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Chain
of events
By
Dr. Tariq Rahman
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The communal riots of 1947 have been the
subject of literature, films and scholarly research. Yet,
despite scores of works on the subject, there was still a
need for an objective and scholarly account of the way
they happened in undivided Punjab. This need has been
filled by Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed who was already well-known in
scholarly circles for his work on social science issues in
the Asian context (State, Nation and Ethnicity in
Contemporary South Asia (1998) and an edited book on
religion in Asia). But his latest book is so magisterial
in its thoroughness and so meticulous in its research that
it should establish him as a major historian of
contemporary South Asia.

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The book begins with a theoretical
introduction which describes what ethnic cleansing is and
then goes on to give a historical background of the Punjab
and the genesis of its partition. This is followed by
three 'stages'. The first is the period between January
1945 till 31 March 1947. This is the period of the
violence against the Hindu and Sikh population of northern
Punjab, especially the area around Rawalpindi. Then comes
the period between 24 March till 14 August when, among
communal attacks on both sides of the border, the main
tragedy was the attack and arson of the Hindus of Lahore.
Then is the third stage from 15 August till 31 December of
the year when, though the attacks on the Hindus and Sikhs
did continue in West Punjab, the real crisis was in the
East Punjab where much of the Muslim population was killed
or forced to flee to Pakistan by armed Sikh bands. The
same kinds of events took place in the princely states of
the Punjab and have been described in detail. In the end
there are Ahmed's analysis and conclusions which help us
answer questions about whether there were organized plans
by the Muslims to drive the non-Muslims out of the Punjab
or vice versa. In the end, as at the end of each chapter,
there are lists of sources used and names of interviewees.
This is followed by annexures and an index which make the
book very useful for scholars.
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Jinnah,
Mountbatten and Nehru |
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All accounts establish the fact that
pre-Partition Punjab was a tolerant and peaceful society
in which Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus lived mostly
peacefully. The Hindus did have religious restrictions in
terms of eating or mixing too intimately with Muslims, and
these must have been resented by some people; but they did
not translate into violence. However, the Hindus and Sikhs
were generally richer and if they were moneylenders there
is ground to believe that they were resented by the Muslim
peasants who owed them money. Yet, there is
incontrovertible evidence that communal hatred was
injected into the equation when the Muslim League used the
evocative symbol of religion and promised an Islamic state
to the ordinary gullible people. The slogans they used
against the Unionist government of Sir Khizar Hayat Khan
Tiwana included the most scurrilous attacks on him and his
family and portrayed him as an enemy of Islam. From 24
January to 26 February 1947 the Muslim League confronted
the Khizar Minstry directly by force and there was much
incitement to violence. On 02 March Khizar resigned and
from then on the Sikhs and Hindus knew that they would be
discriminated against in a Muslim-dominated Punjab.
Meanwhile it was becoming clear that the Punjab would be
partitioned and this urged the Sikhs to demand a state of
their own which would contain Lahore, Nankana Sahib and
other Sikh holy places. The violence was precipitated by
Master Tara Singh's brandishing of his dagger (kirpan) and
aggressive speeches by Hindu Mahasabha leaders. Violence
was thus triggered, but the Hindus and Sikhs were quickly
outnumbered. Moreover, when it spread to Rawalpindi, it
became almost a communal cleansing. Hindus and Sikhs were
killed, burnt and the women were raped in attacks which
seemed to have been planned by former soldiers. The lower
strata of the police did nothing to stop the carnage. But
what is especially shocking and inexplicable is that the
army, which was still under British officers, did not
reach the villages in time to save people. These
atrocities had their blowback effect, as we shall see
later.

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In Stage Two, Ishtiaq Ahmed reaches the
conclusion that the roughs (badmashes) of Lahore and
Amritsar, who were mostly Muslims, had a predominant role
in the carnage. The roughs of Amritsar sent bangles to
their counterparts of Lahore, signifying that they were
not avenging attacks on Muslims in the Sikh areas. This
resulted in a quantum leap in violence against the
non-Muslims in Lahore. The fire at Shahalami Gate of June
in which the Hindus were harmed on such a massive scale
left them completely disillusioned. After this they
started leaving for India en masse. The role of some
officials, including police and judicial functionaries,
has been described probably for the first time by this
author.
In the Eastern Punjab the Sikh armed
groups started attacking Muslims even from early in the
year, but the communal cleansing started only in August
when the Sikh leadership knew they would lose by the
division of the Punjab without accommodating their
demands. Here the atrocities of Rawalpindi and Lahore were
repeated on an even bigger scale: murder, arson, rape and
pillage were reported on a staggering scale. Here too some
functionaries of the state aided and abetted the attackers
and even some of the rulers of the Punjab princely states
such as the Maharajah of Kapurthala and the Maharajah of
Patiala abetted the violence against Muslims.
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The
Amritsar train station crowded with Hindus waiting
for a train to take them to India and safety |
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The most important contribution of the
author is that he maintains his scholarly objectivity in a
subject in which his own emotions are obviously deeply
involved. He reaches the conclusion that there was no plan
by the Muslims in general or the Muslim League in
particular to cleanse Pakistan of non-Muslims. However, in
the case of Sikhs, the author concludes that some Sikh
leaders such as the Akalis and rulers did have a
contingency plan to use force against Muslims in case they
did not obtain a Sikh state. Whether this conclusion is
correct or otherwise can only be contested by someone who
has as formidable a knowledge of this subject as Ishtiaq
Ahmed, so I will not argue about it here. However, one
thing does seem obvious: the Pindi riots injected the
spirit of vengeance among the rank and file of Sikhs in
East Punjab. The non-Muslims who left Northern Punjab from
March onwards, and the Hindus of Lahore with their tales
of atrocities, could not but have created an implacable
desire for vengeance among the armed Sikhs. But, being of
Pakistani Muslim origin does not mean that in this
particular the author is siding with his co-religionists.
On the contrary, Ishtiaq Ahmed is probably the only
historian of Pakistani origin who suggests that the
'demand for a partition of India on a religious basis was
inherently discriminatory' (p. 544). He also points out
that the Muslim League leaders were 'fatuously complacent
and irresponsible since they did not realize that their
Pakistan scheme would inevitably imperil the lives of
millions of unarmed Muslims' (p. 545). I would go further
and add that if the leaders of the Muslim League had
stopped Muslims for using violence against non-Muslims in
the Rawalpindi area in March and used the army to help
them cross over to India in peace the massacres would not
have taken place or, at least, not in the present-day
Pakistan area. And it would not have taken place in East
Punjab if the Congress and Sikh leaders had pacified the
Sikhs and used the army to help Muslims emigrate to
Pakistan. But, unfortunately, neither the Indian nor the
British leadership took any effective step to save human
lives. Ishtiaq Ahmed suggests that Mr Jinnah's decision to
become the Governor General of Pakistan instead of
allowing Mountbatten to become the joint Governor General
of both dominions harmed the Muslims and Pakistan as
Mountabetten was no longer responsible for both sides
after 15 August.

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The research methods used by Ishtiaq
Ahmed contribute to the authenticity of this work. He uses
government reports, letters of officials, intelligence
reports, autobiographies, eyewitness accounts and a very
large number of interviews of people on both sides of the
border. This is a magnum opus, the one major work one
writes in a lifetime, and it must have taken the author
years of meticulous recording, reading and interviewing.
Moreover, as he was dealing with a very emotional subject,
the interviewing must have had a deep personal effect upon
him. As such, the author should be commended for having
written such a masterly account of the partition of the
Punjab.

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Among the few minor improvements I would
suggest are that references to scholarly accounts of
language and education, especially with reference to
Punjabi, should be added. The author makes no mistake when
he refers to these factors but he gives no reference to
recent scholarly sources, which needs correction. Another
omission, and this is more serious, is the reference to
Hobbes while talking about human nature (p. 560), whereas
one of the most influential accounts of how ordinary
people commit evil by Philip Zimbardo (The Lucifer Effect,
2007)-that certain contingent conditions make us play
roles which dehumanize us if differentials of power exist
between groups-as well as other theories of how we focus
hatred on the out-group and love on the in-group,
effectively dehumanizing it, are missing. For a masterly
work like this, one would like some inclusion of such
theories to explain why people go berserk in such
situations like the ones that arose in 1947.
But these are minor quibbles that do not detract from the
scholarly stature of the book. I would like to sum up by
congratulating the author for undertaking this work, which
will remain a milestone in our understanding of the
Partition and the roots of violence which threaten this
ancient cradle of civilizations. If we have to exist at
all, especially when we are nuclear-armed nations, we need
to come to terms with the ghosts of 1947 in order to build
a South Asia on the model of the Schengen states. This is
only possible if, among other things, we understand the
past we share, which Ishtiaq Ahmed's work will help us to
do. I recommend the book to not only scholars on South
Asia but all interested readers and the media.
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The Friday Times: April 13-19, 2012
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