

ANGLO - SIKH WARS

(1845-1849)

Dr. Bakhshish Singh Nijjar, P.E.S.(I)

M.A., Ph.D. (History), M.A., M.O.L. (Persian) M.A. (Punjabi)

Addl. Director, Punjab State Archives, Patiala,

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
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SKETCH OF THE POSITIONS OF THE BRITISH SIKH ARMIES ON THE JUTLANDS



Dr. G. S. MITTAL

THE FIRST ANGLO-SIKH WAR—1845-46

INEVITABLE CONFLICT

A clash between the Lahore Kingdom and the British Government was inevitable. During his reign, the Lion of the Punjab foresighted as he was relying on the counsel of his foreign minister, Faqir Aziz-ud-din, avoided the clash, but its inevitability was apparent after his death. Many causes of this encounter were brewing since 1809, when the British Government began to think seriously about the problem of the "Scientific Frontier of India". During the life time of Maharaja Ranjit Singh the attitude of the British Government was domineering and it provided an effective check to the ambitious designs of the Lion of Punjab, which may be attributed as a prelude to the ultimate extinction of Sikh sovereignty in the Punjab. In 1808, Ranjit Singh entered into an agreement with the British Government not to interfere in the Cis-Satluj States. Such was the case when Maharaja's ambitious scheme of expansion towards Shikarpur in 1836 was again checked and he had to withdraw his forces. Ferozepur was occupied in 1835 and was turned into a British military cantonment in 1838. Even Sind fell under the protection of the British Government. The British Government had the upper hand even at the time of the Tripartite Treaty.

The Decline

After the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, in 1839, the whole of the superstructure raised by him fell to pieces. The army became all powerful. It was the king-maker. Confusion and disorder were rampant everywhere. The hostility between the Dogras and the Sindhanwalias worsened the confusion. For six long years, there was no

law and order in the country. The British Government had an opportunity to fish in the troubled waters. They considerably strengthened their military establishment on the Satluj frontier where the number of soldiers rose from 2,500 men, in 1836 to 14,000¹ strong, in 1843.

The British Plans

Plans for the occupation of the Punjab by the British Government appear to have been made much earlier. In April-May, 1841, when the British had been in Afghanistan for some 18 months, fully secure, Mrs. Henry Lawrence had written to Mrs. Cameron from Sabathu on May 26, 1841:

“Wars and rumours, are on every side and there seems no doubt that next cold weather will decide the long suspended question of occupying the Punjab; Henry, both in his Civil and Military capacity, will probably be called to take part in whatever goes on.”

The annexation of Sindh² in 1843 alarmed the Sikhs. One object of the outrage upon Sindh was to take possession of the country on both sides on the Indus to be able to push up British and Indian regiment and military stores to the frontiers of the Punjab for operations against it from towards the south west as well as from the south. The appointment of Major Broadfoot in place of Mr. Clark as British Agent at Ludhiana further exasperated the Khalsa army. He was a hot-headed and over ambitious man, who annoyed the Khalsa army on account of his arbitrary actions.

However, the most important cause of the First Anglo-Sikh War was the problem of the Khalsa Army which was facing Lal Singh and Rani Jindan. Both felt that the

1. But the Military strength of the British had been raised lately to the length of:

1. Ferozepur	5876	men	and	12	guns
2. Ludhiana	4205	"	"	—	"
3. Ambala	8859	"	"	8	"
4. Meerut	3971	"	"	8	"
	<u>22911</u>	"	"	<u>28</u>	"

2. *Correspondence - Anglo Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh, p. 49.

only way to deal with the Khalsa Army was to egg it on to fight against the British. In case of success, the whole of India would lie at the feet of the Khalsa. Otherwise, its influence and number would topple as a result of defeat. To quote Dr. Hasrat "For long, the Army of Lahore had been held in contempt and branded as licentious, and its violent republican character held a negative force. Its errant militant temper was believed to expand itself on depredations and violations: it could produce anarchy and dissolution rather than wars."¹ "The leaders were half hearted or even treacherous fearing victory almost as much as defeat. We were fighting against a fine army without a general or, at any rate, without one supreme controlling mind",² wrote P.E. Roberts.

What was the reason? Obviously, the British politicals were blinded by self interest. They were lost to all sense of honour and gratitude. While Maharaja Sher Singh was unreservedly extending his helping hand of friendship, with hearty and steady co-operation, they were planning to stab him in the back by corrupting his officers, with alluring promises of territories sliced out of his kingdom and winning them over to their side against the interests of the Maharaja.³ The expansionist policy of Lord Ellenborough knew no limits for the territorial expansion.

The catastrophe took place on September 15, 1843, when Maharaja Sher Singh and his son Prince Partap Singh, as well as Prime Minister Dhian Singh, were murdered by the Sindanwalia Sardars.⁴ These murders raised the hopes of Lord Ellenborough for an early opportunity to occupy the Punjab; either directly by 'occupation or indirectly through 'protection'.

Account of the War

The Sikh Army under the command of Lal Singh and

1. *Anglo-Sikh Relation* —Bikrama Jit Hasrat, p. 265.

2. *History of British India*—P.E. Roberts, p. 334,

3. *Correspondence—Anglo Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh, p. 44.

4. *The British Friend of India* —London, December, 1843.

Tej Singh, crossed the Satluj between Harike¹ and Kasur² on the 11th December 1845. Its five divisions numbering fifty thousand men and 108 guns, were assembled on the right bank of the Satluj. It immediately proceeded to invest Ferozepur³, the designed centre of British military operations, where its command, Major-General Litler with seven thousand and five hundred men and 35 heavy guns in position, was caught unaware. Ferozepur was well fortified with thrown up shelter trenches and light fieldworks, but it was highly vulnerable. Two divisions of the Sikh Army took up position at Ferozeshah, a village 10 miles above it, to intercept the main British army, marching from Ambala to relieve Ferozepur.

Perfidy of the British

On 13 December, 1845, the Governor-General issued a Declaration of war, charging the State of Lahore for violating the treaty of 1809. It justified British precautionary measures for the protection of the Satluj frontier, which had become necessary on account of the disorganised state of the Lahore Government (on the connivance of the British Government) and its uncontrollable Army. The Sikh Army, it accused, had without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British territories. Consequently, the possessions of Maharaja Dalip Singh, on the left bank of the Satluj, were declared confiscated and annexed to the British territories.

Here the argument forwarded by the British historians that "The Sikhs had violated the treaty and broken the peace," looks unjustified, since the Sikhs did not act in that manner without sufficient provocations. Without any provocation or show of hostility from anywhere in the Punjab, Lord Ellenborough was eagerly looking forward to preparing for marching his armies into the Punjab. He had not occupied this province like Sindh, Gwalior, Kai-

1. District, Amritsar, 48 miles from Lahore.

2. District, Lahore, 16 miles from Ferozepur, and 34 miles from Lahore.

3. Lahore, 50 miles, Faridkot, 21 miles.

thal and Jytpur, it was not because the army was not fully equipped and prepared, and because suitable officers for higher commands were not available. He was doing his best to equip and raise the army to the required standard. On his part, he had actually fixed a date—the 15th of November 1845—on which he hoped to be ready for any operations in the Punjab.¹

The hectic military preparations of the British across the Satluj, had compelled them to forestall their adversary from taking the initiative. The British military forces had already arrived from Ambala. On the 14th December, 1845 the British army took up a position near Ferozepur. Before further move on Ferozepur, Lal Singh wrote to Captain Peter Nicholson, the Assistant Agent at Ferozepur, "I have crossed with the Sikh army. You know my friendship with the British. Tell me what to do." Nicholson, answered, "Do not attack Ferozepur. Halt as many days as you can, and then march towards the Governor General."²

In addition to this the British Government carried on propaganda against the Sikh-kingdom. They sent spies and agents, who were provocative to Punjab. British officials and the press started intensive propaganda in order to prepare the people of India and England for a war between the Sikhs and the British and to conceal their warlike preparations. A speech of Sir Charles Napier was published in Delhi Gazette, wherein he declared in the most threatening manner that the British were going to declare war against the Sikhs. The British Government had been warned by military men, as well as civilians, whose opinions should have received attention, that "the Sikhs would burst across the confines of their empire like a flooded river suddenly rising and overflowing the banks".³

1. Secret Committee under No. 12 G.G. Home Deptt. dated 11-2-1844.

2. *Correspondence-Anglo Sikh Wars* —Ganda Singh p. 90.

3 While they (The Khalsa army) declared that they desired peace, there was a strong party clamorous for war." The Chiefs, Lal Singh and Tej Singh; urged them on to war."

The First and Second Sikh Wars—Burton R.G. 12-8-10.

BATTLE OF MUDKI—December 18, 1845

Advance of the Khalsa Army

The Sikh Army, consisting of five divisions each, numbering eight thousand to twelve thousand strong, encircled Ferozepur in a bold sweeping move, and arranged the troops in a twenty two mile wide semi-circle, stretching from Harike to Mudki, 10 miles in the south, and thence to Ferozeshah, 10 miles further in the south-east, one division was precipitately advanced towards Ludhiana, as the garrison stationed there under Wheeler, was withdrawn in order to join the Army of the Satluj. The Khalsa Army, under the command of Lal Singh¹ entrenched at Ferozeshah. Sham Singh Attariwala remained at Harike with one division, while Tej Singh's two divisions hovered around Ferozepur.

The British force consisted of the Ambala and Ludhiana divisions. It was well-equipped to undertake the military operations. It consisted of the division under Major-General Sir H. Smith, a brigade of that under Major-General Sir J. M'Caskill, and another of that under Major-General Gilbert, with five troops of horse artillery, and two Light Field Batteries, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, of the Horse Artillery.² The cavalry division, consisting of Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, the Body-guard, 4th and 5th Light Cavalry, and 9th Irregular Cavalry. The artillery of the Sikhs created havoc among the twelve British battalions of infantry as they formed from echelon of brigade into line. The Horse Artillery operating under Brigadier Brooke, for a time replied so severe a fire without silencing it, but being reinforced by two light field-pieces, that object was accomplished.

British Strategy

In order to complete the formation of his infantry with-

1. "The Commander-in-Chief, in his official despatch, made a very different estimate of the strength of his army." Broadfoot Major W. R.E., p. 384.

2. Brigadier in Command of the artillery force.

out advancing his artillery too near the jungle, Sir Hugh Gough¹ organised a flank movement with his cavalry, under Brigadiers White and Gough, upon the left of the Sikh line. This was a brilliantly conceived manoeuvre. The Dragoons turned the Sikh Army's left, and swept along the whole rear of their line of infantry and cannon. In order to out-manoevre the Khalsa, Sir Hugh Gough directed Brigadier M'Tier to make a similar movement with the remainder of the cavalry upon the right of the Sikhs.

Struggle for Victory or Death

Amidst clouds of dust and smoke, deepened by the shadows of closing day, the English rolled their heavy musketry fire into the jungles, sometimes the Sikhs fell back under this fire, or the close discharges of the Horse Artillery, which galloped upto the jungle; in other instances the sand hills and the brushwood were contested amidst the dash of bayonets and the grapple of desperate conflict, when man met man in a struggle of victory or death.

Lal Singh, the Traitor

Acting on the advice of Captain Nicholson, as already stated Lal Singh waited for the British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Gough, to arrive with his main army. It was after that occasion when he advanced with his full force to meet him with the sinister object that, as planned, the British might have a full and fair opportunity of destroying them.² Lal Singh headed the attack but in accordance with his original design, he involved them (his troops) in an engagement and then left them to fight as their undirected valour, might prompt.³ Deserted by their Commander, the Sikh force had to return. Sir H. Gough attributed the success of his charge to the bayonets of the English infantry.

1. *Correspondence-Anglo Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh, p. 205.

2. *History of the Sikhs*—McGregor, Vol. II, p. 81.

3. *History of the Sikhs*—Cunningham, p. 306.

The Sikhs Withdrew

Though out-numbered, the Sikhs fought with series of dogged stands and skirmishing retreats. In the fierce encounter, the stubborn resistance offered by them over sandy hillocks, was unprecedented, but the battle was lost and the Sikhs were compelled to withdraw, leaving seventeen guns in the hands of the British.

The army of the Satluj returned to the camp about midnight, and rested on the 19th and 20th of December in order to collect the wounded, bring in the guns, and enliven the exhausted troops. Major-General Sir R. Sale died of his wounds. A shot was fired at the chest of Sir J. M'Caskill and was killed. The number of killed were two hundred and fifteen and six hundred and fifty seven were wounded. The Sikhs killed and wounded many officers by firing from trees. Both Tej Singh and Lal Singh showed irresolution, and each seemed to act as he thought best. There was neither a unity of command, nor a well co-ordinated plan of offensive action. No master mind planned or directed the destiny of the Khalsa, which had, on a sudden impulse, released a formidable force across the Satluj. No swift forward action could be planned. Drift and indecision, therefore, marked the course adopted by its irresolute commanders.¹

This was a heavy loss to the small army of Sir Hugh Gough. The death of Sale and M'Caskill, two of the best officers in India, was regretted by all the officers of the Army of the Satluj, and by the gallant soldiers who were so often led by them to victory. But at Mudki for the first time, the fierce full audacity and reckless abandon of the Sikh soldiers surprised their English adversaries.²

Battle of Ferozeshah—21 December, 1845

On the 21st, the army marched within three or four miles of Ferozeshah. Sir John Litler had been ordered to form a junction with the grand army, with a large

1. *Anglo Sikh Relations*—Bikramajit Hasrat p. 268.

2. Broadfoot, Major W. pp. 384-385.

portion of the garrison of Ferozepur as could safely be withdrawn from it. The Governor-General afterwards wrote a narrative of the junction of those forces, and the operations they were called upon to perform.

Account of the War

Sir Henry Hardinge, a veteran of the peninsular War, upon whom devolved the responsibility of conducting the operations in the war alongwith Viscount Gough, gives a graphic account of the battle.

"At half-past one O'clock, the Ambala force, having marched across the country disencumbered of every description of baggage, except the reserve ammunition, formed its junction with Sir John Litler's force, who had moved out of Ferozepur with five thousand men, two regiments of cavalry and twenty-one field-guns. This combined operation having been effected, the Commander-in-Chief with my entire concurrence, made his arrangements for the attack of the enemy's position at Ferozeshah, about four miles distant from the point where our forces had united. The British force consisted of sixteen thousand seven hundred men, and sixty nine guns, chiefly horse artillery. The Sikh forces varied from forty-eight thousand to sixty thousand men, with one hundred and eight thousand to sixty thousand men, with one hundred pieces of cannon of heavy calibre, in fixed batteries. The camp of the enemy was in one form of a parallelogram, of about a mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, including within its area the strong village of Ferozeshah; the shorter sides looking towards the Satluj and Mudki, and the longer towards Ferozepur and the open country. The British troops moved against the last named place and the ground in front of which was, like the Sikh position in Mudki, covered with low jungle. The divisions of Major-General Sir J. Litler, Brigadier Wallace¹ and Major-General Gilbert, deployed into line, having in the exception of three troops of Horse Artillery, moved as occasion required. Major-General Sir H. Smith's division, and the

1. He had succeeded Major-General Sir, J. M'Caskill.

British small cavalry force, moved in a second line, having brigade in reserve to cover each wing.”

A Night of Terrors

Sir Hugh Gough thus narrates the events of the terrible night and of the succeeding day :- “Although I now brought up Major-General Sir H. Smith’s division, and he captured and long retained another point of the position, and her Majesty’s 3rd Light Dragoons charged and took some of the most formidable batteries, yet the enemy remained in possession of a considerable portion of the great quadrangle, whilst our troops, intermingled with theirs, kept possession of the remainder, and finally bivouaced upon it, exhausted by their gallant efforts, greatly reduced in numbers, and suffering extremely from thirst.”

Cunningham, another eyewitness at Ferozeshah, further records about this memorable scene: “Men of all regiments were mixed together; generals were doubtful of the fact or of the extent of their own success, and Colonels knew not what had become of the regiments they commanded or of the army of which they formed a part.”¹ On the dogged resistance offered by the Sikhs, he comments: “The resistance met with was wholly unexpected, and all started with astonishment. Guns were dismounted, and their ammunition was blown into the air; squadrons were checked in mid career; battalion after battalion was hurled back with shattered ranks, and it was not after sunset that portions of enemy position were finally carried.”² It was “a night of terrors” for the British soldiers, and Gough’s frontal attack had precipitately hurled them into the mouth of Sikh guns. The situation is described thus by another eye-witness: “half outside and half within the enemy’s position, unable either to advance or retreat, regiments were mixed up with regiments, and officers with men, in the wildest confusion.”³

1. *History of the Sikhs*—J. D. Cunningham, p. 266.

2. *History of the Sikhs*—J. D. Cunningham, p. 266.

3. *Life of Lord Lawrence*, p. 186.

That fateful night, the Sikhs remained firmly entrenched and in possession of the greater part of the entrenchments. Regiments of British troops intermingled with them in the darkness. Men utterly exhausted and famished, endeavoured to keep possession of some of their hardly won positions. At midnight, the Sikhs advanced one of their heavy ordinance and played with deadly effect upon the scattered British troops. H.M. 80th Foot and 1st European Infantry under Hardinge, counter-attacked and captured the gun.¹ Then for a while, there was an ominous silence, but during the whole night, the Sikh artillery continued to shell British troops whenever moonlight disclosed their position.

Hardinge Took Over the Charge

At this moment Lt. General Sir H. Hardinge placed himself at the head of the left, whilst Lord Gough rode at the head of the right wing. The British line, advanced and unchecked by the fire of the Khalsa, drove them rapidly over the village of Ferozeshah and their encampment; then, changing front to its left, on its centre, the British force continued to sweep the camp, bearing down all opposition, and dislodged the Sikhs from their whole position. The line then halted, as if on a day of manoeuvre, receiving its two leaders as they rode along its front with a gratifying cheer, and displaying the captured standards of the Khalsa army. The British had taken upwards of seventy-three pieces of cannon, and were masters of the whole field.²

Criticism

The conduct of this war was broadly discussed and criticised particularly by the critics of Europe and America and generally by the Indians. As to the battle itself, it was observed, that the British artillery did not display the superiority in the battle. The Sikhs were said to have fired three times for every two shots from the British guns. The position taken up by the British was condemned.

1. Hardinge to Commander-in-Chief, 22nd December, 1845.

2. Gough's Despatch, December, 1845, pp. XXXI.

Like the battle of Mudki, there was inadequate information. The intelligence department of the British army failed to prove itself effective. It was stated that the British Army marched along the rear of the Sikh position on which 'face' of the entrenchments there were no guns, and took position in front of the lines from which the Sikh cannons were directed, and generally so fixed, that they could not turn to the reverse, had the attack been directed upon it.

There were disparity in numbers of the British Army as compared to the well-equipped and disciplined Sikh Army, which clearly indicated that no adequate conception was formed by either the Governor-General or the Commander-in-Chief of the task undertaken. The importance of Khalsa army was underrated. The defective information at Calcutta, and want of judgement among those who had the Chief control of the campaign and the responsibility of providing accoutrements for it, cost fearful loss of valuable soldiers. On the other hand, suddenly, as the sun arose, the second Sikh army under Tej Singh in full battle array and battalions after battalions of cavalry appeared before the wrecked battlefield. The second army of the Khalsa had arrived at the most opportune time. The victors of Ferozeshah were completely exhausted: their soldiers were dropping for want of sleep and were hungry; there was no reserve at hand, no reinforcements in sight, and their last ammunition had already been fired. Tej Singh's advance had virtually cut their retreat to Ferozepur. His force drove straight in British cavalry lines. Simultaneously, a combination of infantry and artillery charged the left British flank under Litler. During this manoeuvre, Tej Singh maintained an incessant fire, whilst the British artillery, completely short of ammunition, was unable to answer him with a single shot.¹ From the center of the war-torn village of Ferozeshah, the British generals ordered their exhausted cavalry divisions to advance and receive the onslaught. The three divisions of Infantry prepared to march wearily in sup-

1. Commander-in-Chief to Governor-General, 22 December, 1845, pp. XXXI.

port. As the mass slaughter was about to begin, suddenly, Tej Singh's guns ceased to fire, and he seemed to abandon the field. The advancing British columns watched in utter amazement and disbelief, and their generals ordered an immediate retreat to Ferozepur.

It is positive that Tej Singh's force, which appeared that fateful day in the shattered battlefield of Ferozeshah, would have utterly annihilated the Army of the Satluj if its commander had shown determination and courage.¹ The cowardly leader of second army of the Khalsa witnessed the British army in full retreat towards Ferozepur, but did not stop it, or pursue it or give battle. He hesitated, opened fire again with a feeble cannonade, and then to everybody's surprise, hastily disappeared. The retreating British force was thus mercifully left unharmed, and their generals heaved a sigh of relief.

The arrangements of commissariat were deplorable, which intensified the sufferings of the soldiers. The entrenchments were undoubtedly stormed, but they were not generally formidable not being more than eighteen inches high; but the new force brought up by Tej Singh, would probably have retrieved the lost position, had he not withdrawn the Sikh army under his command. The English cavalry left the field and marched to Ferozepur. This was in accordance with the order as declared by an officer and given by authorities. Two inferences may be drawn from the occurrence; whether a shameful blunder was committed, or a retreat was contemplated. The fact was that the cavalry, or a large portion of it, left the field, and exposed the whole army to the most imminent peril. This blunderous episode was, however, mistaken by Tej Singh for a grand measure to attack him in the rear; and supposing the English must have obtained reinforcements

1. This opinion is also shared by British writers, e.g. Gough and Innes (p. 37): "It would even seem that if they had shown the same capacity for attack as for defence, if Tej Singh had known what to do with his fresh army at Ferozeshah, the frontier force with the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief might have been crushed on December 22nd."

to attempt the like, deemed it prudent to withdraw his army.

The British school critics did not give credit for this victory to the British Government since they called it an accident which actually gave them the victory at a critical juncture when the men and their ammunition were nearly exhausted. Neither Sir Henry Hardinge nor Sir Hugh Gough showed the foresight, comprehensive-ness, faculty of detail necessary to great commanders, or great statesmen. During the nights of suspense, when the wearied British Soldiery lay down under the incessant fire of the Khalsa artillery, which ploughed up the ground in various directions, Sir Henry Hardinge went among the soldiers, lay down among the groups, chatted with them in a tone of confidence, talked of "chastising" the Sikhs next morning if they were insolent, and thoroughly sound-ed the temper of the soldiers as to what reliance might be placed upon them in the dreadful conflict which awaited them.

Battle of Baddowal—January 21, 1846

After one month's lull, Major General Sir Harry Smith captured Dharmkot¹, without blood-shed on the 17th January, 1846, but when it became known that Sardar Ranjodh Singh had crossed the Satluj and threatened Ludhiana, he was ordered to proceed against him. On the 20th of January he was ordered to proceed against him. On the 20th of January he encamped at Jagraon.² Here he learnt that Sardar Ranjodh Singh, encamped at Baddowal³ hardly 18 miles distant on the direct road from Jagraon. "The British detachment, which had been swelled by reinforcements to four regiments of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and eighteen guns, marched soon after midnight and early, on the morning of 21st January it was learnt that the whole Sikh army, estimated at ten thousand men,

1. *Correspondence-Anglo Sikh Wars* — Ganda Singh p. 8.

2. District Ludhiana 51 miles from Ferozepur & 25 miles from Ludhiana.

3. A small village near Ludhiana headquarter of the Ladwa family; Read *History of the Sikhs* —Cunningham, pp. 270 71.

had moved to Baddowal," wrote Cunningham.¹ The Sikhs opened fire on the half-hearted fighting force of the British; and an ineffective charge of cavalry was ordered by the British Commander to protect the main body of troops which had reached the outskirts of Baddowal.

The Sikh traitors already conspired with the British to give the latter time for further preparations. Sir Hugh Gough was not then in a position to assume the offensive until reinforced with fresh troops, guns, and ammunition. Practically all ammunition had been expended, and the troops were exhausted. Tej Singh and Lal Singh knew it but they would not attack the British in their difficult situation. In this battle, 69 men were killed, 68 wounded and 77 taken prisoner from the retreating British force.²

The Battle of Aliwal—January 28, 1846

Ludhiana was thus saved, but the Sikhs claimed a victory at Baddowal. On 22 January, Ranjodh Singh leaving that place secured the passage of the Satluj, and large Sikh reinforcements joined him, swelling his force to 15,000 men. The British General immediately occupied the evacuated village of Baddowal; and the timely arrival of reinforcements from Ferozepur made him to act at once. Ranjodh Singh's objective was to sieze Jagraon, and to reach Gungrana,³ from which place he could intercept the direct British line of communications. A large British convoy with reinforcements, provisions and heavy guns was moving towards the Satluj. Threat of its interception prompted Harry Smith to engage the Sikh army as early as possible.

General Smith being reinforced marched against the Sikhs on the 27th January. He found them posted in the Low-land, close to the Satluj with their Light resting on the village of Bhundri, on the high bank and their left on Aliwal, close to the river. East of Bhundri, the ridge, which repeats the valley of the Satluj from the uplands,

1. *Correspondence-Anglo Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh, p. 8.

2. *Punjab on the Eve of First Sikh War*—H. R. Gupta, p. 112.

3. *Correspondence-Anglo Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh, p. 9.

sweps inwards in semi-circle crowned with villages at intervals for five or six miles, and leaves a wide open plain between it and the river.

On 28 January, Smith moved out of Baddowal with 11,000 men and reaching the outskirts of Bhundri, surprised the Sikh columns which lay spread like an octopus at Aliwal. The British cavalry made the initial charge under cover of an artillery barrage. The Sikhs were caught unaware. Their hastily dug trenches proved ineffective and their guns had no cover. Successive cavalry onslaught broke their ranks and Ranjodh Singh fled across the Satluj leaving his army leaderless. Then the reckless slaughter of the Sikh began in which 3,500 men were killed and 67 guns were lost; the British casualties numbered 589, with 15 killed. But the fact is that no battle worth the name was fought at Aliwal. It was only small scrimmage. But something was required to be done for Harry Smith to cover his loss of reputation at Baddowal. "Aliwal was the *battle of despatch*, for none of us knew we had fought a battle until the particulars appeared in a document, which did more than justice to every one concerned," wrote Dr Andrew Adams.

Aliwal was a signal victory for the British but a storm was gathering at Sobraon north of Ferozepur. 30,000 soldiers of the Khalsa with 67 pieces of heavy artillery and over 200 light swivel guns, had recrossed the Satluj, over which a *Bridge of Boats* had been constructed.¹ A *tele-depont* had been thrown in front of it with the finest military skill. The Sikh armies had entrenched themselves firmly on the left bank of the Satluj under the command of Tej Singh. The main cavalry battalions and the dreaded *Ghorcharas* under Lal Singh were stationed across the

1. Under the instructions from the Duke of Wellington Lord Ellenborough had ordered this bridge to be built, in 1844. He wrote from Calcutta on May 9, 1844 to Duke, "I expect that by the end of December (1844) there will be on the Sutlej seventy boats of about 35 Tons each containing for its equipment as a pantoon. This will bridge the Sutlej anywhere, and when not so used they will convey troops up and down, and save us an enormous charge for the hire of boats."

river beyond Harike, a few miles to the right of the Khalsa encampment.

Gulab Singh's Treachery

The news of the Sikh reverse at Aliwal had further emboldened Gulab Singh to execute his nefarious designs. He threatened the Darbar chiefs with the dire consequences of their action and made them stand in mortal fear of their lives. But the army leaders were away and those who remained at Lahore, demanded his expulsion. It was, however, too late. Rani Jindan, the Queen mother of Maharaja Dalip Singh, and the Darbar having been won over by Dogra machinations, stood demoralised; and reluctantly they acquiesced in what he did. A secret understanding was arrived at between Gulab Singh and the British that the Darbar would openly disavow the acts of the Army and that Maharaja Dalip Singh would be allowed to retain his nominal sovereignty, provided the British forces were allowed to occupy the Capital of the Sikhs unopposed.¹

Thus with ignominious treachery and deceit, were impelled the lives of the valiant soldiers of the Khalsa by their Prime Minister, and thus was fought the battle of Sobraon. It is clear that Gulab Singh's perfidy was known to the chiefs of the Darbar and perhaps the commanders, who led the army, had an inkling of it but the soldiers and the regimental committees at Sobraon had no knowledge of it. The conduct of Lal Singh and Tej Singh, during the course of operations, cannot be explained otherwise.²

Battle of Sobraon—February 10, 1846

On the left bank of the Satluj, at Sobraon, the Sikh army had established itself on a strong position. It was resolved by the British Commanders to attack that post as soon

1. *Punjab on the Eve of the Sikh War* —H. R. Gupta, pp. LXXX-JI
Anglo Sikh Relations—Bikramajit Hasrat pp. 278-279.

2. *British India*—Vol. II, J. M. Ludlow, p. 145
Havelock A. Forbes, p. 71.

Anglo Sikh Relations —Bikramajit Hasrat, pp. 278-279.

as General Smith and the victors of Aliwal should form a junction with the army, and when large artillery and other heavy ordnance would arrive from Delhi, the strange want of proper preparation, which has hitherto characterised the councils and operations of the British authorities, still prevailed.

The English were allowed with a very small force of artillery, consisting of field-pieces, light guns and howitzers, to march against entrenchments covered with guns of the heaviest calibre, worked by the most skilful artillerymen that any native power in India had ever possessed. But, it was absolutely necessary to wait for a supply from the arsenal at Delhi before the strong position of Sobraon could be assaulted. It was unfortunate that Tej Singh did not conceive the manoeuvre to march to Delhi and make an easy capture of the stores upon which the British then relied to win the war.

Sixty-seven pieces of artillery were in the trenches of the Sikhs. The greater part of the infantry were within the defences. The cavalry, under Lal Singh, was secluded to the positions along the river Satluj, by the British cavalry under the gallant and skilful generals Thackwell and Cureton. Lord Gough says that 20,000 men would exceed the actual number. The Sikhs themselves afterwards stated their actual amounted to 37,000. Though the entrenchments were not dug in accordance with the strategy of war yet excessive labour put on them strengthened the position. Hurbon, a Spanish officer and Mouton, a Frenchman, aided the defence. But the haughty pride of the Sikh persisted on measures which these officers opposed.¹

The battle commenced on the 10th of February. Before dawn a surprise was made on a post called Rode Walla or the post of observation. The post, which the British had allowed, from sheer negligence on the part of the superior officers, to fall into the hands of the Sikhs just as they had allowed to defences of Sobraon to become formidable.

1. *History of the Sikh*—Cunningham, p. 282

Commander-in-Chief to Governor, 13 February, 1843.

without any efforts to retard or molest the Sikhs. They were waiting for guns and stores which had not yet been received.

After the possession of Rode-Walla, the battle began. It was an action, exceedingly complicated and the generalship of both sides was regarded as exceedingly defective. There was a lack of strategy, concentrated authority and guidance on the part of the Sikhs and similar deficiencies existed on the English side. Impatience and impetuosity caused the sacrifice of many lives, although the strategic attack could be effected. After all the delay, guns of sufficient magnitude were wanting in the hour of action and the infantry's assault was precipitated upon the formidable batteries without having been silenced by those of the Britishers. The English infantry were formed into line for the attack as if the whole face of the trenches had been equally assailable. After all, the men were obliged to crowd together in wedges or columns and penetrate the gaps made in entrenchments by the English artillery.¹

The Sikhs Hacked Mercilessly

The difficulty of entering the trenches was great. The Sikhs guarded battery and every fortification with fierce courage, giving and receiving no quarter, cutting down and hacking mercilessly, the wounded fell on the ground. Long and furious was the conflict and never did men fight and fall more bravely than the Khalsa soldiery.

Tej Singh's Treachery

Tej Singh was not the son of the Land of the Five rivers. He was not loyal. He hailed from Ekri in the pargana of Sardhana in Meerut District, who became a willing tool in the hands of the British Government. Being a foreigner and a mere soldier of fortune, he was ready to do anything for the glittering gold. He was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Khalsa Army in September, 1845, when Lal Singh became the Prime Minister after the

1. Gough's *Despatch*, 13 February, 1846, pp. XXXI.

death of Sardar Jawahar Singh. It was due to his planned treachery that the British escaped a disaster at Ferozeshah and were able to win the final victory at Sobraon.¹

After the recurring vicissitudes of battle, Sikhs were pushed back from all their defences, rallying and fighting as they slowly retired. It became necessary to cross the river and they had not taken proper pains to maintain the communications in their rear. An excellent *Bridge of Boats* had been constructed but treacherous Tej Singh, who ran away at the beginning of the assault, broke the centre boat of the chain. Accordingly, when the retreating force came to that point, they stopped or threw themselves into the river and endeavoured to escape by swimming.

Slaughter of the Sikhs at the Bridge of Boats

As the retreating army retired to the *Bridge of Boats*, they were cut down in great numbers by the pursuing troopers and on the bridge were exposed to volleys of musketry, flights of fiery rockets and showers of vertical grape—it was a carnage—a carnage most horrible for human arms to inflict or human eyes to witness; multitudes perished in the river, piles lay dead upon the bridge, round-shot crashed and bursting shells rent the bridge itself, and masses of the dead and dying sank together into the flood which ran red with human gore.

Sikhs Fought to the Last Man

The level of Satluj rose that day by seven inches, thus rendering the efforts of the fugitives to ford the river more perilous than they could have expected. Some fought their way along the banks and reached fords well known to them. And in this way many thousands escaped to the opposite bank. They reassembled and took position at a distant elevation, but some dispersed and others continued their flight to Lahore.

1. *Correspondence-Anglo Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh pp. 70, 71, 80-82.

Loss of the English

The English suffered heavily; many were ill after the battle from excessive fatigue and fever, arising from their exertions. Under the cannonade and in the storm, the loss was heavy. Major-General Sir R. Dick died of a wound, received in the entrenchments. He was a gallant old Waterloo officer. Major-General Gilbert was slightly wounded and of the officers, killed and wounded, most suffered due to the extraordinary courage they displayed. Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock (the future hero of Lucknow) had a miraculous escape. A ball entered the saddle-cloth, killing his horse without inflicting any injury.¹

Criticism

The tidings of the victory at the battle of Sobraon did not cause much rejoicing as might be expected abroad or in India. It was indeed a great relief, as was also that of the battle of Aliwal but there existed much dissatisfaction regarding the conduct of the whole campaign and there was a disposition to throw more than the share of the blame upon Sir Hugh Gough while Sir Robert Peel and his government were assiduous in screening from censure Sir Henry Hardinge. Both were favourites of the Duke of Wellington because he knew the noble gallantry of these men and their masterly strategic skill while serving in the highest commands. The public were not, however, satisfied by even the military testimony of His Grace, much more than by the special pleading of the plausible bayonet.

It was obvious that a great deal had been left unthought of by both the heroes of the war. Some of the most efficient soldiers and officers in the British service had perished, who in all probability would have been preserved, had the campaign in all its aspects, civil, political and military been conducted as it ought to have been. Guns, ammunition, supplies, were all wanting; Delhi had been left exposed to a coup, if Tej Singh had been a skilful enemy, or loyal. Egregious blunders had been com-

1. *Correspondence-Anglo Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh pp1 97-100.

mitted, vast quantities of baggage were lost to an inferior enemy; infantry attacked a wide area of trenches in line although these trenches bristled with the heaviest ordnance and when every officer and soldier knew that attack in column would not only have spared the men but more easily have conducted to success. The management of the campaign did not even improve as blunders and their consequences were developed.

The Sikhs had seized an important post just before the battle of Sobraon. That place was permitted to assume strength, which had a Wellington, a Napoleon, or a Havelock commanded would, by skilful manoeuvre, have been prevented; and at least infantry was compelled to storm entrenchments with the bayonet, the guns of which were far from being disabled because there was no longer an adequate supply, either of artillery or musketry ammunition. Had the fire of the cannon and musketry upon the retreating force on the *Bridge of the Boats*, on the fords and on the fordless river, been as full and continuous as it was well-directed, it would have been destroyed. After Sobraon, British armies marched on to Lahore and occupied it on the 20th February, 1846. Lord Hardinge decided not to annex the Punjab and four reasons have been put forward for the same. It was thought that the existence of a Hindu State between Afghanistan and British India would be advantageous to the Company. Another reason was that the annexation of the Punjab would not be profitable on account of the large amount of money that would be required to be spent on the newly-acquired province. Another reason given is that Lord Hardinge doubted the strength of the English to occupy the whole country. Still another reason that is put forward is that the English did not annex the Punjab out of their respect for the memory of Ranjit Singh, who was their faithful ally for many decades. The fact is that Sir Henry Hardinge succeeded in defeating the Sikhs, but it seemed arduous to him to completely annihilate the power of the Sikhs. Hardinge, wise and astute as he was, decided not to annex the Punjab because the means at his disposal were meagre in order to accomplish the tremendous task.

The following treaty was concluded between the British Government and State of Lahore on the 9th March, 1846 :

The Treaty of 1846

Whereas the treaty of amity and concord, which was concluded between the British Government and the late Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the ruler of Lahore, in 1809, was broken by the unprovoked aggression on the British provinces of the Sikh army, in December last; and whereas, on that occasion, by the proclamation dated the 13th of December, the territories then in the occupation of the Maharaja of Lahore, on the left of British bank of the river Satluj, were confiscated and annexed to the British provinces; and since that time hostile operations have been prosecuted by the two Governments, the one against the other, which have resulted in the occupation of Lahore by the British troops; and where it has been determined that upon certain conditions, peace shall be re-established between the two Governments, the following treaty of peace between the Honourable English East India Company and Maharaja Dalip Singh Bahadur and his children, heirs, and successors has been concluded on the part of the Honourable Company by Frederick Currie, Esq., and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in them; by the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., one of Her Britannic Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-General, appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies; and, on the part of his Highness the Maharaja Dalip Singh, by Bhai Ram Singh, Raja Lal Singh, Sardar Tej Singh, Sardar Chattar Singh Attariwala, Sardar Ranjodh Singh Majithia, Diwan Dina Nath, and Faqir Nur-ud-din, vested with full powers and authority on the part of his Highness.

Article 1.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part and Maharaja Dalip Singh, his heirs and successors on the other.

Article 2.—The Maharaja of Lahore renounces for him-

self, his heirs and successors, all claim to, or connection with the territories lying to the south of the river Satluj, and engages never to have any concern with those territories or the inhabitants thereof.

Article 3.—The Maharaja cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories and rights, in the Doab or country, hill and plain, situated between the rivers Beas and Satluj.

Article 4.—The British Government having demanded from the Lahore State, as indemnification for the expenses of the war in addition to the cession of territory described in Article 3, payment of one and a half crores of rupees; and the Lahore Government being unable to pay the whole of this sum at this time, or to give security satisfactory to the British Government for its eventual payment; the Maharaja cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of rupees, all his forts, territories, rights, and interests in the hill countries, which are situated between the rivers Beas and Indus including the provinces of Kashmir and Hazara.

Article 5.—The Maharaja will pay to the British Government the sum of fifty lacs of rupees on or before the ratification of this treaty.

Article 6.—The Maharaja engages to disband the mutinous troops of the Lahore army, taking from them their arms; and his Highness agrees to reorganise the regular, or *Ain*, regiments of infantry, upon the system, and according to the regulations, as to pay and allowances, observed in the time of late Maharaja Ranjit Singh. The Maharaja further engages to pay up all arrears to the soldiers that are discharged under the provisions of this article.

Article 7.—The regular army of the Lahore State shall henceforth be limited to 25 battalions of infantry, consisting of 800 bayonets each with 12,000 cavalry; This number at no time to be exceeded without the concurrence of the British Government. Should it be necessary at any time, for any special cause, that this force should be increased, the cause shall be fully explained to the British Government; and when the special necessity shall

have passed, the regular troops shall be again reduced to the standard specified in the former clause of this article.

Article 8.—The Maharaja will surrender to the British Government all the guns, thirty-six in number, which have been pointed against the British troops and which, having been placed on the right bank of the river Satluj, were not captured at the battle of Sobraon.

Article 9.—The control of the rivers Beas and Satluj with the continuations of the latter river, commonly called the Chara and Panjnad, to the confluence of the Indus Mithankot and the control of the Indus from Mithankot to the borders of Baluchistan, shall, in respect to tolls and ferries, rest with the British Government. The provisions of this article shall not interfere with the passage of boats belonging to the Lahore Government on the said rivers, for the purposes of traffic or the conveyance of passengers up and down their course. Regarding the ferries between the two countries respectively, at the several '*ghats*' of the said rivers, it is agreed that the British Government, after defraying all the expenses of management and establishments, shall account to the Lahore Government for one-half of the net profits of the ferry collections. The provisions of this article have no reference to the ferries on that part of the river Satluj which forms the boundary of Bahawalpur and Lahore respectively.

Article 10.—If the British Government should, at any time, desire to pass troops through the territories of his Highness the Maharaja for the protection of the British territories, or those of their allies, the British troops shall, on such special occasion, due notice being given, be allowed to pass through the Lahore territories. In such case, the officers of the Lahore State will afford facilities in providing supplies and boats for the passage of rivers; and the British Government will pay the full price of all such provisions and boats and will make fair compensation for all private property that may be damaged. The British Government will moreover observe all due consideration to the religious feelings of the inhabitants of those tracts through which the army may pass.

Article 11.—The Maharaja engages, never to take or re-

by Bhai Ram Singh, Raja Lal Singh, Sardar Tej Singh, Sardar Chattar Singh Attariwala, Sardar Ranjodh Singh Majithia, Diwan Dina Nath, and Fakir Nur-ud-din, on the part of the Maharaja Dalip Singh; and the said treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor-General, and by that of His Highness Maharaja Dalip Singh.

Done at Lahore, this 9th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1846, corresponding with the 10th day of Rabi-ul-awal Hijri, and ratified on the same day.

THE INTERREGNUM

By the Treaty of Lahore the British got the Cis-Satluj States, the Jullundur Doab and Hazara. The Sikhs were to pay an indemnity of one and a half *crores* of rupees. They were able to pay only half a *crore* out of their treasury and for the balance of it, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was sold to Raja Gulab Singh¹. The Khalsa Army was reduced to 25 battalions of infantry and twelve thousand cavalry. The Sikhs were deprived of all those guns, which were used by them against the English. The Lahore Darbar agreed not to employ subjects of any European State without the concurrence of the British Government. Passage was to be allowed to the British troops through the Punjab. Maharaja Dalip Singh was recognised as the ruler of Punjab. A British force was to be stationed at Lahore and was to be withdrawn only by the end of the year. Henry Lawrence was appointed as the British Resident at Lahore².

After the Treaty of Lahore, things did not work smoothly. Lal Singh and other Sikh leaders were opposed to the handing over of Jammu and Kashmir to Gulab Singh and the territory was given to him only after the intervention of the British troops. Rani Jind Kaur and Lal Singh were accused of fomenting the trouble. When Raja Lal Singh was installed as Chief Minister of the Punjab, he changed his attitude towards the transfer of Kashmir to

1. The eldest of the three brothers, known as the Jammu Rajas or the Dogra Brothers. The title of Raja was conferred on him in 1822, by Maharaja Ranjit Singh.

2. *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars* —Gough, pp. 141-142.
Correspondence-Anglo Sikh Wars —Ganda Singh, p. 101.

Raja Gulab Singh. He instigated its governor, Shaikh Imam-ud-din not to hand over the Valley to Gulab Singh, the new Maharaja. On enquiry, Imam-ud-din submitted proofs to Lawrence that he opposed to British for occupation of the Valley under Raja Lal Singh's instructions. Lal Singh was tried in open court at Lahore, found unanimously guilty on December 4, 1846 and was immediately exiled to Banaras, with forfeiture of his jagirs.

Second Treaty with Lahore of 1846

After a few days' deliberations, relative to the means of forming a government at Lahore, the remaining members of the Darbar, in concert with all the Sardars and chiefs of the State, solicited the interference and aid of the British Government for the maintenance of an administration, and the protection of the Maharaja Dalip Singh during the minority of his Highness.

This solicitation by the Darbar and Chiefs has led to the temporary modification of the relations between the British Government and that of Lahore, established by the treaty of the 9th March of the present year.

The terms and conditions of this modification are set forth in the following articles of agreement.

Articles of Agreement concluded between the British Government and the Lahore Darbar on 16th December 1846

Whereas the Lahore Darbar and the principal Chiefs and Sardars of the State have, in express terms, communicated to the British Government their anxious desire that the Governor-General should give his aid and his assistance to maintain the administration of the Lahore State during the minority of Maharaja Dalip Singh, and have declared this measure to be indispensable for the maintenance of the government: And whereas the Governor-General has, under certain conditions, consented to give the aid and assistance solicited, the following articles of agreement, in modification of the articles of agreement executed at Lahore on the 11th March last, have been concluded, on the part of the British Government, By Frederick Currie, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, and Lt.-Colonel Henry

Montgomery Lawrence, C. B., Agent to the Governor-General, North-West Frontier by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in them by the Right Honourable Viscount Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor-General, and on the part of his Highness Maharaja Dalip Singh, Diwan Dina Nath, Fakir Nur-ud-din, Rai Kishan Chand, Sardar Ranjodh Singh Majithia, Sardar Attar Singh Kaliwala, Bhai Nidhan Singh, Sardar Kahn Singh Majithia, Sardar Shamsheer Singh, Sardar Lal Singh Muraria, Sardar Kehar Singh Sindhanwala, Sardar Arjun Singh Rangranglia, acting with the unanimous consent and concurrence of the Chiefs and Sardars of the State assembled at Lahore.

Article 1.—All and every part of the treaty of peace between the British Government and the State of Lahore, bearing date the 9th day of March 1846, except in so far as it may be temporarily modified in respect to clause 15 of the said treaty by this engagement, shall remain binding upon the two Governments.

Article 2.—A British officer, with an efficient establishment of assistants, shall be appointed by the Governor-General to remain at Lahore, which officer shall have full authority to direct and control all matters in every department of the State.

Article 3.—Every attention shall be paid, in conducting the administration, to the feelings of the people, to preserving the national institutions and customs, and to maintain the just rights of all classes.

Article 4.—Changes in the mode and details of administration shall not be made, except when found necessary for effecting the objects set forth in the fore-going clause, and for securing the just dues of the Lahore Government. These details shall be conducted by native officers as at present, who shall be appointed and Superintendent by a Council of Regency, composed of leading Chiefs and Sardars, acting under the control and guidance of the British Resident.

Article 5.—The following persons shall in the first instance constitute the Council of Regency, viz., Sardar Tej Singh, Sardar Sher Singh Attariwala, Diwan Dina Nath, Fakir Nur-ud-din, Sardar Ranjodh Singh Majithia, Bhai

Nihan Singh, Sardar Atar Singh Kaliwala, Sardar Sham Singh Sindhanwala; and no change shall be made in the persons thus nominated, without the consent of the British Resident, acting under the orders of the Governor-General.

Article 6.—The administration of the country shall be conducted by this Council of Regency in such manner as may be determined on by themselves in consultation with the British Resident, who shall have full authority to direct and control the duties of every department.

Article 7.—A British force of such strength and numbers and in such positions, as the Governor-General may think fit shall remain at Lahore for the protection of the Maharaja and the preservation of the peace of the country.

Article 8.—The Governor-General shall be at liberty to occupy with British soldiers any fort or military post in the Lahore territories, the occupation of which may be deemed necessary by the British Government for the security of the capital or for maintaining the peace of the country.

Article 9.—The Lahore State shall pay to the British Governments twenty-two *lacs* of new Nanakshahi rupees of full tale and weight per annum for the maintenance of this force and to meet the expenses incurred by the British Government; such sum to be paid by two instalments, or 13 *lacs* and 20,000 in May or June, and 8 *lacs* and 80,000 in November or December of each year.

Article 10.—Inasmuch as it is fitting that her Highness the Maharani, the mother of Maharaja Dalip Singh, should have a proper provision made for the maintenance of herself and dependents. The sum of 1 *lac* and 50,000 rupees shall be set apart annually for that purpose and shall be at her Highness's disposal.

Article 11.—The provision of this engagement shall have effect during the minority of his Highness Maharaja Dalip Singh, and shall cease and terminate on his Highness attaining the full age of 16 years or on the 4th September of the year 1854; but it shall be competent to the Governor-General to cause the arrangement to cease at any period prior to the coming of age of His Highness at

which the Governor-General and the Lahore Darbar may be satisfied that the interposition of the British Government is no longer necessary for maintaining the government of His Highness of Maharaja.

This agreement, consisting of eleven articles, was settled and executed at Lahore, by the officers and Chiefs and Sardars above named, on the 16th day of December 1846.

On the 16th December, 1846¹, this treaty known as the Treaty of Bhairowal² was executed by the British Government with the Lahore Darbar. By this treaty, the council of Regency consisting of eight Pro-British Sikh Chiefs was instituted and the Council was to act under the advice and guidance of the British Resident.³ A British force was to be maintained at Lahore and the Sikhs were to pay Rs. 22 lacs to defray the expenses every year. This arrangement was to continue upto 1854, when Maharaja Dalip Singh was to attain the age of puberty. It was presumed by the Darbar that the British Government will not meddle with the internal administration of the Sikh Kingdom—but in all cases which may be referred to the British Government, the Governor-General will give the aid of his advice for the furtherance of the interest of the Sikhs. But the picture was otherwise, as by this treaty, the Britishers became virtually the masters of the Punjab.⁴

During the years 1847 and 1848, many measures were carried out in the name of reforms, which were against the interest of the Sikh nobility, who greatly resented. The disbanded soldiers of the Khalsa army were already discontented, because of the deprevation of means of livelihood. The Sikhs had bitterly resented their defeat particularly because it was due to the treachery of their leaders. After the banishment of Lal Singh, Sardar Tej Singh was the Chief henchman of the first Anglo-Sikh War and now he was the Chief advisor of Henry Law-

1. *Correspondence Anglo-Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh p. 106.

2. Situated, on the right bank of the river Beas, in Amritsar District.

3. *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*—Gough, pp. 145-151.

4. *Correspondence Anglo Sikh Wars* —Ganda Singh, pp. 482-

rence. In recognition of his services, the title of Raja, was conferred upon him on the 7th August, 1847. On the other hand, Rani Jind Kaur was accused of conspiracy and was sent away to Chunar and her deportation and the exaltation of Tej Singh were highly resented by the Sikhs.¹ Henry Lawrence could no longer tolerate the presence of Maharani Jind Kaur. Her inquisitiveness to outmanoeuvre the secret-British plans, her skilfulness in the use of her pen, her amazing ability to act with energy and spirit, and, above all, her intense patriotism could not be tolerated by the British.

Second Anglo-Sikh War

Under these circumstances, the Second Anglo-Sikh War commenced almost immediately after the first had concluded. These elements had begun to work which burst forth in an eruption of desolation and blood-shed in the Punjab once more. As soon as the Treaty of Bhairawal had been concluded, the British Government settled down with the conviction that, in the eyes of the Sikhs, the English were irresistible.

Chattar Singh Revolts

The fort of Gobindgarh² at Amritsar was occupied on July 29th, 1848, by the orders of the British Resident. He further sent out detachments of troops to the eastern districts in search of Political suspects. Captain James Abbott, the assistant of the British Resident instigated the Muslims of Hazara against Sardar Chattar Singh Attariwala.³

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1. Meantime the Sikh Chiefs had yielded to the pressure of Henry Lawrence and Frederick Currie.
 2. The fort of Gobindgarh, in Amritsar District, situated on the Grand Trunk Road, was built by Maharaja Ranjit Singh, in 1807-1808. It was strongly built, but it had weakness in as much as its interior was quite visible from outside, which was against the science of fortification of these days.
 3. He was the son of Jodh Singh, a member of the younger family of Attari. During the reign of Ranjit Singh, Chattar Singh had title hold over the affairs of administration. But his family had gained interference in the Darbar. In 1843, his daughter, Tej Kaur was betrothed to Maharaja Dalip Singh.

The Sikh Governor of Hazara was forced to revolt¹. Since the British Government had decided upon pulling down the structure of the independence of the Punjab, Sardar Chattar Singh, whose daughter had been engaged to Maharaja Dalip Singh, could not be allowed by them to gain greater strength by the proposed matrimonial alliance of the House of Attari with the royal family².

On August 6th, 1848, the Muslims of Hazara assembled in great numbers and surrounded the town of Haripur³, where Sardar Chattar Singh encamped. In self-defence, the Sardar directed the Lahore troops to bring guns. But he had to leave Hazara and to move towards Hassan Abdal (Panja Sahib, and Attock.⁴ Since the outbreak at Multan, Abbott declared that a conspiracy was being hatched up by Chattar Singh Attariwala to lead a general rising against the British. He suspected the Sardar of high treason and cut off all connections with him⁵. The Hazara rising was the result of the stupidity and arrogance of James Abbott. Dalhousie wrote to Hobhouse on 7th September, 1848, "It is doubtful who rose in revolt first. The Resident blames Capt. Abbott and says his distrust of Chattar Singh was the cause of the army becoming agitated, because they thought Captain Abbott wanted to destroy them by means of raising the Muhammadan population. . . ."

Dewan Mulraj Suspected

The next indication of opposition was made by Mulraj⁶, the Governor of Multan.⁷ He had in various ways given

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1. *Punjab on the Eve of First Sikh War*—H. R. Gupta, p. 320.
 2. *Lahore Political Diaries Vol. IV*—pp. 161, 166-67, 169-175.
 3. Havelian 13, miles, Campbelpore, 22, miles, Rawalpindi 50, miles.
 4. *Correspondence—Anglo Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh, p. 140.
 5. The Dairies, under dates: 28, 29 May, 4, 5 and 6 July, 1858. *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*—Gough, pp. 193-196.
 6. He was the son of Deman Sawan Mal, the late Governor of Multan, who was shot in revenge by a condemned criminal on September 29, 1844.
 7. 214 miles from Lahore, 111 miles from Montgomery and 95 miles from Jhang.

offence to the Lahore Darbar, and was averse to the English influence in that Darbar. Remonstrances having proved ineffectual, Mulraj was addressed in terms which plainly intimated that unless his conduct was shaped in conformity with behests of the Lahore Darbar, force against him would be employed. But "it was theoretically the duty of the Sikh government at Lahore to punish Mulraj, who had risen against the British Government, and at any rate, till they proved unable or unwilling to demand repatriation for the outrage on British subjects, the British Government would legally have no right to interfere."¹

Mulraj responded by resigning the governorship of Multan and expressing his intention to consign it into the hands of any authorised person or persons sent to receive the charge of his governorship.

Whether this was a pre-arranged manoeuvre between Mulraj and the opponents of the English in the Lahore Darbar, it is difficult to determine; it is probable, however, that had the Sikh officers been sent to receive the resignation of Dewan Mulraj, there would have been no trouble. But it is definite on record that Dewan Mulraj was being coerced to surrender the governorship. A crore of rupees had been demanded from him and even higher rates of revenue. He was governing the province of Multan with all the popularity of his capable father's system.²

The English Resident ordered Mr. Agnew of the Civil Service and Lt. Anderson of the Bombay Army, to accompany Sardar Kahan Singh³, who was nominated to the governorship of Multan. "General Kahan Singh Mann,

1. *History of British India*—P.E. Roberts, p. 341.

2. Richmond to Currie, October 16, 1844.

3. Kahan Singh Mann was the son of Sardar Hukam Singh, village Sarhala, Thana Mahilpur, District Hoshiarpur. He was appointed commandant of Maharaja Ranjit Singh's body-guard at a comparatively young age. Later he rose to the rank of a general. The Maharaja held his family in high esteem and often used to say that Mann Sardars were his "Wari-da-Tewar" i.e. best suit of clothes.

History of the Sikhs—Griffin, pp. 26, 38, 40.

will be almost nominal and the administration will be really conducted by the British Agent (Mr. Agnew), though in the name and through the instrumentality of the General and the subordinates.¹

Five hundred and thirty irregulars were sent as an escort. Mulraj made a show of surrendering his governorship, but made pretexts of delay.²

Mr. Agnew and Lt. Anderson Assassinated

In the meantime insurrections began in the city and Mr. Agnew and Lt. Anderson were assassinated, which "was the signal for an insurrection that led to a general rising of the military classes, a reassemblage of the old Khalsa Army and a second trial with the British troops," wrote Sir Alfred Lyall³. Mulraj, affected to be no party to his crime, but averred that he had no power to punish the perpetrators, who were popularly upheld. The British Government charged Dewan Mulraj that he was personally responsible for foul and treacherous murder, in which he was an accomplice. If he were not the original plotter of it, he undoubtedly abetted the murderers after the deed.

On the 17th of April, the governorship was formally surrendered by Mulraj and the object of the British officer seemed to be accomplished. On the 18th, however, they were attacked and desperately wounded; it was, at first, supposed from a sudden impulse on the part of the soldiery of Mulraj but it was afterwards known to be the result of a foul play of the British Government. The officers accompanied by the new governor, were carried to a small fort outside the town. A fire was opened upon the place from Multan but it was ineffectual.

A few days afterwards, the fort was attacked by the soldiers of Mulraj; the Sikhs who garrisoned the place and among whom were the escort, opened the gates, and

1. Letter of April 6, 1848 to Henry Elliot by Mr. Currie.

2. *Correspondence - Anglo Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh, p. 79.
History of the Sikhs—Cunningham, p. 243.

3. *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India*
Alfred Layall, p. 325.

the assailants entered, burning with rage, and demanding vengeance upon their usurpers. The insurgents called a council of the chiefs. The Muslims swore on the *Quran* and the Sikhs on the *Granth* to stand by Dewan Mulraj and invested him with the leadership of the revolt by fastening a '*Kangana*' or bracelet of war. Lt. Anderson was in dying state, but Mr. Agnew badly wounded. Both officers were murdered. Intelligence reached Lahore and a force of three thousand cavalry and some infantry was immediately dispatched, under Sardar Sher Singh Attariwala, to curb down the insurrection at Multan¹.

Lt. Edwardes Reinforced Multan

There happened to be upon the Indus, at the head of a small force, a young and gallant British officer who had served with distinction upon the staff of Lord Gough. Lt. Edwardes was renowned for his clever contributions to the Indian Press on the state of Company's territory, civil and military. He received the message at Dera Fateh Khan on April 22, and within 22 days, he made the necessary preparations, Raised levies from the border tribes, called Courtlandt from Bannu and crossed the Indus.

At the same time, Colonel Van Cortlandt², a distinguished officer of the Company, occupied Dera Ismael Khan³ and the adjoining territory. Lt. Edwardes had already written to the Khan of Bahawalpur, requesting him to make such a movement of troops, as would prevent Mulraj from failing upon either Edwardes or Cortlandt.

Chief of Bahawalpur

The Khan of Bahawalpur's⁴ territories were so situated as enabled him to effect a military disposition to accom-

1. Government of India to Resident, March 10, 1848 pp. JLI, 1849 Dalhousie to Hob house, 8 March, 1848.

2. He was the son of Colonel Cortlandt of the 19th Dragoons and was born in 1814. He was put in charge of two battalions and one brigade of cavalry with which he had served in the Hazara Distt.

3. 89, miles from Bannu.

4. 56, miles, from Multan and 34, miles from Dera Nawab.

plish this object. The Khan made the required demonstration. When Edwardes had crossed the Indus, he had left a detachment of three hundred horses to protect the collection at Leih¹, where, on the 18th of May, they were attacked by a body of cavalry exceeding their own in number, sent against them from Multan, with 10 light field-guns (zamburaks). The British force so manoeuvred as to attain a good position, although under the fire of the zamburaks, and then charged brilliantly, dispersing the Sikh forces at Multan, and capturing their guns.

Colonel Cortlandt was as prompt as Edwardes in the measures taken by him. He left the fort of Dera Ismael Khan and had proceeded by the base of the hills southwards. On his route, he was joined by a Bilochi Chief with 100 of his men. Cortlandt detached these, with a portion of his own troops, against the fortress of Sangrur, westward of the Indus. The commander of the fort refused the summons of surrender, and for six hours offered a gallant resistance. He then brought off the garrison by a skilful manoeuvre,¹ reaching Multan in safety².

Lt. Edwardes & Col. Cortlandt Effected a Junction

Lt. Edwardes and Colonel Cortlandt effected a junction of their small forces and on the 20th of May, were attacked by a division of the insurgents. The united forces of Cortlandt and Edwardes were so disposed that not more than 1500 men could be brought into action, while the Sikhs numbered 3,000. The number of artillery forces of each was about equal. Edwards was, however, joined by body of irregular cavalry and a party of Biloches which brought up the British force more nearly to an equality of numbers. The Sikhs in British pay, showed no inclination to fraternise with the Sikh army, although the calculations of Dewan Mulraj were based upon such an expectation. There was a heavy slaughter on both sides³.

1. District Muzaffargarh, 37 miles from Nawan Kot.

2. *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*—Gough, pp. 166-67.

The Life of John Nicholson—J. T. Trotter, p. 75.

3. *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*—Gough, pp. 116-167, 172.

Correspondence-Anglo Sikh Wars—Ganda Singh, pp. 223-24.

New Forces Raised

After his engagement, Edwards, acting upon the authority which he possessed as a Civil Officer of the Company, demanded a reinforcement from the Khan of Bahawalpur and in the meantime recruited his force comprising Sikhs, Biloches, Afghans and men from the hills of various tribes very actively. Colonel Cortlandt was less equal to the part assigned to him; but although senior in military rank, the civil functions of the former gave him special and, in some respects, superior authority. The Khan of Bahawalpur responded to the demands of Edwardes, and a plan was devised for a junction of their troops.

The English Crossed the Indus

The British crossed the Indus on the 10th and 11th of June. Mulraj, the popular leader of Punjabis, was informed by his spies of every movement and the intelligence was conveyed to him with astonishing rapidity. He accordingly marched with a large force to intercept either army and beat both. On the 14th, he crossed the Chenab, leaving a considerable force on the other bank. This detachment marched to Khan Ghur, but on the following day crossed the river, being surprised, at that place by the advance of Edwardes' irregulars. The Khalsa troops had barely time to cross the Chenab when the scouts of the English galloped into Khan Ghur. The Sikhs, instead of receiving Edward's force at that place and practically attempting the scheme of Mulraj, encamped on the opposite side of the river.

This delay and timidity was fatal; for Edwardes was soon joined by the infantry and a portion of the Artillery of Cortlandt, whose cavalry were scouring the country. The situation of affairs became now interesting and important, for the Bahawalpur forces had arrived on the Sikhs' side of the Chenab, within 12 miles. Edwardes made a retrogressive movement, so as to place himself opposite to the Bahawalpur encampment. The Khalsa army advanced to within four miles of that position.¹

1. *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*—Gough, p. 169.

In the course of the night, the raw levies of Edwardes contrived to cross the river in a very regular manner and within the dangerous proximity to the Khalsa's patrols but remained unmolested. On the 18th, early in the morning, Edwardes crossed with the remainder of his men, except the horse and artillery, which remained with Cortlandt on the opposite side for a more slow and safe transport across the river. Scarcely had Edwardes reached the opposite bank, than he was attacked by the Sikh army, which had been moving from Bagarrah, while he was forcing the passage¹.

This was a terrible action. The sun had hardly risen upon the river and swamp and undulating plains when the Khalsa army fell upon the motley crowd of the British levies and in such superior numbers that victory seemed certain. For nine hours the English officers resisted the onslaught. At last Cortlandt's guns were brought over and balanced the contest somewhat equal. Later in the day two regular regiments, belonging to Cortlandt's division, arrived with six guns and the Khalsa troops fled, leaving a large proportion of their troops upon the field, slain, wounded and prisoners with six guns and their entire baggage and ammunitions of war. But this rising had become a national one as already stated and the British Government were warranted in meeting it with all their power. On October 5th, Governor-General had made his famous declaration at Barrackpore (Calcutta), that unwarmed by precedent, uninfluenced by example, the Sikh nation has called for war and on my word, Sirs, they shall have it with vengeance." By this time the revolt had spread to some of the North western parts of the Punjab as well. By the misbehaviour of Captain James Abbot, the British Adviser of the Governor of Hazara, Sardar Chattar Singh Attariwala was compelled by him to take the hostile attitude. There were also revolts in Banu and Peshawar. The banishment of Rani Jindan, at this time, from the Punjab added fuel to the

1. *History of the British Empire and the East*—E.H. Nolan, p. 654.

fire¹.

Retreat of Mulraj to Multan

Mulraj retreated to Multan, followed by the British and the Khan of Bahawalpur, who had rendered hitherto but little assistance, and whose movements led to the suspicion that he had more sympathy with Mulraj than he dared to avow. On the 28th of June, Sikh brigade under the command of Sheikh-Imam-ud-din, which had been despatched by the Government of Lahore, arrived to reinforce the English. The whole army appeared before Multan, consisting of 1800 men².

Imam-ud-Din's Force Put Under the Command of Sher Singh

Imam-ud-din retired; the bulk of his force remained and was ultimately placed under the command of Sher Singh, son of Sardar Chattar Singh, governor of Hazara, on the side of the Maharaja Dalip Singh and the English but it was presumed by the British Government that in reality he was organizing a most perilous plot of treachery and treason against the British. However, Sher Singh maintained loyalty and was rapidly joined by another Sardar with troops.

Proclamation Against Mulraj

On July 22nd the Resident issued a proclamation of the British advance on Multan and the two Columns started on July 24th and 26th, a fortnight. Sir F. Currie had given orders for the move; but took about 25 days over it. The Nawab of Bahawalpur, General Cortlandt and Lt Edwardes remained before Multan, constantly skirmishing with the Sikhs, their force being inadequate for the reduction of the place but too strong to be easily beaten off.³

1. *Correspondence - Anglo Sikh Wars* -Ganda Singh, p. 125.

2 The (British) forces were: Rang Ram 8,000 to 10,000 trained troops: 10 guns. Daudputras 8,500 troops: 11 guns, Edwardes, 3,000 Irregular levies. Cortlandt 1,500 trained troops: 15 guns (*Multan District Gazetteer—1923—24*, p. 64).

3. Sir John Litler was of the opinion that the forces under the British officers and their allies, should be left as army

On the 13th of July, 1848, Edwardes warned his superiors that Sher Singh Attariwala was a traitor and was collecting to aid the revolt under cover of co-operation with the English¹.

On the 18th of August, Major-General Whish, a distinguished artillery officer, arrived with a force of 7,000 men and took command of the whole investing army. On the 12th of September, the place was bombarded and other operations were undertaken which prepared for the end of the struggle. On the 14th, Sher Singh marched from Multan with his division, consisting of the finest soldiers of the Sikh army. Mulraj was anxious for the withdrawal of the Sardar. Had he remained, it was probable that the forces sent by the English government against Mulraj would have failed².

An Evil Plot

Edwardes had contrived to ferment³ disputes between Dewan Mulraj and Sardar Sher Singh Attariwala by letters fabricated for the purpose of creating misunderstanding between them. Naturally, Dewan Mulraj began to think seriously about Sher Singh and thus Sher Singh was sadly disappointed at the suspicious attitude of Mulraj, who looked upon his movement with distrust and re-

observation, and no offensive operations undertaken against Multan until the general plans of the Sikhs became developed, and the English had gathered a main army sufficiently strong for complete suppression of revolt throughout the Sikh territories. The Commander-in-Chief had formed the same opinion independent of Sir John Litler's communications.

1. Either the higher officials did not credit the sagacious judgement of Lt. Edwardes, or they neglected to act upon it, Sher Singh had ample scope for maturing his plans, to desert the British Government, since the honour of his own family was at stake.
2. *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*,—Gough, pp. '80-180.
3. Aurangzeb was perhaps the predecessor of such evil plans to work against good, honest and patriot people like Dewan Mulraj by the British statesmen like Lt. Edwardes. Aurangzeb had contrived such letters against his brother Dara Shikoh to his general Khalil-ulla Khan. (See *Punjab Under the Great Muhgals*) Dr. B.S. Nijjar.

fused him admission into the fort of Multan. He was also deserted by his two colleagues Sardar Atar Singh Kalianwala and Sardar Shamsheer Singh Sindhanwala. In disgust Sher Singh marched away from Mulraj, on October 9th, to join his father Sardar Chattar Singh, the Governor of Hazara.

Multan Stormed

Whish was now at the head of a very large army, amounting to 15,000 British, European and native and 7,000 of the troops of the Chief of Bahawalpur and other allies. He had also 150 pieces of cannon. On the 2nd of January, 1849, Multan after a terrible cannonade, was stormed. The resistance was desperate, the Sikhs fighting as at Mudki, Ferozeshah and Sobraon with the tenacity of men and the ferocity of wild beasts. Late Ranjit Singh and his distinguished soldiers were well named, in the War-Cries "the Lion of the Punjab"¹ etc.

Mulraj, a Great Patriot

It was not until the 21st that the citadel was surrendered. Mulraj demanded terms of capitulation. General Whish would hear of nothing but an unconditional surrender. This was at last made and Dewan Mulraj with firmness and dignity, delivered himself as prisoner². He made no manifestation of grief, nor allowed depression to cloud his brow³. He bore himself with uncommon fortitude until he learnt that, banishment from his country but not death, was to be his doom. He then gave way to violent expressions of grief and despair and wanted to be executed in the country of his birth. He said "I am a murderer and I deserve a murderer's death."

When Porus was brought before Alexander and was

1. "Sher-e-Punjab, Zindabad".
"Singh Bahadur, Zindabad".

2. *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*—Gough, p. 203.

3. The Commission for the trial of Mulraj was: Mr. Mansel, C.C., Mr. Montgomery, C.S., and Colonel Penny. Mr. L. Rowing appeared for prosecution and Captain Hamilton for the defence.

asked to how he would like to be treated, his proud reply, like Dewan Mulraj, was that he wanted to be treated as a king. On account of bold reply, Alexander the Great made him the over Lord of his (porus') kingdom. In the similar situation Ahmed Shah Abdali had called "Farzand, Khan Bahadur, Rustam-e-Hind" Mirmanu, in 1752 and had put his own turban on his head for a bold reply that he liked also to be treated as "the King treats a King." But Mulraj a great Punjabi was treated otherwise by the so called "the most civilized" nation of the world. In the trial, the sentence of death was pronounced by the Commission, presided over by Mr Mansel, was confirmed by the Governor-General, on a hint from the India Board. Accordingly Dalhousie informed the home authorities "if he could not be proved guilty, I think of sending him across the seas. The natives dread this punishment worse than death and we should avoid by it, the shedding of the blood¹." Mulraj, true to the Sikh Kingdom, died on his way to the Andamans (Kala-Pani) in August, 1851.

Unprecedented Carnage at Multan

Seldom did a conquered city presented so terrible a scene as that was witnessed in Multan. The dead and dying lay everywhere, and notwithstanding the cold season, the odour arising from putrescent corpses was intolerable. One of the first duties, which the British Generals felt bound to impose upon themselves, was the discovery of the bodies of their murdered countrymen, and their burial. The bodies discovered were cast into an obscure place² and covered with earth. Anderson's own regiment was among the troops who effected the conquest and their band played the dead march as they followed the remains of their comrades in arms. The coffins were deposited in a grave at the highest part of the fort, with demonstration of respect, and much manifestation of sor-

1. Dalhousie, 14th July, 1849.

2. Later this place began to be known as Khooni-Khoon (The bloody-well).

row for their loss and the cruelty which they had experienced.

On the 21st of November, 1848, Lord Gough joined the grand army at Saharun, a position from which he could march with nearly equal advantage upon any point of the territory where decisive events were likely to take place. But it was something unique in history that without issuing a declaration of war, the Punjab State was considered directly at war by a British, while its own officers were controlling and directing with full and final authority, all matters in every department of that state, its ruler, a minor, being, by treaty, their wards.

Battle of Ramnagar, November 22, 1848

The town of Ramnagar¹ lay upon the left bank of the Chenab, stretching to distance of a mile and a half from the stream. That place was the point of support and headquarters of Sher Singh, who had, as before related, left the vicinity of Multan. He had now decided upon a separate line of operations.

Besides the forces on the right bank of the river and on the island, the Sikhs had a strong body of troops on the left bank, which Lord Gough wanted to dislodge. The strength of the main position of Sher Singh at Ramnagar was very great. It was flanked on the side by the land in the river, on the other by a grove. Between the right bank and the island, the communication was maintained by boats with which the Sikhs were well supplied; they were a peculiar description of craft, suitable especially for the purpose. The ford (nullah), between the island and the left bank, was not very difficult to cross but the descent to it was steep.² The Chenab at this point was very wide from bank to bank. The river bed being extremely sandy, sand—banks were constantly forming and changing in its course splitting it up into channels, sometimes wet and

1. Situated on the Sialkot-Multan Road to the West of Wazirabad, down the river at a distance of 22, miles. This town was originally called Bosulnagar, and was founded about 1735 A.D. by Nur Muhammad, the Chatha Chieftain.

2. *Correspondence—Anglo-Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh, pp. 430-443.

sometimes dry. At Ramnagar, there was fairly good ford and the Sikhs had consequently thrown an outpost across the river with which the troops, there, could be reinforced or withdrawn at pleasure; while to force a passage from the east was practically impossible¹.

Operations Commenced

The whole of Sher Singh's arrangements were scientific. Lord Gough commenced his operations by directing the 8th Light Cavalry to advance along the left bank, supported by Her Majesty's Light Dragoons and the Company's Light Horse. The 8th skirmished, the Sikhs receding as the supporting cavalry came up. The Horse Artillery, in their ever forward valour, pushed into the deep sand on the margin of the river and brought the Sikhs' position at Ramnagar within range.

The guns in position there were very heavy and opening with precision upon the light pieces of the English, soon silenced them and forced the men to retire, leaving one of two ammunition wagons behind. The 14th Light Dragoons were directed to charge them, supported by a regiment of Native Cavalry. The 14th Dragoons was commanded by Colonel William Havelock, brother to the hero who afterwards won in India a renown immortal:-

"It was while the Sikhs were thus apparently setting up a defence that Lt. Colonel Havelock of the 14th Dragoons requested permission to charge and drive them from the bank. No sooner had the equivocal assent been accorded, then the flaxen-haired boy of the Peninsular, on whose deed of valour of military, historian, has proudly dwelt, entering into a hand gallop at the head of his men, soon threw himself on the crowd of Sikhs who lined the high bank," wrote General Thackwell, an eyewitness².

The slow movements of the English enabled Sher Singh to acquire new strength. His troops accumulated to the number of 40,000 men, powerful, artillery swelled the magnitude and strength of that army. This force of guns

1. *The Sikh and the Sikh Wars*—Gough, pp. 206-207.

2. *Correspondence-Anglo-Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh, pp. 201-211.

had been variously estimated from sixty-two to ninety. Sher Singh marched to the Jhelum where he took post near the village of Rasul¹. The position, which he had abandoned, was very strong but the movement of Thackwell led him to despair of holding it and in choosing Rasul, he perhaps made a selection still more eligible for a grand contest. It also more easily led him to combine with Sardar Chattar Singh and other Chiefs and concentrate the whole. Sardar Chattar Singh had reduced the fort of Attock, after it had been well defended by Major Herbert. He contrived to send intelligence of its fall to the Commander-in-Chief and to warn him that Chattar Singh intended to form a junction with Sher Singh².

The slow movements of Lord Gough were quickened by this information, and he resolved, if possible, to bring the Sikhs to battle before the grand junction of their forces had taken place. This was resolution which he should have taken sooner and the officials at Calcutta should have better provided with means for the onerous task which thus devolved upon him in the resubjugation of the Punjab. Lord Gough formed an erroneous opinion as to the strength of the ground taken up by Sher Singh and so to its peculiarities, circumstances which considerably influenced the remainder of the campaign. When the Commander-in-Chief arrived before the village of Rasul, he reconnoitered the Sikh strength, the right of which rested on the village Lackniwalla and Fateh-Shalechak, the left on the village of Rasul by the Jhelum and the centre where the main strength of the Sikhs was gathered, lay around the village of Chillianwala³.

The Battle of Chillianwala, January 13, 1849

The position chosen was upon the southern extremity

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1. 37, miles from Jhelum, 32, miles from the Gujarat, in Gujarat Dist.
 2. *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*—Gough, pp. 206-208.
Correspondence Anglo-Sikh War—Ganda Singh, pp. 439-41, 445-446.
 3. *Correspondence-Anglo-sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh, 439-41, 445-446.

of a low line of hills. The part of the range was more especially cut up by the streamlets, intersected by ravines and obstructed by high points, obstacles to the approach of an assailing force which had been keenly observed and skilfully discriminated by the artful and vigilant officer, by whom the Sikhs were commanded. Lord Gough determined to bring the Khalsa army to a general action and prepared his measures accordingly. Sardar Sher Singh had made excellent strategic arrangements, "It is impossible not to admire" says Adams, "the military capacity which the Sikh leader displayed in all his movements and the skill with which he chose and fortified his ground." And without coming to grips with Sardar Sher Singh and only hearing the reports of the movements and tenacity of Sikh army, of which he had a good deal of experience during the first War with them, the British Commander-in-Chief felt nervous and stuck for over five weeks to his camp, about ten miles from the Sikh army. It was a period of inaction on both sides. Sardar Sher Singh was waiting for his father, who was delayed at Peshawar and later at Attock¹ till January, 1849.

Lord Gough Advanced

About noon on the 13th January, 1849, Lord Gough was before the village of Rasul, and finding a very strong picket of the Sikhs on mound, close to that place, Lord Gough, after some fighting, dislodged it. Ascending the mound, the General and his staff beheld the Khalsa army organised along the furrowed hills in all the majestic array of war. The British officers gazed with admiration and professional ardour upon the long lines of compact infantry and the well-marshalled cavalry, mustered in their relative proportions and positions with scientific exactness. The Sardar's batteries were chiefly masked by jungle. The scene was striking in its aspect, the magnitude of the events associated with it, the excitement it stirred up within the hearts of the brave.

1. *Correspondence-Anglo Sikh Wars* —Ganda Singh, pp. 144-145.

Lord Gough found that he could not turn the flanks of the Khalsa army. They were so protected by jungle that unless he detached a portion of his army to considerable distance, which he deemed unsafe. The day was too far advanced to begin any operations¹. The engineer officers were ordered to examine the country in front and the Quarter-Master-General was about to take up ground for the encampment, when the Sikh army advanced some Horse Artillery and opened fire upon the skirmishers in front of Rasul. Lord Gough ordered his heavy guns to open on the Khalsa artillery and for this purpose they were advanced to open space in front of the village¹.

Sher Singh did not act with his usual good strategy at this time in exposing the positions of so many of his cannons, which the jungle had concealed and which might have remained hidden until an attack upon his line would have afforded him opportunity to use them with sudden and terrible advantage as he afterwards was enabled to do with those on his right. As it was, he replied to the British cannonade with such a force of his field artillery as constrained Lord Gough to draw up in order of battle. lest in the night the guns of the Khalsa should be moved still more forward, and open on his camp.

Array of the British Army

Keeping his heavy guns on the centre, Lord Gough placed Sir Walter Gilbert's Division on his right, flanked by Brigadier Pope's brigade of cavalry, strengthened by Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons and three troops of Horse Artillery under Colonel Grant. This arrangement was necessitated by the large force of cavalry observed upon the Sikh's left. On the left of the British line, Brigadier-General Campbell's division was formed, flanked by Brigadier White's cavalry and three troops of Horse Artillery under Colonel Brind.

The demonstrations of the Sikhs were such that, late as was the hour, and weary as the troops were with march-

1. *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*—Gough, pp. 218-219, 240.

Correspondence-Anglo Sikh Wars—Ganda Singh, pp. 144-146.

ing, Lord Gough determined to attack at once. His critics, influenced by the events which followed, had severely censured him for attacking under such circumstances, more especially¹ as the ground was unknown to him. It was true that sufficient time had not been obtained to reconnoitre positions of the Sikhs, but Lord Gough was acquainted with the ground, as he had previously known, especially the country to the left of the Khalsa Army¹. The Duke of Wellington declared that he would, in Lord Gough's place, have acted as he had done; and so full of confidence were the Sikhs in their numbers and resolution that, had not the General given battle he would have been obliged to defend himself from a desperate night attack under circumstances far less favourable.

The Battle Commenced

The battle commenced by a heavy cannonade, which lasted for more than an hour. Lord Gough ordered his left to advance, making a flank movement. In executing this manoeuvre, the troops exposed their own flank to a galling fire from heavy guns, the positions of which had remained covered by jungle, and the Sikh batteries were so placed as to pour a cross-fire, the most destructive, upon the British. When the 3rd and 4th brigades reached the Sikh's guns, they were received by a cannonade so awful that they were obliged to retire.²

Tenacity of the Sikh Soldiers

As soon as it was known that these two brigades were engaged, the 5th, under Brigadier Mountain, was ordered to storm the centre. They were received with round-shot, the moment they moved with grape and canister as they advanced through the jungle, and, finally, with musketry

1. It was generally supposed by his censures that the attack was a wanton waste of life, and arose from the brave, rash, and unreflecting temperament of the General, and the irritation caused by the sudden severe artillery fire to be opened upon him.

2. *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*—Gough, pp. 218-219.

Correspondence-Anglo-Sikh Wars—Ganda Singh, pp. 144-146.

Anglo-Sikh Relations-Bikramjit Hasret, pp. 334-337.

within close and deadly range. Many of the Sikh soldiers, at the cost of their own life, advanced and shot down the British officers. Brigadier Mountain had distinguished himself in China and had the entire confidence of Lord Gough, under whom he had served these. Under his able guidance, the British stormed the batteries and spiked the guns under flank fire from other guns, which they also spiked; while the enemy, without giving way, poured upon them musket-balls thick as hail. Detachments musketeers took them on each flank; and some getting to their rear among the jungle, fired upon them with deadly aim. The British were thus compelled to cut their way back to their own lines through hosts of encircling the Khalsa troops.¹

While this was going on upon the centre, Sir Walter Gilbert advanced against the Sikh's left. Gilbert occupied the extreme right of his division and Brigadier Godby the extreme left. They marched through the dense jungle and were confronted by the Sikh Infantry. Had the British at once charged with the bayonet, the result might for them have less sanguinary. They, however, opened fire and the Sikhs, more numerous, returned the fire and out-flanked them. Two companies of 2nd² British Regiment charged with the bayonet but were surrounded. These gallant and skilful soldiers immediately faced about and after some file-firing, charged rear-rank in front.

A Lucky Change for the British

At this critical moment, a British Field Battery arrived and drove back the Sikhs by the precision of their fire. Several guns were captured by the British. The heroism and losses of the 2nd Regiment were very great. While the infantry had thus been engaged in close and deadly battle, the cavalry also were occupied, both on the left and right. On the former flank of the British, Brigadier White's brigade charged the Sikhs, covering the retreat of the infantry. On the extreme right, Brigadier Pope's brigade, strengthened by the temporary attachment of the

1. *Anglo Sikh Relations*—Bikramjit Hasrat, pp. 335-336. Queen's Second.

14th Light Dragoons of the Queen's army, were ordered to charge a body of the Khalsa cavalry, the number of which was much superior. Instead of obeying the orders given, they wheeled right about and galloped off the field, breaking through the artillery, upsetting artillerymen, drivers and wagons in their course, until they reached the field-hospital.¹

Gallantry of the Khalsa Army

The Sikhs were not slow to take advantage of this extraordinary flight; they pursued—cashed in among the horse artillery—cut down seventy-five gunners and took sixty guns. The arrival of artillery reserves, the rallying of a portion of the 9th Lancers, the steadiness of the infantry, prevented the destruction of the whole right wing.

A Drawn Battle

The fresh artillery which came up, opened upon the Sikh cavalry with grape and canister with such precision and fury that they retreated. Two of the captured guns were recovered in the retreat. The Sikhs gradually withdrew, leaving the field of battle in possession of the British, who, on this account, claimed the victory. The Sikhs, in the right, carried away all the guns which the British had spiked in the right during the action, the four pieces of Horse Artillery which they took on the British right, and five standard of colours. On these grounds the Britishers claimed the victory and a salute of twenty-one guns in honour of the triumph was most impudently fired. This was also done at Attock, in the capital of Chattar Singh, and wherever the Sikh troops held a position. The Sikhs also claimed the victory for the same reason as the British did, being left in possession of the field. It was, in truth, a drawn battle. Whether victory at Chellianwala was

won by the Sikhs or the British, great loss of reputation was caused to Lord Gough. The news of this action at Chellianwala and the fall of Multan reached London at the same time. Whitehall informed Dalhousie: "But the disaster (at Chellianwala) has thrown the success (at Multan) into shade—and the impression made upon public mind has been stronger than that caused in the Kabul massacre. The result has been, that, in eight and forty hours after the arrival of the mail, it was decided to send Sir Charles Napier to command the Indian Army."¹

The Sikhs having begun the engagement and the English having retrieve the ground on which they fought while the former withdrew their line, the battle may more correctly be said to have been won by the British. But the advantage gained were altogether on the part of the Sikhs, who continued to occupy for a month position from which the British did not attempt to dislodge them. During the time, Lord Gough waited for reinforcements and felt the tardy arrival of some of the troops whose presence had been detained before Multan.

Loss of the Sikhs ...

The loss sustained by the Sikhs was much less than that of the English and this is credible when the strength of their position is considered and the losses to which the unaccountable flight of Pope's brigade exposed the British right. The English loss, according to the official returns, was three thousand men, killed and wounded, nearly one-third of whom belonged to the former class. This, however, did not comprehend all the slain, for many were so horribly wounded by the close discharge of artillery that they died in a few days. The numbers of the wounded, who were hit mortally, was beyond that which usually occurs in battle.

Superior Weapon and Valour of the Sikhs ...

The flight of the large body of cavalry under Brigadier Pope was the subject of much investigation and criticism.

1. Hobhouse to Dalhousie (Private) March 7, 1849.

The bigadier was too old for the duties imposed upon him. He had no experience in war, and was placed in the command due to seniority. This gave occasion in England to denounce the substitution of seniority for fitness, so common in the British Army. Unhappily the officer himself, who was much concerned in the responsibility of the event and who had been much respected by his brother officers and his commander, was placed beyond all human accountability, for he fell in front of his fugitive soldiers. Col. King of the 14th Light Dragoons, who succeeded Colonel Havelock who fell at Ramnagar, was also much censured. His defence was, that he did his utmost to rally his men in vain ; that they were generally light small men, mounted upon light small horses ; whereas the cavalry immediately opposed to them were not only much more numerous but cuirassiers, powerful sturdy men with long and superior swords and admirably mounted. The Colonel complained of the bad manufacture of the English weapons, which bent against the swords or cuirasses of the Sikh cavalry.

routed. British losses in killed and wounded amounted to 2,357 men and 79 officers."¹

General Gough Criticised

The generalship of Lord Gough became the subject of anonymous criticism in India and open attack in England; but the brave and skilful general proved, at the subsequent battle of Gujrat, that he knew how to gain victory at as little cost of blood as it was possible for military knowledge to ensure. The late drawn battle—if such it may be called—was designated the battle of Chellianwala, after a village in the immediate neighbourhood of which the British had encamped. The Sikhs knew it as the battle of Rasul, the more appropriate name to give it as it was in the vicinity where the chief strength of the Sikh position was found.

The results of this battle were important; the Sikhs became encouraged and the Sikh generals felt that the superiority of the England in natural talent or military science was not such as to destroy the hopes of the Sardars to shake off the English yoke and perhaps assert an ascendancy of the Khalsa over India.²

The battle of Chellianwala almost paralysed Lord Gough. He ordered General Wheeler with a force to join him, and a reserve under Sir Dudley Hill. Gulab Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir, had sent ten thousand men to fight against the Sikhs but they left the English and their opponents to fight, reserving to themselves the opportunity to take such advantage as an armed neutrality might offer.

Dost Muhammad Helped the Sikhs

Dost Muhammad of Kabul, the professed ally of the English, caused considerable apprehension after the battle of Chellianwala. He assisted the Sikhs with an army of twelve thousand men and it was feared that a large army

1. *History of British India*—P.E. Roberts, p. 343.

2. Lord John Russell announced in parliament that Sir Charles Napier should be appointed to the command of the forces, and this was received with loud cheers.

of Afghans would penetrate into India with the energy and force of the Durani empire. The Afghan auxiliaries were chiefly cavalry, indisciplined, tardy in their movements and not zealous in the war.

General Gough Reinforced by Wheeler and Whish

Lord Gough was obliged to remain inactive, expecting reinforcement which were under the command of Wheeler in one direction and Whish in another. The progress of the latter was discreditably slow, especially of the Bombay column, under the command of the Hon. General Dundas. Wheeler's force had heard and useful work to do before they could join the grand army. Ram Singh, son of the Vazir of Noorpur, one of the small states, rose in arms and proclaimed to end the British rule.¹ He occupied a formidable post in his territory called the Dallah heights.

Battle of Gujarat February 21, 1849.

Sher Singh maintained his post in the neighbourhood of Rasul until the 12th February, when he retired with coolness and deliberation. Lord Gough organised pursuit, but the Sikh cavalry covered the retreat of the army effectively. The approach, at last, of General Whish, greatly embarrassed the movements of the Sikh chief. He was obliged by the functions, which General Whish and Lord Gough were able to effect, to take post of Gujrat, where he requested Chattar Singh to join him with his whole force. He was too sagacious not to preceived that the war, was heading to the crisis. Chattar Singh, accompanied the junction, and then the most formidable army, the English had ever encountered in the East, were drawn up in the lines of Gujarat. The number of men was scarcely less than 80,000; the pieces of ordnance were 59.²

The whole force of Lord Gough, after the junction of Whish, did not exceed 25,000 men, but his artillery was superior to that of the Sikhs; for, although Sher Singh's pieces were of heavy metal and his artillerymen practised

1. *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*—Gough, pp. 195.

2. *The Sikhs and the sikh Wars* —Gough, pp. 244-246.

in battle, as well as thoroughly drilled on the French system, Whish had brought with him heavy guns and the artillerymen, officers, and privates of Lord Gough's army were excellent. The calibre of the British guns was, for the first time during the two campaigns, superior to that of the Sikhs. Major-General Whish was especially competent to direct that arm of the service.¹

A Strategic Position of Gujrat

Sher Singh made the village of Gujrat his headquarters. It was curiously, and for military purposes, strongly situated between the Jhelum and the Chenab, but nearer to Jhelum. It was nearly surrounded by a brook, which ran rather over the pebbles which lay in its bed, although in a few places assumed the shape of pools of water of some considerable depth. Between that brook and the town, the main position of Sher Singh lay. Lord Gough resolved not to despoil his enemy on this occasion, or by any act of precipitancy, give him advantage. He also resolved to contest this battle upon the strictest principles of military science so that no unfavourable critiques should be made upon his generalship at home. He began the action by employing his superior force of artillery and contrived to use it to the utmost, causing great havoc in the ranks of the Sikhs and guns and tumbrils along his lines.²

On the other hand, Sardar Chattar Singh was also very keen to help his son Raja Sher Singh. He joined at Chellianwala. His plan was to provoke Lord Gough by warlike movements and to draw him out of his strong position. But in the absence of any more on the part of the British Commander-in-Chief, he had set out for the Chenab on February 13th. His objective was either to check Whish's force coming from Multan or move upon Lahore.

1. The troops under the command of Lord Gough were: Cavalry—Her Majesty's 3rd, 9th, and 14th Light Dragoons; Bengal 1st, 5th, 6th and 8th Light Cavalry; 3rd and 9th Irregular Cavalry; detachments of 1st and 14th Irregular Cavalry, Scinde Horse. Artillery—Nine troops Horse Artillery, and four Light Field-Battories (one each of the Bombay army).

2. *Correspondence - Anglo Sikh Wars*—Ganda Singh, p. 150.
The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars—Gough, 244-245.

Sher Singh's Superiority

Sher Singh strove to bring into efficient play that arm of war in which he was particularly superior to the Sikh cavalry. With his numerous horse, he endeavoured to out-flank Lord Gough. Vast bodies of cavalry were thrown on either flank and the skill, energy and courage of the British horsemen were taxed to the uttermost to prevent this design. Sher Singh did not, however, display his usual generalship on this occasion. All his movements showed a mind perturbed and anxious.

He did not conceal the position of his batteries as he had so cleverly done at Chelianwala.¹ But opening fire at long range, betrayed the arrangement of his cannon before he could make the weapons seriously injurious to his foe. This fault, considering the superiority of artillery power on the part of the English, was irredeemable.

Lord Gough, having nearly silenced the Sikh, guns and out-manoevred their cavalry upon his flanks, attacked with his infantry, throwing his right against the left centre and the right of the enemy's left. The difficulty was in passing the deep empty brook, in doing which the guns of the Sikhs could be brought to bear, as that English cannon would necessarily cease their fire. This impediment was found formidable; some valuable lives were lost in passing that rivulet but success attended the attempt in spite of the grape and canister of the field-places and the rolling volleys of musketry.

The English ascended the banks of the brook, brought the bayonet to the charge, penetrated the line and separated the Sikh's struggle. It virtually decided the battle. Sher Singh indeed must have seen, after his flank operations had failed that if the British infantry passed the streamlet, his guns would be lost, as well as the battle.

Scarcely had the British right accomplished the purpose for which they were erected against the Sikh's line, than he left, also cleared the brook and turned his right wing, huddling together his flanks in a confused mass upon his

1. Since this day Chelianwala began to be called by the neighbouring area as Qatalgarh (the house of slaughter).

centre. Even then, the gallant Sikhs were optimist for victory. Their cavalry charged the flanks of the victorious infantry but were in their turn brought down by successive close rounds from the horse artillery and then their broken squadrons were charged by the English cavalry. Thus left free to follow their course of conquest. The British infantry of both flanks wheeled round the town of Gujarat, pouring continuous volleys of musketry into the packed masses of the divided Sikh infantry and inflicting horrible slaughter.

The battle was won. Campbell and Dundas with their infantry, Gilbert, with cavalry and artillery, relentlessly pursued, exacting a fearful vengeance for the losses at the streamlet of Ramnagar and their hill-sides of Rasul. The Sikh army was broken. Lord Gough rested the main body of his army, entrusting to General Gilbert with the Cavalry, Horse Artillery and light infantry, for further prosecution of pursuit. Thus, so far as active fighting was concerned, ended the Second Sikh War.

Sir Walter Gilbert pursued the enemy unremittingly, until at last surrender was compelled. The Afghans deserted the fallen fortunes of their confederates and fled through the Khoeree Pass. The Afghans lost half of their number in the field and a large portion of the remainder in retreat. Dost Muhammad Khan submitted to entreaties for peace. The Sikh army surrendered. 41 guns were captured and the whole Khalsa force, remaining after so many fields of slaughter, gave up their arms and obtaining a gratuity of a rupee each, dispersed to their homes.

During the war the Sikhs lost 160 pieces of cannon and 20,000 stand of infantry arms. The consequences of the Sikh War were the annexation of the Punjab and the entire destination of the Khalsa army. The expense of treasure, by which the result was purchased, was very great. The cost of human life was also great. The policy of the British Government, and the grounds of it, were made public in the following proclamation, issued on the 29th of March by the Governor General:—

"For many years, in the time of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, peace and friendship prevailed between the British nation

and the Sikhs, when Ranjit Singh was dead and his wisdom no longer guided the counsels of the state, the sirdar's and the Khalsa army, without provocation and without cause, suddenly invaded the British territories. Their army was again and again defeated. They were driven, with slaughter and in shame, from the country they had invaded and the gates of Lahore, Maharaja Dalip Singh tendered to the Governor-General, the submission of himself and his chiefs and solicited the clemency of the British Government. The Governor-General extended his clemency to the state of Lahore; he generously spared the kingdom which he had acquired a just right to subvert; and the Maharaja having been replaced on the throne, treaties of friendship were formed between the states.

The British had faithfully kept their word and had scrupulously observed every obligation which the treaties imposed upon them. But the Sikh people and their chief, had, on their part, grossly violated the promises by which they were bound. Of their annual tribute, no portion whatever had at any time been paid and large sums, advanced by the government of India, had never been repaid. The control of the British Government, to which they voluntarily submitted themselves, had been resisted by arms. Peace had been cast aside. British officers had been murdered when acting for the state; others engaged in the like employment had been treacherously thrown into prison. Finally, the army of the state and the whole Sikh people, joined by many of the sardars of the Punjab, who signed the treaties and led by a member of the regency itself, had risen in arms against us and had waged a fierce and bloody war for the proclaimed purpose of destroying the British and their power.

Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor-General.

Done at Amritsar, this 16th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1846, corresponding with the 17th day of Rubbe-ul-awul, 1262 Hijree.

Gulab Singh (L.S.)

H. HARDINGE (L.S.)

F. CURRIE.

H. M. LAWRENCE.


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
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
The Thirty First Regiment, Sir Harry Smith's Division,
advancing to the charge at the battle of Mudki,
December 18, 1845



Night Bivouac of the British Army at Ferozeshah
December 21, 1845



Charge of the 16th (Queen's own) Lancers at the Battle of Aliwal, January 28, 1846



The Thirty-First Regiment, with Major-General Sir Harry Smith's Division, engaged at the Battle of Sobraon, February 10, 1846



**Charge of H.M. 14th Light Dragoons at the Battle of
Ram Naggar, November 23, 1848**



The Storming of Multan, January 2, 1849



Charge of the 3rd King's Own light Dragoons at the
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The Battle of Gujrat, February 21, 1849



**Maharani Jind Kaur, the youngest wife of
Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1817-1863)**



Maharaja Sher Singh (1807-1842)



Maharaja Dalip Singh. (1838-1893)



Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh (1821-1840)



ਸ੍ਰੀ ਮਹਾਰਾਜਾ ਗੁਲਾਬ ਸਿੰਘ

Raja Lul Singh



Raja Gulab Singh (1792-1857)



Raja Tej Singh



Sardar Sham Singh Atariwala