repeated history of repression by the rulers of the state. In 2005, a Chechen man in his 30s, who was very skeptical when talking about the Chechen Revolution and Dudayev's regime, explained to me that the heart of the Chechen question is that with regular intervals, Russia has occupied Chechnya – the tsarist forces, the Bolsheviks, Stalin, and now the current post-Soviet regime.[14] In a separate conversation with his wife, who had believed in Dudayev's words that life would be better in an independent Chechnya, the problem was that the center was never willing to let Chechnya try the option of independence. Instead, she said, every 50 to 60 years, they are trying to crush us.[15]

Indeed, the deportation helped create a Chechen basis for solidarity built around collective memories of injustices and suffering (Brauer 2002; Tishkov 2004, 25–31, 53–54; Ustinova 2004, 16–18; Sokirianskaia 2009, 154–155). With the liberalization of *glasnost* in the 1980s, the deportation became subject of political discourse and new research, as well as poems and pop songs. Integral to the collective memory of the deportation was a distrust of the Soviet system, and it did not help the matter that the Russian-dominated leadership of the local Communist Party sought to legitimize the events of February 1944 (Williams 2000). Surveys of Russia's ethnic republics from 1993 indicate that more than any other ethnic group, the Chechens identified primarily with their own republic as opposed to Russia as a whole (Tishkov 1997, 262). Valery Tishkov, in his anthropological study *Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society*, writes about the early 1990s that "People began to believe that to end any continuing discrimination against them, the Chechens had to assume control over the republic" (2004, 53). Although not every Chechen shared a similar view on the Russian state, and the Chechens were divided amongst themselves – based on generational difference, clans ties, or identities as highlander versus

[13] The deportation also aided later mobilization against the state by allowing clan ties and religious practices to survive (Lapidus 1998; Williams 2000; Brauer 2002), which in the 1990s helped micro-mobilization (cf. Opp and Gern 1993). Indeed, the resistance was often organized along clan ties (Lieven 1998, 345; Avioutskii and Mili 2003, 11; German 2003, 77–78).
[14] Personal communication, Moscow, June 11, 2005.
[15] Personal communication, Moscow, June 11, 2005. Note that this antistate or anticenter sentiment does not necessarily translate into an anti-Russian view. One of the Chechens I met with, for example, highlighted that in the Soviet era, Russians and Chechens had lived peacefully together (personal communication, Moscow, June 21, 2005). The struggle is primarily with the Russian state (and its predecessors), not the Russian population (see also Russell 2007, 36).

lowlander (ibid., 54–55, 217) – the history of a threatening center under-
pinned calls for independence. As such, consistent with expectations laid out
in Chapter 1 (Hypothesis 1c), cultural policy autonomy was not central to this
struggle and had relatively little impact on it.

In the early 1990s, the nationalist leaders in Chechnya used collective mem-
ories of the deportation to mobilize people. The central state was a legitimate
target, and the nationalists took advantage of this. Indeed, they frequently
raised the possible danger of a Russian intervention (Tishkov 2004, 82–83).
Even declarations by the communist-led Chechen Supreme Soviet contained
features of a new Chechen identity that came to be dominant in the coming
years – "the image of a 'banished and fighting people'" (ibid., 52–54). Article
10 of the Declaration of Sovereignty, for instance, makes a specific reference
to the "genocide" of the deportation.[16] As the situation between the leaders in
Grozny and Moscow grew increasingly tense, the Chechens were reminded
about the contemporary relevance of the deportation in a mass event com-
memorating its fiftieth anniversary in February 1994. President Dudayev is
even reported to have claimed that Russia would again deport the Chechens
(Williams 2000), and Russian government documents from the mid-1990s sug-
gest that these claims were not entirely unfounded (Naimark 2001, 106).

While it was the case elsewhere in Russia and the Soviet Union, too, that
ethnic minorities may have identified in opposition to the Russian-dominated
center, in Chechnya, other, more typical ethnic markers, such as language and
religion, seemed to play no major role. In a study of Tatar ethnic identity,
Rorlich (1999) notes that in addition to Tatar identity developing in opposi-
tion to Russian domination, key ethnic markers include Islam and language.
She maintains that "The most striking feature of the Tatar identity debate in
the last seven years has been the growing importance attached to language,
not only in identity construction and preservation, but in the fulfillment of
statehood as well" (1999, 390). While language revival was not the only issue
driving the nationalist movement in Tatarstan, language revival as a means to
achieve cultural survival was an equally important part of their program of
sovereignty and independence, and it remained so beyond the initial founding
of the nationalist movement in 1988 (Gorenburg 1999; Giuliano 2000; Graney
2010; Williams 2011).

Even though Soviet institutions had limited Chechen policy autonomy over
issues that typically are central to minority groups' recognition, such as lan-
guage and religion, such markers were not the main elements of a Chechen
identity or solidarity used to mobilize people. Rather, as Tishkov notes (2004,
53), the Chechen identity that had developed was based on notions of collec-
tive suffering at the hands of the center, which has contributed to the image
of the Chechens as a freedom-loving people prepared to fight to defend their
kin and homeland (see also Gammer 2006, 5–7; Russell 2007, 17–19, 24).

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[16] For the text of the declaration, see Eremenko and Novikov (1997, 7–10).

In the words of Musa Akhmadov, a writer and teacher at the Chechen State University, "Generation after generation, our people formed the philosophy of resistance against everything alien, be it russification or sovietization. Even in exile, we remained free in spirit although we were not permitted to travel, for instance" (*Chechnya: Pravo na kulturu* 1999, 112). Dudayev claimed in a 1991 interview that "I will restore my people's pride after our enslavement by the Russians."[17] Similarly, in a 1991 interview, the Chechen political scientist Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov described the 1990–1991 events in Chechnya-Ingushetia as follows:

> (A) revolt of the children in revenge for the deaths of their fathers and mothers during deportation and exile, a protest of the whole people against the continuing dominance of the old structures of power in Checheno-Ingushetia, and the beginning of a liberation revolution of the people for its independence and the independence of the North Caucasus.[18]

Whereas the Soviet state contributed to creating a Chechen identity of historical injustices and repression, the institutions governing center-region relations as they relate to more typical ethnic markers, particularly language, were in the early days of the Soviet Union quite accommodating. In the 1920s, the Soviet authorities encouraged native language education and expression of regional cultures, even printing books, journals, magazines, newspapers, and music in the various native languages (Martin 2001). Although Russian had been the only official language and medium of instruction in secular schools in the North Caucasus from the end of the Caucasian War until the Bolshevik revolution, early Soviet rule brought about schools with native language instruction at the primary level, even some native-language textbooks, and curricula with national contents (Jaimoukha 2005, 198–203). Indeed, the Chechen language had no written script until the 1920s when the Soviet authorities introduced a Latinized script.[19]

These efforts at boosting native languages and culture began to dwindle in the 1930s. In 1938, the Soviet authorities recommended that the peoples of the North Caucasus switch to a Cyrillic alphabet and Russian words, as Russian was to function as the common language of the "Soviet man." Refusing to do so was considered counterrevolutionary. In 1939, Russian became a mandatory second language in all schools in the USSR (Dunlop 1998, 46–47). With

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[17] From Ann Sheehy, "Power Struggle in Checheno-Ingushetia," *RFE-RL Report on the USSR*, November 15, 1991, 22.

[18] Ibid., 26.

[19] The Chechens who were literate prior to the 1920s were primarily religious figures literate in Arabic (Lieven 1998, 305). In 1921, the Soviet authorities recognized Arabic as the official language of education in Chechnya, but between 1923 and 1925, they introduced a Latinized script for the Chechen language – a policy that, besides giving the Chechen language a script, sought to loosen the link to Islam, as well as signal that the new Soviet state was not about Russification (Dunlop 1998, 46–47).

the deportation, Chechen education was essentially put on hold. While in exile, Chechen children did not receive much schooling, much less any schooling in their native language. Upon their return to Chechnya in 1957, the Chechens sought to restore the republic's education system, but by that time Soviet education policy hardly allowed any native language education. By 1978, the only language of instruction was Russian, and only in the countryside did Chechen continue to play a role in schools. Although some newspapers and books were published in Chechen, by the late 1980s, no Chechen language instruction was available past the second grade. In 1990, Chechen language was introduced in schools, but only as a foreign language subject in grades 1 through 4 (Gammer 2006, 191). Thus, in the Soviet era, many Chechens lost (or never gained) the ability to write in their native tongue, although there was no marked decline in the percentage of Chechens claiming Chechen as their native language (Kaiser 1994, 273–275), and many still speak Chechen at home.

Religious institutions faced a similar fate. Prior to Soviet rule, there were reportedly 140 religious schools and 2,675 mosques and other places of worship in Chechnya-Ingushetia (Gammer 2006, 142). Between 1924 and 1927, the Soviet authorities shut down all Islamic or Arabic schools in the North Caucasus, although some continued to operate in the late 1920s (ibid., 147; Dunlop 1998, 48). Even though religious practices, such as marriage and funeral rituals, continued to play a role in people's lives in the Soviet era, religion was officially banned. During the deportation, all mosques in the republic were destroyed, but places used for worship by the Sufi brotherhoods, particularly the Qadiri order, came to serve as underground substitutes. With *perestroika*, the first official mosque was opened in 1987 (Gammer 2006, 192–197).

The combination of a basis for solidarity built around central government repression and center-region institutions limiting the native culture contributed to the emergence of the nationalist movement in the late 1980s. Yet beyond the early phase of nationalist movement, it did not put cultural claims front and center. Influenced by nationalist movements elsewhere in the USSR, particularly in the Baltics (Beissinger 2002), the Chechen nationalist movement, which gained support among both urban intellectuals and the rural population in 1988 through 1990, emerged around calls for a revival of Chechen culture, customs, tradition, and language, as well as religion. Indeed, the first political organizations founded in the late Soviet era, in 1988, were the scholarly society Caucasus (Kavkaz) and the Popular Front of Chechnya-Ingushetia, both oriented toward cultural and linguistics revival, as well as the Green Movement of Chechnya-Ingushetia (Muzayev 1992, 12–25). Yet while such cultural concerns featured prominently also at the first meeting of the Chechen National Congress in November 1990, which called for sovereignty for the Chechen republic and a revival of its history, language, and culture (ibid., 18; Tishkov 1997, 199–201), at its second meeting, in June 1991, key issues were the inefficiency of the republic's communist regime and the creation of an independent

Chechen republic. The organization's executive committee further stated it would like to create its own armed forces, and in August it formed a national guard (Muzayev 1992, 18).[20] Similarly, while some of the extremists in the nationalist movement in the early 1990s called for the creation of an Islamic state (German 2003, 31), the emergence of nationalism and calls for independence in Chechnya had little to do with religion (e.g., Lieven 2000; Wilhelmsen 2004).[21]

As the nationalist movement took off in 1989, ethno-nationalist demands featured in half of the protests taking place in Grozny, while other protest demands focused on concerns related to the environment, the economy, and local government corruption (Beissinger 2002).[22] In 1990, while demands related to the environment and the economy still featured in some 30 percent of protests, ethno-nationalist demands gave way to calls for autonomy and sovereignty, even secession, and opposition to the local government was growing. Indeed, in 1990, opposition to the local government and corrupt officials was part of 40 percent of all protests, and the result was the appointment of the republic's first Chechen chairman, Zavgayev. By 1991, about 30 percent of all protests in Grozny included demands for secession or support for Dudayev's regime, which by the end of the year declared Chechnya independent. A large share of the protests continued to feature demands calling for the resignation of the local communist-led government, while, at the same time, anti-Dudayev protests were emerging. By 1992, the predominant demand in mass protests in Grozny was secession and support for Dudayev. Similarly, of twenty-five violent protest events in the same time period (1987–1992), none before August 1991, a major cause in twenty of them was a desire to secede from the USSR or Russia.

Thus, ethno-national demands regarding the Chechen language, for example, were only part of the story. The state envisioned in the March 1992 constitution, adopted by Dudayev's government, was one in which the economic well-being of its citizens was central, and cultural and religious claims were vague. Of the seventeen Russian republics that adopted their own constitutions between 1992 and 1996, the Chechen constitution was among the seven that did not include a language requirement for its chief executive or an official titular

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[20] See also Ann Sheehy, "Power Struggle in Checheno-Ingushetia," *RFE-RL Report on the USSR*, November 15, 1991, 22.

[21] See also Ann Sheehy, "Power Struggle in Checheno-Ingushetia," *RFE-RL Report on the USSR*, November 15, 1991, 22. Over the course of the first war and in the interwar period, radical Islam has come to play a more central role in Chechnya (see also Gammer 2006, 200–220; Hughes 2007; Bakke 2013).

[22] Beissinger's dataset covers ninety-five peaceful protests in Chechnya between January 1987 and December 1992. Mass protests are voluntary gatherings of at least 100 people with the purpose of collectively displaying a sentiment for or against public policies. For each event, the dataset records up to five demands. The dataset is available at http://www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin /research1.htm#Data (last accessed July 7, 2014).

language clause (Roeder 2007, 215). Indeed, shortly after its election in October 1991, the Chechen parliament declared both Chechen and Russian official state languages.[23] At the fourth meeting of the National Congress in 1992, the main issue concerned the importance of Chechen control over the economy, particularly the oil industry.[24] That is, although the Chechen nationalist movement began as a movement focused on ethno-nationalist demands, calls for sovereignty and independence, along with opposition to the local government, came to dominate. These demands were about political and economic independence as much as, if not more than, cultural concerns.

Take as an example a Chechen woman I met during the spring of 2005. A widow who left Chechnya when the second war broke out in 1999, she now lived in a small one-bedroom apartment in Moscow with her children. As a teacher and songwriter, language was of great importance to her, but she told me that while a pupil and teacher in Chechnya, she never really minded studying Russian language or studying in Russian – after all, she lived in Russia. To her recollection, there was never any popular movement that pushed for education to be in Chechen. Such concerns were not driving the first war, which, in her view, was whipped up by nationalist leaders referring to memories of lost land and the time in exile. In her cousin's words, the first war was about defending their homes.[25]

This is not to say that cultural concerns were – or are – unimportant for the Chechens. In 1992, for example, the Chechen parliament decided to switch the script of the Chechen alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin,[26] and in 1994, members of Dudayev's opposition complained that his regime had not given the population the opportunity to develop their language and culture.[27] In the 1990s, schools in some districts of Chechnya experimented with Chechen-language education, but the effort failed, as Chechen textbooks were never prepared,[28] presumably because of the costs associated with publishing.[29] Indeed, during Dudayev's regime, lack of resources forced a number of schools to close (German 2003, 61). In 1997, the Chechen government under President Aslan Maskhadov passed a law making the Chechen language the first official

[23] Ann Sheehy, "Power Struggle in Checheno-Ingushetia," *RFE-RL Report on the USSR,* November 15, 1991, 24.

[24] Timur Muzayev, "Pervye itogo suvereniteta," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, May 26, 1992.

[25] Personal communication, Moscow, June 21, 2005.

[26] Sharip Asuyev, "Calm Prevails in Chechnya," *TASS,* November 26, 1992.

[27] "Press Conference with a Group of Chechen Elders Who Have Been Meeting," *Official Kremlin International News Broadcast,* September 1, 1994.

[28] Tanya Lokshina, "Chechnya: Learning to Parrot," *Transitions Online,* August 9, 2004.

[29] In her study of education in Dagestan, another poor republic in the North Caucasus, Eaton (2005, 74) points out that even if regional governments are in a position to create curricula that divert from the centrally set standards, a resource-poor region is unlikely to spend its own scarce resources on replicating Moscow's curricular efforts. Indeed, news reports suggest that the costs associated with issuing textbooks, including Chechen-language textbooks, has been a concern. See, for example, "Aid to Chechen Schools," *RIA Novosti,* November 26, 2000; "Russia, Chechnya, ABCs," *RIA Novosti,* January 9, 2001; "Chechen Schools Ready to Admit

language in the republic (while Russian was the language for interethnic communication). Despite a general decentralizing trend in the sphere of education across Russia,[30] Russian is the main language of instruction in primary education in Chechnya, although reports suggest that in some rural areas, instructors use a mix of Chechen and Russian. In the last decades, some Chechen textbooks have appeared, but typically books have been in Russian, which adversely affects learning among children, particularly rural children, who do not necessarily understand Russian.[31] These efforts at boosting education in the Chechen language show that cultural concerns matter to people in their daily lives. Yet in contrast to, for example, the Québec nationalist movement, cultural survival has not been at the center of the Chechen quest for independence.

Rather, the Chechen struggle evolved around a more general grievance about ethnic (and, as I turn to next, economic) repression, stemming from a Chechen solidarity that highlights the group's struggles with central rulers. The violent conflict between Moscow and Chechnya came to be seen as yet another case of a centralized Russian-dominated state imposing suffering on the Chechen people (Williams 2000). The center's institutional restrictions on culture are part of this story, but as Chechen solidarity or identity has formed around the notion of protecting the group from the center, the concern was about a centralized, imposing, and discriminatory center more generally. Neither the Sikhs nor the *Québécois* have to such an extent identified and mobilized in opposition to a central government that threatens the group. As a result, the struggles in Punjab and in Québec have not primarily revolved around being *against* a threatening center but rather about being *for* the protection or promotion of the cultural and economic safety of the ethnic group or region. Only

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190,000 Children," *RIA Novosti,* August 31, 2001; "Chechnya's Education System Shows Signs of Recovery," *RIA Novosti,* January 23, 2002; "Schoolchildren Speak Poor Russian but Have Almost No Chechen Textbooks," *Caucasus Reporting Service* 420, November 22, 2007.

[30] Across Russia, the 1990s saw several steps allowing for greater regional autonomy over language and education. The 1993 constitution allows the republics to use their own state language alongside Russian, and the 1998 amendment to the Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation affirms that people have the right to receive education in their native language. Regional and local governments gained increased autonomy over school curricula within frames set centrally (Eaton 2005, 59–60). For a long time, textbooks in history paid little attention to the country's diverse population and often depicted descendants of non-Slavic peoples, particularly the Mongols, as barbaric warriors. In 2000, the federal Education Ministry began to correct this Slavic-centrism by issuing rewritten textbooks, but until then, the regions had to supplement federally assigned textbooks with more nuanced ones. See Judith Matloff, "Russia Revisits History in Its School Textbooks," *The Christian Science Monitor,* March 28, 2000; Susan B. Glasser, "In a Russian Republic, ABCs Are Test of Power," *Washington Post,* April 16, 2001; Fred Weir, "A Second Chance for Genghis Khan," *The Christian Science Monitor,* April 9, 2003.

[31] Tanya Lokshina, "Chechnya: Learning to Parrot," *Transitions Online,* August 9, 2004; Ruslan Isayev, "Chechen-Language Textbook Being Withdrawn from Schools and Libraries in Chechnya," *Prague Watchdog,* November 19, 2007.

in the Chechen case, for example, has control over armed forces been among the nationalist demands.

Reflecting on the hypotheses about ethnicity and policy autonomy from Chapter 1, the Chechen case shows how the ethnic group's basis of solidarity was shaped by the population's interactions with the state and, in turn, influenced the demands raised. The central state, through a history of repression, helped create demands for independence. Thus, the struggle was not only about "typical" ethnic policy areas (such as language, education, and religion), which meant that policy autonomy in those spheres was not the first priority of the nationalist movement. If we only consider the ethnic demographics of the Chechen republic, we would, per Hypothesis 1a, expect that cultural policy autonomy would help stem the emergence of self-determination demands. Yet, as hypothesized in Hypothesis 1c, we need to also consider the basis of ethnic solidarity. In the Chechen case, the basis for solidarity that underpinned mobilization revolved around a threatening center, which meant that cultural policy autonomy was not central as a means to stem self-determination demands. Thus, we come full circle: the state's institutions and policies helped create a basis for solidarity that underpinned self-determination demands, and the degree to which the state could meet those demands was limited by the very forces it helped foster. This was not a struggle about cultural policy autonomy, as the state had helped foster a struggle that was about much more.

The nationalist movement in Chechnya was Chechen centered, but the demands raised went beyond cultural survival. In contrast to Tatarstan, where the Tatars did not constitute even half of the population and the moderate Tatar nationalists, as such, tried to win the support of the large Russian population by downplaying ethnic revival (Giuliano 2000; see also Gorenburg 1999), in Chechnya, the Chechens constituted a solid majority, and the nationalist movement did not need the support of the region's non-Chechen population. Although Dudayev, who was married to a Russian woman, did not want the nationalist movement to alienate the Russian population,[32] once he came to power in Chechnya, he set out to establish a state in which the well-being of Chechens was the priority. The rationale was not, primarily, based on considerations about cultural protection or promotion but rather on mistreatment of Chechens in other parts of Russia. Between the summer of 1990 and the summer of 1992, about 70,000 Russians or Russian speakers left the republic, more than three times as many as in the previous decade (Dunlop 1998, 134–137). Others have noted that the Chechen nationalist movement did little to appeal to Ingush sentiments or interests (Lieven 1998, 70). That is, demographics allowed the movement to be primarily about Chechens, but the basis for solidarity went beyond the protection of Chechen culture; it was about Chechen survival. In this societal context, cultural policy autonomy was

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[32] Ann Sheehy, "Power Struggle in Checheno-Ingushetia," *RFE-RL Report on the USSR*, November 15, 1991, 22.

secondary to policy autonomy that would protect the group from a threatening center. Given Chechnya's poor economic situation, concerns about fiscal autonomy, to which I turn next, were also key to the struggle.

Wealth (or Lack Thereof) and Fiscal Autonomy

Chechnya was and is a poor region. About the size of Northern Ireland, the republic (approximately 15,000 square kilometers) lies on the northern slope of the Caucasus Mountains. It is traditionally an agricultural region with grain farmers in the lowlands and sheep and cattle breeders in the highlands. In the 1890s and early days of the 1900s, the Chechen capital, Grozny, experienced an upsurge due to the expansion of the oil extracting and processing industry.[33] In the 1920s, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR's oil wells and refineries turned it into one of the most advanced industrial regions in the North Caucasus. Yet despite the oil wealth, the republic was among the poorest of the Russian regions. For example, while the average monthly salary in Russia in 1985 was 199 rubles, it was 158 rubles in Chechnya; in 1991, the corresponding amounts were 548 in Russia but 392 in Chechnya (German 2003, 20).

Not only was the population in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR poorer than the national average; the republic was also characterized by income discrepancies along ethnic lines. When the Chechens and Ingush returned from exile in 1957, they became second-class citizens in their own republic. Among the ethnic republics in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), Chechnya-Ingushetia ranked at the bottom in terms of the ratio of titular representation in the white-collar workforce (Giuliano 2006, 289).[34] The oil industry primarily employed Russians, particularly in executive and trained specialist positions.[35] Indeed, in 1959, among the republic's 8,997 listed specialists with higher education, only 3.3 percent were Chechen and Ingush. Similarly, of the republic's 8,000 teachers, only 18 percent were Chechen and Ingush, the majority of whom had no higher education (Dunlop 1998, 81). In general, Chechens were poorly educated. In 1979, in the Soviet Union, 77 per 1,000 had completed a higher education degree; in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, only 22 of 1,000 had done so. In 1989, the corresponding numbers were 113 per 1,000 and 45 per 1,000 (Tishkov 1997, 165). In part, this lag was a result of the years in exile and lost education opportunities. As put by the Chechen scholar Dzhabrail Gakayev:

[33] On the early days of the oil industry in Grozny, see van der Leeuw (2000, 74–76).

[34] Some Chechens refused to participate in the Soviet-run industries (rather turning to the "grey" or "black" economies), thus making way for this ethnic division of labor (Krag and Funch 1994, 33; Russell 2007, 46).

[35] In the late 1980s, Grozneft and Orgsynthez, the two largest petrochemical companies in Chechnya, employed 500,000 workers and engineers, among whom only a few hundred were Chechen and Ingush (Tishkov 2004, 41). According to Gall and de Waal (1998, 79), it was official policy that all top administrators in the oil industry be ethnic Russians.

> Teaching at schools in the rural areas, where 70 percent of the indigenous popu-
> lation lived, remained at a very low level for decades. Schools had a shortage of
> financing, teachers, infrastructure, and books. Many children didn't attend school
> because of their families' poverty and the seasonal migratory work their parents
> asked them to do. At college entrance exams, those from village schools, mostly
> of Chechen and Ingush nationality, could not compete with the Russian-speaking
> city youth. In consequence, local colleges failed to train Chechen or Ingush spe-
> cialists. (…) Russia's colleges had a system of reserving quotas for applicants
> from ethnic autonomous regions, but the republic's Communist Party committee
> began admitting Russian-speaking applicants among the indigenous candidates
> in these reserved quotas. Those from city schools – Russians, Armenians, Jews –
> received more opportunities. These policies prevented the Vainakhs from bridging
> the cultural gap caused by the years of exile. (quoted in Tishkov 2004, 45)

From the 1960s, the share of Chechens participating in the industrial sectors
of the economy grew, but so did poverty and unemployment, and each year
as many as 100,000 Chechens made their living as seasonal or migrant work-
ers elsewhere in the Soviet Union (German 2003, 21). This kind of economic
hardship played a key role in the emergence of Chechen calls for independence
(Zaurbekova 2000).[36] The nationalist leaders blamed the central government
and its arm in the region, the communist-led government, for the population's
economic hardships. In the following pages, I examine how the intergov-
ernmental fiscal system in the Soviet Union and early 1990s Russia affected
Chechnya's economy, in turn jointly shaping self-determination demands.

In the Soviet Union, the intergovernmental fiscal system between Moscow
and the fifteen union republics was decentralized yet at the same time central-
ized. A number of expenditure responsibilities were decentralized to the union
republics (price subsidies, social security pensions, light-industry enterprises,
transportation, state farms and agricultural collectives) and to the lower-level
republics, districts, and cities (public health, primary and secondary educa-
tion, local transportation and roads, local environmental cleanup, local light
industry, food enterprises, and housing). However, these responsibilities were
typically guided by directives from the state planning agency, Gosplan (Wallich
1994, 35–36). Thus public finance data may paint an image of a union more
fiscally decentralized than what it really was. Similarly, while revenues were
collected locally and assigned to different levels of government to match their
responsibilities, a large share of this income was the so-called turnover tax,
which was shared upward in that the revenues were passed on to higher-level

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[36] Similarly, in a study of nationalist mobilization across the Russian ethnic republics in the early
1990s, Giuliano (2006) argues that nationalist movements gained popular support in republics
in which nationalist leaders blamed the (supposed) subordinate economic position of the titular
population vis-à-vis Russians on a discriminatory central government. That is, what mattered
was not only the socioeconomic status of the titular populations but also the degree to which
nationalist leaders could argue that the titulars were in a subordinate economic position in the
region.

governments. In turn, the central government was in charge of redistributing revenues to balance the union republics' budgets. Both union republics and autonomous republics were, on average, able to cover less than half of their expenditures from their own revenues (Hutchings 1983, 30). Data from Soviet budgets suggest that through the 1980s, about 30 percent of the republics' revenues came from own sources.[37]

Within each of the union republics, such as the RSFSR, both decisions and budgets were centrally controlled by either the union republic government or Gosplan, and the income of lower-level or local governments, such as the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, was heavily dependent on a few sectors of the economy (Bahry 1987, 69–71; 130–135; Ross 1987). The union republic governments approved the local revenue plans and redistribution of revenues, which in effect meant that the union republics were in charge of approving local expenditures. The local governments initially had a larger expenditure responsibility than the union republics, but that changed in the mid-1950s. Yet while the local governments came to have smaller budgets and fewer expenditure responsibilities, they were the ones in charge of posts central to people's well-being, such as housing, health, and social services. For the local governments, their main source of revenue was the shared turnover tax. The local governments' major own revenue source was profit payments from local enterprises, but they typically had little industry under their jurisdiction. Indeed, major industries related to oil and gas, defense, machinery, chemical engineering, and transportation were under the jurisdiction of central ministries, while industries related to oil refining, coal and energy, construction, agriculture, and food processing were typically under the jurisdiction of the union republics. Industries under local jurisdiction included those using locally supplied materials and housing construction.

In the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, own-source revenues were relatively small. The republic was home to machine and metal-working factories, food-processing plants, some lighter manufacturing and textile industries, construction industries, and woodworking factories, but the cornerstone of its economy was the oil-extracting and oil-processing industries (Jaimoukha 2005, 97–101). Somewhat paradoxically, the economy in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was in some ways suffering because of the republic's oil industry. Key to the Soviet planned economy was that certain republics and regions specialized in only a few economic tasks. The Chechen-Ingush ASSR's specialty was oil production, and from the 1920s, Moscow invested in the buildup of this industry. The problem for the Chechen-Ingush republic was that this industry generated revenues that went straight to the central government (Tishkov 2004, 41). So while all autonomous republics and regions in the Soviet Union could cover only a fraction of their expenditures from own sources, it is plausible

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[37] In comparison, the average across the federations in the analysis in Chapter 2 is more than 40 percent.

that it was particularly difficult for the Chechen-Ingush ASSR to cover its own expenditures.

The question, then, is whether central transfers, including the shared turnover tax, compensated for the region's small basis for own-source revenues. Lack of data makes it difficult to assess central transfers to the Chechen-Ingush ASSR over time,[38] but according to one Russian study (cited in Ross 1987, 78–79), of all of the RSFSR's autonomous republics, *krais, oblasts,* and cities, most of them (45 percent) covered only 20 to 30 percent of their income from own sources in 1974. In the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, 22.5 percent of the region's income was covered from own sources, while the average across the seventy-three regions was 29.8 percent. That is, even though the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was among the poorest in the RSFSR, nearly half of the regions (thirty-four of seventy-three) had a larger share of their budget covered by central transfers than did the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.

Most local revenues came from the shared turnover tax and other central transfers and grants to cover specific projects or programs, but resources also flowed from the center to the union republics and lower-level regions via enterprises and ministries' investments in construction, housing, hospitals, and cultural funds. Indeed, a substantial share of central investments in the regions happened off budget, but lack of data again makes it difficult to assess how large that share was for each region.[39] Given that these funds were channeled through ministries and enterprises, an option is to use the health of Chechnya's major industry, the oil sector, as an indicator of central investments in the region. The deportation had an adverse effect on the oil industry, as a number of experienced workers were forced to leave (Dunlop 1998, 74), but production peaked in 1971 with nearly 22 million tons oil processed, most of which was extracted in Chechnya. By 1980, however, oil extraction had dropped to 7 million tons due to failed equipment and declining investments (German 2003, 21, 172, fn. 38), as well as increased investments in oil industries elsewhere in the USSR.[40] In 1991, the Chechen oil industry produced only 4 million tons oil, and the projections for 2000 were 1.5 to 2 million tons (Evangelista 2002, 21–21; Jaimoukha 2005, 97), indicating further decline in investments. The central government further invested in collective farms in the regions, but wages in Chechnya-Ingushetia's agricultural sector lagged far behind the rest of the regions (Dunlop 1998, 88), suggesting that central investments in this sector were low.

Although the data on central transfers and investments to the Chechen-Ingush ASSR are incomplete, they suggest that the growing unemployment and poverty in the 1961 to 1991 period is indicative of the region not getting its fair

[38] See Bahry (1987, 135) for problems related to fiscal data within the USSR's union republics.
[39] According to one estimate, in the late Soviet period, 65–80 percent of infrastructural projects in the regions came from off-budget funds (Kirkow 1998, 37).
[40] Mairbek Vatchagaev, "Oil in Chechnya: A Brief History," *Chechnya Weekly,* April 18, 2008.

share of the federation's economic pie. The public sectors that really suffered due to lack of revenues were those for which the regional government had expenditure responsibility, such as housing, health, and social services – sectors important to people's everyday lives. Indeed, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR's health care system was deemed one of the worst in Russia, and the infant mortality rate and mortality rate from infectious and parasitical diseases were far higher than the Russian average. The republic was also among the Russian regions worst fit to provide housing for its citizens (Dunlop 1998, 87).

Thus, not only did the Chechens have a collective identity or solidarity formed on the basis of the Soviet state's practices, they lived in one of the poorest regions of the Soviet Union, and part of the responsibility for this poverty rested with – and was perceived to rest with – the central government and the communist economic system directed from Moscow (Dunlop 1998, 213; Evangelista 2002, 16). Key to the Chechen nationalists' diagnosis of the republic's "ills" were the financial aspects of the federal system, which did not do much to offset the republic's poverty; rather, it was seen as creating poverty. Consistent with expectations laid out in Chapter 1 (Hypothesis 2a), absent more transfers from the center, their proposed cure was greater autonomy or independence.

At the elite level, demands included greater autonomy over economic affairs and natural resources, even in the declaration of sovereignty from the Chechen-Ingush ASSR's Supreme Soviet.[41] More generally, people identifying or identified as the Chechen intelligentsia who were opposed to Dudayev's quest for independence still favored economic autonomy from the central government, pointing out that the central government was, in part, responsible for Chechnya's high unemployment.[42] The nationalist leaders played on both the Chechen fear of Russian dominance and the sense of economic discrimination at the hands of the center. While Dudayev frequently referred to "300 years of Russian discrimination," he also focused on how independence would mean that Chechnya would be free to use its oil wealth to create jobs and prosperity. In President Dudayev's own words, from an interview in 1992:

> Let us remember that in the Chechen Republic there developed a situation that was in clear contradiction with common sense: although possessing vast stores of the highest-quality oil (…) the Chechen Republic is nonetheless the poorest of the former USSR, ranks lowest in social security, has the highest [indicators] for infant mortality, unemployment, environmental pollution, cancer, and tuberculosis. At the same time, the funds coming into the republican budget from the activity of the oil-extracting and processing complexes are unsatisfactorily (not to say offensively) small, which does not allow placing the solution of a single national problem of Chechnya on the agenda. (quoted in Tishkov 2004, 67)

[41] See the declaration's Articles 11 and 12 (Eremenko and Novikov 1997, 7–10).
[42] Personal communication with Chechens identifying as members of the Chechen intelligentsia, Moscow, May 26, June 21, and June 24, 2005.

   Dudayev's vision was that an independent Chechnya would be able to benefit from its oil revenues, including setting prices for oil export products, enter international trade agreements, and attract foreign direct investment – all of which would improve the local economy. In his view, the Soviet state had made Chechnya, with its potential for wealth, poor. In the early 1990s, Chechnya's economic downturn continued. Even though Dudayev had envisioned Chechnya as a prosperous "second Kuwait," that vision was far from the reality on the ground in 1992 to 1994 (Dunlop 1998, 124–128; Tishkov 2004, 63–68). In 1992, industrial production in Chechnya and Ingushetia fell by 30 percent, which was nearly twice the average drop in Russia as a whole, and in 1993 by more than 60 percent. The oil industry further deteriorated, in part because the Russian population, on whose skills the oil industry depended, was leaving *en masse*.[43] In addition, the oil transported through Chechnya's pipelines was an increasingly popular target of theft; it is estimated that in 1993, oil worth more than 4 billion rubles was simply stolen. The food-production industry and agricultural sector of the economy declined, while unemployment, which was about 33 percent before the Chechen Revolution, increased dramatically, by 16 percent in 1993 alone. For years, a large number of Chechens had found work in other Soviet republics as seasonal workers, but with the collapse of the USSR, this opportunity shrank. Along with this sharp economic decline, public health, education, and pension and social service payments suffered.

   Available data suggest that the nationalist leaders' claims that the region was losing out in the federation was not entirely unfounded. Official Goskomstat or Ministry of Finance data on transfers to Chechnya are available for only a few years in the 1990s (1992, 1995, and 1996), and they show that in 1992, 21.8 percent of the republic's expenditures were covered by grants from the central government, which was below the average across the Russian regions – 26.7 percent (calculated from Freinkman et al. 1999, 88–90). The region ranked as fifty-five out of eighty-nine in terms of expenditures covered by central transfers. The regions that covered the largest share of their expenditures from own pockets were Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, while central transfers to Ingushetia exceeded the region's expenditures (147 percent). Thus, these data suggest that the Chechen republic, where the economy was rapidly deteriorating and unable to provide public goods, covered a larger share of its expenditures from own sources – that is, was more fiscally autonomous – than the average Russian region.[44]

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[43] From 1992 to 1993, oil extraction more than halved (from 2.6 to 1.2 million tons), and the refineries were too old to keep up production levels (Dunlop 1998, 125–129).

[44] There are no data available on central transfers to the republic in 1993 and 1994. In March 1993, the federal government stopped funding pensions and other benefits in Chechnya (German 2003, 74; Tishkov 2004, 66–67), but in the fall of 1994, the federal government stepped up the payment of wages and pensions in two of Chechnya's districts in an attempt to "buy" loyalty (Dunlop 1998, 197). It is not clear that this practice continued, as the federal government in the summer of 1995 invited Chechen residents to go to the neighboring region Stavropol to receive

Complicating the assessment of whether Chechnya was losing out in the federation in the early 1990s is the fact that Chechnya, along with nearly a third of the regions, stopped remitting tax revenues collected on its territory to the federal government (Wallich 1994, 248). According to data published by Leonid Smirnyagin, who was a member of the Presidential Council and an advisor to President Yeltsin, in 1992, Chechnya-Ingushetia was, along with fourteen other ethnic republics, a net beneficiary in the federation.[45] In that year, 50 percent of the republic's budgets came from local taxes and the rest from central transfers (Sokirianskaia 2009, 159). Among the net recipient ethnic republics, Chechnya-Ingushetia was on the lower end in terms of per capita rubles from the federal budget.

Yet even though Chechnya was a net beneficiary, it is reasonable to assume that the combination of poverty and relatively low transfers contributed to the poor provision of public goods in the region, affecting perceptions about the benefits of remaining part of the federation. Indeed, Chechnya's finance minister at the time, Taimaz Abubakarov, claimed that it was a "myth" that the republic received significant transfers from the federal government (German 2003, 74). A separate but related matter is whether transfers from the center, whatever their size, ever reached the Chechen population; allegedly a large share ended up in the hands of corrupt officials both in Moscow and in Chechnya.[46]

Thus, while it is difficult to paint an accurate picture, available evidence suggests that in the early 1990s, Chechnya was not necessarily receiving central transfers that helped offset its poverty. At the same time, Moscow, in an attempt to coerce the regime in Grozny into submission, imposed a blockade on Chechnya, which stopped all flows of foreign aid, loans, and investments. Even though President Dudayev took steps to overcome the economic blockade, reaching one-on-one trade agreements with some of Chechnya's neighbor regions (Slider 1994, 244), the regional government was left with few resources to build a new state. Unable to control the emerging shadow economy (Sokirianskaia 2009, 161–162), the government increasingly turned to illegal sources of income, such as the production of counterfeit money and false financial documents, as well as sales and transit of narcotics and weapons, the latter sold in Grozny at large outdoor markets (Derluguian 2004, 255).

The economic problems facing Chechen government in the early 1990s were exacerbated by the outbreak of the first war, leaving the republic in disastrous

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their pensions (ibid., 184). In other words, in 1993 and 1994, the Chechen budget was almost independent of Moscow. In contrast, Ministry of Finance data for 1995 and 1996 show that the ratio of central transfers to the republic's expenditures was 113.5 and 92.8 percent (Freinkman et al. 1999, 88).

[45] Leonid Smirnyagin, "Politichesky Federalizm protiv ekonomicheskogo," *Segodnya* 28, June 25, 1993.

[46] This is a problem that might have persisted into the 2000s. See, for example, Igor Torbakov, "War on Terrorism in the Caucasus: Russia Breeds Jihadists," *Chechnya Weekly*, November 10, 2005.

shape. So although the federal government does not alone deserve the blame for Chechnya's economic problems – and an independent Chechnya would probably, as Moscow claimed, have turned out to be economically unviable – it was possible for the nationalist leaders to argue that there was little benefit for Chechnya to remain part of the federation. Even among the opposition within Chechnya, which was critical of Dudayev and his quest for independence, few opposed the claim that Chechnya was losing out in the Russian Federation. In August 1992, a leader of one of the opposition groups in Chechnya claimed that the Russian government was intentionally halting all financial operations with Chechnya in order to discredit Dudayev's government in the eyes of the Chechen people.[47] At a press conference in early 1993, another opposition leader stated that sovereignty "should be implemented for the sake of raising the living standards and the prosperity of the republic's citizens irrespective of their nationality" (quoted in Schaefer 2008, 24). Dudayev himself repeatedly claimed that the Russian government was spending billions of rubles in preparing a Chechen invasion, including funding the growing Chechen opposition,[48] reinforcing the point that the federal government's spending priority in Chechnya was to wage war.

It is important not to overstate the degree to which the central government deserved and received blame for the republic's poverty. In the Soviet era, probably an equal share of the responsibility rested with the republic's Communist Party and communist-led government, although that government was – and was seen as – little but an arm of the policy makers in Moscow. Evangelista observes that "For Dudayev and his fellow Chechens, the aspects of 'communism' that elicited the most resistance were the hypercentralization and inefficiency of the political and economic system directed from Moscow, and the secrecy and hypocrisy of political life" (2002, 16). According to Yusup Soslambekov, one of the early leaders of the Chechen nationalist movement, widespread poverty explains why the Chechens overthrew the communist-led government in 1991: "The Chechens don't like being poor, and they are ready to go to any lengths to grab power from the *nomenklatura*, hence the revolution" (quoted in Tishkov 2004, 52). Even some party members held a similarly negative view of their party. In 1987, the chairman of the local Supreme Soviet, Khazhbikar Bokov, wrote a letter to the Communist Party's central committee in Moscow, complaining that the local first secretary and leader of the local Communist Party was simply closing his eyes to widespread corruption (Tishkov 2004, 39).

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[47] *RFE/RL Weekly Review*, August 21, 1992.

[48] In February 1993, for example, he claimed that the federal government was spending 30 billion rubles in destabilizing the Chechen government (*RFE/RL News Brief/Supplement to Research Support,* February 12, 1993), and in August 1994, he claimed that the federal government was spending 150 billion rubles in preparing a Chechen invasion (Dunlop 1998, 198).

In the Chechen population, there was great dissatisfaction with the local Communist Party and the communist-controlled local government, widely seen as corrupt (Tishkov 2004, 38–39). Given the centralized structure of the Communist Party and the fact that there had never been a Chechen first secretary or chairman in the republic until the appointment of Zavgayev in 1989, the party and local government were both closely associated with the Russian-dominated center. For the emerging nationalist leadership in the late 1980s, the first step toward sovereignty was to acquire power at the local level. Given a history of local corruption and Russian control, it was easy to rally people around an agenda ousting the local communist-led government. As a result of this popular outcry, when Vladimir Foteyev, an ethnic Russian, resigned as first secretary of the local Communist Party in the spring of 1989, the party bosses in Moscow backed down on their preferred Russian candidate and appointed Zavgayev, an ethnic Chechen and long-time second secretary of the local party. Although Zavgayev, who became chairman of the Supreme Soviet in 1990, cast himself as a nationalist by participating at the first meeting of the Chechen National Congress, he, too, was seen as a corrupt representative of the communist era. A number of protests in Grozny in 1990 called for Zavgayev's resignation. At the elite level, the Vainakh Democratic Party, which was formed in 1990 and from which the Chechen National Congress emerged, called for the creation of a sovereign Chechen-Ingush republic, for fair share of power in the republic to be given to people of Chechen and Ingush origin, and for better economic opportunities within the republic (Muzayev 1995, 159–160). That is, the demands were directed at both the central and local governments.

Once in power, the nationalist movement under Dudayev proved ill equipped to better the local economy (Sokirianskaia 2009, 160–166). Nor were they less corrupt; even Dudayev's vice president, the writer Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, later acknowledged widespread corruption among high-ranking officials.[49] Combined, the failure of the Chechen government's economic plans and the widespread corruption encouraged the formation of an internal opposition movement.[50] In particular, economic elites and highly educated Chechens, the intelligentsia, were disillusioned by Dudayev's economic program and became part of the opposition. In March 1992, opposition forces seized the TV and radio stations in Grozny, demanding the resignation of Dudayev and the pro-Dudayev parliament on the grounds that their "short-sighted and inconsistent policy" had led to "a catastrophic situation has developed (…) in the economy and the socio-political sphere" (quoted in German 2003, 82). In 1994, the former speaker of the Russian

[49] Dunlop (1998, 130–131) notes that corruption in Chechnya was in part a result of corruption in Russia more generally, in particular in the oil and petroleum product export system.

[50] In February 1993, the opposition groups tried to create a joint program to address the economic and political crisis in Chechnya. See *RFE/RL News Brief/Supplement to Research Report,* February 19, 1993.

parliament (1991–1993), Ruslan Khasbulatov, a native Chechen with aspira-
tions of becoming Chechnya's president himself, argued that the local author-
ities' inaction was to blame for the population's economic hardship.[51] Indeed,
as the following interview excerpt from Tishkov's study demonstrates, those
opposed to Dudayev were often opposed based on economic reasons:

> This Dudayev is of no more use to me than last year's snow. (…) There's never
> before been a worse enemy to Chechens – a man who would ruin his own people.
> Now look around – want and misery everywhere. They tell us on television that
> we have freedom now. What kind of freedom is it if people are starving? There's
> no freedom if we are so poor and our children can't go to school. (quoted in
> Tishkov 2004, 84)

Yet, as noted, the opposition, while dissatisfied with Dudayev's economic pro-
gram, shared the view that Chechnya was not benefiting in the federation. A
Chechen politician I met with in Moscow in 2005, who self-identified as a
member of the intellectual opposition, argued that the blame for Chechnya's
corruption lies in Moscow, as corrupt officials there create the rules that the
Chechen government has to follow. Moreover, he argued, another problem
for the Chechen economy is the federal government's inability to create an
efficient market economy. As he saw it, the solution to Chechnya's problems
was and is independence, but through evolutionary rather than the revolu-
tionary means advocated by Dudayev and his supporters. In the early 1990s,
he argued, Chechnya was simply not ready to become an independent state
overnight (cf. Sokirianskaia 2009, 156).[52] Another self-identified member of
the intelligentsia opposed to Dudayev told me that to most educated people,
independence meant economic independence within the Russian Federation, as
Chechnya would not survive without trade ties to its neighbor regions.[53]

   In sum, both the Soviet and early post-Soviet Russia's intergovernmental fis-
cal systems were considered to contribute to – or at least not offset – economic
hardship among the Chechen population, which gave the nationalist leaders an
opportunity to justify their quest for independence in economic terms. Absent
more transfers and investments from the center, there was little benefit for
the Chechens to stay in the federation. Even members of the Chechen opposi-
tion movement shared the view that Chechnya's economy had suffered from
being part of the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian state, but they were hesi-
tant to embrace a rapid path to independence or a notion of independence
as more than economic independence within Russia. Thus, the Chechen case
demonstrates how fiscal transfers – and, importantly, perceptions of transfers –
shaped grievances and cost-benefit calculations in a poor region. In turn, those

[51] Tatyana Romanenkova and Aleksej Vorobev, "Ruslan Khasbulatov: "Ia by khotel sygrat mirot-
   vorcheskuiu rol na severnom Kavkaze," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, May 25, 1994.
[52] Personal communication, Moscow, May 26, 2005.
[53] Personal communication, Moscow, June 21, 2005.

grievances and calculations set the tone for what kind of fiscal institutional arrangements could help mitigate the conflict.

The Chechen Revolution and the Disbanding of Political Elite Ties

Several scholars have linked nationalism and centrifugal tendencies in Russia in the early 1990s to the disintegration of the Communist Party and the failure of any new party to take its place, which severed institutional ties between tiers of government across Russia (Bunce 1999; Filippov et al. 2004).[54] President Boris Yeltsin, the first Russian president, and his immediate successor Vladimir Putin did officially not represent political parties, although through their terms they were associated with "parties of power," which formally or informally were supported by some of the regional governors.

Special to the Chechen case was the Chechen Revolution of 1990–1991 and the ensuing power struggles within the republic, which made for an unstable regime (Lapidus 1998; Derluguian 1999a; German 2003, 76–93). Here, consistent with the argument developed in Chapter 1 (Hypothesis 3), I maintain that the absence of political ties between the leadership in Moscow and in Grozny hampered negotiation efforts between 1991 and 1994, feeding into elite struggles within the Chechen Republic, which then further complicated negotiations with Moscow. That is, the combination of lack of intergovernmental political elite ties and power struggles within Chechnya helped pave the way for a violent conflict.

The Chechen Revolution refers to the events that brought Dudayev to power in Chechnya. In the summer of 1989, the first openly political organization was founded, and peaceful mass demonstrations around a variety of goals began to take place. By the summer of 1991, violent demonstrations – violent in the sense that they inflicted damage to people or property – picked up. These demonstrations, mostly in the name of secession and the resignation of the republic's Supreme Soviet, were organized by the National Congress under the leadership of Dudayev. The demonstrators took control over Soviet military bases, and on August 22, they seized the TV center in Grozny, whereupon Dudayev declared the "Chechen Revolution." On September 6, forces loyal to Dudayev and the National Congress, the National Guard, stormed the Supreme Soviet building.[55] Nine days later, the Supreme Soviet dissolved, and power was transferred to a Provisional Council, which was to rule until elections scheduled for November 17. On October 1, Dudayev's forces seized the republic's KGB headquarters, including weapons and secret files. These events took place more or less with the blessing of the democratic movement in

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[54] This section draws on Bakke (2010).

[55] This attack caused the first (reported) death in the Chechen conflict, but it is not clear whether it was an accident; in the storming of the building, the head of Grozny's city committee was either pushed or fell out a window.

Moscow, as Dudayev had – unlike the chairman of the Chechen Supreme Soviet, Zavgayev – taken a clear stance against the coup makers of August 19.[56] This gratitude was, however, soon replaced by concerns for Dudayev's nondemocratic means, and when the Chechen National Congress on October 6 dissolved the Provisional Council, Moscow threatened to use force. Nonetheless, the Chechen Revolution carried on, and on October 27, Dudayev came to power in elections that can hardly be considered free and fair.[57] A few days later, on November 1, he declared Chechnya independent.

With the Chechen Revolution, not just political party ties but all institutional ties linking central and regional elites disappeared. Chechnya was the only Russian region in which the first immediate post-Soviet leader came to power as head of a nationalist movement (Treisman 1997), allied neither with the communists and, thus, part of some old boys' *nomenklatura* network, nor with the emerging democratic movement at the center. Although Dudayev had been a member of the Communist Party, he had no history as a politician in the party. In fact, because the Chechens' political participation in their own republic had been limited by the deportation in 1944 and the half-hearted rehabilitation process of 1956 and 1957, there was no large Chechen political elite or intelligentsia (Muzayev 1995, 154; Gammer 2006, 208). Unlike the other titular republics in the Soviet Union, Chechnya did not have a native first secretary until 1990. The late 1980s and early 1990s were a time when the Communist Party at the center was disintegrating across Russia, and incentives such as regional party officials' career depending on being on the good side of the central party bosses mattered less and less. Yet even in post-Soviet Russia with its weak political parties, into the mid-1990s, many regional leaders continued to be political allies of the center either by virtue of being appointed by or in some way affiliated with the Russian president.[58] These ties provided perks such as media exposure, expertise, and financial aid (Orttung 2000) that helped "glue" the regions to the center. Not so in Chechnya. By November 1991, "all organs of federal authority in Chechnya had already been disbanded" (Pain and Popov, quoted in Dunlop 1998, 116).

This disbanding of ties with the federal level had several effects. First of all, it brought more radical demands to the bargaining table. Although the old

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[56] On August 19, 1991, hard-line communists tried to oust Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. The Chechen Supreme Soviet offered no comments of condemnation of the failed coup. There were even rumors that Zavgayev had somehow been involved.

[57] Survey data suggest, though, that 60 to 70 percent of Chechen voters supported Dudayev (Dunlop 1998, 114).

[58] Only nine of eighty-nine regions held regional elections in 1991. One additional region held its first regional elections in 1992, and nine more held their first regional elections in 1993. Most of the eighty-nine regions held their first regional elections in 1995–1996, which means that the center maintained control over the appointment of most regional executives until then. Following the 1996 elections, fewer than half of the leaders in the Russian regions were allied with the party in power, Our Home is Russia.

elites – Zavgayev and the Chechen Supreme Council – had issued a declaration of sovereignty in November 1990 that read like a rather radical declaration, it was meant to provoke "only" economic and political concessions from Moscow (Gall and de Waal 1998, 82–83). In an attempt to compete with the Chechen National Congress, Zavgayev grew increasingly defiant of Moscow over the course of 1991. Yet Zavgayev's nationalist resolve only went so far. Even though he declared Chechnya sovereign, he did not envision Chechnya seceding from Russia (German 2003, 29–32). Unlike Dudayev, Zavgayev to some extent owed his position to Moscow.[59] Dudayev, in contrast, owed little to Moscow, as he came to power as head of the National Congress. As a consequence, he was more outspoken in challenging the territorial integrity of the state.

The Chechen constitution adopted by Dudayev's regime in March 1992 begins by proclaiming the Chechen Republic "as an independent sovereign state and recognizing itself as equal in rights subject in the system of world commonwealth of nations."[60] Despite this rhetoric, it is not clear that Dudayev was unwilling to negotiate. In a letter to Yeltsin from March 1992, Dudayev expressed that he was open to compromise and forming relations with "peoples and states on the basis of the norms and principles of international law" (quoted in German 2003, 73). Though the reference to international law suggests that the relationship with Russia envisioned here is one of separate countries, observers have noted that Dudayev would likely have accepted Chechnya as a union republic within a revived USSR or in an equal military and economic partnership with Russia (Dunlop 1998, 195, 172; Lieven 1998, 58).[61] According to one of President Yeltsin's former advisors, Dudayev was willing to join Russia in a union-type agreement.[62] Nonetheless, such a vision of an equal partnership implied a radical change in Chechnya's relationship to Moscow, which was difficult for Moscow to accept.

Second, the disbanding of party – and otherwise elite – ties between Chechnya and Moscow was followed by concessions or negotiations that never went anywhere. In particular, Moscow's talks of concessions alternated with attempts at forcefully removing Dudayev from power. Indeed, it became clear already in November 1991 that Moscow was willing to use force against

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[59] As noted earlier, when the first secretary of the Chechen Communist Party resigned in the spring of 1989, the Central Committee in Moscow backed down on its preferred candidate and appointed Zavgayev, who was the regional party committee's preferred candidate, instead. Thus, unlike all previous first secretaries in Chechnya, Zavgayev did not owe his position *only* to Moscow.

[60] The constitution is available in Curran and colleagues (1997, 101–118).

[61] See also Natalya Pachegina and Igor Zotov, "Voennye SNG i vlasti Chechni nedovolnyi drug drugom," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, March 25, 1992.

[62] Personal communication, Moscow, May 30, 2005.

the new Chechen leadership. In the week following the Chechen declaration of independence, Yeltsin issued a state of emergency decree and, on November 8 and 9, dispatched Interior Ministry troops to the republic. Although the troops withdrew the same day they arrived (allegedly due to disagreements between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, who was still head of the Soviet Union) and no violent clashes erupted, Moscow's show of force did nothing but fuel the revolutionary movement in Chechnya.[63]

In 1992, more than ten meetings between members of the Russian Supreme Soviet and the Chechen parliament and government took place – although none between Dudayev and Yeltsin. Dudayev insisted on a face-to-face meeting, but Yeltsin was not willing to be seen negotiating with an "illegitimate" leader (German 2003, 69). On March 14, 1992, a deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet and the Chechen vice president, Yandarbiyev, signed a protocol that referred to "the recognition of the political independence and state sovereignty of the Chechen Republic." This was an agreement that Dudayev found acceptable, as it went a long way toward recognizing Chechnya's sovereignty. However, this and other attempts at negotiation alternated with less diplomatic strategies. On March 31, other Moscow officials supported the Chechen opposition in an attempted coup against Dudayev. Just a couple of months later, a new Russian delegation claimed that the March protocol, known as the Sochi agreement, constituted nothing but a preliminary, nonbinding briefing (Dunlop 1998, 169–171; Magnusson 1998, 413).

In November 1992, Russian troops again entered Chechnya, this time on the pretext of halting the growing conflict between Ingushetia and North Ossetia over the disputed Prigorodny district, although the real motive appears to have been a new attempt at forcefully removing Dudayev from power (Dunlop 1998, 174–175). Dudayev threatened retaliation, and although the conflict was averted by an agreement between the Chechen deputy prime minister, Yaragi Mamodayev, and the Russian prime minister, Yegor Gaidar, the standoff served as another indicator of the center's willingness to use force. Moreover, Moscow

[63] Indeed, upon arrival, the troops were "greeted" not only by Dudayev's National Guard but also by members of a civilian volunteer corps. And in the streets of Grozny, people rallied around demands for independence (Dunlop 1998, 117). In addition, the aborted invasion convinced Dudayev of the need to strengthen the Chechen forces, which had been lightly armed. In February 1992, the Chechen forces seized weapons, ammunition, artillery, and transport equipment from the Russian bases that were still based in Grozny. By June, Dudayev had reached an agreement with the Russian defense minister, Pavel Grachev, whereupon the Russian forces stationed in Chechnya left, leaving behind half of their remaining equipment (for details, see German 2003, 57–58; Evangelista 2002, 21). In 1995, the chairman of the Russian Council of Nationalities claimed that this armament of the Chechen republic boosted the separatist regime's confidence, as its military strength now constituted an alternative to negotiation (German 2003, 57–58).

continued to arm and fund the growing internal opposition in Chechnya.[64]
Moscow's support of the Chechen opposition also included weapons, mili-
tary training, and volunteers – and Dudayev knew this to be the case.[65] In the
summer of 1994, there were rumors that the federal government was plan-
ning some form of military intervention in Chechnya (German 2003, 102).
Indeed, a former member of Yeltsin's administration told me that a colleague of
his earned "good money" that summer doing reconnaissance in the Caucasus
Mountains in preparation of a special forces attack.[66] That is, not only was
the disbanding of political elite ties followed by more radical demands at the
bargaining table; it was followed by half-hearted concessions and noncredible
commitments by the center.

The failure of negotiations and the increasingly volatile situation in
Chechnya reflected poorly on Yeltsin's administration in the rest of Russia.
Having faced strong competition from nationalist and antireform parties in
the December 1993 Duma elections and won support in only one out of the
eight gubernatorial elections held in the spring of 1993,[67] Yeltsin envisioned
that a "small and victorious" war in Chechnya could restore the image of a
strong Russian state and help him win the 1996 presidential elections. In addi-
tion, some of Chechnya's neighbor regions in the North Caucasus – which
"felt" the growing tension in Chechnya through migration flows, inter-
rupted transportation routes, and general instability in the region – put pres-
sure on Moscow to bring the conflict to an end through military means.[68] At
the end of November 1994, the executives in Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria,
Karachay-Cherkessia, Stavropol *krai*, and Rostov *oblast* appealed to President
Yeltsin that he should "take all possible measures to introduce constitutional
order, defence of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens and most impor-
tantly of these, the right to life and safety [in Chechnya]."[69] The executives in
Karachay-Cherkessia (Vladimir Khubiyev) and Rostov (Vladimir Chub) were

[64] Nikolaj Gritchki, "Kakie dengi voyuyut v Chechne," *Izvestiya,* September 21, 1994.
[65] Allegedly, Moscow supported a number of attempts at assassinating Dudayev in 1994, and
when the opposition group the Interim Council tried to carry out a coup in November 1994, it
was aided by Russian helicopters and crews (Magnusson 1998, 421; Dunlop 1998, 204–205;
Toft 2003, 78–79).
[66] Personal communication, Moscow, June 3, 2005.
[67] In the April 1993 gubernatorial elections, opposition candidates came to power in seven out of
eight regions (Zlotnik 1997).
[68] For concerns about the war in Chechnya in the neighbor regions, see Lyudmila Leontyeva,
"Dangerous Roads," *Moscow News,* November 26, 1993.
[69] Quoted in "Chechnya: Reaction of Regions Bordering on Chechnya to Yeltsin's Address,"
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 1, 1994. The North Caucasus include the
Russian-majority regions Krasnodar, Stavropol, and Rostov, as well as Chechnya, Dagestan,
Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, and Adygeya, which are
defined by one or two ethnic minority groups – although in Adygeya, the majority of the popu-
lation is Russian.

at the time serving as regional leaders appointed by Yeltsin.[70] Similarly, the regional head of Krasnodar, Nikolai Yegorov, put pressure on Moscow to use military force against the republic. Like Stavropol and Rostov, Krasnodar is a region of the North Caucasus not defined by an ethnic minority group. The ethnic minorities in the North Caucasus have a history of resisting central control, so it is reasonable to assume that the central government was interested in keeping the Russian-majority regions' support. In terms of popular support for Yeltsin and the party in power, however, both Stavropol and Krasnodar had provided less support than the all-Russian average in the 1991 presidential elections, which may have made the Yeltsin administration, already worried about the upcoming 1996 presidential election, even more concerned about paying attention to the executives in these regions.[71] In May 1994, Yeltsin appointed Yegorov Minister of Nationalities.[72] An eager proponent of a military solution in Chechnya, Yegorov was among the "hawks" in Yeltsin's administration credited for financing the anti-Dudayev opposition within Chechnya and planning the invasion of Grozny in December 1994. From July to December 1994, the Yeltsin administration moved steadily toward a military invasion of Chechnya.[73] In fact, after Yegorov's appointment in May 1994, no meetings were held between the leadership in Grozny and Moscow.[74] Although the negotiation process between Chechnya and Moscow was already fraught with troubles – due to the demands raised, unwillingness to compromise, and commitments not followed through – Moscow's decision to ultimately resort to force was also influenced by (or at least "sanctioned" by) concerns in other regions of the North Caucasus, several of them headed by Yeltsin allies or appointees. This unfolding of events is consistent with the expectations of Hypothesis 3a, which suggests that the absence of political ties between an ethnic region and the central government can be detrimental to intergovernmental negotiation, especially when many other regions of the states are copartisans of the center.

The Chechen case also sheds light on the mechanisms through which failed negotiations were transformed into violence. As negotiations were failing and the Chechen economy deteriorating, opposition within Chechnya was

[70] Valery Kokov was, at the time, the elected president of Kabardino-Balkaria without a clear party affiliation. He was considered pro-Yeltsin. In 1995, he joined the pro-Yeltsin Our Home is Russia (Orttung 2000, 163–164).

[71] Nikolai Styazhkin, "Sergei Shakhrai Visits Stavropol Territory," *TASS*, December 29, 1992; "Russian President Meets Krasnodar Governor," *TASS*, March 15, 1994.

[72] Yegorov was considered a protégé of Vladimir Shumeiko, the speaker of the upper house of parliament, who some considered to be Yeltsin's successor. See Thomas de Waal, "Shumeiko Emerging as Yeltsin Heir Apparent," *Moscow News,* June 10, 1994.

[73] Another member of the Yeltsin administration instrumental in pushing for the use of force in 1994 was Sergei Shakhrai, who had served as Minister of Nationalities in 1992–1993 (Dunlop 1998, 188–198).

[74] Vladimir Yemelyanenko, "New Vice-Premier Stakes His Position on the Use of Force in Chechnya," *Moscow News,* December 16, 1994.

growing. Indeed, although the Chechen Revolution's severing of center-region institutional ties by itself complicated any attempts at negotiations, the difficulties that the new Chechen leadership faced locally, once in power, contributed to political divisions within the region, resulting in a situation in which the republic spoke with two heads. That is, one of the effects of failed negotiations was deepened divisions within the region, but Dudayev's regime was also early on confronted by an outspoken Chechen opposition, who disagreed with Dudayev's quest for independence and rather wanted autonomy within the federation (Sokirianskaia 2009, 167–168). Policy makers in Moscow used such internal divisions in Chechnya to try to undermine Dudayev's regime.

The failure of the negotiations between Chechnya and Moscow both fed into and resulted from such divisions within Chechnya. One problem was that the parties negotiating on behalf of the Chechens were not always allied with the Chechen executive. Moscow's official line was to negotiate with all political forces in Chechnya, although in practice, this turned out to be about taking advantage of divisions in Chechnya and negotiating only with members of the Chechen parliament (Dunlop 1998, 154–156, 188–189, 197–198), thereby deepening political divisions and further impeding peaceful negotiations between the secessionist Chechen government and the center.

From the summer of 1992, Mamodayev, the Chechen prime minister who was a Dudayev ally turned Dudayev opponent, played a key role in negotiations with representatives of the Russian parliament. In December 1992, he drafted an agreement with the Russian vice premier, Sergei Shakhrai – the "Treaty on the Separation of Power and Authorities between the State Governing Bodies of the Russian Federation and the Governing Bodies of the Chechen Republic." However, this attempt failed, as Dudayev, who did not approve of the initiative (and refused to meet Shakhrai), saw the agreement as falling short of the sovereignty promised in the March 1992 accord brokered by his ally Yandarbiyev. The Chechen parliament's negotiations on the draft treaty continued in January 1993, when Shakhrai headed a Russian delegation to Grozny. Again, though, the parties reached an agreement that was dismissed by Dudayev (German 2003, 71–72).

Thus, the situation was one in which representatives of the Chechen parliament, increasingly in opposition to the Chechen executive, and the federal center reached an agreement that in the end was unacceptable to the Chechen executive. This was not necessarily because Dudayev was opposed to negotiations – he made public calls for negotiations (Magnusson 1998, 413) – but because the negotiations had been in the hands of his rivals and fell short of previous promises on the part of the central government.[75] In the spring of 1993, the conflict

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[75] Indeed, in January 1993, Dudayev assembled a negotiation team of his own, headed by Yandarbiyev. In Moscow, the delegation held talks with a delegation under Nikolai Ryabov, a deputy chairman of the Russian legislature. These negotiations, which were primarily about economic affairs, failed when the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov,

between the Chechen executive and legislature reached a peak. Dissatisfied with Mamodayev sidestepping his authority in dealing with the central government, Dudayev fired Mamodayev and appointed Yandarbiyev in his place. In response, the parliament called for Dudayev's resignation. In May–June 1993, violent clashes broke out in the center of Grozny between Dudayev's supporters and opponents.[76] The result was that Dudayev dissolved the "treacherous" parliament.

Although the dissolution of the parliament ended the deadlock between the Chechen executive and the legislature, in May 1993, Mamodayev formed an opposition government, the Government of Popular Trust, which worked as an unofficial parliament out of Moscow. Similarly, in April, Yusup Soslambekov (another Dudayev ally turned opponent, who had been among the leaders of the Chechen Revolution) had in April 1993 formed a Parliament of the Chechen Republic in Exile, first based in Urus-Martan, then in Moscow (Muzayev 1995). By December 1993, yet another opposition group, the Chechen Interim Council, emerged under the leadership of Umar Avturkhanov. By August 1994, Avturkhanov had allied with the armed forces of Beslan Gantemirov, a former mayor of Grozny and one of the founders of Dudayev's National Guard. Even though the Interim Council had limited support in Chechnya, Moscow decided in 1994 that the Interim Council was the only legitimate source of power in the republic. Clashes between forces loyal to Dudayev and the opposition continued throughout 1994, and, as noted previously, Moscow played an instrumental role in supporting and arming the opposition. Table 3.1 outlines key opposition groups to Dudayev's regime after he came to power in October 1991.

Even prior to the declaration of Chechen independence in November 1991, there was internal opposition to Dudayev and the executive committee of the Chechen National Congress (Muzayev 1992) based on diverging views on the path to independence. While the opposition prior to the spring of 1993 consisted primarily of civic or political organizations founded by members of the intelligentsia (from late 1992 loosely organized under the umbrellas of the Round Table and the Council of National and Civil Accord), the opposition groups that emerged in 1993 and 1994 were more forceful in challenging Dudayev's regime. While many of them, too, envisioned some degree of autonomy for Chechnya, they wanted to be in charge.

The Chechen case is perhaps an extreme version of how federal bargaining is disrupted by the lack of intergovernmental political elite ties, and it further demonstrates how the "wrong" political ties can be disruptive. The leader of

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found the conclusions of the negotiations to be in conflict with Mamodayev's treaty with Shakhrai (Dunlop 1998, 183).

[76] For details on the crisis between the parliament and president and how various actors lined up, see Sokirianskaia (2009, 167–177), who considers the crisis of 1992 to be both one of ideology (political differences) and power struggles.

TABLE 3.1. *Opposition Groups in Chechnya, 1992–1994*

Date	Group	Leader(s)	Origins/Activities/Objectives	Alliances
Feb.–March 1992	Coordinating Committee for the Restoration of a Constitutional System	Members of the Chechen intelligentsia	Seizes the TV and radio station in Grozny, calling for Dudayev's resignation, and then seeks refuge in Nadterechny district	Possible support from Moscow
Sept. 1992	Round Table	Leaders of six opposition groups from the intelligentsia	Aims to achieve a sovereign, democratic, legitimate, and secular Chechen state through political means, within Russia	Opposition rally in Grozny in April 1993, along with SNGS
1992/1993	The Council of National and Civic Accord (SNGS)	Parliament faction led by Yusup Soslambekov	Aims to be a coordinating organization for resolving the political crisis in Chechnya, including bridging divisions	Opposition rally in Grozny in April 1993, with the Round Table
April 1993	The Parliament of the Chechen Republic in Exile	Yusup Soslambekov	First based in the district of Urus-Martan, then moves to Moscow	
May 1993	Government of Popular Trust	Yaragi Mamodayev	After PM Mamodayev is fired by Dudayev, the parliament gives him the mandate to form an oppositional government, based in Moscow	

Dec. 1993	The Chechen Interim Council (IC)	Umar Avturkhanov	Umbrella movement, based in Nadterechny and Urus-Martan districts, which includes former communists, city and district administrators, clan, and clergy, and members of the 1991 Chechen parliament and the dismissed Constitutional Court	Allies with the armed forces of Beslan Gantemirov and is also supported by Ruslan Labazanov and Moscow
Jan. 1994	Committee of National Salvation of Chechnya	Ibragim Suleimenov	Tries to oust Dudayev in failed coup	
Spring-summer 1994	The Peacemaking Group	Ruslan Khasbulatov	Group of well-known Chechens engaging in "peace-making activities"	Supports Labazanov's forces and Gantemirov's attacks in Grozny in Oct. 1994
May 1994	Justice Party	Ruslan Labazanov	Argun-based anti-Dudayev party, armed (criminal)	Supported by Moscow

Sources: Based on Muzayev (1995), Dunlop (1998, 149–158), German (2003, 85–106).

the Interim Council, Avturkhanov, had incentives to cooperate with the central government, as he received both money and weapons that would help boost his local control. In return, he did not push for independence. While this may look like the kind of "federal-friendly" dynamic that such elite ties may have, the problem was that Avturkhanov controlled only some of Chechnya's districts, in the north, and had limited support in the Chechen population. Moscow fostering ties with a local leader in opposition to the region's chief executive alienated the Chechen leadership and further contributed to its weak hold on power. Although such a weakening of the Chechen leadership might have been Moscow's very intention, there is no evidence suggesting that a weak(ened) local regime helped avoid a violent center-region confrontation. Rather, internal power struggles due to a weak local regime appeared to further complicate peaceful intergovernmental bargaining. Indeed, Derluguian describes Chechnya in this time period as "an example of a working anarchy ruled by an unsuccessful dictator" (1999a, 1417). Moreover, though there is evidence to suggest that both Dudayev and the population more generally were willing to settle for something less than independence in the early 1990s, the continuous failure of negotiations appears to have hardened attitudes among the leadership both in Chechnya and Moscow (German 2003, 86, 108–109). Moscow's resort to force in December 1994 suggested to the Chechens that the peaceful route was a lost opportunity.

INGUSHETIA: THE COUSIN THAT FOLLOWED
A DIFFERENT PATH

Despite being ethnically close to the Chechens and sharing many of the Chechens' traumatic experiences, including the 1944 deportation, the Ingush population of Chechnya-Ingushetia was not actively involved in the quest for independence in the early 1990s.

The Ingush and Chechens were joined together in one *oblast* in 1934, which in 1936 became the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. The two formally separated in June 1992, but the Ingush had taken steps in that direction since 1988–1989, when 60,000 citizens signed a petition that called for a separate Ingush ASSR (Orttung 2000, 131). In September 1991, an emergency congress of Ingush deputies declared the establishment of an Ingush Autonomous Republic within Russia, a request that was formally granted the following year (Dunlop 1998, 108, 169). As a separate republic, the Ingush were content with a home of their own within the federation and did not pursue independence (George 2005, 207–208; Sokirianskaia 2009, 252–254). The Ingush were, rather, engaged in an ethnic conflict of their own, calling for the return of Prigorodny district of North Ossetia to Ingushetia, which in fall 1992 resulted in violent clashes with Ossetian and Russian forces. While institutional and societal variables in conjunction encouraged a violent quest for independence in Chechnya in the early

1990s, in Ingushetia, the cards were not similarly stacked against accommodation within the Russian Federation.

Ethnicity and Policy Autonomy

Recall that per the 1989 census, of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR's 1.27 million inhabitants, about 734,500 were Chechen and 163,700 Ingush. The Ingush population was concentrated in the Ingush part of the republic, but a substantial share of the Ingush population also lived outside the republic in the neighboring region North Ossetia. In 1944, when the Chechens and Ingush were deported, the Prigorodny district of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, which per official census data was home to more than 32,000 Ingush,[77] became part of North Ossetia, a neighboring region. When the Chechens and Ingush were "rehabilitated" in 1956 and 1957 and their republic restored, Prigorodny *raion* remained in North Ossetia. For the Ingush, the return of Prigorodny was of greater importance than joining the Chechens in their quest for independence. Indeed, for the Ingush population of the Chechen-Ingush republic to join the Chechens in creating a separate state would mean leaving behind a large number of their ethnic kin in Russia. Among the Ingush, there was a belief that the return of Prigorodny district hinged on being part of Russia (Lieven 1998, 70). Reportedly, Yeltsin promised in his 1991 presidential campaign that the Ingush's problems would be over by the end of the year (Smith 1998, 108), although by the end of the following year, violent clashes with Ossetian paramilitary forces and Russian federal troops had not brought Prigorodny district back to Ingushetia. As Toft (2003) has argued, even though the majority of the Ingush population lived in their historical homeland within the borders of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, the presence of a large number of Ingush in neighboring North Ossetia made their situation different from that of the Chechens and helped prevent a secessionist quest. Demographics helped prevent demands for independence, enabling accommodation within the federation, even though that accommodation was complicated by the Ingush's quest to redraw the internal boundaries in the federation.

But the differences between the Chechen and Ingush cases went further. Although the Ingush share many historical experiences with the Chechens, they emphasize a history of more collaboration with the Russian state. In the Caucasian Wars, for instance, the Ingush did not take up arms against the tsarist forces (Gammer 2006). Indeed, prior to the 1860s, the Ingush were considered western Chechens, but due to these western clans' nonparticipation in the armed struggle against the Russians, the Russians began to distinguish among the "hostile" eastern and "nonhostile" western Chechens, naming them, respectively after the villages Chechen and Ongusht – hence Chechens and

[77] Per unofficial data, the Prigorodny district was home to 60,000 Ingush (Krag and Funch 1994, 34).

Ingush (Wixman 1984, 82–83). Consequently, resistance to central rule has become part of the Chechen cultural narrative in a manner it did not do in the rest of the North Caucasus (Russell 2007, 39–40). In the words of Magomed Mamilov, who became deputy chairman of the Ingush People's Council:

> Some of us fought with Shamil, but ever since the 1770s, most have fought on the side of Russia. One of my own ancestors signed a treaty with Russia in 1776. Many of them became officers in the Russian army, and even despite the Soviet repression and deportation, we are now the core of the Ingush national intelligentsia. We are also present in Moscow. There are only about 6–7,000 Ingush there, but we are playing an important role, and you will see that we will be more and more prominent in the future. (1992 interview, quoted in Lieven 1998, 70)

Even after the 1992 violent clashes over Prigorodny district, which led to Ingush casualties and forced thousands of Ingush residents of North Ossetia out of their homes, evoking the image of a "genocide" of the Ingush population at the hands of Ossetian and Russian forces, Ingush elites emphasized that part of the responsibility for the turn of events was theirs (Sokirianskaia 2009, 255).

As such, it is reasonable to suggest that in the early 1990s, the Chechen nationalist leaders' fear-laden arguments of continuous Russian rule did not resonate similarly among the Chechen and Ingush inhabitants of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Observers have also pointed to a certain degree of alienation between the Chechens and the Ingush. Some Chechens saw the Ingush as having betrayed them in the Caucasian Wars, while on their part, some Ingush considered the Chechens arrogant (Lieven 1998, 70–71, 348; Gall and de Waal 1998, 25). Indeed, the nationalist movement that emerged in Chechnya in the waning days of the Soviet Union quickly came to focus on Chechens only. A decade and a half later, in June 2006, following a Chechen proposal that Chechnya and Ingushetia merge, the Ingush historian Beslan Kostoyev published an essay opposing the proposal, citing, among other things, what he considered a long-standing pro-Ossetian bias of Chechen leaders.[78] Thus, while the Chechens emphasized a struggle based on the physical threat posed by the Russian state, the Ingush did not similarly emphasize the Russian state as a threat, which, as hypothesized in H1c, would more easily allow accommodation trough cultural policy autonomy.

Indeed, once Ingushetia decided to split from its Chechen cousin and after the 1992 clashes over Prigorodny district, the new republic, in which nearly 75 percent of the population was ethnic Ingush, sought and achieved policy autonomy within the federation, including over areas central to their culture. Somewhat controversially, in 1999, the Ingush president and parliament took steps to legalize polygamy, which was hailed as a long-standing local tradition,

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[78] Liz Fuller, "Analysis: Chechnya Seeks to Subsume, 'Stabilize' Ingushetia," *RFE/RL*, June 13, 2006.

but the Russian Justice Ministry disapproved.[79] President Ruslan Aushev also sought control over judicial appointments and law enforcement, which went contrary to federal law. In particular, Aushev wanted the republic to have the right to pardon people convicted of crimes related to local traditions, including blood feuds and carrying weapons.[80] On this issue, the republic reached a power-sharing agreement with Moscow, which stipulated "coordinated" oversight of Ingush law enforcement.[81] As for language, Ingush is an official language in the republic, yet instruction in schools is still in Russian, and Ingush is taught only as a foreign language. In 1998, the Ingush government distributed a brochure in which it voiced concern for the state of Ingush language and pointed to proposals and initiatives meant to boost the use of the language, including Ingush instruction in elementary schools and more radio and TV programs in Ingush.[82] Nonetheless, the state of Ingush is in a stronger position in an independent republic than it was in the Soviet era, when it was subordinate to both Russian and Chechen.

In sum, while the Ingush constituted a majority of the population within the Ingush part of Chechnya-Ingushetia, they were a minority in the ASSR as a whole and had a large kin population living in neighboring North Ossetia, which made them hesitant to embark on a route toward independence along with the Chechens. Rather than seeking independence, the Ingush, whose cultural narrative puts less emphasis on an anticenter struggle than that of their Chechen cousins, sought and achieved some autonomy in spheres related to local traditions.

As I turn to next, the immediate post-Soviet era saw influx of investments and money to the republic, which provided an economic rationale for staying put within the federation, although poverty and corruption have, over time, fueled opposition to the local regime.

Wealth (or Lack Thereof) and Fiscal Autonomy

Although Chechnya-Ingushetia was a poor republic, the republic's potential for wealth was the oil industry. That industry, however, was mainly located around Grozny, in the Chechen part of the republic, depriving the Ingush of an economic argument for independence (George 2005, 209). In the words of Sokirianskaia (2009, 258), Ingushetia "had underdeveloped industry, social infrastructure and transport, it had no higher educational establishment, no hotels, no railway station, no airport or cinema or stadium, [and] many settlements had

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[79] Simon Saradzhyan, "Ingushetia President Defends Polygamy," *Moscow Times,* July 30, 1999.

[80] "Russian Central, Ingush Govts to Negotiate over Referendum," *Interfax,* February 11, 1999.

[81] "Moscow, Nazran Sing Power Sharing Agreement in Law Enforcement," *Interfax*, February 19, 1999.

[82] A translated version of the article is available at the website of the Ingush Language Project at the University of California, Berkeley, http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/~ingush/endangerment .html (last accessed September 13, 2009). See also Nichols (1997).

no water-pipes, telephone connection or gas." Indeed, to the Ingush, who saw themselves as a disadvantaged minority in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, there was a sense that an independent Chechnya-Ingushetia simply was not viable, certainly not at the speed envisioned by the Chechen nationalist leaders (Lieven 1998, 70–72). This skepticism was reinforced under Dudayev's regime, when the economy collapsed. After Ingushetia formally split from Chechnya, the new republic's president, Aushev, emphasized the troubled economic conditions.[83] The Russian government, eager to have an ally near the increasingly volatile Chechnya, took several steps to aid Ingushetia's economic situation, although the region has remained among the poorest in Russia due to political instability both internally and in the North Caucasus as a whole.[84]

In May 1993, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin told a group of Ingush leaders that "The Russian government is ready to contribute to the development of the young Ingush republic."[85] This promise was followed up in a variety of ways. Though the new republic had the potential to develop oil and gas resources,[86] it lacked the capital to do so, and its economy depended entirely on central investments and transfers from the federal budget (Orttung 2000, 130; George 2005, 209–210).[87] Recall that in 1992, the ratio of federal transfers to regional expenditures was relatively low in Chechnya; in Ingushetia, in contrast, that ratio was 147 percent (Freinkman et al. 1999, 88–90). In 1994, as much as 90 percent of the republic's budget came from fiscal transfers (Sokirianskaia 2009, 258–259). The federal government was not, however, able to keep up sufficient transfers and, to make up for that, took several steps to boost business in the region. In July 1994, Ingushetia was granted status as an *ofshornaya zona* – a new Russian term for an offshore tax zone – by a presidential decree. Private companies could register in the offshore zone without actually having to set up shop there and could pay no regional or local taxes, receive 80 percent reduction in federal taxes, and get 50 percent reduction in regular import and export tariffs (Freeland 2000, 99). In 1992, the young entrepreneur behind the zone, Mikhail Gutseriev, had taken advantage of Ingushetia's strategic importance to the Kremlin, persuading the Russian government that a wealthier Ingushetia would be a loyal ally in the troubled North Caucasus region. An offshore zone, he argued, would help make the poor Ingush region richer, and the Kremlin agreed. Although the Kremlin, upon pressure from the International Monetary

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[83] "Formation of an Ingush Republic to be Included in Russian Congress Agenda," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,* December 2, 1992; "Ruslan Aushev Intends to Closely Cooperate with Russia," *TASS,* March 16, 1993.

[84] In 1997 Ingushetia ranked as number eighty-seven of eighty-nine regions in terms of investment risk (Orttung 2000, 130).

[85] Ivan Ivanov and Mikhail Shevtsov, "Chernomyrdin Meets Ingush Eldermen and Leaders," *TASS,* May 10, 1993.

[86] "Republic of Ingushetia," *Kommersant,* March 10, 2004.

[87] Liz Fuller, "Russian President Calls for 'Emergency Measures' in Ingushetia," *RFE/RL*, January 21, 2009.

Fund, in 1995 began to crack down on financial loopholes such as tax breaks and import and export tariff exemptions, Ingushetia's *ofshornaya zona* survived into the late 1990s due to the republic's strategic importance to the Kremlin (ibid., 106; Smith 1998, 117). In December 1994, another presidential decree said that the Russian government would provide four million rubles in easy-term loans to small and medium businesses in Ingushetia.[88] As put by the journalist Andrew Meier (2005, 33), who traveled in the region, "The Ingush hated to say it, and few did, but the war in Chechnya had been good to them."

Thus, as expected, per Hypothesis 2a, this combination of poverty and central resources has contributed to keeping Ingushetia in the federal fold. However, widespread corruption and dissatisfaction with the local regime have contributed to unrest and opposition *inside* the republic, which over time enabled Chechen insurgents to stage attacks from Ingushetia.

Political Elite Ties

Once Ingushetia formally separated from Chechnya in June 1992, the republic's new chief executive, Aushev, was appointed by Yeltsin. That is, unlike the first Chechen chief executive in the post-Soviet era, the first Ingush leader owed his position to Moscow. Like Dudayev, Aushev had a background as a general in the Soviet military, but unlike Dudayev, Aushev also had political experience in the Soviet system, having been a member of the USSR's Congress of People's Deputies (Orttung 2000, 135). Initially then, the relationship between Nazran, the then-Ingush capital, and Moscow was characterized by political elite ties. However, these formal ties very soon eroded.

Already in December 1992, Aushev resigned from his position in protest of the Russian government's handling of the conflict between Ingushetia and North Ossetia over Prigorodny district. In February 1993, he was elected president with the support of 99.8 percent of the popular vote (Orttung 2000, 131). The conflict with North Ossetia proved to be a thorn in the side of Aushev's relationship to Moscow, especially as the central government's involvement in the conflict came to be seen as pro-North Ossetian. Indeed, Moscow has long considered the North Ossetians its most loyal allies in the North Caucasus. As noted previously, the conflict resulted in deadly confrontations between Ingush militias and North Ossetian and Russian forces in October 1992, followed by the forced expulsion (or ethnic cleansing) of some 40,000 Ingush from Prigorodny district. In turn, Aushev did not support the propresident party Our Home is Russia in the 1993 parliamentary elections. In July 1993, the unresolved conflict with North Ossetia even led Aushev to voice the idea that Ingushetia could decide to separate from Russia,[89] but he

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[88] Ruslan Maysigov, "Russia to Loan Ingushetia 4 Billion Roubles in 1995," *TASS*, December 29, 1994.

[89] "Ingushetia May Withdraw from Russia," *TASS*, July 28, 1993.

later emphasized that Ingushetia will never ask for independence.[90] Despite this conflict, Aushev and Yeltsin kept the channels for communication open, which has been attributed to the mutually dependent relationship between the elites in Ingushetia and Moscow: "Moscow needs Aushev's diplomacy and Ingushetia needs Moscow's help in developing its republic" (Orttung 2000, 133).

   With the second Chechen war, Ingushetia became home to a large number of Chechen internally displaced persons,[91] and Aushev became an outspoken critic of the Chechen war, which boosted his popularity at home but further put him at odds with Moscow. In 2002, President Putin replaced Aushev with Murat Zyazikov, who had a background from the Soviet and Russian intelligence services.[92] Although President Zyazikov played on Moscow's team, he faced growing internal opposition in Ingushetia due to corruption, unemployment, the still-unresolved dispute over Prigorodny district, and increasing spillover of the Chechen conflict into Ingushetia.[93] In 2008, then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev replaced the unpopular Zyazikov with Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, an Ingush who had served as a colonel in the Russian army. He, too, has faced internal unrest and violence, fueled by unemployment and the still-unresolved status of Prigorodny district.[94] Thus, while political elite ties have kept the appointed Ingush executive allied with – and at an official level at peace with – Moscow, the problem in Ingushetia since it split from Chechnya in 1992 has rather revolved around whether the Ingush executive is aligned with interests within Ingushetia.

[90] "Press Conference with Ruslan Aushev, President of Ingushetia," *Official Kremlin International News Broadcast,* September 24, 1996.
[91] In 1999/2000, Ingushetia was home to 240,000 Chechen IDPs (Norwegian Refugee Council 2005, 16).
[92] "FSB General Elected President of Ingushetia," *TASS*, April 29, 2002; Arbi Arbiyev, "Kremlin's Candidate Wins Controversial Victory in Ingush Vote," *Agence France Presse*, April 29, 2002.
[93] Liz Fuller, "Russia: Poll Reveals High Level Of Discontent In Ingushetia," *RFE/RL*, November 7, 2005; Andrei Smirnov, "Zyazikov's Declining Political Support," *Chechnya Weekly,* September 6, 2007; "Commentators See Ingushetia as a 'Failed State' Where an Uprising Could Occur…," *Chechnya Weekly*, September 6, 2006; "…While Ingushetian and Federal Officials Say: 'Crisis? What Crisis?'" *Chechnya Weekly*, September 6, 2006; Andrei Smirnov, "The Kremlin Clings to Zyazikov," *Chechnya Weekly*, January 24, 2008; Valery Dzutsev, "Final Settlement of North Ossetian-Ingush Conflict is Tied to Peace in Ingushetia," *North Caucasus Analysis,* May 29, 2009; Mairbek Vatchagaev, "More Russian Troops Headed to Ingushetia," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, August 21, 2009. There is evidence to suggest that the tragic hostage crisis at School Number One in Beslan, North Ossetia, in 2004 was linked to Ingushetia's unresolved conflict with North Ossetia. Several of the terrorists involved in the attack were of Ingush origin, and the school itself was, in 1992, used as a holding place for Ingush families who were forced to leave Prigorodny district (Tuathail 2009).
[94] "Ingushetia: the Peaceful Exception: A New President Has Worked Wonders," *The Economist*, April 7, 2011; Valery Dzutsev, "Ingushetia's Government May Face New Surge of Violence," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, September 26, 2011.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter has been to show how institutions and societal traits jointly shaped people's grievances and assessments of the value of being part of the state. In Chechnya, the ways in which relations between the center and the regions were governed in both the Soviet and immediate post-Soviet Russian state enabled the nationalists that came to power in the early 1990s to attribute ethnic and economic grievances to the central government, as such justifying action directed at the center and calls for greater political and economic autonomy. Key to mobilizing people based on these demands were perceptions of how the central government and center-region institutions adversely affected Chechnya. The contrasting Ingush case highlights the importance of focusing on institutional and societal variables' joint effect on self-determination conflicts. A focus exclusively on center-region institutions would be unable to account for why, in 1990–1991, Chechnya sought independence while Ingushetia did not, as they until 1992 were part of the same ASSR. The different response to the same institutional context stems from differences in societal variables. The large Ingush population in North Ossetia has served as a brake on Ingush separatism (Toft 2003), but beyond that, the basis for solidarity underpinning political mobilization made accommodation within the federation more difficult for the Chechens than for the Ingush. Once the Ingush decided to part ways with their Chechen cousins, differences in institutional variables can explain why similar societal variables played out differently. In 1992, both Chechnya and Ingushetia were poor. However, Moscow, realizing that Ingushetia was a possible ally in the region, embarked on a visible strategy of central transfers and boosting investments. Chechnya, in contrast, was subject to an economic blockade.

Nationalist movements also emerged in parts of Russia in the early 1990s, but only in Chechnya did the conflict turn violent. The turn to violence was helped by a combination of two related developments that impeded the region's ability to negotiate with Moscow. First, the Chechen Revolution in 1991 severed all political and institutional ties between regional and central elites, contributing to a negotiation process of broken promises. Second, even though the Chechen government from the very beginning was faced with internal opposition, this opposition grew over time as negotiations stalled in 1991 through 1994, further complicating center-region negotiations and helping pave the way for violent means. Again, the comparison with the Ingush case can be useful. In contrast to Chechnya, Ingushetia's first executive, President Aushev, was appointed by Yeltsin. Although Aushev soon broke formal political ties with Moscow, there was a sense of mutual dependence – largely due to the deteriorating situation in neighboring Chechnya – which helped keep channels of communication open.

Given that the conflict in Chechnya has been a relatively bloody and long-lasting one, there is a well-developed Chechen-specific literature. This

chapter contributes to this literature in three ways. First, it does not treat the turn to violence in Chechnya as a result of idiosyncratic factors but rather sees the case in the context of a more general argument of why center-region relations turn violent. Several scholars treat the violent confrontation between Moscow and Chechnya as a theoretical anomaly, often attributed to the personalities and attitudes of Yeltsin and Dudayev (e.g., Tishkov 1997, 187, 212–216). Treisman (2001, 44–45), whose general explanation emphasizes the role of federal transfers in shaping Russian center-region relations, explains the Chechen case by pointing to leadership traits and decisions both in Grozny and Moscow. A similar sentiment was echoed in my conversations with public officials and scholars in Russia during the spring of 2005.[95] The analysis in this chapter also emphasizes the role of elite relationships, but it considers such relationships as part of a general explanation of how political copartisanship (or lack thereof) contributes to center-region negotiations. While Evangelista (2002) and Lapidus (1998) attribute the outbreak of war in Chechnya to a poorly institutionalized policy process at the center (see also Tishkov 1997, 202–206; Derluguian 1999a, 1418–1419), this chapter complements such an analysis by also pointing to the institutionalization (or lack thereof) of the policy process between center and regions. Divisions in Moscow certainly did not help the negotiation process, but such divisions cannot explain why negotiations with Chechnya failed at a time when the center was signing bilateral agreements and negotiating with other regions. The focus on political ties between the center and the regions thus advances our understanding of how Chechnya turned out as a violent exception to Russian center-region relations in the early 1990s.

One might object that Tatarstan, which is typically seen as the "second most" separatist region in Russia in the early 1990s, was also not governed by a copartisan of President Yeltsin. Mintimer Shaimiev, the first post-Soviet leader in Tatarstan, was a long-time member of the Communist Party, a part of the *nomenklatura*. Indeed, until Shaimiev was elected Chairman of the Supreme Council, the republic's *de facto* president, in the 1990 elections, he was the First Secretary of the Tatar Communist Party. In other words, in the early days of the nationalist mobilization in Tatarstan, the man who became the official head of the Tatar separatist quest was still a copartisan of the center – albeit copartisan of a crumbling center. Although Shaimiev was not a copartisan of President Yeltsin (and, indeed, refused to hold a Russian presidential election in 1991 and rather held republic-level presidential elections, which he won), Yeltsin was in 1993 and 1994 willing to negotiate with Shaimiev. Shaimiev's bargaining chip was his ability to control the outcomes of the Russian federal elections in the republic. The strategy worked, as Yeltsin needed Shaimiev to "deliver" favorable electoral outcomes (Matsuzato 2001, 59–63).[96] Thus, whereas there

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[95] For a review of dominant explanations of the conflict in the Russian media and among experts, see Tishkov (1997, 183–187).

[96] See also Roeder (2007, 87–95) on Shaimiev's electoral machine.

was no relationship of political dependence between Moscow and Dudayev, Moscow needed Shaimiev's electoral machine. Moreover, the demands under-pinning the nationalist movement in Tatarstan, focusing on cultural rather than physical survival, were also more easily accommodated within the federation.

Leadership explanations do not by themselves account for the emergence of separatist demands, and dominant scholarly works on Chechnya point to the role of societal characteristics, particularly ethnicity and wealth. This chapter's second contribution to the Chechen-specific literature is to put front and center how institutions and societal traits jointly shaped the emergence of separatist demands, which may better explain the content of the demands raised than a focus on societal traits alone. Focusing on ethnic demograph-ics, Toft (2002, 2003) sees the Chechen conflict as a result of how both the Chechens and Moscow viewed the Chechen territory. She argues that while territorially concentrated ethnic groups inhabiting their historical homeland are likely to see this territory as indivisible and hence push for independence, the central government of a state consisting of multiple territorially concen-trated groups is unlikely to set a soft precedent by giving in to demands for independence – that is, it, too, sees territory as indivisible (cf. Walter 2006a). The argument in this book is consistent with Toft's account, insofar as it considers ethnic demographics as key to understanding the conditions under which cultural policy autonomy may mitigate self-determination demands. Yet as Toft's own account indicates (2002, 108–110), ethnic demographics alone cannot account for the basis of solidarity that underpinned mobili-zation in Chechnya, which is central to understanding why the Chechen elites emphasized the importance of physical survival as opposed to cultural survival. The basis for solidarity that was used by the nationalist leaders to mobilize people in the early 1990s – physical survival – had emerged in response to central rule, not just demographics. While cultural survival can be accommodated through cultural policy autonomy, as in Tatarstan, it is harder to accommodate demands aimed at protecting a group's physical sur-vival within the bounds of a federation, as such autonomy would include, for example, a separate armed force.

Others scholars have pointed to the socioeconomic determinants for the outbreak of war in Chechnya. Dunlop (1998), a historian who has done extensive research on Chechnya, argues that the support of the Chechen nationalist movement was fueled by poverty and high unemployment. The account presented in this chapter builds on Dunlop's in-depth research on Chechnya, but it demonstrates that the Chechens' economic demands cannot be seen in isolation from federal institutions governing redistribution. Indeed, in the absence of a consideration of how institutions and economic variables jointly shape separatism, it is difficult to account for how both relatively poor and relatively rich Russian regions raised separatist demands (cf. Herrera 2005; Giuliano 2006). As the chapter shows, the Chechen demands explicitly pointed out how the Chechens, as inhabitants of a relatively poor region, did

not sufficiently benefit from central redistribution. Again, the demands that motivated the conflict emerged in response to both institutional and societal characteristics.

Indeed, the study suggests that contrary to accounts attributing separatist mobilization to the Soviet Union's ethno-federal structure's fostering of nationalist movements by training nationalist elites or giving them resources for mobilization (Roeder 1991; Brubaker 1996; Bunce 1999; Cornell 2002; Gorenburg 2003), ethno-federalism did not create a separatist movement in Chechnya by way of concessions to ethnic minority groups. Rather, in Chechnya, federal institutions, in conjunction with societal traits, fostered separatism through a (perceived) *lack* of concessions (cf. Derluguian 1999b).[97] That is, although the Soviet state created a Chechen identity, it did so primarily through what it denied the group rather through what it conceded in terms of, for example, native-language education and political attainment.

Finally, the chapter contributes to existing scholarship on Chechnya by demonstrating the interplay between center-region relations and local dynamics in Chechnya. While several scholars have focused on how the second Chechen war with Moscow, which began in September 1999, was fueled by then-Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov's weak hold on power in the republic and struggles with rivals (Tishkov 2004; Ware 2005b; Zürcher 2007), this chapter has emphasized how internal divisions in Chechnya in the early 1990s were fueled by Dudayev's inability to negotiate a deal with Moscow. Similarly, Maskhadov's weak reign cannot be seen in isolation from his failed negotiations with Moscow.

Maskhadov's ability to succeed where Dudayev had failed initially looked promising. As a prominent Chechen commander, he brokered the peace treaty that officially ended the first war, the August 1996 Khasavyurt accord, with Russian General Alexander Lebed. In January 1997, Maskhadov was elected president of Chechnya. With the support of about 60 percent of the population and eager to accommodate his potential opponents by including them in his cabinet, Maskhadov initially achieved what his predecessors had failed to do: in 1997, he met with Yeltsin and signed a peace agreement concerning relations between Chechnya and Russia. Increasingly, however, Maskhadov was challenged from within the republic by field commanders from the first war. In part, as I have argued elsewhere (Bakke 2014), the challenges to Maskhadov resulted from the influence of foreign fighters who entered Chechnya during the first war and contributed to some field

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[97] Also note that the warning from skeptics of ethno-federalism is often based on how policy autonomy may create nationalist intellectuals in the regions who will lead the struggle against the central state. In the Chechen case, there was, indeed, a group of intellectuals who founded the nationalist movement, but due to the deportation and long years in exile, the Chechen intelligentsia was the least developed among all the ethnic regions in Russia – hence Chechnya should have been the region *least* likely to see a powerful nationalist movement.

commanders adopting an Islamist framing of the struggle, fueling an ideological split within what had, predominantly, been a nationalist movement.[98] Importantly, the internal opposition to Maskhadov's reign also found him to be a Moscow sellout. In this regard, it was problematic for Maskhadov that the Khasavyurt accord left Chechnya's political status undecided until 2001 (i.e., did not reach an agreement on the key issue at stake), and Moscow failed to provide promised reconstruction funds (i.e., commitments not followed through), contributing to former allies turning against him (Lieven 2000).[99] Indeed, the lack of a final settlement and irregular transfers was an ill-fated combination, as it gave incentives to former field commanders not to disarm, fueled a criminalized economy in the hands of these armed groups, and gave Maskhadov few resources to engage in postwar reconstruction (Sokirianskaia 2009, 201–246). After a promising meeting with the Russian premier, Yevgeny Primakov, in the fall of 1998, Maskhadov commented on previous treaties that "We signed many documents, we had many meetings. Some of these were important, historic documents, including the peace treaty, the government agreement, the customs treaty and other treaties. To our great regret, these treaties have not been observed."[100] The result was, as under Dudayev's regime, an increasingly volatile situation within Chechnya, including a growing kidnapping-for-ransom industry.

In June 1999, it looked like negotiations were picking up, as Maskhadov met with the Russian prime minister, Sergei Stepashin, and a new meeting with Yeltsin was in the works.[101] However, the meeting never took place. Moreover, Stepashin, concerned by the increasingly lawless situation in Chechnya, was already planning for a limited occupation of the republic.[102] Two incidents in August and September 1999 proved critical in spurring Moscow's full-scale invasion. In August, the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev – *the* hero from the first war – and his close associate Ibn Al-Khattab, a foreign fighter of Saudi Arabian or Jordanian origin, carried out unsanctioned attacks into Chechnya's neighbor region Dagestan. In September, a series of apartment buildings in Moscow was bombed, and Moscow "credited" Basayev and Khattab – although this accusation has never been corroborated (Dunlop 2012).

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[98] See Wilhelmsen (2004); Radnitz (2006); Williams (2007); Hughes (2007); Moore and Tumelty (2009); and Bakke (2013). See also Paul Tumelty. "The Rise and Fall of Foreign Fighters in Chechnya," *Terrorism Monitor,* January 26, 2006.

[99] See "President Maskhadov Recalls All Officials from Moscow," *BBC Monitoring Service,* February 5, 1998; Simon Saradzhyan, "Chechnya's President Isolated by Warlords," *Moscow Times*, October 3, 1998.

[100] Quoted in "Primakov, Maskhadov Give Joint News Conference after Talks," *BBC Monitoring Service,* October 30, 1998.

[101] Ilya Maksakov, "Meeting Two Years Later," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, May 12, 1999; Alla Barakhova, "Good Start to Presidential Campaign," *Kommersant,* June 15, 1999.

[102] David Hoffman, "Miscalculations Paved Path to Chechen War," *The Washington Post*, March 20, 2000.

Notably – and echoing the scenario leading up to the first war – Maskhadov's calls for negotiations with Moscow following the acts of Basayev and Khattab failed, as Moscow opted to meet with representatives of an anti-Maskhadov Chechen government in exile instead.[103] On October 1, 1999, Russian troops again entered Chechnya.

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[103] Celestine Bohlen, "Russia Severs Ties to Republic of Chechnya," *The New York Times,* October 2, 1999; "Chechen Parliament in Exile's Top Man Scorns President's 'Useless' Peace Plan," *BBC Monitoring Service,* October 11, 1999. Notably, though, unlike the 1991–1994 period, the center's policy toward Dudayev had not been one of consistent opposition, as some policy makers in Moscow considered supporting Maskhadov the best bet for a stable Chechnya.

4

The Rise and Decline of the Punjab Crisis

INTRODUCTION: INDIA'S POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION AND
THE PUNJAB CRISIS

If you enter India from Pakistan through the Attari border crossing in Punjab,
you are welcomed by a sign that says, "India the largest democracy in the
world welcomes you." In addition to English, the greeting on the sign is written
in three of the country's twenty-three official languages – Hindi, Punjabi, and
Urdu. With a population exceeding one billion, India prides itself on being the
world's largest democracy. The pride lies not only in the fact that it is the larg-
est democracy but that it is a relatively peaceful democracy despite tremendous
ethnic diversity.[1]

Ethnic and religious divisions have played an important role in Indian
politics since its birth as an independent state on August 15, 1947, and
independence itself was colored by these divisions. Accompanied by the
partition of British India into two countries based on religions divisions,
Muslim-dominated Pakistan and Hindu-dominated India, independence was
both preceded and followed by violent clashes between communal groups. The
partition along religious lines and ensuing communal conflicts convinced the
Congress Party-dominated leadership of the new state that although it was
important to recognize ethnic diversity, organizing the state along ethnic lines
was a poor idea – indeed, it was seen as a slippery slope toward secession and
ethnic conflict.[2] In 1956, however, the Congress Party under the leadership
of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1946–1964) gave in to pressures from

[1] The 1961 census reported more than 1,600 mother tongues and some 400 languages. As for
religion, the majority of the population is Hindu (80 percent), but there are significant Muslim
(13.4 percent), Christian (2.4 percent), Sikh (1.9 percent), Buddhist (0.8 percent), and Jain
(0.4 percent) minorities.

[2] For overviews of the origins and nature of federalism in India, see, for example, Bhattacharya
(1992), Ramasubramaniam (1992); Majeed (2005); Mathew (2006); and Pritam Singh (2008).

ethno-linguistic groups and passed the States Reorganization Act. The result is the Indian federation – or Indian union – as we know it today, with states and union territories divided along linguistic lines, where the constitution's State List grants the states exclusive powers over police administration, state civil service and local government, public health and sanitation, agricultural development, regulation of mineral development and certain industries, and primary education, as well as taxation power over land revenues and agricultural incomes, estate duties and land tax, sales tax, and some excise duties. India today consists of twenty-nine states and seven union territories. By organizing the states along linguistic lines, federalism in India has to a large extent succeeded in stemming ethnic and secessionist tensions. However, as violent conflicts in Punjab, India's northeastern states, and Kashmir can attest, there are exceptions. Here, I examine the Punjabi Sikhs' conflict with the central government in the postindependence period.

Located in northern India, on the border to Pakistan, Punjab is part of the historical homeland of the Sikhs. Since 1947, the Sikhs in Punjab have twice mobilized against the government in Delhi. The nonviolent campaign of the 1950s and 1960s was a quest for a separate Punjabi-speaking homeland, a Punjabi *Suba*. While the other major ethno-linguistic groups in India had, with the States Reorganization Act in 1956, been granted their own states within the federation, the central government refused to give in to the Sikhs' demands. Yet in 1966, in response to the Punjabi *Suba* agitation, which was widely supported in the Sikh community, the central government agreed that Punjab be divided into two states, present-day Haryana and Punjab. Although the reorganization granted the Punjabi Sikhs a majority-Punjabi-speaking state in which Sikhs dominated (about 60 percent), it left several questions unresolved. First, the reorganization excluded the city that had served as the capital of greater Punjab, Chandigarh, which was transformed into a federally governed union territory that was to serve as the capital of both Punjab and Haryana. Second, the reorganization transferred to the central government the administration, maintenance, and operation of Punjab's major power and irrigation complexes. This transfer meant that the central government was to regulate how much of the water from three of Punjab's five rivers was to go to Punjab and its neighbors. In addition, several Punjabi-speaking areas were left out of the new state.

In 1973, the major Sikh political party, the Akali Dal, issued the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR), requesting that India become a "real" federation and that the states be granted autonomy over all government functions apart from defence, foreign relations, currency, railways, and communications. Although the demands based on the ASR, formulated as twelve policy resolutions at a conference in Ludhiana in 1978, could have been met within the boundaries of the Indian federation, the Sikhs ended up in a violent struggle with Delhi that lasted for nine years (1984–1993). In 1982, a newly emerged militant Sikh group began to use the Golden Temple at Amritsar, the holiest Sikh shrine, as

sanctuary, which culminated in the infamous Operation Bluestar – or, as it is known among many in Punjab, the Golden Temple massacre. On June 6, 1984, the Indian army stormed the Golden Temple, killing hundreds, some claim thousands, including innocent bystanders. The attack led to the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by Sikh members of her bodyguard, ensuing deadly anti-Sikh riots in Delhi, and radicalized the rhetoric among some of the Sikh militant groups. However, in 1985 it looked like the conflict would come to a peaceful end. From 1986, however, violence escalated in a spiral of insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns. The years between 1989 and 1992 were particularly deadly, and among residents of Punjab, there was a sense that the militant groups in pursuit of an independent Sikh state, Khalistan, were going to achieve their goal.[3] Since 1992–1993, life in Punjab has returned to "normal," occasionally interrupted by deadly clashes.

The chapter examines the ways in which the Akalis' demands emerged, gained popular support, and turned violent in what is known as the "Punjab crisis." As Punjab twice has found itself in a struggle with Delhi (first in the 1950s–1960s, then in the 1970s–1980s), the case is an opportunity to explore how the parties of the conflict may both enter and retreat from a conflictual, even violent relationship. I pay attention to endogenous relationships, analyzing how conflict and institutional arrangements at one point in time shape ethnicity and wealth, which are societal traits that, then, at a later stage affect how policy and fiscal autonomy can or cannot contain the emergence of a new conflict.

I begin by arguing that both ethnic solidarity and demographics in Punjab influenced the degree to which cultural policy autonomy could contain self-determination demands. Whereas Chapter 3 showed how the Chechen nationalists sought to mobilize people around the image of a threatening center, in Punjab in the 1960s, the Akali Dal's Punjabi *Suba* agitation focused on more "typical" ethnic concerns, such as the protection of language and religion. Although, just as in Chechnya, memories of past struggles against central rulers are part of the Sikhs' identity, religion and language are two equally important pillars of their identity, which have been central to their mobilization against the Hindu/Hindi-dominated center. Thus, the Akalis' concern was the cultural, not physical, survival of the Sikhs as a nation. As a result, cultural policy autonomy, in the form of granting the group a Punjabi-speaking (and Sikh-dominated) state within India in 1966, put, at least for a while, a lid on the Sikhs' pursuit of autonomy. Indeed, even though the reorganization left key and contentious issues unresolved, which spurred the reemergence of claims for greater autonomy in the 1970s, it went a long way toward meeting the Sikhs' ethnically based demands, and the struggle that reemerged in the 1970s focused on economic demands. This shift in focus was also the result of ethnic demographics in the new, reorganized Punjab. Whereas the Punjabi *Suba*

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[3] Personal communication, Chandigarh and Amritsar, winter 2006.

agitation had been in the name of the Sikhs as an ethnic group, the campaign that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s was in the name of Punjab state, not just the Sikhs. Although they formed a majority in the new state, the Sikhs made up only 60 percent of the population. As a result, the Akali Dal also depended, politically, on support from other ethnic groups. Such demographics meant that typical ethnic concerns were not at the forefront of the struggle, which emphasized economic issues that affected Punjab's population overall. In this setting, cultural policy autonomy was of secondary importance to fiscal policy autonomy as a means to accommodate regional self-determination demands.

As far as fiscal autonomy goes, at first glance, one would have thought that the combination of Punjab as a relatively rich and relatively fiscally autonomous state should be a peace-preserving recipe. However, a closer look at Punjab's economy and the institutions governing intergovernmental fiscal relations suggests that the Akali Dal's concerns, which reflected the concerns of the landowning Sikhs and emphasized that Punjab was getting a bad deal in the federation, were rooted in center-region relations that the population of a relatively wealthy state might find unfavorable. At the same time, the militant groups of the self-determination movement mobilized the poorer strata of Punjab's populations, reflecting divisions within the state that make it problematic to discuss wealth as if the region were a unitary actor.

Divisions within Punjab deepened as negotiations with the center stalled and, in the end, failed. The lead-up to violence in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrates how political ties with the central government can dampen regional self-determination demands, as well as how the center's political ties to other regions can complicate negotiations with an ethnic region, even when that region is a political ally of the center. Indeed, Delhi's decisions with respect to Punjab were influenced by its political concerns in other Indian states, with violent consequences for Punjab.

The empirical analysis ends by exploring the deescalation of the violent conflict in the early 1990s. Indeed, a puzzling trait of the Punjab case is the return to "normal" in 1993, which by most accounts happened without any formal changes in federal institutional arrangements. I consider both the degree to which the situation in Punjab has returned to "normal" and the degree to which there were no changes taking place.

SOCIETY-STATE RELATIONS AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN PUNJAB

Ethnicity and Policy Autonomy: The Punjabi *Suba* Agitation

Today, India's 19 million Sikhs constitute about 2 percent of the country's population, and the majority (80 percent) lives in Punjab.[4] Per the 2001 census, about 60 percent of Punjab's 24 million inhabitants are Sikhs, and the rest are

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[4] The sections on policy and fiscal autonomy build on Bakke (2009).

MAP 4.1. India.

predominantly Hindus. Until 1966, however, the Sikhs did not constitute a majority in the state. With independence in 1947, Punjab was divided between Pakistan and India. The partition was a bloody process involving a massive population transfer and deadly communal clashes. About 13 million people crossed the borders between the new east and west Punjab to find a new home based on their religious affiliation.[5] More than one million died in the process.

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[5] About four million Sikhs and Hindus moved from west Punjab in Pakistan into east Punjab in India, and an even larger number of Muslim refugees moved from east Punjab to west Punjab (Grewal 1990, 181).

Partition dramatically changed the ethnic makeup of east Punjab in India. Whereas greater Punjab had been a Muslim-dominated state, postpartition east Punjab was a Hindu-majority (62 percent) state with a large Sikh minority (35 percent). This minority status was central to the Punjabi *Suba* agitation in the 1960s.

Religion, memories of past struggles and kingdoms, and language form three pillars of Sikh identity (Brass 1974). The most outwardly visible sign that sets Sikhs apart from other religious groups is the turban that baptized Sikh men wear to cover their unshorn hair and the middle or last names Singh for men and Kaur for women.[6] In origin, Sikhism's "other" is Hinduism – it emerged as a reaction to Hinduism's hierarchical caste system – but it is a faith of egalitarianism and tolerance, and among Sikhs there is pride in a history that highlights how they have fought for these principles. For example, Ranjit Singh, the maharaja of the independent Sikh kingdom of Punjab, which existed between 1799 and 1849, welcomed both Hindus and Muslims as cabinet members, governors, and soldiers.[7] Until the turn of the nineteenth century, the boundary between the two religions was fluid, but gradually Sikhs came to emphasize their identity as separate from Hindus.[8] Central to Sikhs' identity are memories of struggles tied to the territory of Punjab – although with the partition, the Sikhs conceded to Pakistan the religion's birthplace and capital of Ranjit Singh's kingdom, Lahore. The museum at the Golden Temple in Amritsar portrays a bloody history, with graphic paintings of the martyrdom

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[6] There are five symbols – five Ks – that all baptized Sikhs, known as *Khalsa* Sikhs, are supposed to display: unshorn, combed hair (*kesh*), which for men is to be tied and covered by a turban and, for women, covered when in a temple; a comb (*kangha*); an iron bangle (*kara*); a steel dagger or sword (*kirpan*); and knee-length shorts (*kachha*). The tenth Sikh guru told all baptized Sikh men to use the name Singh (which means lion) and all baptized Sikh women to use the name Kaur (which means lioness or princess).

[7] In 1526, India and large parts of today's Pakistan and Afghanistan came under the rule of the Moghul Empire. Under Ranjit Singh, the Sikhs ruled their own kingdom (1799–1849), which included the territories of present-day east Punjab in India, west Punjab in Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir, and parts of Afghanistan. Sikhs made up less than 10 percent of the population in the kingdom, while about half were Muslims, a third Hindus, and the rest Buddhists. After Ranjit Singh's death, the Sikhs fought two wars to resist British imperial control, but in 1849, greater Punjab became a British India province, where the Sikhs constituted about 12 percent of the population.

[8] The *gurudwara* reform movement in the 1920s, which was the first major Sikh oppositional mobilization under British rule, helped turn Sikh identity into one that emphasized Sikh separateness. The movement was spurred by the Sikhs' wish to control their temples and shrines, called *gurudwaras*, which they found to be mismanaged by corrupt Hindu priests. The movement was led by the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) and the Akali Dal, a group of volunteers. In 1925, the central government passed the Sikh Gurudwara Act, which recognized the SGPC as the managing body of the *gurudwaras* and the Akali Dal as its political arm (Grewal 1990, 159–163; Grewal 1998, 89–92). For a different take on when the Sikhs developed a distinct identity, see Gopal Singh (1994, 73–78).

of the Sikh gurus and other defenders of the faith, as well as the suffering of the Sikh population under Moghul, British, and Hindu rulers.[9]

Added to these pillars of religion and historical memories is language. In colonial India, Hindi was the vernacular language of the Hindu-dominated areas of Punjab, and Punjabi was the vernacular language of Sikh-dominated and mixed areas. In the mid-1800s, people started demanding that Hindi and Punjabi replace English and Urdu as languages of instruction in schools. Although Urdu remained the official language of primary education until independence, the vernacular languages spread through the education and publishing efforts of religious organizations. Spoken Hindi and Punjabi are not incomprehensible to one another, but the scripts are different. Hindi is written in Devanagari script and Punjabi in Gurmukhi script. Between 1921 and 1961, language and religious identity became congruent, as Hindus increasingly declared Hindi their mother tongue and Sikhs, Punjabi.

After independence, language issues in Punjab remained highly politicized and tense. Following a failed reform effort, the Sachar formula, of dividing the state into Punjabi-speaking and Hindi-speaking zones, in 1950 the Akali Dal's working committee passed a resolution for a state based on Punjabi language and culture. In response, the Hindu organization Arya Samaj, which had blocked the implementation of the Sachar formula, urged Hindus to report Hindi rather than Punjabi as their mother tongue in the 1951 census.[10] To the Akalis, the fact that Hindus disowned the Punjabi language left the Sikhs as the key protectors of the language (Sarhadi 1970, 206, 218), and the Akali Dal has emphasized that political power was key for protecting the Sikh religion and promoting the Punjabi language (Grewal 1998, 74).

Indeed, Sikh politicians were concerned about their minority status in Punjab even prior to India's independence, so when the central government in Delhi in 1953 set up the States Reorganization Commission to consider organizing the country along linguistic lines, the Akalis pushed for a Punjabi-speaking state – a Punjabi *Suba* – where the Sikhs would constitute a larger share of Punjab's population. At the time, the majority of the state's population was Hindus, but the Sikhs constituted about 35 percent, concentrated in six districts. The

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[9] For historical works on the Sikhs, see Harbans Singh (1964) and Grewal (1990). See also the works of Khushwant Singh, including an illustrated volume on Sikh history (2006). Although the Sikhs lost their kingdom to the British in 1849, they became loyal subjects in colonial India. In 1857, for instance, the Sikhs did not participate in the Hindu rebellion against the British. Under British rule, the Sikhs formed a disproportionally large share of the soldiers in the army – in World War II, 30 percent of the soldiers in British India's army were Sikhs – which many attribute to the British being impressed by the Sikh resistance in 1849. Brass (1974, 278–281) notes that the Sikhs' version of their history tends to overemphasize resistance and downplay periods and instances of cooperation with the occupying powers.

[10] By the 1961 census, the Arya Samaj had launched a campaign that convinced Punjab's Hindus to denounce Punjabi as their mother tongue. The result was skewed census results (Brass 1974, 292–297).

Akali Dal's request, which was backed by the communist and socialist parties, highlighted that a Punjabi-speaking state would eliminate causes of unrest on the border, remove the language controversy, (further) enable children to receive education in their mother tongue, and – as the proposed state was rich in resources and food – create an advanced state that could serve as a model for other states. In addition, the Akalis emphasized that a Punjabi-speaking state would satisfy the Sikh community (Sharma 1969, 192; Sarhadi 1970, 241). Even though Akali leaders to this date claim that their quest was always based on language and not religion – in fact, they have highlighted that the Sikh population in the proposed state was less than 50 percent (Sarhadi 1970, 235) – opponents to the Punjabi *Suba* claimed that the demand was a poor disguise for a demand in favor of a Sikh-majority homeland (ibid., 198–242). The history of the demand, which emerged in the years preceding partition, points to both linguistic and religious roots. The Sikhs were clearly concerned about being dominated by another religious group (Brass 1974, 320; Grewal 1990, 171–174; Narang 1997, 251–252),[11] but the Sikhs' identity was closely tied to language. In its 1952 election manifesto, the Akali Dal claimed that in a true democracy, all minority groups would feel like free and equal partners of the country:

> To bring home this sense of freedom to the Sikhs, it is vital that a Punjabi-speaking province should be carved out from the different States of the country on the basis of the Punjabi language and culture. (from Sarhadi 1970, 221)

The Akali leader Master Tara Singh later stated that a Punjabi-speaking state would solve the question of both religious domination and language divisions (ibid., 261).

The Akalis' demand for a Punjabi-speaking state was not out of the ordinary at the time; other linguistically based ethnic groups in India, such as the Tamils

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[11] The road to India's independence took a difficult turn for the Sikhs in 1940, when the Muslim League announced its intention of establishing an independent Muslim state, the Pakistan Resolution. Realizing that a division of the country inevitably meant a division of Punjab, the Akalis denounced the resolution. In this context, the idea of a Sikh state, Khalistan, was first voiced, envisioned as a buffer state between India and Pakistan if Pakistan came into existence. In 1943, the Akali Dal suggested that because the Sikhs were not in a majority anywhere to ask for a Sikh state, an option would be to carve out a province in which the Sikhs would be dominated by no one community – a province in which the religious ratio would be 40 percent Muslim, 40 percent Hindu, and 20 percent Sikh – yet still remain part of India. This proposal was called the *Azad* Punjab Scheme, where the word "azad" created the impression that this was about an independent Sikh state (Grewal 1990, 173). The main concern of the Sikhs was to avoid domination by another religious group, and they wanted, at least, representation of Sikhs in political organs and the bureaucracy, no restrictions on religious rights, and state-provided teaching in Punjabi in the Gurmukhi script. See the Sikh All Parties Committees' list of "safeguards for the Sikhs" to S. Cripps of 31 March 1942, reprinted in Grover, Vol. 3 (1999, 223–224) and Master Tara Singh's letter to the Secretary of State for India of 25 May 1946, reprinted in Gurmit Singh, Vol. 1 (1989, 249–250).

and the Telugu, also mobilized in pursuit of greater autonomy. As expected, per the argument developed in Chapter 1 (Hypothesis 1a), the linguistic reorganization of the states, which was implemented in 1956, took the steam out of most of these movements. For example, reorganization along linguistic lines largely met the demands of the Tamil and Telugus, who already in 1953 were granted their own Tamil- and Telugu-speaking states, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. In contrast, the States Reorganization Commission, which had the partition of India along religious lines fresh in mind and saw the Akalis' call for a Punjabi-speaking state as a disguise for a religiously based Sikh state, rejected the Sikhs' request. The commission maintained that Punjabi was not sufficiently distinct from Hindi and that the demand lacked popular support.[12]

The states reorganization in 1956 meant that most states came to have a dominant regional language, typically based on the spoken language of the state's majority ethnic group (although no states are unilingual). Among other things, this meant that the day-to-day language in public administration and the medium of instruction in public primary schools would be the regional language.[13] Although India's official language is Hindi, English is allowed for all official purposes, and each state can adopt as official language one or more regional languages. Likewise, as primary education was a state-level responsibility, linguistically based states meant that India's major ethnic groups gained increased control in that policy area. In general, linguistic organization of the states granted to the major ethnic groups more autonomy across all policy areas on the constitution's State List, which lists the policy areas that are the states' jurisdiction, as they now had their "own" states.[14]

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[12] Brass (1974, 286–292) argues that although the Akalis may have overemphasized the differences between Punjabi and Hindi, these are grammatically and lexically distinct languages, but certain forms of spoken Punjabi are closer to Hindi. With regard to the lack of popular support, Brass (1974, 320) notes that this conclusion was influenced by the very vocal Punjabi-speaking Hindu opposition in the state.

[13] For those whose mother tongue was not the regional language, they had the right to receive education in their mother tongue if the state declared it an official regional language. By 1976, sixty-seven languages were used as medium of instruction or subject language in India's schools (Chaturvedi and Mohale 1976, 43).

[14] In the federation that emerged after independence, the units were a mix of British Indian governors' provinces and 562 autonomous princely states. Where the units already were organized linguistically, they remained so after 1947, but otherwise few attempts were made to achieve a distribution of powers based on ethnicity. In the constitution, which came into effect in 1950, the distribution of power among tiers of government is taken care of via three lists – the Union List, the State List, and the Concurrent List (see Ramasubramaniam 1992; Majeed 2005; Mathew 2006). Although the constitution grants significant autonomy to the states, it includes a number of centralizing features (e.g., Pritam Singh 2008), including vast emergency powers for the center in the event of wars, internal disturbances, natural disasters, and financial crises. In particular, Article 356, which is referred to as President's Rule, gives the center the right to dismiss the state governments, dissolve the state legislatures, and – through the centrally appointed governor in the states – take over the functions of a state government in the "case of failure of

For the Punjabi Sikhs, it was a blow not to be treated the same as other ethnic groups. The Akali Dal's leadership emphasized that of all the fourteen official languages in the constitution, Punjabi was the only one left without a state of its own. In the words of one member of the party, "While others got states for their languages, we lost even our language" (quoted in Brass 1974, 320). Moreover, as linguistic identity was tied to religious identity, the rejection came to be seen as discrimination against the Sikhs as a religious group as well. According to the Akali leader Sant Fateh Singh, "If non-Sikhs had owned Punjabi as mother tongue, then the rulers of India would have seen no objection in establishing a Punjabi state" (ibid., 325–326). Likewise, G. S. Dhillon, a Sikh historian, has stated that, "There was a clear desire in the mind of (…) the Centre to keep the Sikhs in a perpetual minority so that they are unable to enjoy autonomy in their own home of Punjab and are always ruled by the Hindu majority (…)" (2004, 22). Indeed, according to Ajit Singh Sarhadi, an Akali politician active in the *Suba* agitation, the result of the center refusing the Akalis' demand was a deepening of ethnic divisions in the state: "(A) demand purely linguistic in its inception, took a communal turn, and became entirely a demand of the Sikhs, and they alone became the protagonists and supporters of the Punjabi language and culture" (1970, 203).

As a consolation prize, in 1955, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of the Congress Party and Punjab's Congress-led government under Partap Singh Kairon, negotiated the Regional Formula, which envisioned Punjab as a bilingual state where Punjabi in Gurmukhi script was to be the official language in designated Punjabi-speaking zones. The formula had the potential of addressing the most pressing language concerns in Punjab (e.g., Dang 1999), and the Akalis, who found the compromise satisfactory, agreed to ally with Congress in the state's 1957 elections. This compromise opportunity was lost, however, as Chief Minister Kairon, who faced significant Hindu opposition to the Regional Formula, did not implement it. In turn, the Akalis broke their temporary alliance with Congress and, in May 1960, launched the Punjabi *Suba* agitation, which focused on redrawing state boundaries to create a Punjabi-speaking state and emphasized the linguistic rather than the religious aspect of the demand (Puri 1983a, 53; Brass 1974, 321–327; Grewal 1998, 77–78). Yet, as noted by Sarhadi:

> Sant Fateh Singh had given this demand a twist in an attempt to make it look secular in character, to give the central leadership an opportunity to concede it and, at the same time, to canvass non-Sikh opinion in its favor, but there was no illusion in anybody's mind, that the Sikhs had begun to consider this demand a panacea for their inferior status, which they attributed to the non-fulfillment of their demand. The demand had all along been on a linguistic basis (…), yet this protracted struggle, and the resultant bitterness, made a section of the Sikhs think

constitutional machinery" in that state. In the event that there is a conflict between federal and state law, federal law prevails, and all residual powers rest with the center.

that it was essential that the Sikhs should have an area which they could call their homeland, where they had a majority, with an effective voice. (1970, 410)

The Punjabi *Suba* movement was primarily a nonviolent campaign, although it resulted in arrests of thousands of Sikh protestors. When mass protests failed at gaining concessions from the center, the Akali leaders Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh resorted to several fast-unto-death attempts. After a struggle lasting more than a decade, in 1966 the Sikhs were granted a state of their own when Punjab was divided into Punjabi-speaking (and Sikh-dominated) Punjab and Hindi-speaking (and Hindu-majority) Haryana (in addition, six of Punjab's mountain regions were transferred to Himachal Pradesh). The Punjab Reorganization Act of 1966, which was a unilateral move by the center rather than the result of negotiations, met many of the Sikhs' concerns, including giving them a majority of the population in all but three of Punjab's eleven districts (Narang 1997, 265). Despite issues left unresolved (more in what follows), the reorganization came close to ending the Sikhs' struggle. Neither Master Tara Singh nor Sant Fateh Singh was pleased with the reorganization, but the election results in 1967 suggest that slogans of creating a Sikh homeland did not resonate with the masses (Sarhadi 1970, 462).

For the purpose of understanding the conditions under which cultural policy autonomy can help preserve peace, the Punjabi *Suba* agitation shows that when the struggle was waged in the name of the Punjabi Sikhs as a group – aimed at carving out a new state for that group – it was about explicitly ethnic demands, related to the lack of policy autonomy in areas we typically think about as central to ethnic minority group's recognition, such as culture, education, language, and religion. Indeed, to Master Tara Singh, the initiator of the Punjabi *Suba* agitation, and the famous Sikh writer Khushwant Singh, a key concern was education. Worried that younger generations were abandoning Sikhism – for example, by cutting off their long hair – and thereby threatening the very existence of the Sikh community, they thought Sikh traditions could more easily be kept alive in a Sikh-dominated state that allowed the teaching of Sikh history and traditions in public school (Khushwant Singh 1992, 39–40). Though not formally giving in to a religious demand, the linguistically based reorganization in 1966 also granted the Sikhs a Sikh-majority state. That is, cultural policy autonomy was an effective means to contain a struggle fought in the name of an ethnic group (per Hypothesis 1a), focusing on cultural survival (per Hypothesis 1c).

Note that contrary to arguments in the resource-mobilization vein, which worry that policy decentralization will foster regional identities and separatist conflicts, the Sikhs in Punjab had solidified their identity as distinct from Hindus long before Punjab in 1966 became a separate state within India. Granted, Punjab had a history as an independent kingdom (1799–1849), but the formation of a Sikh identity as distinct from that of Hindus appears to have solidified later, in the 1920s, when the Sikhs mobilized to gain control over the

Sikh temples. As in the case of Chechnya, Sikh identity and separatist demands were fueled by the absence rather than the presence of policy autonomy.

Ethnicity and Policy Autonomy: The Reemergence of Conflict

In contrast to the Punjabi *Suba* agitation, in the 1970s, when the Akalis again mobilized in pursuit of greater autonomy, the struggle was in the name of Punjab state. At the time, Punjab was a majority-Sikh state (about 60 percent), while the rest of the population was predominantly Hindu. Although many of the Akalis' ethnic demands had been met with the Punjab Reorganization Act of 1966, there were still unresolved ethnically based concerns on the table, including Punjabi-speaking areas left out of the new state.[15] Moreover, the years following the granting of the Punjabi *Suba* were characterized by a centralizing tendency in the Indian federation. In 1978, several policy areas were moved from the State List to the Concurrent List, including education, giving the center the power to set guidelines and make decisions regarding textbooks and curricula. The Akalis saw this move as yet another strategy of the central government to intrude on the Sikhs' hard-won policy autonomy and limit the expression of Sikh culture, history, and religion (Dhillon 2004, 98–100; Gopal Singh 1994, 153; Government of Punjab 1998, 875–876). However, such ethnic concerns, while part of the Akalis' struggle, were not articulated as being at the struggle's forefront, much due to the state's ethnic demographics.

The struggle that emerged in the 1970s was primarily justified based on economic reasons, some of which were a consequence of the 1966 reorganization. The Anandpur Sahib Resolution issued by the Akali Dal's working committee in 1973 called for the Indian constitution to be "recast on real federal principles, with equal representation at the center for all States" (reprinted in Grover 1999, Vol. 3, 317). Its most controversial part is the stated political goal of the "pre-eminence of the Khalsa (…) through creation of congenial environment and a political set-up," (ibid., 316), where Khalsa refers to the "pure" Sikh community. It is this objective that led Akali opponents to see the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973 as a call for a separate Sikh state, although that was, arguably, not the Akalis' intention (Gurharpal Singh 2000, 109). According to Harish Puri (1983a), who has written extensively on Punjab politics, observers must understand that the 1973 resolution was a comprehensive party program, and in subsequent meetings with the center, the resolution in its full format was never on the agenda. Indeed, the policy proposals that were developed based on the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in Ludhiana a few years later, in 1978, put socioeconomic concerns at the core.

In particular, the 1978 Ludhiana resolution called for an end to the center's control of Punjab's river waters and better procurement prices and more

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[15] The boundaries of the new Punjab were based on the 1961 census, in which the language returns were skewed against Punjabi, and as a result several Punjabi-speaking areas were left out.

subsidies for the state's farmers. In 1980, the Akali Dal and the Communist Party embarked on a campaign known as the *Nehar Roko Morcha*, which refers to "the struggle to stop the canal." The campaign was aimed at preventing the central government's planned construction of the Satluj-Yamuna Link (SYL) canal, which would divert river water from Punjab to Haryana. Granted, these were issues that were of greater concern to the state's Sikh population than to the Hindu population, as the Sikhs dominated the agricultural sector (e.g., D'Souza 1985). However, the Akalis, knowing that the state in whose name they were fighting was only barely a Sikh-majority state – and that they would need a coalition partner if they were to rule the state – did not fight a struggle restricted to the Sikh majority (for the Akali Dal's electoral performance, see Appendix Table A.4.1). Whereas the Akali Dal is a strictly Sikh party, the Congress Party has also drawn a substantial share of the state's Sikh votes, forcing the Akalis to turn to the other non-Congress parties, most of the time the Hindu-dominated Jana Sangh or Janata Party, as coalition partners (Brass 1991, 176–177; Sharma 1986/87, 640). Indeed, the Akali Dal's election manifests from 1967 played down religious concerns and focused on secular, economic, and political programs (Puri 1999, 448–450).

Religious concerns were not entirely off the agenda. The 1978 Ludhiana resolution, for example, called for proper representation of Sikh minorities in other states and permission to install a broadcasting station at the Golden Temple. These matters did not, however, dominate the Akalis' initial struggle. In September 1981, the Akalis formulated a list of forty-five grievances to present to the center. Among the grievances on this list, twenty-one were economic in nature and concerned the Punjabi population overall; eight were political in nature and concerned both restrictions on autonomy in general and matters more explicitly about ethnic concerns, such as Punjabi-speaking areas left out of the 1966 reorganization. The remaining demands were religious (fourteen) and social (two) in nature, concerning the Sikhs specifically. In October, the list was trimmed down to fifteen demands, where most were religious in nature and only five were economic in nature (see Samiuddin 1985, 688–691). These October 1981 demands were picked up in the Akalis' *Dharam Yudh Morcha* campaign, which means a "righteous" campaign. I argue next that the inclusion of religious demands was a result of a radicalization of the Akalis' goals following failed negotiations, but, as Brass notes (1991, 193–195), they also stemmed from the Akalis trying to ally with – or perhaps outbid – the militants. Yet one of the Akali leaders, Parkash Singh Badal, expressed hesitance to allying with the militants, as he wanted the party to maintain its ties to the Hindu-dominated Janata Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), whose support the Akalis needed to form a government.[16] That is, the Sikhs' political leaders were aware of the implications of ethnic demographics for the

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[16] "Punjab: Willing to be Used" (editorial), *Economic and Political Weekly,* August 28, 1982.

ability of the Akali Dal to garner public support and had to work out a fine balance between fighting a Sikh- or Punjab-specific struggle.

Of course, it is possible that the Akalis' articulation of demands that went beyond Punjab's Sikh population was really just a facade and that, ultimately, they would have been appeased with institutional solutions that protected the culture of the ethnic group. Yet the record suggests that accommodating the Akalis' demands was not only about cultural policy autonomy for the Sikhs. Indeed, the only Akali demands that the center gave in to during negotiations in the early 1980s were those related specifically to the Sikh community, and such concessions turned out to be insufficient (Brass 1991, 203–204).[17] In contrast, the accord negotiated between the Akali leader Sant Harchand Singh Longowal and India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in June 1985 included provisions of the transfer of Chandigarh and Punjabi-speaking areas in Haryana to Punjab and a promise that the river water issue would be presented to a tribunal to be presided over by a Supreme Court judge. Indeed, as the following section on wealth and fiscal autonomy makes clear, the river water issue was central to the struggle that emerged in the 1970s. Although Rajiv Gandhi did not concede to all of the Akalis' demands, he agreed to later take them into consideration. I return to a discussion of the failure of the Rajiv-Longowal accord later in this chapter, but I want to emphasize here that the accord, had it been implemented, would most likely have put an end to the struggle. Importantly, the accord was not a document only about Sikh-specific concerns and cultural policy autonomy; it addressed center-state relations that affected Punjab's population more generally. Although the reorganization in 1966 had accommodated many of the Sikhs' ethnically based demands, there were still challenges to their cultural policy autonomy, including the center's moving of education from the State List to the Concurrent List. However, in the Akalis' post-1966 struggle, where 40 percent of Punjab's population was non-Sikh, cultural policy autonomy was, at least on paper, not as central to the struggle as in the Punjabi *Suba* agitation, which had been fought in the name of the Sikhs only. This is consistent with the first hypothesis developed in Chapter 1 (Hypothesis 1a), which proposes that ethnic demographics will condition the degree to which cultural policy autonomy is sufficient to meet self-determination demands.

In contrast to the Akalis, several of the militant factions that emerged in the 1980s were waging a battle in the name of the Sikhs and not the state as a whole and, thus, had little concern for how other ethnic groups in the state might perceive their demands. In the early 1980s, the militant leader Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale voiced concerns about the fate of Sikh religious traditions in Punjab, while some of the militant factions that emerged later

[17] News reports from the time suggest that although the central government of Indira Gandhi was willing to give into some of the Sikhs' religious demands, it was not willing or able to give in to the demands for greater autonomy, which would affect other states (e.g., "Sikhs Plan More Agitation in February," *The Associated Press,* January 19, 1983).

in the decade were more outspoken in their quest for creating a separate Sikh state, Khalistan, and implementing a strict religious code of conduct (Judge 2005). Although the militants were also concerned with economic hardship (Telford 1992), their struggle was explicitly about the Sikhs. Because Sikhism is a religion based on equality, the plight of poor Sikh farmers came to be linked to religious autonomy and independence (Pettigrew 1995). Indeed, both the Punjabi *Suba* movement and the militant movement in the 1980s suggest that where the struggle was waged in the name of the ethnic group and not Punjab as a whole, institutions and policies restricting the expression of ethnicity were central to the struggle. Yet the militants of the 1980s sought a more radical form of autonomy than the Punjabi *Suba* activists of the 1960s.

Indeed, consistent with Hypothesis 1c, the struggle in Punjab shows how the basis for solidarity around which people mobilize influences self-determination demands and, as such, cultural policy autonomy as peace preserving. While both the Punjabi *Suba* agitation in the 1960s and the militants' struggle in the 1980s focused on concerns specific to the Sikhs, a key difference was that the militants in the 1980s also called for an independent state. As the preceding pages have shown, in the *Suba* agitation, mobilization happened along the dimensions of religion and language, and the struggle was about protecting the status of Punjabi speakers and Sikhs within the federation. In contrast, the militant groups that emerged in the 1980s, like the Chechen separatists discussed in Chapter 3, emphasized a threatening center and called for an independent Sikh state, which is a demand more difficult to negotiate than greater cultural policy autonomy within the federation.

Importantly, the central government in 1984 helped create an image of a center posing a physical threat, thus making it more difficult to meet separatist demands within the bounds of the federation. Even though Punjab's population had not widely supported the idea of Khalistan prior to Delhi's Operation Bluestar in 1984, the operation boosted the very forces it was supposed to suppress. Operation Bluestar and the ensuing Delhi riots and counterinsurgency campaign in Punjab made the militants' allegations of the center's discrimination ring true. Today, when you visit the museum at the Golden Temple complex, the last image of the Sikhs' historical struggle against central rulers is the June 1984 destruction of the Akal Takht, the holiest building within the complex. The Sikhs invoked the term *ghallughara* (holocaust) to refer to the large number of innocent Sikhs killed in the attack, and they placed the attack in the context of two previous massacres of Sikhs by central rulers in Delhi, the *chotta ghallughara* (the small holocaust) in 1746 and the *vadha ghallughara* (the big holocaust) in 1762 (Pritam Singh 2008, 44). The attack also radicalized the demands raised. Consider the words of Wassan Singh Zaffarwal, the leader of the Khalistan Commando Force, one of the key militant groups:

> Prior to June 1984 we used to talk about the Anandpur Sahib resolution because it contained the right to self-determination within India. After 1984 we needed

our own independent home. The government that could kill hundreds, send thousands to prison, rape our women and generally humiliate our people, there could never be a compromise with them! We now needed an independent home for the Sikhs. (quoted in Pettigrew 1995, 149)

Operation Bluestar set off a series of violent events, among them Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's assassination by two Sikh members of her own bodyguard, which spurred anti-Sikh riots in Delhi, killing thousands (e.g., Amrik Singh 1985, 317–321). Toward the end of 1984, new militant factions began to emerge, some of which called for independence. Notably, the militants did not officially state that they wanted to create an independent Sikh state, Khalistan, until 1986, after the attack on the Golden Temple and the failure of the Rajiv-Longowal accord.[18] As the militancy in Punjab was rising, the Punjab police under the command of K.P.S. Gill and the central security forces, which operated almost with a free hand, escalated the counterinsurgency campaign. They combed the villages for suspected terrorists, resorting to extrajudicial killings, torture, and "disappearances," which had a radicalizing effect and reinforced the image of a threatening center (Pettigrew 1995; Kumar et al. 2003).

It is impossible to give numbers for popular support for the militants, but observers of Punjab politics have noted that the only way that the militants could have operated was if the population provided support. Others, however, have pointed out that such popular support may rather have been the result of a population fearing for their lives if they did not cooperate.[19] Survey results from one village in 1985 suggest that there was little support for the demand for Khalistan (Kaur 1989, 69), although several accounts report that anticenter sentiments and anger were strong (Chowdhury and Anklesaria 1985; Opender Singh 1985). The 1984 attack on the Golden Temple enabled the militants to more credibly "credit" the center for threatening the physical safety of the Sikhs, and it appears to have boosted demands for an independent Sikh state. In this environment, and consistent with Hypothesis 1c, accommodation through cultural policy autonomy within the federation was less relevant than in the Punjabi *Suba* agitation. Indeed, key to the center's justification for using force rather than accommodation in the first place, in 1984, was what it considered "the maturing of a secessionist and anti-national movement" (quoted in Grover 1999, Vol. 3, 323). If the militant movement had not been secessionist prior to Operation Bluestar, it became so afterward, making accommodation through autonomy within the federation more difficult.

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[18] The first time Khalistan was publicly mentioned in India's postindependence era was in a 1971 *New York Times* advertisement, placed by a Sikh expat living in London. Bhindranwale, who was killed in Operation Bluestar in 1984, never stated that he wanted an independent Sikh state. In April 1986, a gathering of several militant organizations officially adopted a Declaration of Khalistan.

[19] Personal communication, Chandigarh, February 2006.

Wealth (and Wealth Divisions) and Fiscal Autonomy

Punjab has since the 1960s been one of India's wealthiest states. It has also been one of India's most fiscally autonomous states. In 1970–1971, the proportion of own revenue receipts to revenue expenditures in Punjab was 102 percent. In 1980–1981, it was 80 percent; in 1990–1991, 61 percent; and in 1999–2000, 62 percent (Bagchi 2003, 30). Per my argument (Hypothesis 2a), a relatively rich state with significant fiscal autonomy is a peace-preserving combination. So why, then, did demands for greater autonomy in Punjab reemerge in the 1970s?

To understand the ways in which wealth and fiscal autonomy have affected the struggle in Punjab, it is important to note that the Akali Dal, which is the main party representing Sikh interests, has always been relying on the relatively well-off landowning Sikhs. Indeed, the landowning Sikhs have overwhelmingly voted for the Akalis, while lower-caste Sikhs have tended to vote for the Congress Party.[20] Thus, the struggle fought by the Akalis has primarily reflected the concerns of the landowning Sikhs, although, as noted earlier, the party's dependence on a coalition partner means that the Akalis have had to consider how other ethnic groups may perceive their platform. In the following pages, I first discuss how the Akali Dal reacted to federal fiscal arrangements and other center-region policies that limited the fiscal autonomy of a relatively wealthy or well-developed state, which has the means to be autonomous. I then consider how economic divisions within the state complicate this assessment, as some of the demands emerging in the 1980s rather reflected concerns of a more poorly developed state.

Although Punjab in the 1970s was more fiscally autonomous than any other Indian state, in the sense that it covered a large share of its own expenditures, the Akalis pushed for greater autonomy over taxation and spending. So far, the book's discussion of fiscal decentralization has focused on the division of revenues between the regional and central governments, but recall that fiscal decentralization also refers to decision making over taxation and spending. The Akali Dal's call for fiscal autonomy was primarily about this latter aspect of fiscal decentralization, as they considered their decision-making power over their own expenditure responsibilities to be limited, resulting in calls for more taxation powers as well as fewer strings attached to central transfers.

In 1978, at a speech delivered at the party's conference in Ludhiana, the Akali leader Gurcharan Singh Tohra called for more taxation powers to the states:

> Apart from statutory share in the Union Revenues, the State should have the exclusive power to levy, collect, and retain the taxes, duties within their own

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[20] In the first three state legislative elections after the 1966 reorganization, for example, the Akali Dal gained less than 30 percent of the popular vote in the state. Only in 1985 have the Akalis been able to garner sufficient support to rule Punjab without a coalition partner (38 percent of the popular vote).

sphere. For the purpose of uniformity of taxation in the States, the Centre may issue guide lines from time to time. Income tax should be provincialised; though it may be levied by the Centre for the sake of uniformity, the collection should be by and through the State Agencies. As the income tax is divisible between the Union and the States, the States after collection should contribute to the central pool a fixed share out of the income tax revenue.[21]

The idea was that if the state had more taxation powers, it could more independently and better manage its economy. This demand was further developed in the Akali-led Punjab government's memorandum submitted to the centrally appointed Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations in 1987, where they argued that one of the main problems behind the states' financial dependence on the center was their narrow tax base. The memorandum suggested that a solution would be to transfer to the states an additional sales tax on certain products in lieu of union excise duties; reimpose the sales tax on sugar, textiles, and tobacco; allow the states to raise the tax ceiling on taxes already on the State List; and enlarge the states' share in central taxes, such as the the income and corporations tax, as well as excise duties (Government of Punjab 1998, 910–918, 952–955).[22] Consistent with my expectations, the individual states' reports to the Sarkaria Commission show that other middle- and high-income states (such as Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal) also suggested that the states be granted more taxation powers, while low-income states typically wanted no major changes in the rather centralized distribution of taxation powers.

Although demands for greater decision-making autonomy over taxation and more taxation powers can be seen as an example of "much wants more" and the possible danger of federalism encouraging separatism, a close look at the Akalis' demands and the center's role in Punjab's (and the states') economy suggests that the Akalis' concerns reflected aspects of center-state relations that the population of a wealthy and well-developed region might find unfavorable.

To begin with, India's central planning system means that the states' five-year plans have to be approved by the central government, specifically the Planning Commission. Moreover, because the constitutional division of powers means that the states do not have sufficient revenues to fund their

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[21] From the speech "Federal Polity – The Question of Autonomy: Its Meaning, Necessity and Framework," reprinted in Gopal Singh (1994, 146–157).

[22] Scholars have noted that the Punjab government has been reluctant to exploit the tax base it already has, indicating that the state should perhaps rather use that tax base before demanding more taxation powers. Among the Indian states' own sources of revenues are land revenues and agricultural income taxes, which would have placed Punjab in a position to raise significant revenues. Like most states in India, however, the Punjab state government does not levy agricultural income tax (Bhalla 1995). Especially the Akali Dal has been reluctant to tax rural groups, as the well-off rural Sikhs are the party's most important vote base (Brass 1991, 128). According to Punjab's memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission, however, agricultural income tax is likely to yield insignificant additional revenues (Government of Punjab 1998, 914).

expenditure responsibilities, the states have since the 1950s become increasingly dependent on the center to cover their expenditures (Bagchi 2003; Pritam Singh 2008, 70–103).[23] Important here is the type of transfers that have decreased and increased. In the 1970s, the Akali Dal argued that the central government's use of central transfers via the Planning Commission contributed to central control in the states.

In India, transfers are funneled to the states through three channels, with varying degrees of strings attached. Statutory transfers, which are based on the Finance Commission's recommendations and are aimed at fiscal equalization among the states, are formula based and nondiscretionary. Plan transfers, in contrast, come from the Planning Commission, whose recommendations are based on the discretion of the center. The Planning Commission prepares the national five-year plans and approves the states' five-year plans. The plan transfers are aimed at helping the states finance their state plans, since the constitutional division of powers means that the states do not have sufficient resources to fund their expenditure responsibilities. A formula for distribution of plan transfers was introduced in 1969, although some maintain that the criteria for distribution of plan transfers have remained unclear (Pritam Singh 2008, 75). Similarly, assistance to the states for implementation of central or centrally sponsored programs comes in the form of discretionary transfers that go through the Planning Commission to the various central ministries and on to the state ministries. Typically, the implementation of the programs and schemes is required and concerns policy areas on the constitution's State List, but by way of discretionary transfers, the center can exercise significant authority. Plan transfers and discretionary transfers, particularly the latter, have been the most controversial in India's federal financial relations. Indeed, the Planning Commission and the central programs were intended as tools to make the states adopt certain policies (Bagchi 2003) – and the Akali Dal reacted against the ways in which the center could use transfers to impede on Punjab's hard-won autonomy.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, several Indian states argued that discretionary transfers contributed to increased central control. For that reason, the recommendations of the Administrative Reform Commission (in 1968) and Tamil Nadu's Rajamannar Committee (in 1971) called for a diminished role of the Planning Commission.[24] Indeed, in the states' reports to the Sarkaria

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[23] In 1950–1951, the states funded more than 80 percent of current expenditures out of their own revenue receipts, but in 1960–1961, that share had decreased to 64, and in 1970–1971, 60 percent. In 1999–2000, the states funded 45 percent of their current expenditures, while the rest was transfers and loans (Bagchi 2003). In terms of capital expenditures, the states' autonomy has remained relatively stable but much lower, as the states have been more dependent on central loans, which are discretionary, to cover such expenditures.

[24] Bagchi's data (2003) show that in India overall, nonstatutory transfers (plan transfers and discretionary transfers) did actually not increase as share of total transfers, although in the 1969–1974 plan period, there was a marked increase in the share of discretionary transfers to

Commission on Centre-State Relations in the mid-1980s, several governments criticized federal fiscal relations (Saez 1999; Pritam Singh 2008). According to an Akali politician interviewed in 1973, "What I stress is more economic and financial powers to the states. The justification of the demands is that the yoke of the center will go. States would work independently and they will not have to run to Delhi for each and every thing" (quoted in Dhami 1975, 30). Similarly, in 1978, at his speech at the Akali conference in Ludhiana, the Akali leader Tohra argued that the Planning Commission "has reduced the states to a beggar-status by doling out grants-in-aid at the discretion of the center, instead of the rightful claim of the states to the revenues through the Finance Commission."[25] Even among some militants in the late 1980s, similar concerns were raised. According to the leader of the Khalistan Commando Force, "Our development policies also were controlled by the center. Even our local tax collection was transferred to the center. The state government was a state government only in name" (quoted in Pettigrew 1995, 157). The composition of transfers to Punjab, as shown in Table 4.1, suggests that these complaints were not unfounded. Indeed, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a significant portion of central resources going to Punjab was discretionary grants and loans, which are the kinds of transfers with most strings attached.[26] Regional politicians in other states, too, reacted against such strings, but to the Akalis, it looked like no coincidence that the center was tightening its grip on the states just when the Sikhs had won their struggle for a state of their own.

The Punjab case also demonstrates that concerns about wealth go beyond the workings of the federal fiscal system, encompassing other center-region institutions, policies, and practices that affect a state's economy. Indeed, central

central and centrally sponsored schemes and programs. Transfers to central and centrally sponsored schemes and programs are the type that most infringes on the states' policy priorities (Rao and Singh 2001; Chaubey 2003). Data used in earlier studies differ somewhat. According to Gulati and George (1988, 14, 95) and Brass (1991, 130), who cite the reports of the 7th and 8th Finance Commission, statutory transfers made up 31 percent of all transfers in the 1951 to 1956 plan period and 36 percent in the 1969–1974 period, a slight increase, but at a level much lower than that reported in Bagchi (2003). Moreover, Brass (1991, 131) reports that while transfers directly from the Planning Commission to the state plans decreased between the 1951–1956 and 1969–1974 plans (from 61 to 31 percent), discretionary transfers to central or centrally sponsored programs and schemes jumped significantly, from about 7 percent of all transfers in the 1951–1956 plan to 33 percent in the 1969–1974 plan. In Gulati and George (1988, 95), these shares are slightly different: transfers directly from the Planning Commission to the state plans decreased to 24 percent in the 1969–1974 plan period, while discretionary transfers to central or centrally sponsored programs and schemes increased to 41 percent in the 1969–1974 plan period. The differences among these studies rest with data sources, which transfers count as which category, and the number of states included. Despite differences, these accounts all demonstrate that the 1969–1974 plan period witnessed an increase in highly discretionary transfers.

[25] From the speech "Federal Polity – The Question of Autonomy: Its Meaning, Necessity and Framework," reprinted in Gopal Singh (1994, 146–157).

[26] See also data in Sarojini (1991, 188–204).

TABLE 4.1. *Discretionary Grants and Loans in Punjab and India*

Year	Discretionary Grants as % of Total Grants		Discretionary Grants and Loans as % of Total Grants and Loans	
	Punjab	India	Punjab	India
1972	83.3	24.6	92.2	75.7
1973	0.00	23.6	30.5	70.8
1974	26.5	18.2	68.4	60.2
1975	26.6	20.0	65.4	61.2
1976	19.9	20.8	57.1	59.7
1977	32.5	24.0	78.4	62.9
1978	50.0	24.4	90.0	67.2
1979	52.8	30.9	83.4	69.8
1980	46.0	32.1	82.6	68.5
1981	50.3	33.7	88.0	70.4
1982	0.0	30.6	76.8	69.2
1983	0.0	35.7	82.0	71.7
1984	62.7	42.2	95.9	74.2
1985	30.3	32.9	84.9	71.1
1986	10.4	34.0	82.4	67.7
1987	64.9	38.2	96.2	70.5
1988	42.4	36.9	91.0	66.6
1989	59.1	29.3	95.2	69.6
1990	46.0	36.5	92.9	70.0
1991	45.2	34.4	89.4	65.1
1992	39.2	36.0	86.6	62.9
1993	45.8	37.6	89.3	63.3
1994	54.4	28.1	91.5	63.4
1995	42.4	31.6	83.7	63.6
1996	42.6	26.4	80.0	62.6
1997	37.6	27.4	89.5	67.0
1998	42.6	35.2	83.9	72.1
1999	43.0	26.4	81.6	55.6
2000	23.2	22.2	56.2	46.8

Source: Based on data from the Reserve Bank of India, including all states, provided by Jonathan Rodden (see Rodden and Wilkinson 2004).

control of river waters, centrally controlled agricultural prices, and the lack of central investments in industries precipitated the Akalis' demands that Punjab was not receiving its fair share of revenues from the center.

To understand why these issues mattered to Punjab's population, let me take a step back and consider the development of the state's economy. With the partition in 1947, the majority and the most fertile areas of greater Punjab went to west Punjab in Pakistan. However, east Punjab in India, which after

independence had turned into a food-deficit state, rapidly developed to become one of India's most prosperous states. With the Green Revolution in the 1960s, which was a period of economic growth driven by agricultural developments, Punjab came to be characterized as the entire country's bread basket. By 1978–1979, Punjab contributed 6 million tons of food grains out of the country's total procurement of 11 million tons (Jeffrey 1994, 28–30). It is widely recognized as the state in India that gained the most from the Green Revolution. Literacy rates and university enrolment increased, as did the state's overall economic well-being. Per-capita public expenditures were the highest in India (Bhalla 1995). Indeed, until the mid-1980s, Punjab topped the list of per-capita income and placed toward the bottom in terms of poverty (Grewal 1975, 64; Brass 1991, 229). Based on such measures, Punjab has remained among the better-off states in India (Bagchi 2003).

Often, the development of Punjab's economy is attributed to the Sikhs' hard-working nature and value system that considers farming a noble profession, but it would not have taken place without a state government dedicated to agricultural development through land reforms, research, training and extension programs, and infrastructure, as well as a central government willing to help fund this development through grants. In the first two five-year plans (1951–1961), the highest spending priority in Punjab was power and irrigation. The development of such infrastructure, which underpinned the Green Revolution, was carried by Punjab's government but helped by large grants from the center (Bhalla 1995; Thandi 1999). Most of the relief and rehabilitation costs of post-Partition Punjab were covered by the central government (Rai 1965, 121–197). These developments paved the way for the Green Revolution of the 1960s, which was a process driven by government planning, financing, and favorable procurement prices for wheat and paddy. The point here, as it relates to the functioning of the federation, is that in the immediate postindependence period, Punjab was in poor shape, but the central government helped transform it into one of India's economic success stories. As argued by Pritam Sing, however, the success in terms of agricultural output and income had come about "in the absence of autonomy for Punjab to chart its own economic priorities and strategy of development (…)" (2008, 118). Indeed, once Punjab was back on its feet, segments of the population came to see the center as detrimental to the state economy. Central control of river water is key to such a claim.

Agriculture in Punjab, which has been the backbone of the state's economy since colonial times, requires much water and is supported by an extensive irrigation system. In particular, crops of high-yielding varieties, which were a key ingredient of the Green Revolution, are water-intensive. The Akalis' protest against the sharing of river waters, which was implemented with the 1966 reorganization, must be seen in this context. The rationale for the river water sharing was that the irrigation and power systems of pre-1966 Punjab were integrated in one system, which meant that dividing these systems would be economically disruptive. To ensure fair allocation, the Boundary Commission

in charge of the 1966 reorganization decided that both irrigation and power from the rivers Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas should be controlled by a board of representatives from each of the affected states – Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and Rajasthan – but under central government supervision (Sections 78 to 80 in the Punjab Reorganization Act). Because water – including water supplies, irrigation, canals, drainage, embankments, water storage, and water power – greatly affect the states' agriculture and industry, these matters are the jurisdiction of the state governments (Article 17 of the State List in the Indian constitution), although the constitution includes a provision for central regulation of interstate rivers if it is in the "public interest." For the center to reserve control over Punjab's river waters and power system was seen as a violation of the new state's constitutional rights.

According to the Sikh historian G. S. Dhillon (2004, 60–61), the sharing of river waters limited canal irrigation and forced farmers to opt for the more expensive, complicated, and environmentally unsound tube-wells.[27] About 75 percent of Punjab's river waters are allocated to other states (Kumar 2005), and while it is difficult to say whether this water rightfully belongs to Punjab, the Akalis have perceived it that way. According to one Akali politician in 1982, the sharing of river water meant that Punjab's wealth was "gifted away to others at the cost of our economy" (quoted in Jafar 1988, 29). This sentiment was not just rhetoric on the part of politicians. As Table 4.2 shows, survey data from Punjab's villages in 1988 indicate that among people's top economic concerns were questions related to canal irrigation and crop diversification and insurance.[28] Thus, the Akalis' concern with water, which was key to the conflict that developed, was one that resonated with the population. To many, the river water sharing created a sense that Punjab was deprived of its wealth and treated unfairly. In the words of G. S. Dhillon:

> The facts indicate that there has been a calculated plan to denude Punjab and its people of its natural wealth and thereby seriously to jeopardize the economic, industrial and agricultural destiny of the State. (…) when facts are seen in their nakedness and the realities understood, it becomes clear enough that after every Government decision or agreement, the Centre made its strangulating control over the politico-economic structures of Punjab increasingly tight and firm. (2004, 63)

Similarly, because agriculture was so important to Punjab's economy, it was highly dependent on government subsidies, low input costs, and high output prices, which were largely determined by the central government through procurement prices (and, as the country's economy increasingly opened up,

[27] In the 1970s, more than 50 percent of irrigation in Punjab was done through private tube-wells. Of the state's irrigated areas, canal-irrigated lands were decreasing from 1960 (McGuirk and Mundlak 1991, 32).

[28] These data come from Kumar's unpublished 1990 dissertation, "Causation, Content and Forms of Communalism in India: Punjab and Gujarat." E-mail correspondence, September 9, 2014.

TABLE 4.2. *Economic and Political Demands of Punjabi Villagers, 1988*

District and Landholding Size	Top Three Economic Demands	Top Three Political Demands
Gurdaspur	Canal irrigation facilities. Loans at easy interest rates. Insurance of crops.	Checking police repression. Greater autonomy for states. Control prices of wage goods.
Marginal landholding	Writing off debts. Job recruitment in army and police. Higher subsidies for agricultural inputs.	Checking police repression. Control prices of wage goods. Reservation of seats in local bodies based on size of landholding.
Medium landholding	Representation in civil administration. Loans at easy interest rates. Economic diversification.	Representation in and power of local and state legislature. Trial of Delhi rioters. Greater autonomy for states.
Large landholding	Assured prices for cash crops. Subsidies for high-tech farm machinery. Ancillary-based large industry.	Elections to state legislature. General amnesty for terrorists and Delhi rioters. Release of moderate leaders.
Amritsar	Canal irrigation facilities. Insurance of crops. Writing off debts.	Control prices of wage goods. Action against lower ranks of police officials. Greater autonomy for states.
Marginal landholding	Writing off debts. Higher subsidies for agricultural inputs. Job recruitment in army and police.	Control prices of wage goods. Action against lower ranks of police officials. Reservation of seats in local bodies based on size of landholding.
Medium landholding	Representation in civil administration. Insurance of crops. Economic diversification.	Checking police repression. Representation in and power of local and state legislature. Trial of Delhi rioters.
Large landholding	Ancillary-based industrialization. Assured prices for cash crops. Agro-based industrialization.	Elections to state legislature. Greater economy for states. General amnesty for terrorists and Delhi rioters.
Ferozepur	Loans at easy interest rates. Canal irrigation facilities. Crop diversification: Risk foundation.	Greater autonomy for states. Checking police repression. Action against lower ranks of police officials.

District and Landholding Size	Top Three Economic Demands	Top Three Political Demands
Marginal landholding	Writing off debts. Loans on operational holdings. Job recruitment in army and police.	Action against lower ranks of police officials. Control prices of wage goods. Reservation of seats in local bodies based on size of landholding.
Medium landholding	Loans at easy interest rates. Representation in civil administration. Crop diversification: Risk foundation.	Checking police repression. Trial of Delhi rioters. Greater autonomy for states.
Large landholding	Agro-based industrialization. Ancillary-based industrialization. Assured prices for cash crops.	Elections to state legislature. Greater autonomy for states. Release of moderate political leaders.

Source: Table provided by Pramod Kumar, Institute for Development and Communication, Chandigarh, based on a field survey of 1,404 households in randomly selected villages.

international markets).[29] Even though the procurement prices for wheat and rice set by the Food Corporation of India covered more than 100 percent of the average production cost in Punjab (Bhalla 1997, 380), the Akali Dal considered the government-set prices nonprofitable (Grewal 1990, 213–214), particularly when the Green Revolution began to level in the late 1970s.[30] Although Punjabi farmers, on average, were not poor, their wages declined in the first half of the 1970s. Moreover, prices for rice and wheat were gradually declining from 1960 to the end of the 1970s (McGuirk and Mundlak 1991, 40). Since the mid-1970s, the prices that farmers paid were increasing at a faster rate than the prices they received, reducing the profits of the large and rich farmers and increasing the deficits of the poor farmers (Gill 2000, 360–361). Many of the demands in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution spelled out these concerns of the state's farming population (Gopal Singh 1985). Part of the third resolution from 1978 calls upon the Indian government "to bring about parity between

[29] From 1965, government procurement accounted for more than 30 percent of wheat and 75 percent of rice production (McGuirk and Mundlak 1991, 39). As for subsidies, typically, the center has subsidized fertilizers, while the states have subsidized canal irrigation and electricity (Acharya 2001, 160).

[30] Between 1962–1965 and 1970–1973, agricultural outputs in Punjab grew at 8.2 percent a year, but from 1970–1973 to 1980–1983, the rate dropped to 5.4 percent (Bhalla 1995, 82–83).

the prices of the agricultural produce and that of the industrial raw materials so that the discrimination against such states that lack these materials may be removed" (reprinted in Grover 1999, Vol. 3, 311). Again, survey data from 1988, in Table 4.2, reveal that these were sentiments that occupied Punjabi villagers.

Punjab's Movement against State Repression (MASR) has sought to demonstrate that the large number of rural suicides in Punjab since the mid-1980s is a direct consequence of central policies that are harmful to the state's farmers, such as low government-set procurement prices and high input costs, lack of subsidies and industrial development, and the sharing of river waters.[31] According to an MASR activist and former representative of the Akali Dal, the conflict in the 1980s was about these economic factors. What the Punjabi population wanted, he explained to me, was greater fiscal autonomy; if the budget was not in central hands through the central planning system and if Punjab had real fiscal autonomy, the state government would be able to set the price on wheat and rice. In addition, he suggested that Punjab would benefit from control over major tax posts such as the income tax. Thus, there was – and to a certain degree still is – a sense that, while Punjab was feeding the rest of the country, it was not receiving its fair share in return, which encouraged calls for greater fiscal autonomy and decision-making autonomy in spheres affecting the state's economy.

Likewise, while Punjab's agricultural sector was growing until the early 1980s, the industrial sector lagged behind, fueling the notion that Punjab was losing out. Even though Punjab in the mid-1960s topped the list of India's states when it came to GDP per capita and social development, West Bengal, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu all did better than Punjab in terms of industrial development (Grewal 1975, 64). Indeed, Punjab's high GDP depended on agriculture, much more so than in India overall. While the primary sector made up 48 percent of India's domestic product in 1970, its share was 60 percent in Punjab. Among India's seventeen major states, by 1990 to 1991, Punjab was the least industrialized state (Pritam Singh 2008, 146–151).

By most accounts, the cause of Punjab's industrial development lag rests with the center's industrial policies, although within the state, the power of the landowning Sikhs may have created more political pressure for agricultural subsidies rather than industrial developments (Puri 1983b, 105). Although industry, per the constitution, is a state-level responsibility, the central government exercises significant control through public-sector investments and licensing, which in turn affect private investments (Pritam Singh

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[31] Documents provided in meeting with MASR representative, Chandigarh, February 27, 2006.

2008, 129–132). Both the Akali Dal's 1978 Ludhiana resolutions and the Akalis' 1982 campaign, the *Dharam Yudh Morcha* agitation, called for the center to invest in industries in the state: "During the last 30 years, the Punjab has not been given even a single public sector project and the total Central investment in the state since 1950 is a meager sum of about Rs. 200 crores."[32] Although Punjab had the capital to develop and support industries and enterprises, this was not happening because the central government was unwilling to provide industrial licenses to the state (Gujral 1985, 48; Bhalla 1995, 103). With the goal of reducing interstate inequalities, the central government has not invested much in industries in Punjab precisely because Punjab already was a relatively rich state due to its agricultural outputs.[33] Data from 1966 to 1983 show that of the center's public-sector investments in the states, Punjab's share was between 0.8 and 2.7, on average 1.6 percent, below that of most other states (and below its share of India's population; Pritam Singh 2008, 142–49; see also Maini 2004, 231). As a consequence of the state's industrial backwardness, there has been little demand for credit by industries within the state, which means that the savings generated in Punjab's agricultural sector were invested not in the state but elsewhere in the country (Pritam Singh 2008, 158–160).

While the Akalis and their supporters, primarily the landowning Sikhs, saw the lack of central investments in Punjab's industries as a justification for greater state autonomy, the same trend also boosted recruitment into the militant movement. Due to the small size of Punjab's industrial sector, it failed to serve as an alternative source of income for the losers of the Green Revolution, the middle or poorer peasants, who might have tried their luck in the cities. The Green Revolution was accompanied by a quite significant increase in inequality between the winners, the large farmers, and the losers, the small farmers and rural laborers.[34] Nor did the little-developed industrial sector provide employment chances for the increasingly educated Sikh youth from the rural

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[32] From Akali Dal's 1982 "Why this Holy War? Dharam Yudh" (reprinted in Gopal Singh 1994, 158–161). A crore equals ten millions; Rs. refers to rupees.

[33] In addition, India's wars with Pakistan and Punjab's location as a border state have prevented Delhi from investing in heavy industry and approving plan outlays to such developments in the state. For the same reason, it has been difficult for the state to attract domestic and foreign private investors. Industrial development in the 1980s and 1990s has primarily been driven by local investors (Bhalla 1995, 104).

[34] Among the landholders, 57 percent were poor peasants who cultivated only 15 percent of the land, while the large and middle farmers constituted 23 percent of the landholders and cultivated 65 percent of the land (Grewal 1990, 211). Landless workers constituted 17 percent of the agricultural work force in 1961, but by 1971, that share had increased to 32 percent. Bhalla and Chadha (1982) suggest that one of the main reasons for rural poverty is the combination of overpopulation in agriculture and unequal land distribution. A means to combat rural poverty would be to expand nonagricultural occupations and industries.

landowning class.[35] These groups formed the recruitment base of the militant movement that emerged in the 1980s. Indeed, the areas of Punjab with the highest unemployment rates were the districts most affected by militancy and violence (Telford 1992; Pettigrew 1995).[36] Based on interviews with militants in Punjab in the late 1980s, Pettigrew (1995) maintains that Bhindranwale's speeches appealed to the small farmers who were struggling under the impact of the Green Revolution, encouraging both active and passive support, in the form of providing shelter and food, to the militant movement. Her interviews also reveal antagonism between the Akali leadership and the militants. Take as an example the leader of the Khalistan Commando Force, Zaffarwal. He was active in the Akali Dal in the early 1970s but became disillusioned with the party, as its leadership appeared to have no concern for the "working man" and did little to pursue the aims of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. In other words, the militants were disillusioned not only with the central government but also with the Akali Dal. As a close Sikh observer of Punjab politics, who on several occasions met with Bhindranwale, explained to me in 2006, people were frustrated because "the Akalis are notorious for saying one thing and doing another."[37] Such divisions complicate how one thinks about regional wealth. Although my expectation was that the peace-preserving effects of institutions that govern center-region financial arrangements depend on a region's level of wealth, the Punjab case suggests that economic divisions within a region may play a role as well.

So let me return to my argument about the peace-preserving potential of fiscal autonomy in well-to-do versus poorer regions (Hypothesis 2a). Consistent with my expectations, the Sikh struggle in the 1950s and 1960s was not based on reasons related to wealth and fiscal relations or about seceding from the Indian union. Punjab, in a difficult position after the partition, benefited from central grants and loans for rehabilitation and development of the state's infrastructure. Similarly, nor in the 1970s and 1980s was the Akalis' struggle about seceding from India. Living in a relatively wealthy region with significant fiscal autonomy, in the sense that the state government could cover a large share of its expenditures, much of Punjab's population had reasons to stay put – and,

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[35] Historically, emigration to North America, the United Kingdom, and the Persian Gulf states had been an alternative source of employment for the Sikhs, but that changed with stricter immigration laws. In the 1970s, planned changes in the recruitment policies of the Indian army also influenced the employment opportunities for young Sikh men, who had always formed a large share of the army's soldiers.

[36] Telford (1992, 977) notes that two of the districts that consistently performed poorly in terms of average farm income were Gurdaspur and Amritsar, which were also two of the districts with most militancy in the mid-1980s. Both of these districts are located on the border to Pakistan and were – and still are – not recipients of any significant industry investment. Chandhoke (2005), however, maintains that some of the high-conflict areas actually performed better (in the agricultural sector) than low-conflict areas.

[37] Personal communication, Chandigarh, February 6, 2006.

indeed, the population did not unanimously rally behind the Akali Dal and its demands for greater autonomy. The problems that the Akali Dal identified could be resolved within a reformed federation. The Akalis called for greater fiscal autonomy in terms of more decision-making capacity over taxation and spending, including a wider tax base and transfers with fewer strings attached. Although such demands might look like a case of "much wants more," in the sense that even a wealthy region with significant fiscal autonomy will want even more autonomy, I have shown that, indeed, the state's decision-making authority over fiscal relations was restricted.

Moreover, the case study suggests that concerns about wealth and fiscal autonomy go beyond federal fiscal arrangements and that it may be problematic to speak about Punjab as a whole as wealthy or poor. The Akalis' concern with river waters, which was a key issue driving the struggle that emerged in the 1970s, was essentially about a relatively wealthy region in which a relatively rich (and politically powerful) group, the landowning Sikhs, considered the central government's actions to diminish their wealth. Since agriculture was the backbone of this group's (and the state's) wealth, they considered the sharing of river waters to be an unjust way of redistributing Punjab's wealth and an intrusion on the state's autonomy. These are dynamics consistent with my expectations about what a wealthy and well-developed region might want.

As the Green Revolution began to level in the late 1970s, Punjab's farmers, who were not poor but gradually became poorer, began to worry about their wealth. Indeed, the 1978 Ludhiana resolutions reveal a concern not only with greater autonomy, such as an end to the center's "arbitrary and unjust" sharing of the state's river waters (reprinted in Grover, Vol. 3, 1999, 310), but with getting more from the central government, including approval for establishing industries.[38] Indeed, the Punjab case shows that it may be difficult to talk about a state's wealth as if the state were unitary. In Punjab, the losers of the Green Revolution, the small farmers and rural laborers, saw their grievances as resting with the center in terms of, for example, insufficient subsidies for agricultural inputs and lack of industrial investments, which is consistent with how I would expect a poor and poorly developed region to act. Although the Akali Dal tried to address the grievances of the state's poor in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, these less well-to-do Sikhs also saw their grievances as resting with the Akalis' inability to represent their interests, creating conflicts within the state that complicated its interactions with the center. As I turn to next, such divisions were fueled by failed negotiations with the central government in Delhi.

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[38] The twelve policy resolutions adopted in 1978 clearly call on the central government to take certain steps. The 1973 version of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution reads more like a party program for the Akali Dal, listing the steps the party plans to take to, for example, reduce inequality and combat poverty (the resolution is reprinted in Grover 1999, Vol. 3, 307–321).

FIGURE 4.1. Violence in Punjab, 1981–1993.
Source: Data from Table 10.1 in Gurharpal Singh (2000, 164). The different lines refer to casualty figures from different sources.

Political Elite Ties

Punjab was the scene of occasional deadly Sikh-Hindu communal confrontations between 1978 and 1984, but the turning point in the conflict between the central government and militants in Punjab came when the Indian army stormed the Golden Temple in Amritsar in June 1984.[39] Yet Operation Bluestar was not immediately followed by a rise in violence. In 1985, it looked like the Akali Dal under Longowal would be able to steer the conflict to a peaceful end. However, as Figure 4.1 shows, from 1986, violence escalated in a spiral of insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns. I suggest that the turn to violence rests with how political ties between central and regional elites affected the negotiation process and opposition within Punjab (Hypothesis 3a). The case, which consists of three distinct phases, demonstrates how the presence of political ties with the central government dampened self-determination demands (1977–1980) but also how the center's political ties to other states complicated negotiations with an ethnic region (1980–1983, 1985–1987), even when the government in that region was a political ally of the center (1980–1983). The central government's official reason for employing the army in Punjab in 1984 was an increasingly volatile situation in the state. Yet the central government, worried about its fate in Punjab's neighboring state Haryana, which was governed by a political ally of the center, had contributed to that volatile situation.

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[39] This section draws on Bakke (2010).

In June 1985, the central government and the Akalis reached a settlement that addressed many of the issues at stake. However, the deal fell through, contributing to a proliferation in armed militant groups within Punjab.

    Before turning to the role of political elite ties, let me briefly set the scene. In August 1977, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a young man from a farmer's family, was appointed head of the Damdami Taksal, a Sikh seminary near Amritsar. He quickly became a popular religious figure in the villages of Punjab, much due to his confrontation with the Nirankaris, a heterodox Sikh sect unpopular among many (orthodox) Sikhs. In the spring of 1978, Bhindranwale and his followers clashed with members of the Nirankaris, who were holding a convention in Amritsar. The confrontation resulted in fifteen deaths, among them thirteen of Bhindranwale's followers. Bhindranwale blamed the state government, at the time led by a coalition of the Akali Dal and the Janata Party, for allowing the Nirankaris to hold a convention in Amritsar in the first place and for not doing enough to prosecute the perpetrators of violence. Bhindranwale soon became the unofficial leader of the emerging Sikh militant movement. The movement spoke of greater autonomy or a separate Sikh state, although Bhindranwale never directly said he favored an independent Sikh state, Khalistan. The closest he ever came to such a statement was when asked by BBC's Mark Tully if he supported independence. He answered, "I am neither for independence nor against it, but if I am offered it I will not refuse it'" (Tully and Jacob 1985, 129). Most of his speeches, which he delivered frequently from 1982 and were circulated on tape cassettes in the villages, addressed concerns about declining religious observance among young Sikhs and emphasized differences between Hindus and Sikhs, often referring to a history of a Hindu-ruled state discriminating against the Sikhs (Judge 2005, 128–157). The emerging militant movement gained followers among small and middle Sikh farmers and the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF). The recruits, mostly young men, were concerned about the protection of Sikh culture and religion and the plight of the small farmers. Bhindranwale's message resonated with these concerns (Telford 1992; Pettigrew 1995), as did the "adventure" that the militant movement offered (Puri et al. 1999).[40] Besides the AISSF, the only other institutional incarnation of the militant movement at the time was Dal Khalsa, a party founded in April 1978. Though the seeds of the militant movement were set in 1978, it was not until late 1982 that Bhindranwale became a powerful Sikh leader (Judge 2005, 65).

    The Akali Dal's demands for greater autonomy could all be met within the Indian federation, and the main faction of the Akali Dal never called for a

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[40] For the mixed motives of the young militants, the following quote from one of the leaders of the AISSF, Harminder Singh Sandhu, is telling: "You see for a while Sikh youths had turned their face away from Sikhism, mainly because the Akali leadership had become passive – they had adjusted to the so-called democratic system. To be a Sikh and to be young necessarily means to be adventurous. Sant Bhindranwale offered us the adventure" (quoted in Tavleen Singh 1984, 40).

separate Sikh state. Yet as the narrative that follows shows, in the early 1980s, the Akalis' inability to gain concessions from the central government fueled dissatisfaction with the party within the state and boosted the militant movement, which had more radical demands and was more inclined to use violent means.

Political Elite Ties and Toned-Down Akali Demands, 1977–1980

The Akali Dal passed the Ludhiana resolutions while governing Punjab in a coalition with the Janata Party, which also ruled in Delhi. In 1977, the long-time dominant Congress Party lost elections both at the center and across a number of traditionally Congress-ruled states. In Delhi, Morarji Desai of the Janata Party (a coalition of anti-Congress parties and Congress splinter groups) succeeded Indira Gandhi as prime minister. In Punjab, the Congress Party won a larger share of the vote than did the Akali Dal, but the Akalis joined forces with the Janata Party and formed a coalition government with Parkash Singh Badal of the Akali Dal as chief minister.

While facing pressure from within the party to pursue greater autonomy (Gandhi 1999, 460), Badal did not actively do so. In fact, the 1978 Ludhiana resolutions are often considered a watered-down version of the 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution. Particularly among its critics, the Akali Dal is known for turning to agitations and radical demands when out of power while doing little to follow up on those demands while in power. In light of the book's argument about the effect of political elites (Hypothesis 3a), it is not surprising that the party's chief minister, when a political ally of the party ruling at the center, did not push an autonomy agenda. Recall that one of the effects of political elite ties across tiers of government is that regional elites may refrain from pursuing radical demands.

When in Punjab in 2006, I was given the following explanations for the Akalis' reluctance to pursue the goals of the ASR while in power: in an interview in 1978, an Akali leader was asked why the party, now in power, was not raising the demands of the ASR. He suggested that since the Akalis now had the responsibility for governing the country, the party did not have the time to talk about "small demands for small communities."[41] Similarly, according to an Akali politician somewhat disillusioned with the party's leadership, politics (in Punjab) is always about a certain "dynasty" whose only interest is to gain and hold on to power. Once in power, he suggested, no one has any interest in fighting for the ASR.[42] Thus, despite the adoption of the Ludhiana resolutions in 1978, the 1977 to 1980 period was one in which divisive issues were toned down and agitational tactics avoided. In March 1978, for instance, a religious Sikh leader began a fast-unto-death campaign (a frequent protest tactic of the Akalis) in the name of transferring Chandigarh and Punjabi-speaking areas in

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[41] Recounted to me in personal communication with a Punjab scholar, Amritsar, February 23, 2006.

[42] Personal communication, Amritsar, February 18, 2006.

Haryana to Punjab, but Akali leaders stepped in and called for such issues to be dealt with through "peaceful negotiations" instead (Wallace 1999, 221). While the political autonomy demands of the 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution were debated at the Akalis' party meetings and gatherings of the Sikh community, the debates in the state's legislative assembly did not go beyond concerns about greater autonomy to all states in India. The Akali Finance Minister in Punjab, Balwant Singh, emphasized that the Akali Dal's autonomy demand was merely about restructuring center-state relations to secure more financial resources to the state (Mehra 1999, 237–238). Indeed, the coalition with the centrally governing Janata Party, which threatened to leave the coalition if Badal gave in to pressures from more extreme factions of the Akali Dal, provided incentives for him to work out compromise solutions both among factions of the party and with Delhi (ibid., 242, 245).[43]

Both the Janata coalition at the center and the coalition between the Akali Dal and the Janata Party in Punjab were fraught with internal divisions (e.g., Mehra 1999), contributing to their demise. In January 1980, Congress returned to power at the center, and after a period of direct central rule, Congress returned to power in Punjab in elections in May 1980. The ensuing period of copartisanship between Punjab and Delhi was, however, not characterized by harmonious intergovernmental relations.

Political Elite Ties and Stalled Negotiations, 1980–1983
Whereas the Congress Party under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's leadership (1947–1964) was characterized by close ties between the national branch of the party and strong state-level party branches, the Congress Party of Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, was one in which the central party at times deliberately weakened the party's chief ministers in the states to enhance central control (Brass 1991, 184–187; Kohli 1991). In 1949 and 1956, the Congress governments in Punjab and Delhi negotiated agreements to meet Sikh demands (although none of them were followed through), but in contrast, Punjab's Congress government under Chief Minister Sardar Darbara Singh (1980–1983), which drew support from both the Hindu and Sikh populations, was not similarly involved in negotiating the Sikhs' demands with Indira Gandhi in the early 1980s. In fact, Indira Gandhi and Home Minister (later President) Zail Singh seemed to work against Darbara Singh's government. Zail Singh, a Sikh who had served as Punjab's chief minister (1972–1977), initially backed Bhindranwale in an attempt to split the Akali Dal and destabilize the government of Darbara Singh, who was a long-rime political rival (Tully and

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[43] The Akalis are notorious for factionalism, primarily because of the organization of Sikhism in Punjab. In elections to the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), which governs the Sikh temples, the competition takes place only among factions of the Akali Dal, thus pitting different Akali leaders against one another (Brass 1974, 313; Gurharpal Singh 2000, 101).

Jacob 1985, 66–72, 105; Gill and Singhal 1985, 48).[44] Ultimately, what seemed to matter for Delhi's decisions with respect to Punjab were Congress's electoral prospects elsewhere. The negotiations of Sikh demands took place between the Akali Dal and the Congress-ruled central government in a process characterized by lack of compromise, noncredible commitments, and radicalization of the Akalis' demands and means. The consequence of this stalled negotiation process was a growing militant movement in Punjab dissatisfied with the central government, the state's Congress-led government, and the Akali Dal.

The Akali Dal met with representatives of the central government more than twenty times between 1981 and 1984, on a few occasions with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi present (Sarab Jit Singh 2002, 48). Yet none of these negotiations led anywhere, for at least three reasons. First, the parties could not reach a compromise. Indira Gandhi and the Congress Party were willing to give in to relatively minor demands, but they did not agree to grant concessions with respect to the Akalis' main demands, such as a reconsideration of the sharing of Punjab's river waters, the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab, and greater policy autonomy to the states. After two days of negotiations in November 1981, one of the Akali leaders, Badal, told the journalist Kuldeep Nayar that Indira Gandhi seemed set on delaying discussions and leaving issues pending as a means to exhaust the Akalis. The last time Indira Gandhi was present at the negotiation table was in April 1982, and the Akali leaders left the meeting with the impression that the prime minister had already, prior to the meeting, decided not to concede to their demands (Nayar 1985, 124–125).

Second, the talks were characterized by broken promises. In August 1982, the Akali leaders met with Swaran Singh, a Sikh Congress politician, and reached a compromise settlement that addressed many of the Akalis' demands. After the meeting, Swaran Singh presented the settlement to the prime minister, who approved it. By the time the settlement was presented to parliament for approval, however, the concessions had been watered down – and some of them were now pending consent of the governments of Rajasthan and Haryana. Apparently, observes Nayar (1985, 132–134), the prime minister had changed her mind.[45] Subsequent talks broke down.

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[44] Editorials from India's *Economic and Political Weekly* at the time discussed how the increasingly troubled Congress Party was based on personal loyalties and opportunism and in Punjab used Bhindranwale to try to split the ranks of the Akalis. See "Congress Party: Politics of Personal Loyalty," February 20, 1982; "Politics: Trouble in State," March 27, 1982; "Punjab: Congress (I)'s Dangerous Game," May 8, 1982; "Punjab: Willing to be Used," August 28, 1982; "Punjab: More Opportunism," November 6, 1982.

[45] The central government had similar views about the Akalis. According to one of the central government politicians involved in the negotiations with the Akalis, the "Bhindranwale factor" created confusion among the Akalis about what they really wanted (Surjeet 1985). Indeed, in the central government's *White Paper,* it comments as follows on negotiations with the Akalis: "When after protracted discussions an agreement appeared to have been reached on some issues, new issues were raised, thereby frustrating any possibility of settlement. The demands were often put forward without the Akali Dal having worked out all the relevant

Third, whereas Chief Minister Badal of the Akali Dal had not actively pushed the party's autonomy agenda (the Anandpur Sahib Resolution or the Ludhiana resolutions) in 1977 to 1980, once the Akalis were out of power, many of these demands were back on the table, formulated first as a list of forty-five grievances presented to the central government in September 1981 (reprinted in Samiuddin 1985, 688–691). After the failure of negotiations in April 1982, the main faction of the Akali Dal, under Longowal, launched the *Dharam Yudh Morcha* (the "righteous" campaign), which is the closest the Akalis ever were to be (associated) with the militant forces in the state (Puri 1983a, 54) – and represented a departure from the attempt to avoid agitational tactics in 1977 to 1980. Over the next two years, a number of agitation campaigns, which resulted in arrests of thousands of Sikh protestors, were occasionally replaced by negotiations, but these did not go far.[46] The *Dharam Yudh Morcha* made it easier for the central government to conflate the Akalis' demands for greater autonomy with the militant movement, although after Operation Bluestar, the official explanation was that the attack was not a response to the Akalis' demands but a response to a growing secessionist movement (Government of India 1999). Notably, the militant movement grew as it became clear that negotiations between Punjab's Akali-led government and the Congress government at the center were not going anywhere.

Why such a stalled negotiation process? For one thing, a settlement in Punjab could have meant a victory for the Akali Dal in Punjab – and thus a loss to the ruling Congress Party. Moreover, observers and scholars of Indian politics have noted that Indira Gandhi's concern for Congress's electoral fate elsewhere in India contributed to the failure of the Punjab negotiations between 1981 and 1984 (Bhambhari 1985, 207–208; Sheth and Narang 1985, 128–130; Brass 1991, 203, 207; Kohli 1991, 362; Biswas 2014, 24). Indira Gandhi was concerned that a negotiated settlement in Punjab, particularly over the Chandigarh transfer and the river water question, would hurt Congress's fortunes in the neighbor states, especially Haryana and Rajasthan. Indeed, when the negotiations between the center and the Akali Dal stalled in April 1982, state assembly elections in Haryana were only a month away, and Haryana's Congress chief minister, Bhajan Lal, had informed Indira Gandhi that he already faced enough troubles due to a decision she made in December 1981 that modified the division of river waters between Punjab and Haryana.[47] Similarly, in November

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implications for the Sikh community itself. The Akali Dal appeared to want to keep an agitation going on some issue or other" (Government of India 1999, 334).

[46] According to the central government, steps were taken toward meeting the Akalis' demands, notably the establishment of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations in 1983 (Government of India 1999), but the work on this commission did not start until later. Indira Gandhi announced the establishment of the commission, which was headed by a retired Supreme Court judge, Ranjit Singh Sarkaria (a Sikh), in March 1983. The Punjab government, under the leadership of the Akali Dal, delivered its memorandum to the commission in 1987, and the commission delivered its report in 1988 (Saez 1999).

[47] See "Punjab: Willing to be Used" (editorial), *Economic and Political Weekly,* August 28, 1982.

1982, the Akali Dal and the prime minister's team of negotiators reached a settlement, but Lal convinced Indira Gandhi not to agree to the deal before consulting the government in his state as well as in Rajasthan, another state benefiting from Punjab's river waters (Nayar 1985, 135; Tully and Jacob 1985, 87–88). In 1983, Congress lost elections in the large states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, making it even more apprehensive about acts that could cost support in Haryana and Rajasthan – both among the northern Indian states key for Congress's ability to stay in power at the center.

The failure of negotiations discredited the Akali Dal among the more militant Sikhs, who considered the party to be both unable and unwilling to further the interests of the Sikh community, thus weakening its power in the state. An observer at the time noted that the failure of negotiations helped make violence a legitimate means in Punjab (Bhambhari 1985, 206). According to Nayar, a journalist covering Punjab at the time, "The Akalis' main problem was how to maintain their credibility with the community; the government was not giving them any opportunity to show that by staying in the mainstream, they had won their demands" (1985, 138). Bhindranwale's claims that the path of peaceful and moderate resistance was a blind alley gained support, particularly among the youth (ibid., 140–142). By 1982 to 1983, violence was spreading in the villages in Punjab as young Sikh men, upon Bhindranwale's request, took up arms and rode around on motorcycles, killing people considered to be enemies of the Sikhs, including Hindus, Nirankaris, police officials thought to be informers (also Sikhs), and political figures (ibid., Tully and Jacob 1985, 130–131). The militancy also included attacks on Sikh and Hindu temples and train and police stations and bank robberies and thefts (Grewal 1990, 223). In October 1983, Punjab was declared a "disturbed area" and placed under central control, known as President's Rule.

Even the Golden Temple itself, the holiest of all Sikh shrines, resembled a disturbed area. The Golden Temple complex is home to the headquarters of the religious body Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) and the Akali Dal, but by 1982, Bhindranwale had set up camp within the complex's residence halls for pilgrims.[48] The main Akali faction under Longowal wanted the militants out of the complex and briefly teamed up with the Babbar Khalsa, a militant group opposed to Bhindranwale, to fight them (Tavleen Singh 1984, 42). Yet in late 1983, Bhindranwale and a small group from his 400 to 500 supporters instead moved into the Akal Takht, which is situated inside the Golden Temple and is the primary seat of Sikh religious authority. This inability of anyone, particularly the Akali Dal,

[48] The Akali faction of Gurcharan Singh Tohra, the SGPC leader, allegedly allowed Bhindranwale and his followers to move into the Golden Temple in late 1981 (Brass 1991, 180), although some have argued that Tohra acted more as a mediator among Bhindranwale and his supporters (including the AISSF) and the Akali Dal, the SGPC, and Babbar Khalsa (Tavleen Singh 1984, 43).

to control militant Sikh forces was central to the official justification for Operation Bluestar in June 1984.

Again, however, the decision to employ the army in Punjab was informed by concerns for the Congress Party elsewhere. Aware that the precarious situation in Punjab reflected poorly on the party, particularly in Hindu-dominated states, its leadership sought to appear tough on the Sikhs ahead of the coming elections. In May 1984, just a few weeks before Operation Bluestar, the Congress Party performed poorly in by-elections in twelve states across India. The losses in the northern states were attributed to Indira Gandhi's failure to stem Hindu anger at what was perceived to be Sikh secessionism (Kumar et al. 2003, 32). In April 1984, a Hindu opposition leader even called for Indira Gandhi's resignation over the growing crisis in Punjab.[49] Yet rather than strengthen the position of her party, Indira Gandhi's decision to attack the Golden Temple in June 1984 cost her life.

In sum, in the years between 1980 and 1983, the central government and Punjab's government were both ruled by the Congress Party. Yet due to the Congress Party's concern for its electoral fortunes elsewhere in India, particularly Haryana, it was a period characterized by a stalled negotiation process that nourished the militant movement. In this case, the center's concerns for political allies in other regions trumped its concern for Punjab, even though the government in Punjab was ruled by the party ruling at the center. In part, the Congress leadership's lack of concern with respect to the implications for its copartisan ally in Punjab – that it reflected poorly on Punjab's Congress Party to be unable to uphold law and order in the state –was a result of idiosyncratic factors, particularly the rivalry between the home minister, Zail Singh, and Punjab's chief minister, Darbara Singh. Yet in the counterfactual case, the central government would have been less concerned about its electoral fortunes in Haryana and more inclined to reach a compromise solution with the Sikhs, despite such personal competition.

Political Elite Ties and Escalation of Violence, 1985–1987
The army's attack on the Golden Temple in June 1984 killed hundreds (some claim thousands), including innocent bystanders. It was followed by the assassination of Indira Gandhi by Sikh members of her own bodyguard and ensuing anti-Sikh riots in Delhi and elsewhere in the country, which left thousands dead and many homeless (Gurharpal Singh 2000, 162–163; Khushwant Singh 2006, 242–243). Despite Operation Bluestar and its bloody aftermath, in June 1985, the Punjab crisis looked like it was coming to a halt. While Punjab was still under President's Rule, the main Akali leader, Longowal, and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his mother, Indira Gandhi, reached an agreement.

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[49] See "Hindu Leader Calls for Gandhi's Resignation," *United Press International,* April 5, 1984.

The Rajiv-Longowal accord, also known as the Punjab accord, gave in to almost all of the demands rejected by Indira Gandhi in 1981 to 1984, such as provisions for the transfer of Chandigarh and a promise that the river water issue would be presented to a Supreme Court tribunal. Also negotiated were provisions related to the aftermath of Operation Bluestar, including an inquiry into the Delhi riots and compensation to the families of innocent civilians killed in these riots.[50] The central government did not concede to all of the Akalis' demands, but it agreed to later take them into consideration. On paper, the accord was promising. Although some Akali leaders were offended, as they had been left out of the negotiation process, and some militant groups opposed the accord, it was well received in Punjab's population among both Sikhs and Hindus (Kohli 1991, 368–369). Indeed, it looked like Longowal, in the aftermath of Operation Bluestar and ensuing violence in Delhi, was about to unite Punjab's population and make peace with the center. As Figure 4.1 shows, violence in Punjab declined from 1984 to 1985.[51] However, some of the militants saw the accord as little but a sell-out or last resort for a power-hungry Akali leadership to stay in power, and in July 1985, Longowal was assassinated. In the state assembly elections the following September, the Akalis won an unparalleled victory (38 percent of the popular vote) and were for the first time able to rule without a coalition partner.

Upon Longowal's assassination, the Congress government at the center did not follow up on its promises in the accord, which was never fully implemented. Importantly, the first main provision of the accord was broken when Chandigarh was not transferred to Punjab by January 26, 1986. Initially, the transfer was delayed to March, then July, but Chandigarh today still remains the shared capital of Punjab and Haryana. Similarly, in May 1987, the Supreme Court tribunal adjudicating on the sharing of Punjab's river waters reduced Punjab's share and doubled that of Haryana (Gurharpal Singh 2000, 133), and the river water question remained unresolved. Both Atul Kohli (1991, 370–376) and Paul Brass (1991, 210–211) suggest that the failure of the Rajiv-Longowal accord rests with the Congress Party's concerns in other Indian states, particularly Haryana.[52] In December 1985, Congress lost the state elections in Assam, fueling dissatisfaction with Rajiv Gandhi's leadership within the party. Next up, in June 1986, were elections in Haryana, which had been ruled by Bhajan Lal, a Congress politician, since 1979.[53] In the Rajiv-Longowal accord, neither

[50] For a copy of the accord, see Grover (1999), Vol. 3, 384–386. The accord also addressed ethnic concerns related to the *gurudwaras* and Punjabi-speaking areas outside the state but gave no specific promises.
[51] Of the deaths in 1985, most occurred prior to the signing of the accord (Kohli 2004, 369).
[52] See also the account of Sarab Jit Singh (2002), who was deputy commissioner in Amritsar in 1978–1992.
[53] Since its creation in 1966, Haryana had only in 1977–1979 been ruled by a non-Congress party. Notably, the non-Congress chief minister in 1979 was Bhajan Lal, who switched allegiance when it became clear that the Janata Party would not remain in power. Lal stepped down in

the clause on the transfer of Chandigarh nor the clause concerning river water was popular in Haryana. After the signing of the accord, opposition parties in Haryana called for Lal's resignation if he accepted it.[54] In fact, by January 1986, the proposed Chandigarh transfer had become such a contentious issue that the chief ministers of Punjab and Haryana, who had offices in the same building in Chandigarh, did not speak to one another, and violent demonstrations broke out in Haryana. The decision to delay the transfer of Chandigarh was based on disagreements about which areas of Punjab to give to Haryana in compensation.[55] In the end, Rajiv Gandhi backed out of the Punjab accord, giving credence to the claims of the politicians and militants who had opposed it in the first place.

While Longowal's assassination was followed by a major victory for the Akali Dal in the September 1985 elections, the failed implementation of the Rajiv-Longowal accord undermined the Akalis' ruling faction, the Akali Dal (Longowal), as a representative of the Sikh community. It also nourished factionalism within the party and a growth in militant groups with radical demands. As a result, it became increasingly difficult for Barnala's Akali government to rule the state. In June 1987, the Congress government at the center dismissed Punjab's government and placed the state under President's Rule, citing the Akalis' inability to curb the growing violence.

In February 1986, after the transfer of Chandigarh failed to take place, the Akali faction under Badal, known as Akali Dal (Badal), split from the ruling Longowal faction. In fact, twenty-seven members of the Akalis' seventy-three–person contingent in the state's legislative assembly (37 percent) defected from the party, leaving Chief Minister Barnala dependent on Congress for ruling the state (Gurharpal Singh 2000, 132). By 1987–1988, another Akali faction, under Simranjit Singh Mann, began calling for Khalistan. The proliferation of Akali factions continued, and in 1991, ahead of the 1992 elections, as many as seven splinter groups of the party were active in the state (Sidhu 1994).[56] In addition, from 1986 to 1992, the number of militant groups in Punjab grew, chief among them the Babbar Khalsa, the All India Sikh Students

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June 1986 but was succeeded by another Congress man, Bansi Lal. Congress lost the elections in Haryana in June 1987.

[54] "Haryana Opposition MPs Quit Over 'Sell-Out' to Sikhs: State Officials Criticise Agreement between Indian Government and Punjab Leaders," *The Times,* July 29, 1985.

[55] See "Tensions Rising over Transfer of State Capital," *United Press International,* January 20, 1986; "Extremists Hold the Keys to the Punjab Lock: Threats to Indian State's Sikh Accord," *The Guardian,* January 8, 1986.

[56] Elections to the SGPC have always pitted different Akali leaders against each other, as such being a source of fragmentation, but from the 1980s, these divisions began to manifest themselves beyond SGPC elections. The elections in February 1992 were boycotted by most Akali factions and the state's population (voter turnout was 24.3 percent for the state assembly and 21.5 percent for the national assembly) because the central government several times postponed the elections (Gurharpal Singh 2000, 149–161).

Federation (AISSF), the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), and one of KCF's splinter groups, the Bhindranwale Tiger Force for Khalistan (BTFK). Although these militant groups and their many splinter groups came under the umbrella of three different coordinating committees known as Panthic Committees, they operated relatively independently of one another, sometimes in pursuit of different goals, sometimes forming (short) alliances.

Consider the following brief description of the militant landscape in Punjab in the late 1980s. On January 26, 1986 (the day that the Chandigarh transfer was scheduled to take place), the first Panthic Committee was formed, and the KCF, which had emerged after Operation Bluestar in 1984, grew to become its powerful armed wing, particularly under the command of Wassan Singh Zaffarwal in the late 1980s. In April 1986, the committee issued a declaration of Khalistan. By 1988, several of the field commanders of Zaffarwal's KCF had formed their own armed groups, including the BTFK under Gurbachan Singh Manochahal. In November 1988, groups opposed to the KCF – including two KCF splinter groups (KCF [Panjwar] and the Khalistan Liberation Front), the Babbar Khalsa, and a splinter group of the AISSF under Daljit Singh Bittoo – came together under the leadership of the second Panthic Committee, led by Sohan Singh. In April 1990, a third Panthic Committee, led by BTFK's Manochahal, brought together militant groups – including the KCF (Rajasthani), the Dashmesh regiment, BTFK (Manochahal), and the AISSF faction under Manjit Singh – that opposed members of the other committees. Almost twenty different militant groups, excluding the various Akali factions, were active in Punjab over the course of the 1980s. Table 4.3 provides an overview of the political and militant groups that were part of Punjab's self-determination movement between 1978 and 1994.

Particularly from 1988 to 1991, violence in Punjab grew rapidly as spirals of insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns intensified. Some of the violence in Punjab was a result of militant groups fighting not only the police and security forces but also each other. Both Sikh and Hindu civilians were targets and collateral damage in these struggles. Two studies provide a fascinating look at violence among the militants and between the militants and Punjab's population in this period. Joyce Pettigrew (1995) details how the various factions and splinter groups of the KCF emerged, whom they fought, and whom they allied with, while Paramjit Singh Judge (2005) analyzes hundreds of warnings that the militant groups placed in Punjab's newspapers. The largest share (34 percent) was directed to other militants or "looters, extortionists or anti-social elements" pretending to be militants, while the body that most embodied the counterinsurgents, the police, were targets in 17 percent of the warnings. The militants even seem to have been aware that their own infighting distracted them from their real cause, fighting the central government. In a warning published in *Ajit* on September 25, 1990, "Gurbachan Singh Manochahal and Gurjant Singh Rajasthani appealed to and also warned other militant organizations against fratricide and emphasized the need for orienting

TABLE 4.3. *Militant and Akali Dal Factions in Punjab, 1978–1994*

Date	Group	Founder/Leader	Origins/Activities/Objectives	Alliances
April 1978	Militant movement at Damdami Taksal	Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale	Militant movement, not openly pro-Khalistan	AISSF, as well as initial Congress-backing
1978	Dal Khalsa		Political party, pro-Khalistan	Militants, as well as initial Congress-backing
July 1978	All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF)	Amrik Singh, Harminder Singh Sandhu. From 1986: Gurnam Singh Buttar	Student organization that wants greater powers for the Sikhs	Bhindranwale and Damdami Taksal
April 1978 (1980)	Babbar Khalsa	Sukhdev Singh Babbar	Militant group that targets Nirankaris and Bhindranwale's men and pursues moral code of conduct. Is defeated in Operation Bluestar (1984) but reemerges 1986–1988, opposed to another militant group, the KCF	Joins Car Jhujharu Jathebande (CJJ)/2nd Panthic Committee (1988)
April 1980	Council of Khalistan	Jagjit Singh Chauhan, Balbir Singh Sandhu	London-based council of Sikh expats, pro-Khalistan	Babbar Khalsa, 1st Panthic Committee (1986)
1980	Akali Dal (Talwandi)	Jagdev Singh Talwandi	Splinter of the main Akali Dal faction (which from 1980 is under Longowal)	
June 1984	Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) (Zaffarwal)	Labh Singh, Manbir Singh Chaheru (1986), Wassan Singh Zaffarwal (1988)	Loosely organized armed militant group, consisting of about 400 fighters by spring 1986	1st Panthic Committee (1986)

(continued)

TABLE 4.3 (*continued*)

Date	Group	Founder/Leader	Origins/Activities/Objectives	Alliances
May 1985	United Akali Dal (UAD)	Baba Joginder Singh, then later Harcharan Singh Rode	Pro-Khalistan faction that attempts to unite Akali factions, but the main Akali Dal (Longowal) continues	
Jan. 1986	1st Panthic Committee		Coordinating committee for militant groups, pro-Khalistan	KCF (and AISSF (Buttar)
Spring 1986	Akali Dal (Badal)	Parkash Singh Badal	Splinter party of Akali Dal (Longowal), anti-Khalistan	Gurcharan Singh Tohra (SGPC)
Feb. 1987	Unified Akali Dal	Simranjit Singh Mann	Radical faction attempting to unite Akali factions, but Akali Dal (Longowal) persists as the main faction, now under Surjit Singh Barnala	
1987	Bhindranwale Tiger Force for Khalistan (BTFK) (Manochahal)	Gurbachan Singh Manochahal	Powerful splinter group of KCF	
1987/1988	BTFK (Sangha)	Sukhwinder Singh Sangha	Autonomous BTFK group	Joins KCF (Zaffarwal) (1990)
1988	Sikh Students Federation (SSF)	Daljit Singh Bittoo	Splinter group of AISSF	CJJ, 2nd Panthic Committee
1988	Khalistan Liberation Front (KLF)	Avtar Singh Brahma Later: Gurjant Singh Budhsingwala	Splinter group of the KCF	CJJ, 2nd Panthic Committee
1988	KCF (Panjwar)	Paramjit Singh Panjwar	Splinter group of the KCF	CJJ, 2nd Panthic Committee
1988	KCF (KanwarjitSingh)	Kanwarjit Singh	Splinter group of the KCF	CJJ, 2nd Panthic Committee

Year	Group	Leader	Description	Related groups
1988	2nd (Sohan) Panthic Committee	Sohan Singh	Coordinating committee for militant groups, opposed to 1st Panthic Committee	Militant groups of CJJ
1988	Car Jhujharu Jathebande (CJJ)	Sohan Singh	Encompassing militant movement (1988–1991), competitor to the KCF	2nd Panthic Committee, Babbar Khalsa, SSF (Bittoo), KLF, KCF (Panjwar), and in 1990, BTFK (Sangha) joins
1988	Akali Dal (Mann)	Simranjit Singh Mann	Splinter party of Unified Akali Dal, pro-Khalistan	
1988	Akali Dal (Talwandi). From 1989 it is known as Akali Dal (Badal)	Jagdev Singh Talwandi, then from 1989, Parkash Singh Badal	Splinter party of Unified Akali Dal, anti-Khalistan. At this point, Akali Dal (Badal) becomes the main faction of the Akali Dal	Gurcharan Singh Tohra (SGPC) and Akali Dal (Badal)
1988	Akali Dal (Longowal)	Tota Singh	The previously dominant faction turns into a less dominant faction after Akali Dal (Talwandi)/Akali Dal (Badal) becomes the dominant faction	
1989	AISSF (Manjit)	Manjit Singh	Reorganization of the AISSF, separate from SSF (Bittoo)	BTFK (Manochahal), 3rd Panthic Committee (1990), Baba Joginder Singh, Damdami Taksal
Early 1990	Shahpur's group	Balwinder Singh Shahpur	Splinter group of the KCF	Intelligence
Early 1990	Kallia's group	Hardev Singh Kallia	Splinter group of the KCF	
Early 1990	Satnam Singh Chhina's group	Satnam Singh Chhina	Splinter group of the KCF	Intelligence
Early 1990	KCF (Rajasthani)	Gurjant Singh Rajasthani	Splinter group of the KCF	Forms 3rd Panthic Committee

TABLE 4.3 (*continued*)

Date	Group	Founder/Leader	Origins/Activities/Objectives	Alliances
Early 1990	Dashmesh regiment	Sital Singh Matthewal	Splinter group of the KCF	Forms 3rd Panthic Committee
April 1990	3rd Panthic Committee	Manochahal (BTFK)	Coordinating committee for militant groups, opposed to 1st and 2nd Panthic Committees	KCF (Rajasthani), Dashmesh regiment, AISSF (Manjit)
Aug. 1990	Akali Dal (Panthic)	Rajdev Singh	Splinter party of Akali Dal (Mann)	
Jan. 1991	Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar)/ Akali Dal (Mann)	Simranjit Singh Mann	Attempt at unifying Akali Dal factions	Akali Dal (Mann), Akali Dal (Badal), parts of Akali Dal (Longowal)
1991	Akali Dal (Badal)	Parkash Singh Badal	Badal faction leaves Mann's Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar)	
1991	Akali Dal (Longowal)	Kabul Singh	Longowal faction leaves Mann's Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar)	
1991	Akali Dal (Panthik)	Amarinder Singh	Splinter group of the Akali Dal (Badal)	
1991	Shiromani Akali Dal		Akali Dal (Longowal) and Akali Dal (Panthik) merge	
1991	Akali Dal (Kabul)	Kabul Singh	Splinter faction of Akali Dal (Badal)	
1991	Akali Dal (Sukhjinder)	Sukhjinder Singh	Splinter faction of Akali Dal (Badal)	
1991	Akali Dal (Talwandi)	Jagdev Singh Talwandi	Revival of Talwandi faction, splits from Akali Dal (Badal)	
1994	Akali Dal (Amritsar)	Simranjit Singh Mann	Radical, non-Badal factions of Akali Dal unite, pro-Khalistan	Initially supported by Gurcharan Singh Tohra (SGPC)

Notes: Most of the militant leaders are killed or leave Punjab in 1991–1993. Sources include Pettigrew (1995), Tully and Jacob (1985), Sidhu (1994), Gurharpal Singh (2000), Kumar (2004).

the struggle against the Indian state" (ibid., 210). The civilian population, too, was targeted in these warnings (even killed or otherwise punished if they failed to oblige), which were directed particularly toward people breaking the moral code of conduct issued by some militant groups, including behaving inappropriately toward women, cheating on exams, selling liquor and tobacco, informing on the militants, violating what the militants considered Sikh principles (such as having too-large wedding parties), and wearing fashionable clothes (ibid., 223). Thus, to a certain extent, the militants alienated the very population in whose name they were fighting, which contributed to the "success" of the counterinsurgency campaign under the command of Punjab's most (in)famous police chief, K.P.S. Gill.[57] Indeed, by 1993, most of the militant leaders had been killed in the counterinsurgency campaign or sought exile abroad.

Violence in Punjab in the late 1980s took on a life on its own, pitting different groups against one another and the government, but the point to emphasize here is that the failed implementation of the Rajiv-Longowal accord, much due to the Congress-led central government's concern for its fate in other Congress-led states, played an important role in feeding these divisions in Punjab, as it discredited the Akali Dal. In turn, the Akali Dal, plagued by intra-party factions and opposed by a growing number of militant groups, could neither rule the state nor negotiate with the center.

THE DECLINE OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

The common story about the Punjab crisis is that it came to an end thanks to a war-weary population, an increasingly unpopular militant movement, and a successful counterinsurgency campaign (Gurharpal Singh 2000, 162–176). According to some observers in Punjab, the underlying causes have remained unresolved, which is a why few pro-Khalistan parties remained on the political scene. The findings of this chapter do not dispute such an analysis, but I emphasize here that it is not the case that nothing changed. From the 1990s, both Punjab's society and federal institutions changed in ways that diminished the chances of a reemerging violent self-determination conflict.

The river water issue has been on the agenda in Punjab since 1966, going through rounds of negotiations and Supreme Court rulings.[58] All along, the

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[57] Human rights organizations have argued that the success of this campaign came at an unacceptably large cost in terms of extrajudicial killings and "disappearances" (Kumar et al. 2003). K.P.S. Gill later became the director of the Institute of Conflict Management in Delhi. His book about the violent conflict in Punjab, *Knights of Falsehood* (1997), is posted on the center's website (http://www.satp.org/).

[58] In 1981, Indira Gandhi brokered an agreement that modified the allocation of river waters among Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan, and the Punjab government agreed to build half of the 210-kilometer SYL canal to take waters from the Ravi-Beas rivers to Haryana. In 1985, the Rajiv-Longowal Accord established that the SYL project was to continue and that the allocation of river waters was to be determined by a tribunal. This tribunal presented its decision in

arguments of Punjab's governments have been the same as they were when the dispute first emerged, referring both to the unconstitutional nature of the 1966 Punjab Reorganization Act's Section 78, which gave the center the powers to adjudicate on the Ravi and Beas river waters, and the detrimental consequences of river water sharing for Punjab's economy. More generally, Punjab's farmers have been facing difficulties, since the mid-1980s contributing to high farmers' suicide rates. Many of Punjab's farmers have been heavily in debt, which they have attributed primarily to low (government-set) prices on agricultural produce (wheat and rice) and high costs on agricultural inputs (Jodhka 2006; Singh et al. 2008). When I was in Chandigarh in March 2006, farmers had come from all over Punjab to protest against the central government's decision to import wheat, which goes against the interests of India's own wheat producers, including Punjab's farmers. In addition, the government's procurement prices have been considered not to have risen proportionally to the cost of producing wheat and rice, including input costs on diesel and tube-wells.[59] Although these are concerns similar to those voiced in the 1970s, it is not clear that the population thirty years on considered the center responsible. Survey data from the 2002 state elections, for example, showed that among the population aware of the high rate of farmers' suicides in Punjab, the bulk of the blame was put on the state government alone or on both the central and state governments, although Akali voters typically blamed the center (Kumar and Kumar 2002).

Punjab has remained among India's better-off states, although per the 2002 Punjab Development Report, the rural population was becoming impoverished (Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development 2002). In the 1990s, liberalization caused Punjab's growth rates to slow down, while the trend in India as a whole was the opposite (Singh and Singh 2002). Whereas Punjab's farmers have been concerned about their economic lot since the 1970s, by the 1990s, the state was facing an agricultural crisis. Per one Punjab-based study, by 1998, 20 percent of the farming population lived below the poverty line (Chand 1999).[60] Thus, to a certain extent, Punjab came to need the center.

1987, but the matter remained unresolved. Due to opposition from Punjab, the work on the SYL canal stalled, and in 2002, the Supreme Court ruled that Punjab was to complete construction on its share of the canal within a year. Punjab filed a revision petition, which the Supreme Court rejected in June 2004, demanding that the state government hand over the project to a central agency. In response, in July 2004, Punjab's Congress-led government passed the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, dismissing all previous water agreements, although the agreement's Section 5 safeguarded Haryana and Rajasthan's usage of present amount of river waters. In March 2007, Punjab's newly elected Akali chief minister announced that he intended to remove Section 5 of the 2004 agreement, making it the right of the Punjab government to make an allocation only if it so wishes (see "Badal Cautioned on Water Act," *Indian Express,* March 5, 2007). By July 2014, the issue was again back on the agenda (see Sarbjit Dhaliwal, "Decades on SYL Canal Hangs Fire," *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, July 15, 2014).

[59] According to a survey released in 2005, Punjab has the highest number of farmers in debt. See "Farmers Crop Loan Sellout Puts Them in a Fix," *Times of Chandigarh*, February 5, 2006.

[60] According to the Punjab Development Report 2002 (Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development 2002), however, rural poverty in Punjab in 1999–2000 was about 6 percent.

The trend in intergovernmental fiscal relations in the 1990s showed that the Punjab government was funding a smaller share of current expenditures from own revenue receipts (Bagchi 2003). Across India, the volume and number of centrally sponsored schemes have remained high and have been bypassing the state budgets (Garg 2006). Recall that the Akalis considered transfers, particularly transfers with strings attached, a major problem in the 1970s. From the 1990s, the Akali Dal has moved toward rhetoric of "cooperative federalism" (Kumar 2005).

In terms of ethnicity and cultural policy autonomy, Punjab has remained a Sikh-majority state with a large Hindu minority, and the Akalis have depended on coalition partners to rule the state. Indeed, in 1997 and 2007, the Akalis won the state elections on a ticket joint with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu communal party, and in both elections, the Akali Dal sought to portray itself as a Punjabi rather than Sikh party (e.g., Baixas 2007; Kumar 2007). Similarly, the main faction of the Akali Dal's campaign ahead of the January 2012 elections focused on development rather than Sikh-specific issues,[61] and they won the elections in an alliance with the BJP. Even though the central government has continued to make inroads into education, which is a state-level responsibility, the issue has not been actively pursued by the Akalis. Education has remained a concurrent responsibility of the state and central governments, and the center has continued to play an active role. The University Grant Commission sets standards in the country's universities and colleges, and all professional colleges, such as medical and technical schools, need to be approved by the central government. As for elementary and secondary schools, every state in India has its own school board, but the central government's Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSC) is in charge of a large number of state-run schools, which means that the central government is in charge of syllabi and the language of instruction is English. An Akali politician and former Minister of Education explained the general acceptance of the trend toward greater centralization in education as follows: Although there has been a state-wide movement that calls for the states rather than the central government to be in control of curricula, particularly in history, this effort has not picked up. In general, CBSC schools have come to be associated with upward social mobility, in particular for parents who think that their children will seek jobs outside Punjab. Even the Sikh-run schools, such as those run by the SGPC and the Khalsa, are affiliated with the CBSC, although they use Punjabi as the medium of instruction.[62]

Thus, although one of the objectives of the still-active pro-Khalistan organization Dal Khalsa has been to "revamp the education system in accordance with Sikh traditions (…)," this is not necessarily a matter that broadly resonates with the population. Indeed, the second part of that very sentence of the

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[61] Ajoy Ashirwad Mahaprashasta, "Shift in Strategy," *Frontline*, January 28, 2012.
[62] Personal communication, Amritsar, February 18, 2006.

party's constitution might be a more pressing concern: "(…) and to the needs of modern society."[63] Indeed, to the degree that the population in Punjab is concerned about education, the concern is perhaps not whether education is in Punjabi, Hindi, or English or which level of government decides the curricula. Rather, it is a matter of whether there are adequate education opportunities available. Rural state-run schools, especially in the border districts, are in sorry shape, which has more to do with economic than ethnic concerns. In February 2006, I visited a few of the villages on the border to Pakistan. According to the nonprofit organization Aapna Punjab, whose mission is to promote socio-economic development of these areas, the rural border districts has since 1947 been neglected by both the central and the state government. There is no significant industry in these areas, and they have been the scene of cross-border smuggling, excessive alcohol consumption, and drug addiction. In turn, the government schools in these areas are few and far between, in poor material shape, and without teachers.

As for policy autonomy more generally, in 1988, the Sarkaria Commission made a number of recommendations meant to solve center-state conflicts, and by the mid-2000s, most recommendations were at some stage of implementation or execution (Mathew 2006). While this has been a slow process, it has moved toward the kind of "real federalism" that the Akali Dal called for in 1973. A former high-level official in the Ministry of Finance and Planning Commission explained to me that there had been a gradual realization of what federalism was about:

> I, myself, didn't pay attention to the federal idea until the mid-1970s (…). Before, I was impatient with the states. We, the civil servants in Delhi, were running the state rationally from Delhi. The chief ministers with their demands were just messing things up. Then I realized that I had seen it from the wrong end of the telescope: The central federal policy *had* to emerge from varying poles. Otherwise, India couldn't go ahead. I think many had that realization, and this is reflected in the literature. In the 1970s, there was nothing on federalism; the term "federalism" emerged only in the 1980s. Before that, we talked about state-center relations, which were a matter of convenience [rather than principle].[64]

There are still voices that call for the creation of Khalistan, seeking to mobilize the population around the idea of a threatening center. They use the Delhi riots of 1984 and human rights abuses in the counterinsurgency campaign in the late 1980s as justification. While the mistreatment of Sikhs in these events is well-documented (Kumar et al. 2003), such fear-laden appeals no longer appear to aid mobilization, as the militant groups in the 1980s alienated the very population in whose name they were fighting. Indeed, while a share of

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[63] See the party's constitution online at http://www.dalkhalsa.com/dkc.html (last accessed July 16, 2014).
[64] Personal communication, Delhi, January 19, 2006.

Punjab's Sikh population at the time had grievances that could be attributed to the center, the militant groups "representing" those grievances failed at doing so and instead established themselves as someone to be feared. In addition, the central government has begun to offer compensation to the victims of the 1984 Delhi riots. These developments have contributed to taking the steam out of fear-based appeals and calls for Khalistan, which makes accommodation within the federation a possibility. In the 2011 elections to the religious body that manages Sikh temples, the SGPC, where Akali factions compete with one another, the pro-Khalistan Simranjit Singh Mann lost his seat.[65]

Thus, while K.P.S. Gill's counterinsurgency campaign, the militant groups' (mis)behavior, and the war-weariness of Punjab's population certainly contributed to the demise of the Punjab crisis, there have been gradual changes in the state's society as well as the state's relationship with the center that have helped reduce the potential for center-region conflict. In addition, according to a former Akali politician commenting on the future of center-state relations in India, the rise of coalition governments at the center since 1989 and, particularly, the inclusion of state-level parties as important partners in those coalitions, have encouraged a move toward decentralization that meets regional demands.[66]

CONCLUSION

The Punjab crisis was in many ways directly about decentralization. The demands raised by the Akali Dal in the 1970s go into great detail in explaining what, for example, about the workings of the federal fiscal system they found dissatisfactory and how the federation could be reformed. Similarly, the quest for a Punjabi *Suba* in the 1960s raised specific concerns about what the lack of cultural policy autonomy meant for an ethnic group. None of these demands can be understood by examining institutions or societal characteristics alone, and the aim in this chapter has been to examine the rise and decline of the conflict through a lens focusing on the interplay between institutional and societal variables. Existing accounts of the Punjab crisis have also considered such state-society relations. Gurharpal Singh (2000), for instance, has emphasized the ways in which Sikh national identity has been shaped and contested the boundaries of the Indian state; Pritam Singh (2008) has highlighted the interplay between federalism and Punjab's political economy; and Brass (1991) and Kohli (1991) have highlighted the role of political elite ties, center-region negotiations, and factionalism. The analysis in this chapter complements these works by providing an integrated analysis of how different institutional features of decentralization, in conjunction with ethnicity and wealth, have shaped

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[65] Gurpreet Singh Mehak, "Simranjit Singh Mann and Son Lost SGPC Elections," *Punjab Newsline Network*, September 19, 2011.

[66] Personal communication, Chandigarh, February 27, 2006. See also Arora (2000) and Pai (2000).

two waves of self-determination struggles in Punjab since 1947. By doing so, the chapter accounts for both the ethnic and economic demands that have been central to the struggle, as well as the relationship between the more moderate and militant branches of the self-determination movement.

The case is largely consistent with the argument laid out on Chapter 1, but it also brings to light three points worth further exploring. First, as the discussion of wealth and fiscal autonomy demonstrates, concerns about how institutions governing center-state relations affect a state's wealth go beyond the division of tax revenues. Although Punjab, a relatively wealthy state in India, covered a large share of its own expenditures from own revenues, the Akali Dal pointed to other ways through which the central government somehow limited both the state's economy and autonomy, including the use of discretionary transfers through the Planning Commission and central control of river waters. Rodden (2004) has already pointed to the many different ways in which one can conceptualize and measure fiscal decentralization; the analysis here reinforces that point. The chapter further suggests that understanding decentralization as a conflict management tool means considering a diverse set of policies and practices that govern center-region relations, some of which might not be easily understood without careful case-study analysis.

Second, the case also indicates that it is problematic to speak about a region's wealth as if it were unitary. Indeed, while the demands of the Akali Dal reflected the concerns of a relatively wealthy region, blaming the central government for trying to take away its riches, the militant movement fed on grievances among the less well-to-do Sikhs, blaming not only the central government but also the state government and the Akali Dal. Thus, consistent with the book's argument about fiscal autonomy, the Akali Dal and the militant movement both raised self-determination demands rooted in their constituents' economic situation, but these demands differed, as the constituents within the region lived in different economic realities. This means that even though, in the empirical analysis in Chapter 2, I have gone to great lengths to capture interregional inequalities, a full understanding of decentralization's affect on self-determination conflicts also requires consideration of intraregional inequalities.

Third, the lead-up to a violent conflict in Punjab is a telling case for how the path to violence is paved with political concerns elsewhere, which is not a novel claim in the context of Punjab. Contrary to my expectations, though, in Punjab, the period of copartisanship between Delhi and the government in Chandigarh in 1980 to 1983 was not characterized by harmonious intergovernmental relations. The central government's concerns about its political allies elsewhere trumped its concerns for Punjab, making it increasingly difficult for Punjab's Congress government to rule the state. Indeed, in the early 1980s, the Congress Party at the center actively helped fuel the militant movement in Punjab to destabilize Darbara Singh's Congress government in the state. This poses the question why or the conditions under which some copartisan regions are more important to the center than others. Whereas this study posits that central elites,

due primarily to rational considerations, will negotiate with their regional polit-
ical allies, observers and scholars of Indian politics have emphasized that the
leadership style, political (in)securities, and views of particular central leaders,
particularly Indira Gandhi, have played a key role in shaping their relation-
ship to their regional counterparts (Sheth and Narang 1985; Tully and Jacob
1985; Weiner 1989; Kohli 1991, 2004). Clearly, concerns for regional political
allies were not irrelevant to Indira Gandhi, as she considered what giving in
to autonomy demands in Punjab would mean in terms of Congress support in
other regions, but the value of some copartisan allies weighed more than others.
One can think of assessing the value of the center's copartisan regional elites in
terms of their ability to deliver votes both in national and regional elections but
also perhaps more broadly in terms of delivering goods such as stability and
economic growth (both of which presumably boost electoral support). Further
research should more systematically consider the motivations for central elites'
interactions with both friends and foes in the regions.

Chapter 4 Appendix

APPENDIX TABLE A.4.1. *Akali Dal's Electoral Performance*

Year	Vote Share in National Legislative Elections (%)	Vote Share in State Legislative Elections (%)	Akali Dal Chief Ministers
1952	11.4	12.4	
1957	Not contested	Not contested	
1962	12.2	11.9	
1967	22.6	20.5	Gurnam Singh (1967), Lachhman Singh Gill (1968)
1969	N/A (state elections only)	29.4	Gurnam Singh (1969), Parkash Singh Badal (1970–1971)
1972	30.9	27.6	
1977	42.3	31.4	Parkash Singh Badal (1977–1980)
1980	23.4	26.9	
1985	37.2	38.0***	Surjit Singh Barnala (1985–1987)
1989	35.84*	N/A (national elections only)	
1991	2.6****	N/A (national elections only)	
1992	N/A (state elections only)	5.2****	
1996	28.7	N/A (national elections only)	
1997	N/A (state elections only)	37.6	Parkash Sing Badal (1997–2002)
1998	32.9	N/A (national elections only)	

Year	Vote Share in National Legislative Elections (%)	Vote Share in State Legislative Elections (%)	Akali Dal Chief Ministers
1999	32.0**	N/A (national elections only)	
2002	N/A (state elections only)	30.5	
2004	34.3	N/A (national elections only)	
2007	N/A (state elections only)	37.0	Parkash Singh Badal (2007–2012)
2009	33.9	N/A (national elections only)	
2012	N/A (state elections only)	34.6	Parkash Singh Badal (2012-)
2014	26.6**	N/A (national elections only)	

Notes: Prior to 1966, Punjab was a Sikh-minority state. * includes the vote share of three Akali Dal factions. ** includes the vote share of two Akali Dal factions. *** indicates only time the Akali Dal has led a noncoalition government. **** indicates that militants urged boycott.

5

Québec's Sovereignty Movement

INTRODUCTION: PUZZLES OF QUÉBEC'S SOVEREIGNTY
STRUGGLE

In contrast to the Sikhs and Chechens, the *Québécois* have fought their struggle for self-determination almost entirely through nonviolent means. Yet among these three cases, it is perhaps Québec that has come the closest to achieving independence. Québec's government has twice, in 1980 and 1995, called a referendum asking the province's population whether it wants sovereignty for Québec. The 1980 referendum was a clear victory for the no-side, the "federalists," but the 1995 referendum brought Canada to a near breaking point. Only 54,288 votes stood between the winning no-side from those seeking to opt out of the federation, the "sovereigntists" spearheaded by the Parti Québécois (PQ). The support for sovereignty dwindled after the 1995 referendum, but ten years later, around the time of the PQ's 2005 leadership race, polls showed that support for sovereignty and independence had surged, and the sentiment among PQ activists was that within ten years, Québec would become independent. It turned out differently, though. In the March 2007 provincial elections, the PQ had its worst performance since it first came to power in 1976. In fall 2012, the party was voted back into power but able to form only a minority government, with slim prospects for holding a new referendum. In the April 2014 provincial elections, which came to revolve around the question of sovereignty, the party suffered a crushing defeat, strongly indicating that voters in the province had little appetite for a new referendum.

This chapter explores how federal institutions, in conjunction with Québec's ethnic makeup and wealth, have influenced the quest for sovereignty. The chapter homes in on the following questions: What explains changes in support for Québec's self-determination movement, known as the sovereignty movement, over time? In particular, why has the sovereignty movement survived? And why

has this struggle, which has seriously challenged the territorial integrity of the Canadian state, been a nonviolent one?

The sovereignty movement's survival is puzzling if we consider the extent to which the Canadian federation has changed and developed to accommodate its French-speaking minority population, concentrated in Québec. For example, French has been Québec's official language since 1977. And although the Canadian constitution of 1867, the British North America Act, envisions a highly centralized federation, the trend over time has been toward greater powers to the provinces. The chapter shows how cultural policy autonomy strengthening the status of French in the late 1970s was a significant step toward accommodating the grievances that motivated the emergence of the movement. Indeed, the PQ's success in achieving accommodation within the federation has undermined its own claim that independence is necessary. As Québec society changed to become more diverse, the quest for sovereignty came to revolve around policy autonomy also in other spheres than culture, but in the 2000s, the federalist government in the province took steps to try to show that these new reasons for sovereignty could be met within the federation. To the sovereignty movement, spearheaded by the PQ, it is a fine balance to speak in the name of the province's Francophone population and the *Québécois* population as a whole, and the 2014 election suggested that making the case for sovereignty based on the plight of the Francophone population is no longer a winning strategy.

Also, fiscal autonomy and (people's perceptions of) the province's wealth, which both have varied over time, have affected people's assessments of the benefits of the federation. For much of the movement's history, the perception that Québec's economy needs the rest of Canada or is not necessarily going to be better off outside Canada put a brake on support for sovereignty. Beginning in the 1990s, however, there was a growing sense in Québec that in economic terms, the federation did not offer economic incentives to stay put. Across Canada, the provinces were pointing out that federal transfers were making up a smaller share of provincial budgets at a time when provincial costs for health care, education, and social programs were rising. In Québec, these matters related to fiscal federalism became new reasons in favor of sovereignty. These new reasons, however, could be met within the federation.

The second puzzle is the largely nonviolent nature of the self-determination struggle in Québec. While sovereigntists claim that this is no puzzle at all, as Canada is a democratic state and the *Québécois* are of a "pacifist nature," the struggle went through a violent phase in the 1960s. From 1963 to 1970, a radical group called the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) was responsible for a number of bombings in Montréal. In October 1970, the FLQ kidnapped a British diplomat, James Cross, and kidnapped and killed Québec's Minister of Labor, Pierre Laporte. In response, the Canadian government enacted the War Measures Act. During a few weeks in the fall of 1970, Montréal looked like an

occupied city, where the army carried out raids to detain suspected terrorists. These events, known as the October Crisis, marked the climax of violence in Québec's sovereignty movement, and neither the FLQ nor any other violent group has played an important role in the province's politics since. There has never been a widespread sense that violence is a necessary means, as channels for intergovernmental bargaining have ensured that the political parties in power in Québec have, often despite lack of copartisanship with Ottawa, been able to gain concessions from the center. Even though a lack of copartisanship has contributed to instability by enabling a sovereignty movement that has challenged the very integrity of the state, the case of Québec also shows that copartisanship is only one channel for intergovernmental bargaining that facilitate compromise solutions. Solutions outside the framework of such ties, however, are highly contingent on preferences of the other provinces in the federation.

The chapter proceeds as follows: First, due to the ambivalence of the *Québécois*' demand for sovereignty, I begin by describing how the sovereignty movement and its demands have developed over time. Second, I turn to analyzing the ways in which institutional and societal factors have jointly influenced the rationale and support for sovereignty. In the third section, I examine the role played by political elite ties and the violent path not taken. I conclude by discussing implications for the book's argument.

WHAT DOES QUÉBEC WANT?

Québec, or New France as it was known, was founded as a French colony in 1608. In 1759, it was conquered by the British, and since then, Canada has been torn between recognizing the country's dual French and English origins and establishing national unity. For many Francophones, recognition as one of two founding nations is important, and even today, some of the activists in the sovereignty movement see the struggle they are fighting as correcting the injustice done to the French Canadians in the Conquest of 1759, which marked an end to a unilingual French Canada protected from Anglo-American culture. Not only was Québec distinct from the British colonies in terms of language; its culture was more agrarian, religious (Catholic), and traditional (McRoberts and Posgate 1981).

In 1867, present-day Québec, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, united by the wish to remain independent from the United States, formed the Dominion of Canada, a confederation formalized with the British North America (BNA) Act.[1] The BNA Act granted Québec a government

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[1] The other provinces later joined: Manitoba in 1870, British Columbia in 1871, Prince Edward Island in 1873, Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905, and Newfoundland and Labrador in 1949. Today, Canada consists of the ten provinces and three territories, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon Territory. The powers of the provinces are outlined in the constitution, and the powers of the territories are delegated by the federal government.

MAP 5.1. Canada.

of its own and included provisions that made French the official language of the province's legislature and courts, sanctioned separate Protestant and Catholic school systems, and allowed Québec to continue its civil law – as opposed to common law – system. The BNA Act also included centralizing features. For example, all residual powers rested with the center in a clause giving the center the responsibility for "peace, order, and good government." The act also gave the federal government access to indirect taxes, while income taxes were to be shared among the federal and provincial governments, making the federal government the financially more powerful actor. And although the BNA Act granted the provinces jurisdiction over issues that are typically of concern to ethnic minority groups, such as education, it included measures that protected the English-speaking minorities in Québec. Over time, the Canadian federation has changed to become one of the most decentralized federations in the world, much due to centrifugal pressures from Québec but also as a result of judicial interpretations of the division of powers that have favored the provinces and the growing importance of provincial areas of responsibility (such as health, education, and welfare) (Cameron 2005).

Until the 1950s, politicians in Québec did not challenge the division of power between tiers of government, but gradually both the province's governments and social movements came to question the functioning of the federation. In the 1950s, the conservative Union Nationale government of Maurice Duplessis (1936–1939, 1944–1959) appointed the Tremblay Commission to examine the distribution of taxes and power between the federal and provincial governments. The commission's report, published in 1956, called for greater provincial autonomy, particularly in the spheres of education and culture. This was at a time when Ottawa was engaged in a number of conditional-grants programs in the provinces, and Québec's government refused to participate, which meant that the province had to forgo substantial federal funds. Duplessis told universities to reject the direct grants that the federal government established in 1951, but in 1960, Ottawa agreed to allow Québec to recover the money intended for the universities through a federal tax abatement. Even though Duplessis initiated such changes in federal-province relations, his government is primarily remembered as a conservative and passive government. According to McRoberts and Posgate (1981, 87–90), the Québec government under Duplessis sought to block federal initiatives that invaded provincial jurisdiction, but it did not fully take advantage of those jurisdictions – and it did not seek to revise the distribution of powers in the BNA Act. The period of major change, Québec's Quiet Revolution, occurred under the Liberal government of Jean Lesage (1960–1966), which picked up on several recommendations made in the Tremblay report.

The Quiet Revolution was a period of social and economic development. The province's Francophone population started to catch up with the Anglophone population, which had played the dominant economic role, and

the Québec government took on the role of the principal agent for change. In 1961, the province's Ministry of Cultural Affairs was formed, followed by the establishment of the Ministry of Education in 1964. A system of two-year community colleges was instituted, and, in 1969, a University of Québec system was set up. The provincial government began to regulate and take control of social and health care services, which had previously been the domain of the Catholic Church and the federal government. In 1965, for example, Québec's National Assembly established a fund to manage pension investments, the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec. In order to boost Francophone control in the province's economy, the government nationalized Hydro-Québec (1962–1963), created the Société Générale de Financement to support smaller industrial and commercial enterprises (1962), and established the state-run steel mill Sidérurgie Québécoise (1964). The goal of the Lesage administration was to make Québec's Francophone population "masters in our own house." In terms of federal-province relations, rather than choosing to simply opt out of federal programs, as in the Duplessis era, in 1964, the provincial government reached a deal that enabled the provinces to opt out of federal programs with compensation. In retrospect, the first half of the 1960s is seen as an era of "cooperative federalism."

At the same time as the provincial government was taking on a more assertive role, changes were taking place in Québec society. The Francophone population developed an identity as a *Québécois* majority rather than a French Canadian minority.[2] There was a growth in organizations speaking up on behalf of the Francophone population, accompanied by the emergence of a "serious, sustained political debate" about the French language (Levine 1990, 39).

The Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN) was among the first organizations founded around the idea of Québec independence, in 1960. While the left-leaning RIN and its right-leaning counterpart, the Ralliement National (RN), played important roles in bringing about the sovereignty movement in Québec, the organization that came to carry the movement was the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association (MSA) and its successor, the Parti Québécois (PQ). The MSA was formed in 1967 under the leadership of René Lévesque, who had been a minister in Lesage's Liberal government. In January 1968, Lévesque published the manifesto *Option Québec*, which envisioned Québec as sovereign but associated with the rest of Canada in an economic union. This was the birth of the idea of sovereignty-association. To Lévesque, sovereignty was not an end in itself but a means for the *Québécois* to "live

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[2] Some scholars consider this development to be a result of the increasingly active Québec state (Mendelsohn 2002), but others see this shift in identity as a key factor pushing the more active Québec state (McRoberts 1997). The growth of movements pushing for French-language rights – such as the Société Saint-Jean Baptiste de Montréal, the Société de Bon Parler Français, the Comité Permanent de la Survivance Française, and the Conseil de la Vie Française (Levine 1990) – begun already in the 1950s, which lends support to McRoberts's stance in this debate.

FIGURE 5.1. Public Opinion on Sovereignty and Independence in Québec.

Particularly among opponents of Québec sovereignty, much has been made out of the ambiguity in the "association" or "partnership" part of the referendum questions, and many have made the argument that the *Québécois* do not really want independence. Public opinion polls have suggested that many prosovereigntists see no sharp division between the Québec Liberals' mandate of "renewed federalism" and sovereignty-association; some believe sovereignty-association means that Québec will continue to be a Canadian province (Simeon 2004, 110). Among the sovereigntists, it is acknowledged that if the referendum question did not include a clause about an association or partnership with Canada, the yes-side would have had much less support. Nonetheless, to the PQ and its sister party at the federal level, the Bloc Québécois (BQ), there is not necessarily a contradiction between wanting sovereignty and a continued partnership with Canada. In the words of a long-time activist, in 2005 serving as a BQ representative:

> of nations; this agreement would enable Québec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, administer its taxes and establish relations abroad – in other words, sovereignty – and at the same time, to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common currency; any change in political status resulting from these negotiations will be submitted to the people through a referendum. On these terms, do you agree to give the Government of Québec the mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between Québec and Canada?" In the 1995 referendum, the question read as follows: "Do you agree that Québec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Québec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?"

FIGURE 5.2. Vote Share for the Parti Québécois in National Assembly Elections.

> I despise the word "separatism" about Québec. We don't want Québec to *separate* from Canada. There are no purely independent countries in the world. In fact, countries are more and more interdependent. In this sense, the notion of sovereignty isn't the same as it was in the last century. Now it's more about interdependence and (…) coming together as equal partners. We want to keep the economic union with Canada, which is a much closer union than the EU. If we need political institutions to do that, go for it. (…) We don't want to break something that Europe wants to achieve, but we want Quebecers to be represented as Quebecers.[5]

When talking to sovereigntists in Québec in the summer and fall of 2005 – which was a hot time for questions about sovereignty, as the PQ was in the midst of a leadership race – I also heard a different take. A woman who had been an official in the PQ since the 1994 federal elections emphasized that there is, indeed, a certain degree of ambivalence or ambiguity when it comes to what Quebecers want:

> It is very ambivalent. English-Canada hates that. They ask, "what does Québec want?" They have no clue. I'm not sure we know it either. There's a joke in Québec: We want a very strong Québec in a limited Canada. We want to be a country, but we don't want to split with Canada. We want the best of both worlds. I don't think we know what we want. We're very puzzled.

This ambiguity, she argued, shows up in elections:

> When we're doing political strategy at the PQ, we're puzzled by the population. For example, if the Conservative Party wins in Québec, then the Bloc will win

[5] Personal communication, Montréal, September 21, 2005.

the federal elections. If the PQ wins in Québec, the voters don't vote for the Bloc at the federal level. We lost the last referendum with 50,000 votes. But we're like that: Split in halves.[6]

In the PQ's history, its stance toward sovereignty with or without some form of association with Canada has varied over time. In this respect, the PQ's agenda was the most radical under Jacques Parizeau (1988–1995) and the most moderate under Pierre-Marc Johnson (1985–1987), who tried to move the party toward a strategy of national affirmation rather than independence.

In terms of the popularity of sovereignty, the difference in support for sovereignty as revealed in public opinion polls and the vote share for the PQ in Québec's National Assembly elections indicates that a share of Quebecers may, in fact, be hesitant to embrace the sovereignty option – or may be casting their vote based on considerations separate from the sovereignty question.[7] That is not to say that a large share of the population is opposed to greater autonomy or changes in federal-province relations. Indeed, changes in federal-province relations have also consistently been issues on the agenda of the federalist party in Québec, the Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ).

As shown, the Liberal government of Jean Lesage achieved a number of significant changes in federal-province relations in the 1960s. Prior to the 1980 referendum, the Québec Liberals under Claude Ryan issued a widely supported document known as the Beige Paper, which outlined the party's vision of a renewed federation based on constitutional changes and increased decentralization of power. After a series of failed constitutional negotiations in the late 1980s, the Liberals issued the Allaire Report, which called for an even more radical devolution of powers to Québec. As such, one would be hard pressed to claim that Québec's Liberals have favored the status quo. From 2003, Québec's Liberal government under Jean Charest, much driven by the initiative of his administration's first Minister for Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs, Benoît Pelletier, pushed for asymmetrical federalism and greater provincial autonomy for Québec through administrative agreements rather than constitutional changes (Pelletier 2001, 2005). To some of the representatives and activists in the PQ, however, nothing short of constitutional changes that give special status to Québec is acceptable. As put by a former vice president of the PQ: "But my identity as a Quebecer will not be satisfied by administrative agreements. That's not enough for me."[8]

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[6] Personal communication, Montréal, September 23, 2005.

[7] See Pinard (2005) for a discussion about the effect of voter ambivalence on the support for the PQ and the consequences for public opinion polls. Mendelsohn and colleagues (2007) report that while a large share of Québec's electorate was mobilized based on the federalist-sovereignty polarization until the end of the 1990s, poll data from the early 2000s suggest that people have less interest in the national question. See also Yale and Durand (2011) for an analysis of how question wording in the polls affects support for sovereignty.

[8] Personal communication, Montréal, November 11, 2005.

All the major political players in Québec have agreed that the status quo is not preferable and that there are a number of "ills" in the Canadian federation that need to be cured, but they have disagreed about what the cure is. While the PQ has favored sovereignty, the Liberals have favored renewed federalism. In the February 2007 elections, the Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ) positioned itself between the PQ and the Liberals on the question of sovereignty, gathering more votes than the PQ. By 2012, the ADQ had been absorbed into the increasingly popular Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ), founded by a former PQ minister, whose key promise was to set aside the federalist-sovereignty divide. The party won 27 percent of the popular votes in the 2012 provincial elections, which brought the PQ back in power (with 32 percent of the votes). In the 2014 elections, which brought the Liberals to victory (with almost 42 percent of the votes) and saw a humiliating defeat for the incumbent PQ (25 percent of the votes), the CAQ won 23 percent of the votes, running on an agenda that took a clear stance against a referendum. Understanding the degree to which the proposed cures, including sovereignty, have resonated with Québec's population is key to explaining the wax and wane in support for sovereignty and requires looking at the ways in which federal institutions interact with a changing Québec society.

SOCIETY-STATE RELATIONS AND DEMANDS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN QUÉBEC

Ethnicity and Policy Autonomy: The Language Question

The sovereignty movement's origins lie with Québec's status as a French-speaking province. Unlike the rest of the country, the majority (almost 80 percent) of Québec's 7.8 million inhabitants declare French as their mother tongue, and the vast majority of Canada's Francophone population lives in Québec.[9] The quest for sovereignty has been fought in the name of Québec, where the basis for solidarity and mobilization among the majority population has been the protection and promotion of French. In particular, concerns about language have revolved around the status of French in the workplace and the status of French versus English among the province's economic elites. The language chosen by the province's increasing immigrant population has also come to play a key role in the sovereignty debate. In all respects, the status of French in the province's largest and economically most important city, Montréal, has figured prominently.

The 2011 census reported that about 63 percent of greater Montréal's population have French as their mother tongue. About 12 percent of the metropolitan area's population have English as their mother tongue, while 22 percent

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[9] All 2011 census data reported in this chapter are available from Statistics Canada at http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/index-eng.cfm (last accessed June 2, 2014).

(more than 800,000 people) have another language as their mother tongue. Until the 1970s, however, Montréal was an English-dominated city, and there are infamous stories about Francophones being told to "speak white" and not being served in French in downtown department stores. Banks, heavy industry, and large commercial enterprises were controlled by Anglophones, and in the private sectors, above the middle-management level, English was the language of work. The Anglophone-controlled corporations preferred English-speaking workers, which led to a wage gap between Francophones and Anglophones. As detailed by Levine (1990), Montréal was a divided city, where the Francophone majority felt like second-class citizens. By the late 1980s, however, the "English city" had been reconquered by the French-speaking majority. Beginning with the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s, schools, public administration, the economy, and public signs were transformed. Per the 2001 census, 59 percent of Quebecers above the age of 15 used only French in the workplace. About 33 percent used both English and French, while about 5 percent used English only. In Montréal, 32 percent of the population used only French while at work, 50 percent used both English and French, and about 12 percent used English only.[10]

Just as the status of French in the economic sphere has been a key issue of the sovereignty movement, the language chosen by the immigrant population has raised concerns about the status, even survival, of French as a majority language in the province. After 1945, immigrants from southern and eastern Europe settled in Montréal and began to send their children to English-language schools. The fear among the Francophone population was that as immigrants turned to English, declining birth rates would make Francophones a minority, particularly in Montréal. Québec's Allophone population, which is the term used about speakers of a language different than English and French, has significantly increased over the past decades, from barely 4 percent in 1951 to about 12 percent in 2011. Before the 1960s and 1970s, Francophones were right to worry that these demographic trends favored English. Prior to 1971, the Allophone population predominantly chose to transfer to English rather than French, but since 1971, language transfers have increasingly been toward French.[11] The 2006 census showed that for the first time, the majority of Allophones speaking a language different than their mother tongue at home transferred toward French (51 percent).[12] From the 2006 to 2011 census, the share of the population reporting speaking French "most often" at home declined slightly, from 82.7 to 82.5 percent, but the share of the population

[10] Available from Statistics Canada at http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/home/index.cfm (last accessed June 2, 2014).

[11] See the Privy Council's report on "Language Trends in Quebec," prepared by Michael O'Keefe, online at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/olo/docs/reference/quebec_data_en.pdf (last accessed May 8, 2007).

[12] Language data for 2006 is available from Statistics Canada, at https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/lng-eng.cfm (last accessed December 10, 2014).

speaking French regularly as their secondary language increased from 4.3 to 4.5 percent.

As the following pages detail, many of the concerns related to the status of the French language were accommodated by cultural policy autonomy in the late 1970s, culminating in a no-vote in the 1980 referendum. Indeed, as expected per the argument developed in Chapter 1 (Hypotheses 1a and 1c), given that mobilization focused on the province's Francophone majority and the group's cultural rather than physical survival, cultural policy autonomy served to stem the separatist tide. Yet the quest for sovereignty continued after the 1980 referendum, in part due to failed constitutional negotiations that reinforced the *Québécois'* identity as distinct from the rest of Canada, encouraging calls for constitutional recognition. Increasingly, the movement's demands came to focus on autonomy in policy spheres that went beyond typical ethnic concerns related to language and culture, as it was trying to garner support from the province's growing immigrant population. Although Québec is still a majority Francophone province, these dynamics are consistent with the logic underpinning Hypothesis 1a, which maintains that ethnic demographics will condition policy autonomy's effect on self-determination demands.

In the 1960s, when the sovereignty movement in its current incarnation emerged, its goal was protecting and preserving the language and culture of Québec's Francophones, and, closely linked to that, boosting the socioeconomic position of the Francophone population. At the time, the movement was seen – and many of the activists saw themselves – as part of a wave of anticolonial struggles.[13] The sovereignty movement, concentrated in Montréal, was not alone in wanting to do something about the linguistic and socioeconomic situation of Québec's Francophone population, but the difference between the province's Liberal party and the emerging PQ was the proposed solutions. While the Liberals sought change within the federation, the PQ maintained that change would only happen with sovereignty. Perhaps somewhat ironically, when the PQ came to power in 1976, the party proved that some of Québec's self-determination demands could, in fact, be met within the federation.

Among the first organizations devoted to Québec independence was the RIN, which emerged in 1960, calling for an end to the federal government's violation of the division of powers in the BNA Act, maintaining that the Canadian federation was moving in a centralized direction. Already in the 1950s, the conservative Union Nationale Québec government under Duplessis had challenged the centralizing trend that had begun with World War II, when the federal government took control over the income tax, thus limiting the provinces' ability to collect own-source revenues. In 1949, the federal government had established the Canada Council to foster cultural activities and a program of

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[13] Personal communication, Québec City, November 15, 2005.

distributing federal grants to the universities, both of which were initiatives that gave the federal government inroads to the province-level tasks of culture and education (McRoberts 1997). Québec's Liberal Lesage government tried to counteract this trend, but the proindependence activists of the RIN wanted to go further. In 1961–1962, the RIN called for Québec to become a unilingual French state, arguing that the cultural survival of the Francophone population was threatened by the current state of official bilingualism. In 1965, they proposed that the only language of instruction in Québec's publicly funded schools be French, but the proposal had little support (Levine 1990, 53). Neither the RIN nor its conservative counterpart, the RN, became major political forces in Québec.[14]

Between 1960 and 1966, the Liberal government under Lesage took several steps to take on responsibilities that the province was entitled to under the division of the BNA Act, as well as request greater powers from the federal government. Indeed, the Québec Liberals fought and won the 1960 elections under the slogan "it's time for a change," for the first time incorporating proposals about changing the Canadian federation in its party program (Filippov et al. 2004, 208). The party was reelected in 1962, under the promise of making Québec's Francophone population "masters in our own house," including nationalizing the province's hydro companies, which would give Francophones more control over the province's economy.

The point to make note of here, as it relates to cultural policy autonomy and the ethnic demographics of the province (Hypothesis 1a), is that the struggle was fought in the name of a province in which the majority of the population was an ethnic minority in the state as a whole, and the group considered itself to be at a disadvantage in the federation, both culturally and economically. Indeed, the demand for sovereignty emerged in response to a centralizing trend that was considered harmful to both the cultural and economic position of the province's majority Francophone population. For that very reason, in the 1966 elections, all parties, including the conservative Union Nationale, called for significant changes in federal-province relations.

Although it initially looked like the Union Nationale government (1966–1970) would keep up the Lesage government's speed of social reforms and quest for transfers of powers from Ottawa, it soon became clear that the party was neither committed to nor able to achieve either option. The premier, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, emphasized that Québec's Francophone population should be able "to live collectively in French, to work in French, to build a society in their image" (quoted in McRoberts 1997, 35). He presented to Québec's National Assembly two bills aimed at achieving this goal, focusing on the language of instruction in schools, as immigrants tended to send their children to English-language schools. None of the bills, which left it up to parents to choose

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[14] The RN called for an associated-state status rather than full independence (Corbett 1967, 14–44).

whether to send their children to English- or French-language schools, were well-received in the Francophone community. Between 1967 and 1969, the streets of Montréal were filled with demonstrators mobilized around *la question linguistique*. "By the end of 1969," writes Levine (1990, 85), "there was a near-consensus in the Francophone community that immigrant Anglicization via public schooling posed a fundamental threat to French in Montreal and, eventually, to all of Quebec as Montreal progressively Anglicized." Indeed, there was a sense that there was a limit to how much Francophone Quebecers, as a nation, could achieve within the federation.

It was in this environment that the PQ emerged and became a political force. This follows my expectation that an ethnic group whose basis for solidarity or mobilization is language is likely to mobilize and seek institutional arrangements that ensure the status of the ethnic (here, linguistic) group. I would, however, not expect linguistic concerns related to group status to fuel mobilization around demands for greater autonomy in areas concerning the group's physical safety or outright independence (Hypothesis 1c). In this respect, the PQ's call for sovereignty, while justified based on the group's status,[15] appears perhaps too radical (cf. Pinard 2005). Indeed, this discrepancy between diagnosis and proposed solution may explain why the majority of the population still supported the Liberals in the 1970 elections. To the PQ, Québec's problems rested with the province's position in the Canadian federation, and the solution was to become a sovereign country with an economic association with Canada. While the Liberals and the Union Nationale also diagnosed the problem as such, their solution was not to question the integrity of the federation.[16] And, indeed, the PQ's own efforts toward achieving greater cultural policy autonomy within the federation helped put a brake on the quest for self-determination.

The PQ came to power in 1976. Already in 1970, the then–two-year-old party had won 23 percent of the popular vote, which made it the second most popular party in the province. From 1970 to 1976, when Québec was governed by the Liberals under Robert Bourassa, the province saw no transfers of powers from Ottawa and limited progress on the linguistic question (Levine 1990), which contributed to the PQ victory. By the 1976 elections, even among some of the Liberal party members, there was a sense that the Bourassa government was falling short of promoting its stated goal of "cultural sovereignty." While 30 percent of the popular vote had favored the PQ already in the 1973 elections, survey data show that people were reluctant to embrace the PQ because

[15] The first manifesto for sovereignty-association, Lévesque's *Option Québec* from 1968, begins with the premise that sovereignty is a necessary step for the realization of the "collective personality" of the Québec nation, as there is not room for two nations within one country. Trying to reform the federation through negotiations was seen as a "blind alley" likely to last too long and cause frustration both in French and English Canada (Lévesque 1977, 24–26).

[16] In the 1970 provincial elections, for example, the Liberals emphasized that they wanted to solve the province's problems without "breaking up Canada to achieve that goal," and the program of the Union Nationale played down constitutional issues (Fitzmaurice 1985, 229).

of the party's commitment to independence (McRoberts and Posgate 1981, 169–179). In the fall of 1974, however, this changed, as the party committed to holding a referendum on the sovereignty question if elected, which meant that a vote for the PQ was no longer synonymous with a direct vote for independence. In 1976, the PQ ran an election campaign that capitalized on popular discontent with the Liberals. Unlike the 1973 elections, the party's campaign did not focus on sovereignty – in fact, the words "independence" and "sovereignty" were not at the forefront of the debate (Fitzmaurice 1985, 196). The PQ won the elections with 41 percent of the popular vote – and more than half of the Francophone vote – and formed a government that four years later carried out the first referendum on sovereignty. Part of the PQ's victory was due to its ability to use popular discontent and separate that from an automatic yes to independence, but McRoberts and Posgate (1981, 182–184), examining survey data from the time, conclude that most of the PQ's voters favored sovereignty-association, even though both voters and party members may have been somewhat confused about the form that such a sovereignty-association would take – to some, it meant little but renewed federalism. The PQ winning the 1976 elections only after having toned down its secessionist language reinforces the point that independence was a solution that may have been seen as too radical for the grievances motivating the voters.

Having come to power on a program that since the party's founding had focused on how sovereignty would solve Québec's dependence on Ottawa and the Francophones' disadvantaged position in the province, the PQ's record during its first years in power was a mixed success. On one hand, in 1977, there was a scaling down of the opting-out programs achieved under the Liberal Lesage government in 1964–1965, which fueled the PQ's claim that changes within the federal framework were a futile option. On the other hand, in its first years in power, the PQ carried out a set of changes that enhanced the position of the province's Francophone population but possibly also hurt the party's sovereignty agenda, as it showed, despite the rhetoric to the contrary, that achievements could be made within the federal framework (see McRoberts and Posgate 1981, ch. 9). In 1978, Ottawa and Québec signed the Cullen-Couture accord on immigration, which gave Québec more control in "choosing" its immigrants so that immigration "should contribute to sociocultural enrichment of Quebec, taking into account its French character" (quoted in McRoberts 1997, 153).[17] Moreover, the first six months of 1978 saw a series of federal subsidies directed Québec's way, which "showed that a 'good' strong Provincial government could achieve results within the Federal system" (Fitzmaurice 1985, 197–198).

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[17] Since 1971, Québec had been allowed to participate in such decisions, but the 1978 agreement gave the province decision-making power over aspects of immigration policy. With the 1990 Canada-Québec Agreement, Québec gained exclusive responsibility for the linguistic and economic integration of immigrants (McAndrew 2004, 310).

The PQ's chief achievement during its first years in office was Bill 101, *La charte de la langue française,* which made French the province's only official language. The bill stipulates that the population in Québec has a right to receive official communication in French, be served in French in stores and restaurants, and work in French. The official language of instruction in public schools is French, and only children whose parents received education in English in Québec (later changed to anywhere in Canada) have the right to receive English-language instruction in public schools.

Bill 101 accommodated many of the concerns related to the French language, such as the threat of Francophone "minorization" in Montréal's schools and the Anglicization of business, even though by the 1980s French was still not the dominant language in Montréal's economy (Levine 1990; McAndrew 2004). Although 60 percent of Québec's Francophone population in the mid-2000s still considered the French language to be threatened (Mendelsohn et al. 2007), Bill 101 has enabled the Francophone population to work in French, and it has contributed to a narrowing in the income gap between Francophones and Anglophones (Levine 1990; Albouy 2008; Bourhis 2008).[18]

Thus, by the time of the 1980 referendum, the PQ had managed to carry on with the kinds of reforms initiated by the Lesage government. The efforts bore fruit. Prereferendum surveys showed that the majority of Francophones were satisfied with the PQ's performance (McRoberts and Posgate 1981, 278). While a feather in the cap for the PQ, Bill 101 also demonstrated that the key issue underpinning the sovereignty movement, the language question – and, linked to that, the socioeconomic position of the population's Francophone population – could be addressed within the federation.

Prior to the 1980 referendum, the PQ issued *Québec-Canada: A New Deal* (1979), known as the White Paper, which justified its call for sovereignty based on the long trend of centralization, the federal government's use of earmarked transfers and invasion of provincial policy areas (particularly social policies and labor relations, municipal affairs, natural resources, and culture), Québec's disadvantages in the federation, the inefficiency of federal-provincial meetings and conferences, and the fact that renewed federalism, the Liberals' alternative, was simply

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[18] Levine (1990, 178) notes that it is unclear whether some of these changes are the result of public policies or market forces. Survey data in Laczko (1995) support the notion that Bill 101 had a positive impact: among Québec's Francophone population in 1970, there was a strong sense that there was a difference between the province's Anglophone and Francophone populations and that the way of living of the French-Canadians was threatened. Over time, between 1970 and 1985, there was a decline both in perceptions about difference between Anglophones and Francophones and in perceptions about Anglophones having an economic advantage in the province. Other survey data show that there is still a large share of *Québécois* who consider French to be threatened. See, for example, the 2003 survey "Perceived Threat to the French Language and Culture and Support for Bilingualism in Canada" by the Association for Canadian Studies/ Environics Canada, available at http://www.acs-aec.ca/pdf/polls/Perceived%20Threat%20 to%20the%20French%20Language%20and%20Culture%20and%20Support%20for%20 bilingualism%20in%20canada-2003-01-01.04.doc (last accessed December 10, 2014).

not an option. Although these complaints about the federation were, for the most part, not ethnic in nature, the premise of the program was that "Francophones were never regarded in Canada as a society with a history, a culture and aspirations of its own" (PQ 1979, 12). That is, despite gains for the Francophone cause, such as Bill 101, the PQ wanted better safeguards to protect the identity and interest of the province's Francophone majority. In the referendum, however, held in May 1980, the PQ's request for a mandate to negotiate sovereignty was supported by only 40.4 percent of the province's electorate. Though 40.4 percent is still a substantial share, not even a majority of the province's Francophone population voted yes. That the PQ a year later won the provincial elections suggests that Québec's electorate was pleased with the PQ in power, but the party's very strategy of providing good government and achievements within the federation was not a recipe for a victory in the referendum. The no-vote was also bolstered by the campaigns of the Liberals in Ottawa and in Québec, who sought to reassure voters, many of whom were worried about their economic future in an independent Québec, that a no-vote was in no way an approval of the status quo; rather, it would be a mandate for "renewed federalism."

Let me return to my argument about cultural policy autonomy and the basis for ethnic solidarity or mobilization. The development of the sovereignty movement in Québec demonstrates that to the degree that an ethnic minority group's identity is tied to being linguistically and culturally distinct from the state's ethnic majority, as was the case with Québec's Francophone population, the group may want control over language policies, education, and other policy areas that protect the group's status and interests against assimilation – cultural survival. Maclure (2004) calls this the "melancholic" nationalist discourse in Québec, which is about recovering from a position of political, economic, and cultural inferiority. These concerns do not necessarily justify independence (even though their advocates may claim so), and if institutional arrangements can convince the population that their concerns can be met within the federation, it may opt to stay put. In 1960s Québec, where the Francophones made up the overwhelming majority of the population, all political parties were calling for greater cultural policy autonomy, as evident, for example, in the various language bills introduced. The ethnic group's solidarity and mobilization revolved around group status and linguistic survival, as opposed to the group's physical survival, and the political parties calling for the most radical self-determination option, independence, disappeared from the political scene. Indeed, the PQ was not elected into office until it toned down its message on sovereignty: a PQ victory would mean a mandate to hold a referendum on sovereignty-association, not a direct step toward independence.

If, in contrast, key to a minority group's solidarity and mobilization are memories of violent struggles with the center, as in the Chechen case, it is more likely to want control over policy areas related to the group's physical safety, including independence. Indeed, although the Francophone *Québécois* do have a history of violent struggles with the central government, only the FLQ used memories of

previous rebellions to justify a violent struggle, while the mainstream sovereignty movement (and Québec historians) have not reached a consensus on whether, for example, the British conquest (1759–1763) caused uniformly or irreversible harmful consequences for Québec or whether the Conquest alone was to blame for Québec's inferior position (Stevenson 2004; Maclure 2004). Comparing the use of historical memories in Ireland and Québec, Stevenson argues that "the greater amount of exploitation, suffering, and violence that Ireland experienced in its history makes its memories more conducive to reinforcement, commiseration and inspiration than any on which Quebec's nationalists can draw" (2004, 923). In the 1960s, the key concern of Québec's Francophone population was the status of French and French speakers in the federation, focusing on Québec province. This was not a concern that necessitated independence or violent means. Thus, the cultural policy autonomy that Québec achieved within the federation in the 1970s was a step toward accommodating some of the key demands underpinning the sovereignty movement.

Ethnicity and Policy Autonomy: Turning Toward Social Policies

In the aftermath of the 1980 referendum, Québec's struggle for sovereignty changed in two different ways. First, to some in the sovereigntist camp, the failed constitutional negotiations that began after the referendum made symbolic recognition of Québec as a "distinct society" in the constitution more important than it had been before. Second, the idea of what makes Québec distinct came to focus on issues besides the language question. Let me address each of these developments in turn and discuss how they affect cultural policy autonomy as a means to appease self-determination demands.

The no-vote in the 1980 referendum was seen as a major victory for the province's Liberals, at the time under the leadership of Claude Ryan. The Liberals' campaign had revolved around their vision of a renewed federation, outlined in *A New Canadian Federation* (1980), known as the Beige Paper. Such commitments, along with the achievements of the PQ while in power, convinced the majority of the population that change could happen within the federal framework. Indeed, according to one of Lévesque's advisors, it was difficult to make the argument for sovereignty at the time, and, in his experience, the PQ was willing to give up on sovereignty and settle for something like the vision of renewed federalism outlined in the Beige Paper or in the later Allaire report, published in 1991.[19] However, for some in the sovereignty movement, the will to settle for less changed with the failed constitutional negotiations that followed the process of amending and patriating the Canadian constitution in 1981.[20]

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[19] Personal communication, Montréal, September 13, 2005.
[20] "Patriation" refers to the process of making Canada legislatively independent from the United Kingdom.

Prime Minister Trudeau had claimed that a no-victory would be a mandate for change,[21] but the changes that followed the 1980 referendum fell short of PQ's vision, as well as the Québec Liberals' Beige Paper and even the report of the federal Pepin-Roberts commission from 1979, which had proposed a return to federalism à la Lester Pearson. Instead, the federal government and the provinces negotiated constitutional amendments that resulted in no new powers to the provinces and eliminated none of the federal unilateral powers (McRoberts 1997). Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the new amendments was the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was consistent with Trudeau's strong belief in individual rights but went contrary to Québec's request for collective rights, including Bill 101. In the end, the BNA Act was repatriated, resulting in the Constitution Act of 1982, without Québec's signature.

The Meech Lake accord, which was signed in 1987, was supposed to redress the "wrongs" of the repatriation process.[22] At the start of the negotiations, the Québec government was willing to sign the Constitution Act on the conditions that Québec be recognized as a distinct society and granted a veto on constitutional changes affecting the province; that the federal spending power be limited and provinces be able to opt out of federal programs with compensation; that Québec be allowed to participate in Supreme Court nominations;[23] and that Québec's immigration powers, as spelled out in the Cullen-Couture accord, be recognized in the constitution. The premiers from the other provinces agreed to these conditions, and the accord was initially well received in Québec.[24] Even Lévesque spoke out favorably about it, although hard-line sovereigntists rejected it.

In the rest of Canada, the accord was at first welcomed, but it was soon met with opposition, as there was a growing consensus that Québec should be content with being a province just like all the other provinces. By the June 1990 deadline for ratification of the accord, which required the approval of all the provincial legislatures and the federal parliament, two of the provincial premiers backed out, and the accord died. The rescue attempt was the Charlottetown accord (1992), but as a watered-down version of Meech, it fell

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[21] In a speech in Montréal on May 14, 1980, just a week before the referendum, Trudeau declared that "If the answer to the referendum question is NO, we have all said that this NO will be interpreted as a mandate to change the Constitution, to renew federalism." Available through Libraries and Archives Canada online at http://www.collectionscanada.ca/primeministers/h4-4083-e.html (last accessed March 19, 2009).

[22] For details about this and subsequent constitutional negotiations, see Lisée (1994), McRoberts and Monahan (1993), and McRoberts (1997).

[23] The Supreme Court became a concern in Québec as many challenges to Bill 101 were brought before it.

[24] Public opinion data from 1988 showed 68 percent of Quebecers in favor of the accord. See the Public Opinion Research Archive at Queen's University (http://www.queensu.ca/cora/) series on "Constitution: Quebec-Meech Support."

short of the expectations of both the sovereigntists and federalists in Québec, neither devolving powers nor granting special status to Québec. That accord, too, fell through.

The failure of these constitutional negotiations had a profound impact on the sovereignty movement, demonstrating that contrary to the Liberals' long-standing claims, Québec's demands could not be met within a renewed federation. In response, support for sovereignty-association, independence, and the PQ grew, paving the way for the 1994 PQ victory and the 1995 referendum. Many of the sovereigntists I met in 2005 were of the opinion that had Meech succeeded, it would have stemmed the sovereigntist tide. Instead, the failed negotiations reinforced the notion that the *Québécois* were different from the rest of Canada. The fact that the rest of Canada rejected Québec's demands – which, many sovereigntists argue, were not all that demanding anyway – made symbolic and constitutional recognition more important than it had ever been. As one sovereigntist in his 20s put it:

> If Canada wasn't so stubborn about Québec…. They never understand anything about us. We didn't sign the 1982 constitution, and they don't care (…). And at Meech, they couldn't even let us have a distinct society, much less any real powers. The rest of Canada doesn't want to recognize us.[25]

Noteworthy among some of the sovereigntists I talked to was their belief that there simply was no way that Québec could find a place within the federation. To them, the failures of Meech and Charlottetown were clear signals that negotiating for more within the federal framework was no option. In the words of a BQ representative:

> In the last 50 years, we've tried to find a new arrangement, a compromise that would make Québec comfortable within the federation. Each time we've tried, we've failed, and it has even brought us backward (…). More and more Quebecers feel that enough is enough. We can't do it from within, so let's try to do it from without. Let's sit down at the table as equal partners and negotiate a new partnership. (…) It's not so much that all the failed negotiations have fueled the sovereignty movement, as it is that the failed negotiations didn't fuel the federalist passion in Québec.[26]

The strengthened notion among some that there was no room for Québec in the federal fold meant that sovereignty was a more attractive option than it had been before. To them, cultural policy autonomy was not sufficient. And, indeed, the near yes-vote in the 1995 referendum seems to suggest so. Some have argued, though, that the near yes-vote in 1995 was driven by the popularity of the leader of the yes-campaign in its final stages, BQ founder Lucien Bouchard, particularly in comparison to the relatively unpopular leaders on the

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[25] Personal communication, Montréal, October 6, 2005.
[26] Personal communication, Montréal, September 21, 2005.

no-side, PLQ's Daniel Johnson and Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. In a large-*n* analysis of attitudes prior to the 1980 and 1995 referenda, Pammett and LeDuc (2001) find that while people's perceptions of campaign leadership did matter for the outcome in both 1980 and 1995, it did not cancel out the effect of people's coolness or warmth toward Canada.

The federal government's response to the 1995 referendum did little but fuel the fire. It embarked on a sponsorship program that looked much like an advertisement campaign, intended to promote Canada and federalism in Québec. By 1999–2000, however, rumors began to emerge about corruption in the management of the sponsorship money, and, by 2005, the sponsorship program had evolved into a full-blown scandal.[27] One public opinion poll from April 2005 showed that the support for sovereignty had surged to more than 50 percent, with 37 percent of the respondents claiming that the sponsorship scandal contributed to their support for sovereignty.[28]

Yet, as Figure 5.1 shows, with the exception of the jump in support for sovereignty in 2004–2005, when the sponsorship scandal was at a height and the PQ in the midst of an intense leadership race, poll data show an overall decline in support of sovereignty since the early 1990s. The overall trend for support for independence in the same period shows a less steep decline, but, as noted before, the support for independence is consistently lower than the support for sovereignty. Based on survey data from 1996 to 2003, Mendelsohn and colleagues (2007) suggest that while about 40 percent of Québec's population continues to support sovereignty and as much as 60 percent of Francophone *Québécois* still consider the French language to be threatened, which means there is potential for the issue to reignite (as it did in 2005), the sovereignty issue has over time become "depoliticized," and most do not consider secession the most suitable manner for addressing their remaining grievances. Indeed, the victories of the Québec Liberals in the 2003, 2007, 2008, and 2014 provincial elections suggest that a large share of the population may be of the view that change and accommodations of Québec's distinctiveness can happen within the federation. There are also signs that the population is increasingly tired of debates about the province's constitutional status, as indicated by the entry of the Coalition Avenir

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[27] In 2004, the federal auditor general reported that between 100 and 250 million dollars of the sponsorship program had been illicitly directed to advertising firms or corporations sympathetic to the Liberals. Hearings and investigations revealed that the federal Liberal government under Jean Chrétien had funneled hundred of thousands of dollars to the Québec Liberals in an illicit kickback scheme. For an overview of the scandal, see "Federal Sponsorship Scandal," *CBC News*, October 26, 2006, available at http://www.cbc.ca/news2/background/groupaction/ (last accessed December 10, 2014).

[28] As many as 76 percent said they felt betrayed by the actions of the federal government under Chrétien after the 1995 referendum. See "Poll Finds Sovereignty Support Rising in Quebec," *CBC News*, April 27, 2005. In general, across Canada, the sponsorship scandal was met with disbelief and outrage, and the scandal was seen as a key factor contributing to the Liberals' decline in votes and seats in the 2004 election and the Conservative victory in 2006.

Québec (CAQ) on the political scene. The CAQ garnered about a quarter of the popular vote in both the 2012 and 2014 elections, with a message of setting aside the sovereignty-federalist divide and simply getting on with improving Québec.[29]

The notion of what makes Québec distinct has also changed over time (e.g., Maclure 2004). The justification for sovereignty has come to encompass issues that are not only about the province's Francophone population, in part in response to the increasing immigrant population of the province. Such demographics matter as long as the sovereigntists claim (as many of them do) that the question of sovereignty is about the will of Québec's population at large. Béland and Lecours (2005, 2006, 2007) suggest that in the mid-1990s, the PQ, in an attempt to broaden its appeal to the province's increasingly diverse population and remove itself from rhetoric of ethnic nationalism focusing only on the Francophone population, turned to social policies (cf. Caron 2013). Such policies affect people's everyday lives, regardless of their ethnic background. Thus, "alongside language, policies dealing with income support, child care and drug insurance have become an integral part of the nationalist discourse as they are said to both illustrate and reinforce the distinctiveness of the Québec nation" (Béland and Lecours 2006, 84). Although progressive social policies have always been central to *Québécois* identity and political parties in Québec, the authors note that such a move became particularly important after the 1995 referendum and PQ premier Jacque Parizeau's damaging comment that the referendum was lost due to the "ethnic vote," by which he referred to the vote of the province's growing immigrant population.[30] While Francophones are still a clear majority in Québec, immigrants today make up about 12 percent of the province's population, and sovereigntists have tried to portray the quest for sovereignty as a movement not only about Francophone interests and identity.

For example, the PQ itself, while torn, has come to show more signs of an integrationist over assimilationist attitude to immigrants (Karmis 2004), which is a shift away from a more French-focused aspiration of the 1960s and 1970s (Salée 2004). In the mid-2000s, the organization Génération Québec, which mainly consisted of second-generation *indépendantistes*, aimed to change the discourse in the sovereignty movement away from an "us versus them" conception of immigrants.[31] The run-up to the 2014 provincial elections, however, saw a turn toward what some considered a more exclusionary vision of the *Québécois* with the PQ's proposed Québec Charter of Values

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[29] For the CAQ's plan ahead of the 2012 elections, see http://coalitionavenirquebec.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Platform-2012_ENG1.pdf. For the 2014 platform, see http://coalitionavenirquebec.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Plateforme-Elec_ANG.pdf (last accessed June 2, 2014).

[30] Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Quebec Vote Bares Latent Ethnic Anger," *New York Times,* November 5, 1995.

[31] Personal communication with member of Génération Québec, Montréal, September 29, 2005.

(Bill 60). The proposed charter, in the name of affirming secularism, sought to ban public-sector employees from wearing "objects such as headgear, clothing, jewelry or other adornments which, by their conspicuous nature, overtly indicate a religious affiliation."[32] The charter died with the PQ loss in the 2014 elections, but it brought up memories of the infamous "ethnic vote" comment from 1995.[33]

Indeed, while the steps toward accommodating French in Québec have always been met with opposition from some in the Anglophone minority community, the threat that Québec's efforts to protect French language and culture poses to other minority groups within the province became particularly thorny for the PQ in the 1990s. The 1995 referendum was linked to the PQ's attitude to immigrants as well as the rights of aboriginal peoples in northern Québec. Besides Parizeau's "ethnic vote" comment, which caused outcries about racism, in the lead-up to the referendum, the Crees and Inuits of Québec claimed that just like the *Québécois* had a right to hold a referendum on secession for their territory, aboriginal peoples of the province had the right to hold a referendum on whether they wanted their territory in northern Québec, which includes the James Bay hydropower project, to remain part of Canada (Wherrett 1996; Salée 2004). Disagreement about aboriginal rights was part of the failure of the Meech Lake accord, and aboriginal claims for self-determination became a central issue on the table during the negotiations of the Charlottetown accord, which referred to aboriginal self-government as a "third order of government" alongside the federal and provincial governments (Whitaker 1995, 207–209). Although sovereigntists had assured the province's aboriginal people that their rights to self-government would continue to be recognized within an independent Québec, the claim of the aboriginal peoples was that their right to self-determination should be settled simultaneously with Québec's claim to self-determination – not after. The thorny issue here is that in attempting to protect the culture and status of the province's Francophone majority, the sovereignty movement ran the risk of being considered a threat to minority groups within the province, which is an ill fit with the image of the PQ as a progressive party, open to a diverse population – and troublesome to the degree that the party needs the support of this share of the population.

In my conversations with sovereigntists in 2005, particularly younger members emphasized that the sovereignty movement was no longer about protecting language or enhancing the socioeconomic status of the Francophone population, as the Quiet Revolution and Bill 101 went a long way toward accommodating these concerns. According to one activist in his twenties, he

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[32] The proposed bill is available at http://www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-60-40-1.html (last accessed June 4, 2014).
[33] For a theoretical discussion of the relationship among nationalism, secularism, and pluralism in Québec, see Dupré (2012).

never thought about language as *the* issue. Language is certainly one of the main reasons why Québec and the rest of Canada grew apart, he said, but the movement is more about different values in Québec and the rest of Canada.[34] Similarly, in early 2012, PQ leader Pauline Marois made precisely that argument when claiming that the central government's positions with respect to same-sex marriage, greenhouse emissions, gun control, and criminal sentencing are not in tune with Québec's social values.[35] Among some sovereigntists, a key motivation is creating a social project that can serve as an example for others, built on the notion that while Québec is changing in a progressive direction, the rest of Canada is not. Whereas the sovereigntists of the 1960s sought to protect a French-Canadian identity, some of the sovereigntists today rather seek to promote a progressive *Québécois* identity:

> It is not just about economic power for Québec. It's about a *social project,* which we can only achieve through sovereignty. We can't do it within Canada. (…) We have more "avant-garde" views when it comes to the environment, development.… We have a different manner of thinking and doing [than the rest of Canada]. It's not just about protecting our own culture, but about showing the rest of the world![36]

In terms of "showing the rest of the world," having a separate seat in international fora, particularly UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations) was in the mid-2000s an important matter. Young activists would also bring up Québec's progressive views on the war in Iraq and same-sex marriage as examples of their distinctiveness. Similarly, another young activist argued that the struggle was no longer about protecting Québec's culture but about promoting it: "Our ideas are different. We want more money to health care, education, public protection…"[37] The potential tension between sovereignty in the name of promoting an "avant-garde" Québec and sovereignty in the name of protecting Québec culture is part of the explanation for the divided support for the proposed Québec Charter of Values, introduced by the PQ in 2013. The debate about the charter showed divisions also within the PQ,[38] and provincial polls in 2013–2014 showed that support for the charter ranged from 42 to 51 percent (higher among Francophones), with lower

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[34] Personal communication, Montréal, August 8, 2005. See also "Young Quebecers Reject PQ, Sovereignty: Poll," *CTV News*, Montréal, June 2, 2014.

[35] Rhéal Séguin, "Parti Québécois Leader Pauline Marois Uses Tory Policies to Her Advantage," *Globe and Mail*, January 18, 2012.

[36] Personal communication with representative of the BQ's youth wing, Montréal, September 15, 2005.

[37] Personal communication, Montréal, August 22, 2005.

[38] To get a sense of some of the debate about the Charter, see, for example, Ingrid Peritz, "Quebec Values Charter 'Goes too Far,' Says Former Parti Québécois Premier Parizeau," *Globe and Mail*, October 30, 2013; Jake Flanagin, "The Dangerous Logic of Quebec's 'Charter of Values,'" *The Atlantic*, January 23, 2014; Mélanie Loise, "La Charte va Trop Loin, Selon les Indépendantistes," *Le Devoir*, January 27, 2014.

support among younger respondents.[39] As put by a young self-proclaimed *indépendantiste* in fall 2013, protesting against the charter: "The position of the PQ is practically xenophobic. (…) I'm an inclusive *indépendantiste*, and taking to the street is the most beautiful way to show how we feel."[40]

Although the PQ has consistently opposed that Québec's demands can be met through administrative agreements, in the fall of 2004, the Liberal government of Charest, by working in an alliance with the other provinces, signed two such administrative agreements that, at least de facto, recognized asymmetrical federalism and a special status for Québec in the sphere of health care.[41] The prime minister, the leader of the opposition, as well as the other premiers agreed that the agreement reached in September 2004 was a way of recognizing Québec's distinctiveness and avoiding another close call like the 1995 referendum.[42] Even in sovereignist circles, the Charest government was praised,[43] although there was skepticism of the clout of such administrative agreements (Seymour 2009). The Liberal government under Charest also sought to demonstrate that in many ways, the Canadian federation is asymmetrical – it allows all the provinces to negotiate one-on-one deals with Ottawa and opt out of certain federal programs, but the only province that has really taken advantage of this practice is Québec (e.g., Milne 2005; Pelletier 2005). In May 2006, the Charest government reached another agreement with Ottawa, this time under Prime Minister Stephen Harper (Conservative) that gave Québec its own representative to UNESCO.[44] Having a seat at UNESCO

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[39] Louise Leduc, "L'Appui à la Charte Est Maintenant Majoritaire," *La Presse*, March 3, 2014.

[40] Quoted in Martin Patriquin, "Quebec's War on Religion," *MacLeans*, September 20, 2013.

[41] Elizabeth Thompson, "Canada's New Prescription: $18 Billion in Extra Cash; 'No Conditions for Quebec': Asymmetrical Deal a Win for Charest. Health Pact Calls for System to Reduce Waiting Time for Key Medical Procedures," *The Gazette*, September 16, 2004. See Graefe (2005) on the importance of the 2004 agreement in light of other asymmetrical deals that Québec has reached with Ottawa over the years and Iacovino (2010) for a discussion of these and other steps in an asymmetric federalism direction.

[42] Graham Fraser, "Quebec Pact Recognizes Distinctness, PM Says," *The Toronto Star*, September 17, 2004. The agreement was, however, met with some opposition in the rest of Canada and among the Trudeau adherents in the Liberal party. See Susan Delacourt, "Quebec Health Deal Unpopular, Poll Shows," *The Toronto Star*, October 16, 2004; André Pratte, "Take a Valium, English Canada: Asymmetrical Federalism Is Not, Repeat Not, a Special Deal for Quebec, Says Quebec Editor André Pratte," *Globe and Mail*, October 5, 2004; Elizabeth Thompson, "Ex-Trudeau Minister Sounds Alarm over Health-Care Pact: Serge Joyal Calls Asymmetrical Federalism a Threat to National Unity, Equality of Human Rights," *The Gazette*, September 22, 2004; L. Ian McDonald, "Dual Visions of Canada: Health-Care Pact Has Pitted the Pearsonian and Trudeauist Streams of Thought in the Liberal Party against Each Other," *The Gazette*, September 27, 2004.

[43] Hubert Bauch, "Parizeau Gives Charest Thumbs-Up: Obtained Traditional Special Status. Quebec Premier Might Have Inadvertently Advanced Cause of Separation: Ex-PQ Leader," *The Gazette*, September 17, 2004.

[44] Kevin Dougherty, "Quebec Gets Own Delegate at UNESCO: Representative at World Body Latest Harper Handout," *Ottawa Citizen*, May 6, 2006; Kevin Dougherty, "UNESCO Deal

was a matter that was repeatedly brought up as a reason for sovereignty when I talked to sovereigntists in 2005. Although the PQ claims that having an official representative in the Canadian delegation is still not the same as having an official representative sitting at the table behind Québec's flag, the 2006 deal was a step in that direction.

In sum, cultural policy autonomy in the form of Bill 101 and other developments initiated with the Quiet Revolution went a long way toward accommodating the language question, which was at the heart of the sovereignty movement when it emerged, demonstrating to Québec's Francophone population that their most pressing concerns could, indeed, be met within the federation. Although the language question is not off the agenda in Québec (and seems to have had a revival with the PQ in power between 2012 and 2014), after the 1995 referendum, the sovereignty movement, wanting to avoid the brand "ethnic nationalists" in an increasingly ethnically diverse province, came to emphasize that what makes the *Québécois* distinct from the rest of Canada is not only the language. Hence, the sovereignty movement's quest for autonomy has gone beyond cultural policy autonomy (Hypothesis 1a). From 2003, the Québec Liberals took steps to meet such demands of the sovereignty movement, contributing to a federalist, Jean Charest, being the province's longest-serving premier. As I turn to next, Charest's long stay in power (from 2003 to 2012) and the PQ loss in the 2014 elections were also boosted by internal divisions within the sovereignty movement.

A Movement Divided

Since its founding, the PQ has united a variety of interests tied together in their quest for a sovereign Québec. Increasingly, the party has been challenged by new prosovereignty voices and internal divisions, in part due to disagreements about the party's place on the left–right dimension and in part due to debates about the language question.

The PQ's nation-building project has always incorporated the vision that independence would make way for social democracy, but, as argued earlier, social policies came to be even more central to the party in the 2000s. At one end of the political spectrum, the PQ is challenged by groups that see the party as not going far enough in its social project. In early 2006, two prosovereignty movements on the left of the PQ, the feminist movement Option Citoyenne and Union des Forces Progressistes, merged to form the party Québec Solidaire, which also sees sovereignty as a key step toward creating a more progressive society.[45] The party won less than 4 percent of the popular vote in both 2007

Lets Quebec Take Dissenting Positions: Officials: Accord Goes Farther than Previous Pacts in Recognizing Province's 'Specificity,' " *The Gazette,* May 12, 2006.

[45] Personal communication, Montréal, October 31, 2005.

and 2008, but in 2012, its support had increased to 6 percent and, in the 2014 elections, to almost 8 percent. At the other end of the political spectrum and, as the 2007 elections demonstrated, another threat to the PQ has been the Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ), which from 2007 to 2008 replaced the PQ as the official opposition to the Liberals. The ADQ was in 2011 swallowed up by the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ). The CAQ is seen as center-right, with a more conservative economic policy than the PQ and a softer line on the sovereignty question. It has become a powerful contender to the PQ. While the PQ won the 2012 elections with 32 percent of the popular vote, the CAQ came in as the third strongest party, with 27 percent of the vote, and in the 2014 elections, the party garnered almost as much popular support as the PQ, with 23 percent of the popular vote (the PQ came in at 25 percent). The point is, the PQ is challenged from both the left and the right. As put by Caron (2013), the problem of turning toward a more civic form of nationalism focused on social democratic values is that such a nationalism based on political values, just like ethnic nationalism, can not be inclusionary either.

   Indeed, to the sovereigntists who call themselves "conservative" or "hard-line" nationalists, the PQ has gone too far in a social democratic direction. In the mid-2000s, they argued that the mainstream of the PQ was misunderstanding what the sovereignty quest is all about. To them, the movement should be about the French Canadian majority in Québec, not about building a social-democratic, liberal, or multicultural state – or, to the degree that building a social democracy is what the movement should be about, the issue should be put on the sideline until after sovereignty is achieved.[46] So even though the sovereigntists may agree that there are problems with the workings of federal-provincial relations that can only be addressed through sovereignty, they do not necessarily agree on what the new state should look like. The PQ, as the party that has traditionally carried the movement, has increasingly found itself under attack from both sides. In the 2012 election campaign, PQ leader Pauline Marois emphasized steps the party would take to further strengthen the province's control over language and culture, which earned both her and the PQ criticism from Anglophone and Allophone groups for being for the French only.[47] The party did win the 2012 elections, but barely so, with results showing popular support not even a percentage point higher than the then-incumbent and then-scandal-ridden Liberals.[48] The proposed Québec

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[46] Personal communication, Montréal, October 6, 2005; October 31, 2005; November 3, 2005.

[47] For reactions to the campaign, see William Johnson, "The PQ Aims to Divide," *Ottawa Citizen*, September 4, 2012; "Editorial: If Change Is to Come, Let It Be for the Better," *The Gazette*, September 1, 2012; Jeremy Richler, "Dead End! Back to the Future with Pauline Marois and the Parti Quebecois," *The Metropolitain*, August 19, 2012.

[48] The Liberals lost the 2012 election in Québec, facing allegations of corruption and having faced protests in response to raised tuition fees. See, for example, Benjamin Shingler, "Quebec Liberals Say Goodbye to Jean Charest, Prepare to Choose New Leader," *Huffington Post*, Canada, March 17, 2013.

Charter of Values introduced in 2013 and the PQ's emphasis on language in the 2014 election campaign did little but boost a view of the party as returning to its French-focused roots.[49]

In this mix, there also appears to be a generational gap. Although Québec's youth historically has been considered more sovereigntists than older residents (Perrella and Bélanger 2009), polls from fall 2011 and from the aftermath of the 2014 elections showed that younger voters were turning away from the PQ and a prosovereignty attitude.[50] Among some of the activists who have been part of the movement since the 1960s, there is a lingering concern about language and culture and a worry that the younger generations of sovereigntists are, somehow, downplaying this aspect. Bill 101 addressed many of the concerns about the French language in Québec, but French as the everyday language in Montréal is, according to some, still fragile. "The French issue is like feminism," one of the PQ officials I met with in 2005 argued. "Young people think that it's not an issue for them. 'What's the problem?' 'Where's the glass ceiling?' They don't think it's fragile." Keeping the status of French is an ongoing struggle, she argued, particularly in English-dominated North America.[51] Others pointed out how Bill 101 is no guarantee for preserving the status of French, particularly as it is frequently attacked in court.[52] Similarly, while Bill 101 protects French as the dominant language of work, hiring practices and the day-to-day life of businesses are not always consistent with that spirit.[53] As census data show, the status of French in Québec today is far more secure than it was in the 1960s. More people live and work in French, and Allophones have increasingly come to adopt French rather than English as their home language. The share of the province's population reporting speaking French "most often" at home or on a regular basis was relatively stable from the 2006 to 2011 census, but the share of the population speaking only French at home declined, from 75.1 percent in 2006 to 72.8 percent in 2011. This decline was particularly notable in Montréal, where the share declined from 62.4 percent in 2001 to 59.8 percent in 2006 and 56.5 percent in 2011.[54] These are data that

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[49] See, for example, Allan Woods, "PQ Returns to Charter, Language Laws in Quebec Election's Final Week," *The Star*, March 30, 2014.

[50] See "Support for Separation Waning among Quebec Youth: Poll," *CTV News*, Montréal, November 7, 2011; "Young Quebecers Reject PQ, Sovereignty: Poll," *CTV News*, Montréal, June 2, 2014. For young sovereigntists' reactions to the 2014 poll, which surveyed only 500 people, see "Young Sovereigntists Dismiss Poll Showing Support Is Waning," *CTV News*, Montréal, June 3, 2014.

[51] Personal communication, Montréal, September 23, 2005.

[52] See, for example, Levine (1990, 128) on how the Canadian Supreme Court has abrogated sections of the bill.

[53] See, for example, Rhéal Séguin, "PQ Demands Charest Crack Down on Corporate Language Scofflaws," *Globe and Mail*, December 8, 2011.

[54] From Statistics Canada's "Linguistic Characteristic of Canadians," available at http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/98-314-x/98-314-x2011001-eng.cfm (last accessed June 4, 2014).

feed concerns about the French language, at least among older voters. The PQ's 2014 election campaign seemed to cater to these concerns, promising tougher laws to protect French if elected.[55] That strategy, however, coupled with the proposed charter and the promise of a referendum, did not work out in the party's favor.

Thus, it might seem that along with the steps taken by the Québec Liberals, divisions within the sovereignty movements (and within the PQ) have come to hurt the PQ's electoral fortunes. While the party may have changed too little for some voters, it may have changed too much for others.[56]

Wealth and Fiscal Autonomy

The linguistic question that initially drove the sovereignty movement was closely tied to the distribution of wealth among Québec's Anglophone and Francophone populations. Indeed, among the most contentious economic issues in the early days of the sovereignty debate was the income gap between the province's Anglophone and Francophone populations. The wage gap declined but did not entirely disappear between 1970 and 2000 (Albouy 2008). Data from the 2006 census onward, including Statistics Canada's 2011 National Household Survey, suggest that the median (but not mean) income for Francophones in the province has surpassed that of Anglophones.[57] Table 5.1 provides an overview of a few socioeconomic indicators in Québec as compared to Canada as a whole. Québec has consistently fared somewhat worse than the country as a whole in terms of unemployment rate, GDP per capita, and average income, but it is not among the poorest provinces (see also Bird and Vaillancourt 2007, 59–61). Questions about fiscal redistribution are important to the population in any of the provinces in the federation (regardless of whether they are net beneficiaries or recipients), but scholars have pointed out that it might be particularly so in Québec, given that (unilingual) Francophone workers may be less mobile than Anglophones (ibid., 63).

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55 See, for example, Marian Scott, "Expect Tougher Language Laws if PQ Wins Majority, Minister Says," *The Gazette*, February 24, 2014.

56 See, for example, Hubert Bauch, "They Don't Make Pequistes Like They Used To: A Talk Show Caller Says PQ Has Lost its Soul. It's Certainly Missing the Charisma of Old," *The Gazette*, April 1, 2007.

57 The 2011 National Household Survey is available from Statistic Canada at http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/index-eng.cfm (last accessed June 10, 2014). For a news summary, see Evan Dyer, "Francophones Still Dominate Quebec's Public Service," *CBC News*, September 17, 2013. See also the Government of Québec's 2012 report on *The Socioeconomic Status of Anglophones in Québec*, available at http://www.inspq.qc.ca/pdf/publications/1494_SituationSocioEconoAngloQc_VA.pdf, as well as the 2012 Canada Year Book's section on languages, available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-402-x/2011000/chap/lang/lang-eng.htm (last accessed June 10, 2014).

TABLE 5.1. *Socioeconomic Indicators for Québec and Canada*

Year	GDP Per Capita (CAN $, Market Prices)			Average Income (CAN $)			Unemployment Rate (%)		
	Québec	Canada	QU relative to CA	Québec	Canada	QU relative to CA	Québec	Canada	QU relative to CA
1976	7,650	8,265	0.93	27,300	29,600	0.92	7.3	6.2	1.24
1981	12,587	14,769	0.85	27,500	30,400	0.90	8.7	7.0	1.38
1986	17,872	19,999	0.89	28,500	31,000	0.92	10.5	7.6	1.13
1991	22,326	24,855	0.90	28,600	31,500	0.91	11.0	9.7	1.17
1996	25,422	28,870	0.88	28,400	31,500	0.90	12.1	10.3	1.24
2001	32,231	36,583	0.88	33,600	36,000	0.93	11.9	9.6	1.21
2006	38,101	45,652	0.83	34,400	37,900	0.91	8.7	7.2	1.29
2011	43,120	51,248	0.84	35,900	39,300	0.91	8.1	6.3	1.04

As for the structure of Québec's economy, it has since the early 1990s become increasingly open and dependent on trade, with the United States as the largest international trading partner.[58] The economy is carried by the service industry, which makes up about 70 percent of GDP, and the manufacturing and construction industries. While agriculture and mining traditionally have been key to Québec's economy, the exports of aeronautical products and machinery and equipment are today central to the province's exports, and the information technology industry is the fastest-growing sector of the economy.[59] The province prides itself on a diversified economy, which may shape the support for sovereignty by affecting people's assessments of Québec's ability to stand on its own feet as an independent state (Duchesne et al. 2003).

Among many of the early sovereigntists, the inferior position of the Francophone population in Québec was chief among the reasons for seeking independence. In the 1960s, leftist intellectuals in Québec sought to explain and often justify the emergence of the independence movement based on the cultural division of labor.[60] Arguments in this vein can help us understand the emergence of the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, but they are harder pressed to account for developments since the 1970s. Although survey research from the 1980 referendum showed that views on economic standing were important grievances underpinning mobilization in favor sovereignty, such grievances alone are not sufficient to account for the ups and downs of mobilization (e.g., Pinard and Hamilton 1986). In my interviews with representatives of the PQ and BQ in 2005, many emphasized that Québec's struggle for sovereignty is no longer about Anglophone exploitation of Francophones (cf. Millar 1997, 114).

Several scholars, many of them drawing on survey research, have argued that economic factors play a key role in influencing people's expectations of success of the sovereignty movement. Risk-averse *Québécois*, fearful that independence will hurt their economic interests, provide a brake on support for sovereignty (Pinard 1992; Meadwell 1993; Mendelsohn 2003). On the flip

[58] The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) was implemented in 1989. Prior to 1989, about 16 percent of Québec's GDP was exported to non-Canadian markets (75 percent of those exports went to the United States). By 1994, a quarter of the province's GDP was exported abroad (82 percent of which went to the United States). By 2001, as share of GDP, Québec's exports going to international markets, mainly the United States, exceeded the exports going to other provinces in the federation (Stevens 1997; Courchene 2004, 2007). This remains so today. Despite these trends, scholars have also noted that in terms of trade flows, Québec has been more dependent on interprovincial trade than the other provinces (Duchesne et al. 2003).

[59] Metallic and nonmetallic products still made up a large share of exports in 2012 (19.7 percent), followed by machinery and equipment (12.9 percent) and aircrafts and parts (11.6 percent). See Québec Ministry of Finance's 2013 brochure *Economic and Financial Profile of Québec*, available at http://www.finances.gouv.qc.ca/documents/Autres/en/AUTEN_profile2013.pdf (last accessed June 20, 2014).

[60] For reviews of these works, see Corbett (1967, 141–144) and McRoberts and Posgate (1981, 144–150).

side, others argue that an optimistic outlook on the economic prospects of an independent Québec fuels support for sovereignty (Blais and Nadeau 1992; Dion 1996).

In this section, I link this debate on the role of economic factors to the ways in which intergovernmental fiscal relations have affected (perceptions about) the economic viability of sovereignty. Recall from Chapter 1 the hypothesis that relatively poor regions are likely to prefer (and be appeased with) fiscal transfers over fiscal autonomy, while the opposite holds for relatively rich provinces (Hypothesis 2a). Consistent with these expectations, Québec, as a slightly poorer-than-average province, has for decades benefited from transfers from Ottawa, which have helped keep the province within the federal fold. In the late 1990s, however, declining central transfers paired with a notion that globalization works to the benefit of Québec's economy did, for some, turn fiscal relations into a new reason for sovereignty rather than a reason for staying in the federation.

Ever since the PQ became a political force, it has had to counter arguments from the federalist side that sovereignty means loss of investments and economic hardship for Québec. While the sovereigntists have pointed to the long-term benefits of sovereignty for Québec's economy and the detrimental consequences of staying put, federalists have pointed to both long-term and short-term costs.[61] The notion of an association or partnership with Canada has been the PQ's solution for assuring Québec's population that they still will have access to the Canadian market in an independent Québec (Meadwell 1993).[62] According to some of the sovereigntists I spoke to in 2005, a sovereign Québec would not break all ties with Canada; some even envisioned that the two would keep the same currency. Per the PQ, Québec will be better off, in economic terms, as a country with a partnership with Canada than with the Liberals' long-favored solution of renewed federalism, as the former implies that Canada and Québec are equals. Yet, as detailed earlier, with the Quiet

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[61] Per Young (1994), the potential economic burdens associated with secession are related to transaction costs (implementing new monetary arrangement, administration, and so on), fiscal costs (possibly higher taxes to offset loss of federal transfers and division of the federal debt), and uncertainty costs (the possibility of out-migration, capital investments, and less cooperation with the rest of Canada).

[62] Prior to the 1980 referendum, the PQ's program envisioned that an independent Québec would have a union with Canada that included a common set of tariffs; free flow of goods, services, capital, and people; joint currency (but different central banks); and, possibly, cooperation in terms of rail, air, and inland transportation. The association could also include close Québec-Canada cooperation in defense. Prior to the 1995 referendum, the proposed partnership between Canada and Québec was envisioned as including a customs union; free movement of goods, individuals, services, and capital; and cooperation regarding monetary policies, labor mobility, and citizenship. There would also be the possibility of cooperation regarding internal trade, international trade, international representation, transportation, defense policies (such as joint or coordinated participation in NATO), financial institutions, fiscal and budgetary policies, environmental protection, fight against arms and drug trafficking, and postal services.

Revolution in the 1960s, the Québec government was able to carry out a massive modernization project of its economy within the federation, which makes it harder to convince the population that staying put works to the province's disadvantage.

In terms of public expenditures and the ability of subnational governments to set tax rates and base, Canada is today a highly decentralized federation (Rodden 2004; Bird and Vaillancourt 2007). A relatively large share of public spending takes place at the provincial level, and a large share of the provinces' revenues (on average more than 80 percent) come from own sources. Major revenue posts such as personal income tax, sales and consumption tax, corporate tax, and payroll taxes are occupied by both the federal and provincial governments (Boadway and Watts 2000). The central government engages in interprovincial redistribution through equalization transfers aimed at fostering a relatively even provision of public goods across the provinces. In addition, a major source of central transfers to the provinces goes through the Canada Health and Social Transfer. Until the 2000s, central transfers came to make up a smaller share of provincial revenues, from about 32 percent in 1961 to about 14 percent in 2001 (Bird and Vaillancourt 2007, 67), but from the mid-2000s, this share began to increase, and data from 2013–2014 show that central transfers made up about 19 percent of revenues of the provinces and territories.[63]

Canada's decentralized fiscal system has been in place since the 1950s. During World War II, the tax system was temporarily centralized (the federal government controlled the income tax), and although Ottawa initially was reluctant to decentralize following the war, it began to do so in the 1950s. The federal government offered to keep collecting the provincial income tax (and then remit the revenues to the provinces), and all provinces but Québec accepted (Alberta and Ontario opted to collect their own corporate income taxes but not the personal income tax). These tax-collection agreements initially came with the condition that the provinces would have to accept the federal government's tax base and rate (Boadway and Watts 2000, 74–77), a condition that Québec considered to impinge on its autonomy. Thus, in 1962, Québec set up its own tax system, Revenu Québec, which meant that it could directly tax income on its own tax base and set its own tax rate. The provincial tax rate for personal income in Québec is higher than in the other provinces, but that is offset by a lower federal tax rate (a "Québec abatement"). Its corporate income tax rate is the lowest among the provinces (Bird and Vaillancourt 2007, 68–73). That is, Québec is fiscally autonomous in the sense that it sets its own tax base and rate for one of the major sources of revenues, the income tax.

Given that Québec's GDP per capita is somewhat lower than in the country as a whole, it has consistently been a recipient of fiscal transfers aimed at

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[63] The Department of Finance, Canada, on "Federal Support to Provinces and Territories," available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/mtp-eng.asp (last accessed June 12, 2014).

equalizing the provinces' ability to fund public goods. That is, along with the other poorer-than-average provinces, it is a net recipient of equalization transfers.[64] Calculating who is and is not benefiting from the federation is a complicated "battle of the balance sheet" question, which long has been a matter of tension in many of the provinces (Leslie and Simeon 1977). Although the PQ's position has been that it is losing out in the federation, several studies have shown that since the 1960s, Québec is, indeed, one of the provinces that has benefited from central transfers aimed at equalization (ibid.; Economic Council of Canada 1982, 17–22; Mansell and Schlenker 1995; Boadway and Hayashi 2004; Crowley and Winchester 2005; Bird and Vaillancourt 2007, 65). As the second most populous province in the federation, Québec receives the largest share of central transfers.

In terms of fiscal self-sufficiency, from 1961 to 2001, central transfers as share of Québec's total revenues ranged from 26 percent to 16 percent (Bird and Vaillancourt 2007, 67).[65] From the mid-2000s, there is an upward trend, with transfers making up 18 percent of revenues in 2009.[66] By 2013–2014, the province received $17.9 billion in central transfers, which accounted for 26 percent of provincial revenues; the average across the provinces was 19 percent.[67] In the referendum year 1995, central transfers made up 17.5 percent of provincial revenues in Québec. In the more well-off provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario, central transfers constituted between 10 and 12 percent. In the poorer Atlantic provinces, that share ranged from 34.5 percent to 41.7 percent. The average in the country as a whole was about 16 percent (Boadway and Watts 2000, 37, 110). Thus, Québec, a province slightly poorer than the Canadian average, has received transfers slightly higher than the Canadian average and has been a net recipient of transfers specifically aimed at equalization. These aspects of the fiscal system should, per my argument (Hypothesis 2a), be appeasing demands for sovereignty.

And indeed, while the sovereigntists have challenged the workings of the fiscal system in the Canadian federation since the 1950s, the concern until the

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[64] The biggest net recipients are the Atlantic provinces (New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador), which are significantly poorer than the average. Other net recipients are Manitoba and Saskatchewan. The two provinces that have been consistent net contributors to the federation are Alberta and Ontario and sometimes also British Columbia.

[65] There is some variation here, depending on which source one looks at. See also, for example, Government of Québec, Commission on Fiscal Imbalance (2001) and Boadway and Watts (2000, 36). Note that in contrast to the measure for fiscal decentralization in Chapter 2, which assesses overall subnational expenditures as share of total expenditures in each federation, I here assess the region's dependence on transfers (cf. Rodden 2004).

[66] Data from Statistics Canada's series on "Consolidated Federal, Provincial, Territorial and Local Government Revenue and Expenditures," available via CANSIM at http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a01?lang=eng (last accessed June 12, 2014).

[67] Data from the Department of Finance, Canada, on "Federal Support to Provinces and Territories," available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/mtp-eng.asp (last accessed June 12, 2014).

1990s was primarily the ways in which the federal government used (or could use) central transfers to impinge on the province's autonomy – not whether transfers were (in)sufficient. The sovereigntists' concern has been akin to that of the Akali Dal in Punjab about the central government using discretionary grants to make inroads into the province's jurisdiction. Such critiques of the fiscal system have resulted in agreements with Ottawa in which Québec (or any province) is allowed to opt out of national programs with compensation, which means that it receives transfers or tax points to implement its own version of the national program – although a persistent thorn here is Québec's claim that the compensation received when opting out is not sufficient to cover the cost of running the program itself (Telford 2003, 37). In the 1990s, the terms of the debate about the fiscal system changed, however, due to declining central transfers, increasing provincial expenditures, and a sense that Québec had what it would take to be an independent state.

While changes in fiscal relations between Ottawa and the provinces fueled the notion among some that the federation was not offering much to Québec, economic changes in Québec society fueled the notion that Québec could, indeed, make it on its own. As a result of both of these changes, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the sovereigntists emphasized reasons for sovereignty related to fiscal federalism. The arguments took two forms, both consistent with the logic of H2a but suggesting slightly different perceptions of Québec as relatively poor or rich. On the one hand, there was the claim that the fiscal federal system, by decreasing central transfers, was putting pressure on Québec's economy; Québec (and the other provinces) did not, in comparison to the federal government, have sufficient resources to fulfill its spending responsibilities. On the other hand, the argument was that Québec, with its increasingly strong economy, no longer needed the federal government, certainly when transfers were decreasing, and it could therefore rather go it alone. As far as boosting support for sovereignty went, these arguments were a mixed success, both because they were disputed and because there were efforts toward accommodating fiscal concerns within the federation.

In terms of institutional changes, the federal government's contribution to the budgets of the provincial governments via central transfers – conditional and unconditional grants intended to fund a variety of programs and redistribute wealth – was decreasing. Of provincial revenues and expenditures, such transfers made up about 32 percent in the early 1960s, 20 to 21 percent in the early 1980s, about 19 percent in the early 1990s, and 14 to 16 percent by the early 2000s (St-Hilaire 2005, 19; Bird and Vaillancourt 2007, 67).[68] In

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[68] See also Statistics Canada's series on "Consolidated Federal, Provincial, Territorial and Local Government Revenue and Expenditures," available via CANSIM at http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a01?lang=eng (last accessed June 12, 2014). The numbers are lower but show a general decreasing trend in Boadway and Watts (2000, 36). The same trend holds when transfers are measured as share of total federal revenues, with the exception of a slight increase in the early

2001, the Government of Québec set up a Commission of Fiscal Imbalance to look into this matter, and its report, too, showed a similar pattern of declining transfers over time. This trend became a contentious issue in the late 1990s, when the federal government cut transfers under the Canada Health and Social Transfer program, while the provinces were spending more on health, social programs, and education.[69] About the same time, the provinces emphasized that while they were running budget deficits or were barely in balance, the federal government was running a surplus. To the provincial governments, this was evidence of a vertical fiscal imbalance, a mismatch between the expenditure responsibilities and revenues of the federal and provincial governments. That is, responsibilities related to health care, social programs, and education were major and growing provincial expenditure posts, but the federal government had the revenues (Noël 2009).

In the early 2000s, there was much dispute in Canada about whether there really was a vertical fiscal imbalance, with the PQ being in the forefront claiming that there was one.[70] In Ottawa, the Conservative government that came to power in 2006 both recognized and promised to address the issue – this in contrast to the Liberals at the federal level, who did not acknowledge the existence of a fiscal imbalance while in power. In Québec, the PLQ saw increased transfers as a solution, while to the sovereigntists the fiscal imbalance was, as one PQ representatives put it, "a new reason for sovereignty." Québec, he maintained, is a social democratic society with good education, health care, and social housing programs, and the population is willing to pay for these programs. The problem is that paired with a lack of federal transfers, the tax share of the provincial governments is not sufficiently large. If the federal government had any

1990s. From the 1960s to the 1980s, in contrast, transfers as share of federal revenues were increasing (Government of Québec, Commission on Fiscal Imbalance 2001, 6).

[69] According to the federal government, the provinces, when complaining that the federal government is spending less on health care, are conveniently forgetting that in 1977, a number of tax points were transferred to the provinces, which means that they should be able to cover the cuts by raising their own revenues. Nonetheless, notes McIntosh (2004), the decrease in federal transfers to health care has given the provinces less flexibility, mainly because they have been hesitant to raise provincial taxes (see also St-Hilaire 2005). According to PQ politicians, however, the problem is that Ottawa has not transferred sufficient tax points either, so that the provincial government could make up for lost federal transfers. Budget data available via Statistics Canada show that the trend throughout the 1990s is that spending on the social sector (health, social services, education, labor and employment, and housing) goes from 69 to 71 percent of total provincial expenditures. In Québec, this share remains relatively stable at 72 to 73 percent of the province's expenditures. See Statistics Canada's series on "Consolidated Federal, Provincial, Territorial and Local Government Revenue and Expenditures," available via CANSIM at http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a01?lang=eng (last accessed June 12, 2014).

[70] While St-Hilaire (2005) argues that the difficulties faced by the provinces are, at least in part, caused by measures taken by Ottawa to eliminate its deficit, Crowley and Winchester (2005) claim the opposite and point out that if the provinces want more revenues, they are able but unwilling to raise provincial taxes.

concern for the fiscal imbalance and the provinces' increasing expenditure burden, he continued, it would have transferred tax points to the provinces.[71] This was precisely one of the proposals in the report of Government of Québec's Commission of the Fiscal Imbalance (2001).

The PQ's concern about the fiscal imbalance was shared with the Liberals in the province, as well as the other provincial governments in Canada.[72] Yet in contrast to the other provinces, in Québec, the problem of the fiscal imbalance was not separate from the language question that originally motivated the sovereignty movement, making it a more contentious matter in Québec than elsewhere. Although many *Québécois* agree that the language question was by and large addressed with Bill 101, there has been a growing concern that the federal government has found ways to undermine provincial jurisdictions in spheres that affect language. Indeed, a key concern about the fiscal imbalance was that it allowed Ottawa to use its spending power in areas of province-level jurisdiction, particularly education and social policies (Telford 2003; Noël 2009; Seymour 2009; Caron 2013). The federal spending power refers to the policy-making power that comes with the federal government's financial power – the power of the purse. Because of the fiscal imbalance, the provinces faced difficulties in funding their expenditure responsibilities from their own pockets. To assist the provinces, the federal government increasingly stepped in and started spending money directly on social programs and postsecondary education,[73] which the sovereigntists see as an intrusion on provincial jurisdiction. Thus, to the sovereigntists, the fiscal imbalance became a reason for sovereignty not only because it deprived Québec of resources; it also deprived the province of policy autonomy. That said, despite the decline in central transfers as a share of the province's revenues up until the early 2000s, survey evidence from the mid-2000s showed that the majority of Québec's population (64 percent) still considered federal transfers to social programs to be one of the benefits of the Canadian federation.[74]

At the same time as there were changes in fiscal relations between Ottawa and the provinces, Québec society changed in ways that encouraged a belief that independence was economically viable. The federalists have consistently

[71] Personal communication with PQ representative, Québec City, November 15, 2005.

[72] Unlike the PQ, which in 2001 considered holding a referendum on transferring tax powers from Ottawa to Québec, the PLQ emphasized that Québec needs to ally with the other provinces in this battle against Ottawa. When the PLQ came to power in 2003, the party's Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Benoît Pelletier, was a key figure in championing this approach.

[73] In postsecondary education, these federal programs include the Canada Research Chairs program and the Millennium Scholarship Fund, as well as budget funds to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) (McIntosh 2004).

[74] See *Portraits of Canada 2005*, CRIC Research Paper No. 19, available at http://www.library.carleton.ca/sites/default/files/find/data/surveys/pdf_files/cric-paper_19-2005.pdf (last accessed June 10, 2014).

argued that Québec needs the rest of Canada for its economic well-being; it needs central transfers and it needs the markets of the other Canadian provinces.[75] Evidence from the hearings before the Bélanger-Campeau Commission, which was established by the Québec National Assembly in 1991 to look into questions regarding Québec's status, suggests that, indeed, among many supporters of independence, preserving economic ties with Canada was considered necessary (Meadwell 1993). Recall that the 1995 referendum question was about independence *with a partnership* with the rest of Canada. Yet since the 1990s, globalization and diminished importance of state borders have made it easier for the PQ to argue that the province can make it on its own. Even prior to the 1995 referendum, the PQ suggested that in order to meet the challenges of globalization and take advantage of its benefits, Québec needs to be sovereign (PQ 1994). Among both some scholars and some activists in the sovereignty movement, globalization is seen as a chief explanation for the support for sovereignty since the late 1990s:

> (E)ven if the federal government continues to deprive Quebec for its economic resources, by reducing its transfer payments and increasing taxes, the fact that Quebec is one of the more open economies in the world makes Quebec an international trade partner less dependent on the Canadian domestic market. Quebec has become an international actor and has adopted strategies similar to many sub-states entities. New forms of partnership will certainly emerge in the next few years. (Lachapelle and Paquin 2003, 14)

Similarly, Courchene suggests that as Québec's north–south exports (primarily to the United States) have exceeded interprovincial exports (in 2001, 33.6 and 19.4 percent of GDP, respectively), the province's "economic future is clearly in NAFTA economic space, not Canadian economic space" (2007, 213), which reduces the costs of looser economic ties with the rest of Canada (see also Bird and Vaillancourt 2007, 79). For instance, the Québec Ministry of Finance's 2013 brochure on *Economic and Financial Profile of Québec* highlights how international exports are growing and are becoming more diversified.[76] Perhaps particularly among young activists in the sovereignty movement, there was a sense in the mid-2000s that globalization had helped eliminate previous generations' fear that an independent Québec would be economically unviable.[77] In

[75] In the 2007 provincial election campaign, for example, the Québec Liberals suggested that if the PQ won the elections, it would mean an end to federal transfers, which would hurt the Québec economy. See, for example, Ingrid Peritz and Rhéal Séguin, "PQ 'Delusional,' Charest Asserts as Race Heats Up: Liberal Leader, Boisclair Square off on Fiscal Risks of Quebec Sovereignty," *Globe and Mail,* February 26, 2007.
[76] Available at http://www.finances.gouv.qc.ca/documents/Autres/en/AUTEN_profile2013.pdf (last accessed June 20, 2014).
[77] Survey data from 2005 showed that support for sovereignty among the province's 18- to 24-year-olds was, at 63 percent, well above the province's population at large (49 percent). See *Portraits of Canada 2005*, CRIC Research Paper No. 19, available at

the words of a young PQ representative, who became active in the sovereignty movement after the 1995 referendum:

> My generation, we feel equal to the English people. We're proud that we can compete in the international market and have big industries, proud of our cultural affairs. We have a good quality of life, and we're more proud now than Quebecers were in the 1960s. People are no longer afraid that in the event of a referendum, the money will go to Ontario. In the 1980s, older people were afraid of losing their pensions if Québec separated from Canada. Some old people still worry about this, which could be a card for the federalists.[78]

Indeed, as noted, the income gap between Anglophones and Francophones in Québec has narrowed (and, recent data suggest, even been reversed), and Québec has become more open to international markets. The province's Francophone population has economic reasons to be more confident than when the sovereignty movement emerged. That, paired with formal steps toward meeting the language questions (Bill 101), contributed to the sovereignty movement embracing new reasons for independence. These reasons included declining central transfers, the fiscal imbalance, and the federal spending power. Not only have these issues by themselves become reasons for wanting out of the federation, they also adversely affect social policies, which, at the same time, have come to figure more prominently in the sovereignty debate, tied to a *Québécois* identity. Thus, the use of the federal spending power in the sphere of social policies fit into the image of the central government being a threat to what it means to be *Québécois*.

While the active participants in the sovereignty movement, perhaps particularly younger ones, consider globalization to have changed the calculations about the province's viability as an independent state,[79] this does not hold across Québec society. There are also those in Québec who see globalization and free trade as reasons against sovereignty. Businesses, for example, are not certain that an independent Québec will have the same place as Canada – or any place at all – in NAFTA (Meadwell 1993). More generally, Courchene (2007) notes that with globalization and the growth of the knowledge-based economy, being a state is no longer as important as it used to be. In the knowledge-based economy, he argues, the areas of jurisdiction that really matter are those related to human capital development, which are

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http://www.library.carleton.ca/sites/default/files/find/data/surveys/pdf_files/cric-paper_19-2005 .pdf (last accessed June 10, 2014).

[78] Personal communication, Montréal, September 8, 2005.

[79] This is the impression from my conversations with young sovereigntists in 2005. Analyzing survey data of 18- to 34-year-olds in Québec, Perrella and Bélanger (2009) find that there is a high correlation between support for sovereignty and thinking that a sovereign Québec can deal effectively with globalization or protect the environment, but they also find that young sovereigntists have a wide – and not necessarily coherent – range of reasons for supporting sovereignty.

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already in provincial hands. Thus, even though the new reasons driving some to demand sovereignty – revolving around fiscal matters, social policies, and globalization – are issues that concern the population, it is not clear that sovereignty is the only way to address them.

Indeed, from 2003, the Liberal government in Québec took steps toward showing that such new reasons for sovereignty could be met within the federation. In 2003, Premier Jean Charest took the initiative to create a forum for interprovincial collaboration, the Council of the Federation. The forum enabled the provinces to come together and form a common front, including confronting Ottawa on the fiscal imbalance (Noël 2009). Combined with the fact that in an increasingly open economy, all the provinces want more policy freedom, the Council of the Federation helped create acceptance for asymmetrical federalism (Courchene 2007) – although skepticism about the value of agreements short of constitutional reforms remained (Seymour 2009). At the federal level, in 2006, the Conservatives came to power in Ottawa, not only recognizing the existence of the fiscal imbalance but also promising to do something about it. In that spirit, and undoubtedly in an attempt to boost the federalist sentiment in the province, in 2007, Prime Minister Harper promised increased equalization transfers to Québec (Lecours and Béland 2009).[80] The debate about fiscal imbalance has almost died down since, although neither the PQ nor the Québec Liberals consider Harper as having resolved the problems associated with the fiscal imbalance – and have, rather, expressed a number of other disagreements with his Conservative government's policies.[81] The Conservative federal government appears to have continued faith in federal transfers as a means to keep Québec appeased, in late 2011, for example, agreeing to a long-promised federal transfer payment to compensate for the province's sales-tax harmonization.[82]

In sum, declining central transfers and the fiscal imbalance in the late 1990s and early 2000s fueled the PQ's claims that the federation was not working for Québec, but steps were taken that sought to demonstrate that these new reasons for sovereignty could be addressed within the federal framework. Both election results and public opinion data suggest that the majority of the province's population prefer staying put in the federation, yet they are not satisfied with the status quo of federal-province relations.

[80] While Québec considers such funds to be money that rightly belongs to the province, the view in the rest of Canada is different. See the following comment in a major Ottawa-based paper for a sense of the attitude in the rest of Canada: "The Disconnect between Quebec Francophones and Canada," *Globe and Mail*, March 27, 2007.

[81] "Harper Budget Will Hurt Provinces, Premiers Say," *CBC News*, March 6, 2012.

[82] "Ottawa and Quebec Announce Long-Awaited $2.2 Billion Tax Agreement," *Canadian Business*, October 1, 2011.

Political Elite Ties

Although Québec's quest for sovereignty revolves around its minority status in the federation, it is a powerful minority region, with clear influence on federal politics. Since World War II, five out of eleven Canadian prime ministers have been from Québec. And from 1993 to 2011, the Bloc Québécois (BQ) was an important opposition party in the House of Commons, where 75 of 308 seats are from Québec (in proportion to the province's population). Yet despite this presence of Quebecers in Ottawa, when it comes to political party ties between central and provincial elites, Québec has seen few periods of copartisanship. Only in 1963 to 1966, 1970 to 1976, and 2003 to 2006 has Québec been governed by the same party that governs at the federal level. Any observer of Québec politics would quickly note that the events that have posed the greatest challenge to the territorial integrity of the Canadian federation, the 1980 and 1995 referenda, took place when Québec's government was controlled by the PQ, which suggests that there are, indeed, destabilizing consequences of having a regional party rule a minority province. Yet this instability has never led to an armed conflict. The most cooperative era of Canadian federalism was, arguably, the early 1960s, when the governments in both Québec and Ottawa were under Liberal rule.

In this section, I look more closely at the effects of the presence and absence of political elite ties (Hypothesis 3a from Chapter 1). My expectation is that political elite ties between regions and the center will ease center-region bargaining. First, I examine the role of copartisanship in the turbulent 1960s, leading up to the October Crisis of 1970, which is the closest the sovereignty struggle that emerged in the 1960s has come to a violent conflict with Ottawa. Second, I examine how, despite the relatively nonintegrated feature of Canadian political parties, conflicts have nonetheless been routed through institutional channels.

Political Elite Ties and the Violent Road Not Taken
Unlike the territorial struggles in Chechnya and Punjab, Québec's struggle has been fought without much bloodshed; five people died as a result of the FLQ's actions, all but the death of Laporte accidental. The FLQ never gained widespread support. It is estimated that at the most, the FLQ consisted of some 40–50 active members and had 200 to 300 sympathizers willing to provide financial aid and shelter for the activists (Pelletier 1971). Once the army came onto the streets in the October Crisis of 1970, support fell, and the FLQ disappeared from the scene. That is, unlike the Chechen nationalists and the militant Sikh groups in Punjab, the "extremists" of the FLQ did not manage to draw sustained support from the masses, even though they shared many of the same grievances. The October Crisis shook Québec's population and marked the end of a cycle of violence that had begun in 1963. In this period, the FLQ's actions primarily took place in Montréal, directed at the Anglophone population (often Molotov cocktails planted in mailboxes in the upscale neighborhood

Westmount) and symbols of Anglophone power, such as Montréal's Stock
Exchange, the Board of Trade, Eaton's Department Store, the Central Station
of the Canadian National Railway, and the Canadian Army recruitment center
(Pelletier 1971). While not at all trivial to Montréal's population, compared
to the violence in Chechnya and Punjab, these events do not constitute armed
conflict.

   As the chapter so far has shown, the sovereignty movement's demands have,
in many ways, been accommodated through both policy and fiscal autonomy
within the Canadian federation, which has reduced the potential for armed
conflict. Here, I consider how the presence and absence of political ties between
Québec City and Ottawa influenced negotiations between the regional and
central elites and the implications for the turbulence of the 1960s.[83] As I dis-
cuss further, the political party system in Canada is considered a prime example
of a system that is not "federal friendly," as the provincial party branches of the
two major federal parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, have few or no ties
to their mother parties at the federal level (Filippov et al. 2004; Simeon 2004).
Nonetheless, the most accommodating period in Ottawa-Québec relations, the
years of "cooperative federalism" under the Liberal party in the first half of the
1960s, can be understood by examining political elite ties between Ottawa and
Québec City. The latter half of the 1960s, in contrast, which saw the provin-
cial party Union Nationale return to power in Québec, was characterized by
a lack of such ties, increasingly a lack of center-region cooperation, and a rise
in violence.

   The violent protests in 1963 grew out of a sense among segments of
Québec's population that their interests were not adequately represented by
the established political parties. When the FLQ first emerged, it was inspired
by anticolonial movements at the time, and to the degree that the *felquistes,*
as the FLQ members were known, had one coherent message, it was that
Québec's problems rested with capitalism, imperialism, and Anglophone con-
trol.[84] The responsibility for these problems of the Francophone population in
Québec rested with the "colonialist government" in Ottawa and its "valets"
in Québec.[85] While the RIN was emerging as a more peaceful independence

[83] This is not to say that policy and fiscal autonomy or political elite ties are the only reasons why
   this struggle did not turn violent. In comparison to Chechnya and Punjab, the relative wealth of
   the state, for example, which shapes overall state capacity, available recruits for armed struggle,
   and grievances, is likely to play a role.
[84] The FLQ was never a highly institutionalized organization. Over the course of its lifespan, it
   existed in different incarnations. In fact, the term "FLQ" is loosely applied to a number of dif-
   ferent violent groups that operated in Québec, mainly Montréal, in the 1960s, including the
   L'Armée de Libération de Québec and L'Armée Révolutionnaire de Québec. In 1965–1966, the
   FLQ came under the intellectual leadership of Charles Gagnon and Pierre Vallières, who are
   considered its chief ideologists.
[85] English translations of a number of the FLQ's manifestos and public announcements are avail-
   able online through the Marxist website www.marxists.org, specifically at http://www.marxists
   .org/history/canada/quebec/flq/index.htm.

movement in the same time period, the early FLQ supporters were RIN members dissatisfied with that organization's course of action. The young founders of the FLQ found that there were no political organizations that adequately represented and fought for their interests. To the majority of Québec's population, however, the steps taken by the province's Liberal Lesage government began to address some of their long-standing grievances, and there was little support for a violent, proindependence agenda. Indeed, violent attacks attributed to the FLQ declined between 1965 and 1967, and the outcome of the 1966 elections to Québec's National Assembly made clear that most people were not in favor of independence; the proindependence parties RIN and RN won a combined 9 percent. Recall that by 1966, the Liberal Lesage government had, through the Quiet Revolution, taken significant steps toward making Québec's population "masters in our own house," while Prime Minister Lester Pearson was willing to grant Québec power over joint federal-province tasks beyond those given to the other provinces, on the condition that the other provinces were given the same opportunity. Indeed, Corbett maintains that because the Lesage government had made significant achievements to improve the everyday lives of Quebecers within the federation, it "robbed the separatist organizations of many of their arguments" (1967, 148). The subsequent years of Union Nationale rule (1966–1970) saw a lack of such progress.

The era of "cooperative federalism" has been attributed to the diplomatic personality of Prime Minister Lester Pearson (1963–1968), who believed compromise was the best solution for dealing with Québec.[86] In contrast, his successor, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1968–1978, 1980–1984), who was from Québec, was a staunch believer in individual rights and refused to accommodate Québec by recognizing its collective rights as a distinct society (e.g., Laforest 1995; McRoberts 1997). There is much to such explanations focusing on the backgrounds, beliefs, and ideas of national leaders; in particular, Trudeau's ideas have had a great impact on Canadian public opinion, which in turn has affected federal-provincial relations. Nonetheless, I suggest that the difference between the cooperative era of the early 1960s and the less cooperative late 1960s rests with the political ties between elites in Ottawa and Québec City. The federal ruling elites' dependence on their Liberal copartisans in Québec, as well as shared backgrounds within the Liberal party, gave way to center-province compromise solutions.

In the 1963 federal elections, when the Liberals under Pearson came to power in Ottawa, the party made up for the previous federal elections, in 1958, when it had suffered a humiliating defeat. In Québec, the Union Nationale machinery had worked in favor of securing the 1958 victory of the Conservatives, who had gained fifty out of seventy-five seats in the province. However, with twenty-five

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[86] One of Pearson's advisors from the 1960s attributed Pearson's approach to Québec to his diplomat background, making him seek compromise rather than confrontation (personal communication, Ottawa, October 27, 2005).

Liberal seats, Québec was the biggest contributor to the mere forty-eight seats that the Liberals secured in the 1958 federal elections. Both in 1960 and 1962, Jean Lesage led the Québec Liberals to a victory in the provincial elections. In Ottawa, the Liberals set their hopes on Lesage winning back Québec in the federal elections as well, and indeed, in 1963, the Liberals returned to power with the help of 47 (out of 128) seats from Québec. Of the popular vote in the province, almost 46 percent had gone to the Liberals. Not only had the Liberals under Lesage ended sixteen years of Union Nationale dominance at the provincial level, they had also helped the Liberals come back strong at the federal level. As such, from the very start, the Pearson government had an interest in keeping the Liberals in power in Québec and was, to a certain degree, indebted to the Québec Liberals.

By no means was this copartisan relationship by-the-book perfect. In 1964, the Québec wing of the Liberal party officially separated from the Liberals at the center, forming the Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ), which among other things meant that the federal and provincial party staffs were no longer the same (Fitzmaurice 1985, 228).[87] After the 1963 election of the Liberals in Ottawa, the Québec Liberal Party, which from the late 1930s to the 1960 election had avoided emphasizing federal-province relations, needed to assert to Québec's population its role as a promoter of their cause, hence the split (Filippov et al. 2004, 209). Nonetheless, Pearson and Lesage knew each other from politics in Ottawa, from the days when Lesage had been a minister in the 1953 to 1957 Liberal government, and had a relatively close personal relationship. Indeed, at one point, Pearson envisioned Lesage as his successor (Stursberg 1978). Pearson also made an effort to have civil servants from Ottawa serve in Québec and vice versa to facilitate the integration of French speakers into the public service. In a biography of Pearson, Stursberg (1978) suggests that Pearson's accommodating attitude to Québec did, indeed, rest with the fact that he was dealing with a fellow Liberal government.[88] The accommodating steps of the federal government helped the Lesage government in Québec carry out the reforms that made more extremist alternatives and radical demands less attractive to Québec's population. These are dynamics that are consistent with "federal friendly" copartisanship across tiers of government.

Yet subsequent periods of copartisanship between the Liberals in Québec City and Ottawa (1970–1976, 2003–2006) were not characterized by

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[87] Today, in federal elections, the Liberal candidates in Québec are part of the central Liberal party, Parti Libéral du Canada (Québec), while the PLQ fields the provincial candidates.

[88] Stursberg notes that in part, Pearson faced a setback in the 1965 federal elections as the Western and Atlantic provinces found that the federal government had paid too little attention to their needs – as opposed to Québec's needs – and that in 1966, when the Liberals lost the elections in Québec, Pearson was "no longer inhibited by having to deal with fellow Liberals in Québec City" (Stursberg 1978, 206).

cooperative relations; the formal split between the provincial and federal wings of the party was not mitigated by a shared party history between the premier and the prime minister. While Jean Lesage, like his predecessor Georges-Émile Lapalme, had begun his political career in Ottawa and was part of the federal Liberal machine, neither his immediate successor, Robert Bourassa, nor his later successors, Daniel Johnson, Jr., Gérard Lévesque, and Claude Ryan, were involved in federal politics.[89] This trajectory, in which the provincial party is *not* a stepping stone for federal politics, is typical across political parties in Canada (Filippov et al. 2004).[90] At a personal level, while Pearson and Lesage had a close relationship, in the subsequent period of Liberal copartisanship from 1970 to 1976, Prime Minister Trudeau did not consider Premier Bourassa a strong or preferred leader (Radwanski 1978, 322, 337).[91] Trudeau's responses to Bourassa's demands for Québec were far from conciliatory, despite the demands being less assertive than those of Lesage.

But let me return to the turbulent 1960s and the immediate aftermath of the years of "cooperative federalism." Despite the successes of the Liberal Lesage government's Quiet Revolution, the Liberals lost the 1966 provincial elections in Québec. Even though the PLQ won the popular vote, Union Nationale secured more seats.[92] The years of rule by the Union Nationale (1966–1970) witnessed a halt in the process of social transformation from the Lesage era. Although it initially looked like the Union Nationale under Daniel Johnson, who had run on a ticket calling for a better deal for Québec within the federation, would keep up the Lesage government's speed of social reforms and quest for transfers of powers from Ottawa, it soon became clear that the party would achieve neither (McRoberts and Posgate 1981, 159–160). Particularly after Johnson's death in 1968, when Jean-Jacques Bertrand took over as party leader and premier, the population did not see the Union Nationale as a credible agent of change, and frustration grew among those who had favored the reforms of the Quiet Revolution.

[89] Québec's Liberal premier from 2003 to 212, Jean Charest, did have federal government experience, but not in the Liberal party. Charest was active in politics for the Progressive Conservative Party since 1984, and from 1993 to 1998 he was the party's leader. The Progressive Conservative Party has never had a wing that fields candidates in Québec's provincial elections.

[90] Trudeau, a Francophone Quebecer, became involved with the Liberal party in Ottawa – and was elected prime minister – without having played a role in the PLQ.

[91] Bourassa officially had the support of the federal Liberals prior to the PLQ's leadership election in 1970, but according to Trudeau, that decision was made by Jean Marchand, who was leader of the Québec caucus. Trudeau would rather have seen Marchand as the PLQ leader (Radwanski 1978, 322).

[92] This defeat of the Liberals took both the party members and observers by surprise. It is attributed to the nature of Québec's first-past-the-post electoral system and opposition to the speed of reforms among segments of the population, as well as opposition among those who found that reforms had not gone far enough and, therefore, turned to the RIN and the RN (McRoberts and Posgate 1981, 115–117).

The lack of progress on the "Québec question" was a result of the Union Nationale's hesitate to push for reforms. That is, it cannot be credited to lack of political ties only, although it did not help the party's cause that Prime Minister Pearson's successor in Ottawa, Pierre Trudeau, was of a rival party and strongly opposed to granting special concessions to Québec. The era of "cooperative federalism" under Premier Lesage and Prime Minister Pearson was gone. And, indeed, the late 1960s were a period of rising social tension in Québec, including both student and labor protests. While FLQ-orchestrated attacks declined between 1965 and 1967, in 1968, following the conviction of FLQ leaders Gagnon and Vallières,[93] there was a surge in protests and violence. The violence in 1968 to 1970 consisted primarily of a series of bombings in Montréal, including a major bomb outside the city's stock exchange and in the mayor's home. Even though the PQ was emerging as a peaceful, proindependence alternative to the FLQ, the PQ's loss in the 1970 provincial elections, which brought to power a probusiness Liberal government under Bourassa, appear to have demonstrated to the *felquistes* that the peaceful route was a no-go.

In fact, the 1970 election campaign was, in the view of a former FLQ activist, a fear-driven campaign that caused a revival of the FLQ.[94] In an attempt to deter voters from casting their vote in favor of the PQ, Montréal's Anglophone-dominated business community argued that a PQ victory would drain the province of capital. In a symbolic and staged event three days prior to the elections, one of the major banks, the Royal Trust Company, arranged for nine armored Brinks trucks to collect and transport valuables from Montréal to Toronto, making sure the press documented the event. Both the PQ and FLQ sharply criticized this kind of show, and the campaign's effect on the Francophone population appeared to boost rather than reduce support for sovereignty. Indeed, the PQ, only two years in the making, came in second after the victorious Liberals. To the FLQ, however, second place for the PQ was not good enough. In their October 6, 1970, manifesto following their kidnapping of the British diplomat James Cross, the FLQ stated, "Once, we believed it worthwhile to channel our energy and our impatience, in the apt words of René Lévesque, into the Parti Québécois, but the Liberal victory shows that what is called democracy in Québec has always been, and still is, nothing but the 'democracy' of the rich."[95] On October 10, the FLQ

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[93] They had been arrested while protesting outside the United Nations in New York in 1966, then extradited to Canada, tried, and found guilty for a number of charges related to the FLQ's activities.

[94] Personal communication, Montréal, August 23, 2005.

[95] English translation available at http://www.marxists.org/history/canada/quebec/flq/1970/manifesto.htm. See also http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/docs/october/manifest.htm (last accessed June 23, 2014).

kidnapped Québec's Vice Premier and Minister of Labor, Pierre Laporte, who was later killed.

Killing Laporte backfired as a strategy. The ensuing October Crisis of 1970 is the only time that the federal government, upon the request of the provincial government, has responded with force in Québec. The decision to enact the National Defense Act (October 15) and the War Measures Act (October 16), which employed the Canadian army in the streets of Montréal and gave the provincial government emergency powers to suspend civil liberties, was based on the government's considerations that the FLQ was able to spur significant civil disorder and riots in Québec (Pelletier 1971).

Many in Québec were shocked by the presence of the army in the streets of Montréal and considered the response disproportionate to the actions of the FLQ, although compared to the Russian army's attack on Grozny in 1994 and the Indian army's attack on the Golden Temple in 1984, the October Crisis was a minor event.[96] The immediate public reaction to the employment of troops in Montréal on October 15 was a student rally of about 3,000, where many expressed support for the FLQ. However, beyond that, the October Crisis was not used to further justify the sovereignty cause – even though it resulted in the arrest of more than 450 suspected terrorists, many of them PQ members, the majority of whom were released without ever being charged. To the majority of Québec's population, neither their grievances nor the War Measures Act was a sufficient justification for violent means. While Lévesque condemned the use of the War Measures Act, he continued to distance himself and the PQ from the actions of the FLQ. Nonetheless, the crisis appeared to have had an immediate negative effect on the PQ; membership dropped and the party lost the 1973 elections to the Liberals, who also favored change but within the federation (Levine 1990, 90). One of the PQ representatives I met in Montréal recalled the effect that violence and the October Crisis had on her own political engagement:

> … the FLQ kidnapped Cross from Westmount – Westmount representing the dominant thinking here [in Montréal] – and Laporte, who was killed. In response, Trudeau imposed the War Measures Act. I was 11 years old, going to school, and the army was on Mont Royal Street! One night, when I was babysitting the neighbor kids, at 11 o'clock at night on the TV, I saw images from a raid. The army was arresting everyone who had made separatist statements. There was no mandate, no explanation …. I was 11, and to me, these were the things that would happen if you joined the PQ. I saw people get arrested and thrown in jail without explanation. Sometimes, it was just for having written a letter! It made a big impression on me. I had never even seen soldiers before. I never expected we'd see that here,

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[96] According to Freeman (2003), the use of emergency powers in Québec in 1970 is an example of emergency powers used right.

in Montréal. It happens in Chile, but not here. Therefore, for a long time I was very hesitant and scared to be on the list of the party.[97]

So even though 1960s Québec saw a number of social conflicts, support for violence was slim. In the first half of the decade, the Liberal government under Lesage, with its program of *maîtres chez nous*, managed to gain concessions from its copartisan ally in Ottawa and steer the struggle through institutional channels. The return to power of the Union Nationale in 1966, who did not have a political ally in Ottawa, was a setback for "cooperative federalism" and the process of reforms begun by the Lesage government. Both support for sovereignty and violent protests picked up. Marrying the quest for independence with a socialist ideology, the FLQ was unlikely to see the Liberals or any other party considered probusiness sufficient for addressing its demands, regardless of the concessions these parties could gain through negotiating with Ottawa. To the majority of Québec's population, however, the reforms of the Quiet Revolution had demonstrated that change could take place through institutional channels, and the 1973 elections showed a clear preference for the federalists, the Québec Liberals. By December 1970, even FLQ's Pierre Vallières discarded violence as a means and expressed his support for the PQ and Lévesque, who throughout the October Crisis had sought to distance the party from violent means. Since the October Crisis, both the PQ and the PLQ have shown that the struggle for sovereignty or greater autonomy for Québec can be fought peacefully through center-province negotiations. As I turn to next, some of these negotiations have been characterized by lack of compromise and broken promises, but the availability of institutional channels for intergovernmental bargaining have nonetheless helped ensure sufficient accommodation to make Québec stay put and allow for peaceful negotiations.

Political Elite Ties and Constitutional Negotiations

Since 1960, only from 1963 to 1966, 1970 to 1976, and 2003 to 2006 has Québec had a premier of the same party as the prime minister, each time of the Liberal party. These periods of copartisanship have been characterized by different dynamics. Even though, as discussed earlier, the first period saw the formal split between the federal and provincial branches of the Liberal party, it was an era of "cooperative federalism" due to the federal party branch's dependence on the Québec Liberals and a shared background between Prime Minister Pearson and Québec Premier Lesage. In the second period of copartisanship (1970–1976), none of these factors were present. In 2005, when the Liberals governed both in Ottawa and Québec City (2003–2006), a Liberal cabinet member in Québec pointed out to me that, while the Liberals at the federal level and in Québec are

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[97] Personal communication, Montréal, September 23, 2005.

both federalist parties and bear the same name, they are different parties and see the federation very differently, almost from opposite points of view.[98]

The relationship between the Parti Québécois (PQ) and the Bloc Québécois (BQ), the PQ's sister party at the federal level, demonstrates a similar nonintegrated feature in that the two are separate organizations. Nonetheless, there are close ties between the PQ and the BQ. The membership is overlapping, and the founding BQ leader, Lucien Bouchard, went on to become PQ premier of Québec (1996–2001). Bouchard's successor in the BQ leadership chair, Michel Gauthier (1996–1997), started his political career as a representative of the PQ, as did Daniel Paillé (2011–2013). Yet long-time BQ leader Gilles Duceppe (1997–2011) did not have a past as a PQ representative, and neither does the Bloc's leader elected in 2014, Mario Beaulieu.

This nonintegrated character of Québec (and, more generally, Canada's major political parties) means that copartisan ties across tiers of government do not constitute a self-reinforcing mechanism for federal stability, although more informal ties, including shared backgrounds, exist.[99] The lack of integrated parties provides for a system of intergovernmental bargaining in which questions concerning the workings of the federation are addressed in meetings between the federal and provincial executives or among the provincial premiers. Indeed, since the early 1900s, key political issues in Canada have been addressed at so-called First Ministers' conferences, which are meetings between the provincial premiers and the prime minister. Since 2003, the Council of the Federation has been another venue to, in its own words, "work collaboratively to strengthen the Canadian federation by fostering a constructive relationship among the provinces and territories, and with the federal government."[100]

Added to the nonintegrated feature of the party system, voters in Canada have a tendency to vote for different parties in federal and provincial elections. If voters in a province have elected, say, Liberal representatives to the

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[98] Personal communication, Montréal, October 21, 2005.

[99] In Alberta and British Columbia, the split between the provincial and federal branches of the Liberal and Conservative parties happened as early as the 1930s, as the development of natural resources made the provincial wing of the parties less dependent on financing from the central party organization (Filippov et al. 2004, 206). The party that today is called the Conservative Party is a new incarnation of the party that used to be called the Progressive Conservative Party. In 2003, the Progressive Conservative Party and the Canadian Alliance merged to form the Conservative Party of Canada. The Conservative Party has ties to the provincial branches of its predecessor, the Progressive Conservatives. Currently, the only Canadian-wide party with "official" branches in each province is the Liberal party, although as in the case of Québec, the provincial Liberals are more or less independent of the federal Liberals.

[100] See the Council's website at http://www.councilofthefederation.ca/en/about (last accessed June 23, 2014).

parliament in Ottawa, they are likely to vote the opposition party into office in the provincial government (e.g., Fitzmaurice 1985).[101] As a result, copartisanship across tiers of government is typically low.[102]

Despite Canada's lack of integrated parties and low copartisanship, the federation has channeled bargaining over divisive issues through institutional means, including the First Ministers' conferences and the Council of the Federation. The practice of consultation with provincial premiers is one version of what Bednar (2009, 102–103) calls federalism's "structural safeguards," which aim to aid intergovernmental coordination by providing provincial leaders with an avenue for input on national decision-making processes. Similarly, although ethnic and regional parties are often considered a source for territorial conflict (e.g., Brancati 2006), the presence of the PQ and the Québec Liberals has ensured that there are viable political parties at the regional level that are able to negotiate with the central government. While the PQ as a party took a hit after the 1980 referendum (Millar 1997), the failed intergovernmental negotiations of the 1980s and 1990s did not, as they did to the Akali Dal in Punjab, lead to violent power struggles among different groups seeking to represent the province's interests. Instead, the failure of the Meech Lake accord was in 1991 followed by the founding of PQ's sister party at the federal level, the BQ – which, to the surprise of many, was elected as the official opposition in the House of Commons in 1993.[103] The Canadian federation's combination of nonintegrated parties, alternative channels for intergovernmental bargaining, and viable regional parties has led to instability in the sense that the constitutional division of powers is up for grabs, but it has not led to violent conflict. In this respect, the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords demonstrate the

[101] Since the emergence of the BQ, Quebecers have tended to favor the BQ in federal elections when the PQ has been out of power in Québec City. In the 1993 federal elections, the BQ secured about 49 percent of the popular vote in Québec. This was at a time when the provincial government was in the hands of the Québec Liberals. In the September 1994 elections, the PQ was voted into power in Québec, but in the subsequent 1997 federal elections, the popular vote in the province was almost evenly split among the Liberals and the BQ (with the BQ securing the most seats, 44 of 75). In 1998, the PQ was reelected in the provincial elections, but in the 2000 federal elections, the Liberals won more votes in the province (about 44 percent) than the BQ (about 40 percent), even though the BQ again secured more seats. In 2003, the PLQ was voted into power in the provincial elections, and in the federal elections the year after, the BQ won 49 percent of Québec's popular vote, while the Liberals won only about 34 percent of the popular vote. In the 2008 federal elections, the BQ won 38 percent of the popular vote in Québec, but the Liberals won the biggest vote share in the provincial elections both in 2007 and 2008. In the last federal elections, in 2011, the BQ's support dropped to about 23 percent in Québec, but the following year, the PQ did very well in the provincial elections (nearly 32 percent), but then lost in the 2014 elections.

[102] Since 1960, the tendency is that fewer than half of the ten Canadian provinces are governed by the party that governs in Ottawa.

[103] On the BQ's agenda when in power, see Young and Bélanger (2008), who find that the BQ's issue priorities during Question Period in the House of Commons are not focused exclusively on the national unity question; rather, the party fronts a comprehensive political agenda.

perils of intergovernmental negotiations that take place outside the framework of integrated parties: highly divisive issues end up at the bargaining table. Yet these negotiations also show the benefits of such imperfect channels: highly divisive issues end up at the bargaining table rather than in extra-institutional confrontations.

At the time of the Meech Lake negotiations, half of the Canadian provinces were ruled by Conservative governments, as was the central government under Brian Mulroney (1984–1993). Despite federal and regional party branches operating relatively independently of one another, this coalition of Conservative governments in 1987 appears to have helped enable the negotiations. Indeed, the agreement fell apart once two of the Conservative provincial governments were voted out of power. Yet contrary to my expectation that it is key for ethnic minority regions to be part of such a governing coalition, Québec was not a copartisan of the center when the agreement was reached; less surprisingly, nor was it when the accord failed.

Although the constitutional negotiations of the 1980s and 1990s did not result in the kind of concessions sought by Québec (to the contrary), intergovernmental bargaining from the late 1990s was characterized by a willingness of the other provinces to grant Québec de facto distinct status, at least as long as the option of any kind of special treatment was available to all. Recall that one of the stated benefits of "within bargaining" through political party channels and copartisanship is that regional interests are set aside. In contrast, in "without bargaining" through, for example, the kind of executive meetings we see in Canada, these interests are at the forefront and less prone to compromise (Filippov et al. 2004, 119–125). A comparison of the failed Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords and the steps taken toward accommodating Québec from the late 1990s points to how the dynamics of "without bargaining" changed as regional interests changed.

The Meech Lake accord is the closest Canada has come to a constitutional accommodation of Québec's demands. The accord did not go as far as the PQ and staunch supporters of sovereignty wanted, but it was well received in Québec. By the time the accord was up for ratification in 1990, however, it failed to garner unanimous support from the provincial governments. Key to the accord's death was public opinion in the rest of Canada, which increasingly had turned against any special status for Québec. In addition, two of the Conservative provincial governments that had initially agreed to the accord, in New Brunswick and Newfoundland, were voted out of power.[104] After the

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[104] The death blow to the accord came from Newfoundland's Liberal premier Clyde Wells, whose 1989 electoral victory ended seventeen years of Conservative rule in the province. The Liberal leader of the opposition in Manitoba, Sharon Carstairs, who in 1988 had been instrumental in leading the Liberals to their best election results in the province since 1953, also opposed the accord.

failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords, both provincial governments and governments in Ottawa were reluctant to pick up the constitutional debate, as public opinion was against such attempts at accommodating Québec, particularly against granting Québec a special status within the federation.[105] According to McRoberts (1997), Trudeau's vision of federalism and nationalism, embodied in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, fueled English Canada's resistance to give in to Québec's demands. This is a claim shared among key figures in the sovereignty movement, including one of the party's former leaders, who in 2005 suggested, "Trudeau intoxicated the rest of Canada with his doctrine. And that's what they wanted to hear. The result is their 'take it or leave it' position."[106] Also, groups that felt empowered by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, such as women and minorities, considered a distinct society status for Québec to violate individual rights (Simeon 2004). In the 1993 federal elections, following the failed Charlottetown accord, the public punished Mulroney's Progressive Conservative Party, which shrank from 169 to 2 seats in the federal assembly. Clearly, constitutional debates did not pay off in federal elections.

The hesitancy on the part of the other provinces to allow for special treatment of Québec began to change in the late 1990s, as the provinces joined forces to create a united regional front against the central government's attempts at invading their jurisdictions through its spending power. In 1998, the provinces adopted the Calgary Declaration, which showed a willingness to allow for asymmetrical arrangements and special powers given to one province as long as that option was available to all. The document further stated that "the legislature and Government of Quebec have a role to protect and develop the unique character of Quebec society within Canada" (quoted in Courchene 2007, 209). A new form of "collaborative federalism" began to emerge (Cameron and Simeon 2002) in which the issues at stake were no longer expressed in terms of uncompromising constitutional changes. Similarly, when coming to power in 2003, the path pursued by the Liberal government in Québec rested on the idea that in order for Québec to achieve asymmetry and special treatment in the federation, it had to get the other provinces on board before confronting Ottawa. To that end, moving away from constitutional questions was a key strategy. These developments paved the way for gradual accommodation of some of Québec's demands and were in the mid-2000s also boosted by political changes at the federal level. Indeed, for a short while, it looked like there was a relationship of mutual dependence between political elites in Ottawa and Québec City.

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[105] For example, public opinion data show that while more than 60 percent of Canadians favored the Meech Lake accord in 1988, by 1990, fewer than 30 percent did. See Queen's University Public Opinion Research Archive (http://www.queensu.ca/cora/), series on "Constitution: Meech Support."

[106] Personal communication, Montréal, October 7, 2005.

Québec's Liberal government under Jean Charest (2003–2012), unsatisfied with the workings of the federation but recognizing that the time was not right for another round of constitutional negotiations, worked for greater asymmetry, aiming for special treatment of Québec through administrative agreements with Ottawa. In the 2003 to 2006 period, when the Liberals formed the government in Ottawa as well, this route proved moderately successful – consider, as discussed, the health care agreements reached in the fall of 2004 – but was made difficult by the federal Liberals not acknowledging that there was a fiscal imbalance between the federal government and the provinces. From 2006, the Conservative federal government under Stephen Harper went further than the Liberal Paul Martin government to meet Québec's demands, through several "one shot deals" (Iacovino 2010, 85–91). Harper's notion of "open federalism," as elaborated in the Conservative party program ahead of the 2006 elections (Conservative Party of Canada 2005), resonated with the Charest government's belief in administrative agreements rather than constitutional reforms and envisioned a highly decentralized federation of strong provinces. The Conservative Party has no branch in Québec, and Harper's early accommodating steps, such as establishing a formal role for Québec at UNESCO and directing significant transfers to Québec to correct for the fiscal imbalance, was a way to boost his party's support and try to find, in Charest, a federalist ally in Québec. Charest – who was no stranger to the Conservatives, having served as a Progressive Conservative Party representative from 1984 to 1998 – was eager to find a cooperative partner at the federal level, which would enable him to front the PQ with evidence that asymmetrical federalism was, indeed, a possibility. Despite Harper's concessions to Québec in the courtship period 2005 to 2007, which showed that asymmetrical federalism was a possibility, since the 2008 federal elections, he found himself at odds with Charest, the PQ, and Québec public opinion.[107] The Conservatives' social and economic policies on arts funding, abortion, crime law, and the environment did not sit well with the province's liberal political culture (Jeffrey 2010; Caron 2013). Indeed, Québec did little to ensure the Conservative's victory in the 2011 federal elections,[108] so in the time leading up to the 2012 elections in Québec, which saw Liberal premier Charest lose his seat and the PQ return to power, there was little that tied leaders in Québec City and Ottawa to one another.

In sum, the lesson from Québec is that political elite ties across tiers of government can, indeed, help stem intergovernmental instability; in the 1960s, such ties were key to preventing public support for the FLQ and proindependence

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[107] More generally, Simmons and Graefe (2013) consider 2006 an end to the era of so-called collaborative federalism. Moreover, when looking at policy outputs, they are also skeptical about how collaborative the era of "collaborative federalism" actually was.

[108] In the 2006 federal elections, the Conservatives won almost 25 percent of the popular vote in Québec. In the 2008 elections, they won nearly 22 percent of the province's popular vote, and in 2011, only 16.5 percent.

parties. Indeed, the early 1960s are considered a special era of "cooperative federalism," far different from the confrontational constitutional debates seen since. However, in the absence of "federal friendly" parties, alternative institutional channels for intergovernmental bargaining can also bring about accommodation of a regional challenger, as seen since the late 1990s. The degree to which "without bargaining" has led to compromise solutions with Québec is contingent on the preferences in the other regions and ad-hoc (rather than institutionalized) political dependence between Québec City and Ottawa. The other provinces have come to accept, even prefer, a certain degree of de facto asymmetry out of self-interest (Courchene 2007), but skeptical voices warn that the other regions' indifference to Québec's concerns, such as protection of the French language, may jeopardize future accommodation (Richards 2007; Seymour 2009).

CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter has been to show how institutional and societal factors have jointly shaped the sovereignty movement in Québec. Cultural policy autonomy has been central to the sovereignty movement since it emerged in the 1960s, focusing on the status and interests of the Francophone community. Although a substantial share of Québec's population is still concerned about the status of French, public policies such as Bill 101 have shown that despite the arguments of the sovereigntists, accommodating steps toward meeting Québec's grievances were possible within the Canadian federation. In an increasingly diverse population, however, in the late 1990s and 2000s, the sovereignty movement came to focus on demands that went beyond cultural policy autonomy. In this context, control over social policies, which always have been important to the PQ, figured prominently and became entangled with Québec's growing dissatisfaction with the workings of the federal fiscal system – itself a result of changing institutions and assessments of Québec's wealth – providing new reasons for sovereignty. Indeed, consistent with much of the literature on the Québec sovereignty movement, the chapter identifies multiple motives that drive support for sovereignty. While survey research from the 1980 referendum has shown that, for example, views on economic standing were important grievances underpinning mobilization, such grievances alone are not sufficient to account for the ups and downs of mobilization and support for sovereignty. People's expectations of failure and success, disappointments about the governing parties, the role of political leaders, consideration of the economic consequences of secession, Quebecers' feelings of not being recognized in Canada, and evaluations of the federal system also play a role (Pinard and Hamilton 1986; Pinard 1992, 2005; Blais and Nadeau 1992; Pammett and LeDuc 2001; Mendelsohn 2003; Bélanger and Perrella 2008; Richez and Bodet 2012).

The decentralized nature of the Canadian political system and the autonomy granted to Québec over the years may have fueled an appetite for separation

among some. According to a representative of the PQ's youth wing, "If Canada gave us more autonomy tomorrow, I would ask for more the day after. If they give us something, I'll take it, but it's not enough."[109] However, the province's autonomy has also ensured that the majority of the population opts for Québec to remain part of the federation. For those scholars and policy makers who see federalism as a slippery slope toward secession, it should be noteworthy that the major jump in support for sovereignty in Québec followed a setback, the failure of the Meech Lake accord, rather than a concession. Although the provincial 2012 elections brought the PQ back to power, after nine years of Liberal rule, the crushing defeat of the party in 2014 suggests that a new referendum on sovereignty is off the agenda. The relatively large support for the "nonaligned" Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) in the 2012 and 2014 elections would suggest that many in the province are happy to put the sovereignty question on hold. Seemingly, the *Québécois*, while dissatisfied with the status quo, accept that change can happen within the federation.

Indeed, many of the grievances underpinning the sovereignty movement – both old and new ones – have been met within the Canadian federation, thus making the PQ's proposed cure less attractive than that of its main competitor in the province, the PLQ. Although the Québec Liberals largely agree with the PQ's diagnosis of the "ills" with the Canadian federation, to them, these problems can be met without, as the PQ puts it, Québec becoming a country. Nor does a constitutional solution appear to be necessary, even though the failed negotiations of the late 1980s and early 1990s made constitutional recognition more important than it was before. The 2003 to 2012 PLQ government's strategy of seeking asymmetrical federalism through administrative agreements was not really a new one; the cultural policy autonomy that Québec has achieved within the federation has happened through public policies, not constitutional changes (Erk 2006).

Even though failed Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords are good examples of the destabilizing consequences of a "without bargaining" approach, outside the framework of political party ties across tiers of government, intergovernmental negotiations have nonetheless helped the political parties in power in Québec to convince the population that their grievances can be addressed peacefully. Thus, the case of Québec demonstrates that while political ties between elites at the center and in the regions can be helpful for cooperation across tiers of government, as in the mid-1960s, they are not a necessary condition for peaceful intergovernmental bargaining.

[109] Personal communication, Montréal, September 26, 2005.

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Conclusion: Comparative Perspectives

In the Sikh museum at the Golden Temple in Amritsar, Punjab, there is a painting of the damage done to the Akal Takht, the most important Sikh institution, during the Indian army's attack in June 1984. The painting is accompanied by the following text:

> Under the calculated move of Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi, Military troops stormed the Golden Temple with tanks. Thousands of Sikhs where massacred. Sri Akal Takht suffered the most damages. Sikhs rose up in a united protest. Many returned their honours. Sikh soldiers left their barracks. The Sikhs however soon had their vengeance.

Since World War II, millions of people have died in intrastate conflicts. Millions more have suffered from the aftermath of such struggles. Poverty, destruction of property and infrastructure, famines, crime, shortened life expectancies, diseases and disabilities, population displacements, and damage to cultural treasures, as well as fears, distrust, and animosities that may feed further violence, are some of the consequences. Many of these conflicts have, as in Punjab, been waged between central governments and regions or ethnic minority groups in pursuit of self-determination. This book is about the kinds of struggles that resulted in the Golden Temple attack of 1984 and the ways in which decentralization can (or cannot) help preserve peace. Emphasizing state-society interactions, I argue that, although decentralization indeed can help prevent self-determination struggles, institutional effects cannot be considered in isolation from societal traits, such as levels of wealth and the kind of solidarity ties that, as in the opening quote, unite regional minority groups.

Many policy makers and scholars alike have come to see decentralization, including federalism and regional autonomy arrangements, as a promising long-term institutional tool for containing conflicts in internally divided states. Yet as recent years' discussions about state building in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya can testify, decentralization is a hotly debated alternative with strong

voices both for and against. In Afghanistan, the 2004 constitution forms the basis for a highly centralized state, while in Iraq, the 2005 constitution is the blueprint for a federal state, but in neither case, it seems, is the final word on decentralization versus centralization said. In 2012, the making of post-Gaddafi Libya was in the very early stages, but pro-autonomy voices had already led to discussions about federalism or decentralization as an institutional possibility. And in spring 2014, the Russian annexation of Crimea and separatist sentiments in the country's southern and eastern regions reintroduced a debate about decentralization, even federalism, in Ukraine, which had been scrapped in the 1990s due to concerns about repeating the fate of the USSR. Empirically, the track record of conflict across federations, which are formally decentralized states, is mixed. While some have been largely peaceful, others have gone through periods of serious violent conflict within their borders. And while many scholars praise the potentially peace-preserving merits of decentralization, there are also arguments to be made about the same institutions being a recipe for further conflict. Given such empirical variation and theoretically divergent findings, the question to focus on is not an either/or version of *whether* decentralization preserves peace but, rather, *what are the conditions under which* it does?

The short version of my answer to this question is that decentralization has different effects in different societies. In particular, a society's ethnic composition and distribution of wealth affect the degree to which policy, fiscal, and political autonomy can help preserve peace. In this final chapter, I view the argument and findings from the book's case studies – Chechnya's relationship to Moscow, Punjab's relationship to Delhi, and Québec's relationship to Ottawa – in light of other self-determination struggles, past and present, drawing out policy implications. I conclude by considering avenues for further research. Based on the empirical cases, I suggest that scholars interested in how decentralization can help restore peace in postwar states might benefit from examining the effects of intraregional divisions and the legacy of wartime institutions.

ARGUMENT AND FINDINGS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The book maintains that decentralization can help preserve peace conditional on how these institutions respond to the underpinnings of the societies they are meant to govern. The conflict literature has demonstrated that both ethnicity and distribution of wealth are likely to affect self-determinations struggles, and there are good reasons to believe that these societal traits will shape the peace-preserving effects of decentralization. To assess the effects of institutional design, the book disaggregates the concept of decentralization to focus on specific institutions: policy decentralization (which level of government does which tasks), fiscal decentralization (which level of government pays for public goods provision and from which sources), and political

decentralization, here captured by the political ties between tiers of government. Such a disaggregated take on decentralization is consistent with the comparative literature on federalism/decentralization but is missing in much of the conflict literature.

Policy Autonomy and Ethnicity

A number of scholars have suggested that central governments can appease self-determination demands by granting regional governments control over policy areas that matter for ethnic and regional minority groups' recognition, such as language, education, and religion. And indeed, in many cases, such cultural policy autonomy will be a good strategy. However, cultural policy autonomy's peace-preserving potential is likely to be conditional on any given region's ethnic demographics and the basis for solidarity within the group mobilizing for self-determination. Indeed, while cultural policy autonomy may stem self-determination demands if the struggle is waged in the name of an ethnically homogenous minority region or if the basis for solidarity emphasizes the group's cultural survival, cultural policy autonomy may have little or no such effect if a region is ethnically diverse and the basis for solidarity rather emphasizes how the group's physical survival is at stake.

Let me first revisit the argument about ethnic demographics. The statistical analysis in Chapter 2 revealed that in countries in which a large share of the population lives in ethnic regions, centralized decision-making power over education is likely to fuel ethnic protests, suggesting, not surprisingly, that regionally concentrated ethnic minority groups react to policies that infringe on their ability to make decisions over issues that matter for recognition of their distinctiveness, such as language and school curricula. Of the cases examined in this book, Québec, where about 80 percent of the population is Francophone, is the region whose demographics would most clearly speak in favor of cultural policy autonomy as a peace-preserving means. As Chapter 5 showed, although the Parti Québécois over time has aimed to capture the vote of also the province's growing immigrant population, the struggle long revolved around ethno-linguistic concerns. Although the sovereignty movement in Québec is still alive, both observers and activists agree that these key ethnic-linguistic concerns were largely met with Bill 101, which secured the status of French in the province (including in education) and has helped keep Québec within the federation. But even in Québec, where education formally is decentralized, a persistent thorn in the province's relationship to Ottawa has been the perception that the federal government is trying to bypass provincial policy autonomy over education via its spending power and federal programs. Indeed, the findings in this book suggest that to the degree that cultural policy autonomy can mitigate self-determination conflict, it needs to clearly delineate where responsibility lies.

The Québec case also demonstrates how changing ethnic demographics have conditioned the demands raised and, thus, the kind of policy autonomy central to addressing the demands. Although social policies have always been part of the sovereignty movement's agenda, its efforts at trying to also attract the province's growing immigrant population and speak in the name of the *Québécois*, as opposed to exclusively in the name of the Francophones, pushed social policies to the fore. Central to the accommodation of Québec within the federation today is autonomy over social policies and health care, which are concerns that speak to all *Québécois* and not only the Francophone population. Similarly, as shown in Chapter 4, in 1970s Punjab, where the Sikhs' majority status in the region was only about 60 percent and the Akali Dal was unlikely to govern unless it was willing to form a coalition with parties that drew on both Sikh and Hindu supporters, the Akalis, in their quest for greater autonomy, emphasized that their demands went beyond Punjab's Sikh population. Their demands were about things that mattered for the region's population at large: "real" federalism, an end to the center's control of river waters, and better procurement prices and subsidies for farmers.

Ethnic demographics have played a similar role elsewhere, shaping the degree to which cultural policy autonomy is central to stemming self-determination demands. In the United Kingdom, where the central government has tried to accommodate self-determination demands via devolution, the kind of autonomy at stake has gone beyond ethnic-related concerns. For example, in Wales, while Welsh was spoken by the majority of the population until the nineteenth century, today only about 20 percent of the population speaks the language (Keating 2004, 156–158), and survey evidence shows that more than half the population identifies as British rather than or as well as Welsh (Andersen 2001). In 1925, Plaid Cymru, the Welsh nationalist party, was founded as a response to a perceived loss of Welshness, but already in the interwar years, the nationalist campaigns went from focusing on land and language to evoking historical associations related to values such as pacifism and social justice (Gruffudd 1995). The region's large English-speaking population has been skeptical of self-government, and the campaign that culminated in Wales's 1997 referendum, in which a thin majority of 50.3 percent voted in favor of devolution, emphasized devolution's economic development benefits (Morgan 2006; McGarry 2010). Indeed, consistent with what I would expect in a region where members of the titular ethnic group do not form a majority, the nationalist movement in Wales has welcomed "Anglicized" members and emphasized social democratic values as a pragmatic approach to wanting to win elections (Rawkins 1979). That is not to say that cultural policy has not mattered in keeping Wales part of the union – indeed, Westminster has, successfully, taken several steps to address cultural grievances through devolution (Keating 2004) – but calls for self-determination go beyond "typical" ethnic-related concerns. Similar

dynamics characterize Scotland and also Catalonia in Spain, neither of which is an ethnically homogenous region – Scotland internally split among Scots, English, and Gaelic speakers, Protestants and Catholics, highlanders and low-landers, and Catalonia home to a large immigrant population – and where mobilization around self-determination demands has been driven by civic rather than ethnic nationalism (Keating 1997, 695–696). In the Scottish case, while cultural resentment has not been irrelevant to the movement, Hearn (2000, 4) notes, "the political activism of the movement is more centered on ideas about social justice and good government, whether through devolution or independence."

An example in which ethnic demographics have contributed to ethnic-related concerns playing a more central role comes from France. Like the United Kingdom, France is not a federal state but has tried to accommodate self-determination demands through autonomy arrangements. Since the 1960s, the island of Corsica has waged a nationalist struggle against the central government in Paris. The majority of the island's population identifies as Corsican (70 percent), although the knowledge and use of the Corsican language has drastically declined since the 1950s, to the degree that it is considered endangered.[1] This threat to Corsica's cultural distinctiveness has been central to the nationalist movement (Daftary 2008), which primarily is waging a campaign in the name of the island's Corsican majority population. In the mid-1970s, as a result of the French government not taking steps to address the nationalist grievances (and local political parties failing to direct these grievances through institutional channels), the struggle turned violent. Since then, the central government has tried to accommodate Corsican self-determination demands by delegating competencies related to culture and language, as well as planning, agriculture, and tourism, to a Corsican national assembly. By also supporting weekly instruction in Corsican language, hiring of Corsican-language teachers, and television in Corsican, the center has managed to take some of the steam out of the Corsican nationalist rhetoric. Moderate factions of the nationalist movement have distanced themselves from violence as a means and independence as a goal, although there are still radical factions in favor of both violence and independence (Hossay 2004). Yet even though, as I would expect based on ethnic demographics, cultural policy autonomy has gone a long way toward meeting Corsican self-determination demands, the French government's back-and-forth between concessions and repression has been a mixed success in terms of institutional accommodation (Daftary 2008), and the island has continued to be the scene of occasional violence.

In Chechnya, too, the nationalists' struggle in the early 1990s revolved around reasons quite explicitly linked to the region's titular ethnic group,

[1] See UNESCO's online atlas for endangered languages: http://www.unesco.org/culture/languages-atlas/index.php?hl=en&page=atlasmap (last accessed June 4, 2012).

which formed the majority of the population. In this case, however, the ability of cultural policy autonomy to meet self-determination demands has been mitigated by the basis for solidarity around which the group has mobilized. The basis for solidarity and mobilization is the second aspect of ethnicity that may shape cultural policy autonomy as a potentially peace-preserving means. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, in Chechnya, the basis for solidarity around which mobilization took place was not so much about protecting a common language and culture, as in Québec or Corsica, but rather about protecting the physical safety of the group. In such a setting, cultural policy autonomy is likely to be an insufficient "shield" against the center. Indeed, if an ethnic group is bound together based on fear of the central government, its concern may not be about institutions that allow policy autonomy over education, language, and religion. Rather, those may be covers for a larger, less easily satisfied demand: checking the center. It is reasonable to expect that if fear of the center is key to group solidarity and mobilization, the group may seek control over issues that help protect its physical security, including defense, which is a key state function that central governments are typically unwilling to decentralize. Similarly, if the center is seen as a threat to the physical security of an ethnic group, it is probably easier for leaders to rally the population around the most extreme type of autonomy demand, independence, which most central governments are unwilling to give in to.

Of the cases examined in this study, only in Chechnya has mobilization consistently revolved around fear of the center. While Chechnya traditionally has been a fragmented, clan-based society, a collective Chechen identity has developed much out of fear of the central government through violent and repressive encounters, such as the deportations under Stalin in 1944. In the early 1990s, the nationalist leaders used the image of 300 years of Chechen suffering to mobilize people, and the actions of the central government did little but boost this claim. Similarly, in Ethiopia, which was transformed into an ethnically based federation in the early 1990s, decentralization has helped stem separatist mobilization by granting ethnic minority groups cultural policy autonomy within their regions, but the center's continued military interventions have, in the case of the Somali region, for example, served to alienate people from the center and keep the self-determination movement and chance of renewed conflict alive (Aalen 2006; Hagmann and Khalif 2008). The same goes for the question of whether Israel's Palestinian-Arab citizens are likely to be able to coexist peacefully with the country's Jewish population. In contrast to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinians living in Israel have not necessarily wanted a separate Palestinian state. However, consistent with the argument made in this book, Waxman (2012, 27) suggests that if the "deterioration in Jewish-Palestinian relations is not reversed (…) (t)he Arab public will withdraw from Israeli politics (a majority of Arab voters will boycott Israeli elections), and there will be growing Arab demands for political autonomy, not just cultural autonomy."

Similar dynamics have featured in Iraq. The Kurds' long and bloody struggle for self-determination, including memories of the Iraqi army's infamous al-Anfal genocide campaign in the late 1980s (Makiya 1992), means that accommodating the Kurds within a federal Iraq has gone beyond protecting the group's culture.[2] It has been about physical protection from the center.[3] The 2005 constitution allowed the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to maintain its own internal security forces, the *peshmerga*, and the KRG insisted on the right to approve the deployment of Iraqi federal troops in the region (Stansfield and Anderson 2009; Gunter 2011). Although the final institutional makeup of a federal Iraq and the Kurds' willingness to be part of that federation are yet to be determined,[4] the Kurds are unlikely to accept anything less than a policy autonomy deal that gives them physical, not only cultural, protection from the center. It might seem counterintuitive that decentralizing a key state function like security would help preserve peace in Iraq, as well as its unity (Brancati 2004), but it is equally hard to imagine that the Kurds would stay put without such a shield against the center.

In contrast, most of the *Québécois* I met while doing research in Montréal in 2005 would go out of their way to clarify that the sovereignty struggle is not about any negative feelings toward Canada and Ottawa but rather about wanting to promote the *Québécois*. Although the identity of the Punjabi Sikhs, too, is about collective memories of struggles against central rulers – as this chapter's opening quote shows, some of them fostered by the violent struggle in the 1980s – such memories are only one pillar of Sikh identity. The two other pillars, religion and language, have been key to the Sikhs' struggle. Similarly, in Corsica, periods of violence have, for some, created more of a sense of solidarity focused on oppression (Hossay 2004), but the majority of the Corsican population supports greater autonomy and not independence (Daftary 2008, 276), which is consistent with what one would expect when the basis of solidarity focuses on threats to cultural rather than physical survival. As put by a former leader of the Corsican National Liberation Front in 2000: "An armed fight against the French state is a fantasy. We're not colonized or oppressed by France."[5]

Such differences in the ties that bind people have affected the kinds of demands around which people have mobilized in the three cases examined in this book and, thus, the kind of policy autonomy that can accommodate the demands. Indeed, only the Chechens have adopted a constitution that envisions

[2] On the development of Kurdish identity in Iraq, see Natali (2005).
[3] For example, see Saeed Kakey, "The Progress of the Peshmerga Forces and Their Role in Post-2003 Iraq," *Kurdish Aspect*, June 24, 2010, available at http://www.kurdishaspect.com/doc062410SK2.html (last accessed August 22, 2012).
[4] For an interesting counterfactual scenario of the "Republic of Kurdistan" in 2036, see Stansfield (2013).
[5] Marlise Simons, "Corsican Rebels Whose Eyes Have Turned to Peace," *New York Times*, October 8, 2000.

a separate military. While both the nationalist leaders in Chechnya and the sovereigntist *Québécois* have called for their region to become an independent state, the Parti Québécois's quest has very explicitly been about independence paired with some sort of association or partnership with Canada, and the majority of the province's population has not supported outright independence. Although the 1995 referendum was a close call, for most *Québécois,* it may seem, independence has been a cure too extreme for the province's "ills." It may have been easier for Chechen leaders to argue that independence is an appropriate solution, making accommodation within the federation much harder.

In the United Kingdom, the Scottish National Party (SNP) won a landslide victory in the Scottish parliamentary elections in 2011, bringing new life into the debate about Scottish independence. In a high-turnout referendum in September 2014, almost 45 percent of the population in Scotland voted for independence, with polls in the preceding weeks showing a close race.[6] To boost the no-side (the "better together" campaign), in the final days before the referendum, the central government offered more devolved powers to the Scottish parliament, sparking a postreferendum debate about further devolution, even federalism, in the United Kingdom. Given that the struggle has not revolved around a group's physical survival or been based on the English "other" as a threat,[7] to many in Scotland, full-fledged independence might be a step too drastic (although, as I turn to later, economic considerations may go in a different direction). Indeed, as in Québec, to many in Scotland, the meaning of independence has been some sort of status short of traditional statehood in the shape of a social union with England, sometimes labeled "devolution plus" or "devolution max" (Keating 2004, 175).[8] In Northern Ireland, in contrast, "the Troubles" have shaped the basis for solidarity and mobilization, often (although not exclusively) revolving around memories and symbols of violence, domination, resistance, besiegement, and fear of the ethnic or nationalist/unionist "other" (e.g., Ross 2001; Shirlow 2001; Barton and McCully 2005). Thus, key to resolving the long-time conflict have been issues related to security and human rights, and in this respect, for the Catholic community in Northern Ireland, the case for separation from the UK has been stronger than for the Scottish population in Scotland.

The Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which gave birth to the Northern Ireland Assembly, has been relatively successful at promoting peace – to the degree that the queen in June 2012 visited the region and shook hands with

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[6] Joshua Tucker, "In Scotland, the Polls Got It Wrong. Or Did They?" The Monkey Cage, *Washington Post,* September 19, 2014.

[7] For the Scottish government's framing of the case for independence on the Scotland Referendum website, directed to the public, see https://www.scotreferendum.com/topic/the-case-for-independence/ (last accessed November 3, 2014).

[8] Scott MacNab, "Scottish Independence: Most Scots Back 'Devo Max,'" *The Scotsman*, February 14, 2014.

former Irish Republic Army (IRA) leader Martin McGuinness – but both the process leading up to the agreement and the years afterward reveal dynamics that rest with a basis for solidarity or mobilization that goes beyond cultural protection.[9] In the negotiations leading up to the agreement, the parties could not agree on the highly contentious issue of policing, with the Catholic/nationalist community rightly considering the Royal Ulster Constabulary to be a symbol of a sectarian state, partial to the Protestants/unionists.[10] The agreement did establish an Independent Commission on Policing (Perry 2011), but not until 2006 did the local parties, along with the British and Irish governments, reach an agreement about the devolution of policing and justice, which were devolved to Northern Ireland in 2010. The 1998 agreement allows the Northern Ireland Assembly to seek jurisdiction over any matters reserved for Westminster, and it stipulates that Northern Ireland can secede from the United Kingdom to join Ireland if the people in Northern Ireland and Ireland agree to such an option – options Scotland and Wales do not, on paper, have. Also in contrast to Wales and Scotland, devolution in Northern Ireland is anchored in an international treaty between the United Kingdom and Ireland; Northern Ireland is linked to Ireland via political institutions (such as the North/South Ministerial Council), and Westminster cannot unilaterally alter the relationship between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. These interstate features makes for more of a federal, even confederal arrangement than simply devolution (O'Leary 1999). Indeed, McGarry (2010, 157) notes on the difference between Northern Ireland on one hand and Scotland and Wales on the other that "states may have some success of extending devolution to minorities that are not seriously or violently alienated from the state. However, if they want to end militant secessionism, or reintegrate territories which have de facto seceded, and are unable to prevail militarily, they may, as in Northern Ireland, have to concede a 'federacy.'" This is consistent with the hypothesis that the basis for solidarity in a region will mitigate what kind of policy autonomy can help promote peace. Even though the Catholic community, associated with the nationalist side, is only about 40 percent of the population, this community's long-time mobilization in opposition to a state perceived as sectarian, discriminative, and repressive has shaped how and what kind of devolution can serve as peace preserving in Northern Ireland.

A comparison between the Catalan and Basque self-determination movements in Spain reveals similar dynamics. More so than Catalan nationalist mobilization, Basque nationalist mobilization has evoked the image of a country occupied by a foreign power. When the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the main proponent of violence and independence, emerged, it framed its role

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[9] On the nature of the peace in Northern Ireland, see Colum McCann, "Northern Ireland's Peace Is Delicately Poised – It Needs to Look Forward," *The Guardian*, May 16, 2014.

[10] I recognize that the nationalist/unionist cleavage is about more than religion, but the Catholic/Protestant dimension is part of it and central to discussion about policing.

as one similar to that of organizations fighting oppression in Cuba, Algeria, or Angola (Edles 1999; Guibernau 2000). The deal that the government in Madrid struck with the moderate Basque nationalists in 1979, after they had refrained from voting in the referendum on the 1978 constitution, granted the region significant autonomy, including the creation of a separate Basque police force. The region's high level of autonomy has helped keep it within the federal fold, although the quest for self-determination has not disappeared. While Catalan nationalism, too, has encompassed memories and symbols of repression and past struggles against the state, the emphasis has been on protecting and, importantly, promoting the ethnic group's cultural survival and democratic values. Indeed, Edles (1999) sees Basque nationalism as more defensive than Catalan nationalism, emphasizing that Basque nationalism has revolved around separateness from Spain. In the 1980s, violence-begets-violence dynamics fueled ETA's claim that the Spanish state continues to be oppressive (Woodworth 2001). Even though cultural survival has been important to both Catalan and Basque nationalism – and cultural policy autonomy, as a result, has been an important step toward accommodation within a federal state – the basis of solidarity in Basque mobilization means that there is more emphasis on separation. This difference can, at least in part, explain why cultural policy autonomy seemingly has done more to appease the nationalist movement in Catalonia than in the Basque Country, which since the 1960s has been the scene of terrorist violence and broken ceasefires – although at the time of writing, ETA's 2010 ceasefire remains intact.[11] As I turn to in what follows, though, understanding separatist dynamics in these regions also requires attention to fiscal federalism.

Another group that has laid down its weapons in return for the promise of greater autonomy is the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia, which from 1976 to 2005 called for independence. In this case, too, the basis for solidarity has shaped the kind of policy autonomy that can preserve peace. Predominantly Muslim, the population in Aceh had raised demands for self-determination since the 1950s, at first based primarily on cultural grounds. They wanted an Islamic rather than a secular state. Until the 1970s, these demands were largely met through an agreement with Jakarta, which granted Aceh special autonomy over religious, educational, and customary law (albeit within central guidelines). The struggle resurfaced in the 1970s in response to the Indonesian state's centralizing and authoritarian steps under General Suharto – steps that limited the region's autonomy over religious affairs and, in addition, failed to bring about economic progress. It was in this context that GAM first emerged. It initially cast the struggle as an anticolonial one, but there was relatively little support for independence in the region. This changed with the Indonesian state's

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[11] Giles Tremlett, "Basque Separatist Group Eta Gives Up Token Part of Arsenal," *The Guardian*, February 21, 2014.

repressive strategies, which "succeeded" in suppressing the rebellion through-
out the late 1980s and early 1990s but over time boosted support for GAM.

That is, while the self-determination movement that emerged in the 1950s
did not envision separation from Indonesia, years of brutal repression over
time helped form a shift in the basis for solidarity and mobilization, revolv-
ing around the security forces' physical threat to the Acehnese population.
This image of the center as a threat cast independence as an attractive option
to many, making accommodation within the state harder than when the
self-determination demands first emerged (Aspinall 2006). For example, the
2001 law on "Special Autonomy for the Special Region of Aceh as Nanggroe
Aceh Darussalam" transferred significant autonomy to the region but largely
failed to stem the separatist quest. The law allowed for the legal system in
Aceh to be based on Shariah, and while many welcomed this, people criticized
the local leadership for "failing to apply the law to respond to the dominant
Acehnese demand for justice for human rights abuses" (Miller 2006, 306).
Indeed, the population's hope that the introduction of Shariah courts, in March
2003, would help restore justice for human rights abuses was jeopardized by
the fact that excesses committed by the security forces continued to belong
under the jurisdiction of national courts (ibid., 307). Consistent with my
expectations, this suggests that as solidarity comes to revolve around fear of
the center, policy autonomy over "mere" cultural affairs may not be sufficient
for stemming self-determination demands. While the 2005 agreement, which
emerged in the aftermath of the devastating 2004 tsunami, so far has managed
to keep the peace in Aceh, there are lingering concerns about the presence of
central security forces in the region.

Thus, both the cases examined in this book and evidence from
self-determination struggles elsewhere support the argument that cultural pol-
icy decentralization's peace-preserving potential depends on the concentration
of the ethnic population in a region and the reference points that form the basis
of group solidary and mobilization. Where the quest for self-determination is
in the name of an ethnic group or a region in which that ethnic group domi-
nates, institutional accommodation is likely to be about meeting demands spe-
cific to the ethnic group. Cultural policy autonomy may, in such settings, be a
peace-preserving means – if the distribution of power is respected by the center.
Where mobilization takes place around issues that are about protecting an
ethnic group's physical safety, as opposed to protecting its culture, accommo-
dation is likely to be about meeting demands beyond "typical" issues central
to the minority group's recognition. In such settings, cultural policy autonomy
may be a step in the right direction, but not sufficient. Important here, cer-
tainly for policy makers considering decentralization as a means to help *restore*
peace in conflict-ridden societies, is that violent conflict itself may shape the
very basis for solidarity and mobilization that makes certain institutions viable
peace-preserving measures (cf. Cederman et al. 2015). The text accompany-
ing the picture of the destroyed Akal Takht in the Sikh museum at the Golden

Temple, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, suggests that Operation Bluestar, Indira Gandhi's assassination (the "vengeance" referred to in the text) and ensuing Delhi riots, and the counterinsurgency in Punjab created, at least for some, a new justification for fighting the center. In Chechnya, the two campaigns waged by the Russian troops have done little but reinforce the image of the central government as a threat to the survival of the Chechen people. To the degree that the state's practices foster mobilization around an image of a threatening center, it may, inadvertently, help create a struggle whose resolution takes more than cultural policy autonomy, as in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan.

So what about Afghanistan, where the 2004 constitution sets out a centralized state, and Libya, which under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was centralized but where debates about a new constitution are just beginning? In both cases, the wars preceding current state-building efforts have not primarily been fought over demands for self-determination but over central government control. In Libya in 2011, the Arab Spring brought along an armed revolution against Gaddafi's long-time repressive regime. In Afghanistan, different groups have fought over central government control since the 1970s. Most recently, the United States–led multinational invasion in 2001, which removed the Taliban regime, has been followed by continued struggles against the internationally backed regime, as the Taliban has sought to regain control over the country. In both Libya and Afghanistan, though, there is a strong regional dimension to politics, which is why decentralization has featured in debates about postwar (or, more accurately in the Afghan case, wartime) state building. In Libya, there are strong regional (and tribal) identities, which have led to tensions both prior to and after the fall of Gaddafi, mainly between the eastern region, historically known as Cyrenaica, and the western region, historically known as Tripolitania (Anderson 1986; Paoletti 2011; Salem and Kadlec 2012). Similarly, Afghanistan has long been the scene of struggles between different regional "strongmen" and ethnic groups seeking power or control over certain areas.[12]

In post-Gaddafi Libya, the Berber/Amazigh population, predominantly living in the mountainous areas in the northwest but also in southern Libya (although accurate demographic statistics are nonexistent),[13] has raised hopes that the new state will allow them to express their culture and language, banned under Gaddafi's rule.[14] It is not clear that the Berber population's quest for cultural protection is about autonomy in a certain region; the demands rather

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[12] For an overview of such struggles in the post-Cold War era, see the list of nonstate violence under the Afghanistan entry in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, available at www.ucdp.uu.se/database (last accessed May 20, 2014).

[13] "Libya Overview," *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People*, available at http://www.minorityrights.org/4171/libya/libya-overview.html (last accessed August 24, 2012). See also information from the Libyan tour operator Temehu, available at http://www.temehu.com/Libyan-People.htm#Berbers (last accessed August 24, 2012).

[14] Alice Fordham, "An Exuberant Awakening for Libya's Berbers," *Washington Post*, November 15, 2011; Edwin Lane, "After Gaddafi, Libya's Amazigh Demand Recognition," *BBC News*,

emphasize official recognition of the language and people in a new constitu-
tion, in which case the most appropriate institutional response might not be
decentralization. Indeed, as far as cultural policy autonomy goes, to the degree
that the Berber population lives in different parts of Libya, recognition of their
culture and language might be best served by centralized policies that recog-
nize the rights of the country's many minority groups. The autonomy demands
coming from groups in the east do not emphasize cultural protection. Rather,
due to the perceived favoritism of the western region during Gaddafi's regime,
the so-called Barqa conference in March 2012 envisioned something akin to
the federal structure the country had between 1951 and 1963. Specifically, the
conference focused on autonomy for the historical Cyrenaica region as a gen-
eral protection against dominance and exploitation by Tripoli, calling for the
establishment of a regional parliament and policy autonomy over police and
courts.[15] Given that also the center is in the making in Libya today, it is diffi-
cult to predict how these demands will play out. If eastern groups' image and
experience of the central government in Tripoli remains one of exploitation
and dominance, they are likely to push for further autonomy.[16]

Even though Afghanistan, both prior to and after the fall of the Taliban,
has been characterized by struggles over territorial control between different
armed groups – based on ethnic, territorial, and political affiliations – there
have been no outright secessionist struggles. Some of Afghanistan's territorially
concentrated minority groups, such as Uzbeks and Hazaras, have in the past
made a case for institutionalizing the de facto territorial power they have held,
but in the process leading up to the 2004 constitution, their main demand,
as far as decentralization goes, was that regional governors be elected rather
than appointed, as a means to avoid the center imposing on them governors
of the long-dominant Pashtun ethnic group (Rubin 2004, 16; Adeney 2008,
542–543). This demand was rejected. In fact, Thier (2006/2007, 576) notes,
"Even advocates of federalism tended to argue that the state needed to be con-
solidated, foreign interference brought to an end, and fiscal control established
before decentralization could be realized" (cf. Rubin 2004, 18). Fueling the
worry about policy decentralization was that even if decentralization was done
in the name of granting minority groups influence over issues that matter for
their recognition, it would simply serve the purpose of empowering warlords
with more personal and predatory power motives (Wimmer and Schetter 2003,

December 23, 2011; Al Pessin, "Libya's Minority Berbers Renew Equality Demands," *Voice of America*, August 15, 2012.

[15] Wolfram Lacher, "Is Autonomy for Northeastern Libya Realistic?" *Sada: Analysis on Arab Reform*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 21, 2012, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/21/is-autonomy-for-northeastern-libya-realistic/chk0 (last accessed August 24, 2012).

[16] "Federalism in Libya: The Never-Ending Debate," *Al Jazeera*, May 9, 2014, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/federalism-east-libya-debate-201442493215796441.html (last accessed May 13, 2014).

536). If we accept that a decentralized structure of governance might be unsuitable for the short term, as long as there is ongoing violence (more in what follows), what about policy decentralization for the long term, in particular as it relates to cultural policy autonomy as a peace-preserving means?

Given what we know about Afghanistan's ethnic demographics (and there is quite a bit of uncertainty) and assuming that the starting point is the current provinces rather than a redrawing of provincial boundaries, cultural policy decentralization would not be the recipe for meeting demands for recognition for all minority groups. While the Uzbeks and Hazaras are, to some extent, territorially concentrated, several minority groups are dispersed across provinces (Wimmer and Schetter 2003; Adeney 2008). For dispersed groups, ethnic demographics would speak in favor of central protection of cultural rights, which is something the 2004 constitution does. Akin to Iraq's 2005 constitution, Afghanistan's constitution recognizes the multiethnic character of the country and, importantly (and at the time of negotiations, quite controversially), allows for education in minority languages in areas where these are spoken by a majority of the population. Article 16 states:

> From amongst Pashto, Dari, Uzbeki, Turkmani, Baluchi, Pachaie, Nuristani, Pamiri and other current languages in the country, Pashto and Dari shall be the official languages of the state. In areas where the majority of the people speak in any one of Uzbeki, Turkmani, Pachaie, Nuristani, Baluchi or Pamiri languages, any of the aforementioned language, in addition to Pashto and Dari, shall be the third official language, the usage of which shall be regulated by law. The state shall design and apply effective programs to foster and develop all languages of Afghanistan. Usage of all current languages in the country shall be free in press publications and mass media. Academic and national administrative terminology and usage in the country shall be preserved.[17]

To the degree that groups making self-determination demands are motivated by a wish to protect their cultural, as opposed to physical, survival and Article 16 is implemented, it should serve a peace-preserving role. If groups are territorially concentrated and are mobilizing around fear of central repression, as has been the case of the Hazaras (even though they, too, are dispersed across more than one province), they might want more than cultural protection to feel secure, but that will depend on whether the "national unity" government formed in the fall of 2014 indeed manages to function as a unity government.[18]

Discussions about decentralization and federalism in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya have brought to the fore the question of how to (re)draw regional boundaries. In Iraq, the constitution allows for any one of the existing eighteen provinces or groups of provinces to request that they be recognized as a

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[17] A copy of the 2004 constitution is available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_2004.pdf?lang=en (last accessed December 1, 2014).
[18] Sean Mann, "Are Ethnic Politics Afghanistan's Great Hope?" *Foreign Policy*, November 11, 2014.

federal region and, thus, have the rights of a region as stipulated in the constitution. The territorial units that remain provinces will, per the constitution, have "administrative and financial authorities to enable them to manage their affairs in accordance with the principle of decentralized administration, and this shall be regulated by law."[19] Only the region of Kurdistan, which consists of three provinces, is mentioned in the constitution, and it is still the only federal region. A continued thorn in the relationship between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad is the status of Kirkuk, a neighboring multiethnic city and province. While Kirkuk is home to several ethnic groups, the Kurds consider it to be part of the territory that historically has been Kurdish but a victim of "Arabization." Baghdad, for its part, is reluctant to let Kirkuk join Kurdistan, as it contains as much as 20 percent of the country's oil reserves (Stansfield and Anderson 2009, 137–140). Afghanistan is divided into thirty-four provinces, none of which have much formal policy (or fiscal or political) autonomy, but discussions prior to the drafting of the 2004 constitution brought up the question of how, in a potentially federal Afghanistan, boundaries should be drawn (e.g., Radnitz 2004). And in Libya, the nascent discussions about decentralization versus centralization have referred to whether they should return to the internal boundaries existing between 1951 and 1963 or any other point in the country's history.

Key to the question of (re)drawing regional boundaries in each of these countries is whether to do so along ethnic lines, echoing the longer-standing debate on ethno-federalism referred to in Chapter 1. One suggestion for Iraq is to create three regions roughly along the dividing lines of the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish populations (e.g., Brancati 2004), if the population in the potential regions so wishes. If ethnic groups are already territorially concentrated, decentralization along ethnic lines makes sense, keeping in mind that not all ethnic groups will have similar demands and preferences for autonomy. While critics might argue that a more "integrationist" approach would be to divide territorially concentrated ethnic groups across different regions, as such preventing an institutionalization of ethnic boundaries (cf. Roeder 2005, 2007), it is hard to imagine how such a solution would be acceptable as a means to restore peace in societies where territorially concentrated groups have mobilized in pursuit of self-determination (McGarry and O'Leary 2007), especially if the basis for solidary or mobilization focuses on a threatening center. If, in contrast, ethnic groups are territorially dispersed, trying to create ethnically bounded subunits is probably not a good idea, as the process of creating new boundaries might encourage involuntary population transfers and ethnic cleansing. While this book suggests that decentralizing decision-making power or cultural policy might, under certain circumstances, help contain self-determination struggles, it has also emphasized that in other circumstances, as when ethnic groups are

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[19] A copy of the 2005 constitution is available at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en (last accessed December 1, 2014).

territorially dispersed, centralization of cultural policy might be a better means to protect the rights of minority groups. That is, the book is *not* advocating population transfers to create ethnically homogenous regions. Nor does the book advocate that in postwar states where internal boundaries along ethnic lines might be appropriate, there should not be measures aimed at intergroup contact, exchange, and reconciliation (Trew 1986; Maoz 2000; Kaufman 2001, 215–218; Hewstone et al. 2006; Kelman 2008; Garson 2015). Indeed, while decentralized governance, including federalism and regional autonomy arrangements, is an institution that may allow ethnic groups to express their own identity, the integrity of the state will be best protected if minorities *also* identify with the state (cf. Ahuja and Varshney 2005), as well as respect and understand each other's differences.

Fiscal Autonomy and Wealth

The second institution at the center of this book is the intergovernmental fiscal system. While policy autonomy over certain issues – be those cultural or not – has the potential to meet self-determination demands through shared rule, such autonomy means little or nothing in the absence of money to spend on decentralized tasks. Either money can come from the center through transfers, or a region can have fiscal autonomy. The effects of regions having fiscal autonomy are likely to vary depending on any given region's wealth. If a region is resource poor and poorly developed, reliance on its own source revenues to cover expenditures will probably harm its ability to implement policies, fueling grievances related to poor public goods provision and a sense that it is not receiving its fair share from the central government. Thus, absent high transfers that mitigate poverty, the region's population may assess that it will be better off on its own. In contrast, resource-rich and highly developed regions can afford to fund public goods provision from their own revenues. Rich regions are, therefore, likely to prefer fiscal autonomy, which enables policy autonomy. In this case, absent high fiscal autonomy, the region may decide that it will be better off as an independent state.

In all three cases examined in this book, central versus regional governments' control of resources has been central to the self-determination struggles. In Punjab and Québec, the debate has explicitly focused on and used the language of fiscal federalism, whereas in the Chechen case, the grievance has rested with a more widely defined concern about (re)distribution.

In Punjab, fiscal decentralization played an important role in the struggle for greater autonomy in the 1970s. The region was one of India's wealthiest states, and it had significant fiscal autonomy in the sense that a large share of public expenditures came from own-source revenues. As such, the autonomy-seeking party, the Akali Dal, did not pursue independence. Well-off and able to fund public goods from own-source revenues, there were reasons to stay put. However, as the region's fiscal autonomy decreased and the central government increasingly used grants with conditions attached to bypass

the region's policy autonomy, the Akalis called for more decision-making power over taxation and spending. As Chapter 4 showed, their argument was that if the region had more taxation powers, it could more independently manage its economy. The Akalis also reacted to central policies beyond the fiscal system that, they argued, adversely affected their wealth. This echoes what we see in other federations, for example in Ethiopia, where there are concerns that distribution of resources happens through off-budget transfers, business deals, and infrastructure allocation that benefit some regions more than others (Kefale 2009, 93). In the case of Punjab, despite the regional government being able to fund public goods provision from its own pockets, people reacted to how the center infringed on the region's ability to make decisions with respect to taxation and spending and also used other channels to deprive the region of its wealth. This is consistent with what I would expect in a wealthy region.

Similarly, when federalism was introduced with Spain's 1978 constitution, Catalonia, which was granted limited fiscal autonomy, wanted more. One of the wealthier regions of Spain, Catalonia had the capacity to fund public goods from its own pockets, but there was a concern in the region about the gap between its capacity to spend and capacity to collect revenues. Both in the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, steps were taken to meet such concerns through an increase in fiscal autonomy (Beramendi 2012, 197–202; Colomer 1998), which, along with the cultural policy autonomy the region enjoys, has helped ensure that the nationalist movement has been appeased within the federation, not challenging Spanish unity (Guibernau 2000). By 2012, however, with the growing economic crisis in Spain, Catalans were increasingly fed up with funding less affluent regions within the federation, pushing for further fiscal autonomy.[20] Indeed, by 2014, these concerns even led the Catalan president to call for a referendum on independence. He emphasized, however, that "'We will never give up on the option of reaching an agreement with Madrid. But at the moment such an agreement is very unlikely.'"[21] As in the case of Punjab, these are dynamics that are consistent with what one would expect to see in a relatively wealthy region.

The Basque case is more of a challenge for my argument. Also a wealthy region within Spain, the Basque government can raise and spend taxes. It collects income, corporate, and value-added tax (contributing a set share to the

[20] Montserrat Guibernau, "The Rise of Secessionism in Catalonia Has Emerged Out of the Will to Decide the Region's Political Destiny as a Nation," LSE Blog, May 29, 2012, available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/05/29/catalonia-secession (last accessed June 28, 2012).

[21] Quoted in Tobias Buck, "Catalonia to Forge Ahead with Referendum on Independence," *The Financial Times*, April 23, 2014. For his take after the request for a referendum was turned down by Madrid, see Artur Mas, "Scotland Is Getting Its Referendum – Next Up Catalonia," *The Guardian*, April 30, 2014. The Catalans went ahead and scheduled an unofficial referendum in November 2014, in which more than two million people voted (out of an estimated 5.4 million voters), the majority in favor of independence. See "Catalonia Vote: 80% Back Independence – Officials," *BBC News*, November 10, 2014.

central government), which has given it autonomy to spend according to its own priorities. Thus, as far as fiscal decentralization goes, I would expect the institutional arrangements in place to have a peace-preserving effect. Yet the region has, in contrast to Catalonia, been the scene of an on-and-off violent self-determination struggle. Important here, though, is the distinction between the motivation of the violent organization demanding independence, the ETA, and the largest nationalist party, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), as well as a consideration of the share of the population supporting violence and independence. Indeed, the long-dominant PNV has used the region's fiscal autonomy to boost the Basque economy and strengthen its own position, and the region's significant fiscal autonomy appears to have diminished the voices in the party calling for independence (Nordberg 2005). The ETA's agenda is independence, but even though popular support for ETA (and the radical nationalist parties that have served as its political arm) has not been insignificant, it has nonetheless been modest. Thus, the autonomy granted to the Basque Country has, in many ways, succeeded in containing the self-determination struggle (Beramendi and Máis 2004; Lecours 2008), contributing to diminishing – although not eradicating – support both for independence and violence.

Chapter 5 showed that in Québec, too, fiscal decentralization has been central to the sovereignty debate. In contrast to Punjab, Catalonia, and the Basque Country, Québec is not a wealthy province in the federation. It is not among the poorest provinces in Canada, either, but it fares slightly worse than the average. As Chapter 5 showed, several studies have pointed out that Québec has benefited from central transfers aimed at equalization across the Canadian provinces. As a result, and as expected, the sovereigntists' concern about the federal fiscal system has not been that transfers are insufficient. Indeed, people's worries about what would happen to Québec's economy were the province to become independent have functioned as a brake on the support for sovereignty. Similarly, in France, while the Corsicans' quest for self-determination has been fueled by the island's economic plight and marginalization, in a July 2003 referendum, half the population (51 percent) rejected an option of greater autonomy, including more control over taxes. Although there are several reasons why many Corsicans voted no, the rejection suggests that there are worries about the island's ability to sustain itself, economically, without strong French involvement.[22] In Québec, the terms of the debate about the fiscal system changed in the 1990s, as central transfers were decreasing while the costs for the provinces' expenditure responsibilities increased. Among the sovereigntists in Québec, this kind of "fiscal imbalance" became a new reason *for* sovereignty. Their argument is that the fiscal imbalance makes it less beneficial for Québec to be part of the federation. This argument has been fueled by a growing perception that in a globalized world, with easy access to markets outside Canada, Québec no longer needs the federation.

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[22] "Corsicans Reject Autonomy Offer," *BBC News*, July 6, 2003.

In the United Kingdom, the case of Scotland reveals similar dynamics. After World War I, the Scottish economy, in dire shape, was dependent on UK markets and financial support. Indeed, Scotland, like Wales and Northern Ireland, is a region that has benefited from the central government's redistribution, more so than most other regions in the union (Hechter 1971; Bell and Christie 2001; Burchardt and Holder 2009). Yet over time, the economic argument, much like in Québec, has lost some of its appeal, as there is a growing sense that Scotland can make it in a world of multinational finance and, importantly, access to EU markets. Indeed, increasingly, there has been a sense that the union is working to deprive the Scottish people of their well-earned (oil) riches (Keating 2004), and since the 1970s, the SNP has pushed the economic case for independence.[23] Whether Scotland would be better off economically as an independent country remains, as in Québec, a hotly debated question,[24] but also proponents of "devolution plus" call for the Scottish parliament to be in charge of most welfare spending, and, as a result, control the income and corporation tax, as well as a geographical share of oil revenues.[25] These questions were central to the September 2014 referendum on Scottish independence, which kept the union intact but saw almost 45 percent of the population voting in favor of independence. The economic insecurity associated with independence and Westminster's last-minute promise of what has come to be referred to as "devo max," including the promise of devolved powers over taxation and welfare, proved critical in the outcome of the referendum.[26]

In Scotland and elsewhere, the presence of oil makes for a somewhat ambiguous assessment of a region's wealth. Indeed, even though Scotland,

[23] Andrew Black, "Scottish National Party Profile," *BBC*, January 11, 2012, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-13315752 (last accessed June 28, 2012). For the Scottish Government's take on the economic aspect of independence ahead of the September 2014 referendum, directed to the public, see http://www.scotreferendum.com/topic/the-economy (last accessed May 20, 2014). On the yes-campaign's website, key to the portrayal of "the reality" are the economic opportunities that independence would bring Scotland. See http://www.yesscotland.net/#theReasons (last accessed November 3, 2014).

[24] "The Economics of Home Rule: The Scottish Play," *The Economist*, April 14, 2012. In fall 2013, the politically independent Institute for Fiscal Studies in the UK issued a report stating, "the imbalance in Scotland's public finances projected for 2017–18, along with projected demographic changes over the next 50 years, would require significant fiscal action by an independent Scottish government to ensure sustainability" (Amior et al. 2013, 24).

[25] "Scottish Independence: Devo Plus Gains Support from Three MSPs," *BBC*, February 28, 2012; Severin Carrell, "Scottish Devolution: What Questions Will Future Referendum Ask Voters?" *The Guardian*, November 23, 2011.

[26] "Scottish Independence: Cameron, Miliband and Clegg sign 'No' Vote Pledge," *BBC News*, September 16, 2014; "Scotland Decided: Experts React to No Vote," *The Conversation*, September 19, 2014, available at http://theconversation.com/scotland-decided-experts -react-to-no-vote-31908 (last accessed November 3, 2014); Arthur Midwinter, "Devo Max in Scotland Would Be Disastrous for Northern Ireland and Wales," *The Conversation*, October 22, 2014, available at http://theconversation.com/devo-max-in-scotland-would-be-disastrous-for -northern-ireland-and-wales-33276 (last accessed November 3, 2014); Murie Dickie, "Parties Agree 'Substantial' Scottish Devolution Package," *The Financial Times*, October 22, 2014.

like Northern Ireland and Wales, is a beneficiary of fiscal transfers, there has been more confidence in Scotland about the gains that could be made from fiscal autonomy and independence given the region's potential for wealth.[27] In contrast, in Northern Ireland, where there are no hopes pinned on oil riches, the original draft of the 1998 Northern Ireland Act included provisions for revenue-raising power to the Northern Ireland Assembly, but the local parties asked that these be removed (McGarry 2010, 156). In early 2012, one of Sinn Fein's representatives argued that fiscal autonomy would put the region's politicians in a stronger position to tackle the economic crisis, but the region's finance minister, of the Democratic Unionist Party, argued that fiscal autonomy would put Northern Ireland in a much worse position than it currently is, as own-source revenues would not be able to make up for the reduction in transfers from Westminster.[28]

Chapter 3 showed that while Chechnya clearly is and has been among the very poorest regions in the USSR and Russia, in need of transfers from the central government, the separatists made the case that there was the potential for wealth given the region's oil resources. Indeed, even though the Chechen separatists' arguments for independence has not referred to the federal fiscal system as explicitly as in Punjab and Québec, one of the key issues driving this conflict was about similar concerns: the redistribution of wealth. In the Soviet era, Chechnya was considered a net recipient of federal transfers, and opponents to Chechen independence argued, for that very reason, that Chechnya could not be independent. However, there is also some evidence to suggest that in economic terms, Chechnya was, as the region's separatist leadership in the early 1990s claimed, not benefiting much. Since Moscow was not seen as mitigating but rather considered to contribute to the region's poverty, the separatists called for independence. Their grievance with the fiscal system – and case for independence – was aggravated by the (perhaps unjustified) perception that if it were to become independent, Chechnya could become a "second Kuwait," living off its oil wealth. Similarly, the long and on-and-off violent separatist struggle fought by the Balochistan region in southwestern Pakistan is driven by a quest for greater autonomy over the region's natural resources. Despite being the home to significant natural resources and potential oil reserves, the region

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[27] "Scottish Independence: Oil Fund 'Could be Worth £30bn,' " *BBC News,* February 15, 2012. In 2011–2012, oil income made up 18.6 percent of Scottish revenues, much above the UK average of 2 percent, although the Institute for Fiscal Studies warns that "This highlights the extent to which Scotland's public finances are more exposed than the UK's public finances to revenues from the North Sea, which are volatile and expected to decline in the long run" (Amior et al. 2013, 1).

[28] See the finance minister's statement on February 9, 2012, at http://www.northernireland.gov.uk /news-dfp-080212-devolution-of-fiscal?WT.mc_id=rss-news (last accessed May 31, 2012). See also Gerry Adams's May 2012 speech to the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis in Killarney, Ireland, making a case for more fiscal autonomy at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/sf/ga260512.htm (last accessed May 31, 2012).

has the highest poverty rates Pakistan, which, like in Chechnya, fuels resentment against a central government seen as not contributing to the development of the region's economy (Khan 2009).

Also in Aceh, Indonesia, did oil play a role in assessments of the region's wealth and demands for self-determination. In contrast to Chechnya and Balochistan, Aceh has been among the wealthier regions in Indonesia when looking at GDP per capita, although poverty rates have been disproportionally high. The grievances that fueled the self-determination struggle that resurfaced under General Suharto's centralized and authoritarian rule were related to lack of cultural policy autonomy but also to the lack of economic progress. The discovery of oil in 1971, which was a promise of wealth, created resentment within the region, as the wealth was funneled to the central government, contributing to the case for independence (World Bank 2006).

In Aceh, the 2001 law on "Special Autonomy for the Special Region of Aceh as Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam" sought to address also grievances related to a lack of fiscal autonomy by granting the government in Banda Aceh more control over the region's oil wealth. However, and contrary to what one would expect, instead of emerging as one of Indonesia's wealthiest regions, Aceh emerged as one of the most corrupt regions. Networks of illegal businesses that had grown out of the war economy meant that provisions for greater fiscal autonomy did not necessarily translate into greater benefits for the population (Miller 2006, 305, 307–308).[29] Although the focus in this study has been how the effects of fiscal decentralization are likely to be conditional on regional wealth, Aceh, like the Chechen case, suggests that the "success" of fiscal decentralization also requires a consideration of local institutional capacity.

Local institutional capacity is particularly important when considering how fiscal autonomy can help preserve or restore peace in regions that have long been plagued by violent conflict. Wars sometimes lead to the establishment of successful civilian governance by armed groups (e.g., Mampilly 2011), but armed struggles may also eradicate local institutional capacity and foster more illicit war economies that complicate war-to-peace transitions (Rubin 2000; Andreas 2004; Goodhand 2005). For example, Afghanistan on paper

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[29] Thus the efforts of the early 2000s failed to bring peace via decentralization. In 2005, GAM gave up its long-time struggle for independence. Contributing to the resolution of this struggle were somewhat idiosyncratic factors related to the devastation caused by the tragic 2004 tsunami. In 2005, the GAM accepted a deal that granted the province autonomy. The peace agreement, adopted as law in 2006, allowed Aceh to retain 70 percent of income from the oil revenues, although it fell short of giving the regional government full control over the management authority over oil and gas (to be shared with the center). Given the massive destruction in the region after the tsunami, Aceh has also seen an influx of foreign aid and transfers from Jakarta. Aceh's oil and gas resources are estimated to dry up in the not-too-distant future, but the 2006 law ensures the region's economy via a special autonomy fund from the center, managed by the regional government (World Bank 2006).

today is fiscally centralized, but provincial governors nonetheless exercise a certain degree of de facto autonomy through their access to off-budget and illicit sources of revenue, which makes for a system that is nontransparent, as well as the emergence of governance structures that exist parallel to the state (Thier 2006/2007; Shurkin 2011). A fruitful avenue for further research on how decentralization (or other institutions, for that matter) can help restore peace in conflict-ridden states would consider how the legacy of wartime institutions shapes postwar state building.

As far as fiscal decentralization goes, the lesson in this book is that there is no one right level, but it is still possible to say something general about the conditions under which fiscal decentralization helps stem self-determination struggles. A region's level of wealth – and perception of wealth (cf. Herrera 2005; Giuliano 2006) – is going to affect the population's preference for fiscal autonomy versus fiscal transfers. If the fiscal system fails to reflect such preferences, it can become a source of conflict between the center and the regions. In the spring of 2014, one of the concerns underpinning the increasingly vocal separatist demands in Donbas in the east of Ukraine was that the region, as one of the country's most economically developed, was feeding the rest of the country.[30] In post-Gaddafi Libya, in March 2012, groups in the oil-rich east made the case for creating an autonomous eastern region within a federal Libya (in essence, reestablishing the federal structure of 1951–1963), much in reaction to the political and economic favoritism shown toward the western part of the country under Gaddafi's centralized rule, although no strong case was made for fiscal autonomy and exclusive control of the region's oil revenues.[31] In Iraq, resource-rich regions have more strongly voiced demand for fiscal autonomy. Resentment in the oil-rich southern Shia-dominated Basra province has been growing, as, in the absence of fiscal autonomy, "locals are sure that the money made from their oil fields is being whisked off to Baghdad" (Parker 2012, 106). Similarly, in northern Iraq, while the Kurdistan Regional Government has shown willingness to commit to some form of revenue sharing with the center, their staying put hinges on (but is not guaranteed by) the implementation of their vision of a federal Iraq that allows the region significant autonomy over its oil and gas resources (O'Leary 2010; Stansfield 2013). From the perspective of keeping these resource-rich regions within the federation, the institutional solution would be fiscal autonomy.

[30] Gordon Hahn, "The Way Out in Ukraine: Domestic Federalism and International Neutrality," *Fair Observer*, May 23, 2014, available at http://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/the-way-out-in-ukraine-a-constitution-of-domestic-federalism-and-international-neutrality-65210 (last accessed May 27, 2014).
[31] Wolfram Lacher, "Is Autonomy for Northeastern Libya Realistic?" *Sada: Analysis on Arab Reform*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 21, 2012, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/21/is-autonomy-for-northeastern-libya-realistic/chko (last accessed August 24, 2012).

For policy, complicating the quest for institutional solutions for individual regions is a consideration of the country as a whole. Cross-nationally, the statistical analysis in Chapter 2 tells us that in countries with high levels of interregional inequality, fiscal decentralization increases the likelihood of both ethnic protest and armed conflict. Under conditions of high interregional inequality, fiscal centralization may be the better option, as it gives the central government the resources it needs to redistribute wealth. These statistical findings with respect to the relationship between interregional inequality and fiscal decentralization shed light on why central governments in some cases are hesitant to give in to demands for greater fiscal autonomy from relatively wealthy regions, even though that is an option likely to appease the region. If the country is characterized by significant interregional inequalities, the central government may need to hold on to major sources of revenues, allowing for redistribution that keeps the poorer regions satisfied. In Spain, such considerations about redistribution are central to why Madrid is hesitant to grant Catalonia further fiscal autonomy – and certainly why it does not want to see the region secede.[32] In the case of Iraq, a worry among those opposed to the fiscal autonomy envisioned by oil-rich regions such as Iraqi Kurdistan is that the center will be left with an insufficient revenue base to redistribute wealth (which in turn would foster growing interregional inequalities) and fulfill basic functions (Haltermann et al. 2012). Concerns about redistribution have informed views on the possibly detrimental effects of fiscal decentralization in Afghanistan (Rubin 2009, 20), where poverty rates are overall high but there are significant interregional differences (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2010, 28–29).[33] In Nigeria, interregional inequalities have made the workings of the intergovernmental fiscal system a contentious matter for years. The oil-rich regions in the south want greater fiscal autonomy, but from the central government's perspective, wide interregional income disparities speak in favor of fiscal centralization. The solution the Nigerian central government has opted for is fiscal centralization, where oil revenues are shared among the regions with the aim of fostering interunit equality while at the same time reassigning a share of the centrally collected oil revenues to the oil-producing states based on the principle of derivation. Although such an arrangement serves as a major incentive for the relatively poor northern states, whose budgets depend on central transfers, to stay put in the federation, it has contributed to dissatisfaction in the south and horizontal conflict among the states (Suberu 2001, 2004, 2005). From a policy perspective, questions to consider in such settings are which regional minority groups pose the greatest threat to the unity of the

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[32] Tobias Buck, "Catalonia to Forge Ahead with Referendum on Independence," *The Financial Times*, April 23, 2014.

[33] Although, as noted, due to the de facto powers enjoyed by some provincial governors, thanks to their access to off-budget and illicit sources of revenue, it is unclear how much say the central government has over redistribution in spite of the centralized system.

state and whether the other dimensions of decentralization – policy and political autonomy – can help accommodate self-determination demands or direct them through institutional rather than violent channels.[34]

Political Elite Ties

To the degree that policy and fiscal decentralization do not respond to a society's ethnic makeup or wealth, these institutions affect the potential for violent conflict by fueling or even creating grievances directed at the center and assessments of the value of the federation. Whether this potential for violent conflict turns violent also hinges on the presence or absence of factors enabling center-region bargaining. In the federalism literature, scholars have argued that political party ties between tiers of government provide one way to ensure that bargaining between the capital and the regions takes place within institutional channels and that central and regional politicians alike have incentives to consider their counterparts' interests. Political party ties can, thus, be the stabilizing "glue" that holds decentralized states together. Regional or ethnic parties, in contrast, may "unglue" decentralized states by solidifying ethnic or regional differences, as such encouraging conflict, unless these parties are sharing power at the center, which would give regional elites a stake in keeping the state intact.

In this book, I examine the degree to which the elites that govern in the regions are from the same political party or coalition or politically affiliated with the ruling elites at the center, expecting such political elite ties to ease center-region bargaining, thus reducing the chances of violent conflict. Indeed, the Chechen case demonstrates how the lack of party (and otherwise institutional) ties between Moscow and Chechnya was one of the reasons why negotiations in 1992 to 1994 did not lead anywhere, deepening already existing divisions within Chechnya, which further paved the way for a violent conflict. In Québec, the era of "cooperative federalism" in the 1960s was, in part, a result of copartisan ties between the Liberals in Ottawa and in Québec City, taking the steam out of the more radical and proindependence parties in the province. Indeed, even though the 1960s saw the emergence of the violent separatist group Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), the fact that the Québec government had already managed to gain concessions within the federal system, in large part due to political elite ties, contributed to the relatively slim support of the FLQ in the province.

Scholars writing about decentralization elsewhere have noted the stability-inducing effects of copartisan ties. For example, on the

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[34] This leaves aside the question of how fiscal decentralization has implications not only for intrastate conflict but also for economic performance (e.g., Weingast 1995; Wibbels 2005) – the Nigerian case, in that regard, being a good example of the detrimental effects of fiscal decentralization.

smooth-functioning of devolution in the United Kingdom, introduced in 1999, McGarry noted in 2010 that "It is possible that the stability that has existed during the first decade of devolution is a result not of devolution, or not just of devolution, but of the fact that the British Labour Party has dominated UK governments and the executives in Scotland and Wales. This has meant that intergovernmental relations have been a relatively benign intraparty affair" (McGarry 2010, 164). Previewing the situation just a year later, with a Conservative-Liberal coalition governing in London and the ruling Scottish National Party (SNP) in Edinburgh calling for a referendum on independence, he noted: "It is unlikely that intergovernmental relations will be as amicable in the future as they were during devolution's first decade" (ibid.). In Spain, many regions have been governed by parties *not* in the national government, but there has been more informal copartisan support across tiers of government, contributing to concessions in center-region bargaining. For example, the Popular Party (PP) has supported decentralization demands from nationalists in Catalonia in exchange for the Catalan nationalists' support of the PP in parliament. The same goes for the Socialists (Guibernau 2000, 62). Neither the Basque nor the Catalan parties participated in national coalition governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but they offered their support to individual parties in minority governments (Colomer 1998, 46, 48–49). In 2005, the two nationalist parties in Catalonia did join the coalition government in Madrid, which in 2006 "earned" the Catalans greater autonomy in taxation and legal affairs (Beramendi 2012, 199–202).[35] Key to the integrating dynamics of copartisan ties is a degree of mutual political dependence between central and regional elites.

At the national level of analysis, a full consideration of the role of political party ties across tiers of government benefits from examining whether ethnic regions are part of those ties. In the statistical analysis in Chapter 2, I find that encompassing governing parties or coalitions may increase the likelihood of violent conflict when ethnic regions are excluded from those parties or coalitions. The Punjab case sheds light on some of the mechanisms underpinning these statistical findings. In 1985, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of the Congress Party and the Akali leader Sant Longowal reached an agreement that addressed many of the Akalis' long-standing concerns. The accord was promising on paper, but it was never implemented. The failure to implement the accord was largely driven by the Congress Party's concern for its electoral

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[35] "Assessment for Catalans in Spain," Minorities at Risk profile, available at http://www.cidcm .umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=23002 (last accessed June 6, 2012). In the Basque Country, 2009 to 2011 was a period of copartisanship, with the region's president from the Basque affiliate of the nationally governing Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. While this period of copartisanship culminated with an ETA declaration of cessation of armed activity, that decision appears to have had more to do with informal appeals by outside mediators than any center-region negotiations. See John F. Burns, "Basque Separatists Halt Campaign of Violence," *New York Times*, October 20, 2011.

fortunes in neighboring Haryana, which had long been ruled by a Congress chief minister. In the Punjab accord, two of the key clauses were highly unpopular in Haryana, and Rajiv Gandhi backed out of the accord in order for the Congress Party to stay in power in this long-time copartisan-allied state. The failure of this accord fueled dissatisfaction with the Akali Dal within Punjab. In fact, the failure of the 1985 accord was the catalyst that made Punjab descend into a violent conflict, as it convinced the emerging militant groups that the Akali Dal was unable to represent their interests and that peaceful negotiations were unlikely to bring about results. In this case, political party ties excluding Punjab precipitated divisions within the state that made violent conflict more likely.

Thus, the empirical findings are supportive of the argument that political ties across tiers of government can help ensure that intergovernmental bargaining takes place through institutional channels and foster political interdependence and incentives for both regional and central elites to respect the state's integrity (or status quo). In the context of Afghanistan, which de jure is a centralized state but with provincial officials exercising a certain degree of de facto powers, Radnitz (2004) argues that tying the fortunes of regional leaders to the center will help transform Afghanistan into a cohesive state (but no strong party system has so far developed). The same can be said for post-Gaddafi Libya if it moves toward a decentralized system of governance. This is not to argue that the absence (presence) of elite-level political party ties is the only reason why struggles between regional challengers and the center may turn violent (or not), but it is one mechanism. Another related mechanism is executive power sharing that incorporates regional interests. Such power sharing is one version of what Bednar (2009, 102–103) calls federalism's "structural safeguards," which aim to aid intergovernmental coordination by making the national decision-making process dependent on – or at least open to input from – the country's subunits.[36] In Iraq, the 2005 constitution, which created a hybrid presidential-parliamentary executive, laid out a power-sharing system that for a transitional period shared presidential power in a Presidency Council consisting of one president and two vice presidents. Executive power rests with the Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister, but for any legislation to be turned into law, it needed to be approved unanimously by the Presidency Council, essentially giving each of its members veto power. Although there was no guarantee that different regional or ethnic minority groups would be included in the Presidency Council, each of its three members had to be elected by a two-thirds majority in the national assembly, which helped make the presidency broadly representative (McGarry and O'Leary 2007, 670–672). Ever since the first Presidency Council was elected, a representative from Kurdistan,

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[36] Although, notes Bednar (2009, 104–107), such a structural safeguard might be better at preventing the national level from encroaching on the regions than encouraging the regions to respect the division of powers between tiers of government.

which poses the potentially strongest secessionist threat, has served as president. In addition, the proportional-representation electoral system makes room for smaller parties, including regional ones, at the center. That said, power sharing and coalition politics in Iraq have not been unproblematic – indeed, a major and growing source of contention with Nouri al-Maliki's reign as prime minister (2006–2014) was the lack of an inclusive government (e.g. Parker 2012) – and do not explicitly incorporate regions into national decision-making processes, but these mechanisms have ensured that the Kurds have some stake at the center. More idiosyncratically and less institutionalized, one can also imagine shared backgrounds, personal relationships, and patronage networks among central and regional elites defusing self-determination demands.

It is worth emphasizing that, among the cases examined in this book, Chechnya provides an important corrective to the stabilizing dynamics that elite ties between central and regional leaders can have. In the Soviet era, the copartisan ties between the Communist Party in Moscow and its branches in the regions were key to keeping radical demands from the regions off the table. Yet, as Chapter 3 described, in the waning days of the Soviet Union, dissatisfaction with the local branch of the Communist Party led to an *intra*-Chechen struggle, the Chechen Revolution, during which the Chechen nationalist movement came to power. Subsequently, the republic's relationship to the center soured. Because the regional elites of the Communist Party in Grozny owed their position of power to Moscow, more than to constituents in Chechnya, they had been able to sustain a corrupt regime – and dissatisfaction in the region was growing. Thus, to the degree that regional elites are beholden only to the center and not their constituents in the region, copartisan ties can in the long run foster conflict. Similarly, the ties that the current Chechen president, Ramzan Kadyrov, has fostered with Moscow, especially to Vladimir Putin,[37] have corresponded with a decrease in violence directed at the center and an increase in central concessions to the region, such as federal transfers.[38] At the same time, Kadyrov, Moscow's ally in Grozny, runs the risk of weakening his regime due to internal Chechen opposition to his notoriously brutal reign. The very purpose of the Kremlin's "Chechenization" policy in place since 2001 – propping up a pro-Moscow government with *carte blanche* to maintain security in the region (and, incidentally, good at delivering votes for Putin in federal elections) – was to defeat the separatists by way of divide and rule. While the policy has succeeded in dividing Chechen

[37] "Kadyrov Bows Down to Putin …," *Chechnya Weekly,* June 21, 2007; Mairbek Vatchagaev, "Kadyrov Expands His Influence in Moscow," *Chechnya Weekly,* February 21, 2008.

[38] "Kadyrov Government Demands Federal Concessions," *Chechnya Weekly,* March 23, 2006; "Chechen Parliament Floats Economic Autonomy Bill," *Chechnya Weekly,* September 15, 2006; "Observers Deconstruct Chechnya's Reconstruction Boom," *Chechnya Weekly,* June 8, 2006; Olivia Ward, "Shiny New Buildings Mask Lawlessness, Repression," *Toronto Star,* May 29, 2007; "Newspaper Describes How Chechen Officials Get Compensation Payment Kickbacks," *Chechnya Weekly,* February 7, 2008.

society by turning the struggle largely into an intra-Chechen spiral of deadly attacks and disappearances (Gilligan 2010, 83–91),[39] fostering an environment of fear, these very divisions may in the longer run prove an obstacle to ruling (Russell 2011). These observations on the Chechen case point to a more general point about "the darker side" of political elite ties across tiers of government, namely that they may foster authoritarian enclaves (Gibson 2005; Bednar 2009, 118). Even if politicians in the capital are democratically inclined (which they are not in the case of the Kremlin), they may look the other way when faced with authoritarian regional politicians, as long as these offer support to the national level.

FURTHER RESEARCH

As the preceding discussion shows, the argument and findings in this book, which have examined how decentralization can (or cannot) help *preserve* peace, speak to policy debates about how state and institution building can help *restore* peace in postwar states. Hopes for decentralization as a potentially peace-restoring means are generally about long-term peace and stability. Once a conflict has turned violent, the immediate steps toward conflict resolution concern ending the violence through, for example, negotiations and third-party mediation and monitoring, as well as programs aimed at the safe return of refugees and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. The credible promise of decentralization and other power-sharing measures might be key to successful peace negotiations, that is, reaching a settlement (Walter 2002), but it is difficult to start implementing any kind of institution building in an ongoing violent setting. Indeed, one of the challenges of peace building in places like Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is that they have been prematurely or mistakenly treated as if they are *post*war societies (cf. Autesserre 2009), and institution building for the long term becomes entangled with the state's goal of defeating the insurgency (Goodhand and Sedra 2010).

In many self-determination (and other) conflicts, the struggle itself may foster rationales that work against its resolution by way of creating sunk costs and vested interests. This is particularly so if the struggle has been ongoing for a long time. Much research on the legacy of violent conflicts has focused on how the illicit or shadow economy that often develops in wartime creates incentives for violent entrepreneurs or warlords to perpetuate an environment of violence or instability (Reno 2000; Rubin 2000; Andreas 2004; Goodhand 2005; Marten 2012). Even in struggles that have not turned violent and in which no wartime economy has developed, there are actors with incentives

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[39] See also Arch Puddington, "Little to Celebrate in Kadyrov's Chechnya," Freedom House, October 11, 2011, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/blog/little-celebrate-kadyrov%E2%80%99s-chechnya#.U4SPKNj4KB0 (last accessed May 27, 2014).

not to give up the fight. For example, one of the former Parti Québécois offi-
cials whom I met in Montréal in 2005 suggested that the party should have
disappeared several years ago: "It's dedicated to one cause and it has failed
twice in bringing about that cause. It has been thrown out of government, but
it has – when in government – achieved great things in Canada." His expla-
nation was that for some people, joining the Parti Québécois has little to do
with the causes it represents. Put differently, he said, sometimes you climb a
mountain because there's a mountain there.[40] Indeed, in the words of a youn-
ger Bloc Québécois representative: "There is no case in history of a sovereignty
movement, once it has started, that decides to stop (…) That's what will hap-
pen here, too. Independence will happen."[41] Indeed, among some *Québécois*, a
view of the sovereignty movement is that it is a movement started by a genera-
tion who, at this point, are not going to give up, as they have invested so much
time and energy in it. Echoing this sentiment, in her farewell-to-politics speech,
after leading the party to crushing defeat in the 2014 provincial elections, PQ
leader Pauline Marois said:

> I think this project (sovereignty) is always an important necessary project for our
> nation and I am sure many leaders, many citizens will continue to fight to be a
> country one today. I don't know when. I don't know how. But one thing I know is
> that we (would) be in the best situation if we were independent. I am sure of that.
> We are different. We are a nation.[42]

To these hard-core activists, it is perhaps unlikely that accommodation within
the federation is going to be sufficient (cf. Horowitz 1985, 625–626). Yet if the
hard-core activists need the support of more moderate voices in the movement,
in the presence of an agreement that addresses popular grievances and provides
for favorable assessments about staying put in the state, it may be difficult to
garner that support.

   To the degree that research on postwar institution building has paid atten-
tion to the legacy of wartime institutions, the negative aspects – the vested inter-
ests in keeping the struggle going – have typically been the focus. As I sketch
out next, this book points to new avenues for research that call for an emphasis
on also the potentially positive sides of wartime institutions. In particular, as
the empirical cases in the book have highlighted the role of intraregional divi-
sions in complicating bargaining with the central government, further research
might want to consider the ways in which regional-level institutions can miti-
gate such divides.

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[40] Personal communication, Montréal, September 13, 2005.
[41] Personal communication, Montréal, September 21, 2005.
[42] Quoted in "Pauline Marois Has No Regrets as She Bids Tearful Goodbye," *The Huffington Post*
    (Canada), April 16, 2014.

Local Divisions and Institution Building

As I was researching the Punjab case, it became clear that economic divisions within the region shaped the Sikhs' self-determination struggle. The demands of the Akali Dal reflected the concerns of a relatively wealthy region, blaming the central government for trying to take away its riches, but the militant movement fed on grievances among the less well-to-do Sikhs within Punjab, blaming not only the central government but also the regional government and the Akali Dal. In such a setting, to the degree that the fiscal autonomy is to function as peace preserving in a relatively wealthy region, its ability to contain conflict will also hinge on how the regional government goes about redistribution (cf. Kefale 2009). A (perception of) fair and transparent distribution of wealth within the region would be key. In a related fashion, in a region in which a majority of the population belongs to a group that is a minority in the state as a whole, cultural policy autonomy has the potential to stem self-determination demands, although it might simultaneously be a cause of tension, even violent conflict, if minorities within that minority region feel that the protection of their culture and rights is jeopardized (cf. Pavković 2011; Cunningham and Weidmann 2010). Even in regions that are relatively homogenous when it comes to wealth and identity, there are likely to be subdivisions. For instance, in Québec, the 1995 referendum raised concerns among the province's aboriginal population about what the sovereignty quest for Québec would mean for their claims to self-determination. That is, although containing self-determination conflicts is about the relationship between the center and the regions, which is where decentralization is a potentially peace-preserving means, it is also about intraregional dynamics.

Scholars have referred to the possible institutional solutions in self-determination struggles as "complex power sharing" (Wolff 2009), where decentralization is one part of a bigger package of institutional tools aimed at accommodating diversity, including power sharing within the regions (McGarry and O'Leary 2007). Further research on decentralization's peace-preserving capacity would benefit from systematically theorizing and examining the interplay among the center-region institutions examined in this book, societal traits, intraregional divisions, and institutional arrangements (and capacity) within the regions. For research on decentralized states' capacity to restore peace in postwar states, a fruitful starting point would be the literature on rebel governance and wartime political orders (McColl 1969; Wickham-Crowley 1987; Kasfir 2005; Schlichte 2009; Mampilly 2011; Staniland 2012b). This literature examines why and how some armed groups successfully establish civilian governance in the areas they control, providing public goods, but there is little work on how a group or region's wartime governance structures shape state and institution building in the postwar era.

The empirical cases in this book also point to another type of internal division, namely within the self-determination movement. In Punjab, intraregional

divisions based on wealth contributed to the fragmented nature of the Sikh self-determination movement. Movement fragmentation can stem from intra-regional or intragroup divisions (based, for example, on clan or class divides), geographic divides (such as highlanders versus lowlanders), the central government's strategies, and divergent beliefs in appropriate strategies (Seymour et al. 2014). All of these factors contributed to the fragmented nature of the Chechen self-determination movement, but as both the Chechen and Punjab cases demonstrated, the failure of center-region negotiations fueled existing divisions and fostered new ones. A number of scholars have begun to examine the effects of local-level cleavages and movement or group fragmentation on violent conflicts (e.g., Kalyvas 2006; Cunningham 2006; Weinstein 2007; Kenny 2010; Lawrence 2010; Staniland 2012a). Most self-determination movements consist of several factions making demands in the name of the group the movement represents (Cunningham 2014). And research done with my coauthors suggests that the more factions representing the same movement, the more intense the competition within the movement, as the factions contend with one another over political dominance in the larger struggle with the state (Cunningham et al. 2012). For example, violence in Corsica today has been the result of an internally divided movement and outbidding among various factions (Daftary 2008, 205). The Corsican nationalist movement has throughout its existence been fragmented and characterized by deadly infighting among the various factions, mirroring the fragmented clan-based Corsican society (Hossay 2004).[43] While the "prize" in a self-determination struggle will benefit the whole group or region, the factions that dominate the struggle might have better access to power and a bigger say in postwar politics. This kind of competition within a movement – whose members are ostensibly fighting for a similar goal, such as greater autonomy – can make accommodation difficult. In the Palestinian case, Pearlman (2008/2009) demonstrates that deals acceptable to some factions in the self-determination movement were unacceptable to others because they empowered rival factions within the movement. In a cross-national study, Cunningham (2011) shows that central governments are more likely to give concessions to divided self-determination movements, but such concessions are likely to be smaller and less likely to halt the conflict than are concessions given to unified movements. Thus, while central governments may use divisions within movements to minimize the concessions they have to give, what they might actually want, at least if the goal is long-term peace and stability within their borders, are cohesive challengers.

What this research points to is the role of organizational cohesion of the movements fighting the state. Some self-determination movements, despite consisting of numerous factions, manage to overcome internal divides through, for example, concentration of power (Krause 2013/2014) or through

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[43] Marlise Simons, "Corsican Rebels Whose Eyes Have Turned to Peace," *New York Times*, October 8, 2000.

alliances, fronts, or other institutions that coordinate and constrain the actions of individual factions, such as regional parliaments (Bakke et al. 2012). In Chechnya, the outbreak of war in 1994 rallied the various factions behind Dudayev, who exercised a certain degree of military and political coordination, yet once the war ended in 1996, Maskhadov was unable to uphold that kind of coordination, with the result that negotiations with Moscow bore few fruits, in turn deepening internal divisions in the Chechen movement – and war again broke out in 1999. While a growing body of work has examined how the organizational cohesion and strength of subnational challengers shape conflict outcomes – from mediation (Clayton 2013) to negotiations (D. Cunningham 2013), concessions (Cunningham 2011), variation in settlements (Seymour 2008), and spoiling of peace agreements (Pearlman 2008/2009) – this study suggests that a fruitful avenue for further research would be to examine how the organizational cohesion of subnational challengers shapes the implementation of institutions meant to restore peace. It also underscores the importance of considering whether and how movements manage to overcome internal divisions through overarching institutions or power concentration.

These new avenues for research that I have sketched out are consistent with the insight that there is no one-size-fits-all decentralized fix to governing divided societies. An understanding of decentralization's peace-preserving effects (or lack thereof) requires systematically considering the institutions' context. The book has emphasized the context provided by regional-level societal traits, but further research should, in line with the growing research agenda that calls for a disaggregated approach to the analysis of violent conflict, examine the context provided by divisions and institutions within the regions and within the movements challenging the state.

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